[No. L-11442.

May 23, 1958]

MANUELA T. VDA. DE SALVATIERRA, petitioner, vs.HON. LORENZO C.
GARLITOS, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch
II, and SEGUNDINO REFUERZO, respondents.
1. 1.PLEADING AND PRACTICE; PETITION FOR RELIEF;WHEN TO FILE
PETITION.Rule 38, Section 3, of the Rules of Court treats of 2 periods within
which a petition for relief may be filed. The petition must be filed within 60 days
after the petitioner learns of the judgment and not more than 6 months after the
judgment or order was rendered, both of which must be satisfied.
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58
Vda.deSalvatierravs.Hon.Garlitosetc.,andRefuerzo
1. 2.CORPORATION LAW; LlABILITY OF PERSON DEALING WITH ASSOCIATION
AS A CORPORATE BODY; WHEN ESTOPPEL MAY NOT BE INVOKED.While
as a general rule, a person who deals with an association in such a way to recognize
its existence as a corporate body is estopped from denying the same in an action
arising out of such transaction, yet this doctrine may not be held to be applicable
where fraud takes a part in the said transaction. In the instant case, on plaintiff's
charge that she was unaware of the fact that the defendant corporation had no
juridical personality, its president gave no confirmation or denial of the same and
the circumstance surrounding the execution of the contract lead to the inescapable
conclusion that plaintiff was really made to believe that such corporation was duly
organized in accordance with law.
1. 3.ID.; LIABILITY OF MEMBERS WHO ACT AS AGENTS OF AN
UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION.A corporation when registered has a
juridical personality separate and distinct from its component members or
stockholders and officers, such that a corporation cannot be held liable for the
personal indebtedness of a stockholder even if he should be its president (Walter A.
Smith Co. vs. Ford, SC-G. R. No. 42420) and conversely, a stockholder cannot be
held personally liable for any financial obligation by the corporation in excess of his
unpaid subscription. But this rule is understood to refer merely to registered
corporations and cannot be made applicable to the liability of members of an
unincorporated association. The reason behind this doctrine is obviousan
unincorporated association has no personality and would be incompetent to act and
appropriate for itself the power and attributes of a corporation as provided by law,
it cannot create agents or confer authority on another to act in its behalf; thus,
those who act or purport to act as its representatives or agents do so without
authority and at their own risk. And as it is an elementary principle of law that a
person who acts as an agent without authority or without a principal is himself
regarded as the principal, possessed of all the right and subject to all the liabilities
of a principal, a person acting or purporting to act on behalf of a corporation which
has no valid existence assumes such privileges and obligations and becomes
personally liable for contracts entered into or for other acts performed as such

agent (Fay vs. Noble, 7 Cushing [Mass.] 188. Cited in II Tolentino's Commercial
Laws of the Philippines, Fifth Ed., p. 689-690).
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ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Jimnez, Tantuico, Jr. & Tolete for petitioner.
Francisco Astilla for respondent Segundino Refuerzo.
FLIX, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari filed by Manuela T. Vda. de Salvatierra seeking to
nullify the order of the Court of First Instance of Leyte in Civil Case No. 1912, dated
March 21, 1956, relieving Segundino Refuerzo of liability for the contract entered
into between the former and the Philippine Fibers Producers Co., Inc., of which
Refuerzo is the president. The facts of the case are as f ollows:
Manuela T. Vda. de Salvatierra appeared to be the owner of a parcel of land
located at Maghobas, Poblacin, Burauen, Leyte. On March 7, 1954, said landholder
entered into a contract of lease with the Philippine Fibers Producers Co., Inc.,
allegedly a corporation "duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines, domiciled at Burauen, Leyte, Philippines, and with business address
therein, represented in this instance by Mr. Segundino Q. Refuerzo, the President".
It was provided in said contract, among other things, that the lifetime of the lease
would be for a period of 10 years; that the land would be planted to kenaf, ramie or
other crops suitable to the soil; that the lessor would be entitled to 30 per cent of the
net income accruing from the harvest of any crop without being responsible for the
cost of production thereof; and that after every harvest, the lessee was bound to
declare at the earliest possible time the income derived therefrom and to deliver the
corresponding share due the lessor.
Apparently, the aforementioned obligations imposed on the alleged corporation
were not complied with because on April 5, 1955, Manuela T. Vda. de Salvatierra
filed
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Vda.deSalvatierravs.Hon,Garlitosetc.,andRefuerzo

with the Court of First Instance of Leyte a complaint against the Philippine Fibers
Producers Co., Inc., and Segundino Q. Refuerzo, for accounting, rescission and
damages (Civil Case No. 1912). She averred that sometime in April, 1954,
defendants planted kenaf on 3 hectares of the leased property which crop was, at
the time of the commencement of the action, already harvested, processed and sold
by defendants; that notwithstanding that fact, defendants refused to render an
accounting of the income derived therefrom and to deliver the lessor's share; that
the estimated gross income was P4,500, and the deductible expenses amounted to

P1,000; that as defendants' refusal to undertake such task was in violation of the
terms of the covenant entered into between the plaintiff and defendant corporation,
a rescission was but proper.
As defendants apparently failed to file their answer to the complaint, of which
they were allegedly notified, the Court declared them in default and proceeded to
receive plaintiff's evidence. On June 8, 1955, the lower Court rendered judgment
granting plaintiff's prayer, and required defendants to render a complete accounting
of the harvest of the land subject of the proceeding within 15 days from receipt of
the decision and to deliver 30 per cent of the net income realized from the last
harvest to plaintiff, with legal interest from the date defendants received payment
for said crop. It was further provided that upon defendants' failure to abide by the
said requirement, the gross income would be fixed at P4,200 or a net income of
P3,200 after deducting the expenses for production, 30 per cent of which or P960
was held to be due the plaintiff pursuant to the aforementioned contract of lease,
which was declared rescinded.
No appeal therefrom having been perfected within the reglementary period, the
Court, upon motion of plaintiff, issued a writ of execution, in virtue of which the
Provincial Sheriff of Leyte caused the attachment of 3
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parcels of land registered in the name of Segundino Refuerzo. No property of the

Philippine Fibers Producers Co., Inc., was found available for attachment.
On January 31, 1956, defendant Segundino Refuerzo filed a motion claiming that
the decision rendered in said Civil Case No. 1912 was null and void with respect to
him, there being no allegation in the complaint pointing to his personal liability and
thus prayed that an order be issued limiting such liability to defendant corporation.
Over plaintiff's opposition, the Court a quo granted the same and ordered the
Provincial Sheriff of Leyte to release all properties belonging to the movant that
might have already been attached, after finding that the evidence on record made no
mention or referred to any fact which might hold movant personally liable therein.
As plaintifFs petition for relief from said order was denied, Manuela T. Vda. de
Salvatierra instituted the instant action asserting that the trial Judge in issuing the
order complained of, acted with grave abuse of discretion and prayed that same be
declared a nullity.
From the foregoing narration of facts, it is clear that the order sought to be
nullified was issued by the respondent Judge upon motion of defendant Refuerzo,
obviously pursuant to Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. Section 3 of said Rule, however,
in providing for the period within which such a motion may be filed, prescribes that:

"SEC. 3. WHEN PETITION FILED; CONTENTS AND VERIFICATION.A petition

provided for in either of the preceding sections of this rule must be verified, filed within
sixty days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, order, or other proceeding to be set
aside, and not more than six months after such judgment or order was entered, or such
proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavit showing the fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good

and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be, which he may prove if his
petition be granted". (Rule 38)

The aforequoted provision treats of 2 periods, i.e., 80 days after petitioner learns of
the judgment, and not
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more than 6 months after the judgment or order was rendered, both of which must
be satisfied. As the decision in the case at bar was under date of June 8, 1955,
whereas the motion filed by respondent Refuerzo was dated January 31, 1956, or
after the lapse of 7 months and 23 days, the filing of the aforementioned motion was
clearly made beyond the prescriptive period provided for by the rules, The remedy
allowed by Rule 38 to a party adversely affected by a decision or order is certainly an
act of grace or benevolence intended to afford said litigant a penultimate
opportunity to protect his interest. Considering the nature of such relief and the
purpose behind it, the periods fixed by said rule are non-extendible and never
interrupted; nor could it be subjected to any condition or contingency because it is of
itself devised to meet a condition or contingency (Palomares vs. Jimenez, G. R. No.
L-4513, January 31, 1952). On this score alone, therefore, the petition for a writ of
certiorari filed herein may be granted. However, taking note of the question
presented by the motion for relief involved herein, We deem it wise to delve in and
pass upon the merit of the same.
Refuerzo, in praying for his exoneration from any liability resulting from the nonfulfillment of the obligation imposed on defendant Philippine Fibers Producers Co.,
Inc., interposed the defense that the complaint filed with the lower court contained
no allegation which would hold him liable personally, for while it was stated therein
that he was a signatory to the lease contract, he did so in his capacity as president
of the corporation. And this allegation was found by the Court a quo to be supported
by the records. Plaintiff on the other hand tried to refute this averment by
contending that her failure to specify defendant's personal liability was due to the
fact that all the time she was under the impression that the Philippine Fibers
Producers Co., Inc., represented by Refuerzo was a duly registered corporation as
appearing in the con*

_____________
*

90 Phil., 773.

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tract, but a subsequent inquiry from the Securities & Exchange Commission yielded
otherwise, While as a general rule a person who has contracted or dealt with an
association in such a way as to recognize its existence as a corporate body is
estopped from denying the same in an action arising out of such transaction or
dealing, (Asia Banking Corporation vs. Standard Products Co., 46 Phil.,
144; Compaia Agrcola de Ultramar vs. Reyes, 4 Phil., 1;Ohta Development
Co. vs. Steamship Pompey, 49 Phil., 117), yet this doctrine may not be held to be

applicable where fraud takes a part in the said transaction. In the instant case, on
plaintiff's charge that she was unaware of the fact that the Philippine Fibers
Producers Co., Inc., had no juridical personality, defendant Refuerzo gave no
confirmation or denial and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
contract lead to the inescapable conclusion that plaintiff Manuela T. Vda. de
Salvatierra was really made to believe that such corporation was duly organized in
accordance with law.
There can be no question that a corporation when registered has a juridical
personality separate and distinct from its component members or stockholders and
officers such that a corporation cannot be held liable for the personal indebtedness
of a stockholder even if he should be its president (Walter A. Smith Co. vs. Ford, SCG. R. No. 42420) and conversely, a stockholder or member cannot be held personally
liable for any financial obligation by the corporation in excess of his unpaid
subscription. But this rule is understood to refer merely to registered corporations
and cannot be made applicable to the liability of members of an unincorporated
association. The reason behind this doctrine is obvioussince an organization
which before the law is non-existent has no personality and would be incompetent to
act and appropriate for itself the powers and attribute of a corporation as provided
by law; it cannot create agents or confer
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PHILIPPINEREPORTSANNOTATED
Vda.deSalvatierravs.Hon.Garlitosetc.,andRefuerzo

authority on another to act in its behalf; thus, those who act or purport to act as its
representatives or agents do so without authority and at their own risk. And as it is
an elementary principle of law that a person who acts as an agent without authority
or without a principal is himself regarded as the principal, possessed of all the
rights and subject to all the liabilities of a principal, a person acting or purporting
to act on behalf of a corporation which has no valid existence assumes such
privileges and obligations and becomes personally liable for contracts entered into
or for other acts performed as such agent (Fay vs. Noble, 7 Cushing [Mass.] 188.
Cited in II Tolentino's Commercial Laws of the Philippines, Fifth Ed., p. 689-690).
Considering that defendant Refuerzo, as president of the unregistered corporation
Philippine Fibers Producers Co., Inc., was the moving spirit behind the
consummation of the lease agreement by acting as its representative, his liability
cannot be limited or restricted to that imposed upon corporate shareholders. In
acting on behalf of a corporation which he knew to be unregistered, he assumed the
risk of reaping the consequential damages or resultant rights, if any, arising out of
such transaction.
Wherefore, the order of the lower Court of March 21, 1956, amending its previous
decision on this matter and ordering the Provincial Sheriff of Leyte to release any
and all properties of movant therein which might have been attached in the
execution of such judgment, is hereby set aside and nullified as if it had never been
issued. With costs against respondent Segundino Refuerzo. It is so ordered.
Pars,
C.
J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes,
A., Bautista
Angelo, Labrador, Concepcin, Reyes, J. B. L., andEndencia, JJ., concur.

Order set aside and nullified.

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