

# Understanding Malware

2015/08/13 Security Camp 2015 10-D  
JPCERT/CC Analysis Center  
You NAKATSURU

# Notice

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- These training materials are used for "Security Camp 2015" in Japan
  - Security training program for students to discover & nurture young talent
  - <https://www.ipa.go.jp/jinzai/camp/> (Japanese only)
- The training course consists of the following 2 parts
  - Malware, Malware analysis basics, Static analysis basics
    - Learning basic knowledge for malware analysis
  - Malware analysis
    - Understanding details of malware samples using static analysis method
- The training mainly focuses on 32bit Windows malware
- Some slides have display problems due to animation
- Any questions and comments are welcome
  - Please contact us at [aa-info@jpcert.or.jp](mailto:aa-info@jpcert.or.jp)

# Agenda

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- Malware Basics
- Malware Analysis Basics
- Static Analysis Basics

# Objectives of This Session

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## Understanding malware

- What malware is
- What malware does
- Malware trends
- Typical prevention/response methods

## Understanding malware analysis

- What malware analysis is
- Malware analysis methods
- Static analysis techniques

# Malware Basics



# Malicious Software

- Broader in concept than a computer virus
  - Virus, Worm, Trojan Horse, Rootkit, Bot, DoS Tool, Exploit kit, Spyware

# Malware Purpose



## Mischief

- Crashing a system
- DoS



## For Profit

- Havoc via DDoS
- Sending Spam
- Visiting affiliate sites



## Others

- Stalking
- Self-assertion

# For Profit

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## Selling

- Sensitive information
- Malware, malware builder

## Sending spam emails

- Rental business

## DDoS

- Blackmail


## Affiliate

- Let user access to the site using malware



# Growth of Malware

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# Infection Method

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## Software

- Attack software vulnerabilities
  - OS, Office, Browser
- Make machines to execute malware

## Human

- Trick users to execute malware
  - provide a line about software contents
  - camouflage an "icon"

# Exploiting Software Vulnerability

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Attack  
Vulnerability

- Buffer overflow, etc.
- Take control and execute arbitrary code




Execute  
arbitrary  
code

- Shellcode for malware execution
- Malware


# Malware Attack Vector

- Vulnerability, Social engineering



# Malware Behavior

- Can do anything on the infected machine
  - Within the limits of infected user's privilege



# Malware Behavior: Installation

## Create main module




- download, creation

## Copy / Delete itself



- copy to the system folder

## Run after reboot



- registry entry related to Autorun
- Startup folder
- register as a service

# Malware Behavior: Modifying System

## Disable security features



- Windows Firewall
- Windows Update

## Avoid security programs



- Anti-Virus software
- Analysis tool

## Hide itself



- modifying other processes

# Malware Behavior: Main Behavior

## Steal information



- read registry entries / config files
- key logging, packet capture

## Bot



- connect to C&C servers
  - execute commands

## Spread



- attack other machines



# Important Points

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## Network activity is important


- Attackers need to take out information for profit
- Able to recognize damage by analyzing packets

## Do not trust infected machines

- Possibility of data falsification
  - Such as anti-virus software results on infected machines
    - Recommended to re-install Windows
- Preventing malware infection is the most important

# MALWARE EXAMPLE

# Targeted Attack



# RAT


- Remote Administration Tool/Trojan
  - Often used for targeted attack

The screenshot shows a RAT interface titled "test1 [127.0.0.1] - Poison Ivy". The left sidebar contains various management tools like Information, Managers, Files, Regedit, Processes, Services, etc. The main window displays a table of running processes. The 'csrss.exe' process is selected, and a context menu is open over it, showing options like Refresh, Show Modules, Save To File, Kill Process, Suspend Process, and Unload Module.

Image Name	Path	PID	Image Base	Image Size	Threads	CPU
System Id...		0	00000000	00000000	1	94
System		4	00000000	00000000	52	2
smss.exe	\SystemRoot\System32\smss.exe	620	48580000	0000F000	3	0
csrss.exe	\\?.\C:\WINDOWS\system32\csrss.exe	692	4A680000	00005000	11	1
winlogon...	\\?.\C:\WINDOWS\system...	716	01000000	0007E000	20	0
services....	C:\WINDOWS\system32\...	760	01000000	0001C000	16	1
lsass.exe	C:\WINDOWS\system32\...	772	01000000	00006000	20	0
svchost.e...	C:\WINDOWS\system32\...	932	01000000	00006000	17	0
svchost.e...	C:\WINDOWS\system32\...	1008	01000000	00006000	11	0
svchost.e...	C:\WINDOWS\system32\...	1112	01000000	00006000	57	0
svchost.e...	C:\WINDOWS\system32\...	1256	01000000	00006000	6	0
svchost.e...	C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe	1348	01000000	00006000	14	0
spoolsv.e...	C:\WINDOWS\system32\spoolsv.exe	1448	01000000	00010000	11	0
alg.exe	C:\WINDOWS\System32\alg.exe	492	01000000	0000D000	6	0
explorer.e...	C:\WINDOWS\Explorer.EXE	1088	01000000	000FD000	13	2
wscntfy.e...	C:\WINDOWS\system32\wscntfy.exe	1396	01000000	00006000	1	0
procexp....	C:\Documents and Settings\user\My Documents\tool...	1976	00400000	0033D000	4	0
wuauctl.e...	C:\WINDOWS\system32\wuauctl.exe	440	00400000	0001D000	3	0
svchost.e...	C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe	1368	01000000	00006000	6	0
Adobe_U...	C:\Program Files\Common Files\Adobe\Updater6\Ad...	1720	00400000	0026E000	3	0
Poison Iv...	C:\Documents and Settings\user\デスクトップ\Poison Iv...	1520	00400000	00001000	6	0
firefox.exe	C:\PROGRA~1\MOZILL~1\FIREFOX.EXE	876	00400000	00762000	5	0


# Banking Trojan

- Attempts to steal users credential of the Internet banking
  - Inject additional input form on the web page




# Web-based Attack

## ■ Attacking web browsers or add-ons




# Ransomware

■ "All your important files are encrypted!"



# Android Malware

- Re-package popular legitimate apps
  - Distributed through
    - 3<sup>rd</sup> party market
    - Android Market





# MALWARE TRENDS IN JAPAN

# Banking Trojan

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■ Zeus, Citadel, Gameover were over

Vawtrak

Dyre

Tsukuba

Tinba

Dridex

Chthonic

KINS

# Ransomware

## ■ Spread through Drive-by-Download attack

<https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Angler+exploit+kit+pushes+new+variant+of+ransomware/19681>



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**Angler exploit kit pushes new variant of ransomware**

*Introduction*

The Angler exploit kit is pushing a new variant of ransomware through a popup window that displays a message like the following:

**All your documents will be encrypted. Recycle Bin Private decrypt**

Your photos, and you

JPCERT-AT-2015-0015  
JPCERT/CC  
2015-05-26

<<< JPCERT/CC Alert 2015-05-26 >>>

ランサムウェア感染に関する注意喚起


<https://www.jpcert.or.jp/at/2015/at150015.html>

I. 概要

JPCERT/CC では、いわゆるランサムウェアと呼ばれるマルウェアを用いて、端末内のファイルを暗号化し、復号の為に金銭等を要求する攻撃の被害を多数確認しています。

# Targeted Attack: Watering Hole Attack



- A case of compromised site for a media player update





# CloudyOmega/Blue Termite

**Attack infrastructure (affected sites, affected VPS servers)**

Japan



Outside of Japan



**Victim (government related organizations, private companies)**



Targeted email



医療費通知のお知らせ

Mass email

# ANTI-MALWARE

# Typical Malware Prevention

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## Fix vulnerabilities

- Update OS & software
- Configure security options for OS & software

## Use anti-virus software

- Possibly false results

## Do not open a file without confirming

- Beware of social engineering

# Typical Response

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## Disconnect network connection first

- To stop information leakage & attack to outside

## Re-install OS

- Basically malware can do anything on infected machines

## Recurrence prevention

- Identify & fix up the cause of infection



# Worldwide Activity

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## Botnet takedown

- Microsoft, FBI, anti-virus vendors, etc.
- Major activities
  - Rustock takedown
  - ZeroAccess takedown
  - Citadel takedown

## Convention on Cybercrime

- Drawn up by the Council of Europe
  - Convention for co-investigation of cyber criminals

# Malware Analysis Basics



# Who Analyzes Malware?

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CSIRTs

Security product developers

Security service providers

Anti-malware researchers

Software developers

Law enforcement

# Why Analyze Malware?

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Incident response

Product development/improvement

Signature creation

Cutting-edge countermeasure

Vulnerability analysis

Criminal arrest

# Malware Analysis Method

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**Environment Setup**

**Malware collection**

**Surface analysis**

**Runtime analysis**

**Static analysis**

# IMPORTANT POINT

# Security is a Key for Success

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## Analyze malware with great care

- If you make a mistake, it may bring serious consequences


## Develop environment with great care

- Pay great attention to environment for malware download and analysis

## Publish results with great care

- Take great care in publishing details of malware
  - e.g. 0-day vulnerability

# Sample Analysis Environment






# SURFACE ANALYSIS

# Surface Analysis

- Retrieve surface information from targets without execution



# Runtime Analysis

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- Execute malware and monitor its behavior
  - Difficult to reveal "all" of malware's behavior

## Manual Analysis


- Use monitoring tools on analysis environment
  - Sysinternals suite, etc.

## Automation

- Use sandbox system
  - Free / Commercial products
- Can reduce analysis time

# Runtime Analysis Environment

- Dedicated and isolated network/system
  - Native or Virtual (VMware, etc.)



DNS  
HTTP  
HTTPS  
FTP  
IRC  
SMTP  
POP3  
etc.

netcat

# What Static Analysis is

- Reading code in binary file and understanding its functionality
  - Takes a long time
  - Requires deep and broad knowledge




```
0003CD70 73 11 6A 0D 5E 66 39 30 75 09 6A 0A 5E 66 39 32 s.j.^f90u.j.^f92
0003CD80 0F 44 C2 8D 70 02 8D 14 BD 04 00 00 00 E8 9E 10 .D..p.....
0003CD90 FF FF 84 C0 74 4C 85 ED 74 19 8B 4C 24 14 8B D5 ....tL..t..L$...
0003CDA0 E8 C4 A3 FE FF 8B 6C 24 1C 8B 4D 00 89 04 B9 85 .....l$..M.....
0003CDB0 C0 74 33 8B 4C 24 1C 8B 01 83 3C B8 00 74 0C 8B .t3.L$....<..t..
0003CDC0 0C B8 E8 9E FD FF FF 8B 4C 24 1C 47 6A 0D 5D 3B .....L$.Gj.];
0003CDD0 F3 0F 82 66 FF FF FF 8B C7 5F 5E 5D 5B 59 59 C2 ...f....._^][YY.
0003CDE0 0C 00 8B 6C 24 1C 8B D7 8B CD E8 D9 06 00 00 83 ...l$.....
0003CDF0 C8 FF EB E5 51 8B 44 24 08 53 55 56 57 8B F9 33 ....Q.D$.SUVW..3
0003CE00 C9 21 08 8D 2C 17 89 4C 24 10 3B FD 0F 83 D9 00 .!..,..L$.;.....
0003CE10 00 00 8A 07 3C 20 74 12 3C 09 7C 04 3C 0D 7E 0A ....< t.<.|.<~.
0003CE20 0F BE C0 3D FF 00 00 00 75 05 47 3B FD 72 E3 3B ...=. ....u.G; ;r.;
0003CE30 FD 0F 83 B4 00 00 00 8A 1F 8D 77 01 80 FB 27 74 .....w... 't
0003CE40 05 80 FB 22 75 1D 8B FE EB 37 8A 06 3C 20 74 3A ..."u....7..< t:
0003CE50 3C 09 7C 04 3C 0D 7E 32 0F BE C0 3D FF 00 00 00 <|.|.<~2...=. ....
0003CE60 74 28 46 3B F5 72 E3 EB 21 38 1E 75 13 33 D2 8D t(F; ;r..!8.u.3..
0003CE70 46 FF EB 02 42 48 80 38 5C 74 F9 F6 C2 01 74 05 F...BH.8\t....t.
0003CE80 46 3B F5 72 E4 3B F5 75 01 4F 8D 14 8D 04 00 00 F; ;r.; ;u.O.....
0003CE90 00 8B DE 8B 4C 24 18 2B DF E8 92 0F FF FF 84 C0 ...L$.+.....
0003CEA0 74 33 85 DB 75 0A 33 D2 B9 8C 72 40 00 42 EB 04 t3...u.3...r@.B..
0003CEB0 8B D3 8B CF E8 04 A3 FE FF 8B 4C 24 10 8B D0 8B .....L$.....
0003CEC0 44 24 18 8B 00 89 14 88 85 D2 74 0D 41 8D 7E 01 D$.....t.A.~.
0003CED0 E9 31 FF FF FF 8B 4C 24 10 8B 44 24 18 8B D1 8B .1....L$.D$....
```

# ANALYSIS PROCESS

# Analysis Process Comparison

	Surface analysis	Runtime analysis	Static analysis
Overview	Retrieve surface information from targets <b>without execution</b>	<b>Execute samples</b> and monitor its behavior	<b>Read codes</b> in binary files and understand its functionality
Output	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Hash values</li> <li>- Strings</li> <li>- File attributes</li> <li>- Packer info</li> <li>- Anti-virus detection info</li> </ul>	Activity of <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- File system</li> <li>- Registry</li> <li>- Process</li> <li>- Network</li> </ul>	Malware's functionality e.g. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Bot commands</li> <li>- Encode/decode methods</li> </ul>
Security risk	Low	High	Moderate
Analysis coverage	Low	Moderate	High

# Malware Analysis Flow





# Static Analysis Basics



# Important Points

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No need to know all of malware

- You need much time for static analysis

Need much knowledge/experiences

- Need
  - OS knowledge
  - Assembly basics
  - Efficient reading techniques
  - Anti-analysis techniques
- We have to continue studying




# Debugging

## Read assembly code while executing step by step

The screenshot shows a debugger window titled "[CPU - main thread, module test]". The main window is divided into several panes:

- Assembly View:** Shows a list of instructions with their addresses, hex dumps, disassemblies, and comments. The current instruction at address 004012E8 is `CALL test.00401689`. Other instructions include `JMP test.004010A5`, `MOV EDI,EDI`, `PUSH EBP`, `MOV EBP,ESP`, `MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]`, `MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX]`, `CMP DWORD PTR DS:[EAX],E06D7363`, `JNZ SHORT test.0040132E`, `CMP DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+10],3`, `JNZ SHORT test.0040132E`, `MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+14]`, `CMP EAX,19930520`, `JE SHORT test.00401329`, `CMP EAX,19930521`, `JE SHORT test.00401329`, `CMP EAX,19930522`, `JE SHORT test.00401329`, `CMP EAX,1994000`, `JNZ SHORT test.0040132E`, `CALL <JMP.&MSVCR100.?terminate@@YAXXZ>`, `XOR EAX,EAX`, `POP EBP`, `RETN 4`, `PUSH test.004012F2`, `CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&KERNEL32.SetUnhand kernel32.SetUnhandledExceptionFilter`, `XOR EAX,EAX`, `RETN`, `JMP DWORD PTR DS:[<&MSVCR100._amsgr_exit MSVCR100._amsgr_exit`, `PUSH 14`, and `PUSH test.004021E8`.
- Registers (FPU):** Shows the state of various registers. EAX is 77483865, ECX is 00000000, EDX is 004012E8, EBX is 7EFDE000, ESP is 0018FF8C, EBP is 0018FF94, ESI is 00000000, EDI is 00000000, and EIP is 004012E8. The FPU registers (C0, P1, A0, Z1, S0, T0, D0, O0) are also shown, along with the LastErr register (ERROR\_SUCCESS) and the EFL register (00010246).
- Hex Dump:** Shows the raw bytes of the memory at the current instruction address. The hex dump starts at 00403000 and ends at 00403060. The ASCII column shows the corresponding characters, including "..." and "RETURN to kernel32.77483877".


# Static Analysis Flow



# Static Analysis Tools

Category	Name	Description
<b>Disassembler</b>	<b>IDA</b>	Disassembles more than 50 architectures
<b>Decompiler</b>	<b>Hex-rays Decompiler</b>	x86/ARM binary to C source code
	<b>VB Decompiler</b>	Visual Basic binary to Visual Basic source code
	<b>.NET Reflector</b>	.NET binary to .NET source code
<b>Debugger</b>	<b>OllyDbg</b>	World famous x86 debugger
	<b>Immunity Debugger</b>	Python familiar x86 debugger




# Static Analysis Basics



# Interactive DisAssembler

■ <http://www.hex-rays.com/idapro/>


—3 versions are available

	Free 	Starter 	Pro 
Version	Ver. 5.0 Ver. 6.8 demo	Ver. 6.8	Ver. 6.8
Cost	Free	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• 589USD/User</li><li>• 879USD/Computer</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• 1129USD/User</li><li>• 1689USD/Computer</li></ul>
Features	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Old or limited</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Supports up to 20 processes</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Supports up to 50 processes</li><li>• Can analyse files for 64 bit platforms</li></ul>




# ASSEMBLY BASICS


# Components of Computer System



# CPU Operation



# Compiling Source Code




# Disassemble

## Machine code to assembly code (human readable)

```
55
8B EC
81 EC 04 01 00 00
83 7D 0C 01
74 06

33 C0
C9
C2 0C 00

68 04 01 00 00
8D 85 FC FE FF FF
50
6A 00
FF 15 2C 60 00 10
8D 85 FC FE FF FF
6A 5C
50
E8 83 01 00 00
```



```
; BOOL __stdcall DIIMain(HINSTANCE hinstDLL, DWORD fdwR
_DIIMain@12      proc near          ; CODE XREF: __
; __DIIMainCRT

var_108         = dword ptr -108h
Filename       = byte ptr -104h
hinstDLL       = dword ptr 8
fdwReason      = dword ptr 0Ch
lpvReserved    = dword ptr 10h

                push    ebp
                mov     ebp, esp
                sub     esp, 104h
                cmp     [ebp+fdwReason], 1
                jz      short loc_100014E9

loc_100014E3:                                       ; CODE XREF: DI
                xor     eax, eax
                leave  0Ch

; -----
loc_100014E9:                                       ; CODE XREF: DI
                push   104h          ; nSize
                lea   eax, [ebp+Filename]
                push  eax           ; lpFilename
                push  0             ; hModule
                call  ds:GetModuleFileNameA
```

# Format of Assembly Code

OpCode

```
push
mov
sub
mov
mov
mov
add
mov
mov
push
push
call
add
xor
mov
pop
retn
```

```
ebp
ebp, esp
esp, 0Ch
[ebp-4], 1
[ebp-8], 2
eax, [ebp-4]
eax, [ebp-8]
[ebp-0Ch], eax
ecx, [ebp-0Ch]
ecx
0040C000h
00401034h
esp, 8
eax, eax
esp, ebp
ebp
```

Operand  
(arguments)

# Register

---


## ■ Memory inside CPU

- Can use them as variables for calculations
- Address that indicates next instruction (Program Counter)
- Pointers related stack

Register name	Description
<b>EAX, EBX, EDX</b>	General purpose register
<b>ECX</b>	General purpose register especially used for counter
<b>ESI, EDI</b>	General purpose register especially used for "source" and "destination"
<b>EIP (Instruction Pointer)</b>	Address that indicates next instruction
<b>ESP (Stack Pointer)</b>	Current stack address
<b>EBP (Base Pointer)</b>	Bottom of stack for current function

# Register Size

- Several registers' names are changed according to the data size
  - EAX, EBX, ECX...



`"mov eax, 0"`  $\neq$  `"mov ax, 0"`



# Major Instructions


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---

Assignment	mov	Copy value
	lea	Load address
Calculation	add & sub	+ / -
	and & or & xor & not	Logical operation
	inc & dec	++1 / --1
Jump	jmp	Jump to specified address
	jz, jnz, ja, ...	For branch on condition
	call	Call subroutine (function)



# Stack

- Store temporary values to "stack" on memory
  - Due to the limits of registers
- Stack management
  - Use PUSH/POP
  - Stack related addresses are stored in EBP & ESP



# Function Call using Stack


- call = push + jmp
- retn = pop + jmp



# Local Variables

- Local variables are allocated on stack
  - Normally referred using offset from ebp

```
void func(){  
    char Name[] = "abcdefg";  
    int i;  
    :  
}
```



# Branch on Conditions

## ■ Basic flow



### 1. Comparison operation

—cmp a b

■ "sub a b" and discard result

—test a b

■ "and a b" and discard result test

### 2. Jump on condition

—jz

—jnb

—ja

—etc.

	Char	Description	
	n	not	
	z/e	zero/equal	Previous result is 0 (Both values are same)
	a	above	Operand 1 is higher than operand 2
	b	below	Operand 1 is smaller than operand 2

# Exercise 1. Static Analysis Basic

- i. Analyze the following function and explain what it does

```
sub_401000    proc near                ; CODE XREF: _main+8↓p
var_8        = dword ptr -8
arg_0        = dword ptr 8
arg_4        = dword ptr 0Ch

                push    ebp
                mov     ebp, esp
                sub     esp, 8
                mov     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
                add     eax, [ebp+arg_4]
                mov     [ebp+var_8], eax
                mov     eax, [ebp+var_8]
                mov     esp, ebp
                pop     ebp
                retn
sub_401000    endp
```

# Exercise 1. Answer

- i. Analyze the following function and explain what it does

```
sub_401000    proc near                ; CODE XREF: _main+8↓p
var_8        = dword ptr -8
arg_0        = dword ptr  8
arg_4        = dword ptr  4

    push     ebp
    mov     ebp, esp
    sub     esp, 8
    mov     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
    add     eax, [ebp+arg_4]
    mov     [ebp+var_8], eax
    mov     eax, [ebp+var_8]
    mov     esp, ebp
    pop     ebp
    retn
sub_401000    endp
```

**arg\_0 + arg\_4**

# Exercise 1. Static Analysis Basic

- ii. Find "branch on condition" and explain each condition and corresponding result

```
_main      proc near          ; CODE XREF: ___tmainCRTStartup+15A↓p
var_4     = dword ptr -4

          push    ebp
          mov     ebp, esp
          push    ecx
          push    5
          push    4
          call   sub_401000
          add     esp, 8
          mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
          cmp     [ebp+var_4], 0
          jz     short loc_40104C
          mov     eax, [ebp+var_4]
          push    eax
          push    offset aAnswerIsD_ ; "Answer is %d.\n"
          call   _printf
          add     esp, 8
          jmp     short loc_401059
```

sub\_401000 is "add\_value" function



# Exercise 1. Answer

- ii. Find "branch on condition" and explain each condition and corresponding result

```
_main      proc near      ; CODE XREF: ___tmainCRTStartup+15A↓p
var_4      = dword ptr -4

          push     ebp
          mov     ebp, esp
          push   ecx
          push   5      ;
          push   4      ;
          call  sub_401000
          add    esp, 8
          mov    [ebp+var_4], eax
          cmp    [ebp+var_4], 0
          jz     short loc_40104C
          mov    eax, [ebp+var_4]
          push  eax
          push  offset aAnswerI
          call  _printf
          add    esp, 8
          jmp    short loc_401059
```

stored result of  
"add\_value" func

result is 0 or not?

# Deep Understanding x86

- IA-32 Architectures Software Developer Manuals
  - <http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/processors/architectures-software-developer-manuals.html>

INSTRUCTION SET REFERENCE, A-M

## MOV—Move

Opcode	Instruction	Op/En	64-Bit Mode	Compat/Leg Mode	Description
88 /r	MOV r/m8,r8	MR	Valid	Valid	Move r8 to r/m8.
REX + 88 /r	MOV r/m8 <sup>***</sup> ,r8 <sup>***</sup>	MR	Valid	N.E.	Move r8 to r/m8.
89 /r	MOV r/m16,r16	MR	Valid	Valid	Move r16 to r/m16.
89 /r	MOV r/m32,r32	MR	Valid	Valid	Move r32 to r/m32.
REX.W + 89 /r	MOV r/m64,r64	MR	Valid	N.E.	Move r64 to r/m64.
8A /r	MOV r8,r/m8	RM	Valid	Valid	Move r/m8 to r8.
REX + 8A /r	MOV r8 <sup>***</sup> ,r/m8 <sup>***</sup>	RM	Valid	N.E.	Move r/m8 to r8.
8B /r	MOV r16,r/m16	RM	Valid	Valid	Move r/m16 to r16.
8B /r	MOV r32,r/m32	RM	Valid	Valid	Move r/m32 to r32.
REX.W + 8B /r	MOV r64,r/m64	RM	Valid	N.E.	Move r/m64 to r64.
8C /r	MOV r/m16,Sreg**	MR	Valid	Valid	Move segment register to r/m16.
REX.W + 8C /r	MOV r/m64,Sreg**	MR	Valid	Valid	Move zero extended 16-bit segment register

# **EFFICIENT CODE ANALYSIS**

# Understanding Source Code

- In which order should be read the following source code?

```
int send_data(){
    HANDLE hInternet, hConnect, hRequest;

    hInternet = InternetOpen(NULL, INTERNET_OPEN_TYPE_PRECONFIG,
                             NULL, NULL, 0);
    if(hInternet == NULL)
        return 1;
    hConnect = InternetConnect(hInternet, SERVER_NAME,
                              INTERNET_DEFAULT_HTTP_PORT,...)
    if(hConnect == NULL){
        InternetCloseHandle(hInternet);
        return 2;
    }
    hRequest = HttpOpenRequest(hConnect, __T("GET"), NULL, NULL, ...)
```

# Reading Steps

1. Check Windows API

2. Check arguments

3. Check brunch on condition

```
lea    edx, [esp+400h+FileName]
push   edx           ; lpBuffer
push   104h         ; nBufferLength
call   ds:GetTempPathW
test   eax, eax
jnz    short loc_4010B1
lea    eax, [esi+12h]
```

# Learning Windows API

## ■ Use MSDN Library

— <http://msdn.microsoft.com/library>

	Online	Offline
Cost	Free	MSDN Subscription needed to download
Features	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Always up to date</li><li>• Need Internet connection</li><li>• Can download necessary sections for offline use</li><li>• Depends on connection speed</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Can be used in offline environment</li><li>• Fast</li></ul>

# Reading Arguments

## ■ Assembly code

```
push    0          ; bFailIfExists
mov     eax, [ebp+C]
push    eax        ; lpNewFileName
mov     ecx, [ebp+8]
push    ecx        ; lpExistingFileName
call   ds: CopyFileA
```

Reverse  
order

## ■ C++ syntax from MSDN Library

```
BOOL CopyFile(  
    LPCTSTR lpExistingFileName,  
    LPCTSTR lpNewFileName,  
    BOOL bFailIfExists  
);
```

## ■ Return value is stored in EAX

# Exercise 2. Efficient Code Analysis

- Read the following function efficiently and guess what it does

```
and    [ebp+hKey], 0
lea    eax, [ebp+hKey]
push   eax           ; phkResult
push   0F003Fh      ; samDesired
push   0             ; ulOptions
push   offset SubKey ; "SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVe"
push   80000001h    ; hKey
call   ds:RegOpenKeyExA
test   eax, eax
jz     short loc_401382
xor    eax, eax
jmp    short locret_4013BB
; -----
loc_401382:           ; CODE XREF: sub_401357+25↑j
push   105h          ; cbData
push   offset Data   ; lpData
push   1             ; dwType
push   0             ; Reserved
push   offset ValueName ; "TRAINING"
push   [ebp+hKey]    ; hKey
call   ds:RegSetValueExA
```

ersion¥¥Run



# Exercise 2. Answer

- Read the following function efficiently and guess what it does

```
and [ebp+hKey], 0
lea eax, [ebp+hKey]
push eax
push 0F003Fh
push 0
push offset SubKey ; "SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVe"
push 80000001h ; hKey
```

Target entry is "Run" key

Run

**Register itself to be executed automatically after rebooting**

```
loc_401382: ; CODE XREF: sub_401357+25↑j
; ...
push offset ValueName ; "TRAINING"
push [ebp+hKey] ; hKey
call ds:RegSetValueExA
```




Write value in registry entry

# USING IDA

# (recap) Interactive DisAssembler

■ <http://www.hex-rays.com/idapro/>

—3 versions are available

	Free 	Starter 	Pro 
Version	Ver. 5.0 Ver. 6.5 demo	Ver. 6.5	Ver. 6.5
Cost	Free	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• 539USD/User</li><li>• 819USD/Computer</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• 1059USD/User</li><li>• 1589USD/Computer</li></ul>
Features	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Old or limited</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Supports up to 20 processes</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Supports up to 50 processes</li><li>• Can analyze files for 64 bit platforms</li></ul>

# You Have to Talk with

---



**Madame de  
Maintenon**  
(see Wikipedia)

# Important Points for IDA

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## 1. Make it right


- **Instruction** or **data**?
- **Malicious function** or **library function**?

## 2. Use as a high functionality notepad

- Name analyzed function / variables
- Write your comments
- Put function type-declaration
- Change display format for easier reading
  - Hex / binary / ASCII / offset

# Main Windows (IDA view)

## ■ Graph view / Text view



# Main Windows (IDA view)

## ■ Reading Code

```
00000000 55 MYUNK db 55h ; U
00000001 02 MYDATA db offset MYCODE+1
00000001 MYCODE:
00000001 1D+
00000001 2B+
00000001 02+
00000001 00+ sbb eax, 555
00000007 53+ unicode 0 <String constant>
00000025 9A+ call PostMessage
0000002C 55 unk_0_2B db 55h
0000002D 01 HIDNAME db <#ucode>
0000002E 49 off_1 d
0000002F 63 d
00000030 55 db 55h
00000031 ; Below are an assembler directive and a segment name
00000031 assume ds:seg000
00000031 ; ===== S U B P R O C E D U R E =====
00000031 ; MyFunc::MyClass(int,unsigned long)
00000031 ; A demangled name is above
00000031 @MyFunc@MyClass$gint_proc_near
00000031 arg_4 = dword ptr 8
00000031 80+ mov al, 'U'
00000033 8B+ mov ebx, 88h ; ' ; <void> ; A void operand
00000038 E8+ call MYCODE
0000003D E8+ call near ptr MYCODE+1
00000042 C7+ mov [ebp+arg_4], ALTOP
00000049 locret_2:
```

**Name**

**Calling API**


**XREF**

**Comments**

- Regular unknown name
- Regular data name
- CODE XREF: MyFunc::MyClass(int,ulong)
- MyFunc::MyClass(int,ulong)+C↓
- DATA XREF: seg000:0000002C↓
- seg000:00000000↑
- Regular code name
- Macro name & string
- A repeatable comment
- Dummy unknown name
- Hidden name
- Dummy data name and libfunc name
- Character data constant
- Numeric data constant
- Below are an assembler directive and a segment name
- ===== S U B P R O C E D U R E =====
- MyFunc::MyClass(int,unsigned long)
- A demangled name is above
- @MyFunc@MyClass\$gint\_proc\_near
- Character constant in instruction
- A void operand
- Call Procedure
- Call Procedure
- Stack var and alternative operand
- Dummy code name

# Strings Window

## ■ Like BinText




The screenshot shows the IDA Pro interface with the Strings window open. The window title is "IDA - C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\svn\malware\_analyst\trunk\sample\_code\runtime\_sample\_basic\Release\dropper.exe -...". The menu bar includes File, Edit, Jump, Search, View, Debugger, Options, Windows, and Help. The toolbar contains various icons for file operations, navigation, and editing. The main window displays a list of strings extracted from the binary file, with columns for Address, Length, Type, and String.

Address	Length	Type	String
"..." HEADE...	00000027	C	!This program cannot be run in DOS mode
"..." HEADE...	00000005	C	RichR
"..." HEADE...	00000006	C	.text
"..." HEADE...	00000008	C	`.rdata
"..." HEADE...	00000007	C	@.data
"..." HEADE...	00000006	C	.rsrc
"..." HEADE...	00000008	C	@.reloc
"..." .rdata:0...	0000000F	C	CorExitProcess
"..." .rdata:0...	00000008	C	FIsFree
"..." .rdata:0...	0000000C	C	FIsSetValue
"..." .rdata:0...	0000000C	C	FIsGetValue
"..." .rdata:0...	00000009	C	FIsAlloc
"..." .rdata:0...	00000018	C	GetProcessWindowStation
"..." .rdata:0...	0000001A	C	GetObjectInformationW
"..." .rdata:0...	00000013	C	GetLastActivePopup
"..." .rdata:0...	00000010	C	GetActiveWindow



# Functions Window

## ■ A list of functions




The screenshot shows the IDA Pro interface with the 'Functions' window active. The window displays a list of functions with the following columns: Function name, Segment, Start, Length, and flags (R, F, L, S, B, T, =). The function 'sub\_401000' is selected and highlighted in blue.

Function name	Segment	Start	Length	R	F	L	S	B	T	=
sub_401000	.text	00401000	00000202	R	.	.	.	B	.	.
sub_401210	.text	00401210	00000147	R	.	.	.	B	T	.
sub_401357	.text	00401357	0000000F	R	.	.	.	.	.	.
sub_401366	.text	00401366	00000006	R	.	.	.	B	.	.
sub_40143C	.text	0040143C	00000029	R	.	.	.	B	.	.
sub_401594	.text	00401594	00000014	R	.	.	.	.	.	.
sub_4015A8	.text	004015A8	0000001A	R	.	.	.	.	.	.
start	.text	004015D2	0000000A	R	.	L	.	.	.	.
sub_4016E2	.text	004016E2	0000000F	R	.	.	.	B	.	.
sub_4016F1	.text	004016F1	00000129	R	.	.	.	B	.	.
sub_40181A	.text	0040181A	00000025	R	.	.	.	.	.	.
sub_40183F	.text	0040183F	0000002D	R	.	.	.	B	.	.
sub_40186C	.text	0040186C	00000010	R	.	.	.	.	.	.
sub_40187C	.text	0040187C	00000042	R	.	.	.	B	.	.
sub_4018BE	.text	004018BE	00000013	R	.	.	.	.	.	.
TopLevelExceptionHandler	.text	004018D1	00000042	R	.	.	.	B	T	.

Line 1 of 147

# Imports Windows

- A list of APIs required by the target



The screenshot shows the IDA Pro interface with the Imports window open. The window displays a list of imported functions and their source libraries. The functions listed are:

Address	Ordinal	Name	Library
00406000		ExitProcess	KERNEL32
00406004		GetEnvironmentVariableW	KERNEL32
00406008		FindResourceW	KERNEL32
0040600C		LoadResource	KERNEL32
00406010		CreateProcessW	KERNEL32
00406014		HeapAlloc	KERNEL32
00406018		HeapFree	KERNEL32
0040601C		GetProcessHeap	KERNEL32
00406020		WriteFile	KERNEL32
00406024		LoadLibraryW	KERNEL32
00406028		SizeofResource	KERNEL32
0040602C		GetModuleFileNameW	KERNEL32
00406030		CreateFileW	KERNEL32
00406034		GetTempPathW	KERNEL32
00406038		GetLastError	KERNEL32
0040603C		GetProcAddress	KERNEL32

Line 1 of 65

# Hex View Window

## ■ Imports (list of APIs required by the target)

```
.text:00401590 00 00 EB 2E 8B 45 EC 8B 08 8B 09 89 4D DC 50 51 ...繼· ·窺DPQ
.text:004015A0 E8 75 08 00 00 59 59 C3 8B 65 E8 8B 45 DC 89 45 變..YY?菊開印右
.text:004015B0 ED 83 7D E4 00 75 06 50 E8 FD 05 00 00 E8 1D 06 焜}·u P· ··
.text:004015C0 00 00 C7 45 FC FE FF FF FF 8B 45 E0 E8 84 14 00 ..又· · ·繼球
.text:004015D0 00 C3 38 28 16 00 00 E9 89 FE FF FF 8B FF 55 8B 行[.繼· ··
.text:004015E0 EC 81 EC 28 03 00 00 A3 38 9C 40 00 89 0D 34 9C · · ·J8廖· ·4·
.text:004015F0 40 00 89 15 30 9C 40 00 89 1D 2C 9C 40 00 89 35 @..0廖· ·,廖· ·
.text:00401600 28 9C 40 00 89 30 24 9C 40 00 68 8C 15 50 9C 40 (廖·$廖.f·P廖
.text:00401610 00 68 8C 0D 44 9C 40 00 68 8C 1D 20 9C 40 00 68 .f·D廖.f· 廖.f
.text:00401620 8C 05 1C 9C 40 00 68 8C 25 18 9C 40 00 68 8C 2D ·廖.f· ↑廖.f·
.text:00401630 14 9C 40 00 9C 8F 05 48 9C 40 00 8B 45 00 A3 3C 廖.恂 H廖.繼.J<
.text:00401640 9C 40 00 8B 45 04 A3 40 9C 40 00 8D 45 08 A3 4C 廖.繼 J@廖.孔 JL
.text:00401650 9C 40 00 8B 85 E0 FC FF FF FF C7 05 88 98 40 00 01 廖.球球· ·又·@
.text:00401660 00 01 00 A1 40 9C 40 00 A3 3C 98 40 00 C7 05 30 · ·@廖.J<奸.又 0
.text:00401670 9B 40 00 09 04 00 C0 C7 05 34 98 40 00 01 00 00 奸·.又 4奸· ··
.text:00401680 00 A1 04 90 40 00 89 85 D8 FC FF FF A1 08 90 40 · ·拭.怒? · ·.书
.text:00401690 00 89 85 DC FC FF FF FF 15 6C 60 40 00 A3 80 9B .怒? · · |@.J
.text:004016A0 40 00 6A 01 E8 F1 15 00 00 59 6A 00 FF 15 68 60 @.j 類 ..Yj· · h
.text:004016B0 40 00 68 40 61 40 00 FF 15 64 60 40 00 83 3D 80 @.h@a@· · d@· ·
.text:004016C0 9B 40 00 00 75 08 6A 01 E8 CD 15 00 00 59 68 09 奸..u j 龔 ..Yh`
.text:004016D0 04 00 C0 FF 15 60 60 40 00 50 FF 15 5C 60 40 00 .夕· ·@.P· ¥`
.text:004016E0 C9 C3 8B FF 55 8B EC 8B 45 08 A3 54 9E 40 00 5D 疗·U驅繼 J嘩.]
```

# Recommended Configuration

- IDA config files you can edit
  - C:\Program Files (x86)\IDA Free\cfg\
- You can create user settings file
  - idauser.cfg, idauserg.cfg

Config File	Name	Meaning	Recommended Value
ida.cfg / idauser.cfg	OPCODE_BYTES	Display binary data	8
	SHOW_SP	Display stack pointer	YES
	SHOW_XREFS	Display cross references	8
idagui.cfg / idauserg.cfg	DISPLAY_PATCH_SUBMENU	Display patch submenu	YES

# Basic Instruction

---

## ■ Move

Key assign	Description
<b>G</b>	Jump to address
<b>Esc</b>	Back

## ■ Changing data type

<b>U</b>	Change selection to "Unknown"
<b>C</b>	Change selection to "Code"
<b>D</b>	Change selection to "Data" • Byte, Word, Double Word
<b>P</b>	Change selection to "Function"
<b>A</b>	Change selection to "ASCII string"
<b>*</b>	Change selection to "Array"

# Basic Instruction

## ■ Note


Key assign	Description
<b>N</b>	Name function/variables/etc.
<b>:</b>	Insert comment
<b>;</b>	Insert repeatable comment
<b>Y</b>	Put type-declaration <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <code>void __cdecl Func(int num1, int num2);</code></li></ul>

## ■ Display format

<b>H</b>	Decimal <-> Hexadecimal
<b>R</b>	ASCII <-> Hexadecimal
<b>Right-click -&gt; Symbolic constant</b>	Symbolic constant <-> Hexadecimal <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <code>ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS</code></li><li>• <code>ACCESS_ALL</code></li><li>• <code>KEY_WRITE</code></li></ul>

# Basic Analysis Process in IDA

---



# Example of Renaming


## ■ Exercise 1

```
sub_401000    proc near                ; COD
var_8         = dword ptr -8
arg_0        = dword ptr  8
arg_4        = dword ptr  0Ch

push    ebp
mov     ebp, esp
sub     esp, 8
mov     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
add     eax, [ebp+arg_4]
mov     [ebp+var_8], eax
mov     eax, [ebp+var_8]
mov     esp, ebp
pop     ebp
retn
sub_401000    endp
```

```
int __cdecl add_func(int arg1, int arg2)
proc near                ; COD
var_8         = dword ptr -8
arg_0        = dword ptr  8
arg_4        = dword ptr  0Ch

push    ebp
mov     ebp, esp
sub     esp, 8
mov     eax, [ebp+arg1]
add     eax, [ebp+arg2]
mov     [ebp+answer], eax
mov     eax, [ebp+answer]
mov     esp, ebp
pop     ebp
retn
add_func     endp
```






# Example of Analysis

## ■ Analyzed IDB sample

```
push    offset rclsid    ; rclsid
call    ds:CoCreateInstance
mov     esi, eax
cmp     esi, edi
jl      loc_10016896
mov     eax, [ebp+ppv]
mov     ecx, [eax]
lea     edx, [ebp+pProxy]
push    edx
push    edi
push    edi
push    edi
push    edi
push    edi
push    offset aRootCimv2 ; "ROOT\\CIMV2"
push    eax
mov     eax, [ecx+0Ch]
call    eax
mov     esi, eax
cmp     esi, edi
jl      loc_10016896
mov     ecx, [ebp+pProxy]
push    edi                ; dwCapabilities
push    edi                ; pAuthInfo
push    3                  ; dwImpLevel
push    3                  ; dwAuthnLevel
push    edi                ; pServerPrincName
push    edi                ; dwAuthzSvc
push    0Ah                ; dwAuthnSvc
push    ecx                ; pProxy
call    ds:CoSetProxyBlanket
```



```
push    offset IID_WbemLocator ; rclsid
call    ds:CoCreateInstance
mov     esi, eax
cmp     esi, edi
jl      loc_10016896
mov     eax, [ebp+ppv]
mov     ecx, [eax+IWbemLocator.lpVtbl]
lea     edx, [ebp+pProxy]
push    edx                ; ppNamespace
push    edi                ; pCtx
push    edi                ; strAuthority
push    edi                ; ISecurityFlags
push    edi                ; strLocale
push    edi                ; strPassword
push    edi                ; strUser
push    offset aRootCimv2 ; "ROOT\\CIMV2"
push    eax                ; strNetworkResource
mov     eax, [ecx+IWbemLocatorVtbl.ConnectServer]
call    eax                ; IWbemLocatorVtbl.ConnectServer
mov     esi, eax
cmp     esi, edi
jl      loc_10016896
mov     ecx, [ebp+pProxy]
push    edi                ; dwCapabilities
push    edi                ; pAuthInfo
push    RPC_C_IMP_LEVEL_IMPERSONATE ; dwImpLevel
push    RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_CALL ; dwAuthnLevel
push    edi                ; pServerPrincName
push    edi                ; dwAuthzSvc
push    RPC_C_AUTHN_WINNT ; dwAuthnSvc
push    ecx                ; pProxy
call    ds:CoSetProxyBlanket
```

# Exercise 3. Using IDA

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- i. Analyze the following functions in "static\_sample3.idb" and rename functions/variables or insert your comments
  - sub\_4012DD
  - sub\_401303
  - sub\_401357


# Exercise 3. Answer

---

- i. Analyze the following functions in "static\_sample3.idb" and rename functions/variables or insert your comments
  - sub\_4012DD
  - sub\_401303
  - sub\_401357
  - See static\_sample3\_ans.idb**

# FYI: IDC Scripting

- If you want to change background color on "jmp" & "call" instructions



**Questions?**

