Generic Research Firm

Contents
EXECTUTIVE SUMMARY.......................................................................................... 2
INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................ 2
METHODOLOGY........................................................................................................ 3
RESULTS.................................................................................................................... 3
Part 1: Events That Started Scrutiny of the Dreamliner...............................3
Part 2: Results of the Scrutiny..........................................................................3
Part Three: Final Solution and Consequences................................................4
Conclusion................................................................................................................ 5
REFERENCES.............................................................................................................. 6

EXECTUTIVE SUMMARY
It is the intent of this White Paper to document the events of January 2013 in
regards to the Battery Fires onboard of the Boeing 787 Dreamliner.
The Research of this paper was found from various sources on the internet. They
were put together in a chronological order to move through the crisis in the most
logical way possible. The crisis began with two events on two separate airplanes
with the battery fires happening while they were on the ground. This sparked an
investigation by Boeing, the FAA and the NTSB on what had happened on the
planes. They determined there was an issue with the batteries of the planes and
were forced to ground all Dreamliners for three months. At the end of those three
months Boeing discovered a solution to the battery problem and quickly made
reparations and installed the fix to all Dreamliners. This incident was handled
quickly and handedly as a way to go back to delivering and making money on this
new airplane. This paper analyzes why this issue was so large for huge government
groups and other special interest groups. There is a distinct noteworthy idea that
there was a lot of money involved with this plane and the lack of negative
consequences from the FAA and the Federal Government on Boeing speaks to how
valuable this plane is to the aerospace community. There was no official apology
from Boeing to the general populace from installing a dangerous system into their
planes which calls into question the ability of the Boeings Public Relations.
The paper concludes with the commentary on the issue of the money that was
involved in this plane and the solution and a recommendation of better Public
Relation statements made by Boeing to major consumers and the public.

INTRODUCTION
On January 7, 2013 a Boeing 787 Dreamliner airplane that was recently delivered
to Japan Airlines was found smoking after a battery unit overheated while on the
ground at Logan International Airport. Two days later, January 9, 2013, another
Dreamliner owned by United Airlines had another fire begin in the battery unit just
like the Japan Airlines Dreamliner. This began a long road for Boeing that came
under fire from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), as well as the international community. This crisis for
Boeing not only threatened safety of aviation consumers, and their entire image as
an aerospace leader in safety and innovation. After the entire Dreamliner fleet was
grounded for three months Boeing developed a solution but did not find the root
cause of the battery fires.
The purpose of this white paper is to move through a few of the key developments
in the timeline of this crisis and to analyze the implications of this crisis on the
rapport and validity of the FAA as a safety checkpoint and Boeing as a leader in
aerospace safety and innovation. This will be done by taking key articles that were
written during the timeline of this crisis with comments from Boeing, the FAA, and
the public at large. These articles will give a glimpse at thoughts during the event
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and how the major reaction by these three groups during the three months it took
for Boeing to find a solution.

METHODOLOGY
The entirety of the research was retrieved off major sources of digital news sites.
These involve comments from leaders in the FAA, Boeing, and Airliners that were
involved in this crisis. The method of organization is one of chronological order
following the article by Ryan M. Martin and Lois A. Boyton From liftoff to landing:
NASAs crisis communications and resulting media coverage following the
Challenger and Columbia tragedies which is a chronological framework from
beginning of crisis to end. The data has been split into three parts for ease of
movement throughout this paper:
1. Events that Started Scrutiny of the Dreamliner
2. Results of the Scrutiny
3. Final Solution and Following Consequences
This data has been analyzed and coded in an Aristotelian method following a basic
system of separating data into Logos, Pathos, and Ethos. You will find that the
majority of the data is coded into Logos as the crisis was one that was very
technical from all standpoints.

RESULTS
Part 1: Events That Started Scrutiny of the Dreamliner
Beginning on January 7, 2013 a Dreamliner owned by Japan Airlines had the battery
unit overheat while on the ground with a fire starting at Logan International Airport.
Two days later another Dreamliner owned by United Airlines had their own battery
unit overheat and a fire destroyed the cockpit and the entire battery unit. This
prompted the NTSB and the FAA to begin looking into the problem with the
Dreamliner. (BBC News, 2013) During this time there was no comment by Boeing to
the general public rather they apologized to their customers and guaranteed a fix to
the problems and replacement of the systems after they were burned away.
Bringing two of the largest Airline safety administrators down on Boeing was very
bad for business and their public image. Not only did they see public confidence
they also were met with calls for repayment from other clients. All the approaches
by the FAA and the NTSB are Logos approaches as they only look at facts as is
clearly necessary in the crisis that is presented. With a technical problem one
should use a technical/logical solution. That solution presented itself two days later
with a decision from the FAA.
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Part 2: Results of the Scrutiny

On January 11, 2013 the FAA elected to temporarily ground the select group of
Dreamliners that had battery issues and some control planes to fully review their
systems. This brought a new wave of concern from consumers, buyers who had
already purchased their planes, and of course Boeing. It was met with feedback
from three major sources (Topham, 2013).
This may be the most important part of the findings as even though all the groups
involved were going after this problem in a logos sense there was definitely some
pull from the FAA to ensure this plane would be still able to be flown. In order to
keep people safe and to ensure no other accidents would happen in the air all
commercial Dreamliners were grounded indefinitely in order for Boeing to find a
solution to its faulty batteries. There are three quotes from different members both
directly involved and one who is from the outside. The two directly involved are
Boeing Commercial Airplanes President, Ray Conner, and the FAA chief, Michael
Huerta. The indirectly involved party is the US Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood.
Take a look at LaHoods comments first.
LaHood publically claimed he would have no reservation in boarding these planes
and taking a flight this is very clearly a Pathos look at a Logos problem. We can see
a very important member of the government who is in charge of the inner workings
of the department that oversees transportation safety claiming that he has faith in a
system that has shown that it is hazardous. This calls into question that there may
have been some ulterior motives for so many people taking an interest in the
Dreamliner issue. This is brought into a clearer picture when looked at through the
scope of the other two quotes starting with BCA president Ray Connor saying that
the 787 had undergone the most robust and rigorous certification process in the
history of aviation. The statement leads to a conclusion that is already known: the
Boeing 787 Dreamliner cost the Boeing Company and others a lot of money to
develop and manufacture.
The final quote really hits this home because the chief of the FAA wants to use
whatever technical resources necessary for the review of an aircraft which is
already worth tens of billions of dollars. This isnt so clear from the casual observer
but this researchers findings within these quotes and the articles they came from
that there is a vested interest in ensuring that the Dreamliner was capable of being
back in the air as soon as possible because of how much money that Boeing, the
FAA, and of course the U.S government would lose if they were to halt the
Dreamliner production completely. This calls into question how much safety
inspection went into the plane not only the first time but also at the end of every
production line for each plane. With such a severe investment from three powerful
groups its clear that they would do anything to solve this problem as quickly as
possible.
When this wasnt the reality the FAA was forced to expand the temporary
groundings to all of the active Dreamliners on January 17, 2013 shortly after Boeing
halted all deliveries of Dreamliners until a solution had been found.
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Part Three: Final Solution and Consequences

Three months following the groundings on April 19, 2013 Boeing announced that
they had found a solution to the battery issue. What they actually meant was that
they found a work around to the problem but not necessarily a complete solution to
the root cause of the fires as they did not find what actually caused them. The FAA
shortly followed the announcement with the Dreamliners grounding to be ended
and all planes that had suffered damages were replaced with new systems and all
repairs were done quickly so passengers could once again board the aircraft (Drew,
2013). The most important thing to note again is that during just the three months it
took to find a solution Boeing most likely lost hundreds of millions of dollars with the
consumers looking for more reparations afterwards. Again it is clear that the
Dreamliner was a very important plane to the aerospace community with its vastly
improved fuel efficiency and its better sleeker design.
It took a while for any real review of the battery system and the crisis as a whole to
appear in public news but once it did it came at a high cost for the public image for
both the FAA and Boeing. Two years after the incidents the NTSB released a report
laden with criticisms of the FAA and Boeing together. It called out for more
reparations to be made and made it clear to the public that it was Boeings direct
fault for not installing and building their battery system properly and the FAAs for
not thoroughly inspecting each critical system as they should (Flight Global, 2014).
This assumption the NTSB has made calls into question again how quickly these
groups wanted the Dreamliner on the market ready to deliver to make money and
get the world on board with the new style of plane.

Conclusion
The best conclusion to draw from all of the data is one of not necessarily corporate
greed but rather a desire to allow a new plane on the market that the groups
involved thought would change the aerospace landscape significantly. The plane did
indeed change the landscape significantly in the both a way they wanted and one
they did not. From the research it is clear that the design, and manufacturing of the
Dreamliner battery system was rushed as was the inspection by the FAA. This
incident now brings even sharper eyes down on the safety of airplanes everywhere
as well as allowed a strong new plane into the marketplace. Next time it should be
clear that one should not be too quick to release a product until it is fit for consumer
use. In addition to this there is a clear need for a company as large as Boeing to
provide a status report on their progress throughout the solution process. This
would amplify the much needed reassurance that Boeing was making progress and
had consumer safety in the forefront of their minds.

REFERENCES
BBC News. (2013, January 9). Fresh Faults with Boeing Dreamliner Planes. Retrieved
from BBC News: http://www.bbc.com/news/business-20950287
Drew, C. (2013, April 19). Boeing Fix for Battery is Approved by F.A.A. Retrieved
from The New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/20/business/faaendorses-boeing-remedy-for-787-battery.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
Flight Global. (2014, December 1). NTSB 787 battery report details quality concerns
at GS Yuasa. Retrieved from Flight Gloabal:
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/ntsb-787-battery-report-detailsquality-concerns-at-gs-406632/
Topham, G. (2013, January 11). Boeing 787 Dreamliner to be investigated by US
authorities. Retrieved from The Guardian:
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/jan/11/boeing-787-dreamliner-usinvestigation