Lecture Notes in Clj4 Evidence

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
Compiled Notes in CLJ 4 - Evidence |1

(culled from UP, Ateneo, San Beda, UST, FEU Notes)
RULES OF EVIDENCE
It may be ascertained in:

1. pleadings submitted by the parties
2. pre-trial order
3. issues which are tried with the express or implied consent of the
parties. (Sec. 5, Rule 10)
RULE 128
NOTE: If fact is admitted, there is no more factum probandum because

there is no fact in issue.
General Provisions
FACTUM PROBANS - the material evidencing the proposition. It is

the fact by which the factum probandum is established.
Section 1. Evidence defined. ? Evidence is

the means, sanctioned by these rules, of
truth respecting a matter of fact. (1)
Factum probandum
"ultimate facts"
Proposition to be established
Hypothetical
Section 2. Scope. ? The rules of evidence

shall be the same in all courts and in all
trials and hearings, except as otherwise
provided by law or these rules. (2a)
Section 3. Admissibility of evidence. ?
Evidence is admissible when it is relevant
to the issue and is not excluded by the law
of these rules. (3a)
Section 4. Relevancy; collateral matters. ?
Evidence must have such a relation to the
fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence. Evidence on
collateral matters shall not be allowed,
except when it tends in any reasonable
degree to establish the probability or
improbability of the fact in issue. (4a)
BASIC CONCEPTS
Evidence - It is the means, sanctioned by the Rules of Court, of
ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of
fact.
TWO PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS IN EVIDENCE:
1. How to determine which evidence is admissible; and
2.
Having determined that the evidence is admissible, how to present

that evidence in a manner that would make the court admit it once
it is offered.
SOURCES:
Rules of Court, Rule 128-133
Constitution
Special Laws (e.g.Anti-Wiretapping Act)
Revised Penal Code, Civil Code, etc.
Every evidential question involves the relationship between the factum
probans and the factum probandum.
Factum probans
"intermediate facts"
Material evidencing the
proposition
Existent
Q: What are the four component elements?

A:
1. Means of ascertainment includes not only the procedure or
manner of ascertainment but also the evidentiary fact from which the
truth respecting a matter of fact may be ascertained
2. Sanctioned by the rules not excluded by the Rules of Court
3. In a judicial proceeding contemplates an action or proceeding filed
in a court of law
4. The truth respecting a matter of fact refers to an issue of fact and
is both substantive (determines the facts needed to be established)
and procedural (governs the manner of proving said facts).
Q: Why is evidence required?
A: It is required because of the presumption that the court is not aware
of the veracity of the facts involved in a case. It is therefore incumbent
upon the parties to prove a fact in issue thru the presentation of
admissible evidence (Riano, Evidence: A Restatement for the Bar, p.
2, 2009 ed.).
ALVIN TUASON y OCHOA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.1995 February 23
2nd Division
G.R. Nos. 113779-80
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove
the crime but to prove the identity of the
criminal. For even if the commission of the crime
can be established, without proof of identity of
the criminal beyond reasonable doubt there can
be no conviction. In the case at bench, the
identification of the petitioner cannot rest on an
assured conscience. We rule that petitioner is
entitled to a mandatory acquittal.
FACTUM PROBANDUM - the ultimate fact sought to be established.
CJE-CRIM CLASS 4-POINT AGENDA

1. STAY FOCUSED 2. NEVER QUIT 3. GO FOR 100 4. FINISH WELL
CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca

Petitioner Alvin Tuason y Ochoa, John Doe,

Peter Doe, and Richard Doe were charged
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
1 with Robbery 2 (Article 294, paragraph 5 of
the Revised Penal Code) and Carnapping 3
(republic Act No. 6539).
Of the four (4) accused, only petitioner was
apprehended. The other three (3) are still atlarge.
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty
to both charges and was tried.
We come to the facts.
Complainant CIPRIANA F. TORRES is a public
school teacher of Kaligayahan Elementary
School, Novaliches. Her work requires her to
leave her maid, JOVINA MADARAOG TORRES,
alone in her house at Block 45, Lot 28, Lagro
Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon City. Her
husband is in Australia while her children go to
school.
The incident transpired at around 8:45 in the
morning of July 19, 1988. Somebody knocked at
the gate of the Torres residence pretending to
buy ice. As the maid Madaraog handed the ice to
the buyer, one of the robbers jumped over the
fence, poked a gun at her, covered her mouth,
and opened the gate of their house. 4 The ice
buyer and his companions barged in. Numbering
four (4), they pushed her inside Torres' house
and demanded the keys to the car and the
safety vault. 5 She told them she did not know
where the keys were hidden. 6 They tied up
her hands and dragged her to the second floor
of the house. Petitioner was allegedly left
downstairs as their lookout. 7
On order of the accused, Madaraog sat on
Torres' bed, her body facing the bedroom door

with her back on the vault. They also gagged her
mouth and ransacked Torres' room. One of the
accused stumbled upon a box containing keys.
They used the keys to open drawers and in the
process found the car key. Petitioner was then
summoned upstairs and given the car key. He
tried it on the car and succeeded in starting its
engine.
In twenty (20) minutes, accused were able to
loot the vault and other valuable items in the
house. They then tied Madaraog's hands and
feet to the bed's headboard and escaped using
Torres' car.
Still gripped with fear, Madaraog loosened her
ties with her fingers, hopped to the stairs and
cried for help. 8 Her neighbor Semia Quintal
responded and untied her. They also sought the
help of Angelina Garcia, another neighbor. It was
Garcia who informed Torres that her house was
burglarized.
Torres reported the robbery to the police
authorities at Fairview, Quezon City and the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). On July
25, 1988, Madaraog and Quintal described the
physical features of the four (4) robbers before
the NBI cartographer. One of those drawn by
the artist was a person with a large mole
between his eyebrows. 9 On August 30, 1988,
petitioner was arrested by the NBI agents. The
next day, at the NBI headquarters, he was
pointed to by Madaraog and the other
prosecution witnesses as one of the
perpetrators of the crimes at bench.
SEMIA QUINTAL 10 averred that she saw
petitioner allegedly among the three (3) men
whiling away their time in front of Alabang's
store some time before the crimes were

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca

committed. Quintal is a neighboring maid.

MARY BARBIETO 11 likewise declared that she
saw petitioner allegedly with several companions
standing by at Torres' house that morning of
July 19, 1988. She is a teacher and lives within
the block where the crimes were committed.
Petitioner ALVIN TUASON, 12 on the other
hand, anchored his defense on alibi and
insufficient identification by the prosecution. he
has lived within the neighborhood of the Torres
family since 1978. He averred that on July 19,
1988, he was mixing dough and rushing cake
orders from 7:00 o'clock in the morning till 1:00
o'clock in the afternoon at his sisters' TipTop
Bakeshop in Antipolo Street, Tondo, Manila. It
takes him two (2) hours to commute daily from
Lagro, Novaliches to Tondo.
He was arrested more than one (1) month after
the robbery. On August 30, 1988 at about 8:00
o'clock in the evening, he was in their house
watching a basketball game on T.V. and went out
to buy a cigarette. On his way back, a person
accosted him and asked his name. After he
identified himself, 13 a gun was poked at his
right side, a shot was fired upward, and five (5)
men swooped on him without any warrant of
arrest. He asked them if he could wear t-shirt
as he was naked from waist up. They refused.
They turned out to be NBI agents of one of
whom a certain Atty. Harwin who lived in Lagro,
Novaliches. He was shoved into the car and
brought to the NBI headquarters. 14 He was
surprised when an NBI agent, whose identity was
unknown to him, pointed to him as one of the
suspects in the robbery in the presence of
Madaraog and the other prosecution witnesses.
Petitioner's sister ANGELI TUASON, 15 partowner of TipTop Bakeshop corroborated his
story. She testified that on July 17, 1988 she

asked her sister Mary Ann to remind petitioner
to work early on July 19, 1988 since Mondays,
Tuesdays, and Wednesdays are busy days as she
caters to schools.
The trial court in a Joint Decision convicted
petitioner of the crimes charged and sentenced
him as follows:
xxx
xxx
xxx
"In Q-88-396 (carnapping) or an indeterminate
term of SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4)
MONTHS as minimum and TWENTY (20) YEARS
as maximum; and in Q-88-397 (robbery) for a
term of ONE (1) YEAR, SEVEN (7) MONTHS
and ELEVEN (11) DAYS as minimum and TWO (2)
YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY (20)
DAYS as maximum.
On the civil aspect, the court hereby orders
Alvin Tuason y Ochoa as follows:
1. In Q-88-396 (carnapping) to return to Mrs.
Cipriana Torres and her husband the carnapped
Toyota Corona Sedan, Model 1980 with Plate No.
NPZ 159 or to pay its value of P180,000.00
which the court finds to be the reasonable value
of said car; and.
2. In Q-88-397 (robbery) to return to Mrs.
Cipriana Torres and her husband the stolen
items mentioned in the information filed in said
case and hereinabove stated or pay the
corresponding values thereof or a total of
P280,550.00 which the court finds to be the
reasonable values.
The civil liability is joint and solidary with the
co-conspirators of accused Alvin Tuason.
In case of appeal, the bail bonds are fixed at
TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca

(P280,000.00) fro criminal case No. Q-88-396

and ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P100,000.00) for criminal case No. Q-88-397.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED." 16
Petitioner appealed to respondent Court of
Appeals. On December 16, 1993, the Eleventh
Division of the appellate court gave no credence
to the exculpatory allegations of petitioner and
affirmed in toto the assailed Decisions. 17 On
February 4, 1994, petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
18
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner
contends that respondent appellate court erred:
A.
[I]N WRONGLY APPLYING TO THE CASE AT
BAR THE PRINCIPLE THAT FINDINGS OF
TRIAL COURTS ARE GENERALLY NOT
DISTURBED ON APPEAL, PARTICULARLY
CONSIDERING THAT THE FINDINGS OF THE
TRIAL COURT IN THIS CASE ARE BASED ON
CERTAIN REFUTABLE REASONS EXPRESSLY
STATED IN ITS DECISION.
B.
[I]N WRONGLY APPLYING TO THE
TESTIMONY OF HEREIN PETITIONER THE
CONCEPT AND ATTENDING INFIRMITY OF
"SELF-SERVING EVIDENCE."
C.
[I]N WRONGLY APPLYING TO THE
TESTIMONY OF HEREIN PETITIONER THE
CONCEPT AND ATTENDING INFIRMITY OF
"NEGATIVE EVIDENCE."
D.
[F]OR IGNORING OR DISREGARDING THE
GLARING AND FATAL INFIRMITIES OF THE
TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION
WITNESSES, SPECIALLY AS
IDENTIFICATION, AS WELL AS TO THE
PALPABLE IMPROBABILITY OF HEREIN
PETITIONER HAVING BEEN A SUPPOSED
PARTICIPANT IN THE OFFENSES CHARGED,
THE ERROR BEING TANTAMOUNT TO GROSS
MISAPPREHENSION OF THE RECORD.
E.
[I]N AFFIRMING THE CLEARLY REVERSIBLE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT.
We reverse.
Time and again, this Court has held that
evidence to be believed, must proceed not only
from the mouth of a credible witness but the
same must be credible in itself. 19 The trial
court and respondent appellate court relied
mainly on the testimony of prosecution witness
Madaraog that from her vantage position near
the door of the bedroom she clearly saw how
petitioner allegedly participated in the robbery.
After a careful review of the evidence, we find
that the identification of petitioner made by
Madaraog and Quintal is open to doubt and
cannot serve as a basis for conviction of
petitioner.
Firstly, it must be emphasized that of the four
(4) prosecution witnesses, only the maid
Madaraog actually saw petitioner in the act of
committing the crimes at bench. Witnesses
Quintal and Barbieto testified they only saw
petitioner at the vicinity of the crimes before
they happened. There is, however, a serious
doubt whether Madaraog and Quintal have
correctly identified petitioner. At the NBI

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca

headquarters, Madaraog described petitioner as

5'3" tall and with a big mole between his
eyebrows. 20 While Quintal also described
petitioner as 5'3" and with a black mole between
his eyebrows. 21 On the basis of their
description, the NBI cartographer made a
drawing of petitioner showing a dominant mole
between his eyes. 22 As it turned out,
petitioner has no mole but only a scar between
his eyes. Moreover, he is 5'8 1/2" and not 5'3"
tall. There is a big difference between a mole
and a scar. A scar is a mark left in the skin by a
new connective tissue that replaces tissue
injured. 23 On the other hand, a mole is a small
often pigmented spot or protuberance on the
skin. 24 If indeed Madaraog and Quintal had a
good look at petitioner during the robbery, they
could not have erroneously described petitioner.
Worthy to note, petitioner was not wearing any
mask in the occasion. Madaraog's attempt to
explain her erroneous description does not at all
convince, viz.:
xxx
xxx
xxx
"Q: We come now to the third person 'iyong
namang isa ay mga 28 o 29 ang edad, mga 5'2" o
5'3" ang taas, payat, medyo kulot ang buhok at
maiksi at mayroong malaking bilog na nunal sa
pagitan ng kilay sa noo. Mahaba at malantik ang
pilikmata,' who is that?
A: A mole, sir." 25
xxx
xxx
xxx
"Q: Among the four drawings prepared by the
cartographer section of the NBI, you will agree
with me Madam Witness that it is only on
Exhibit "J" when that rounded mole appear?
A: No sir, it is the third one." 26
xxx
xxx
xxx
"Q: You did not call the attention of the NBI
that the third one whom you identified as
Exhibit "J-3" did not bear that rounded mole as
mentioned by you, did you?
A: I did not remember.
Q: Why did you not remember having called the
attention of the NBI to that deficiency in the
drawing?
A: I was not able to call the attention of the
NBI (sic) because there were four of us who
made the description." 27
Q: Madam witness where is that round mole

that appears in the two eyebrows of the person?
A: It is probably the cartographer that made a
mistake.
Secondly, the trial court and the respondent

appellate court unduly minimized the importance
of this glaring discrepancy in the identification
of the petitioner. The trial court resorted to
wild guesswork. It ruled:
xxx
xxx
xxx
"[T]he court has observed that Alvin has a
prominent scar in between his two (2) eyebrows.
It is not within the realm of improbability that
Alvin covered up that scar with a black coloring
to make it appear that he has a 'nunal' which
was therefore the one described by Jovina and,
which reinforces her testimony that she had a
good eye view of Alvin from the start of the
robbery to its conclusion." 28
Q: I am referring to you now Exhibit "J". I call

your attention to that black rounded figure at
the middle of the bridge of the nose between
the two eyebrows, what was that represent?
This is a grave error. The trial court cannot

convict petitioner on the basis of a deduction
that is irrational because it is not derived from
an established fact. The records do not show
Interpreter:
Witness referring to Exhibit "J-3."

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca

any fact from which the trial court can logically

deduce the conclusion that petitioner covered up
his scar with black coloring to make it appear as
a mole. Such an illogical reasoning cannot
constitute evidence of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. This palpable error was perpetrated by
respondent appellate court when it relied on the
theory that this "fact" should not be disturbed
on appeal because the trial court had a better
opportunity to observe the behavior of the
prosecution witnesses during the hearing. This is
a misapplication of the rule in calibrating the
credibility of witnesses. The subject finding of
the trial court was not based on the demeanor
of any witness which it had a better opportunity
to observe. Rather, it was a mere surmise, an
illogical one at that. By no means can it be
categorized as a fact properly established by
evidence.
And thirdly, corroborating witness Barbieto has
serious lapses in her testimony that diluted her
credibility, thus:
xxx
xxx
xxx
"Q: I am showing to you Exhibit "M" and please
point to this Honorable Court that portion where
the accused (Alvin Tuason) allegedly asked from
you the price of that plastic pack of ice.
A: I did not state it in my statement.
Q: Why did you say a moment ago that you place
it there (Sinumpaang Salaysay)?
A: But that is the truth, sir.
Q: I am not asking you the truth or falsehood . .
. I am only asking you why you said a moment ago
that the portion of your testimony now is
incorporated in Exhibit "M."
A: [B]ecause they asked the price of the ice."
29
xxx
xxx
xxx
"Q: After reading Exhibit "M", did you or did
you not call the attention of the investigator

that some of your narrations were not
incorporated therein?
A: No, I did not because he did not ask me.
Q: [Y]ou did not come forward to volunteer that
some portions of your narration were not
incorporated therein?
A: [T]he investigator knew it.
Q: You mean to tell the Honorable Court that
after reading Exhibit "M", the NBI investigator
knew that there were some lapses or omissions
in your statement?"
A: It's up to the investigator." 30
Barbieto is a school teacher and the kind of
excuses she proffered does not enhance her
credibility. Moreover, she and Quintal merely
testified they saw petitioner within the vicinity
where the crimes were committed. By itself, this
circumstance cannot lead to the conclusion that
petitioner truly committed the crimes at bench.
Petitioner, we note, lives in the same vicinity as
the victim. To use his words, he lives some six
(6) posts from the house of Torres. His
presence in the said vicinity is thus not
unnatural.
The doubtful identification of petitioner was not
at all cured by the process followed by the NBI
agents when petitioner was pointed to by
Madaraog and the other prosecution witnesses in
their headquarters. Madaraog's identification of
petitioner from a line-up at the NBI was not
spontaneous and independent. An NBI agent
improperly suggested to them petitioner's
person. Petitioner thus testified:
xxx
xxx
xxx
"Q: Mr. Witness (Alvin Tuason) do you know of
any reason why these two witnesses in the
persons of Jovina Madaraog Torres and Mary

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca

Barbieto would be testifying in the manner that

they did against you?
A: At the NBI, I saw them with the NBI agent.
After the agent pointed at me, later on they
also pointed at me." 31
presentation of a single suspect to a witness for

purposes of identification. Together with its
aggravated forms, it constitutes the most
grossly suggestive identification procedure now
or ever used by the police. 33
On cross-examination, he declared:
xxx
xxx
xxx
"Q: Do you know the reason why they testified
and pointed to you as one of the robbers of July
19, 1988?
A: Because when I was at the NBI, the NBI
agent pointed at me.
The respondent appellate court, however,

dismissed this claim of petitioner as selfserving. Again, the ruling misconstrues the
meaning of self-serving evidence. Self-serving
evidence is not to be literally taken as evidence
that serves one's selfish interest. Under our law
of evidence, self-serving evidence is one made
by a party out of court at one time; it does not
include a party's testimony as a witness in court.
It is excluded on the same ground as any
hearsay evidence, that is the lack of opportunity
for cross-examination by the adverse party, and
on the consideration that its admission would
open the door to fraud and to fabrication of
testimony. On the other hand, a party's
testimony in court is sworn and affords the
other party the opportunity for crossexamination. 34 Clearly, petitioner's testimony
in court on how he was identified by the
prosecution witnesses in the NBI headquarters
is not self-serving.
Q: Did you see them at the NBI when they

pointed at you?
A: They were outside a room where there was a
glass window.
Q: So you can see those persons outside the
room?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When they pointed you and identified you
were there other persons with you when you
were lined up during that time?
A: In the second line I was in the line-up.
Q: When was the first time they pointed you as
one of the suspects?
A: In the Office of the Chief Unit there, to the
third floor of the NBI building." 32
This damaging testimony of the petitioner was
not rebutted by the prosecution. The NBI agent
present during the identification of petitioner
was not presented to belie petitioner's
testimony. Consequently, the identification of
the petitioner in the NBI headquarters is
seriously flawed. According to writer Wall, the
mode of identification other than an
identification parade is a show-up, the
Petitioner's main defense is alibi. He professed

that on July 19, 1988 he was mixing dough at
TipTop Bakeshop from 7:00 o'clock in the
morning till 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. With
the usual traffic jam, it takes him two (2) hours
to commute from Lagro to Tondo. It was thus
physically impossible for him to be at the locus
criminis. He said he learned about the robbery
thru his neighbor three (3) days thereafter. He
did not flee. He was arrested by the NBI agents
more than one (1) month after the crimes were
perpetrated.
Angeli Tuason's corroborative testimony

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca

established that her brother had an eye

examination on July 17, 1988 35 and she
reminded him to work early on July 19, 1988
which he did.
Judges should not at once look with disfavor at
the defense of alibi. Alibi should be considered
in the light of all the evidence on record for it
can tilt the scales of justice in favor of the
accused. 36 In People vs. Omega, 37 we held:
"Although alibi is known to be the weakest of all
defenses for it is easy to concoct and difficult
to disprove, nevertheless, where the evidence
for the prosecution is weak and betrays lack of
concreteness on the question of whether or not
the accused committed the crime charged, the
defense of alibi assumes importance."
The case at bench reminds us of the warning
that judges seem disposed more readily to
credit the veracity and reliability of
eyewitnesses than any amount of contrary
evidence by or on behalf of the accused,
whether by way of alibi, insufficient
identification, or other testimony. 38 They are
unmindful that in some cases the emotional
balance of the eyewitness is disturbed by her
experience that her powers of perception
becomes distorted and her identification is
frequently most untrustworthy. Into the
identification, enter other motives, not
necessarily stimulated originally by the accused
personally - the desire to requite a crime, to
find a scapegoat, or to support, consciously or
unconsciously, an identification already made by
another. 39
IN VIEW THEREOF, the Decision of December
16, 1993 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
petitioner Alvin Tuason is ACQUITTED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ.,
concur.
Q: Distinguish Evidence in Civil Cases from Evidence in
Criminal Cases.
A: Civil Cases
Criminal Cases
The party having the burden of
The guilt of the accused has to
proof must prove his claim by a
be proven beyond reasonable
preponderance of evidence
doubt
An offer of compromise is not an An offer of compromise by the
admission of any liability, and is
accused may be received in
not admissible in evidence
evidence as an implied
against the offeror
admission of guilt
The concept of presumption of
The accused enjoys the
innocence does not apply
constitutional presumption of
innocence
WHEN EVIDENCE IS NECESSARY

Evidence is the means of proving a fact. It becomes necessary to
present evidence in a case when the pleadings filed present factual
issues. Factual issues arise when a party specifically denies material
allegations in the adverse partys pleading. These are the issues which
the judge cannot resolve without evidence being presented thereon.
Thus, whether a certain thing exists or not, whether a certain act was
done or not, whether a certain statement was uttered or not, are
questions of fact that require evidence for their resolution. Questions of
fact exist when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or
falsehood of alleged facts.1 Other than factual issues, the case
invariably presents legal issues. On the other hand, a question of law
exists when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts. Legal issues are resolved by simply applying the
law or rules applicable, or interpreting the law applicable considering
the facts of the case. Generally, no evidence need be presented on
what the applicable law is. Everyone, including the judge, is presumed
to know the law.
When the parties pleadings fail to tender any issue of fact, either
because all the factual allegations have been admitted expressly or
impliedly (as when a denial is a general denial), there is no need of
conducting a trial, since there is no need of presenting evidence
anymore. The case is then ripe for judicial determination, either
through a judgment on the pleadings2 or by summary judgment.3
Q: Distinguish proof from evidence.

A: Proof
Evidence
The effect when the requisite
The mode and manner of
quantum of evidence of a particular
proving competent facts in
fact has been duly admitted and
judicial proceedings
given weight

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
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The probative effect of evidence
The means of proof
_ KINDS OF EVIDENCE
1. Depending on its ability to establish the fact
in dispute:
a. Direct that which proves the fact in
dispute without the aid of any inference
or presumption.
_ Example: In case of arson, that the
witness saw the defendant apply the
torch which lighted the fire.
b. Circumstantial proof of facts from
which, taken collectively, the existence
of the particular fact in dispute may be
inferred as a necessary or probable
consequence.
_ Such evidence is founded on
experience and observed facts and
coincidences establishing a
connection between the known and
proven facts and the facts which are
sought to be proved.
2. Depending on its weight and acceptability:
a. Primary or Best Evidence that
which affords the greatest certainty of
the fact in question.
b. Secondary or Subtitutionary that
which is necessarily inferior to primary
evidence and shows on its face that
better evidence exists.
3. Depending on its NATURE:
a. Object (real/physical) that which is
addressed to the senses of the court, as
where the objects are exhibited for the
personal observation of the judge. It is
also called autopic proference
(evidence of ones own senses). (5
Moran)
b. Documentary consists of writing, or
any material containing letters, words,
numbers, figures, symbols or other
modes of written _expression offered as
proof of their contents. (Sec. 2, Rule
130)
_ supplied by written instruments or
derived from conversational symbols
and letters by which ideas are
represented on material substances.
c. Testimonial (oral/verbal) consists
of narration or deposition by one who
has observed or has personal knowledge
of that to which he is testifying.
_ A witness is reliable when his
answers are prompt, concise,
responsive to interrogatories,
outspoken and entirely devoid of
evasion and any semblance of
shuffling. (People vs. Francisco, 74
SCRA 158).
1) Positive- when the witness affirms
that a fact did or did not occur, it is
entitled to greater weight since the
witness represents of his personal
knowledge the presence or absence
of a fact.
2) Negative when the witness states
that he did not see or know the
occurrence of a fact there is total
disclaimer of personal knowledge.

4. Depending on its DEGREE OF VALUE:
a. Conclusive that which is
incontrovertible or one which the law
does not allow it to be contradicted. It is
insurmountable evidence.
b. Prima facie that which suffices for
the proof of a particular fact, until
contradicted and overcome by other
evidence.
_ If notice of non-payment by the
drawee bank is not sent to the maker
or drawer of the bum check, or if there is no other proof as to
when
such notice was received by the
drawer, then the presumption of
knowledge as provided in Section 2
of B.P. 22 cannot arise, since there
would simply be no way of
reckoning the crucial five-day
period.(Rico vs. People, G.R. 137191,
Nov. 18, 2002)
c. Cumulative additional evidence of
the same kind bearing on the same
point.
_ Example: When testimony has been
given by one or more witnesses as to
an assault and other witnesses are
produced to testify to the same state
of facts and to no new fact, the
evidence given by such witnesses is
merely cumulative.
d. Corroborative additional evidence
of a different kind and character tending
to prove the same point.
_ While cumulative is additional
evidence of the SAME kind and
character, corroborative is also
additional evidence but of
DIFFERENT kind and character.
(Jones on Evidence)
5. Depending on its QUALITY:
a. Relevant if it has any value in reason
as tending to prove any matter provable
in an action.
_ Evidence is relevant when it has a
tendency in reason to establish the
probability or improbability of a fact
in issue. (Sec. 4, Rule 128)
b. Material if it is directed to prove a
fact in issue as determined by the rules
of substantive law and pleadings.
(Wigmore on Evidence)
c. Admissible- if it is relevant to the
issue and is not excluded by law or by
the Rules of Court.
d. Credible- if it is not only admissible
but also believable and used by the court
in deciding a case.
6. Depending on its FUNCTION:
a. Rebuttal that which is given to
explain, repel, counteract or disprove facts given in evidence
by the adverse
party.
b. Sur-rebuttal that which is given to
explain, repel, counteract or disprove
facts introduced in rebuttal.
Quantum of Evidence
a. Proof beyond reasonable doubt required

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C o m p i l e d N o t e s i n C L J 4 - E v i d e n c e | 10
in criminal cases; does not

mean such degree of proof as excluding
possibility of error, and/or producing
absolute certainty. Moral certainty is
only required, or that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.
b. Preponderance of evidence required
in civil cases; evidence which is
of greater weight, or more convincing,
than that which is offered in opposition
thereto. (Sec. 2, Rule 133)
c. Substantial evidence- sufficient in
administrative proceedings; that
amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion. (Sec. 5,
Rule 133)
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
The study of the law on Evidence involves two main problems, viz.: (1)
determining whether a given piece of evidence is admissible; and (2)
the proper presentation of that evidence so that the court will consider
it in resolving the issues and deciding the case. Although evidence
may, by itself, be admissible, the court may not admit or consider it in
the resolution of the case unless the evidence was properly presented.
Axiom of Admissibility of Evidence
Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issues and is
competent, i.e., it is not excluded by the law or the Rules of Court.4
Evidence is relevant if it tends in any reasonable degree to establish
the probability or improbability of a fact in issue.5 It is of a lesser
degree of reliability as evidence than material evidence. Material
evidence directly proves a fact in issue. Thus, the testimony of an
eyewitness to the commission of a crime is material; the evidence of
motive or flight of the accused may be relevant. Evidence that is
material or relevant must also be competent to be admissible. For
example, although the testimony of the eyewitness may be material, it
may be inadmissible if it is excluded by the marital disqualification rule.
Relevancy or materiality of evidence is a matter of logic, since it is
determined simply by ascertaining its logical connection to a fact in
issue in the case. It is therefore inadvisable for a judge to ask an
objecting counsel why an offered piece of evidence is irrelevant or
immaterial. By his inquiry, he shows his unfamiliarity with the issues in
the case. A judge is expected to be aware of the issues which he was
supposed to have defined and limited in his mandatory pre-trial order.
On the other hand, the grounds for objection to the competency of
evidence must be specified6 and are determined by the Rules or the
law.
The opposites of the three requisites for admissibility of evidence, viz,
irrelevancy, immateriality or incompetency, are the general grounds for
objection. The first two are valid grounds for objection without need of
specification or explanation. The third ground for objection,
incompetency, if offered without further explanation, is not valid for
being unspecific, except when invoked in reference to the lack of
qualification of a witness to answer a particular question or give a
particular evidence.
Q: Distinguish admissibility of evidence from probative value of

evidence.
A: Admissibility
Probative Value
Question of whether certain pieces
Question of whether the
of evidence are to be considered at
admitted evidence proves an
all.
issue.
MANOLO P. FULE, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondent.
1988 June 22 En Banc
G.R. No. 79094
D E C I S I O N
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the
Decision of respondent Appellate Court, which
affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court, Lucena City, Branch LIV, convicting
petitioner (the accused-appellant) of Violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (The Bouncing Checks
Law) on the basis of the Stipulation of Facts
entered into between the prosecution and the
defense during the pre-trial conference in the
Trial Court. The facts stipulated upon read:
"a) That this Court has jurisdiction over the
person and subject matter of this case;
"b) That the accused was an agent of the
Towers Assurance Corporation on or before
January 21, 1981;
"c) That on January 21, 1981, the accused
issued and made out check No. 26741, dated
January 24, 1981 in the sum of P2,541.05;
"d) That the said check was drawn in favor of
the complaining witness, Roy Nadera;
"e) That the check was drawn in favor of the
complaining witness in remittance of collection;

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"f) That the said check was presented for

payment on January 24, 1981 but the same was
dishonored for the reason that the said
checking account was already closed;
"g) That the accused Manolo Fule has been
properly identified as the accused party in this
case."
At the hearing of August 23, 1985, only the
prosecution presented its evidence consisting of
Exhibits "A," "B" and "C." At the subsequent
hearing on September 17, 1985, petitionerappellant waived the right to present evidence
and, in lieu thereof, submitted a Memorandum
confirming the Stipulation of Facts. The Trial
Court convicted petitioner-appellant.
On appeal, respondent Appellate Court upheld
the Stipulation of Facts and affirmed the
judgment of conviction. 1
Hence, this recourse, with petitioner-appellant
contending that:
"The Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals
erred in affirming the decision of the Regional
Trial Court convicting the petitioner of the
offense charged, despite the cold fact that the
basis of the conviction was based solely on the
stipulation of facts made during the pre-trial on
August 8, 1985, which was not signed by the
petitioner, nor by his counsel."
Finding the petition meritorious, we resolved to
give due course.
The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which
became effective on January 1, 1985, applicable
to this case since the pre-trial was held on
August 8, 1985, provides:
"SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed.

No agreement or admission made or entered
during the pre-trial conference shall be used in
evidence against the accused unless reduced to
writing and signed by him and his counsel." (Rule
118)
By its very language, the Rule is mandatory.
Under the rule of statutory construction,
negative words and phrases are to be regarded
as mandatory while those in the affirmative are
merely directory (McGee vs. Republic, 94 Phil.
820 [1954]). The use of the term "shall" further
emphasizes its mandatory character and means
that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty
which may be enforced (Bersabal vs. Salvador,
No. L-35910, July 21, 1978, 84 SCRA 176). And
more importantly, penal statutes whether
substantive and remedial or procedural are, by
consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against
the government and liberally in favor of the
accused (People vs. Terrado, No. L-23625,
November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 648).
The conclusion is inevitable, therefore, that the
omission of the signature of the accused and his
counsel, as mandatorily required by the Rules,
renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in
evidence. The fact that the lawyer of the
accused, in his memorandum, confirmed the
Stipulation of Facts does not cure the defect
because Rule 118 requires both the accused and
his counsel to sign the Stipulation of Facts.
What the prosecution should have done, upon
discovering that the accused did not sign the
Stipulation of Facts, as required by Rule 118, was
to submit evidence to establish the elements of
the crime, instead of relying solely on the
supposed admission of the accused in the
Stipulation of Facts. Without said evidence
independent of the admission, the guilt of the
accused cannot be deemed established beyond

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reasonable doubt.
Consequently, under the circumstances obtaining
in this case, the ends of justice require that
evidence be presented to determine the
culpability of the accused. When a judgment has
been entered by consent of an attorney without
special authority, it will sometimes be set aside
or reopened (Natividad vs. Natividad, 51 Phil.
613 [1928]).
WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent
Appellate Court is REVERSED and this case is
hereby ordered RE-OPENED and REMANDED to
the appropriate Branch of the Regional Trial
Court of Lucena City, for further reception of
evidence.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (C.J.), Fernan, Narvasa, Cruz, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,
Grio-Aguino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Proper Presentation Of Evidence

Every piece of evidence, regardless of its nature, requires certain
processes of presentation for its admissibility and admission.
1. Object evidence
Object evidence must generally be marked (Exhibit A, B, etc. for the
plaintiff; Exhibit 1, 2, 3, etc. for the defendant) either during the pre-trial
or during its presentation at the trial. It must also be identified as the
object evidence it is claimed to be. This requires a testimonial sponsor.
For example, a forensic chemist identifies marijuana leaves as those
submitted to him in the case for examination. Further, object evidence
must be formally offered after the presentation of a partys testimonial
evidence.
2. Oral evidence
Oral evidence is presented through the testimony of a witness. Under
the 1989 Rules on Evidence, oral evidence must be formally offered at
the time the witness is called to testify.8 Objections may then be raised
against the testimony of the witness. If the objection is valid, as when
the witness testimony is barred by the hearsay rule or the opinion rule,
the witness will not be allowed to testify. If the witness is otherwise

allowed to testify, he shall be sworn in, either by taking an oath or
making an affirmation.9 It is essential that the proper foundation for the
testimony of a witness must be laid. An ordinary witness must be
shown to have personal knowledge of the facts he shall testify to;
otherwise, his testimony will be hearsay, or he will be incompetent to
answer the questions to be asked of him. An expert witness must be
specifically qualified as such; otherwise, he cannot validly give his
opinion on matters for which he may have been summoned as a
witness.
However, the requirement of qualifying an expert witness may be
dispensed with if:
(a) the adverse counsel stipulates on the experts
qualification; or
(b) the court takes judicial notice of the witness
expertise, because the judge happens to be aware
thereof on account of the judges judicial functions.
3. Documentary evidence
Documentary evidence is (1) marked; (2) identified as the document
which it is claimed to be (as when the witness asserts that the
document presented to him is the same contract which he claims was
executed between the two parties); (3) authenticated, if a private
document, by proving its due execution and genuineness; and (4)
formally offered after all the proponents witnesses have testified.
Rule 132, Sec. 34 provides that the court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered, and that the purpose for which the
evidence is offered must be specified. In this connection, it has been
asked whether it would be proper for the judge to disregard a witness
direct testimony given without the prior formal offer thereof which Rule
132, Sec. 35 requires, and corollarily, whether the adverse party may
be required to cross-examine that witness. In People v. Marcos,11 the
Supreme Court ruled that if a witness has given unoffered direct
testimony without objection from the adverse party, the latter is
estopped from raising that objection which he is deemed to have
waived; hence, although not formally offered, the testimony may be
considered by the court.
The view can be advanced, however, that although the aforesaid
testimony was not expressly formally offered, it was nonetheless
formally offered, albeit impliedly and automatically, the moment each
question was propounded to elicit an answer. This view is premised on
two related provisions in Rule 132, Sec. 36, i.e., that 'Objection to
evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is
made,' and that 'Objection to a question propounded in the course of
the oral examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the
grounds therefor shall have become reasonably apparent.' Clearly, the
purpose of the express formal offer of oral evidence before the witness
testifies is merely to determine, on the basis of the stated substance of
the testimony and its purpose, whether the witness shall be allowed to
testify. Once the witness is allowed to testify, each question
propounded to elicit specific oral evidence may still be objected to as
soon as a ground for objection becomes reasonably apparent. But it is
fundamental that an objection to evidence can be validly raised only
after an offer is made. Thus, every question asked of a witness
especially on direct examination presupposes a formal offer of the
answer, the oral evidence, sought to be elicited. It would seem
therefore that unlike documentary and object evidence which are

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formally offered only after all the witnesses of a party have testified,
oral evidence is offered twice: once, expressly, before the witness
testifies, and again, with each question propounded to the witness.
C. Formal Offer Of Evidence; Need For Statement Of The
Purpose Of Evidence
Evidence not formally offered will not be considered by the court in
deciding the case.
A party makes a formal offer of his evidence by stating its substance or
nature and the purpose or purposes for which the evidence is
offered.13 Without a formal offer of evidence, and hence without a
disclosure of its purpose, it cannot be determined whether it is
admissible or not. This is so because it is the intended purpose of a
piece of evidence which determines what rule of evidence will apply for
its admissibility. A piece of evidence may be admissible if offered for
one purpose but may be inadmissible if offered for another. For
example, the testimony of a witness, in a libel case, that he heard the
defendant call the plaintiff a liar and a crook is certainly inadmissible
for being hearsay, if offered to prove the truth of the perceived
statement. However, the same testimony is perfectly admissible if
offered simply to prove that the statement was uttered. For that
purpose, the witness would be the only person qualified to testify on,
and prove, what he heard defendant say. Similarly, the declaration of a
dying person made without consciousness of his impending death will
not qualify as a dying declaration, although it may be admissible if
offered as part of the res gestae.
It must be noted that the mere marking, identification, or authentication
of documentary evidence does not mean that it will be, or has been,
offered as part of the evidence of a party. This was the ruling of the
Supreme Court in People v. Santito, Jr.
Annexes attached to pleadings, if not offered formally, are mere scraps
of paper and should not be considered by the court, unless the truth of
their contents has been judicially admitted.
To the general rule that the court shall not consider any evidence not
formally offered, there are certain exceptions:
1. Under the Rule on Summary Procedure, where no full
blown trial is held in the interest of speedy administration
of justice;
2. In summary judgments under Rule 35 where the judge
bases his decisions on the pleadings, depositions,
admissions, affidavits and documents filed with the court;
3. Documents whose contents are taken judicial notice of
by the court;
4. Documents whose contents are judicially admitted;
5. Object evidence which could not be formally offered
because they have disappeared or have become lost
after they have been marked, identified and testified on
and described in the record and became the subject of
cross-examination of the witnesses who testified on them
during the trial, e.g., marijuana involved in a prohibited
drugs prosecution.
TYPES OF ADMISSIBILITY
a. Multiple Admissibility Rule
evidence is relevant and competent for
two or more purposes.
_ Evidence will be received if it satisfies all the requirements
prescribed by law in order that it
may be admissible for the purpose for which it was presented, even if it
does not satisfy the other requirements for its admissibility for other
purposes. (5 Moran)
_ Under the rule of multiple admissibility o evidence, even if Consunjis
confession may not be
competent as a against his co accused Panganiban, being hearsay as
to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them without conspiracy
being established by
other evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless,
admissible as evidence of the declarants own guilt (People vs. Yatco,
97 Phil. 941).
b. Conditional Admissibility Rule
evidence that which appears to be immaterial is admitted by the court
subject to the condition that its connection with other facts
subsequently to be proved will be
established. (People vs. Yatco, 97 Phil. 940).
_ A fact offered in evidence mayappear to be immaterial unless it is
connected with other facts to be subsequently proved. In such a case,
evidence of that fact may be received on condition that the other facts
be
afterwards proved. On failure to comply with this condition, the
evidence already given shall be stricken out. (5 Moran)
c. Curative Admissibility Rule evidence,
otherwise improper, is admitted to contradict improper
evidence introduced by the other party. (1 Wigmore)
_ Improper evidence admitted on one side without objection, does not
give the other side the right to introduce in reply the same kind of
evidence if objected to; however, when a plain and unfair prejudice
would
otherwise inure to the opponent, the court may permit him to use a
curative counter-evidence to contradict the improper evidence
presented. (5 Moran)
Digital evidence or electronic evidence is

any probative information stored or transmitted
in digital form that a party to a court case may use
attrial.[1] Before accepting digital evidence a court
will determine if the evidence is relevant, whether
it is authentic, if it is hearsay and whether a copy is
acceptable or the original is required.[1]
The use of digital evidence has increased in the
past few decades as courts have allowed the use
of e-mails, digital photographs, ATM transaction
logs, word processing documents, instant
message histories, files saved
from accounting programs, spreadsheets, internet
browser histories,databases, the contents
of computer memory, computer backups,
computer printouts, Global Positioning
System tracks, logs from a hotels electronic door
locks, and digital video or audio files.[2]
Many courts in the United States have applied

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the Federal Rules of Evidence to digital evidence

in a similar way to traditional documents, although
some have noted important[according to
whom?]
differences. For example, that digital
evidence tends to be more voluminous, more
difficult to destroy, easily modified, easily
duplicated, potentially more expressive, and more
readily available. As such, some courts have
sometimes treated digital evidence differently for
purposes of authentication, hearsay, the best
evidence rule, and privilege. In December 2006,
strict new rules were enacted within the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure requiring the preservation
and disclosure of electronically stored evidence.
Digital evidence is often attacked for its
authenticity due to the ease with which it can be
modified, although courts are beginning to reject
this argument without proof of tampering. [3]1
MODES OF EXCLUDING INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE

There are two ways of excluding inadmissible evidence. One is by
objection and the other is by a motion to strike out.
a continuing objection is properly made.20 Objection to the purpose for

which evidence is offered is not proper.
B. A motion to strike out answer or testimony is proper in the
following instances:
1. The witness answers prematurely.21
2. The answer is incompetent, irrelevant or improper.22
The incompetency referred to here is limited to the
incompetency of the witness to answer the question
posed; it does not extend to the general concept of
incompetency of evidence for being excluded by law or
the Rules.
3. The answer given is unresponsive.
4. The ground for objection was not apparent when the
question was asked.
5. Uncompleted testimony e.g., a witness who gave
direct testimony becomes unavailable for crossexamination through no fault of the cross-examiner.
6. Unfulfilled
testimony.
condition
in
conditionally
admitted
C. Objections and Ruling

Objections to evidence may be formal or substantive.
A. Evidence is objected to at the time it is offered and not

before:
1. Oral evidence is objected to after its
express formal offer before the witness
testifies.17 When thereafter the witness is
allowed to testify, objection to a question
propounded in the course of the oral
examination of a witness shall be made as
soon as the grounds therefor shall become
reasonably apparent.18
1. Formal objections are based on the defective form of

the question asked. Examples:
(1) leading questions which suggest to the
witness the answer desired.23
2. Documentary and object evidence are

objected to upon their formal offer after the
presentation of a partys testimonial
evidence.
Failure to seasonably object to offered evidence amounts to a waiver
of the grounds for objection. The rules of exclusion are not selfoperating. They must be properly invoked.
The grounds for objection must be specified.19 Grounds not raised are
deemed waived. However, repetition of objection is unnecessary when
www. Wikipedia.com

a. If counsel finds difficulty in

avoiding leading questions, the
judge may suggest, to expedite
questions, that counsel begin his
questions
with
the
proper
interrogative pronouns, such as
"who", "what", "where", "why", "how",
etc.
b. Leading questions are allowed of
a witness who cannot be reasonably
expected to be led by the examining
counsel,
as
(a)
on
crossexaminations;24 (b) when the
witness is unwilling or hostile, after it
has been demonstrated that the
witness had shown unjustified
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reluctance to testify or has an

adverse interest or had misled the
party into calling him to the witness
stand, and in either case after having
been declared by the court to be
indeed unwilling or hostile;25 or (c)
when the witness is an adverse party
or an officer, director, or managing
agent of a public or private
corporation or of a partnership or
association with is an adverse
party.26
2. Substantive objections are those based on the

inadmissibility of the offered evidence, e.g.;
(1) irrelevant, immaterial
(2) best evidence rule
(3) parol evidence rule
(4) disqualification of witness
c. Leading questions may also be

asked when there is difficulty in
getting direct and intelligible answers
from a witness who is ignorant, or a
child of tender years, or is feeble
minded, or a deaf-mute.27
(5) privileged communication
d. Leading questions may moreover

be asked on preliminary matters, i.e.,
on facts not in controversy, and
offered only as basis for more
important testimony to follow. For
example, "You are Mrs Maria
Morales, wife of the plaintiff in this
case?"
(8) opinion
(2) misleading questions, which assume as

true a fact not testified to by the witness
("question has no basis"), or contrary to that
which he has previously stated;28
(3) double or multiple questions, which are two
or more queries in one. For example, Q: "Did
you see the defendant enter the plaintiffs
house, and was the plaintiff there?"
(4) vague; ambiguous; indefinite or uncertain
questions - not allowed because the witness
cannot understand from the form of the
question just what facts are sought to be
elicited.
(5) repetitious questions; or those already
answered. However, on cross-examination, the
cross-examiner may ask a question already
answered to test the credibility of the witness.
(6) argumentative questions, which challenge a
witness testimony by engaging him in an
argument, e.g., Q: "Isnt it a fact Mr Witness
that nobody could possibly see all the
circumstances you mentioned in a span of
merely two seconds, and that either your
observations are inaccurate or you are lying?"
(6) res inter alios acta

(7) hearsay
(9) evidence illegally obtained

(10)private document not authenticated
The ruling by the court on an objection must be given immediately after
an objection is made, unless the court desires to take a reasonable
time to inform itself on the question presented; but the ruling shall
always be made during the trial and at such time as will give the party
against whom it is made an opportunity to meet the situations
presented by the ruling.29 Thus, an objection to a question asked of a
witness must be at once resolved by the court by either sustaining or
overruling the objection. It would be incorrect for a judge to consider
the objection "submitted" or "noted". Unless the objection is resolved,
the examination of the witness could not be expected to continue
since, in all likelihood, the next question would depend on how the
objection is resolved. If the issue raised by the objection is a
particularly difficult one, it would not be improper for the judge to
perhaps declare a brief recess to enable him to quickly study the
matter. But certainly, the resolution must be given before the trial
resumes.
The reason for sustaining or overruling an objection need not be
stated. However, if the objection is based on two or more grounds, a
ruling sustaining the objection, or one or some of them, must specify
the ground or grounds relied upon.30
Judges are advised to judiciously consider the validity of the grounds
for objections and carefully rule on them. A ruling that all evidence
formally offered are "admitted for whatever they may be worth" will not
reflect well on the judge, as it implies a hasty and ill-considered
resolution of the offer and the objections. Besides, the phrase "for
whatever they may be worth" is improper since it refers to the weight or
credibility of the evidence; the weight of the evidence shall be
considered only after the evidence shall have been admitted. Another
ruling that is ludicrous and even nonsensical is "Evidence admitted
subject to the objections". This is a non-ruling.
In case of an honest doubt about the admissibility of evidence, it is
better policy to rule in favor of its admission. An erroneous rejection of
evidence will be unfair to the offeror since the judge cannot validly

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consider it even if after the trial, the judge realizes his mistake. On the
other hand, if the judge had erred in admitting a piece of evidence, he
may simply give it little or no weight when deciding the case.
THE RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE

A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC
Effective August 1, 2001
Scope: Unless otherwise provided in this Rule,
it shall apply whenever an electronic document
or electronic data message is offered or used in
evidence.
Coverage: The Rules shall apply to all civil
actions and proceedings, as well as quasijudicial
and administrative cases.
_ R.A. 8792 gave recognition to the admissibility of electronic
documents and electronic data messages as
evidence. The law says that for evidentiary purposes, an electronic
document shall be the functional
equivalent of a written document under existing laws.:
_ To be admissible must maintained its
integrity, reliability and must be capable
of being authenticated.
_ Definitions:
1) Electronic Document refers to information or the representation of
information, data, figures, symbols
or other modes of written expression, described or however
represented, by which a right is established or an obligation
extinguished, or by which a fact may
be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved, or
produced electronically.
What Electronic Document Includes
(a) Digitally signed document; or
(b) Any print-out or output, readable by sight or other means, which
accurately reflects the electronic data
message or electronic document.
2) Digitally Signed refers to an electronic document or electronic data
message bearing a digital
signature verified by the public key listed in a certificate.
3) Electronic Data Message refers to information generated, sent,
received or stored by electronic,
optical or similar means. For purposes of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence, the term electronic document may
be used interchangeably with electronic data message.
4) Electronic Signature refers to any distinctive mark, characteristic
and/or sound in electronic form,
representing the identity of a person and attached to or logically
associated with the electronic data message or electronic document or
any methodology or procedure
employed or adopted by a person and executed or adopted by such
person with the intention of authenticating, signing or approving an
electronic data message or electronic document. It includes
digital signatures.
5) Digital Signature refers to an electronic signature consisting of a
transformation of an electronic
document or an electronic data message using an asymmetric or
untransformed electronic document
public cryptosystem such that a person having the initial
and the signers public key can accurately determine:

(a) whether the transformation was created using the private key that
corresponds to the signers public key; and,
(b) whether the initial electronic document had been altered after the
transformation was made.
Note: An electronic signature or a digital signature is deemed as the
functional equivalent of the signature of a person on a written
document.
6) Asymmetric or Public Cryptosystem a system capable of
generating a secure key pair, consisting of a private key for creating a
digital signature, and a public key for verifying the digital signature.
7) Ephemeral Electronic Communication refers to
telephone conversations, text messages, chatroom sessions,
streaming audio, streaming video, and other electronic forms of
communication the evidence of
which is not recorded or retained.
RULES:
1. A recording of the telephone conversation
or ephemeral electronic communication may be offered as ephemeral
evidence in the same way as in presenting audio, photographic or
video evidence to the court.
2. Electronic Documents as Functional Equivalent of Paper-Based
Documents: Whenever a rule of evidence
refers to the term writing, document, record, instrument, memorandum
or any other form of writing, such term shall be deemed to include an
electronic document.
3. The TOTAL EXCLUSIONARY RULE: Evidence obtained in
violation of a defendants constitutional rights must be suppressed from
the governments case in
chief.
4. The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree / But For/ Taint Doctrine- posits
that all evidence (the fruit) derived from an illegal search (the
poisonous tree) must be suppressed, whether it was obtained directly
through the illegal search itself or indirectly using information obtained
din the illegal search.
_ Scope of Exclusionary Rule
a) Right against unreasonable search and seizure.
b) Right to privacy and inviolability of communication.
c) Right under investigation for an offense.
d) Right against self-incrimination.
_ Note: The rule is limited only to evidence obtained by law enforcers
except as otherwise provided by law.
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 170491
April 4, 2007
NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAMON G. CODILLA, JR., Presiding
Judge, RTC of Cebu, Br. 19, BANGPAI
SHIPPING COMPANY, and WALLEM

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
SHIPPING, INCORPORATED, Respondents.

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 00848, dated 9 November
2005, which dismissed the Petition for
Certiorari filed by the National Power
Corporation seeking to set aside the
Order2 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cebu, Branch 19 dated 16 November 2004,
denying admission and excluding from the
records plaintiffs (herein petitioner) Exhibits
"A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its sub-markings, "I",
"J", and its sub-markings, "K", "L", "M" and its
sub-markings, "N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P"
and its sub-markings, "Q" and its sub-markings,
"R" and "S" and its sub-markings.
On 20 April 1996, M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of
foreign registry owned and operated by private
respondent Bangpai Shipping, Co., allegedly
bumped and damaged petitioners Power Barge
209 which was then moored at the Cebu
International Port. Thus, on 26 April 1996,
petitioner filed before the Cebu RTC a complaint
for damages against private respondent Bangpai
Shipping Co., for the alleged damages caused on
petitioners power barges.
Thereafter, petitioner filed an Amended
Complaint dated 8 July 1996 impleading herein
private respondent Wallem Shipping, Inc., as
additional defendant, contending that the latter
is a ship agent of Bangpai Shipping Co. On 18
September 1996, Wallem Shipping, Inc. filed a
Motion to Dismiss which was subsequently
denied by public respondent Judge in an Order
dated 20 October 1998. Bangpai Shipping Co.
likewise filed a Motion to Dismiss which was also

denied by public respondent Judge in an Order
issued on 24 January 2003.
Petitioner, after adducing evidence during the
trial of the case, filed a formal offer of
evidence before the lower court on 2 February
2004 consisting of Exhibits "A" to "V" together
with the sub-marked portions thereof.
Consequently, private respondents Bangpai
Shipping Co. and Wallem Shipping, Inc. filed
their respective objections to petitioners
formal offer of evidence.
On 16 November 2004, public respondent judge
issued the assailed order denying the admission
and excluding from the records petitioners
Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its submarkings, "I", "J" and its sub-markings, "K", "L",
"M" and its sub-markings, "N" and its submarkings, "O", "P" and its sub-markings, "Q" and
its sub-markings, "R" and "S" and its submarkings. According to the court a quo:
The Court finds merit in the objections raised
and the motion to strike out filed respectively
by the defendants. The record shows that the
plaintiff has been given every opportunity to
present the originals of the Xerox or
photocopies of the documents it offered. It
never produced the originals. The plaintiff
attempted to justify the admission of the
photocopies by contending that "the photocopies
offered are equivalent to the original of the
document" on the basis of the Electronic
Evidence (Comment to Defendant Wallem
Philippines Objections and Motion to Strike).
But as rightly pointed out in defendant Wallems
Reply to the Comment of Plaintiff, the Xerox
copies do not constitute the electronic evidence
defined in Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence as follows:

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
"(h) "Electronic document" refers to information

or the representation of information, data,
figures, symbols or other models of written
expression, described or however represented,
by which a right is established or an obligation
extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved
and affirmed, which is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or
produced electronically. It includes digitally
signed documents and any printout, readable by
sight or other means which accurately reflects
the electronic data message or electronic
document. For the purpose of these Rules, the
term "electronic document" may be used
interchangeably with "electronic data message".
The information in those Xerox or photocopies
was not received, recorded, retrieved or
produced electronically. Moreover, such
electronic evidence must be authenticated
(Sections 1 and 2, Rule 5, Rules on Electronic
Evidence), which the plaintiff failed to do.
Finally, the required Affidavit to prove the
admissibility and evidentiary weight of the
alleged electronic evidence (Sec. 1, Rule 9, Ibid)
was not executed, much less presented in
evidence.
The Xerox or photocopies offered should,
therefore, be stricken off the record. Aside
from their being not properly identified by any
competent witness, the loss of the principals
thereof was not established by any competent
proof.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs Exhibits "A", "C", "D",
"E", "H" and its sub-markings, "I", "J", and its
sub-markings, "K", "L", "M" and its sub-markings,
"N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its submarkings, "Q" and its sub-markings, and "R" are
hereby DENIED admission and excluded from
the records. However, these excluded evidence

should be attached to the records of this case
to enable the appellate court to pass upon them
should an appeal be taken from the decision on
the merits to be rendered upon the termination
of the trial of this case.
Exhibits "S" and its sub-markings are also
DENIED admission for lack of proper
identification since the witness who brought
these pictures expressly admitted that he was
not present when the photos were taken and had
not knowledge when the same where taken. 3
Upon denial of petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration in an Order dated 20 April
2005, petitioner filed a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure before the Court of Appeals
maintaining that public respondent Judge acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in denying the
admission of its Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H"
and its sub-markings, "I", "J" and its submarkings, "K", "L", "M" and its sub-markings, "N"
and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its submarkings, "Q" and its sub-markings, "R", and "S"
and its sub-markings.
On 9 November 2005, the appellate court issued
a Decision dismissing petitioners petition for
certiorari, the pertinent portions of which
elucidate:
After a judicious scrutiny of the record of the
case on hand, together with the rules and
jurisprudence which are applicable in the
premises, we have come up with a finding that
the petition for certiorari filed in this case is
not meritorious.
It appears that there is no sufficient showing by
the petitioner that the respondent judge acted

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the

assailed orders in Civil Case No. CEB-18662. As
what our jurisprudence tells us, grave abuse of
discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as would be equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction x x x.
In the case at bench, what has been shown to
the contrary by the totality of the record on
hand is that the respondent judge acted
correctly and within the pale of his sound
discretion in issuing the assailed order, dated
November 16, 2004, in Civil Case No. CEB-18662.
Indeed, it appears that the pieces of
petitioners documentary evidence which were
denied admission by the respondent judge were
not properly identified by any competent
witness. As pointed out by the respondent
Bangpai Shipping Company in its comment on the
petition filed in this case which reproduces some
excerpts of the testimonies in the court a
quo of Atty. Marianito De Los Santos, Engr.
Nestor Enriquez, Jr. and Mr. Rodulfo I. Pagaling,
the said witnesses did not have personal
knowledge of and participation in the
preparation and making of the pieces of
documentary evidence denied admission by
respondent judge x x x. In other words, there
was lack of proper identification of said pieces
of documentary evidence. x x x.
Then another ground for denying admission of
petitioners Exhibits A, C, D, E, H, I, J, K, L, M,
N, O, P, Q, R, and S by the respondent judge is
that said pieces of documentary evidence were
merely photocopies of purported documents or
papers. There is no gainsaying the fact that the
respondent judge acted within the pale of his
discretion when he denied admission of said
documentary evidence. Section 3 of Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court of the Philippines is very
explicit in providing that, when the subject of
inquiry are the contents of documents, no

evidence shall be admissible other than the
original documents themselves, except in certain
cases specifically so enumerated therein, and
the petitioner has not shown that the nonpresentation or non-production of its original
documentary pieces of evidence falls under such
exceptions. As aptly pointed out by the
respondent judge in the order issued by him on
November 16, 2004:
"x x x The record shows that the plaintiff
(petitioner herein) has been given every
opportunity to present the originals of the
Xerox or photocopies of the documents it
offered. It never produced said originals."
So, the petitioner has only itself to blame for
the respondent judges denial of admission of its
aforementioned documentary evidence.
Of course, the petitioner tries to contend that
the photocopies of documents offered by it are
equivalent to the original documents that it
sought to offer in evidence, based on the Rules
on Electronic Evidence which were in force and
effect since August 1, 2001. However, such a
contention is devoid of merit. The pieces of
documentary evidence offered by the petitioner
in Civil Case CEB-18662 which were denied
admission by the respondent judge do not
actually constitute as electronic evidence as
defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence. The
informations therein were not received,
retrieved or produced electronically. The
petitioner has not adequately established that
its documentary evidence were electronic
evidence. it has not properly authenticated such
evidence as electronic documents,
assuming arguendo that they are. Lastly, the
petitioner has not properly established by
affidavit pursuant to Rule 9 of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence the admissibility and

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
evidentiary weight of said documentary

evidence.
Thus, by any legal yardstick, it is manifest that
the respondent judge did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in denying admission of the
aforementioned documentary evidence of
petitioner.
But even if it be granted just for the sake of
argument that the respondent judge committed
an error in denying the aforementioned
documentary evidence of the petitioner, still the
petition for certiorari filed in this case must
fail. Such error would at most be only an error
of law and not an error of jurisdiction. In Lee vs.
People, 393 SCRA 397, the Supreme Court of
the Philippines said that certiorari will not lie in
case of an error of law. x x x.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises,
judgment is hereby rendered by us
DISMISSING the petition filed in this case and
AFFIRMING the assailed orders issued by
respondent judge in Civil Case No. CEB-18662.4
Aggrieved by the aforequoted decision,
petitioner filed the instant petition.
The focal point of this entire controversy is
petitioners obstinate contention that the
photocopies it offered as formal evidence
before the trial court are the functional
equivalent of their original based on its
inimitable interpretation of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence.
Petitioner insists that, contrary to the rulings of
both the trial court and the appellate court, the
photocopies it presented as documentary
evidence actually constitute electronic evidence
based on its own premise that an "electronic
document" as defined under Section 1(h), Rule 2
of the Rules on Electronic Evidence is not limited

to information that is received, recorded,
retrieved or produced electronically. Rather,
petitioner maintains that an "electronic
document" can also refer to other modes of
written expression that is produced
electronically, such as photocopies, as included in
the sections catch-all proviso: "any print-out or
output, readable by sight or other means".
We do not agree.
In order to shed light to the issue of whether or
not the photocopies are indeed electronic
documents as contemplated in Republic Act No.
8792 or the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of the Electronic Commerce Act, as well as the
Rules on Electronic Evidence, we shall enumerate
the following documents offered as evidence by
the petitioner, to wit:
1. Exhibit "A" is a photocopy of a letter
manually signed by a certain Jose C.
Troyo, with "RECEIVED" stamped
thereon, together with a handwritten
date;
2. Exhibit "C" is a photocopy of a list of
estimated cost of damages of petitioners
power barges 207 and 209 prepared by
Hopewell Mobile Power Systems
Corporation and manually signed by
Messrs. Rex Malaluan and Virgilio Asprer;
3. Exhibit "D" is a photocopy of a letter
manually signed by a certain Nestor G.
Enriquez, Jr., with "RECEIVED" stamped
notation of the date it was received;
4. Exhibit "E" is a photocopy of a
Standard Marine Protest Form which was
filled up and accomplished by Rex Joel C.

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
Malaluan in his own handwriting and

signed by him. Portions of the Jurat were
handwritten, and manually signed by the
Notary Public;
5. Exhibit "H" is a photocopy of a letter
manually signed by Mr. Nestor G.
Enriquez, Jr. with "RECEIVED" stamped
notation of the date it was received;
6. Exhibit "I" is a photocopy of a
computation of the estimated energy loss
allegedly suffered by petitioner which
was manually signed by Mr. Nestor G.
Enriquez, Jr.;
7. Exhibit "J" is a photocopy of a letter
containing the breakdown of the cost
estimate, manually signed by Mr. Nestor
G. Enriquez, Jr., with "RECEIVED"
stamped thereon, together with a
handwritten notation of the date it was
received, and other handwritten
notations;
8. Exhibit "K" is a photocopy of the
Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum
written using a manual typewriter, signed
manually by Atty. Ofelia Polo-De Los
Reyes, with a handwritten notation when
it was received by the party;
9. Exhibit "L" is a photocopy of a portion
of the electricity supply and operation
and maintenance agreement between
petitioner and Hopewell, containing
handwritten notations and every page
containing three unidentified manually
placed signatures;
10. Exhibit "M" is a photocopy of the
Notice of Termination with attachments
addressed to Rex Joel C. Malaluan,

manually signed by Jaime S. Patinio, with
a handwritten notation of the date it was
received. The sub-markings also contain
manual signatures and/or handwritten
notations;
11. Exhibit "N" is a photocopy of a letter
of termination with attachments
addressed to VIrgilio Asprer and
manually signed by Jaime S. Patino. The
sub-markings contain manual signatures
and/or handwritten notations;
12. Exhibit "O" is the same photocopied
document marked as Annex C;
13. Exhibit "P" is a photocopy of an
incident report manually signed by
Messrs. Malaluan and Bautista and by the
Notary Public, with other handwritten
notations;
14. Exhibit "Q" is a photocopy of a letter
manually signed by Virgilio Asprer and by
a Notary Public, together with other
handwritten notations.
On the other hand, an "electronic document"
refers to information or the representation of
information, data, figures, symbols or other
models of written expression, described or
however represented, by which a right is
established or an obligation extinguished, or by
which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which
is received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced
electronically.5 It includes digitally signed
documents and any printout, readable by sight or
other means which accurately reflects the
electronic data message or electronic
document.6

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
The rules use the word "information" to define

an electronic document received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or
produced electronically. This would suggest that
an electronic document is relevant only in terms
of the information contained therein, similar to
any other document which is presented in
evidence as proof of its contents. 7 However,
what differentiates an electronic document
from a paper-based document is the manner by
which the information is processed; clearly, the
information contained in an electronic document
is received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
A perusal of the information contained in the
photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal
that not all of the contents therein, such as the
signatures of the persons who purportedly
signed the documents, may be recorded or
produced electronically. By no stretch of the
imagination can a persons signature affixed
manually be considered as information
electronically received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved or produced.
Hence, the argument of petitioner that since
these paper printouts were produced through an
electronic process, then these photocopies are
electronic documents as defined in the Rules on
Electronic Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if
not preposterous, interpretation of the law.
Having thus declared that the offered
photocopies are not tantamount to electronic
documents, it is consequential that the same may
not be considered as the functional equivalent of
their original as decreed in the law.
Furthermore, no error can be ascribed to the
court a quo in denying admission and excluding
from the records petitioners Exhibits "A", "C",
"D", "E", "H" and its sub-markings, "I", "J" and
its sub-markings, "K", "L", "M" and its submarkings, "N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and
its sub-markings, "Q" and its sub-markings, and

"R". The trial court was correct in rejecting
these photocopies as they violate the best
evidence rule and are therefore of no probative
value being incompetent pieces of evidence.
Before the onset of liberal rules of discovery,
and modern technique of electronic copying, the
best evidence rule was designed to guard against
incomplete or fraudulent proof and the
introduction of altered copies and the
withholding of the originals.8 But the modern
justification for the rule has expanded from the
prevention of fraud to a recognition that
writings occupy a central position in the
law.9 The importance of the precise terms of
writings in the world of legal relations, the
fallibility of the human memory as reliable
evidence of the terms, and the hazards of
inaccurate or incomplete duplicate are the
concerns addressed by the best evidence rule. 10
Moreover, as mandated under Section 2, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court:
"SECTION 2. Original writing must be produced;
exceptions. There can be no evidence of a
writing the contents of which is the subject of
inquiry, other than the original writing itself,
except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost,
destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court;
(b) When the original is in the possession
of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it
after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original is a record or other
document in the custody of a public
officer;

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
(d) When the original has been recorded

in an existing record a certified copy of
which is made evidence by law;
(e) When the original consists of
numerous accounts or other documents
which cannot be examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact
sought to be established from them is
only the general result of the whole."
When the original document has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or
existence and the cause of its unavailability
without bad faith on his part, may prove its
contents by a copy, or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order
stated.11 The offeror of secondary evidence is
burdened to prove the predicates thereof: (a)
the loss or destruction of the original without
bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror
which can be shown by circumstantial evidence
of routine practices of destruction of
documents;12 (b) the proponent must prove by a
fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a
reasonable inference of the loss or destruction
of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown
that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful
search has been made for the document in the
proper place or places.13 However, in the case at
bar, though petitioner insisted in offering the
photocopies as documentary evidence, it failed
to establish that such offer was made in
accordance with the exceptions as enumerated
under the abovequoted rule. Accordingly, we find
no error in the Order of the court a quo denying
admissibility of the photocopies offered by
petitioner as documentary evidence.
Finally, it perplexes this Court why petitioner
continued to obdurately disregard the
opportunities given by the trial court for it to

present the originals of the photocopies it
presented yet comes before us now praying that
it be allowed to present the originals of the
exhibits that were denied admission or in case
the same are lost, to lay the predicate for the
admission of secondary evidence. Had petitioner
presented the originals of the documents to the
court instead of the photocopies it obstinately
offered as evidence, or at the very least laid the
predicate for the admission of said photocopies,
this controversy would not have unnecessarily
been brought before the appellate court and
finally to this Court for adjudication. Had it not
been for petitioners intransigence, the merits
of petitioners complaint for damages would have
been decided upon by the trial court long ago. As
aptly articulated by the Court of Appeals,
petitioner has only itself to blame for the
respondent judges denial of admission of its
aforementioned documentary evidence and
consequently, the denial of its prayer to be given
another opportunity to present the originals of
the documents that were denied admission nor
to lay the predicate for the admission of
secondary evidence in case the same has been
lost.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 00848,
dated 9 November 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIAMARTINEZ
Associate Justice
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Asscociate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
-oOoAnti-Wire Tapping Act (RA 4200)

_ An Act to prohibit and penalize Wire-Tapping and other Related
Violations of the Privacy of Communications, and for other purpose
_ This law provides that it shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by
using any other device commonly known as a Dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or taperecorder, or
however otherwise
described.
_ What are Covered by the
Prohibition
1) Knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record or any
other such record, or copies thereof, of any
communication or spoken word; or
2) Replay the same for any other person;
3) Communicate the contents thereof either verbally or in writing; or
4) Furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any
other persons.
Rules:
1. Any information obtained in violation of this act shall not be
admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.
2. Law Limited to Wiretapping Device: The law refers to a tap of a
wire or cable or the use of a device or arrangement for the purpose of
secretly overhearing,
intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either:
a. physical interruption through a wiretap, or
b. deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in
order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken
words.
3. Instances Not Covered by the Act
a. Listening to telephone extension lines.
b. Telephone party lines.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 1096-CFI May 31, 1976

ROLANDO BARTOLOME, complainant,
vs.
HON. JUAN DE BORJA, District Judge,
Branch XX, Court of First Instance,

Manila, respondent.
Adm. Matter No. 1114-CFI May 31, 1976
FRANCISCO GREGO, complainant,
vs.
HON. JUAN DE BORJA, District Judge,
Branch XX, Court of First Instance,
Manila, respondent.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:
Administrative charges usually arise from a deep
sense of grievance on the part of complainants.
They are often, as a result, made to appear much
graver than the facts warrant. Even with due
allowance made for that tendency, what is
evident on a most cursory appraisal of these
cases against respondent Judge Juan de Borja
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, is that
no curb was placed on such propensity to
exaggerate matters. The language of hyperbole
was employed. In the first, he was accused by
Rolando Bartolome, who Identifies himself as a
labor regulation officer in the Department of
Labor, of oppression and deliberate violation of
the penal laws, gross ignorance of the law and
deliberate intent to place the Secretary of
Labor and the Office of The President in a very
bad light, as well as grave misconduct in the
proceedings had with reference to a certiorari
petition. 1 In the other, with a certain Francisco
Grego as complainant, he is indicted for serious
misconduct, characterizing what was done by him
in a pending criminal case where the complainant
was the accused as oppressive, whimsical,
capricious, arbitrary and despotic. 2 Respondent
Judge was required to answer each of the above
complaints by the then Judicial Consultant,
retired Justice Manuel P. Barcelona of the Court

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
of Appeals. He did so in pleadings couched in a

dispassionate tone with citation of the
authorities to lend support to the way he
discharged his functions. After a study of the
records of the case, this Court is of the opinion
that no disciplinary action is warranted. Another
judge may have ruled differently on the
questions submitted, but it would not conduce to
the proper administration and the prized Ideal
of independence that a man on the bench is
expected to cherish if he is held to such a strict
degree of accountability that for the exercise
of his discretion, he is made to suffer. The
complaints must be dismissed.
It was a detailed administrative complaint that
was submitted by Rolando Bartolome in support
of his charges that there was oppression and
deliberate violation of the Anti-Wire Tapping
Act, 3 as well as the provisions on libel in the
Revised Penal
Code. 4 In essence the gravamen of such charges
consisted of respondent Judge allowing the
replay of a taped telephone conversation
between complainant and Adelina Velasco who
with her father was accused of violating the
Minimum Wage Law and found guilty thereof by
the Department of Labor. The matter was then
elevated in a petition for prohibition and
mandamus filed with the Court of First Instance
and assigned to the sala of respondent
Judge 5 to show the grave abuse of discretion as
well as the motivation of the complainant against
them. Permission was sought for the court to
listen to a taped telephone conversation between
her and the complainant. It was made at her
instance without the knowledge of the latter.
The lower court granted the request.
Information derogatory to complainant thus
came to light. Moreover, certain portions of the
testimony of Adelina Velasco were likewise
damaging to his reputation. Complainant is most
vehement in his accusation that respondent

Judge's actuation was not only oppressive in
character but likewise violative of the aforesaid
penal statutes. It was also characterized by him
as manifesting gross ignorance of the law as well
as deliberate intent to place the Secretary of
Labor and the President "in a very bad light," all
of which he summarized as constituting grave
misconduct that would justify the removal of
respondent Judge. In the answer submitted by
respondent Judge, he noted that while there
were three separate headings in the complaint,
the discussion "is rather repetitious and, in
parts at least, disorganized, [he therefore]
found it more convenient to take up the matters
involved in the order they are discussed by
complainant." 6 Then came an analysis of the
Anti-wire Tapping Act 7 to show there was no
violation thereof on his part. Then respondent
Judge referred to the next main charge which
dealt with "the admission of allegedly libelous
testimony." 8 It is his submission that as a
matter of law, he could not refuse the
introduction of any evidence as long as the
adverse party does not object to it.
Furthermore, he pointed out that considering
the nature of the petition for prohibition and
mandamus, he could not very well refuse
evidence of such character, adding that
Solicitor Kilayko, who represented respondent
public officials did not interpose any
objection. 9 It is not amiss to refer to what was
stressed in the opening portion of his answer:
"At the outset, I should like to make one general
observation with respect to recurring
statements in the letter-complaint to the effect
that I "deliberately" committed one thing or
another. In every case tried before my court, I
have always tried to act deliberately, never
rashly, impetuously or carelessly. I know of
course that neither deliberation or
deliberateness can ensure infallibility; they

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
merely tend to safeguard against mindless or

careless errors. In Civil Case No. 94698 I
likewise acted or at least tried to act carefully
and with deliberation but not for the purpose,
design or motives alleged by complainant." 10
The impression readily yielded by the other
complaint lodged by Francisco Grego was his
resolute determination to avoid being tried on a
libel charge by respondent Judge. On at least
five occasions, he filed motions for
postponement alleging as ground that The
Department of Justice had not finished
reviewing the case. Thus while originally set by
respondent Judge for arraignment and trial on
March 6, 1975, and he was arraigned but not
tried on that day, as of August 22, 1975, after
such repeated postponements, the case had not
been heard. On that day in view of the absence
of complainant, respondent Judge issued a
warrant for his arrest as was done on a previous
occasion although later on set aside. Again,
complainant felt he had a legitimate grievance as
he was then suffering from pharyngitis and had
to stay at home. On these occasions, when as
could have been expected, the patience of
respondent Judge was sorely tried, it was
asserted by complainant that respondent acted
not in a calm and dispassionate manner but with
visible indignation. On September 8, 1975, he
went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari to
nullify the warrant of arrest and was able to
obtain a restraining order. It is on the
allegations of such a petition that he based this
complaint to this Court. It likewise contained
assertions that the respondent Judge, giving
vent to his ire when postponements were sought
or orders set aside, did employ intemperate and
vile language, at times addressed to his wife,
who was sent by him in his stead when he was
unable to appear in person. When asked to
comment respondent Judge did so on November
21, 1975. He stated there: "Since the lettercomplaint of Francisco Grego adopted as his
grounds therefor the allegations and annexes of
his petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 04579), the undersigned is
adopting as his answer to the letter-complaint
his answer to said petition for certiorari, with
annexes, and the decision of the Court of
Appeals of October 22, 1975 dismissing the
petition. It seems that this complainant, instead
of facing manfully the charges in Crim. Case No.
20079 pending against him in this court, is trying
to avoid at all cost going to trial, to the point of
employing harassing tactics against the judge, of
which the letter-complaint is only the
latest." 11 He summarized in his answer to the
Court of Appeals what he considered the
background facts of the pending libel case in his
sala against complainant Francisco Grego: "1. The
information in the case was filed on January 29,
1975 and an order for the arrest of the accused
was issued on February 4, 1975. 2. The accused
filed on February 12, 1975 a motion to reduce
the amount of the bail bond from P1,750.00 to
P1,000.00 and the same was granted by the
Court on the same date. 3. The bail bond was
filed the following day. On February 17, 1975
the accused filed a motion to suspend
arraignment and trial on the ground that the
resolution of the fiscal who filed the case had
been appealed to the Department of Justice. the
motion was denied. 4. The accused was arraigned
on March 6, 1975 and he entered a plea of not
guilty. 5. The case was set for hearing on March
20, 1975 but postponed to April 18, 1975 upon
motion of the accused. 6. On April 14, 1975 the
accused filed a motion for postponement, which
was denied by the Court, and when be failed to
appear at the hearing he was ordered arrested.
However, no warrant of arrest was actually
issued and the case was again set for hearing on
June 6, 1975. As the accused was not

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
represented by counsel, a counsel de oficio was

appointed for him in the person of Atty.
Florencio Paredes. 7. On June 6, 1975 the
accused again failed to appear the hearing and
another order for his arrest was issued. 8. On
June 30, 1975, the accused filed a motion to lift
order of arrest and confiscation of the bail bond
and the motion was granted on the same date.
The case was set for hearing on July 10, 1975.
On that date the counsel de oficio moved for
postponement and the hearing was reset for
July 17, 1975. 9. The hearing on that date was
not held because of a motion of the prosecuting
fiscal for suspension of the proceedings, alleging
that the Chief State Prosecutor had asked that
the case be elevated to the Department of
Justice for review. On August 22, 1975 the
Court issued an order denying the motion to
suspend proceedings. * * * On the same date the
Court issued an order for the arrest of the
accused and the confiscation of his bond. A
motion for reconsideration was filed by the
accused on the same date, which was granted by
the Court on September 4, 1975, at the same
time setting the case for hearing on October 2,
1975 10. The accused filed a motion addressed
to the Executive Judge on September 4, 1975 to
transfer the case to another sala. The same was
referred to Branch XX by the Executive Judge.
On September 12, 1975 the Court issued an
order considering the motion as one to have the
Judge inhibit or disqualify himself from trying
the case, on ground of bias, and denying the
same as without merit. The Chief State
Prosecutor has Advised the prosecuting fiscal
that the records of the case are being returned
to the latter without action on the petition for
review filed by the accused. The case may
therefore be heard by the Court without
further impediment, unless ordered otherwise
by this Honorable Tribunal." 12 He likewise
enclosed affidavits subscribed to by him and by
his branch clerk of court denying "as

falsifications and falsehoods certain allegations
made in the petition regarding statements they
allegedly made to petitioner and his wife." 13 It
bears repeating that the Court of Appeals
dismissed the certiorari petition of complainant
in a decision promulgated on October 22, 1975,
the opinion being penned by Justice San Diego
with the concurrence of Justices MelencioHerrera and Domondon.
Complainants in These two administrative cases
would have this Court remove respondent Judge
for the acts imputed to him. They should have
realized that for such a plea to prosper there
must be a showing of ."serious misconduct or
inefficiency." 14 Proceedings of this character,
according to In re Horrilleno, 15 as set forth in
the opinion of Justice Malcolm, are "in their
nature highly penal in character and to be
governed by the rules of law applicable to
criminal cases. The charges must, therefore, be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 16 that 1922
decision has been subsequently adhered to. 17 It
is quite obvious then, why as set forth at the
outset, complainants must fail.
1. The charge of serious misconduct is without
support, even on the assumption that no
exaggeration was indulged in by complainants.
That is evidently the case as far as the alleged
grievance of Rolando Bartolome is concerned.
What was objected to by him was the replay of a
tape-recording which did cast reflection on his
actuations. It is his contention that thereby
respondent Judge was guilty of oppression.
Clearly it would be to impart a novel concept to
the accepted meaning of what is oppressive to
assent to such a view. It is equally so as far as
the alleged misconduct imputed to respondent
by complainant Francisco Grego. His orders
denying repeated motions for postponement and
when appropriate issuing warrants of arrest for

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
non-appearance of the accused did not fail to

conform to the norm expected of a judge. So
the Court of Appeals held in dismissing Grego's
certiorari petition. In both cases therefore,
respondent Judge clearly cannot be held
accountable for misconduct, much less serious
misconduct.
2. Now as to respondent Judge having laid
himself open to charges of inefficiency. The
complaint filed by Francisco Grego is bereft of
any such allegation. If at all respondent perhaps
would not have been proceeded against if he
were less insistent on procedural regularity,
more tolerant for the pleas for postponement,
as well as the failure of complainant to appear in
court when required to do so. On the other hand,
the complaint filed by Rolando Bartolome did
indict respondent Judge for gross ignorance of
the law. If such a charge could be substantiated,
it would follow that inefficiency, serious
inefficiency at that, could be imputed to
respondent. The root cause of the matter, as
was made plain before, was the replay of the
taped telephone conversation between Adelina
Velasco and complainant. The accusation is that
in so allowing it, respondent violated the AntiWire Tapping Act. 18 In his answer to this Court,
respondent Judge to refute such a contention
relied on the second paragraph of its first
section with this proviso: "That the use of such
record or any copies thereof as evidence in any
civil, criminal investigation or trial of offense
mentioned in Sec. 3 hereof shall not be covered
by this prohibition." 19 He further justified the
action taken by him thus: "I may be further
stated that, * * * the tape replay and the
admission in evidence of the transcript thereof
* * * were objected to on the other grounds, but
never on the ground that they were in violation
of the anti-wire tapping law, RA 4200.
Apparently, Solicitor Kilayko, representing the
respondent officials, [in Civil Case No. 946987]

was satisfied, after hearing testimony that
Adelina Velasco, with whom complainant had the
tape recorded telephone conversation, was the
one who "initiated" or took a recording of the
conversation, that there was no violation of the
prohibition of sections 1 to 3 of RA 4200
because the recording was taken by one of the
parties to the conversation or that the use of
the tapes was authorized by the above-quoted
proviso of section 1. The failure of Solicitor
Kilayko to object to the replay of the tape
recording or the transcripts thereof on the
ground that they were in violation of the antiwire tapping law, cannot be imputed to his
ignorance of that law because he tried to crossexamine Adelina Velasco precisely for the
reason, as he manifested, that "we were trying
to find out whether there was any violation of
any law in the tape recording of telephone
conversation" * * * In the circumstances
mentioned above, and finding that the grounds
offered against the replay (to wit, that "it was
sufficiently established that his voice is that of
Rolando Bartolome's voice," quoted on p. 2 of the
complaint) and the grounds ("hearsay and selfserving and immaterial") offered against the
transcript * * * of the tape recording * * * to be
untenable, I believed that as a judge I had no
alternative except to allow the replay and to
admit the transcript in evidence." 20 Complainant
Grego would likewise indict respondent Judge
for gross ignorance of the law when instead of
merely conforming to the rules and regulations
of The Department of Labor, he did rely on the
explicit wording of Presidential Decree No. 21.
If there is an awareness on the part of
complainant of the ruling of this Court, he ought
to have realized that as held in Nation Multi
Service Labor Union v. Agcaoili, 21 the explicit
wording of the decree is controlling. Neither can
respondent Judge be held accountable for

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
entertaining the petition for as was decided by

this Court in San Miguel Corporation v.
Secretary of Labor 22 the judiciary possesses
the power to review acts of administrative
agencies exercising quasi-legislative power in
appropriate cases especially so when a due
process question is involved. It would seem,
therefore, that respondent Judge, far from
being ignorant, acted after due deliberation in
the light of his understanding of statutes or
presidential decrees, as well as decisions of this
tribunal. Even on the assumption, however, that
his interpretation was erroneous, still he could
not be held accountable to gross ignorance of
the law. At the most, he could have been
mistaken. That does not render him liable to
administrative sanction. As was declared by the
then Chief Justice Makalintal in Vda. de Zabala
v. Pamaran: 23 "No one, called upon to try the
facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice, can be infallible in his
judgment."24 In the complaint of Rolando
Bartolome, characterized by prolixity, there is
likewise reference to the possible violation of
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on libel
as well as the Civil Code. All that needs be said is
that if it were prepared by him unaided he is
a layman it is understandable why the
conclusions reached by him on such questions do
not bear the mark of orthodoxy. On the other
hand, if he relied on a legal practitioner, it is
quite probable that the one consulted, even if
possessed of the requisite skill, did try to lend
plausibility to what at bottom are essentially
groundless charges by a rather strained reading
of legal doctrines. What emerges clearly then is
that the failing of inefficiency cannot be
imputed to respondent Judge.
3. In the light of the foregoing, there would
have been nothing amiss if the two complaints
were summarily dismissed. A brief opinion then
would have sufficed. Nonetheless, it was felt

more appropriate to explain the action taken by
the Court in some detail, conformably to its
policy of assuring each and every complainant
that due attention is paid to any administrative
charge against a member of the judiciary. As
was noted in Tobias v. Ericta:25 "The
constitutional right to a petition, to enable the
citizen to air his grievances, would certainly be
emasculated if the response of the governmental
body to which it is addressed is one of
indifference. The fate of the people and the
supremacy of the Constitution would thereby be
sorely tested. What is worse, a safety valve
against a violent reaction would be closed. This
constitutional guarantee requires then that
complaints against officialdom be seriously
attended to. Where meritorious, the remedy
could be supplied. If found to be devoid of
substance, the party charged is vindicated with
the complainant having the satisfaction of at
least having been listened to. There is thus
fidelity to what the Constitution
ordains." 26 There is this additional beneficial
result of such a policy. It emphasizes even more
the need for occupants of the bench to live up
to the Ideal of a disinterested and impartial
arbiter, dispensing justice with an even hand in a
calm and dispassionate manner. For the
appearance, no less than the reality of justice,
does count. As far as the behavior of a trial
judge is concerned, however, it is not realistic to
assume, considering the nature and the burden
laid on his shoulders, that he will at all times
personify equanimity. It is understandable if
there may be occasions when he is visibly
annoyed or irked and that he would react
accordingly. Francisco Grego did complain of
such conduct on the part of respondent. It could
have happened thus, but certainly complainant
ought to have realized that his stubbornness in
seeking postponements and his failure to be

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
present at scheduled hearings could not have

been expected to have gone unnoticed or to have
been overlooked. Such being the case, there is
nothing objectionable to the use of vigorous and
strong language to characterize what for the
judge would be attempts to obstruct the
administration of justice. This is not to condone
resort to what had been referred to as an
epithetical response. If there be display of wit
or sarcasm, however, that is not to be deplored.
They are qualities associated, as Shaw noted,
with intellectuals. There certainly can be no
objection to having people on the bench gifted
with such talent, although Cardozo would counsel
moderation. For it is a truism that the law is
both a noble and learned profession.
WHEREFORE, the charges of Rolando Bartolome
and of Francisco Grego are dismissed for lack of
merit. Let a copy of this resolution be entered
on the record of respondent Judge Juan de
Borja.
Castro, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar,

Antonio, Esguerra, Muoz Palma, Aquino and
Martin JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.
Section 4. Relevancy; Collateral Matters

Test of Relevancy
1. Every fact or circumstance tending to throw light on the issue is
relevant,
2. Evidence is relevant from which the fact in issue is logically
inferable;
3. Any circumstance is relevant which tends to make the proposition at
issue more or less probable, or which is calculated to explain or
establish facts pertinent to the inquiry;
4. The test is whether the evidence conduces to the proof of a
pertinent hypothesis, such hypothesis being one which, if sustained,
would logically influence the issue;
5. Facts are relevant if they fairly tend to prove the offense charged.
_ Components of Relevant Evidence
a. Materiality- looks to the relation between the propositions for
which the evidence is offered and the issues of the case.
_ Test of Materiality: Whether the evidence is offered upon a matter
properly in issue. The question is, Is this relevant?
_ Example: Where A sues B on a written contract, and the only

defense pleaded by B is a denial that he executed the contract,
evidence offered by him as to a release would be immaterial, and
hence irrelevant.
b. Probative Value- the tendency of
evidence to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove.
DEGREE OF PROBATIVENESS REQUIRED:

To be relevant, evidence need not be absolutely determinative of the
fact which it is directed, in other words, it need not be conclusive. To
be relevant, the
evidence must merely help a little.
_ Example: Flight by no means proves guilt or makes guilt more likely
than not. Evidence of flight merely makes guilt somewhat more likely.
_ Collateral facts those other than the facts in issue and which are
offered as a basis for inference as to the existence or non-existence of
the facts in issue. (Sec. 4,
Rule 129)
a. CLASSIFICATION OF COLLATERAL MATTERS:
1) Prospectant Collateral matters are those preceding of the fact in
issue but pointing forward to it.
Example: moral character, motive, conspiracy.
2) Concomitant Collateral matters- are those accompanying the fact
in issue and pointing to it.
Example: alibi, or opportunity and incompatibility;
3) Retrospectant Collateral matters- are those succeeding the fact
in issue but pointing backward
to it.
Example: flight and concealment, behavior of the
accused upon being arrested, fingerprints or footprints,
articles left at the scene of the crime which may identify the culprit. (1
Wigmore)
Rules:
1. Rule: Collateral matters are not allowed.
Exception: Admissible when they tend in any reasonable degree to
establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue.
2. Knowledge, motive, or intent may often be ascertained from
evidence of transactions, apparently collateral, and such evidence, if
shown to be relevant, is admissible for such and similar purpose. Such
evidence is admissible in both civil and criminal cases.
3. The rule is that when a persons conduct is in issue the fact that the
person engaged in conduct of the same sort on a different occasion
may be shown as tending to shed some light on some quality of the
conduct in question such as intent, knowledge, good or bad faith,
malice or other state of mind or bodily feeling. (1 Jones)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 140538-39. June 14, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
GODOFREDO B. ADOR and DIOSDADO B.
ADOR III, appellants.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
The quiescence of the fading day was shattered
by bursts of gunfire, startling the otherwise
tranquil but sanguine folks of Pacol, Naga
City. As the fusillade of shots ceased and the
wisp of smoke cleared, frolicking promenaders

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
stumbled upon Ompong Chavez who was gasping

his last, clutching his intestines which had
spewed out from his bloodied stomach. He did
not in fact reach the hospital alive. A breath
away, Abe Cuya lay lifeless on the pavement. He
died on the spot. For the twinned deaths, the
Adors, six (6) of them, were haled to court.
In two (2) separate informations, Diosdado Sr.,
Diosdado Jr., Diosdado III, Godofredo, Rosalino
and Allan, all surnamed Ador, were charged with
the murder of Absalon Abe S. Cuya III and
Rodolfo Ompong S. Chavez. The Informations
in Crim. Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816
identically read:
That on or about March 10, 1997, in the City of
Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating together and mutually
helping one another, with intent to kill, with
treachery and the aid of armed men, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
shoot ABSALON ABE CUYA III (RODOLFO
OMPO CHAVEZ y SAN ANDRES for Crim.
Case No. 97-6816) with firearms, inflicting upon
him multiple and mortal gunshot wounds which
caused his death, to the damage and prejudice
of his heirs.
With the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation and nighttime.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
However, only four (4) of the six (6) Adors,
namely, Diosdado Sr., Godofredo, Rosalino and
Allan, were taken into custody. The two (2),
Diosdado Jr. and Diosdado III, remained at
large. Trial thus proceeded only against
Diosdado Sr., Godofredo, Rosalino and Allan who
all pleaded not guilty. Diosdado Sr. is the father
of Diosdado Jr., Diosdado III and Godofredo,
while Rosalino is the father of Allan. Diosdado
Sr. and Rosalino are brothers.
In its effort to secure the conviction of the
accused, the prosecution presented a total of
sixteen (16) witnesses: Mercy Beria, Larry

Cado, Medico-Legal Officer of Naga City Dr.
Joel S. Jurado, Police Inspector Ma. Julieta
Razonable, SPO1 Benjamin Barbosa, SPO3
Augusto Basagre, Major Ernesto Idian,
Inspector Reynaldo F. Fulgar, SPO1 Noli Reyes
Sol, SPO3 Eduardo C. Bathan, Inspector Vicente
C. Lauta, Ernani Castillo, PO3 Augusto I.
Nepomuceno, Absalon Cuya Sr., Efren Chavez
and Pablo Calsis.
From the evidence of the prosecution, it appears
that on March 10, 1997, at around seven-thirty
in the evening, while Mercy Beria, Larry Cado
and some eleven (11) others were leisurely
walking along Kilometer 11 on their way to Zone
1, Kilometer 10, Pacol, Naga City, to attend a
wedding anniversary, they heard several
gunshots. Shortly after, they met a certain
Pablito Umali who told them that Ompong
Chavez had been shot. They ran to Chavez
straight off and saw him already lying on the
ground, about 1 meters away from a lighted
electric post, holding on to his intestines which
were starting to come out. Beria shook Chavez
and asked him what had happened. Chavez
replied tinambangan kami na Ador (We were
ambushed by the Adors) and requested that he
be brought to the hospital as he was
dying. About eight (8) meters from where
Chavez was, in a dark spot, lay Abe Cuya, dead.
Upon learning of the shooting incident through
their radio communication, SPO1 Benjamin
Barbosa, together with PO2 Alexander Diaz,
immediately proceeded to the crime scene to
conduct an investigation. SPO3 Eduardo Bathan
and SPO1 Wilfredo Fernandez, among others,
were already there. SPO1 Barbosa collected
some pieces of evidence, took some pictures and
made some sketches. SPO1 Fernandez on the
other hand interviewed one Cresenciana
Mendoza in her house which was nearby, and
when he heard people shout that Chavez was still

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
alive, he brought Chavez to the hospital but the

latter expired on the way.
That same evening, upon being informed that the
Adors had a long-standing grudge against the
Cuyas, SPO1 Barbosa sought the help of then
Barangay Captain Josue Perez to accompany him
to the residence of the Adors. They arrived at
the Adors at around ten oclock that evening and
spoke with their patriarch, Diosdado Ador Sr.
SPO1 Barbosa looked for the other male
members of the Ador family but was told by
Diosdado Sr. that they were already
asleep. Diosdado Sr. nevertheless promised to
present them the following day.
The following morning, March 11, 1997, Barangay
Captain Perez accompanied the Adors, namely,
Diosdado Sr., Diosdado III, Godofredo, Rosalino,
Allan and Reynaldo, to SPO1 Barbosa at the PNP
Central Police Headquarters. The Adors were
informed of their constitutional rights to remain
silent and to choose their own counsel. They
were then brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory
at the Provincial Headquarters and subjected to
paraffin tests. On the way to the crime
laboratory, Godofredo told his police escort that
he had been entrusted with a handgun which he
kept in his residence. The information was
relayed to Major Ernesto Idian, then Deputy
Chief of Police of Naga City, who ordered PO3
Augusto I. Nepomuceno to accompany him in
recovering the gun because Godofredo said that
he would turn in the gun only to PO3
Nepomuceno. Thus, Major Idian, PO3
Nepomuceno and some others accompanied
Godofredo to the latters residence.
Upon reaching the Ador residence, Godofredo,
together with PO3 Nepomuceno, went to their
backyard, retrieved the gun from under a fallen
coconut trunk and turned it in to the
latter. Godofredo allegedly told the police that
he fired the said gun outside their house on the
night of March 10 after he heard several
gunshots. PO3 Nepomuceno identified the gun

as a caliber .38 paltik handgun which had no
serial number. PO3 Nepomuceno then turned
over the handgun to Major Idian who likewise
identified it as a .38 caliber revolver. Major
Idian returned the handgun to PO3 Nepomuceno
for ballistic and paraffin examination.
Thereafter, PO3 Nepomuceno placed his initials
on the gun and put it in his private locker while
preparing the documents for the examinations
and the possible filing of a case for Illegal
Possession of Firearm.
Also, on the same day, March 11, 1997, Dr. Joel
S. Jurado, Medico-Legal Officer of Naga City,
conducted an autopsy on the bodies of Chavez
and Cuya. Based on the autopsy reports, Dr.
Jurado testified that Cuya sustained five (5)
gunshot wounds and died from cardio-pulmonary
arrest, massive intra-thoracic, intra-abdominal,
intra-cranial hemorrhage secondary to multiple
gunshot wounds penetrating the heart, brain,
lungs and digestive tract. Chavez on the other
hand had three (3) gunshot wounds and died
from traumatic shock and massive intraabdominal hemorrhage secondary to multiple
gunshot wounds penetrating the right kidney and
the internal abdominal organs. Dr. Jurado
further testified that that he recovered a slug
from Cuyas head three (3) days after he
conducted the autopsy - after Cuyas relatives
called his attention to a protruding mass in
Cuyas head. Thus, he had Cuyas cadaver sent
back to the funeral parlor, opened it and was
able to extract a deformed .38 caliber slug
which he thereafter submitted to the City
Prosecutors Office.
Police Inspector Reynaldo Fulgar, Chief of the
Firearm Identification Section of the PNP Crime
Laboratory, Camp Ola, Legaspi City, testified
that based on the ballistic examination he
conducted on the bullets submitted to his
office, the .38 caliber slug recovered from

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
Cuyas head matched the three (3) .38 caliber

test bullets which were test-fired from the
suspected firearm surrendered by
Godofredo. He however averred that the .38
caliber bullets were actually fired from a .357
Smith and Wesson Magnum homemade revolver
without serial number, and not from a .38 caliber
revolver.
The paraffin casts taken from the Adors were
also transmitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory
Services for examination and yielded the
presence of gunpowder nitrates, thus
(1) Diosdado A. Ador both hands, positive;
(2) Diosdado B. Ador III right hand, positive;
left hand, negative;
(3) Godofredo B. Ador right hand, positive; left
hand, negative;
(4) Rosalino A. Ador both hands, positive;
(5) Reynaldo T. Ador both hands, negative;
(6) Allan T. Ador both hands, positive.
Absalon Cuya Sr., father of deceased Cuya III,
said that the killing of his son was driven by the
long-standing feud between the Adors and his
family. He said that Diosdado Jr. had earlier
accused his other son Liberato of frustrated
homicide for allegedly stabbing him (Diosdado
Jr.). Then, Adelina, a daughter of Diosdado Sr.,
filed a case for abduction with multiple rape
against him, Absalon III, Rayne and Josephine,
all surnamed Cuya, after the romantic
relationship between Adelina and his deceased
son Absalon III turned sour. He also presented
official receipts of the funeral and burial
expenses which amounted to P10,230.00.
Efren Chavez, brother of deceased Chavez,
likewise spoke of the animosity between the
Chavez and the Ador families. He produced a
certification from the PNP Naga City Police
Station that on February 17, 1997, a blotter was
entered in the Daily Record of Events showing
that deceased Chavez reported a certain
Ricardo Ador who while under the influence of
liquor caused him physical injury. The witness

likewise presented an official receipt showing
that the family spent P3,500.00 for the funeral
of the deceased Chavez. After presenting
Chavez, the prosecution rested its case.
On April 7, 1998, the four (4) accused filed a
demurrer to evidence for utter lack of
evidence. On May 13, 1998, the trial court
dismissed the cases against Diosdado Sr.,
Rosalino and Allan but denied the demurrer to
evidence against Godofredo
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the demurrer to
evidence to be justified for the accused
Diosdado A. Ador, Allan T. Ador and Rosalino
Ador, hence, the same is hereby granted insofar
as these accused are concerned. Said accused
therefore, namely: Diosdado A. Ador, Allan T.
Ador and Rosalino Ador are ACQUITTED in
Crim. Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816. The
bailbonds posted for their provisional liberty are
hereby cancelled.
Trial of the case insofar as Godofredo B. Ador is
concerned shall proceed.
SO ORDERED.
Thus, trial proceeded against Godofredo.
For his defense, Godofredo denied any
participation in the killings of Cuya and
Chavez. He said that on March 10, 1997, at
around seven oclock in the evening, he heard
several gunshots while he was having dinner with
his wife and four (4) children in their house in
Pacol, Naga City. Since his wife advised him not
to go out anymore, he slept after dinner. The
following day, while he was gathering pili nuts,
his long-time friend Dominador Bautista arrived
and asked him to go down from the
tree. Bautista wanted to borrow money and on
his way to see him, found a gun by the
footpath. Bautista gave the gun to him. It was
his first time to hold a gun. He tried it out and
fired three (3) times. After firing the gun, he
removed the empty shells from its chambers and

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
threw them away. He then wrapped the gun with

plastic and hid it under a coconut
trunk. Bautista left when he told him that he
had no money. He then continued to gather pili
nuts until Major Idian and three (3) other
policemen came.
Godofredos father told him that they were
being suspected of killing Chavez and Cuya the
night before. Thus, they went to the provincial
headquarters, were subjected to paraffin
testing and made to sign a blank bond
paper. After that, they went back to the
central police station. At the central police
station, Godofredo narrated to a certain Calabia
that that morning, his friend Bautista found a
gun along the road and gave it to him. He hid
the gun under a coconut trunk. Calabia relayed
the information to Major Idian who directed
PO3 Nepomuceno to go with Godofredo to get
the gun. Godofredo led PO3 Nepomuceno to
where he hid the gun, retrieved it and handed it
to the latter. They then returned to the police
headquarters where he was jailed. He asserted
that the gun presented in court is different
from the gun he surrendered to the police.
Bautista corroborated Godofredos story. He
testified that he found the gun which Godofredo
yielded to PO3 Nepomuceno. He said that he
was on his way to see Godofredo to borrow
money when he chanced upon the handgun on the
pathway. He gave the gun to Godofredo and the
latter tested it by pulling its trigger. After
firing the gun, Godofredo removed the empty
shells and threw them. Godofredo then wrapped
the gun with plastic and hid it under a fallen
coconut trunk.
Meanwhile, Diosdado Jr. was arrested on
October 9, 1998, at Barangay Doa, Orani,
Bataan, and committed to the Naga City Jail on
November 17, 1998, while Diosdado III
surrendered to the court and was committed to
the same city jail on November 22, 1998. On
November 23, 1998, both Diosdado Jr. and

Diosdado III were arraigned and entered a plea
of not guilty. Hence, trial against them
commenced and proceeded jointly with the case
of the remaining accused, Godofredo.
The prosecution presented Pablo Calsis as a
witness against Diosdado Jr. and Diosdado
III. Calsis testified that on March 10, 1997, at
around 7:30 in the evening, he dropped by the
house of Cresenciana Mendoza whom he fondly
called Lola Kising at Kilometer 10, Pacol, Naga
City, before going home from work. After
asking permission from her to go home and while
about to urinate outside her house, he heard
several gunshots. He ducked by a sineguelas
tree at a nearby flower plantation. As he was
about to stand up, he saw Disodado Jr., Diosdado
III, Godofredo and another unidentified man
run away. Godofredo was carrying a short
firearm while Diosdado Jr. had a long firearm.
He saw Chavez and Cuya lying on the
road. Chavez was about five (5) meters away
from where he stood while Cuya was ten (10)
meters away. The place was illuminated by a
bright light from an electric post. There were
no other people around. Calsis ran away for fear
that he might be identified by the
assailants. He heard Chavez mumbling but
shirked nevertheless.
Calsis narrated to Absalon Cuya Sr. what he saw
only after about one (1) year and nine (9)
months. Fear struck him. He maintained that he
knew the assailants because he and his wife lived
in the house of Lola Kising after they got
married. Immense fear prevented him from
attending to Chavez, even while he heard him
murmuring, and from informing the families of
the victims of the incident that very same
night. He was about to tell the Chavez family
the following morning but was counseled by his
Lola Bading, the sister of his Lola Kising, against
getting involved in the case. Calsis and his family

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
left their residence in Pacol one (1) month after

the incident because he was afraid the
assailants might have identified him. Even Lola
Kising left her residence two (2) months after
the incident. It was only after he learned from
Absalon Cuya Sr. that the trial court dismissed
the cases for lack of evidence insofar as some
of the original accused were concerned that he
took pity on the respective families of the
victims who have failed to get justice for the
death of their loved ones.
In defense, Diosdado Jr. testified that on
March 10, 1997, he was in Marikina City working
as a warehouseman and timekeeper of the
Consuelo Builders Corporation. He was there the
whole time from February 15, 1997, until March
24, 1997. Pablo Aspe, a co-worker of Diosdado
Jr., corroborated the latters testimony. He
said that on February 15, 1997, he and Diosdado
Jr. left Pacol, Naga City, together to work in
Consuelo Construction in Marikina City. They
were with each other in Marikina City the whole
time from February 15, 1997, until he (Aspe)
went home to Naga City on March 22,
1997. While in Marikina City, they resided and
slept together in their barracks at the
construction site.
Diosdado III also took the witness stand. On
March 10, 1997, at around seven oclock in the
evening, he was at their house at Zone 1, Pacol,
Naga City, watching television with his parents
and cousins Reynaldo and Allan when they heard
gunshots. They ignored the gunshots, continued
watching television and slept at eight
oclock. The following day, at around six oclock
in the morning, while he was fetching water, four
(4) policemen arrived at their house and talked
to his father. Thereafter, his father called him,
his brother Godofredo, uncle Rosalino and
cousins Allan and Reynaldo. The policemen then
requested all of them to go to the PNP Central
Police Headquarters for investigation regarding
the killings of Chavez and Cuya. Upon reaching

the police headquarters, they were interviewed
by the media and afterwards brought to the
provincial headquarters where they were
subjected to paraffin tests. They were then
brought back to the Central Police Headquarters
and later allowed to go back home to Pacol.
Then, sometime in October, 1997, his father was
arrested by the police. Diosdado III was at
their residence when his father was picked
up. Only his father was taken by the police. He
continued to reside in their house until April,
1998, when he transferred to Sagurong, San
Miguel, Tabaco, Albay, to work as a
fisherman. On November 21, 1998, he received
a letter from his father telling him to come
home. Thus, he went home the following day. On
November 23, 1998, he surrendered to the
court.
The defense also presented Barangay Captain
Josue Perez and an uncle of Diosdado Jr. and
Disodado III, Jaime Bobiles. Perez testified
that he was the barangay captain of Pacol from
1982 until May, 1997. In 1996, Cresenciana
Mendoza left their barangay permanently to live
with her children in Manila because she was
sickly and alone in her house. He said that
Mendoza never came back. He does not know
any Pablo Calsis and the latter could not have
talked to Mendoza on March 10, 1997, because
at that time, Mendoza was not there and her
house was already abandoned. Similarly, Bobiles
confirmed the testimony that Diosdado III
worked as a fisherman in Tabaco and stayed in
his residence from May 1, 1998, until November
1998 when Diosdado III received a letter from
his father and had to go home.
In rebuttal however, prosecution witness SPO1
Fernandez asserted that he interviewed
Cresenciana Mendoza that fateful night of
March 10, 1997. After the rebuttal witness was
presented, the cases were finally submitted for

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
decision.
On August 2, 1999, the trial court held that a
chain of circumstances x x x lead to a sound and
logical conclusion that indeed the accused
(Diosdado III and Godofredo) committed the
offense charged and as such rendered
judgment
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court
finds the accused Godofredo B. Ador and
Diosdado B. Ador III GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER,
defined and penalized under the provisions of
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act 7659 in Criminal Cases
Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816, hereby sentences
the said accused Godofredo B. Ador and
Diosdado B. Ador III to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA in Criminal Case No. 976815; RECLUSION PERPETUA in Criminal Case
No. 97-6816, to pay the heirs of Absalon Abe
Cuya III P25,000 each by way of actual damages
and P50,000 in each criminal case by way of
indemnity. To pay the heirs of Rodolfo
Ompong Chavez the sum of P50,000 in each
criminal case by way of indemnity, such
accessory penalties as provided for by law and to
pay the cost. For insufficiency of the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused
Diosdado B. Ador, Jr. beyond reasonable doubt,
he is hereby ACQUITTED in Crim. Cases Nos.
97-6815 and 97-6816.
The Jail Warden of the Naga City District Jail
is hereby ordered to forthwith release from its
custody the accused Diosdado B. Ador, Jr.,
unless his further detention is warranted by any
other legal cause or causes.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this joint appeal interposed by Disodado
III and Godofredo. They maintain that the trial
court gravely erred in convicting them of murder
based on circumstantial evidence. The testimony
of prosecution witness Pablo Calsis that he saw
them running away from the scene of the crime

was concocted. The handgun turned in by
Godofredo was not the same gun presented by
the prosecution during the trial. The unusual
discovery of a slug from the head of the
deceased - three (3) days after the autopsy was
conducted and after the cadaver was turned
over to the family of the victim - was quite
doubtful. Even the supposed dying declaration
of the victim specifically pointed to neither
Diosdado III nor Godofredo. And, the trial
court erred in admitting in evidence those taken
against them in violation of their constitutional
rights to counsel during custodial investigation.
The rules of evidence allow the courts to rely on
circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion
of guilt. It may be the basis of a conviction so
long as the combination of all the circumstances
proven produces a logical conclusion which
suffices to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. All the circumstances
must be consistent with each other, consistent
with the theory that all the accused are guilty
of the offense charged, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that they are
innocent and with every other possible, rational
hypothesis except that of guilt. The evidence
must exclude each and every hypothesis which
may be consistent with their innocence. Also, it
should be acted on and weighed with great
caution. Circumstantial evidence which has not
been adequately established, much less
corroborated, cannot by itself be the basis of
conviction.
Thus, for circumstantial evidence to suffice, (1)
there should be more than one circumstance; (2)
the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. Like an ornate
tapestry created out of interwoven fibers which
cannot be plucked out and assayed a strand at a

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
time apart from the others, the circumstances

proved should constitute an unbroken chain
which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion
that the accused, to the exclusion of all others,
is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The test to
determine whether or not the circumstantial
evidence on record are sufficient to convict the
accused is that the series of the circumstances
proved must be consistent with the guilt of the
accused and inconsistent with his innocence.
Accordingly, we have set guidelines in
appreciating circumstantial evidence: (1) it
should be acted upon with caution; (2) all the
essential facts must be consistent with the
hypothesis of guilt; (3) the facts must exclude
every theory but that of guilt; and (4) the facts
must establish such a certainty of guilt of the
accused as to convince the judgment beyond a
reasonable doubt that the accused is the one
who committed the offense.
Measured against the guidelines set, we cannot
uphold the conviction of the accused based on
the circumstantial evidence presented.
The first circumstance which the prosecution
sought to prove is that the accused were
supposedly seen fleeing from the locus criminis,
armed with their respective weapons. Thus, the
trial court, gleaning from the evidence
presented, found that [w]hen about to stand,
Calsis saw Godofredo B. Ador, Diosdado B. Ador,
Jr. and Diosdado B. Ador III, and a person going
to the direction of the house of the Adors which
is about 500 meters away. In fact, prosecution
witness Calsis allegedly even saw Diosdado Jr.
carrying a long firearm but x x x could not
determine what kind of gun it was. However,
the trial court acquitted Diosdado Jr. But only
rightly so. For, Calsis had difficulty in
identifying the Adors notwithstanding his
assertion that he knew and saw them
personally. We defer to his direct examination
ATTY. TERBIO (Private Prosecutor):
Q. You said you recognized the persons running,

could you tell us their names?
PABLO CALSIS:
A. Yes sir.
Q. Name them?
A. Godofredo Ador, Jr., Sadang III.
Q. How about the others?
A. I could not tell his name but if I see him I
could identify him.
Q. The 4 persons whom you saw that night, if
they are present in court, please point them out?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Point particularly Godofredo Ador, Jr.?
A. (Witness pointed or tapped the shoulder of a
person inside the courtroom who answered by
the name Diosdado Ador, Jr.)
Q. How about this Sadang III?
A. (Witness tapped the shoulder of a man who
answered by the name of Diosdado Ador III.)
Q. Likewise, point to the third person?
A. (Witness pointed to a man)
COURT:
Delete that portion from the record, he is
not on trial.
ATTY TERBIO:
Q. You said you saw 4 persons, is the fourth one
inside the courtroom?
A. None sir.
Q. But if you saw that person, will you be able
to recognize him?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Why do you know these persons whom you
just tapped the shoulder?
xxx
xx
x
xxx
A. I know these persons having lived in the
house of Lola Kising.
Q. How far?
A. Around 100 meters.
Q. On the said date and time and place, you said
you saw them running, how far were you from
them?

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
A. Around 10 meters. (Emphases supplied)

The testimony of Calsis, if at all, could hardly be
used against Diosdado III whom he miserably
failed to positively identify during trial. In fact,
the acquittal of Diosdado Jr. by the trial court
renders the entire testimony of Calsis in serious
doubt. Calsis was presented to positively
identify the assailants who were supposedly
personally known to him and were just ten (10)
meters away from him. It puzzles us no end why
he cannot even identify the Adors in open court.
Thus, despite Calsis assertion that Diosdado Jr.
was one of the assailants, the trial court
doubted him and gave credence to the alibi of
Diosdado Jr. that the latter was in Nangka,
Marikina, when the killings took place. The trial
court favored the unbiased testimony of Aspe
who said that Diosdado Jr. worked as a
timekeeper and warehouseman with him at the
Consuelo Construction at Nangka, Marikina, from
February 15, 1997, until March 22, 1997, and
went home to Pacol only on May 27, 1997. This
ruling is strengthened by the fact that on the
morning following the killings, all the male
members of the Ador family were brought to
the police headquarters for paraffin
examination and Diosdado Jr. was not among
them. We thus respect the finding of the trial
court that indeed Diosdado Jr. was not at the
scene of the crime absent any indication that
the lower court overlooked some facts or
circumstances which if considered would alter
the outcome of the case.
While it is true that the courts are not bound to
accept or reject an entire testimony, and may
believe one part and disbelieve another, our
Constitution and the law mandate that all doubts
must be resolved in favor of the accused. Calsis
committed an obvious blunder in identifying the
supposed assailants which this Court cannot
simply let go. On the contrary, it creates
reasonable doubt in our minds if Calcis really saw
the persons he allegedly saw or if he was even

where he said he was that evening. For, it is
elementary that the positive identification of
the accused is crucial in establishing his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. That is wanting in the
instant case.
What is more, Calsis asseverations, at the
outset, could no longer be used against
Godofredo since both the prosecution and the
defense have already rested and the case
against Godofredo was already submitted for
decision when Calsis was presented. Neither can
they still be used against Diosdado Jr. who was
already acquitted by the trial court.
Both Diosdado III and Godofredo denied the
charges hurled against them. But, while it is
true that alibi and denial are the weakest of the
defenses as they can easily be fabricated,
absent such clear and positive identification, the
doctrine that the defense of denial cannot
prevail over positive identification of the
accused must yield to the constitutional
presumption of innocence. Hence, while denial is
concededly fragile and unstable, the conviction
of the accused cannot be based thereon. The
rule in criminal law is firmly entrenched that
verdicts of conviction must be predicated on the
strength of the evidence for the prosecution
and not on the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.
The second circumstance is the handgun turned
in by Godofredo. But this was bungled by the
prosecution. Major Idian, Deputy Chief of Police
of the Naga City Police Station, to whom the
handgun was turned over after Godofredo
surrendered it, identified it as a caliber .38
revolver, thus
ATTY TERBIO (Private Prosecutor):
Q. What kind of firearm was it?
MAJOR IDIAN:
A. Revolver handgun, caliber .38 with 6 rounds
ammunition.

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
Q. What is the caliber?

A. .38 caliber.
Similarly, PO3 Nepomuceno who then had been
with the PNP for eight (8) years already and to
whom Godofredo turned in the handgun, likewise
identified it as a caliber .38, thus
ATTY TERBIO (Private Prosecutor):
Q. What is the caliber of that gun?
PO3 NEPOMUCENO:
A. .38 caliber.
However, Insp. Fulgar, Chief of the Firearm
Identification Section of the PNP Crime
Laboratory, testified that [t]he indorsement
coming from the City Prosecutors Office x x x
alleged that the .38 caliber live bullet was fired
from a .38 caliber revolver. But our office
found out that the firearm was not a .38 caliber
revolver but a .357 caliber revolver.
Could it be that the handgun was replaced
before it was turned over to the PNP Crime
Laboratory? While the prosecution traced the
trail of police officers who at every stage held
the gun supposedly recovered from Godofredo,
it never clarified this discrepancy which is quite
glaring to ignore. It is difficult to believe that a
Deputy Chief of Police and a police officer of
eight (8) years will both mistake a .357 caliber
for a .38 caliber handgun. Likewise, a Chief of
the Firearm Identification Section of the PNP
Crime Laboratory cannot be presumed not to
know the difference between the two (2)
handguns. Suffice it to say that the prosecution
failed to clear up the variance and for this Court
to suggest an explanation would be to venture
into the realm of pure speculation, conjecture
and guesswork. Thus, faced with the obvious
disparity in the suspected firearm used in the
crime and that which was turned over by
Godofredo, his declaration that the handgun
presented in court was different from the gun
he gave to the police deserves serious, if not
sole consideration.
Consequently, even the third circumstance, the

.38 caliber slug supposedly recovered from the
head of the victim three (3) days after the
autopsy was conducted loses evidentiary value as
its source is now highly questionable. It has
become uncertain whether the deformed slug
was fired from the .38 caliber revolver turned in
by Godofredo or from a .357 caliber handgun as
attested to by the Chief of the Firearm
Identification Section of the PNP Crime
Laboratory.
Neither can this Court rely on the dying
declaration of the dying Chavez nor on the
results of the paraffin tests to convict either
Diosdado III or Godofredo or both. To refute
these, we need not go far and beyond the 13 May
1998 Order of the trial court partially granting
the demurrer to evidence filed by the accused
The only direct evidence introduced by the
prosecution is the testimony of Mercy Beria,
that she heard Rodolfo Ompong Chavez say
tinambangan kami na Ador (We were ambushed
by the Adors). Sad to say, no specific name was
ever mentioned by the witness. Neither was she
able to tell how many (persons) Adors were
involved. This testimony if it will be given
credence may inculpate any person with the
family name Ador as assailant. The prosecution
therefore was not able to establish with moral
certainty as to who of the Adors were
perpetrators of the offense x x x x Paraffin
tests are not conclusive evidence that indeed a
person has fired a gun.
The fact that the accused-appellants tested
positive of gunpowder nitrates does not
conclusively show that they fired the murder
weapon, or a gun for that matter, for such
forensic evidence should be taken only as an
indication of possibility or even of probability,
but not of infallibility, since nitrates are also
admittedly found in substances other than
gunpowder. (People v. Abellarosa, G.R. No.

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
121195, 27 November 1996; People v. de Guzman,

250 SCRA 118; People v. Nitcha, 240 SCRA 283)
Thus, while a dying declaration may be
admissible in evidence, it must identify with
certainty the assailant. Otherwise, it loses its
significance. Also, while a paraffin test could
establish the presence or absence of nitrates on
the hand, it cannot establish that the source of
the nitrates was the discharge of firearms a
person who tests positive may have handled one
or more substances with the same positive
reaction for nitrates such as explosives,
fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, tobacco
and leguminous plants. In People v. Melchor, this
Court acquitted the accused despite the
presence of gunpowder nitrates on his hands
[S]cientific experts concur in the view that the
result of a paraffin test is not conclusive. While
it can establish the presence of nitrates or
nitrites on the hand, it does not always
indubitably show that said nitrates or nitrites
were caused by the discharge of firearm. The
person tested may have handled one or more of
a number of substances which give the same
positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as
explosives, fireworks, pharmaceuticals and
leguminous plants such as peas, beans and
alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also
have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands
since these substances are present in the
products of combustion of tobacco. The
presence of nitrates or nitrites, therefore,
should be taken only as an indication of a
possibility but not of infallibility that the person
tested has fired a gun.
In fine, the admissions made by Godofredo to
Major Idian and PO3 Nepomuceno including the
gun in question cannot be considered in evidence
against him without violating his constitutional
right to counsel. Godofredo was already under
custodial investigation when he made his
admissions and surrendered the gun to the police
authorities. The police had already begun to

focus on the Adors and were carrying out a
process of interrogations that was lending itself
to eliciting incriminating statements and
evidence: the police went to the Ador residence
that same evening upon being informed that the
Adors had a long-standing grudge against the
Cuyas; the following day, all the male members
of the Ador family were told to go to the police
station; the police was also informed of the
dying declaration of deceased Chavez pointing to
the Adors as the assailants; the Adors were all
subjected to paraffin examination; and, there
were no other suspects as the police was not
considering any other person or group of
persons. The investigation thus was no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime as the
Adors were already being held as suspects for
the killings of Cuya and Chavez.
Consequently, the rights of a person under
custodial investigation, including the right to
counsel, have already attached to the Adors, and
pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 12(1) and (3), 1987
Constitution, any waiver of these rights should
be in writing and undertaken with the assistance
of counsel. Admissions under custodial
investigation made without the assistance of
counsel are barred as evidence. The records are
bare of any indication that the accused have
waived their right to counsel, hence, any of their
admissions are inadmissible in evidence against
them. As we have held, a suspects confession,
whether verbal or non-verbal, when taken
without the assistance of counsel without a valid
waiver of such assistance regardless of the
absence of such coercion, or the fact that it had
been voluntarily given, is inadmissible in
evidence, even if such confession were gospel
truth. Thus, in Aballe v. People, the death
weapon, a four-inch kitchen knife, which was
found after the accused brought the police to
his house and pointed to them the pot where he

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
had concealed it, was barred from admission as

it was discovered as a consequence of an
uncounseled extrajudicial confession.
With hardly any substantial evidence left, the
prosecution likewise played up the feud between
the Adors on one hand and the Chavezes and the
Cuyas on the other hand, and suggested that the
Adors had an axe to grind against the Chavezes
and the Cuyas. For sure, motive is not sufficient
to support a conviction if there is no other
reliable evidence from which it may reasonably
be adduced that the accused was the
malefactor. Motive alone cannot take the place
of proof beyond reasonable doubt sufficient to
overthrow the presumption of innocence.
All told, contrary to the pronouncements of the
trial court, we cannot rest easy in convicting the
two (2) accused based on circumstantial
evidence. For, the pieces of the said
circumstantial evidence presented do not
inexorably lead to the conclusion that they are
guilty. The prosecution witness failed to identify
the accused in court. A cloud of doubt continues
to hover over the gun used and the slug
recovered. The dying declaration and paraffin
examination remain unreliable. Godofredos
uncounseled admissions including the gun he
turned in are barred as evidence. And, the
supposed motive of the accused is simply
insufficient. Plainly, the facts from which the
inference that the accused committed the crime
were not proven. Accordingly, the guilt of the
accused cannot be established, more so to a
moral certainty. It is when evidence is purely
circumstantial that the prosecution is much
more obligated to rely on the strength of its own
case and not on the weakness of the defense,
and that conviction must rest on nothing less
than moral certainty.
Consequently, the case of the prosecution has
been reduced to nothing but mere suspicions and
speculations. It is hornbook doctrine that
suspicions and speculations can never be the

basis of conviction in a criminal case. Courts
must ensure that the conviction of the accused
rests firmly on sufficient and competent
evidence, and not the results of passion and
prejudice. If the alleged inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two (2) or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused, and the other
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence is
not adequate to support conviction. The court
must acquit the accused because the evidence
does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is
therefore insufficient to support a judgment of
conviction. Conviction must rest on nothing less
than a moral certainty of the guilt of the
accused. The overriding consideration is not
whether the court doubts the innocence of the
accused but whether it entertains a reasonable
doubt as to his guilt. It is thus apropos to repeat
the doctrine that an accusation is not, according
to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt
the prosecution must overthrow the presumption
of innocence with proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The prosecution has failed to
discharge its burden. Accordingly, we have to
acquit.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Br. 25, in
Crim. Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816 dated
August 2, 1999, finding accused-appellants
Godofredo B. Ador and Diosdado B. Ador III
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts
of murder and imposing on them the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants Godofredo B.
Ador and Diosdado B. Ador III are ACQUITTED
on reasonable doubt and their IMMEDIATE
RELEASE is hereby ORDERED unless they are
being held for some other legal cause.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
Tinga, JJ., concur.

Both dated 12 November 1997; Rollo, pp. 17-18.
[1993V331] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOEL SARTAGODA y
BOCANEGRA, JIMMY BASCUA y LAZARTE,
VICENTE STA. ANA y GUTIERREZ and JOHN
DOE, accused-appellants.1993 April 072nd
DivisionG.R. No. 97525D E C I S I O N
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
The Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region,
Branch 36, Calamba, Laguna convicted all three
accused-appellants in its decision ** dated
November 7, 1990, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the court hereby finds the
accused Joel Sartagoda y Bocanegra, Jimmy
Bascoa (sic) y Lazarte and Vicente Sta. Ana y
Gutierrez all guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
co-principals of the crime of Robbery With
Rape, defined and penalized in Article 294,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code; there
being two aggravating circumstances without any
mitigating circumstance to offset the same,
hereby sentences each of the said accused to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with
the accessories provided for by the law.
Each of the three accused is ordered to
indemnify the offended party Vilma de Belen the
sum of P30,000.00, and each of them shall
recognize the offspring if there be any.
The said accused are likewise ordered to return
the personal properties stolen or pay its
equivalent amount of P17,490.00 to Rogelio de
Belen, the lawful owner thereof.
SO ORDERED." 1
The facts of the case may be summarized as
follows:
It was the evening of July 2, 1988 while Rogelio
de Belen, his two daughters and his sister Vilma
de Belen were sleeping in their house at Calamba,
Laguna, when appellant broke in and woke him up,
poking a knife at him. They tied up his hands and

made him lie flat on his stomach and asked for
the key to his cabinet. Fearing for his life and
that of his companions, he reluctantly told them
where the key was kept.
Just on the other room was Vilma, who heard
whispers (kaluskos) but simply played possum.
When the three saw her on the bed, they
approached her. One covered her mouth as
another poked a knife at her neck. They
threatened to kill her if she should make an
outcry.
They raised her blouse and removed her
underwear. They tied both her hands so that she
could offer no resistance. She was at such a
pitiful state when the accused Jimmy Bascua
went on top of her, kissing her on different
parts of her body, while Vicente Sta. Ana held
her legs apart. Jimmy finally inserted his sex
organ inside her and satisfied his bestial desire.
After Jimmy was over, Vicente took his turn and
then Joel. After the three of them had
successfully deflowered Vilma, they left,
carrying with them the money and other
personal belongings of the de Belen family.
After the three men left, Rogelio, with his
hands and feet still tied up, tried to get up from
the bed and switched the lights on and called to
his neighbors for help. Vilma, meanwhile, had lost
consciousness due to shock.
Meanwhile, Petra Lamire, his sister-in-law who
lives right next to his house responded to his
cry for help. She went to their house and untied
Rogelio. She saw Vilma with her upper body
naked and sobbing so she covered Vilma with a
blanket. Soon after, his other sister-in-law also
arrived. They reported the incident to the
Barangay Captain.
They had Vilma examined by Dr. Danilo A.
Ramirez at Dr. Jose Rizal Memorial Hospital at
about 10:00 that same morning. He conducted
external and internal examinations. His external

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
examination showed no physical injuries except

that he noted several abrasions at the genital
area. His internal examination showed fresh
lacerations of the hymen at 9:00 and 4:00
positions. The vagina admitted two fingers with
ease.
In the present appeal the lone assigned error is:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING (THAT) THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION UTTERLY FAILED TO PROVE
THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT HENCE, THEIR
ACQUITTAL IS INEVITABLE.
This appeal has no merit.
The accused-appellants fault the trial court of
ignoring the fingerprint examination report
submitted by the Crime Laboratory of the
PC/INP Camp Crame which stated that none of
the specimen latent fingerprints were found to
be positive. It is their contention that since
their fingerprints were not found in the objects
found in the scene of the crime they cannot be
held guilty of the crime charged beyond
reasonable doubt.
Although We agree with their opinion that a
positive finding of matching fingerprints has
great significance, We cannot sustain their
theory that from the negative findings in the
fingerprint examination conducted in the course
of the investigation in the instant case, it must
be concluded that they could not have been at
the scene of the crime. Negative findings do not
at all times lead to a valid conclusion for there
may be logical explanations for the absence of
identifiable latent prints other than their not
being present at the scene of the crime.
Only latent fingerprints found on smooth
surface are useful for purposes of comparison in
a crime laboratory because prints left on rough
surfaces result in dotted lines or broken lines
instead of complete and continuous lines. Such
kind of specimen cannot be relied upon in a
fingerprint examination. The latent fingerprints

are actually oily substances adhering to the
surfaces of objects that come in contact with
the fingers. By their very nature, oily
substances easily spread such that when the
fingers slide against the surface they touch, no
identifiable latent print is left, only smudges
instead. Not all police investigators are aware of
the nature of latent fingerprints so as to be
guided accordingly in deciding which objects to
submit for fingerprint lifting and examination.
Noting the interplay of many circumstances
involved in the successful lifting and
identification of proper latent fingerprints in a
particular crime scene, the absence of one does
not immediately eliminate the possibility that
the accused-appellants could have been at the
scene of the crime. They may be there yet they
had not left any identifiable latent fingerprint.
Besides, in the case at bar, only ten latent
fingerprints are involved. The findings in this
particular fingerprint examination are not
sufficient to cast even just a reasonable doubt
in their finding of guilt for the crime charged.
The accused-appellants likewise contend that
the police line-up had been irregularly conducted
revealing suggestibility to their prejudice. They
accused Pat. Reyes of coaching complainant Vilma
de Belen when she identified her three
assailants. They claim that it was Pat. Reyes'
fault that "they were not allowed to select their
positions at the line-up; that they were not
placed in line under a numeral against a wall
marked to indicate their respective height in
feet and inches; that there was no record made
of their descriptions and physical
characteristics; that the witness/victim was not
out of view of the three (3) accused lined-up for
identification purposes." 2
We find these claims of irregularities of little if

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
not, of no significance at all when considered in

the light of the natural desire in the victim to
seek retribution not simply from anybody who
may be put before her but from the very same
offenders who actually did violence against her.
It would be most illogical for an outraged victim
to direct her anger against anyone other than
her three offenders. We cannot accept the
accused-appellants' claim that it was on Pat.
Reyes' suggestion that the victim pointed to the
accused-appellants as her assailants. No amount
of coaching will be sufficient to counter the
natural outrage of a rape victim against her
abuser when said abuser is presented before her
in a police line-up. The outrage displayed by the
rape victim was a spontaneous reaction. She
identified her assailants because of no other
reason except to let people know who hurt her.
Whether or not there was a previous police lineup, the fact is that they were positively
identified at the trial. There is no law requiring
a police line-up as essential to a proper
identification. 3 The complainant's recognition
of the accused-appellants as her attackers
cannot be doubted for she had during the carnal
acts ample opportunity to see the faces of the
men who ravaged her. It is the most natural
reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive
to see the looks and faces of their assailants
and observe the manner in which the crime was
committed. Most often the face of the assailant
and body movements thereof, create a lasting
impression which cannot easily be erased from
their memory. 4
The accused-appellants further claim that "the
Medical Findings of Dr. Danilo Ramirez concludes
that the alleged victim of rape, Vilma de Belen
must have had sexual experienced (sic) five (5)
to six (6) days before the alleged incident
happened on July 2, 1988 at about 3 to 4 o'clock
in the morning". 5 There is no truth to this

claim. In fact, there was no categorical or
positive assertion on the part of Dr. Ramirez
that the sexual intercourse with Vilma was
committed on the very date when the alleged
"robbery with rape" took place on July 2, 1988.
This is a clear distortion of the testimony of Dr.
Ramirez who on cross-examination testified as
follows:
"ATTY. MAIQUEZ:
Q You cannot also determine when was the first
and when was the last intercourse as per your
examination?
FISCAL Objection, witness is incompetent.
COURT Witness may answer.
A The findings suggest that because of hymenal
laceration the injuries was (sic) recent not more
than one week, sir.
Q When you say it is not more than one week,
could it be 6 or 5 days?
A Possible, sir.
Q When you say it is possible that the victim
could have experienced sexual intercourse 6 to 5
days that was indicated in your examination
marked as Exh. A, can you determine as per your
finding?
A Well, yes, sir, I placed fresh hymenal
laceration because laceration will determine
whether it is fresh or old because of the
characteristice (sic) of the laceration, sir.
Q At the time you examined the patient in your
medical opinion it could have been 5 or 6 days
had elapsed?

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. MAIQUEZ: That will be all." 6
The trial court, in the exercise of its discretion
to seek clarification in witness' testimony
proceeded as follows:
"COURT:
Q Doctor, in your findings you noted that there
was an abrasion?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q Is that more than one abrasion?
A I found 3 mm., your Honor.
WITNESS (continuing):
and on the lower opening of the vagina on the
right side, that is the only place, sir.
COURT:
Q Aside from that injury or rater (sic) that
portion there is no other injury which you found?
A None, your Honor.
Q Because laceration stated in your medicolegal
certificate that there was fresh hymenal
laceration noted at 9 and 4 o'clock on the face
of the clock?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q Do we gather it right when you stated in your
medicolegal certificate fresh it is not yet
healed?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q From that finding of yours regarding the
existence of fresh hymenal laceration you said
that it least one or 2 days had elapsed before
you have conducted the physical examination?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q In other words from one to 5 days?

A Yes, your Honor.
COURT:
Q But it is possible that it could be more than
one or two days?.
WITNESS:
A Yes, your Honor." 7
It is evident that Dr. Ramirez never
categorically concluded that the sexual
intercourse causing the fresh hymenal
lacerations took place five to six days before
the date of her examination. The accusedappellants' claim that the sexual intercourse
took place on June 26 or 27, 1988 is conjectural
and without factual basis.
The claim of the accused-appellants that the
prosecution failed to present rebuttal evidence
to refute the averments of Joel Sartagoda that
they tried in vain to persuade him to admit the
charge against him and to implicate his two (2)
co-accused did not deserve the attention of the
trial court nor does it deserve Ours, being per
se unacceptable and unbelievable in the light of
human experience.
Finally, they claim that the fact that Vicente
Sta. Ana and Jimmy Bascua did not flee, even
when they had all the opportunities to do so,
prove their innocence. When they were allowed
to go home after Vilma failed to identify them
during the first confrontation at the police
station, they stayed home and did not flee until
they were again required to appear at the police
station for the second time. The accusedappellants in effect posit that if flight is an
indication of guilt, non-flight or the decision not
to flee, having the opportunity to do so, is a sign
of innocence.

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
We do not agree. Although it is settled that

unexplained flight indicates guilt, it does, not
necessarily follow that absence thereof proves
innocence, specially so when there is
overwhelming evidence to establish their guilt.
This Court finds no reversible error having been
committed by the trial court in convicting the
three accused-appellants for the crime of
robbery with multiple rape under Article 294
par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code. We affirm its
findings of fact which are firmly grounded on
the evidence presented at the trial. We
reiterate our ruling thus:
"There is need to stress anew that this Court
has long been committed to the principle that
the determination by a trial judge who could
weigh and appraise the testimony as to the facts
duly proved is entitled to the highest respect,
unless it could be shown that he ignored or
disregarded circumstances of weight or
influence sufficient to call for a different
finding." 8
We are for the affirmance of the conviction of
the three accused-appellants. With regard to
the indemnity to Vilma de Belen for multiple
rape, there having been evidence of conspiracy,
the act of one being the act of all, each must be
liable for all the three rapes committed, they
must be held solidarily liable 9 for said
indemnity which the trial court fixed at
P30,000.00 for each offender or a total of
P90,000.00. 10
However, this Court cannot uphold the trial
court's ruling ordering each of the accused to
"recognize the offspring if there be any". In
multiple rape, not one maybe required to
recognized the offspring of the offended
woman. In a case 11 where three persons, one
after another, raped a woman, neither of the

accused was ordered to recognize the offspring
simply because it was impossible to determine
the paternity thereof.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the accused-appellants
are held jointly and severally liable to indemnify
Vilma de Belen for multiple rape in the amount of
P90,000.00, and that none of the accused is
required to recognize the offspring.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Padilla, Regalado and
Nocon, JJ., concur.
--------------RULE 129
WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED
Section 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory.

? A court shall take judicial notice, without
the introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of states,
their political history, forms of government
and symbols of nationality, the law of
nations, the admiralty and maritime courts
of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines,
the official acts of legislative, executive and
judicial departments of the Philippines, the
laws of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions. (1a)
Section 2. Judicial notice, when
discretionary. ? A court may take judicial
notice of matters which are of public
knowledge, or are capable to
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to
be known to judges because of their
judicial functions. (1a)

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing

necessary. ? During the trial, the court, on
its own initiative, or on request of a party,
may announce its intention to take judicial
notice of any matter and allow the parties to
be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on
appeal, the proper court, on its own
initiative or on request of a party, may take
judicial notice of any matter and allow the
parties to be heard thereon if such matter is
decisive of a material issue in the case. (n)
Section 4. Judicial admissions. ? An
admission, verbal or written, made by the
party in the course of the proceedings in
the same case, does not require proof. The
admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was
made. (2a)
Judicial notice is a rule in the law of evidence that
allows a fact to be introduced into evidence if the truth
of that fact is so notorious or well known, or so
authoritatively attested, that it cannot reasonably be
doubted. This is done upon the request of
the party seeking to rely on the fact at issue. Facts and
materials admitted under judicial notice are accepted
without being formally introduced by a witness or other
rule of evidence, and even if one party wishes to lead
evidence to the contrary.
Judicial notice is frequently used for the simplest, most
obvious common sense facts, such as which day of the week
corresponded to a particular calendar date.2
It is the authority of a judge to accept as facts
certain matters which are of common knowledge from
sources which guarantee accuracy or are a matter of
official record, without the need for evidence
establishing the fact. Examples of matters given judicial
notice are public and court records, tides, times of
sunset and sunrise, government rainfall and temperature
records, known historic events or the fact that ice melts
in the sun.3
_ The function of judicial notice is that, it displaces

evidence, since as it stands for proof, it fulfills the object
which evidence is designed to fulfill and makes evidence
unnecessary.
_ It is based upon obvious reasons of convenience and
expediency and operates to save trouble, expense, and
2
3
time which would be lost in establishing, in the ordinary

way, facts which do not admit of contradiction.
Definitions:
1. Judicial Notice no more than that the court will
bring to its aid and consider, without proof of the facts,
its knowledge of those matters of public concern which
are known by all well-informed persons.
2. Judicial Knowledge cognizance of certain facts
which a judge under rules of legal procedure or
otherwise may properly take or act upon without proof
because they are already known to him, or is assumed
to have, by virtue of his office.
Q: What is judicial notice?
A: It is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may
properly take and act upon without proof because they
are supposed to be known to them. It is based on
considerations of expediency and convenience. It
displaces evidence, being equivalent to proof.
Note: Judicial notice fulfils the objective which the
evidence intends to achieve. It is not equivalent to
judicial knowledge or that which is based on the
personal knowledge of the court; rather, it is the
cognizance of common knowledge. Judicial notice
relieves the parties from the necessity of introducing
evidence to prove the fact notified. It makes evidence
unnecessary.
Q: What are the facts that need not be proved?
1. Those which the courts may take judicial notice (Rule
129);
2. Those that are judicially admitted (Rule 129);
3. Those that are conclusively presumed (Rule 131); and
4. Those that are disputably presumed but
uncontradicted (Rule 131).
Q: What are the requisites of judicial notice?
A:
1. The matter must be one of common and general
knowledge;
2. It must be well and authoritatively settled and not
doubtful or uncertain; and
3. It must be one which is not subject to a reasonable
dispute in that it is either:
a. Generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of
the trial court; or
b. Capable of accurate and ready determination by
resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
be questionable (Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. CA, G.R.
No. 152392, May 26, 2005).
Note: The principal guide in determining what facts may
be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety
(Ibid.). The test of notoriety is whether the fact involved
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judicial_notice
http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=1065
CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
is so notoriously known as to make it proper to assume

its existence without proof.
Q: When is a matter considered common
knowledge?
A: They are those matters coming to the knowledge of
men generally in the course of ordinary experiences of
life, or they may be matters which are generally
accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready
and unquestioned demonstration.
Note: Thus, facts which are universally known, and
which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or
other publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they
are of such universal notoriety and so generally
understood that they may be regarded as forming part of
the common knowledge of every person. A court
however cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in
part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a
fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge
(Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 152392, May
26, 2005).
Q: What is mandatory notice?
A: If the fact sought to be proved are:
1. Existence and territorial extent of States;
2. Political history, forms of government and symbols of
nationality;
3. Law of nations;
4. Admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their
seals;
5. Political constitution and history of the Philippines;
6. Official acts of legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines;
7. Laws of nature;
8. Measure of time; and
9. Geographical divisions (Sec. 1).
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,

vs.
ROMAN MENESES Y MARIN, accusedappellant.
1998 March 26 3rd Division
G.R. No. 111742 D E C I S I O N
KAPUNAN, J:
Eyewitness identification is vital evidence and, in
most cases, decisive of the success or failure of
the prosecution. 1 Subject of the Court's
scrutiny in the instant criminal case is the
credibility of a child's alleged eyewitness
account on which the appellant's conviction by
the trial court was solely anchored.
At around three o'clock in the early morning of

December 15, 1991, thirty-three year old Cesar
Victoria was stabbed to death while sleeping by
his seven-year old son Christopher in a rented
makeshift room in Tondo, Manila.
Appellant Roman Meneses was charged with the
murder of Cesar Victoria, in an Information
dated December 27, 1991, which reads:
That on or about December 15, 1991, in the City
of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with
evident premeditation and treachery, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with intent to kill, attack, assault and use
personal violence upon one CESAR VICTORIA y
FERNANDEZ, by then and there stabbing the
latter with a fan knife (balisong) on the
different parts of his body, thereby inflicting
upon the said CESAR VICTORIA y FERNANDEZ
mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death immediately. 2
The prosecution presented the following
witnesses: Christopher R. Victoria, SPO3 Jaime
Mendoza, SPO3 Eduardo Gonzales and MedicoLegal Officer Florante Baltazar.
Christopher R. Victoria testified that he
witnessed the stabbing of his father. He
testified that while he lived with his Kuya Odeng
on Kasipagan Street, Tondo, on the night of
December 14, 1991, he went to his father's
rented makeshift room to sleep after he
(Christopher) was whipped by his brother.
Christopher's other siblings lived elsewhere in
Tondo and his mother was living in Quezon. He
further testified that he was awakened from
sleep and saw his father being stabbed in the
heart with a "veinte nueve." After the assailant
ran away, Christopher cried.
SPO3 Jaime Mendoza, a police investigator of
the Western Police District testified that on
December 15, 1991, a kagawad of Barangay 123,
Zone 9, Tondo, Manila called the precinct
informing him that Cesar Victoria was found

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
stabbed to death. With three policemen,

Mendoza immediately went to the crime scene,
arriving there at around three o'clock in the
morning. Mendoza described the scene as a
makeshift room about three by five square
meters. The room was connected by a divider
with a door to a house owned by the Spouses
Ardiete, the victim's landlord. The policemen
saw the victim's bloodied body, with several stab
wounds, lying on a wooden bed.
Mendoza testified that when he questioned
Christopher, who was then in the house,
Christopher could not identify nor describe the
attacker, but that the child said he could
identify him because he knew his face. On redirect examination however, Mendoza said that
Christopher identified the assailant as appellant.
Mendoza and the policemen brought Christopher
to the precinct where his statement was taken.
3 After the appellant was arrested and turned
over to the investigators on December 26, 1991,
Christopher was again brought to the precinct
where, during a confrontation with appellant,
Christopher identified appellant as the person
who stabbed his father. 4
SPO3 Eduardo C. Gonzales testified that at
about two o'clock in the morning of December
25, 1991, he arrested appellant. The arrest was
based on the report of Angelina Victoria,
appellant's wife, who implicated appellant in the
crime. The policemen found appellant at the
place pointed to by Angelina, which was a flower
box at the corner of Tuazon and Mithi Streets.
Frisked, appellant yielded a balisong. After
announcing that they were policemen and that
appellant was being arrested as the suspect in
the stabbing of Cesar Victoria, Gonzales and his
companions brought appellant to Police Station
No. 2. Appellant was later transferred to the
Homicide Section.
On cross-examination, Gonzales stated that he
and his companions merely "invited" appellant to

go with them to the police station for
investigation, but that at the police station,
appellant verbally admitted to stabbing Cesar
Victoria. 5
Medico-Legal Officer Florante P. Baltazar of the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory
conducted the autopsy on the victim. He
testified in court that the cause of death of the
victim, as stated in his Autopsy Report, was
"cardio-respiratory arrest due to shock and
hemorrhage secondary to stab wounds," and that
the victim sustained five external injuries, two
of which were fatal. 6 He opined that based on
the direction of the stab wounds, the victim was
not lying down when stabbed, but could have
been standing or sitting when stabbed by the
attacker who could have also been standing. 7
The lone witness for the defense was the
appellant himself, Roman Meneses. He
interposed the defense of denial and alibi.
Appellant testified that the victim, who was his
brother-in-law, and Christopher used to live with
him and his wife Angelina, the victim's sister, in
their house at A. Tuazon Street, Tondo, Manila.
On the day of the crime, appellant alleged that
he was in San Isidro, Mexico, Pampanga, and had
been there since the tenth or eleventh of that
month, after he had a misunderstanding with
Angelina.
He further testified that he was arrested on
December 24, 1991, without a warrant after
being implicated in the crime by his wife. He was
brought to the police station where he was
mauled by policemen; he never admitted though
to killing Cesar Victoria, his brother-in-law.
Appellant also denied that there was animosity
between him and his brother-in-law. In fact,
when Cesar was stabbed after he (Cesar) got out
of prison, appellant even brought him to the
hospital and paid for his medical expenses.
Appellant even sent his nephew Christopher to

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
school. 8
In a Decision dated July 26, 1993, the trial
found appellant guilty, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
convicting the accused of the crime of Murder,
and he is hereby sentenced with the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua.
The accused is hereby ordered to indemnify and
pay the heirs of the victim Cesar Victoria the
sum of P50,000.00 as damages sustained by
them on account of the victim's death. 9
In this appeal, appellant assigns to the trial
court the following errors:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING
EXCULPATORY WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE
ADDUCED BY THE DEFENSE.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING
APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT APPELLANT IS
GUILTY, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
CONVICTING HIM OF MURDER INSTEAD OF
HOMICIDE ONLY. 10
The issue in the instant case is credibility. The
judgment of appellant's conviction is anchored
entirely on the testimony of the single
eyewitness, Christopher Victoria, who identified
appellant as the one who he allegedly saw stab
his father.
We find that the trustworthiness of the
identification of appellant by Christopher is
dubious, raising reasonable doubt in the mind of
the Court as to appellant's culpability.
It was established that the crime took place in
the wee hours of the morning, before the crack
of dawn, at around three o'clock. 11 The court
can take judicial notice of the "laws of nature,"
12 such as in the instant case, that at around
three in the morning during the Christmas
season, it is still quite dark and that daylight

comes rather late in this time of year. 13
Nowhere in the description of the crime scene
by witness SPO3 Mendoza in his testimony was
it established that there was light or
illumination of any sort by which Christopher
could see the attacker. SPO3 Mendoza testified
thus:
Q. You said you found the body of the victim,
what (sic) did you found (sic) at the body of the
victim?
A. We found the body of the victim on adjacent
makeshift of the No. 1324.
Q. The makeshift room which was adjacent to
the house, whose house of that makeshift was
adjacent?
A. It was owned by Cesar Victoria and his son
Christopher.
Q. You said you interviewed a couple named
Ardiete, where did you see this couple?
A. Inside the house, sir.
Q. How far is that house to the house of the
victim?
A. Only a division within that house, only division
separate.
COURT:
Q. You said that the makeshift was adjacent to
the house, does the Court understand from you
that the makeshift was attach to the house?
A. Part of the house, Your Honor.
Q. Is there an opening on it?
A. Yes, Your Honor.
Q. How wide?
A. The main door going to the house.
Q. Did you come to know, what that makeshift
was for?
A. It was occupied intended for the victim Cesar
Victoria and his son, they actually rented the
space.
Q. So the place where you found the victim is a
place which can be used for living purposes?

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How did you come to that conclusion?
A. Because that portion, there was a door, there
was a door before you can get inside.
FISCAL SULLA:
Q. How big is that room more or less?
A. More or less about three meters or five
meters.
Q. Now who occupied the room adjacent to the
room occupied by the victim?
A. The spouses Ardiete, sir. 14
The crime took place in a makeshift room
measuring about three by five square meters.
While the room had a door, there was no mention
of a window which could have allowed entry of
some kind of light from the outside. It is highly
improbable that a young boy, just roused from
sleep and his eyes adjusting to the unlit room,
could identify the attacker, much less identify
the knife used, as Christopher did, as a "veinte
nueve."
The prosecution failed to paint a crystal-clear
picture of the environ by which Christopher
could have made an accurate and reliable
identification of the attacker. Christopher's
testimony being improbable, is not credible.
Evidence is credible when it is "such as the
common experience of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances. We have no
test of the truth of human testimony, except its
conformity to our knowledge, observation, and
experience." 15
We now consider the identification itself. We
note a glaring discrepancy, not inconsequential,
in the testimony of SPO3 Mendoza regarding
Christopher's identification of appellant. SPO3
Mendoza testified thus:
Q. Where was the son of the victim when you
arrived?
A. Inside the house, sir.
COURT:
Q. Did you talked (sic) to the son of the victim?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did he tell you?
A. He told me he can remember the suspect
whenever he sees him again.
Q. Then he can identify him?
A. Yes, Your Honor.
ATTY. SARMIENTO:
Q. So at the time that you were there, the son
of the victim was not able to tell you who the
suspect was?
A. Yes, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. Neither the wife nor the husband [referring
to the spouses Ardiete], nor the son tell you
that they saw the killing?
A. The son of the victim said that he can
identified (sic) the suspect.
Q. Did you asked (sic) him if he can identify?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And what did he tell you?
A. He knows the face of the suspect.
Q. Did you ask him the name of the suspect, if
he knows him at that time?
A. He can't tell the name.
Q. Did he tell you the description of the
suspect?
A. He can't tell the description of the suspect
but he insist (sic) that if he can see him again,
he can identify. 16
During his direct and cross-examination, SPO3
Mendoza asserted that Christopher could not
name his father's attacker nor give a
description; however, in his re-direct
examination he said that Christopher mentioned
categorically appellant's name, Roman Meneses,
thus:
Q. When you responded to the scene of the
crime, and talking to Christopher Victoria who

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
can identify the suspect, did you asked [sic] him

why he can identify the suspect?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did he say?
A. He remember [sic] the face.
Q. And did you ask him why he can remember
the face?
A. Yes, sir. Because he openly sees the face, sice
(sic) he was his uncle.
Q. Did you asked [sic] the son what is the name
of his uncle?
A. Yes, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. What is the name?
A. Roman Meneses. 17
This inconsistency in the testimony of SPO3
Mendoza not only tolls on his credibility as well
as the credibility of his testimony, but more
significantly, casts doubt on the
trustworthiness, veracity and reliability of the
alleged identification itself. Significantly, this
inconsistency was noted by the trial court with
vexation, but the Court merely glossed over the
same, stating that the identification of appellant
by Christopher during the subsequent
confrontation rendered such inconsistency
unimportant.
Even in the Advance Information 18 prepared by
SPO3 Mendoza on December 15, 1991, no
mention was made regarding an identification
made by Christopher when questioned
immediately after the crime. Mendoza wrote:
CHRISTOPHER VICTORIA, 8 years old, son of
victim, who was sleeping beside the latter during
the commission of the crime when interviewed
stated that he was awakened, while his father
was being stabbed by suspect, whom he claimed
he can identify if he can see him again.
Case to be further investigated and follow-up to
determine the motive behind the knife-slaying

and efforts will be exerted to establish the
identity of suspect. 19
Indeed, it taxes the credibility of Christopher's
testimony that while he knew appellant prior to
the crime, being his uncle, who for some time he
was staying with, he failed to point to appellant
as the attacker when questioned by the police
immediately after the incident. Wall 20 in his
work on eyewitness identification expounds on
the danger signals which a trial court judge and
the appellate courts should watch out for when
considering identifications in criminal cases,
thus:
When a person has been the victim of a crime
committed by a friend, acquaintance, relative, or
other person previously familiar to him, and
decides to make a complaint to the police, it is to
be expected that he would immediately inform
them of the name (or it that be unknown, then at
least the identity) of the person whom they
should arrest. The victim would normally tell the
police that he had been hit by John Smith, or
that her purse had been snatched by the
grocer's delivery boy. Of course, some crimes
are never reported, for one reason or another.
But once the victim decides to make a criminal
complaint, then he will almost invariably name or
designate the perpetrator of the crime
immediately, if he is able to do so. The
occasional failure of a complainant to do this is a
danger signal of which the courts have
sometimes taken note.
In an Idaho prosecution for rape, for example,
the complaining witness identified the defendant
at the trial, but had not accused him when
making her original complaint to the police, even
though he was previously known to her. As an
explanation, she testified that she had not
recognized him during the commission of the
crime. The ensuing conviction was reversed on
the ground that the evidence of identification

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
was insufficient. In an Iowa prosecution for

assault with intent to commit rape, the
complainant was a young married woman who had
known the defendant prior to the commission of
the alleged crime. She identified him at the
trial, but admitted that she had not recognized
him during the assault, for he had a veil covering
his face. It was after he left, she testified that
it came to her mind that he assault, and on the
same day, she became afraid to stay alone at
home while waiting for her husband to return,
and asked none other than the defendant to wait
with her a course of action which was
commented upon by the appellate court which
reversed the conviction on grounds which
included the insufficiency of the evidence of
identification.
In a New York murder prosecution, the victim's
widow identified the defendant prior to her
husband's killers. Although she knew the
defendant prior to her husband's death, she
admitted that she had not named him to the
police on the night of the crime, and admitted
also that she had told the coroner that she had
never before seen her husband's murderers. A
conviction for murder in the first degree was
reversed because the trial judge had failed to
charge the jury that they should consider those
facts in determining the accuracy of the
identification. And in a recent New York robbery
prosecution, it was brought out that the two
women who had identified the defendant at the
trial had not immediately named him to the
police, even though they had known him
previously, since he was the son of an
acquaintance of one of them. The conviction was
reversed on appeal, the court stating, with
respect to the identifying witnesses, that:
If we give credence to their testimony, it
appears that they were able to and did observe
fully the fact and general appearance of one of
the three alleged robbers who was identified by
them 17 months later as the defendant . . .

Certainly, if, at the time of the incident, they
had recognized the particular individual as one
whom they knew or as resembling one with whom
they were acquainted, it is reasonable to expect
that they would have given this information
promptly to the police . . . On the state of this
record, there was no plausible explanation for
the failure of the two women, or one of them, to
recognized the defendant at the time of the
robbery or, in any event, to pass along to the
police within a reasonable time information
which would have led them to identify the
defendant as one of the robbers. We realize . . .
That the issue is one of credibility and that,
generally speaking, such issued is for the trier
of the facts. Here, however, on the whole
record, we have concluded that the finding of
the jury as to the guilt of the defendant . . . is
contrary to the weight of the evidence; and
that, in any event, a new trial should be had in
the interests of justice.
These four cases should suffice to illustrate
how the courts react to this danger signal on the
rather rare occasions when it is in the record
before them. Those occasions are rare, it is
submitted, because when the point actually
arises in a case, it usually produces that
reasonable doubt which causes a jury to acquit.
It may also be of some significance that when a
jury convicts despite such a glaring weakness in
the identification, it is usually in the type of
case that stirs up the greatest emotions sex
crimes and crimes of violence. Common sense,
however, dictates that when this danger signal is
present in a case, and the failure of the witness
or complainant to do what would normally be
done, i.e., to name or designate the perpetrator
of the crime immediately, is not satisfactorily
explained, no conviction should occur or should
be allowed to stand in the absence of
independent and persuasive evidence of the

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
defendant's guilt.
The prosecution did not endeavor to explain
Christopher's failure to name the attacker at
the time he was questioned immediately after
the crime. From SPO3 Mendoza's testimony,
Christopher was at that time coherent and
answering clearly questions from the police.
We further find objectionable Christopher's
identification of appellant during a "show-up" at
the police station. As testified to by SPO3
Mendoza, "I made confrontation between them,"
referring to Christopher and appellant. SPO3
Mendoza testified on the circumstances
surrounding the "confrontation" between
Christopher and appellant, thus:
Q. Who was able to arrest the suspect?
A. PO Eddie Gonzales sir.
Q. And what did you do when you informed about
this?
A. I invited again the eye witness, the son of the
victim.
Q. And what did you do when you invited the eye
witness?
A. We make confrontation between the suspect
and him.
Q. Where?
A. Inside the room sir.
Q. When was that?
A. Right after the suspect was arrested.
Q. When was he arrested?
A. December 25, 1991
xx
xxx
xxx
Q. And then in the confrontation between the
suspect and the eye witness, what happened?
A. The eye witness positively identified the
suspect as the one who stabbed the victim..
COURT:
Who identified?
A. The eye witness Your Honor.
xxx
xxx
xxx
FISCAL SULLA:
Q. Exactly, where was the suspect when he was
identified by the witness?

A. Inside the office.
Q. In what particular place inside your office?
A. Crime against person, homicide. 21
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. So, when the accused was arrested and you
were informed about it, what did you do?
A. I investigated again, after I made a
confrontation between the son of the victim and
the suspect.
Q. Son of the victim alone?
A. Together with Angelina? 22
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. So the suspect was turn-over (sic) over to
you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When was that?
A. Day after December 25, 1992.
Q. And when the suspect was turned-over to
your office, who were there?
A. The night shift in charge.
Q. How about the son of the victim, were (sic)
he there?
A. I just saw him (there) when I arrive (sic).
Q. What happened when they arrived.
A. I took immediately the statement of the son
of the victim.
Q. Did you point them the suspect?
A. No, sir.
Q. Was there confrontation between the
suspect and the son together with Angelina?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What happened during the confrontation?
A. He pin-pointed the suspect.
Q. Who pin-pointed the suspect?
A. The son of the victim.
Q. How about Angelina?
A. She did not. 23
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. And from that time how long did it take?
When they arrive (sic), how long (did) this
Christopher Victoria identify the suspect?

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
A. Immediately during my investigation I made a

confrontation with the suspect and the victim,
and he pinpointed to me that the suspect was
really the one.
Q. You said that the suspect was inside the jail,
when you made the investigation in your office,
how far is your office to the detention cell?
A. About three meters.
Q. When did the confrontation exactly took (sic)
place?
A. I let the son of the victim to go (sic) nearer
the detention cell.
COURT:
Q. Did you tell something, did you asked (sic) did
you tell anything to the son before the
confrontation?
A. Yes, sir.
COURT:
What did the son told (sic) you?
A. He told me he can.
Q. And after he told you he can, what did you
do?
A. I made confrontation between them.
COURT:
And during the confrontation, what did the son
tell you?
A. He is Roman Meneses.
COURT:
Did you asked (sic) him where did he saw (sic)
the person pointed to?
A. Yes, he told me that he saw him in the room
they rented at Alinia. 24
In Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 25 the Court
stated that an identification of the accused
during a "show-up" or where the suspect alone is
brought face to face with the witness for
identification, 26 is seriously flawed. We stated
thus:
. . . the mode of identification other than an
identification parade is a show-up, the

presentation of a single suspect to a witness for
purposes of identification. Together with its
aggravated forms, it constitutes the most
grossly suggestive identification procedure now
or ever used by the police (See Louisell, David
W., Kaplan, John, and Waltz, Jon R., Cases and
Materials on Evidence; Wall, Eyewitness
Identification in Criminal Cases, 1968 ed., p.
1263)
In the Tuason case, during a first encounter in
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
headquarters, the accused therein was pointed
to by the alleged eyewitnesses after an NBI
agent first pointed him out to them. The Court
said that "[the eyewitnesses'] identification of
[petitioner] from a [subsequent] line-up at the
NBI was not spontaneous and independent. An
NBI agent improperly suggested to them
petitioner's person." 27
From Mendoza's testimony we can gather that
appellant was presented as the suspect in the
crime to Christopher inside Mendoza's office in
the Homicide Section of the police station, or
later in the detention cell the boy was made to
approach. While Mendoza did not literally point
to appellant as in the Tuason case, equally
pervasive in the "confrontation" in the instant
case is what Wigmore calls "the suggestion of
guilty identity." 28
Even applying the totality of circumstances test
set in People v. Teehankee, Jr, 29 formulated
and used by courts in resolving the admissibility
and reliability of out-of-court identifications, we
must hold the identification of appellant by
Christopher to be seriously flawed. The test
lists three factors to consider:
. . . (1) the witness' opportunity to view the
criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the
witness' degree of attention at that time; (3)
the accuracy of any prior description given by
the witness; (4) the level of certainty

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
demonstrated by the witness at the

identification; (5) the length of time between
the crime and the identification; and, (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification process.
(See Neil v. Biggers, 409 US 188 (1973); Manson
v. Brathwaite, 432 US 98 (1977); Del Carmen,
Criminal Procedure, Law and Practice, 3rd
Edition., p. 346)
Indeed, we cannot discount the angle that young
Christopher was influenced by prior prompting
or manipulation by an adult, his aunt Angelina.
Rather than reinforce the identification, the
circumstances pointed out by the trial court
plants in mind the plausibility that appellant's
wife Angelina could have coached the young
impressionable Christopher. These
circumstances are:
First, was the insistence of [appellant's] wife as
testified by the accused himself, that he was
the one who killed the victim, and was pointed to
by her as the assailant, thus, he was arrested.
Another was the resentment of the accused
against his brother-in-law-victim brought about
by the latter's intervention in that serious
quarrel between him and his wife. Thirdly, that
the accused no doubt disliked the financial
support and subsistence being given by his wife
to the victim.
Quite revealingly, Angelina was the one who went
to the police to implicate appellant in the crime
and who directed the police to where he could
be found. She later herded Christopher to the
police station for the boy to give his statement.
She was also with the boy when he was made to
identify appellant during the "confrontation."
We see Angelina's actuations as suspect,
especially when we consider that per SPO3
Mendoza's testimony, when he questioned
Christopher immediately after the crime, the
boy could not simply name the attacker.
And while the above circumstances, particularly,
the supposed resentment of appellant against
the victim, who was his wife Angelina's brother,

and envy proceeding from Angelina's giving
financial support to the victim may constitute
motive, motive alone, without credible positive
identification, cannot be a basis for conviction.
30
The People points out that appellant had verbally
admitted having committed the crime at the
time of his arrest and later during the conduct
of the investigation. 31 The appellant however
during the trial denied having made such verbal
admissions of guilt. Granting arguendo that
appellant indeed made such verbal admissions,
the same would not be admissible in evidence
against him because the constitutional
preconditions for its admission were not
complied with The mere assertion by a police
office that after an accused was informed of his
constitutional right to remain silent and to
counsel he readily admitted his guilt, does not
make the supposed confession admissible against
the purported confessant. 32 Here, it was not
even shown that appellant's supposed admissions
of guilt were made with benefit of counsel. 33
It is conceded that appellant's defense of alibi
is weak. 34 The settled rule however is that
conviction should rest on the strength of the
prosecution and not on the weakness of the
defense. 35 The onus is on the prosecution to
prove the accused guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, in view of the constitutional presumption
of the innocence of the accused. 36 We must
rule that the prosecution failed to so discharge
its burden.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Decision dated July 26, 1993 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, National Capital Judicial
Region, Branch 34 in Criminal Case No. 91101878 convicting appellant ROMAN MENESES
y MARIN is REVERSED and appellant is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the
ground of reasonable doubt. The Court orders

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by: Meo J. Mallorca
his RELEASE from commitment unless he is held

for some other legal cause or ground. Costs de
Oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Romero and Purisima, JJ .,
concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 142295. May 31, 2001]
VICENTE DEL ROSARIO y NICOLAS,
petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
Petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas appeals
via certiorari from a decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming with modification the decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, Branch 20,
Malolos, and finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of P. D. No. 1866,
as amended by Republic Act No. 8294 (illegal
possession of firearms), sentencing him to four
(4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of
prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine of
P30,000.00.
On June 17, 1996, Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Eufracio S. Marquez of Bulacan filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, Malolos an
Information charging petitioner Vicente del
Rosario y Nicolas with violation of P. D. No. 1866,
as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of June 1996, in
the municipality of Norzagaray, Province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession under his
custody and control, the following, to wit:
a) One (1) pc. Pistol Cal. 45 SN:70G23792 (w/o
license)
b) One (1) pc. Revolver Cal. 22 SN:48673 (w/o
license)
c) Twenty Seven (27) rds live ammos. For cal.
.45
d) Five (5) pcs. Magazines for cal. .45
e) Eight (8) rds live ammunitions for cal. 22
f) Five (5) pcs. Magazines short for cal. 5.56
(M16)
g) Twenty (20) rds live ammunitions for cal 5.56
without first having obtained a proper license
therefor.
Contrary to law.
On June 25, 1996, the trial court arraigned the
petitioner. He pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are
as follows:
Sometime in May 1996, the police received a
report that accused-appellant Vicente del
Rosario was in possession of certain firearms
without the necessary licenses. Acting upon the
report, P/Sr. Insp. Jerito Adique of the PNP
Criminal Investigation Group at Camp Olivas,
Pampanga inquired from the PNP Firearms and
Explosive Division whether or not the report was
true. On May 10, 1996, P/Sr. Insp. Edwin C.
Roque of the PNP Firearms and Explosives
Division issued a certification (Exhibit L) stating
that per records in his office, the appellant is
not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any
kind and caliber. Armed with the said
certification, P/Sr. Insp. Adique applied for a
search warrant to enable his team to search the
house of appellant.
On June 13, 1996, a search warrant (Exhibit A)
was issued by Judge Gil Fernandez, Sr. of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217,
authorizing the search of the residence of
appellant at Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray,
Bulacan. On June 15, 1996, at about 7:00 oclock
in the morning, a team led by P/Sr. Insp. Adique
went to Norzagaray to serve the warrant.

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
Before proceeding to the residence of the

appellant, the police officers requested
Barangay Chairman Rogelio de Silva and Barangay
Councilman Aurelio Panteleon to accompany them
in the implementation of the warrant. Upon
arrival at the house of appellant, the police
officers introduced themselves to the wife of
appellant. When the appellant came out, P/Sr.
Insp. Adique informed him that they had a
search warrant and that they were authorized
to search his house. After appellant gave his
permission, the police officers conducted a
search of the house. The search yielded the
following items: (a) a caliber .45 pistol with
Serial No. 703792 with five magazines of caliber
.45 (Exhibits B and H) found at the masters
bedroom; (b) five magazines of 5.56 M-16 rifle
and two radios (Exhibits C to C-4) found in the
room of appellants daughter; and (c) a caliber
.22 revolver with Serial No. 48673 (Exhibit F)
containing 8 pieces of live ammunition (Exhibit
M) found in the kitchen of the house. When
asked about his license to possess the firearms,
the appellant failed to produce any. This
prompted the police officers to seize the
subject firearms.
SPO2 Marion Montezon, one of the searching
officers, prepared three separate inventories of
the seized items (Exhibits H, M and N). The
inventories were signed by P/Sr. Insp. Adique,
the appellant and the barangay officials who
witnessed the search. Thereafter SPO2
Montezon prepared a certification of orderly
search (Exhibit I) which was signed by the
appellant and the barangay officials attesting to
the orderly conduct of the search.
For his defense, appellant contends that he had
a license for the caliber .45 pistol recovered in
his bedroom and that the other items seized
during the search including the caliber .22
revolver, were merely planted by the police
officers. Appellant likewise assails the manner
in which the search was carried out, claiming

that the police officers just barged into his
house without asking permission. Furthermore,
he claimed that the barangay officials arrived
only after the police already had finished the
search.
After trial and on July 2, 1998, the trial court
rendered a judgment of conviction, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
finds the accused VICENTE DEL ROSARIO y
NICOLAS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of P. D. No. 1866 as charged under the
Information dated June 17, 1996.
Conformably with the provisions of said law, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8294, and pursuant
to the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the Court hereby sentences the accused to
suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years of
prision correctional, as maximum, and to pay a
fine of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00).
On July 20, 1998, petitioner appealed to the
Court of Appeals, assailing the decision for being
contrary to facts and the law.
On July 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision affirming with
modification the decision of the trial court as
set out in the opening paragraph of this decision.
On August 10, 1999, petitioner filed with the
Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration
and/or new trial. He contended that the
certification issued by the Chief, Firearms and
Explosives Division, Philippine National Police
stating that the person named therein had not
been issued a firearm license referred to a
certain Vicente Vic del Rosario of barangay
Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan, not to him. He
comes from barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray,
Bulacan, and that he has a valid firearm license.
On February 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion for reconsideration for lack

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
of merit.
Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner submits that the search conducted at
his residence was illegal as the search warrant
was issued in violation of the Constitution and
consequently, the evidence seized was
inadmissible. He also submits that he had a
license for the .45 caliber firearm and
ammunition seized in his bedroom. The other
firearm, a .22 caliber revolver seized in a drawer
at the kitchen of his house, a magazine for 5.56
mm. cal. Armalite rifle, and two 2-way radios
found in his daughters bedroom, were either
planted by the police or illegally seized, as they
were not mentioned in the search warrant.
We find the petition impressed with merit.
We define the issues as follows:
First: whether petitioner had a license for the
.45 caliber Colt pistol and ammunition seized in
his bedroom; and
Second: whether the .22 caliber revolver seized
in a drawer at the kitchen of his house, a
magazine for 5.56 mm. cal. Armalite rifle and
two 2-way radios found in his daughters
bedroom, were planted by the police or were
illegally seized.
We shall resolve the issues in seriatim.
First: The .45 cal. Colt pistol in question was
duly licensed.
Normally, we do not review the factual findings
of the Court of Appeals and the trial courts.
However, this case comes within the exceptions.
The findings of fact by the Court of Appeals
will not be disturbed by the Court unless these
findings are not supported by evidence. In this
case, the findings of the lower courts even
directly contradict the evidence. Hence, we
review the evidence. The trial court held that
the copy of the license presented was blurred,
and that in any event, the court could rely on the
certification dated May 10, 1996, of P/Sr.
Inspector Edwin C. Roque, Chief, Records
Branch, Firearms and Explosives Division,

Philippine National Police stating that Vicente
Vic del Rosario of Barangay Bigte, Norzagaray,
Bulacan is not a licensed/registered firearm
holder of any kind and caliber. As against this,
petitioner submitted that he was not the person
referred to in the said certification because he
is Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas from Barangay
Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan. The Court takes
judicial notice of the existence of both barangay
Tigbe and barangay Bigte, in Norzagaray,
Bulacan. In fact, the trial court erred grievously
in not taking judicial notice of the barangays
within its territorial jurisdiction, believing the
prosecutions submission that there was only
barangay Tigbe, and that barangay Bigte in the
certification was a typographical error.
Petitioner presented to the head of the raiding
team, Police Senior Inspector Jerito A. Adique,
Chief, Operations Branch, PNP Criminal
Investigation Command, a valid firearm license.
The court is duty bound to examine the evidence
assiduously to determine the guilt or innocence
of the accused. It is true that the court may
rely on the certification of the Chief, Firearms
and Explosives Division, PNP on the absence of a
firearm license. However, such certification
referred to another individual and thus, cannot
prevail over a valid firearm license duly issued to
petitioner. In this case, petitioner presented
the printed computerized copy of License No.
RCL 1614021915 issued to him on July 13, 1993,
expiring in January 1995, by the Chief, Firearms
and Explosives Division, PNP under the signature
of Reynaldo V. Velasco, Sr. Supt. (GSC) PNP,
Chief, FEO. On the dorsal side of the printed
computerized license, there is stamped the
words Validity of computerized license is
extended until renewed license is printed dated
January 17, 1995, signed by Police Chief
Inspector Franklin S. Alfabeto, Chief, Licence
Branch, FEO. Coupled with this indefinite

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
extension, petitioner paid the license fees for

the extension of the license for the next twoyear period.
Consequently, we find that petitioner was the
holder of a valid firearm license for the .45
caliber Colt pistol seized in the bedroom of his
house on June 15, 1996. As required, petitioner
presented the license to the head of the raiding
team, Police Senior Inspector Jerito A. Adique
of the Criminal Investigation Division Group,
PNP. As a senior police officer, Senior Inspector
Adique could easily determine the genuineness
and authenticity of the computerized printed
license presented. He must know the
computerized license printed form. The stamp is
clearly visible. He could decipher the words and
the signature of the authorized signing official
of the Firearms and Explosives Division,
PNP. He belonged to the same national police
organization.
Nevertheless, Senior Insp. Adique rejected the
license presented because, according to him, it
was expired. However, assuming that the license
presented was expired during the period
January 1995 to January 1997, still, possession
of the firearm in question, a .45 caliber Colt
pistol with serial No. 70G23792, during that
period was not illegal. The firearm was kept at
home, not carried outside residence. On June
15, 1996, at the time of the seizure of the
firearm in question, possession of firearm with
an expired license was not considered
unlawful, provided that the license had not been
cancelled or revoked. Republic Act No. 8294,
providing that possession of a firearm with an
expired license was unlawful took effect only on
July 7, 1997. It could not be given retroactive
effect.
According to firearm licensing regulations, the
renewal of a firearm license was automatically
applied for upon payment of the license fees for
the renewal period. The expired license was not
cancelled or revoked. It served as temporary

authority to possess the firearm until the
renewed license was issued. Meantime, the
applicant may keep the gun at home pending
renewal of the firearm license and issuance of a
printed computerized license. He was not
obliged to surrender the weapon. Printed at the
dorsal side of the computerized license is a
notice reading:
IMPORTANT
1. This firearm license is valid for two (2)
years. Exhibit this license whenever demanded
by proper authority.
2. Surrender your firearm/s to the nearest PNP
Unit upon revocation or termination of this
license. Under any of the following instances,
your license shall be revoked for which reason
your firearm/s is/are subject to confiscation
and its/their forfeiture in favor of the
government.
a. Failure to notify the Chief of PNP in writing
of your change of address, and/or qualification.
b. Failure to renew this license by paying
annual license, fees, within six (6) months
from your birth month. Renewal of your
license can be made within your birth month
or month preceding your birth month. Late
renewal shall be penalized with 50% surcharge
for the first month (from the first day to the
last day of this month) followed by an additional
25% surcharge for all of the succeeding five (5)
months compounded monthly.
c. Loss of firearm/s through negligence.
d. Carrying of firearm/s outside of residence
without appropriate permit and/or carrying
firearm/s in prohibited places.
e. Conviction by competent court for a crime
involving moral turpitude or for any offense
where the penalty carries an imprisonment of
more than six (6) months or fine of at least
P1,000.00.
f. Dismissal for cause from the service.

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
g. Failure to sign license, or sign ID picture or

affix right thumbmark.
3. Unauthorized loan of firearm/s to another
person is punishable by permanent
disqualification and forfeiture of the firearm in
favor of the government.
4. If termination is due to death, your next of
kin should surrender your firearm/s to the
nearest PNP Unit. For those within Metro
Manila, surrender should be made with FEO,
Camp Crame.
5. When firearms become permanently
unserviceable, they should be deposited with the
nearest PNP Unit and ownership should be
relinquished in writing so that firearms may be
disposed of in accordance with law.
6. Application for the purchase of ammunition
should be made in case of a resident of Metro
Manila direct to the Chief, FEO and for
residents of a Province to secure
recommendation letter to the nearest PNP
Provincial Command who will thereafter endorse
same to CHIEF, FEO for issuance of the
permit. License must be presented before an
authority to purchase ammo could be obtained.
Indeed, as heretofore stated, petitioner duly
paid the license fees for the automatic renewal
of the firearm license for the next two years
upon expiration of the license in January 1995,
as evidenced by official receipt No. 7615186,
dated January 17, 1995. The license would be
renewed, as it was, because petitioner still
possessed the required
qualifications. Meantime, the validity of the
license was extended until the renewed
computerized license was printed. In fact, a
renewed license was issued on January 17, 1997,
for the succeeding two-year period.
Aside from the clearly valid and subsisting
license issued to petitioner, on January 25,
1995, the Chief, Philippine National Police issued
to him a permit to carry firearm outside
residence valid until January 25, 1996, for the

firearm in question. The Chief, Philippine
National Police would not issue a permit to carry
firearm outside residence unless petitioner had
a valid and subsisting firearm license. Although
the permit to carry firearm outside residence
was valid for only one year, and expired on
January 25, 1996, such permit is proof that the
regular firearm license was renewed and
subsisting within the two-year term up to
January 1997. A Permit to Carry Firearm
Outside Residence presupposes that the party
to whom it is issued is duly licensed to possess
the firearm in question. Unquestionably, on
January 17, 1997, the Chief, Firearms and
Explosives Division, PNP renewed petitioners
license for the .45 cal. Colt pistol in question.
Clearly then, petitioner had a valid firearm
license during the interregnum between January
17, 1995, to the issuance of his renewed license
on January 17, 1997.
Finally, there is no rhyme or reason why the
Court of Appeals and the trial court did not
accept with alacrity the certification dated
June 25, 1996, of P/Sr. Inspector Edwin C.
Roque, Chief, Records Branch, Firearms and
Explosives Division, PNP that Vicente N. del
Rosario of Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan
is a licensed/registered holder of Pistol, Colt
caliber .45 with serial number 70G23792,
covered by computerized license issued dated
June 15, 1995, with an expiry date January
1997. Reinforcing the aforementioned
certification, petitioner submitted another
certification dated August 27, 1999, stating
that Vicente N. del Rosario of Barangay Tigbe,
Norzagaray, Bulacan, was issued firearm license
No. RL-C1614021915, for caliber .45 Pistol with
Serial Number 70G23792, for the years
covering the period from July 13, 1993 to
January 1995, and the extension appearing at
the back thereof for the years 1995 to 1997.

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
Had the lower courts given full probative value

to these official issuances, petitioner would have
been correctly acquitted, thus sparing this Court
of valuable time and effort.
In crimes involving illegal possession of
firearm, the prosecution has the burden of
proving the elements thereof, viz.: (a) the
existence of the subject firearm and (b) the
fact that the accused who owned or possessed it
does not have the license or permit to possess
the same. The essence of the crime of illegal
possession is the possession, whether actual or
constructive, of the subject firearm, without
which there can be no conviction for illegal
possession. After possession is established by
the prosecution, it would only be a matter of
course to determine whether the accused has a
license to possess the firearm. Possession of
any firearm becomes unlawful only if the
necessary permit or license therefor is not first
obtained. The absence of license and legal
authority constitutes an essential ingredient of
the offense of illegal possession of firearm and
every ingredient or essential element of an
offense must be shown by the prosecution by
proof beyond reasonable doubt. Stated
otherwise, the negative fact of lack or absence
of license constitutes an essential ingredient of
the offense which the prosecution has the duty
not only to allege but also to prove beyond
reasonable doubt. To convict an accused for
illegal possession of firearms and explosives
under P. D. 1866, as amended, two (2) essential
elements must be indubitably established,
viz.: (a) the existence of the subject firearm
or explosive which may be proved by the
presentation of the subject firearm or explosive
or by the testimony of witnesses who saw
accused in possession of the same, and (b) the
negative fact that the accused had no license or

permit to own or possess the firearm or
explosive which fact may be established by the
testimony or certification of a representative of

the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that the
accused has no license or permit to possess the
subject firearm or explosive. x x x We stress
that the essence of the crime penalized under P.
D. 1866 is primarily the accuseds lack of license
or permit to carry or possess the firearm,
ammunition or explosive as possession by itself is
not prohibited by law. Illegal possession of
firearm is a crime punished by special law, a
malum prohibitum, and no malice or intent to
commit a crime need be proved. To support a
conviction, however, there must be possession
coupled with intent to possess (animus
possidendi) the firearm.
In upholding the prosecution and giving credence
to the testimony of police officer Jerito A.
Adigue, the trial court relied on the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official
duties by the police officers. This is a flagrant
error because his testimony is directly
contradictory to the official records of the
Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP, which
must prevail. Morever, the presumption of
regularity can not prevail over the Constitutional
presumption of innocence. Right from the start,
P/Sr. Insp. Jerito A. Adigue was aware that
petitioner possessed a valid license for the
caliber .45 Colt pistol in question. Despite this
fact, P/Sr. Insp. Adigue proceeded to detain
petitioner and charged him with illegal
possession of firearms. We quote pertinent
portions of the testimony of petitioner:
Q: What else did Adigue tell you after showing
to him the license of your cal. .45 pistol and the
alleged cal. .22 found in a drawer in your
kitchen?
A: He told me that since my firearm is
licensed, he will return my firearm, give him ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00) and for me to tell
who among the people in our barangay have
unlicensed firearm, sir.

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
Q: How did he say about the ten thousand

pesos?
A: He said palit kalabaw na lang tayo sir.
Q: And what did you answer him?
A: I told him my firearm is licensed and I do
not have money, if I have, I will not give him, sir,
because he was just trying to squeeze something
from me.
Q: How about the unlicensed firearms in your
barangay which he asked from you?
A: I said I do not know any unlicensed firearm
in our barangay, sir.
Q: About the .22 cal. pistol, what was your
answer to him?
A: I told him that it was not mine, they
planted it, sir.
Q: What did he say next?
A: He said that it is your word against mine,
the Court will believe me because I am a
police officer, sir.
Q: What was your comment to what he said?
A: I said my firearm is licensed and we have
Courts of law who do not conform with officials
like you and then he laughed and laughed, sir.
The trial court was obviously misguided when it
held that it is a matter of judicial notice that a
caliber .45 firearm can not be licensed to a
private individual. This ruling has no basis either
in law or in jurisprudence.
Second issue. The seizure of items not
mentioned in the search warrant was illegal.
With respect to the .22 caliber revolver with
Serial No. 48673, that the police raiding team
found in a drawer at the kitchen of petitioners
house, suffice it to say that the firearm was not
mentioned in the search warrant applied for and
issued for the search of petitioners house.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays
down the general rule that a search and seizure
must be carried out through or on the strength
of a judicial warrant, absent which such search
and seizure becomes unreasonable within the
meaning of said constitutional provision.

Supporting jurisprudence thus outlined the
following requisites for a search warrants
validity, the absence of even one will cause its
downright nullification: (1) it must be issued upon
probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be
determined by the judge himself and not by the
applicant or any other person; (3) in the
determination of probable cause, the judge must
examine, under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and such witnesses as the latter
may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must
particularly describe the place to be searched
and persons or things to be seized. Seizure is
limited to those items particularly described in a
valid search warrant. Searching officers are
without discretion regarding what articles they
shall seize. Evidence seized on the occasion of
such an unreasonable search and seizure is
tainted and excluded for being the proverbial
fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of
the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
In this case, the firearm was not found
inadvertently and in plain view. It was found as a
result of a meticulous search in the kitchen of
petitioners house. This firearm, to emphasize,
was not mentioned in the search warrant. Hence,
the seizure was illegal. The seizure without the
requisite search warrant was in plain violation of
the law and the Constitution. True that as an
exception, the police may seize without warrant
illegally possessed firearm or any contraband for
that matter, inadvertently found in plain
view. However, [t]he seizure of evidence
in plain view applies only where the police
officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object. Specifically, seizure of
evidence in plain view is justified when there
is:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally

present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered
by the police who had the right to be where they
are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent,
and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search.
Hence, the petitioner rightly rejected the
firearm as planted and not belonging to him. The
prosecution was not able to prove that the
firearm was in the effective possession or
control of the petitioner without a license. In
illegal possession of firearms, the possessor
must know of the existence of the subject
firearm in his possession or control. In People v.
de Gracia, we clarified the meaning of possession
for the purpose of convicting a person under P.
D. No. 1866, thus: x x x In the present case, a
distinction should be made between criminal
intent and intent to possess. While mere
possession without criminal intent is sufficient
to convict a person for illegal possession of a
firearm, it must still be shown that there was
animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the
part of the accused. x x x x Hence, the kind of
possession punishable under P. D. No. 1866 is one
where the accused possessed a firearm either
physically or constructively with animus
possidendi or intention to possess the same.
That is the meaning of animus possidendi. In the
absence of animus possidendi, the possessor of a
firearm incurs no criminal liability.
The same is true with respect to the 5.56 cal.
magazine found in the bedroom of petitioners
daughter. The seizure was invalid and the seized
items were inadmissible in evidence. As
explained in People v. Doria, the plain view
doctrine applies when the following requisites
concur: (1) the law enforcement officer is in a
position where he has a clear view of a particular
area or has prior justification for an intrusion;

(2) said officer inadvertently comes across (or
sees in plain view) a piece of incriminating
evidence; and (3) it is immediately apparent to
such officer that the item he sees may be
evidence of a crime or a contraband or is
otherwise subject to seizure.
With particular reference to the two 2-way
radios that the raiding policemen also seized in
the bedroom of petitioners daughter, there was
absolutely no reason for the seizure. The radios
were not contraband per se. The National
Telecommunications Commission may license twoway radios at its discretion. The burden is on
the prosecution to show that the two-way radios
were not licensed. The National
Telecommunication Commission is the sole agency
authorized to seize unlicensed two-way
radios. More importantly, admittedly, the twoway radios were not mentioned in the search
warrant. We condemn the seizure as illegal and
a plain violation of a citizens right. Worse, the
petitioner was not charged with illegal
possession of the two-way radios.
Consequently, the confiscation of the two 2-way
radios was clearly illegal. The possession of such
radios is not even included in the charge of
illegal possession of firearms (violation of P. D.
No. 1866, as amended) alleged in the
Information.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby REVERSES the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CR
No. 22255, promulgated on July 09, 1999.
The Court ACQUITS petitioner Vicente del
Rosario y Nicolas of the charge of violation of P.
D. No. 1866, as amended by R. A. No. 8294
(illegal possession of firearms and ammunition),
in Criminal Case No. 800-M-96, Regional Trial
Court, Bulacan, Branch 20, Malolos.
Costs de oficio.
The Chief, Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP
shall return to petitioner his caliber .45 Colt

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
pistol, with Serial Number No. 70G23792, the

five (5) extra magazines and twenty seven (27)
rounds of live ammunition, and the two 2-way
radios confiscated from him. The Chief,
Philippine National Police, or his duly authorized
representative shall show to this Court proof of
compliance herewith within fifteen (15) days
from notice. The .22 caliber revolver with Serial
No. 48673, and eight (8) live ammunition and the
magazine for 5.56 mm. caliber Armalite rifle are
confiscated in favor of the government.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, and YnaresSantiago, JJ., concur.
Q: What is discretionary notice?

A: Discretionary a court may take judicial notice of
matters which are:
1. Of public knowledge;
2. Capable of unquestionable demonstration; or
3. Ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions (Sec. 2).
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 142295. May 31, 2001]
VICENTE DEL ROSARIO y NICOLAS,
petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
Petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas appeals
via certiorari from a decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming with modification the decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, Branch 20,
Malolos, and finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of P. D. No. 1866,
as amended by Republic Act No. 8294 (illegal
possession of firearms), sentencing him to four
(4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of
prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine of
P30,000.00.
On June 17, 1996, Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Eufracio S. Marquez of Bulacan filed

with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, Malolos an
Information charging petitioner Vicente del
Rosario y Nicolas with violation of P. D. No. 1866,
as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of June 1996, in
the municipality of Norzagaray, Province of
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession under his
custody and control, the following, to wit:
a) One (1) pc. Pistol Cal. 45 SN:70G23792 (w/o
license)
b) One (1) pc. Revolver Cal. 22 SN:48673 (w/o
license)
c) Twenty Seven (27) rds live ammos. For cal.
.45
d) Five (5) pcs. Magazines for cal. .45
e) Eight (8) rds live ammunitions for cal. 22
f) Five (5) pcs. Magazines short for cal. 5.56
(M16)
g) Twenty (20) rds live ammunitions for cal 5.56
without first having obtained a proper license
therefor.
Contrary to law.
On June 25, 1996, the trial court arraigned the
petitioner. He pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are
as follows:
Sometime in May 1996, the police received a
report that accused-appellant Vicente del
Rosario was in possession of certain firearms
without the necessary licenses. Acting upon the
report, P/Sr. Insp. Jerito Adique of the PNP
Criminal Investigation Group at Camp Olivas,
Pampanga inquired from the PNP Firearms and
Explosive Division whether or not the report was
true. On May 10, 1996, P/Sr. Insp. Edwin C.
Roque of the PNP Firearms and Explosives
Division issued a certification (Exhibit L) stating
that per records in his office, the appellant is

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any

kind and caliber. Armed with the said
certification, P/Sr. Insp. Adique applied for a
search warrant to enable his team to search the
house of appellant.
On June 13, 1996, a search warrant (Exhibit A)
was issued by Judge Gil Fernandez, Sr. of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217,
authorizing the search of the residence of
appellant at Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray,
Bulacan. On June 15, 1996, at about 7:00 oclock
in the morning, a team led by P/Sr. Insp. Adique
went to Norzagaray to serve the warrant.
Before proceeding to the residence of the
appellant, the police officers requested
Barangay Chairman Rogelio de Silva and Barangay
Councilman Aurelio Panteleon to accompany them
in the implementation of the warrant. Upon
arrival at the house of appellant, the police
officers introduced themselves to the wife of
appellant. When the appellant came out, P/Sr.
Insp. Adique informed him that they had a
search warrant and that they were authorized
to search his house. After appellant gave his
permission, the police officers conducted a
search of the house. The search yielded the
following items: (a) a caliber .45 pistol with
Serial No. 703792 with five magazines of caliber
.45 (Exhibits B and H) found at the masters
bedroom; (b) five magazines of 5.56 M-16 rifle
and two radios (Exhibits C to C-4) found in the
room of appellants daughter; and (c) a caliber
.22 revolver with Serial No. 48673 (Exhibit F)
containing 8 pieces of live ammunition (Exhibit
M) found in the kitchen of the house. When
asked about his license to possess the firearms,
the appellant failed to produce any. This
prompted the police officers to seize the
subject firearms.
SPO2 Marion Montezon, one of the searching
officers, prepared three separate inventories of
the seized items (Exhibits H, M and N). The
inventories were signed by P/Sr. Insp. Adique,

the appellant and the barangay officials who
witnessed the search. Thereafter SPO2
Montezon prepared a certification of orderly
search (Exhibit I) which was signed by the
appellant and the barangay officials attesting to
the orderly conduct of the search.
For his defense, appellant contends that he had
a license for the caliber .45 pistol recovered in
his bedroom and that the other items seized
during the search including the caliber .22
revolver, were merely planted by the police
officers. Appellant likewise assails the manner
in which the search was carried out, claiming
that the police officers just barged into his
house without asking permission. Furthermore,
he claimed that the barangay officials arrived
only after the police already had finished the
search.
After trial and on July 2, 1998, the trial court
rendered a judgment of conviction, the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
finds the accused VICENTE DEL ROSARIO y
NICOLAS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of P. D. No. 1866 as charged under the
Information dated June 17, 1996.
Conformably with the provisions of said law, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8294, and pursuant
to the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the Court hereby sentences the accused to
suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years of
prision correctional, as maximum, and to pay a
fine of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00).
On July 20, 1998, petitioner appealed to the
Court of Appeals, assailing the decision for being
contrary to facts and the law.
On July 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision affirming with
modification the decision of the trial court as
set out in the opening paragraph of this decision.

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
On August 10, 1999, petitioner filed with the

Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration
and/or new trial. He contended that the
certification issued by the Chief, Firearms and
Explosives Division, Philippine National Police
stating that the person named therein had not
been issued a firearm license referred to a
certain Vicente Vic del Rosario of barangay
Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan, not to him. He
comes from barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray,
Bulacan, and that he has a valid firearm license.
On February 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion for reconsideration for lack
of merit.
Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner submits that the search conducted at
his residence was illegal as the search warrant
was issued in violation of the Constitution and
consequently, the evidence seized was
inadmissible. He also submits that he had a
license for the .45 caliber firearm and
ammunition seized in his bedroom. The other
firearm, a .22 caliber revolver seized in a drawer
at the kitchen of his house, a magazine for 5.56
mm. cal. Armalite rifle, and two 2-way radios
found in his daughters bedroom, were either
planted by the police or illegally seized, as they
were not mentioned in the search warrant.
We find the petition impressed with merit.
We define the issues as follows:
First: whether petitioner had a license for the
.45 caliber Colt pistol and ammunition seized in
his bedroom; and
Second: whether the .22 caliber revolver seized
in a drawer at the kitchen of his house, a
magazine for 5.56 mm. cal. Armalite rifle and
two 2-way radios found in his daughters
bedroom, were planted by the police or were
illegally seized.
We shall resolve the issues in seriatim.
First: The .45 cal. Colt pistol in question was
duly licensed.
Normally, we do not review the factual findings

of the Court of Appeals and the trial courts.
However, this case comes within the exceptions.
The findings of fact by the Court of Appeals
will not be disturbed by the Court unless these
findings are not supported by evidence. In this
case, the findings of the lower courts even
directly contradict the evidence. Hence, we
review the evidence. The trial court held that
the copy of the license presented was blurred,
and that in any event, the court could rely on the
certification dated May 10, 1996, of P/Sr.
Inspector Edwin C. Roque, Chief, Records
Branch, Firearms and Explosives Division,
Philippine National Police stating that Vicente
Vic del Rosario of Barangay Bigte, Norzagaray,
Bulacan is not a licensed/registered firearm
holder of any kind and caliber. As against this,
petitioner submitted that he was not the person
referred to in the said certification because he
is Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas from Barangay
Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan. The Court takes
judicial notice of the existence of both barangay
Tigbe and barangay Bigte, in Norzagaray,
Bulacan. In fact, the trial court erred grievously
in not taking judicial notice of the barangays
within its territorial jurisdiction, believing the
prosecutions submission that there was only
barangay Tigbe, and that barangay Bigte in the
certification was a typographical error.
Petitioner presented to the head of the raiding
team, Police Senior Inspector Jerito A. Adique,
Chief, Operations Branch, PNP Criminal
Investigation Command, a valid firearm license.
The court is duty bound to examine the evidence
assiduously to determine the guilt or innocence
of the accused. It is true that the court may
rely on the certification of the Chief, Firearms
and Explosives Division, PNP on the absence of a
firearm license. However, such certification
referred to another individual and thus, cannot
prevail over a valid firearm license duly issued to

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
petitioner. In this case, petitioner presented

the printed computerized copy of License No.
RCL 1614021915 issued to him on July 13, 1993,
expiring in January 1995, by the Chief, Firearms
and Explosives Division, PNP under the signature
of Reynaldo V. Velasco, Sr. Supt. (GSC) PNP,
Chief, FEO. On the dorsal side of the printed
computerized license, there is stamped the
words Validity of computerized license is
extended until renewed license is printed dated
January 17, 1995, signed by Police Chief
Inspector Franklin S. Alfabeto, Chief, Licence
Branch, FEO. Coupled with this indefinite
extension, petitioner paid the license fees for
the extension of the license for the next twoyear period.
Consequently, we find that petitioner was the
holder of a valid firearm license for the .45
caliber Colt pistol seized in the bedroom of his
house on June 15, 1996. As required, petitioner
presented the license to the head of the raiding
team, Police Senior Inspector Jerito A. Adique
of the Criminal Investigation Division Group,
PNP. As a senior police officer, Senior Inspector
Adique could easily determine the genuineness
and authenticity of the computerized printed
license presented. He must know the
computerized license printed form. The stamp is
clearly visible. He could decipher the words and
the signature of the authorized signing official
of the Firearms and Explosives Division,
PNP. He belonged to the same national police
organization.
Nevertheless, Senior Insp. Adique rejected the
license presented because, according to him, it
was expired. However, assuming that the license
presented was expired during the period
January 1995 to January 1997, still, possession
of the firearm in question, a .45 caliber Colt
pistol with serial No. 70G23792, during that
period was not illegal. The firearm was kept at
home, not carried outside residence. On June
15, 1996, at the time of the seizure of the

firearm in question, possession of firearm with
an expired license was not considered
unlawful, provided that the license had not been
cancelled or revoked. Republic Act No. 8294,
providing that possession of a firearm with an
expired license was unlawful took effect only on
July 7, 1997. It could not be given retroactive
effect.
According to firearm licensing regulations, the
renewal of a firearm license was automatically
applied for upon payment of the license fees for
the renewal period. The expired license was not
cancelled or revoked. It served as temporary
authority to possess the firearm until the
renewed license was issued. Meantime, the
applicant may keep the gun at home pending
renewal of the firearm license and issuance of a
printed computerized license. He was not
obliged to surrender the weapon. Printed at the
dorsal side of the computerized license is a
notice reading:
IMPORTANT
1. This firearm license is valid for two (2)
years. Exhibit this license whenever demanded
by proper authority.
2. Surrender your firearm/s to the nearest PNP
Unit upon revocation or termination of this
license. Under any of the following instances,
your license shall be revoked for which reason
your firearm/s is/are subject to confiscation
and its/their forfeiture in favor of the
government.
a. Failure to notify the Chief of PNP in writing
of your change of address, and/or qualification.
b. Failure to renew this license by paying
annual license, fees, within six (6) months
from your birth month. Renewal of your
license can be made within your birth month
or month preceding your birth month. Late
renewal shall be penalized with 50% surcharge
for the first month (from the first day to the

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
last day of this month) followed by an additional

25% surcharge for all of the succeeding five (5)
months compounded monthly.
c. Loss of firearm/s through negligence.
d. Carrying of firearm/s outside of residence
without appropriate permit and/or carrying
firearm/s in prohibited places.
e. Conviction by competent court for a crime
involving moral turpitude or for any offense
where the penalty carries an imprisonment of
more than six (6) months or fine of at least
P1,000.00.
f. Dismissal for cause from the service.
g. Failure to sign license, or sign ID picture or
affix right thumbmark.
3. Unauthorized loan of firearm/s to another
person is punishable by permanent
disqualification and forfeiture of the firearm in
favor of the government.
4. If termination is due to death, your next of
kin should surrender your firearm/s to the
nearest PNP Unit. For those within Metro
Manila, surrender should be made with FEO,
Camp Crame.
5. When firearms become permanently
unserviceable, they should be deposited with the
nearest PNP Unit and ownership should be
relinquished in writing so that firearms may be
disposed of in accordance with law.
6. Application for the purchase of ammunition
should be made in case of a resident of Metro
Manila direct to the Chief, FEO and for
residents of a Province to secure
recommendation letter to the nearest PNP
Provincial Command who will thereafter endorse
same to CHIEF, FEO for issuance of the
permit. License must be presented before an
authority to purchase ammo could be obtained.
Indeed, as heretofore stated, petitioner duly
paid the license fees for the automatic renewal
of the firearm license for the next two years
upon expiration of the license in January 1995,
as evidenced by official receipt No. 7615186,

dated January 17, 1995. The license would be
renewed, as it was, because petitioner still
possessed the required
qualifications. Meantime, the validity of the
license was extended until the renewed
computerized license was printed. In fact, a
renewed license was issued on January 17, 1997,
for the succeeding two-year period.
Aside from the clearly valid and subsisting
license issued to petitioner, on January 25,
1995, the Chief, Philippine National Police issued
to him a permit to carry firearm outside
residence valid until January 25, 1996, for the
firearm in question. The Chief, Philippine
National Police would not issue a permit to carry
firearm outside residence unless petitioner had
a valid and subsisting firearm license. Although
the permit to carry firearm outside residence
was valid for only one year, and expired on
January 25, 1996, such permit is proof that the
regular firearm license was renewed and
subsisting within the two-year term up to
January 1997. A Permit to Carry Firearm
Outside Residence presupposes that the party
to whom it is issued is duly licensed to possess
the firearm in question. Unquestionably, on
January 17, 1997, the Chief, Firearms and
Explosives Division, PNP renewed petitioners
license for the .45 cal. Colt pistol in question.
Clearly then, petitioner had a valid firearm
license during the interregnum between January
17, 1995, to the issuance of his renewed license
on January 17, 1997.
Finally, there is no rhyme or reason why the
Court of Appeals and the trial court did not
accept with alacrity the certification dated
June 25, 1996, of P/Sr. Inspector Edwin C.
Roque, Chief, Records Branch, Firearms and
Explosives Division, PNP that Vicente N. del
Rosario of Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan
is a licensed/registered holder of Pistol, Colt

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
caliber .45 with serial number 70G23792,

covered by computerized license issued dated
June 15, 1995, with an expiry date January
1997. Reinforcing the aforementioned
certification, petitioner submitted another
certification dated August 27, 1999, stating
that Vicente N. del Rosario of Barangay Tigbe,
Norzagaray, Bulacan, was issued firearm license
No. RL-C1614021915, for caliber .45 Pistol with
Serial Number 70G23792, for the years
covering the period from July 13, 1993 to
January 1995, and the extension appearing at
the back thereof for the years 1995 to 1997.
Had the lower courts given full probative value
to these official issuances, petitioner would have
been correctly acquitted, thus sparing this Court
of valuable time and effort.
In crimes involving illegal possession of
firearm, the prosecution has the burden of
proving the elements thereof, viz.: (a) the
existence of the subject firearm and (b) the
fact that the accused who owned or possessed it
does not have the license or permit to possess
the same. The essence of the crime of illegal
possession is the possession, whether actual or
constructive, of the subject firearm, without
which there can be no conviction for illegal
possession. After possession is established by
the prosecution, it would only be a matter of
course to determine whether the accused has a
license to possess the firearm. Possession of
any firearm becomes unlawful only if the
necessary permit or license therefor is not first
obtained. The absence of license and legal
authority constitutes an essential ingredient of
the offense of illegal possession of firearm and
every ingredient or essential element of an
offense must be shown by the prosecution by
proof beyond reasonable doubt. Stated
otherwise, the negative fact of lack or absence
of license constitutes an essential ingredient of
the offense which the prosecution has the duty
not only to allege but also to prove beyond

reasonable doubt. To convict an accused for
illegal possession of firearms and explosives
under P. D. 1866, as amended, two (2) essential
elements must be indubitably established,
viz.: (a) the existence of the subject firearm
or explosive which may be proved by the
presentation of the subject firearm or explosive
or by the testimony of witnesses who saw
accused in possession of the same, and (b) the
negative fact that the accused had no license or

permit to own or possess the firearm or
explosive which fact may be established by the
testimony or certification of a representative of

the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that the
accused has no license or permit to possess the
subject firearm or explosive. x x x We stress
that the essence of the crime penalized under P.
D. 1866 is primarily the accuseds lack of license
or permit to carry or possess the firearm,
ammunition or explosive as possession by itself is
not prohibited by law. Illegal possession of
firearm is a crime punished by special law, a
malum prohibitum, and no malice or intent to
commit a crime need be proved. To support a
conviction, however, there must be possession
coupled with intent to possess (animus
possidendi) the firearm.
In upholding the prosecution and giving credence
to the testimony of police officer Jerito A.
Adigue, the trial court relied on the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official
duties by the police officers. This is a flagrant
error because his testimony is directly
contradictory to the official records of the
Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP, which
must prevail. Morever, the presumption of
regularity can not prevail over the Constitutional
presumption of innocence. Right from the start,
P/Sr. Insp. Jerito A. Adigue was aware that
petitioner possessed a valid license for the
caliber .45 Colt pistol in question. Despite this

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
fact, P/Sr. Insp. Adigue proceeded to detain

petitioner and charged him with illegal
possession of firearms. We quote pertinent
portions of the testimony of petitioner:
Q: What else did Adigue tell you after showing
to him the license of your cal. .45 pistol and the
alleged cal. .22 found in a drawer in your
kitchen?
A: He told me that since my firearm is
licensed, he will return my firearm, give him ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00) and for me to tell
who among the people in our barangay have
unlicensed firearm, sir.
Q: How did he say about the ten thousand
pesos?
A: He said palit kalabaw na lang tayo sir.
Q: And what did you answer him?
A: I told him my firearm is licensed and I do
not have money, if I have, I will not give him, sir,
because he was just trying to squeeze something
from me.
Q: How about the unlicensed firearms in your
barangay which he asked from you?
A: I said I do not know any unlicensed firearm
in our barangay, sir.
Q: About the .22 cal. pistol, what was your
answer to him?
A: I told him that it was not mine, they
planted it, sir.
Q: What did he say next?
A: He said that it is your word against mine,
the Court will believe me because I am a
police officer, sir.
Q: What was your comment to what he said?
A: I said my firearm is licensed and we have
Courts of law who do not conform with officials
like you and then he laughed and laughed, sir.
The trial court was obviously misguided when it
held that it is a matter of judicial notice that a
caliber .45 firearm can not be licensed to a
private individual. This ruling has no basis either
in law or in jurisprudence.
Second issue. The seizure of items not

mentioned in the search warrant was illegal.
With respect to the .22 caliber revolver with
Serial No. 48673, that the police raiding team
found in a drawer at the kitchen of petitioners
house, suffice it to say that the firearm was not
mentioned in the search warrant applied for and
issued for the search of petitioners house.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays
down the general rule that a search and seizure
must be carried out through or on the strength
of a judicial warrant, absent which such search
and seizure becomes unreasonable within the
meaning of said constitutional provision.
Supporting jurisprudence thus outlined the
following requisites for a search warrants
validity, the absence of even one will cause its
downright nullification: (1) it must be issued upon
probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be
determined by the judge himself and not by the
applicant or any other person; (3) in the
determination of probable cause, the judge must
examine, under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and such witnesses as the latter
may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must
particularly describe the place to be searched
and persons or things to be seized. Seizure is
limited to those items particularly described in a
valid search warrant. Searching officers are
without discretion regarding what articles they
shall seize. Evidence seized on the occasion of
such an unreasonable search and seizure is
tainted and excluded for being the proverbial
fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of
the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
In this case, the firearm was not found
inadvertently and in plain view. It was found as a
result of a meticulous search in the kitchen of
petitioners house. This firearm, to emphasize,
was not mentioned in the search warrant. Hence,
the seizure was illegal. The seizure without the

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
requisite search warrant was in plain violation of

the law and the Constitution. True that as an
exception, the police may seize without warrant
illegally possessed firearm or any contraband for
that matter, inadvertently found in plain
view. However, [t]he seizure of evidence
in plain view applies only where the police
officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object. Specifically, seizure of
evidence in plain view is justified when there
is:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered
by the police who had the right to be where they
are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent,
and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search.
Hence, the petitioner rightly rejected the
firearm as planted and not belonging to him. The
prosecution was not able to prove that the
firearm was in the effective possession or
control of the petitioner without a license. In
illegal possession of firearms, the possessor
must know of the existence of the subject
firearm in his possession or control. In People v.
de Gracia, we clarified the meaning of possession
for the purpose of convicting a person under P.
D. No. 1866, thus: x x x In the present case, a
distinction should be made between criminal
intent and intent to possess. While mere
possession without criminal intent is sufficient
to convict a person for illegal possession of a
firearm, it must still be shown that there was
animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the
part of the accused. x x x x Hence, the kind of
possession punishable under P. D. No. 1866 is one
where the accused possessed a firearm either
physically or constructively with animus

possidendi or intention to possess the same.
That is the meaning of animus possidendi. In the
absence of animus possidendi, the possessor of a
firearm incurs no criminal liability.
The same is true with respect to the 5.56 cal.
magazine found in the bedroom of petitioners
daughter. The seizure was invalid and the seized
items were inadmissible in evidence. As
explained in People v. Doria, the plain view
doctrine applies when the following requisites
concur: (1) the law enforcement officer is in a
position where he has a clear view of a particular
area or has prior justification for an intrusion;
(2) said officer inadvertently comes across (or
sees in plain view) a piece of incriminating
evidence; and (3) it is immediately apparent to
such officer that the item he sees may be
evidence of a crime or a contraband or is
otherwise subject to seizure.
With particular reference to the two 2-way
radios that the raiding policemen also seized in
the bedroom of petitioners daughter, there was
absolutely no reason for the seizure. The radios
were not contraband per se. The National
Telecommunications Commission may license twoway radios at its discretion. The burden is on
the prosecution to show that the two-way radios
were not licensed. The National
Telecommunication Commission is the sole agency
authorized to seize unlicensed two-way
radios. More importantly, admittedly, the twoway radios were not mentioned in the search
warrant. We condemn the seizure as illegal and
a plain violation of a citizens right. Worse, the
petitioner was not charged with illegal
possession of the two-way radios.
Consequently, the confiscation of the two 2-way
radios was clearly illegal. The possession of such
radios is not even included in the charge of
illegal possession of firearms (violation of P. D.
No. 1866, as amended) alleged in the

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by: Meo J. Mallorca
Information.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby REVERSES the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CR
No. 22255, promulgated on July 09, 1999.
The Court ACQUITS petitioner Vicente del
Rosario y Nicolas of the charge of violation of P.
D. No. 1866, as amended by R. A. No. 8294
(illegal possession of firearms and ammunition),
in Criminal Case No. 800-M-96, Regional Trial
Court, Bulacan, Branch 20, Malolos.
Costs de oficio.
The Chief, Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP
shall return to petitioner his caliber .45 Colt
pistol, with Serial Number No. 70G23792, the
five (5) extra magazines and twenty seven (27)
rounds of live ammunition, and the two 2-way
radios confiscated from him. The Chief,
Philippine National Police, or his duly authorized
representative shall show to this Court proof of
compliance herewith within fifteen (15) days
from notice. The .22 caliber revolver with Serial
No. 48673, and eight (8) live ammunition and the
magazine for 5.56 mm. caliber Armalite rifle are
confiscated in favor of the government.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, and YnaresSantiago, JJ., concur.
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch

167, in Criminal Case No. 86163, convicting him
of robbery, thus:
SECOND DIVISION
That on or about the 19th day of October, 1990,

in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction
accused, conspiring and confederating together
with John Doe, whose true identity and present
whereabout is still unknown, and mutually helping
and aiding one another, armed with high powered
handguns, with intent of gain, by means of
violence and intimidation employed upon the
person of one Catherine F. Manalo, an employee
of J & E Manalo Construction Co., Inc., who was
then aboard a private car, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and
[G.R. No. 128720. January 23, 2002]

S/SGT. ELMER T. VERGARA, petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Court of
Appeals decision dated October 31, 1996, in CAG.R. No. CR 18318, which affirmed the judgment

finding the accused S/Sgt. Elmer Vergara
GUILTY beyond peradventure of doubt of the
crime of Robbery defined and penalized under
Art. 294, No. (5), in relation to Art. 295, of the
Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) years of
prision correcional, as minimum, to Eight (8)
years and Twenty-One (21) days of prision
mayor, as maximum; to indemnify the offended
party in the sum of P106,000.00; to suffer all
the accessory penalties appurtenant thereto;
and, to pay the Costs.
SO ORDERED.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On March 19, 1991, an information charging
S/Sgt. Elmer Vergara, PC, C1C Nicasio Custodio y
Abrera, PC and Leonido Losanes y Vasquez of
robbery in band was filed by the Rizal Provincial
Prosecutors Office with the RTC of Pasig,
Metro Manila. The information reads:

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
divest from Catherine F. Manalo the payroll

money amounting to P89,000.00 belonging to J &
E Manalo Construction Company, Inc. and a gold
necklace with two (2) pendants, 18K valued at
P17,000 belonging to Catherine F. Manalo, to the
damage and prejudice of J & E Manalo
Construction Company, Inc. and Catherine F.
Manalo in the aforementioned amounts of
P89,000.00 and P17, 000.00 respectively.
Contrary to law.
Although all the suspects were brought into
police custody, petitioners co-accused managed
to extricate themselves from police control and
remain at large. Only petitioner was left to face
the charges. On May 21, 1993, he was
arraigned. With the assistance of counsel de
oficio, he pleaded not guilty to the
charges. Following the pre-trial conference on
August 20, 1993, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution relied on the positive
identification made by private complainant who
testified in court. As found by the court a quo:
xxx
On October 27, 1990, during the police line-up
at the San Juan Police Stationshe positively
identified herein accused Elmer Vergara as the
armed man who pointed the gun at her after he
approached the left side of the car and wearing
an army fatigue uniform with black hat and who
got her car keys, thereafter, she executed
another statement implicating accused Elmer
Vergara as one of the four armed men who
robbe[d] her.
On March 16, 1994, during the hearing of the
case, she (Catherine F. Manalo) again pointed to
accused Elmer Vergara to be one of the
robbery/hold-up gang members (HULIDAP), who
took the payroll money of the J & E Manalo

Construction Co., Inc., and her gold necklace, his
participation being that of the person who
pointed the gun at her and got the keys to her
car; she remembered him to be about 56 to
57 in height, with dark features, chubby and
heavily built.
Petitioner claimed an alibi, while denying any
participation in the offense. The trial court
summed up his defense as follows:
Accused Elmer Vergara lays a serious doubt on
his identity as one of the perpetrators of the
robbery hold-up in questionClaiming innocence,
he presented evidence showing that he was at
some other place during the occurrence of the
robbery. His alleged presence at the Pacita
Complex at San Pedro, Laguna, being a member
of the narcotic operatives engaged in a
surveillance of a suspected drug pusher, was
corroborated by no less than the team leader
Captain, now Major Christopher Laxa. Major
Christopher Laxa was definite in declaring that
S/Sgt. Elmer Vergara was physically present
inside the Pizza Hut restaurant at Pacita
Complex, San Pedro Laguna, at about 3:00 oclock
in the afternoon of October 19, 1990 and, that
he did not leave the area from the time of their
arrival at around 1:00 oclock in the morning until
11:30 oclock in the evening.
The trial court chose to believe the prosecution
and disregarded petitioners alibi. On March 29,
1995, it convicted Vergara not of robbery in
band as charged in the information, however, but
of robbery as defined and penalized under
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. As
explained by the trial court:
Under Art. 295 of the Revised Penal Code a
robbery shall be deemed to have been
committed by a band when more than three

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by: Meo J. Mallorca
armed malefactors (underline supplied) take part

in its commission. The prosecutions evidence
demonstrates that only three (3) in the group
were armed, although there was another member
inside the car at the time of the commission.
However, there is no indication that the person
inside the car was armed. Conceding in gratia
argumenti, therefore, that the group of the
accused Elmer Vergara was composed of more
than three (3) malefactors, the evidence
disclosed that only three (3) were armed, and
hence, the crime cannot be considered to have
been committed by a band and does not come
within the purview of Article 296 of the Revised
Penal Code, which requires more than three (3)
armed malefactors to constitute the crime of
robbery committed by a band.
In convicting petitioner for robbery, the trial
court stated:
Both the defenses of negative identification and
alibi are unavailing. Contrary to these
protestations, complainant Catherine Manalo had
a vivid recollection of the identity of S/Sgt.
Elmer Vergara as the person who accosted her
on the left side of the car or at the drivers seat
and who poked a gun at her neck and was also
the one who took the key from the ignition. It
was a clear day, 3:00 oclock in the afternoon,
and the probability of a poor recollection is
nil. Catherine Manalo was able to see Sgt. Elmer
Vergara while on board the Gallant (sic) Sigma
Car when it was trailing her car and also at the
time it was passing her car until her path was
blocked and the three (3) armed malefactors
disembarked. She had sufficient time to
recollect the faces of the persons who
approached the car and their respective
positions. There is no reason to doubt her
unerring testimony that she was able to
positively remember and then later on identified
the robbers. Between the positive declaration
of Catherine Manalo and the denial of accused

Elmer Vergara, the former deserves more
credence, notwithstanding minor inaccuracies as
to the height and weight and styling of the hair
of accused Elmer Vergara.
xxx
Conceding the fact that accused Elmer Vergara
was in San Pedro, Laguna, it is not physically
impossible for him to have gone to Pasig, Metro
Manila, considering that he had an available
means of transportation. The distance between
San Pedro, Laguna where the accused claimed he
was at the time the robbery took place, and
Pasig, Metro Manila, where the crime was
committed, is less than an hour drive by car and
can easily be reached by one who, like the
accused Elmer Vergara, had a car available to
him.
Aggrieved by his conviction, Vergara elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals, docketed as
CA-G.R. CR No. 18318, on the sole issue of
whether or not petitioner committed the crime
charged against him. The appeal was anchored
on two grounds: (1) the alleged dubious
identification of Vergara by the private
complainant, and (2) failure of the trial court to
appreciate Vergaras alibi that he was on an
intelligence mission in San Pedro, Laguna at the
time the alleged robbery, specially in view of the
corroboration of his alibi by his commanding
officer.
Finding no reversible error in the findings and
conclusions of the trial court, the Court of
Appeals affirmed Vergaras conviction. The
appellate court said:
In the case at bench (sic), the prosecution had
proven the identity of accused-appellant beyond
reasonable doubt through the testimonies of

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
prosecution witnesses Villanueva and

Manalo. Appellant failed to controvert the
testimony of prosecution witness Villanueva that
accused-appellant was pointed to by witness
Manalo out of nine (9) persons. Thus, the trial
court had no reason to consider the
identification made by witness Manalo in the
police station as one that stemmed from a
suggestive identification procedure used by the
police.
The trial court was correct in regarding the
difference in height as a minor matter. What is
vital is that the witness recognized accused in
the line-up and reiterated her identification of
accused-appellant in open court. In the absence
of ill-motive on her part to testify falsely
against accused-appellant, the trial court is
correct in giving full faith and credence to the
testimony of witness Manalo.
Petitioner timely filed a motion for
reconsideration, but it was denied by the
appellate court in its resolution of March 26,
1997.
Insisting on his innocence, petitioner now
submits to this Court the following sole
assignment of error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MORE CREDENCE
TO THE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINANT
CATHERINE MANALO THAN THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE ACCUSED AND HIS
WITNESS AND CONSEQUENTLY FURTHER
ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY
OF THE CRIME BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
The issue of whether or not the guilt of the
accused had been proven beyond reasonable
doubt hinges, in our view, on the credibility of
witnesses presented by the prosecution and the

defense. Crucial in this regard is the
identification made by the complaining witness,
Catherine Manalo, of the petitioner, Sgt. Elmer
T. Vergara, as one of the malefactors.
Petitioner vehemently insists that the
contradictions in Catherine Manalos testimony
are not mere minor inconsistencies. According
to petitioner, while private complainant below
described him as around 56-57 tall, weighing
about 160-165 lbs., and sporting a military
haircut; in truth, he is only 53-1/2 tall, tips the
scale at less than 150 lbs., and had long hair at
the time of the incident. Given these
discrepancies, petitioner insists that private
complainant below must have been referring to
another person and not to him.
Basically, petitioners contention raises questions
of facts, which traditionally fall within the
province of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals. After reviewing the records of this
case, we find no reason to disturb the
assessment of the trial court of all the pieces of
evidence submitted before it, particularly as its
findings and conclusions had been affirmed by
the appellate court.
In this case, petitioner has been convicted on
the basis of the positive identification made by
private complainant below. As the Court of
Appeals stressed, petitioner was categorically
identified by the private complainant not just
once, but twice, as one of the armed men who
robbed her. The first time was during the police
line-up of nine (9) persons on October 27, 1990
and the second time was during her testimony in
open court. The records show that private
complainant had no motive to falsely testify
against petitioner. We agree with the lower
courts that the discrepancies in the private
complainants description are not decisive. Her

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
description was based on visual estimates, which

cannot be expected to be perfect. What is
decisive is that petitioner was positively and
categorically identified as one of the robbers,
not just once but twice, by private complainant,
Catherine Manalo. Her recollection of his
description might suffer from imperfection
regarding his height, weight and personal
appearance. But we note less. Jurisprudence
recognizes that victims of crime have a penchant
for seeing the faces and features of their
attackers, and remembering them. That some
variance as to petitioners height and weight
might exist in her recollection, in comparison to
his statistical measurement does not destroy
her credibility. That the trial court found this
variance inconsequential does not render its
findings on the credibility of witnesses
erroneous. Such findings are accorded great
respect and will be sustained by the appellate
courts unless the trial court overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which
could alter the decision or affect the result of
the case. Here, the important thing is that
complaining witness Catherine Manalo identified
the petitioner as one of the perpetrators of the
robbery twice, without any presumptions or
suggestion from the police at the line-up or the
court at the trial.
Petitioner also argues that the prosecution
failed to contradict his alibi. He submits that
the prosecution failed to prove that he had a car
available to him, or that he drove one from San
Pedro, Laguna to Pasig, Metro Manila. Petitioner
further insists that the trial courts finding that
the place where the crime was committed is less
than an hours drive by car and can easily be
reached by one who, like petitioner, had a car
available to him, is erroneous and unsupported by
the evidence on record.
Judicial notice could be taken of the travel time

by car from San Pedro, Laguna to Pasig City,
Metro Manila, because it is capable of
unquestionable demonstration, and nowadays is
already of public knowledge, especially to
commuters. We find no error in the trial courts
finding that it was not impossible for petitioner
to be at the scene of the crime, despite his alibi
that he was engaged in intelligence work in San
Pablo Laguna that same afternoon of October
19, 1990.
For alibi to prosper, it would not be enough for
the accused to prove that he was elsewhere
when the crime was committed. He must
further demonstrate that it would have been
physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
It is essential that credible and tangible proof
of physical impossibility for the accused to be at
the scene of the crime be presented to
establish an acceptable alibi. Petitioner failed to
meet this test. While petitioner could have
been working as intelligence agent in San Pedro,
Laguna from October 19 21, 1990, contrary to
his claim, it was not physically impossible for him
to have been in Pasig City, Metro Manila on the
day of the commission of the crime.
Petitioners insistence that he had no vehicle
available to him is not supported by the
testimony of his own commanding officer who
testified in petitioners defense, to wit:
FISCAL: CROSS EXAMINATION:
Q: Mr. Witness, what mode of transportation
did you take in going to Laguna in (sic) October
19, 1990.
A: We used cars.
Q: What vehicle?
A: Toyota Corona 78 model and a Galant, old
model.

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
Q: And in what particular vehicle did you

yourself used?
A: Toyota Corona and another car as a back-up
vehicle.
xxx
Q: Who arrived ahead, your car or the car of
the accused?
A: We arrived together because we traveled
not far with each other, we maintained the
distance of three to five meters, mam.
Q: How many were you?
A: Normally, up to nine members of the team,
but in that operation I think, seven or six
members, mam.
xxx
Q: Who were the companions of Vergara where
he was riding?
A: It was Sgt. San Jose who was driving the
car, together with Sgt. Magno and Sgt. Rubi.
Q: How about you, who were your companions?
A: I was with the other car, with a civilian
driver, and I cannot recall anymore whom I was
with at the time.
Nor was his commanding officers corroborative
testimony of much help in sustaining petitioners
alibi, as shown by the following:
FISCAL:
What is your basis that Vergara was with
you at about 3:00 in the afternoon of October
19, 1990?
A: What do you mean basis? His physical
presence in the area is my basis, mam, that he
was there.
Q: Do you keep an attendance record or
attendance book of the members of the team?
A: We do not normally do it once we left for an
operation, we believe it is not necessary to
account every minute every hour of the
operation, so long as we are in the area, target
area and every body (sic) is posted on our
designated position, as soon as the signal is
already given then thats the time we will
respond or arrest the guy, but I can say that

Sgt. Vergara never left the place until the 21st
of October, he was there in Pacita Complex,
mam.
Q: In other cases where you conducted
surveillance do you maintain a logbook?
A: The log book is filled up only, I mean we do
the logging prior and after the operation, thats
the time we placed the preparations or extent
of our operation, thats the time we entered this
in the log book and when we returned from the
operation, we also registered about the result of
the operation.
xxx
Q: You do not likewise keep a call or make a roll
call or keep attendance record?
A: It is automatic mam, everytime, during the
operation we see to it that all the persons were
in the area at the time we registered ourselves
in the logbook.
Q: In your team, who in particular is assigned
to keep track of the attendance?
A: Being the team leader, I am the one in
charge to keep the movements of every
members (sic) of the team, but when I left on
19th October proceeding to Makati, I specifically
gave instructions to maintain the operation and
see to it that they have new informations (sic)
or new development of the case they have to call
me by radio so that I can come back in the area,
that was the instruction to the assistant team
leader whenever I left the area.
Q: So I understand that you do not go with the
members of the team during the whole period or
duration of the surveillance.
A: Sometimes, mam, there are instances. In
that particular instance I left my men at about
1130 in the evening of 19th October, I left my
team and back again in the early morning of 20
October.
There were far too many glaring lapses in the
testimony of petitioners corroborative witness

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by: Meo J. Mallorca
for petitioners alibi to be given much weight,

thus:
Q: And what was that particular mission in San
Pedro, Laguna on October 19, 1990?
A: We were supposed to conduct a buy-bust
operation with the aid of our informant, an
errand boy of the subject pusher.
Q: Do you know the name of that informant?
A: I cannot recall.
xxx
Q: And in what particular place in Laguna was
this suppose(d) surveillance that you will
conduct?
A: I cannot recall the name of the street but I
know the place, but the street name and the
exact number I cannot recall.
xxx
Q: What place?
A: I cannot recall.
Q: What is the number?
A: I cannot recall.
Q: Who was the subject?
A: It was a certain alias German, mam.
xxx
COURT:
Is a certain Nicasio Custodio y Abrera a
member of your team?
A: I think during that time.
xxx
COURT:
On October 19, 1990, will you recall if he
was with you?
A: I cannot recall, your honor.
In the case of alibi, it is elementary that the
requirements of time and place be strictly
complied with by the defense, meaning that the
accused must not only show that he was
somewhere else but that it was also physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of
the crime at the time it was committed.
In the light of private complainants positive
identification of petitioner as the perpetrator

of the crime, the latters defense of bare denial
and alibi must necessarily fail, as her positive
testimony overrides his negative testimony. Alibi
is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in
the face of positive identification of the
accused. Further, an alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the petitioner by a
credible witness who has no motive to testify
falsely.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. No. CR 18318 is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,

vs.
ANDRES PEAFLORIDA, accused-appellant.
1999 September 02
1st Division G.R. No. 130550 D E C I S I O N
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Accused-appellant Andres Peaflorida
(hereafter ANDRES) appeals from the decision1
[Original Record (OR), 132. Per Judge Renato C.
Francisco.] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 19, Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case No.
2683-M-94, dated 12 May 1997, finding him
guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and indemnify
the heirs of the victim, SPO3 Eusebio Natividad,
in the amount of P50,000.
The information,2 [Id., 2.] filed on 13 October
1994, charged ANDRES together with two other
persons, whose identities are still unknown, with

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
murder, allegedly committed in this manner:

That on or about the 5th day of October, 1994,
in the municipality of San Ildefonso, province of
accused together with two (2) other persons,
whose true names are still unknown and against
whom the preliminary investigation has not yet
been completed by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Bulacan, armed with guns, and with
intent to kill one SPO3 Eusebio Natividad,
conspiring, confederating together and mutually
helping one another did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery,
evident premeditation and use of superior
strength, attack, assault and shoot with guns the
said SPO3 Eusebio Natividad, hitting him on
different parts of his body, thereby inflicting
upon him mortal wounds which directly caused
death.
ANDRES pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.3
[OR, 9.].
At the trial, the prosecution presented its
eyewitness, Rodolfo de la Cruz (hereafter
RODOLFO). He testified that at around 4:00
p.m. on 5 October 1994, he was resting on the
terrace of his house at Pinaod, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan, when he noticed an oncoming ownertype jeep. On board were the driver SPO3
Eusebio Natividad, RODOLFO's former CAFGU
trainer and an unknown companion passenger.
Suddenly, three men, each armed with a short
pistol, blocked and stopped the jeep. One of the
three armed men shouted: "Natividad katapusan
mo na ito," (Natividad, this is your end).
Afterwhich, the three gunmen simultaneously
fired upon Natividad. When the assault ceased,
one of the gunmen took Natividad's wallet and
gun. The attackers then fled on board a
vehicle.4 [TSN, 25 January 1995, 1-7.]
RODOLFO claimed that the killing took place in a
small market (talipapa) about five armslength
from his terrace, hence, he was able to see

clearly the faces of Natividad's assailants.5
[Id.]
RODOLFO also recounted that seven days after
the shooting incident or on 12 October 1994, he
voluntarily proceeded to the 175th PC
Detachment upon the invitation of the police
authorities who were conducting the
investigation on the matter. There, the police
officers presented a man whom RODOLFO
instantly recognized as one of NATIVIDAD's
assailants, in particular, the one who took
Natividad's gun and wallet. The police then
informed RODOLFO that the man's name was
ANDRES Peaflorida. Armed with the name to
match one of the faces he remembered as one
of Natividad's attackers, RODOLFO voluntarily
and promptly executed on that same day, a
sworn statement narrating the events pertaining
to the attack.6 [TSN, 25 January 1995, 8-9.] In
open court, RODOLFO once again specifically
pointed to ANDRES as one of the assailants of
Natividad who seized the latter's gun and
wallet.7 [Id., 5-6.]
After RODOLFO's testimony, the prosecution
formally offered in evidence his aforementioned
sworn statement as Exhibit "A" and Exhibit "A1."8 [OR, 5. ] It also offered in evidence the
death certificate of Natividad as Exhibit "B,"9
[Id., 142.] which indicated that the cause of his
death was massive hemorrhage due to multiple
gunshot wounds. The defense raised no
objections and admitted the exhibits. The
prosecution then rested its case.10 [TSN, 20
May 1996, 5-6.]
The defense thereafter presented its witnesses
ANDRES and his brother, Roberto Peaflorida.
ANDRES interposed alibi. He claimed that at
around 4:30 p.m., on 5 October 1994, he was in
the house of his brother, Roberto in Marulas,
Bulacan where he assisted the latter in the
repair of the chassis of some automobiles. He

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
did not leave Marulas that day hence, he could

not be physically present in some other place,
much less in San Ildefonso. He left Marulas only
on 11 October 1994 upon his cousin's request to
harvest palay at Sapang Palay. He was arrested
on said date.11 [Id. ]
ANDRES further denied ever knowing both
Natividad and RODOLFO. Natividad certainly
was not his enemy hence, ANDRES could not
think of any reason why RODOLFO implicated
him in the killing of Natividad.12 [TSN, 28 May
1996, 1-9.]
Roberto Peaflorida corroborated the alibi of
ANDRES. He maintained that he was working
with ANDRES the whole day of 5 October 1994
in the repair of a Motherland bus. Roberto
further declared that ANDRES had been living
with him since December, 1993. There had been
no occasion for ANDRES to leave Marulas
except on 11 October 1994 when he was invited
by a friend to go to San Ildefonso. A week later,
Roberto learned that ANDRES had been
arrested.13 [TSN, 3 September 1996, 4-6.]
The trial court considered said evidence of the
defense as unworthy of belief. It instead gave
full faith and credit to the evidence of the
prosecution, particularly the testimony of the
lone prosecution witness RODOLFO. It is
convinced that RODOLFO positively identified
ANDRES as one of the culprits who, using a
short firearm, riddled the different parts of
Natividad's body with bullets that led to his
untimely demise. It assessed the testimony of
RODOLFO as "clear, unequivocal, unmistakable
and overwhelming leaving no room for doubt as
to its veracity and conclusiveness."14 [Rollo, 16.]
The trial court then reiterated in its decision,
the jurisprudential doctrine that RODOLFO's
positive identification prevails over the
uncorroborated and self-serving denial and alibi
interposed by the defense.15 [Id., 18-19.]
The trial court also appreciated that treachery,

evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength attended the killing of Natividad. It
then convicted ANDRES of the crime of murder
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of
Natividad in the amount of P50,000. The
dispositive portion of the decision16 [Id., 19.]
reads, as follows:
Wherefore, based on the evidence on record,
this Court finds the accused, ANDRES
PEAFLORIDA, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of MURDER punishable under
Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the killing
having been attended with aggravating
circumstances of alevosia, evident premeditation
and abuse of superior strength, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with the accessory penalties provided
by law and to indemnify the heirs of SPO3
Eusebio Natividad the sum of P50,000.00 and to
pay the costs.
ANDRES seasonably appealed from the decision.
In his Appellant's Brief, ANDRES contends that
the trial court erred in convicting him since he
was not positively identified by RODOLFO.
There was no positive identification because (a)
RODOLFO could not have remembered the
physical features of the three (3) gunmen,
particularly ANDRES, given the short time that
he (RODOLFO) had seen them and that previous
to the incident he did not know any one of
them;17 [Rollo, 41-42.] (b) RODOLFO did not
identify ANDRES from a police line-up but was
introduced to him (RODOLFO) alone;18 [Id., 43.]
and (c) RODOLFO belatedly executed the sworn
statement (Exhibit "A" and Exhibit "A-1"), albeit
seven days after the shooting incident. With
this, ANDRES insinuates that the police
authorities "coached" RODOLFO in the

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
identification for he executed the sworn

statement, propitiously on 12 October 1994, a
day after ANDRES' arrest. ANDRES
additionally points out that he was arrested not
by virtue of a warrant of arrest but upon mere
invitation by a certain police officer Palarca who
brought him immediately to the 175th PC
Detachment.19 [Id., 44.]
In its Appellee's Brief, the Office of the
Solicitor General supports the trial court's
decision and prays that the assailed decision be
affirmed in toto.
The appeal is without merit.
Well settled is the rule that the ascertainment
of the credibility of witnesses is best left to
the determination of the trial court. This is so
because the trial court is in a distinct
advantageous position to examine the witnesses'
deportment and manner of testifying. On appeal,
its evaluation or assessment of the testimonies
of witnesses is accorded great respect and
finality in the absence of any indication that it
overlooked certain facts or circumstances of
weight and influence which, if considered, would
alter the results of the case.20 [See People v.
Gornes, 230 SCRA 270, 275 (1994)]
In this case, no cogent reasons were presented
to disturb the factual findings of the trial court
particularly on the assessment of the credibility
of the prosecution eyewitness. The trial court
ascertained that RODOLFO "categorically,
unequivocably and repeatedly pointed to"
ANDRES as one of the three armed men who
ambushed and gunned down Natividad. It
declared that RODOLFO positively identified
ANDRES. We agree.
RODOLFO had all the opportunity to observe
the horrible occurrence as he was only about

five armslength from the scene of the crime. He
had a good view of the assailants' physical and
facial features. True, he had seen their faces
for only a short span of time but that was all
RODOLFO needed in order to remember their
faces. Even if he did not know any one of the
assailants previous to the incident, such a fact
would not deter RODOLFO from remembering
them. In fact, RODOLFO was so certain of the
attackers' faces that he easily and quickly
recognized ANDRES as one of them when he saw
the latter at the 175th PC Detachment. It is
therefore unnecessary for RODOLFO to have
identified ANDRES from the police line-up.
Besides, there is no law requiring a police line-up
as an essential requisite for proper
identification.21 [People v. Buntan, Sr., 221
SCRA 421, 430 (1993)] Further, no proof was
adduced indicating that RODOLFO was coached
by the police officers or improperly motivated in
identifying ANDRES as one of Natividad's
slayers.
As to the alleged delay in the execution of
RODOLFO's sworn statement, it does not and
will not impair his credibility as witness. This
Court takes judicial notice of the actuality that
witnesses in this country are usually reluctant to
volunteer information about a criminal case or
are unwilling to be involved in or dragged into
criminal investigations.22 [People v. Landicho,
258 SCRA 1, 37 (1996)] Indeed, RODOLFO
exhibited a natural human reaction. Although
there was delay in the execution of his sworn
statement, what matters is RODOLFO overcame
his initial reluctance and fear to be involved by
voluntarily participating in the police
investigation and then openly testifying in court.
In sum, RODOLFO's positive identification of
ANDRES as one of the authors of the crime

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by: Meo J. Mallorca
prevails over his defense of alibi.23 [See People

v. Barlis, 231 SCRA 426, 439 (1994); People v.
Pidia, 249 SCRA 687, 703 (1995); People v.
Gomez, 251 SCRA 455, 470 (1995); People v.
Quijada, 259 SCRA 191, 214 (1996)] Settled is
the rule that alibi is the weakest of all defenses,
for it is easy to contrive and difficult to
prove.24 [See People v. Kyamko, 222 SCRA 183,
194 (1993); People v. Abo, 230 SCRA 612, 625
(1994); People v. de Leon, 248 SCRA 609, 623
(1995)] For such a defense to prosper, it is not
enough for ANDRES to prove that he was
somewhere else when the crime occurred, i.e., at
Marulas, Bulacan but he must also demonstrate
that it was physically impossible for him to have
been at the scene of the crime at San Ildefonso,
Bulacan, at the time of its commission.25 [See
People v. Buka, 205 SCRA 567, 584 (1992);
People v. Maqueda, 242 SCRA 565, 592 (1995);
People v. Laurente, 255 SCRA 543, 565 (1996);
People v. Alshaika, 261 SCRA 637, 646 (1996)]
This, ANDRES failed to establish.
We will now discuss the trial court's assessment
that all the aggravating circumstances alleged in
the information attended the commission of the
crime. We approve the trial court's correct
appreciation of alevosia, but disapprove its
determination of evident premeditation and
abuse of superior strength.
For treachery to be considered, two elements
must concur: (1) the employment of means of
execution that gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and
(2) the means of execution were deliberately or
consciously adopted.26 [See People v. De la Cruz,
207 SCRA 632, 650 (1992); People v. Garcia, 209
SCRA 164, 178 (1992); People v. Tampon, 258
SCRA 115, 132 (1996); People v. Tumaob, Jr., 291
SCRA 133, 138-139 (1998)]
Natividad's assailants unexpectedly appeared

from nowhere to ambush him. The assailants
were able to immediately establish strategic
positions from which vantage point they
simultaneously fired upon the victim, taking him
by surprise. The stratagem ensured Natividad's
helplessness, defenselessness and immobility.
Thus, it can be said that ANDRES and his two
(2) still unknown companions employed means of
execution which gave Natividad no opportunity
at all to defend himself and that the manner of
execution was deliberately and consciously
adopted. The fact that the attack was preceded
by a cry or signal of "Natividad katapusan mo na
ito," from ANDRES and his companions did not
make such attack less treacherous. In the same
vein, the frontal attack did not negate or lessen
the presence of treachery.27 [People v. Tampon,
id.; People v. De Manuel, 263 SCRA 49, 58-59
(1996)]
Like treachery, evident premeditation should be
established by clear and positive evidence.
Sifting through the records, we found a dearth
of evidence establishing the requisites of
evident premeditation, to wit: (1) the time when
the accused determined to commit the crime; (2)
an act manifestly indicating that the accused
has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient
lapse of time between such determination and
execution to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act.28 [See People v. Barba,
203 SCRA 436, 458 (1991); People v. Boniao, 217
SCRA 653, 672 (1993); People v. Cordova, 224
SCRA 319, 347-348 (1993); People v. Castillo,
289 SCRA 213, 228 (1998)] Hence, the finding
thereof by the trial court in the absence of any
evidentiary basis was but speculation. We have
already ruled that mere presumptions and
inferences, no matter how logical and probable
they might be, would not suffice to establish
evident premeditation.29 [See People v.

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
Villanueva, 265 SCRA 216, 226 (1996)]
confinement to another.
For the similar reason that there must exist

proof that the attackers deliberately took
advantage of their superior strength, their
apparent superiority in number vis-a-vis that of
the victim, notwithstanding,30 [See People v.
Castor, 216 SCRA 410, 421 (1992)] the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength cannot be appreciated. Again, the
records disclosed no such proof. In any event,
even if abuse of superior strength was proved, it
would still be absorbed by the qualifying
aggravating circumstance of treachery.31 [1
Ramon C. Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 376
(1987 ed.), citing authorities.]
In Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan,32 [263 SCRA 222,

264 (1996)] petitioner therein impugned the
validity of his arrest on the ground that it was
effected not by virtue of a warrant but by mere
invitation. We observed therein that the claim
was belatedly made, stressed that petitioner
should have questioned the validity of his arrest
before he entered his plea, and ruled that his
failure to do so constituted a waiver of his right
against unlawful restraint of liberty. We
reiterate herein said ruling. Anyway, even if
ANDRES was illegally arrested, it would not
affect his culpability since an allegation of a
warrantless arrest could not deprive the State
of its right to convict the guilty when all the
facts on the record pointed to his guilt.33 [See
People v. Briones, 202 SCRA 708, 718-719
(1991); People v. Silan, 254 SCRA 491, 505
(1996). See also De Asis v. Romeo, 41 SCRA 235,
239-240 (1991)]
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby
DISMISSED and the challenged 12 May 1997
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19,
Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 2683-M94, finding herein accused-appellant Andres
Peaflorida guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the victim in the sum of P50,000 is
hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED
One final point, ANDRES assails the regularity

and validity of his arrest. He claims that his
arrest without a warrant circumscribes the
conditions for a valid warrantless arrest which
are set forth in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court, to wit:
SEC. 5. Arrest without a warrant when lawful. -A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one
Q: What is judicial admission?

A: It is an admission, verbal or written, made by a party
in the course of the proceedings in the same case, which
does not require proof (Sec. 4).
Q: What are the elements of judicial admission?

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
A:
1. It must be made by a party to the case or his counsel;
2. It must be made in the course of the proceedings in
the same case; and
3. It can be verbal or written admission. There is no
particular form required.
Q: Distinguish judicial admission from extrajudicial
admission.
JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
EXTRAJUDICIAL
ADMISSIONS
Those made in the course
Those made out of court
of the proceeding in the
or in a judicial proceeding
same case
other than the one under
consideration
Do not require proof and
Regarded as evidence
may be contradicted only
and must be offered as
by showing that it was
such, otherwise the court
made through palpable
will not consider it in
mistake or that no such
deciding the case.
admission was made.
______________________ _____________________
Judicial admissions need
Requires formal offer for it
not be offered in evidence
to be considered
since it is not evidence. It is
superior to evidence and
shall be considered by the
court as established.
Conclusive upon the
Rebuttable
admitter
Admissible even if selfNot admissible if selfserving
serving
Subject to crossNot subject to crossexamination
examination
Q: When are judicial admissions made?
A: It may be made by the party himself or by his
counsel:
1. In the pleadings filed by the parties;
2. In the course of the trial either by verbal or written
manifestations or stipulations, including depositions,
written interrogatories and requests for admissions; or
3. In other stages of the judicial proceedings, as in pretrial
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 139416. March 12, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. ERNESTO HERMANES, accused-
appellant.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
Before us on automatic review is the decision
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of the 8th

Judicial Region (Branch XXX, Basey, Samar)
finding appellant Ernesto Hermanes guilty of the
crime of rape and imposing upon him the supreme
penalty of death.
The conviction of appellant stemmed from an
Information dated September 25, 1996 which
reads:
That on or about the 2nd day of November, 1995
at about 10:00 oclock in the evening, at Brgy.
Maligaya, Municipality of Sta. Rita, Province of
Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
by means of violence and intimidation, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
succeed in having carnal knowledge without the
consent and against the will of the complainant
MARINA HERMANES, inside her house, the
accused being her step-father, with threats of
killing her and all members of her family.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(p. 7, Rollo.)
At his arraignment, appellant pleaded not
guilty. Thereupon, trial ensued.
The relevant facts as presented by the
prosecution are faithfully summarized in the
brief submitted by the Solicitor General, to wit:
On or about November 2, 1995 at around ten
oclock in the evening, private complainant
Marina Hermanes, who at that time was ten (10)
years old, was in the house shared by appellant
Ernesto Hermanes, her stepfather, and his wife
Milagros (p. 6, TSN, July 22, 1997). Marinas
natural mother already died (p. 135, Records).
Marina further declared that she has been living
with her stepfather, the appellant, and his wife
Milagros since she was two (2) years old (p. 6,
TSN, July 22, 1997).
Marina was lying in her bedroom when appellant
entered and undressed her. Appellant opened his
trousers, placed himself on top of private
complainant, and successfully inserted his organ

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
(sili) into her vagina (pipi), Marina felt pain (p.

8, ibid.). Thereafter, appellant made a push and
pull motion for quite some time (p. 9,
ibid.). Having satisfied himself, appellant stood
up, closed his trousers and left Marina alone to
attend to his carabao (pp. 110-11, ibid.).
The following day at eight (8) oclock in the
morning, Marina proceeded to the house of
Soltero Salubre, a Kagawad of their barangay at
that time, and told him that her father, Ernesto
Hermanes, raped her, and has raped her twice
before the incident of November 2, 1995 (pp. 6,
12, TSN, January 14, 1998). Because of said
complaint, Salubre brought Marina to the
Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) Office in Sta. Rita, Samar (p. 9,
ibid.). Marina has since been in the custody of
the DSWD Home for Girls (Abused) Children,
Lingap Center, Palo, Leyte (p. 5, TSN, July 22,
1997).
(pp. 4-5, Appellees Brief.)
On November 4, 1995, or 2 days after the rape,
Marina was physically examined by the Municipal
Health Officer of Sta. Rita, Dra. Rusela
Grapa. Marina was found to have hymenal
lacerations at the 3 and 7 oclock positions,
which, according to Dra. Grapa could have been
caused by the insertion of male organ (tsn,
November 11, 1996, p. 5). Moreover, on direct
examination, Dra. Grapa testified that these
lacerations were fresh.
Q: When you examined the patient, what was
then the nature of the lacerations? New or
healing?
A: It was a fresh healing laceration. It was
fresh but starting to heal.
Q: If these lacerations were fresh but healing,
can you estimate the time of the incident?
A: Yes.
Q: And from your day of examination, when
could have the incident happened?
A: Between 24 to 48 hours.
Q: This laceration, was this caused by sexual

intercourse?
A: Yes.
(tsn, August 14, 1997, p. 10-11.)
As the prosecution was about to call its last
witness on January 14, 1998, appellant, through
counsel, manifested his desire to withdraw his
previous plea of not guilty and to change the
same to a plea of guilty. The trial court allowed
him to do so. Thus, appellant was re-arraigned
and, with the aid of his counsel, he subsequently
pleaded guilty to the crime charged (Record, p.
86).
The change in plea notwithstanding, the
prosecution continued with the presentation of
its last witness in order to establish appellants
guilt and precise degree of culpability (ibid.).
Thereafter, on July 14, 1998, appellant, through
new counsel Atty. Mario Nicolasora, filed a
manifestation in court denying that he wanted to
change his original plea of not guilty to
guilty. Consequently, the trial court ordered the
withdrawal of appellants earlier plea of guilty
and the reversion of his plea to not guilty (ibid.,
p. 104).
At the subsequent hearing set on August 12,
1998, the defense was to present appellant as
its witness. Instead of so doing, Atty.
Nicolasora asked that the presentation of
evidence for the defense be deferred and that
appellant be allowed to prove intoxication,
degree of instruction and education, and the lack
of intent to do so grave a wrong as that
committed, in order to mitigate his liability, all
for the purpose of convincing the trial court to
recommend to the Office of the President the
grant of executive clemency (ibid., p. 107).
On August 14, 1998, appellant, through counsel,
filed a manifestation admitting responsibility for
the November 2, 1995 rape, and asked for
forgiveness from complainant and the public in
general. Likewise, appellant manifested that he

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
would present evidence to prove certain

mitigating circumstances in his favor and
reiterated his request for the trial court to
recommend executive clemency (ibid., p. 108).
However, despite having been given ample
opportunity to prove supposed mitigating
circumstances, appellant inexplicably defaulted
thereat, and given the long delay that had
attended the hearing of the case for the
defense, the trial court was constrained, on
December 21, 1998, to consider the defense as
having waived its right to present evidence. The
case was thus considered submitted for final
resolution.
On March 19, 1999, the trial court rendered its
decision convicting appellant. The dispositive
part of the decision states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, finding the
accused Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
heinous crime of raping his own 10-year-old
stepdaughter Marina Hermanes through the
conclusive evidences presented by the
prosecution as well as his admission of the same
through his counsel, he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the extreme penalty of
DEATH. However, taking into consideration the
underlying circumstances herein as above
pointed out, the Court hereby recommends the
granting of Executive Clemency to the said
accused.
Upon promulgation of the above, let the record
herein be forwarded to the Honorable Supreme
Court for automatic review.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 23-24, Rollo.)
Appellant assails the trial court on the sole issue
of the imposition of the penalty of death.
The case being one on automatic review, the
Court undertook an examination and scrutiny of
the evidentiary record, and on the basis thereof,
it now affirms the trial courts finding of guilt.
The prevailing rule is that the testimony of rape
victims who are young and immature deserves

full credence (People vs. Bernaldez, 294 SCRA
317 [1998]). The Courts attention has not been
called to any dubious reason or improper motive
on the part of Marina that would have impelled
her to charge and testify falsely against
appellant in regard to so heinous a crime as
rape. Where no compelling and cogent reason is
established that would explain why the
complainant was so driven as to blindly implicate
an accused, the testimony of a young girl of
having been the victim of a sexual assault cannot
be discarded (People vs. Abella, 315 SCRA 36
[1999]).
The evidence establishes beyond reasonable
doubt the guilt of appellant. The testimony of
complainant is plain, straightforward, and
positive. With clarity and candor, complainant
recounted the manner in which she was raped by
appellant, viz:
Q: Okey, do you recall where were you on
November 2, 1995 at about 10:00 oclock in the
evening?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where were you then, if you can recall?
A: I was in the house.
Q: And where is this house of yours located that
you are referring to?
A: Brgy. Maligaya, Sta. Rita, Samar.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q: While you were there in your house that
evening do you recall of any incident that
occurred to you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what is this incident that occurred to
you?
A: That night I was undressed.
Q: By whom were you undressed?
A: Ernesto Hermanes.
Q: Where were you then particularly inside the
house when you were undressed?
A: I was in the bedroom.

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
Q: How did Ernesto Hermanes undress you?

A: He placed himself on top of me.
Q: What were you wearing then if you can
recall?
A: I was wearing a dress.
Q: After this Ernesto Hermanes undressed you
and placed himself on top of you, what did he do
to you next?
A: He sexually abused me.
Q: By sexual abuse, what did he actually do to
you?
A: He placed his sili (organ) inside my pipi
(vagina).
Q: Do you know where is your pipi?
A: Here (Witness pointing between her legs).
Q: When Ernesto Hermanes put inside his organ
to your organ, what did you feel?
A: It was very painful.
Q: Do you know what do you mean by sili?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q: When his penis was already inside your
vagina, what did Ernesto Hermanes do to you?
A: He did it again.
Q: What do you mean by saying, he did it again?
A: I do not know how to call it.
Q: As you were feeling the pain, what did you do
next if any?
A: (No answer)
Q: For how long did he place his penis inside your
vagina?
A: It was 9:00 oclock in the evening.
Q: Was the penis of Ernesto Hermanes inside
your vagina long?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did he make any movement of his penis while
it was inside your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How?
A: (He was making a push and pull motion as
witness indicated).
Q: How many times did Ernesto Hermanes do
this sexual abuse to you during that evening?

A: One.
(tsn, July 22, 1997, p. 6-10.)
Prescinding from the above, and on the basis of
the manifestation filed by Atty. Nicolasora on
August 14, 1998, the trial court observed that
appellant admitted having raped his
stepdaughter, stating that it is only in this case
now that the accused herein Ernesto Hermanes
has admitted guilt, manifesting his desire to ask
for forgiveness, and had practically and wholly
submitted himself to the discretion and
compassion of this Court (Decision, p. 10). Said
manifestation, states in part:
1. That after an exhausting conference with the
accused, the latter informed the undersigned
that he cannot bear his conscience and he would
like to state completely in court the actual
circumstances of the rape that transpired on
November 2, 1995 at about 10:00 oclock in the
evening at Barangay Maligaya, Sta. Rita, Samar;
xxx
xxx
xxx
3. That he is now remorseful and he believes
that by completely stating the truth he may be
forgiven by his foster daughter, Marina
Hermanes (rape victim), his spouse and the
public in general;
4. That the gist of the would be testimony of
the accused would show that during the rape
incident he was heavily intoxicated and he and
his foster daughter, Marina Hermanes, were
alone at their residence;
5. That he will present the following mitigating
circumstances in his favor, as follows: (a)
intoxication; (b) plea of guilty; (c) the degree of
instruction and education of the offender; and
(d) that he had no intention to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed.
6. That he plead for the mercy and compassion
of the Honorable Court that in the event the
penalty prescribed by law be meted against him,
he respectfully pleads to this court that it

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
recommends executive clemency for his behalf.

A perusal of the manifestation filed by Atty.
Nicolasora on behalf of appellant shows that it
was signed only by Atty. Nicolasora, not by
appellant. While we stated in People vs. Balisoro
(307 SCRA 48 [1999]) that an admission made in
the pleadings cannot be controverted by the
party making such admission and that the same
is conclusive as to him, it is also hornbook
doctrine that the authority of an attorney to
bind his client as to any admission of facts made
by him is limited to matters of judicial
procedure. An admission which operates as a
waiver, surrender, or destruction of the clients
cause is beyond the scope of the attorneys
implied authority (People vs. Maceda, 73 Phil.
679 [1942]). In this case, Atty. Nicolasoras
admission that appellant was heavily intoxicated
at the time of the incident and that he had no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed practically frittered away appellants
case in favor of the prosecution. The
manifestation cannot thus be held as an
admission by appellant of his guilt.
The inadmissibility of Atty. Nicolasoras
manifestation notwithstanding, appellant
nonetheless is still criminally liable for the rape
of Marina Hermanes. While appellant is not
bound by the manifestation of guilt filed by
Atty. Nicolasora, he is still bound by the decision
of the trial court to consider the case submitted
for decision due to the inordinate delay and
failure of his counsel to present evidence on his
behalf. It must be noted that the prosecution
completed the presentation of its evidence on
January 14, 1998, and that the defense was
given numerous opportunities to present
evidence but, for almost one year, and despite
several warnings to that effect, they failed to
do so, so much so that the trial court, on
December 21, 1998, was constrained to consider
the case submitted for decision. A client is
bound by an adverse decision rendered as a

result of his attorneys inaction or negligence,
such as failure to present sufficient
evidence. The reason for this is that the
adverse judgment is a mere consequence of an
omission on a procedural matter in regard to
which an attorney has the implied authority to
bind his client. Too, the prosecution has more
than sufficiently proven appellants guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
Appellant, however, is correct in his sole
submission that he does not deserve the death
penalty.
The crime of rape is punished under Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 which
pertinently reads:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the
crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years
of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity
or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Summarizing the recent rulings of the Court
under the aforequoted provision (People vs.
Lomibao, 337 SCRA 211 [2000]; People vs. Acala,
307 SCRA 330 [1999]; People vs. Maglente, 306
SCRA 546 [1999]), the concurrence of the
minority of the victim and her relationship to
the offender constitute special qualifying
circumstances and both factors must be alleged
and proved with certainty, otherwise, the death
penalty cannot be imposed. In the present case,
while the information did state that appellant is

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
the stepfather of the complainant, it, however,

failed to mention that complainant was under 18
years of age at the time of the commission of
the offense. As such, the charge of rape in the
information is not in its qualified form so as to
fall under the special qualifying circumstances
stated in Section 11 of Republic Act No.
7659. Verily, the informations failure to allege
the minority of the victim cancels out the
imposition of the death penalty.
In addition to the failure of the information to
allege the minority of the complainant, appellant
also claims that the trial court erred in imposing
the death penalty allegedly because the stepfather and step-daughter relationship between
appellant and the victim was never conclusively
established. We deem it unnecessary to discuss
this particular argument in view of the previous
disquisition that the death penalty cannot be
imposed for failure of the information to allege
the minority of the complainant. There being no
allegation of the minority of the victim in the
indictment under which appellant was arraigned,
he cannot be convicted of qualified rape as he
was not properly informed that he is being
accused of qualified rape. Appellants conviction
of qualified rape violates his constitutional right
to be properly informed of the nature and cause
of accusation against him. Having been apprised
only of the elements of simple rape, which crime
was duly established by the prosecution,
appellant can be convicted only for such crime
and accordingly should be sentenced to reclusion
perpetua.
As to the damages, the trial court failed to

award civil indemnity in favor of private
complainant. Inasmuch as the death penalty is
not imposable in this case due to the deficiency
in the allegations of the information against
appellant, private complainant is only entitled to
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, in accordance with
current rulings (People vs. Bares, G.R. Nos.
137762-65, March 27, 2001; People vs. Lomibao,

supra).
Likewise, appellant is liable to pay the rape
victim the amount of P50,000.00 as moral
damages, which is automatically granted in rape
cases without need of pleading or proof of the
basis thereof (People vs. Alba, 305 SCRA 811
[1999]).
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is
hereby affirmed with the modifications that (a)
appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt only of the crime of simple rape, for which
he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua; (b) that appellant is ordered
to pay the victim the amount of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos as civil indemnity and Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Buena,
Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., SandovalGutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Q: What is self-serving evidence?
A: No. The self-serving rule which prohibits the
admission of declaration of a witness applies only to
extrajudicial admissions. If the declaration is made in
open court, such is raw evidence. It is not self-serving. It
is admissible because the witness may be crossexamined on that matter.
Q: Are judicial admissions made by the accused
during his arraignment binding upon him?
A: No. A plea of guilty entered by the accused may be
later withdrawn at any time before the judgment of
conviction becomes final. Such plea is not admissible in
evidence against the accused and is not even
considered as an extrajudicial admission.
Q: What are the consequences of judicial
admissions?
A:
1. A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later
challenge that fact as judicial admissions constitute
waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed
with;
2. No evidence is needed to prove a judicial admission
and it cannot be contradicted unless it is shown to have
been made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made.
Q: May courts take judicial notice of foreign laws?

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
A:
GR: Foreign laws may not be taken judicial notice of,
and have to be proved like any other fact.
XPN: When said laws are within the actual knowledge of
the court and such laws are:
1. Well and generally known;
2. Actually ruled upon in other cases before it; and
3. None of the parties claim otherwise.
Q: What are the rules with regard to judicial notice of
ordinances?
A:
1. MTCs are required to take judicial notice of the
ordinances of the municipality or city wherein they sit.
2. RTCs must take judicial notice only:
a. When expressly authorized to do so by statute; or
b. In case on appeal before them and wherein the
inferior court took judicial notice of an ordinance involved
in the same case.
3. Appellate courts may also take judicial notice of
ordinances not only because the lower courts took
judicial notice thereof but because these are facts
capable of unquestionable demonstration. (Riano,
Evidence: A Restatement for the Bar, pp. 90-91, 2009
ed.)
Q: What is the rule on judicial notice of records of
another case previously tried?
A:
GR: Courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of
the contents of the records of other cases, even when
such cases have been tried or are pending in the same
court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may
have been heard or are actually pending before the
same judge. (Calamba Steel Center, Inc. v. CIR, G.R.
No. 151857, Apr. 28, 2005)
XPNS:
1. When in the absence of any objection, with the
knowledge of the opposing party, the contents of said
other cases are clearly referred to by title and number in
a pending action and adopted or read into the record of
the latter;
2. When the original record of the other case or any part
of it is actually withdrawn from the archives at the courts
discretion upon the request, or with the consent, of the
parties, and admitted as part of the record of the pending
case. (Jumamil v. Cafe, G.R. No. 144570, Sept. 21,
2005)
3. When the action is closely interrelated to another case
pending between the same parties;
4. Where the interest of the public in ascertaining the
truth are of paramount importance;
5. In cases seeking to determine what is reasonable
exercise of discretion or whether or not the previous
ruling is applicable in a case under consideration; or
6. Where there is finality of a judgment in another case

that was previously pending determination and therefore,
res judicata. (Herrera, Vol. V, pp. 89-90, 1999 ed.)
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. JAILON KULAIS, CARLOS

FALCASANTOS @ "Commander Falcasantos,"
AWALON KAMLON HASSAN @ "Commander
Kamlon," MAJID SAMSON @ "Commander
Bungi," JUMATIYA AMLANI DE
FALCASANTOS, NORMA SAHIDDAN DE
KULAIS, SALVADOR MAMARIL y MENDOZA,
HADJIRUL ASIN y ALIH, JAINUDDIN
HASSAN y AHMAD, IMAM TARUK ALAH y
SALIH, JALINA HASSAN DE KAMMING,
FREDDIE MANUEL @ "Ajid" and several JOHN
and JANE DOES, accused, JAILON KULAIS,
appellant.
1998 July 16 1st Division G.R. Nos. 100901-08
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J:
The trial court's is erroneous in taking of
judicial notice of a witness' testimony in another
case, also pending before it, does not affect the
conviction of the appellant, whose guilt is proven
beyond reasonable doubt by other clear,
convincing and overwhelming evidence, both
testimonial and documentary. The Court takes
this occasion also to refund the bench and the
bar that reclusion perpetua is not synonymous
with life imprisonment.
The Case
On August 22, 1990, five Informations for
kidnapping for ransom (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060,
10061, 10062, 10063 and 10064) and three
Informations for kidnapping (Crim. Case Nos.
10065, 10066 and 10067), all dated August 14,
1990, were filed 1 before the Regional Trial
Court of Zamboanga City against Carlos

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
Falcasantos, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani,

Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Jalina Hassan de
Kamming, 2 Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin,
Jaimuddin Hassan, Imam 3 Taruk Alah, Freddie
Manuel alias "Ajid," and several John and Jane
Does. The Informations for kidnapping for
ransom, which set forth identical allegations
save for the names of the victims, read as
follows:
"That on or about the 12th day of December,
1988, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, being all private
individuals, conspiring and confederating
together, mutually aiding and assisting one
another, with threats to kill the person of
FELIX ROSARIO [in Criminal Case No. 10060] 4
and for the purpose of extorting ransom from
the said Felix Rosario or his families or
employer, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, KIDNAP the person of said Felix
Rosario, 5 a male public officer of the City
Government of Zamboanga, who was then aboard
a Cimarron vehicle with plate No. SBZ-976 which
was being ambushed by the herein accused at
the highway of Sitio Tigbao Lisomo, Zamboanga
City, and brought said Felix Rosario 6 to
different mountainous places of Zamboanga City
and Zamboanga del Sur, where he was detained,
held hostage and deprived of his liberty until
February 2, 1989, the day when he was released
only after payment of the ransom was made to
herein accused, to the damage and prejudice of
said victim; there being present an aggravating
circumstance in that the aforecited offense was
committed with the aid of armed men or persons
who insure or afford impunity."
The three Informations for kidnapping, also
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,
likewise alleged identical facts and
circumstances, except the names of the victims:

"That on or about the 12th day of December,
1988, in the City of Zamboanga and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, being all private individuals,
conspiring and confederating together, mutually
aiding and assisting one another, by means of
threats and intimidation of person, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
KIDNAP, take and drag away and detain the
person of MONICO SAAVEDRA Y LIMEN
[Criminal Case No. 10065] 7 a male public officer
of the City Government of Zamboanga, against
his will, there being present an aggravating
circumstance in that the aforecited offense was
committed with the aid of armed men or persons
who insure or afford impunity."
Of the twelve accused, only nine were
apprehended, namely, Jailon Julais, Jumatiya
Amlani, Nonna Sahiddan de Kulais, Salvador
Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassan, Imam
Taruk Alah, Jalina Hassan and Freddie Manuel. 8
On their arraignment on September 13, 1990, all
the accused pleaded not guilty. Joint trial on the
merits ensued. On April 8, 1991, Judge Pelagio S.
Mandi rendered the assailed 36-page Decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, above premises and discussion
taken into consideration, this Court renders its
judgment, ordering and finding:
1. FREDDIE MANUEL, alias "AJID" and IMAM
TARUK ALAH y SALIH not guilty of the eight
charges of kidnapping for ransom and for
kidnapping, their guilt not having been proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
Their immediate release from the City Jail,

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by: Meo J. Mallorca
Zamboanga City is ordered, unless detained for

some other offense besides these 8 cases (Crim.
Cases Nos. 10060-10067).
2. JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, JAILON
KULAIS, SALVADOR MAMARIL y MENDOZA
and HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH [g]uilty as
principals by conspiracy in all these 8 cases for
kidnapping for ransom and for kidnapping (Crim.
Cases Nos. 10060-10067).
Their guilt is aggravated in that they committed
the 8 offenses with the aid of armed men who
insured impunity. Therefore, the penalties
imposed on them shall be at their maximum
period.
WHEREFORE, for the five charges of kidnapping
for ransom, and pursuant to Art. 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, five life imprisonments are
imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon
Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and Kadjirul
Plasin y Alih (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).
For kidnapping Mrs. Virginia San Agustin-Gara, a
female and public officer and pursuant to Art.
267, Revised Penal Code (par. 4.), another life
imprisonment is imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y
Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y
Mendoza and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim. Case
No. 10066)
For kidnapping Monico Saavedra y Limen, and
Calixto Francisco y Gaspar, and their kidnapping
not having lasted more than five days, pursuant
to Art. 268, Revised Penal Code, and the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the same four
accused - Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon
Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and Hadrijul
Plasin y Alih - are sentenced to serve two (2) jail
terms ranging from ten (10) years of prision
mayor as minimum, to eighteen (18) years of
reclusion temporal as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos.

10065 and 10067).
3. JAMATIYA AMLANI FALCASANTOS not
guilty in the three charges of kidnapping and she
is acquitted of these charges. (Crim. Cases Nos.
10065, 10066 and 10067).
But Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is guilty as
accomplice in the five charges of kidnapping for
ransom.
WHEREFORE, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is
sentenced to serve five (5) imprisonments,
ranging from TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor
as minimum to EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS of
reclusion temporal as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos.
10060-10064).
4. NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, 18 years
old, and JALIHA HUSSIN (charged as Jalina
Hassan de Kamming), 15 years old, not guilty in
the three charges for kidnapping and are,
therefore, ACQUITTED of these three charges.
(Crim. Cases Nos. 10065, 10066 & 10067).
But Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin
are found guilty as accomplices in the five
charges for kidnapping for ransom. Being minors,
they are entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority which lowers the
penalty imposable on them by one degree.
WHEREFORE, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and
Jalina Hussin are sentenced to serve five
imprisonments ranging from SIX (6) YEARS of
prision correccional as minimum to TEN YEARS
AND ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum
(Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).
Due to the removal of the suspension of
sentences of youthful offenders "convicted of

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by: Meo J. Mallorca
an offense punishable by death or life" by

Presidential Decree No. 1179 and Presidential
Decree No. 1210 (of which kidnapping for ransom
is such an offense) the sentences on Norma
Sahiddan de Kulais and Jaliha Hussin de Kamming
are NOT suspended but must be served by them.
Januddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril
and Hadjirul Plasin are sentenced further to
return the following personal effects taken on
December 12, 1988, the day of the kidnapping,
or their value in money, their liability being
solidary.
To Jessica Calunod:
One (1) Seiko wrist watch
P250.00
One Bracelet
P2,400.00
One Shoulder Bag
P200.00
Cash
P200.00
To Armado C. Bacarro:
One (1) wrist watch
P800.00
One Necklace
P300.00
One Calculator
P295.00
Eyeglasses
P500.00
One Steel Tape
P250.00
To Edilberto S. Perez
One (1) Rayban
P1,000.00
One Wrist Watch
P1,800.00
Cash
P300.00
To Virginia San Agustin-Gara
One (1) Wrist Watch
P850.00
The benefit of Art. 29, Revised Penal Code, on
preventive suspension, shall be extended to
those sentenced.
The cases against Majid Samson, alias
"Commander Bungi" Awalon Kamlon a.k.a.
"Commander Kamlon" Carlos Falcasantos and
several "John Does" and Jane "Does" are
ARCHIVED until their arrest.
Costs against the accused convicted.
SO ORDERED." 9
On May 7, 1991, Jallon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani
de Falcasantos, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and
Jaliha Hussin filed their joint Notice of Appeal.
10 In a letter dated February 6, 1997, the same
appellants, except Jailon Kulais, withdrew their
appeal because of their application for
"amnesty." In our March 19, 1997 Resolution, we
granted their motion. Hence, only the appeal of
Kulais remains for the consideration of this
Court. 11
The Facts
The Version of the Prosecution
The solicitor general summarized in this wise,
the facts as viewed by the People:
"On December 12, 1988, a group of public
officials from various government agencies,
organized themselves as a monitoring team to
inspect government projects in Zamboanga City.
The group was composed of Virginia Gara, as the
head of the team; Armando Bacarro,
representing the Commission on Audit; Felix del
Rosario, representing the non-government;
Edilberto Perez, representing the City
Assessor's Office; Jessica Calunod and Allan
Basa of the City Budget Office and Monico
Saavedra, the driver from the City Engineer's
Office. (p. 3, TSN, October 22, 1990.)
On that particular day, the group headed to the
Lincomo Elementary School to check on two of
its classrooms. After inspecting the same, they
proceeded to the Talaga Footbridge. The group
was not able to reach the place because on their
way, they were stopped by nine (9) armed men
who pointed their guns at them (p. 4, TSN, ibid.).
The group alighted from their Cimarron jeep
where they were divested of their personal

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by: Meo J. Mallorca
belongings. They were then ordered to walk to

the mountain by the leader of the armed men
who introduced himself as Commander
Falcasantos (p. 5, TSN, ibid.)
While the group was walking in the mountain,
they encountered government troops which
caused their group to be divided. Finally, they
were able to regroup themselves. Commander
Kamlon with his men joined the others. (pp. 7-8,
TSN, ibid.).
The kidnappers held their captives for fiftyfour (54) days in the forest. During their
captivity, the victims were able to recognize
their captors who were at all times armed with
guns. The wives of the kidnappers performed
the basic chores like cooking. (pp. 9-10. TSN,
ibid.)
Commander Falcasantos also ordered their
victims to sign the ransom notes which
demanded a ransom of P100,000.00 and
P14,000.00 in exchange for twenty (20) sets of
uniform. (p. 15, TSN, ibid.)
On February 3, 1989, at around 12:00 o'clock
noontime, the victims were informed that they
would be released. They started walking until
around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of that day.
At around 12:00 o'clock midnight, the victims
were released after Commander Falcasantos and
Kamlon received the ransom money. (p. 19, TSN,
ibid.) The total amount paid was P122,000.00.
The same was reached after several negotiations
between Mayor Vitaliano Agan of Zamboanga
City and the representatives of the kidnappers.
(pp. 2, 6, TSN, Nov. 11, 1990)
xxx
xxx
xxx." 12
The prosecution presented fifteen witnesses,
including some of the kidnap victims themselves:
Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro, Edilberto

Perez, Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Calixto
Francisco, and Monico Saavedra.
The Version of the Defense
The facts of the case, according to the defense,
are as follows: 13
"On May 28, 1990, at about 10:00 o' clock in the
morning, while weeding their farm in Sinaburan,
Zamboanga del Sur, accused-appellant Jumatiya
Amlani was picked up by soldiers and brought to
a place where one army battalion was stationed.
Thereat, her five (5) co-accused, namely
Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin
Hassin, Imam Taruk Alah and Freddie Manuel
were already detained. In the afternoon of the
same day, appellants spouses Jailon Kulais and
Norma Sahiddan were brought to the battalion
station and likewise detained thereat. On May
30, 1990, the eight (8) accused were
transported to Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City.
Here on the same date, they were joined by
accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin.
At the time Amlani was picked up by the
military, she had just escaped from the captivity
of Carlos Falcasantos and company who in 1988
kidnapped and brought her to the mountains.
Against their will, she stayed with Falcasantos
and his two wives for two months, during which
she slept with Falcasantos as aide of the wives
and was made to cook food, wash clothes, fetch
water and run other errands for everybody. An
armed guard was assigned to watch her, so that,
for sometime, she had to bear the ill-treatment
of Falcasantos' other wives one of whom was
armed. After about two months, while she was
cooking and Falcasantos and his two wives were
bathing in the river, and while her guard was not
looking, she took her chance and made a
successful dash for freedom. (TSN, January 29,

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by: Meo J. Mallorca
1992, pp. 2-15)

Likewise a kidnap victim herself is accusedappellant Jaliha Hussin, who was thirteen years
old at the time (she was fifteen years old when
the trial of the instant cases commenced). She
was kidnapped by Daing Kamming and brought to
the mountains where he slept with her. She
stayed with him for less than a month sleeping
on forest ground and otherwise performing
housekeeping errands for Kamming and his men.
She made good her escape during an encounter
between the group of Kamming and military
troops. She hid in the bushes and came out at
Ligui-an where she took a "bachelor" bus in going
back to her mother's house at Pudos, Guiligan,
Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur. One day, at
around 2:00 o' clock in the afternoon, while she
was harvesting palay at the neighboring village
of Tigbalangao, military men picked her up to
Ticbanuang where there was an army battalion
detachment. From Ticbawuang, she was brought
to Vitali, then to Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City,
where on her arrival, she met all the other
accused for the first time except Freddie
Manuel. (Ibid., pp. 16-21)
Another female accused is appellant Norma
Sahiddan, a native of Sinaburan, Tungawan,
Zamboanga del Sur. At about 3:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of a day in May, while she and her
husband were in their farm, soldiers arrested
them. The soldiers did not tell them why they
were being arrested, neither were they shown
any papers. The two of them were just made to
board a six by six truck. There were no other
civilians in the truck. The truck brought the
spouses to the army battalion and placed them
inside the building where there were civilians
and soldiers. Among the civilians present were
her six co-accused Hadjirul Plasin, Salvador
Mamaril, Jaimuddin Hassan, Ima[m] Taruk Alah,
Freddie Manuel and Jumatiya Amlani. That night,

the eight of them were brought to Tictapul,
Zamboanga City, then to Vitali; and, finally, to
the Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City where they
stayed for six days and six nights. On the
seventh day, the accused were brought to the
City Jail, Zamboanga City. (TSN, January 30,
1991, pp. 6-11)
The husband of Norma Sahiddan is Jailon Kulais
who, as heretofore narrated, was arrested with
his wife the day the soldiers came to their farm
on May 28, 1990. He has shared with his wife
the ordeals that followed in the wake of their
arrest and in the duration of their confinement
up to the present. (TSN, January 22, 1991 pp. 24).
The Trial Court's Ruling
The trial court found Appellant Kulais guilty of
five counts of kidnapping for ransom and one
count of kidnapping a woman and public officer,
for which offenses it imposed upon him six
terms of "life imprisonment." It also found him
guilty of two counts of slight illegal detention
for the kidnapping of Monico Saavedra and
Calixto Francisco. The trial court ratiocinated as
follows:
"Principally, the issue here is one of credibility both of the witnesses and their version of what
had happened on December 12, 1988, to
February 3, 1989. On this pivotal issue, the
Court gives credence to prosecution witnesses
and their testimonies. Prosecution evidence is
positive, clear and convincing. No taint of evil or
dishonest motive was imputed or imputable to
prosecution witnesses. To this Court, who saw all
the witnesses testify, prosecution witnesses
testified only because they were impelled by a
sense of justice, of duty and of truth.

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
Contrarily, defense evidence is weak,

uncorroborated and consisted only of alibis. The
individual testimonies of the nine accused dwelt
principally on what happened to each of them on
May 27, 28 and 29, 1990. None of the accused
explained where he or she was on and from
December 12, 1988, to February 3, 1989, when
prosecution evidence showed positively seven of
the nine accused were keeping the five or six
hostages named by prosecution evidence.
The seven accused positively identified to have
been present during the course of the captivity
of the five kidnap-victims-complainants are: (1)
Jumatiya Amlani; (2) Jaliha Hussin; (3) Norma
Sahiddan; (4) Jailon Kulais; (5) Hadjirul Plasin;
(6) Salvador Mamaril and (7) Jainuddin Hassan.
The two accused not positively identified are:
Freddie Manuel alias "Ajid", and Imam Taruk
Alah. These two must, therefore, be declared
acquitted based on reasonable doubt.
The next important issue to be examined is: Are
these seven accused guilty as conspirators as
charged in the eight Informations; or only as
accomplices? Prosecution evidence shows that
the kidnapping group to which the seven accused
belonged had formed themselves into an armed
band for the purpose of kidnapping for ransom.
This armed band had cut themselves off from
established communities, lived in the mountains
and forests, moved from place to place in order
to hide their hostages. The wives of these
armed band moved along with their husbands,
attending to their needs, giving them material
and moral support. These wives also attended to
the needs of the kidnap victims, sleeping with
them or comforting them.
xxx
xxx
xxx
II) The guilt of Jainuddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais,
Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul Plasin. The Court

holds these four men guilty as conspirators in
the 8 cases of kidnapping. Unlike the three
women-accused, these male accused were armed.
They actively participated in keeping their
hostages by fighting off the military and
CAFGUS, in transferring their hostages from
place to place, and in guarding the kidnap
hostages. Salvador Mamaril and Jailon Kulais
were positively identified as. among the nine
armed men who had kidnapped the eight kidnap
victims on December 12, 1988.
The higher degree of participation found by the
Court of the four accused is supported by the
rulings of our Supreme Court quoted below.
(1) The time-honored jurisprudence is that
direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy.
It may be shown by a number of infinite acts,
conditions and circumstances which may vary
according to the purposes to be accomplished
and from which may logically be inferred that
there was a common design, understanding or
agreement among the conspirators to commit
the offense charged. (People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil
64; People vs. Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868.)
(2) The crime must, therefore, in view of the
solidarity of the act and intent which existed
between the sixteen accused, be regarded as
the act of the band or party created by them,
and they are all equally responsible for the
murder in question. (U.S. vs. Bundal, et. al. 3 Phil
89, 98.)
(3) When two or more persons unite to
accomplish a criminal object, whether through
the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding
severally or collectively, each individual whose
evil will actively contribute to the wrongdoing is
in law responsible for the whole, the same as

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by: Meo J. Mallorca
though performed by himself alone.

(People vs. Peralta, et. al. 25 SCRA 759, 772
(1968).) 14
The Assigned Errors
The trial court is faulted with the following
errors, viz:
I
"The trial court erred in taking judicial notice of
a material testimony given in another case by Lt.
Melquiades Feliciano, who allegedly was the team
leader of the government troops which allegedly
captured the accused-appellants in an encounter;
thereby, depriving the accused-appellants their
right to cross-examine him.
II
On the assumption that Lt. Feliciano's testimony
could be validly taken judicial notice of, the trial
court, nevertheless, erred in not disregarding
the same for being highly improbable and
contradictory.
III
The trial court erred in finding that accusedappellants Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha Hussin and
Norma Sahiddan provided Carlos Falcasantos, et.
al., with material and moral comfort, hence, are
guilty as accomplices in all the kidnapping for
ransom cases.
IV
The trial court erred in denying to accusedappellant Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan the
benefits of suspension of sentence given to
youth offenders considering that they were
minors at the time of the commission of the
offense." 15
As earlier noted, Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha Hussin
and Norma Sahiddan had withdrawn their appeal,
and as such, the third and fourth assigned
errors, which pertain to them only, will no longer
be dealt with. Only the following issues

pertaining to Appellant Jailon Kulais will be
discussed: (1) judicial notice of other pending
cases, (2) sufficiency of the prosecution
evidence, and (3) denial as a defense. In
addition, the Court prosecution will pass upon
the propriety of the penalty imposed by the trial
court.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
First Issue: Judicial Notice and Denial of Due
Process
Appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due
process when the trial court took judicial notice
of the testimony given in another case by one Lt.
Melquiades Feliciano, who was the team leader
of the government troops that captured him and
his purported cohorts. 16 Because he was
allegedly deprived of his right to cross-examine
a material witness in the person of Lieutenant
Feliciano, he contends that the latter's
testimony should not be used against him. 17
True, as a general rule, courts should not take
judicial notice of the evidence presented in
other proceedings, even if these have been tried
or are pending in the same court, or have been
heard and are actually pending before the same
judge. 18 This is especially true in criminal cases,
where the accused has the constitutional right
to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him.
Having said that, we note, however, that even if
the court a quo did take judicial notice of the
testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use
such testimony in deciding the cases against the
appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not denied
due process. His conviction was based mainly on
the positive identification made by some of the

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by: Meo J. Mallorca
kidnap victims, namely, Jessica Calunod,

Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez. These
witnesses were subjected to meticulous crossexaminations conducted by appellant's counsel.
At best, then, the trial court's mention of
Lieutenant Feliciano's testimony is a decisional
surplusage which neither affected the outcome
of the case nor substantially prejudiced
Appellant Kulais.
Second Issue: Sufficiency of Prosecution
Evidence
Appellant was positively identified by Calunod, as
shown by the latter's testimony:
"CP CAJAYON D MS:
Q. And how long were you in the custody of
these persons?
A. We stayed with them for fifty-four days.
Q. And during those days did you come to know
any of the persons who were with the group?
A. We came to know almost all of them
considering we stayed there for fifty-four days.
Q. And can you please name to us some of them
or how you know them?
A. For example, aside from Commander
Falcasantos and Commander Kamlon we came to
know first our foster parents, those who were
assigned to give us some food.
Q. You mean to say that the captors assigned
you some men who will take care of you?
A. Yes.
Q. And to whom were you assigned?
A. To lla Abdurasa.
Q. And other than your foster [parents] or the
parents whom you are assigned to, who else did
you come to know?
A. Pagal and his wife; Tangkong and his wife
Nana; the two (2) wives of Commander
Falcasantos - Mating and Janira - another
brother in-law of Commander Kamlon, Usman,
the wife of Kamlon, Tira.

xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. Now, you said that you were with these men
for fifty-four days and you really came to know
them. Will you still be able to recognize these
persons if you will see the[m] again?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. Now will you look around this Honorable Court
and see if any of those you mentioned are here?
A. Yes, they are here.
Q. Some of them are here?
A. Some of them are here.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. Where is Tangkong? What is he wearing?
A. White t-shirt with orange collar. (witness
pointing.) He was one of those nine armed men
who took us from the highway.
RTC INTERPRETER:
Witness pointed to a man sitting in court and
when asked of his name, he gave his name as
JAILON KULAIS.
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Q. Aside from being with the armed men who
stopped the vehicle and made you alight, what
else was he doing while you were in their
captivity?
A. He was the foster parent of Armando Bacarro
and the husband of Nana.
COURT:
Q. Who?
A. Tangkong.
xxx
xxx
xxx: 19
Likewise clear and straightforward was
Bacarro's testimony pointing to appellant as one
of the culprits:
"FISCAL CAJAYON:

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. And what happened then?
A. Some of the armed men assigned who will be
the host or who will be the one to give food to
us.
Q. To whom were you assigned?
A. I was assigned to a certain Tangkong and his
wife Nana.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. Now, you said you were assigned to Tangkong
and his wife. Do you remember how he looks
like?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, will you please look around this Court
and tell us if that said Tangkong and his wife are
here?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. Could you please point this Tangkong to us?
A. Witness pointed to a person in Court. When
asked his name he identified [himself] as Jailon
Kulais.
Q. Why did you say his name is Tangkong?
Where did you get that name?
A. Well, that is the name [by which he is] usually
called in the camp.
xxx
xxx
xxx
ATTY. FABIAN (counsel for accused Kulais)
Q. When did you first meet Tangkong?
A. That was on December 11, because I
remember he was the one who took us.
Q. When you were questioned by the fiscal a
while ago, you stated that Mr. Mamaril was one
of those who stopped the bus and took you to
the hill and you did not mention Tangkong?
A. I did not mention but I can remember his
face.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. And because Tangkong was always with you as
your host even if he did not tell you that he
[was] one of those who stopped you, you would
not recognize him?
A. No, I can recognize him because he was the
one who took my shoes.
COURT:
Q. Who?
A. Tangkong, your Honor.
xxx
xxx
xxx" 20
Also straightforward was Ernesto Perez' candid
narration:
"FISCAL CAJAYON:
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. Who else?
A. The last man.
Q. Did you come to know his name?
A. Only his nickname, Tangkong. (Witness
pointed to a man in Court who identified himself
as Jailon Kulais.)
Q. And what was Tangkong doing in the
mountain?
A. The same, guarding us.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. SAHAK
Q. Engr. Perez, you stated that you were
ambushed by nine armed men on your way from
[the] Licomo to [the] Talaga Foot Bridge. What
do you mean by ambushed?
A. I mean that they blocked our way and
stopped.
Q. They did not fire any shots?
A. But they were pointing their guns at us.
Q. And among the 9 armed men who held you on
your way to the Talaga Footbridge, you stated
that one of them was Commander Falcasantos?
A. Yes.
Q. Could you also recognize anyone of the
accused in that group?
A. Yes.
Q. Will you please identify?
A. That one, Tangkong. (The witness pointed to a

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
man sitting in court who identified himself as

Jailon Kulais.)
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. FABIAN
Q. You said Jailon Kulais was among those who
guarded the camp?
FISCAL CAJAYON:
Your Honor, please, he does not know the name
of Julais, he used the word Tangkong.
ATTY. FABIAN
Q. You said Tangkong guarded you. What do you
mean?
A. He guarded us like prisoners. After guarding
us they have their time two hours another will
be on duty guarding us.
Q. Where did you meet Tangkong?
A. He was one of the armed men who kidnapped
us.
xxx
xxx
xxx" 21
It is evident from the foregoing testimonies of
Calunod, Bacarro and Perez that kidnapping or
detention did take place: the five victims were
held, against their will, for fifty-three days
from December 12, 1988 to February 2, 1989. It
is also evident that Appellant Kulais was a
member of the group of armed men who staged
the kidnapping, and that he was one of those who
guarded the victims during the entire period of
their captivity. His participation gives credence
to the conclusion of the trial court that he was a
conspirator.
Kidnapping for Ransom
That the kidnapping of the five was committed
for the purpose of extorting ransom is also
apparent from the testimony of Calunod, who
was quite emphatic in identifying the accused
and narrating the circumstances surrounding the
writing of the ransom letters.
"CP CAJAYON D MS:
Q. Now, you were in their captivity for 54 days

and you said there were these meetings for
possible negotiation with the City Government.
What do you mean by this? What were you
supposed to negotiate?
A. Because they told us that they will be
releasing us only after the terms. 22
Q. And what were the terms? Did you come to
know the terms?
A. I came to know the terms because I was the
one ordered by Commander Falcasantos to write
the letter, the ransom letter.
Q. At this point of time, you remember how
many letters were you asked to write for your
ransom?
A. I could not remember as to how many, but I
can identify them.
Q. Why will you able to identify the same?
A. Because I was the one who wrote it.
Q. And you are familiar, of course, with your
penmanship?
A. Yes.
Q. Now we have here some letters which were
turned over to us by the Honorable City Mayor
Vitaliano Agan. 1,2,3,4,5 - there are five letters
all handwritten.
COURT:
Original?
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Original, your Honor.
Q. And we would like you to go over these and
say, tell us if any of these were the ones you
were asked to write.
A. (Witness going over [letters]) This one, 2
pages. This one, 2 pages. No more.
Q. Aside from the fact that you identified your
penmanship in these letters, what else will make
you remember that these are really the ones you
wrote while there?

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
A. The signature is there.

Q. There is a printed name here, Jessica
Calunod.
A. And over it is a signature.
Q. That is your signature?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. How about in the other letter, did you sign it
also?
A. Yes, there is the other signature.
Q. There are names " other names here " Eddie
Perez, Allan Basa, Armando Bacarro, Felix
Rosario, Jojie Ortuoste and there are signatures
above the same. Did you come up to know who
signed this one?
A. Those whose signatures there were signed by
the persons. [sic]
Q. And we have here at the bottom, Commander
Kamlon Hassan, and there is the signature above
the same. Did you come to know who signed it?
A. [It was] Commander Kamlon Hassan who
signed that.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. Jessica, I am going over this letter . . . Could
you please read to us the portion here which
says the terms? . . .
A. (Witness reading) "Mao ilang gusto nga
andamun na ninyo and kantidad nga P100,000 ug
P14,000 baylo sa 20 sets nga uniforms sa
Biyernes (Pebrero 3, 1989)." 23
xxx
xxx
xxx
INTERPRETER (Translation):
"This is what they like you to prepare[:] the
amount of P100,000.00 and P14,000.00 in
exchange [for] 20 sets of uniform on Friday,
February 3, 1989.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. Now you also earlier identified this other
letter and this is dated January 21, 1988. 24

Now, could you please explain to us why it is
dated January 21 1988 and the other one Enero
31, 1989 or January 31, 1989?
A. I did not realize that I placed 1989, 1988,
but it was 1989.
Q. January 21, 1989?
A. Yes
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. Now, in this letter, were the terms also
mentioned? Please go over this.
A. (Going over the letter) Yes, ma'am.
Q. Could you please read it aloud to us?
A. (Witness reading) "Gusto nila and P100,000.00
ng kapinan nu ug 20 sets nga completong
uniformer (7 colors marine type) wala nay labot
ang sapatos, tunga medium ug tunga large size."
25
xxx
xxx
xxx
INTERPRETER:
"They like the P100,000.00 and an addition of 20
sets of complete uniform (7 colors, marine-type
not including the shoes), one half medium, one
half large."
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. After having written these letters, did you
come to know after [they were] signed by your
companions and all of you, do you know if these
letters were sent? If you know only.
A. I would like to make it clear. The first letter
was ordered to me by Falcasantos to inform the
City Mayor that initial as P500,000.00, and when
we were already - I was asked again to write, we
were ordered to affix our signature to serve as
proof that all of us are alive." 26 [sic]
Calunod's testimony was substantially
corroborated by both Armando Bacarro 27 and
Edilberto Perez. 28 The receipt of the ransom

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
letters, the efforts made to raise and deliver

the ransom, and the release of the hostages
upon payment of the money were testified to by
Zamboanga City Mayor Vitaliano Agan 29 and
Teddy Mejia. 30
The elements of kidnapping for ransom, as
embodied in Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, 31 having been sufficiently proven, and the
appellant, a private individual, having been
clearly identified by the kidnap victims, this
Court thus affirms the trial court's finding of
appellant's guilt on five counts of kidnapping for
ransom.
Kidnapping of Public Officers
Victims Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Monico
Saavedra and Calixto Francisco were members
of the government monitoring team abducted by
appellant's group. The three testified to the
fact of kidnapping; however, they were not able
to identify the appellant. Even so, appellant's
identity as one of the kidnappers was
sufficiently established by Calunod, Bacarro and
Perez, who were with Gara, Saavedra and
Francisco when the abduction occurred.
That Gara, Saavedra and Francisco were
detained for only three hours 32 does not
matter. In People vs. Domasian, 33 the victim
was similarly held for three hours, and was
released even before his parents received the
ransom note. The accused therein argued that
they could not be held guilty of kidnapping as no
enclosure was involved, and that only grave
coercion was committed, if at all. 34 Convicting
appellants of kidnapping or serious illegal
detention under Art. 267 (4) of the Revised
Penal Code, the Court found that the victim, an
eight-year-old boy, was deprived of his liberty
when he was restrained from going home. The
Court justified the conviction by holding that

the offense consisted not only in placing a
person in an enclosure, but also in detaining or
depriving him, in any manner, of his liberty. 35
Likewise, in People vs. Santos, 36 the Court held
that since the appellant was charged and
convicted under Article 267, paragraph 4, it was
not the duration of the deprivation of liberty
which was important, but the fact that the
victim, a minor, was locked up.
Thus, in the present case, the detention of Gara,
Saavedra and Francisco for only a few hours is
immaterial. The clear fact is that the victims
were public officers 37 - Gara was a fiscal
analyst for the City of Zamboanga, Saavedra
worked at the City Engineer's Office, and
Francisco was a barangay councilman at the time
the kidnapping occurred. Appellant Kulais should
be punished, therefore, under Article 267,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, and not
Art. 268, as the trial court held.
The present case is different from People vs.
Astorga, 38 which held that the crime
committed was not kidnapping under Article 267,
paragraph 4, but only grave coercion. The
appellant in that case had tricked his sevenyear-old victim into going with him to a place he
alone knew. His plans, however, were foiled when
a group of people became suspicious and rescued
the girl from him. The Court noted that the
victim's testimony and the other pieces of
evidence did not indicate that the appellant
wanted to detain her, or that he actually
detained her.
In the present case, the evidence presented by
the prosecution indubitably established that the
victims were detained, albeit for a few hours.
There is proof beyond reasonable doubt that
kidnapping took place, and that appellant was a

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
member of the armed group which abducted the

victims.
Third Issue: Denial and Alibi
The appellant's bare denial is a weak defense
that becomes even weaker in the face of the
prosecution witnesses' positive identification of
him. Jurisprudence gives greater weight to the
positive narration of prosecution witnesses than
to the negative testimonies of the defense. 39
Between positive and categorical testimony
which has a ring of truth to it on the one hand,
and a bare denial on the other, the former
generally prevails. 40 Jessica Calunod, Armando
Bacarro and Edilberto Perez testified in a clear,
straightforward and frank manner; and their
testimonies were compatible on material points.
Moreover, no ill motive was attributed to the
kidnap victims and none was found this Court.
We agree with the trial court's observation that
the appellant did not meet the charges against
him head on. His testimony dwelt on what
happened to him on the day he was arrested and
on subsequent days thereafter. Appellant did
not explain where he was during the questioned
dates (December 12, 1988 to February 3, 1989);
neither did he rebut Calunod, Bacarro and Perez,
when they identified him as one of their
kidnappers.
Reclusion Perpetua, Not Life Imprisonment
The trial court erred when it sentenced the
appellant to six terms of life imprisonment. The
penalty for kidnapping with ransom, under the
Revised Penal Code, is reclusion perpetua to
death. Since the crimes happened in 1988, when
the capital penalty was proscribed by the
Constitution, the maximum penalty that could
have been imposed was reclusion perpetua. Life
imprisonment is not synonymous with reclusion
perpetua. Unlike life imprisonment, reclusion

perpetua carries with it accessory penalties
provided in the Revised Penal Code and has a
definite extent or duration. Life imprisonment is
invariably imposed for serious offenses
penalized by special laws, while reclusion
perpetua is prescribed in accordance with the
Revised Penal Code. 41
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Jailon
Kulais as principal in five counts of kidnapping
for ransom and in three counts of kidnapping is
AFFIRMED, but the penalty imposed is hereby
MODIFIED as follows: Appellant is sentenced to
five terms of reclusion perpetua, one for each of
his five convictions for kidnapping for ransom;
and to three terms of reclusion perpetua, one
each for the kidnapping of Public Officers
Virginia Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto
Francisco. Like the other accused who withdrew
their appeals, he is REQUIRED to return the
personal effects, or their monetary value, taken
from the kidnap victims. Additionally, he is
ORDERED to pay the amount of P122,000
representing the ransom money paid to the
kidnappers. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ
., concur.
Q: Anna and Badong were accused of killing Cathy. However,
only Anna was arrested since Badong went in to hiding. After
trial, Anna was acquitted of the charge in a decision rendered by
Judge Santos. Subsequently, Badong was arrested and brought
to trial. After trial, Badong was found guilty of homicide in a
decision rendered by Judge Yantok, the judge who replaced
Judge Santos after the latter retired. On appeal, Badong argues
that Judge Yantok should have taken judicial notice of the
acquittal of Anna rendered by Judge Santos. Is Badong correct?
A: No. The appreciation of one judge of the testimony of a certain
witness is not binding on another judge who heard the testimony of the
same witness on the same matter. Each magistrate who hears the
testimony of a witness is called upon to make his own appreciation of
the evidence. It is, therefore, illogical to argue that because one judge
made a conclusion in a certain way with respect to one or more of the
accused; it necessarily dictates that the succeeding judge who heard
the same case against the other accused should automatically make
the same conclusion (People v. Langit, G.R. Nos. 134757-58, Aug. 4,
2000).

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
Note: All courts must take judicial notice of the decisions of the
Supreme Court as they are duty bound to know the rulings of the
highest tribunal and to apply them in the adjudication of cases,
jurisprudence being a part of our judicial system
POSTSCRIPT ON RULE 129
LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR EVIDENCE
the propriety of taking judicial notice of a certain matter if such matter

is decisive of a material issue in the case.35 This procedure will
apprise the parties of the possibility that the judge will or will not take
judicial notice of a fact, or of his resolution either way; it will thus
eliminate the element of surprise and enable the parties to act
accordingly.
3. Judicial Notice of Proceedings in Another Case
In determining the competency of an offered piece of evidence, the

court must examine the requisites provided by the pertinent rule or law
for its admissibility. These requisites must be established as
foundations for the evidence. For example, for a declaration of an
agent to be admissible against his principal, as an exception to the res
inter alios acta rule,31 the declaration must be: (1) within the scope of
the agents authority; (2) made during the existence of the agency; and
(3) the agency is shown by evidence other than by such declaration.32
If the agents declaration is on a matter outside the scope of his
agency, or is made after the agency had ceased, the agents
declaration cannot be admitted against his principal; the general rule of
res inter alios acta will apply instead.
In the adjudication of a case pending before it, a court is not authorized

to take judicial notice of the contents of another case even if said case
was heard by the same judge. The following are exceptions to this
general rule: (1) when in the absence of any objection, with the
knowledge of the opposing party, the contents of said other case are
clearly referred to by title and number in a pending action and adopted
or read into the record of the latter; or (2) when the original record of
the other case or any part of it is actually withdrawn from the archives
at the courts discretion upon the request, or with the consent, of the
parties, and admitted as part of the record of the pending case.36
Parenthetically, a court will take judicial notice of its own acts and
records in the same case.37
Similarly, the foundation required by the Rules for the proper

presentation of evidence must be laid, lest the evidence be rejected.
For example, when the original of a document is unavailable, before
secondary evidence thereof is admitted, the proponent must establish:
(1) the existence or execution of the original document, and (2) the
circumstances of the loss or destruction of the original, or that the
original cannot be produced in court.
When there is an objection, and the judge therefore cannot take

judicial notice of a testimony or deposition given in another case, the
interested party must present the witness to testify anew. However, if
the witness is already dead or unable to testify (due to a grave cause
almost amounting to death, as when the witness is old and has lost the
power of speech38), his testimony or deposition given in a former case
or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and
subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party
who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.39
A. Judicial Notice
1. Mandatory and Discretionary Judicial Notice
Not everything alleged in a partys pleading is required to be proved.
Certain matters may be so well known to the court that to compel a
party to prove it would be a waste of time and effort.
Under the Rules, it shall be mandatory for the court to take judicial
notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and
territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government
and symbols of nationalities, the law of nations, the admiralty and
maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political Constitution
and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the three departments
of the Philippine government, the laws of nature, the measure of time
and the geographical divisions.33 Courts may take judicial notice of
matters which are: (a) of public knowledge, (b) capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or (c) ought to be known to judges
because of their official functions.34
2. Hearing the Parties on Discretionary Judicial Notice
During the trial, when a court is uncertain whether it may, at its
discretion, take judicial notice of a certain fact or not, it may call the
parties to a hearing to give them a reasonable opportunity to present
information relevant to the propriety or impropriety of taking judicial
notice of that fact. Certainly the so-called "hearing" is not for the
purpose of adducing evidence on that fact. Similarly, even after the trial
and before judgment or on appeal, the court may hear the parties on
If the testimony or deposition given in another proceeding is that of a

party in a case, the other party may simply offer in evidence the record
of that testimony or the deposition without having to call the declarantparty to testify thereon. Certainly, a party will offer the opposing partys
declaration as evidence only if it is prejudicial to the latters interest.
Such declaration of a party against his interest is an extra-judicial
admission which may be given in evidence against him.40
B. Admissions: Judicial And Extra-Judicial
An admission is a partys acknowledgment of a fact which is against
his interest.
A party may make an admission in any of these ways:
1. In written pleadings, motions and other
papers, and stipulations filed in the case.
2. In open court, either by his testimony on
the stand or by his statement or that of his
counsel.

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
3. In his statement made outside the

proceedings in the same case.
In the first two instances above-mentioned, the admissions made are
regarded as judicial admissions. A judicial admission does not require
proof and may be contradicted only by showing that it was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. A
judicial admission need not be offered in evidence since it is not
evidence. It is superior to evidence and shall be considered by the
court as established.
On the other hand, statements made by a party outside the
proceedings in the same case are extrajudicial admissions which may
be an act, declaration or omission made by a party as to a relevant fact
and may be given in evidence against him.41 This type of admission is
regarded as evidence and must be offered as such; otherwise, the
court will not consider it in deciding the case. If the extra-judicial
statement of a party is not against his interest but is in his favor, it
becomes a self-serving declaration which is inadmissible for being
hearsay since it will be testified to by one who simply heard the
statement and has no personal knowledge of it. But it will not be
incompetent evidence, nor self-serving, if testified to by the party
himself at the trial.42
By the rules definition, not all admissions made by a party during a
judicial proceeding are judicial admissions. To qualify, they must be
made and offered in the proceedings in the same case. If made in one
judicial proceeding, but offered in another, they become extrajudicial
admissions for purposes of the latter case. Thus, the declaration of a
defendant in a case that the plaintiff therein is his agent is a judicial
admission of the agency relationship between them if that fact is
against the defendants interest. However, that same admission may
only be an extrajudicial admission if considered in another case
between the same parties.
With more reason, an admission made in a document drafted for
purposes of filing as a pleading in the case but never filed, another
pleading being filed in its stead, is not a judicial admission, for the
unfiled document is not considered a pleading. Whether it would even
be an extrajudicial admission would depend upon whether the
document was signed by the client or only by his attorney. If signed
only by the attorney, it would not be admissible at all, since an attorney
has authority to make statements on behalf of his client only in open
court or in a pleading actually filed.43
In criminal cases, it should be noted that an admission or stipulation
made by the accused during the pre-trial cannot be used in evidence
against him unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his
counsel.44 But this rule does not apply to admissions made in the
course of the trial. Thus, an admission made by an accused or his
counsel during the trial may be used against the accused although not
signed by either of them.45
Admissions in a pleading which had been withdrawn or superseded by
an amended pleading, although filed in the same case, are reduced to
the status of extrajudicial admissions and therefore must be proved by
the party who relies thereon46 by formally offering in evidence the
original pleading containing such extrajudicial admission.47

Consistently, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that 'An
amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it amends. However,
admissions in superseded pleadings may be received in evidence
against the pleader xxx.'48
Since generally a judicial admission does not require proof and cannot
be contradicted, any attempt made by a party to still prove it may be
objected to as immaterial, i.e., not in issue anymore; and any attempt
to adduce evidence in contradiction of that admission may also be
objected to. In either case, the judge may himself block such attempts
as improper departures from the issues of the case. Unless, of course,
it can be shown that the admission was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made at all.
RULE 130
RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY
OBJECT (REAL) EVIDENCE
Real evidence, material evidence or physical evidence is
any material object, introduced in a trial, intended to
prove a fact in issue based on its demonstrable physical
characteristics. Physical evidence can conceivably
[1]
include all or part of any object.
Examples
Examples include the written contract, the defective part
or defective product, the murder weapon, the gloves used
by an alleged murderer.
Trace evidence, such as fingerprints, glove
prints and firearm residue, is also a type of real
evidence. Real evidence is usually reported upon by
anexpert witness with appropriate qualifications to give
an opinion. This normally means a forensic scientist or
one qualified in forensic engineering.
In a murder trial for example (or a civil trial
for assault), the physical evidence might
include biological evidence such as DNA left by the
attacker on the victim's body, the body itself,
the weapon used, pieces of carpet spattered with blood,
or casts of footprints or tire prints found at the scene
of the crime.
Provenance
Admission of real evidence requires authentication,
demonstration of relevance, and a showing that the object
is in the same or substantially the same condition now
as it was on the relevant date. An object of real
evidence is authenticated through witness statements or
by circumstantial evidence called the chain of custody.
Physical and documentary evidence
Evidence that conveys in a different form the same
information that would be conveyed by a piece of physical
evidence is not itself physical evidence. For example, a
diagram comparing a defective part to one that was
properly made is documentary evidenceonly the actual
part, or a replica of the actual part, would be physical
evidence. Similarly, a film of a murder taking place
would not be physical evidence (unless it was introduced
to show that the victims blood had splattered on the

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
film), but documentary evidence (as with a written

4
description of the event from an eyewitness).
RULE 130
Rules of Admissibility
A. OBJECT (REAL) EVIDENCE
Section 1. Object as evidence. ? Objects as
evidence are those addressed to the senses
of the court. When an object is relevant to
the fact in issue, it may be exhibited to,
examined or viewed by the court. (1a)
Objects as evidence are those addressed to the senses
of the court. When an object is relevant to the fact in
issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the
court.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 131516
March 5, 2003

vs.
RONNIE RULLEPA Y GUINTO, accusedappellant.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On complaint of Cyra May Francisco Buenafe,
accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto was
charged with Rape before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City allegedly committed
as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of
November, 1995, in Quezon City,
4
Philippines, the said accused, by means of

force and intimidation, to wit: by then
and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously removing her parity, kissing
her lips and vagina and thereafter
rubbing his penis and inserting the same
to the inner portion of the vagina of the
undersigned complainant, 3 years of age,
a minor, against her will and without her
consent.1
Arraigned on January 15, 1996, accusedappellant pleaded not guilty. 2
From the testimonies of its witnesses, namely
Cyra May,3 her mother Gloria Francisco Buenafe,
Dr. Cristina V. Preyra, and SPO4 Catherine
Borda, the prosecution established the following
facts:
On November 20, 1995, as Gloria was about to
set the table for dinner at her house in Quezon
City, Cyra May, then only three and a half years
old, told her, "Mama, si kuya Ronnie lagay niya
titi niya at sinaksak sa puwit at sa bibig ko."
"Kuya Ronnie" is accused-appellant Ronnie
Rullepa, the Buenafes' house boy, who was
sometimes left with Cyra May at home.
Gloria asked Cyra May how many times accusedappellant did those things to her, to which she
answered many times. Pursuing, Gloria asked
Cyra May what else he did to her, and Cyra May
indicated the room where accused-appellant
slept and pointed at his pillow.
As on the night of November 20, 1995 accusedappellant was out with Gloria's husband Col.
Buenafe,4 she waited until their arrival at past
11:00 p.m. Gloria then sent accused-appellant out
on an errand and informed her husband about
their daughter's plaint. Buenafe thereupon
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Real_evidence
CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
talked to Cyra May who repeated what she had

earlier told her mother Gloria.
When accused-appellant returned, Buenafe and
Gloria verified from him whether what Cyra May
had told them was true. Ronnie readily admitted
doing those things but only once, at 4:00 p.m. of
November 17, 1995 or three days earlier. Unable
to contain her anger, Gloria slapped accusedappellant several times.
Since it was already midnight, the spouses
waited until the following morning to bring
accused-appellant to Camp Karingal where he
admitted the imputations against him, on account
of which he was detained. Gloria's sworn
statement5 was then taken.6
GENITAL:
There is absence of pubic hair. Labia
majora are full, convex and coaptated
with congested and abraded labia
minora presenting in between. On
separating the same is disclosed an
abraded posterior fourchette and an
elastic, fleshy type intact hymen.
External vaginal orifice does not admit
the tip of the examining index finger.
xxx
xxx
xxx
CONCLUSION:
Subject is in virgin state physically.
Recalling what accused-appellant did to her, Cyra

May declared at the witness stand: "Sinaksak
There are no external signs of recent application

of any form of trauma at the time of
examination. (Emphasis supplied.)
to cry. She added that accused-appellant did

these to her twice in his bedroom.
By Dr. Preyra's explanation, the abrasions on

the labia minora could have been caused by
friction with an object, perhaps an erect penis.
She doubted if riding on a bicycle had caused
the injuries.8
nya ang titi sa pepe ko, sa puwit ko, at sa

bunganga," thus causing her pain and drawing her
Dr. Ma. Cristina V. Preyra, the Medico-Legal

Officer and Chief of the Biological Science
Branch of the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory who examined Cyra May, came up
with her report dated November 21,
1995,7containing the following findings and
conclusions:
FINDINGS:
GENERAL AND EXTRA GENITAL:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished and
coherent female child subject. Breasts
are undeveloped. Abdomen is flat and
soft.
The defense's sole witness was accusedappellant, who was 28 and single at the time he
took the witness stand on June 9, 1997. He
denied having anything to do with the abrasions
found in Cyra May's genitalia, and claimed that
prior to the alleged incident, he used to be
ordered to buy medicine for Cyra May who had
difficulty urinating. He further alleged that
after he refused to answer Gloria's queries if
her husband Buenafe, whom he usually
accompanied whenever he went out of the house,
was womanizing, Gloria would always find fault in
him. He suggested that Gloria was behind the
filing of the complaint. Thus:

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
q
According to them you caused the
abrasions found in her genital?
a That is not true, sir,
q
If that is not true, what is the truth?
a As I have mentioned earlier that before I
started working with the family I was sent to
Crame to buy medicine for the daughter because
she had difficulty in urinating.
q
Did you know why the child has difficulty
in urinating?
a No, I do not know, sir.
q
And how about the present complaint
filed against you, the complaint filed by the
mother of the victim?
a I did not do it, sir.
q
What is the truth, what can you say about
this present complaint filed against you?
a As I said Mrs. Buenafe got mad at me because
after I explained to her that I was going with
her gusband (sic) to the children of the husband
with a former marriage.9
Finding for the prosecution, Branch 96 of the
Quezon City RTC rendered judgment, the
finding accused RONNIE RULLEPA y GUINTO
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape, and he is
accordingly sentenced to death.
The accused is ordered to pay CYRA MAE
BUENAFE the amount of P40,000.00 as civil
indemnity.
Costs to be paid by the accused.10 (Italics in the
original.)
Hence, this automatic review, accused-appellant
assigning the following errors to the trial court:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN
CONSIDERING AS ADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT'S ADMISSION.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED ON (sic)
RULING THAT THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT'S SILENCE DURING TRIAL
AMOUNTED TO AN IMPLIED
ADMISSION OF GUILT.
III
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME
CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
IV
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF
DEATH UPON THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT.11 (Emphasis supplied.)
Accused-appellant assails the crediting by the
trial court, as the following portion of its
decision shows, of his admission to Gloria of
having sexually assaulted Cyra May:
In addition, the mother asserted that
Rullepa had admitted Cyra Ma[y]'s
complaint during the confrontation in the
house. Indeed, according to the mother,
the admission was even
expressly qualified by Rullepa's insistence
that he had committed the sexual
assault only once, specifying the time
thereof as 4:00 pm of November 17,
1995. That qualification proved that the
admission was voluntary and true. An
uncoerced and truthful admission like this
should be absolutely admissible and

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
competent.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Remarkably, the admission was not denied

by the accused during trial despite his
freedom to deny it if untrue. Hence, the
admission became conclusive upon
him.12 (Emphasis supplied.)
To accused-appellant, the statements attributed
to him are inadmissible since they were made out
of fear, having been elicited only after Cyra
May's parents "bullied and questioned him." He
thus submits that it was error for the trial
court to take his failure to deny the statements
during the trial as an admission of guilt.
Accused-appellant's submission does not
persuade. The trial court considered his
admission merely as anadditional ground to
convince itself of his culpability. Even if such
admission, as well as the implication of his
failure to deny the same, were disregarded, the
evidence suffices to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The plain, matter-of-fact manner by which Cyra
May described her abuse in the hands of
her Kuya Ronnie is an eloquent testament to the
truth of her accusations. Thus she testified on
direct examination:
q
Do you recall if Ronnie Rullepa did
anything to you?
a
Yes, sir.
q
What did he do to you?
a
"Sinaksak nya ang titi sa pepe ko, sa puwit
ko, at sa bunganga"
q
How many times did he do that to you?
a
Twice, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
q
Do you remember when he did these
things to you?
a
Opo.
q
When was that?
a
When my mother was asleep, he put he
removed my panty and inserted his penis inside
my vagina, my anus and my mouth, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
q
After your Kuya Ronnie did those things
to you what did you feel?
a
"Sabi nya ganito (Witness putting her
finger in her lips) Nasaktan po ako at umiyak po
ako".
q
Did you cry because of hurt?
a
Yes.
q
What part of your body hurt?
a
"Pepe ko po." When I went to the
bathroom to urinate, I felt pain in my organ,
sir.13
Cyra May reiterated her testimony during crossexamination, providing more revolting details of
her ordeal:
q
So, you said that Kuya Ronnie did
something to you what did he do to you on
November 17, 1995?
a
"Sinaksak nga yong titi nya". He inserted
his penis to my organ and to my mouth, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
q
When you said that your kuya Ronnie
inserted his penis into your organ, into your
mouth, and into your anus, would you describe
what his penis?
a
It is a round object, sir.
Court:
Is this titi of your kuya Ronnie a part of his
body?
a
Opo.
q
Was that in the head of kuya Ronnie?
a
No, sir.
q
Which part of his body that titi located?
(Witness pointing to her groin area)
Court:
Continue

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
xxx
xxx
xxx
q
Why were you in that room?
a
Gusto nya po matulog ako sa kuwarto niya.
q
When you were in that room, what did
Kuya Ronnie do to you?
a
"Hinubo po niya ang panty ko."
q
And after he remove your panty, what did
Kuya Ronnie do, what did he do to you?
a
He inserted his penis to my organ, sir.
q
Why did kuya Ronnie, was kuya Ronnie
already naked or he was already wearing any
clothing?
a
Still had his clothing on, sir.
q
So, where did his penis, saan lumabas ang
penis ni Kuya Ronnie?
a
Dito po, (Witness referring or pointing to
her groin area)
xxx
xxx
xxx
q
So, that's the and at the time, you did
not cry and you did not shout for help?
a
Sabi nya po, not to make any noise
because my mother might be roused from sleep.
q
How long was kuya Ronnie did that to you?
a
Matagal po.
q
After kuya Ronnie scrub his penis to your
vagina, what other things did he do?
a
After that he inserted his penis to my
mouth, and to my anus, sir.
q
You did not complain and you did not
shout?
a
I cried, sir.14
Accused-appellant draws attention to the
statement of Cyra May that he was not in the
house on November 17 (1995), as reflected in
the following transcript of her testimony:
q
Is it not a fact that you said a while ago
that when your father leaves the house, he [was]
usually accompanied by your kuya Ronnie?
a
Opo.
q
Why is it that Kuya Ronnie was in the
house when your father left the house at that
time, on November 17?
a
He was with Kuya Ronnie, sir.
q
So, it is not correct that kuya Ronnie did
something to you because your kuya Ronnie [was]
always with your Papa?
a
Yes, sir.15
The above-quoted testimony of Cyra May does
not indicate the time when her father Col.
Buenafe left their house on November 17, 1995
with accused-appellant and, thus, does not
preclude accused-appellant's commission of rape
on the same date. In any event, a young child is
vulnerable to suggestion, hence, her affirmative
response to the defense counsel's abovequoted leading questions.
As for the variance in the claim regarding when
Gloria was informed of the rape, Gloria having
testified that she learned of it on November 20,
199516 while Cyra May said that immediately
after the incident, she awakened her mother
who was in the adjacent room and reported
it:17 This is a minor matter that does not detract
from Cyra May's categorical, material testimony
that accused-appellant inserted his penis into
her vagina.
Accused-appellant goes on to contend that Cyra
May was coached, citing the following portion of
her testimony:
q
"Yong sinabi mong sinira nya ang
buhay mo," where did you get that
phrase?
a
It was the word of my Mama, sir.18
On the contrary, the foregoing testimony

indicates that Cyra May was really narrating the
truth, that of hearing her mother utter " sinira
niya ang buhay mo."
Accused-appellant's suggestion that Cyra May

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
merely imagined the things of which he is

accused, perhaps getting the idea from
television programs, is preposterous. It is true
that "the ordinary child is a `great weaver of
romances,"' and her "imagination may induce
(her) to relate something she has heard or read
in a story as personal experience." 19 But Cyra
May's account is hardly the stuff of romance or
fairy tales. Neither is it normal TV fare, if at all.
This Court cannot believe that a victim of Cyra
May's age could concoct a tale of defloration,
allow the examination of her private parts, and
undergo the expense, trouble, inconvenience, not
to mention the trauma of public trial." 20
Besides, her testimony is corroborated by the
findings of Dr. Preyra that there were abrasions
in her labia minora, which she opined, could have
been caused by friction with an erect penis.
This Court thus accords great weight to the
following assessment of the trial court regarding
the competency and credibility of Cyra May as a
witness:
Her very tender age notwithstanding,
Cyra Ma(y) nonetheless appeared to
possess the necessary intelligence and
perceptiveness sufficient to invest her
with the competence to testify about her
experience. She might have been an
impressionable child as all others of
her age are but her narration
of KuyaRonnie's placing his "titi" in her
"pepe" was certainly one which could not
be considered as a common child's tale.
Her responses during the examination of
counsel and of the Court established her
consciousness of
the distinction between good and bad,
which rendered inconceivable for her to
describe a "bad" act of the accused
unless it really happened to her. Needless

to state, she described the act of the
accused as bad. Her demeanor as a
witness manifested during trial by her
unhesitant, spontaneous, and plain
responses to questions further
enhanced her claim to credit and
trustworthiness.21 (Italics in the original.)
In a futile attempt at exculpation, accusedappellant claims that even before the alleged
incident Cyra May was already suffering from
pain in urinating. He surmises that she could
have scratched herself which caused the
abrasions. Dr. Preyra, however, was quick to rule
out this possibility. She stated categorically
that that part of the female organ is very
sensitive and rubbing or scratching it is
painful.22 The abrasions could not, therefore,
have been self-inflicted.
That the Medical-Legal Officer found "no
external signs of recent application of any form
of trauma at the time of the examination" does
not preclude accused-appellant's conviction since
the infliction of force is immaterial in statutory
rape.23
More. That Cyra May suffered pain in her vagina
but not in her anus despite her testimony that
accused-appellant inserted his penis in both
orifices does not diminish her credibility. It is
possible that accused-appellant's penis failed to
penetrate her anus as deeply as it did her
vagina, the former being more resistant to
extreme forces than the latter.
Accused-appellant's imputation of ill motive on
the part of Gloria is puerile. No mother in her
right mind would subject her child to the
humiliation, disgrace and trauma attendant to a
prosecution for rape if she were not motivated
solely by the desire to incarcerate the person

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
responsible for the child's defilement. 24 Courts

are seldom, if at all, convinced that a mother
would stoop so low as to subject her daughter to
physical hardship and shame concomitant to a
rape prosecution just to assuage her own hurt
feelings.25
Alternatively, accused-appellant prays that he
be held liable for acts of lasciviousness instead
of rape, apparently on the basis of the following
testimony of Cyra May, quoted verbatim, that he
merely "scrubbed" his penis against her vagina:
q
Is it not a fact that kuya Ronnie
just made some scrubbed his penis into
your vagina?
a
Art. 335. When and how rape is

committed. Rape is committed by
having carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
xxx
xxx
xxx.
3. When the woman is under twelve

years of age . . .
xxx
xxx
xxx.
The crime of rape shall be punished

by reclusion perpetua.
Yes, Sir.
q
And when he did not actually
penetrated your vagina?
a
The victim's age is relevant in rape cases since it

may constitute an element of the offense.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659,29 provides:
Yes, sir.26
Dr. Preyra, however, found abrasions in the labia

minora, which is "directly beneath the labia
majora,"27 proving that there was indeed
penetration of the vagina, not just a mere
rubbing or "scrubbing" of the penis against its
surface.
In fine, the crime committed by accusedappellant is not merely acts of lasciviousness but
statutory rape.
The two elements of statutory rape are (1) that
the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman,
and (2) that the woman is below twelve years of
age.28 As shown in the previous discussion, the
first element, carnal knowledge, had been
established beyond reasonable doubt. The same
is true with respect to the second element.
xxx
xxx
xxx.
Furthermore, the victim's age may constitute

a qualifying circumstance, warranting the
imposition of the death sentence. The same
Article states:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if
the crime of rape is committed with any
of the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18)
years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity with
the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim:
xxx
xxx
xxx.
4. when the victim is . . . a child below

seven (7) years old.

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
xxx
xxx
xxx.
Because of the seemingly conflicting decisions

regarding the sufficiency of evidence of the
victim's age in rape cases, this Court, in the
recently decided case of People v.
Pruna,30 established a set of guidelines in
appreciating age as an element of the crime or
as a qualifying circumstance, to wit:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of
the offended party is an original or
certified true copy of the certificate of
live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live
birth, similar authentic documents such
as baptismal certificate and school
records which show the date of birth of
the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or
authentic document is shown to have been
lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and
credible, of the victim's mother or a
member of the family either by affinity
or consanguinity who is qualified to
testify on matters respecting pedigree
such as the exact age or date of birth of
the offended party pursuant to Section
40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be
below 3 years of age and what is
sought to be proved is that she is
less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12
years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 18 years
old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live
birth, authentic document, or the
testimony of the victim's mother or
relatives concerning the victim's age, the
complainant's testimony will suffice
provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the
burden of proving the age of the
offended party. The failure of the
accused to object to the testimonial
evidence regarding age shall not be taken
against him.
6. The trial court should always make a
categorical finding as to the age of the
victim.
Applying the foregoing guidelines, this Court in
the Pruna case held that the therein accusedappellant could only be sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua since:
. . . no birth certificate or any similar
authentic document, such as a baptismal
certificate of LIZETTE, was presented
to prove her age. . . . .
xxx
xxx
xxx.
However, the Medico-Legal Report relied

upon by the trial court does not in any
way prove the age of LIZETTE, for there
is nothing therein which even mentions
her age. Only testimonial evidence was

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
presented to establish LIZETTE's age.

Her mother, Jacqueline, testified (that
the victim was three years old at the
time of the commission of the crime).
xxx
xxx
xxx
Likewise, LIZETTE testified on 20

November 1996, or almost two years
after the incident, that she was 5 years
old. However, when the defense counsel
asked her how old she was on 3 January
1995, or at the time of the rape, she
replied that she was 5 years old. Upon
further question as to the date she was
born, she could not answer.
For PRUNA to be convicted of rape in its
qualified form and meted the supreme
penalty of death, it must be established
with certainty that LIZETTE was below 7
years old at the time of the commission
of the crime. It must be stressed that
the severity of the death penalty,
especially its irreversible and final nature
once carried out, makes the decisionmaking process in capital offenses aptly
subject to the most exacting rules of
procedure and evidence.
In view of the uncertainty of LIZETTE's
exact age, corroborative evidence such as
her birth certificate, baptismal
certificate or any other authentic
document should be introduced in
evidence in order that the qualifying
circumstance of "below seven (7) years
old" is appreciated against the appellant.
The lack of objection on the part of the
defense as to her age did not excuse the
prosecution from discharging its burden.
That the defense invoked LIZETTE's
tender age for purposes of questioning
her competency to testify is not

necessarily an admission that she was
below 7 years of age when PRUNA raped
her on 3 January 1995. Such being the
case, PRUNA cannot be convicted of
qualified rape, and hence the death
penalty cannot be imposed on him.
However, conformably with no. 3 (b) of
the foregoing guidelines, the testimony of
LIZETTE's mother that she was 3 years
old at the time of the commission of the
crime is sufficient for purposes of
holding PRUNA liable for statutory rape,
or rape of a girl below 12 years of age.
Under the second paragraph of Article
335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, in
relation to no. 3 of the first paragraph
thereof, having carnal knowledge of a
woman under 12 years of age is punishable
by reclusion perpetua. Thus, the penalty
to be imposed on PRUNA should
be reclusion perpetua, and not death
penalty. (Italics in the original.)
Several cases31 suggest that courts may take
"judicial notice" of the appearance of the victim
in determining her age. For example, the Court,
in People v. Tipay,32 qualified the ruling in People
v. Javier,33 which required the presentation of
the birth certificate to prove the rape victim's
age, with the following pronouncement:
This does not mean, however, that the
presentation of the certificate of birth
is at all times necessary to prove
minority. The minority of a victim of
tender age who may be below the age of
ten is quite manifest and the court can
take judicial notice thereof. The crucial
years pertain to the ages of fifteen to
seventeen where minority may seem to be
dubitable due to one's physical

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
appearance. In this situation, the

prosecution has the burden of proving
with certainty the fact that the victim
was under 18 years of age when the rape
was committed in order to justify the
imposition of the death penalty under the
above-cited provision. (Emphasis
supplied.)
On the other hand, a handful of cases34 holds
that courts, without the requisite hearing
prescribed by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules
of Court,35 cannot take judicial notice of the
victim's age.
Judicial notice signifies that there are certain
"facta probanda," or propositions in a party's
case, as to which he will not be required to offer
evidence; these will be taken for true by the
tribunal without the need of evidence.36Judicial
notice, however, is a phrase sometimes used in a
loose way to cover some other judicial action.
Certain rules of Evidence, usually known under
other names, are frequently referred to in
terms of judicial notice.37
The process by which the trier of facts judges a
person's age from his or her appearance cannot
be categorized as judicial notice. Judicial notice
is based upon convenience and expediency for it
would certainly be superfluous, inconvenient, and
expensive both to parties and the court to
require proof, in the ordinary way, of facts
which are already known to
courts.38 As Tundag puts it, it "is the cognizance
of certain facts which judges may properly take
and act on without proof because they already
know them." Rule 129 of the Rules of Court,
where the provisions governing judicial notice
are found, is entitled "What Need Not Be
Proved." When the trier of facts observes the
appearance of a person to ascertain his or her
age, he is not taking judicial notice of such fact;
rather, he is conducting an examination of the

evidence, the evidence being the appearance of
the person. Such a process militates against the
very concept of judicial notice, the object of
which is to do away with the presentation of
evidence.
This is not to say that the process is not
sanctioned by the Rules of Court; on the
contrary, it does. A person's appearance, where
relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the
same being addressed to the senses of the
court. Section 1, Rule 130 provides:
SECTION 1. Object as evidence.
Objects as evidence are those addressed
to the senses of the court. When an
object is relevant to the fact in issue, it
may be exhibited to, examined or viewed
by the court.
"To be sure," one author writes, "this practice
of inspection by the court of objects, things
or persons relevant to the fact in dispute, has
its roots in ancient judicial procedure." 39 The
author proceeds to quote from another
authority:
"Nothing is older or commoner in the
administration of law in all countries than
the submission to the senses of the
tribunal itself, whether judge or jury, of
objects which furnish evidence. The view
of the land by the jury, in real actions, of
a wound by the judge where mayhem was
alleged, and of the person of one
alleged to be an infant, in order to fix
his age, the inspection and comparison of
seals, the examination of writings, to
determine, whether they are
(`)blemished,(') the implements with
which a crime was committed or of a
person alleged, in a bastardy proceeding,

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
to be the child of another, are few

illustrations of what may be found
abundantly in our own legal records and
textbooks for seven centuries
past."40 (Emphasis supplied.)
A person's appearance, as evidence of age (for
example, of infancy, or of being under the age
of consent to intercourse), is usually regarded
as relevant; and, if so, the tribunal may properly
observe the person brought before
it.41 Experience teaches that corporal
appearances are approximately an index of the
age of their bearer, particularly for the marked
extremes of old age and youth. In every case
such evidence should be accepted and weighed
for what it may be in each case worth. In
particular, the outward physical appearance of
an alleged minor may be considered in judging his
age; a contrary rule would for such an inference
be pedantically over-cautious.42Consequently, the
jury or the court trying an issue of fact may be
allowed to judge the age of persons in court by
observation of such persons.43 The formal offer
of the person as evidence is not necessary. The
examination and cross-examination of a party
before the jury are equivalent to exhibiting him
before the jury and an offer of such person as
an exhibit is properly refused.44
This Court itself has sanctioned the
determination of an alien's age from his
appearance. In Braca v. Collector of
Customs,45 this Court ruled that:
The customs authorities may also determine
from the personal appearance of the immigrant
what his age is. The person of a Chinese alien
seeking admission into the Philippine Islands is
evidence in an investigation by the board of
special inquiry to determine his right to enter;
and such body may take into consideration his
appearance to determine or assist in determining
his age and a finding that the applicant is not a

minor based upon such appearance is not without
evidence to support it.
This Court has also implicitly recognized the
same process in a criminal case. Thus, in United
States v. Agadas,46this Court held:
Rosario Sabacahan testified that he was
17 years of age; that he had never
purchased a cedula; and that he was going
to purchase a cedula the following
January. Thereupon the court asked this
defendant these questions: "You are a
pretty big boy for seventeen." Answer: "I
cannot tell exactly because I do not
remember when I was born, but 17 years
is my guess." Court: "If you are going to
take advantage of that excuse, you had
better get some positive evidence to that
effect." Answer: "I do not remember, as
I already stated on what date and in what
year I was born." The court, in
determining the question of the age of
the defendant, Rosario Sabacahan, said:
"The defendant, Rosario
Sabacahan, testified that he
thought that he was about 17
years of age, butjudging by his
appearance he is a youth 18 or 19
years old. He has shown that he
has no positive information on the
subject and no effort was made by
the defense to prove the fact that
he is entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of article 9,
paragraph 2, of the Penal code,
which fact it is held to be
incumbent upon the defense to
establish by satisfactory evidence
in order to enable the court to
give an accused person the benefit

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
of the mitigating circumstance."

In United States vs. Estavillo and Perez
(10 Off. Gaz., 1984) Estavillo testified,
when the case was tried in the court
below, that he then was only 16 years of
age. There was no other testimony in the
record with reference to his age. But the
trial judge said: "The accused Estavillo,
notwithstanding his testimony giving his
age as 16 years, is, as a matter of fact,
not less than 20." This court, in passing
upon the age of Estavillo, held:
"We presume that the trial court
reached this conclusion with
reference to the age of Estavillo
from the latter's personal
appearance. There is no proof in
the record, as we have said, which
even tends to establish the
assertion that this appellant
understated his age. . . . It is true
that the trial court had an
opportunity to note the personal
appearance of Estavillo for the
purpose of determining his age,
and by so doing reached the
conclusion that he was at least 20,
just two years over 18. This
appellant testified that he was
only 16, and this testimony stands
uncontradicted. Taking into
consideration the marked
difference in the penalties to be
imposed upon that age, we must,
therefore, conclude (resolving all
doubts in favor of the appellants)
that the appellants' ages were 16
and 14 respectively."
While it is true that in the instant case
Rosario testified that he was 17 years of
age, yet the trial court reached the

conclusion, judging from the personal
appearance of Rosario, that "he is a youth
18 or 19 years old." Applying the rule
enunciated in the case just cited, we must
conclude that there exists a reasonable
doubt, at least, with reference to the
question whether Rosario was, in fact 18
years of age at the time the robbery was
committed. This doubt must be resolved
in favor of the defendant, and he is,
therefore, sentenced to six months
of arresto mayor in lieu of six years ten
months and one day of presidio mayor. . . .
.
There can be no question, therefore, as to
the admissibility of a person's appearance in
determining his or her age. As to the weight to
accord such appearance, especially in rape
cases, Pruna laid down guideline no. 3, which is
again reproduced hereunder:
3. If the certificate of live birth or
authentic document is shown to have been
lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and
credible, of the victim's mother or a
member of the family either by affinity
or consanguinity who is qualified to
testify on matters respecting pedigree
such as the exact age or date of birth of
the offended party pursuant to Section
40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be
b. If the victim is alleged to be

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca

c. If the victim is alleged to be
less than 18 years old.
Under the above guideline, the testimony of a
relative with respect to the age of the victim is
sufficient to constitute proof beyond reasonable
doubt in cases (a), (b) and (c) above. In such
cases, the disparity between the allegation and
the proof of age is so great that the court can
easily determine from the appearance of the
victim the veracity of the testimony. The
appearance corroborates the relative's
testimony.
As the alleged age approaches the age sought to
be proved, the person's appearance, as object
evidence of her age, loses probative value. Doubt
as to her true age becomes greater and,
following Agadas, supra, such doubt must be
resolved in favor of the accused.
This is because in the era of modernism
and rapid growth, the victim's mere
physical appearance is not enough to
gauge her exact age. For the extreme
penalty of death to be upheld, nothing
but proof beyond reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the
crime must be substantiated. Verily, the
minority of the victim should be not only
alleged but likewise proved with equal
certainty and clearness as the crime
itself. Be it remembered that the proof
of the victim's age in the present case
spells the difference between life and
death.47
In the present case, the prosecution did not

offer the victim's certificate of live birth or
similar authentic documents in evidence. The
victim and her mother, however, testified that
she was only three years old at the time of the
rape. Cyra May's testimony goes:
q
Your name is Cyra Mae is that correct?
a
Yes, sir.
q
And you are 3 years old?
a
Yes, sir.48
That of her mother goes:
Q
How old was your daughter when there
things happened?
A
3 and years old.
Q
When was she born?
A
In Manila, May 10, 1992.49
Because of the vast disparity between the
alleged age (three years old) and the age sought
to be proved (below twelve years), the trial
court would have had no difficulty ascertaining
the victim's age from her appearance. No
reasonable doubt, therefore, exists that the
second element of statutory rape, i.e., that the
victim was below twelve years of age at the time
of the commission of the offense, is present.
Whether the victim was below seven years old,
however, is another matter. Here, reasonable
doubt exists. A mature three and a half-year old
can easily be mistaken for an underdeveloped
seven-year old. The appearance of the victim, as
object evidence, cannot be accorded much
weight and, following Pruna, the testimony of the
mother is, by itself, insufficient.
As it has not been established with moral
certainty that Cyra May was below seven years
old at the time of the commission of the
offense, accused-appellant cannot be sentenced
to suffer the death penalty. Only the penalty

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
of reclusion perpetua can be imposed upon him.

In line with settled jurisprudence, the civil
indemnity awarded by the trial court is
increased to P50,000.00. In addition, Cyra May
is entitled to an award of moral damages in the
amount of P50,000.00.50
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 96,
is AFFIRMED withMODIFICATION. Accusedappellant Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto is
found GUILTY of Statutory Rape, defined and
punished by Article 335 (3) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, and is sentenced to suffer
the penalty ofreclusion perpetua. He is ordered
to pay private complainant, Cyra May Buenafe y
Francisco, the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug,

Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, SandovalGutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr.,
and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago and Corona, JJ ., are on leave.
_ Classification of Object Evidence

a. That which consists in the exhibition or
production of the object inside or outside the courtroom,
b. That which consists in the inspection of the object outside the
courtroom (ocular inspection), and
c. That which consists in the making of an experiment
_ Requisites for Admissibility:
a. The object must be relevant to the fact in
issue; and
b. The object must be authenticated before it is admitted.
Rules:
1. Instances when Exhibition Maybe
Dispensed with
a. Where the presentation is violative of decency.
b. Where the presentation has no purpose other than to arouse the
passion of the court towards the party against whom it is offered in
evidence.
c. When the object is repulsive or offensive to the sensibilities.
d. Where, in the discretion of the court, the production of evidence
will cause great inconvenience, or where, for other reasons, it is unjust.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 121979 March 2, 1998
vs.
SAMUEL ULZORON, accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
SAMUEL ULZORON was charged with rape with
the use of a deadly weapon. Complaining witness
was Emily Gabo. On 8 March 1995 the trial court
adjudged him guilty as charged and sentenced
him to reclusion perpetua. 1 No indemnity was
awarded to Emily for the sexual assault.
On 31 March 1987, at around 10:00 o'clock in
the morning, Emily was watering her plants near
a well in Brgy. Tumarbong, Roxas, Palawan, when
Samuel suddenly appeared. He was armed with a
2-foot long bolo hanging in its scabbard around
his waist with a long-sleeved work shirt slung
over his shoulder. He asked Emily where her
husband was. She replied that Roberto was
already in the kaingin so she advised him to
follow her husband there. But Samuel opted to
remain and rest on an anthill some two and a half
(2-1/2) meters from the well. 2
After Emily finished watering her plants and
before she could start washing clothes, Samuel
grabbed her wrists and locked them with one
hand behind her back with the other hand
drawing his bolo and pointing it at her neck. She
struggled to free herself from his hold but was
so intimidated with the bolo that she could not

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
shout for help; she lost her strength eventually.

After she weakened, he dragged her some forty
(40) meters away to the bushes and tall grasses.
He forced her to lie down; then he mounted her.
He laid his bolo beside him, pinned her arms with
one hand, and with the other, loosened the
buttons of her dress. Emily could only struggle in
vain until he ripped off her dress and panties.
He opened the zipper of his pants and then
inserted his penis to her vagina. He copulated
with her for about fifteen (15) minutes. She did
everything to disengage herself from the sexual
imbroglio but her efforts proved no match to his
strength. 3
At this moment, Emily heard her husband's voice
calling for her. Roberto was now somewhere
within the vicino. He saw Emily's slippers near
the well so he franctically hollered, "Baby!" She
answered back. When Roberto's voice was heard
by Samuel, he dashed off and fled to the
thickets. 4
Roberto followed the direction of Emily's voice
until he saw her emerge from the thick hushes.
She was in a state of shock. He asked her what
happened and she told him that she was sexually
abused by Samuel Ulzoron. Emily pointed
Roberto to the place where she was dragged and
raped. Together they went there and found
Ulzoron's bolo and work shirt and took them
home. 5
The following afternoon, Emily went to Dr.
Feliciano M. Velasco Jr. for physical examination.
The doctor noted the discharge mixed with
semen in her private part. He opined that it
could have been caused by sexual intercourse
within twenty-four (24) hours prior to his
examination. He found her cervix to be parous
with superficial erosions. Her hymen was
obliterated with caruncles. 6 The next day Emily
lodged a complaint for rape against Samuel
Ulzoron as she turned over his belongings to the

police authorities as her evidence in support
thereof. 7
Ulzoron had his own story to tell. He said that on
the day of the incident he saw Emily at the well.
She told him that work in the kaingin would be in
the afternoon yet so she advised him to come
back. Since he was returning in the afternoon,
he decided to leave his bolo and work shirt near
the well. However, at around 10:00 o'clock that
morning, as he was about to retrieve his bolo and
shirt, he saw the Gabo spouses having sexual
intercourse in a hut with a wall only on one side.
As he was ashamed to be seen by them he
proceeded instead to the house of a relative. 8
On the strength of the testimony of Emily Gabo,
the trial court convicted the accused. It found
her testimony straightforward and credible. It
rationalized that she would not have filed her
complaint for rape if her accusations were not
true, for to do so would only expose herself to
public shame or ridicule. No improper motive on
her part to file the case had been shown. The
findings of the examining physician also lent
credence to her claim. On the other hand, the
trial court found the defense of the accused too
weak, anemic, for if Ulzoron really felt
embarrassed to be seen by the Gabo spouses, he
could have taken a detour or passed another way
to get back his bolo and work shirt. Besides, it
was never established that the Gabos had so
much yearning for each other that they had to
indulge in sexual congress in a hut that was open
to public view and at such an unlikely hour. 9
Appellant concedes, even as he assails his
conviction, that his defense is inherently weak.
Nevertheless, he faults the trial court for
convicting him on the basis of his defense. He
argues that the undisputed facts and
circumstances made it more likely that Emily was

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
involved in an adulterous relationship with

him. 10 He claims, for instance, that there was
absolutely nothing to support the victim's claim
of struggle, and that while he allegedly dragged
her forty (40) meters away before assaulting
her sexually, the examining physician could not
conclude that physical force was actually
inflicted since she did not sustain any physical
injuries. 11 Another point raised by the defense
is her testimony that while he was on top of her
his bolo was beside him. The plain import of such
testimony, according to the accused, is that the
bolo was not a necessary instrument in the
commission of the crime. 12 He also invites
attention to the circumstance that the judge
who wrote the decision did not personally try
the case and therefore lacked the opportunity
to observe the demeanor of the parties and
their witnesses. 13
The arguments of appellant are unpersuasive;
they fail to convince us. Contrary to his claim
that he was convicted because of his weak
defense, his conviction was actually founded on
the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution.
With regard to his claim that he had an
adulterous relationship with the victim, the
Office of the Solicitor General observed that
such claim was a radical departure from the
defense of denial he raised at the trial. The
OSG observed further that the "sweetheart
defense" was being raised for the first time in
this appeal hence should be disallowed
conformably with established
jurisprudence. 14 Here, the Court does not
necessarily agree. Appellant could only be
emphasizing the point that the facts and
circumstances established could lead to a
conclusion of the existence of adulterous
relationship between him and Emily and not of
rape. In other words, appellant could be utilizing
the "sweetheart theory" not necessarily as a
defense but as a focal point in disputing the

appreciation by the trial court of the evidence
for the prosecution. Thus, this course taken by
the defense may not be totally disregarded.
The term "dragged" should not indeed be taken
in the meaning understood by appellant as
"dragged along on the ground." When asked on
cross-examination by the defense counsel to
"describe how she and appellant traveled at ( sic)
forty (40) meters distance," 15 she said, "He was
holding my hands and at the same time he is
(sic) pushing me forward." 16 This testimony
adequately explains the absence of injuries in
her body. At any rate, it is not necessary for the
commission of rape that there be marks of
physical violence on the victim's body. 17 While
Emily repeatedly mentioned her struggles to be
released from his grasp, such efforts need not
always result in physical injuries. 18 Besides, they
did not refer to the circumstances when she was
being dragged by the accused, but to the
circumstances when he initially grabbed her
hands, 19 when he was on top of her, 20 when he
was undressing her, 21 and when she was exerting
efforts to disengage herself from the sexual
anchorage. 22
Intimidation may be of the moral kind, e.g., the
fear caused by threatening a woman with a
knife. 23 There was sufficient intimidation when
appellant pointed his 2-foot long bolo at Emily's
neck while they were near the well until they
reached the spot where she was finally abused.
This intimidation continued even after he
positioned himself on top of her and placed the
bolo beside him since he was at liberty to point
it anew at her neck or any part of her body.
Anyway, the significant consideration is that, as
aforementioned, the intimidation was continuous
as to sufficiently engender fear in her mind. 24
The circumstance that the judge who wrote the

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
decision had not heard the testimonies of the

prosecution witnesses does not taint or disturb
his decision. After all, he had the records of the
case before him including the transcript of
stenographic notes. The validity of a decision is
not necessarily impaired by the fact that its
writer only took over from a colleague who had
earlier presided at the trial unless there is a
clear showing of grave abuse of discretion in the
appreciation of the facts, 25and none exists in
the present case. The records amply support the
factual findings of the trial court and its
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses.
The circumstances of force and intimidation
attending the instant case were manifested
clearly not only in the victim's testimony but
also in the physical evidence presented during
the trial consisting of her torn dress and
underwear as well as the medico-legal report.
Such pieces of evidence indeed are more
eloquent than a hundred witnesses. 26 The fact
of carnal knowledge is not disputed. It was
positively established through the offended
party's own testimony and corroborated by that
of her examining physician.
Moreover, the conduct of the complaining
witness immediately following the assault clearly
established the truth of her charge that she
was raped by accused-appellant. 27 Consequently,
we agree with the observation of the OSG that
Emily's actuations following her misfortune,
namely, her revelation to her husband of her
violation by the accused and subjecting her
private parts immediately to medical
examination, as well as the filing of her
complaint for rape immediately thereafter are
consistent with her straightforward, logical,
truthful and credible testimony thus rebutting
any insinuation of voluntariness on her part to
the sexual confrontation; rather, they only
display a moral certainty of his culpability for
the crime charged.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from
finding accused-appellant SAMUEL ULZORON
guilty of rape and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua is AFFIRMED. In addition, he is
ordered to indemnify his victim Emily Gabo the
amount of P50,000.00, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 118816 July 10, 1998

SANTIAGO ARGONCILLO, RICHARDO
BALBONA and POLICARPIO
UMITEN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas
City, Branch 15, 2 finding petitioners herein
guilty of "illegal fishing with the use of an
explosive," the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused,
Policarpio Umiten, Santiago Argoncillo and
Richard Balbona, guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of illegal fishing with the use of an

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
explosive punishable under Section 33 in relation

to Section 38 of Presidential Decree No. 704
dated May 16, 1975 as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1058 dated December 1, 1976 and
each shall suffer a straight penalty of twenty
(20) years imprisonment.
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating and
helping one another, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously catch, take, gather and have in their
possession and control different species of fish
with the use of explosives. 4
However, accused, Johnson Sucgang, Elvis Villar

and Efren Alvaro, are acquitted for failure of
the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
Upon arraignment on September 11, 1990, the

accused, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded
"not guilty" to the offense charged. Trial ensued
thereafter.
The fish sample is forfeited in favor of the

government.
The lower court synthesized the evidence

presented by the prosecution as follows: 5
Considering the penalty imposed upon the

accused, Policarpio Umiten, Santiago Argoncillo
and Richard Balbona, the bail bond for their
provisional liberty is increased to Twenty
Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos each effective
immediately upon promulgation. They shall not be
released from detention until they put up an
appropriate bail bond for their provisional
liberty.
Due to reports of rampant illegal fishing at

Barangay Basiao, Ivisan, Capiz, personnel from
the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources specifically from the Bureau of
Fisheries as well as the Barangay Captain of said
place assisted by the local policemen created a
team to conduct surveillance within the Ivisan
Bay. Thus, around 5:30 in the afternoon of May
7, 1990, a team riding in two (2) pumpboats from
the Barangay Basiao wharf proceeded along the
waters of Ivisan Bay. Riding in one pumpboat
were Persinefles U. Oabe, the Barangay Captain
of said place; Rolando Amoroso, an employee of
the Bureau of Fisheries; Pat. Rafael Tupaz, a
member of the local Integrated National Police
and Remegio Unasin, a barangay councilman who
acted as the pilot. In the other pumpboat were
Joey de la Cruz, a co-employee of Rolando
Amoroso; Pat. Reggie Uadan and Enido Baldesimo.
Now and then, the team had to stop and listen
for possible occurrences of illegal fishing within
their vicinity. Around 6:30 of the same evening
while standing by with their engines off, in a
place facing Barangay Culasi, they heard an
explosion. Sensing it was caused by dynamite,
they proceeded to the area around five hundred
meters (500 m.) away from them.
The property bond of accused, Johnson Sucgang,

Elvis Villar and Efren Alvaro, are deemed
cancelled.
Costs against the convicted accused.
SO ORDERED.
On August 1, 1990, an Information was filed by

the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz charging Johnson
Sucgang, Policarpio Umiten, Elvis Villar, Santiago
Argoncillo, Richardo Balbona and Efren Alvaro
with illegal fishing (with the use of dynamite), as
follows:
That at or about 6:30 o'clock [sic] in the evening
of May 7, 1990, in the sea water of Barangay
Basiao, Ivisan, Capiz, Philippines, and within the

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
After ten minutes of navigation, the team

arrived at the scene in question which was near
an islet. They surrounded the area. At a distance
of around ten meters, Joey de la Cruz, an
employee of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources, saw three persons diving into the
water. Thereafter, they would surface and
throw their catch of fish to the unmotorized
banca around four meters long nearby. In the
seashore of said islet, around three to four
meters away from these three persons floating
in the water, were three other persons standing
in the rocky portions around three meters apart.
These six persons tried to escape but Rolando
Amoroso, the co-employee of Joey de la Cruz,
advised them not to do so and introduced
themselves as law enforcers. The team found
out that the fishes they caught were deep sea
fish of four kinds locally known as "vulgan,"
"bulawis," "pacol," and "bag-angan." Joey de la
Cruz gathered seven fish samples from their
banca while Rolando Amoroso went down from
the pumpboat and proceeded to the islet.
However, upon inspection, he failed to find any
explosive (dynamite) either on the seashore or
on the banca. No paraphernalia used in dynamite
fishing were found. Both Joey de la Cruz and
Rolando Amoroso recognized the six persons as
the herein accused by their faces.
Persinefles U. Oabe, barangay captain of
Barangay Basiao, who was with the team riding in
a pumpboat with Rolando Amoroso identified the
three persons retrieving fish from the water as
Policarpio Umiten, Santiago Argoncillo and
Richard Balbona while the other three persons
standing on the rocky portions of the islet as
Johnson Sucgang, Elvis Umiten and Efren Alvaro.
The team apprehended the six accused and
brought them to the fish cage of the barangay
captain located within the same barangay. While
on their way, Joey de la Cruz externally
examined the fish samples.

Upon their arrival at the fish cage, another
external examination was conducted by Joey de
la Cruz and Rolando Amoroso. In both external
examinations, the two found out that the fishes
were caught with the use of explosives because
blood was oozing from their operculums and
their eyes were protruding.
An on-the-spot investigation was conducted but
the accused denied any culpability. They were
then released on the strength of their promise
to report to the local police the following day.
The fish samples were then placed in a plastic
bag filled with ice at the house of Barangay
Captain Persinefles U. Oabe that evening. In the
morning, Joey de la Cruz and Rolando Amoroso
brought the fish samples to their office in
Roxas City where they conducted an internal
examination. The examination revealed that the
fish samples were caught with the use of
explosives because their air bladders were
raptured and deeply stained with blood; the
vertebral columns were broken but with
bloodstains; their ribs were broken; and there
were blood clots in their abdomens. Joey de la
Cruz and Rolando Amoroso rendered a written
report of their internal examination to the
Provincial Agricultural Officer.
The testimonies of Joey de la Cruz, Rolando
Amoroso, and Persinefles U. Oabe above were
corroborated by Pat. Rafael Tupaz, one of the
police escorts of the team.
Sgt. Sergio Ordales, a member of the local
police of the municipality of Ivisan testified
that while on duty in the morning of May 8,
1990, herein six accused arrived at their station.
He asked why they were there and they
answered that they were told to report to the

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
police station. He learned from them that they

were arrested for illegal fishing with the use of
explosives.
On the other hand, the lower court portrayed
the evidence presented by the version of the
defense, thus:
All the accused denied the imputation of the
prosecution.
Policarpio Umiten, Santiago Argoncillo, Richard
O. Balbona were uniform in alleging that around
4:00 in the afternoon of May 7, 1990, they
dropped a fishnet about two hundred (200)
"armslength" and one (1) meter in width at the
scene where they were apprehended. This
method they locally call "patuloy" requires that
the fishnet be retrieved every hour to collect
its catch. The trio went back to the place near
the islet in question around 6:30 in the evening
for the purpose of collecting their catch from
the fishnet. They had not been able to collect all
their catch from the net when the team of law
enforcers, prosecution witnesses herein, arrived.
They were asked whether they heard an
explosion. After they denied having heard any,
Barangay Captain Persinefles U. Oabe, told the
accused to go with them. The team got seven
pieces of fish samples. The accused left around
one and one-half kilos of fish they had gathered
at the time the team of law enforcers arrived.
They were then brought to the fish cage owned
by Persinefles U. Oabe at Barangay Basiao.
Above three accused would like the Court to
believe that the seven pieces of fish samples
taken by the team of fishing law enforcers were
the catch of their fishnet they locally called
"patuloy."
On the other hand, Elvis Villar testified that he
and Efren Alvaro were together in going to the
islet in question, riding in an unmotorized banca

to gather shells locally called "suso" and
"butlogan" for viand. Both started gathering
shells under the stones in the islet around 5:30
in the afternoon. While they were preparing to
go home at around 6:30 in the evening, the team
of law enforcers riding in motorized pumpboats
arrived. The barangay captain and the personnel
from the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources asked them whether they heard an
explosion. After they denied having heard any,
they were told by the barangay captain to board
their pumpboats. They obliged, leaving the shells
they had gathered. They were then brought to
the fish cage of the barangay captain.
Although accused Johnson Sucgang admitted his
presence in the islet in question, he offered a
different explanation. He testified that he went
to said place to look for "pulutan" requested by
his customer, Wilfredo Arcangeles. Being an
operator and manager of Virgen Beach Resort
located at Sitio Manangkalan, he obliged. Thus,
between 5:00 to 5:30 in the afternoon of May 7,
1990, he left his resort riding in a banca. He
paddled his way towards the islet where he saw
two persons at the bank while the other three
were on the water. He went ashore. Later, the
barangay captain and his companions riding in
two pumpboats arrived. Like his co-accused, he
was asked if he heard an explosion. After he
denied hearing any, the barangay captain told
him to go with them. They were all brought to
the fish cage of the barangay captain for
questioning.
Wilfredo Arcangeles corroborated the claim of
Johnson Sucgang. He confirmed that he
requested the latter to look for "pulutan" since
he had visitors from Bacolod City prompting
Johnson Sucgang to look for some. He saw the
accused leave in a banca and affirmed that he

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
had no dynamite with him.
On September 30, 1991, the trial court

rendered its decision which, as stated at the
beginning, was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners point out that the fact that neither
explosives nor related paraphernalia were found
in their possession is an indication of their
innocence.
We do not agree. First, it is quite probable that
petitioners dumped these materials into the sea
while the raiding party was approaching.
Moreover, Section 33, Presidential Decree No.
704, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1058, provides:
Sec. 33. Illegal fishing; . . . It shall be
unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather,
or cause to be caught, taken or gathered fish or
fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters
with the use of explosives, obnoxious or
poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity
as defined in paragraphs (l), 7 (m) 8 and
(d), 9respectively, of Sec. 3 hereof . . .
of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance

or electricity.
In Hizon vs. Court of Appeals, 10 this Court held
that the law, as contained in the last paragraph
of Section 33, creates a presumption that illegal
fishing has been committed when fish caught or
killed with the use of explosives, obnoxious or
poisonous substances or by electricity are found
in a fishing boat. In this case, it cannot be
denied that the fishes found in petitioners'
banca were caught or killed by the use of
explosives.
The Report 11 of Bureau of Fisheries employees
Joey de la Cruz and Rolando Amoroso states:
Department of Agriculture
Roxas City
1990-05-08
The Provincial Agricultural Officer
Department of Agriculture
xxx xxx xxx
Roxas City
The discovery of dynamite, other explosives and

chemical compounds containing combustible
elements, or obnoxious or poisonous substance,
or equipment or device for electric fishing in any
fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman
shall constitute a presumption that the same
were used for fishing in violation of this Decree,
the discovery in any fishing boat of fish caught
or killed by the use of explosives, obnoxious or
poisonous substance or by electricity shall
constitute a presumption that the owner,
operator or fisherman were fishing with the use
Sir:
I have the honor to submit to this office the
result of the scientific fish examination
conducted on the fish samples taken from the
possession of Mr. Johnson Umiten Sucgang, 38
years old, married and resident of Barangay
Basiao, Ivisan, Capiz and company on May 7,
1990, 6:30 PM by combined elements of the
Department of Agriculture, PC/INP Unit of
Ivisan, Capiz and Barangay officials of Basiao,
Ivisan, Capiz conducting sea borne patrol on

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
illegal fishing.
Conclusion:
Source of fish samples : Sea water of Brgy.,

Basiao, Ivisan,Capiz
The fish samples manifested signs that said fish

were caught or killed by the use of explosives.
Fish samples taken from : Johnson U. Sucgang,

38 years old,married, of Brgy., Basiao,
Ivisan,Capiz, et. al.
Examined by:
Date fish samples taken : May 7, 1990 at 6:30

PM
JOEY I. DE LA CRUZ
Date fish samples examined : May 7, 1990 at

7:00 PM
Name offish samples taken Number Weight
Value
Local Name
Bulawis 2 pcs. 300 gms P 8.00
Bulgan 2 pcs. 200 gms 10.00
Pakol 1 pc. 100 gms 2.00
Bag-angan 1 pc. 150 gms 3.00
Bukod 1 pc. 150 gms 3.00
Characteristics noted on the fish examined:
(Sgd.)
(Sgd.)
ROLANDO E. AMOROSO
Fish Examiners
Joey de la Cruz affirmed the above findings in
his testimony before the trial court. 12 Said
testimony was corroborated by Rolando
Amoroso, a co-employee of De la Cruz in the
Bureau of Fisheries. The latter further stated
that the fish were killed specifically by
dynamite:
ATTY. LUMAWAG:
Q Can you identify whether it was through
dynamite or any other means of explosive the

fish was caught?
A Yes, sir. Because you know when we saw, when
1. External Manifestation
a. Blood, oozing on the operculum.
2. Internal Manifestation
a. Air bladder raptured deeply stained with
blood;
b. Vertebral column broken with blood stain.
we conducted the external manifestation of the

fish, not only blood oozing from the ears but
also from the eyes that were protruding.
Q Is it not possible that it be caused also
through fishing by means of electricity?
A No.
Q Other kinds of explosives?

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
A Yes, explosives.
Q For example, what other aside from
dynamite?
A What explosives aside from dynamite, no
other. 13
The trial court correctly gave credence to these
testimonies, thus:
Above three (3) accused would like the Court to
believe that the seven (7) pieces of fish samples
taken by the team of fishing law enforcers were
the catch of their fish net they locally called
[sic] "patuloy."
xxx xxx xxx
With the external and internal examination by
Joey de la Cruz and Rolando Amoroso showing
that these fishes were caught with the use of
explosive, bare denial of above three (3) accused
that they caught them by means of a fishing net
they locally call "patoloy" is insufficient to
disprove such finding. It is simply a superiority
of weight of object evidence over testimonies of
the accused.
Joey de la Cruz is an agricultural technologist of
their office and a graduate of Bachelor of
Science in Fishery. Joey de la Cruz and Rolando
Amoroso had undergone training course in
fishery laws and implementing regulations as well
as actual demonstrations in sea to practice what
they had learned in theory. [As] . . . technical
personnel of the Bureau of Fishery and Aquatic
Resources, their finding after an internal and
external examination of fish samples to prove
they were caught with the use of explosives
should be presented to show that these
prosecution witnesses fabricated their story.
There is no ulterior motive which implied them
to testify as they did. Furthermore, no evidence

was introduced by the defense to impeach their
credibility nor evidence to discredit their
persons. Credibility of the testimonies having
remained unimpeached, it shall be given great
weight in the determination of the guilt of the
accused. Besides, being public officers to
enforce fishing laws, in the absence of ill-motive
on their part, to impute to the accused a serious
offense of illegal fishing with the use of
explosive, the presumption is that there was
regular performance of public duty on their
part. 14
The presumption that the crime of illegal fishing
was committed has, therefore, been clearly
established. Such presumption, however, is
merely prima facie, and may be rebutted by the
accused. 15
Petitioners attempt to overcome said
presumption by disputing the findings of
prosecution witnesses Joey de la Cruz and
Rolando Amoroso. They claim that since not all
their catch were examined, there can be no
conclusive proof that the fish were killed with
the use of explosives. 16
They also question the credibility of these
witnesses, thus:
. . . . If it is true that prosecution witness Joey
dela Cruz, allegedly a technical personnel [sic] of
the Bureau of Fisheries and competent to
determine if a fish is killed by dynamite blast,
found the 7 fishes to have been killed by a
dynamite blast, it was unnatural for the team
not to arrest the petitioners on the spot. . . . 1
Petitioners' arguments have no merit.
It is ridiculous to have expected that all the
fish found in the accused's fishing boat would be

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
subjected to an examination. It is sufficient

that, as in the case at bar, a random sample of
the accused's catch was examined and found to
have been killed with the use of explosives. A
patent impracticality would result if the law
required otherwise.
The fact that the patrol team did not
immediately deliver the accused to the municipal
jail does not diminish the credibility of the
above witnesses. Persinefles U. Oabe, the
barangay captain of Basiao, gave a plausible
explanation for the accused's release:
A We released those six persons because if we
bring them to the municipality of Ivisan we have
no available transportation because they were
only riding in a single motor vehicle. 18
The want of available transportation is not
surprising. The dearth in law enforcement
facilities, especially in the provinces, is not lost
on this Court and is a matter of judicial notice.
In fine, we find no reason to disturb the
assessment of the trial court regarding the
credibility of prosecution witnesses Joey de la
Cruz and Rolando Amoroso. Its findings are
accorded great respect by appellate tribunals
since trial courts have the advantage of
examining the witnesses' testimonies and
observing their demeanor first hand. 19
Petitioners also argue that they could not have
been caught fishing with the use of dynamite in
shallow waters because the fishes used as
evidence were described by the prosecution
witnesses as "deep sea fishes." According to
petitioners:
The seven (7) fishes that the prosecution used
as evidence were described by prosecution
witnesses as "deep sea fishes". But it has been
shown in the testimony of petitioner Santiago

Argoncillo that he and the other petitioners
were fishing in shallow waters about 1 1/2
meters deep (TSN, March 13, 1991, p. 7) and
using fishnet 200 armslength long and 1 meter
wide (TSN, March 13, 1991, p. 4). This testimony
was not rebutted by the prosecution. In fact,
the 3 accused who were acquitted by the trial
court were found by the prosecution witnesses
standing on the seashore near where the
petitioners were fishing (TSN, January 23, 1991,
pp. 5 to 6). That petitioners would engage in
dynamite fishing in shallow waters and near the
seashore would be unnatural. The allegation that
the petitioners were fishing with the use of
explosive is therefore not credible. 20
We are not persuaded.
The fishes caught by petitioners were not
actually "deep sea fishes" in the sense that they
came from the deep portions of the sea as
distinguished from shallow waters or waters
near or along the shores. The fishes caught were
locally known as "vulgan," "bulawis," "pacol," and
"bag-angan." They are generally described as
"isda sa bato" or "bottom feeders." The
following excerpt from the testimony of fish
examiner Joey de la Cruz shows that the term
"deep sea fishes" arose from the trial court's
erroneous translation of "isda sa bato" or
"bottom feeders" which were the terms actually
employed by said witness to describe the
subject fishes:
ATTY. LUMAWAG:
Q What were the species of the fishes that you
recovered from that banca?
A Bottom feeders.

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
COURT:
"Isda sa bato," in English?
A Bottom feeders.
COURT:Deep sea fishes. 21
Petitioners next contend that if it is true that
they were engaged in illegal fishing, it would be
"unnatural" for them to use a boat which would
make it difficult for them to escape from the
law enforcers riding motorized boats. 22
Petitioners' contention is too ludicrous to
warrant serious consideration. The law punishing
illegal fishing does not require the use of
motorized banca or boat for the crime to be
committed. Concededly, a motorized banca can
better serve those engaged in illegal fishing for
purposes of eluding law enforcers. However, not
everyone can financially afford to fit a motor in
his banca. Indeed, petitioner Argoncillo
admitted that the banca that they were using
was leased from a certain Dikoy Odrunia. 23
Petitioners likewise aver that they did not flee
when the law enforcers arrived, and even
voluntarily reported to the Ivisan Police Station
the following morning. They submit that their
alleged non-flight should strengthen their claim
of innocence. 24
We disagree. There is no established doctrine to
the effect that, in every instance, non-flight is
an indication of innocence. 25 Moreover, even if
they wanted to, petitioners could not have
possibly eluded the law enforcers who were in
two pump boats. Attempts to flee would also
have been useless since petitioners were already
identified by the barrio captain.
Lastly, the fact that the accused were asked by
the patrol team whether or not they heard an

explosion is not in any way reflective of
petitioners' innocence. We deem such inquiry as
nothing more than a part of the investigative
process. It is quite common, and in most cases,
necessary, for law enforcers to ask questions to
help them ascertain whether or not there exists
probable cause to arrest persons suspected of
committing a crime.
Having failed to discharge themselves of the
burden of disproving that they have committed
illegal fishing, the Court is left with no
alternative but to affirm petitioners' conviction.
The penalty imposed by law 26 for illegal fishing
if explosive is actually used is imprisonment
ranging from twenty (20) years to life
imprisonment. The Indeterminate Sentence Law
provides that if, as in this case, the offense is
punished by a law other than the Revised Penal
Code, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of
which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by
said law and the minimum shall not be less than
the minimum term prescribed by the
same. 27 The trial court therefore erred when it
sentenced petitioners to "suffer
a straight penalty of twenty (20) years
imprisonment." 28 In Spouses Jose and Trinidad
Bacar vs. Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr., 29 we
held that it was erroneous to impose a straight
penalty of six (6) years imprisonment on the
accused for homicide. We explained:
. . . It is basic law that . . . the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory
where imprisonment exceeds one (1) year,
except only in the following cases:
a. Offenses punished by death or life
imprisonment.

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
b. Those convicted of treason (Art. 114),

conspiracy or proposal to commit treason (Art.
115).
c. Those convicted of misprision of treason (Art.
116), rebellion (Art. 134), sedition (Art. 139, or
espionage (Art. 117).
d. Those convicted of piracy (Art. 122).
e. Habitual delinquents (Art. 62, par. 5).
Recidivists are entitled to an indeterminate
sentence. (People v. Jaramilla, L-28547, Feb. 22,
1974). Offender is not disqualified to avail of
the benefits of the law even if the crime is
committed while he is on parole. (People v.
Calreon, CA 78 O.G. 6701, Nov. 19, 1982).
f. Those who escaped from confinement or those
who evaded sentence.
g. Those granted conditional pardon and who
violated the terms of the same (Art. 159).
(People v. Corral, 74 Phil. 359).
h. Those whose maximum period of imprisonment
does not exceed one year.
Where the penalty actually imposed does not
exceed one year, the accused cannot avail
himself of the benefits of the law, the
application of which is based upon the penalty
actually imposed in accordance with law and not
upon that which may be imposed in the
discretion of the Court. (People v. Hidalgo, [CA]
G.R. No. 00452-CR, Jan. 22, 1962).
i. Those who are already serving final judgment
upon the approval of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
The need for specifying the minimum and
maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence

is to prevent the unnecessary and excessive
deprivation of liberty and to enhance the
economic usefulness of the accused, since he
may be exempted from serving the entire
sentence, depending upon his behavior and his
physical, mental, and moral record. The
requirement of imposing an indeterminate

sentence in all criminal offenses whether
punishable by the or by special laws, with
definite minimum and maximum terms, as the
Court deems proper within the legal range of the
penalty specified by the law must, therefore, be
deemed mandatory. 30
Accordingly, the proper penalty to be imposed
upon the accused should be
an indeterminate penalty which is hereby set at
twenty (20) years as minimum to twenty-five
(25) years as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED, and the decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modification
that petitioners are hereby sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
ranging from twenty (20) years as minimum to
twenty-five (25) years as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Romero and Purisima, J., concur.
2. Requirements for Admissibility of Tape Recordings, Wire and

Dictaphone
a. The tape, wire, or dictaphone was capable of taking testimony;
b. The person operating the device was competent to operate it;
c. The recording is authentic and correct;
d. The testimony has been duly preserved;
e. The testimony was voluntarily made;
and
f. The speaker has been correctly identified.
3. Requisites for Experiments to be Admissible
a. Relevancy; and
b. The present condition of the object must be the same at the time
of issue.

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
Q: What are the purposes of authentication of object evidence?

A:
1. Prevent the introduction of an object different from the one testified
about; and
2. Ensure that there has been no significant changes in the objects condition.
Q: What are the requisites for the object evidence to be admissible?
A: It must
1. Be relevant to the fact in issue;
2. Be authenticated before it is admitted;
3. Not be hearsay;
4. Not be privileged; and
5. Meet any additional requirement set by law.
Q: What does object evidence include?
A:
1. Any article or object which may be known or perceived by the use of the
senses;
2. Examination of the anatomy of a person or of any substance taken
therefrom;
3. Conduct of tests, demonstrations or experiments; and
4. Examination of representative portrayals of the object in question (e.g.
maps, diagrams)
Q: May the courts refuse the introduction of object or real evidence
and rely on testimonial evidence alone?
A: Yes, but only if:
1. Its exhibition is contrary to public morals or decency;
2. To require its being viewed in court or in ocular inspection would result in
delays, inconvenience, or unnecessary expenses which are out of proportion
to the evidentiary value of such object;
3. Such object evidence would be confusing or misleading, as when the
purpose is to prove the former condition of the object and there is no
preliminary showing that there has been no substantial change in said
condition; or
4. The testimonial or documentary evidence already presented clearly
portrays the
object in question as to render a view thereof unnecessary. (Regalado, Vol. II,
p. 716, 2008 ed.)
Q: Is exhibition of the object which is repulsive or indecent
absolutely prohibited?
A: No. If a view of the object is necessary in the interest of justice, such
object may still be exhibited, but the court may exclude the public from such
view. Such view may not be refused if the indecent or immoral objects
constitute the very basis of the criminal or civil action (e.g. obscene pictures
or exhibits). (Moran, p. 73)
Q: In a criminal case for murder, the prosecution offered as evidence
photographs showing the accused mauling the victim with several of
the latters companions. The person who took the photograph was
not presented as a witness. Be that as it may, the prosecution
presented the companions of the victim who testified that they were
the ones in the photographs. The defense objected to the
admissibility of the photographs because the person who took the
photographs was not presented as witness. Is the contention of the
defense tenable?
A: No. Photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the
photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under
which they were produced. The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being
a correct representation or reproduction of the original, and its admissibility
is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the

crime.
The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the
pictures he has taken. The correctness of the photograph as a faithful
representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by
the testimony of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses
who can testify to its exactness and accuracy, after which the court can admit
it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy.
Here, the photographs are admissible as evidence inasmuch as the
correctness thereof was testified to by the companions of the victim (Sison v.
People, G.R. Nos. 108280-83, Nov. 16, 1995).
Q: Ron was charged with murder for shooting Carlo. After trial, Ron
was found guilty as charged. On appeal, Ron argued that the trial
court should have acquitted him as his guilt was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt. He argues that the paraffin test conducted on him
2 days after he wasarrested yielded a negative result. Hence, he
could not have shot Carlo. Is Ron correct?
A: No. While the paraffin test was negative, such fact alone did not ipso facto
prove that Ron is innocent. A negative paraffin result is not conclusive proof
that a person has not fired a gun. It is possible to fire a gun and yet be
negative for nitrates, as when the culprit is wearing gloves or he washes his
hands afterwards. Here, since Ron submitted himself for paraffin testing only
two days after the shooting, it was likely he had already washed his hands
thoroughly, thus removing all traces of nitrates therefrom (People v. Brecinio,
G.R. No. 138534, Mar. 17, 2004).
Q: What are the categories of object evidence for purposes of
authentication?
A:
1. Unique objects those that have readily identifiable marks (e.g. a calibre
40 gun with serial number XXX888)
2. Objects made unique those that are readily identifiable (e.g. a bolo knife
used to hack a victim which could be identified by a witness in court)
3. Non-unique objects those which have no identifying marks and cannot be
marked (e.g. footprints left at a crime scene)
Q: Distinguish real evidence from demonstrative evidence.
A: Real evidence
Tangible object that played
some actual role in the
matter that gave rise to the
litigation
Intends to prove that the
object is used in the
underlying event
Demonstrative Evidence
Tangible evidence that merely
illustrates a matter of importance in
the litigation
Intends to show that the
demonstrative object fairly
represents or illustrates what it is
alleged to be illustrated
Q: What is ocular inspection or view?

A: An ocular inspection conducted by the judge without the presence
of the parties or due notice is not valid, as an ocular inspection is part of
the trial.
Note: It is a discretionary act of the trial court to go to the place where
the object is located, when the object evidence cannot be brought in
courts.
CHAIN OF CUSTODY IN RELATION TO SECTION 21 OF THE
COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002
Q: What is Chain of Custody Rule in relation to Sec. 21 of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002?

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
A: It is a method of authenticating evidence. It requires that the admission of

an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was
picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every
person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which
it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that
there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity
for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. (Lopez v.
People, G.R. No. 172953, Apr. 30, 2008)
A: Yes. The Rules on DNA Evidence does not preclude a DNA testing, without
need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law
enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced (Sec. 4).
Q: What are the requisites for the issuance of a DNA testing order?
A: It is necessary when the object evidence is non-unique as it is not readily

identifiable, was not made identifiable or cannot be made identifiable, e.g.
drops of blood or oil, drugs in powder form, fiber, grains of sand and similar
objects. (Riano, Evidence: A Restatement for the Bar, p. 149, 2009 ed.)
A: In pending actions, the appropriate court may, at any time issue a DNA
testing order either motu proprio or upon application of any person who has
a legal interest in the matter in litigation after due hearing and notice to the
parties and upon showing of the following:
1. A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
2. The biological sample:
3. was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or
4. was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons;
5. The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
6. The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information
that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and
7. The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as
potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing (Sec. 4).
Q: What is the purpose of establishing a chain of custody?
Q: Is the order granting the DNA testing appealable?
A: To guaranty the integrity of the physical evidence and to prevent the

introduction of evidence which is not authentic but where the exhibit is
positively identified the chain of custody of physical evidence is irrelevant.
(Ibid.)
A: No. An order granting the DNA testing shall be immediately executory and
shall not be appealable. Any petition for certiorari initiated therefrom shall
not, in any way, stay the implementation thereof, unless a higher court
issues an injunctive order (Sec. 5).
RULE ON DNA EVIDENCE (A.M. NO. 06-11-5-SC)
Q: During Alexis trial for rape with murder, the prosecution sought
to introduce DNA evidence against him, based on forensic
laboratory matching of the materials found at the crime scene and
Alexis hair and blood samples. Alexis counsel objected, claiming
that DNA evidence is inadmissible because the materials taken from
Alexis were in violation of his constitutional right against selfincrimination as well as his right of privacy and personal integrity.
Should the DNA evidence be admitted or not? Reason.
Q: When is there a need to establish a chain of custody?
Q: In what cases do the Rules on DNA Evidence apply?

A: It shall apply whenever DNA evidence is offered, used, or proposed to be
offered or used as evidence in all criminal and civil actions as well as special
proceedings (Sec. 1).
Q: What is DNA?
A: DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) is the chain of molecules found in every
nucleated cell of the body (Sec. 3, Rule on DNA Evidence). It is the
fundamental building block of a persons entire genetic make-up, which is
found in all human cells and is the same in every cell of the same person
(People v. Umanito, G.R. No. 172607, Oct. 26, 2007).
Q: What is DNA evidence?
A: It constitutes the totality of the DNA profiles, results and other genetic
information directly generated from DNA testing of biological samples (Sec.
3).
Q: What is DNA testing?
A: It means verified and credible scientific methods which include the
extraction of DNA from biological samples, the generation of DNA profiles
and the comparison of the information obtained from the DNA testing of
biological samples for the purpose of determining, with reasonable certainty,
whether or not the DNA obtained from two or more distinct biological
samples originates from the same person (direct identification) or if the
biological samples originate from related persons (Kinship Analysis) (Sec. 3).
Note: The scientific basis of this test comes from the fact that our differences
as individuals are due to the differences in the composition of our genes.
These genes comprise a chemical substance, the deoxyribonucleic acid or
DNA [The Court Systems Journal (1999)].
Q: May DNA testing be conducted absent a prior court order?
A: The DNA evidence should be admitted. It is not in violation of the

constitutional right against self-incrimination or his right of privacy and
personal integrity. The right against self-incrimination is applicable only to
testimonial evidence. Extracting a blood sample and cutting a strand from
the hair of the accused are purely mechanical acts that do not involve his
discretion nor require his intelligence. (2004 Bar Question)
Q: Is the result of DNA testing automatically admitted as evidence in
the case in which it was sought for?
A: No. The grant of a DNA testing application shall not be construed
as an automatic admission into evidence of any component of the
DNA evidence that may be obtained as a result thereof (Sec. 5).
Q: If a DNA test was conducted, what are the possible results that it
may yield?
A:
1. The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source
(Rule of Inclusion). In such a case, the analyst proceeds to determine the
statistical significance of the similarity.
2. The samples are different hence it must have originated from different
sources (Rule of Exclusion). This conclusion is absolute and requires no
further analysis;
3. The test is inconclusive. This might occur due to degradation,
contamination, failure of some aspect of protocol, or some other reasons.
Analysis might be repeated to obtain a more conclusive result (People v.
Vallejo, G.R. No. 144656, May 9, 2002).

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
Q: What should the courts consider in evaluating DNA testing

results?
A:
1. The evaluation of the weight of matching DNA evidence or the relevance
of mismatching DNA evidence;
2. The results of the DNA testing in the light of the totality of the other
evidence presented in the case; and
3. DNA results that exclude the putative parent from paternity shall be
conclusive proof of non-paternity (Sec. 9).
Q: To whom is the post-conviction DNA testing available?
1. The falsifiability of the principles or methods used, that is, whether the
theory or technique can be and has been tested;
2. The subjection to peer review and publication of the principles or
methods;
3. The general acceptance of the principles or methods by the relevant
scientific community;
4. The existence and maintenance of standards and controls to ensure the
correctness of data generated;
5. The existence of an appropriate reference population database; and
6. The general degree of confidence attributed to mathematical calculations
used in comparing DNA profiles and the significance and limitation of
statistical calculations used in comparing DNA profiles.
A: Post-conviction DNA testing may be available, without need of prior

court order, to the prosecution or any person convicted by final and
executory judgment.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
Q: What are the requisites for the applicability of the Post-conviction

DNA testing?
A:
1. Existing biological sample;
2. Such sample is relevant to the case; and
3. The testing would probably result in the reversal or modification of the
judgment of conviction (Sec. 6).
Q: What is the remedy of the convict if the post-conviction DNA
testing result is favorable to him?
A: The convict or the prosecution may file a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the court of origin. In case the court, after due hearing, finds
the petition to be meritorious, it shall reverse or modify the judgment
of conviction and order the release of the convict, unless continued
detention is justified for a lawful cause (Sec. 10).
Q: What should the courts consider in determining the probative
value of DNA evidence?
A:
1. The chain of custody, including how the biological samples were collected,
how they were handled, and the possibility of contamination of the samples;
2. The DNA testing methodology, including the procedure followed in
analyzing the samples, the advantages and disadvantages of the procedure,
and compliance with the scientifically valid standards in conducting the tests;
3. The forensic DNA laboratory, including accreditation by any reputable
standards-setting institution and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests. If the laboratory is not accredited, the relevant
experience of the laboratory in forensic casework and credibility shall be
properly established; and
4. The reliability of the testing result (Sec. 7).
Q: What are the things to be considered in assessing the probative
value of DNA evidence?
A:
1. How the samples are collected;
2. How they were handled;
3. The possibility of the contamination of the samples;
4. The procedure followed in analyzing the samples;
5. Whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests; and
6. The qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. (Ibid.)
Q: What are the things to be considered in evaluating whether or not
the DNA testing methodology is reliable?
A:
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 185708
September 29, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
JUANITO CABIGQUEZ y ALASTRA, Appellant.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), Mindanao Station, which affirmed the
Decision2 dated October 29, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 18 finding appellant Juanito
Cabigquez y Alastra (Cabigquez) and Romulo Grondiano y Soco
(Grondiano) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery (Criminal
Case No. 2001-816), and also convicting appellant Cabigquez of rape
(Criminal Case No. 2001-815), both crimes committed against
private complainant AAA,3 a 43-year old widow and mother of ten
(10) children. Grondiano decided to withdraw his appeal before the
appellate court.4 Hence, this review shall consider only Cabigquezs
appeal.
Below are the facts, as culled from the records of both the trial
and appellate courts.
In the evening of March 26, 2001, AAA and her three minor
children BBB, CCC, and DDD5 slept inside AAAs small sarisari store which was annexed through the exterior balcony of her
house at Purok 1-A, Tablon in Cagayan de Oro City. AAAs head was
close to the door, while a cabinet stood at her right side. She left
the 50-watt incandescent bulb on as they slept through the night.6
At around 3:30 a.m., March 27, 2001, AAA was awakened when
clothes fell on her face. When she looked up, she saw a man whose
face was covered with a handkerchief and wearing a camouflage
jacket and cycling shorts. He immediately poked a gun at her. AAA
shouted "Ayyy!," rousing her three children from sleep.7 Despite

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
the cover on the burglars face, BBB was able to identify him as
Romulo Grondiano, one of their neighbors, based on the hanging
mole located below his left eye.8 Armed with a stainless
handgun,9 Grondiano ordered AAA and her children to lie face
down.10 Though stricken with fear, BBB noticed that Grondiano had
a companion who stayed at the balcony keeping watch. 11 Grondiano
then ransacked the store, taking with him P3,000.00 cash from the
cabinet and P7,000.00 worth of grocery items. Before he left,
Grondiano pointed the gun at AAAs back and warned them not to
make any noise.12
As soon as Grondiano left the store, the other man entered. BBB
identified the man as appellant Juanito Cabigquez as the latter did
not conceal his face. Armed with Grondianos gun, Cabigquez
stripped AAA of her short pants and underwear, placed a pillow on
her lower abdomen and mounted her from behind. He lifted and
twisted one of her legs and pinned the other. AAA shouted "Ayaw!"
(No!), but offered no further resistance. Cabigquez inserted his
penis into AAAs vagina, and proceeded to ravish her in full view of
her children, and even as the latter cried for mercy. Before he
left, Cabigquez threatened to kill AAA and her children if they
would tell anyone about the incident.13
Afraid for their lives, AAA and her children remained prostrate on
the floor even after the two malefactors had left. Shortly
thereafter, they decided to proceed to the house of AAAs older
son, EEE, and asked for help. AAA failed to disclose to her son the
identities of the two men. Meanwhile, BBB, fearing retaliation from
the two men, decided not to divulge the identities of Cabigquez and
Grondiano to her mother and brother.14
That same morning, March 27, 2001, AAA reported the incident to
the Puerto Police Station. No criminal complaint, however, was filed
since AAA was still uncertain of the identities of the two men.
AAA was physically examined by Dr. Cristilda O. Villapae and Dr.
Riman Ricardo, resident physicians at the Northern Mindanao
Medical Center.15Dr. Villapaes examination revealed that the
smear recovered from AAAs vagina was positive for
spermatozoa, 16while Dr. Ricardo found a two-centimeter contusion
on AAAs left hand dorsum. 17
On May 24, 2001, Cabigquez was arrested for possession of illegal
drugs.18 Grondiano was likewise arrested on May 26, 2001 also for
possession of illegal drugs.19 With the two men incarcerated, and
now certain of their safety, BBB finally mustered the courage to
reveal the identities of Cabigquez and Grondiano to her mother. 20
On July 18, 2001, two Informations were filed against Cabigquez
and Grondiano, viz:
Criminal Case No. 2001-816 (For: Robbery)
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses JUANITO
CABIGQUEZ y ALASTRA, alias "DODOY", and ROMULO
GRONDIANO y SOCO, alias "Molok", of the crime they committed,
as follows:
That on March 27, 2001, at more or less 3:30 oclock in the early
morning in a store located at Purok 1-A, Barangay Tablon, Cagayan
de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping with one another, with intent to gain and
violence or intimidation of persons, did then and there wil[l]fully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away cash
Php3,000.00 and assorted [grocery] stocks valued Php7,000.00 all
in all amounting to Php10,000.00, owned by and belonging to one
[AAA], in the following manner: that accused Romulo Grondiano
intimidated the offended party with a gun pointed to her and her
three children and ordered them to lay on the floor with face down
and then took, robbed and carried away the aforementioned
valuable personal things while Juanito Cabigquez y Alastra
acting/serving as lookout at the door of the store, to the damage
and prejudice of the offended party, in the total sum of
Php10,000.00, Philippine Currency.
Contrary to and in violation to Article 294, par. 5, of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended.21
Criminal Case No. 2001-815 (For: Rape)
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses, JUANITO
CABIGQUEZ Y ALASTRA ALIAS "DODOY", of the crime of RAPE
that he committed as follows:
That on March 27, 2001, at more or less 3:30 oclock or
thereabout, in the early morning, at Purok 1A, Tablon, Cagayan de
Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, armed with a gun, and with the
use thereof, by means of force, and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledged
(sic) of the offended party [AAA], against her will [and] in the
presence and full view of her children.
Contrary to and in violation to (sic) Article 266-A (Formerly under
Art. 335) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353.22
Both accused pleaded not guilty to the charges.23 During the trial,
Cabigquez admitted that on the night of March 26, 2001, he slept
in the house of Leonila Omilao, a neighbor of Cabigquez and
AAA.24 He admitted that he did not have any quarrel with AAA and
found no possible reason why AAA would file the complaints and
testify against him.25 Omilao herself testified that Cabigquez was
in her house on the night of the incident and even saw the latter
sleeping in the kitchen. During Omilaos cross-examination,
however, the trial court noted Silvina Cabigquez, appellants
daughter, coaching Omilao in her answers.26
On October 21, 2002, the trial court, on motion by the defense,
ordered the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila to
conduct a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis on the sperm taken
from AAAs vagina. On May 21, 2003, NBI Forensic Chemist III

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
Aida Viloria Magsipoc testified that the sample collected from

AAA did not match Cabigquezs DNA profile since the specimen
submitted to them were mere vaginal discharges from AAA.27
On October 29, 2003, the trial court rendered judgment
convicting Cabigquez and Grondiano of the crimes charged. The
dispositive portion of said decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds
accused JUANITO CABIGQUEZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code, punishable under Article 266-B of the same Code, and there
being one aggravating circumstance [the used (sic) of a deadly
weapon (firearm)] without a[ny] mitigating circumstance, accused
JUANITO CABIGQUEZ is hereby sentenced and is SO ORDERED
to suffer the supreme penalty of Death by lethal injection,
including its accessory penalties. He is further directed and is SO
ORDERED to pay the victim the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) as indemnity, plus another TWENTY FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00), as moral damages. Pursuant to
Section 22 of R.A. 7659 and Section 10 of Rule 122 of the Rules of
Court, let the entire record of this case be forwarded to the
Supreme Court for automatic review.
FURTHERMORE, the Court likewise finds accused JUANITO
CABIGQUEZ and ROMULO GRONDIANO GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the Crime of Robbery punishable under
paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, and [there]
being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, and after
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused JUANITO
CABIGQUEZ and ROMULO GRONDIANO are hereby sentenced
and are SO ORDERED to serve the [penalty of] imprisonment of
TWO (2) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS
OF PRISION CORRECCIONAL , as the MINIMUM, to SIX (6)
YEARS, ONE (1) MONTH AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS OF PRISION
MAYOR, as the MAXIMUM, including its accessory penalties, plus
further SO ORDERED to pay the stolen items and cash in the sum
of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00).
SO ORDERED. Cagayan de Oro City, October 29, 2003. 28
The records of the case were elevated to this Court on automatic
review. Pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo, 29 the case was
referred to the CA.
found BBBs testimony candid and not prompted by ill-motive. As to

BBBs failure to promptly implicate Grondiano and Cabigquez for
the crimes, the appellate court ruled that this cannot be taken
against her in the light of serious threats made by said accused on
their family. The alleged contradictions in the testimonies of AAA
and BBB were likewise not fatal to the case of the prosecution as
they bear no materiality to the commission of the crime. The CA
also noted that the accused were able to consummate their
criminal acts without any physical resistance from the victims who
could not even cry loudly because they were ordered at gunpoint
not to make any noise. It rejected the defense of alibi put up by
Cabigquez in view of his admission that he stayed at a house within
the vicinity of AAAs store.32
The CA thus decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed October 29,
2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Misamis
Oriental, 10th Judicial Region, Branch 18, Cagayan de Oro City,
convicting Juanito A. Cabigquez, the lone appellant before Us, for
the crimes of Robbery and Rape, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that Juanito A. Cabigquez is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the crime of Rape.
SO ORDERED.33
Before this Court, appellant Cabigquez reiterates the following
arguments:
I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED
DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING
WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE AND
INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES.
III.
In his appeal, appellant maintained his defense of alibi and denial.

He questioned the accuracy and credibility of BBBs testimony
given her failure to immediately divulge the identity of the
perpetrators after the incident. Appellant also noted that AAAs
lone interjection, while she was allegedly being raped by him, can
hardly be considered as a manifest resistance.30 The defense also
argued that the prosecution failed to establish conspiracy since
BBB did not actually see that Cabigquez was on the balcony while
the robbery was being committed.31
By Decision dated July 9, 2008, the CA upheld the RTC in
convicting appellant of both crimes of robbery and rape. The CA
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS COMMITTED ROBBERY, THE COURT A

QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THEM TO PAY
THE COMPLAINANT P10,000.00 AS ACTUAL
DAMAGES.
IV.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY IN THE CASE AT

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
BAR.34
Q Do you want to be imprisoned?
We sustain the ruling of the CA.
A No, sir.
The factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the appellate

court, indubitably prove that appellant raped AAA even if the
specimen obtained from the vaginal swabs and submitted to the
NBI failed to match appellants DNA profile. Rape is committed by
a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman through force,
threat or intimidation.35 The commission of rape was clearly shown
by testimonial and documentary evidence; the defense submits
that it is the identity of the perpetrator which is not duly
established.
Q So, you will tell the truth nothing but the truth?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you know accused Romulo Grondiano?
A Yes, sir because he is our neighbor.
xxxx
For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is indeed

a fertile source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. 36 In
this case, however, the result of the DNA test is rendered
inconclusive to exculpate or inculpate the appellant since the
sample tested by the NBI merely contained vaginal discharges. In
the laboratory test earlier conducted by Dr. Villapae on the
vaginal swab obtained from AAAs genitalia, the presence of
spermatozoa was confirmed. This notwithstanding, the totality of
evidence satisfactorily established that it was indeed appellant
who raped AAA.
AAAs daughter, BBB, who witnessed the entire incident which
happened inside their store on the night in question, positively
identified appellant as the one who raped her mother against the
latters will by threatening her and her children with a handgun he
was then carrying. BBBs unflinching and consistent testimony,
when taken together with Dr. Villapaes findings and AAAs own
declarations in court, provides sufficient basis for the conviction
of appellant for rape.
Quoted herein are the relevant portions of BBBs testimony on
direct examination as to her identification of appellant as her
mothers rapist, viz:
Q Now, [BBB], you said that you are 13 years old and you
said a while ago you sworn that you will tell the truth, can
you remember that?
A Yes, sir.
Q Okay now, are you going to tell the truth and nothing
but the truth before this Honorable Court?
A Yes, sir I will tell the truth.
Q Do you know what will happen to you if you tell a lie in
court?
A Yes, sir I will be imprisoned.
Q Do you also know accused Juanito Cabigquez who is

accused for rape and co-accused in robbery?
A Yes, sir he is also our neighbor.
Q For how long have you known Juanito Cabigquez before
March 27, 2001?
A Since I came that age of reason I already knew Juanito
Cabigquez.
Q Is Juanito Cabigquez also a resident of Purok 1-A at
Tablon?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you also know the nickname of Juanito Cabigquez?
A Its Dodoy.
Q If Juanito Cabigquez is inside this courtroom, can you
point to him?
A Note: Witness pointed to a person who when asked of
his name identified himself as Juanito Cabigquez.
Q Okay, on March 27, 2001 at about 3:30 early in the
morning, do you remember where were you?
A I was inside our store sleeping together with our
mother.
Q Aside from you and your mother, who were other
persons who were with you?
A Together with my two (2) siblings.
xxxx

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
Q Now, while you were sleeping together with your

mother and your two (2) younger siblings at that time,
what happened?
A Because we had a chair made of bamboo and then if

somebody or a person hit it, it will sound.
xxxx
xxxx
A The three (3) of us were awakened because of the
shout of our mother.
Q Who is that us?
Q Now, after Romulo Grondiano took all those things that

you have enumerated a while ago, where did Romulo
Grondiano go?
A He pointed a gun at my mothers back and then ordered
us not to move.
A I together with my two (2) siblings.
xxxx
Q Your mother also woke up?

Q Alright, after Romulo Grondiano told you, your mother
and your two (2) younger siblings not to move, where did
Romulo Grondiano go?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, after you were awakened by the shout of your
mother, what did you observe, if there was any?
A I saw my mother knelt down and I came nearer and
then I embraced her because I thought she was dreaming
but I saw Romulo Grondiano with a gun.
xxxx
Q Alright, what happened while you saw accused Romulo
Grondiano already at the door of your store of your
mother holding a gun and your mother was kneeling?
A He ordered us to lay face down.
Q After Romulo Grondiano ordered you to lay face down,
what did you, your mother and your two (2) siblings do?
A I let my mother lay face down.
Q How about you?
A He went to the balcony and then Juanito Cabigquez

replaced him (Romulo) in going up, he (Juanito) went
inside our store.
xxxx
Q Alright, you testified a while ago that after Romulo
Grondiano went inside your store he passed by the
balcony of your house, then co-accused Juanito Cabigquez
came in, where did Juanito Cabigquez come in?
A He entered in our store.
Q The same store where you, your mother and two (2)
younger siblings were staying at that time?
A Yes, sir.
Q How were you able to recognize that it was Juanito
Cabigquez who came in?
A Because I saw him.
A I also lay face down.

Q How about your two (2) younger siblings?
A They also lay face down.
Q Alright, while the four (4) of you were lying face down,
what did you observe?
A I noticed that he had a companion who is at our
balcony.
Q How were you able to notice that he has a companion?
Q When you saw Juanito Cabigquez, were you still lying

face down or were you already sitting?
A I was already lying face down.
Q How were you able to see him?
A Because I looked back at the door because I thought
that Romulo Grondiano already left but then I saw
Juanito Cabigquez came in and replaced Romulo
Grondiano.
Q This Juanito Cabigquez who came in after Romulo

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
Grondiano went out, is he the same Juanito Cabigquez the

co-accused for robbery and accused in rape case?
your mother?
A Yes, sir because it was a gartered shortpants.
A Yes, sir.
Q If he is inside this courtroom, can you point him again?
Q Now, how about the panty of your mother?

A It was removed together with the shortpants.
A Note: Witness pointed again to a person who when

asked of his name identified himself as Juanito
Cabigquez.
Q After Juanito Cabigquez came in inside the store, what
did you observe?
A He removed the shortpants of my mother and then he
got the pillow of my mother and placed it under her
abdomen.
Q Now, after the shortpants and panty of your mother

were taken off and the pillow was placed under her
abdomen, what next did you observe?
A Juanito Cabigquez mounted on my mother.
Q And then, what did Juanito do when he mounted to
your mother?
A He did a push and pull motion.
xxxx
Q Now, what was the position of your mother when
Juanito Cabigquez took off the shortpants of your
mother?
A She was still lying face down.
Q How about your two (2) younger siblings, were they

still awake at that time?
A Yes, sir, they were crying.
Q How about you?
Q What was the position of your mother when Juanito

Cabigquez put the pillow under her abdomen?
A I also cried.
A She was still lying face down.
Q When you noticed that he (Juanito Cabigquez) entered

your store, was he carrying a gun?
Q By the way, when Juanito Cabigquez entered the store,

was the light still on?
xxxx
A He was bringing a gun.
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, you said that your mother shouted when Juanito
Cabigquez came in. My question is, when did your mother
actually shout?
A When Juanito Cabigquez was removing the shortpants
of my mother.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q Can you tell the Court what kind of shout your mother
did?
A My mother shouted "ay!"
PROS. M. NOLASCO: (contg.)
Q Now, was Juanito able to take off the shortpants of
xxxx
Q Can you demonstrate the length of the gun that you
saw?
A The gun which Juanito Cabigquez was bringing was the
same gun Romulo brought.
Q How about your mother while Juanito Cabigquez was
already mounted on her and make a push and pull motion,
what did your mother do?
A My mother was crying.
xxxx
Q You said that you, your mother and your two (2)
younger siblings were crying while Juanito Cabigquez

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
mounted on your mother and made a push and pull motion,

what happened after that?
A He pointed his gun at the back of my mother and then
told us not to tell to anybody because they will return
and kill us.
Q Now, after Juanito Cabigquez warned you not to tell
anybody otherwise they will return and kill you, what did
Juanito Cabigquez do?
A He went up to the balcony.
xxxx
Q How about Juanito Cabigquez, when he entered your
store of your mother and raped your mother, what was
he wearing?
A He was wearing a white t-shirt and maong pants.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q Was it long or short?
A Long pants.
xxxx
37
(Emphasis supplied.)
Appellant asserts that it is significant that AAA herself did not

recognize him and his co-accused despite her familiarity with them
as they were her customers in her store. It was pointed out that
the identification of the perpetrators was supplied solely by her
daughter BBB, who should not have been given any credence in view
of her inconsistent declarations such as when she testified that
when she woke up, her mother was kneeling contrary to the latters
testimony that when clothes fell on her face, she was awakened
and that her mother shouted but a gun was pointed to her.
Moreover, BBB saw the accused several times after the alleged
crimes transpired and yet she did not manifest any alarm even
when they reported the matter to the police; it was only after the
accused were detained that their identities were revealed. In the
light of serious discrepancies in the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses, appellant maintains that BBBs identification of the
perpetrators of robbery and rape was unreliable and doubtful. 38
We are not persuaded.
While it is true that the most natural reaction for victims of
crimes is to strive to remember the faces of their assailants and
the manner in which the craven acts are committed,39 in this case,
AAA cannot be faulted for failing to recognize appellant as her
rapist though the latter was their neighbor. It must be recalled, as
narrated by AAA and BBB, they were all still lying face down when
appellant suddenly entered the store right after his co-accused
Grondiano exited through the balcony taking the loot with him. BBB
recounted that her mother was still lying face down when appellant
removed her mothers short pants and panty, placed a pillow below
her abdomen and then proceeded to rape her. It was BBB who had
the opportunity to look at this second person who entered their
house because she looked back at the door thinking that Grondiano
(the one who first entered the store) already left, but then
appellant immediately came in after Grondiano. Although AAA was
able to shout at that time, she could not move because she was
afraid that her three children, who were already crying, will be
harmed.40
As to the alleged inconsistency in the position of her mother when
accused Grondiano entered their store, the same is inexistent
considering that AAA was relating the exact moment when she
woke up and realized the presence of an intruder because clothes
fell on her face, while BBB who was awakened by the shout of her
mother, simply described her mother then already in a kneeling
position as she woke up first. BBB had thought her mother was just
dreaming but then she saw Grondiano already inside the house with
a gun.
Neither would BBBs delay in revealing the identities of the
perpetrators to the police taint her identification of appellant as
the one who raped her mother and conspirator of Grondiano in
robbing their store. Failure to immediately reveal the identity of a
perpetrator of a felony does not affect, much less impair, the
credibility of witnesses, more so if such delay is adequately
explained.41 BBB sufficiently explained her action in not
immediately divulging to her mother and brother nor reporting to
the police whom she saw inside their house that early morning of
March 27, 2001. She was afraid that the assailants would make
good their threat that they will return and kill their family if they
reported the incident to anybody. But when a couple of months
later appellant and his co-accused Grondiano were arrested on drug
charges, BBB finally felt it was safe to come out in the open and
inform the police of the identities of the two men who robbed
their house, one of whom subsequently raped her mother
(appellant).
Appellant cannot seek acquittal on the basis of the negative result
of the DNA test on the specimen conducted by the NBI.
A positive DNA match is unnecessary when the totality of the
evidence presented before the court points to no other possible
conclusion, i.e., appellant raped the private offended party. A
positive DNA match may strengthen the evidence for the
prosecution, but an inconclusive DNA test result may not be
sufficient to exculpate the accused, particularly when there is
sufficient evidence proving his guilt. Notably, neither a positive
DNA match of the semen nor the presence of spermatozoa is
essential in finding that rape was committed. The important
consideration in rape cases is not the emission of semen but the
penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ. 42
Moreover, it is evident that the rape of AAA was committed in the
presence and in full view of her three minor children. Thirteen

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
(13)-year old BBB, as well as her two minor siblings who were
present at the time when the rape was committed, was already old
enough to sense the bestiality being committed against their own
mother.43 Such circumstance, as recited in the last portion of the
Information for Criminal Case No. 2001-815 is, by itself, sufficient
to qualify the rape under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code,44 as amended. Consequently, the CA was correct in affirming
the conviction of appellant for qualified rape.
With respect to the charge of robbery, we find no merit in
appellants argument that the prosecution failed to establish that
he conspired with co-accused Grondiano in stealing goods from
private complainants store. He asserts that there was no proof
that he was outside the store when the crime of robbery was being
committed; private complainant and her daughter merely surmised
that another person was outside the store because of a creaking
sound created by a bamboo chair, but they actually did not see
that person or if there was indeed that person.451avvphi1
On this issue, we hold that the CA correctly ruled that conspiracy
was sufficiently proven by circumstantial evidence on record, thus:
We also find that the trial court correctly appreciated conspiracy
against Cabigquez with respect [to] the crime of robbery. There is
conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not
necessary. Conspiracy may be shown through circumstantial
evidence, deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense
was perpetrated, or inferred upon the acts of the accused
themselves when such lead to a joint purpose and design, concerted
action, and community of interest.
Neither [AAA] nor [BBB] saw Cabigquez acting as a lookout outside
the store. However, the creaking sound coming from the balcony
and the fact that [BBB] saw Cabigquez go inside the store, as soon
as Grondiano left, reasonably verify a discernment that someone
stood by outside and close to the stores entrance during the
looting, and that such person was Cabigquez. The fact that only
Grondiano concealed his face reasonably indicates a prior
agreement between the two (2) malefactors for Cabigquez to act
as a lookout in the commission of robbery. After raping [AAA],
Cabigquez also warned of killing [AAA and her children] if they
told anyone about the incident, which threat contributed to the
common sentiment of concealing both crimes of robbery and rape.
These circumstances sufficiently establish a joint purpose and
design, and a community of interest, between Cabigquez and
Grondiano, in committing the crime of robbery.46
On the matter of actual damages awarded by the trial court,
appellant questions the amount thereof, insisting there was no
basis for the actual cost of the items taken from the store.
We find no reversible error committed by the CA in sustaining
such award. In People v. Martinez,47 this Court ruled that the trial
court has the power to take judicial notice of the value of stolen
goods because these are matters of public knowledge or capable of
unquestionable demonstration. Judicial cognizance, which is based

on considerations of expediency and convenience, displace evidence
since, being equivalent to proof, it fulfills the object which the
evidence is intended to achieve. Surely, matters like the value of
the appliances, canned goods and perfume are undeniably within
public knowledge and easily capable of unquestionable
demonstration.48 Here, what is involved are common goods for
everyday use and ordinary stocks found in small sari-sari stores
like private complainants store, i.e., milk, soap, coffee, sugar, liquor
and cigarettes. The RTC was thus correct in granting the
reasonable amount of P10,000.00 as computed by the private
complainant representing the value of stolen merchandise from her
store.
Further, the Court deems it proper to adjust the sums awarded as
civil indemnity, moral and exemplary damages. Applying prevailing
jurisprudence, the private complainant is entitled to P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.49
Lastly, the death penalty imposed on appellant was correctly
modified to reclusion perpetua, in view of the passage of Republic
Act No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
Death Penalty in the Philippines."50 Notwithstanding the reduction
of the penalty imposed on appellant, he is not eligible for parole
following Section 3 of the said law, which provides:
SEC. 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion
perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion
perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole
under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, as amended.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision dated
July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals, Mindanao Station in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 00409 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that
the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed on appellant in Criminal
Case No. 2001-815 for qualified rape is herein clarified as without
eligibility for parole, and the appellant is ordered to pay the
private complainant P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,P75,000.00 as
moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
With costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
B. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
Section 2. Documentary evidence. ?

Documents as evidence consist of writing
or any material containing letters, words,
numbers, figures, symbols or other modes
of written expression offered as proof of
their contents. (n)
Documentary evidence
Documentary evidence is any evidence introduced at a
trial in the form of documents. Although this term is
most widely understood to mean writings on paper (such as
an invoice, a contract or a will), the term actually
include any media by which information can be preserved.
Photographs, tape recordings, films, and printed emails
are all forms of documentary evidence.
Documentary versus physical evidence
A piece of evidence is not documentary evidence if it is
presented for some purpose other than the examination of
the contents of the document. For example, if a bloodspattered letter is introduced solely to show that the
defendant stabbed the author of the letter from behind as
it was being written, then the evidence is physical
evidence, not documentary evidence. However, a film of
the murder taking place would be documentary evidence
(just as a written description of the event from an
eyewitness). If the content of that same letter is then
introduced to show the motive for the murder, then the
evidence would be both physical and documentary.
Authentication
Documentary evidence is subject to specific forms
of authentication, usually through the testimony of
an eyewitness to the execution of the document, or to the
testimony of a witness able to identify
the handwriting of the purported author. Documentary
evidence is also subject to the best evidence rule, which
requires that the original document be produced unless
there is a good reason not to do so.
Documents as evidence consist of writing or any material containing

letters, words, numbers, figures, symbols or other modes of written
expression offered as proof of their contents.
Question:
When a document does considered real or object evidence?
Answer:
If the object is to examine the age, signature thereon, or the conditions
of the document itself, the same is considered real evidence which the
court may view for such purpose.
Q: May a private document be offered and admitted in evidence
both as documentary evidence and as object evidence? Explain.
A: Yes. A private document is considered as object evidence when it is
addressed to the senses of the court or when it is presented in order to
establish certain physical evidence or characteristics that are visible on
the paper and the writings that comprise the document. It is considered
as documentary evidence when it is offered as proof of its contents.
Q: What are the requisites for admissibility of documentary

evidence?
A:
1. The document must be relevant;
2. The evidence must be authenticated;

3. The document must be authenticated by a competent witness; and
4. The document must be formally offered in evidence.
[G.R. No. 143125. June 10, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs. DIOSDADO CORIAL y
REQUIEZ, appellant.
D E C I S I O N
VITUG, J.:
For automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, Branch 109,[1] imposing the death penalty on
convicted appellant Diosdado Corial y Requiez for the crime of
qualified rape,[2] said to have been committed, according to the
indictment, against his own minor granddaughter Maricar Corial.
At his arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the
charge;[3] trial ensued shortly thereafter.
The Case for the Prosecution. Maricar Corial was born to Marietta Corial, appellants
daughter, but she did not come to know her father (now said to be
deceased). Maricar had two maternal sisters who lived with their
mother and her stepfather in Balagtas, Bulacan. Maricar lived
with her grandparents, herein appellant and his wife Carmelita, in
Pasay City.
One afternoon in July 1998, Maricar and appellant were left
alone in the house. She was wearing a duster when her
grandfather forced himself on her. He first inserted his penis
into her private part, and then into her mouth and, finally, into her
anus. When her mother, Marietta, arrived for Christmas in 1998,
Maricar revealed the sexual abuse she had suffered from her
grandfather. Maricar went first to the barangay hall where she
lodged a complaint against appellant and then to the Philippine
General Hospital where Maricar was physically examined. Still
later, they repaired to the Pasay City Police station where Maricar
executed a sworn statement (salaysay).
According to barangay captain Policarpio Tawat, Marietta and
Maricar went to see him on the morning of 29 December 1998 at
the barangay hall to seek assistance about the sexual
assault. Along with a barangay kagawad, Tawat went to invite
appellant to the barangay hall and then had a medical examination
conducted on Maricar. When the medical examination proved
positive for rape, Tawat turned appellant over to the Pasay City
Police station.
The Provisional Medical Certificate,[4] dated 29 December
1998, showed the following findings of Dr. Mariella SugueCastillo; viz:
GENITAL EXAMINATION:
External genitalia: normal
Hymen: crescentic hymen, no discharge seen,
(+) mound at 7 oclock position, (+)
attenuation of posterior hymen

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
Anus: normal findings
by his daughter Marietta. It instead gave credence to what it so

described as the spontaneous and straightforward testimony of
Maricar Corial. The trial court adjudged:
IMPRESSION
Disclosure of sexual abuse.
Genital finding of posterior hymen
attenuation is suspicious for prior
penetration injury[5]
On the afternoon of 29 December 1998, SPO3 Milagros
Carrasco was at the Women and Children Desk of the Pasay City
Police station when Barangay Captain Tawat, Marietta, young
Maricar, and Mariettas father arrived. After hearing the story,
SPO3 Carrasco contacted social worker Erlinda Aguila to assist her
in conducting the interview with Maricar. The child claimed that
her maternal grandfather had sexually abused her. When
confronted by SPO3 Carrasco, appellant remarked in Tagalog that
he was just having a taste of the child (tinitikman niya lang).
The Case for the Defense. Testifying for her father, Nelly Corial stated that the 59year-old appellant had six children, all of them female, by his wife
Carmelita. He was a mason and construction worker employed by D.
M. Consunji while her mother was a dressmaker. Her father was a
responsible person with no vices. Her parents first took custody
of Maricar because the latters father, Francisco Amado and livein partner of Marietta, would often inflict physical harm upon the
child. After Franciscos death, Marietta resided in Balagtas,
Bulacan, with yet another live-in partner, Rene Malinao, who both
for a while took Maricar into their custody. Maricar was soon
brought back to her grandparents residence in Pasay City because
of the maltreatment she had been getting from Malinao. According
to Nelly, her parents loved Maricar, provided for her needs, and
had her take up schooling at the Pio del Pilar Elementary School.
After the case against appellant was filed, Marietta confided to
Nelly her regrets (nagsisisi) for having filed the case. Marietta
became mentally deranged and would harm herself for no reason
at all. She concluded that Mariettas complaint was fabricated
(gawa-gawa lamang niya iyun ). Menchu, another daughter of
appellant, also testified for him. Her residence in Pasay City was
separated from appellants house only by a wall. She confirmed
that Maricar was brought to San Pedro, Laguna, at the instance of
appellant who had wanted the child to have a vacation there.
Appellant denied having raped Maricar. He took the child
away from her parents because they were unable to properly care
for her. After Franciscos death, he took custody of Marietta and
her child but only for four months when Marietta started to live
with another partner in Bulacan. Marietta was a good daughter and
a good mother but she was mentally ill and hardheaded ( suwail).
Marietta instigated the case against him because he had refused
to allow her to live in their house in Pasay City. From Monday to
Saturday, he would leave the house at six oclock in the morning
and return from work at seven oclock in the evening. On Sundays,
Nelly would always be at home.
The Assailed Decision. -
In view of all the foregoing, the Court opines that the prosecution
has proven the guilt of the accused, Diosdado Corial y Requiez for
rape as defined and penalized under Art. 266-A and 266-B of RA
8353 as amended, and the Court hereby sentences the accused,
Diosdado Corial y Requiez to death and to indemnify the
complainant in the amount of P75,000.00 and moral and exemplary
damages in the amount of P50,000.00. [6]
Appellant, in this Courts review of his case, would consider
erroneous his conviction for there was no opportunity for him and
his granddaughter to be alone in their residence, particularly on
Sundays when all the members of the household stayed home, and
for Maricars failure to make an outcry during the alleged sexual
assault that could have easily attracted the attention of close kins
whose house was only adjacent to theirs.
Quite often, this Court has held that rapists are not
deterred from committing the odious act of sexual abuse by the
mere presence nearby of people or even family members. Rape is
committed not exclusively in seclusion;[7] lust, it is said, respects
neither time nor place. The trial court has valued Maricars
testimony as being spontaneous and straightforward. Indeed,
when a victims testimony is straightforward and unflawed by any
major inconsistency or contradiction, the same must be given full
faith and credit.[8] Appellant capitalizes on the so-called disparity
between the declaration of Maricar in her testimony in court and
her sworn statement. He quotes a portion of her salaysay; viz:
06. T:
Natatandaan mo ba kung kailan at kung

saan nangyari ang mga ginawa na
sinasabi ng lolo mo sa iyo?
S:
Opo, simula po ng Grade II ako. Tapos

naulit po nuong July 1998 at nauulit po
pag araw ng Linggo pag wala ang lola ko
at ang tita ko sa bahay namin. Kasi
nagtratrabaho si Lolo ng Lunes
hanggang Sabado. Pero pag wala siyang
pasok ay ginagalaw din niya ako. Sa
bahay namin sa Dolores, Pasay.[9]
He then labels it as being inconsistent with her testimony on crossexamination; viz:

Atty. Casas:
Now, it was in July 1998 which is finally the alleged
(sic) contained in the information that you
claimed you have been sexually molested, is that
correct?
A: Yes, sir.
The trial court debunked the defense of denial interposed by

appellant and the assertion that the rape case was only trumped-up
Q: And you told the Court in your direct examination

that it was the first time that the same was

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
committed?
sexually molested by your grandfather Diosdado

Corial?
A: Yes, sir.[10]
Not only is her assailed statement - that before the July
1998 incident she has also been subjected to sexual assault by
appellant inconsequential in a material point but it also does not
necessarily take away her credibility at the witness stand. It is
acknowledged that affidavits, usually taken ex parte, are often
held unreliable for being incomplete and inaccurate.[11]
Maricars failure to shout during the sexual assault is not all
that strange. Not every witness to or victim of a crime can be
supposed to always act in conformity with the usual expectations
of everyone;[12] in fact, there is no known and accepted standard
therefor. Moreover, to attribute to her the sophistication of an
adult woman would be to brush aside the fact that Maricar is just
a young girl. Even then, it would be unreasonable to judge her
actions on the traumatic experience by any norm of behavior that,
if at all, may be expected from mature persons. [13]
The Court is not persuaded by the claim of appellant that
Marietta, the victims mother, has fabricated the charge simply
because appellant did not allow her to stay with him. It just is not
a convincing tale. It is difficult to believe that Marietta would
send his own father to jail, even to the gallows, sacrifice the honor
and dignity of their family and subject her own child to untold
humiliation and disgrace if she were motivated by any desire other
than to bring to justice the person responsible for defiling her
child.[14]
Appellants claim that Marietta is deranged lacks unbiased
evidentiary support. In any event, it hardly has any bearing on the
credibility of her own daughter. Nor would the failure of the
prosecution to present Marietta at the witness stand adversely
affect the outcome of the case. The prosecution is not bound to
present any witness other than the victim herself, for as long as
the testimony of the victim is credible, natural, convincing and
otherwise consistent with human nature and the course of
things,[15] it may be the basis for a conviction. It is the prerogative
of the prosecution, not much unlike that of the defense, to
determine which evidence to submit in support of its own case. [16]
Maricar, on direct examination, testified thusly:
Q: In the information filed to (sic) this Honorable
Court, stated that you are complaining for rape
perpetrated by your Lolo Diosdado Corial that
happened in July 1998. Do you still recall the date
in July when this incident, the alleged incident
happened?
A: It was in July but I do not know or remember the
date, sir.
A: The incident happened at 164 Dolores Street,

Pasay City.
Q: Was it inside your house?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You earlier stated that the alleged rape happened
in the afternoon, sometime in July 1998 inside
your house at No. 164 Dolores Street, Pasay City.
My question is, who were actually present inside
your house when the incident happened?
A: My grandmother was there, but she left.
Q: And who was left behind in the afternoon of July
1998 when the incident happened?
A: I and my grandfather was (sic) left inside the
house.
Q: And what actually were you doing in that afternoon
of July 1998 when you were inside your house?
A: None, sir.
Q: What were you wearing then?
A: I was wearing a duster, sir.
Q: And so was there any unusual incident that
happened in the month of July 1998? When you
were left by your Lola inside your house and left
with your Lolo?
A: Yes, there was.
Q: Would you kindly tell to this Honorable Court, what
happened to you on that month of July 1998?
A: I was raped by my grandfather, sir.
Q: Will you further explain to this Honorable Court,
how were you raped by your grandfather?
A: He inserted his penis into my private part, sir.
Q: And what did you feel when your grandfather
inserted his penis inside your private part?
A: I felt pain, sir.
Fiscal Barrera:
Besides inserting his penis at your private part, what
else did your Lolo do to you?
Q: But could you still recall if that was in the morning

or lunch time or evening of July 1998?
A: He was requesting me to suck his penis.
A: It was in the afternoon of July 1998.
Q: And did he actually put his penis inside your

mouth?
Q: And in what place where this incident happened

regarding the complaint (sic) that you were
A: Yes, sir.

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
Q: And what happen(ed) after he inserted his penis

inside your mouth?
A: He requested me to suck it, sir.
Atty. Casas:
You also mentioned that your Lolo raped you by placing
his penis inside your mouth, is that correct?
Q: And what else happened aside (from) inserting his

penis at your private part, and putting his penis
inside your mouth sometime in the month of July
1998?
A: Yes, sir.
A: He inserted his penis inside my anus.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you feel when he inserted his penis inside

your anus in the month of July 1998?
A: It was painful, sir.
Q: Definitely, you did not like that idea or actuation

by your Lolo?
x x x
xxx
xxx
Q: By the way, Maricar, do you love your Lolo and

Lola?
Q: What else happened besides inserting his penis

inside your anus or Puwet?
A: I love my grandmother.
A: No more, sir.
A: I dont love him.
Q: And so after that, what did you do?
Q: Why do you not love your grandfather?
A: When my mother arrived last Christmas, I told

her what my grandfather did to me.
A: Because, he did something wrong to me. [18]
Q: How about your grandfather, do you love him?
A: Yes, sir.
The trial court has found appellant guilty of having violated

Sections 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 8353 (Anti-Rape Law of 1997),[19] that read:
Q: And so what actually did you tell your mother

Marietta Corial?
Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. Rape is

committed
Q: You mean that was last Christmas 1998?
A: I told her that my grandfather put his penis inside

my vagina.[17]
On cross examination, she recounted:
Q: You specifically mentioned the word rape when you
were asked any unusual incident that happened on
June 1998, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who told you or how did you learn the word rape?
A: Nobody told me, sir.
1)
By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
and
Court:
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years

of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
Pero alam mo ba ang meaning nang rape?

Alam mo ba ang ibig sabihin nang rape?
A: Rape means `Pang gagahasa.
x x x
xxx
xxx
Q: And because the penis of your Lolo was inserted

inside your vagina, you felt pain?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But you did not shout, is that correct?
A: I was boxing him.
x x x
xxx
xxx
2)
By any person who, under any of the circumstances
mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual
assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal
orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice
of another person.
Article 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next
preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
x x x
xxx
xxx

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is

committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying
circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
The death penalty for the crime herein charged may be
imposed only when the twin qualifying circumstances of relationship
between the appellant and the victim and the latters age are
indubitably proven; otherwise, the appellant can only be held liable
for the crime of simple rape penalized by reclusion
perpetua.[20] The relationship between appellant and the victim has
been adequately established. The prosecution evidence has shown
that appellant is the grandfather of the victim,[21] a fact that
appellant himself has likewise maintained.[22] The same cannot,
however, be said with respect to the age of the victim.
In People vs. Pruna ,[23] the Court, after noting the divergent
rulings on proof of age of the victim in rape cases, has set out
certain guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the
crime or as a qualifying circumstance. The primary evidence of age
of the victim is her birth certificate. Age may also be proven by
such authentic documents as a baptismal certificate and school
records only in the absence of a birth certificate. If the
aforesaid documents are shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the
victims mother or a member of the family either by affinity or
consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting
pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the
offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules
on Evidence shall be sufficient but only under the following
circumstances: a) If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of
age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years
old; b) If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what
is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old; c) If
the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought
to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
In the instant case, the prosecution did not offer the
victims certificate of live birth or any similar authentic document
in evidence. The trial court, in convicting the appellant of the
crime of rape and imposing upon him the death penalty even in the
absence of the necessary documents, relied on the sworn
statement of Marietta Corial, the mother of the victim, attesting
to the fact that her daughter Maricar Corial was born on 26 May
1990.[24] Marietta Corial, however, did not testify in court. Such
sworn statement was thus inadmissible in evidence under the
hearsay rule,[25] and unless the affiant had been placed on the
witness stand, the admission of the mere affidavit and the
conviction of appellant on the basis thereof would violate the right
of the accused to meet witness face to face.[26]
In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic
document, or the testimony of the victims mother or relatives
concerning the victims age under the circumstances heretofore
mentioned, the complainants sole testimony can suffice provided
that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused; to

repeat, provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the
accused.[27] There is no such declaration and admission on the part
of appellant.
This Court cannot be overly strict as regards the proof of
age of the victim particularly when, such as under Article 266-B of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8353, age is
an element of the crime that, if shown, would make it punishable by
death. As so frequently expressed by the Court, the severity of
the death penalty, which by its nature is irreversible when carried
out, should behoove courts to apply the most exacting rules of
procedure and evidence. The prosecution is not excused from
discharging its burden even when the defense lets itself loose
about it.
The trial court ordered appellant to indemnify the
complainant in the amount of P75,000.00 and moral and exemplary
damages in the amount of P50,000.00. The award must be
corrected. In consonance with prevailing jurisprudence, appellant
must be made to pay P50,000.00 civil indemnity, an award that is
outrightly due the victim of rape by the mere fact of its
commission, P50,000.00 moral damages which is deemed
concomitant with and which necessarily results from this odious
criminal offense, and P25,000.00 exemplary damages which are
awarded under Article 2230 of the Civil Code when the crime is
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances [28] such as
relationship between the offender and the victim. [29]
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo finding
appellant Diosdado Corial y Requiez guilty of rape is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION in that he is hereby only adjudged guilty of
simple, not qualified, rape and sentenced to suffer, instead of the
death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The award of
damages by the trial court is likewise modified by hereby ordering
appellant to indemnify the victim the amounts of P50,000.00 civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 moral damages and P25,000.00 exemplary
damages. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing,

Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ.,concur.
1. Best Evidence Rule

Section 3. Original document must be
produced; exceptions. ? When the subject
of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except in the
following cases:

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
(a) When the original has been lost or

destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, without bad faith on the part of
the offeror;
A: Object evidence, also known as real evidence, demonstrative

evidence, autoptic preference and physical evidence, is that evidence
which is addressed to the senses of the court (Sec. 1). It is not limited
to the view of an object. It extends to the visual, auditory, tactile,
gustatory, and olfactory. It is considered as evidence of the highest
order.
(b) When the original is in the

custody or under the control of the
party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce
it after reasonable notice;
Q: What are the purposes of authentication of object evidence?

A:
To avoid risk of error in trusting to
somebodys copy or recollection the words of a
document.
(c) When the original consists of

numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss
of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the
general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public
record in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public
office. (2a)
The best evidence rule is a common law rule
of evidence which can be traced back at least as far as
the 18th century. In Omychund v Barker (1745) 1 Atk, 21,
49; 26 ER 15, 33, Lord Harwicke stated that no evidence
was admissible unless it was "the best that the nature of
the case will allow". The publication ten years later of
Gilbert's enormously influential Law of Evidence,[1] a
posthumous work by Sir Jeffrey Gilbert, Lord Chief Baron
of the Exchequer, established the primacy of the best
evidence rule, which Gilbert regarded as central to the
concept of evidence. The general rule is that secondary
evidence, such as a copy or facsimile, will be not
admissible if an original document exists, and is not
unavailable due to destruction or other circumstances
indicating unavailability.
The best evidence rule is also thought to be the basis
for the rule precluding the admissibility
of hearsay evidence, although the two rules are now quite
distinct.
The best evidence rule applies when a party wants to
admit as evidence the contents of a document at trial,
but that the original document is not available. In this
case, the party must provide an acceptable excuse for its
absence. If the document itself is not available, and the
court finds the excuse provided acceptable, then the
party is allowed to use secondary evidence to prove the
contents of the document and have it as admissible
evidence. The best evidence rule only applies when a
party seeks to prove the contents of the document sought
to be admitted as evidence.
Q: Define object evidence.
Q: What are the requisites for the object evidence to be

admissible?
A: It must
1. Be relevant to the fact in issue;
2. Be authenticated before it is admitted;
3. Not be hearsay;
4. Not be privileged; and
5. Meet any additional requirement set by law.
Q: What does object evidence include?
A:
1. Any article or object which may be known or perceived by the use of
the senses;
2. Examination of the anatomy of a person or of any substance taken
therefrom;
3. Conduct of tests, demonstrations or experiments; and
4. Examination of representative portrayals of the object in question
(e.g. maps, diagrams)
What are Considered Original Documents
a. The original of a document is one the contents of which are the
subject of inquiry.
b. When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the
same time, with identical contents, all such copies are equally
regarded as originals.
c. When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one
being copied from another at or near the time of the transaction, all the
entries are likewise equally regarded as originals.
d. An electronic document, if it is a printout or output readable by sight
or other means shown to reflect the data accurately. (Rules on
Electronic Evidence, A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC)
Q: In a criminal case for murder, the prosecution offered as
evidence photographs showing the accused mauling the victim
with several of the latters companions. The person who took the
photograph was not presented as a witness. Be that as it may, the
prosecution presented the companions of the victim who testified
that they were the ones in the photographs. The defense objected
to the admissibility of the photographs because the person who
took the photographs was not presented as witness. Is the
contention of the defense tenable?
A: No. Photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified
by the photographer as to its production and testified as to the
circumstances under which they were produced. The value of this kind
of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or reproduction of
the original, and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in
portraying the scene at the time of the crime.
The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identif y
the pictures he has taken. The correctness of the photograph as a
faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima
facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or by other
competent witnesses who can testify to its exactness and accuracy,
after which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its
accuracy.
Here, the photographs are admissible as evidence inasmuch as the
correctness thereof was testified to by the companions of the victim
(Sison v. People, G.R. Nos. 108280-83, Nov. 16, 1995).

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
Q: Ron was charged with murder for shooting Carlo. After trial,
Ron was found guilty as charged. On appeal, Ron argued that the
trial court should have acquitted him as his guilt was not proved
beyond reasonable doubt. He argues that the paraffin test
conducted on him 2 days after he was arrested yielded a negative
result. Hence, he could not have shot Carlo. Is Ron correct?
A: No. While the paraffin test was negative, such fact alone did not
ipso facto prove that Ron is innocent. A negative paraffin result is not
conclusive proof that a person has not fired a gun. It is possible to fire
a gun and yet be negative for nitrates, as when the culprit is wearing
gloves or he washes his hands afterwards. Here, since Ron submitted
himself for paraffin testing only two days after the shooting, it was likely
he had already washed his hands thoroughly, thus removing all traces
of nitrates therefrom (People v. Brecinio, G.R. No. 138534, Mar. 17,
2004).
MONEY AS EVIDENCE
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 80505 : December 4, 1990.]
192 SCRA 28
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MARIO TANDOY y
LIM,Defendant-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
CRUZ, J.:
The decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 133 dated October 13, 1987,
convicting Mario Tandoy of the crime of
violation of Art. II, Sec. 4 of Rep. Act No. 6425
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is
before us on appeal.
The information against the accused-appellant
read as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of May 1986, in
the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused
without being authorized by law, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell
eight (8) pieces of dried marijuana flowering
tops, two (2) pieces of dried marijuana flowering
tops and crushed dried marijuana flowering tops,
which are prohibited drug, for and in
consideration of P20.00.
Upon arraignment, Tandoy entered a plea of not
guilty. After trial, Judge Buenaventura J.
Guerrero rendered a decision the dispositive
portion of which declared:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Mario
Tandoy y Lim guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, Rep.
Act No. 6425, as amended, and is hereby
sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay
a fine of P20,000.00 and cost.: nad
The marijuana confiscated in this case is
declared confiscated and forfeited and
ordered turned over to the Dangerous
Drugs Board for proper disposal.
SO ORDERED.
The accused-appellant raises the
assignment of errors in this appeal:
following
1. The Court a quo erred in finding

accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged despite lack of
evidence to prove that he sold marijuana
to the poseur-buyer.
2. The Court a quo erred in admitting in
evidence against the accused Exh. "E-2A" which is merely a xerox copy of the
P10.00 bill allegedly used as buy-bust
money.
The evidence of the prosecution may
summarized as follows:
be
On May 27, 1986, at about 3:30 p.m. Lt. Salido,

Jr. of the Makati Police Station dispatched Pfc.
Herino de la Cruz, and Detectives Pablo R.
Singayan, Nicanor Candolesas, Luisito de la Cruz,
Estanislao Dalumpines, Antonio Manalastas and
Virgilio Padua to conduct a buy-bust operation at
Solchuaga St., Barangay Singkamas, Makati.
The target area was a store along the said

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
street, and Singayan was to pose as the buyer.

He stood alone near the store waiting for any
pusher to approach. The other members of the
team strategically positioned themselves. Soon,
three men approached Singayan. One of them
was the accused-appellant, who said without
preamble: "Pare, gusto mo bang umiskor?"
Singayan said yes. The exchange was made then
and there two rolls/pieces of marijuana for
one P10.00 and two P5.00 bills marked ANU
(meaning Anti-Narcotics Unit).
The team then moved in and arrested Tandoy.
Manalastas and Candolesas made a body search
of the accused-appellant and took from him the
marked money, as well as eight more rolls/foils
of marijuana and crushed leaves.: nad
The arresting officers brought Tandoy to the
Office of the Anti-Narcotics Unit, Makati Police
Station, for investigation by Detective Marvin
Pajilan. The accused-appellant chose to remain
silent after having been informed of his
constitutional rights.
These events were narrated under oath by De la
Cruz, Singayan and Pajilan. 1 Microscopic,
chemical and chromotographic examination was
performed on the confiscated marijuana by
Raquel P. Angeles, forensic chemist of the
National Bureau of Investigation, who later
testified that the findings were positive. The
marijuana was offered as an exhibit. 2
As might be expected, the accused-appellant
had a different story. His testimony was that
from 1:30 to 4:00 p.m. of the day in question, he
was playing "cara y cruz" with 15 other persons
along Solchuaga St. when somebody suddenly
said that policemen were making arrests. The
players grabbed the bet money and scampered.
However, he and a certain Danny (another "cara
y cruz" player) were caught and taken to the
Narcotics Command headquarters in Makati.
There they were mauled and warned that if they
did not point to their fellow pushers, they would

rot in jail. The accused-appellant denied he had
sold marijuana to Singayan and insisted the bills
taken from him were the bet money he had
grabbed at the "cara y cruz" game. 3
The trial court, which had the opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses and to
listen to their respective testimonies, gave more
credence to the statements of the arresting
officers. Applying the presumption that they
had performed their duties in a regular manner,
it rejected Tandoy's uncorroborated allegation
that he had been manhandled and framed.
Tandoy had not submitted sufficient evidence of
his charges, let alone his admission that he had
no quarrel with the peace officers whom he had
met only on the day of his arrest.
In People v. Patog, 4 this Court held:
When there is no evidence and nothing to
indicate the principal witness for the
prosecution was actuated by improper motives,
the presumption is that he was not so actuated
and his testimony is entitled to full faith and
credit.
Tandoy submits that "one will not sell this
prohibited drug to another who is a total
stranger until the seller is certain of the
identity of the buyer."
The conjecture must be rejected.: nad
In People v. Paco, 5 this Court observed:
Drug-pushing when done on a small level as in
this case belongs to that class of crimes that
may be committed at anytime and at any place.
After the offer to buy is accepted and the
exchange is made, the illegal transaction is
completed in a few minutes. The fact that the
parties are in a public place and in the presence
of other people may not always discourage them
from pursuing their illegal trade as these
factors may even serve to camouflage the same.

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
Hence, the Court has sustained the conviction of

drug pushers caught selling illegal drugs in a
billiard hall (People v. Rubio, G.R. No. 66875,
June 19, 1986, 142 SCRA 329; People v.
Sarmiento, G.R. No. 72141, January 12, 1987, 147
SCRA 252), in front of a store (People vs. Khan,
supra) along a street at 1:45 p.m. (People v.
Toledo, G.R. No. 67609, November 22, 1985, 140
SCRA 259), and in front of a house (People v.
Policarpio, G.R. No. 69844, February 23, 1988).
As the Court has also held, "What matters is not
an existing familiarity between the buyer and
the seller but their agreement and the acts
constituting the sale and delivery of the
marijuana leaves." 6
Under the second assigned error, the accusedappellant invokes the best evidence rule and
questions the admission by the trial court of the
xerox copy only of the marked P10.00 bill.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment, correctly
refuted that contention thus:
This assigned error centers on the trial court's
admission of the P10.00 bill marked money (Exh.
E-2-A) which, according to the appellant, is
excluded under the best evidence rule for being
a mere xerox copy. Apparently, appellant
erroneously thinks that said marked money is an
ordinary document falling under Sec. 2, Rule 130
of the Revised Rules of Court which excludes
the introduction of secondary evidence except in
the five (5) instances mentioned therein.:-cralaw
The best evidence rule applies only when the
contents of the document are the subject of
inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or
not such document was actually executed, or
exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or
surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule
does not apply and testimonial evidence is
admissible. (Cf. Moran, op. cit., pp. 76-77; 4
Martin, op. cit., p. 78.)
Since the aforesaid marked money was

presented by the prosecution solely for the
purpose of establishing its existence and not its
contents, other substitutionary evidence, like a
xerox copy thereof, is therefore admissible
without the need of accounting for the original.
Moreover, the presentation at the trial of the
"buy-bust money" was not indispensable to the
conviction of the accused-appellant because the
sale of the marijuana had been adequately
proved by the testimony of the police officers.
So long as the marijuana actually sold by the
accused-appellant had been submitted as an
exhibit, the failure to produce the marked
money itself would not constitute a fatal
omission.
We are convinced from the evidence on record
that the prosecution has overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence in favor
of the accused-appellant with proof beyond
reasonable doubt of his guilt. He must therefore
suffer the penalty prescribed by law for those
who would visit the scourge of drug addiction
upon our people.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and
the challenged decision AFFIRMED in toto, with
costs against the accused-appellant.: nad
SO ORDERED
Narvasa (Chairman), Gancayco, Grio-Aquino
and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
UNAUTHENTICATED COPIES

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-85785 April 24, 1989

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
BENITO SY y ONG, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES PHILIPPINES
and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Convicted of Estafa under Article 315,
Paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code by
three (3) Courts, namely, the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Caloocan City, Branch 52; 1 the Regional
Trial Court of the same City, Branch 129 ; 2and
respondent Court of Appeals, petitioner now
seeks to break the chain of convictions.
The indictment against petitioner-accused, filed
on 18 August 1986, reads:
That on or about and during the month of
January 1986 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above- named accused received from the
Panama Sawmill Inc., represented in this case by
TE PENG MEN, PBC Check No. 291616 dated
January 15, 1986 for P6,000.00 which check was
subsequently encashed by said accused for the
purpose of and under the express obligation on
his part to use the said amount in securing a
Marine Insurance coverage for P3,000,000.00 on
a shipment of logs owned by Panama Sawmill, Inc.
but said accused with abuse of trust and
confidence reposed upon him far from complying
with his obligation and with intent to deceive and
defraud said corporation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously receive a
Marine Insurance coverage for only
Pl,000,000.00 to cover said shipment of logs,
paying therefor only the amount of P2,712.50 as
insurance premium without the knowledge and
consent of said Panama Sawmill, Inc., and

thereafter, said accused misappropriated and
converted to his own personal use and benefit
the balance of P3,287.50, and despite repeated
demands upon him, said accused refused and
failed to account for said sum of P3,287.50 to
the damage and prejudice of said Panama
Sawmill Inc., in the aforestated amount of
P3,287.50. (p. 3, Original Record)
After trial on the merits, the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Caloocan City convicted petitioner in a
Decision, dated 17 December 1986, the
WHEREFORE, by proof beyond reasonable
doubt, the accused BENITO SY is found
GUILTY of violating Art. 315, Par. 3 of the
Revised Penal Code, he is sentenced to a straight
penalty of FOUR (4) MONTHS imprisonment, to
reimburse or give restitution in the amount of
THREE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY
SEVEN (3,287.50) PESOS AND 50/100
CENTAVOS and to pay costs. (p. 37, Original
Record.)
On appeal before it, the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City, affirmed the judgment of
conviction on 3 June 1987, but increased the
penalty, as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court
finds the accused Benito Sy y Ong guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, thru
misappropriation, as defined under par. 1(b) and
penalized under the 3rd par. of Art 315 of the
Revised Penal Code and there being no attendant
mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of THREE (3) MONTHS OF ARRESTO
MAYOR TO ONE (1) YEAR AND ONE (1) DAY
OF PRISION CORRECCIONAL; to suffer the
accessory penalties provided for by law; and to

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
pay complainant Panama Sawmill Co., by way of

reparation, the amount of P3,287.50. Costs
against appellant. (p. 304, Original Record)
On 30 June 1988 respondent Court of Appeals
affirmed the Regional Trial Court
Decision 3 notwithstanding two (2)
Manifestations in lieu of Comment submitted by
the Office of the Solicitor General, dated 3
March 1988 and 3 October 1988, respectively,
recommending acquittal of petitioner-accused.
Before us now, petitioner re-asserts his
innocence. The Solicitor General has also
reiterated his recommendation for acquittal.
According to Te Peng Men Manager of Panama
Sawmill, Inc. (henceforth, simply "Panama") and
sole witness of the prosecution, the
developments in this case unfolded as follows:
1. Sometime in January 1986 "Panama" engaged
petitioner, an insurance agent, to obtain marine
insurance in the amount of P3M to cover its log
shipment from Palawan to Manila.
2. As instructed,on l4 January l986 petitioner
secured Marine Insurance Policy No. OAC-M86/002 from Oriental Assurance Corporation
("Oriental", for short), with a face value of P3M
(Exhibit "A"). Only the duplicate original of the
Policy was left with "Panama".
3. On 15 January 1986, "Panama" gave petitioner
Philippine Bank of Communication Check No.
291616 in the amount of P6,000.00 payable to
"Oriental" for the policy coverage of P3M.
4. On 28 January 1986 some of the logs valued
at P1.2M were lost when the barge transporting
the shipment encountered rough seas in the
vicinity of Dumaran Island, Palawan.
5. "Panama" filed a claim for loss against

"Oriental" only to be informed by the latter that
its marine insurance coverage was only for P1M
and that petitioner had paid a premium of only
P2,712.50 (Exhibit "D")
6. Contending that petitioner had
misappropriated the difference of P3,287.50
for his personal use and benefit to its prejudice,
"Panama" charged petitioner with Estafa.
For his part, petitioner maintains that the
following details constitute the truth:
a) Petitioner had never, at any one time, dealt
with prosecution witness, Te Peng Men. It was
only through one Tau Tian that petitioner had
any contact with "Panama".
b) "Oriental" had issued a Marine Insurance
Policy in the amount of P3M in favor of "Panama"
through petitioner's efforts.
c) However, Tau Tian requested petitioner to
return the Policy since the rate was quite high
and "Panama" wanted to pay only P6,000.00.
Thereafter, Tau Tian returned the original of
the Policy to petitioner but retained the
duplicate copy. Tau Tian instructed petitioner to
obtain a reduction of the premium from
P8,137.50 to P6,000.00.
d) Since petitioner was not able to secure a
reduction in the premium, he obtained instead a
P1M policy from "Oriental" paying for that
purpose a premium of P2,712.50. In addition, he
obtained a P2M policy from the First Integrated
Insurance Co., Inc. paying a premium therefor of
P3,255.00. The two policies totalled P3M and the
premiums paid reached P5,967.50, or almost
P6,000.00.
e) The real reason why "Panama" was not able to

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
recover on the aforementioned policies was

because the policy of "Oriental" was for total
loss only and not for partial loss. In fact, even
the Tan Gatue Adjustment Company sustained
the rejection of "Panama's" claim for that
reason.
guaranteed by a bond or by denying having

received such money, goods, or other property.
Defense witness, Kent Cotoco, the Underwriting

Manager of "Oriental" corroborated petitioner's
testimony that the P3M Policy first issued by
"Oriental" (Exhibit "1") was cancelled and
replaced by a P1M Policy (Exhibit "3"). He
explained that before the P3M Policy was
cancelled, petitioner had surrendered the
original to "Oriental"; that the original and the
replacement Policies bear the same serial
number 86/002 because it is company policy for
the replacement Policy to carry the same
number as the original Policy; and that he was
aware that the First Integrated Insurance Co.,
Inc., had issued a P2M Policy for "Panama" (t.s.n.,
November 21, 1986, pp. 78-80) because the
latter company charges a lower premium rate
than "Oriental" (ibid., pp. 80-82).
1. That money, goods or other personal property

is received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of, or to return, the same;
Is the accused guilty of Estafa committed

through misappropriation under paragraph l(b),
Article 325 of the Revised Penal Code? Said
provision reads:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who
shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned herein-below shall be punished by:
xxxxxxxxx
(b) By appropriating or converting, to the
prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other
personal property received by the offender in
trust or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of or to return the same, even
though such obligation be totally or partially
For the crime of Estafa through

misappropriation to exist the following elements
must be present:
2. That there be misappropriation or conversion

of such money or property by the offender, or
denial on his part of such receipt;
3. That such misappropriation or conversion or
denial is to the prejudice of another; and
4. That there is a demand made by the offended
party to the offender. (II Criminal Law, Luis B.
Reyes, 12th Edition, p. 717)
Have the foregoing elements been met in
respect of petitioner-accused? Petitioner,
supported by the Solicitor General, avers that
they have not because no conversion or
misappropriation has been committed and that
there was no demand for the return of the
P6,000.00 given to petitioner. In other words,
elements 2, 3, and 4 of the crime are lacking.
The totality of the evidence yields the following
incontrovertible data in chronological order:
Jan. 14, 1986 - Issuance of Oriental Marine
Insurance Policy No. OAC-M-86/002 for P 3M,
with a total premium of P8,137.50. "against total
loss only." (carbon copy, Exhibit "A", original,
Exhibit "1").
Jan. 15, 1986 - PBC Check No. 291616 payable to

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
Oriental Assurance Corporation for P6,000.00

(Exhibit "C"), endorsed at the back by petitioner
(Exhibit "C-1") and stamped "cleared' on the
same day, January 15, 1986.
Jan. 15, 1986 - Issuance of First Integrated
Marine Insurance Policy No. 00266 for P2M with
a premium of P3,000.00 plus P225.00
documentary stamps with a coverage "Total Loss
by Total Loss of the Vessel Only" (Exhibit "2").
Jan. 20, 1986 - Issuance of "Oriental" Marine
Insurance OAC-M-861002 for P1M, with a total
premium of P2,712.50 "against total loss only."
(Exhibit "3").
Jan. 21, 1986 - Official receiptof "Oriental"for
P2,712.50 representing premium for Policy No.
M-861002 in the amount of P1M (Exhibits "D"
and 4").
Jan. 28, 1986 - Partial loss of the log shipment.
Feb. 28, 1986 - Report of the Tan-Gatue
Adjustment Co., Inc., that the loss was not
compensable under the terms and conditions
"Total Loss Only" stipulated in the "Oriental"
Policy (Exhibit "6").
May 2, 1986 - Endorsement No. M-0001 of First
Integrated declaring that its Marine Cargo
Policy No. 00266, issued on January 15, 1986, is
"CANCELLED effective as of its inception date,
for non-payment of premium" (Exhibit "E"; "E1").
May , 1986 - Investigation of case by City Fiscal
of Caloocan city.
June 10, 1986 - First Integrated Official
Receipt for P3,255.00 in payment of premium
for Marine Cargo Policy No. 00266 issued
(Exhibit "5")
June 10, 1986 - Endorsement No. NPA/M0002/86 First Integrated, reinstating Marine
Cargo Policy No. 00266 provided no loss "has
occurred prior to the date of issuance of this
endorsement" (Exhibit "7").
Aug. 18, 1986 - Information for Estafa filed
before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan
City.
Upon the established facts, there can be no
dispute that petitioner received a check in the
amount of P6,000.00 from "Panama" for the
particular purpose of securing a marine
insurance coverage of P3M. That marked the
creation of a fiduciary relation between them,
the existence of which, either in the form of a
trust or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of the same, is an
essential element of the crime of Estafa by
misappropriation or conversion. The first
element of the crime of Estafa, therefore, is
satisfied.
As to the second element of "misappropriation
or conversion" of the money or property
received, petitioner contends that the same is in
attendant because petitioner had, in fact,
procured the P3M insurance coverage from two
companies, spending therefor all of the
entrusted amount of P6,000.00 for premiums.
We find ourselves in disagreement.
To "convert" ("distraer") connotes the act of
using or disposing of another's property as if it
were one's own. And to "misappropriate"
("appropiar") means to own, to take something
for one's own benefit (II Criminal Law, Luis B.
Reyes, 12th Edition, p. 729). That there was
conversion or misappropriation by petitioner is

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
immediately shown by the fact that, as admitted

by him on cross-examination, he had deposited
the "Panama" check of P6,000.00 payable to
"Oriental" in his own personal account (t.s.n.,
November 21, 1986, p. 30) even though he was
not authorized to do so by "Oriental" being
merely an ordinary, not a special agent, as
testified to by the underwriting agent of
"Oriental" (ibid., pp. 70-74). Petitioner assumed
the right to dispose of it as if it were his, thus
committing conversion with unfaithfulness and a
clear breach of trust. A check while not
regarded as legal tender is normally, under
commercial usage, a substitute for cash. The
credit represented by it in stated monetary
value is properly capable of appropriation
(Galvez vs. Court of Appeals, L- 22760,
November 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 278).
More, petitioner only gave a duplicate original
copy of the "Oriental" policy to "Panama", which
accepted it as the right policy. If, as petitioner
alleges, "Panama" had asked him to secure a
reduction in premium, it would have been a
simple matter for him to have informed
"Panama" of the second Policy for P1M he had
secured from "Oriental" as well as the P2M
Policy from First Integrated. But, no. All these
were fraudulently concealed from "Panama" and
were brought out only during the preliminary
investigation of the case before the City
Fiscal's Office.
Petitioner's obtainment of the First Integrated
Policy, with a coverage of P2M, was only on
paper. He had failed to pay the premium
therefor of P3,255.00 at the time of issuance so
that the Policy never became valid and binding
(Sec. 77, Insurance Code of 1978). Eloquent
proof of that is the Endorsement of 2 May 1986
of First Integrated cancelling its said Policy for
non-payment of premium "effective as of its
inception date," or on 15 January 1986.
Petitioner's explanation that he paid for the

premium twice - the first time on 21 January
1986 except that he was not issued a receipt
because he paid for it in cash (t.s.n., November
21, 1986, pp. 36-37), and the second time on 10
June 1986 "because the first time my sub-agent
did not pay it directly to the company on the
first time so I paid it again," (ibid., p. 38) - is
prevarication, pure and simple.
Petitioner paid the premium for the First
Integrated Policy only on 10 June 1986 or five
(5) months after its issuance and five (5) months
after the partial loss of the shipment, and while
the case was already pending investigation at the
City Fiscal's Office. The company reinstated the
Policy, also on 10 June 1986, but on the condition
that "no loss had occurred prior to the date of
issuance of this endorsement." It was a useless
reinstatement, therefore, and the stark fact
remains that at the time of loss there was no
coverage from First Integrated because of nonpayment of premium. Evidently petitioner paid
the premium at that late date in a futile attempt
to revive the Policy and as a last-ditch effort to
show that the entire P6,000.00 amount received
from "Panama" was used by petitioner for the
purpose intended - namely, the payment of
premium for marine insurance coverage of P3M.
Indications are that no payment of premium to
First Integrated would have been made either,
but for this criminal charge. The evidence is
clear that he had utilized the balance of the
P6,000.00 (after deducting the premium of
P2,712.50 paid to "Oriental") for his own
benefit, and with abuse of confidence, which is
the very essence of misappropriation. And he
would have gotten away scot-free if no loss of
the shipment had occurred.
The third element of Estafa is likewise present.
The misappropriation or conversion resulted in
prejudice to "Panama" which had believed all

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
along that its shipment was insured for P3M.

There was disturbance in its property rights,
and, although temporary, is sufficient to
constitute injury within the meaning of Article
315(1-b) of the Revised Penal Code (Lu Hayco vs.
Court of Appeals, L-49607-13 & 55775-86,
August 26, 1985, 138 SCRA 227).
As to the fourth essential element, that of
demand made by the offended party to the
offender, which petitioner claims is wanting in
this case, suffice it to state that demand is not
necessary when there is evidence of
misappropriation as in this case.
It so happens only that failure to
account, upon demand, for funds
or property held in trust, is
circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation. The same may,
however, be established by other
proof, such as that introduced in
the case at bar. (Tubb vs. People,
et al., 101 Phil. 114 [1957])
All the essential elements of Estafa through
misappropriation or conversion being present, we
do not see our way clear to breaking the chain of
convictions by the other Courts before us. The
guilt of petitioner-accused has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is
hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against
petitioner-accused, Benito Sy y Ong.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ.,

concur.
Q: What are the categories of object evidence for purposes of

authentication?
A:
1. Unique objects those that have readily identifiable marks (e.g. a
calibre 40 gun with serial number XXX888)
2. Objects made unique those that are readily identifiable (e.g. a bolo
knife used to hack a victim which could be identified by a witness in
court)
3. Non-unique objects those which have no identifying marks and
cannot be marked (e.g. footprints left at a crime scene)
Q: What is ocular inspection or view?
A: An ocular inspection conducted by the judge without the presence
of the parties or due notice is not valid, as an ocular inspection is part
of the trial.
Note: It is a discretionary act of the trial court to go to the place where
the object is located, when the object evidence cannot be brought in
courts.
Q: What is Chain of Custody Rule in relation to Sec. 21 of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002?
A: It is a method of authenticating evidence. It requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be.
It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence,
in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which
it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next
link in the chain.
These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure
that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the
same. (Lopez v. People, G.R. No. 172953, Apr. 30, 2008)
Q: When is there a need to establish a chain of custody?
A: It is necessary when the object evidence is non-unique as it is not
readily identifiable, was not made identifiable or cannot be made
identifiable, e.g. drops of blood or oil, drugs in powder form, fiber,
grains of sand and similar objects. (Riano, Evidence: A Restatement
for the Bar, p. 149, 2009 ed.)
Q: What is the purpose of establishing a chain of custody?
A: To guaranty the integrity of the physical evidence and to prevent the
introduction of evidence which is not authentic but where the exhibit is
positively identified the chain of custody of physical evidence is
irrelevant. (Ibid.)
RULE ON DNA EVIDENCE (A.M. NO. 06-11-5-SC)
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE

What is Parol Evidence?
It is any evidence aliunde (extrinsic evidence) which is intended or
tends to vary or contradict a complete and enforceable agreement
embodied in a document (Regalado, Vol. II, p. 730, 2008 ed.). It may
refer to testimonial, real or documentary evidence
What is the rationale of the parol evidence rule?
1. To give stability to written statements;
2. To remove the temptation and possibility of perjury; and
3. To prevent possible fraud.

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
Q: Who are qualified to be witnesses?
A: All persons who:
1. can perceive and perceiving;
2. can make known their perception to others (Sec. 20, Rule 130);
3. must take either an oath or an affirmation (Sec. 1, Rule 132;
Riano, Evidence: A Restatement for the Bar, p. 245, 2009 ed.); and
4. must not possess the disqualifications imposed by law or the rules
(Riano, Evidence: A Restatement for the Bar, p. 246, 2009 ed.)
NOTE: The ability to make known the perception of the witness to the
court involves two factors: (a) the ability to remember what has been
perceived; and (b) the ability to communicate the remembered
perception. Consider a witness who has taken the oath and who has
personal knowledge of the event which he is going to testify (Riano,
Evidence: A Restatement for the Bar, p. 248, 2009 ed)..
Q: What are the qualifications of a witness?

A: A prospective witness must show that he has the following
abilities:
1. To Observe the testimonial quality of perception;
2. To Remember the testimonial quality of memory;
3. To Relate the testimonial quality of narration; and
4. To Recognize a duty to tell the truth the testimonial quality of
sincerity.
Q: What cannot be considered as grounds for
disqualification?
A: GR:
1. Religious or political belief;
2. Interest in the outcome of the case; or
3. Conviction of a crime (Sec. 20).
XPN: There is prima facie evidence of incompetency in the following:

1. The fact that a person has been recently found of unsound mind
by a court of competent jurisdiction; or
2. That one is an inmate of an asylum for the insane.
DISQUALIFICATIONS OF WITNESSES
Q: Who are disqualified to be witnesses under the rules?
A: Those who are:
1. Disqualified by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity;
2. Disqualified by reason of marriage;
3. Disqualified by reason of death or insanity of adverse party; and
4. Disqualified on the ground of privileged communication:
a. Marital privilege;
b. Attorney-client privilege;
c. Doctor-patient privilege;
d. Minister-penitent privilege; or
e. Public officer as regards communications made in official
confidence.
Note: The qualifications and disqualifications of witnesses are
determined as of the time they are produced for examination in court or
at the taking of the depositions.
DISQUALIFIED BY REASON OF MENTAL INCAPACITY

OR IMMATURITY
1. The proposed witness must be incapable of making known his
perception to others; and
2. The incapacity must exist as of the time of his production for
examination (Riano, Evidence: A Restatement for the Bar, p. 254,
2009 ed.).
XPN: Unless otherwise provided by law like the following:

1. Those convicted of falsification of document, perjury or false
testimony is prohibited from being witnesses to a will (Art. 821,
NCC).
2. Those convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude cannot be
discharged to become a State witness (Sec. 17, Rule 119; Sec. 10,
R.A. 6981).
3. Those who fall under the disqualification provided under Secs. 2124, Rule 130.
Q: Who are disqualified by reason of mental incapacity or

immaturity?
COMPETENCY VS CREDIBILITY OF A WITNESS
2. Mental immaturity children whose mental maturity is such as to

render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they
are examined and of relating them truthfully. (Sec. 21)
A: Competency of a Witness
Credibility of a Witness
Has reference to the basic qualifications

of a witness as his capacity to perceive
and his capacity to communicate his
perception to others. (Riano, 2009,
p.250)
Refers to the believability of

the witness and has nothing
to do with the law or the
rules. (Ibid).
A:
1. Mental incapacity those whose mental condition, at the time of
their production for examination, is such that they are incapable of
intelligently making known their perception to others; he can still be
a witness during his lucid interval. The disqualification is only
absolute if the insane person is publicly known to be insane and
does not have lucid intervals.
Q: When must the incompetence of the witness by reason of

mental incapacity or immaturity exist?
A: Mental Incapacity
Q: What is the rule on competency of witness?

A: GR: A person who takes the witness stand is presumed to possess
the qualifications of a witness. (Presumption of competency)

Mental Immaturity
CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
The incompetence of the witness
must exist not at the time of his
perception of the facts but at the
time he is produced for
examination, and consists in his
inability to intelligently make
known what he has perceived.
(Riano, Evidence: A Restatement
for the Bar, p. 255, 2009 ed.)
The incompetence of the

witness must occur at the
time the witness perceives
the event including his
incapability to relate his
perceptions truthfully.
(Ibid.)
Q: Does mental unsoundness of the witness at the time the

fact to be testified occurred affect his competency?
A: No, it only affects his credibility. Nevertheless, as long as the
witness can convey ideas by words or signs and can give sufficiently
intelligent answers to questions propounded, she is a competent
witness even if she is feeble-minded (People v. De Jesus, G.R. No. L39087, Apr. 27, 1984) or is mental retardate (People v. Gerones, G.R.
No. 91116, Jan. 24, 1991) or is a schizophrenic (People v. Baid, G.R.
No. 129667, July 31, 2000).
Q: Cyrus, a deaf-mute, was presented as a witness in a
criminal case. The accused objected to the presentation of the
testimony of Cyrus on the ground that, being a deaf-mute, he
was not a competent witness. Is the contention of the accused
correct?
A: No. A deaf-mute is not incompetent as a witness. Deaf-mutes are
competent witnesses where they can:
1. understand and appreciate the sanctity of an oath;
2. comprehend facts they are going to testify on; and
3. communicate their ideas through a qualified interpreter (People v.
Tuangco, G.R. No. 130331, Nov. 22, 2001).
DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF
MARRIAGE/SPOUSAL IMMUNITY
The rule forbidding one spouse to testify for or against the other is
based on principles which are deemed important to preserve the
marriage relation as one of full confidence and affection, and that
this is regarded as more important to the public welfare than that
the exigencies of the lawsuits should authorize domestic peace to be
disregarded for the sake of ferreting out facts within the knowledge
of strangers.
Q: What are the requisites in order for the spousal immunity
to apply?
A:
1. That the spouse for or against whom the testimony is offered is a
party to the case;
2. That the spouses are validly married;
3. The testimony is one that is offered during the existence of the
marriage (Riano, Evidence: A Restatement for the Bar, p. 266, 2009
ed.); and
4. The case is not one of the exceptions provided in the rule.
(Herrera, Vol. V, p. 302, 1999 ed.)
Q: What kind of testimony is covered by the prohibition?
A: The prohibition extends not only to testimony adverse to the

spouse but also to a testimony in favor of the spouse. (Sec. 22, Rule
130; Riano, Evidence: A Restatement for the Bar, p. 265, 2009 ed.)
Note: It does not apply in the case of estranged spouses, where the
marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more
harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be
disturbed (Alvarez vs Ramirez, October 14, 2005)
Section 4. Original of document.

(a) The original of the document is one
the contents of which are the subject of
inquiry.
(b) When a document is in two or more
copies executed at or about the same
time, with identical contents, all such
copies are equally regarded as originals.
(c) When an entry is repeated in the
regular course of business, one being
copied from another at or near the time
of the transaction, all the entries are
likewise equally regarded as originals.
(3a)
THREE (3) CONCEPTS OF ORIGINAL UNDER THE BEST EVIDENCE
RULE (Sec. 4)
1.
One the contents of which is the subject of inquiry;
2.
When a document is in two or more copies executed at or
about same time with identical contents, all such copies are equally
regarded as originals;
3.
When an entry is repeated in the regular course of
business, one being copied from another at or near the time of the
transaction.
Q: What is the rule on duplicate original?
A: It states that when a document is in two or more copies
executed at or about the same time with identical contents, all
such copies are equally regarded as originals (Sec. 4b, Rule 130).
It may be introduced in evidence without accounting for the
non-production of the other copies.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 109172 August 19, 1994
TRANS-PACIFIC INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIES,

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
INC., petitioner,
vs.
The COURT OF APPEALS and ASSOCIATED
BANK, respondents.
denominated as restructured interest; (3)

Promissory Note No. TL-9079-82 for the
amount of P42,234.00 denominated similarly as
restructured interest (Rollo. pp. 113-115).
In this petition for review on certiorari,

petitioner Trans-Pacific Industrial Supplies, Inc.
seeks the reversal of the decision of respondent
court, the decretal portion of which reads:
The mortgaged parcels of land were substituted

by another mortgage covering two other parcels
of land and a chattel mortgage on petitioner's
stock inventory. The released parcels of land
were then sold and the proceeds amounting to
P1,386,614.20, according to petitioner, were
turned over to the bank and applied to TransPacific's restructured loan. Subsequently,
respondent bank returned the duplicate original
copies of the three promissory notes to TransPacific with the word "PAID" stamped thereon.
WHEREFORE, the decision of June 11, 1991 is

SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED; the complaint is
dismissed, and on the counterclaim, Transpacific
is ordered to pay Associated attorney's fees of
P15,000.00.
Costs against Transpacific.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 47)
Sometime in 1979, petitioner applied for and was
granted several financial accommodations
amounting to P1,300,000.00 by respondent
Associated Bank. The loans were evidenced and
secured by four (4) promissory notes, a real
estate mortgage covering three parcels of land
and a chattel mortgage over petitioner's stock
and inventories.
Unable to settle its obligation in full, petitioner
requested for, and was granted by respondent
bank, a restructuring of the remaining
indebtedness which then amounted to
P1,057,500.00, as all the previous payments
made were applied to penalties and interests.
To secure the re-structured loan of
P1,213,400.00, three new promissory notes were
executed by Trans-Pacific as follows: (1)
Promissory Note No. TL-9077-82 for the
amount of P1,050,000.00 denominated as
working capital; (2) Promissory Note No. TL9078-82 for the amount of P121,166.00
Despite the return of the notes, or on December

12, 1985, Associated Bank demanded from
Trans-Pacific payment of the amount of
P492,100.00 representing accrued interest on
PN No. TL-9077-82. According to the bank, the
promissory notes were erroneously released.
Initially, Trans-Pacific expressed its willingness
to pay the amount demanded by respondent
bank. Later, it had a change of heart and instead
initiated an action before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Br. 146, for specific
performance and damages. There it prayed that
the mortgage over the two parcels of land be
released and its stock inventory be lifted and
that its obligation to the bank be declared as
having been fully paid.
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment
in favor of Trans-Pacific, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and upon a
clear preponderance of evidence in support of
the stated causes of action, the Court finds for
the plaintiffs and against defendant, and

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
(a) declares plaintiff's obligations to defendant

to have been already fully paid;
(b) orders defendant to execute and deliver to
plaintiffs a release on the i September 11, 1981
mortgage over TCT (50858)
S-10086 and TCT (50859) S-109087,
and ii December 20, 1983 chattel mortgage,
within fifteen (15) days from the finality
hereof;
(c) orders defendant to pay plaintiffs Romeo
Javier and Romana Bataclan-Javier the sum of
P50,000.00 as and for moral damages; and
(d) orders defendant to pay plaintiffs the sum
of P30,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus expenses
of the suit.
Defendant's counterclaims are dismissed for
lack of merit.
With costs against defendant.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 101)
Respondent bank elevated the case to the
appellate court which, as aforesaid, reversed the
decision of the trial court. In this appeal,
petitioner raises four errors allegedly
committed by the respondent court, namely:
RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE ACCRUED INTEREST IN
THE AMOUNT OF 492,100.00 HAS NOT BEEN
PAID WHEN ARTICLE 1176 OF THE CIVIL
CODE PROVIDES THAT SUCH CLAIM FOR
INTEREST UPON RECEIPT OF PAYMENT OF
THE PRINCIPAL MUST BE RESERVED
OTHERWISE IT IS DEEMED PAID.
II

HOLDING THAT WITH THE DELIVERY OF
THE DOCUMENTS EVIDENCING THE
PRINCIPAL OBLIGATION, THE ANCILLARY
OBLIGATION OF PAYING INTEREST WAS
NOT RENOUNCED CONTRARY TO THE
PROVISIONS OF ART. 1273 OF THE CIVIL
CODE AND THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE ON
RECORD.
III
NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAS
FULLY PAID ITS OBLIGATION
CONFORMABLY WITH ARTICLE 1234 OF THE
CIVIL CODE.
IV
AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES IN FAVOR OF
ASSOCIATED BANK (Rollo, p. 15).
The first three assigned errors will be treated
jointly since their resolution border on the
common issue, i.e., whether or not petitioner has
indeed paid in full its obligation to respondent
bank.
Applying the legal presumption provided by Art.
1271 of the Civil Code, the trial court ruled that
petitioner has fully discharged its obligation by
virtue of its possession of the documents
(stamped "PAID") evidencing its indebtedness.
Respondent court disagreed and held, among
others, that the documents found in possession
of Trans-Pacific are mere duplicates and cannot
be the basis of petitioner's claim that its
obligation has been fully paid. Accordingly, since
the promissory notes submitted by petitioner
were duplicates and not the originals, the
delivery thereof by respondent bank to the

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
petitioner does not merit the application of

Article 1271 (1st par.) of the Civil Code which
reads:
Art. 1271. The delivery of a
private document evidencing a
credit, made voluntarily by the
creditor to the debtor, implies the
renunciation of the action which
the former had against the latter.
Respondent court is of the view that the above
provision must be construed to mean the original
copy of the document evidencing the credit and
not its duplicate, thus:
. . . [W]hen the law speaks of the delivery of the
private document evidencing a credit, it must be
construed as referring to the original. In this
case, appellees (Trans-Pacific) presented, not
the originals but the duplicates of the three
promissory notes." (Rollo, p. 42)
The above pronouncement of respondent court is
manifestly groundless. It is undisputed that the
documents presented were duplicate originals
and are therefore admissible as evidence.
Further, it must be noted that respondent bank
itself did not bother to challenge the
authenticity of the duplicate copies submitted
by petitioner. In People vs. Tan, (105 Phil. 1242
[1959]), we said:
When carbon sheets are inserted between two
or more sheets of writing paper so that the
writing of a contract upon the outside sheet,
including the signature of the party to be
charged thereby, produces a facsimile upon the
sheets beneath, such signature being thus
reproduced by the same stroke of pen which
made the surface or exposed impression, all of
the sheets so written on are regarded as
duplicate originals and either of them may be
introduced in evidence as such without

accounting for the nonproduction of the others.
A duplicate copy of the original may be admitted
in evidence when the original is in the possession
of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice (Sec. 2[b], Rule 130), as in the
case of respondent bank.
This notwithstanding, we find no reversible
error committed by the respondent court in
disposing of the appealed decision. As gleaned
from the decision of the court a quo, judgment
was rendered in favor of petitioner on the basis
of presumptions, to wit:
The surrender and return to plaintiffs of the
promissory notes evidencing the consolidated
obligation as restructured, produces a legal
presumption that Associated had thereby
renounced its actionable claim against plaintiffs
(Art. 1271, NCC). The presumption is fortified
by a showing that said promissory notes all bear
the stamp "PAID", and has not been otherwise
overcome. Upon a clear perception that
Associated's record keeping has been less than
exemplary . . ., a proffer of bank copies of the
promissory notes without the "PAID" stamps
thereon does not impress the Court as sufficient
to overcome presumed remission of the
obligation vis-a-vis the return of said promissory
notes. Indeed, applicable law is supportive of a
finding that in interest bearing obligations-as is
the case here, payment of principal (sic) shall
not be deemed to have been made until the
interests have been covered (Art. 1253, NCC).
Conversely, competent showing that the principal
has been paid, militates against postured
entitlement to unpaid interests.
In fine. the Court is satisfied that plaintiffs
must be found to have settled their obligations

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
in full.
As corollary, a finding is accordingly compelled
that plaintiffs (sic) accessory obligations under
the real estate mortgage over two (2)
substituted lots as well as the chattel mortgage,
have been extinguished by the renunciation of
the principal debt (Art. 1273, NCC), following
the time-honored axiom that the accessory
follows the principal. There is, therefore,
compelling warrant (sic) to find in favor of
plaintiffs insofar as specific performance for
the release of the mortgages on the substituted
lots and chattel is concerned. (Rollo, p. 100)
premised by:
Records show that Associated's Salvador M.
Mesina is on record as having testified that all
three (3) December 8, 1990 promissory notes
for the consolidated principal obligation,
interest and penalties had been fully paid (TSN,
July 18, 1990, p. 18). It is, moreover, admitted
that said promissory notes were accordingly
returned to Romeo Javier. (Ibid.)
The above disquisition finds no factual support,
however, per review of the records. The
presumption created by the Art. 1271 of the
Civil Code is not conclusive but merely prima
facie. If there be no evidence to the contrary,
the presumption stands. Conversely, the
presumption loses its legal efficacy in the face
of proof or evidence to the contrary. In the
case before us, we find sufficient justification
to overthrow the presumption of payment
generated by the delivery of the documents
evidencing petitioners indebtedness.
It may not be amiss to add that Article 1271 of
the Civil Code raises a presumption, not of
payment, but of the renunciation of the credit
where more convincing evidence would be
required than what normally would be called for

to prove payment. The rationale for allowing the
presumption of renunciation in the delivery of
a private instrument is that, unlike that of a
public instrument, there could be just one copy
of the evidence of credit. Where several
originals are made out of a private document,
the intendment of the law would thus be to
refer to the delivery only of the
original original rather than to the
original duplicate of which the debtor would
normally retain a copy. It would thus be absurd
if Article 1271 were to be applied differently.
While it has been consistently held that findings
of facts are not reviewable by this Court, this
rule does not find application where both the
trial and the appellate courts differ thereon
(Asia Brewery, Inc. v. CA, 224 SCRA 437
[1993]).
Petitioner maintains that the findings of the
trial court should be sustained because of its
advantage in observing the demeanor of the
witnesses while testifying (citing Crisostomo v.
Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 833) more so where
it is supported by the records (Roman Catholic
Bishop of Malolos v. Court of Appeals, 192 SCRA
169).
This case, however, does not concern itself with
the demeanor of witnesses. As for the records,
there is actually none submitted by petitioner to
prove that the contested amount, i.e., the
interest, has been paid in full. In civil cases, the
party that alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it (Imperial Victory Shipping Agency v.
NLRC 200 SCRA 178 [1991]). Petitioner could
have easily adduced the receipts corresponding
to the amounts paid inclusive of the interest to
prove that it has fully discharged its obligation
but it did not.

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
There is likewise nothing on the records relied

upon by the trial court to support its claim, by
empirical evidence, that the amount
corresponding to the interest has indeed been
paid. The trial court totally relied on a
disputable presumption that the obligation of
petitioner as regards interest has been fully
liquidated by the respondent's act of delivering
the instrument evidencing the principal
obligation. Rebuttable as they are, the court a
quo chose to ignore an earlier testimony of Mr.
Mesina anent the outstanding balance pertaining
to interest, as follows:
18, 1990, p. 22)
Court:
that you permit us to fully liquidate the

remaining obligations to you of P492,100 through
a payment in kind (dacion en pago) arrangement
by way of the equipments (sic) and spare parts
under chattel mortgage to you to the extent of
Q Notwithstanding, let us go now specifically to

promissory note No. 9077-82 in the amount of
consolidated principal of P1,050,000.00. Does
the Court get it correctly that this consolidated
balance has been fully paid?
A Yes, the principal, yes, sir.
Q Fully settled?
A Fully settled, but the interest of that
promissory note has not been paid, Your Honor.
Q In other words, you are saying, fully settled
but not truly fully settled?
A The interest was not paid.
Q Not fully settled?
A The interest was not paid, but the principal
obligation was removed from our books, Your
Honor.
Q And you returned the promissory note?
A We returned the promissory note. (TSN, July
That petitioner has not fully liquidated its

financial obligation to the Associated Bank finds
more than ample confirmation and self-defeating
posture in its letter dated December 16, 1985,
addressed to respondent bank, viz.:
. . . that because of the prevailing unhealthy
economic conditions, the business is unable to
generate sufficient resources for debt
servicing.
Fundamentally on account of this, we propose
their latest appraised values." (Rollo, pp. 153154; Emphasis supplied)

Followed by its August 20, 1986 letter which
reads:
We have had a series of communications with

your bank regarding our proposal for the
eventual settlement of our remaining obligations
...
As you may be able to glean from these letters
and from your credit files, we have always been
conscious of our obligation to you which had not
been faithfully serviced on account of
unfortunate business reverses. Notwithstanding
these however, total payments thus far remitted
to you already exceede (sic) the original
principal amount of our obligation. But because
of interest and other charges, we find ourselves

still obligated to you by P492,100.00. . . .
. . . We continue to find ourselves in a very fluid
(sic) situation in as much as the overall outlook

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
of the industry has not substantially improved.

Principally for this reason, we had proposed to
settle our remaining obligations to you by way of

dacion en pago of the equipments (sic) and spare
parts mortgaged to you to (the) extent of their
applicable loan values. (Rollo, p. 155; Emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner claims that the above offer of
settlement or compromise is not an admission
that anything is due and is inadmissible against
the party making the offer (Sec. 24, Rule 130,
Rules of Court). Unfortunately, this is not an
iron-clad rule.
To determine the admissibility or nonadmissibility of an offer to compromise, the
circumstances of the case and the intent of the
party making the offer should be considered.
Thus, if a party denies the existence of a debt
but offers to pay the same for the purpose of
buying peace and avoiding litigation, the offer of
settlement is inadmissible. If in the course
thereof, the party making the offer admits the
existence of an indebtedness combined with a
proposal to settle the claim amicably, then, the
admission is admissible to prove such
indebtedness (Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, Vol. 5, p. 233 [1980 ed.); Francisco, Rules
of Court, Vol. VII, p. 325 [1973 ed.] citing
McNiel v. Holbrook, 12 Pac. (US) 84, 9 L.ed.
1009). Indeed, an offer of settlement is an
effective admission of a borrower's loan balance
(L.M. Handicraft Manufacturing Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, 186 SCRA 640 [1990]). Exactly, this is
what petitioner did in the case before us for
review.
Finally, respondent court is faulted in awarding
attorney's fees in favor of Associated Bank.
True, attorney's fees may be awarded in a case
of clearly unfounded civil action (Art. 2208 [4],
CC). However, petitioner claims that it was
compelled to file the suit for damages in the

honest belief that it has fully discharged its
obligations in favor of respondent bank and
therefore not unfounded.
We believe otherwise. As petitioner would
rather vehemently deny, undisputed is the fact
of its admission regarding the unpaid balance of
P492,100.00 representing interests. It cannot
also be denied that petitioner opted to sue for
specific performance and damages after
consultation with a lawyer (Rollo, p. 99) who
advised that not even the claim for interests
could be recovered; hence, petitioner's attempt
to seek refuge under Art. 1271 (CC). As
previously discussed, the presumption generated
by Art. 1271 is not conclusive and was
successfully rebutted by private respondent.
Under the circumstances, i.e., outright and
honest letters of admission vis-a-vis counselinduced recalcitrance, there could hardly be
honest belief. In this regard, we quote with
approval respondent court's observation:
The countervailing evidence against the claim of
full payment emanated from Transpacific itself.
It cannot profess ignorance of the existence of
the two letters, Exhs. 3 & 4, or of the import of
what they contain. Notwithstanding the letters,
Transpacific opted to file suit and insist(ed)
that its liabilities had already been paid. There
was thus an
ill-advised attempt on the part of Transpacific
to capitalize on the delivery of the duplicates of
the promissory notes, in complete disregard of
what its own records show. In the
circumstances, Art. 2208 (4) and (11) justify the
award of attorney's fees. The sum of
P15,000.00 is fair and equitable. (Rollo, pp. 4647)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
of merit. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
2. Secondary Evidence
Section 5. When original document is unavailable.
? When the original document has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and
the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on
his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a
recital of its contents in some authentic document,
or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
(4a)
Section 6. When original document is in adverse
party's custody or control. ? If the document is in
the custody or under the control of adverse party,
he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If
after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its
existence, he fails to produce the document,
secondary evidence may be presented as in the
case of its loss. (5a)
Section 7. Evidence admissible when original
document is a public record. ? When the original of
document is in the custody of public officer or is
recorded in a public office, its contents may be
proved by a certified copy issued by the public
officer in custody thereof. (2a)
Section 8. Party who calls for document not bound
to offer it. ? A party who calls for the production of a
document and inspects the same is not obliged to
offer it as evidence. (6a)
Q: What is secondary evidence?
A: Secondary evidence is that which shows that better or primary
evidence exists as to the proof of the fact in question. It is the class
of evidence that is relevant to the fact in issue, it being first shown
that the primary evidence of the fact is not obtainable. It performs
the same functions as that of primary evidence. (Francisco, p. 68,
1992 ed.)
Note: All originals must be first accounted for before one can resort to
secondary evidence. It must appear that all of them have been lost or
destroyed or cannot be produced in court. The non-production of the
original document, unless it falls under any of the exceptions in Sec. 3,
Rule 130, gives rise to the presumption of suppression of evidence.
Q: When may secondary evidence be admitted?

A: It may be admitted only by laying the basis for its production and
such requires compliance with the following:
1. The offeror must prove the due execution and existence of the
original document;
2. The offeror must show the cause of its unavailability; and
3. The offeror must show that the unavailability was not due to his
bad faith.
Accordingly, the correct order of proof is as follows: existence,
execution, loss, and contents. This order may be changed if
necessary at the sound discretion of the court. (Citibank N.A.
Mastercard v. Teodoro, G.R. No. 150905, Sept. 23, 2003)
Note: Intentional destruction of the originals by a party who acted in
good faith does not preclude the introduction of secondary evidence of
the contents thereof.
. Q: What is the order of presentation of secondary evidence?
A:
1. Copy of the original;
2. A recital of the contents of the document in some authentic
document; or
3. By the testimony of witnesses (Sec. 5, Rule 130)
Q: What is Definite Evidentiary Rule?
A: Where the law specifically provides for the class and
quantum of secondary evidence to establish the contents of a
document, or bars secondary evidence of a lost document, such
requirement is controlling. E.g. Evidence of a lost notarial will
should consist of a testimony of at least two credible witnesses
who can clearly and distinctly establish its contents (Sec. 6, Rule
76).
Q: How may the due execution of the document be proved?
A: It may be proved through the testimony of:
1. The person who executed it;
2. The person before whom its execution was acknowledged;
3. Any person who was present and saw it executed and delivered;
4. Any person who thereafter saw and recognized the signature;
5. One to whom the parties thereto had previously confessed the
execution thereof; or
6. By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of
the maker. (Sec. 20, Rule 132)
Q: How may the loss or destruction be proved?
A: It may be proved by:
1. Any person who knew of such fact;
2. Anyone who, in the judgment of the court, had made sufficient
examination in the places where the document or papers of similar
character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the
document was and has been unable to find it; or
3. Any person who has made any other investigation which is
sufficient to satisfy the court that the document is indeed lost.
Q: How may the contents be proved?
A: They may be proved by the testimony of:
1. Any person who signed the document;

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
2. Any person who read it;

3. Any person who heard when the document was being read;
4. Any person who was present when the contents of the document
were talked over by the parties to such an extent as to give him
reasonably full information of the contents; or
5. Any person to whom the parties have stated or confessed the
contents thereof.
Q: What facts must be shown by the party offering secondary
evidence if the original is in the custody of the adverse
party?
A:
1. Original is in the possession or under the control of the opponent;
2. Demand or notice is made to him by the proponent signifying that
the document is needed;
3. Failure or refusal of opponent to produce document in court; and
4. Satisfactory proof of existence of document (Sec. 6).
Note: The party who called for a document is not obliged to offer it into
evidence (Sec. 8).
Q: Paula filed a complaint against Lynette for the recovery of a sum

of money based on a promissory note executed by Lynette. Paula
alleged in her complaint that although the promissory note says
that it is payable within 120 days, the truth is that the note is
payable immediately after 90 days but that if Paula is willing, she
may, upon request of Lynette give the latter up to 120 days to pay
the note.
During the hearing, Paula testified that the truth is that the
agreement between her and Lynette is for the latter to pay
immediately after 90 days time. Also, since the original note was
with Lynette and the latter would not surrender to Paula the
original note which Lynette kept in a place about one day's trip
from where she received the notice to produce the note and in
spite of such notice to produce the same within 6 hours from
receipt of such notice, Lynette failed to do so. Paula presented a
copy of the note which was executed at the same time as the
original and with identical contents.
1. Over the objection of Lynette, will Paula be allowed to testify as
to the true agreement or contents of the promissory note? Why?
2. Over the objection of Lynette, can Paula present a copy of the
promissory note and have it admitted as valid evidence in her
favor? Why?
A:
1. Yes. As an exception to the parol evidence rule, a party may
present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the
written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading the failure of
the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of
the parties thereto. Here, Paula has alleged in her complaint that the
promissory note does not express the true intent and agreement of
the parties.
2. Yes. The copy in possession of Paula is a duplicate original
because it was executed at the same time as the original and with
identical contents. Moreover, the failure of Lynette to produce the
original of the note is excusable because she was not given
reasonable notice, a requirement under the Rules before secondary
evidence may be presented.
Note: The promissory note is an actionable document and the

original or a copy thereof should have been attached to the
complaint. (Sec. 7, Rule 8) In such a case, the genuineness and due
execution of the note, if not denied under oath, would be deemed
admitted. (Sec. 8, Rule 9)
Q: When Linda died, her common law husband, Lito and

their alleged daughter Nes executed an extrajudicial partition
of Lindas estate. Thereafter, the siblings of Linda filed an
action for partition of Lindas estate and annulment of titles
and damages with the RTC. The RTC dismissed the
complaint and rendered that Nes was the illegitimate
daughter of the decedent and Lito based solely on her birth
certificate, which on closer examination, reveals that Nes was
listed as adopted by both Linda and Lito. Is the trial court
correct?
A: No. The mere registration of a child in his or her birth
certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid
adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an
adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even
amounts to simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his
or her birth certificate, which is a public document.
Furthermore, a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence
of the facts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of
the truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested
parties. Nes should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in
view of the contents of her birth certificate. The records
however are bereft of any such evidence (Rivera v. Heirs of
Villanueva, G.R. No. 141501, July 21, 2006).
Q: What is Electronic Evidence?
A: According to Black's Law Dictionary, evidence is "any
species of proof, or probative matter, legally presented at the
trial of an issue, by the act of the parties and through the
medium of witnesses, records, documents, exhibits, concrete
objects, etc. for the purpose of inducing belief in the minds of
the court or jury as to their contention." Electronic information
(like paper) generally is admissible into evidence in a legal
proceeding..
Q: What is Electronic Data Message?
A: Electronic data message refers to information generated,
sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means.
Q: What are the factors to be considered in assessing
evidentiary weight of an electronic document?
A:
1. The reliability of the manner or method in which it was generated,
stored or communicated, including but not limited to input and
output procedures, controls, tests and checks for accuracy and
reliability of the electronic data message or document, in the light of
all the circumstances as well as any relevant agreement;
2. The reliability of the manner in which its originator was identified;
3. The integrity of the information and communication system in
which it its recorded or stored, including but not limited to the
hardware and computer programs or software used as well as
programming errors;
4. The familiarity of the witness or the person who made the entry
with the communication and information system;

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
5. The nature and quality of the information which went into the
communication and information system upon which the electronic
data message document was based; or
6. Other factors which the court may consider as affecting accuracy
or integrity of the electronic document or electronic data message.
(Sec. 1, Rule 7)
Q: How is an electronic document authenticated?
A:
1. By evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person
purported to have signed the same;
2. By evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices
as may be authorized by the Supreme Court or by law for
authentication of electronic documents were applied to the
document; or
3. By other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the
satisfaction of the judge (Sec. 2, Rule 5).
Q: What is Electronic Signature?
A: It refers to any distinctive mark, characteristic and/or
sound in electronic form, representing the identity of a person
and attached to or logically associated with the electronic data
message or electronic document or any methodology or
procedure employed or adopted by a person and executed or
adopted by such person with the intention of authenticating,
signing or approving an electronic data message or electronic
document. For purposes of these Rules, an electronic signature
includes digital signatures [Sec. 1 (j), Rule 2].
Q: How is an electronic signature authenticated?
A:
1. By evidence that a method or process was utilized to establish a
digital signature and verify the same;
2. By any other means provided by law; or
3. By any other means satisfactory to the judge as establishing the
genuineness of the electronic signature (Sec. 2, Rule 6).
Q: What is the effect of authentication of an electronic
signature?
A: Upon authentication, it shall be presumed that:
1. The electronic signature is that of the person to whom it
correlates;
2. The electronic signature was affixed by that person with the
intention of authenticating or approving the electronic document to
which it is related or to indicate such persons consent to the
transaction embodied therein; and
3. The methods or processes utilized to affix or verify the electronic
signature operated without error or fault (Sec. 3, Rule 6).
Q: What is a Digital Signature?
A: It refers to an electronic signature consisting of a transformation
of an electronic document or an electronic data message using an
asymmetric or public cryptosystem such that a person having the
initial untransformed electronic document and the signers public
key can accurately determine:
1. whether the transformation was created using the private key
that corresponds to the signers public key; and
2. whether the initial electronic document had been altered after
the transformation was made [Sec. 1(e), Rule 2]
Q: What is the effect of authentication of digital signatures?

A: Upon authentication, it shall be presumed that:
1. The information contained in a certificate is correct;
2. The digital signature was created during the operational period of
a certificate;
3. No cause exists to render a certificate invalid or revocable;
4. The message associated with a digital signature has not been
altered from the time it was signed; and
5. A certificate had been issued by the certification authority
indicated therein (Sec. 4, Rule 6).
Q: When is the Hearsay Rule not applicable to electronic
documents?
A: A memorandum, report, record or data compilation of acts,
events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made by electronic,
optical or other similar means at or near the time of or from
transmission or supply of information by a person with knowledge
thereof, and kept in the regular course or conduct of a business
activity, and such was the regular practice to make the
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation by electronic,
optical or similar means, all of which are shown by the testimony of
the custodian or other qualified witnesses, is excepted from the rule
on hearsay evidence (Sec. 1, Rule 8).
Note: The presumption provided for in Section 1 of this Rule may be
overcome by evidence of the untrustworthiness of the source of
information or the method or circumstances of the preparation,
transmission or storage thereof (Sec. 2, Rule 8).
Q: May parties present audio, photographic or video
evidence? Discuss.
A: Yes. Audio, photographic and video evidence of events, acts
or transactions shall be admissible provided it shall be shown,
presented or displayed to the court and shall be identified,
explained or authenticated by the person who made the
recording or by some other person competent to testify on the
accuracy thereof (Sec. 1, Rule 11).
Q: What is ephemeral electronic communication?
A: It refers to telephone conversations, text messages, chat
room sessions, streaming audio, streaming video, and other
electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is
not recorded or retained. [Sec. 1(k)]
Q: Are text messages admissible as evidence?
A: Yes. Text messages have been classified as ephemeral
electronic communication under Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the
Rules on Electronic Evidence, and shall be proven by the
testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has
personal knowledge thereof (Vidallon-Magtolis v. Cielito Salud,
A.M. No. CA-05-20-P, Sept. 9, 2005).
Q: How shall ephemeral electronic communication be
proven?
A: It shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a
party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof. In the
absence or unavailability of such witnesses, other competent
evidence be admitted. A recording of the telephone
conversation or ephemeral electronic communication shall be
covered by the immediately preceding section. If the foregoing
communications are recorded or embodied in an electronic
document, then the provisions of Rule 5 regarding
Authentication of Electronic Documents shall apply. (Sec. 2,
Rule 11)

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
3. Parol Evidence Rule

Section 9. Evidence of written agreements.
? When the terms of an agreement have
been reduced to writing, it is considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and
there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to
modify, explain or add to the terms of
written agreement if he puts in issue in his
pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or
imperfection in the written
agreement;
(b) The failure of the written
agreement to express the true intent
and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written
agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms
agreed to by the parties or their
successors in interest after the
execution of the written agreement.
that, at or before the signing, of the document, other or different terms

were orally agreed upon by the parties.
3. Requisites for Applicability
a. When there is a valid contract;
b. When the terms of agreement are reduced to writing;
c. The agreement is between the parties and their successors in interest;
and
d. There is a dispute as to the terms of the agreement.
4. Exceptions to Parole Evidence Rule:
A party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms
of written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
a. An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written
agreement;
_ Note: It must be intrinsic ambiguity, i.e., when the writing admits
two or more meanings or when it is understood in more than one way.
Extrinsic ambiguity on the other hand, is one where the document on
its face is so unintelligible and the words used so defective that it
totally fails to express a meaning, in such case parol evidence is
forbidden.
b. The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto;
c. The validity of the written agreement; _ Example: where the consent
of one of the parties was procured by mistake, fraud, intimidation,
violence, or undue influence.
d. The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their
successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement.
_ The term "agreement" includes wills.
5. Requisites to Admit Parol Evidence by Reason of Mistake
a. That the mistake should be of fact,
b. That the mistake should be mutual or common to both parties to the
instrument, and
c. That the mistake should be alleged and proved by clear and
convincing
evidence.
6. Theory of Integration of Jural Acts (Previous Acts): Previous acts
and contemporaneous transaction of the parties are deemed integrated
and merged in the written agreement which they have executed. When
the parties reduced their agreement to writing, it is presumed that
they have made the writing the only repository and memorial of the
truth, and whatever it is not found in the writing must be understood
to have been waived or abandoned.
The term "agreement" includes wills. (7a)
_ Collateral Oral Agreement A contract made prior to or

contemporaneous with another agreement and if oral and NOT
inconsistent with written agreement is admissible within the exception
to parol evidence rule
Purpose: To give stability to written agreement and remove the

temptation and possibility of perjury, which would be afforded
if parol evidence was admissible.
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE

Presupposes that the original
document is available in court
Basis: The rule is based on the presumption that the parties have made
the written instrument the only repository and memorial of the truth
and whatever is not found must have been waived and abandoned by
the parties.
Prohibits the varying of the terms

of a written agreement
Rules:
1. The written agreement is considered as containing all the terms
agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors
in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement.
2. This rule forbids any addition or contradiction of the terms of a
written instrument by testimony purporting to show
Applies only to documents which

are contractual in nature except
wills
Can be invoked only when the
controversy is between the parties
to the written agreement, their
privies, or any party affected
thereby like a cestui que trust

BEST EVIDENCE RULE

The original document is not
available or there is a dispute as to
whether said writing is original
Prohibits the introduction of
secondary evidence in lieu of the
original document regardless of
whether or not it varies the contents
of the original
Applies to all kinds of writings
Can be invoked by any party to an

action whether he has participated
or not in the writing involved
CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
4. Interpretation Of Documents
Section 10. Interpretation of a writing according
to its legal meaning. ? The language of a writing
is to be interpreted according to the legal
meaning it bears in the place of its execution,
unless the parties intended otherwise. (8)
Section 11. Instrument construed so as to give
effect to all provisions. ? In the construction of
an instrument, where there are several
provisions or particulars, such a construction
is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect
to all. (9)
Section 12. Interpretation according to
intention; general and particular provisions. ?
In the construction of an instrument, the
intention of the parties is to be pursued; and
when a general and a particular provision are
inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the
former. So a particular intent will control a
general one that is inconsistent with it. (10)
Section 13. Interpretation according to
circumstances. ? For the proper construction of
an instrument, the circumstances under which
it was made, including the situation of the
subject thereof and of the parties to it, may be
shown, so that the judge may be placed in the
position of those who language he is to
interpret. (11)
characters in which an instrument is written are

difficult to be deciphered, or the language is not
understood by the court, the evidence of
persons skilled in deciphering the characters,
or who understand the language, is admissible
to declare the characters or the meaning of the
language. (14)
Section 17. Of Two constructions, which
preferred. ? When the terms of an agreement
have been intended in a different sense by the
different parties to it, that sense is to prevail
against either party in which he supposed the
other understood it, and when different
constructions of a provision are otherwise
equally proper, that is to be taken which is the
most favorable to the party in whose favor the
provision was made. (15)
Section 18. Construction in favor of natural
right. ? When an instrument is equally
susceptible of two interpretations, one in favor
of natural right and the other against it, the
former is to be adopted. (16)
Section 19. Interpretation according to usage. ?
An instrument may be construed according to
usage, in order to determine its true character.
(17)
C. TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
1. Qualification of Witnesses
Section 14. Peculiar signification of terms. ?

The terms of a writing are presumed to have
been used in their primary and general
acceptation, but evidence is admissible to show
that they have a local, technical, or otherwise
peculiar signification, and were so used and
understood in the particular instance, in which
case the agreement must be construed
accordingly. (12)
Section 15. Written words control printed. ?
When an instrument consists partly of written
words and partly of a printed form, and the two
are inconsistent, the former controls the latter.
(13)
Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. ?

Except as provided in the next succeeding
section, all persons who can perceive, and
perceiving, can make their known perception to
others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the
outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime
unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be
ground for disqualification. (18a)
1. Witness one who, being present, personally sees or perceives a
thing, a beholder, spectator or eyewitness; one who testifies to what he
has seen or heard, or otherwise observed.
2. Prosecution witness - It is a person who is not an accused and who is
called to testify relating to a criminal case.
Section 16. Experts and interpreters to be used

in explaining certain writings. ? When the
CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
3. State witness It is one of two or more persons jointly charged with

the commission of a crime but who is discharged with his consent so
he that he can be a witness for the state.
Rules:
1. All persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known
their perception to others may be witnesses. Religious or political
belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime
shall be a ground for disqualification unless otherwise provided by
law.
2. Exception: When a person is disqualified:
a. By reason of his mental condition or mental maturity;
b. By reason of public policy;
c. By reason of confidential communication; or
d. When disqualified by law or these Rules.
3. When deaf mutes are competent witnesses
a. where they can understand and appreciate the sanctity of an
oath;
b. can comprehend facts they are going to testify on; and
c. can communicate their ideas through a qualified interpreter.
4. While an accused may voluntarily take the witness stand to testify
on his behalf in a criminal case filed against him and be crossexamined
thereby, he cannot be compelled to be a witness for the prosecution.
_ Basis: The Constitution provides that no person shall be compelled to
be a witness against himself. The constitutional proscription is based
on two grounds:
1) Public policy It would place the witness against the strongest
temptation to commit perjury.
2) Humanity It would be to extort a confession of truth by force
and degree of which the law abhors.
_ Exceptions: He can be compelled to do certain mechanical or
physical acts as the right extends only against the use of physical
or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused.
5. Types of immunity from suit granted
to a witness:
a. Transactional immunity A witness can no longer be prosecuted
for any offense whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction.
b. Use-and-derivative-use immunity A witness is only assured
that his or her particular testimony and evidence derived from it
will not be used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution.
6. An adverse party in a civil case may compelled to be a witness, by
subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, provided, the other party has
served interrogatories or made request for admissions.
7. Other Statutes Granting Immunity from suit
a. RA No. 6770 The ombudsman has the authority to grant
immunity from criminal prosecution to any person whose
testimony is necessary to determine the truth.
b. RA No. 6646 Grants an acceptor or coconspirator immunity
from prosecution, if he voluntarily testifies in the prosecution of
vote-buying or voteselling, which is an election offense.
8. Qualities or Abilities a Witness Must Possess
a. to observe
b. to remember
c. to relate
d. to recognize a duty to tell the truth _ The objection to the
competency of a witness must be made before he has given any
testimony or as soon as it becomes apparent.
9. Acts Considered as Waiver
a. Where the party fails to raise the objection when the witness
testifies, and
b. Where the party who might have made the objection calls the
witness in support of his own case.
Question:
Is a mental retardate disqualified to testify?
Answer:
A mental retardate is not by itself disqualified to testify as long as he
has ability to make his perception known to others.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 100199 January 18, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PRUDENCIO DOMINGUEZ and RODOLFO
MACALISANG, accused-appellants.
Prudencio Dominguez and Rodolfo Macalisang, along with Roger C.
Dominguez, were charged with the murders of Regional Trial Court
Judge Purita A. Boligor and of her brother Luther Avancea.
Prudencio and Rodolfo were found guilty and sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of
Judge Purita A. Boligor in the amount of P30,000.00 and the heirs
of Luther Avancea of another P30,000.00, jointly and severally.
At the same time, the trial court dismissed the charges against
Roger C. Dominguez for lack of sufficient evidence.
In their brief, accused-appellants assigned the following as errors
allegedly committed by the trial court:
First error the trial court gravely erred in giving credence to
the prosecution's evidence, particularly the testimony of Oscar
Cagod, and basing its judgment of conviction thereon.
Second error the trial court gravely erred in refusing to give
credence to the evidence of the accused-appellants.
Third error the trial court gravely erred in not acquitting the
accused-appellants and declaring them innocent of the charge
against
them. 1
The facts as found by the trial court may be summarized in the
following manner. Sometime after 8:00 o'clock in the evening of 6
February 1986, that is, on the eve of the "snap" presidential
election held on 7 February 1986, appellant Prudencio Dominguez
then Mayor of the Municipality of Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental
and his brother Roger C. Dominguez went to visit their second
cousin, Judge Purita A. Boligor. Judge Boligor, according to the
defense, was promoting the candidacy of Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino,
the opposition candidate in the presidential race. Mayor Dominguez
was affiliated with the "Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan" ("KBL") and was
at that time working for the re-election of former President
Marcos. Mayor Dominguez and Roger arrived at Judge Boligor's
house in Sinacaban in an Integrated National Police ("INP") jeep
driven by Felix Amis, a police officer detailed as security man of
Mayor Dominguez. Rodolfo Macalisang, brother-in-law of Mayor
Dominguez, emerged on the leftside of the jeep, spoke briefly with
the Mayor, then stepped aside and stayed under the shadow of a
citrus (calamansi) tree. The Mayor and his brother Roger

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
proceeded towards Judge Boligor's house and entered that house.

There they met with Judge Boligor and her brother Luther
Avancea who was then the UNIDO Chairman in Sinacaban,
Misamis Occidental. About ten (10) minutes later, Rodolfo
Macalisang entered Judge Boligor's house with an M-16 armalite
automatic rifle and bursts of gunfire were heard. Shortly
thereafter, Mayor Dominguez and Roger ran out of the house, got
into the jeep which had been waiting for them and sped away.
Macalisang then came out of the house and disappeared into the
darkness. Judge Boligor and Luther were found inside the house,
with multiple bullet wounds in vital parts of their bodies which
caused their instantaneous death.
The prosecution's case rested mainly on the testimony of Oscar
Cagod who witnessed the above sequence of events from a store
across the street. The defense, for its part, attacked the
credibility and the testimony of Oscar Cagod on the following
grounds:
First, Cagod was not a disinterested witness, having lived in the
house of Judge Boligor for eighteen (18) to nineteen (19) years and
having treated the Judge like his own mother;
Second, Cagod waited for four (4) months after the slaying of
Judge Boligor and Luther Avancea before he executed his sworn
statement;
Third, Cagod, according to the defense, executed his sworn
statement only after the police authorities had arrested him and
promised him immunity from prosecution. His testimony therefore
came from a polluted source and should be received only with
utmost caution.
Fourth, Cagod had been convicted, when he was twelve (12) years
old, of murder, a crime involving moral turpitude and accordingly
his testimony deserved no credence.
Last, the defense assailed the testimony of Cagod as being
incredible in itself.
We consider the above objections seriatim. We must note initially,
however, that Oscar Cagod, the prosecution star witness, was slain
not long after he had testified on direct examination and on crossexamination. So far as the record here is concerned, the killer or
killers of witness Oscar Cagod remain unknown. Another
prosecution witness, Diosdado Avancea brother of the two (2)
deceased victims, mysteriously disappeared after his direct
examination. He could not be recalled to testify on crossexamination and his testimony was stricken from the records by
the trial judge upon motion of the defense.
We find the first contention of appellants to be without merit. In
a long line of cases, the Court has consistently held that the
relationship of a witness to a party to a case does not, by itself,
impair the credibility of the witness. 2In the instant case, assuming
that Cagod had indeed treated the deceased victim Judge Boligor
like his own mother, that circumstance would only add to the
weight of his testimony, since he would then be most interested in
seeing the real killers brought to justice rather than in falsely
implicating innocent persons. In People v. Uy, et al., 3the Court
explained:
. . . mere relationship to the victim need not automatically tarnish
the testimony of the witness. When there is no showing of
improper motive on the part of the witnesses for testifying against

the accused, the fact that they are related to the victim does not
render their clear and positive testimony less worthy of full faith
and credit. On the contrary, their natural interest in securing the
conviction of the guilty would prevent them from implicating
persons other than the culprits, for otherwise, the latter would
thereby gain immunity . 4 (Emphasis supplied).
In its second argument, the defense assails witness Cagod's
credibility since he waited four (4) months after the slaying
before executing his sworn statement. The sworn statement was
allegedly made by Cagod after he had been arrested by Philippine
Constabulary-Criminal Investigation Service ("PC-CIS") operatives
and placed under detention. The defense complains that prior
thereto, Cagod had not informed anyone about what he saw on the
night of the slaying. It is settled, however, that delay on the part
of witnesses in informing the authorities of what they know about
the occurrence of a crime will not, by itself, affect their
credibility, where such delay is satisfactorily explained. 5 We
consider that the delay of four (4) months before prosecution
witness Cagod executed his sworn statement should not affect the
credibility of his testimony. Cagod had understandable reasons for
hesitating to report to the authorities what he had seen. The
accused in the instant case were clearly powerful and influential
persons in Sinacaban. Prudencio Dominguez, as already noted, was
Mayor of Sinacaban and Roger Dominguez was his brother. As
Mayor, appellant Dominguez had armed men as personal bodyguards
and otherwise at his command. Appellant Rodolfo V. Macalisang was
a PC Sergeant and Civilian Home Defense Force ("CHDF")
Supervisor. An alleged co-conspirator, Isidro Macalisang, was a
Lieutenant of the Armed Forces of the Philippines ("AFP"), while
Josue Vente also an alleged co-conspirator, was a Police Sergeant
and Police Station Commander of Sinacaban. Cagod had been
warned by Alfeo Lucing, a CHDF member and a follower of Mayor
Dominguez, and by appellant Macalisang himself, not to talk about
the shooting, upon pain of dire consequences.6 In People v.
Bustarde, et al, 7 the Court stated that the
failure of the witness to go to the police immediately after the
killing because she feared for her life, is a factor which is entirely
human and quite understandable, and should not detract from her
testimonial credit. 8
In People v. Marmita, Jr., 9 the Court likewise sustained the
credibility of the witness after the latter's delay in identifying
the accused was explained to have been due to fear of reprisal
from the accused who was known to be a powerful and influential
person. In People v. Baring, 10 witness explained that her silence
immediately after the slaying of her father was due to the fact

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
that previous killings in the barrio had not been given proper
attention by the police authorities, and this Court ruled that her
silence was understandable and did not affect her credibility. The
natural reluctance of most people to get involved in a criminal case,
and to volunteer information about a criminal case, is a mutter of
judicial notice. 11 We, therefore, agree with the trial judge when
she rejected this argument of the defense, saying:
Cagod's credibility also comes under fire for the reason that it
took him four months before he executed a statement revealing
what he had witnessed on February 6, 1986. As the defense would
have it, be should have gone straight-away to Boligor's son or to
any member of the Boligor household with his story. The defense
points out that instead of doing so, Cagod went away to the ABC
Hall to sleep until morning. This Court, however, notes that it was
not so, for Cagod related that he rushed away to inform a cousin of
Boligor, Mrs. Candelaria Gamotin, and that before he reached her
house, Alfeo Lucing, one of the Mayor's men, followed him warning
him not to tell other stories except that Boligor was dead.
That defense makes much of Cagod's conduct after the shooting
of Boligor. Why did he remain silent when everyone wanted to know
who the malefactors were? Why indeed? The defense forgets that
the malefactors were not just any Tom, Dick and Harry they
were, perhaps, the most powerful and influential men in the
Municipality of Sinacaban. Alfeo Lucing, who had shadowed Cagod,
had already given stern warning. Cagod's fears later took concrete
shape when Macalisang (whose name, oddly enough, translates as
"terrifying") threatened him at gun point with dire consequences if
he as much as breathe a word of the incident. Was Cagod's
conduct after the shooting natural, conforming to normal behavior?
This Court believes that his conduct was as normal as that of Mrs.
Gamotin who, upon learning of Boligor's death, is not shown to have
roused up family, relatives and neighbors to succor the Boligors
the record only shows that "they cried." Cagod's conduct was as
normal as that of Dionisio Burlat, Engracia Avancea and Diosdado
Avancea who fled the Boligor house and remained holed up in a
neighbor's house till the following morning. Cagod's conduct was as
normal as that of neighbors who refused to succor the Boligor
household. 12
As to the third contention of the defense that Cagod's testimony
came from a "polluted source" because the sworn statement had
been given after his arrest and after he had been promised
immunity from prosecution, the Court notes that there was no
showing that the prosecuting authorities would have included him in
the criminal information. In other words, the record is bereft of
any indication that Cagod was a participant or co-conspirator in the
carrying out of the crimes. Neither was there any showing that
Cagod had been promised or granted immunity from prosecution in
consideration of his executing the affidavit in question. Even if he
had been promised or granted immunity, that in itself is no
indication of lack of truth or credibility in his testimony,
considering that a person already charged in court may be
discharged from the information and utilized as a state witness
under certain conditions. 13 The defense also assails a supplemental
affidavit executed by witness Cagod on 31 July 1986 as baseless
and untrue and designed merely to reinforce the prosecution's
theory. Cagod's first affidavit lacked certain details which Cagod

later supplied in a supplemental affidavit after more clarificatory
questions had been asked of him. In People v. Salvilla, 14 the Court
held that the failure of a prosecution witness to mention the
taking, an essential element of the crime of robbery, in her sworn
statement did not militate against her credibility, considering that
"an affidavit is almost always incomplete and inaccurate and does
not disclose the complete facts for want of inquiries and
suggestions."
In its fourth contention, the defense stresses that Oscar Cagod
had been convicted of murder when he was twelve (12) years old
and insists that, therefore, Cagod's testimony "deserves no
credence and must be considered with extreme caution. 15 Initially,
we note that Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides as
follows:
Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications . Except as provided in
the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses.
. . . [C]onviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall
not be a ground for disqualification . (Emphasis supplied).
In Cordial v. People, 16 this Court echoed the above cited provision
of law stating that
even convicted criminals are not excluded from testifying in court
so long as, having organs of sense, they "can perceive and
perceiving can make known their perceptions to others. 17
The fact of prior criminal conviction alone does not suffice to
discredit a witness; the testimony of such a witness must be
assayed and scrutinized in exactly the same way the testimony of
other witnesses must be examined for its relevance and credibility.
None of the cases cited by the appellants militates against this
proposition. 18
Oscar Cagod did not dispute his prior conviction for murder when
he was only twelve (12) years old. Because of his minority, instead
of being imprisoned, he was placed under the custody of Judge
Boligor and her late husband, who was then Chief of Police of
Sinacaban. Cagod lived with the for eighteen (18) or nineteen (19)
years until Judge Boligor was slain. During that period of time,
Cagod had no record of any bad or socially destructive behavior.
He had in fact been of much help around the Boligors' house and
had in fact worked for appellant Mayor Dominguez himself as a
motorcar driver. 19 His testimony was not in favor of an accused
"comrade," 20 and Oscar Cagod, moreover, was obviously not a
hardened criminal. 21 Taking account of these circumstances, the
Court considers that Oscar Cagod's credibility was not put in
doubt by reason alone of conviction of a crime when he was twelve
(12) years old.
In their final contention concerning the credibility of Oscar Cagod

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
as a witness, the defense insists that the testimony of Cagod was

incredible in itself.
Cagod had testified that he was in the store across the street
from Judge Boligor's house on the night of the killing, because he
had been about to get sample ballots of candidate Corazon C.
Aquino from Judge Boligor; but when he arrived at the latter's
house, Judge Boligor told him to stay across the street considering
that Mayor Dominguez was coming to her house. And so Cagod was
there across the street from the Boligors' home and had an
unobstructed view of the events as they unfolded outside the
Boligor house which events culminated in gunfire inside the house
and the Mayor and Roger speeding away from the Boligor house on
the jeep which had waited for them and appellant Macalisang
coming out of Judge Boligor's house and fading away into the
darkness while she and her brother Luther lay dead in her house.
In addition, Oscar Cagod had testified that on the afternoon of
that same day, while he was at the market place in Sinacaban,
Roger Dominguez (the Mayor's brother), Josue Vente (the Police
Station Commander of Sinacaban), Lt. Isidro Macalisang of AFP
and the Mayor were on the terrace of the Mayor's house fronting
the Sinacaban Public Market. Josue Vente summoned him (Cagod),
and so he went up the stairs to the terrace. As he stepped on the
terrace, he heard Mayor Dominguez saying angrily: "I gave money
to Purita [A. Boligor] and Luther (Avancea) so they will not work
during election, they are hard-headed, better that these persons
are taken care of." Cagod further testified that Josue Vente
ordered him to buy a pack of cigarettes and that when he returned
to the terrace with the cigarettes, he heard Mayor Dominguez say:
"This is our agreement." Later, Mayor Dominguez ordered his men
to go to Barangay Sinonok to continue their election campaign
efforts and they left in four (4) motorcycles. Cagod stated that he
heard the Mayor telling Roger over an hand-held radio to follow
Judge Purita Boligor and to apprise him (the Mayor) of her
whereabouts periodically. 22
The defense expended a great deal of effort assailing the above
testimony of Oscar Cagod concerning the goings-on on the terrace
of the Mayor's house, the basic contention being that if the
accused-appellants were indeed to plan a conspiracy, they would
not have been so "stupid" as to batch it in broad day light within
public view and within hearing distance of strangers, when they
could have very well gone inside the Mayor's house. It does not
seem necessary for the Court to consider in detail the arguments
of the defense in this connection. For the trial court did not
interpret the above testimony of Oscar Cagod as showing
conspiracy being hatched by the appellants and their associates
while on the Mayor's terrace. For the trial court ruled that:
. . . The Mayor at that precise time [need] not have been plotting a
dastardly deed. He could have been merely expressing his disgust
or anger with Boligor and Luther . . . nevertheless, . . . this Court is
convinced that he (Cagod) was telling the facts as he had actually
heard and seen them. He had no motive to testify falsely. 23
The evidence of the defense included ballistics reports (Exhibits
"16" and "16-A") concerning twenty-seven (27) empty cartridges

retrieved from the scene of the crime. These twenty-seven (27)
empty cartridges or shells were, according to this ballistics report,
examined and compared with twenty-four (24) test cartridges
submitted by the accused appellant and said to have been fired
from eight (8) M-16 armalite rifles in the armory of the Sinacaban
Police Force, including an M-16 rifle with Serial No. 162705 which
allegedly was taken by appellant Macalisang from Wilfredo Daluz, a
police officer and prosecution witness. In those reports, PC T/Sgt.
Rodolfo C. Burgos, a ballistic technician who had conducted the
examination, concluded that the twenty-seven (27) empty shells
retrieved from the scene of the crime had not been fired from any
of the weapons from which the twenty-four (24) test cartridges
had been fired. 24 According to the letter of PC Capt. Bonfilio
Dacoco, Commanding Officer of the 466th Philippine Constabulary
Company, Ozamis City, dated 21 February 1986, which Sgt. Burgos
read into the record during the trial, the twenty-one (21) test
shells had been fired from eight (8) long firearms of the Sinacaban
Police Force. 25 The trial court, however, did not give much weight
to this ballistic report saying:
. . . Cagod's testimony that he had seen Macalisang enter and exit
from the house of the Boligor's moments before and after the
shooting remains unshaken by Burgos's testimony, especially when
taken with the defense story. 26
We agree with the trial court's appraisal that the testimony of
Ballistic Technician Burgos did not have the effect of overturning
the testimony of Oscar Cagod. We note that the defense had not
shown that appellant Macalisang had no access to any M-16 rifle
other than the eight (8) rifles of the Sinacaban Police Force from
which the twenty-one (21) test bullets were said to have been
fired. The negative allegation that Macalisang did not use any of
the eight (8) M-16 rifles, particularly the rifle with Serial No.
162705, does not logically lead to the conclusion that Macalisang
could not have used any other weapon nor does it prove that he was
not the assailant. All that the testimony of Sgt. Burgos tended to
show was that the murder weapon was not among the eight (8)
rifles of the Sinacaban Police Force from which the test shells
were said to have been fired.
In addition to denying and assailing the testimony of the now
deceased witness Oscar Cagod, the appellants' raised the defense
of alibi. In a long line of cases, this Court has held that for the
defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough to show that the
accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but
that the accused must further demonstrate that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the
time of the commission thereof. 27 In the instant case, the Mayor's
argument was that when the shooting occurred, he was already
outside the house of Judge Boligor. Clearly, therefore, it was not
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime. In fact,
he was only a few steps away, according to his own testimony, when
Judge Boligor and her brother were felled by automatic fire.
Appellant Rodolfo Macalisang, the latter's Chief Security Officer,
and as already noted, Police Supervisor of the CHDF of Sinacaban,
said that he had slept the whole night of 6 February 1986 (the eve
of the "snap" presidential election) and that he knew nothing of

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
the murder until the next morning. 28 This alibi was obviously a very
weak one, considering that Macalisang's house was not only in the
same municipality but was indeed only "about 120 meters" away
from Judge Boligor's house. 29
The applicable doctrine is that the defense of "alibi is worthless in
the face of positive identification by the prosecution
witnesses." 30 In People v. Plandez, 31 the Court stressed that:
. . . [A]libi the much abused sanctuary of felons and which is
considered as an argument with a bad reputation, cannot prevail
over positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. It is, to say
the least, the weakest defense and must be taken with caution
being easily fabricated. (Emphasis supplied).
In the instant case, Cagod did not, of course, see appellant
Macalisang actually shooting Judge Boligor and her brother inside
her house. But Cagod did see Macalisang enter the Boligor house
with a firearm, hear automatic gunfire and later saw him leave the
same house with a firearm and melt away in the night. We hold
that in the circumstances of this case, the testimony of
prosecution witness Cagod was sufficient to produce moral
certainty of guilt on the part of both appellants. Clearly, here as in
most criminal cases, the issues before this Court relate to the
credibility of the witnesses, particularly of Oscar Cagod and of
accused-appellants. It is true that the trial judge who wrote the
decision, Judge Ma. Nimfa Penaco-Sitaca, was not presiding over
the trial court when Oscar Cagod rendered his testimony on direct
and on cross-examination. At the same time, it was before Judge
Penaco-Sitaca that the prosecution presented additional witnesses
and before whom the defense presented all its evidence, both
testimonial and documentary and rested its case. Thus, Judge
Penaco-Sitaca had observed the deportment of the defense
witnesses and their manner of testifying during the trial. The
doctrine is firmly settled that the trial court's conclusion on issues
of credibility is accorded with highest respect by appellate
courts. 32 We have examined carefully the record of this case
before the trial court and the briefs of both the appellants and
the People and we
have found nothing to justify overturning the conclusions reached
by Judge Penaco-Sitaca.
In its decision, the trial court found the presence of treachery as
well as the generic aggravating circumstances of dwelling and
abuse of superior strength. The trial court said:
. . . [The mayor] had the motive. He called the shots. He occupied a
position of ascendancy over his brother-in-law and personal
security officer, Macalisang, who, on his own, would have no motive
nor criminal design against the victims. . . . Macalisang's armed
entry into the house, immediately followed by the burst of gunfire,
. . . constituted a sudden, unexpected, treacherous attack of the
victims who could not have had the slightest opportunity to defend
themselves. Just as treacherous was the Mayor's entry into the
house under cover of civility and mirthful conversation.
It is very difficult to disagree with this finding of the trial court.
We agree, further, that the aggravating circumstance of dwelling

was present, but believe that the circumstance of abuse of
superior strength is properly deemed absorbed by the qualifying
circumstance of treachery. This modification, however, has no
effect upon the penalty properly imposable upon accusedappellants.
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the trial court
dated 10 May 1991 is hereby AFFIRMED, except that the element
of abuse of superior strength is properly disregarded, and except
that the indemnity imposable is hereby, in accord with current
jurisprudence, RAISED to P50,000.00 for the killing of Judge
Purita A.. Boligor and another P50,000.00 for the slaying of Luther
Avancea. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Regalado, Nocon and Campos, Jr., JJ.,

concur.
Interest in the case

PEOPLE v. ALFREDO ENTILA
G.R. No. 135368. February 9, 2000
Before us is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated March 11, 1998 of
Branch 26 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila finding
appellant Alfredo Entila alias "Bogie" guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of kidnapping and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Information reads as follows:
"The undersigned accuses ALFREDO ENTILA Y PINEDA of the
crime of Kidnapping, committed as follows:
"That on or about and during the period comprised between
December 15, 1995 and February 21, 1996, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, being then a private individual, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and illegally kidnap
or detain or in any manner deprive ten years (sic) old THERESA
ADATO of her liberty and deliberately failed to return or restore
her to her guardian.
"Contrary to law."[2]
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded "not guilty"; and trial on the
merits ensued.
Prosecution witness Araceli Mendiola testified that the victim,
Theresa Adato, was entrusted to her custody since 1995 by a
friend;[3] and that in 1995, her ten (10) year old ward was enrolled
in the Justo Lucban Elementary School in Paco, Manila. On
December 19, 1995, Adato failed to come home, from her

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
afternoon classes, at the usual time of six oclock in the evening.

Worried by Adatos failure to come home on time, Mendiola went
to the school to look for her. When Mendiola arrived at the school
at 6:30 in the evening, it was already closed. Outside the school,
she met one of Adatos classmates who informed her that he saw
Adato forcibly being taken by a man. Mendiola immediately
reported the incident to the barangay authorities. But when the
barangay authorities were unable to find Adato, Mendiola sought
the help of one SPO2 Conrado Quilala.[4]
SPO2 Conrado Quilala testified for the prosecution and stated
that Mendiola approached him regarding the case of Adato on
January 29, 1996. At that time, he was an intelligence operative of
the Task Force Spider at Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig. He
invited Mendiola to file a formal complaint at the police precinct in
Bicutan, and Mendiola readily complied. Quilala then advised
Mendiola to gather more information pertaining to the
whereabouts of her ward and the appellant.[5] Mani kx
Later, Mendiola received a call from one Bobby Cabanero who was a
housemate of appellant in Tuguegarao, Cagayan informing her that
appellant was there with Adato.[6] Mendiola relayed this
information to Quilala on February 19, 1996.
Thereafter, a team, composed of Quilala, Captain Cabigas and
SPO2 Camacho, was organized to rescue Adato. The team then
proceeded to Cagayan on February 21, 1996. Upon reaching
Cagayan, they proceeded to Barangay Bag-ay where appellant was
renting a house. They were, however, informed that appellant had
already left for work at Barangay Abay and that Adato was with
him.[7]
In Barangay Abay, the team found appellant in a shop where he was
painting a car. They approached him and informed him that
Mendiola had filed a complaint against him. When asked about
Adato, the appellant replied that she was just within the vicinity
playing "sungka". True enough, they found Adato playing some fifty
(50) meters away from the shop. The team arrested appellant on
the spot and brought him and Adato back to Manila.[8]
Adato narrated that on December 15, 1995, at around eleven
oclock in the morning, she was at the Jose Lucban Elementary
School. She saw appellant near the entrance of the market which is
two (2) meters away from the school gate. Appellant was familiar
to her as they lived in the same house with Adato and her guardian,
Mendiola, occupying the second floor, and the appellant and his
children staying in the ground floor. Thus, when appellant
summoned her, she readily approached the former. Thereupon, the
appellant pulled Adato inside the sidecar that he was
driving.[9]Then she was told by the appellant, to keep quiet and he
threatened to box her should she say anything.[10] Appellant
brought Adato to a house in Mataas na Lupa near Paco which, Adato
later came to know, was owned by appellants friend, Chit. [11] On the
way to Mataas na Lupa, Adato could not alight from the sidecar
because appellant held her whenever the traffic stopped. Appellant
also discouraged Adato from shouting for help by telling her that
no one would be able to hear her.[12]

According to Adato, she was locked inside a room in Chits house
for more or less one (1) week. During that time, she did not see
appellant, and it was Chit who gave her food.[13]
Adato only saw appellant again when the latter fetched her and
brought her to the bus terminal where they were to board a bus
for Tuguegarao. While waiting for their bus, Adato did not ask help
from any of the other passengers in the bus terminal since
appellant had threatened her life before leaving Chits house. [14]
When they reached Tuguegarao, they initially stayed in the house
of Bobby Cabanero who was introduced to Adato as appellants
cousin. Appellant and Adato occupied one room in Cabaneros house.
Upon the appellants instructions, Adato did not leave the room
except to eat and to relieve herself.[15] Maniks
After a while, appellant and Adato transferred residence to a
rented house in Barrio Bag-ay.[16] While they lived together,
appellant repeatedly had sexual intercourse with Adato against her
will. The appellant first abused Adato sexually on January 15, 1996
and this continued until the policemen rescued her and brought her
home to Mendiola.[17]
For his part, appellant interposed the defense of denial and
claimed that Adato voluntarily went with him to Tuguegarao to
escape the unhappy life she led under the care of her guardian,
Mendiola.
Appellant testified that he was an overseas contract worker in
Saudi Arabia from 1984 to March 15, 1995 when he returned to
the Philippines after hearing of his wifes critical condition. After
his wifes demise on July 10, 1995, appellant decided not to go back
to Saudi Arabia anymore. He stayed with his children in their
house in Paco, Manila. According to the accused-appellant, he
rented out the second floor of the said house to his cousin,
Mendiola, who was living there with her family and ward, Adato. [18]
In the early morning of December 15, 1995, appellant informed his
children that he was going to Tuguegarao as his friend, Bobby
Cabanero, had offered him a job there. His children agreed, and he
proceeded to his mothers house in Santiago Street, Paco, Manila,
to ask for her blessing. Outside his mothers house, he saw his
cousin, Arvie Entila, driving a sidecar. He then asked Arvie Entila
to bring him to Quirino Highway where he planned to wait for a
ride going to the bus terminal. Arvie Entila acceded to his request
and brought him to the highway. While appellant was waiting for a
ride, Adato approached him. According to appellant, Adato wanted
to go with him, and when he told her to go back to her foster
mother, she replied that Mendiola and her husband had no business
meddling in her life as they were not her real parents. Adato also
complained that she always quarreled with Pollard, Mendiolas real
son, who often taunted her: "salot ka, umalis ka dito" (you are a
curse, go away). Taking pity on Adato, appellant agreed to let her

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
tag along.[19]
Appellant and Adato took the bus from Manila to Tuguegarao that
same morning. Upon reaching Tuguegarao, they proceeded to the
house of Bobby Cabanero in Barrio Calita. According to appellant,
they talked about the car repair job that Cabanero had promised
him,[20] and that he and Adato stayed at the residence of Cabanero
for about two (2) weeks during which time, Adato slept in the room
of Cabaneros mother, while he stayed in the room of Cabaneros
brothers.[21]
Thereafter, appellant proceeded to a repair shop in Barangay Bagay where the car repair job was waiting for him. While working at
the repair shop owned by a certain Vito, appellant stayed at a
house being rented by the niece of Vito while Adato stayed in a
neighbors house.[22]
One and a half weeks later, SPO2 Quilala arrived at Barangay Bagay with his companions. Quilala informed appellant that Mendiola
had filed a complaint against him for the kidnapping of Adato.
Appellant was stunned by the seriousness of Mendiolas charges,
and although he denied the same to Quilala, he readily acceded to
the latters request that he go back to Manila with
them.[23] Manikan
Before going back to Manila, however, appellant was brought to the
Tuguegarao Municipal Hall where he was investigated by Colonel
Pealosa. Thereafter, appellant, together with Quilalas team and
Adato, boarded an Island Liner bus bound for Manila. When they
reached Manila, they proceeded to Camp Ricardo Papa in Bicutan,
Taguig.[24]
Appellant was detained in Camp Ricardo Papa for two (2) days
without an investigation being conducted by the police officers.
Thereafter, he was transferred to the Manila City Jail. Appellant
claims that while at the Manila City Jail, police officers forced him
to affix his signature to a document, the contents of which were
not explained to him. The fiscal investigated appellant only after
he had already been detained for two (2) days.[25]
Arvie Entila corroborated the testimony of appellant that Adato
voluntarily went with the former.
According to Entila, while he was driving his sidecar along Quirino
Highway on December 14, 1995 at around eleven oclock in the
morning, he saw Adato with a classmate. Entila who knew Adato as
the ward of his aunt, Mendiola, asked her why she was there, but
he received no reply from the latter.[26]
[27]
Later that day, Entila heard that Mendiola

was looking for Adato
so he went to the house of Mendiola to inform her that he had
seen Adato along Quirino Highway. However, Mendiola did not
react to Entilas information.[28]
At around 8:30 in the evening of same day, Entila saw Mendiola
walking along Santiago Street in Paco, Manila. He asked her if
Adato had already gone home, and Mendiola replied in the

affirmative. On his way out of Santiago Street, he met Adato who
was apparently on her way home.[29]
The following day, at around 5:30 in the morning, Entila was outside
his grandmothers house in Santiago Street. While waiting for his
grandmother, he saw his uncle, the appellant. The latter
approached him and told him that he was going to Olongapo to work
there. Appellant then asked Entila to inform his grandmother, that
is, appellants mother, about his plan to leave town. [30]
Appellant then requested Entila to take him to Quirino Highway
where he planned to hail a cab. Entila acceded and drove appellant
to Quirino Highway. While appellant was waiting for a cab, Entila
saw Adato come out from behind some plants at the side of Lanuza
Street. He overheard Adato asking appellant to allow her to go
with him because she was being given away by Mendiola. At first,
appellant refused, saying that Mendiola might get angry. However,
when Adato cried, appellant eventually succumbed to her pleas and
took her with him.[31] Oldmis o
After weighing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial
court found appellants denial unworthy of merit in the face of
Adatos positive declaration that appellant forcibly brought her
first to a friends house and then to Tugugarao, and deprived her
of liberty for more than two (2) months. The trial court thus
declared that appellants guilt of the crime of kidnapping has been
established beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, appellant was
meted out the penalty of reclusion perpetua.[32]
Hence, this appeal where the appellant contends that:
"The Court A Quo Erred:
"1) In convicting appellant of the crime of Kidnapping; and
2) In the appreciation of the Evidence presented by the
parties."[33]
We find for the accused-appellant.
At the outset, this Court observes that a material point of
inconsistency has unfortunately been totally disregarded by the
trial court and even by the prosecution and defense. The actual
date of the alleged commission of the crime has been subject of
varying testimonies.
During the direct and cross-examination of Mendiola, she
consistently referred to December 19, 1995[34] as the day when
Adato failed to come home from school. Thus, if Mendiolas
testimony is to be given any weight, then the accused-appellant
kidnapped the victim on December 19, 1995, and held her captive
until February 21, 1996. However, Adato herself testified that the
appellant kidnapped her on December 15, 1995. In denying
Adatos charges, appellant declared that Adato voluntarily went
with him on December 15, 1995, and this was corroborated by

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
defense witness Arvie Entila.

Mendiolas sworn statements before the police authorities are
likewise not helpful and merely add to the confusion. On January
29, 1996, she executed a sworn statement before SPO2 Simplicio
Robles of the Philippine National Police at Camp Ricardo Papa,
Taguig, Metro Manila where she said that her ward, Adato, failed
to come home on December 15, 1995.[35] In a subsequent
statement given to SPO1 Celso Zapata also of the PNP at Camp
Ricardo Papa, Mendiola reported that Adato had been missing
since December 19, 1995.[36] Earlier, however, Mendiola had
executed an affidavit of complaint against appellant wherein she
stated that Adato failed to return home on December 15,
1995.[37]
What baffles this Court even more is that the trial court
completely ignored this discrepancy, and the prosecution exerted
no effort whatsoever to explain these inconsistencies. Ncm
This is not to say, however, that we are acquitting appellant solely
on the basis of Mendiolas inconsistent statements with respect to
the date Adato failed to return home. But we acquit appellant
because a judicious review of the records of this case reveals that
the defense had presented evidence, which if given due credence
by the trial court, would have been sufficient to acquit him on the
ground of reasonable doubt. We refer to the corroborative
testimony of defense witness Arvie Entila.
Consistent with the appellants allegation that Adato voluntarily
accompanied him to Tuguegarao is the following testimony of
defense witness Arvie Entila:
"q
On December 15, 1995 at about five thirty in the morning
can you tell us where were you, Mr. witness?
a
I was at home, sir.
q
What were you doing at that time?
a
I was about to bring my grandmother to the market.
q
By the way, Mr. witness, what is the exact address of your
house?
a
1265 Santiago street.
q
While saiting (sic) for your grandmother what happened, if
any, Mr. witness, at that time?
a
I fixed my sidecar.
q
While you were fixing your sidecar what happened, if any,
Mr. witness?
a
I saw my uncle.
q
What is the name of your uncle, Mr. witness?
a
Alfredo Entila, sir.
q
What was he doing at that time when you saw him?
a
He was carrying a TV set approaching me.
q
What did you do, Mr. witness, when you saw your uncle
carrying a TV set.
a
I asked him where he would go.
q
What was the answer of your uncle?
a
He said that he would go to Olongapo because he would work
there.
q
You said that he was carrying a television set, will you tell us
how big is that television set? Ncmmis

a
21-inch TV set, sir.
q
What did you do when your uncle answered you that he will
be going to Olongapo?
a
I did not say anything.
q
After that what happened, if any?
a
He asked for my grandmother.
q
What was your answer, if any, Mr. witness?
a
I told him that she was upstairs.
q
What did your uncle do when you informed him that your
grandmother was upstairs?
a
He told me to inform my grandmother about his leaving.
q
Did you do that, Mr. witness, as requested?
a
Yes, sir.
q
After that what happened?
a
Alfredo requested me to bring him to Quirino Highway.
q
Did you bring him to Quirino Highway as per request?
a
Yes, sir.
q
While at Quirino Highway what happened, if any, Mr.
witness?
a
He called a taxi.
q
After that what happened, what else happened, if any?
a
Suddenly Teresa went out.
q
From where?
a
At the side of the plants.
q
In what particular place, Mr. witness?
a
Side of Lanuza street, sir.
q
What did Teresa do after you saw yer (sic) came (sic) out
from Lanuza at the side of Lanuza street? Scnc m
a
She wanted to go with Alfredo, my uncle.
q
How did she ask Alfredo Entila that she would go with him?
a
she told my uncle that she was being given away by Chi.
q
What was the answer of Alfredo Entila of (sic) the
information given to him?
a
Alfredo told Teresa that Chi might get angry.
q
What did Teresa do after being informed that this Entila
does not want Teresa to go with him?
a
She forced Alfredo.
q
What did Alfredo do, if any?
a
Teresa was crying.
q
Did Alfredo eventually agree?
pros. icay Leading, Your Honor.
defense counse
I will reform.
court
Reform.
defense counsel
q
What did Alfredo Entila do when Teresa Adato cried and
informed him that she wanted to go with him?
a
Alfredo brought Teresa with him.
q
Do you know where?
a
Olongapo.
q
Teresa Adato or Teresa testified here that she was forcibly
taken by Alfredo Entila on December 15, 1995 at about eleven o
clock in the morning, what can you say about it, Mr. witness?
a
That is not true, sir. Sdaa miso
q
Why do you say that Teresa Adato was not telling the truth
when she said that she was forcibly taken by Alfredo Entila on
that particular date?

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
a
I was the one who brought my uncle."[38]
The prosecution would have us believe that defense witness Arvie

Entilas testimony was motivated by nothing more than the natural
desire to help the appellant who is his uncle. It is true that in most
instances, corroboration by relatives of an accused is accorded
scant consideration in view of the truism that blood is thicker than
water.[39] However, a witness testimony cannot be stripped of full
faith and credit simply on account of his relationship to the
parties.[40] Although relationship can put the testimony of a witness
in doubt, it cannot affect credibility itself.[41] The Judge should
have subjected the testimony of defense witness Arvie Entila to
the ordinary process of evaluation and accordingly assigned to it
the proper intrinsic weight.[42]
Furthermore, the basis for disregarding Arvie Entilas testimony in
this case, simply does not exist. It should be remembered that
defense witness Arvie Entila is related to the families of both the
appellant and Mendiola, guardian of Adato. While appellant is his
uncle, Mendiola is also his aunt, being the first cousin of his
father.[43] There is no indication whatsoever that defense witness
Arvie Entila favored one relative over another nor is then any
proof that he harbored any improper motive to testify against
Mendiola or her ward.[44] On the contrary, there exists evidence
that defense witness Arvie Entila was just as concerned over the
welfare of his aunts ward, Theresa Adato. Thus, having heard that
Mendiola was looking for Adato, Entila did not waste any time in
informing Mendiola that he had seen Adato in Quirino Highway.
Later that day, Entila again asked about Adato. Hence:
"q
Mr. witness, On December 14, 1995 at about eleven o (sic)
clock in the morning can you tell us where were you?
a
I was in the market, sir.
q
Where is this market located, Mr. witness? Sdaad
a
In Paco, Manila, sir.
q
What were you doing at that particular place and time?
a
I was driving my sidecar looking for passenger (sic), sir.
q
While thereat, Mr. witness, can you tell us what happened, if
any?
a
I have no passenger, sir.
q
So what did you do then, Mr. witness?
a
So I went around, sir.
q
Where?
a
Quirino Highway, sir.
q
Where is this Quirino Highway located, Mr. witness?
a
Corner of Lanuza.
q
Is this located within Manila?
a
Yes, sir.
q
While at Pres. Quirino Highway looking for passenger (sic)
while you were driving your pedicab what happened, if any?
a
I saw Teresa, sir.
q
Who is this Teresa, Mr. witness?
a
Chit was the one who was taking care of Teresa, a ward of
Chit.
q
If this Teresa is here in court can you point her to us, Mr.
witness?
a
Yes, sir.
q
Willyou (sic) please stand up and point her to us?
a
There sir.
interpreter
Witness pointing to a person who when asked her name
answered
complainant
Teresa Adato.
defense counselScs daad
q
What was Teresa doing when you saw her at Quirino Highway
on December 14, 1995 at about eleven oclock in the morning?
a
She was with her classmate sitting.
q
What did you do, Mr. witness, when you saw this Teresa
Adato?
a
I asked her why she was there.
q
What was her answer, Mr. witness?
a
She did not answer.
q
At about four oclock in the afternoon of the same date, Mr.
witness, can you tell us where were you?
a
I was also still in the market.
q
What were you doing there, Mr. witness?
a
Still waiting for passenger.
q
Were you able to get a passenger at that time?
a
Yes, sir.
q
What happened when you were able to get that passenger?
a
I brought them at (sic) Santiago street.
q
Where is this Santiago street?
a
Paco, Manila, sir,
q
Were you able to bring that passenger of yours at (sic)
Santiago street?
a
Yes, sir.
pros. icay
Leading, Your Honor.
defense counsel
Already answered, Your Honor.
q
What happened when you arrived together with your
passenger at Santiago street?
a
I went to my aunt.
q
And where? Sup rema
a
1238 Santiago street.
q
On your way to the house of your aunt what happened, if any,
Mr. witness?
a
I heard that Chi was looking for Teresa.
q
Who is this Chi?
a
She is the one taking care of Teresa.
q
Is this Chi here in court now?
a
No, sir.
q
What did you hear, Mr. witness, from Chi?
a
That she was looking for Teresa.
q
Do you know the reason why this Chi was looking for Teresa?
pros. icay
Incompetent.
court
Witness may answer.
witness
a
She did not come here.
defense counsel
q
What did you tell her when you heard that this Chi was
looking for Teresa?
a
I told her that I saw Teresa along Quirino Highway.

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
q
What was the reaction of this Chi, if any, when you tell (sic)
her that you saw Teresa at the Highway?
a
No reaction, sir.
q
Mr. witness, at about eight thirty p.m. on the same date can
you tell us where were you?
a
I was in the house of my aunt, sir.
q
While at the house of your aunt what happened, Mr. witness?
a
I went out. Juris
q
To where?
a
I went out of Santiago street.
q
On your way out of Santiago strert (sic) will you tell us what
happened, if any, Mr. witness?
a
I saw Chi.
q
what was Chi doing at that time, Mr. witness?
a
She was walking.
q
What else happened, if any, Mr. witness?
a
I asked Chi if Teresa has arrived.
q
What was the answer of Chi?
a
And she answered yes.
q
What did you do after that, Mr. witness, if any?
a
I was on my way out of Santiago street when I saw Teresa.
q
What was Teresa doing then, Mr. witness?
a
She is on her way home.
q
What did you do when you saw Teresa at that time?
a
I told Teresa that you are really here.
q
what was the answer of Teresa, if any, Mr. witness?
a
She did not answer."[45]
Even the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, SPO2 Quilala and
SPO2 Camacho, show that Adatos actuations were inconsistent
with those expected of one who has been kidnapped.
SPO2 Camacho testified as follows:
"Q
you said that when you arrived in Cagayan you were able to
contact Magno Quilang, is that correct?
a
no, the informant first.
q
But eventually you were able to contact Magno Quilang?
a
yes, sir. Sc juris
q
and in fact, you said you were able to talk to him?
a
yes, sir.
q
did you ask him when did they start renting the place?
a
no, sir.
q
and you said you proceeded to Barangay Bagay and you were
able to see Entila?
a
yes, maam.
q
and he even told you that the girl is just nearby playing?
a
yes, maam.
q
can you describe the place where the girl was all gedly (sic)
playing sungka?
a
the house is very near the repair shop.
q
is this a close place?
a
open place.
q
so, the child is free to go out?
a
YES.
Q
She wasnot (sic) detained atthat (sic) time?
q
did the child told (sic) you that she was kidnapped, raped or
sexually abused at the time you saw her playing?
a
no, maam. I did not ask.
q
But the child did not inform you of such fact?
a
no, maam."[46]
Curiously, Adato did not exhibit any sign of hostility towards her
alleged tormentor. On the contrary, she prevented the police
officers from handcuffing appellant during the trip from
Tuguegarao to Manila.
SPO2 Quilala testified thus:
"q
Is it not true also that this Adato requested you not to
handcuff Entila?
a
Yes, sir.
q
Why? Juris sc
a
I donot (sic) know, sir.
q
You said you reached Bicutan, at what date was that you
arrived Bicutan, what date was that?
a
It was on the 22nd at about four thirty in the mornigg (sic).
q
As a veteran law enforcer, Mr. witness, the action of Entila
and this Adato when you found them in Tuguegarao is consistent
with a woman or a child which (sic) has not been detained or
kidnapped, is that right?
a
Yes, sir."[47]
Adatos compassion towards appellant is more consistent with a
debt of gratitude felt for one who had helped her escape a
miserable life than anger and vengefulness at one who had taken
her away from home and repeatedly abused her.
In convicting the appellant, the trial court relied on the oft-cited
rule that denial, like alibi, is a weak defense since it is easily
fabricated or concocted. There are nonetheless settled
pronouncements of this Court to the effect that where an accused
sets up alibi, or denial for that matter, as his line of defense, the
courts should not at once look at the same with wary eyes for
taken in the light of all the evidence on record, it may be
sufficient to reverse the outcome of the case as found by the trial
court and thereby rightly set the accused free.[48] Furthermore,
the defense of alibi or denial may assume significance or strength
when it is amply corroborated by a credible witness, as in the
instant case.[49]
The trial court also pointed out that the defense had failed to
establish any nefarious or sinister motive on the part of the victim
to impute the commission of a crime to the appellant. It should be
noted, however, that although Adato herself had no motive to
falsely incriminate appellant, her guardian, Mendiola, had an axe to
grind against appellant.
That appellant and Mendiola were feuding over the ownership of
the house they were occupying in Paco, Manila is evident from their
respective statements in open court.
Thus, appellant testified, thus:
"q
a
q
do you know one Araceli Mendiola, Mr. witness?

Yes, sir, my first cousin, sir.
Can you tell us

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
a
Araceli Pineda MendiolaMisj uris
q
where was she residing at that time, Mr. witness, in 1995?
a
Just on the second floor of my house which I rented out.
q
You mean to say that you are the owner of the house which
Araceli Mendiola was occupying at the time?
a
Yes, sir.
q
When you returned to the Philippines and after the death of
your wife do you have any occasion to talk with Araceli Mendiola
regarding the lease of your property?
a
No, sir, she just occupied the place.
q
My question, Mr. witness, is that did you have any occasion
to talk with Araceli Mendiola after the death of your wife
regarding the lease of your property?
a
Yes, sir.
q
What did you talk about, Mr. witness?
a
about the rent of the house.
q
What did you tell her regarding the lease of your property?
a
She said that if she has only available money that was the
only time that she will pay me.
q
On December 14, 1995 Araceli Mendiola testified here
before that she is the owner of the house from (sic) which she was
residing at the time and it was located on the second storey (sic)
of the place where you are residing, what can you say about that,
Mr. witness?
a
I am the owners (sic), sir.
q
Do you mean to say that this Araceli Mendiola was not telling
the truth when she said or testified that she is the owner of the
place, Mr. witness?
pros. icay
Leading, Your Honor.
defense counsel
Point of clarification, your Honor.
court
Witness may answer. Jj lex
witness
a
That is not true, sir.
defense counsel
q
what did you do when this Araceli Mendiola claims (sic)
ownership over the house, over the portion of the house which you
said that you only rented to her, Mr. witness, if any?
a
I did not agree to that situation, sir.
q
When you did not agree to that situation, Mr. witness, what
did Araceli Mendiola do, if any?
a
She got mad at me.
q
How?
a
She said that she introduced some improvements on the
property.
court
q
Do you know what was that improvement?
q
What?
a
The three G.I. sheets that she replaced, sir."[50]
On the other hand, Mendiola denied accused-appellants ownership
of the said house:
"q
Madam witness, you are residing at 1238 Santiago St., Paco,
Manila?
a
Yes, sir.
q
And you are renting this place from theaccused (sic), is that
right?
a
No, sir.
q
And the accused is also residing at that place at 1238
Santiago St., Paco, Manila is that right?
a
Yes, sir.
q
And he is residing in that place because he is the owner of
the house is that right?
a
No, sir.
q
Will you please tell us why is it that he is residing in that
address?
a
He lives downstairs while I live on the second floor of the
house, sir."[51]
It is therefore not altogether impossible, as alleged by the
defense, that Adato was merely cajoled by Mendiola into
concocting the charges against appellant.
Defense witness Arvie Entilas testimony, coupled with the
aforementioned circumstances, has engendered in the mind of this
Court a nagging doubt as to the guilt of the appellant. This
uneasiness has been spawned by the failure of the prosecution to
convince this Court of appellants guilt to that degree of moral
certitude that is indispensable for the conviction of an accused.
Hence, we have held in a long line of cases that if the inculpatory
facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations,
one consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test
of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. [52]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of Branch 26 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila in Criminal Case No. 96-147974 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant, Alfredo Entila Y Pineda alias
"Bogie" is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground that his guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt. francis
SO ORDERED.
Testimony of relative of accused against him

HIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 131357. April 12, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. ERNESTO GARCHITORENA, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J .:
In resolving the sole issue raised by appellant, the Court relies on
the time-tested doctrine that the trial courts assessment of the
credibility of witnesses should be upheld, if it is not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight
and influence which, if considered, would materially affect the
result of the case.

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
The Case
Filed before this Court is an appeal by Ernesto Garchitorena, who
seeks reversal of the September 30, 1997 Decision[1] of the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila (Branch 171) in
Criminal Case No. 5510-V-96. The Decision found him guilty of rape
and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
In an Information[2] dated May 6, 1996, Assistant City Prosecutor
Eriberto A. Aricheta charged appellant with rape by means of
force and intimidation. The Information reads as follows:
"That on or about February 18, 1996 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, by means of force and intimidation employed upon
the person of one JENNIFER ACOSTA y ALEJO, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse
with the said JENNIFER ACOSTA y ALEJO, against her will and
without her consent."
Upon his arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial proceeded
in due course. Thereafter, the court a quo rendered the assailed
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, finding accused Ernesto Garchitorena y Medina
[g]uilty beyond reasonable doubt, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of [r]eclusion [p]erpetua and to pay the costs.
"Accused is likewise sentenced to indemnify the offended party
the sum of P50,000.00."[3]
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution

In its Brief,[4] the Office of the Solicitor General[5] presents the
following narration of the facts:
"Jennifer Acosta was nineteen (19) years old at the time she
testified in court in 1996. Appellant is her step grandfather, being
the live-in partner of her paternal grandmother Rosalina Acosta.
Rosalina is separated from her husband. Rosalina and appellant took
Jennifer to their custody when the latter was only two (2) years
old and until Jennifer was about ten (10) or eleven (11) years old.
During that period, however, Jennifer would reside alternately in
her grandmother and appellants house at No. 1078 Sta. Monica
Subdivision, Ugong, Valenzuela, Metro Manila and her parents
house at # 2007 La Mesa St., Ugong, Valenzuela. Rosalina and
appellants house is about two hundred (200) steps away, or about
five (5) minutes walk [from] Jennifers parents house.
"Jennifer was ten (10) or eleven (11) years old when she resided
permanently at her parents[] x x x house. But Jennifer would still
go to her grandmothers house when she would call for her.
Sometimes appellant would fetch Jennifer from her parents house
pretending that her grandmother needed her. If Jennifer would

refuse to go with appellant, Clarita would scold her. When she was
ten (10) years old, Jennifer noticed that appellant treated her
differently, such as placing her on his lap, kissing her on the neck
or on the cheeks and touching her private parts. Jennifer calls
appellant Daddy because her grandmother told her to address
appellant as such. According to Jennifer, appellant started raping
her when she reached the age of ten (10), but she could no longer
remember how many times appellant raped her. The rapes were
committed not only in her grandmothers house but also in her
parents house. She did not tell anyone about the rapes committed
by appellant against her because he threatened to kill her, her
grandmother and sister should she (Jennifer) do so.
"On February 18, 1996, a Sunday, Jennifer was at the chapel until
11:00 a.m. Thereafter she went home [to] her parents house and
had lunch with her parents and sister. Around 1:00 p.m., she went
to her grandmothers house. When she arrived at her
grandmothers house, appellant and her grandmother were eating
lunch at the kitchen. Since Jennifer had eaten her lunch, she took
a little food at her grandmothers house. The kitchen was at the
back of the store owned by her grandmother and outside the
house. After eating, Jennifer went to the sala of the house and lay
down on the sofa while appellant left and her grandmother went to
the store. The sala was about twenty (20) to twenty-five (25)
meters away from the store. The sofa where Jennifer had [lain]
down [on] was beside a window. When one opens the door of the
house, one would immediately see the sofa. When Jennifer was
lying on the sofa, her head was towards the door, so she could not
see the door. She had slept for less than an hour when she was
awakened by a kiss planted by appellant on her right cheek.
Jennifer was then wearing a T-shirt and a garterized short pants
while appellant was wearing a T-shirt and pants. She could no
longer remember whether appellant wore long or short pants. When
Jennifer opened her eyes, she saw appellant on her right side and
she uttered Daddy. She attempted to stand up, but appellants
right hand held her left hand and appellant kissed her on the lips.
Jennifer could not do anything but cry. She could not shout
because she was afraid of him. Then, with his right hand, appellant
touched her breasts. Thereupon, appellant raised her T-shirt and
her bra with his right hand and alternately kissed and touched her
exposed breasts. While appellant was doing all these to her, she
constantly pleaded with him to stop, but her plea was useless.
Thereafter, appellant pulled down her garterized short pants and
panty. When her panty was removed, appellant touched her vagina
with his right hand and inserted a finger into her vagina. At this
point, Jennifer closed her eyes and when she opened them she saw
appellant removing his brief. Appellant then placed himself on top
of her and masturbated with his right hand. As appellant was on
top of her, he kissed her. Jennifer was repelled by that (nadidiri
ako sa kanya). Then appellant inserted his penis into her vagina.
Suddenly, Jennifers grandmother called out to appellant. Appellant
stood up, hurriedly fixed himself up and told Jennifer not to leave
because he would come back. But as soon as appellant left,
Jennifer fixed herself up and went home.
"When Jennifer arrived at her parents house, she tried to act
normally. But her mother asked why she was frowning and she told

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
her mother that she had a headache. Her mother became

suspicious. Then on March 30, 1996, her mother asked her if she
had a problem. Jennifer did not answer until her mother slapped
her. Then Jennifer told her motherNanay, hirap na hirap na
ako and told her mother that appellant was molesting her. Her
mother said, napakawalanghiya niya.
Solitary Issue:
Credibility of the Witness
Version of the Defense
Appellant contends that the trial court misapplied the doctrine

that a girl of tender age would not disclose that she was raped if it
were not true, arguing that complainant herein was already 19
years old at the time of the rape. He also contends that her
actions of going back to his house and even eating with him after
the supposed rape showed that it did not take place. Lastly, he
argues that her Appellant contends that the trial court misapplied
the doctrine that a girl of tender age would not disclose that she
was raped if it were not true, arguing that complainant herein was
already 19 years old. He further contends that her testimony
should not be believed because it contained many inconsistencies.
In his Brief,[7] appellant did not present his version of the facts,
but merely stated that Witnesses Rogelio and Rosalinda Acosta
both testified that complainant had gone to his residence several
times after the date when the alleged rape took place, and that
there was thus no indication that the relationship between him and
complainant was strained or abnormal.
The contentions of appellant are incorrect. He was convicted on

the basis of the victims testimony which the trial court deemed to
be a true and honest narration of the events that occurred on that
fateful day. During direct examination, Jennifer clearly testified
as to how she had been raped by her grandfather, herein appellant.
We quote hereunder the pertinent portion of her testimony:
Ruling of the Trial Court
"FISCAL RAZON: (To the witness)

Q.......Now, when he arrived, what happened?
A.......He kissed me.
Q.......Where were you kissed?
A.......[On] my cheeks.
Q.......And after you were kissed, what happened?
A.......I was awakened. When I was about to stand up, he held my
hands.
Q.......And after holding your hands, what happened?
A.......Then he again kissed me.
Q.......Where were you kissed the second time?
A.......[On] my lips.
Q.......And after you were kissed on the lips, what did the accused
do?
A.......He touched my breast.
Q.......By the way, how were you attired at that time?
A.......I was wearing shorts and T-shirt.
Q.......What about your bra, were you then wearing bra?
A.......Yes, sir.
Q.......Now you stated that the accused touched your breast, what
happened after that?
A.......While he was kissing me, he was holding my breast.
Q.......[Which hand] of the accused was touching your breast?
A.......Right hand.
Q.......What about his left hand, what was his left hand doing?
A.......His left hand was holding my hands.
Q.......After your breast [was] touched, what happened?
A.......When he stopped touching my breast, he pulled up my T-shirt.
Q.......And after your T-shirt was pulled up, what happened?
A.......Then he pulled up my bra.
Q.......And after he pulled your bra, what did he do next?
A.......He kissed my breast.
Q.......And after kissing your breast, what did he do?
A.......After cooling down, he pulled down my shorts.
"Dr. Noel Minay, a [m]edico-[l]egal [o]fficer of the National Bureau

of Investigation, Manila conducted a physical examination on
Jennifer on April 2, 1996. Dr. Minay testified that there was no
physical injury on the body of Jennifer, but he found an old healed
hymenal laceration at [the] 6 oclock position. His examination
revealed that Jennifer was no longer physically [a] virgin."[6]
After examining the evidence presented by both the prosecution

and the defense, as well as the demeanor of the witnesses of both
sides, the trial court concluded that the prosecutions account was
more credible.
The trial court accorded full faith to the victims narration of the
incident which occurred on February 18, 1996. It observed that a
girl of tender age would not willingly falsify a rape charge. Her lack
of sufficient discretion and judgment, as well as the threats to her
life and the lives of her sister and her grandmother, prevented her
from resisting appellants advances, thus enabling him to
perpetrate the crime. The trial court also noted the findings of
the medicolegal officer, which lent support to the fact that rape
had been committed against the victim.
Hence, this appeal.[8]
Assignment of Errors
In his Brief, appellant interposes this lone assignment of error:
"The trial court erred in convicting the accused on the basis of the
incredible and conflicting statements of the complainant and
despite the positive testimony in favor of the accused." [9]
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is devoid of merit.

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
Q.......And after pulling down your shorts, what did he do?

A.......He removed my panty.
Q.......And after he removed your panty, what did he do?
A.......He touched my vagina.
Q.......And after touching your vagina, what did he do next?
A.......He inserted his finger.
Q.......And after he inserted his finger into your vagina, what did he
do next, if any?
A.......He contin[u]ously inserted his finger.
Q.......And how was he attired at that time?
A.......He was wearing [pants].
Q.......And what was your position while this thing was being done to
your person?
A.......I was lying down, face up.
Q.......And after he repeatedly inserted his finger into your vagina,
what did he do next?
A.......Then he released me and unbuttoned his pants.
Q.......And after he unbuttoned his pants, what did he do?
A.......He put [out] his private part.
Q.......And after that, what did he do?
A.......He kissed me and went back to me, and placed himself on top
of me.
x x x......x x x......x x x
Q.......When he placed himself on top of you, what did he do to you?
A.......While he was kissing me, he was holding his penis and he was
masturbating.
Q.......After he had masturbated, what did he do, if any?
A.......He inserted his penis into my vagina.
Q.......Now, a while ago, you stated that he unbuttoned his pants,
and brought out his penis[;] how far was he from you?
A.......He was just beside me.
Q.......When he inserted his penis into your vagina, what was your
feeling?
A.......It was painful."[10]
experience."[12]
True, the statement of the complainant that she was ravished in

the sala conflicted with that of Rogelio Acosta who, testifying for
the defense, claimed that he was watching television in the same
place at that time. After hearing the testimonies of both parties,
however, the trial court attached greater weight and credence to
the testimony of the victim, Jennifer Acosta. This Court finds no
compelling reason to reverse or alter its holding. It is a timetested doctrine that a trial courts assessment of the credibility
of a witness is entitled to great weight and is even conclusive and
binding, if it is not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some
fact or circumstance of weight and influence.[11]
shouted, calling him.

Q.......You stated a while ago that your grandmother was inside?
A.......Inside the store.
Q.......How come that she was able to call on your grandfather[?]
A.......Because the store was just outside x x x the house.
Q.......How far was it [from] the house of your grandmother?
A.......More or less ten (10) meters away."[15]
Furthermore, the trial court found no motive for complainant to

testify falsely against appellant who was a close relative. In People
v. Tidula, this Court stated that a witness testimony against a
blood relative is given great weight, if it is not found to have been
motivated by any ill will. The Court held:
"A witness testimony is accorded great weight, particularly when
his or her accusation is directed against a close relative. For one to
prosecute a blood relative -- especially when, as in this case, no ill
or evil motive is shown -- goes beyond logic and normal human
Appellant insists that Jennifer fabricated the rape charge,

because she had felt that her grandparents were too strict with
her and her suitors. This allegation does not hold water, because no
proof was ever offered to substantiate it. Moreover, one does not
fabricate so serious a charge as rape simply because ones
grandparents are strict, especially in this case wherein complainant
was not even living with them but only visited them from time to
time. In any event, her testimony is corroborated by the findings
of the NBI medicolegal officer,[13] who found an old healed
laceration in her sexual organ after conducting a genital inspection.
In insisting that the trial court erred in finding that Jennifer did
not resist, appellant is not correct either. In rape cases, the force
applied need not be irresistible.[14] It merely has to be enough to
successfully carry out the assailants carnal desire. In the present
case, appellant did apply sufficient force and intimidation to
consummate his lustful desire.
During her testimony, Jennifer stated that appellant held her
hands while kissing her. Also, she explained that she did not shout
or ask for help because she was afraid, and that he threatened to
kill her grandmother and her sister. She testified as follows:
"Q.......Why did you not shout and ask for help from anybody?
A.......I was afraid of him.
Q.......Why were you afraid?
A.......Because when he was doing that thing to me, when he was
raping me, he told me that he [would] kill my grandmother and my
sister.
Q.......And after the penis was inserted into your vagina. what
happened?
A.......When his penis was already inside my vagina, my grandmother
Lastly, appellants argument that complainant would not have

returned to his house if the rape had really occurred can also be
easily dispensed with. She was reported to have been to appellants
house after February 18, 1996, but prior to March 30, 1996.
However, she told her mother about the rape only on the latter
date because she had at first been reluctant to talk about it out of
either fear or humiliation. Thus, prior to March 30, 1996,
complainant had to pretend that everything was normal. Not going
to appellants house which she was known to have frequented could
have caused suspicion that something was amiss.
It can be seen from her testimony, however, that she did not go to
that house on the mentioned dates without anyone accompanying

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
Ildefonso Virtucio Jr. approached the store muttering, " Ako nasay
her. She testified thus:

"Q.......[On w]hat other dates [did] you [see] Jennifer Acosta at
the house of your mother?
A.......On March 22, 1997 x x x my brother arrived from abroad[;]
the next day March 23, 1996 Jennifer Acosta went to our house.
Q.......And who were the companion[s] of Jennifer Acosta when she
arrived at the house of your mother on March 23, if any?
A.......She was accompanied by her father and her mother.
Q.......Who else?
A.......And he[r] sister.
Q.......After March 23 was there any occasion [on which] Jennifer
Acost[a] went to the house of your mother?
A.......From March 23 to March 29, 1996 they came to our [house]
to play domino.
Q.......And who was her companion at the time she returned on
March 24 to March 29?
A.......Her younger sister."[16]
The trial court correctly awarded the amount of P50,000 by way
of civil indemnity, which was mandatory upon the finding of the
fact of rape.[17] This Court likewise awards an additional sum
ofP50,000 by way of moral damages. The fact that complainant has
suffered trauma which constitutes the basis for moral damages is
too obvious to still require the victims recital thereof at the
trial.[18]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court AFFIRMED, with the modification that
appellant is ordered to pay the victim the amount of P50,000 as
moral damages, in addition to the trial courts grant of P50,000 as
indemnity ex delicto. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Testimony of relative of victim

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 130667. February 22, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. ILDEFONSO VIRTUCIO JR. alias
"Gaga," accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
An Information was filed on 8 April 1996 charging Ildefonso
Virtucio, Jr. with murder for the death of Alejandro Briones. To
this day however the accused professes innocence.
The conviction of the accused was based on the following evidence
of the prosecution: At around ten o'clock in the evening of 31
March 1996 Alejandro Briones was standing outside his store in
Mambaling, Cebu City. He was watching his neighbors play
"chikicha," a card game. Suddenly appearing from nowhere accused
andar karon kay duna koy tawo nga nalagutan nga nagpa-raid nako sa
shabu."[1] The accused then took out his gun and fired downwards.
Then without any provocation the accused aimed his gun at the
head of Alejandro Briones; the gun did not fire. Alejandro stood up
and parried off the firearm. He asked Virtucio, " Unsa man, Ga ?" In
answer, Virtucio fired his gun and this time Alejandro was hit on
his stomach. Virtucio fired another shot hitting Alejandro on his
right forearm. Wounded and bleeding from his wounds, Alejandro
tried to run but Virtucio finished him off with a fatal shot on the
head which sent the victim falling to the ground.
Betty Briones, wife of Alejandro, was in their store. She was just
one and a half (1 1/2) meters away from her husband when shot.
She saw the startling occurrence as did their 12-year old son "Aly
Boy" who was playing outside the store.
With the help of their neighbors Alejandro was taken to the Cebu
City Medical Center where he died two (2) days later. Proximate
cause of his death, according to his examining physician, was
"cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to pulmonary embolism with
possible myocardial infraction and fulminating sepsis secondary to
multiple gunshot wounds.[2] For his hospitalization and medical
attendance, the Brioneses incurred expenses in the amount
of P57,000.00.
Accused Virtucio interposed alibi for his defense. He alleged that
as early as eleven o'clock in the morning of 31 March 1996 he was
already on his way to Tabuelan, Cebu, together with his business
partner, Pablo Cuer, to await the arrival of seashells from
Escalante, Negros Occidental. They arrived in Tabuelan at around
four-thirty in the afternoon. He stayed in the house of Cuer until 2
April 1996 since the seashells did not arrive on the expected date.
During his stay in Tabuelan he shared the same room with Cuer
leaving the latter's wife to sleep in another room.
On 2 April 1996 police authorities from the Tabuelan Police
Station went to the Cuer residence and invited the accused to
their headquarters where he was subsequently detained. He came
to know that he was implicated in the killing of Alejandro Briones
only on 3 April 1996. He could not think of any reason why Betty
and " Aly Boy" Briones would implicate him in the crime. In fact, the
Brioneses were his neighbors for three (3) years and they had
maintained good relationship throughout those years. He admitted
though that one (1) month before the killing, the house of his
common-law wife's parents was raided for shabu; however, he
never blamed anyone for the incident.
Pablo Cuer corroborated the testimony of Virtucio. He said that
once in Tabuelan, Cebu, the accused never left their house as they
even shared the same room, while his wife slept in another room.
On 1 April 1996 they woke up at four-thirty in the morning and
proceeded to the wharf to wait for the seashells from Escalante,
Negros Occidental. Since the seashells failed to arrive as
scheduled Virtucio had to stay with the Cuers for another night. In
the afternoon of the following day, 2 April 1996, Policeman Alfredo
Arellano invited Virtucio to the police station where he was

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
subsequently detained. According to Cuer, he did not bother to

give Virtucio some food while detained because he (Cuer) returned
to the wharf to get the seashells.
Fe Tesoro, mother of the common-law wife of the accused,
testified that she asked the accused to go in her stead to
Tabuelan in the company of Pablo on 31 March 1996. So, Virtucio
and Cuer left Cebu City at about ten o'clock in the morning. The
Tesoros likewise went to Tabuelan that same evening using their
old Tamaraw vehicle. They arrived at the house of the Cuers at
around eleven o'clock in the evening. Fe Tesoro allegedly told the
accused to go home as soon as the seashells were available,
afterwhich the Tesoros returned to Cebu City arriving there at
midnight. Fe denied knowing that her neighbor Alejandro Briones
was shot at the time she left for Tabuelan, Cebu. She insisted that
she only knew about the shooting of Alejandro the following day.
As to the fact that Virtucio was a suspect, she testified that she
learned about it only on 2 April 1996 when the police authorities
fetched him from Tabuelan, Cebu.
On 21 October 1996 the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City found
Virtucio guilty of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Alejandro
Briones the amount of P50,000.00. The court a quo disregarded
the alibi of the accused in view of his positive identification by the
prosecution witnesses as the author of the crime. Besides, he
miserably failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him
to have been at the crime scene at the time it was committed.
The trial court found that evident premeditation and treachery
qualified the killing to murder. The court below ratiocinated that
evident premeditation was present considering that the accused
had harbored a grudge against the victim, the latter being
suspected of instigating the raid in the house of his common-law
wife's mother. The court a quo concluded, in addition, that the
killing was treacherous as it was done in a sudden and unexpected
manner, leaving the victim in no position to effectively defend
himself.
Accused-appellant is now before us impugning the testimonies of
the victim's widow and son for allegedly being "biased and
polluted." He suggests that their testimonies be considered
fabricated as they were too harmonious with nary a hint of
inconsistency in their narration of facts.
In resolving the issue of credibility of witnesses, we must yield to
the oft-repeated rule that the trial courts evaluation of the
testimony of a witness is accorded the highest respect because of
its direct opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and to
determine if they are telling the truth or not.[3] Lacking any ground
in questioning the discretion of the trial court, we consider its
ruling on the credibility of the witnesses as settled.
The witnesses' relationship to the victim does not automatically
affect the veracity of their testimonies. No legal provision
disqualifies relatives of the victim of a crime from testifying if
they are competent. That the prosecutions eyewitnesses were the
widow and son of the deceased, without more, is not reason enough
to disregard and label their testimonies as biased and unworthy of
credence. Plainly, relationship did not affect their
credibility.[4] This Court is well aware that not too infrequently
crimes are committed with just the relatives of the victim as
witnesses.[5]
On the same note, the testimony of "Aly Boy" should not be
discarded simply because he was a mere child when he testified. A
child is only disqualified if it can be shown that his mental maturity
renders him incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which he
is being examined and of relating them truthfully. [6] Once it is
established that he understands or discerns the nature and
character of an oath, full faith and credit should be given to his
testimony. The narration of "Aly Boy" was vivid and full of details,
stemming only from a recollection of what actually took place and
not from a concocted story impressed upon him by his mother, as
insinuated by accused-appellant.
The prosecution witnesses positively identified accused-appellant
as the author of the crime. Faced with this positive identification,
he could only offer the defense of denial and alibi. Denials, as
negative and self-serving evidence, do not deserve as much weight
in law as a positive and affirmative testimony.[7] Alibi as a defense
has an inverse relation to positive identification. It is regarded as
the weakest and most unreliable of all defenses especially in the
light of clear and positive identification of the accused by the
prosecution witnesses against whom no motive to falsely testify
against the accused can be imputed. Alibi can only prosper by
indubitably proving that the accused was somewhere else when the
crime was committed, and that he could not have been physically
present at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity at the time
of its commission; physical impossibility, in other words, of being in
two (2) places at the same time.[8]
Accused-appellants defense that he was in Tabuelan, Cebu, when
Briones was killed does not persuade. The sequence of events is
much too doubtful to be believed. His nonchalance upon being
invited by the police strikes us as unusual. His subsequent
detention minus any vehement objection also baffles this Court.
Paradoxically, he claims innocence yet he has shown no signs of it.
His contention that his business partner Pablo Cuer fetched him
contradicted Cuer's and Tesoro's testimony that he was asked to
accompany Cuer. Plainly, his alibi is riddled with inconsistencies.
The trial court, however, erred in appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of evident premeditation. The court below concluded
that accused-appellant must have planned the killing considering
that he harbored a grudge against the deceased for quite some
time. This basis falls short of the requirement that the element of
evident premeditation must, like the crime itself, be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. There is evident premeditation when the
following are satisfactorily proved: (a) the time when the appellant
decided to commit the crime; (b) an overt act showing that the
appellant clung to his determination to commit the crime; and, (c)
the lapse of sufficient period of time between the decision and the
execution of the crime, to allow the appellant to reflect upon the

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
consequences of the act.[9] Other than the fact that accusedappellant had the motive to kill the victim, the prosecution in the
instant case miserably failed to establish that he plotted the
killing of Briones and that he had sufficient time to ponder over
his plan. Notably, the proof of motive is no longer necessary in view
of the positive identification of accused-appellant as the assailant.
On the other hand, the court a quo properly appreciated the
qualifying circumstance of treachery. The essence of treachery is
the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest
provocation on the part of the person attacked. There is treachery
when the attack on the victim was made without giving the latter
warning of any kind and thus rendering him unable to defend
himself from an assailant's unexpected attack. While a victim may
have been warned of a possible danger to his person, in treachery,
what is decisive is that the attack was executed in such a manner
as to make it impossible for the victim to retaliate. [10] In the case
before us, the deceased was totally unaware of the impending
attack to his person. He was just standing outside their store
watching some neighbors play cards. Accused-appellant suddenly
sprang from nowhere and without any provocation from the victim,
shot him at close range. The deceased was unarmed and
defenseless when he was killed in cold blood.
The trial court failed to award actual damages to the heirs of the
victim despite the testimony of the widow that they
incurred P57,000.00 for hospital and burial expenses. However,
upon examination of the records, we find that only P9,000.00 of
the total P57,000.00 was sufficiently and competently proved.
Hence, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to an award
of P9,000.00 as actual damages. On the other hand, the trial court
properly awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity without need of
further proof other than the death of the victim.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City finding accused-appellant ILDEFONSO VIRTUCIO JR. alias
"Gaga" guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Alejandro
Briones the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is additionally
ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased P9,000.00 as actual
damages. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
DISQUALIFICATIONS OF WITNESSES (MIM DIP)
-
Mental incapacity or immaturity.

Marriage (Marital Disqualification Rule)
Death or Insanity. (Dead Mans Statute and claim v.
insane)
Privilege (MAP PP)
Section 21. Disqualification by reason of

mental incapacity or immaturity. ? The
following persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at

the time of their production for
examination, is such that they are
incapable of intelligently making
known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is
such as to render them incapable of
perceiving the facts respecting which
they are examined and of relating
them truthfully. (19a)
marriage. ? During their marriage, neither
the husband nor the wife may testify for or
against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse, except in a civil case by
one against the other, or in a criminal case
for a crime committed by one against the
other or the latter's direct descendants or
ascendants. (20a)
death or insanity of adverse party. ? Parties
or assignor of parties to a case, or persons
in whose behalf a case is prosecuted,
against an executor or administrator or
other representative of a deceased person,
or against a person of unsound mind, upon
a claim or demand against the estate of
such deceased person or against such
person of unsound mind, cannot testify as
to any matter of fact occurring before the
death of such deceased person or before
such person became of unsound mind.
(20a)
privileged communication. ? The following
persons cannot testify as to matters
learned in confidence in the following
cases:
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after
the marriage, cannot be examined without
the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
one from the other during the marriage

except in a civil case by one against the
other, or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or the
latter's direct descendants or ascendants;
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent
of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him,
or his advice given thereon in the course of,
or with a view to, professional employment,
nor can an attorney's secretary,
stenographer, or clerk be examined,
without the consent of the client and his
employer, concerning any fact the
knowledge of which has been acquired in
such capacity;
(c) A person authorized to practice
medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a
civil case, without the consent of the
patient, be examined as to any advice or
treatment given by him or any information
which he may have acquired in attending
such patient in a professional capacity,
which information was necessary to enable
him to act in capacity, and which would
blacken the reputation of the patient;
(d) A minister or priest cannot, without the
consent of the person making the
confession, be examined as to any
confession made to or any advice given by
him in his professional character in the
course of discipline enjoined by the church
to which the minister or priest belongs;
(e) A public officer cannot be examined
during his term of office or afterwards, as to
communications made to him in official
confidence, when the court finds that the
public interest would suffer by the
disclosure. (21a)
Disqualifications of Witnesses
(1) Absolute disqualification:
(a) Those who cannot perceive (Sec. 20);
(b) Those who can perceive but cannot make their perception known (Sec. 20);
(c) Mentally incapacity Those whose mental condition, at the time of their
production for examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently
making known their perception to others (Sec. 21);
(d) Mentally immaturity Children whose mental maturity is such as to render
them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of
relating them truthfully (Sec. 21);
(e) Marital disqualification During their marriage, neither the husband nor the
wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a
crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or
ascendants (Sec. 22).
(f) Parental and filial privilege -- No person may be compelled to testify against
his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants (Sec.
25).
(2) Relative disqualification:
(a) Dead Mans Statute Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in
whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon
a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such
person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before
the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound
mind (Sec. 23).
(b) Disqualification by reason of privileged communication (Sec. 24):
1. The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence
by one from the other during the marriage except in a civil case by one against
the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or
the latter's direct descendants or ascendants;
2. An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the
course of, or with a view to, professional employment, nor can an attorney's
secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client
and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired
in such capacity;
3. A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a
civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or
treatment given by him or any information which he may have acquired in
attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information was
necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the
reputation of the patient;
4. A minister or priest cannot, without the consent of the person making the
confession, be examined as to any confession made to or any advice given by
him in his professional character in the course of discipline enjoined by the
church to which the minister or priest belongs;
5. A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as
to communications made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that
the public interest would suffer by the disclosure.
(c) Newsmans privilege -- Without prejudice to his liability under the civil and
criminal laws, the publisher, editor, columnist or duly accredited reporter of any
newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot be compelled to
reveal the source of any news-report or information appearing in said publication
which was related in confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter unless the
court or a House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is
demanded by the security of the State (RA 1477);
(d) Bank deposits -- All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking
institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the
Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities,
are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be
examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or
office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of
impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or
invested is the subject matter of the litigation (RA 1405).
(e) Sanctity of the ballot voters may not be compelled to disclose for whom
they voted.
(f) Trade secrets.
(g) Information contained in tax returns (RA 2070, as amended by RA 2212).
Disqualification by reason of mental capacity or immaturity
(1) The following persons cannot be witnesses:

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for
examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their
perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of
perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them
truthfully (Sec. 21).
(2) Regardless of the nature or cause of mental disability, the test of competency
to testify is as to whether the individual has sufficient understanding to
appreciate the nature and obligation of an oath and sufficient capacity to observe
and describe correctly the facts in regard to which he is called to testify.
(3) Basic requirements of a childs competency as a witness:
(a) Capacity of observation;
(b) Capacity of recollection;
(c) Capacity of communication.
In ascertaining whether a child is of sufficient intelligence according to the
foregoing requirements, it is settled rule that the trial court is called upon to
make such determination (People vs. Mendoza, 68 SCAD 552, 02/22/96).
b. Disqualification by reason of marriage (spousal immunity)
(1) During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or
against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil
case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one
against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants (Se. 22).
(2) The spouses must be legally married to each other to invoke the benefit of
the rule; it does not cover an illicit relationship (People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil.
694). When the marriage is dissolved on the grounds provided for by law like
annulment or declaration of nullity, the rule can no longer be invoked. A spouse
can already testify against the other despite an objection being interposed by the
affected spouse. If the testimony for or against the other spouse is offered during
the existence of the marriage, it does not matter if the facts subject of the
testimony occurred before the marriage. It only matters that the affected spouse
objects to the offer of testimony.
(3) The testimony covered by the marital disqualification rule not only consists of
utterances but also the production of documents (State vs. Bramlet, 114 SC 389).
Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party (Survivorship or
Dead Mans Statute)
(1) This rule applies only to a civil case or a special proceeding. The following are
the elements for the application of the rule:
(a) The plaintiff is the person who has a claim against the estate of the decedent
or person of unsound mind;
(b) The defendant in the case is the executor or administrator or a representative
of the deceased or the person of unsound mind;
(c) The suit is upon a claim by the plaintiff against the estate of said deceased or
person of unsound mind;
(d) The witness is the plaintiff, or an assignor of that party, or a person in whose
behalf the case is prosecuted; and
(e) The subject of the testimony is as to any matter of fact occurring before the
death (ante litem motam) of such deceased person or before such person became
of unsound mind (Sec. 23).
Disqualification by Reason of Privileged Communications between Husband and
Wife
(1) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence
by one from the other during the marriage except in a civil case by one against
the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or
the latter's direct descendants or ascendants (Sec. 24).
(2) The application of the rule requires the presence of the following elements:
(a) There must be a valid marriage between the husband and the wife;
(b) There is a communication made in confidence by one to the other; and
(c) The confidential communication must have been made during the marriage.
Marital Disqualification (Sec. 22)
Marital Disqualification (sec. 22)

Can be invoked only if one of the
spouses is a party to the action;
Applies only if the marriage is existing
at the time the testimony is offered;
Ceases upon the death or either
spouse;
Constitutes a total prohibition against
any testimony for or against the
spouse of the witness;
The prohibition is a testimony for or
against the other.
Marital Privilege (Sec. 24)

Can be claimed whether or not the
spouse is a party to the action;
Can be claimed even after the
marriage has been dissolved;
Continues even after the termination
of the marriage;
Applies only to confidential
communications between the
spouses.
The prohibition is the examination of
a spouse as to matters related in
confidence to the other spouse.
Mental Incapacity
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 145225
April 2, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
SALVADOR GOLIMLIM @ "BADONG", appellants.
DECISION
On appeal is the Decision1 of June 9, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 65 in Criminal Case No. 241, finding appellant
Salvador Golimlim alias "Badong" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape,
imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and holding him civilly
liable in the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity, and P50,000.00 as moral
damages.
The Information dated April 16, 1997 filed against appellant reads as
follows:
That sometime in the month of August, 1996, at Barangay Bical,
Municipality of Bulan, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named
accused, armed with a bladed weapon, by means of violence and
intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, have carnal knowledge of one Evelyn Canchela against
her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law. 2
Upon arraignment on December 15, 1997, 3 appellant, duly assisted by
counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
The facts established by the prosecution are as follows:
Private complainant Evelyn G. Canchela (Evelyn), is a mental
retardate. When her mother, Amparo Hachero, left for
Singapore on May 2, 1996 to work as a domestic helper, she
entrusted Evelyn to the care and custody of her (Amparos) sister
Jovita Guban and her husband Salvador Golimlim, herein appellant,
at Barangay Bical, Bulan, Sorsogon. 4
Sometime in August 1996, Jovita left the conjugal residence to meet a

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
certain Rosing,5 leaving Evelyn with appellant. Taking advantage of the

situation, appellant instructed private complainant to sleep,6 and soon after
she had laid down, he kissed her and took off her clothes. 7 As he poked at
her an object which to Evelyn felt like a knife, 8 he proceeded to insert his
penis into her vagina. 9 His lust satisfied, appellant fell asleep.
When Jovita arrived, Evelyn told her about what appellant did to her. Jovita,
however, did not believe her and in fact she scolded her.10
Sometime in December of the same year, Lorna Hachero, Evelyns halfsister, received a letter from their mother Amparo instructing her to fetch
Evelyn from Sorsogon and allow her to stay in Novaliches, Quezon City where
she (Lorna) resided. Dutifully, Lorna immediately repaired to appellants
home in Bical, and brought Evelyn with her to Manila.
A week after she brought Evelyn to stay with her, Lorna suspected that her
sister was pregnant as she noticed her growing belly. She thereupon brought
her to a doctor at the Pascual General Hospital at Baeza, Novaliches, Quezon
City for check-up and ultrasound examination.
Lornas suspicions were confirmed as the examinations revealed that Evelyn
was indeed pregnant. 11 She thus asked her sister how she became pregnant,
to which Evelyn replied that appellant had sexual intercourse with her while
holding a knife. 12
In February of 1997, the sisters left for Bulan, Sorsogon for the purpose of
filing a criminal complaint against appellant. The police in Bulan, however,
advised them to first have Evelyn examined. Obliging, the two repaired on
February 24, 1997 to the Municipal Health Office of Bulan, Sorsogon where
Evelyn was examined by Dr. Estrella Payoyo. 13 The Medico-legal Report
revealed the following findings, quoted verbatim:
FINDINGS: LMP [last menstrual period]: Aug. 96 ?
Abd [abdomen]: 7 months AOG [age of gestation]
FHT [fetal heart tone]: 148/min
Presentation: Cephalic
Hymen: old laceration at 3, 5, 7, & 11 oclock position 14
On the same day, the sisters went back to the Investigation Section of the
Bulan Municipal Police Station before which they executed their sworn
statements.15
On February 27, 1997, Evelyn, assisted by Lorna, filed a criminal complaint
for rape16 against appellant before the Municipal Trial Court of Bulan,
Sorsogon, docketed as Criminal Case No. 6272.
In the meantime or on May 7, 1997, Evelyn gave birth to a girl, Joana
Canchela, at Guruyan, Juban, Sorsogon. 17
Appellant, on being confronted with the accusation, simply said that it is not
true "[b]ecause her mind is not normal,"18 she having "mentioned many other
names of men who ha[d] sexual intercourse with her." 19
Finding for the prosecution, the trial court, by the present appealed
Decision, convicted appellant as charged. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Salvador Golimlim
having been found guilty of the crime of RAPE (Art. 335 R.P.C. as
amended by RA 7659) beyond reasonable doubt is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and
to indemnify the offended party Evelyn Canchela in the amount of
P50,000.00 as indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral
damage[s], and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.20
Hence, the present appeal, appellant assigning to the trial court the
following errors:
I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT
AND CREDENCE TO THE CONTRADICTORY AND
IMPLAUSIBLE TESTIMONY OF EVELYN CANCHELA, A
MENTAL RETARDATE, [AND]
II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME
CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT. 21
Appellant argues that Evelyns testimony is not categorical and is replete
with contradictions, thus engendering grave doubts as to his criminal
culpability.
In giving credence to Evelyns testimony and finding against appellant, the
trial court made the following observations, quoted verbatim:
1) Despite her weak and dull mental state the victim was
consistent in her claim that her Papay Badong (accused Salvador
Golimlim) had carnal knowledge of her and was the author of her
pregnancy, and nobody else (See: For comparison her Sworn
Statement on p. 3/Record; her narration in the Psychiatric
Report on pp. 47 & 48/Record; the TSNs of her testimony in open
court);
2) She remains consistent that her Papay Badong raped her only
once;
3) That the contradictory statements she made in open court
relative to the details of how she was raped, although would seem
derogatory to her credibility and reliability as a witness under
normal conditions, were amply explained by the psychiatrist who
examined her and supported by her findings (See: Exhibits F to
F-2);
4) Despite her claim that several persons laid on top of her
(which is still subject to question considering that the victim
could not elaborate on its meaning), the lucid fact remains that
she never pointed to anybody else as the author of her
pregnancy, but her Papay Badong. Which only shows that the
trauma that was created in her mind by the incident has remained
printed in her memory despite her weak mental state.
Furthermore, granting for the sake of argument that other men
also laid on top of her, this does not deviate from the fact that
her Papay Badong (the accused) had sexual intercourse with her. 22

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
The trial judges assessment of the credibility of witnesses testimonies is,

as has repeatedly been held by this Court, accorded great respect on appeal
in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on its part, it having had the
advantage of actually examining both real and testimonial evidence including
the demeanor of the witnesses. 23
In the present case, no cogent reason can be appreciated to warrant a
departure from the findings of the trial court with respect to the
assessment of Evelyns testimony.
That Evelyn is a mental retardate does not disqualify her as a witness nor
render her testimony bereft of truth.
Sections 20 and 21 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:
SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in
the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses.
SEC. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or
immaturity. The following persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production
for examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently
making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them
incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are
examined and of relating them truthfully.
In People v. Trelles,24 where the trial court relied heavily on the therein
mentally retarded private complainants testimony irregardless of her
"monosyllabic responses and vacillations between lucidity and ambiguity," this
Court held:
A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se,
disqualified from being a witness, her mental condition not being
a vitiation of her credibility. It is now universally accepted that
intellectual weakness, no matter what form it assumes, is not a
valid objection to the competency of a witness so long as the
latter can still give a fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of
the matter testified to.25
It can not then be gainsaid that a mental retardate can be a witness,
depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows. 26 If his or
her testimony is coherent, the same is admissible in court. 27
To be sure, modern rules on evidence have downgraded mental incapacity as
a ground to disqualify a witness. As observed by McCormick, the remedy of
excluding such a witness who may be the only person available who knows the
facts, seems inept and primitive. Our rules follow the modern trend of
evidence.28
Thus, in a long line of cases,29 this Court has upheld the conviction of the
accused based mainly on statements given in court by the victim who was a
mental retardate.
From a meticulous scrutiny of the records of this case, there is no reason to
doubt Evelyns credibility. To be sure, her testimony is not without
discrepancies, given of course her feeblemindedness.

By the account of Dr. Chona Cuyos-Belmonte, Medical Specialist II at the
Psychiatric Department of the Bicol Medical Center, who examined Evelyn,
although Evelyn was suffering from moderate mental retardation with an IQ
of 46,30 she is capable of perceiving and relating events which happened to
her. Thus the doctor testified:
Q: So do you try to impress that although she answers in general
terms it does not necessarily mean that she might be inventing
answers only that she could not go to the specific details
because of dullness?
A: I dont think she was inventing her answer because I
conducted mental status examination for three (3) times and I
tried to see the consistency in the narration but very poor (sic) in
giving details.
xxx
Q: May we know what she related to you?
A: She related to me that she was raped by her uncle Tatay
Badong. What she mentioned was that, and I quote: hinila ang
panty ko, pinasok ang pisot at bayag niya sa pipi ko. She would
laugh inappropriately after telling me that particular incident. I
also tried to ask her regarding the dates, the time of the
incident, but she could not really. I tried to elicit those
important things, but the patient had a hard time remembering
those dates.
Q: But considering that you have evaluated her mentally, gave her I.Q. test,
in your honest opinion, do you believe that this narration by the patient to
you about the rape is reliable?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why do you consider that reliable ?
A: Being a (sic) moderately retarded, I have noticed the
spontaneity of her answers during the time of the testing. She
was not even hesitating when she told me she was raped once at
home by her Tatay Badong; and she was laughing when she told me
about how it was done on (sic) her. So, although she may be
inappropriate but (sic) she was spontaneous, she was consistent.
Q: Now, I would like to relate to you an incident that happened in
this Court for you to give us your expert opinion. I tried to
present the victim in this case to testify. While she testified
that she was raped by her uncle Badong, when asked about the
details, thereof, she would not make (sic) the detail. She only
answered wala (no). I ask this question because somehow this
seems related to your previous evaluation that while she gave an
answer, she gave no detail. Now, I was thinking because I am a
man and I was the one asking and the Judge is a man also. And
while the mother would say that she would relate to her and she
related to you, can you explain to us why when she was presented
in court that occurrence, that event happened?
A: There are a lot of possible answers to that question; one, is
the courts atmosphere itself. This may have brought a little
anxiety on the part of the patient and this inhibits her from
relating some of the details relative to the incident-in-question.
When I conducted my interview with the patient, there were only

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
two (2) of us in the room. I normally do not ask this question

during the first session with the patient because these are
emotionally leading questions, and I do not expect the patient to
be very trusting. So, I usually ask this type of questions during
the later part of my examination to make her relax during my
evaluation. So in this way, she will be more cooperative with me. I
dont think that this kind of atmosphere within the courtroom
with some people around, this could have inhibited the patient
from answering questions.
Q: What if the victim is being coached or led by someone else,
will she be able to answer the questions?
A: Yes, she may be able to answer the questions, but you would
notice the inconsistency of the answers because what we normally
do is that we present the questions in different ways, and we
expect the same answer. This is how we try to evaluate the
patient. If the person, especially a retarded, is being coached by
somebody, the answers will no longer be consistent.
Q: You also mentioned a while ago that the answers given by the
patient, taken all in all, were consistent?
A: Yes, sir.31 (Underscoring supplied)
As noted in the above-quoted testimony of Dr. Belmonte, Evelyn could give
spontaneous and consistent answers to the same but differently framed
questions under conditions which do not inhibit her from answering. It could
have been in this light that Evelyn was able to relate in court, upon
examination by a female government prosecutor and the exclusion of the
public from the proceedings, on Dr. Belmontes suggestion, 32 how, as quoted
below, she was raped and that it was appellant who did it:
Q: Lorna Hachero testified before this Court that you gave birth
to a baby girl named Johanna, is this true?
A: (The witness nods, yes.)
Q: Who is the father of Johanna?
A: Papay Badong
Q: Who is this Papay Badong that you are referring to?
A: The husband of Mamay Bita.
Q: Is he here in court?
A: He is here.
Q: Please look around and point him to us.
A: (The witness pointing to the lone man sitting in the first row of the
gallery wearing a regular prison orange t-shirt who gave his name as Salvador
Golimlim when asked.)
Q: Why were you able to say that it is Papay Badong who is the father of
your child Johanna?
A: Because then I was left at Mamay Bitas house, although I am not there
now.
Q: And that house where you were left is also the house of your Papay
Badong?
A: Yes maam.
Q: What did Salvador Golimlim or your Papay Badong do to you thats why
you were able to say that he is the father of your child?
A: I was undressed by him.
xxx
Q: What did you do after you were undressed?
A: I was scolded by the wife, Mamay Bita.
Q: I am referring to that very moment when you were undressed.
Immediately after your Papay Badong undressed you, what did you do?
xxx
A: He laid on top of me.
Q: What was your position when he laid on top of you?
A: I was lying down.
Q: Then after he went on top of you, what did he do there?
A: He made (sic) sexual intercourse with me.
Q: When you said he had a (sic) sexual intercourse with you, what did he do
exactly?
A: He kissed me.
Q: Where?
A: On the cheeks (witness motioning indicating her cheeks).
Q: What else did he do? Please describe before this Honorable Court the
sexual intercourse which you are referring to which the accused did to you.
A: Initoy and he slept after that.
(to Court)
Nevertheless, may we request that the local term for sexual intercourse,
the word Initoy which was used by the witness be put on the record, and we
request judicial notice of the fact that initoy is the local term for sexual
intercourse.
xxx
Q: What did you feel when your Papay Badong had sexual intercourse with
you?
A: I felt a knife; it was like a knife.
Q: Where did you feel that knife?
A: I forgot.
Q: Why did you allow your Papay Badong to have sexual intercourse with you?
A: I will not consent to it.
xxx
Q: Did you like what he did to you?
A: I do not want it.
Q: But why did it happen?
A: I was forced to.
xxx
Q: Did you feel anything when he inserted into your vagina when your Papay
Badong laid on top of you?
A: His sexual organ/penis.
Q: How did you know that it was the penis of your Papay Badong that was
entered into your vagina?
A: It was put on top of me.
Q: Did it enter your vagina?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
xxx
Q: Madam Witness, is it true that your Papay Badong inserted his penis into
your vagina or sexual organ during that time that he was on top of you?
A: (The witness nods, yes.)33 (Underscoring
supplied)
Appellants bare denial is not only an inherently weak defense. It is not

supported by clear and convincing evidence. It cannot thus prevail over the
positive declaration of Evelyn who convincingly identified him as her rapist. 34
In convicting appellant under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act 7659 (the law in force when the crime was
committed in 1996), the trial court did not specify under which mode the
crime was committed. Under the said article, rape is committed thus:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed
by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances.
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
by: Meo J. Mallorca
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is

demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a
deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua or death.
It is settled that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate
constitutes statutory rape which does not require proof that the accused
used force or intimidation in having carnal knowledge of the victim for
conviction. 35 The fact of Evelyns mental retardation was not, however,
alleged in the Information and, therefore, cannot be the basis for
conviction. Such notwithstanding, that force and intimidation attended the
commission of the crime, the mode of commission alleged in the Information,
was adequately proven. It bears stating herein that the mental faculties of a
retardate being different from those of a normal person, the degree of
force needed to overwhelm him or her is less. Hence, a quantum of force
which may not suffice when the victim is a normal person, may be more than
enough when employed against an imbecile. 36
Q: Gizelle was estranged from her husband Mico for more than a
year. Gizelle was temporarily living with her sister in Pasig City.
For unknown reasons, the house of Ivys sister was burned,
killing the latter. Gizelle survived.
Gizelle saw her Mico in the vicinity during the incident. Later,
Mico was charged with arson. During the trial, the prosecutor
called Gizelle to the witness stand and offered her testimony to
prove that her husband committed arson. Can Gizelle testify over
the objection of her husband on the ground of marital privilege?
A: Yes. The marital disqualification rule is aimed at protecting the harmony
and confidences of marital relations. Hence, where the marital and domestic
relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor
peace and tranquillity which may be disturbed, the marital disqualification no
longer applies.
The act of Mico in setting fire to the house of his sister-in-law, knowing that
his wife was there, is an act totally alien to the harmony and confidences of
marital relation which the disqualification primarily seeks to protect. The
criminal act complained of had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the
conjugal relation. (Alvarez v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 143439, Oct. 14, 2005).
Still under the above-quoted provision of Art. 335 of the Rev ised Penal
Code, when the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon,
the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. In the case at bar,
however, although there is adequate evidence showing that appellant indeed
used force and intimidation, that is not the case with respect to the use of a
deadly weapon.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon,
Sorsogon, Branch 65 in Criminal Case No. 241 finding appellant, Salvador
Golimlim alias "Badong," GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of rape, which
this Court finds to have been committed under paragraph 1, Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, and holding him civilly liable therefor, is
hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
DISQUALIFICATION BY REASON OF MARRIAGE

The testimony covered by the marital disqualification rule not only consists of
utterances but also the production of documents.
The spouses must be legally married to each other to invoke the benefit of the
rule; it does not cover an illicit relationship.
When the marriage is dissolved on the grounds provided for by law like
annulment or declaration of nullity, the rule can no longer be invoked. A spouse
can already testify against the other despite an objection being interposed by the
affected spouse. If the testimony for or against the other spouse is offered during
the existence of the marriage, it does not matter if the facts subject of the
testimony occurred before the marriage. It only matters that the affected spouse
objects to the offer of testimony.
Q: What is purpose of this disqualification?
A: The rule forbidding one spouse to testify for or against the other is
based on principles which are deemed important to preserve the
marriage relation as one of full confidence and affection, and that this
is regarded as more important to the public welfare than that the
exigencies of the lawsuits should authorize domestic peace to be
disregarded for the sake of ferreting out facts within the knowledge of
strangers.

CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY
E v i d e n c e | 194
by: Meo J. Mallorca
Notes)
Compiled Notes in CLJ 4 (culled from UP, Ateneo, San Beda, UST, FEU


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CHMSC CRIMINOLOGY

by: Meo J. Mallorca

Compiled Notes in CLJ 4 - Evidence |1

It may be ascertained in:

NOTE: If fact is admitted, there is no more factum probandum because

FACTUM PROBANS - the material evidencing the proposition. It is

Section 1. Evidence defined. ? Evidence is

Section 2. Scope. ? The rules of evidence

Having determined that the evidence is admissible, how to present

Q: What are the four component elements?

ALVIN TUASON y OCHOA, petitioner,

FACTUM PROBANDUM - the ultimate fact sought to be established.

CJE-CRIM CLASS 4-POINT AGENDA

Compiled Notes in CLJ 4 - Evidence |2

Petitioner Alvin Tuason y Ochoa, John Doe,

Torres' bed, her body facing the bedroom door

CJE-CRIM CLASS 4-POINT AGENDA

Compiled Notes in CLJ 4 - Evidence |3

committed. Quintal is a neighboring maid.

story. She testified that on July 17, 1988 she

CJE-CRIM CLASS 4-POINT AGENDA

Compiled Notes in CLJ 4 - Evidence |4

(P280,000.00) fro criminal case No. Q-88-396

CJE-CRIM CLASS 4-POINT AGENDA

Compiled Notes in CLJ 4 - Evidence |5

headquarters, Madaraog described petitioner as

Q: Madam witness where is that round mole

Secondly, the trial court and the respondent

Q: I am referring to you now Exhibit "J". I call

This is a grave error. The trial court cannot

CJE-CRIM CLASS 4-POINT AGENDA

Compiled Notes in CLJ 4 - Evidence |6

any fact from which the trial court can logically

you not call the attention of the investigator

CJE-CRIM CLASS 4-POINT AGENDA

Compiled Notes in CLJ 4 - Evidence |7

Barbieto would be testifying in the manner that

presentation of a single suspect to a witness for

The respondent appellate court, however,

Q: Did you see them at the NBI when they

Petitioner's main defense is alibi. He professed

CJE-CRIM CLASS 4-POINT AGENDA

Compiled Notes in CLJ 4 - Evidence |8

established that her brother had an eye

WHEN EVIDENCE IS NECESSARY

Q: Distinguish proof from evidence.

CJE-CRIM CLASS 4-POINT AGENDA

The means of proof

Compiled Notes in CLJ 4 - Evidence |9

CJE-CRIM CLASS 4-POINT AGENDA

in criminal cases; does not

Q: Distinguish admissibility of evidence from probative value of

MANOLO P. FULE, petitioner,

CJE-CRIM CLASS 4-POINT AGENDA

"f) That the said check was presented for

"SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed.

CJE-CRIM CLASS 4-POINT AGENDA

Proper Presentation Of Evidence

the witness will not be allowed to testify. If the witness is otherwise