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The '''''Septemberprogramm''''' (Ger.: "September Program") was the plan for the territorial expansion of [[German Empire|Imperial Germany]], prepared for [[Chancellor of Germany|Chancellor]] [[Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg]], in the early weeks of the [[World War I|First World War]] (1914–18). The Chancellor's private secretary, [[Kurt Riezler]], drafted the ''Septemberprogramm'' on 9 September 1914, in the early days of the German attack in the west, by which Germany expected to quickly and decisively defeat France. The extensive territorial conquests proposed in the ''Septemberprogramm'' required making [[vassal state]]s of Belgium and France, in Western Europe, and seizing much of European Russia, in Eastern Europe. The territorial-expansion program of Imperial Germany was not effected because the trench-warfare stalemate, which ensued the initial action of the War, occupied most of the German army in Western Europe to realise the ''Septemberprogramm'' .<ref>{{cite book|last=Edgar Feuchtwanger|title=Imperial Germany 1850-1918|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=GhCEAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA178|year=2002|publisher=Routledge|pages=178–79}}</ref>
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The '''''Septemberprogramm''''' ({{IPA-de|zɛpˈtɛmbɐpʁoˌɡʁam|lang}}) was the plan for the territorial expansion of [[German Empire|Imperial Germany]], prepared for [[Chancellor of Germany|Chancellor]] [[Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg]], at the beginning of [[World War I]] (1914–18). The Chancellor's private secretary, [[Kurt Riezler]], drafted the ''Septemberprogramm'' on 9 September 1914, in the early days of the German attack in the west, when Germany expected to defeat France quickly and decisively. The extensive territorial conquests proposed in the ''Septemberprogramm'' required making [[vassal state]]s of [[Belgium]] and [[France]], in western Europe, and seizing much of the [[Russian Empire]], in eastern Europe. The ''Septemberprogramm'' was not effected because France withstood the initial German attack, and the war devolved into a trench-warfare stalemate, and ultimately ended in German defeat.<ref>{{cite book|last=Edgar Feuchtwanger|title=Imperial Germany 1850-1918|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GhCEAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA178|year=2002|publisher=Routledge|pages=178–79}}</ref>
  
As [[geopolitics]], the ''Septemberprogramm'' (1914), itself, is a documentary insight to Imperial Germany's war aims, and shows the true scope of German plans for territorial [[expansionism]] in two directions, East and West, upon winning the First World War. The book ''Germany's Aims in the First Word War'' (1967) indicates that the ''Septemberprogramm'' is a ''[[Lebensraum]]'' philosophy that rationalises and justifies German territorial expansion, Imperial Germany's primary motive for having launched the First World War in 1914.<ref>Fischer, Fritz. ''Germany's Aims in the First World War'' (1967).</ref> Moreover, the essay “Old Knowledge and New Research: A Summary of the Conference on the Fischer Controversy 50 Years On” (2003) proposes that if the [[Schlieffen Plan]] had worked, and produced a decisive German victory, like the one in the  [[Franco-Prussian War]] of 1870, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg’s ''Septemberprogramm'' would have been implemented, thus realising Imperial Germany's long-thwarted geopolitical ambitions for expanding the territory of Germany; and thus achieve and establish a German [[hegemony]] of Europe.<ref>Steinberg, Jonathan. "Old Knowledge and New Research: A Summary of the Conference on the Fischer Controversy 50 Years On", ''Journal of Contemporary History'' (April 2013) 48#2 pp. 241-50, quotation in p. 249.</ref>
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As [[geopolitics]], the ''Septemberprogramm'' itself is a documentary insight to Imperial Germany's war aims, and shows the true scope of German plans for territorial expansion in two directions, east and west. Historian Fritz Fischer wrote that the ''Septemberprogramm'' was based on the ''[[Lebensraum]]'' philosophy, which made territorial expansion Imperial Germany's primary motive for war.<ref>Fischer, Fritz. ''Germany's Aims in the First World War'' (1967).</ref>  
 +
Jonathan Steinberg has suggested that if the [[Schlieffen Plan]] had worked, and produced a decisive German victory, like the [[Franco-Prussian War]] of 1870, the ''Septemberprogramm'' would have been implemented, thus establishing German [[hegemony]] in Europe.<ref>Steinberg, Jonathan. "Old Knowledge and New Research: A Summary of the Conference on the Fischer Controversy 50 Years On", ''Journal of Contemporary History'' (April 2013) 48#2 pp. 241-50, quotation in p. 249.</ref>
  
 
==War goals==
 
==War goals==
[[File:Ww1 germany goals.GIF|thumb|war goals in Europe]]
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[[File:Ww1 germany goals.GIF|thumb|War goals in Europe]]
*France should cede some northern territory, such as steel-producing [[Briey]] and a coastal strip running from [[Dunkirk]] to [[Boulogne-sur-Mer]], to [[Belgium]] or Germany. A [[war indemnity]] of 10 billion [[German gold mark|German Marks]] for [[France]], with further payments to cover veterans' funds and to pay off all Germany's existing national debt, should prevent French rearmament. The French economy would be dependent on Germany and all trade with the [[British Empire]] will cease. France will partially disarm by demolishing its northern forts.
+
 
 +
The ''Septemberprogramm'' was a list of goals for Germany to achieve in the war.
 +
 
 +
*France should cede some northern territory, such as the iron-ore mines at [[Briey]] and a coastal strip running from [[Dunkirk]] to [[Boulogne-sur-Mer]], to Belgium or Germany.
 +
*France should pay a [[war indemnity]] of 10 billion [[German gold mark|German Marks]], with further payments to cover veterans' funds and to pay off all of Germany's existing national debt. This would prevent French rearmament, make the French economy dependent on Germany, and end trade between France and the [[British Empire]].
 +
*France will partially disarm by demolishing its northern forts.
 
*[[Belgium]] should be annexed to Germany or, preferably, become a "vassal state", which should cede eastern parts and possibly [[Antwerp]] to Germany and give Germany military and naval bases.
 
*[[Belgium]] should be annexed to Germany or, preferably, become a "vassal state", which should cede eastern parts and possibly [[Antwerp]] to Germany and give Germany military and naval bases.
 
*[[Luxembourg]] should become a member state of the German Empire.
 
*[[Luxembourg]] should become a member state of the German Empire.
*Creation of a ''[[Mitteleuropa]]'' economic association dominated by Germany but ostensibly egalitarian. Members would include newly created [[buffer states]] carved out of the [[Russian Empire]]'s west such as [[Kingdom of Poland (1916–1918)|Poland]], which would remain under German sovereignty "for all time".<ref>Tuchman, Barbara, ''The Guns of August'' (New York, New York:  Macmillan Co., 1962), p.315.</ref>  
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*[[Buffer states]] would be created in territory carved out of the western Russian Empire, such as [[Kingdom of Poland (1916–1918)|Poland]], which would remain under German sovereignty "for all time".<ref>Tuchman, Barbara, ''The Guns of August'' (New York, New York:  Macmillan Co., 1962), p.315.</ref>  
*Expansion of the [[German colonial empire]] with, most importantly, the creation of a contiguous [[German colonization of Africa|German colony across central Africa]] ([[Mittelafrika]]) at the expense of the French and Belgian colonies. Presumably leaving the option open for future negotiations with Britain, no British colonies were to be taken, but Britain's "intolerable hegemony"{{Citation needed|date=April 2014}} in world affairs was to end.
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*Germany would create a ''[[Mitteleuropa]]'' economic association, ostensibly egalitarian but actually dominated by Germany. Members would include the new buffer states.
*The [[Netherlands]] should be brought into a closer relationship to Germany while avoiding any semblance of force.
+
*The [[German colonial empire]] would be expanded. The [[German colonization of Africa|German possessions in Africa]] would be enlarged into a contiguous German colony across central Africa (''[[Mittelafrika]]'') at the expense of the French and Belgian colonies. Presumably to leave open future negotiations with Britain, no British colonies were to be taken, but Britain's "intolerable hegemony"{{Citation needed|date=April 2014}} in world affairs was to end.
 +
*The [[Netherlands]] should be brought into a closer relationship to Germany while avoiding any appearance of coercion.
  
 
==Significance==
 
==Significance==
The "September plan" was drafted by [[Kurt Riezler]], a staffer in the office of the German Chancellor, [[Bethmann-Hollweg]], based on the input of Germany's industrial, military, and economic leadership.<ref>Wayne C. Thompson, ''In the Eye of the Storm: Kurt Riezler and the Crises of Modern Germany'' (1980). pp 98-99</ref><ref>{{cite web|last=Raffael|first=Scheck|title=Military Operations and Plans for German Domination of Europe|url=http://web.colby.edu/rmscheck/contents/germanyc2/|accessdate=31 March 2014}}</ref> However, since Germany did not win the war in the west, it was never put into effect. As historian Raffael Scheck concluded, "The government, finally, never committed itself to anything. It had ordered the September Programme as an informal hearing in order to learn about the opinion of the economic and military elites."<ref>See [http://www.colby.edu/personal/r/rmscheck/GermanyC2.html Raffael Scheck, ''Germany 1871–1945: A Concise History'' (2008)]</ref>
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The ''Septemberprogramm'' was based on suggestions from Germany's industrial, military, and political leadership.<ref>Thompson, Wayne C. ''In the Eye of the Storm: Kurt Riezler and the Crises of Modern Germany'' (1980). pp 98-99</ref><ref>{{cite web|last=Scheck|first=Raffael|title=Military Operations and Plans for German Domination of Europe|url=http://web.colby.edu/rmscheck/contents/germanyc2/|accessdate=31 March 2014}}</ref> However, since Germany did not win the war, it was never put into effect. As historian Raffael Scheck concluded, "The government, finally, never committed itself to anything. It had ordered the September Programme as an informal hearing in order to learn about the opinion of the economic and military elites."<ref>See [http://www.colby.edu/personal/r/rmscheck/GermanyC2.html Raffael Scheck, ''Germany 1871–1945: A Concise History'' (2008)]</ref>
  
In the east, on the other hand, Germany and her allies did demand and achieve significant territorial and economic concessions from Russia in the [[Treaty of Brest-Litovsk]] and from Romania in the [[Treaty of Bucharest (1918)|Treaty of Bucharest]].<ref>{{cite web|last=Raffael|first=Scheck|title=Military Operations and Plans for German Domination of Europe|url=http://web.colby.edu/rmscheck/contents/germanyc2/|accessdate=31 March 2014}}</ref>
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In the east, on the other hand, Germany and her allies did demand and achieve significant territorial and economic concessions from Russia in the [[Treaty of Brest-Litovsk]] and from Romania in the [[Treaty of Bucharest (1918)|Treaty of Bucharest]].<ref>{{cite web|last=Scheck|first=Raffael|title=Military Operations and Plans for German Domination of Europe|url=http://web.colby.edu/rmscheck/contents/germanyc2/|accessdate=31 March 2014}}</ref>
  
 
==Notes==
 
==Notes==
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==Further reading==
 
==Further reading==
* Thompson, Wayne C. "The September Program: Reflections on the Evidence." ''Central European History'' (1978) 11#4 pp: 348-354. : http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0008938900018823
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* {{cite journal|last=Thompson |first=Wayne C. |title=The September Program: Reflections on the Evidence|journal=Central European History|year=1978|volume=11|issue=4|pages=348–354|doi=10.1017/S0008938900018823}}
 
* {{cite book |last=Thompson |first=Wayne C.  |title=In the Eye of the Storm: Kurt Riezler and the Crises of Modern Germany|year=1980 |location=Iowa City |publisher=University of Iowa Press |isbn=0-87745-094-3}}
 
* {{cite book |last=Thompson |first=Wayne C.  |title=In the Eye of the Storm: Kurt Riezler and the Crises of Modern Germany|year=1980 |location=Iowa City |publisher=University of Iowa Press |isbn=0-87745-094-3}}
  
 
==External links==
 
==External links==
* {{de icon}} [http://www.dhm.de/lemo/html/dokumente/hollweg/ Full text of the Septemberprogramm].  9 September 1914.  Retrieved on 2010-09-15.
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* {{de icon}} [http://www.dhm.de/lemo/html/dokumente/hollweg/ Full text of the ''Septemberprogramm''].  9 September 1914.  Retrieved on 2010-09-15.
 
* {{en icon}} [http://www.wwnorton.com/college/history/ralph/workbook/ralprs34.htm English Translation]. Retrieved on 2010-09-15.
 
* {{en icon}} [http://www.wwnorton.com/college/history/ralph/workbook/ralprs34.htm English Translation]. Retrieved on 2010-09-15.
  
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[[Category:1914 in Germany]]
 
[[Category:1914 in Germany]]
 
[[Category:German Empire in World War I]]
 
[[Category:German Empire in World War I]]
[[Category:1914 works]]
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[[Category:1914 documents]]
 
[[Category:Government reports]]
 
[[Category:Government reports]]
[[Category:Documents of Germany]]
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[[Category:Official documents of Germany]]

Latest revision as of 09:36, 5 May 2017

The Septemberprogramm (German: [zɛpˈtɛmbɐpʁoˌɡʁam]) was the plan for the territorial expansion of Imperial Germany, prepared for Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, at the beginning of World War I (1914–18). The Chancellor's private secretary, Kurt Riezler, drafted the Septemberprogramm on 9 September 1914, in the early days of the German attack in the west, when Germany expected to defeat France quickly and decisively. The extensive territorial conquests proposed in the Septemberprogramm required making vassal states of Belgium and France, in western Europe, and seizing much of the Russian Empire, in eastern Europe. The Septemberprogramm was not effected because France withstood the initial German attack, and the war devolved into a trench-warfare stalemate, and ultimately ended in German defeat.[1]

As geopolitics, the Septemberprogramm itself is a documentary insight to Imperial Germany's war aims, and shows the true scope of German plans for territorial expansion in two directions, east and west. Historian Fritz Fischer wrote that the Septemberprogramm was based on the Lebensraum philosophy, which made territorial expansion Imperial Germany's primary motive for war.[2] Jonathan Steinberg has suggested that if the Schlieffen Plan had worked, and produced a decisive German victory, like the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the Septemberprogramm would have been implemented, thus establishing German hegemony in Europe.[3]

War goals

War goals in Europe

The Septemberprogramm was a list of goals for Germany to achieve in the war.

  • France should cede some northern territory, such as the iron-ore mines at Briey and a coastal strip running from Dunkirk to Boulogne-sur-Mer, to Belgium or Germany.
  • France should pay a war indemnity of 10 billion German Marks, with further payments to cover veterans' funds and to pay off all of Germany's existing national debt. This would prevent French rearmament, make the French economy dependent on Germany, and end trade between France and the British Empire.
  • France will partially disarm by demolishing its northern forts.
  • Belgium should be annexed to Germany or, preferably, become a "vassal state", which should cede eastern parts and possibly Antwerp to Germany and give Germany military and naval bases.
  • Luxembourg should become a member state of the German Empire.
  • Buffer states would be created in territory carved out of the western Russian Empire, such as Poland, which would remain under German sovereignty "for all time".[4]
  • Germany would create a Mitteleuropa economic association, ostensibly egalitarian but actually dominated by Germany. Members would include the new buffer states.
  • The German colonial empire would be expanded. The German possessions in Africa would be enlarged into a contiguous German colony across central Africa (Mittelafrika) at the expense of the French and Belgian colonies. Presumably to leave open future negotiations with Britain, no British colonies were to be taken, but Britain's "intolerable hegemony"[citation needed] in world affairs was to end.
  • The Netherlands should be brought into a closer relationship to Germany while avoiding any appearance of coercion.

Significance

The Septemberprogramm was based on suggestions from Germany's industrial, military, and political leadership.[5][6] However, since Germany did not win the war, it was never put into effect. As historian Raffael Scheck concluded, "The government, finally, never committed itself to anything. It had ordered the September Programme as an informal hearing in order to learn about the opinion of the economic and military elites."[7]

In the east, on the other hand, Germany and her allies did demand and achieve significant territorial and economic concessions from Russia in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and from Romania in the Treaty of Bucharest.[8]

Notes

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  2. Fischer, Fritz. Germany's Aims in the First World War (1967).
  3. Steinberg, Jonathan. "Old Knowledge and New Research: A Summary of the Conference on the Fischer Controversy 50 Years On", Journal of Contemporary History (April 2013) 48#2 pp. 241-50, quotation in p. 249.
  4. Tuchman, Barbara, The Guns of August (New York, New York: Macmillan Co., 1962), p.315.
  5. Thompson, Wayne C. In the Eye of the Storm: Kurt Riezler and the Crises of Modern Germany (1980). pp 98-99
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  7. See Raffael Scheck, Germany 1871–1945: A Concise History (2008)
  8. Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.

Further reading

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External links