FIRST DIVISION

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY

(SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T.
CABIGAO and BONIFACIO S.
TUMBOKON,
Petitioners,

-versus-

G.R. No. 156052

Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR.,

in his capacity as Mayor of the
City of Manila,
Respondent.
x----------------------x

CHEVRON PHILIPPINES INC.,

PETRON CORPORATION and
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION,
Movants-Intervenors.

x----------------------x

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY,
Movant-Intervenor.

Promulgated:
February 13, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:

After we promulgated our decision in this case on March 7,

2007, Chevron Philippines Inc. (Chevron), Petron Corporation
(Petron)

and

Pilipinas

Shell

Petroleum

Corporation

(Shell)

(collectively, the oil companies) and the Republic of the Philippines,

represented by the Department of Energy (DOE), filed their
respective motions for leave to intervene and for reconsideration of
the decision.
Chevron[1] is

engaged

in

the

business

of

importing,

distributing and marketing of petroleum products in the Philippines

while

Shell

and

Petron

are

engaged

in

the

business

of

manufacturing, refining and likewise importing, distributing and

marketing of petroleum products in the Philippines. [2] The DOE is a
governmental

agency

created

under

Republic

Act

(RA)

No.

7638[3] and tasked to prepare, integrate, coordinate, supervise and

control

all

plans,

programs,

projects

and

activities

of

the

government relative to energy exploration, development, utilization,

distribution and conservation.[4]
The facts are restated briefly as follows:
Petitioners Social Justice Society, Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao
and

Bonifacio

S.

Tumbokon,

in

an

original

petition

for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, sought to

compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the City
of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. This ordinance was
enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila on November 20,
2001,[5] approved by respondent Mayor on November 28, 2001,
[6]

and became effective on December 28, 2001 after publication.

[7]

Sections 1 and 3 thereof state:

SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning
and ensuring health, public safety, and general welfare of the
residents of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas,
the land use of [those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig
River in the north, PNR Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in the
south, Palumpong St. in the southwest, and Estero de Pandacan
in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the northwest area, Estero de
Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River in the southeast and Dr.
M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana
bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 St.,
and F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from Industrial II to
Commercial I.
xxx

xxx

xxx

SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses,

the operation of which are no longer permitted under Section 1
hereof, are hereby given a period of six (6) months from the date
of effectivity of this Ordinance within which to cease and desist
from the operation of businesses which are hereby in
consequence, disallowed.

Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein

from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and
operators of businesses disallowed under the reclassification to
cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months
from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses
situated in the area are the so-called Pandacan Terminals of the
oil companies.
On June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of
Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU)
[8]

with the oil companies. They agreed that the scaling down of the

Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No.
97.[9] In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU
was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002.
[10]

Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted

Resolution No. 13[11] extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to

April 30, 2003 and authorizing the mayor of Manila to issue special
business permits to the oil companies.[12]

This was the factual backdrop presented to the Court which

became the basis of our March 7, 2007 decision. We ruled that
respondent had the ministerial duty under the Local Government
Code (LGC) to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the
governance of the city,[13]including Ordinance No. 8027. We also
held that we need not resolve the issue of whether the MOU entered
into by respondent with the oil companies and the subsequent
resolutions passed by the Sanggunian could amend or repeal
Ordinance No. 8027 since the resolutions which ratified the MOU
and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force
and effect only until April 30, 2003. We concluded that there was
nothing that legally hindered respondent from enforcing Ordinance
No. 8027.
After we rendered our decision on March 7, 2007, the oil
companies and DOE sought to intervene and filed motions for
reconsideration in intervention on March 12, 2007 and March 21,
2007 respectively. On April 11, 2007, we conducted the oral
arguments in Baguio City to hear petitioners, respondent and
movants-intervenors oil companies and DOE.
The oil companies called our attention to the fact that on April
25, 2003, Chevron had filed a complaint against respondent and
the City of Manila in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 39, for the annulment of Ordinance No. 8027 with
application for writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and

preliminary mandatory injunction.[14] The case was docketed as civil

case no. 03-106377. On the same day, Shell filed a petition for
prohibition

and mandamus likewise

assailing

the

validity

of

Ordinance No. 8027 and with application for writs of preliminary

prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction.
[15]

This was docketed as civil case no. 03-106380. Later on, these

two cases were consolidated and the RTC of Manila, Branch 39

issued an order dated May 19, 2003 granting the applications for
writs

of

preliminary

prohibitory

injunction

and

preliminary

mandatory injunction:
WHEREFORE, upon the filing of a total bond of TWO
MILLION (Php 2,000,000.00) PESOS, let a Writ of Preliminary
Prohibitory Injunction be issued ordering [respondent] and the City
of Manila, their officers, agents, representatives, successors, and
any other persons assisting or acting in their behalf, during the
pendency of the case, to REFRAIN from taking steps to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027, and let a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction be issued ordering [respondent] to issue [Chevron and
Shell] the necessary Business Permits to operate at the
Pandacan Terminal.[16]

Petron likewise filed its own petition in the RTC of Manila,

Branch 42, also attacking the validity of Ordinance No. 8027 with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order (TRO). This was docketed as civil case
no. 03-106379. In an order dated August 4, 2004, the RTC
enjoined the parties to maintain the status quo. [17]

Thereafter, in 2006, the city council of Manila enacted

Ordinance No. 8119, also known as the Manila Comprehensive
Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006. [18] This was approved
by respondent on June 16, 2006.[19]
Aggrieved anew, Chevron and Shell filed a complaint in the
RTC of Manila, Branch 20, asking for the nullification of Ordinance
No. 8119.[20] This was docketed as civil case no. 06-115334. Petron
filed its own complaint on the same causes of action in the RTC of
Manila, Branch 41.[21] This was docketed as civil case no. 07116700.[22] The court issued a TRO in favor of Petron, enjoining the
City of Manila and respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8119.
[23]

Meanwhile, in civil case no. 03-106379, the parties filed a joint

motion to withdraw complaint and counterclaim on February 20,
2007.[24]In an order dated April 23, 2007, the joint motion was
granted and all the claims and counterclaims of the parties were
withdrawn.[25]
Given these additional pieces of information, the following
were submitted as issues for our resolution:
1. whether

movants-intervenors

intervene in this case;[26]

should

be

allowed

to

2. whether the following are impediments to the execution

of our March 7, 2007 decision:
(a) Ordinance No. 8119, the enactment and
existence of which were not previously brought
by the parties to the attention of the Court and
(b) writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and
preliminary mandatory injunction and status
quo order issued by the RTC of Manila,
Branches 39 and 42 and
3. whether the implementation of Ordinance No. 8027 will
unduly encroach upon the DOEs powers and functions
involving energy resources.
During the oral arguments, the parties submitted to this
Courts power to rule on the constitutionality and validity of
Ordinance No. 8027 despite the pendency of consolidated cases
involving this issue in the RTC. [27] The importance of settling this
controversy

as

fully

and

as

expeditiously

as

possible

was

emphasized, considering its impact on public interest. Thus, we

will also dispose of this issue here. The parties were after all given
ample

opportunity

to

present

and

argue

their

respective

positions. By so doing, we will do away with the delays concomitant

with litigation and completely adjudicate an issue which will most
likely reach us anyway as the final arbiter of all legal disputes.

Before we resolve these issues, a brief review of the history of

the Pandacan Terminals is called for to put our discussion in the
proper context.

HISTORY OF THE PANDACAN

OIL TERMINALS

Pandacan (one of the districts of the City of Manila) is

situated along the banks of the Pasig river. At the turn of the
twentieth century, Pandacan was unofficially designated as the
industrial center of Manila. The area, then largely uninhabited, was
ideal for various emerging industries as the nearby river facilitated
the transportation of goods and products. In the 1920s, it was
classified as an industrial zone. [28] Among its early industrial settlers
were the oil companies. Shell established its installation there on
January 30, 1914.[29] Caltex (now Chevron) followed suit in 1917
when the company began marketing its products in the country.
[30]

In 1922, it built a warehouse depot which was later converted

into a key distribution terminal.[31] The corporate presence in the

Philippines of Esso (Petrons predecessor) became more keenly felt
when it won a concession to build and operate a refinery in Bataan
in 1957.[32] It then went on to operate a state-of-the-art lube oil
blending plant in the Pandacan Terminals where it manufactures
lubes and greases.[33]

On December 8, 1941, the Second World War reached the

shores of the Philippine Islands. Although Manila was declared an
open city, the Americans had no interest in welcoming the
Japanese. In fact, in their zealous attempt to fend off the Japanese
Imperial Army, the United States Army took control of the Pandacan
Terminals and hastily made plans to destroy the storage facilities to
deprive the advancing Japanese Army of a valuable logistics
weapon.[34] The U.S. Army burned unused petroleum, causing a
frightening conflagration. Historian Nick Joaquin recounted the
events as follows:
After the USAFFE evacuated the City late in December 1941, all
army fuel storage dumps were set on fire. The flames spread,
enveloping the City in smoke, setting even the rivers ablaze,
endangering bridges and all riverside buildings. For one week
longer, the open city blazeda cloud of smoke by day, a pillar of
fire by night.[35]

The fire consequently destroyed the Pandacan Terminals and

rendered its network of depots and service stations inoperative. [36]
After the war, the oil depots were reconstructed. Pandacan
changed as Manila rebuilt itself. The three major oil companies
resumed the operation of their depots. [37] But the district was no
longer a sparsely populated industrial zone; it had evolved into a
bustling, hodgepodge community. Today, Pandacan has become a
densely populated area inhabited by about 84,000 people, majority

of whom are urban poor who call it home. [38] Aside from numerous
industrial installations, there are also small businesses, churches,
restaurants, schools, daycare centers and residences situated there.
[39]

Malacaang Palace, the official residence of the President of the

Philippines and the seat of governmental power, is just two

kilometers away.[40] There is a private school near the Petron depot.
Along the walls of the Shell facility are shanties of informal settlers.
[41]

More than 15,000 students are enrolled in elementary and high

schools situated near these facilities. [42] A university with a student

population of about 25,000 is located directly across the depot on
the banks of the Pasig river.[43]
The 36-hectare Pandacan Terminals house the oil companies
distribution terminals and depot facilities.[44] The refineries of
Chevron and Shell in Tabangao and Bauan, both in Batangas,
respectively, are connected to the Pandacan Terminals through a
114-kilometer[45]underground pipeline system.[46] Petrons refinery in
Limay, Bataan, on the other hand, also services the depot. [47] The
terminals store fuel and other petroleum products and supply 95%
of the fuel requirements of Metro Manila, [48] 50% of Luzons
consumption and 35% nationwide.[49] Fuel can also be transported
through barges along the Pasig river or tank trucks via the South
Luzon Expressway.
We now discuss the first issue: whether movants-intervenors
should be allowed to intervene in this case.

INTERVENTION OF THE OIL COMPANIES

AND THE DOE SHOULD BE ALLOWED IN
THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE

Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally

impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable
him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be
affected by such proceedings.[50] The pertinent rules are Sections 1
and 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 1.
Who may intervene. A person who has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either
of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property
in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave
of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and
whether or not the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a
separate proceeding.
SEC. 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may
be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court.
A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the
motion and served on the original parties.

Thus, the following are the requisites for intervention of a nonparty:

(1)

Legal interest
(a)
(b)
I

in the matter in controversy; or

in the success of either of the parties; or
against both parties; or

(d)

person is so situated as to be adversely affected by

a distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court or of an officer thereof;

(2)

Intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the

adjudication of rights of original parties;

(3)

Intervenors rights may not be fully protected in a separate

proceeding[51] and

(g)The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before

rendition of judgment by the trial court.

For both the oil companies and DOE, the last requirement is
definitely absent. As a rule, intervention is allowed before
rendition of judgment as Section 2, Rule 19 expressly provides.
Both

filed

their

separate

motions

after

our

decision

was

promulgated. In Republic of the Philippines v. Gingoyon,[52] a recently

decided case which was also an original action filed in this Court,
we declared that the appropriate time to file the motions-inintervention was before and not after resolution of the case. [53]
The Court, however, has recognized exceptions to Section 2,
Rule 19 in the interest of substantial justice:
The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure, is
intended to make the powers of the Court fully and completely
available for justice. It is aimed to facilitate a comprehensive
adjudication of rival claims overriding technicalities on the
timeliness of the filing thereof.[54]

The oil companies assert that they have a legal interest in this
case because the implementation of Ordinance No. 8027 will
directly affect their business and property rights. [55]
[T]he interest which entitles a person to intervene in a suit
between other parties must be in the matter in litigation and of
such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either
gain or lose by direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.
Otherwise, if persons not parties to the action were allowed to
intervene, proceedings would become unnecessarily complicated,
expensive and interminable. And this would be against the policy
of the law. The words an interest in the subject means a direct
interest in the cause of action as pleaded, one that would put the
intervenor in a legal position to litigate a fact alleged in the
complaint without the establishment of which plaintiff could not
recover.[56]

We agree that the oil companies have a direct and immediate

interest in the implementation of Ordinance No. 8027. Their claim
is that they will need to spend billions of pesos if they are compelled
to relocate their oil depots out of Manila. Considering that they
admitted knowing about this case from the time of its filing on
December 4, 2002, they should have intervened long before our
March 7, 2007 decision to protect their interests. But they did not.
[57]

Neither did they offer any worthy explanation to justify their late

intervention.
Be that as it may, although their motion for intervention was
not filed on time, we will allow it because they raised and presented
novel issues and arguments that were not considered by the Court

in its March 7, 2007 decision. After all, the allowance or

disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court before which the case is pending.
[58]

Considering the compelling reasons favoring intervention, we do

not think that this will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
rights of the original parties. In fact, it will be expedited since their
intervention will enable us to rule on the constitutionality of
Ordinance No. 8027 instead of waiting for the RTCs decision.
The DOE, on the other hand, alleges that its interest in this
case is also direct and immediate as Ordinance No. 8027
encroaches upon its exclusive and national authority over matters
affecting the oil industry. It seeks to intervene in order to represent
the interests of the members of the public who stand to suffer if the
Pandacan Terminals operations are discontinued. We will tackle the
issue of the alleged encroachment into DOEs domain later
on. Suffice it to say at this point that, for the purpose of hearing all
sides and considering the transcendental importance of this case,
we will also allow DOEs intervention.

THE INJUNCTIVE WRITS ARE NOT

IMPEDIMENTS
TO
THE
ENFORCEMENT OF ORDINANCE NO.
8027

Under Rule 65, Section 3[59] of the Rules of Court, a petition

for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust or station. According to the oil companies, respondent did not
unlawfully fail or neglect to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 because he
was lawfully prevented from doing so by virtue of the injunctive
writs and status quo order issued by the RTC of Manila, Branches
39 and 42.
First, we note that while Chevron and Shell still have in their
favor the writs of preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory
injunction, the status quo order in favor of Petron is no longer in
effect since the court granted the joint motion of the parties to
withdraw the complaint and counterclaim.[60]
Second, the original parties failed to inform the Court about
these injunctive writs. Respondent (who was also impleaded as a
party in the RTC cases) defends himself by saying that he informed
the court of the pendency of the civil cases and that a TRO was
issued by the RTC in the consolidated cases filed by Chevron and
Shell. It is true that had the oil companies only intervened much
earlier, the Court would not have been left in the dark about these
facts. Nevertheless, respondent should have updated the Court, by
way of manifestation, on such a relevant matter.

In his memorandum, respondent mentioned the issuance of a

TRO. Under Section 5 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a TRO
issued by the RTC is effective only for a period of 20 days. This is
why, in our March 7, 2007 decision, we presumed with certainty
that this had already lapsed.[61] Respondent also mentioned the
grant of injunctive writs in his rejoinder which the Court, however,
expunged for being a prohibited pleading. The parties and their
counsels were clearly remiss in their duties to this Court.
In resolving controversies, courts can only consider facts and
issues pleaded by the parties. [62] Courts, as well as magistrates
presiding over them are not omniscient. They can only act on the
facts and issues presented before them in appropriate pleadings.
They may not even substitute their own personal knowledge for
evidence. Nor may they take notice of matters except those
expressly provided as subjects of mandatory judicial notice.
We now proceed to the issue of whether the injunctive writs
are legal impediments to the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027.
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court enumerates the
grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction:
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. A
preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a)
the

That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and

whole or part of such relief consists in restraining

the
commission or continuance of the act or acts complained
of,
or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for
a
limited period or perpetually;
(b)
That the commission, continuance or nonperformance of
the act or acts complained of during the litigation would
probably
work injustice to the applicant; or

(g)

IThat a party, court, agency or a person is doing,

threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done,
some act or acts probably in
violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render
the judgment ineffectual.

There are two requisites for the issuance of a preliminary

injunction: (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie and (2) the
acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be
proven that the violation sought to be prevented will cause an
irreparable injustice.
The act sought to be restrained here was the enforcement of
Ordinance No. 8027. It is a settled rule that an ordinance enjoys the
presumption of validity and, as such, cannot be restrained by
injunction.[63] Nevertheless, when the validity of the ordinance is
assailed, the courts are not precluded from issuing an injunctive
writ against its enforcement. However, we have declared that the
issuance of said writ is proper only when:
... the petitioner assailing the ordinance has made out a case of
unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome, in the mind
of the judge, the presumption of validity, in addition to a

showing of a clear legal right to the remedy sought....

[64]
(Emphasis supplied)

Judge Reynaldo G. Ros, in his order dated May 19, 2003,

stated his basis for issuing the injunctive writs:
The Court, in resolving whether or not a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction or Preliminary Mandatory Injunction should be issued, is
guided by the following requirements: (1) a clear legal right of the
complainant; (2) a violation of that right; and (3) a permanent and
urgent necessity for the Writ to prevent serious damage. The
Court believes that these requisites are present in these cases.
There is no doubt that the plaintiff/petitioners have
been legitimately operating their business in the Pandacan
Terminal for many years and they have made substantial capital
investment therein. Every year they were issued Business
Permits by the City of Manila. Its operations have not been
declared illegal or contrary to law or morals. In fact, because of its
vital importance to the national economy, it was included in the
Investment Priorities Plan as mandated under the Downstream
Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1988 (R.A. 8479). As a lawful
business, the plaintiff/petitioners have a right, therefore, to
continue their operation in the Pandacan Terminal and the right to
protect their investments. This is a clear and unmistakable right of
the plaintiff/petitioners.
The enactment, therefore, of City Ordinance No. 8027
passed by the City Council of Manila reclassifying the area where
the Pandacan Terminal is located from Industrial II to Commercial
I and requiring the plaintiff/petitioners to cease and desist from the
operation of their business has certainly violated the rights of the
plaintiff/petitioners to continue their legitimate business in the
Pandacan Terminal and deprived them of their huge investments
they put up therein. Thus, before the Court, therefore, determines
whether the Ordinance in question is valid or not, a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and a Writ of Mandatory Injunction be
issued to prevent serious and irreparable damage to
plaintiff/petitioners.[65]

Nowhere in the judges discussion can we see that, in

addition to a showing of a clear legal right of Chevron and Shell
to the remedy sought, he was convinced that they had made
out a case of unconstitutionality or invalidity strong enough to
overcome

the

presumption

of

validity

of

the

ordinance. Statutes and ordinances are presumed valid unless

and until the courts declare the contrary in clear and unequivocal
terms.[66] The mere fact that the ordinance is alleged to be
unconstitutional or invalid will not entitle a party to have its
enforcement

enjoined.[67] The

presumption

is

all

in

favor

validity. The reason for this is obvious:

The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be
lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things,
be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and
with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject
and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the
ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are
essential to the well being of the people . . . The Judiciary should
not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear
invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police
regulation.[68]
X x x
...[Courts] accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to
abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary[,] in the
determination of actual cases and controversies[,] must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.[69]

of

The oil companies argue that this presumption must be set

aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face
of the ordinance itself.[70] We see no reason to set aside the
presumption. The ordinance, on its face, does not at all appear to be
unconstitutional. It reclassified the subject area from industrial to
commercial. Prima facie, this power is within the power of municipal
corporations:
The power of municipal corporations to divide their territory into
industrial, commercial and residential zones is recognized in
almost all jurisdictions inasmuch as it is derived from the police
power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of their
inhabitants.[71]
X x x
There can be no doubt that the City of Manila has
the power to divide its territory into residential and industrial
zones, and to prescribe that offensive and unwholesome trades
and occupations are to be established exclusively in the latter
zone.
Xxx

xxx

xxx

Likewise, it cannot be denied that the City of

Manila has the authority, derived from the police power, of
forbidding the appellant to continue the manufacture oftoyo in the
zone where it is now situated, which has been declared
residential....[72]

Courts will not invalidate an ordinance unless it clearly

appears that it is unconstitutional. There is no such showing here.

Therefore, the injunctive writs issued in the Manila RTCs May 19,
2003 order had no leg to stand on.
We are aware that the issuance of these injunctive writs is not
being assailed as tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

However,

we are confronted with the question of whether these writs issued

by a lower court are impediments to the enforcement of Ordinance
No. 8027 (which is the subject of the mandamus petition). As
already discussed, we rule in the negative.

ORDINANCE NO. 8027 WAS NOT

SUPERSEDED BY ORDINANCE NO. 8119

The March 7, 2007 decision did not take into consideration the
passage of Ordinance No. 8119 entitled An Ordinance Adopting the
Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Regulations of
2006 and Providing for the Administration, Enforcement and
Amendment thereto which was approved by respondent on June
16, 2006. The simple reason was that the Court was never
informed about this ordinance.
While courts are required to take judicial notice of the laws
enacted by Congress, the rule with respect to local ordinances is
different. Ordinances are not included in the enumeration of

matters covered by mandatory judicial notice under Section 1, Rule

129 of the Rules of Court.[73]
Although, Section 50 of RA 409[74] provides that:
SEC. 50 Judicial notice of ordinances. - All courts sitting
in the city shall take judicial notice of the ordinances passed by
the [Sangguniang Panglungsod].

This cannot be taken to mean that this Court, since it has its seat
in the City of Manila, should have taken steps to procure a copy of
the ordinance on its own, relieving the party of any duty to inform
the Court about it.
Even where there is a statute that requires a court to take
judicial notice of municipal ordinances, a court is not required to
take judicial notice of ordinances that are not before it and to which
it does not have access. The party asking the court to take judicial
notice is obligated to supply the court with the full text of the rules
the party desires it to have notice of. [75] Counsel should take the
initiative in requesting that a trial court take judicial notice of an
ordinance even where a statute requires courts to take judicial
notice of local ordinances.[76]
The intent of a statute requiring a court to take judicial notice
of a local ordinance is to remove any discretion a court might have
in determining whether or not to take notice of an ordinance. Such
a statute does not direct the court to act on its own in obtaining

evidence for the record and a party must make the ordinance
available to the court for it to take notice.[77]
In its defense, respondent claimed that he did not inform the
Court about the enactment of Ordinance No. 8119 because he
believed that it was different from Ordinance No. 8027 and that the
two were not inconsistent with each other.[78]
In the same way that we deem the intervenors late
intervention in this case unjustified, we find the failure of
respondent, who was an original party here, inexcusable.

THE RULE ON JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS

IS
NOT
APPLICABLE
AGAINST
RESPONDENT

The oil companies assert that respondent judicially admitted

that Ordinance No. 8027 was repealed by Ordinance No. 8119 in
civil case no. 03-106379 (where Petron assailed the constitutionality
of Ordinance No. 8027) when the parties in their joint motion to
withdraw complaint and counterclaim stated that the issue ...has
been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the passage of
[Ordinance No. 8119].[79] They contend that such admission worked
as an estoppel against the respondent.

Respondent countered that this stipulation simply meant that

Petron was recognizing the validity and legality of Ordinance No.
8027 and that it had conceded the issue of said ordinances
constitutionality,

opting

instead

to

question

the

validity

of

Ordinance No. 8119.[80] The oil companies deny this and further
argue that respondent, in his answer in civil case no. 06-115334
(where Chevron and Shell are asking for the nullification of
Ordinance No. 8119), expressly stated that Ordinance No. 8119
replaced Ordinance No. 8027:[81]
... Under Ordinance No. 8027, businesses whose uses are not in
accord with the reclassification were given six months to cease
[their] operation. Ordinance No. 8119, which in effect, replaced
Ordinance [No.] 8027, merely took note of the time frame
provided for in Ordinance No. 8119.... Ordinance No. 8119 thus
provided for an even longer term, that is[,] seven years;
[82]
(Emphasis supplied)

Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4.
Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or
written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the
same case, does not require proof. The admission may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made. (Emphasis
supplied)

While it is true that a party making a judicial admission

cannot subsequently take a position contrary to or inconsistent
with what was pleaded,[83] the aforestated rule is not applicable
here. Respondent made the statements regarding the ordinances in

civil case nos. 03-106379 and 06-115334 which are not the same
as this case before us.[84] To constitute a judicial admission, the
admission must be made in the same case in which it is offered.
Hence, respondent is not estopped from claiming that
Ordinance No. 8119 did not supersede Ordinance No. 8027. On the
contrary, it is the oil companies which should be considered
estopped. They rely on the argument that Ordinance No. 8119
superseded Ordinance No. 8027 but, at the same time, also impugn
its (8119s) validity. We frown on the adoption of inconsistent
positions and distrust any attempt at clever positioning under one
or the other on the basis of what appears advantageous at the
moment. Parties cannot take vacillating or contrary positions
regarding the validity of a statute [85] or ordinance. Nonetheless, we
will look into the merits of the argument of implied repeal.

ORDINANCE NO. 8119 DID NOT

IMPLIEDLY REPEAL ORDINANCE NO.
8027

Both the oil companies and DOE argue that Ordinance No.
8119 repealed Ordinance No. 8027. They assert that although
there was no express repeal[86] of Ordinance No. 8027, Ordinance
No. 8119 impliedly repealed it.

According

to

the

oil

companies,

Ordinance

No.

8119

reclassified the area covering the Pandacan Terminals to High

Density

Residential/Mixed

Use

Zone

(R-3/MXD) [87] whereas

Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the same area from Industrial II to

Commercial I:
SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning
and ensuring health, public safety, and general welfare of the
residents of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas,
the land use of [those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig
River in the north, PNR Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in the
south, Palumpong St. in the southwest, and Estero de Pancacan
in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the northwest area, Estero de
Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River in the southeast and Dr.
M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana
bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 St.,
and F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from Industrial II
to Commercial I. (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, Ordinance No. 8119 provides for a phase-out of seven

years:
SEC. 72. Existing Non-Conforming Uses and Buildings. - The
lawful use of any building, structure or land at the time of the
adoption of this Ordinance may be continued, although such use
does not conform with the provision of the Ordinance, provided:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(g) In case the non-conforming use is an industrial use:

xxx

xxx

xxx

d. The land use classified as non-conforming shall

program the phase-out and relocation of the non-

conforming use within seven (7) years from the date

of effectivity of this Ordinance. (Emphasis supplied)

This is opposed to Ordinance No. 8027 which compels affected

entities to vacate the area within six months from the effectivity of
the ordinance:
SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses,
the operation of which are no longer permitted under Section 1
hereof, are hereby given a period of six (6) months from the date
of effectivity of this Ordinance within which to cease and desist
from the operation of businesses which are hereby in
consequence, disallowed.

Ordinance No. 8119 also designated the Pandacan oil depot

area as a Planned Unit Development/Overlay Zone (O-PUD):
SEC. 23. Use Regulations in Planned Unit Development/Overlay
Zone (O-PUD). O-PUD Zones are identified specific sites in the
City of Manila wherein the project site is comprehensively planned
as an entity via unitary site plan which permits flexibility in
planning/ design, building siting, complementarily of building types
and land uses, usable open spaces and the preservation of
significant natural land features, pursuant to regulations specified
for each particular PUD. Enumerated below are identified PUD:
xxx

xxx

xxx

6. Pandacan Oil Depot Area

xxx

xxx

xxx

Enumerated below are the allowable uses:

1.
all uses allowed in all zones where it is located

2.
3.

the [Land Use Intensity Control (LUIC)] under which zones

are located shall, in all instances be complied with
the validity of the prescribed LUIC shall only be
[superseded] by the development controls and regulations
specified for each PUD as provided for each PUD as
provided for by the masterplan of respective PUDs.
[88]
(Emphasis supplied)

Respondent claims that in passing Ordinance No. 8119,

the Sanggunian did not intend to repeal Ordinance No. 8027 but
meant instead to carry over 8027s provisions to 8119 for the
purpose of making Ordinance No. 8027 applicable to the oil
companies even after the passage of Ordinance No. 8119. [89] He
quotes an excerpt from the minutes of the July 27, 2004 session of
the Sanggunian during the first reading of Ordinance No. 8119:
Member GARCIA: Your Honor, iyong patungkol po roon
sa oil depot doon sa amin sa Sixth District sa Pandacan, wala
pong nakalagay eith sa ordinansa rito na taliwas o kakaiba roon
sa ordinansang ipinasa noong nakaraang Konseho, iyong
Ordinance No. 8027. So kung ano po ang nandirito sa ordinansa
na ipinasa ninyo last time, iyon lang po ang ni-lift eithe at inilagay
eith. At eith eith ordinansang iyong naipasa ng huling
Konseho, niri-classify [ninyo] from Industrial II to Commercial C-1
ang area ng Pandacan kung nasaan ang oil depot. So ini-lift lang
po [eithe] iyong definition, density, at saka po yon pong ng
noong ordinansa ninyo na siya eith naming inilagay eith, iniba
lang po naming iyong title. So wala po kaming binago na
taliwas o nailagay na taliwas doon sa ordinansang ipinasa
ninyo, ni-lift lang po [eithe] from Ordinance No.
8027.[90] (Emphasis supplied)

We agree with respondent.

Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a

statute of later date clearly reveals the intention of the legislature to
abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given
effect.[91]
There are two kinds of implied repeal. The first is: where the
provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are
irreconcilably contradictory, the latter act, to the extent of the
conflict, constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. [92] The
second is: if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one
and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the
earlier law.[93] The oil companies argue that the situation here falls
under the first category.
Implied repeals are not favored and will not be so declared
unless the intent of the legislators is manifest. [94] As statutes and
ordinances

are

presumed

to

be

passed

only

after

careful

deliberation and with knowledge of all existing ones on the subject,

it follows that, in passing a law, the legislature did not intend to
interfere with or abrogate a former law relating to the same subject
matter.[95] If the intent to repeal is not clear, the later act should be
construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the earlier
act.[96]
These standards are deeply enshrined in our jurisprudence.
We disagree that, in enacting Ordinance No. 8119, there was any

indication of the legislative purpose to repeal Ordinance No. 8027.

[97]

The excerpt quoted above is proof that there was never such an

intent. While it is true that both ordinances relate to the same

subject matter, i.e. classification of the land use of the area where
Pandacan oil depot is located, if there is no intent to repeal the
earlier enactment, every effort at reasonable construction must be
made to reconcile the ordinances so that both can be given effect:
The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same
subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient
to cause an implied repeal of the prior act, since the new statute
may merely be cumulative or a continuation of the old one. What
is necessary is a manifest indication of legislative purpose to
repeal.[98]

For the first kind of implied repeal, there must be an

irreconcilable conflict between the two ordinances. There is no
conflict

between

the

two

ordinances. Ordinance

No.

8027

reclassified the Pandacan area from Industrial II to Commercial

I. Ordinance No. 8119, in Section 23, designated it as a Planned
Unit Development/Overlay Zone (O-PUD). In its Annex C which
defined the zone boundaries,[99] the Pandacan area was shown to be
within the High Density Residential/Mixed Use Zone (R-3/MXD).
These

zone

classifications

in

Ordinance

No.

8119

are

not

inconsistent with the reclassification of the Pandacan area from

Industrial to Commercial in Ordinance No. 8027. The O-PUD
classification

merely

made

Pandacan

project

site

...

comprehensively planned as an entity via unitary site plan which

permits

flexibility

in

planning/design,

building

siting,

complementarity of building types and land uses, usable open

spaces

and

the

preservation

of

significant

natural

land

features....[100] Its classification as R-3/MXD means that it should

be used primarily for high-rise housing/dwelling purposes and
limited

complementary/supplementary

trade,

services

and

business activities.[101] There is no conflict since both ordinances

actually

have

common

objective, i.e.,

to

shift

the

zoning

classification from industrial to commercial (Ordinance No. 8027) or

mixed residential/commercial (Ordinance No. 8119).
Moreover, it is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that
a subsequent general law does not repeal a prior special law on the
same subject unless it clearly appears that the legislature has
intended by the latter general act to modify or repeal the earlier
special law. Generalia specialibus non derogant (a general law does
not nullify a specific or special law). [102] This is so even if the
provisions of the general law are sufficiently comprehensive to
include what was set forth in the special act. [103] The special act
and the general law must stand together, one as the law of the
particular subject and the other as the law of general application.
[104]

The special law must be taken as intended to constitute an

exception to, or a qualification of, the general act or provision. [105]

The reason for this is that the legislature, in passing a law of
special character, considers and makes special provisions for the
particular circumstances dealt with by the special law. This being

so, the legislature, by adopting a general law containing

provisions repugnant to those of the special law and without
making any mention of its intention to amend or modify such
special law, cannot be deemed to have intended an amendment,
repeal or modification of the latter.[106]

Ordinance No. 8027 is a special law [107] since it deals

specifically with a certain area described therein (the Pandacan oil
depot area) whereas Ordinance No. 8119 can be considered a
general law[108] as it covers the entire city of Manila.
The oil companies assert that even if Ordinance No. 8027 is a
special law, the existence of an all-encompassing repealing clause in
Ordinance

No.

8119

evinces

an

intent

on

the

part

of

the Sanggunian to repeal the earlier ordinance:

Sec. 84. Repealing Clause. All ordinances, rules, regulations in
conflict with the provisions of this Ordinance are hereby
repealed; PROVIDED, That the rights that are vested upon the
effectivity of this Ordinance shall not be impaired.

They cited Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, Cebu City v. Department

of Agrarian Reform:[109]
The presence of such general repealing clause in a later statute
clearly indicates the legislative intent to repeal all prior
inconsistent laws on the subject matter, whether the prior law is a
general law or a special law... Without such a clause, a later
general law will ordinarily not repeal a prior special law on the
same subject. But with such clause contained in the subsequent
general law, the prior special law will be deemed repealed, as the
clause is a clear legislative intent to bring about that result.[110]

This ruling in not applicable here. The repealing clause of

Ordinance No. 8119 cannot be taken to indicate the legislative
intent to repeal all prior inconsistent laws on the subject matter,
including Ordinance No. 8027, a special enactment, since the
aforequoted minutes (an official record of the discussions in
the Sanggunian) actually indicated the clear intent to preserve the
provisions of Ordinance No. 8027.
To summarize, the conflict between the two ordinances is more
apparent

than

real.

reconciled. Ordinance

The

No.

8027

two
is

ordinances
applicable

to

can

be

the

area

particularly described therein whereas Ordinance No. 8119 is

applicable to the entire City of Manila.
MANDAMUS LIES TO COMPEL RESPONDENT MAYOR
TO ENFORCE ORDINANCE NO. 8027

The oil companies insist that mandamus does not lie against
respondent in consideration of the separation of powers of the
executive

and

judiciary.[111] This

argument

misplaced. Indeed,
[the] Courts will not interfere by mandamus proceedings with the
legislative [or executive departments] of the government in the
legitimate exercise of its powers, except to enforce mere

is

ministerial acts required by law to be performed by some

officer thereof.[112] (Emphasis Supplied)

since this is the function of a writ of mandamus, which is the

power to compel the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust or
station.[113]
They also argue that petitioners had a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy to compel respondent to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 which was to seek relief from the President of the Philippines
through the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) by virtue of the Presidents power of supervision
over local government units. Again, we disagree. A party need not
go first to the DILG in order to compel the enforcement of an
ordinance. This suggested process would be unreasonably long,
tedious and consequently injurious to the interests of the local
government unit (LGU) and its constituents whose welfare is sought
to be protected. Besides, petitioners resort to an original action
formandamus before this Court is undeniably allowed by the
Constitution.[114]

ORDINANCE
NO.
8027
CONSTITUTIONAL AND VALID

IS

Having ruled that there is no impediment to the enforcement

of Ordinance No. 8027, we now proceed to make a definitive ruling
on its constitutionality and validity.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. For an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the LGU to enact and be passed according to the
procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution
or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be
partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate
trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy and (6)
must not be unreasonable.[115]

THE CITY OF MANILA HAS THE

POWER TO ENACT ORDINANCE NO.
8027

Ordinance

No.

8027

was

passed

by

the Sangguniang

Panlungsod of Manila in the exercise of its police power. Police

power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make
statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.
[116]

This power flows from the recognition that salus populi est

suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law).[117] While

police power rests primarily with the national legislature, such

power may be delegated.[118] Section 16 of the LGC, known as the
general welfare clause, encapsulates the delegated police power to
local governments:[119]
Section 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit
shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those
which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within
their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units
shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation
and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance
the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and
support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific
and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment
among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve
the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

LGUs like the City of Manila exercise police power through their
respective

legislative

bodies,

in

this

case,

the Sangguniang

Panlungsod or the city council. Specifically, the Sanggunian can

enact ordinances for the general welfare of the city:
Section. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.
(a) The sangguniang panglungsod, as the legislative branch of the
city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants
pursuant to Section 16 of this Code xxxx

This police power was also provided for in RA 409 or the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila:
Section 18. Legislative powers. The [City Council] shall have
the following legislative powers:
xxx

xxx

xx

(g)

To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper

for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the
prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good
order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city
and its inhabitants, and such others as may be necessary to
carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred by this chapter xxxx[120]

Specifically, the Sanggunian has the power to reclassify land

within the jurisdiction of the city.[121]

THE ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCE NO.

8027 IS A LEGITIMATE EXERCISE OF
POLICE POWER

As with the State, local governments may be considered as

having properly exercised their police power only if the following
requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise
and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon

individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful

subject and a lawful method.[122]
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted for the purpose of
promoting sound urban planning, ensuring health, public safety
and
general
welfare[123] of
the
residents
of
Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to protect
the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a
terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective,
the Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in the ordinance from
industrial to commercial.
The following facts were found by the Committee on Housing,
Resettlement and Urban Development of the City of Manila which
recommended the approval of the ordinance:
(1)

(2)
(3)
(4)

the depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of highly

flammable and highly volatile products which include
petroleum gas, liquefied petroleum gas, aviation fuel,
diesel, gasoline, kerosene and fuel oil among others;
the depot is open to attack through land, water or air;
it is situated in a densely populated place and near
Malacaang Palace and
in case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot, the
fire could spread to the neighboring communities. [124]

The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life,

security and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not just of a
particular class.[125] The depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a
representation of western interests which means that it is a
terrorist target. As long as it there is such a target in their midst,

the residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore became necessary

to remove these terminals to dissipate the threat. According to
respondent:
Such a public need became apparent after the 9/11 incident which
showed that what was perceived to be impossible to happen, to
the most powerful country in the world at that, is actually
possible. The destruction of property and the loss of thousands of
lives on that fateful day became the impetus for a public need. In
the aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy, the threats of terrorism
continued [such] that it became imperative for governments to
take measures to combat their effects.[126]

Wide discretion is vested on the legislative authority to

determine not only what the interests of the public require but also
what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests.
[127]

Clearly, the Sanggunian was in the best position to determine

the needs of its constituents.

In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals
may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the
objectives of the government.[128] Otherwise stated, the government
may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty,
property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general
welfare.[129] However, the interference must be reasonable and not
arbitrary. And to forestall arbitrariness, the methods or means
used to protect public health, morals, safety or welfare must have a
reasonable relation to the end in view.[130]

The means adopted by the Sanggunian was the enactment of a

zoning ordinance which reclassified the area where the depot is
situated from industrial to commercial. A zoning ordinance is
defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically
arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political
subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection
of needs.[131] As a result of the zoning, the continued operation of
the businesses of the oil companies in their present location will no
longer be permitted. The power to establish zones for industrial,
commercial and residential uses is derived from the police power
itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents
of a locality.[132] Consequently, the enactment of Ordinance No.
8027 is within the power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City
of Manila and any resulting burden on those affected cannot be
said to be unjust:
There can be no doubt that the City of Manila has the power to
divide its territory into residential and industrial zones, and to
prescribe that offensive and unwholesome trades and occupations
are to be established exclusively in the latter zone.
The benefits to be derived by cities adopting such
regulations (zoning) may be summarized as follows: They attract
a desirable and assure a permanent citizenship; they foster pride
in and attachment to the city; they promote happiness and
contentment; they stabilize the use and value of property and
promote the peace, [tranquility], and good order of the city. We do
not hesitate to say that the attainment of these objects affords a
legitimate field for the exercise of the police power. He who owns
property in such a district is not deprived of its use by such
regulations. He may use it for the purposes to which the section in
which it is located is dedicated. That he shall not be permitted to

use it to the desecration of the community constitutes no

unreasonable or permanent hardship and results in no unjust
burden.
Xxx

xxx

xxx
The 14th Amendment protects the citizen in his right to
engage in any lawful business, but it does not prevent legislation
intended to regulate useful occupations which, because of their
nature or location, may prove injurious or offensive to the
public.[133]

We entertain no doubt that Ordinance No. 8027 is a valid

police power measure because there is a concurrence of lawful
subject and lawful method.

ORDINANCE NO. 8027 IS NOT UNFAIR,

OPPRESSIVE OR CONFISCATORY WHICH
AMOUNTS
TO
TAKING
WITHOUT
COMPENSATION

According to the oil companies, Ordinance No. 8027 is unfair

and oppressive as it does not only regulate but also absolutely
prohibits

them

from

conducting

operations

in

the

City

of

Manila. Respondent counters that this is not accurate since the

ordinance merely prohibits the oil companies from operating their
businesses in the Pandacan area.
Indeed, the ordinance expressly delineated in its title and in
Section 1 what it pertained to. Therefore, the oil companies

contention

is

not

supported

by

the

text

of

the

ordinance. Respondent succinctly stated that:

The oil companies are not forbidden to do business in the City of
Manila. They may still very well do so, except that their oil storage
facilities are no longer allowed in the Pandacan area. Certainly,
there are other places in the City of Manila where they can conduct
this specific kind of business. Ordinance No. 8027 did not render
the oil companies illegal. The assailed ordinance affects the oil
companies business only in so far as the Pandacan area is
concerned.[134]

The oil companies are not prohibited from doing business in other
appropriate zones in Manila. The City of Manila merely exercised
its power to regulate the businesses and industries in the zones it
established:
As to the contention that the power to regulate does not include
the power to prohibit, it will be seen that the ordinance copied
above does not prohibit the installation of motor engines within the
municipality of Cabanatuan but only within the zone therein fixed.
If the municipal council of Cabanatuan is authorized to establish
said zone, it is also authorized to provide what kind of engines
may be installed therein. In banning the installation in said zone of
all engines not excepted in the ordinance, the municipal council of
Cabanatuan did no more than regulate their installation by means
of zonification.[135]

The oil companies aver that the ordinance is unfair and

oppressive because they have invested billions of pesos in the depot.
[136]

Its forced closure will result in huge losses in income and

tremendous costs in constructing new facilities.

Their contention has no merit. In the exercise of police power,

there is a limitation on or restriction of property interests to
promote

public

welfare

which

involves

no

compensable

taking. Compensation is necessary only when the states power of

eminent domain is exercised. In eminent domain, property is
appropriated and applied to some public purpose. Property
condemned under the exercise of police power, on the other hand, is
noxious or intended for a noxious or forbidden purpose and,
consequently, is not compensable.[137] The restriction imposed to
protect lives, public health and safety from danger is not a taking. It
is merely the prohibition or abatement of a noxious use which
interferes with paramount rights of the public.
Property has not only an individual function, insofar as it has
to provide for the needs of the owner, but also a social function
insofar as it has to provide for the needs of the other members of
society.[138] The principle is this:
Police power proceeds from the principle that every holder of
property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds
it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious
to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the
enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the right of the
community. Rights of property, like all other social and
conventional rights, are subject to reasonable limitations in their
enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such
reasonable restraints and regulations established by law as the
legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in
them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient.[139]

In the regulation of the use of the property, nobody else

acquires the use or interest therein, hence there is no compensable
taking.[140] In this case, the properties of the oil companies and
other businesses situated in the affected area remain theirs. Only
their use is restricted although they can be applied to other
profitable uses permitted in the commercial zone.

ORDINANCE NO. 8027 IS NOT

PARTIAL AND DISCRIMINATORY

The oil companies take the position that the ordinance has
discriminated against and singled out the Pandacan Terminals
despite the fact that the Pandacan area is congested with buildings
and residences that do not comply with the National Building Code,
Fire Code and Health and Sanitation Code.[141]
This issue should not detain us for long. An ordinance based
on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional
guaranty of the equal protection of the law.[142] The requirements for
a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of
the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only and (4)
it must apply equally to all members of the same class. [143]

The law may treat and regulate one class differently from
another class provided there are real and substantial differences to
distinguish one class from another. [144] Here, there is a reasonable
classification. We reiterate that what the ordinance seeks to
prevent is a catastrophic devastation that will result from a terrorist
attack. Unlike the depot, the surrounding community is not a highvalue terrorist target. Any damage caused by fire or explosion
occurring in those areas would be nothing compared to the damage
caused by a fire or explosion in the depot itself. Accordingly, there is
a substantial distinction. The enactment of the ordinance which
provides for the cessation of the operations of these terminals
removes the threat they pose. Therefore it is germane to the
purpose of the ordinance. The classification is not limited to the
conditions existing when the ordinance was enacted but to future
conditions as well. Finally, the ordinance is applicable to all
businesses and industries in the area it delineated.
ORDINANCE
NO .
8027
IS
NOT
INCONSISTENT WITH RA 7638 AND RA
8479

The oil companies

and the DOE assert that Ordinance No.

8027 is unconstitutional because it contravenes RA 7638 (DOE Act

of 1992)[145] and RA 8479 (Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation
Law of 1998).[146] They argue that through RA 7638, the national
legislature declared it a policy of the state to ensure a continuous,

adequate, and economic supply of energy[147] and created the DOE

to implement this policy. Thus, under Section 5 I, DOE is
empowered

to

establish

and

administer

programs

for

the

exploration, transportation, marketing, distribution, utilization,

conservation,

stockpiling,

and

storage

of

energy

resources. Considering that the petroleum products contained in

the Pandacan Terminals are major and critical energy resources,
they conclude that their administration, storage, distribution and
transport are of national interest and fall under DOEs primary and
exclusive jurisdiction.[148]
They further assert that the terminals are necessary for the
delivery of immediate and adequate supply of oil to its recipients in
the most economical way.[149] Local legislation such as Ordinance
No. 8027 (which effectively calls for the removal of these terminals)
allegedly frustrates the state policy of ensuring a continuous,
adequate, and economic supply of energy expressed in RA 7638, a
national law.[150] Likewise, the ordinance thwarts the determination
of the DOE that the terminals operations should be merely scaled
down and not discontinued.[151] They insist that this should not be
allowed considering that it has a nationwide economic impact and
affects public interest transcending the territorial jurisdiction of the
City of Manila.[152]

According to them, the DOEs supervision over the oil industry

under RA 7638 was subsequently underscored by RA 8479,
particularly in Section 7 thereof:
SECTION 7. Promotion of Fair Trade Practices. The
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and DOE shall take all
measures to promote fair trade and prevent cartelization,
monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade, and any unfair
competition in the Industry as defined in Article 186 of the Revised
Penal Code, and Articles 168 and 169 of Republic Act No. 8293,
otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Rights Law. The
DOE shall continue to encourage certain practices in the
Industry which serve the public interest and are intended to
achieve efficiency and cost reduction, ensure continuous
supply of petroleum products, and enhance environmental
protection. These practices may include borrow-and-loan
agreements, rationalized depot and manufacturing operations,
hospitality agreements, joint tanker and pipeline utilization, and
joint actions on oil spill control and fire prevention. (Emphasis
supplied)

Respondent counters that DOEs regulatory power does not

preclude LGUs from exercising their police power. [153]
Indeed, ordinances should not contravene existing statutes
enacted by Congress. The rationale for this was clearly explained
in Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.:[154]
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should
not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are
only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise
only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress
as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior
to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It
is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the

acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the
first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the
statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their
powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them
the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so
it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control.
Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the
legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable
of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all
of the municipal corporations in the State, and the corporation
could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as
to the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to
phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature.
This basic relationship between the national legislature and
the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new
provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local
autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here
confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units
although in significantly reduced degree now than under our
previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power
to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or
recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the
Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government
units of the power to tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by mere
statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the
principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or
modify or violate it.[155]

The question now is whether Ordinance No. 8027

contravenes RA 7638 and RA 8479. It does not.
Under Section 5 I of RA 7638, DOE was given the power to
establish

and

administer

programs

for

the

exploration,

transportation, marketing, distribution, utilization, conservation,

stockpiling, and storage of energy resources. On the other hand,

under Section 7 of RA 8749, the DOE shall continue to encourage
certain practices in the Industry which serve the public interest and
are intended to achieve efficiency and cost reduction, ensure
continuous supply of petroleum products. Nothing in these
statutes prohibits the City of Manila from enacting ordinances in
the exercise of its police power.
The principle of local autonomy is enshrined in and zealously
protected under the Constitution. In Article II, Section 25 thereof,
the people expressly adopted the following policy:

Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local

governments.

An entire article (Article X) of the Constitution has been devoted to

guaranteeing and promoting the autonomy of LGUs. The LGC was
specially promulgated by Congress to ensure the autonomy of
local governments as mandated by the Constitution:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the
policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions
of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local
autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development
as self-reliant communities and make them more effective
partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end,
the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable
local government structure instituted through a system of

decentralization whereby local government units shall be given

more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The
process of decentralization shall proceed from the National
Government to the local government units. (Emphasis supplied)

We do not see how the laws relied upon by the oil companies
and DOE stripped the City of Manila of its power to enact
ordinances in the exercise of its police power and to reclassify the
land uses within its jurisdiction. To guide us, we shall make a brief
survey of our decisions where the police power measure of the LGU
clashed with national laws.
In Tan v. Perea,[156] the Court ruled that Ordinance No. 7
enacted by the municipality of Daanbantayan, Cebu allowing the
operation of three cockpits was invalid for violating PD 449 (or the
Cockfighting Law of 1974) which permitted only one cockpit per
municipality.
In Batangas
[157]

the Sangguniang

CATV,

Inc.

Panlungsod of

v.

Court
Batangas

of

Appeals,

City

enacted

Resolution No. 210 granting Batangas CATV, Inc. a permit to

operate a cable television (CATV) system in Batangas City. The
Court held that the LGU did not have the authority to grant
franchises to operate a CATV system because it was the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) that had the power under
EO Nos. 205 and 436 to regulate CATV operations. EO 205
mandated the NTC to grant certificates of authority to CATV

operators while EO 436 vested on the NTC the power to regulate

and supervise the CATV industry.
In Lina, Jr. v. Pao,[158] we held that Kapasiyahan Bilang 508,
Taon 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna could not be
used as justification to prohibit lotto in the municipality of San
Pedro, Laguna because lotto was duly authorized by RA 1169, as
amended by BP 42. This law granted a franchise to the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office and allowed it to operate lotteries.
In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.,[159] the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City passed Ordinance Nos. 3353
and 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos in the city. We
ruled that these ordinances were void for contravening PD 1869 or
the charter of the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation
which had the power to operate casinos.
The common dominator of all of these cases is that the
national laws were clearly and expressly in conflict with the
ordinances/resolutions of the LGUs. The inconsistencies were so
patent that there was no room for doubt. This is not the case here.
The laws cited merely gave DOE general powers to establish
and administer programs for the exploration, transportation,
marketing, distribution, utilization, conservation, stockpiling, and
storage of energy resources and to encourage certain practices in

the [oil] industry which serve the public interest and are intended to
achieve efficiency and cost reduction, ensure continuous supply of
petroleum products. These powers can be exercised without
emasculating the LGUs of the powers granted them. When these
ambiguous powers are pitted against the unequivocal power of the
LGU to enact police power and zoning ordinances for the general
welfare of its constituents, it is not difficult to rule in favor of the
latter. Considering that the powers of the DOE regarding the
Pandacan Terminals are not categorical, the doubt must be resolved
in favor of the City of Manila:
SECTION 5. Rules of Interpretation. In the interpretation of the
provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply:
(a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be
liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question
thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of
the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as
to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the
local government unit concerned;
xxx

xxx

xxx

(g) IThe general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally

interpreted to give more powers to local government units in
accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality
of life for the people in the community xxxx

The least we can do to ensure genuine and meaningful local

autonomy is not to force an interpretation that negates powers
explicitly granted to local governments. To rule against the power of

LGUs to reclassify areas within their jurisdiction will subvert the

principle of local autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution. [160] As
we have noted in earlier decisions, our national officials should not
only comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy
but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these
provisions are based.[161]

THE DOE CANNOT EXERCISE THE

POWER OF CONTROL OVER LGUS

Another reason that militates against the DOEs assertions is

that Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the
Presidents power over LGUs to one of general supervision:
SECTION 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise
general supervision over local governments. Xxxx

Consequently, the Chief Executive or his or her alter egos, cannot

exercise the power of control over them. [162] Control and supervision
are distinguished as follows:
[Supervision] means overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the
latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action
or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter
or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s]
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter.[163]

Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power

of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any
restraining authority over such body.[164] It does not allow the
supervisor to annul the acts of the subordinate. [165] Here, what the
DOE seeks to do is to set aside an ordinance enacted by local
officials, a power that not even its principal, the President,
has. This is because:
Under our present system of government, executive power
is vested in the President. The members of the Cabinet and other
executive officials are merely alter egos. As such, they are subject
to the power of control of the President, at whose will and behest
they can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions
changed, suspended or reversed. In contrast, the heads of
political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign
powers emanate from the electorate, to whom they are directly
accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the
Presidents supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are
exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. By the same
token, the President may not withhold or alter any authority or
power given them by the Constitution and the law.[166]

Thus, the President and his or her alter egos, the department
heads, cannot interfere with the activities of local governments, so
long as they act within the scope of their authority. Accordingly,
the DOE cannot substitute its own discretion for the discretion
exercised by thesanggunian of the City of Manila. In local affairs,
the wisdom of local officials must prevail as long as they are acting
within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. [167]

ORDINANCE NO. 8027 IS NOT INVALID

FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RA 7924
AND EO 72

The oil companies argue that zoning ordinances of LGUs are

required to be submitted to the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority (MMDA) for review and if found to be in compliance with
its metropolitan physical framework plan and regulations, it shall
endorse the same to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB). Their basis is Section 3 (e) of RA 7924: [168]
SECTION 3. Scope of MMDA Services. Metro-wide services
under the jurisdiction of the MMDA are those services which
have metro-wide impact and transcend local political boundaries
or entail huge expenditures such that it would not be viable for
said services to be provided by the individual [LGUs] comprising
Metropolitan Manila. These services shall include:
xxx

(g)

xxx

xxx

Urban renewal, zoning, and land use planning, and

shelter services which include the formulation, adoption and
implementation of policies, standards, rules and regulations,
programs and projects to rationalize and optimize urban
land use and provide direction to urban growth and
expansion, the rehabilitation and development of slum and
blighted areas, the development of shelter and housing
facilities and the provision of necessary social services
thereof. (Emphasis supplied)

Reference was also made to Section 15 of its implementing

rules:

Section 15. Linkages with HUDCC, HLURB, NHA, LGUs

and Other National Government Agencies Concerned on Urban
Renewal, Zoning and Land Use Planning and Shelter
Services. Within the context of the National Housing and Urban
Development Framework, and pursuant to the national standards,
guidelines and regulations formulated by the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board [HLURB] on land use planning and zoning,
the [MMDA] shall prepare a metropolitan physical framework plan
and regulations which shall complement and translate the socioeconomic development plan for Metro Manila into physical or
spatial terms, and provide the basis for the preparation, review,
integration and implementation of local land use plans and zoning,
ordinance of cities and municipalities in the area.
Said framework plan and regulations shall contain, among
others, planning and zoning policies and procedures that shall be
observed by local government units in the preparation of their own
plans and ordinances pursuant to Section 447 and 458 of RA 7160,
as well as the identification of sites and projects that are
considered to be of national or metropolitan significance.
Cities and municipalities shall prepare their respective
land use plans and zoning ordinances and submit the same
for review and integration by the [MMDA] and indorsement to
HLURB in accordance with Executive Order No. 72 and other
pertinent laws.
In the preparation of a Metropolitan Manila physical
framework plan and regulations, the [MMDA] shall coordinate with
the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council,
HLURB, the National Housing Authority, Intramuros Administration,
and all other agencies of the national government which are
concerned with land use and zoning, urban renewal and shelter
services. (Emphasis supplied)

They

also

claim

that

EO

72 [169] provides

that

zoning

ordinances of cities and municipalities of Metro Manila are subject

to review by the HLURB to ensure compliance with national

standards and guidelines. They cite Section 1, paragraphs I, (e), (f)
and (g):
SECTION 1. Plan formulation or updating.
xxx

xxx

xxx

(g) Cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila shall

continue
to
formulate
or
update
their
respective comprehensive land use plans, in
accordance with the land use planning and zoning
standards and guidelines prescribed by the HLURB
pursuant to EO 392, S. of 1990, and other pertinent
national policies.
Xxx

xxx

xxx

(e) Pursuant to LOI 729, S. of 1978, EO 648, S. of 1981,

and RA 7279, the comprehensive land use plans of provinces,
highly urbanized cities and independent component cities shall be
reviewed and ratified by the HLURB to ensure compliance with
national standards and guidelines.
(f) Pursuant to EO 392, S. of 1999, the comprehensive
land use plans of cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila
shall be reviewed by the HLURB to ensure compliance with
national standards and guidelines.

(g) Said review shall be completed within three (3) months

upon receipt thereof otherwise, the same shall be
deemed consistent with law, and, therefore,
valid. (Emphasis supplied)

They argue that because Ordinance No. 8027 did not go

through this review process, it is invalid.
The argument is flawed.
RA 7942 does not give MMDA the authority to review land use
plans and zoning ordinances of cities and municipalities. This was
only found in its implementing rules which made a reference to EO
72. EO 72 expressly refers to comprehensive land use plans
(CLUPs) only. Ordinance No. 8027 is admittedly not a CLUP nor
intended to be one. Instead, it is a very specific ordinance which
reclassified the land use of a defined area in order to prevent the
massive effects of a possible terrorist attack. It is Ordinance No.
8119 which was explicitly formulated as the Manila [CLUP] and
Zoning Ordinance of 2006. CLUPs are the ordinances which should
be submitted to the MMDA for integration in its metropolitan
physical framework plan and approved by the HLURB to ensure
that they conform with national guidelines and policies.
Moreover, even assuming that the MMDA review and HLURB
ratification are necessary, the oil companies did not present any
evidence to show that these were not complied with. In accordance
with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, its
constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of proof
showing

that

the

procedure

prescribed

by

law

was

not

observed. The burden of proof is on the oil companies which

already had notice that this Court was inclined to dispose of all the
issues in this case. Yet aside from their bare assertion, they did not
present any certification from the MMDA or the HLURB nor did they
append these to their pleadings. Clearly, they failed to rebut the
presumption of validity of Ordinance No. 8027.[170]

CONCLUSION

Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to

property. They allege that they stand to lose billions of pesos if
forced

to

relocate. However,

based

on

the

hierarchy

of

constitutionally protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence

over the right to property.[171]The reason is obvious: life is
irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or LGUs exercise of
police power clashes with a few individuals right to property, the
former should prevail.[172]
Both law and jurisprudence support the constitutionality and
validity of Ordinance No. 8027. Without a doubt, there are no
impediments to its enforcement and implementation. Any delay is
unfair to the inhabitants of the City of Manila and its leaders who
have categorically expressed their desire for the relocation of the
terminals. Their power to chart and control their own destiny and
preserve their lives and safety should not be curtailed by the

intervenors warnings of doomsday scenarios and threats of

economic disorder if the ordinance is enforced.
Secondary to the legal reasons supporting the immediate
implementation of Ordinance No. 8027 are the policy considerations
which drove Manilas government to come up with such a measure:
... [The] oil companies still were not able to allay the
apprehensions of the city regarding the security threat in the area
in general. No specific action plan or security measures were
presented that would prevent a possible large-scale terrorist or
malicious attack especially an attack aimed at Malacaang. The
measures that were installed were more directed towards their
internal security and did not include the prevention of an external
attack even on a bilateral level of cooperation between these
companies and the police and military.
Xxx

xxx

xxx

It is not enough for the city government to be told

by these oil companies that they have the most sophisticated firefighting equipments and have invested millions of pesos for these
equipments. The city government wants to be assured that its
residents are safe at any time from these installations, and in the
three public hearings and in their position papers, not one
statement has been said that indeed the absolute safety of the
residents from the hazards posed by these installations is
assured.[173]

We are also putting an end to the oil companies determination

to prolong their stay in Pandacan despite the objections of Manilas
residents. As early as October 2001, the oil companies signed a
MOA with the DOE obliging themselves to:

... undertake a comprehensive and comparative study ... [which]

shall include the preparation of a Master Plan, whose aim is to
determine the scope and timing of the feasible location of the
Pandacan oil terminals and all associated facilities and
infrastructure including government support essential for the
relocation such as the necessary transportation infrastructure,
land and right of way acquisition, resettlement of displaced
residents and environmental and social acceptability which shall
be based on mutual benefit of the Parties and the public.[174]

Now that they are being compelled to discontinue their operations

in

the

Pandacan

Terminals,

they

cannot

feign

unreadiness

considering that they had years to prepare for this eventuality.

Just the same, this Court is not about to provoke a crisis by
ordering the immediate relocation of the Pandacan Terminals out of
its present site. The enforcement of a decision of this Court,
specially one with far-reaching consequences, should always be
within the bounds of reason, in accordance with a comprehensive
and well-coordinated plan, and within a time-frame that complies
with the letter and spirit of our resolution. To this end, the oil
companies have no choice but to obey the law.
A WARNING TO PETITIONERS COUNSEL

We draw the attention of the parties to a matter of grave

concern to the legal profession.

Petitioners

and

their

counsel,

Atty.

Samson

Alcantara,

submitted a four-page memorandum that clearly contained either

substance nor research. It is absolutely insulting to this Court.
We have always tended towards judicial leniency, temperance
and compassion to those who suffer from a wrong perception of
what the majesty of the law means. But for a member of the bar, an
officer of the court, to file in this Court a memorandum of such
unacceptable quality is an entirely different matter.
It is indicative less of a personal shortcoming or contempt of
this Court and more of a lawyers sorry descent from a high sense of
duty and responsibility. As a member of the bar and as an officer of
the court, a lawyer ought to be keenly aware that the chief
safeguard of the body politic is respect for the law and its
magistrates.
There is nothing more effective than the written word by which
counsel can persuade this Court of the righteousness of his
cause. For if truth were self-evident, a memorandum would be
completely unnecessary and superfluous.
The inability of counsel to prepare a memorandum worthy of
this Courts consideration is an ejemplo malo to the legal profession
as it betrays no genuine interest in the cause he claims to

espouse. Or did counsel think he can earn his moment of glory

without the hard work and dedication called for by his petition?
A FINAL WORD

On

Wednesday,

January

23,

2008,

defective

tanker

containing 2,000 liters of gasoline and 14,000 liters of diesel

exploded in the middle of the street a short distance from the exit
gate of the Pandacan Terminals, causing death, extensive damage
and a frightening conflagration in the vicinity of the incident. Need
we say anthing about what will happen if it is the estimated 162 to
211 million liters[175] of petroleum products in the terminal complex
which blow up?
WHEREFORE, the motions for leave to intervene of Chevron
Philippines Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation, and the Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the Department of Energy, are hereby GRANTED. Their respective
motions for reconsideration are hereby DENIED. The Regional Trial
Court,

Manila,

Branch

39

is ORDERED to DISMISS the

consolidated cases of Civil Case No. 03-106377 and Civil Case No.
03-106380.
We reiterate our order to respondent Mayor of the City of
Manila to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. In coordination with the
appropriate agencies and other parties involved, respondent Mayor

is hereby ordered to oversee the relocation and transfer of the

Pandacan Terminals out of its present site.
To ensure the orderly transfer, movement and relocation of
assets and personnel, the intervenors Chevron Philippines Inc.,
Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation shall,
within a non-extendible period of ninety (90) days, submit to the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 39, the comprehensive plan
and relocation schedule which have allegedly been prepared. The
presiding judge of Manila RTC, Branch 39 will monitor the strict
enforcement of this resolution.
Atty. Samson Alcantara is hereby ordered to explain within five
(5) days from notice why he should not be disciplined for his refusal,
or inability, to file a memorandum worthy of the consideration of
this Court.
Treble

costs

Alcantara.

SO ORDERED.

against

petitioners

counsel,

Atty.

Samson