Imbong Vs Ochoa Digest
Imbong Vs Ochoa Digest
Imbong Vs Ochoa Digest
NO. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question
of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not
be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence.
However, they agreed that individual Members could express their
own views on this matter.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life
of the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a
measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this
otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually
prohibits abortion. By using the word or in defining abortifacient
(Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that
prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce
the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb. The RH Law
recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the
State has a bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when
they redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using the term
primarily. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that primarily
induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers
womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mothers womb (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would
pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or
destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This
violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same
The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With
RA 4729 in place, the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to
ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the
public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the
NO. The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without
being dictated upon the policies of any one religion. To allow
religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would
violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment
Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular
religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can
enhance its population control program through the RH Law even if
the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious
beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
The respondents also failed to show that these provisions are least
intrusive means to achieve a legitimate state objective. The
Legislature has already taken other secular steps to ensure that the
NO. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the
Constitution as the definitions of several terms as observed by the
petitioners are not vague.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their
number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and
marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and
desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe
the number of children a couple may have and does not impose
NO. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and
non-government health care service providers to render 48 hours of
pro bono RH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for
two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued
with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State
to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and nongovernment RH service providers to render pro bono service.
Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should
they do otherwise.
NO. The RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local
governments. Paragraph (c) of Section 17 provides a categorical
exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities,
programs and services. Unless a local government unit (LGU) is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no
power over a program for which funding has been provided by the
national government under the annual general appropriations act,
even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within
the jurisdiction of the LGU.
In addition, LGUs are merely encouraged to provide RH services.
Provision of these services are not mandatory. Therefore, the RH
Law does not amount to an undue encroachment by the national
government upon the autonomy enjoyed by LGUs.
Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 or the Organic Act of
the ARMM merely delineates the powers that may be exercised by
the regional government. These provisions cannot be seen as an
abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would
benefit the general welfare.