IMF Regional Economic Outlook Sub-Saharan Africa April 2016

World Economic and Financial Sur veys
Regional Economic Outlook
Sub-Saharan Africa
Time for a Policy Reset
APR
16

Sub-Saharan Africa, April 2016
World Economic and Financial Surveys
Sub-Saharan Africa
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
AP R
16
2016 International Monetary Fund
Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Regional economic outlook. Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, D.C.: International
Monetary Fund, 2003
v. ; cm. (World economic and financial surveys, 0258-7440)
Began in 2003.
Some issues have thematic titles.
1. Economic forecasting Africa, Sub-Saharan Periodicals. 2. Africa, Sub-Saharan

Economic conditions 1960 Periodicals. 3. Economic development Africa, Sub-Saharan
Periodicals. I. Title: Sub-Saharan Africa. II.International Monetary Fund. III. Series: World
economic and financial surveys.
HC800.A1 R445
ISBN: 978-1-49838-813-9 (paper)
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The Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa is published twice a year, in the
spring and fall, to review developments in sub-Saharan Africa. Both projections and
policy considerations are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the
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Contents
Abbreviations ...................................................................................................................................... vi
Acknowledgments ...................................................................................................................................vii
Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................. ix
1. Time for a Policy Reset.................................................................................................................... 1

Anatomy of a Slowdown..............................................................................................................3

Outlook and Risks......................................................................................................................11

Policies Generally Need to Adjust at a Faster Pace.......................................................................13
2. Weathering the Commodity Price Slump..................................................................................... 25
Commodity Terms-of-Trade Cycles in Sub-Saharan Africa.........................................................26

Commodity Price Swings and Macroeconomic Performance......................................................30

Policies to Enhance Resilience to Shocks.....................................................................................36
Conclusions................................................................................................................................40

Annex 2.1. Commodity Terms of Trade: Variable Construction and Methods ..........................45
3. Financial Development and Sustainable Growth.......................................................................... 51

How Has the Regions Financial Sector Developed in the Past Few Decades?.............................52

Financial Stability and Regulatory Reforms.................................................................................58

To What Extent Has Financial Development Boosted Growth and Lowered Its Volatility?........61

What Drives or Inhibits Financial Development in Sub-Saharan Africa?.....................................66

Policy Recommendations............................................................................................................68
Statistical Appendix............................................................................................................................... 79
References ...........................................................................................................................................113
Publications of the IMF African Department, 200916....................................................................117
Boxes
1.1.
Impact of the Drought in Southern and Eastern Africa...............................................................15
1.2.
Private Sector Credit Growth Developments in Sub-Saharan Africa............................................17
1.3.
Fiscal DominanceAn Illustrative Exercise................................................................................19
1.4.
Regional Spillovers Within Sub-Saharan Africa...........................................................................21
1.5.
The Threat of Terrorism..............................................................................................................23
2.1.
Commodity Terms of Trade.......................................................................................................41
2.2.
Commodity Price Slumps Hold Back Economic Activity: The Cases of Nigeria and

the Republic of Congo............................................................................................................42
3.1.
Gender Inequality in Financial Access and Macroeconomic Outcomes.......................................71
3.2.
Supporting Financial Development and Inclusion Through Mobile Payments
and Banking Services................................................................................................................74
3.3.
The Roles of Microfinance in Promoting Financial Inclusion......................................................76
3.4.
Measuring Financial Development and Inclusion........................................................................78
iii
REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Tables
1.1.
1.2.
2.1.
2.2.
3.1.
3.2.
3.3.
Sub-Saharan Africa: Real GDP Growth......................................................................................11

Sub-Saharan Africa: Other Macroeconomic Indicators................................................................12
Sub-Saharan Africa Commodity Exporters: Largest Commodity Terms-of-Trade Declines.........31
Impact of Commodity Shocks on Real GDP Growth: Regression Results...................................37
Sub-Saharan Africa: Financial Sector Supervisory Standards........................................................60
Sub-Saharan Africa: Estimation Results of Impact of Financial Development on Growth...........63
Sub-Saharan Africa: Estimation Results of Impact of Financial Development on Growth
Volatility..................................................................................................................................65
Sub-Saharan Africa: Drivers of Financial Development...............................................................67
Sub-Saharan Africa: Top Ranking of Coefficients between the Distance to the Benchmark
and Detailed Institutional Quality...........................................................................................69
3.4.
3.5.

Figures
Chapter 1
1.1.
Sub-Saharan Africa: Change in Real GDP Growth, Average 201014 to Average 201516.........2
1.2.
Episodes of Largest 18-Month Decline in Real Crude Oil Prices, 19702015..............................2
1.3.
Emerging Market Spreads: 201416............................................................................................3
1.4.
Sub-Saharan Africa: Trade Balance with China, 200515............................................................4
1.5.
Selected Average Commodity Price Changes from 2013..............................................................4
1.6.
Sub-Saharan Africa: Change in Current Account Balance and Nominal Exchange Rate,
201415..................................................................................................................................5
1.7.
Sub-Saharan Africa: End-of-Period Inflation, 2014 versus 2015...................................................5
1.8.
Sub-Saharan Africa: Change in Expenditure and Revenue, Average 201013 to 2015.................6
1.9.
Sub-Saharan Africa: Trends in Public Debt and Borrowing Costs................................................7
1.10. Sub-Saharan Africa: Current Account Balance and Change in Reserves, 2015.............................8
1.11. Sub-Saharan Africa: Change in Monetary Policy Rate since December 2014...............................8
1.12. Sub-Saharan Africa: Change in Base Money Growth, 201415...................................................8
1.13. Sub-Saharan Africa: Growth of Credit to the Private Sector.........................................................9
1.14. Sub-Saharan Africa: Nonperforming Loans, Average 201013 versus 2015.................................9
1.15. Sub-Saharan African Selected Countries: Advances from the Central Bank,
Average 201013 and 2015......................................................................................................10
1.16. CFA Franc Zone: Central Bank Financing versus Commercial Banks Exposure to Government,
Average 201013 to 2015........................................................................................................10
Chapter 2
2.1.
Selected Regions: Net Commodity Exports to GDP...................................................................27
2.2.
Sub-Saharan African Commodity-Exporting Countries by Decade.............................................27
2.3.
Sub-Saharan African Energy and Metal Exporters: Net Commodity Exports to GDP,
201014 Average.....................................................................................................................28
2.4.
World Commodity Prices, 19712015.......................................................................................28
2.5.
Sub-Saharan Africa and Comparator Countries: Commodity Terms of Trade ...........................29
iv
CONTENTS
2.6.
2.7.
2.8.
2.9.
2.10.
2.11.
2.12.
2.13.
2.14.
2.15.
Sub-Saharan African Extractive Commodity Exporters: Commodity Terms of Trade,

200015..................................................................................................................................29
Sub-Saharan Africa: Commodity Terms of Trade and GDP Growth, 200011..........................30
Selected Country Groupings: Real GDP Growth during Commodity Price Upswings
and Downswings......................................................................................................................32
Sub-Saharan African Energy Exporters: Key Macroeconomic Variables during Commodity
Price Upswings and Downswings.............................................................................................32
Sub-Saharan Africa: Exchange Rate Flexibility and Public Debt during Episodes of Low and
High Resilience of Output Growth..........................................................................................33
Sub-Saharan Africa: Inflation during Commodity Price Upswings and Downswings by Type
of Exchange Rate Regime.........................................................................................................33
Sub-Saharan Africa: Effects of Commodity Terms-of-Trade Shocks............................................35
Sub-Saharan Africa and Other Countries: Total International Reserves.......................................39
Sub-Saharan Africa and Other Countries: External Debt............................................................39
Sub-Saharan Africa and Other Countries: Inflation.....................................................................39
Chapter 3
3.1.
Sub-Saharan Africa: Standard Measures of Financial Depth........................................................53
3.2.
Sub-Saharan Africa: Sector Assets, 2012......................................................................................54
3.3.
Sub-Saharan Africa: Indicators of Financial Inclusion.................................................................55
3.4.
Sub-Saharan African Countries: Financial Inclusion...................................................................56
3.5.
Sub-Saharan Africa: Financial Development Index, 19802013..................................................57
3.6.
Sub-Saharan Africa: Dimensions of Financial Development........................................................58
3.7.
Systemic Banking Crises, 19762010..........................................................................................59
3.8.
Sub-Saharan Africa: Financial Soundness Indicators, 200614....................................................59
3.9.
Sub-Saharan Africa: Actual and Predicted Financial Development, 2013....................................62
3.10. Long-Term Impact on GDP of Relaxing Financial Constraints..................................................64
3.11. Sub-Saharan Africa: Impact of Financial Development on Growth Volatility..............................64
3.12. Sub-Saharan Africa: Financial Development and Institutional Quality in 2013..........................68
Abbreviations
ATMs
automated teller machines
BCEAO
Central Bank of West African States
BDEAC
La Banque de dveloppement des tats de lAfrique centrale
BLNS
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland
CEMAC
Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
CFA
currency zone of CEMAC and WAEMU
CPIA
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
CTOT
commodity terms-of-trade index
EMBIG
Emerging Markets Bond Index Global (JP Morgan)
FD financeable deficit
FDI
foreign direct investment
FEWS NET
Famine Early Warning Systems Network
GDP
gross domestic product
GMM
generalized method of moments
HIPC
heavily indebted poor countries
IPC
Integrated Food Security Phase Classificaion
LFP
labor force participation
LICs low-income countries
MFIs microfinance institutions
NPLs nonperforming loans
PABs pan-African banks
RBI
required fiscal improvement
REO
Regional Economic Outlook (IMF)
SACU
Southern African Customs Union
SSA sub-Saharan Africa
TFP
total factor productivity
USAID
United States Agency for International Development
VAR vector autoregression
VIX
Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index
WAEMU
West African Economic and Monetary Union
WEO
World Economic Outlook (IMF)
vi
Acknowledgments
This April 2016 issue of the Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa (REO) was prepared
by a team led by Cline Allard under the direction of Abebe Aemro Selassie.
The team included Francisco Arizala, Wenjie Chen, Larry Qiang Cui, Jesus Gonzalez-Garcia,
ClearyHaines, Dalia Hakura, Mumtaz Hussain, Ahmat Jidoud, Montfort Mlachila,
Bhaswar Mukhopadhyay, MoniqueNewiak, Marco Pani, Bozena Radzewicz-Bak, Misa Takebe,
Tim Willems, Yanmin Ye, MustafaYenice, and Jiayi Zhang.
Specific contributions were made by Aidar Abdychev, Corinne Delechat, Geremia Palomba,
and Fan Yang.
Natasha Minges was responsible for document production, with production assistance from
Charlotte Vazquez. The editing and production were overseen by Joanne Creary Johnson of
the Communications Department.
The following conventions are used in this publication:

In tables, a blank cell indicates not applicable, ellipsis points (. . .) indicate not available, and 0 or
0.0 indicates zero or negligible. Minor discrepancies between sums of constituent figures and totals
are due to rounding.
An en dash () between years or months (for example, 200910 or JanuaryJune) indicates the years
or months covered, including the beginning and ending years or months; a slash or virgule (/) between
years or months (for example, 2005/06) indicates a fiscal or financial year, as does the abbreviation FY
(for example, FY2006).
Billion means a thousand million; trillion means a thousand billion.
Basis points refer to hundredths of 1 percentage point (for example, 25 basis points are equivalent
to of 1 percentage point).
vii
Executive Summary
TIME FOR A POLICY RESET
Economic activity in sub-Saharan Africa has weakened markedly, but, as usual, with a large variation in
country circumstances. Growth for the region as a whole fell to 3 percent in 2015, the lowest level in
some 15 years, and is set to decelerate further this year to 3 percentwell below the 5 to 7 percent range
experienced over the past decade.
The sharp decline in commodity prices has put severe strains on many of the largest sub-Saharan African
economies. Oil exporters, which include Angola and Nigeria, continue to face difficult economic conditions (with growth for oil exporters as a whole forecast to slow further to 2 percent this year from
6percent in 2014), but so do non-energy-commodity exporters, such as Ghana, South Africa, and
Zambia. Meanwhile, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone are only gradually recovering from the Ebola
epidemic, and several southern and eastern African countries, including Ethiopia, Malawi, and
Zimbabwe, are suffering from a severe drought.
At the same time, many other countries continue to register robust growth. Most oil importers are
generally faring better, with growth in excess of 5 percent and even higher in countries such as
Cte dIvoire, Kenya, and Senegal. In most of these countries, growth is being supported by ongoing
infrastructure investment efforts and strong private consumption. The decline in oil prices has also helped
these countries, though the windfall has tended to be smaller than expected, as exposure to the decline in
other commodity prices and currency depreciations have partly offset the gains in many of them.
Although this overall markedly weaker picture begs the question as to whether the regions recent
growth momentum has stalled, our view is that medium-term growth prospects remain favorable.
Clearly, with the advent of a far less supportive external environment, the immediate outlook for many
sub-Saharan African countries remains difficult and clouded by downside risks. But beyond these current
challenges, the underlying drivers of growth that have been in play domestically in the region over the past
decade or somost importantly, the much improved business environmentgenerally continue to be in
place, and favorable demographics are poised to support these drivers over the coming decades.
However, to realize this potential, a substantial policy reset is critical in many cases.
To date, the policy response among most commodity exporters to the historically large terms-of-trade
shock has generally been behind the curve. A year and a half into the shock, and with fiscal and foreign
reserves running low and financing constrained, a robust and prompt policy response is needed urgently
to prevent a disorderly adjustment. For countries outside monetary unions, exchange rate flexibility,
coupled with supportive monetary and fiscal policies, should be the first line of defense. Because the
reduction in revenue from the extractive sector is expected to persist, many affected countries also
critically need to contain fiscal deficits and build a sustainable tax base from the rest of the economy.
With the external financing environment markedly tighter, fiscal policy will also need to be recalibrated
among the regions market access countries where fiscal and current account deficits have been elevated
over the last few years, lest they find themselves with low buffers and vulnerable to a financial crisis if
external conditions worsen further.
ix
WEATHERING THE COMMODITY PRICE SLUMP

The second chapter of this publication examines in more detail how the dependence on natural resources
has made nearly half of the countries in the region vulnerable to a decline in commodity prices. As a result,
though higher commodity prices have in part supported these countries strong growth of the past decade or
so, their exposure to commodity price fluctuations also has a strong macroeconomic impact in downturns, as
recent developments attest.
The most vulnerable countries by far are the regions oil exporters. For them, the commodity terms-of-trade
shock since mid-2014 has represented an income loss from oil price fluctuations of about 20 percent of
GDP. A shock of such a magnitude typically shaves annual growth by some 3 to 3percentage points for
several yearswhich is broadly consistent with the growth deceleration observed for oil exporters since 2014.
Comparatively, metal exporters have tended to be less affected, although there are important price thresholds,
beyond which mines close and jobs are lost, with a detrimental impact on activity.
Evidence from past downswings also highlights the critical role of exchange rate flexibility as a shock absorber
for countries that are not part of a currency union. Countercyclical policies too can be important to smooth
temporary shocks, and in the last few years, commodity exporters have indeed allowed fiscal deficits to widen
in response to declining revenues. However, with fiscal space rapidly diminishing among sub-Saharan African
commodity exporters, and commodity prices foreseen to remain low for long, adjustment is increasingly called
for. Better domestic revenue mobilization offers substantial potential to strengthen the fiscal balance, while
efforts to improve the prioritization, quality, and efficiency of public investment and to enhance the business
climate should be actively pursued, so as to further economic diversification and increase economic resilience.
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND SUSTAINABLE GROWTH

The third chapter documents the substantial progress made by the region in financial development,
including in financial services based on mobile telephone and through large home-grown pan-African banks.
Empirical evidence suggests that financial development has indeed supported growth and reduced its volatility
in the region, as it helped mobilize and allocate financial resources, and supported other economic policies in
enhancing growth and stabilizing the economy.
Even so, there is still considerable scope for further financial development, especially compared to other
regionsa gap that, if filled, could yield as much as 1 percentage points of additional growth on average
for countries in the region. With the exception of the regions middle-income countries, both financial market
depth and institutional development remain lower than in other developing regions.
The regions improving financial development has been largely driven by better macroeconomic fundamentals, but hindered by weak institutional quality, and policies should focus especially on improving legal
frameworks and corporate governance to further support financial development.
1. Time for a Policy Reset

Economic activity in sub-Saharan Africa in 2015
slumped to its lowest level in some 15 years.
Output expanded by 3.4 percent, just a little
above population growth, down from 5 percent
in 2014 and the still higher growth rates that were
customary in recent years. The main reason for the
slowdown is the sharp decline in commodity prices,
which has placed a number of the regions larger
countries under severe strain, with a pronounced
impact on the regionwide aggregate.
Much in the same vein, this year is set to be another
difficult one. We project growth to be still lower
at 3 percent as many countries grapple with the
more difficult external environment. Beyond that,
drought (particularly in eastern and southern
Africa) is set to be an added source of economic
difficulties for several countries.
There is, though, considerable heterogeneity in
growth performance over 201516, which is
evident from the three broad country groupings
(Figure 1.1):
In close to half of the 45 countries in the
region, growth has dropped from their
trajectory prior to the advent of the more
difficult external environment, in some cases
significantly so. This group includes the regions
oil exporters (Angola, most CEMAC countries,1
and Nigeria) and several non-energy-resource
exporters (such as Ghana, South Africa, and
Zambia). Also in this category are Liberia and
Sierra Leone, which had been severely impacted
by the recent Ebola epidemic and are now
suffering from lower commodity prices, as well
as several countries in southern and eastern
Africa that are suffering from the drought.
This chapter was prepared by a team led by
Bhaswar Mukhopadyay comprised of Francisco Arizala,
Cleary Haines, Monique Newiak, Marco Pani, and
Tim Willems.
1
The Economic and Monetary Community of Central African
States (CEMAC) includes Cameroon, the Central African
Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and
Gabon.
In one-third of countriesall oil-importers

and most with limited dependence on
commodity exports, growth looks set to
remain broadly unchanged relative to recent
years.2 Indeed, in many of these countries,
especially low-income countries, this represents
a continuation of the strong growth trend of
recent years, stimulated by strong domestic
investment and supported by lower oil prices.
In a few countries though, this represents a
persistence of lackluster growth.
In a third (much smaller) group of countries
growth prospects in 201516 have
strengthened, reflecting either (1) a rebound
from severe shocks or attenuation of conflict
(such as in the Central African Republic); or
(2) elevated public infrastructure investment,
a good agricultural season, and an improved
business environment (such as in Cte dIvoire
and Senegal); and (3) a positive impact from the
lower oil prices.
The overall weaker outturns beg the question as to
whether the regions recent growth momentum has
stalled with the advent of a more difficult external
environment. We remain optimistic about the
regions medium-term growth prospects. For one,
as noted above, even the current growth picture
is highly varied across countries. Second, and
perhaps more important, the underlying drivers of
growth over the medium term (including favorable
demographics) remain in place. What the current
slowdown shows instead is that the region is not
immune to the multiple transitions afoot in the
global economy. The high growth over the last
decade was made possible by economic reforms and
sound policies on the domestic front, coupled with
a highly favorable external environment, including
high commodity prices and ample inexpensive
This corresponds to growth remaining within a 1 percent

band of its pre-shock average over 201014.
2
Percentage points
Per
Figure 1.1. Sub-Saharan Africa: Change in Real GDP Growth, Average 201014 to Average 201516
15
Change in real GDP growth
10
Real GDP growth average 201516, percent
5
0
5
More
than 1 percentt ddecline
M th
li
10
18.5
SLE
GNQ
TCD
ZWE
LBR
BDI
BWA
GHA
NGA
ZMB
ETH
NER
LSO
GAB
AGO
MWI
BFA
COG
ZAF
COD
SYC
NAM
SWZ
MOZ
ERI
COM
GIN
RWA
KEN
UGA
MUS
STP
TGO
TZA
CPV
BEN
CMR
GMB
MDG
GNB
MLI
SSD
SEN
CIV
CAF
15
More than
1 percent
increase
11 percentt to
t +11 percentt
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.

Note: See page 82 for country abbreviations.
capital inflows.3 With the external environment

now much less supportive though, a policy reset is
needed to reinvigorate the growth momentum.
place on the revenue side where there is much

scope in many countries (see October 2015
Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan
Africa). However, expenditure measures will
also be necessary where adjustment needs are
urgent and benefits from revenue measures will
take time to materialize.
In the broadest of terms, the policy reset required is

as follows:
Of course, though high commodity prices benefited natural

resource exporters, they adversely impacted a majority of
countries in the region that do not rely much on minerals
exports.
3
In the regions market access countries,

adequate policy recalibration consistent with the
more difficult external financing environment
is also needed. Mainly playing off the favorable
external financing environment of recent years,
fiscal and external current account deficits have
been elevated in many of the regions frontier
markets as they have sought to address extensive
infrastructure gaps. However, the external
financing environment has now tightened
markedlythe increase in financing costs for
sub-Saharan African borrowers has been much
more pronounced than for most emerging
markets (Figure 1.3). Against this backdrop,
Figure 1.2. Episodes of Largest 18-Month Decline in Real Crude
Oil Prices, 19702015
0
10
20
Percent
For natural resource exporters, a robust and

prompt policy response is needed given the
prospect of an extended period of sharply
lower commodity prices. To date, the policy
responseparticularly among oil exportersto
a terms-of-trade decline of historic magnitude
(Figure 1.2) has to a large extent been hesitant
and insufficient. But with fiscal and foreign
exchange reserve buffers limited and financing
constrained, the required adjustment will
happen, one way or another: the options really
are between orderly and disorderly adjustment.
And by far the best way to lay the groundwork
for a quicker, durable, and inclusive economic
recovery lies in an orderly adjustment process.
Accordingly, for countries outside monetary
unions, exchange rate flexibility coupled with
supportive policies should be the first line of
defense. As revenue from the extractive sector
is expected to be durably reduced, countries
need to contain fiscal deficits, with the urgency
of adjustment depending on the extent of
macroeconomic and debt vulnerabilities, and
available external and fiscal buffers. Tothe
extent possible, this adjustment should take
30
40
50
60
70
2015
1986
1992
Source: IMF, Commodity Price System.
1998
1999
2009
1. TIME FOR A POLICY RESET
it is important that fiscal deficits are curtailed,

depending on country circumstances, through
better prioritization of spending initiatives and/
or stronger revenue mobilization. If deficits are
not curbed, these countries will be left without
buffers and, worse still, remain vulnerable to
a financing crisis (should external financing
conditions get even more difficult).
The rest of Chapter 1 outlines the strong external
headwinds the region is facing, highlights their
impact on growth performance across various
country groupings, and gives an overview of how
domestic policies have dealt with this unfavorable
environment. It presents the outlook and risks for
the region, and ends with policy recommendations.
Complementing the analysis, evidence from past
swings in commodity prices in sub-Saharan Africa
suggests that commodity price cycles have longlasting effects on key macroeconomic variables but
that stronger macroeconomic policies, in particular
exchange rate flexibility, substantially mitigate
the impact of commodity price shocks. Chapter 2
elaborates in detail on these findings.
Looking at more medium-term issues, Chapter3
finds that financial development in the region
has increased significantly over the past decades.
However, based on an analysis of sub-Saharan
Africas structural characteristics and a comparison
Figure 1.3. Emerging Market Spreads: 201416
1,000
Emerging markets
Sub-Saharan Africa frontier markets
900
Basis points
800
700
600
500
400
Jan-16
Mar-16
Nov-15
Sep-15
Jul-15
May-15
Jan-15
Mar-15
Nov-14
Sep-14
Jul-14
May-14
Jan-14
200
Mar-14
300
Source: Bloomberg, L.P.

Note: Data as of March 25, 2016.
1
The emerging market average includes the Emerging Market Bond
Index Global (EMBIG) spreads of Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile,
Colombia, Hungary, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Russia, South Africa, Turkey, and Ukraine.
The frontier markets spread includes the spreads of Cte dIvoire,
Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zambia.
with other developing regions, the chapter

highlights that there is scope for further financial
development in the region. Further development
of financial institutions and markets could, in
turn, boost the regions economic growth and
lower its volatility. The chapter identifies sound
macroeconomic fundamentals as a major driver of
financial development in the region, whereas weak
institutions have impeded development in the past.
ANATOMY OF A SLOWDOWN
A world of multiple shocks
Global growth was 3.1 percent in 2015 and is
expected to remain modest at 3.2 percent in 2016,
before picking up gradually to 3.6 percent in 2017.
Global growth remains broadly unchanged, but
its composition has become less favorable for subSaharan Africa. In particular, the rebalancing and
slowdown of the Chinese economy is a driving force
behind low commodity prices. Together with lower
oil pricesassociated also with increased global
supplyand tighter global financing conditions,
this is adversely affecting growth and posing
significant policy challenges for a number of subSaharan African countries (see April 2016 World
Economic Outlook).
China has become the regions major trade
partner and increasingly also a source of foreign
direct investment and other financial flows. The
region had a surplus in its trade balance with
China for nearly 15 years, which had improved
sharply since the global financial crisis.
However, as a result of the ongoing transition
in China, the trade balance has recently turned
into a deficit. This is predominantly the result
of collapsing exports from the region, primarily
on account of lower prices and demand for
commodities from China. But, as is evident
from Figure 1.4, the trade deficit of countries
in the region that are not oil and resource
exporters has also deteriorated recently. The
decline in the regions exports to China has
far outweighed the more moderate decline in
Chinas exports to the region. These trends
are likely to remain a drag on growth over the
medium term.
3
Figure 1.5. Selected Average Commodity Price Changes from 2013

40
In the 18-month period through end-2015,

crude oil prices declined more than in any other
18-month period since 1970 (see Figure 1.2).
Other commodity prices have also fallen sharply
since 2013, and are expected to remain even
below their 2015 levels in 2016, and subdued
in the medium term (Figure 1.5). For instance,
under current projections, by 2020, energy and
some metal prices are expected to recover to
just about half of their 2013 peak levels. The
shock is amplified by the fact that the share of
commodities in exports has increased over the
past 15 years for most commodity exporters
in the region (see Chapter 2). Furthermore,
the shock could also affect investment in
countries in which exploration of oil and other
commodities is planned.
Global financial conditions have tightened
substantially for most of the regions frontier
markets. This development reflects in part the
inception of a gradual tightening of monetary
policy in the United States and a broader
episode of financial volatility amid concerns
about growth prospects in emerging markets.
However, the regions frontier markets spreads
have widened significantly more than for
the global emerging market group, possibly
reflecting larger vulnerabilities in some of the
regions countries (see Figure 1.3).4 In parallel,
some forms of capital flows to the region,
For an analysis of the general drivers of spreads, see April
2015 Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa, and Box
1.4, including on evidence of spillovers from larger economies
of the region.
Cocoa
Tea
Coffee
2020 projections
Diamonds
Oct-14
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics.
2016 projections
60
80
Jun-15
Feb-14
Oct-12
Jun-13
Feb-12
Oct-10
Jun-11
Feb-10
Oct-08
Jun-09
Feb-08
Oct-06
Jun-05
Jun-07
S bS h
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Af i
Sub-Saharan Africa excluding oil and nonrenewable
resource exporters
2015
40
Iron ore
11
20
Gold
Cotton
Copper
20
Coal
Natural gas
Peercent change from 2013
Crude oil
Feb-06
Billions oof U.S. dollars, 6-month moving

average
Figure 1.4. Sub-Saharan Africa: Trade Balance with China, 200515
Sources: IMF, Commodity Price System; and IMF Global Assumptions.

Note: Besides oil, some of the main export commodities in the region
are copper (the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia), iron ore
(Liberia and Sierra Leone), coal (Mozambique and South Africa), gold
(Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, South Africa, and Tanzania), and platinum
(South Africa).
notably cross-border bank loans, on which a

broader group of countries than just the frontier
markets rely, declined significantly from its level
in 2014.
Large parts of southern and eastern Africa are
facing a severe drought, putting millions of people
in a situation of food insecurity and impacting
macroeconomic activity (Box 1.1). Growth is
expected to be significantly affected in a number
of countries (Ethiopia, Malawi, Zambia), and food
inflation is accelerating in many countries. Several
are also facing pressures on their budgetary and
external positions, with additional humanitarian
assistance needs.
A severe impact
The regions growth has already slowed markedly.
Growth in 2015 is estimated to have declined to
3.4 percent, from 5.1 percent in 2014.
Oil exporters have been hit very hard by the greater
than anticipated decline in oil prices.5 Their growth
rate in 2015 is estimated to have more than halved
to 2.6 percent compared with 5.9percent the year
before, and fiscal and current account balances have
deteriorated sharply.
See Table 1.1 for a list of countries classified as oil exporters

and nonrenewable resource exporters. Any country that is not
an oil exporter is considered an oil importer.
5
MWI
SWZ
ZAF
MOZ
AGO
TZA LSO
BWA NGA
GHA
GAB CAF COG
BFA SLE
STP
ETH
CIV
BDI
SSD
LBR
COD ZWE
SYC
GMB
20
15
10
10
15
MWI
25
ZMB
20
20
Change in current account balance, percentage points of GDP

Meanwhile, gains for oil importers have been

smaller than expected. Typically, the decline in oil
prices should have translated into an increase in real
disposable incomes and higher aggregate demand.
However, abstracting from country-specific factors,
two developments appear to have impeded the full
realization of such benefits:
The decline in commodity prices has adversely
impacted the exports of sub-Saharan
Africas 15 major exporters of non-oil,
nonrenewable resources in 2015. Insome cases,
this has more than offset the improvement in
the oil trade balance, widening current account
deficits.
Many currencies in the region have depreciated
significantly against a strong U.S. dollar
(Figure 1.6), limiting the decline of oil prices
in domestic currency terms and accelerating
inflation (Figure 1.7). Inaddition, in some
countries, administered energy prices have not
been adjusted to transmit the full decline of
lower fuel prices to final consumers.6
Nonetheless, growth remained strong in many oilimporting countries, with the regions non-fragile
low-income countries in particular experiencing
growth of 7.2 percent, aided in many instances by
large ongoing infrastructure spending (for example,
in some countries of the West African Economic
and Monetary UnionWAEMU).
Box 1.2 in the April 2015 Regional Economic Outlook: SubSaharan Africa, notes that only 35 percent of countries in the
region allow automatic adjustment of fuel prices, with the
others setting them administratively.
6
30
2015, percent
ZMB
Figure 1.7. Sub-Saharan Africa: End-of-Period Inflation, 2014

versus 2015
Depreciation
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
10
20
Appreciation
Change in nominaal exchange rate local

currency per U
U.S. dollar, percent
Figure 1.6. Sub-Saharan Africa: Change in Current Account Balance

and Nominal Exchange Rate, 201415
10
MOZ
BDI
LSO
COM
BEN
CMR
GHA
AGO
15
ZWE
5
ETH
NGA
SLE
ERI
CAF
GNQ
TCD
5
10
2014, percent
15
20
25
30

Fiscal policy has responded, but as yet not

sufficiently
In most resource-rich countries, revenue shortfalls
have been significant, and fiscal balances
have deteriorated despite some adjustment in
expenditures.
Oil exporters, which are more heavily
dependent on resource revenues than other
commodity exporters, have in nearly all cases
seen a substantial reduction in commodity
(and total) revenues compared to 201013
levels, that is, before oil prices slumped
(Figure1.8). At the same time, spending
has risen substantially in Cameroon and the
Republic of Congo, while other countries have
enacted spending cuts varying from substantial
(Angola, Chad) to modest (Nigeria). With
fiscal adjustment or financing lagging, delays in
domestic payments have increased in a number
of countries (for example, Angola, Chad,
Nigeria).
Some non-energy-resource exporters have
also seen a sharp drop in revenue collection
(Central African Republic, Liberia, Sierra
Leone, and Zambia) which have not been fully
compensated by governments fiscal responses.
Indeed, in some instances expenditures have
even increased. This has been the case in
Zambia, where the decline in copper prices and
5
Figure 1.8. Sub-Saharan Africa: Change in Expenditure and Revenue,

Average 201013 to 2015
22
Expenditure increase
> revenue increase
Change in government expenditure,

percentage points of GDP
18
14
10
6
2
2
6
10
14
COG
BEN
Revenue shortfall >

expenditure adjustment
GAB
B
BDI
AGO
LBR
GNB
NER
TCD
TC
CD
SWZ
SW
MWI
M
W
SYC
LSO
GHA
CPV
STP
Non-resourceintensive countries
18
22
Resource-intensive
countries
22 18 14 10 6 2 2
6 10
Change in government revenue,
percentage points of GDP
14
18
22

electricity shortages have produced an especially

acute shock on economic activity, as well as in
Niger, where the public investment program
has been scaled up. By contrast, Ghanas fiscal
position improved in 2015, but the high level
of its deficit and debt still puts a high premium
on further fiscal consolidation.
In a number of other countries, fiscal policy was
not suitably consolidated. For instance, in Kenya,
fiscal consolidation could help reduce the burden
on monetary policy and support the adjustment to
an external environment of lower financial inflows.
Cte dIvoire, which is investing heavily, could also
take advantage of its presently strong growth to start
consolidating its fiscal position.
... triggering increased debt financing under

difficult market conditions.
In the context of weak growth and elevated deficits,
the regions debt level is on the rise (Figure 1.9,
panel 1). Even before 2014, debt was already rising
notwithstanding relatively strong growth rates.
Between 2014 and 2015, with weaker growth,
larger fiscal deficits and exchange rate depreciations,
public debt increased even more markedly
(the median public-debt-to-GDP ratio rose by
5percentage points to about 43 percent).
6
In most oil-exporting and other resourceintensive countries, the decline in commodity

revenue and resulting fiscal expansion have
driven the debt dynamics as fiscal gaps have
been increasingly filled with debt creating flows
(Figure 1.9, panel 2). Oil exporters, such as
Angola, Cameroon, the Republic of Congo,
and Gabon, experienced particularly large
increases (17 to 33 percentage points between
the 201013 average and 2015) to levels up to
65 percent of GDP. The rise in debt in other
resource-intensive countries was smaller, with
some exceptions (Ghana, Zambia). In some
countries, a depreciating exchange rate has
also contributed to rising debt levels
(Angola, Tanzania).
With a few exceptions (Cabo Verde, The
Gambia, Mozambique, and Seychelles),
increases were much smaller in most nonresource-intensive countries. The sources of
debt increases vary, but public infrastructure
investments appear to be a common
denominator (Cabo Verde, Mozambique,
SoTom and Prncipe), while poor growth
and a depreciating exchange rate (Cabo Verde),
unsustainable policies (The Gambia) or weak
fiscal revenue (Lesotho) also played a role.
Both external and domestic debt contributed
to the increase in public debt, and debt
sustainability assessments have deteriorated
in a number of countries (Figure 1.9, panels
3 and 4). In addition, the rise in domestic
debt has increased the exposure of commercial
banks to the government, especially among
oil exporters and other resource-intensive
countries, including notably in Angola and
Gabon. Conversely, Ghana and Zambia have
raised substantial funds from recent Eurobond
issuances.
Furthermore, borrowing costs have generally
increased (Figure 1.9, panels 5 and 6). The cost
of external debt has increased sharply since the
end of 2014, triggered by the continued decline
in commodity prices, oil price volatility, and
heightened risk aversion by foreign investors. Yields
on Eurobonds are now at or close to double-digit
levels in a number of the regions frontier markets,
Median, percentage points
Figure 1.9. Sub-Saharan Africa: Trends in Public Debt and Borrowing Costs
1. Sources of Public Debt Increases 2013151
18
Primary deficit
14
Exchange rate depreciation
Real GDP growth contribution

Change in debt
10
6
2
2
6
120
Oil exporters
Other resource-intensive countries
Other oil importers
Sub-Saharan Africa
2. Total Public Debt, 201015
80
60
40
20
0
Oil exporters
Non-resource-intensive countries
Domestic debt
External debt
20.4
17.5
11.5
15.4
Avg.
201013
2015
Sub-Saharan
Africa
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
4
6
8
20.9
29.4
25.6
9.9
17.7
12.1
5.7
8.6
12.4
15.9
Avg.
201013
2015
Avg.
201013
2015
Oil exporters
28.5
22.4
Number of countries
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Avg.
201013
2015
UGA
ZAF RWA
LSO
NAM
MOZ
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
Fiscal balance 2013, percent of GDP
SYC
AGO
20
12
13
Low
2010
13
Moderate
2013
2015
High
Distress
6. Fiscal Stance and Increase in Sovereign Bond Spreads

(Size of bubble proportional to change in EMBIG spread, basis point
change since December 2014)5
SWZ
-14
14
10
16
Other resource- Other oil importers

intensive countries
GHA
ZMB
KEN
20
5. Fiscal Stance and Increase in Treasury Bill Rates

(Size of bubbles proportional to increase in treasury bill rate,
January 2014 to latest available)4
CPV
GMB
4. Status of Risk of Debt Distress for Low-Income

Countries, 2010153
36
2
2
32
5
6
5
28
6
24
Change in fiscal balance 2014 to

2015, percentage points of GDP
Percent of GDP
3. Public Sector Debt Decomposition, Average 201013 and 2015
Change in fiscal balance 2013 to

2015, percentage points of GDP
2015
Average 201013
100
COG
AGO
SSD
GAB
TCD
CMR
GNQ
NGA
GHA
CAF
ZWE
ZMB
ZAF
GIN
SLE
NER
MLI
TZA
BFA
NAM
COD
BWA
CPV
GMB
STP
MOZ
SYC
TGO
LSO
MUS
GNB
SEN
KEN
ETH
LBR
BDI
BEN
MDG
UGA
CIV
RWA
COM
SWZ
Percent of GDP
Real interest rate contribution

Other
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
4
6
8
Sub-Saharan Africa
Other emerging market and
developing countries
KEN
ZMB
GHA
SENZAF
TZA
CIV
NGA
GAB
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
Fiscal balance 2015, percent of GDP
-2
Sources: Bloomberg, L.P.; Country authorities; IMF Debt Sustainability Analysis database; IMF, International Financial Statistics; IMF, World Economic
Outlook database; and IMF staff calculations.
1
Lesotho and South Sudan have been excluded due to data availability. The Other category comprises debt relief (Heavily Indebted Poor Country
and other), privatization proceeds, recognition of implicit or contingent liabilities, other country-specific factors (such as bank recapitalization), asset
valuation changes, and other unidentified debt-creating flows as defined in the IMF-World Bank Debt Sustainability Framework.
2
For South Sudan data are average 201213 compared with 2015.
3
Excludes Angola and Nigeria as they are no longer classified as a low-income countries. Debt risk ratings for Cabo Verde begin in 2014 and for
South Sudan in 2015.
4
Data as of March 25, 2016.
5
Data as of March 25, 2016. EMBIG = JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index Global.
Exchange rate and monetary policy measures

have been attempted to mitigate the shock
The severe external shock has triggered exchange
rate pressures to which monetary policy responses
have varied.
In some cases, terms-of-trade shocks have been
exacerbated by reduced net inflows of capital
from official and private sources triggered, for
instance, by policy uncertainty (South Africa,
Zambia), or delayed monetary tightening
(Mozambique).
In general, countries have allowed their
currencies to adjust, but many have tried
to smooth the exchange rate depreciation
by dipping into already scarce international
reserves (Figure 1.10). In the CEMAC, which

maintains a fixed peg to the euro, the decline
in international reserves has been substantial,
despite the depreciation of the euro against the
U.S. dollar.
In addition, the pass-through of nominal
exchange rate depreciation and the impact
of the drought on food supply (for example,
Lesotho, South Africa, Zambia; Box 1.1)
have pushed up inflation in some countries.
To mitigate these pressures, many monetary
authorities have lowered the growth in
monetary aggregates (Madagascar did not),
or raised their policy rates. Nigeria initially
lowered its policy rate but partially reversed this
stance in late March (Figures 1.11 and 1.12).
Figure 1.11. Sub-Saharan Africa: Change in Monetary Policy Rate
since December 2014
700
600
500
Basis points
compared to about a 4 percent to 8 percent range

at the end of 2013. Treasury bill rates have also
increased beyond the increase in inflation, mostly
in countries with large or expanding fiscal deficits,
and some countries have not been able to mobilize
needed financing as treasury bill auctions have
on occasion been undersubscribed (The Gambia,
Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia). Looking ahead,
with the external environment projected to remain
unfavorable, mobilizing sufficient financing may
become even more challenging.
400
300
200
100
0
WAEMU
SYC
NAM
SENCMR
ETHSTP AGO
SLE
ZMB
GHA MUS
MDG
TZA
ZWE
ZAFMLI
SSDBEN
KEN
CODCOM
TGO
CIV SWZ
MWI
RWA
UGA
GAB
NER GMB
NGA
CEMAC
ERI
CAF CPV
BFA
BDI TCD

Note: International reserves are pooled within the WAEMU and within
the CEMAC and thus regional reserves are available to all member
countries of the respective currency union. However, this chart depicts
changes in international reserves for individual WAEMU and CEMAC
member countries as this information helps assess individual countries
balance of payments pressures. CEMAC = Economic Community
of Central African States; WAEMU = West African Economic and
Monetary Union. See page 82 for country abbreviations.
Nigeria
Mauritius
South Africa
Angola
Kenya
10
15
20
25
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.
Madagascar
10
Rwanda
15
10
5
0
5
Current account balance 2015, percent of GDP
Congo, Dem. Rep.
20
0
5
Tanzania
GNQ
COG (-14.2, -6.8)
BWA
Mozambique
Sierra Leone
10
Ethiopia
15
Seychelles
The Gambia
Figure 1.12. Sub-Saharan Africa: Change in Base Money Growth,

201415
LSO
Burundi
Source: Haver Analytics.
GNB
Malawi
CEMAC countries
WAEMU countries
Others
Percentage points
Change
ge in reserves in months of
i
imports,
201415
Zambia
Figure 1.10. Sub-Saharan Africa: Current Account Balance and

Change in Reserves, 2015
Ghana
200
Uganda
100
However, in some cases, central banks have

sought to preserve their external buffers by
introducing formal or informal administrative
restrictions on the foreign exchange market
(Angola, Nigeria). Such measures have led to
the emergence and widening of exchange rate
spreads with the parallel market. They have
also triggered pressures on commercial banks
net foreign asset positions, as some commercial
banks are trying to match the demand for
foreign exchange by using their foreign assets,
or by increasing liabilities with counterparties
abroad. Widening parallel market spreads and
pressure on international reserves suggest that
further depreciation may be needed.
Tighter monetary stances, together with greater
recourse to domestic financing by the public
sector, may have amplified the shocks effect on
private sector borrowing activity. Larger fiscal
deficits and tighter monetary policies are increasing
borrowing costs for the private sector. In addition,
administrative measures on foreign exchange
which, as noted above, widened parallel market rate
spreads and limited imports of key inputs (Angola,
Nigeria), have distorted private sector activity. As
a result, most countries are experiencing a decline
in the growth of credit to the private sector, or
even a contraction (Figure 1.13). This slowdown
Figure 1.13. Sub-Saharan Africa: Growth of Credit to the Private
Sector
50
Furthermore, there is a risk that balancing fiscal

and monetary objectives will become increasingly
challenging. An analysis conducted on countries
Figure 1.14. Sub-Saharan Africa: Nonperforming Loans, Average
201013 versus 2015
SSD
30
CIVZMB
B
MWI
TZA
MOZ
M
OZ
COM
UGAMLI
LI
KEN
K
E
N
COD
C
OD
O
D
TGO N
NAM
A
MD
MDG
M
NER
RMR
CMR
C
COG
BFA
B
F
BWA
B
W
A
MUS ZAF
AF SO A SYC
SEN
EN LLSO
BDI
B
DI
D
IW Z
SWZ
S
NGA
GNB
SLE
S
LE
E
GNQ
G
NQ
CPV
C
PV
P
V BE
BEN
B
EN
CAF
C
AF
20
10
0
10
GMB
G
MB
20
GAB
GA
AB
SLE
STP
25
39.6)
STP BEN (17.0,SLE
Deteriorating
GMB
CPV
BEN (17.0, 39.6)
Deteriorating
GMB
CPV
20
LBR
GNQ
SEN NER
20
LBR
GNQ
SEN NER
Latest available, percent of total loans

Latesst available, percent of total loans
Latest year-over-year, percent
Relatedly, indicators of financial soundness have

deteriorated. Significant increases in nonperforming
loans have been observed in some oil exporters
(Angola, Equatorial Guinea) and small and
fragile states (Cabo Verde, The Gambia, Malawi,
SoTom and Prncipe, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe
Figure 1.14), giving rise to recapitalization needs
(Angola, The Gambia). In almost half of the
regions resource-intensive countries, capital
adequacy ratios have worsened. Likewise, banking
sector profitability has declined in two-thirds of
the countries for which data are available, most
notably in oil exporters (Chad, Republic of Congo),
but also in some non-resource-intensive middleincome countries (Lesotho, Mauritius, Senegal),
and fragile states (Burundi, Liberia). Given the
shocks the region is experiencing, macroeconomic
conditions and the accompanying deterioration
of these indicators could worsen further (Box 1.2;
see Chapter 3 for longer-term trends in financial
development and stability).
25
40
20
also comes in a broader context of slower financial

deepening in some cases and a correction of possibly
excessive credit growth in others (Box 1.2).
Slowing
down
TCD
Contracting
10
0
10
20
30
40
December 2013 to December 2014, percent
ZWE
ZWE
MWI
TCD
AGOAGO MWIBDI TCD
BDI
MDG
MDG GHA
GHA
10 10
CMR
CMR
SYCSYC
ZMB
TZATZA ZMB
GIN
RWA
RWA
GIN
US
MUS
KEN
MUS
KEN SWA
Improving
GNB
SWA GNB
NGA
NGA
5 5LSOLSO UGA
Improving
UGA
MOZMOZ BWABWA
ZAF
COG
ZAF
GAB
COG GAB
NAM
0 NAM
0
0
5
10
15
20
25
0
5
10
15
20
25
Average
201013,
percent
of total
loans
Average
201013,
percent
of total
loans
15
GHA
50
15
Energy exporters
Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff estimates.

14
12
Average 201013
2015
10
8
6
4
CEMAC
EAC
GMB
GHA
SLE
MDG
NGA
ZMB
GIN
MWI
ETH
RWA
KEN
TZA
CMR
GAB
TCD
GNQ
CAF
2
COG
End-oof-period stock, percent of GDP
Figure 1.15. Sub-Saharan African Selected Countries: Advances from the Central Bank, Average 201013 and 2015
Other

Note: Data for 2015 are latest available month. CEMAC = Economic Community of Central African States; EAC = East African Community.
See page 82 for country abbreviations.
Indeed, most recent data highlight that direct

financing from the central bank has increased
in many countries (Figure1.15). In the CEMAC,
limits for statutory advances to the government
were increased in August 2015 (from 20 percent of
fiscal receipts in 2008 to 20percent of fiscal receipts
in 2014, representing increases in individual
country limits of up to 1 percent of 2015 GDP).
Nonetheless, most of the unions countries have
already reached their new limits for direct central
bank financing (in the case of Chad even with an
exceptional increase in the limit). Direct financing
by the central bank to the government has also
increased in other countries compared to 2014,
such as Tanzania (within existing legal limits),
Guinea and Sierra Leone (largely due to the Ebola
outbreak), and Ethiopia. In The Gambia, overdue
advances have been securitized into long-term loans
but remain on the central banks balance sheet.
In most cases, direct financing has taken place at
below-market rates (for example, Ethiopia, The
Gambia, Zambia). Bucking that trend, Ghana
eliminated large previous balances in 2015 as part
of the governments adjustment program.
10
In some other cases, the provision of financing

by the central bank to the banking system
has facilitated the placement of new domestic
government debt (Figure 1.16). In the WAEMU
in particular, the positive spread between the
Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO)
key refinancing rate and rates on treasury bills and
bonds has increased banks incentives to borrow
from the central bank to invest in public debt,
increasing maturity mismatches on banks balance
sheets (IMF 2015f). Meanwhile, the CEMACs
regional central bank injected $660 million into
the regional development bank, the Central African
State Development Bank (BDEAC), in January
to support its role in financing regional public
and private investment projects, blurring the line
between the traditional role of a central bank and
development financing.
Figure 1.16. CFA Franc Zone: Central Bank Financing versus
Commercial Banks Exposure to Government, Average 201013
to 2015
Commercial banks' claims
on the government, percent of assets
with an inflation objective suggests that the

size of the fiscal deficit in some of them may
not be consistent with their inflation targets
and some stylized notions of sustainable debt
(Box 1.3). This illustrative exercise highlights that
fiscal vulnerabilities must be addressed, if these
countries are to avert further tensions between
fiscal and monetary policies, including the risk
of resorting to monetary financing at the cost of
higher inflation.
20
CEMAC countries
GAB
18
CIV
WAEMU countries
16
14
TGO MLI
CAR
12
SEN
BEN
10
TCD
NER
CMR
8
6
BFA
4
COG
2
GNQ
0
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Commercial banks' liability to central bank, percent of assets

Note: Arrows point from average 201013 to 2015. CEMAC = Economic
Community of Central African States; WAEMU = West African Economic
and Monetary Union. See page 82 for country abbreviations.
OUTLOOK AND RISKS
In the Republic of Congo though, growth

is expected to pick up owing to the planned
increase in oil production.
A subdued macroeconomic outlook

In light of the environment sketched in the previous
section, sub-Saharan Africa is set to continue on a
trajectory of subpar growth in 2016 (Tables 1.1 and
1.2). As the severe external shocks persist, average
growth for the region in 2016 is expected to reach
just 3 percent, revised downward by 1 percentage
points since the October 2015 Regional Economic
Outlook, and the lowest rate since 1999. However,
the observed heterogeneity in growth for countries
across the region is expected to persist in 2016.
In2017, helped by a small rebound in commodity
prices and timely policy implementation,
particularly in those countries that are most affected
by the shock, growth is expected to recover to
4percent.
The outlook in 2016 remains grim for oil exporters
and a number of other commodity exporters.
Growth in oil-exporting countries is expected to
decline to 2.2 percent. In particular, growth is
forecast to slow further in Angola, given, among
other factors, limited foreign exchange supply
and lower levels of public spending, and in
Nigeria as the adverse impact of lower oil prices
is compounded by disruptions to private sector
activity through exchange rate restrictions.
In a number of large non-oil commodity

exporters, growth is also expected to remain
depressed. Indeed, activity is expected to
further slow in Zambia because of depressed
copper prices, electricity shortages, and weak
domestic demand, and to halve to just 0.6
percent in South Africa on the back of low
investor confidence, tighter policies, the decline
in commodity prices, and the incidence of
drought. In Ghana, non-oil growth is expected
to be stable, albeit at a low level, while total
GDP growth is expected to pick up slightly on
account of increased oil production.
Growth in the countries affected by the Ebola
epidemic is expected to remain low in 2016.
As the epidemic abates, however, growth in
Guinea and Liberia is expected to pick up (by
more than 3 percentage points in each case, to
4.1 percent and 2.5 percent, respectively), and
to reach 5.3 percent in Sierra Leone, after a
double-digit contraction in 2015.
In most other countries, growth is projected to
remain relatively robust. Stimulated by strong
domestic investment and lower oil prices, growth
in oil-importing countries (excluding South Africa)
Table 1.1. Sub-Saharan Africa: Real GDP Growth

(Percent change)
Sub-Saharan Africa
Of which:
Oil-exporting countries
Of which: Nigeria
Middle-income countries
Of which: South Africa
Low-income countries1
Fragile states
Memorandum:
World economic growth
Sub-Saharan Africa resource-intensive countries2
Sub-Saharan Africa frontier and emerging market economies3
200408
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
6.8
4.0
6.6
5.0
4.3
5.2
5.1
3.4
3.0
4.0
9.2
8.6
6.9
4.88
7.7
3.5
7.0
9.0
3.8
1.55
6.3
3.3
8.5
10.0
6.5
3.0
30
7.6
5.6
4.6
4.9
4.5
3.2
3
7.6
3.1
3.8
4.3
4.2
2.2
6.2
3.4
5.7
5.4
4.6
2.2
7.0
7.2
5.9
6.3
4.6
1.55
7.2
6.1
2.6
2.7
2.6
1.33
7.2
3.9
2.2
2.3
2.5
0.6
06
5.6
4.2
3.4
3.5
3.4
1.2
6.5
5.2
4.9
7.0
7.1
0.0
3.9
4.4
5.4
6.7
6.8
4.2
4.9
5.0
3.5
3.9
4.5
3.3
5.0
5.1
3.4
4.7
5.0
3.1
2.6
3.5
3.2
2.4
3.0
3.5
3.4
3.9

1
Excluding fragile states.
2
Includes oil exporters: Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, South Sudan; and nonrenewable resource
exporters: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Namibia, Niger, Sierra
Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
3
Includes Angola, Cameroon, Cte dIvoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda,
and Zambia.
11
Table1.2.
1.2.
Sub-Saharan
Africa:
Macroeconomic
Indicators
Table
Sub-Saharan
Africa:
OtherOther
Macroeconomic
Indicators
200408
2009
2010
2011
2012
(Percent change)
8.2
9.5
9.3
(Percent of GDP)
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
6.6
6.4
7.0
9.0
8.3
8.8
9.8
Fiscal balance
Of which: Excluding oil exporters
1.7
0.66
0
4.6
4 1
4.1
3.4
4 3
4.3
3.1
4 0
4.0
3.6
4 1
4.1
4.1
4 1
4.1
4.6
3 9
3.9
4.1
3 5
3.5
Current account balance

Of which: Excluding oil exporters
2.1
4.3
2.8
4.8
4.1
7.3
5.9
7.6
6.2
7.6
5.5
7.8
5.1
5.2
0.8 0.6 1.8 2.4

3.9 4.8 7.1 7.6
(Months of imports)
4.2
4.6
5.3
5.0
5.6
5.1
4.2
3.9
Inflation, average
Reserves coverage
1.2
3 7
3.7
1.8
3 7
3.7
is projected to be 5.2 percent in 2016 (5.4 percent

in 2015). More specifically, growth in Kenya is
projected to rise to 6percent, aided by investment
in the transport sector, a pickup in electricity
production, and a recovery in tourism. Similarly,
Senegals strong growth is expected to remain
broadly unchanged at 6.6 percent, supported by
improving agricultural productivity and a dynamic
private sector. In the same vein, high cocoa prices
and good agricultural production, as well as an
anticipated boost in investment following the recent
presidential election, are expected to fuel strong
growth in Cte dIvoire, projected at 8.5 percent.
The regional drought threatens to exact a heavy toll
on eastern and southern Africa (Box 1.1). Growth
in Ethiopia and Malawi is expected to be affected
especially severely. In addition, food inflation is on
the rise, and the need to import food and electricity
is expected to result in a deterioration of the current
account, especially in Zambia. The impact of
the drought varies across countries, but its severe
human costs associated with food insecurity are also
likely to increase substantially relative to 2015, with
4050 million people likely to be food insecure
by end-2016. Furthermore, with dry conditions
expected to persist in 201617, the share of the
population vulnerable to the drought could double
from its current level.
... with significant downside risks

On the external front, uncertainty remains,
particularly concerning the path and implications of
the Chinese rebalancing, U.S. monetary tightening,
growth in advanced markets, and their mutual
interactions.
12
Additional difficulties in Europe owing to financial

or geopolitical developments could further weaken
the external demand for African exports and the
supply of capital and development aid.
The heightened volatility in global financial markets
in the first weeks of 2016 underscores the severity of
these concerns because it has significantly affected
the regions frontier economies spreads (Box 1.4.).
Inaddition, energy and other commodity prices
could also remain volatile. Commodity prices
increased toward the end of the first quarter; such
increases could be temporary if Chinas demand
for commodities does not increase, and global oil
supply continues to surprise on the upside.
On the domestic and regional side, the key risk
is that necessary policy adjustments are not
implemented in a timely manner, creating the risk
of financing difficulties and an even more abrupt
adjustment. This risk could be accentuated where
policy uncertainties are intensifying (such as in
countries that have key elections scheduled in
2016). A more prolonged or expanded incidence
of the drought in eastern and southern Africa
would dampen growth in agriculture and expose
significant shares of the population to food
insecurity, triggering displacement and migration.
In addition, the threat of terrorism is mounting in
Central Africa and the Sahel Belt, as exemplified
by recent attacks in Burkina Faso, Cte dIvoire,
and Mali (Box 1.5). Finally, spillovers from
economically hit countries to other countries in
the region through trade, and to the financial
system through cross-border operations, are also
a possible risk.
POLICIES GENERALLY NEED TO ADJUST

AT A FASTER PACE
The previous sections highlight a number of
worrying trends.
Rising fiscal deficits and more costly external
and domestic financing conditions are
increasing macroeconomic vulnerabilities
and, in some cases, impeding central banks
pursuit of their primary objectives, such as price
stability.
These conditions are adding to exchange
rate pressures, and many central banks have
responded by raising interest rates. This, in
combination with large government borrowing,
has increased private sector borrowing costs
thereby undermining growth.
Countries, having already entered this episode
of pressures with lower buffers than at the
onset of the global financial crisis (see October
2015 Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan
Africa), have drawn substantially on their
available buffers to mitigate the shock, severely
limiting room for additional countercyclical
policy.
Sovereign risks associated with large commercial
bank exposures to government debt and related
governments rollover risks have increased in
some cases, posing risks to financial stability.
In view of these trends, governments should
consider a set of policy options tailoring the
urgency of adjustment to the extent of domestic
vulnerabilities. Commodity prices have fallen
sharply and, for energy prices, at an unprecedented
pace. Oil and other commodity exporters are
adjusting, but given the extent of the shock they are
facing, policies are currently behind the curve.
Because the shock is likely to persist, and buffers
have been depleted, adjustment is unavoidable.
For countries that are not members of a
currency union, exchange rates should adjust as
needed to absorb the shock. Interventions by
the central bank should be limited to mitigation
of disorderly market movements, and more
generally, administrative measures on foreign

exchange should be avoided. Central banks may
need to tighten their monetary policy stance
when inflationary pressures are persisting as
a result of exchange rate depreciation, when
drought-related spikes in food-price inflation
are having second-round inflationary effects,
or if warranted on macroprudential grounds.
Such policies are likely to be needed to preserve
macroeconomic stability, notwithstanding
the adverse effect of tighter monetary policies
on private sector activity through higher
borrowingcosts.
Fiscal adjustment is urgently needed to
safeguard macroeconomic stability, especially
in the regions oil-exporting countries. In the
CEMAC, the exchange rate tool is not available,
and governments are reaching the limit on
direct financial support by the central bank. For
these countries, although it is appropriate to
use international reserves to smooth the shock,
the magnitude of the shock and the expectation
that the reduction in resource income will
persist, renders significant fiscal consolidation
unavoidable (IMF 2015b), even at the cost
of short-term output losses. More generally,
the speed of fiscal consolidation across the
region should be guided by countries available
buffers, domestic vulnerabilities, and financing
constraints. In their consolidation efforts,
countries should aim at mobilizing revenues and
preserving priority expenditures, such as social
expenditures, also with a view to not setting
back their longer-term developmentgoals.
Several countries that are not significant
nonrenewable commodity exporters are more
favorably placed to weather the shocks and
have so far coped reasonably well. In some
of these countries, however, efforts to meet
urgent spending needs, in particular to close
infrastructure gaps, have led to widening deficits
and increasing debt levels. These countries
should use their current strength to build
buffers and reduce their vulnerability to a
sudden worsening of the economic climate.
13
Central banks should limit the use of advances

to the government to the mitigation of shortterm financing constraints and avoid easing
commercial banks liquidity constraints with a
view to facilitating lending to the government.
Moreover, central banks should abstain in
general from providing structural development
financing.
14
Governments must remain vigilant to any signs

of increasing financial stress and, in this context,
step up early warning systems and cross-border
cooperation in supervision.
Beyond immediate policy reactions, the current
challenges are also a strong reminder of the
need to advance the economic diversification
agenda.
Box 1.1. Impact of the Drought in Southern and Eastern Africa

Large parts of southern and eastern Africa are facing a severe drought, potentially threatening food security for about
4050 million people. The drought, linked to the ongoing El Nio pattern, is affecting countries through two channels:
reducing agricultural output and, in some cases, hampering hydroelectric power generation. As a result, growth is projected
to slow sharply in Ethiopia, Malawi, and Zambia, and food inflation is accelerating almost everywhere in the subregion.
Several countries also face pressures on their budgets and external positions. The drought may intensify during the year, and
the macroeconomic situation could deteriorate further.
A severe drought affecting millions of people in southern and eastern Africa is expected to intensify over the year,
threatening a regionwide food crisis. Rainfall so far this season has been the lowest in the last 35 years, 40 percent
below its long-term average, following an already poor season last year. Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi, and Zimbabwe
have appealed for humanitarian assistance, and several other countries have declared drought emergencies.
Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland are limiting water usage because of low water levels at reservoirs.
Low water levels are also affecting power generation in Zambia and Zimbabwe, resulting in extensive power outages.
Forecasts suggest a continuation of below-average rainfall and another year with poor crop performance in 2016.
The World Food Program and the United States Agency for International Development predict that about 4050
million people are at risk of inadequate food supply by end-2016, including 2.5 million already identified to be in
an acute food crisis, with varying repercussions across countries.1 If the abnormally hot and dry conditions persist,
a regional food security crisis, including a substantial increase in the size of the extremely vulnerable population,
could emerge in 2016 and early 2017. However, even if rainfall normalizes, crop reserves and seed banks are severely
depleted, leaving farmers vulnerable for the upcoming planting season. According to the Famine Early Warning
Systems Network, a large share of the future harvest will be lost because of poor seeding (particularly maize). The
drought will hit particularly hard the most vulnerable people living in rural areas that depend on agricultural production. The urban poor will be affected by higher food prices.
The macroeconomic impact of the drought is expected to be particularly severe in some of the most vulnerable
countries in the region:

Growth. IMF staff project that in 2016 GDP growth will be significantly impacted in Ethiopia, and
decline by 2.3 percentage points in Malawi mainly because of poor agricultural output. In addition
to its impact on agriculture, the drought has severely crippled the supply of water and the production
of electricity. A number of reservoirs are almost entirely dried up or at very low levels, and the lack of
water is affecting electricity production, in particular in Zambia (lowering growth by 1.2 percentage
points) and Zimbabwe, where prolonged power outages have become the norm. In most of the other
affected countries in the subregion, the drought is estimated to reduce growth by up to 0.5 percentage
point.
Inflation. Food inflation is on the rise in several countries, although the impact on headline inflation
has so far been muted by a decline in other items in the consumer price index basket, particularly fuel.
For example, notwithstanding low international food prices, wholesale maize prices in South Africa
and other neighboring countries are more than 50 percent higher than a year earlier, while retail maize
prices have doubled in Malawi and Mozambique.
Fiscal. The drought is exerting pressure on the government budget in Ethiopia, which released a recent
supplementary budget; in Swaziland, where the cost of emergency plans amount to 1 percent of GDP;
This box was prepared by Geremia Palomba, Aidar Abdychev, and Monique Newiak.
As classified in Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Phase 3. IPC is used to measure the nature and severity of a
food security crisis (for example, IPC 4: Humanitarian Emergency and IPC 5: Famine/Humanitarian Catastrophe).
1
15
Box 1.1. (continued)
and in Zambia, where emergency imports of electricity are estimated at 1 percent of GDP. Other
countries envisage additional drought-related outlays of up to percent of GDP, mainly for droughtrelief efforts.

External. Significant pressures on the external position are likely to emerge in the period ahead. Imports
of food and, in some countries, electricity are expected to increase and significantly deteriorate the
current account, especially in Zambia (12 percent of GDP), while other countries face humanitarian
needs, mainly related to food imports, of about percent of GDP.
The response to the crisis has so far been uneven. In Zimbabwe, the funding of the drought response plan is reportedly below 50 percent, compared to more than 90 percent in Malawi. More generally, relief agencies indicate a
significant gap in funding, and according to international organizations, such as the World Food Program, most
countries in the region are not adequately prepared to deal with the potential humanitarian impact. Moreover, not
much progress has been made in building an agricultural infrastructure resilient to changing weather conditions,
including introducing drought-resistant seeds, new farming techniques, water harvesting, and conservation farming.
16
Box 1.2. Private Sector Credit Growth Developments in Sub-Saharan Africa

In the majority of sub-Saharan African countries, private credit growth has slowed (Figure 1.2.1). The recent decline
is examined against the background of rapid credit growth in 201013, when commodity prices were on the rise
and financing conditions favorable.
The period of favorable financing conditions and high commodity prices was associated with dynamic public and
private credit growth, helping many countries to increase credit depth, often from low levels.1 With the end of the
commodity prices boom, credit growth is now declining, most markedly in energy exporters. Against this background, the following questions arise:

Did countries in the region, and especially commodity exporters, experience an unusually high increase
in credit (a credit bubble) during the previous commodity prices boom or did countries experience
healthy financial deepening?
In that context, what does this imply in terms of financial stability risks, in particular for nonperforming
loans (NPLs)?
To answer these questions, a benchmarking analysis of credit developments is used to evaluate possible risks associated with the recent episode of fast credit growth. Following Marchettini and Maino (2015), we identify countries
in which credit to the private sector has expanded (1) faster compared to a longer-term trend (trend gap), and
(2) beyond a level consistent with countries structural characteristics (frontier gapFigure 1.2.2). The analysis
suggests the following conclusions:2
Figure 1.2.1 Sub-Saharan Africa: Growth of Credit to the Private Sector

50
40
Percent
30
20
10
0
Energy exporters
KEN
TGO
SEN
MOZ
CIV
COM
SYC
LSO
BEN
BDI
SWZ
Average 201013 credit growth

UGA
MWI
MDG
GNB
GMB
NAM
BWA
MLI
ZMB
Average 201415 credit growth

GHA
TZA
NER
CAF
SLE
COD
COG
GNQ
NGA
CMR
TCD
Credit to the private sector in percent of GDP

GAB
20
BFA
10
Sources: Country authorities; IMF, International Financial Statistics; and IMF staff estimates.
In the case of resource-intensive countries, levels of credit to the private sector are often low because the exploitation of natural
resources is often financed through public resources or foreign direct investment.
2
The trend gap is the average deviation in 201013 of a countrys private-credit-to-GDP ratio from a long-term trend using a
backward-looking Hodrick-Prescott filter. The frontier gap is the average deviation in 201013 of the private-credit-to-GDP
ratio from its statistical benchmark, a fitted value from a quantile regression of private-credit-to-GDP ratio on country
fundamentals and cyclical factors. Fundamentals include population size and density, GDP per capita and its square, age
dependency ratios, and dummies for being a frontier market, an oil exporter, a financial center, or land-locked country
(see Feyen, Kibuuka, and Sourrouille 2016).
1
17
Risks associated with rapid credit growth (beyond what seems warranted by structural considerations)
are present in a number of countries that are not resource exporters (Kenya, Mozambique, Senegal,
Togo), and could point to financial stability concerns looking ahead.3
By contrast, in most resource-exporting countries rapid credit growth was associated with catching up
with only two countries seeing credit growth beyond what would be warranted by structural conditions
(Mali, Niger).
There are still a number of countries in which the progress toward financial deepening has been lagging.
In these countries credit growth is both below the trend and below the level consistent with its structural characteristics (The Gambia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone).
Our analysis indicates that in most countries where financial stability risks may be on the rise because of the
unwinding commodity boom, a reversal of excessive credit growth is not likely to add to such risks.

NPLs related to slowing economies are on the rise in a number of countries of the region. This includes
both resource exporters (Angola, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Sierra Leone) and those that are not
resource exporters (Benin, Cabo Verde, The Gambia, Malawi, and SoTom and Prncipe)
(See Figure 1.14).
Only a few countries with rising NPLs are also countries flagged in our analysis as having experienced
credit growth that could be considered excessive, and the prospects for a steeper increase in NPLs in
those countries cannot be discounted. Though a deeper analysis would be needed to make a more
definitive statement, authorities in these countries should nonetheless remain watchful for signs of rising
NPLs.
In most resource exporters, based on our analysis, credit growth has not been at levels that could be
considered excessive. This mitigates the risk of financial instability associated with the unwinding
commodity boom being compounded by loans associated with risky lending going bad.
Furthermore, in the case of resource-intensive countries, rapid credit growth has often been directed to
the exploitation of commodities, including state-owned enterprises.4 In consequence, the likelihood of
NPLs emerging (and being recognized) will be closely linked to fiscal developments in those countries.
Figure 1.2.2. Private Sector Credit: Trend Gap versus Frontier Gap, Average 201013 and 2014
20
15
10
STP
5
0
2014
201013
5
10
15
Above frontier and trend

MOZ
SEN
TGO
STP
SEN
KENMOZ
TGO
KEN
BDI
MWI
BEN
BEN
BDI
COM
CIV
MWI UGA
UGA
COM
GMB
SWZ
SWZ CIV
LSO
GMB
MDG
MDG
LSO
GNB GNB
Above frontier and below trend
Below frontier and trend

12
Frontier
er gap, percent
perc of GDP
Frontier
er gap, percent
per
of GDP
25
Below frontier and above trend
4
0
4
Trend gap, percent of GDP
12
20
15
10
5
0
5
10
15
15
20
25
30
Resource-intensive countries
Above frontier and below trend
NAM
NAM
NGA
NGA
2014
201013
Below frontier and trend

10
Above frontier and trend

BFA
MLI
MLI BFA
NER NER
TZATZA
CAFCMR
CMR
ZMB
COG
ZMB
CAF
GHA
COG
SLE
GAB
SLE
GAB
Below frontier and above trend
BWA
BWA
0
5
Trend gap, percent of GDP
10
Sources: World Bank, FinStats 2016; and IMF staff calculations.

Credit growth and credit-to-GDP ratios are important measures to assess financial stability. However, higher values on these
measures could still be consistent with insufficient access to credit and financial services for large sections of the population.
Chapter 3 discusses further these important dimensions of financial development such as inclusion in terms of access to credit
and financial services.
4
Credit to the private sector shown in Figure 1.2.1 includes credit to state-owned enterprises.
3
18
Box
1.3.Fiscal
DominanceAn

Illustrative Exercise

The current environment of large or expanding fiscal deficits under tight market financing conditions in some
countries could undermine central banks pursuit of their monetary objectives, should it lead to monetization of

deficits. This
situation
is known as fiscal dominance. The following discussion seeks to assess the consistency of
fiscal and monetary policy objectives given assumptions of steady-state debt targets. It should be emphasized that
this is a purely illustrative exercise. In particular, it does not imply a particular path for inflation in the period ahead

(since countries recourse to debt financing may be different than assumed in this exercise), nor should it be seen as
prescriptive of a particular policy for any given country.
and

To illustrate the trade-offs
between fiscal
inflation targets in the region, this box uses the accounting framework
developed by Anand and Van Wijnbergen
(1989). This framework starts from the observation that a given fiscal
deficit can be financed by (1) issuing interest-bearing debtdomestic or foreign, and (2) monetary financing (seignorage). Consequently, the financeable deficit (FD) can be stated as:
FD = feasible domestic borrowing + feasible foreign borrowing + seignorage.

The IMFs low-income country Debt Sustainability Framework (IMF 2013) provides country-specific thresholds for
sustainable debt-to-GDP ratios.1 This

box, for its illustrative exercise, constructs target ratios for the regions lowincome countries debt-to-GDP ( ) as follows:
for countries at low risk of debt distress:
for countries at moderate risk of debt distress:
for countries at high risk of debt distress:

In these equations, the coefficients 0.5 and 0.75 are assumed for illustrative purposes. Under these assumptions,
countries at low
and moderate
of debt
distress
can increase
their
debt-to-GDP ratios toward the threshold
risk

(countries at low risk of debtdistresshave
more
borrowing
space
than
countries
moderate
risk of debt distress

at
and therefore can borrow more). Countries at high risk of debt distress (all of which have a current debt-to-GDP
larger than
their
threshold
level
for moderate risk)
assumedto
target a reduction in their debt-tothat
is

ratio
are

GDP ratios toward the threshold, that is lower

their
risk
of
debt
distress
to
moderate.
For the regions market access

guidance
ratio
for the IMFs market access
countries, a 70 percent debt-to-GDP
is used
as the target,
consistent with

debt
analyses.
sustainability

with
In our calculations, we derivethe level
fiscal
deficit
that
is
consistent
of
the

maintaining
the debt-to-GDP ratio
at its target value in steady state. By implication,

in
steady
state, the difference between this debt-stabilizing level
must

of the fiscal deficit and the financeable
deficit
be financed by seignorage, which depends on the economys
nominal rate of growth and the rate of inflation:

where is the growth rate of real GDP, is the

rate of inflation,
and

is the stock of base money as a fraction
of nominal GDP. Adopting an inflation objective (call it ) thus limits the amount of money that can be raised
through seignorage.
These thresholds, which depend on country capacity (high, medium, or low) associate the level of debt with the risk of debt
distress (high, moderate, or low), with higher
debt levels generally
associated with higher risk of debt distress. The thresholds
that
result from
econometric
estimations
that
regress
the
probability
a country experiences debt distress upon its debt burden and
other variables.
Subsequently, the thresholds are calibrated insuch a way that the probability of debt distress is about 20 percent
(IMF 2012c).
19

The analysis also takes into account that real money demand is affected by inflation.
In particular, higher inflation
rates tend to lower demand for real money balancesthereby reducing the tax base for the inflation tax (which is
the amount of base money held by the private sector). Taking this into account, the exercise calculates the amount
of seignorage that a country can be expected to raise at its inflation objective . Adding this amount to the debtstabilizing level of the fiscal deficit gives us the financeable deficit at the inflation
target.
We then compare the financeable deficit with the actual deficit in countries with an inflation objective. On this
basis, the exercise suggests that there are tensions between fiscal and monetary objectives in a number of countries
in the region. Table 1.3.1 shows the results for nine sub-Saharan African countries and one currency union that
have a stated inflation objective.2 These results suggest that current policies in Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia could be
inconsistent with monetary objectives given our assumptions on feasible debt accumulation, as the required fiscal
balance improvement (RBI) at their respective inflation objectives exceeds 1 percent of GDP. These results are
based on very schematic assumptions, and hence are illustrative in nature, but they support the argument that, in
these countries, fiscal policies would benefit from some adjustment to avoid tensions related to pushing debt above
safe levels or not achieving monetary objectives.
Table 1.3.1. Required Fiscal Balance Improvement (RBI) for Countries with a Stated Inflation Objective
Debt 2015
(percent of GDP)
Zambia
Malawi
Kenya
South Africa
Nigeria
Tanzania
WAEMU
Ghana
Mozambique
Uganda
52.9
83.4
52.7
50.1
11.5
40.5
41.2
73.3
74.8
35.4
Financeable government
Government balance 2015
balance at inflation objective
(percent of GDP)
(percent of GDP)
8.1
3.8
5.9
4.0
8.4
6.8
4.0
3.4
4.0
3.5
3.7
3.4
4.2
3.9
5.0
4.8
6.0
6.2
2.9
4.1
RBI at inflation objective

(percent of GDP)
4.3
1.9
1.6
0.6
0.5
0.3
0.3
0.2
Sources: IMF, Debt Sustainability Analysis database; IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and IMF staff estimates
and calculations.
Note: The calculations producing the financeable government balance use data on local and foreign currency debt from
the Debt Sustainability database. WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union.
These countries are likely to have the most credible monetary policy frameworks, making fiscal dominance less likely. Hence,
this box only points to possible tensions between monetary and fiscal targets.
2
20
Box 1.4. Regional Spillovers Within Sub-Saharan Africa

The April 2012 Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa found that economic developments in Nigeria and
South Africa do not tend to spill over to the entire sub-Saharan Africa region. The result has since been confirmed
by other studies (Canales-Kriljenko and others 2013; Basdevant and others 2014; and World Bank 2016), and
applying the vector autoregression methodology used in the 2012 report to the latest vintage of the data, indeed
confirms this result.1 It also finds that economic developments in Ghana and Zambia do not have a noticeable
impact on output and prices in their neighboring countries. Nonetheless, one important caveat might be that such
spillovers may exist but that official data fail to capture their effects because they could work through informal trade
channels. Moreover, looking ahead, many sub-Saharan African countries may be affected by the slowdown in South
Africa, as it has recently been an important source of foreign direct investment (FDI) to the region.
Information on spillovers not picked up in real sector data, as well as the extent to which prospects for lower FDI
from South Africa and Nigeria could impact growth in recipient countries, may be captured by the spillovers in
U.S.-dollar-denominated bond spreads. Thus, this box uses this alternative approach and considers how changes in
spreads on Nigerian and South African bonds affect the spreads of other sub-Saharan African frontier markets.2
Using weekly data, we estimate the following equation for each frontier country using ordinary least squares:
ln ln ln ln
ln ln .
ln isthe
bond
ln
acountry
ln
t (with
ln
Global
where
spread
in week
referring
to the
for
subscripts
ZAF/NGA
lnand
ln
ln
South African/Nigerian
and EMBIG
spreads,
respectively).
The
remaining
variables
are
the
three-month
rate on
ln
ln
ln ln .
U.S. treasuries,Tthe VIX index, and the change in the oil price from week t 1 to week t.3
Estimation results across the various countries show a consistent pattern: first, there is a lot of persistence in spreads.
Second, increases in the global spread, the U.S. Treasury bill rate, as well as in the VIX index, all tend to widen
t1
Tspreads in the regions
frontier economies, highlighting the extent to which
T global developments affect the spreads
of sub-Saharan African frontier economies. Finally, for all countries apart from Cte dIvoire, oil prices have a
significant
negative effect on spreads. Interestingly, this holds for both oil exporters (Angola, Gabon,
2
t statistically
1
1a proxy for global economic activity or
Nigeria) and for oil importerspossibly because oil price developments tare
for aggregate growth in sub-Saharan Africa. These findings are in line with earlier results.4
2
Figure 1.4.1 visualizes the estimates for our main coefficient of interest, 2 the spillover from an increase in
South Africas spread to each frontier economy. The impact tends to be significant and positive in most cases,
suggesting that worries about South Africas creditworthiness typically increase concerns about the creditworthiness
of other frontier economies in the region (especially those in east Africa). A similar analysis finds that spread-developments in Nigeria do not generate significant spillovers to other frontier markets in the region (except for Gabon,
where the point estimate is 0.2 with a p-value of 0.0008).
One possible exception is Benin, which does seem to be affected by spillovers from Nigeria: IMF staff estimates suggest that
a 1percentage point reduction in Nigerian growth is associated with a 0.3 percentage point reduction in Benins growth rate
(IMF 2015f). Some very recent evidence suggests that foreign exchange restrictions in Nigeria are impacting exporters in trading
partners such as South Africa
2
Given that this exercise employs financial data, it is not subject to the aforementioned data-quality concerns.
3
Bond spreads are taken from JP Morgans Emerging Market Bond IndexGlobal (EMBIG) database. We follow the literature
by estimating on log-transformed variables, but estimating our core regression equation on levels yields results that are very
similar. The global spread is a weighted average of all emerging market spreads present in the EMBIG database. The VIX is the
Chicago Board Options Exchanges index of implied volatility (based on S&P 500 index options) and measures the markets
expectation of future stock market volatility. It is thought to be a good proxy for uncertainty in markets.
4
See Box 1.3, April 2015 Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa.
1
21
There are other possible channels of transmission. Historically, the sharing of revenue within the South African
Customs Union (SACU)5 has always constituted a prominent link between the economy of South Africa and those
of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland (BLNS), as fiscal revenues in BLNS fall when the regions imports
(mainly driven by imports for final consumption in South Africa) are lower. This introduces significant volatility in
BLNS government revenues. BLNS try to insulate themselves from these spillovers by building up buffers in good
times, but with the exception of Botswana, they have only been partially successful. In particular, Swazilandthe
country for which SACU transfers are largest as a share of total government revenuehas faced difficulties in
balancing its budget when SACU revenues are reduced.6
Lately, the emergence of pan-African banks has established another possible channel through which economic
developments can spill over across borders.7 Recent work indicates that most pan-African banks were well capitalized
and mainly reliant on local funding sources. Although the funding model appears to mitigate spillover risks through
financial channels, the growing cross-border activity of such banks poses regulatory and supervisory challenges. In
particular, given the magnitude of the shocks facing the region, it is important to remain mindful of possible risks
from this channel.
Figure 1.4.1. Estimate of 2 (South Africa) along with the 95
Percent Confidence Interval
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
0.1
01
0.2
Kenya
Tanzania
Ethiopia
Zambia
Ghana
Senegal
Gabon
Nigeria
Cte d'Ivoire
Angola
0.3
Source: IMF staff calculations.
Import tariffs levied on goods entering the Union via South Africa are collected by South African authorities and redistributed
among all SACU members.
6
Their 201011 fiscal problems are, for example, attributed to disappointing SACU revenues: in those years, SACU revenues
dropped to 7 percent of GDP, compared with a 200509 average of more than 19 percent of GDP.
7
As shown by Popov and Udell (2012) and De Haas and van Lelyveld (2014) cross-border banks transmit shocks from their
home to their host country. When the underlying business cycles are imperfectly synchronized (or when a country hosts foreign
banks from different countries of origin), this channel actually has a stabilizing effect. Empirical evidence suggests that crossborder banking helps to mitigate the effects of local financial shocks, but that it amplifies global ones (because they increase
business cycle correlations across the board; see IMF 2014).
5
22
Box 1.5. The Threat of Terrorism

Although the number of armed conflicts has declined over the past decade, terrorism is emerging as a severe and
growing threat to several countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Such threats have accelerated sharply in the past couple of
years, when civilians and security staff have come under attack by terrorists, and much property has been destroyed.
Since 2011, and more acutely in 2014 and 2015, the number and severity of attacks has increased dramatically, with
most of the violence occurring in Nigeria, in particular related to attacks from Boko Haram, three of its neighboring
countries (Cameroon, Chad, Niger), and Kenya, as well as countries that are currently being, or have recently been,
affected by civil wars or other internal conflicts. The recent attacks in Burkina Faso, Cte dIvoire, and Mali, related
to insurgencies in the Sahel provide a warning that these threats are spreading to more countries in the region.
In Nigeria, the regions largest country, the number and virulence of terrorist attacks has been on the rise since 2011
and has spilled over into its three neighboring countries. According to the Global Terrorism Database, Nigeria
accounts for one-third of the victims in all sub-Saharan Africa since 1989, and for almost 70percent of the people
killed since 2011. In 2014, Nigeria accounted for 23 percent of all victims of terrorism in the world and ranked third
in the world after Iraq and Afghanistan. Cameroon has also suffered numerous attacks, and, together with Chad
and Niger, has suffered the indirect effects of insecurity on its international trade and from large inflows of refugees.
The combined military efforts of the participating countries with the African Union has reportedly achieved some
success in containing the spread of terrorism and recovering some territory from terrorist control, as well as enabling
important operations to rescue captives. The Buhari administration has listed improving security as one of its priorities and reports that security risks have already abated.
Terrorist violence has also been on the rise in Kenya since 2011. Between 2011 and 2014, about 167 people have
died on average in Kenya every year as a result of terrorist attacks. The terrorists have targeted highly sensitive areas in
the capital and close to tourist areas, which has amplified the economic and political impact of the attacks.
The macroeconomic impact of terrorism is hard to quantify; it depends on the nature of the terrorist attacks and the
size and economic diversification of the targeted country, but typically hampers trade and investment. The Global
Competitiveness Indicators database points to rising costs of doing business owing to terrorism in affected countries
(Figure1.5.1). The business cost of terrorism has increased particularly in Nigeria and Chad since 2011, and is now
higher than the average for both sub-Saharan Africa and low-income countries. It has also increased in Cameroon
and Kenya over the past five years. Evidence suggests that terrorism is also adversely affecting revenue, spending,
tourism, and foreign direct investment.
Figure 1.5.1. Business Cost of Terrorism Index, 200615
Cameroon
Kenya
Sub-Saharan Africa
Low-income countries
Cameroon
Kenya
Sub-Saharan Africa
Cameroon
2014
415
2014
15
2013
314
2013
14
2012
213
2012
13
2014
415
112
201
2011
12
77
2013
314
2010
011
2010
11
66
2012
213
2009
910
2009
10
55
112
201
2008
809
2008
09
44
2010
011
2007
708
2007
08
33
2009
910
2006
607
2006
07
Index, 1 (highest)7 (lowest)
22
2008809
2007708
11
2006607
Chad
Chad
Nigeria
Nigeria
Emerging market and developing
Emerging Europe
market and developing Europe
Emerging market and developing
Emerging Asia
market and developing Asia
Chad
Kenya
Source: World Economic
Forum.
Nigeria
Sub-Saharan Africa
23
More specifically, beyond the tragic humanitarian and social toll exacted by terrorism:
24
Its impact on the Nigerian economy as a whole seems to have been comparatively modest, except in the
regions most directly affected by the problem.
In Cameroon, the threat of terrorism is also concentrated in rural and poor areas, but terrorism has
triggered an increase in security expenditure with a fiscal impact estimated at 12 percent of GDP.
In Chad, the fiscal impact of terrorism is estimated at about 1 percent of non-oil GDP, half stemming
from the loss of revenue (mainly on trade) and half from the increase in security-related spending.
In Niger, budgetary provisions for security spending have increased from 3.6 to 5.2 percent of GDP
between 2012 and 2015.
In Kenya, the most visible impact on the economy to date has been limited to the decline in tourist
arrivals (17 percent lower in the first three quarters of 2015 than in the same period in 2014).
2. Weathering the Commodity Price Slump

The dependence on natural resource exports has
made nearly half of sub-Saharan African countries
vulnerable, one way or another, to the ongoing
decline in commodity prices. But how much and
how deeply countries will be affected remains
an open debate. To shed light on this issue, this
chapter considers three sets of questions:
How important are extractive (energy and
metal) commodities in the region? Which
specific countries are affected? For these
countries, how important are these commodities compared with commodity exporters
elsewhere in the world?
How have previous episodes of booms and busts
in commodity prices affected macroeconomic
outcomes in sub-Saharan Africa, and what
does it tell us about the impact of the current
commodity price slump?
Which policies can help mitigate the macroeconomic effects of adverse terms-of-trade
shocks?
The main findings are as follows:
About half of sub-Saharan African countries
are net commodity exporters and, unlike
other regions, the importance of extractive
commodities exports has risen since the 1990s,
putting the region among the worlds most
commodity-dependent regions, broadly at par
with the Middle East and North Africa region.
As a consequence, though higher extractive
commodity prices have in part supported the
strong growth of the past decade or so, the
regions exposure to commodity price volatility
has also increaseda trend that is coming to
haunt these countries now.
This chapter was prepared by a team led by Dalia Hakura,

comprised of Francisco Arizala, Wenjie Chen, Jesus GonzalezGarcia, Mumtaz Hussain, and Mustafa Yenice. We are grateful
to Aqib Aslam, Oya Celasun, Bertrand Gruss, and Zska
Kczn for sharing their data and programs to construct the
commodity terms-of-trade index.
The most exposed countries by far are the oil

exporters. For them, the commodity terms-oftrade shock, which captures the income loss
from price fluctuations in terms of GDP, has
been particularly marked since mid-2014.
On average, the commodity terms-of-trade
index fell by 20percent of GDP in a matter of
a few years, after fairly steady gains of about
45 percent during 200014. Unsurprisingly,
the macroeconomic impact is found to be large.
The analysis suggests that a negative termsof-trade shock of this size typically triggers a
slowdown in annual growth of 3 to 3 percentage points for several years after the shock.
This is indeed the order of magnitude observed
among sub-Saharan African oil exporters, whose
average growth has gone from 5.9 percent in
2014 to a projected 2.4percent in 201516.
Comparatively, metal exporters in the region
have tended to be less affected. This is because
they are exposed to a wider range of commodity
exports, and commodities play a less prominent
role in their economies. Also, many of them are
oil importers, so the impact of the commodity
price slump has been partly offset for them by
the decline in their energy import bill. That
is not to say, though, that they will not be
affected; there are thresholds for the price of
their commodity exports, under which mines
close, and jobs are lost, as has already been
witnessed in some countries, with substantial
detrimental impact on activity.
The remaining 25 of the 45 sub-Saharan
African countries that are not major exporters
of oil or metals have tended to be less affected
by commodity price swings. Indeed, many
of them sustained solid growth during the
commodity supercycle of the 2000s despite
worsened commodity terms of trade, owing in
part to relatively high oil import bills.
Macroeconomic policies have a critical role to
play in supporting the resilience of sub-Saharan
African economies to commodity price busts,
25
particularly for the highly exposed oil exporters.

Evidence from past downswings highlights the
important role of exchange rate flexibility as a
shock absorber for countries that are not part of
a monetary union. Countercyclical fiscal policy
can also be important to smooth the impact
of the shock, but this only holds in so far as
countries have space to implement that type
of stimulus.
In the last few years, commodity exporters in
the region have indeed allowed fiscal deficits to
widen in response to declining fiscal revenues
from the extractive sector and as they continued
implementing public investment projects to
meet infrastructure gaps. However, with rising
public debt, increasing borrowing costs, and
sharply reduced revenues, fiscal space is rapidly
diminishing in many of these countries, calling
for adjustment as commodity prices are foreseen
to remain low for long.
For commodity exporters that are in a monetary
union, the onus of adjustment is squarely on
fiscal policy. Enhanced domestic revenue mobilization offers substantial potential to improve
the fiscal balance, and expenditure rationalization should also take precedence. In particular,
efforts will be required to better prioritize the
numerous infrastructure investment projects
that these countries were ready to embark on.
Contingent on financing, choice should be
given to the highest-return ones, in order to
minimize the negative impact on medium-term
growth prospects.
Over the medium term, in addition to rebuilding policy space and buffers as commodity
prices gradually recover, sub-Saharan African
commodity-exporting countries should more
actively increase the quality and efficiency of
public investment, continue efforts to mobilize
domestic revenues, and pursue economic diversification to enhance resilience to commodity
price shocks, including by improving the
business climate.
26
COMMODITY TERMS-OF-TRADE CYCLES

IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
The role of commodities has increased steadily in
sub-Saharan Africa over the past 30 years. Unlike
in other developing regions such as Latin America
and Asia, net commodity exports (the difference
between commodity exports and commodity
imports) rose for the region as a whole from
2percent of GDP in the 1980s to 6 percent
during 201014, reflecting mostly the expansion
of extractive commoditiesoil and metals
(Figure 2.1). Indeed, during 201014, commodity
exports represented almost half of the regions total
exports, up from less than one-fourth in the 1980s.
These developments have placed the region among
those with the highest dependence on commodity
exports, broadly at par with the Middle East and
North Africa.
Exports of natural resources are heavily concentrated in about half of the countries in the region,
and by far the highest reliance is found among
oil-exporting countries.
We follow the literature and classify a country
as an exporter of commodities if exports
of commodities (oil, metals, food, and raw
materials) comprise more than one-fourth
of goods exports, and net commodity exports
represent more than 5 percent of goods trade
(exports plus imports).1 On this basis, for
the period 201014, 22 out of the 45 subSaharan African countries are classified as net
commodity exporters (Figure 2.2).
The steady increase in the role of commodities
in sub-Saharan Africa has been underpinned
by the increase in exports of extractive commodities. As a result, 20 countries are now
classified as exporters of extractive commodities,
compared with 14 in the 1990s.
The classification of commodity exporters follows earlier
publications of the Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan
Africa and the October 2015 World Economic Outlook.
With the exception of Zimbabwe, which would no longer
be classified as a commodity exporter in the 1990s, the
classification is broadly robust to raising the threshold
of commodity exports in total exports to 35 percent (see
Commodity Classification in Annex 2.1).
1
2. WEATHERING THE COMMODITY PRICE SLUMP
Figure 2.1. Selected Regions: Net Commodity Exports to GDP
Energy
Metals
Food and raw materials
Total
9
6
3
0
15
1980s
1990s
2000s
201014
2. Middle East and North Africa
Figure 2.2. Sub-Saharan African Commodity-Exporting Countries

by Decade
Main Commodity Export
Percent of GDP
12
9
Countries
6
3
0
3
15
1980s
1990s
2000s
201014
1990s
2000s
201014
3. Asia
Perrcent of GDP
12
9
6
3
0
3
15
1980s
4. Latin America
Perrcent of GDP
12
9
6
Number of commodity
exporters
Energy
0
3
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Central African Rep.
Chad
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Congo, Rep.
Cte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Gabon
Ghana
Guinea
Liberia
Mali
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Sierra Leone
South Africa
South Sudan
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
1980s
1990s
2000s
201014
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; United Nations,

COMTRADE database; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: Simple averages across countries in each region.
0
3
2
0
3
1
2
0
0
1
3
1
1
2
2
3
3
0
2
0
1
2
2
0
3
2
2
20
201014
200009
Perrcent of GDP
12
The reliance on commodities also varies heavily

among commodity exporters. The role of
commodities is by far the largest among oil
exporters, where net commodity exports ranges
between 45 percent and 85 percent of GDP
for countries such as Angola, the Republic of
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon, and
is well above the average for energy exporters
outside the region. Even in Nigeria, a much
more diversified economy, net commodity
exports account for 15 percent of GDP. Though
still significant, the dependence on commodities
199099
15
1. Sub-Saharan Africa
1
0
2
0
0
1
3
1
2
1
3
1
1
2
2
3
2
2
2
0
1
2
2
0
0
2
2
21
Metals
1
0
2
2
0
1
0
1
2
1
3
1
1
2
2
3
2
0
2
2
1
2
2
1
0
2
2
during 201014
Oil
Diamond
Gold
Oil,
Oil Cocoa
Oil
Copper, Cobalt, Oil
Oil
Cocoa
Oil
Oil
Gold, Cocoa, Oil
Gold, Aluminum
Rubber, Iron Ore
Gold
Diamond, Fish, Uranium
Uranium
Oil
Iron ore
Platinum Iron Ore
Platinum,
Ore, Gold
Gold, Coal
Oil
Copper
Gold, Platinum
22
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; United Nations,

COMTRADE database; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: Countries are classified as commodity exporters if commodity
exports constitute at least 25 percent of total goods exports and net
commodity exports are at least 5 percent of goods trade (goods exports
plus goods imports) in each decade. See Commodity Classification in
Annex 2.1.
27
400
350
250
200
150
100
50
0
Given the strong and rising reliance on commodities of about half of the countries in the region,
it is legitimate to ask about the impact of past
cycles in commodity prices and of the recent
slump. Indeed, after experiencing a sustained rise
during the 2000sone that drove many of the
regions countries to start exploiting extractive
resourcesthe prices of energy, metals, and, to a
lesser extent, food started declining in 2011, with
the decline accelerating from mid-2014 onward
(Figure 2.4). Crude oil prices slumped by about
70percent between June 2014 and February 2016,
and the metal commodity price index decreased by
35percent since early 2011.
To understand the implications of fluctuations in
commodity prices for individual countries, and
how they compare with other emerging market
and developing countries, the analysis relies on
Energy
Metals
Food
300
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
Implications of commodity terms-of-trade

fluctuations
Figure 2.4. World Commodity Prices, 19712015
IIndex 2000 = 100
is lower for metal exporters: for these countries,

net commodity exports range between 5percent
and 30percent of GDP, both because their
commodity exports weigh less in GDP and
because they are oil importers. In several
countries such as Burkina Faso, Guinea, Niger,
South Africa, and Zimbabwe, the dependence
is similar to or lower than the average for metal
exporters outside the region (Figure 2.3).
Sources: IMF, Commodity Price System; and IMF staff calculations.
country-specific measures of commodity terms of

trade that take into consideration the composition
of the particular countrys commodity export and
import baskets as a percent of GDP (Box 2.1).
In this formulation, a commodity price increase
implies an increase in the terms-of-trade index if the
country is a net exporter of this commodity, and a
decrease if the country is a net importer. Moreover,
as net exports are measured in terms of GDP, variations in the index directly show the income gain or
loss from a shock.
Reflecting their generally much higher reliance on
commodities discussed earlier, sub-Saharan African
energy exporters experienced exceptional termsof-trade gains during the 2000s boom, and the
downward correction since 2014 has been equally
exceptionally large, as illustrated in the following:
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; United Nations, COMTRADE database; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: SSA = sub-Saharan Africa.
28
South Africa
Zimbabwe
Niger
Guinea
Burkina Faso
Sierra Leone
Mali
Ghana
Namibia
Botswana
Zambia
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Cameroon
Nigeria
Chad
South Sudan
Gabon
Congo, Rep.
Angola
Equatorial Guinea
Percent of GDP
Percent of GDP
Figure 2.3. Sub-Saharan African Energy and Metal Exporters: Net Commodity Exports to GDP, 201014 Average
1. Energy Exporters
2. Metal Exporters
35
90
Energy
30
80
Metals
25
70
Total
20
60
SSA simple average
15
Non-SSA simple average
50
10
40
5
30
0
20
5
10
10
15
0
Figure 2.5. Sub-Saharan Africa and Comparator Countries:

Commodity Terms of Trade
Guinea, and Gabon (Figure 2.6). There, the

cumulative decline in commodity terms of trade
since 2011, and hence the decline in income,
has ranged between 25 and 45 percentage
points of GDP.
(Index, 100 = 19902000 average, median)
160
140
120
100
80
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
Commodity terms of trade
180
Sub-Saharan Africa energy exporters

Non-sub-Saharan Africa energy exporters
Sub-Saharan Africa metal exporters
Non-sub-Saharan Africa metal exporters
Note: See Commodity Classification in Annex 2.1.
These movements have exceeded in magnitude

those witnessed by energy exporters outside
the regionfurther underscoring the extreme
sensitivity to oil prices of sub-Saharan African
oil exporters (Figure 2.5).
The terms-of-trade decline has been generalized
across oil exporters, but has generally been
sharper for the economies that are more highly
concentrated around oil production, such as
Angola, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial
For oil exporters, the substantial improvement

of the commodity terms of trade in the 2000s
was associated with improved growth performance, as strong income flows from rising oil
prices and increased oil production allowed the
funding of investment and domestic consumption (Figure 2.7 and Box 2.2). This result does
not bode well for the outlook in those countries
now that these terms of trade have reversed
trend in a significant manner.
Terms-of-trade movements for the regions metal
exporters have been much more muted, even
compared with metal exporters outside the region.
Two factors underpin this result. First, these
countries often depend on a wider range of
metals with heterogeneous price developments
(for example, copper, iron ore, diamonds,
gold, among others), and the dependence
on each of these metal exports tends to be
lower with respect to the size of the economy.
Second, while metal prices were going up
in the 2000s, so were oil prices, raising their
Figure 2.6. Sub-Saharan African Extractive Commodity Exporters: Commodity Terms of Trade, 200015
(Cumulative change from 2000; percentage points of GDP)
Mozambique
Burkina Faso
Guinea
Sierra Leone
10
Congo, Dem. Rep.
5
Niger
Chad
Cameroon
Nigeria
Gabon
Congo, Rep.
30
Angola
20
Namibia
0
10
Zimbabwe
10
2015
10
Ghana
20
2011
South Africa
30
15
Botswana
2015
2. Metal Exporters
Mali
2011
40
20
Zambia
50
Cumulaative change in percent of GDP
60
Equatorial Guinea
Cumulaative change in percent of GDP
1. Energy Exporters

Note: Cumulative change in commodity terms of trade from 2000 through (1) 2011 when commodity prices peaked (blue diamond), and (2) 2015
after commodity prices had fallen (red dot). Thus, differences between the blue and red markers indicate the change in the commodity terms of trade
between 2011 and 2015.
29
Nevertheless, metal exporters too have experienced a broad pattern of losses since 2011,
although with marked heterogeneity. Among
the most affected, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Sierra Leone, and Zambia have seen
their commodity terms of trade drop by about
5 to 10 percentage points of GDP since 2011,
as the decline in iron ore and copper prices,
respectively, more than offset the beneficial
impact of the drop in oil prices on their import
bill. Movements in metal and oil prices have
also been net negatives on the commodity terms
of trade of countries such as Guinea, Niger, and
South Africa, although to a lesser extent. Two
noteworthy outliers are Botswana and Namibia,
whose commodity terms of trade increased
during 201115, benefiting from the increase in
diamond prices in play during 200914.
For metal exporters, the 200011 period was
associated with both high growth performance
and modest changes in commodity terms of
trade because the increase in the price of their
commodity exports went hand in hand with
the increases of the price of imported oil
leading to an apparent absence of correlation
between growth and terms of trade for them,
as shown in Figure 2.7. However, potentially
large macroeconomic impacts from relatively
smaller declines in commodity terms of trade
(or export prices) for metal exporters cannot be
discounted. It would be particularly the case
where discrete events such as the closure of
mines are leading to substantial job layoffs, as
already experienced in the Democratic Republic
of Congo, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and
Zambia.
Among the 25 remaining sub-Saharan African
countries (including exporters of food and raw
materials), 20 of them experienced cumulative
declines in their commodity terms of trade between
2000 and 2014, mainly because of increased
oil import bills. However, despite the adverse
30
Figure 2.7. Sub-Saharan Africa: Commodity Terms of Trade and GDP

Growth, 200011
14
Average annual growth of commodity
teerms of trade
energy import bills and muting the net impact

on their commodity terms of trade. Now that
commodity prices are trending down, the
reduced oil import bill is acting as a cushion.
Exporters of energy
12
10
Exporters of metals
Other SSA countries
6
4
2
0
2
2
4
6
8
Average annual growth of GDP
10
12
14
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and IMF staff

calculations.
commodity terms-of-trade developments facing

these countries, many sustained solid growth over
that period, averaging 4 percent.
COMMODITY PRICE SWINGS AND

MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
Sharp swings in commodity prices present a formidable challenge for macroeconomic management.
Output, fiscal revenues and external accounts all
received strong support during the years of rising
commodity prices. This section assesses the macroeconomic effects of the current commodity price
shock on sub-Saharan African countries, building
on the evidence of past commodity price swings,
and discusses the implications for the regions
commodity exporters growth outlook.
Evidence from event studies

A first approach consists in examining the macroeconomic effects of previous episodes of commodity
price swings during 19622014, both in subSaharan Africa and in other emerging market and
developing countries, using event studies. More
specifically, the analysis compares the behavior
of key macroeconomic variables before and after
the peaks observed in commodity terms of trade,
but without controlling for factors that may also
affect output growth and other macroeconomic
variables such as global financial conditions, the
size and duration of the shock, or domestic factors,
including the occurrence of armed conflicts or
Table 2.1. Sub-Saharan Africa Commodity Exporters: Largest Commodity Terms-of-Trade Declines
1. Largest 10 Declines from Peak to Trough of 37 Episodes

Country
Episode
Duration
Cumulative Change
(Number of Years)
(Percent of GDP)
Gabon
1981 86
198186
6
44.6
44 6
Zambia
197072
3
34.8
Nigeria
198186
6
29.2
Cte d'Ivoire
197881
4
22.0
Congo, Rep.
198186
6
20.0
Guinea
1989 93
198993
5
15.8
15 8
Liberia
199501
7
14.1
Nigeria
199194
4
13.0
Congo, Rep.
199195
5
12.2
Liberia
201214
3
12.1
2. Largest 10 Declines in First 3 Years of 37 Episodes

Country
Episode
Duration
Cumulative Change
(Number of Years)
(Percent of GDP)
Zambia
1970 72
197072
3
34.8
34 8
Cte d'Ivoire
197881
4
16.4
Guinea
198993
5
14.3
Liberia
201214
3
12.1
Nigeria
199194
4
9.9
Botswana
2006 08
200608
3
9.6
96
Congo, Rep.
199195
5
9.0
Guinea
197174
4
8.3
Gabon
198186
6
7.8
Guinea
200709
3
7.6
changes in political regimes. As such, the event

studies are simply intended to shed light on stylized
facts and detect commonalities across episodes and
regions.
To maximize the similarity of the events studied
with the current bout of commodity price declines,
the episodes studied involve at least two years of
commodity terms-of-trade upswing followed by
at least three consecutive years of declineso as
to capture persistent downward shocks.2 Also, the
cumulative decline in the terms of trade is required
to be at least 1 percent of GDP in the first three
years of the shock.3 These criteria identify 201
episodes for 105 countries, of which 75 episodes
occurred in sub-Saharan Africa (see Annex 2.1,
Figure 2.1.2).
Most sub-Saharan African countries have gone
through two or more cycles in the past five decades.
Table 2.1 shows the 10 episodes with the largest
declines in commodity terms of trade from peak
Episodes are constrained to those with a peak before 2012
so that the first three years of a downswing in the commodity
terms of trade can be examined.
3
This is similar to Adler and Sosa (2011). The 1 percent of
GDP decline threshold allows the identification of aboveaverage declines in the overall sample of emerging market and
developing countries, while retaining a reasonable number
of episodes. The findings reported are robust to (1) a more
stringent criterion for the cumulative decline of at least 2
percentage points of GDP in the first three years; and (2) at
least one year of terms-of-trade upswing that is then followed
by at least three consecutive years of decline and a cumulative
loss of either 1 percent or 2 percent of GDP over this period
(see the discussion of methodology for dating commodity price
cycles in Annex 2.1).
2
to trough and in the first three years among the

37 episodes identified for sub-Saharan African
commodity exporters. Most episodes occurred
in the 1980s and 1990s, and on average lasted
five years, had large income effects, and affected
countries as varied as Cte dIvoire, Guinea,
Nigeria, and Zambia.4
Although growth was only moderately affected on
average during these episodes of commodity termsof-trade declines, energy exporters have tended to
suffer a much larger growth slowdown (Figure 2.8),
as follows:
The slowdown averaged about 1 percentage
point when all 75 episodes in sub-Saharan
Africa were considered. This is broadly the
same average deceleration observed for the
entire sample of emerging market and developing countries.5
The growth deceleration was, however, much
more marked when only episodes among
sub-Saharan African oil exporters were
examined. On average, growth has tended to
slow from about 6 percent prior to the shock
Because the criteria used to identify downswing episodes
required at least three years of decline in the commodity terms
of trade, short-lived events such as the decline in commodity
prices associated with the 200809 global financial crisis are
excluded from the analysis. Similarly, the recent fall in the
commodity terms of trade of the regions oil exporters is not
captured because it only took place in 2015.
5
The focus here is on the impact of the shock in the first three
years, but where shocks persisted longer, the overall impact
might have been even larger.
4
31
Figure 2.8. Selected Country Groupings: Real GDP Growth during Commodity Price Upswings and Downswings
2. Sub-Saharan Africa
1. Emerging Market and Developing Countries

7
Percent
ent
Percent
ent
Percent
ent
(Three-year averages)
Upswings
Downswings
Upswings
Downswings
3. Sub-Saharan Energy Exporters
Upswings
Downswings
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: Samples consist of cycles with peaks before 2012.The bars show simple average values of the variables in the three years leading to the peak
(upswings) and the three years after the peak (downswings).
to about 3 percent in the three years following

a fall in oil prices. In fact, the recent episode
quite narrowly mirrors this pattern, with growth
among oil-exporting countries decelerating
from 5.9 percent in 2014 (the peak year for oil
prices) to 2.6percent in 2015 and projected
to further weaken to 2.2 percent in 2016. This
once more highlights the specific vulnerability
of sub-Saharan African oil-exporting countries

to commodity price reversals.
The more pronounced impact of shocks in
sub-Saharan African oil exporters shows in all
macroeconomic variables (Figure 2.9). Current
account balances tend to swing from large
surpluses to large deficits and these swings are
Figure 2.9. Sub-Saharan African Energy Exporters: Key Macroeconomic Variables during Commodity Price Upswings and Downswings
1
1
0
0
1
1
2
2
33
33
4
4
55
55
6
6
Change
in percent
of GDP
Change
in percent
of GDP
10 1. Current Account Balance

10
8
8
6
6
4
4
2
2
0
0
2
2
4
4
6
6
Upswings
Upswings
Downswings
Downswings
3. Fiscal Balance
3. Fiscal Balance
Change
in percent
of GDP
Change
in percent
of GDP
Perc
Percent
of GDP
Percent
Perc
of GDP
Percent
rcent
of GD
GDP
Percent
rcent
of GD
GDP
(Three-year averages)
1. Current Account Balance
Upswings
Upswings
Downswings
Downswings
32
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
2
2
4
4
3
3
2
2
1
1
0
0
1
1
22
22
3
3
2. International Reserves
2. International Reserves
Upswings
Upswings
Downswings
Downswings
4. Total Public Debt

4. Total Public Debt
Upswings
Upswings
Downswings
Downswings
Figure 2.10. Sub-Saharan Africa: Exchange Rate Flexibility and Public Debt during Episodes of Low and High Resilience of Output Growth
Percent
nt of countries
count
Percent
nt of countries
count
25
30
25
20
20
15
15
10
10
Low resilience
Low resilience
High resilience
High resilience
2. Total
Debt Debt
2. Public
Total Public
100 100
90 90
80 80
70 70
60 60
50 50
40 40
30 30
20 20
10 10
0
0
Low resilience
Low resilience
Percent
cent of GD
GDP
1. Share
of Countries
with awith
Flexible
Exchange
Rate Rate
1. Share
of Countries
a Flexible
Exchange
Percent
cent of GD
GDP
30
High resilience
High resilience
Note: The bars show average values of the policy variables in the three years prior to the shock. The exchange rate regime variable is a dummy
variable with a value of 1 for a country with a de facto flexible exchange rate regime in the year before the shock. The exchange rate regime
classification is based on llzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2010). An episode is classified as a high-resilience episode when the output growth variation
between upswings and downswings is below the sample median.
typically accompanied by declines in international reserves. Also, small fiscal surpluses prior
to the shock tend to turn into deficits of more
than 5 percent of GDP.
Exchange rate flexibility and low public debt

help weather persistent shocks
The event studies also allow a first glimpse at how
specific policies influence the resilience of countries
affected by commodity price shocks. To that effect,
the past episodes of busts in commodity terms of
trade that occurred in sub-Saharan Africa are split
into two groups of countries according to their
performance after a shockthe high-resilience
group, where output was affected less negatively
than for the median country, and the low-resilience group where output was more negatively
affected.
High-resilience countries tended to have more
systematically flexible exchange rate regimes6
at the onset of the adverse commodity price
shock, allowing the exchange rate to play
the role of a shock absorber on real activity
(Figure 2.10, panel 1). Countries with flexible
exchange rate regimes in place prior to the
shock on average had higher inflation than
countries with fixed regimes, but they were on
average able to contain inflation during the
downswings triggered by the pass-through of

exchange rate depreciation to domestic prices
(Figure 2.11).
High-resilience countries also had on average a
lower debt-to-GDP level prior to the shock
(Figure 2.10, panel 2). This would have
provided, everything else equal, more fiscal
space to increase borrowing and to smooth the
impact of the shock once it happened, while
still preserving debt sustainability.
Weak energy prices outlook a tremendous

headwind for sub-Saharan African oil exporters
As noted earlier, the event studies do not control for
other factors that could also affect economic performance at the time of the commodity price slump.
To account for those, the event study analysis is
complemented with an econometric study using
the local projections method of Jord (2005).
This method allows better isolation of the specific
response of macroeconomic variables to commodity
price shocks. Annex 2.1 provides a detailed explanation of the model used.
Once these factors are controlled for, the negative
effect of commodity price declines on sub-Saharan
African net commodity exporters comes out more
strongly than in the event studies. Unlike with other
countries in the region where the impact of such
Countries are classified as having de facto flexible exchange

rate regimes based on Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2010).
6
33
Figure 2.11. Sub-Saharan Africa: Inflation during Commodity Price Upswings and Downswings by Type of Exchange Rate Regime
2. Fixed Exchange Rate Regime
1. Flexible Exchange Rate Regime

30
25
Percent
Percent
20
15
10
5
0
Upswings
Downswings
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Upswings
Downswings
Note: The bars show average inflation in the three years leading to the peak (upswings) and the three years after the peak (downswings) for countries
classified as having flexible and fixed exchange rate regimes based on Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2010).
shocks are not found to be significant,7 the effect

on real GDP of a 1 percent decline in extractive
commodity exporters terms of trade is significant
as early as the year of the shock, and cumulates to
a reduction in the level of GDP of about 0.7 percentage point after four years (Figure 2.12, panels1
and 2). The impact is also found to be larger than
for other developing and emerging market countries
that export the same commodities. For subSaharan African oil exporters, which on average
have experienced a decline in their commodity
terms of trade since mid-2014 of about 20 percent,
this corresponds to a cumulated reduction in GDP
of roughly 13 percent over the course of four years,
or, put differently, lower growth by about 3 percentage points for four straight yearsa substantial
effect. The recent slowdown in growth among
sub-Saharan African oil exporters from about
6 percent in 2014 to a projection of below
2percent in 201516 is indeed of that order of
magnitude.
The effects on the trade balance are also immediate
and large (Figure 2.12, panel 3). A 1 percent deterioration in the commodity terms of trade results in
a worsening of the trade balance of about 0.6percentage point of GDP in the year of the shock.
The effect of the shock, however, tends to dissipate
after two years, possibly reflecting rapid external
This is consistent with the finding in Aslam and others

(2016) for a larger sample of emerging market and developing
countries that are not exporters of extractive commodities.
7
34
adjustment through exchange rate depreciation and

import compression.8
Conversely, the impact on fiscal revenues is found
to be much more persistent (Figure 2.12, panel5).
A 1 percent decline in the commodity terms of
trade is estimated to lead to a decline in fiscal
revenues by about 0.2 percentage point of GDP in
the year following the shock, and as much as 0.4
percentage point of GDP five years later. This effect
is not found in other sub-Saharan African countries,
highlighting the heavy reliance on extractive
sectors for fiscal revenues among energy and metal
commodity exports.9
These results highlight that persistent commodity
terms-of-trade shocks can have large and longlasting growth effects. At the same time, terms-oftrade shocks have implications for macroeconomic
stability: both fiscal revenues and trade balances of
extractive commodity exporters are considerably
affected. Taken together, these findings suggest that
the immediate focus of macroeconomic policies
may need to be on eliminating macroeconomic
imbalances rather than on minimizing output
losses.
A similar phenomenon is also documented for a group of
Latin American countries in Chapter 3, April 2015 Regional
Economic Outlook: Western Hemisphere (IMF 2015a), and
Caceres and Gruss (forthcoming).
9
The estimations are conducted for sub-Saharan African oil and
metal exporters together so as to have a large enough number of
countries. It is likely, however, that the impact on oil exporters
is much larger than for metal exporters, given their much
higher reliance on extractive activities for fiscal revenues.
8
Figure 2.12. Sub-Saharan Africa: Effects of Commodity Terms-of-Trade Shocks

(Percentage points)
0.3
0.3
0.0
0.3
0.0
0.3
0.0
0.3
0.6
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.6
0.9
1.2
0.9
1.2
1.2
0.6
0.3
0.6
0.0
0.3
0.6
0.3
0.0
0.3
0.6
0.3
0.0
0.9
0.6
0.3
12
1.2
0.9
0.6
1.5
12
1.2
0.9
1.8
1.5
12
1.2
1.8
1.5
1.8
0.8
0.6
0.8
0.4
0.6
0.8
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.2
0.0
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.8
0.6
0.8
1. Energy1.and
Metals
Effect onEffect
GDP on GDP
Energy
andExporters:
Metals Exporters:
0.3
0.3
1. Energy1.and
Metals
Effect onEffect
GDP on GDP
Energy
andExporters:
Metals Exporters:
0.3
0.3
0.0
Energy
andExporters:
Metals Exporters:
1. 0.0
Energy1.and
Metals
Effect onEffect
GDP on GDP
0.3
0.3
0.0
0.0
0.3
0.3
0.0
0.0
0.3
0.3
0.6
0.6
0.3
0.3
0.6
0.6
0.9
0.9
0.6
0.6
0.9
0.9
1.2
1.2
0.9
1
21
32
43
54
65
76
7 0.9
1.2
1.2
3.1 Energy3.12and
Metals
Effect
Trade-Balance23andExporters:
34 Exporters:
45 onEffect
56 on Trade-Balance67
7 1.2
Energy
Metals
1.2
to-GDP Ratio
to-GDP Ratio
23
34 Effect
45 on Trade-Balance56
67
7
1 Energy12and Metals
3.0.6
3. Energy andExporters:
Metals Exporters:
Effect on Trade-Balance- 0.6
to-GDP Ratio
to-GDP Ratio
3. and
Energy
andExporters:
Metals Exporters:
on Trade-Balance- 0.3
3.0.3Energy
Metals
Effect onEffect
Trade-Balance0.6
0.6
to-GDP Ratio
to-GDP Ratio
0.0
0.0
0.3
0.6
0.3
0.6
0.3
0.3
0.0
0.3
0.0
0.3
0.6
0.3
0.0
0.9
0.6
0.3
1.2
12
0.9
0.6
1.5
1.2
12
0.9
1.8
1.5
1.2
12
0.6
0.0
0.3
0.9
0.3
0.6
12
1.2
0.6
0.9
1.5
0.9
12
1.2
1.8
12
1.2
1.5
1
12
23
34
45
56
67
7
1.8
1.5
1.5
1.8
5. 1Energy5.and
Effect45onEffect
Fiscal-Revenue2 Metals
1Energy
23Exporters:
34Exporters:
56on Fiscal-Revenue67
7
and
Metals
1.8
1.8
to-GDP Ratio
to-GDP Ratio
1Energy
23 Exporters:
56on Fiscal-Revenue67
7
1Energy5.and
2 Metals
5.0.8
Effect45onEffect
Fiscal-Revenueand
Metals34Exporters:
1.5
to-GDP Ratio
to-GDP Ratio
Energy
andExporters:
Metals Exporters:
on Fiscal-Revenue5.0.6
Energy5.and
Metals
Effect onEffect
Fiscal-Revenue1.5
1.0
0.8 Ratio
to-GDP Ratio
to-GDP
0.4
1.5
0.8
0.6
1.0
0.5
0.2
0.6
0.4
1.0
0.5
0.0
0.0
0.4
0.2
0.5
0.2
0.0
0.2
0.0
0.5
0.5
0.4
0.0
0.2
0.6
0.2
0.4
0.8
0.4
0.6
1
0.6
0.8
1
0.8
1
12
23
34
45
56
67
12
23
34
45
56
67
12
23
34
45
56
67
2. Other Sub-Saharan
African Countries:
Effect onEffect
GDP on GDP
African Countries:
0.3
African Countries:
Effect onEffect
GDP on GDP
African Countries:
0.3
African Countries:
2. 0.0
Other Sub-Saharan
African Countries:
Effect onEffect
GDP on GDP
0.3
0.0
0.3
0.0
0.3
0.6
0.3
0.6
0.9
0.6
0.9
1.2
0.9
1
12
23
34
45
56
67
7
1.2
Sub-Saharan
Effect 5on
4. Other
Trade-on
1
2
6 Effect
23 African34Countries:
67 Trade-7
Sub-Saharan
African45Countries:
4. 1Other
1.2
Balance-to-GDP
Ratio Ratio
Balance-to-GDP
12
23 African34Countries:
4 Effect 5on
67
7
1Other Sub-Saharan
6 Effect
4.0.6
Trade-on
Sub-Saharan
African 5Countries:
4. Other
TradeBalance-to-GDP
Ratio Ratio
Balance-to-GDP
African Countries:
African Countries:
Effect onEffect
4.0.3
Other Sub-Saharan
Trade-on Trade0.6
Balance-to-GDP
Balance-to-GDP
Ratio Ratio
0.0
0.6
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.0
0.6
0.0
0.3
0.9
0.3
0.6
1.2
12
0.6
0.9
1.5
0.9
1.2
12
1.8
1.2
12
1.5
1
12
23
34
45
56
67
7
1.5
1.8
6. Other
African
Sub-Saharan
Countries:
Effect
on
Fiscal1
5
6. Other
Sub-Saharan
12
23
34African 4Countries:
56 Effect on
67 Fiscal-7
1.8
Revenue-to-GDP
Ratio Ratio
Revenue-to-GDP
1
2
3
4
5
67 Fiscal-7
1
2
3
4
5
6
6. 1.5
Other Sub-Saharan
African Countries:
Effect onEffect
Fiscal-on
African Countries:
Revenue-to-GDP
Ratio Ratio
Revenue-to-GDP
African Countries:
African Countries:
Effect onEffect
Fiscal-on Fiscal1.5 Revenue-to-GDP
1.0
Revenue-to-GDP
Ratio Ratio
1.5
1.0
0.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
0.5
0.0
0.5
0.5
0.0
0.5
0.5
1.0
0.0
0.5
0.5
1.0
0.5
0.5
1.0
1.5
0.5
0.5
1.0
1.5
1
1.0
1.5
1
1.5
1
7 1.0
1.5
7
1.5
7
12
23
34
45
56
67
12
23
34
45
56
67
12
23
34
45
56
67

Note: The t = 1 is the year of the shock; grey shadows denote 90 percent confidence bands. The red lines represent the response of the variable to
an exogenous 1 percent decrease in the commodity terms of trade. See Local Projections Method in Annex 2.1. The energy and metals exporters
sample comprises Angola, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Uganda, and Zambia. Other sub-Saharan African
countries comprise Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda,Tanzania, and Togo.
35
POLICIES TO ENHANCE RESILIENCE TO

SHOCKS
Policy responses to shocks matter for output
resilience
The event studies illustrate the moderating effects
on output from exchange rate flexibility and low
debt related to commodity price slumps, but a more
comprehensive approach is still needed to examine
how best countries can prepare for such shocks
and react when they are hit by themas has now
happened to many commodity exporters in the
region, especially oil-exporting countries.10 Such
an analysis is conducted in this section, based on a
regression relating the relative growth performance
in the aftermath of a terms-of-trade shockthe difference in real GDP growth in the three years before
and after the shockto countries policy space and
policy responses.
Policy space and policy conditions consist of
fiscal and external buffers existing at the time
ofthe shock (used to implement countercyclical
policies to mitigate the impact of the shocks),
exchange rate policies (as flexibility can also act
as a shock absorber), and the extent of fiscal and
monetary policies implemented after the shock. In
exploring the role of these factors, the econometric
estimations also control for: (1) the magnitude of
the commodity shock, especially when shocks are
driven by lower export prices (to allow for asymmetric effects from changes in export prices and import
prices), and (2) the prevailing global economic environment (that is, the strength of trading partners
growth, and global interest rates). The regression
analysis builds on the episodes identified above
for the sample of emerging market and developing
countries, and on existing empirical research
The focus of the analysis is on the impact of commodity
shocks on actual output and understanding the role of
macroeconomic policies to smooth the adjustment to the
shocks and bring actual output closer to potential. It is also
possible that commodity price shocks affect potential output
through lower investment and capital accumulation (as shown
in Aslam and others 2016), in which case the slack in aggregate
demand would be smaller, and there may be less scope for
macroeconomic policies to stimulate the economy. The latter
would put more emphasis on structural reforms to diversify the
economy and raise potential output.
(Adler and Sosa 2011; Cspedes and Velasco 2012;

see Annex 2.1 for more details).
The main results are reported in Table 2.2. The
explained variable is the gap between growth prior
to the shock and subsequent to the shock, thus
a positive coefficient on an explanatory variable
indicates that the variable mitigates the adverse
impact of the commodity shock on economic
growth. The main results are as follows.
The size of the terms-of-trade shocks matters, and its
impact is stronger when export prices slump. On
average, a 1 percent decline in the commodity terms
of trade is associated with about a percentage
point decline in growth in each of the three years
following the shock.11 This estimate captures the
direct effects of commodity shocks on the commodity-related sectors, as well as indirect effects on other
sectors, for example, from lower oil prices. Though
commodity terms-of-trade shocks occur for both
commodity exporters and importers (for example,
the shock to food and fuel prices in 200709),
the shocks driven by declines in export prices for
commodity exporters have a larger adverse impact
on growth, reflecting an asymmetric impact on
domestic production and private sector activity
asinvestment suffers, mines or oil fields can be shut
down when prices are too low, and jobs are lost.
A reserve buffer helps mitigate the impact of shocks.
Having a reserve level of 1 percentage point of GDP
above the average level of reserves before the shock
is found to help reduce the impact of the shock on
growth by percentage point. Drawing from these
reserves can temporarily smooth the severity of the
pressures from the shock on the external position
and the exchange rate. Other indicators of policy
space, such as low external debt and low initial
inflation were not found to systematically mitigate
the impact of shocks.12
10
36
A cumulative decline of percent in the three years

following the shock is within the 90 percent confidence interval
of the response to a similar shock estimated in the previous
section (Figure 2.13, panel 1).
12
The finding of a weak relationship between low inflation and
resilience of growth is broadly in line with existing research;
for example, Abiad and others (2015) report that, although
single-digit inflation helps extend growth expansions, it is not a
significant factor for growth recovery after a shock.
11
Table 2.2. Impact of Commodity Shocks on Real GDP Growth: Regression Results
Dependent variable: Difference in real GDP growth (average) between the three
years after the terms-of-trade shock and the three years prior to the shock.
Shock size and types
Size of terms-of-trade shock: three years (cumulative)
Shocks caused by decline in export prices (dummy)
Initial Conditions
International reserves above median at time t 0 (% of GDP)
High external debt before shock (40% of GDP or more)
Flexible exchange rate regime (de facto) at time t 0
Policy Reactions
Growth of real government consumption during shock (average)
Growth of real government consumption x high external debt at time t 0
Broad money growth during shock
Depreciation of nominal exchange rate
Exchange rate collapse: 45% or more depreciation
Observations (terms-of-trade shock events)
Countries
R -squared
(1)
(2)
0.270***
(0.073)
2 994**
2.994**
(1.269)
0.228***
(0.070)
4 096***
4.096***
(1.191)
0.335***
(0.121)
1.150
(1 289)
(1.289)
3.215**
(1.253)
0.367***
(0.138)
0.381
(1 442)
(1.442)
0.356***
(0.133)
0.283*
0.283
(0.164)
0.057*
(0.033)
0.097***
0.097
(0.035)
0.279**
(0.135)
0.245
(0.183)
0.006
(0.030)
0.138***
(0.042)
0.161***
0.161
(0.040)
119
76
0.50
119
76
0.51

Note: The methodology for identifying events is described in Annex 2.1. All regressions control for country fixed effects, as well as changes in
growth in trading partners of a country (as a proxy for the global economic conditions).
Robust standard errors in parentheses; significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.
The exchange rate is found to be a powerful shock

absorber, provided its use is not postponed too much
after the shock, when macroeconomic imbalances have
built up.
A higher degree of exchange rate flexibility
beforehand helps mitigate growth losses after
a shock. Countries with a de facto flexible
exchange rate regime tend to experience growth
losses that are significantly smaller compared
with countries with less flexible regimes, everything else equal (Model 1 in Table 2.2).
Nominal exchange rate depreciation in the
first two years after a shock also has a strong
mitigating effect on the growth lossa 10
percent depreciation is associated with a lower
growth loss of more than 1 percentage points
during the shock period (Model 2 in Table
2.2), consistent with the findings of Edwards
and Levy-Yeyati (2005), Cspedes and Velasco

(2012), and Adler and Sosa (2011).13
However, very large exchange rate depreciations in the aftermath of the commodity busts
(labeled as a collapse) adversely affect growth.
In three-quarters of the episodes concerned,
these large depreciations, in excess of 45
percent within two years of the commodity
shock, came as fixed or pegged regimes could
not be sustained (based on llzetzki, Reinhart,
and Rogoffs 2010 classification). In these
circumstances, the adverse impact on growth
from the exchange rate collapse is estimated
to reach 4 percentage points, as the collapse
pushes inflation up and causes severe import
contractions. This suggests that if the exchange
It is possible that exchange rate depreciation may not always
help mitigate growth losses if price elasticities of exports and
imports are relatively low, for example, because of the lack
of diversification of economies or if there are large dollar
exposures.
13
37
rate tool is not used early enough to alleviate the

macroeconomic implications of the terms-oftrade shock, it cannot play the shock-absorber
role once severe imbalances have built up in the
economy.
This is not to say that fixed exchange rate
regimes cannot be beneficial for sub-Saharan
African countries, but that other macroeconomic policies need to be consistent with
the sustainability of the peg over commodity
price cycles. Hence, for commodity-exporter
countries that are members of a monetary
unionsuch as most countries in the Central
African Economic and Monetary Community
(CEMAC)to maximize the benefits of a
stable, credible policy environment that comes
with the monetary anchor, special attention
needs to be paid to other macroeconomic
policies, in particular fiscal policy, in the adjustment to commodity terms-of-trade shocks.
Supporting fiscal and monetary policies can help
but only if sufficient policy space has been built up.
Increases in real public current spending in the
years immediately after a shock are strongly associated with lower output lossesbut only when the
external-debt-to-GDP ratio is below 40 percent.14
In situations of high debt, a fiscal stimulus has, on
average, little effect on mitigating growth losses
during the shock years, as more resources likely
need to be diverted to repay larger debt and private
investment may be deterred from expectations of
higher future taxes (see also Pattillo, Poirson, and
Ricci 2002, which identifies a similar threshold). An
easing of monetary policyproxied by the growth
of broad moneyis also found to mitigate output
losses, but because postshock periods are often
associated with capital outflows and depreciation
pressures, central banks may have limited room to
engage in easing monetary policy in response to
shocks, and therefore this empirical result should
be interpreted carefully.
The external-debt-to-GDP ratio is used to proxy fiscal space

because of the paucity of long time series data for public
debt. The findings are robust to alternative thresholds (above
40 percent) for external debt beyond which fiscal policys
effectiveness as a countercyclical tool is eroded.
14
38
Implications for sub-Saharan Africas

commodity exporters
What are the policy implications for the subSaharan African net commodity exporters that have
been affected to varying degrees by the bust in the
commodity supercycle? Especially in light of the
persistence of the shock, what should be the best
course of action? As always, policy advice needs to
be country- and context-specific, but informed by
the analysis above, a set of general principles that
apply includes:
For countries that are not part of currency
unions, increased exchange rate flexibility
with supportive monetary and fiscal policies
should be the first line of defense to minimize
output losses, though the effect of exchange rate
depreciations on bank and public sector balance
sheets, and on inflation, would also need to be
closely monitored (as elaborated in Chapter 1).
In addition, recourse to flexibility should not
be delayed particularly if shocks are likely to be
persistent, as a buildup of balance of payments
pressures has to be counteracted either through
sales of scarce external reserves or exchange rate
restrictions that take a toll on activity. Reserves
are finite and a cushion should be preserved to
deal with other shocks. Restrictions on current
account transactions are suboptimal because
they affect economic activity, give rise to
different distortions, and could lead to a disorderly adjustment of the external sector. In that
respect, the emergence of large parallel exchange
rate premiums, such as in Angola and Nigeria,
points to large imbalances in the foreign
exchange markets and hence to the urgent need
for the adoption of more sustainable macroeconomic policies.
External reserves have provided buffers to
face the shock, but the extent of that support
is getting increasingly limited. International
reserves were already lower than for commodity
exporters in other emerging market and developing economies, partly as a result of countries
efforts to expand infrastructure investment to
address longer-term development needs. SubSaharan African oil exporters, however, entered
the period of lower oil prices with relatively
higher reserves than others in the region and

higher than at the onset of previous shocks. This
allowed cushioning of the hit from the oil price
slump, but care should be taken to limit the
drawdown, particularly in view of the expected
persistence of the oil price shock (Figure 2.13).
Although in principle fiscal policy can provide
support, fiscal adjustment is increasingly called
for among the regions commodity exporters,
Figure 2.13. Sub-Saharan Africa and Other Countries: Total
International Reserves
25
Perrcent of GDP
20
15
10
5
0
Sub-Saharan Africa oil exporters

Sub-Saharan Africa non-oil exporters
Other emerging market and developing countries
199099 200005 200608 200911 201214
2015
Figure 2.14. Sub-Saharan Africa and Other Countries: External Debt

100
Percent of GDP
P
80

60
40
20
0
199099 200005 200608 200911 201214
2015
Figure 2.15. Sub-Saharan Africa and Other Countries: Inflation

15
In the case of countries in a monetary union,

such as the CEMAC, where five out of the six
members are oil exporters, fiscal policy is the
main policy tool to bring about the needed
adjustment. There too, as buffers have been
drawn on, the effort should squarely be on fiscal
adjustment:
Better domestic revenue mobilization,
especially where revenue from non-oil activities is particularly low, offers substantial
potential to close the financing gap that has
opened with the decline in oil fiscal revenue
(for example, see Chapter 1, October 2015
Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan
Africa).
Substantial savings need to be achieved
from streamlining government spending,
in particular by reforming across-the-board
subsidies and improving the selection and
execution of public investment projects.
Percent
10
particularly given the expected persistence of

the commodity price shocks. Oil exporters in
particular have allowed their deficit to widen
as fiscal revenues dwindled, to a projected
5.5percent of GDP deficit in 2016, from
about 3 percent in 2014. But with public debt
rising and borrowing costs also increasing, fiscal
space is rapidly disappearing, as extensively
elaborated in Chapter 1. This is especially
true for countries that entered this period of
declining commodity prices with already weak
fiscal positions, such as Ghana and Zambia.
More broadly, given the projected persistence
of low commodity prices, the near-term focus
will be on fiscal adjustment to preserve macroeconomic stability in an increasing number of
these countries. This will become increasingly
important as countries external debt levels
rise above the threshold beyond which fiscal
stimulus is found to no longer support output
resilience (Figure 2.14).

199099 200005 200608 200911 201214
2015
Inflation had fallen to single-digit levels in most

commodity exporters in sub-Saharan Africa
averaging about 6 percent during 201014
(Figure 2.15). However, inflation trended up in
2015 as exchange rate depreciationsassociated
39
with the commodity price declines and

increased global risk aversionpassed through
to inflation, although weather-related increases
in food prices may have also played a role.
Monetary and fiscal policy should seek to
avoid spillover to more generalized inflation,
including to achieve the real depreciation
needed to help minimize output losses from the
ongoing terms-of-trade shocks.
Beyond short-term policy actions, the focus of the
policy agenda should also be turned back squarely
to economic diversification. Even if somewhat
slowed by financing constraints, the ongoing efforts
to upgrade the regions infrastructure and education
skills should be pursued to support the emergence
of new sources of growth and hence create natural
buffers against the dependence on natural resources.
Stronger efforts to enhance the business climate,
improve the efficiency of public spending, and
mobilize domestic revenues will also help unleash
the private sectors potential outside the extractive
sector.
CONCLUSIONS
Many sub-Saharan African countries dependence
on extractive commodity exports has increased
in recent decades, with about half of the regions
countries now considered net commodity exporters.
So long as commodity prices continued rising from
the turn of the century onward, this proved a boon
in terms of higher foreign exchange earnings, fiscal
revenues, and foreign direct investment inflows
helping support the very strong growth momentum
at the time. However, the generalized decline
in commodities prices, first with metal prices
starting in 2011, and oil prices since mid-2014,
has triggered sizable deteriorations in the terms of
trade for many of these commodity exporters. Oil
exporters have been by far the most affected.
40
The analysis presented here shows that persistent

slumps in extractive commodity prices do have a
significant macroeconomic impact, but more so
for oil exporters than other extractive commodity
exporters. The current period should not be
an exception to that pattern, with sub-Saharan
African oil exporters outlook particularly clouded.
Although to a lesser extent, metal exporters growth
will likely be affected as well, especially where lower
prices are also triggering a decline in extractive production, as mines are closed and jobs lost.
But policies have a strong role to play to help those
countries weather the commodity price slump
taking into account the expected persistence of the
shock. For countries that are not part of a monetary
union, exchange rate flexibility coupled with supportive policies should be the first line of defense. In
the face of a large permanent commodity terms-oftrade shock implying durably reduced fiscal revenue
from the extractive sector, countries have no choice
but to undertake fiscal adjustment to close macroeconomic imbalances. Fiscal and external buffers
can and are being used where available to smooth
the pace of the adjustment, but as these diminish,
fiscal deficits can become unsustainably large and
balance of payments pressures can force disorderly
adjustments. Fiscal adjustment efforts should
mobilize revenues outside extractive sectors, as well
as focus on streamlining recurrent spending to
preserve growth-friendly capital investments.
In addition to gradually rebuilding policy buffers
and persevering with efforts to strengthen policies as
commodity prices recover, efforts should focus on
structural reforms to support the diversification of
the economies away from commodities. This puts
the onus on better mobilizing domestic revenues,
increasing the quality of public investment, and
improving the business climate to promote the
development of the private sector and diversify the
export base beyond commodities.
Box 2.1. Commodity Terms of Trade

The commodity terms-of-trade index weighs the changes in international prices of individual commodities according
to country-specific net commodity exports as a share of GDP. The calculation of the country-specific index follows
the approach used in Gruss (2014), the October 2015World Economic Outlook, and Spatafora and Tytell (2009);
see Annex 2.1. The construction of the index addresses some shortcomings of other commonly used terms-of-trade
indices. For instance, standard aggregate terms-of-trade indicators have been found to poorly capture the behavior
of commodity prices (Deaton and Laroque 1992; Cashin, Cspedes, and Sahay 2004). At the same time, analyzing
the movements in one or two commodity prices would not provide a holistic examination of the impact of shocks
affecting a country that is a net exporter of more than one commodity. Among advantages of the index used in this
chapter are the following:

The variation of the index shows the size of the income shock from price effects in terms of GDP.
The effects of variations of commodity prices depend on the size of net exports of commodities of each
country. This is important when countries are net importers of one commodity, for instance oil, but
also net exporters of other commodities such as metals, food, or raw materials. This is the case for 11 of
the 12 non-oil extractive-resource exporters in the region that are also oil importers.
The weights used to calculate the terms-of-trade indicator are updated annually based on trade patterns
in the preceeding three-year period using COMTRADE and IMF data. This is important to capture the
evolving role of commodities in a countrys exports. For instance, energy exports accounted for
2 percent of Angolas exports in the 1990s, but they now exceed 95 percent of total exports. Therefore,
changes in energy prices have a much larger impact today than in the past.
The index includes a wider range of metals (including precious stones) such as gold, platinum, and
diamonds than in previous studies. This is important to capture the specificities of commodity termsof-trade developments in several commodity exporters in sub-Saharan Africa such as Botswana,
Burkina Faso, Mali, Namibia, or South Africa.
41
Box. 2.2. Commodity Price Slumps Hold Back Economic Activity:

The Cases of Nigeria and the Republic of Congo
Nigeria and the Republic of Congo, the largest and the fourth largest oil exporters in sub-Saharan Africa, respectively, have experienced highly volatile terms of trade. This box explores the impact of the oil price cycles on these
two economies over the period 19802015. Macroeconomic management in both countries faces challenges
stemming from the high dependence on volatile oil revenue. In both countries, revenues from oil and gas accounted
for more than 70 percent of total government revenues during 201113. Figures 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 show how the
evolution of commodity terms of trade for the two countries closely follows global oil price developments and
highlight two previous episodes of prolonged downswings.1
500
130
400
120
300
110
200
100
90
100
80
250
600
200
500
300
100
200
50
0
100
Oil price (right scale)
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and IMF

staff calculations.
400
150
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
600
140
Index 19902000 = 100
Figure 2.2.2. The Republic of Congo: Commodity Terms-ofTrade and Oil Price Indices
150
19771
19773
19775
19777
19779
19881
19883
19885
19887
19889
19991
19993
19995
19997
19999
20001
20003
20005
20007
20009
2011
2013
2015
Index 19902000 = 100
Figure 2.2.1. Nigeria: Commodity Terms-of-Trade and Oil

Price Indices
Oil price (right scale)

staff calculations.
The oil price swings before the 2000s had serious macroeconomic effects for Nigeria. GDP growth decelerated
markedly during terms-of-trade downswings (Figure 2.2.3), with the economy contracting by as much as 10 percent
during the oil price slump in the early- to mid-1980s. Inflation was high and volatile owing to substantial currency
depreciation (Figure 2.2.4). The naira depreciated by an average of 28 percent a year during the prolonged oil price
downswing of 198087. However, growth and inflation became considerably less volatile from the early 2000s
onward, partly the result of improved policy frameworks and a more supportive external environment.
Figure 2.2.3. Real GDP Growth
Figure 2.2.4. Inflation
Percent, end of period
20
Percent
15
10
5
0
5
15
Nigeria
Congo, Rep.
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
10
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
10
Nigeria
Congo, Rep.
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
25
For the Republic of Congo, our analysis covers the period starting in 1990 and onward, mainly because of issues pertaining to
data availability and quality prior to 1990.
1
42
In contrast, the Republic of Congo has continued to experience more volatile GDP growth. Oil price downswings
(for example, in 1990 and 2008) had a more significant adverse impact on growth in the Republic of Congo than
in Nigeria. Also, civil conflict contributed to growth volatility in Congo in the 1990s, which remained high even
after stability was restored in the early 2000s. As regards price stability, however, the Republic of Congo generally
experienced lower and more stable inflation than Nigeria, in part because of its exchange rate regime (the Republic
of Congo is part of the Central African Economic and Monetary CommunityCEMAC), even in the immediate
aftermath of the 1994 CFA franc devaluation (Figure 2.2.4).
Between 2004 and 2008, the Nigerian authorities sought to improve the management of oil and gas revenues. In
2004, they established an oil-price-based rule for the budget along with the Excess Crude Account (ECA)a stabilization funddesigned to delink spending from oil revenues. Meanwhile, the central bank showed some flexibility
in its management of the exchange rate and accumulated substantial international reserves (Figure 2.2.5). Together,
these steps helped to smooth the impact of oil revenue shocks in 2008. In addition, debt buyback operations, partly
funded by the ECA, and debt relief resulted in significantly reducing Nigerias external debt (Figure 2.2.6). During
200308, macroeconomic stability was restored, and the procyclicality of spending in response to changes in oil
prices was reduced (Figure 2.2.7). Significant fiscal surpluses were generated, contributing to the accumulation of
sizable assets in the ECA. The countercyclical fiscal policy was complemented by a strong anti-inflationary monetary
policy which brought inflation down to single digits.
45
40
Nigeria
Figure 2.2.6. Total Public Debt

Congo, Rep.
30
Percent of GDP
Percent of GDP
35
25
20
15
10
0
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Nigeria
Congo, Rep.
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Figure 2.2.5. International Reserves
However, procyclical fiscal policy resumed after the global financial crisis: a substantial increase in government
spending accompanied the high oil prices during 201014. Combined with a sharp drawdown from the ECA
savingswhich reached a low of $3.1 billion in 2014, down from $11 billion in 2012this has left Nigeria with
minimal fiscal buffers to smooth the recent decline in oil prices. Against this background, the central bank of
Nigeria has imposed restrictions on access to foreign exchange during the current oil price downswing in an attempt
to preserve international reserves and contain pressures on the currency. This has introduced significant distortions
in the economy, led to the emergence of a significant spread between the official interbank exchange rate and other
markets for foreign exchange, and adversely affected economic activity.
The Republic of Congo, meanwhile, has yet to establish a robust fiscal framework for dealing with oil price shocks.
Public spending has displayed considerable procyclicality throughout 19902014. Expenditure doubled in absolute
terms in recent years, to reach 50 percent of GDP in 2014 (Figure 2.2.8). Past efforts to adopt a fiscal rule, most
recently in 2013, have been ineffective. The current oil price slump could provide the impetus to establish effective
fiscal rules for smoothing the expenditure path during oil booms and busts.
43
Box 2.2 (continued)
Figure 2.2.8 The Republic of Congo: Government Revenue

and Expenditure
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
Real total expenditure growth

Real oil and gas revenue growth
staff calculations.
2015
2013
2011
2009
2005
Revenue
2003
2001
1999
1995
1993
1991
Spending
1989
10
2007
15
1997
Establishment
of stabilization
fund
Percent of GDP
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
20
40
40
60
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Percent
Figure 2.2.7. Nigeria: Revenue and Expenditure Volatility

Before and After the Stabilization Fund

staff calculations.
As in the case of Nigeria, the steep fall in oil prices since mid-2014 has resulted in pronounced declines in fiscal
and external buffers in the Republic of Congo and caused economic growth to slow. When peace was restored in
the early 2000s, the accumulation of reserves and fiscal buffers was a clear policy focus of the government of the
Republic of Congo. This was supported by a series of IMF-supported programs, culminating in debt relief in 2010
under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. As a result, by mid-2014, the Republic of Congo had the
largest reserves among CEMAC countries along with additional government deposits abroad and fiscal savings at
the central bank. In the face of the current oil price slump, both reserves and government deposits declined sharply
in 2015 as the scaling up of public investment was maintained in the face of declining oil revenues. International
reserves fell to about 5.5 months of imports in 2015, the lowest level since 2007. At the same time, the Republic of
Congos debt has increased significantly to 64 percent of GDP in 2015almost three times the level immediately
following debt relief in 2010and is limiting the fiscal space available to pursue countercyclical policies.
44
Annex 2.1. Commodity Terms of Trade: Variable Construction and Methods

This annex provides further details on the classification of commodity exporters, the construction of the commodity terms-oftrade index, the methodology to date commodity price shock episodes, and the other econometric methods and data used in
the chapter.
Commodity Classification
A country is classified as a commodity exporter in a given decade if it meets the following two conditions
(decades: 196279, 198089, 199099, 200009, and 2010-14):
Commodities
constitute
least
25 percent
the (CTOT)
countrys total goods exports, on average, in a given decade; and
Commodity
Termsatof
Trade
Index
1.
Commodity Terms of Trade Index (CTOT)
2.

Net commodity exports accounted for at least 5 percent of its gross trade (exports plus imports) in goods
Commodity Terms of Trade Index (CTOT)
on
average.
ForFor
each
the
inIndex
thecommodity
commodity
terms of trade index corresponds to the
eachcountry,
country,
the change
change
in
the
Commodity
Terms
of Trade
(CTOT) terms of trade index corresponds to the
J
1
weighted
sum
ofofannual
global
prices
of commodities,
weighted
,,variations
,,
Commodity
Terms-of-Trade
Index
weighted
sum
annual
variations
ininglobal
prices
of commodities,
weighted
by theby the
For
each
country,
,with
LogCTOT, , . ,,
,, the change in the commodity terms of trade index corresponds to the
3
GDP,
countrys
net
exports
of
each
commodity
as
a
share
of
GDP,
following
the
approach
For
each
country,
the
change
in
the
commodity
terms
of
trade
index
corresponds
to
the
For each
countrys
net
exports
of
each
commodity
as
a
share
of
GDP,
following
the
approach
inused
weighted
sum
of annual
variations in
global prices
of commodities,
weighted
byweighted
the usedsum
country, the
change
in the commodity
terms-of-trade
index
(CTOT) corresponds
to the
of in
weighted
sum
of
annual
variations
in
global
prices
of
commodities,
weighted
by
the
Gruss
(2014).
The
change
in
commodity
fornet
afor
given
country
i in year
annual
variations
in net
global
prices
of each
commodities,
weighted
by
theofcountrys
exports
of
commoditiy
as
Gruss
(2014).
The
change
in the
the
commodity
terms
ofGDP,
trade
a given
country
iused
int is
year
t is of
countrys
exports
of
commodity
as aterms
share
oftrade
following
theeach
approach
ina share
J
countrys
net
exports
of
each
commodity
as
a
share
of
GDP,
following
the
approach
used
in
GDP,obtained
following
the
approach
used
in
Gruss
(2014).
The
change
in
the
commodity
terms-of-trade
for
a
given
country
i in
obtained
as:
1
,,
,,
, (2014).
Gruss
commodity
terms
of trade
for a givencountry
i in year
t is
as: The change in the LogCTOT
trade
,,a,with
J
, . for
,,
, of
Gruss (2014).
The change in the commodity
terms
given country
i
in yearGDP
t is,
year t is obtained
as:
3
,,
,,
1
obtained
as:
LogCTOT
J , . ,, ,with,,
,
J obtained as:
3
GDP
J
,
,,
1
,, ,,
1
,,
,,,,
1
LogCTOT, , . ,, ,with,,
,
LogCTOT
J , . ,, ,with,,
J ,
3
GDP
GDP
3
LogCTOT
,with
,
,
,,
,,1
,
,,
,,
3 ,, GDP,
1
J
LogCTOT
,, ,,
, , . ,, ,with
,, )
,,
LogCTOT,
GDP
, . ,, ,with1
,, 3
, 3,,
,
,,
GDP
,with
LogCTOT
,
,,
,,
,
where , is the logarithm of the price of commodity
GDP
in,
period (in U.S.
dollars and
J3
of the price of commodity

where
is the
logarithm
(in period
U.S. dollars
divided
by the
IMFs
in period in
,,
dollars
,,
1 (inand
, is
- where
the
logarithm
of
the
price
of
commodity
U.S.
and
, by
divided
the
IMFs
unit
value
index
for
manufactured
exports);
LogCTOT
,with
where
of
thethe
price
of in
commodity
,
in period
(in U.S.
and
-- price
where
thelogarithm
logarithm
of
price
of,
commodity
in period
(indollars
U.S. dollars
and
,,
,,
,
,isisthe
deflator
for
exports
of
manufactures
advanced
economies);
3
GDP
,
the IMFs unit value index for

by
manufactured
exports);
- divided
divided
denotes
differences;
by
the
unit
value
index
for manufactured
exports);
divided
byfirst
theIMFs
IMFs
unit
value
index
for manufactured
exports);
,

denotes
first
differences;
denotes
differences;
- --- denotes
differences;
(,,first
)first
denotes
the exports (imports) value of commodity j by country i (in U.S.
,,
denotes
first
differences;
value
)
denotes
the
exports
(imports)
value
ofcommodity
commodity
country
i(in
(incountry
U.S.
exports
(imports)
of
iby
U.S.
from
UN
dollars,
UNthe
COMTRADE
and
IMF
data)
atof
time
tj jby
;by
, country
- - ,,
((,,
)from
denotes
the
exports
(imports)
value
commodity
i (in
U.S.
,,
,,
)denotes
denotes
the
exports
(imports)
value
of
commodity
j by jcountry
i dollars,
(in U.S.
,,
,,
dollars,
from
UN
COMTRADE
and
IMF
data)
at
time
t
;
COMTRADE
IMF data)
at time GDP
;
denotes and
country
s nominal
in U.S. dollars at time
t
(,, )
, from
dollars,
fromUN
UNCOMTRADE
COMTRADE and
at time
t; t;
dollars,
andIMF
IMFdata)
data)
at time
, denotes country s nominal GDP

in U.S. dollars
at time
t
GDP
the
weights
country
are predetermined
vis--vis
thedollars
price
change
int each
--
denotes
iss
nominal
GDP
in U.S.
dollars
at time
;atand
,,
denotes
country
s
nominal
inin
U.S.
attime
,
denotes
country
nominal
GDP
U.S.
dollars
time
t period, but are
, weights
the
,, are predetermined vis--vis the price change in each period, but are
allowed
to
vary
over
time
reflecting
changes
in
the
basket
of
commodities
actually
1
the
weights
arepredetermined
predetermined
vis--vis
thebasket
price
change
each
period,
but arebut
change
,,are
weights
are
predetermined
vis--vis
price
in actually
each
areover
- thethe
weights
the
change
eachin
period,
but
areperiod,
allowed
to vary
allowed
to vary
time
reflectingvis--vis
changes
in price
the the
ofin
commodities
,,over
traded.
This
implies
that
at
any
point
in
time,
changes
in
CTOT
reflect
changes
in prices
(
)
allowed
to
vary
over
time
reflecting
changes
in
the
basket
of
commodities
actually
,,
,,
time
reflecting
changes
in
the
basket
of in
commodities
actually
traded.
This
implies that
at any
point in time,
traded.
This
implies
at any
point
time,
changes
CTOT
reflect
in prices
allowed
to
vary
overthat
time
reflecting
changes
in in
the
basket
of changes
commodities
actually
only
and
not
in
the
volumes
traded.
When
aand
weight
not
available
for aWhen
country
in prices
a is not
,,
(
) at
inThis
CTOT
reflect
changes
in point
prices
only
not
inisavailable
the
a weight
traded.
implies
that
any
in
time,
changes
involumes
reflect
changes
in
changes
3 and
,,
only
not
in
the
volumes
traded.
When
ain
weight
ischanges
not
fortraded.
a country
in achanges
CTOT
traded.
This
implies
that
at
any
point
time,
in
CTOT
reflect
in prices
given
year,
we
use
the
previous
available
weight.
available
fornot
a country
inprevious
a giventraded.
year,
use
thea previous
available
only and
inusethe
weight is
not
weWhen
given
year,
we
thevolumes
available
weight.
available
1 weight. for a country in a
only and not in the volumes traded. When a weight is not available for a country in a
year, we use
the previous
available
weight.
We use prices
for commodities
starting
in 1960, and
commodities
are
1 sortedinto four broad categories:
given
,
given
year,
we
use
the
previous
available
weight.
We
use
prices
for
commodities
starting
in
1960,
and
commodities
are sorted
into four
We
use
prices
for
commodities
starting
in
1960,
and
commodities
are sorted
into four
(
,,
3
,,
1 ) crude oil, and natural gas.

categories:
EnergyCoal,
categories:
We
use prices for commodities starting in 1960, and commodities are sorted into four
3
,,
,,
(natural
) gas.gas.gold,
- use
1. prices
Energy:for
coal,
crude
oil,
and
,,
-categories:
MetalsAluminum,
cobalt,
copper,
diamond,
lead, nickel, platinum,
tin,into
titanium,
1.
Energy:
coal,
crude
oil,
and
natural
We
commodities
starting
in 1960, iron
andore,
commodities
are sorted
foururanium,
,
3
2.
Metals:
Aluminum,
cobalt,
copper,
diamond,
gold,
iron
ore,
lead,
nickel,
platinum,
tin,
and
zinc.
-2.
gold, iron ore, lead, nickel, platinum, tin,
1. Metals:
Energy:Aluminum,
coal, crude cobalt,
oil, andcopper,
natural diamond,
gas.
categories:
titanium, uranium,
zinc.
,
titanium,
uranium,
zinc.
1ore,
2.
Metals:
Aluminum,
cobalt,
copper,
diamond,
lead, groundnuts,
nickel, platinum,
tin, oil,
beef, cocoa,
coconut oil,
coffee,gold,
corn,iron
fish,
fish meal,
lamb, olive
- 1. FoodBananas,
Energy:
coal,barley,
crude
and
natural
gas.oil,
3.
Food:
Bananas,
barley,oil,
beef,
cocoa,
coconut
coffee, corn,
fish, fish meal,
3.
Food:
Bananas,
barley,
beef,
cocoa,
coconut
oil,
coffee,
corn,
fish,
fish
meal,
,,
,
palm
oil, poultry,
rapeseedcopper,
oil, rice, shrimp,
soybean
meal,
soybean,
soybeans
oil, sugar, sunflower
titanium,
uranium,
zinc.
2. oranges,
Metals:
Aluminum,
cobalt,
diamond,
gold,
iron
ore,shrimp,
lead,
nickel,
groundnuts,
lamb, olive oil,
orange, palm oil,
poultry, rapeseed
oil, rice,
soybean platinum, tin,
oil,
swine, Bananas,
tea,lamb,
and wheat.
groundnuts,
olive
oil,beef,
orange,
palm
oil,poultry,
rapeseed
oil,
rice,
shrimp,
soybean
,,
3.
Food:
barley,
cocoa,
coconut
oil,
coffee,
corn,
fish,
fish
meal,
wheat.
3
meal, soybeans,
soybeans
titanium,
uranium,
zinc.oil, sugar, sunflower oil, swine, tea,
meal,
soybeans,
soybeans
oil,
sugar,
sunflower
oil,
swine,
tea,
wheat.
groundnuts,
lamb, olive
oil,logs,
orange,
palm
oil,
poultry,
rapeseed
oil,logs,
rice,
shrimp,
soybean
,
- Raw
materialsCotton,
hard
sawn
hardwood,
hides,
rubber,
soft soft
logs,
sawnsoft
and wool.
,,
4.
Raw
materials:
hard
logs,
hard
sawn
wood,
hides,
rubber,
sawnmeal,
3. 4.
Food:
Bananas,Cotton,
barley,
beef,
cocoa,
coconut
oil,
coffee,
corn,
fish,softwood,
fish
Raw
materials:
Cotton,
hard
logs,
hard
sawn
wood,
hides,
rubber,
soft
logs,
soft
sawn
meal,
soybeans,
soybeans
oil,
sugar,
sunflower
oil,
swine,
tea,
wheat.
wood,
wool. Commodity Price Cycles and Identifying Episodes
,
Methodology
for Dating
groundnuts,
lamb, olive oil, orange,hard
palm
oil, poultry, rapeseed oil, rice, shrimp, soybean
wood,
4. Rawwool.
materials: Cotton, hard logs,
sawn wood, hides, rubber, soft logs, soft sawn
,,
Cycles in country-specific
indices are
the Bry-Boschan
algorithm,
a standard in the business
meal,
soybeans,
soybeans
oil,identified
sugar, using
sunflower
oil, swine,
tea, wheat.
wood,
wool.CTOT
cycle -literature
(Harding
and
Pagan
2002).
Cycles
are
defined
as
episodes
in
which
the
CTOT
forsoft
at least
two
,,
4. Raw materials: Cotton, hard logs, hard sawn wood, hides, rubber, increased
soft logs,
sawn
consecutive years, with a subsequent decline of at least three consecutive years, and with a cumulated decline of at least 1
wood, wool.
-
45
Annex Figure 2.1.1. Upswing and Downswing in Terms-of-Trade Cycles

Peak
Coommodity terms of trade
percent (Annex Figure 2.1.1). Upswings are defined trough

to peak (excluding the trough year, but including the peak
year); downswings are defined peak to trough (excluding the
peak year, but including the trough year). The analysis of the
event studies further restricts the episodes to downswings
that are driven by declines in the prices of commodity
exports. Thus, episodes in which import price developments
drive the declines in commodity terms of trade and which
may have a different economic impact are excluded.
Upswing
Minimum
1% GDP
Downswing
t3
t2
t1
t
t+1
t+2
t+3
Based on this methodology, 201 episodes for 105 countries
are identified, of which 75 episodes are in sub-Saharan
Africa. Figure 2.1.2 shows the episodes identified for sub-Saharan African commodity exporters and selected others.
-1
1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
-1
-1
1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
1 2 3 4 5
-11
1 2 3 4 5 6
-11
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
-1
1 2 3 4 5
-2 -1
1 2 3 4 5
-2 -1
1 2 3 4
-1
1 2 3
-2 -1
1 2 3 4 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1
1 2 3
-1
1 2 3
-1
-1
1 2 3 -2 -1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6
-2 -1
1 2 3 4
-11
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 -2 -1
-1
1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
1 2 3 4
-1
1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
1 2 3 4
-1
1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
1 2 3 4
1 2 3
-4 -3 -2 -1
-1
-1
1 2 3
-1
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
-1
1 2 3 4 5
2014
1 2 3 4
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3 4
-1
1 2 3
-2 -1
1 2 3
1 2 3 -1
1 2 3
-2 -1
1 2 3
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
-3 -2 -1
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
1 2 3
-4 -3 -2 -1
1 2 3 4
-3 -2 -1
-1
-2 -1
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1
1 2 3 4 5
-2 -1
-1
1 2 3
-1
1 2 3 4
-1
-1
1 2 3
1 2 3 4
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1
-1
2012
1 2 3 4 5
-2 -1
-2 -1
2010
1 2 3 4
-1
-3 -2 -1
2008
2006
2004
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
1988
1986
1984
1982
1980
1978
1976
1974
1972
1970
1968
1966
1964
Countries
Sub-Saharan African Oil
Exporters
Angola
Cameroon
Chad
Congo, Rep.
Equatorial Guinea
Gabon
Nigeria
South Sudan
Sub-Saharan African Metal
Exporters
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Ghana
Guinea
Mali
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Sub-Saharan African Food and
Raw Material Exporters
Cte d'Ivoire
Central African Republic
Liberia
Other Oil Exporters
Russia
Saudi Arabia
Venezuela
Other Metal Exporters
Chile
Mauritania
Peru
Other Food and Raw Material
Exporters
Brazil
Paraguay
Uruguay
1962
Annex Figure 2.1.2. Sub-Saharan African Commodity Exporters and Other Countries: Episodes of Commodity Terms-of-Trade Busts
(Time span of each episode)
-2 -1
1 2 3 4
-2 -1
1 2 3 4 5

Note: A country is classified as a commodity exporter if commodity exports constitute at least 25 percent of total goods exports, on average during the
respective decade, and net commodity exports accounted for at least 5 percent of goods trade (goods exports plus goods imports), on average during
the respective decade. Episodes of negative commodity terms-of-trade shocks are identified on the basis of at least three years of consecutive decline
in the commodity terms-of-trade index and a cumulative drop in the index of at least 1 percentage point of GDP within three years of the peak.
46
Local Projections Method

The effects of commodity terms-of-trade shocks on macroeconomic aggregates are evaluated using the local projections
method of Jord (2005), which was later refined by Teulings and Zubanov (2014). This method allows the estimation
of the dynamic effects of a shock in commodity terms of trade using impulse-response functions that are obtained from
ordinary least squares regressions. Unlike impulse-responses obtained from vector autoregression (VAR), the impulseresponses obtained with local projections do not require assumptions about the structure through which shocks are
transmitted in the
system, which
is a common
issue in VAR models.
For
the

shock
estimation
ofthe
of
a
contemporary
of CTOT on the variable of interest(output, trade
balance,

effects
used control
for other determinants of economic performance such as trading partners
and fiscal revenues),
the models
and
GDP
growth, an indicator
of global financial conditions, and country-specificindicators
of
war
or
conflicts
armed
in
regimes.

changes

political
In this expression,
of CTOT
The equation usedto

estimate the effect
shocksis shown below.
the first two terms

represent country and time effects. The third term contains
the shock
by , which is the change
variable, represented
in the natural log

of the country-specific
CTOT at time
t. The cumulative effect on the variableof
interest is represented
horizon. The other
control variables. The fourth and fifth terms

by the estimate , where h denotes
thetime
termsare
control for shocks in CTOT and other

determinants that
occur before time t but still may have an effect on the outcome
of the dependent variable. The sixth term controls for effects on the dependent variable coming from its own lagged
variations. The last two terms, introduced by Teulings
and Zubanov (2014), control for the effects of shocks in CTOT
and other determinants occurring between t and t+h that can influence the outcome of the dependent variable at time
estimated, it is necessary to estimate a different equation. The

t+h. For each horizon h for which the effect of CTOT is
cumulative responses are obtained from the h different . The equations are estimated using balanced panels for the
period 19622015 and robust standard errors (White 1982).
47
Methodology for Evaluating the Effect of Policies on Countries Resilience in the Aftermath of a Negative
Commodity Price Shock
A multivariate ordinary least squares regression analysis is undertaken that relates the relative real GDP growth performance in the aftermath of a terms-of-trade shock to variables capturing countries policy space and policy responses.
The regression analysis builds on the previously identified episodes for the sample of emerging market and developing
countries and existing empirical research (Adler and Sosa 2011; Cspedes and Velasco 2012).
Although terms-of-trade shocks can be of varying lengths, the focus of the analyses is on the first three years after a
shock hits an economy. To assess the role of policy space and policy reactions in mitigating the impact of a shock on
real economic growth, we need to construct appropriate measures of the impact. A growth difference measure is used to
capture the gap between the real economic growth rate in the first three years of a shock versus the average growth rate
observed during the three years before the shock (as a proxy of what growth could have been in the absence of the shock).
In the aftermath of shocks, countries growth paths will vary depending on a number of factorssome countries show
more resilience than others to shocks, as displayed in Annex Figure 2.1.3. The variables used in the regression analysis are
detailed in Annex Table 2.1.
Annex Figure 2.1.3. Stylized Growth Response to a Commodity
Terms-of-Trade Decline
Growth
Rate
Growth before
t-3
48
Growth after
peak=t
t+3
Annex Table 2.1.1. Descriptions of Variables
Variable
Description
Source
Annual real GDP growth, growth differential measured as

Real GDP growth and growth
average growth of real GDP in first three years of a shock minus
differential
average growth of real GDP in previous three years.
Penn World Tables and IMF, World

Economic Outlook database.
Private consumption
Real terms, national currency, percent growth.
IMF, World Economic Outlook database.
C
Current
t accountt balance
b l
Percent
P
t off GDP.
GDP
IMF,
IMF World
W ld Economic
E
i Outlook
O tl k database.
d t b
International reserves
Gross, in percent of GDP.
IMF, International Financial Statistics and

Fiscal balance
General government, national currency, in percent of GDP.
Total public debt
General government gross debt, national currency, in percent of

GDP.
Consumer price index
Annual percent growth.
IMF, International Financial Statistics.
Cumulative percent change in the CTOT over the first three

Size CTOT shock
years after a shock.
Shocks caused by decline in Dummy variable equal to 1 if a CTOT shock is related to a
export prices
decline in export prices.
Above-average reserve buffers calculated as actual reserves (in
percent of GDP) minus regime-specific (fixed or flexible
International reserves above
exchange rate) median levels of reserves for all emerging market
median at time t 0
and developing countries, in the year immediately before a
shock.
High external debt before
Dummy variable with value 1 if external-debt-to-GDP ratio is
shock
40 percent or more.
Dummy variable with value 1 when the de facto exchange rate
Flexible exchange rate regime
regime is flexible in the year immediately before the CTOT
att time
ti t 0
shock.
Cumulative depreciation in the nominal exchange rate (U.S.
Depreciation of nominal
dollars per national currency) over the first two years of a
exchange rate (percent)
shockused as a proxy for exchange rate flexibility.
IMF staff calculations.

IMF staff calculations.
IMF staff calculations based on data from

Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2010)
ddatabase.
t b
Cumulative depreciation (in percent) during currency collapses,

Exchange rate collapse: 45% where such events are defined as declines of 45 percent or more
or more depreciation
in the value of the domestic currency during the first two years of
a shock.

Growth of real government

consumption
Average annual percent change in real government consumption

over first three years of the shock.

Growth of real government

consumption interacted with
high
g external debt
Interaction term between average percent change in real

government consumption and a dummy variable for externaldebt-to-GDP ratio at 40 percent of GDP or more the year before
the shock.
shock

M2 growth during shock
Average annual percent change in broad money (M2) over the

first three years after the shock.
War or armed conflict

Change in political regime
Financial conditions
External demand
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of deaths in battlerelated conflicts is at least 1,000.
Dummy variable equal to 1 and the following four years in case
of a change in political regime.
Slope of the yield curve of U.S. bonds. Difference between rates
of 10-year and 3-year bonds.
Indicator of external demand. Chained index based on weighted
sum of GDP growth rates of trading partners, weighted by share
of exports to each partner.
World Bank, World Development

Indicators.
Center for Systemic Peace, Polity IV
dataset.
Federal Reserve.
Note: CTOT = commodity terms-of-trade index.
49
Country Coverage
Depending on the data availability, the event studies and regression analyses in the chapter included the following
countries:
Sub-Saharan African countries: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Comoros,
Republic of Congo, Cte dIvoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, So Tom and Prncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra
Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
Non-sub-Saharan African countries: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belize,
Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, FYR Macedonia, Georgia, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives,
Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Qatar, Russia, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia,
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan,
United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, and Vietnam.
50
3. Financial Development and Sustainable Growth

Financial development is important for promoting
strong and stable economic growth in sub-Saharan
Africa. It entails the wider use of existing financial
instruments as well as the creation and adoption of
new ones for intermediating funds and managing
risk (Chami, Fullenkamp, and Sharma 2010).
With external demand and financing conditions
significantly worsening, and a much less favorable
growth outlook for sub-Saharan Africa, identifying
untapped or underutilized sources of growth and
reducing its volatility have become even more
urgent. It is well established in both the theoretical
and empirical literature that financial development
is generally good for growth. Although debates have
revolved around whether financial development is
an engine for growth or just a lubricant, whatever
factor can significantly ameliorate growth prospects
for the region is worth examining in detail.
Theoretically, financial development positively
affects growth through several channels that
are important for sub-Saharan Africa. First, it
helps catalyze savings into more usable forms,
and supports efficient allocation of capital and
enhancement of total factor productivity (TFP).
Second, it supports diversification and management
of risk. Third, it reduces information asymmetries
and transaction and monitoring costs. Fourth, it
can reduce volatility of the economy by providing
a variety of instruments and information to
households and firms to cope with adverse shocks
through consumption and investment smoothing.
Levine (2005), in a comprehensive review of the
literature, finds a robust linkage between financial
development and growth.
This chapter considers three questions to gauge
the role of financial development in sub-Saharan
Africas sustainable growth:
This chapter was prepared by a team led by Montfort Mlachila,

comprised of Larry Qiang Cui, Ahmat Jidoud, Monique Newiak,
Bozena Radzewicz-Bak, Misa Takebe, Yanmin Ye, and Jiayi Zhang,
under the guidance of Anne-Marie Gulde Wolf.
How has sub-Saharan Africas financial sector

developed in the past few decades, compared
with other regions?
With the changes over the past decades, is
the financial sector now able to make a more
positive contribution to growth and reduce its
volatility?
What will it take to draw further benefits from
the financial sector, and what role can policies
play in the process?
Our main findings are as follows:
Sub-Saharan African countries have made
substantial progress in financial development
over the past decade, but there is still
considerable scope for further development,
especially compared with other regions. Indeed,
until a decade or so ago, a large number
of countries had seen the level of financial
development actually regress relative to the
early 1980s. With the exception of the regions
middle-income countries, both financial market
depth and institutional development are lower
than in other developing regions.
The region has led the world in innovative
financial services based on mobile telephony,
but there remains scope to increase financial
inclusion further. The development of mobile
telephone-based systems has helped to
incorporate a large share of the population into
the financial system, especially in east Africa.
Nonetheless, there is a large untapped potential
in this area in other countries, and this can
compensate for some of the infrastructure and
other shortcomings that most countries face.
Microfinance has also grown rapidly, providing
services to customers at the lower end of the
income distribution. However, all new and
rapidly growing financial developments also
pose potential financial stability risks.
Pan-African banks (PABs) have been a driver
of home-grown financial development, but
51
they also bring a number of challenges. Their

expansion has promoted greater economic
integration, and has contributed to improving
competition and financial inclusion. Thebanks
have increasingly filled the gap left by European
and U.S. banks, which traditionally had
dominated the financial landscape in Africa
before the global financial crisis. However,
their rapid growth also poses risks, the
most important of which is related to the
lack of adequate supervisory oversight on a
consolidated basis and relatively weak internal
governance frameworks. These vulnerabilities
need to be addressed to mitigate systemic risks
that could endanger financial development.
Empirical estimates suggest that financial
development has supported growth and
reduced its volatility in sub-Saharan Africa,
although the level of financial development
in the region is below its benchmark level.
Financial development has helped mobilize
and allocate financial resources, and facilitated
other economic policies in enhancing growth
and stabilizing the economy. Though the
literature has suggested that there is a threshold
beyond which financial development can have
an adverse impact on growth and its volatility
(Sahay and others 2015b), the large majority
of the regions countries are well below this
threshold. Given that the regions level of
financial development is below the benchmark
level, raising the median financial development
index to this level could be associated with an
increase in growth by about 1 percentage
points. The results confirm the salutary effect
on reducing the volatility of growth and other
macroeconomic variables. However, countries
need to be vigilant about the emerging macrofinancial risks to effectively manage the risks
associated with financial development.
The regions improving financial
development has been largely driven by better
macroeconomic fundamentals, but hindered by
weak institutional quality. Countries can reap
the potential benefits of financial development
notably by improving legal frameworks and
corporate governance.
52
HOW HAS THE REGIONS FINANCIAL

SECTOR DEVELOPED IN THE
PAST FEW DECADES?
In most sub-Saharan African countries, financial
development has progressed over the past four
decades. However, with the exception of the regions
middle-income countries, both financial markets and
financial institutions are less developed than in other
developing regions. Innovative financial services, such
as mobile payment systems, have helped increase access
for the broader population in several countries, but
there is scope to increase financial inclusion further,
particularly in low-income and fragile countries.
Financial development has progressed in the

region but major gaps remain...
Financial depth has increased in sub-Saharan
Africa but has not caught up with other developing
regions, reflecting lower average income levels
(Figure 3.1). The regions median ratio of private
sector credit to GDP has increased by almost
10percentage points since 1995, to about 21
percent in 2014. However, it remains only about
half the size of that in the Middle East and North
Africa, East Asia, and Latin America and the
Caribbean, driven by sub-Saharan Africas relatively
high number of low-income countries in which
the median level of credit to the private sector
is comparable with other low-income countries.
Trends in the depth of the banking sector paint a
similar picture as banking sector assets at an average
of 57 percent of GDP in 2014 are half the size of
those in other regions.
The banking system dominates the financial
landscape in most countries (Figure 3.2). The
banking sector accounts for the biggest share of
assets in most countries, with the exception of
middle-income countries. For instance, nonbank
assets account for more than 50 percent of financial
sector assets only in Lesotho, Namibia, South
Africa, and Swaziland. Within the banking system,
foreign-owned subsidiaries account for the major
share of assets across all country groups, particularly
in some fragile states (Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Madagascar), while foreign branches contribution
is minor. In several countries, state-owned banks
assets are sizable (Ethiopia, Rwanda, Seychelles,
3. FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND SUSTAINABLE GROWTH
Figure 3.1. Sub-Saharan Africa: Standard Measures of Financial Depth

1. Credit to the Private Sector 1995 versus 2014
400
90
80
ZAF
70
CPV
60
50
NAM
40
TGO KEN
SEN
BWA
STP MOZ
SWZ
BEN
COM
MLI LSO
ETH CIV
CMR
CAF
NGAERI
COG
GINRWA
TCD
SLE
30
20
10
0
2. Total Bank Assets 2001 versus 2014

MUS
350
2014,
4, percent of GDP
2014 (or latest available),

ailable), pe
percent of GDP
100
20
300
250
200
100
50
40
60
80
100
1995
Rest of developing countries (below 100 percent of GDP)
Sub-Saharan Africa
CPV
150
ZAF SYC
GMB NAM
BEN MOZ
AGO
MLILSO
MWI
UGA
BDI
CAF
COD
100
200
300
400
2001
Rest of the world (below 400 percent of GDP)
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; IMF World Economic Outlook database; and World Bank, FinStats 2016.
CAF
MWIMLI
UGA
BDI
GMB
AGO
BENLSO
NAM
MOZ
CPV
MUS
ZAF 400
SYC percent of GDP)
0 COD
Rest
of
the
world
(below
Sierra Leone). Within the nonbank financial

sector, pension funds contribute most significantly
to the systems assets, while stock exchanges are
underdeveloped and illiquid (present in less than
60percent of the regions countries).
The rapid rise of PABs is an important driver

for financial development. The overall scale of
PABs operations in Africa is larger than that of
traditional European and American banks. There
are now seven PABs that have a presence in at least
10 countries. In many cases, they frequently rank
among the three largest banks in the country. They
also constitute the majority of foreign capital in a
number of countries such as Benin, Guinea-Bissau,
Niger, and Togo. Their expansion took place
mainly by establishing subsidiaries in host countries,
which operate under the host countries regulations
and supervision. Some PABs, however, entered
other activities that go beyond traditional bank
intermediation. These include operations in capital
markets, insurance, pensions, money transfers,
microfinance, leasing, and even nonfinancial
transactions.
The scale of PABs operations is growing rapidly
in the region, and has contributed to stronger
competition for loans and deposits. The banks
clients include not only well-established large
domestic and multinational entities, but also,
increasingly, underserved small and medium-sized
Sub-Saharan Africa
enterprises and individuals. Many banks are

committed to deploying mobile banking services
and Web-based technologies. They have become
increasingly involved in arranging syndicated
loans for infrastructure projects, where needs
for such financing are increasing in the region
(Enoch, Mathieu, and Mecagni 2015; Mecagni,
Marchettini, and Maino 2015). This has required
the expansion of funding sources by including
longer-term financing through bond issuance,
capital augmentations, and, in some cases, financing
from international financial institutions. As a result,
the PABs have reported higher profitability and
improved cost-to-income ratios (Stijns 2015).
... with large scope to increase financial

inclusion.
Notwithstanding these positive developments,
access to traditional financial services in subSaharan African countries remains low, particularly
for certain demographic groups (Figure3.3).
The share of the population having an account
at, or borrowing from, a financial institution is
low compared with other regions, with only the
regions middle-income countries coming close
to benchmark levels. Insufficient information on
borrowers (such as credit history and credit risk),
the lack of collateral registries, and difficult contract
enforcement constrain bank lending to the private
sector in many cases. In fragile states, access to
53
Percent of respective sector asse

Per
assets
54
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Oil exporters
Pension funds
Source: IMF, African Department Financial Sector Profiles.
Other resource-intensive
National development banks
Investment banks
Burundi
Mozambique
mbique
Ethiopia
thiopia
Senegal
enegal
Lesotho
esotho
Kenya
Swaziland
aziland
Rwanda
wanda
Uganda
ganda
Oil exporters
Majority private domestic ownership
Majority state-owned
Guinea-Bissau
Bissau
Total bank
Mali
Guinea
Ghana
South Africa
Namibia
amibia
Oil exporters
Zimbabwe
babwe
Tanzania
nzania
Botswana
swana
Nigeria
Angola
0
Nigeria
Angola
South
outh Sudan
Gabon
Cameroon
ongo, Rep
Rep.
Congo,
Equatorial
orial Guinea
South Africa
Tanzania
Zimbabwe
Namibia
Ghana
Niger
Nige
Liberia
Zambia
Mali
Ma
ierra Leone
Sierra
Botswana
Guinea
Cte d'Ivoire
Kenya
Senega
Senegal
Malaw
Malawi
Burund
Burundi
Comoros
Ethiopia
Rwanda
Cabo Verde
Mauritius
Gambia,
ambia, The
Uganda
Mozambique
ozambique
Togo
Lesotho
Swaziland
Seychelles
Madagascar
Madagasca
Benin
Guinea-Bissau
nea-Bissau
pective sector assets

Percent of respec
South Sudan
Gabon
Congo, Rep.
Equatorial Guinea
Nigeria
Angola
Cameroon
Zambia
Niger
Sierra Leone
Liberia
Mali
Guinea
Ghana
Zimbabwe
Tanzania
Botswana
South Africa
Namibia
Benin
Cte d'Ivoire
Malawi
Comoros
Gambia, The
Togo
Madagascar
Senegal
Soo Tom and Prncipe
Guinea-Bissau
Mozambique
Burundi
Ethiopia
Cabo Verde
Uganda
Mauritius
Rwanda
Kenya
Swaziland
Lesotho
Cameroon
meroon
Percent of respective sector assets

a
Figure 3.2. Sub-Saharan Africa: Sector Assets, 2012

100
1. Financial Sector
75
50
25
Non-resource-intensive
2. Banking Sector
Total nonbank
100
75
50
25
Foreign-owned subsidiaries
Branches of foreign banks
3. Nonbank Financial Sector
Finance companies/mutual funds
Other nonbank institutions
financial services is particularly limited because of

the scarce provision of financial infrastructure
fewer than seven ATMs and fewer than three
financial branches per 100,000 persons (Central
African Republic, Comoros, Guinea-Bissau). In all
of the regions country groups, access to financial
services is higher by large margins for the more
educated, the top 60 percent earners, and men.
Access is particularly low in rural areas because
branches are mostly concentrated in urban centers
(Mlachila, Park, and Yabara 2013).
increasing labor force participation rates. However,

the empirical results should be interpreted with
caution: the associations among different gender
gaps, and between gender gaps and economic
outcomes, are complex, and further work, as well
as more data on financial inclusion over time, is
needed to make more definitive statements about
the direction of causality at the macroeconomic
level.
Innovative financial services have started
compensating for some of these shortcomings in a
number of countries. The development of mobile
payment systems has helped to incorporate large
shares of the population into the financial system,
especially in East Africa (Figure 3.4). The fast
spread of systems such as M-Pesa, M-Shwari, and
M-Kesho in Kenya has helped reduce transaction
The region also suffers from considerable gender

inequality in various aspects of financial inclusion,
which is associated with higher income inequality.
Box 3.1 shows that greater financial inclusion for
women is associated with lower income inequality
(see also Sahay and others 2015a), especially by
Total
Female
Male
Total
Bottom 40
Top 60
Total
Primary school or less
MENA
MENA
LAC
LAC
MENA
LAC
EMDE Asia
SSA oil-exp.
SSA fragile
SSA MICs
10
SSA LICs
10
SSA
12
10
MENA
12
LAC
14
12
EMDE Asia
14
SSA oil-exp.
16
14
SSA fragile
18
16
SSA MICs
18
16
E
EMDE Asia
MENA
LAC
E
EMDE Asia
SS
SSA oil-exp.
S
SSA fragile
S
SSA MICs
SSA LICs
SSA
MENA
E
EMDE Asia
2. Borrowed from a Financial Institution, 2014
SSA LICs
Percent of population
18
LAC
SS
SSA oil-exp.
S
SSA fragile
10
S
SSA MICs
10
SSA LICs
20
SSA
20
10
SS
SSA oil-exp.
30
EMDE Asia
30
SSA oil-exp.
40
S
SSA fragile
40
SSA fragile
50
S
SSA MICs
20
60
50
SSA MICs
30
60
SSA LICs
40
70
SSA LICs
50
70
SSA
1. Account at a Financial Institution, 2014
SSA
Percent of population
60
SSA
Figure 3.3. Sub-Saharan Africa: Indicators of Financial Inclusion
Secondary school +
Source: World Bank Global Findex 2014.

Note: EMDE Asia = emerging market and developing Asia; LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; LIC = low-income countries; MENA = Middle East
and North Africa region; SSA = sub-Saharan Africa.
55
costs and facilitate personal transactions, and has

contributed to the use of financial intermediation
services (IMF2012b). The successful experience in
east Africa provides a useful model that could be
adapted by other countries in the region (Box 3.2).
An important lesson from east Africa is the need
to have a flexible enabling regulatory environment
while taking into account supervisory challenges.
development over time, this chapter draws on the

financial development index by Sahay and others
(2015b).
The index combines an assessment of countries
financial institutions (banks, insurance
companies, mutual funds, and pension funds)
and financial markets (stock and bond markets).
It therefore captures the fact that financial
services are provided by a multitude of financial
institutions, and that markets have developed
in a way that allows individuals and firms to
diversify their savings and enterprises to raise
capital beyond bank loans. Financial markets
are relatively underdeveloped and institutions
dominated by banks in many countries of the
region; the index therefore captures the gap in
financial services better than a one-dimensional
measure such as private credit to GDP.
Microfinance offers an important avenue that can

complement mobile banking to foster financial
inclusion. Microfinance has grown rapidly,
providing services to customers at the lower end of
the income distribution (Box 3.3). It is particularly
well suited for use by the poor with little or
no collateral, including in rural areas, thereby
significantly enhancing financial inclusion through
savings mobilization and, to a lesser extent, the
provision of credit. Although individual services in
mobile payments and microfinance are expanding,
both types of financial services so far have been
complementary, with mobile payment systems
facilitating mainly payment transactions, while
microfinance has been relaxing financial constraints
for poorer households.
Both financial institutions and markets are

assessed based on depth (size and liquidity of
markets), access (ability of individuals and
companies to access financial services), and
efficiency (ability of financial institutions to
provide financial services at low cost and with
sustainable revenues, and the level of activity
of capital markets). By including indicators of
profitability, the efficiency dimension of the
index captures the fact that, despite strong
growth in assets, financial systems in subSaharan Africa still lag behind other regions
in terms of competition (World Bank 2012).
Putting together the dimensions of financial

development
A recently developed financial development index
helps paint a more comprehensive picture of
financial development (Box 3.4). To measure
sub-Saharan Africas performance in financial
Perrcent of adult population using

financial services
Figure 3.4. Sub-Saharan African Countries: Financial Inclusion

South Africa 2015
Namibia 2011
Zimbabwe 2014
Kenya 2013
Lesotho 2011
Botswana 2014
Uganda 2013
Swaziland 2014
Nigeria 2014
Ghana 2010
Malawi 2014
Z bi 2015
Zambia
Mozambique 2014
Tanzania 2013
0
10
20
30
Formal
40
Informal
50
Excluded
60
70
80
90
Sources: Finmark Trust, Finscope Survey.

Note: Formal = formally financially included: Individuals 16 years or older who have/use financial products/services provided by a financial service
provider that is regulated or officially supervised; Informal = informally included: Individuals 16 years or older who use financial mechanisms not
provided by a regulated or supervised financial institution; Excluded = financially excluded: Individuals 16 years or older who have no financial
mechanisms and rely on themselves/family/friends for saving, borrowing, and remitting; their transactions are cash-based or in-kind.
56
100
This dimension, along with the aspect of access,

therefore gives an indication of the quality of
the financial sector.
region. Insome cases (Cameroon, Central African

Republic, Chad, and Sierra Leone), the current
development levels are actually lower than in the
1980s, partly reflecting civil wars and conflicts. In
most sub-Saharan African countries, the level of
financial development is significantly lower than in
other developing regions.
This composite index suggests that financial

development in sub-Saharan Africa has been
lackluster over the past three decades, although
there has been some modest acceleration over
the past 15 years. Figure 3.5 depicts the level of
financial development for different country groups.
While some middle-income countries (Mauritius,
Namibia, Seychelles, and South Africa) have seen
rapid financial development since the 1980s,
progress has been slower in other groups of the
Where financial development has been rapid,

it typically took place through both financial
institutions and financial markets (Figure 3.6).
This development has been supported by both
the banking and nonbank financial sectors. For
instance, in Botswana, a multitude of financial
Figure 3.5. Sub-Saharan Africa: Financial Development Index, 19802013

(1 = most developed; 0 = least developed)
0.4
1. Oil Exporters
1980
0.8
2013
2. Other Resource-Intensive
0.7
0.3
1980
2013
0.6
0.5
0.2
0.4
0.3
0.1
0.2
LAC
EMDE Asia
MENA
M
SSA
1980
Central
ntral African Rep.
3. Non-Resource-Intensive
0.4
MENA
Guinea
G
Sierra LLeone
Mali
Niger
LLiberia
Tanzania
Tan
Ghana
G
Zambia
Za
Namibia
Na
Botswana
Bots
South Africa
A
LAC
EMDE Asia
M
MENA
SSA
S
South Sudan
Equatorial
quatorial G
Guinea
Congo, Rep.
Chad
Cam
Cameroon
G
Gabon
Nigeria
N
0.0
SSA
0.5
Angola
A
0.1
0.0
2013
0.3
0.2
LAC
EMDE
Asia
E
Guinea-Bissau
Gui
Comoros
Malawi
M
Madagascar
Eritrea
Rwanda
T
The Gambia
Uganda
Benin
Bu
Burkina Faso
Togo
Burundi
Ethiopia
Senegal
Lesotho
Mozambique
M
So
o Tom an
and Prncipe
Swaziland
C
Cte dIvoire
Kenya
C
Cabo
Verde
Seychelles
0.0
Mauritius
01
0.1
Sources: Sahay and others (2015b); and IMF staff calculations.

Note: EMDE Asia = emerging market and developing Asia; LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; LIC = low-income countries; MENA = Middle East
and North Africa region; SSA = sub-Saharan Africa.
1
2000 for Angola; and 1990 for Equatorial Guinea.
2
1990 for Guinea and Namibia.
3
2000 for Eritrea; 1990 for Mozambique and So Tom and Prncipe.
57
institutions exist, and the Botswana Stock Exchange

and institutional investors share in the financial
system have grown rapidly in the first decade of
the millennium (World Bank and IMF 2008).
In Namibia, similarly, both banking sector and
nonfinancial institutions have grown significantly
within the past two years, with pension funds and
insurance companies combined exceeding the
share of commercial banks in total financial assets
(Marchettini 2015; IMF 2007). Moreover, as the
previous section elaborated, the rise of PABs has
affected the financial sector landscape in the region
significantly.
In sum, financial development in the region has
made good progress, but underperformed against
those of other developing regions. Financial
inclusion also improved with the help of innovative
financial services, such as mobile payment systems,
but there remains scope for further improvement.
Further financial development is predicated on

maintaining financial stability, especially avoiding
financial crises. To that effect, the next section
examines trends in financial stability and the
regulatory environment.
FINANCIAL STABILITY AND REGULATORY

REFORMS
Key financial stability indicatorsthough stronger
than in the pasthave weakened more recently. This
could presage a slower pace of financial development
in the future. Progress in supervisory standards varies
substantially across countries, and challenges to
implementation remain. Pan-African banks bring new
opportunities and are an important driver of financial
development, but also pose oversight challenges, and
may increase systemic risk.
Figure 3.6. Sub-Saharan Africa: Dimensions of Financial Development

(1 = highest development)
1. Financial Institutions Index
0.6
2. Financial Markets Index
0.25
0.5
0.20
0.4
0.15
0.3
0.10
02
0.2
0.00
1
1980
11982
11984
11986
11988
11990
11992
11994
11996
11998
22000
22002
22004
22006
22008
22010
22012
0.0
0.5
0
SSA low-income countries

SSA oil exporters
1982
1984
1986
1988
1980 Latin
America
and the
Carribean
1990
SSA middle-income countries

SSA
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
3. Financial Institutions Index
2002
SSA fragile countries

Emerging market and developing Asia
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
4. Financial Markets Index
0.10
20 to 80 percentile range
0.3
1980
1
1982
1
1984
1
1986
1
1988
1
1990
1
1992
1
1994
1
1996
1
1998
1
22000
22002
22004
22006
22008
22010
22012
0.05
0.1
Median
20 to 80 percentile range
0.2
Median
0.05
Sources: Sahay and others (2015b); and IMF staff calculations.

58
2012
2010
2008
2006
2004
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
1988
1986
1984
1982
0.00
1980
2012
2010
2008
2006
2004
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
1988
1986
1984
1982
0.0
1980
01
0.1
Figure 3.7. Systemic Banking Crises, 19762010

9
Sub-Saharan Africa
Nuumber of countries in crisis
Rest of the world
7
6
5
4
3
2
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1976
1977
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2012).
Banking crises in the region have become

significantly rarer, and financial soundness
indicators have improved over recent decades but
have weakened somewhat more recently (Figures
3.7 and 3.8). The reduced frequency of banking
crisesa trend evolving in parallel with favorable
macroeconomic conditions and improvements in
supervisory frameworkfrom the early 2000s has
undoubtedly contributed to financial development.

At the same time, the impact of the global financial
crisis on financial sector stability has been moderate
in most sub-Saharan African countries (Mlachila,
Park, and Yabara 2013), possibly also reflecting
the regions relatively low financial integration. In
fact, the main financial soundness indicators have
improved compared with a decade ago (Mecagni,
Figure 3.8. Sub-Saharan Africa: Financial Soundness Indicators, 200614

(Percent)
2011
2012
2013
2014
2012
2013
2014
2011
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
3. Return on Equity
4. Return on Assets
4
3
2
2
0
2007
2008
Average
2
0
Median
2
0
2
0
2
0
2014
2013
2012
2011
First to third quartile

2
0
2
0
012345
2
0
2010
2009
2008
2006
2007
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
2006
10
2006
12
2010
14
2010
16
2009
18
2009
20
2008
22
2. Nonperforming Loans
2007
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2006
1. Capital Adequacy Ratio
2
0
24
59
Marchettini, and Maino 2015). However, in

the last five years, financial soundness indicators
deteriorated somewhat, with capital adequacy
ratios staying flat at best and nonperforming loans
continuously rising. More recently, the decline
in commodity prices, tighter external financing
conditions, and exchange rate depreciations have
exerted further pressures on various dimensions of
financial soundness, in particular in commodityexporting countries (Chapter 1). This could be a
harbinger of a slower pace of financial development

in the medium term.
Progress in supervisory standards and implementation of deposit insurance schemes varies
substantially across the region (Enoch, Mathieu,
and Mecagni 2015; Mecagni, Marchettini, and
Maino 2015; Table 3.1). Most countries have
already moved to international reporting standards
or plan to move toward them in the short term,
while only six countries still rely on national
Table 3.1. Sub-Saharan Africa: Financial Sector Supervisory Standards
Angola
B t
Botswana
Burundi
Cabo Verde
CEMAC
Comoros
C g Dem.
Congo,
D
Rep.
R p
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gambia
Ghana
G i
Guinea
Kenya
y
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
M l i
Malawi
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Nigeria
R
Rwanda
d
So Tom and Prncipe
p
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
South Sudan
S il d
Swaziland
Uganda
Tanzania
WAEMU
Zambia
Zi b b
Zimbabwe
Accounting Standard
National
IFRS
IFRS Plan
IFRS
IFRS Plan
National
N ti l
National
N/A
IFRS Plan
IFRS Plan
IFRS
N ti l
National
IFRS
IFRS
IFRS
National
IFRS
IFRS
IFRS
IFRS
IFRS
IFRS
IFRS Plan
IFRS Plan
IFRS
IFRS
National
IFRS
IFRS
IFRS
IFRS Plan
IFRS
IFRS
Capital Adequacy Standard1

No Basel II yet
B l II in
Basel
i progress
p g
Basel II in progress
No Basel II yet
N Basel
No
B l II yet
y t
N/A
No Basel II yet
No Basel II yet
No Basel II yet
N Basel
No
B l II yett
Parts of Basel II/III
No Basel II yet
No Basel II yet
B l II
Basel
Basel II
Basel II
Parts of Basel II
B l II in
Basel
i progress
p g
No Basel II yet
No Basel II yet
Basel III
No Basel II yet
N Basel
No
B l II yet
y t
No Basel II yet
No Basel II yet
No Basel II yet
No Basel II yet
B l II in
Basel
i progress
p g
Deposit Insurance
No
N
No
No
No
Implemented
No
N
No
No
No
No
No
N
No
Implemented
p
No
No
No
N
No
No
No
No
Implemented
N
No
No
No
No
No
No
N
No
Implemented
Implemented
No
No
I pl
Implemented
t d
Asset Classification2
< 90 days
90 days
d y
> 90 days
< 90 days
> 90 days
N/A
90 days
d y
N/A
90 days
90 days
90 days
N/A
90 days
y
90 days
90 days
90 days
90 days
d
90 days
y
> 90 days
90 days
90 days
90 days
d
N/A
90 days
90 days
90 days
N/A
90 days
d y
90 days
90 days
> 90 days
90 days
91 days
d y
Sources: Enoch, Mathieu, and Mecagni (2015); Mecagni, Marchettini, and Maino (2015).
Note: CEMAC = Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa; IFRS = internatinal financial reporting standards; N/A = not available.;
WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union.
1
The Financial Stability Institute conducts a survey on the current status report on implementation of Basel II, Basel 2.5, and Basel III for non-Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision/non-European Union jurisdictions and publishes unedited responses. The column is based for Basel II on answers
to Pillar 1 (standardized approach of credit risk, basic indicator approach, and standardized approach for operational risk), Pillar 2, and Pillar 3.
2
This category indicates the threshold of number of days in arrears after which loans are classified as nonperforming loans.
60
standards (including Angola, Guinea, and South

Sudan). However, only a few countries and one
monetary union have thus far implemented
deposit insurance schemes (in the Economic and
Monetary Community of Central African States,
CEMAC, as well as Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania,
Uganda, and Zimbabwe). Basel II standards have
been implemented only in Malawi, Mauritius,
Mozambique, and South Africa.
Likewise, enforcement of prudential standards
is quite weak in some cases, and the adoption of
stricter financial standards in the future is likely to
face implementation hurdles. Prudential standards
are insufficiently enforced in many of the regions
countries. For example, though the West African
Economic and Monetary Unions (WAEMUs)
Banking Commission has put considerable effort
into building operational capacity and enhancing
banking supervision in the past few years, half of
the WAEMUs member countries do not comply
with the regionally required regulatory (Basel I)
capital adequacy ratio of 8 percent (IMF 2015f).
This highlights that more ambitious standards in
the future may face the risk of weak implementation
capacity.
The rapid expansion of PABs brings new
opportunities, but it also poses more risks. The role
of PABs in enhancing financial intermediation,
promoting greater economic integration, and
fostering innovation is critical. However, there are
also risks related to their systemic importance and
interconnectedness. The most important risk is
related to the lack of adequate supervisory oversight
on a consolidated basis. At the same time, some
banks have weak internal governance frameworks.
These problems need to be addressed to mitigate
systemic risks that could endanger financial
development.
The next section examines what the regions
potential for further improvement with respect to
financial development implies in terms of growth
and growth volatility.
TO WHAT EXTENT HAS FINANCIAL

DEVELOPMENT BOOSTED GROWTH AND
LOWERED ITS VOLATILITY?
Empirical estimates suggest that financial development
has supported growth and reduced its volatility in
sub-Saharan Africa. It has facilitated other economic
policies in enhancing growth and stabilizing the
economy. However, the regions financial development
still performs below the benchmark level. Raising the
median financial development index to its benchmark
value could lead to an increase in growth by about
1percentage points. The results confirm the salutary
effect on reducing the volatility of growth and other
macroeconomic variables. However, countries need to
be vigilant about the emerging macro-financial risks
to effectively manage the risks associated with financial
development.
Catching up with the structural financial

development benchmark
The level of financial development in many subSaharan African countries is below the statistical
benchmark (Figure 3.9).
An empirical analysis of 152 countries from
1980 to 2013 helps obtain benchmark levels
of financial development consistent with
individual countries structural characteristics.1
These fundamentals abstract from countries
institutional capacity or policies, and could
therefore be interpreted as a potential level
that countries with similar characteristics have
accomplished. The next section explores the
factors that could be driving the differences
between the gaps.
An index of financial development is taken as the dependent
variable. Structural characteristics include log of real GDP per
capita and its square to account for nonlinearities, population,
population density, the age-dependency ratio to account for
different saving behaviors across income groups, dummies for
oil exporters and legal origin, and time dummies to capture the
global macroeconomic environment. IMF (2015a) follows a
similar approach with a different financial development index.
Barajas and others (2013) used a similarly structured regression
to benchmark countries private-sector-credit-to-GDP ratio.
Such statistical benchmarking has been applied to specific
country groups in various cases (for example, Alter and
Yontcheva 2015; Newiak and Awad 2015). Similar results were
obtained when financial institutions and financial markets were
examined separately.
1
61
Anngola
Angola
Angola
An
ngola
a a
Gabon
Ga
abon
Gabon
Ga
abon
n n
Nigeria
Nig
geria
Nigeria
Nig
geria
a a
Cameroon
Came
C
Cameroon
Came
C
eroon
eroon
n n
Chad
C
Chad
C
d d
Congo,
Co
ongo,
Congo,
Co
ongo,
Rep.
Rep.
Equatorial
Equatori
Equ
uatorial
Equatorial
Equatori
Equ
uatorial
ial ial
Gu
Guinea
uinea
Gu
Guinea
uinea
a a
South
So
outh
South
So
outh
A
Africa
A
Africa
a a
Namibia
Nam
Namibia
Nam
mibia
mibia
a a
Botswana
Botsw
Botswana
Botsw
wana
wana
a a
Zambia
Za
ambia
Zambia
Za
ambia
a a
MaliMali
i i
Tanzania
Tanz
Tanzania
Tanz
zania
zania
a a
Ghana
Gh
hana
Ghana
Gh
hana
a a
Guinea
Gu
uinea
Guinea
Gu
uinea
a a
Liberia
Lib
beria
Liberia
Lib
beria
a a
Central
Centr
C
Central
Centr
C
ral ral
African
Afrrican
African
Afrrican
Rep.
Rep.
Sierra
Sie
erra
Sierra
Sie
erra
Leone
Le
Leone
Le
e e
Mauritius
Mau
Mauritius
Mau
uritius
uritius
s s
Seychelles
Seych
S
Seychelles
Seych
S
helles
helles
s s
Cabo
Ca
abo
Cabo
Ca
abo
Verde
V
Verde
V
e e
Swaziland
Swaz
S
Swaziland
Swaz
S
ziland
ziland
d d
Kenya
Ke
Kenya
Ke
a a
SooSo
Tom
Tom
o m
Tom
Tom
m
anddand
Prncipe
Prn
d Prncipe
Prn
ncipe
ncipe
e e
Lesotho
Les
sotho
Lesotho
Les
sotho
o o
Senegal
Sen
negal
Senegal
Sen
negal
l l
Togo
T
Togo
T
o o
Mozambique
Mozamb
Mo
ozambique
Mozambique
Mozamb
Mo
ozambique
bique
bique
e e
Burkina
Bur
rkina
Burkina
Bur
rkina
Faso
F
Faso
F
o o
Ethiopia
Eth
hiopia
Ethiopia
Eth
hiopia
a a
Benin
B
Benin
B
n n
Cte
C
te
Cte
C
te
dIv
dIvoire
Ivoire
dIv
dIvoire
Ivoire
e e
Gambia,
Gam
Gambia,
Gam
mbia,
mbia,
, The
, eThee
Eritrea
Er
ritrea
Eritrea
Er
ritrea
a a
Niger
N
Niger
N
r r
Rwanda
Rwa
wanda
Rwanda
Rwa
wanda
a a
Burundi
Bur
rundi
Burundi
Bur
rundi
i i
Uganda
Uga
Uganda
Uga
anda
anda
a a
Madagascar
Madaga
Ma
adagascar
Madagascar
Madaga
Ma
adagascar
ascar
ascar
r r
Malawi
Ma
alawi
Malawi
Ma
alawi
i i
Comoros
Com
Comoros
Com
moros
moros
s s
Guinea-Bissau
Guinea-Bi
Guine
Guinea-Bissau
Guinea-Bi
Guine
ea-Bissau
ea-Bissau
issau
issau
u u
Angola
An
ngola
Angola
An
ngola
a a
Gabon
G
Gabon
G
n n
Nigeria
Ni
igeria
Nigeria
Ni
igeria
a a
Cameroon
Came
C
Cameroon
Came
C
eroon
eroon
n n
Chad
C
Chad
C
d d
Congo,
Co
ongo,
Congo,
Co
ongo,
Rep.
Rep.
. .
Equatorial
Equatori
Equ
uatorial
Equatorial
Equatori
Equ
uatorial
rialrial
Gu
Guinea
uinea
Gu
Guinea
uinea
a a
South
So
outh
South
So
outh
A
Africa
A
Africa
a a
Namibia
Nam
Namibia
Nam
mibia
mibia
a a
Botswana
Botsw
Botswana
Botsw
wana
wana
a a
Zambia
Za
ambia
Zambia
Za
ambia
a a
MaliMali
i i
Tanzania
Tanz
Tanzania
Tanz
zania
zania
a a
Ghana
G
Ghana
G
a a
Guinea
Gu
uinea
Guinea
Gu
uinea
a a
Liberia
Li
iberia
Liberia
Li
iberia
a a
Central
Centr
C
Central
Centr
C
ral ral
African
Afr
frican
African
Afr
frican
Rep.
Rep.
. .
Sierra
Sie
erra
Sierra
Sie
erra
Leone
L Leone
Le e
Mauritius
Mau
Mauritius
Mau
uritius
uritius
s s
Seychelles
Seych
S
Seychelles
Seych
S
helles
helles
s s
Cabo
Ca
abo
Cabo
Ca
abo
Verde
V
Verde
V
e e
Swaziland
Swaz
S
Swaziland
Swaz
S
ziland
ziland
d d
Kenya
K
Kenya
K
a a
SooSo
Tom
Tom
o m
Tom
Tom
m
and
ndand
nd
Prncipe
Prn
Prncipe
Prn
ncipe
ncipe
e e
Lesotho
Les
sotho
Lesotho
Les
sotho
o o
Senegal
Sen
negal
Senegal
Sen
negal
l l
Togo
T
Togo
T
o o
Mozambique
Mozamb
Mo
ozambique
Mozambique
Mozamb
Mo
ozambique
bique
bique
e e
Burkina
Bur
rkina
Burkina
Bur
rkina
Faso
Faso
o o
Ethiopia
Eth
hiopia
Ethiopia
Eth
hiopia
a a
Benin
B
Benin
B
n n
Cte
C
te
Cte
C
te
dI
dIvoire
Ivoire
dI
dIvoire
Ivoire
e e
Gambia,
Gambia
Ga
ambia,
Gambia,
Gambia
Ga
ambia,
a, The
a, eThee
Eritrea
E
Eritrea
E
a a
Niger
N
Niger
N
r r
Rwanda
Rw
wanda
Rwanda
Rw
wanda
a a
Burundi
Bu
urundi
Burundi
Bu
urundi
i i
Uganda
Ug
ganda
Uganda
Ug
ganda
a a
Madagascar
Madaga
Ma
adagascar
Madagascar
Madaga
Ma
adagascar
ascar
ascar
r r
Malawi
Ma
Malawi
Ma
i i
Comoros
Com
Comoros
Com
moros
moros
s s
Guinea-Bissau
Guinea-Bi
Guin
Guinea-Bissau
Guinea-Bi
Guin
nea-Bissau
nea-Bissau
Bissau
Bissau
u u
The results suggest that financial development

in the region is generally below the benchmark
level. Relatively fast financial development
over the past decade has led to a catch-up
or even surpassing the benchmark only in
middle-income countries that expanded
financial institutions beyond the banking sector
(Cabo Verde, Mauritius, South Africa),
Cte dIvoire, and large oil exporters (Angola,
Nigeria). For the latter group, benchmark levels
are typically comparatively low because oil
production is often self-financed and/or from
1. Financial Development: Actual and Predicted

0.9 1. Financial Development: Actual and Predicted
0.9
0.8
0.8
0.7
0.7
06
0.6
00.56
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.4
0.3
0.3
02
0.2
00.12
0.2
0.1
0.0
0.0
Oil exporters
Resource-intensive
Oil exporters
Resource-intensive
2. Financial Institutions: Actual and Predicted
1 0 2. Financial Institutions: Actual and Predicted
1.0
10.90
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.8
07
0.7
00.67
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.5
04
0.4
00.34
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.2
01
0.1
00.01
0.1
0.0
Oil exporters
Oil exporters
62
Resource-intensive
Resource-intensive
Sources: Sahay and others (2015b); and IMF staff estimates.
offshore sources. As a result, the sector

contributes less to financial sector development,
than other sectors. Among others, Angola
has seen particularly rapid development, with
bank deposits increasing from 21 percent to
49percent of GDP, and bank loans rising from
5 percent to 24 percent of GDP between 2005
and 2013, and has consequently surpassed the
benchmark level (Takebe 2015). Asimilar
exercise that creates a benchmark for the
financial institutions component of the index
yields very similar results.
Figure 3.9. Sub-Saharan Africa: Actual and Predicted Financial Development, 2013
(1 = most developed; 0 = least developed)
Actual
Actual
Actual
Actual
Predicted
Predicted
Predicted
Predicted
Financial development has supported growth

and reduced its volatility...
Empirical evidence suggests that financial
development supports growth in the region,
especially at lower levels of financial development,
although the effect on volatility is less robust.
Many studies find a positive impact, but suggest
the existence of a threshold beyond which financial
development is detrimental to growth (Arcand,
Berkes, and Panizza 2012; Ceccheti and
Kharoubi 2015; Sahay and others 2015b).
However, most countries in the region are well
below the threshold to exhibit adverse growth
effects.2 The literature has also shown that financial
development helps dampen the impact of adverse
shocks by alleviating firms and households
borrowing constraints (Caballero and Krishnamurty
2001), and promoting diversification and
management of risk (Acemoglu and Zilibotti 1997).
However, the financial accelerator mechanism may
propagate and amplify the impact of real shocks in
an environment with credit market imperfections
(Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999).
Deeper financial development is associated with
higher growth in sub-Saharan African countries,
with the size of the effect varying across countries.
This section assesses the impact of financial
development on growth3 in sub-Saharan Africa
following Sahay and others (2015b), and includes
factors specific to the region, such as the effect of
aid flows and of the share of the agricultural sector
as a proxy for the primary and informal sectors.
The results show a positive impact of financial
development on growth (Table3.2), and thus
there is further scope for financial deepening in
the region to better support growth, given that
most sub-Saharan African countries are well
below the inflection point for potential adverse
effects. Inparticular, raising the median financial
Arcand, Berkes, and Panizza (2012) find evidence of an
adverse impact of finance on growth above a threshold of
private credit to GDP of 100 percent, far above the actual level
of sub-Saharan African countries.
3
As identified in the literature on finance and growth (for
example, Levine 2005 and Beck 2008), the empirical analysis
encounters significant endogeneity issues. Following the
literature, our analysis uses the panel generalized method of
moments estimator, which uses lagged variables as instruments
to minimize the problem.
2
Table 3.2. Sub-Saharan Africa: GMM Estimation Results of Impact of

Financial Development on Growth
Model 1
Financial development index

Financial development index (squared)
27.00 **
(11.6)
33.83 *
(19.9)
9.956 ***
(3.51)
0.794
(19.19)
19.590
(24.82)
Financial institution index

Financial market index
Financial institution index * financial
market index
Observations
Number of countries
Model 2
216
39
216
39
Source: IMF staff estimates.

Note: The dependent variable is real GDP growth, averaged over
nonoverlapping five-year periods. Data cover more than 43 subSaharan African countries (SSA), but availability varies by variables.
Following Sahay and others (2015b), additional control variables
include initial per capita GDP, education enrollment, and share of
government consumption in GDP. The share of agriculture in GDP
is added to better reflect its significance in SSA. Given the weak
coefficient on the square terms, and that most SSA countries are at
the relatively low level of financial development below the threshold to
exhibit negative growth impact as discussed in the text, the model on
the component index is run in level only in favor of parsimony.
Model 1 represents the overall effect of financial development;
model 2 represents the effect of dimensions of financial development.
GMM = generalized method of moments.
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,* p<0.1.
development index to its benchmark value is

associated with an increase in growth by about
1percentage points.
The impact on growth tends to be stronger for
countries at lower levels of financial development.
For low-income countries, with larger estimated
gaps to the benchmark, the potential increase
in growth is almost 2 percentage points, while
the growth boost for oil producers is at about
percentage point. In other words, raising the
index of Niger (0.08) to the level of Kenya (0.18)
generates a positive growth impact of 2 percentage
points, while a further increase to the level of
Namibia (0.28) adds 1 percentage point.4 The
To obtain the growth impact arising from a baseline financial
development level to a higher one while holding other
conditions equal, a new growth rate is calculated using the new
index and coefficients in Table 3.2, while the baseline growth
rate is calculated using the existing index. Thus the difference
between the two growth rates can be considered as a one-off
impact owing to the improvement of the financial development
index. The estimates for country groups are based on the
median index for the corresponding group.
4
63
The findings of recent microfounded studies

corroborate the salutary growth impact of relaxing
structural financial constraints. The October 2015
Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa
summarizes the benefits of removing the most
binding constraints to financial inclusion on GDP,
TFP, and inequality in a set of countries (Kenya,
Mozambique, Nigeria, Uganda, and Zambia) and
two monetary unions using the general equilibrium
framework of Dabla-Norris and others (2015).
The study identified borrowing constraints
limited enforcement of contracts and asymmetric
information that results in high collateral and
smaller leverage ratiosas the most relevant hurdles
to firms access to finance. Relaxing these borrowing
constraints could increase GDP levels by 8 percent
to 20 percent through a substantial improvement
in TFP over the long term (Figure 3.10). Lowering
participation costsfactors limiting access to
credit such as distance to banks or ATMs and
Figure 3.10. Long-Term Impact on GDP of Relaxing Financial
Constraints
Percent change in GDP
25
Reducing borrowing constraints

Reducing participation costs
Increasing intermediation efficiency
20
10
Figure 3.11. Sub-Saharan Africa: Impact of Financial Development

on Growth Volatility
1.5
Increasing
volatility
Reducing volatility
1.0
0.5
0.0
CMR
C
MR
NGA
N
GA
MWI
M
WU
I GA
UGA
KEN
0
NAM
0.2
0.4
0.6
WAEMU
CEMAC
Zambia
Uganda
Nigeria
Mozambique
Kenya
Sources: Dabla-Norris and others (2015); IMF country staff reports;

and IMF staff calculations.
Note: CEMAC = Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa;
WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union.
64
The relationship between financial development

and growth volatility appears to be nonlinear
in the vast majority of countries in the region.
Following Sahay and others (2015b) and including
region-specific control variables, we find that the
relationship between financial development and
volatility is nonlinear in sub-Saharan African
countries (Table3.3), similar to findings in other
regions. Financial development initially smoothes
growth volatility by relaxing credit constraints
on firms and households, and providing them
with a variety of instruments to withstand adverse
shocks. However, as the financial sector deepens, its
contribution to reducing volatility declines because
a deeper financial sector increases the propagation
and amplification of shocks. However, the majority
of countries in the region are below the threshold
(estimated around 0.4, Figure 3.11) beyond
which financial development starts increasing
growth volatility. The empirical analysis suggests
thatunder the current institutional setting and
structural characteristicsthis threshold is lower
0.5
15
documentation to apply for a loanalso modestly

contribute to growth.
Change in growth volatility

(standard deviation)
results also show that for a median sub-Saharan

African country, most of the growth effect is from
the support of financial institutions, while that from
financial markets is positive but not significant,
likely undermined by the lack of financial
infrastructure and competition. The results are
illustrative and should be taken with caution given
the short history of financial market development
outside of the banking sector among most of these
countries.
Note: See page 82 for country abbreviations. Based on the regression

coefficients, this chart illustrates the simulated marginal impact on
the standard deviation of real GDP growth rate (five-year rolling
standard deviation) of a 10 percent increase in a countrys financial
development index. The U-shaped trend line shows that the reduction
on volatility is stronger for countries with lower index level and still
favorable but less strong for countries with already comparatively
higher level of financial development (blue-shaded area). Beyond a
certain financial development threshold, further increase in the index
would increase growth volatility (red-shaded area). The chart also
reports pilot countries under intensive macrofinancial surveillance at
the IMF (Namibia, Malawi, Uganda) and with more advanced financial
sectors, including Kenya, and Nigeria.
for sub-Saharan Africa compared to that of other

countries. This presumably reflects the insufficiency
of the regions legal and institutional frameworks
required to fully reap the benefits of deeper
financial systems. Moreover, the region is subject
to more frequent and larger shocks than others,
speciallythoserelated to international commodity
prices (see Chapter 2).
The analysis has also been extended to investment
volatility and to different components of
financial development. The results suggest that
financial development reduces investment growth
volatility but only up to a certain point for subSaharan African countries, although it increases
investment fluctuations in other regions of the
world (Table3.3). The pronounced reduction
of investment volatility may be attributed to the
greater access to credit for large firms, which

account for the bulk of investment in sub-Saharan
African countries. Both financial institutions and
financial markets are also found to dampen growth
volatility but financial institutions are found to
play a prominent role, consistent with their level
of development in sub-Saharan African countries,
as elaborated ealier. This relationship holds also for
investment growth though in a linear fashion.
...but requires more vigilance against

macrofinancial risks
Recent country studies in the region highlight
a number of emerging macrofinancial risks. For
example, in the WAEMU, a combination of
widening fiscal imbalances and accommodative
monetary policy by the regional central bank
Table 3.3. Sub-Saharan Africa: Estimation Results of Impact of Financial Development on Growth Volatility
Dependent variable: volatility of

(squared term)
GDP growth
7.589 ***
(1.118)
3.739 ***
(1 318)
(1.318)

(squared term)
(squared term)
SSA* financial development index
SSA* financial development index
(squared term)
SSA* financial institution index
9.706 ***
(1.963)
16.31 ***
(2.679)
SSA* financial institution index

(squared term)
SSA* financial market index
SSA* financial market index
(squared term)
Observations
Number of countries
1,173
95
5.236 ***
(0.664)
5.03 ***
(0.910)
2.967 *
(1 529)
(1.529)
0.106
(1.688)
4.592 ***
(1.265)
7.187 ***
(1.970)
2.290
(4.228)
2.373
(7.077)
1,173
95
Investment-to-GDP growth
157.1
***
(2.741)
280.1
***
(3 519)
(3.519)
24.67 ***
(0.768)
38.80 ***
(1 024)
(1.024)
246.3
***
(10.06)
404.6
***
(51.59)
9.052 ***
(3.253)
32.65 ***
(8.731)
1,083
89
1,083
89
Sources: Sahay and others (2015b); and IMF staff estimates.

Note: Dependent variable: five-year rolling standard deviation of real GDP growth and growth of investment-to-GDP ratio. Additional control variables:
five-year lags of GDP per capita, trade and financial openness, energy exports (percent of GDP), volatility of foreign growth, gross capital inflows
in the region excluding country in question, terms-of-trade changes, polity index, growth in GDP per capita, government balance, and aid to GDP
growth volatility for 19952013. The high magnitude of financial development variables coefficients on investment volatility could be explained by the
substantial volatility of investment across countries and over time. In addition, although the aggregate coefficient is positive for the global sample, the
financial development coefficient for sub-Saharan African countries (FD + FDxSSA) is statistically significant and negative while the coefficient on the
square term is statistically significant and positive at the 5 percent level.
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,* p<0.1.
65
(BCEAO) has allowed banks to significantly

increase holdings of government securities to take
advantage of the interest rate margin of government
bonds over the low BCEAO refinancing rate,
raising the sovereign-financial risk (IMF 2015f;
and see Chapter1).5 In Malawi, inadequate fiscal
adjustment led to the accumulation of domestic
payment arrears and increased recourse to domestic
financing, resulting in higher nonperforming
loans and higher financial sector exposure to the
government, and heightened economic uncertainty
(IMF 2015c). In Namibia, a booming housing
market has been posing a great risk to banks
and could potentially lead to a fiscal risk. In the
CEMAC, Namibia, and Uganda, banks credit
growth has been accompanied by significant
concentration risks (IMF 2015b, 2015d, 2015e).
Moreover, in Uganda, high dollarization in loans
and deposits poses potential credit risks because of
possible currency mismatches in borrowers balance
sheets. These developments could initiate bank and
sovereign risk feedback loops. If such a risk were
to materialize, it could be easily exacerbated given
the lack of enforcement of prudential rules and a
weak judiciary system, and weak crisis resolution
frameworks in the region.
WHAT DRIVES OR INHIBITS FINANCIAL

DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA?
In summary, financial development has supported

growth and reduced its volatility in sub-Saharan
Africa. However, the regions level of financial
development generally stayed below the benchmark
level. If the region can raise the median financial
development index to the benchmark level, its
growth could be increased. The next section
investigates how the region can approach the
benchmark level of financial development.
Macroeconomic fundamentals positively affect

financial development in developing economies
in general and for the region in particular. High
inflation, as a proxy for macroeconomic
instability, negatively affects financial
development.7 Also, the income effect is
significant, indicating more scope for financial
development as the middle class starts to emerge
in sub-Saharan African countries.
This section finds that sound macroeconomic

fundamentals have been driving financial development
in sub-Saharan African countries, while weak
institutional quality has been hindering it in many
countries in the region. Improvements in legal
frameworks and corporate governance seem to be the
most promising avenues to boost financial development
in the region.
Macroeconomic fundamentals have been

driving financial development in the region
Macroeconomic fundamentals are the main drivers
of financial development in the region. Drawing
on the existing literature, this section analyzes the
drivers of financial development in developing
economies, with a special focus on sub-Saharan
African countries. In particular, following the
literature (for example, Kose, Prasad, and Terrones
2006), we investigate the effects from two key
aspects of globalizationtrade and financial
integration.6 Thefollowing are the key findings
(Table 3.4):
International trade integration, measured by

the share of total exports and imports of goods
and services in GDP, positively affects financial
development in developing economies, but
A generalized method of moments estimation was employed
to mitigate the problems caused by the endogeneity.
Nevertheless, the lack of consensus on the theory or the factors
driving financial development suggests some uncertainty in
model specification, and thus the results from this exploratory
analysis should be interpreted with caution.
7
There are many other candidates for a proxy for
macroeconomic stability, but inflation is the most widely used
measure of macroeconomic stability.
6
Government debt has increased from 18 percent to 22 percent

of banks total assets between 2011 and 2014 in the WAEMU
region.
5
66
the effects almost disappear in the region

(in contrast with the theory of financial
development by Rajan and Zingales 2003).8
However, it is noteworthy that the effect from
trade integration is much stronger than that
from financial integration overall in developing
economies, pointing to a large potential
opportunity sub-Saharan African countries
might have missed.
Similarly, international financial integration,
measured by the share of international assets
and liabilities as a share of GDPreflecting
a countrys de facto degree of capital account
opennesspositively affects financial
development in developing economies and even
more strongly affects financial development in
sub-Saharan African countries.
Lower country risk appears to be conducive to
financial development in developing economies,
but the positive effects diminish in the
region. Itmight suggest that financial market
participants demand a higher risk premium
in sub-Saharan African countries, even for the
same risk rating. Thus further institutional
reform to address the country-specific
bottlenecks in financial market information
infrastructure to support market participants
can further stimulate financial development.
To sum up, sub-Saharan Africas financial
developments relatively weak, and does
not sufficiently benefit from international
trade integration as in other regions. We
therefore examine below the reasons for the
underperformance of sub-Saharan African
countries, and try to identify systematic patterns
among them.
Rajan and Zingales (2003) argued that incumbent interest
groups oppose financial development because the greater
competition erodes their rents. They claimed that opening
of trade and finance weakens the incumbent power and
reduces opposition to financial reform. Meanwhile, Svaleryd
and Vlachos (2002) claimed that international financial
integration might increase liquidity and reduce the cost of
capital, and consequently foster financial development. Baltagi,
Demetriades, and Law (2009) and Klein and Olivei (2008)
empirically confirmed this theory in advanced and developing
economies.
8
but weak institutional quality has been

inhibiting financial development in many of the
regions countries
Recent evidence suggests that sub-Saharan African
countries might be able to approach the benchmark
level of financial development by improving
institutional quality. Previous studies have generally
shown that institutional quality is one of the leading
explanations for financial underdevelopment in
the regions countries. We therefore examine
the relationship between institutional quality
Table 3.4. Sub-Saharan Africa: Drivers of Financial Development
GMM
Financial development index (t 1)
Capital account openness
(de facto index, t 1)
Trade openness index
(total trade/GDP, t 1)
Real GDP per capita (t 1)
Inflation rate (t 1)
ICRG county risk rating
SSA * capital account openness (t 1)
SSA * trade openness (t 1)
SSA * inflation rate (t 1)
1)
SSA * ICRG country risk rating
Constant
Observations
Number of countries
0.549
[0.017]
0.005
[0.002]
0 044
0.044
[0.006]
0.087
[0.007]
0.021
[0.003]
0.123
[0.016]
0.009
[0.003]
0.042
[0.009]
0.017
[0 014]
[0.014]
0.105
[0.033]
0.714
[0.046]
***
**
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
1,809
82

Note: Based on panel regressions of data for 19802013 for about
90 developing countries (excluding oil exporters), although the number
of observations vary depending on the variable. Interaction terms with
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) only show the incremental impact for the
regions countries. In other words, the overall impact on sub-Saharan
African countries should be evaluated by the sum of the coefficients
for all developing countries and the coefficients on interaction terms.
Including oil exporters does not qualitatively change the core results.
ICRG = International Country Risk Guide; GMM = generalized method
of moments.
Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
67
Figure 3.12. Sub-Saharan Africa: Financial Development and Institutional Quality in 2013
1. Judicial Independence
Institutional rating
Institutiona
ZAF
NAM
SEN
BEN
AGO
3
2
0 3594
R = 0.3594
MUS
AGO
KEN
NAM
BEN
SEN
1
0
RWA
KEN
ZAF
RWA
2. Strength of Investor Protection
Institutional rating
Institutiona
3063
R = 00.3063
1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8

In
sti
t
100 Other RWAOil

AGO
BEN
KEN NAM
SEN
exporters
0
0.2
0.4
Fi
i ld l
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8

MUS
CEMAC andZAF
WAEMU
0.6
0.8
t i R
d 0 3063

Note: See page 82 for country abbreviations. CEMAC = Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa; WAEMU = West African Economic and
Monetary Union.
and financial development using recent data. 9

Figure 3.12 shows that some types of institutional
indicators are associated with the financial
development index. It could suggest that improving
institutional quality could help countries catch
up in financial development. However, other
factors also play a role. For example, some of the
oil exporters (Angola, Nigeria) outperform the
benchmarks because the availability of oil revenues
is likely to have induced financial development
despite their relatively weak institutional quality.
Some institutions seem to matter more than

others
Sub-Saharan African countries could reap the
benefits of financial development by focusing
on improving legal frameworks and corporate
governance. To derive more specific policy
implications, we analyze empirically the effect
of different institutional indicators in more
detail.10 The results reveal that many indicators of
institutional quality can help reduce the negative
gap to the financial development benchmark
The institutional quality index was obtained from the Global
Competitiveness Indexs Pillar 1 (Institution) by the World
Economic Forum. Using alternative institutional indicators,
such as the World Banks Country Policy and Institutional
Assessment produces similar results.
10
The same exercise was conducted with the World Banks
Doing Business indicators, and the institutional indices of
Polity IV. The results are similar but less robust than the results
using the Global Competitiveness Index.
9
68
(Table3.5). In particular, protecting minority

shareholders interests, strengthening judicial
independence, and strengthening investor
protection are important for achieving a countrys
benchmark level of financial development in
the area of legal frameworks. In the area of
corporate governance, strengthening of auditing
and reporting standards appears essential. In a
similar vein, country studies (for example, Alter
and Yontcheva 2015; Cui, Dieterich, and Maino
2016; Newiak and Awad 2015) find specific
constraints in financial market infrastructure,
such as high collateral requirements and the lack
of credit information and property registry, and
have impeded financial deepening and inclusion
in central and west Africa. Drawing on the above
findings, the next section presents selected policy
recommendations.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Although financial development has contributed
to economic growth and its reduced volatility in
sub-Saharan Africa, it is well below its benchmark.
To reap the full benefits of financial development,
in addition to maintaining overall macroeconomic
stability, appropriate financial sector policies should
be formulated and implemented, focusing on building
institutions, promoting sound legal and regulatory
frameworks, and broadening financial inclusion.
That said, policymakers should be aware that this
process takes time. They also need to recognize that
Table 3.5. Sub-Saharan Africa: Top Ranking of Coefficients between the Distance to the Benchmark and Detailed Institutional Quality
Detailed institutional quality

Protection of minority shareholders interests
Strength of auditing and reporting standards
Efficiency of legal framework in challenging regulations
Efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes
Transparency of government policymaking
Effi
Efficacy
off corporate
t boards
b d
Property rights
Judicial independence
Intellectual property protection
Irregular payments and bribes
Ethical behavior of firms
Strength of investor protection
Coefficient with the distance to

the benchmark
0.0614 **
0.0468 **
0.0424
0.0400
0.0385
0.0379
0 0379
0.0346
0.0343 **
0.0326
0.0326
0.0309
0.0251 *
R -squared
0.153
0.158
0.073
0.079
0.044
0.040
0 040
0.072
0.119
0.064
0.079
0.032
0.118
Ranking of coefficient 1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
9
11
12

1
Coefficients are ranked from high to low as higher coefficients help to improve financial development in a more efficient way.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
promoting financial development requires agility

and careful management, particularly in periods of
financial liberalization, regional integration, and
when adopting technological innovations (such as
mobile banking). As financial systems evolve, existing
rules and regulations need to be adjusted to address
emerging risks.
The policiesappropriately calibrated for subSaharan Africacould include:
Providing strong legal and institutional
frameworks and promoting sound corporate
governance (Gulde and others 2006).
Strengthening legal and institutional
frameworks, including protecting the interests
of minority shareholders, fostering contract
enforcement, and judicial independence, are
critical for creating a conducive environment
in which the financial sector can develop
and thrive. Enhancing credit information
systems and reducing costs related to
prohibitively high collateral requirements
would address constraints to credit growth
and facilitate financial inclusion. Improving
corporate governance and information
disclosure, especially by aligning standards in
accounting, auditing, and financial reporting
with international best practices, would help
to reduce the negative gap to the financial
development benchmark.
Strengthening supervision, including crossborder oversight and on a consolidated basis.

Because enforcement of prudential standards
remains weak in some countries, providing
supervisors with more enforcement power and
strengthening the capacity of the supervisory
agencies should come to the fore of the agenda.
The rapid expansion of pan-African banks calls
for enhancing cross-border oversight, and on
a consolidated basis, which should be done
by improving cross-country collaboration
among home and host supervisors, and interinstitutional cooperation within countries.
Expediting harmonization of regulations and
supervisory procedures and closing gaps in
crisis management should also be addressed in
a timely manner. Establishing an appropriate
mechanism for resolving nonviable institutions
(for example, through a special resolution
regime) and ensuring adequate functioning
of deposit insurance schemes is critical for
mitigating potential risks of spillovers.
Introducing an enabling regulatory environment
to broaden financial inclusion. As indicated by
recent evidence, particularly in mobile banking,
low transaction costs and technological
innovations played a particularly important
role in bringing a large share of the population
into the financial system net, particularly in east
Africa. At the same time, the risks related to
69
rapid growth of mobile money transactions and

the increasing complexity of these transactions
should be monitored carefully by the regulators.
As the mobile money transactions become
increasingly popular in the low-income segment
of the population, it is important to strengthen
protection of householders scarce funds.
Supporting bank competition is also essential
for making financial services more affordable
and positively contributes to financial inclusion
and higher efficiency of the financial system.
70
The main drivers of competition are entry

(regulations on licensing) and exit policies
(resolution regimes); therefore, introducing
policies that allow the entry of well-capitalized
institutions and the timely exit of insolvent
ones is an important precondition for creating a
competitive environment in the sector (World
Bank 2012). As indicated by empirical studies,
fostering competition may in fact require more
regulation, particularly at the early stages of
financial development (Chami, Fullenkamp,
and Sharma 2010).
3.FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND SUSTAINABLE GROWTH
Box 3.1. Gender Inequality in Financial Access and Macroeconomic Outcomes

Sub-Saharan Africa lags behind other developing regions in terms of overall financial access as well as gender aspects
of financial inclusion (Figure 3.1.1). Access to financial services is generally lower in sub-Saharan Africa compared
with other developing regions, in particular in the regions fragile states and low-income countries. In addition,
access is particularly low for women, with gender gaps of most of the regions country groups being higher than in
emerging and developing Asia or Latin America and the Caribbean. The regions fragile states are an exception but
only because access levels are (equally) low for both genders. The gender gap is lower for informal activities, with
more women than men saving in a savings club or with a person outside the family, and men and women appear to
borrow
equally
from their
family and friends.2. Saved at Financial
1. Account
at Financial
Institution
3. Saved Using Savings Club/
0.40.2
0.2
20
M
E
N M
L N
A
L
C A
Female-to-male ratio, right scale
Female-to-male ratio, right scale
1.2
0.8
0.6
0.8
0.4
0.6
0.2
0.4
LAC
MENA
LICs
MICs
EM
EMDE Asia
LAC
EM
EMDE Asia
MENA
6. Borrowed from Family

and Friends
100
6.
Borrowed
from Family
90
and Friends
100 80
90 70
80 60
70 50
60 40
50
30
40
20
30
10
20
10 0
E C
M E
D M
L
L
I I
C C
Female
M
I M
C I
Female
H H
I I
C C
Male
1.4
0.2
0
1.2
1.2
0.8
0.8
0.6
0.6
0.4
0.4
0.2
0.2
LAC
MENA
0.60.4
1.2
LICs
MICs
0.80.6
SSA
SSA LICs
SSA
S
SSA MICsSSA LICs
S
SSA fragileS
SSA MICs
SS
SSA oil-exp.
S
SSA fragile
HICs
SS
SSA oil-exp.
LICs
HICs
MICs
MENA
EM
EMDE Asia
EM
EMDE Asia
LAC
LAC
MENA
1 0.8
S S
S S
A A
Male
1.21
20
10
0
1.4
EMDE Asia
LAC
EMDE
MENA Asia
1.2
5. Borrowed from Informal

Lender
S S
S S
A
A
Total
S S
S A
A
Total
0 0.2
0.2
0.1
0
Person Outside Family

100
90
80 3. Saved Using Savings Club/
Person Outside Family
100 70
60
90
80 50
70 40
60 30
50 20
40 10
30 0
SSA
SSA LICs SSA
SSA SSA
MICs LICs
SSA fragile
SSA MICs
SSA oil-exp.
SSA fragile
HICs
SSA oil-exp.
LICs
HICs
MICs
0.20.4
1
0.9
0.8
1 0.7
0.90.6
0.80.5
0.70.4
0.60.3
0.50.2
0.40.1
0.30
MENA
0.40.6
5. Borrowed from Informal

Lender
EMDE Asia
EMDE Asia
LAC
LAC
MENA
0.60.8
SSA
SSA
SSA LICsSSA LICs
SSA MICs
S
SSA MICsS
S
SSA fragile
S
SSA fragile
SS
SSA oil-exp.
SS
SSA oil-exp.
HICs
HICs
LICs
LICs
MICs
MICs
EM
EMDE Asia
LAC
MENA
0.81
S S
S A
A S
1000
S S
S A
A
1000
1 1.2
100
90
100
80
7090
6080
5070
4060
50
30
40
20
30
10
20
010
SSA SSA
SSASSA
LICsLICs
SSASSA
MICsMICs
SSASSA
fragile
fragile
SSASSA
oil-exp.
oil-exp.
HICsHICs
LICsLICs
MICsMICs
MICs
20
10
0
0.2
0.1
0
1.2
MENA
SSA
SSA LICs
SSA
SSA MICs
SSA LICs
fragile
SSASSA
MICs
SSA
oil-exp.
SSA
fragile
SSA oil-exp.HICs
HICs LICs
LICsMICs
4. Borrowed from Financial

Institution
100
4. Borrowed from Financial
90
Institution
80 100
70 90
60 80
50 70
40 60
50
30
40
20
30
10
20
0 10
EMDE Asia
EMDE Asia LAC
LAC
MENA
SSA
S
SSA MICs
SSA LICs
S
SSA fragile
S
SSA MICs
SS
SSA oil-exp.
S
SSA fragile
HICs
SS
SSA oil-exp.
LICs
HICs
LICs
MICs
MICs
SSA
SSA LICs
20
10
0
EM
EMDE Asia
LAC
MENA
Institution
100
1
100
Figure
3.1.1.
Sub-Saharan
Africa:
Indicators
of
Financial
Inclusion, 2014
90
0.9
90
2. Saved at Financial
1. Account at Financial Institution
80
0.8
80
Institution
70
0.71
70 100
100
60 90
0.60.9 6090
50 80
0.50.8 5080
40 70
0.40.7 4070
30 60
0.30.6 3060
20 50
0.20.5 2050
10 40
0.10.4 1040
030
0 30
0 0.3
20
Source: World Bank, Global Findex 2014.

Note: EMDE Asia = emerging market and developing Asia; HIC = high-income country; LIC = low-income country; MIC = middle-income country;
LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; MENA = Middle East and North Africa; SSA = sub-Saharan Africa.
Narrower gender gaps in financial inclusion are associated with both higher development and more equitable outcomes
(Figure 3.1.2).

More equal access for women and men to financial services, defined here as having an account at a
formal financial institution, is correlated with higher economic development, as measured by higher
GDP per capita or lower poverty rates.
Prepared by Corinne Delechat, Monique Newiak, and Fan Yang.
71
It implies more equal opportunities for men and women, and is therefore associated with a more equal
income distribution (lower net Gini coefficient).
Finally, it is also associated with more equal labor force participation (LFP) rates between men and
women. More equal LFP rates, in turn, have been previously associated with higher growth (Cuberes
and Teignier forthcoming) and a more equal income distribution (Gonzales and others 2015b).
More equality in financial inclusion for men and women is significantly associated with lower income inequality
(Table3.1.1). Lower financial access among different groups of the population distorts the allocation of resources
because it restricts investment in human and physical capital to the wealthier parts of the population (Galor and
Zeira 1993). Using a broader index of formal financial inclusion in a cross-section of countries, we find that
higher gender equality in financial inclusion is associated with lower income inequality. This effect comes on top
of standard drivers of income inequality such as the structure of the economy, government expenditure, financial
depth, and the level of development.
Gender equality in financial inclusion may be influencing income inequality through its effect on female LFP.
Theoretically, financial inclusion can empower women economically and therefore contribute to higher female LFP.
An account at a financial institution provides women with a place outside the home to store money safely (CGAP
2015), and access to borrowing can allow women to start a business, thus contributing to increases in entrepreneurship and self-employment. These channels are particularly important in sub-Saharan Africa where women are overrepresented in the informal sector, with a large part of the population in nonwage employment.
1. Financial Inclusion and GDP per Capita
R = 0.1178
R = 0.1178
NetNet
income
inequality
income
inequality
(Net
G
Gini)
(Net
Gini)
G
12
12
11
11
10
10
9
9
8
8
7
7
6
6
5
5
4
4 0
0
SSA
SSA
0.5
1
1.5
0.5 to male share
1 of population with
1.5 account at
Ratio of female
Ratio of female to male
share
of
population
with
account at
financial institutions
2
2
Pover
Poverty
2 2threshold)
Poverty(US$
Pover
(US$
threshold)
3. Financial Inclusion and Poverty

3. Financial Inclusion and Poverty
100
100
80
80
R = 0.1232
60
R = 0.1232
60
40
40
20
20
0
0
20
20
40
40
60
60
SSA
80
80
SSA
80
80 0
0.5
1
1.5
2
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Ratio of female to male share of population with account at
shareinstitutions
of population with account at
financial
RaRa
Ratio
female
to to
male
labor
force
Ratio
female
male
labor
force
participation
participation
Log
og
real
GD
GDP
perper
capita
Log
og
real
GD
GDP
capita
Figure 3.1.2.
Gender Equality in Financial Inclusion and Macroeconomic
Outcomes
2. Financial Inclusion and Income Inequality
1. Financial Inclusion and GDP per Capita
70
70
60
60
50
50
40
40
30
30
20
20
10
10
0
0 0
0
2. Financial Inclusion and Income Inequality
R = 0.0567
R = 0.0567
SSA
SSA
0.5
1
1.5
2
0.5
1
1.5
2
Ratio of female to male share of population with account at
shareinstitutions
of population with account at
financial
4. Financial Inclusion and Female Labor Force Participation
4. Financial Inclusion and Female Labor Force Participation
120
120
100
100
R = 0.3403
R = 0.3403
80
80
60
60
40
40
20
20
0
0 0
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
0.5
1
1.5
2
Ratio of female to male share of population with account at financial
Ratio of female to male shareinstitutions
of population with account at financial
institutions
Sources: Solt (2014); World Bank, Global Findex 2014; and World Bank, World Development Indicators.
72
SSA
SSA
Indeed, the results from an empirical cross-country analysis suggest that greater gender equality in financial inclusion is
significantly and positively associated with equality in LFP rates (Table 3.1.2). This finding holds when controlling
previously identified determinants of female LFP such as the level of development (Duflo 2011; Tsani and others
2012), the gender gap in education (Eckstein and Lifshitz 2011; Steinberg and Nakane 2012), fertility rate (Mishra
and Smyth 2010), the male-female age differential at the time of the first marriage, and an index of womens rights
(Gonzales and others 2015a). The finding is particularly strong for sub-Saharan Africa, where a 10 percent reduction
in the gender gap in financial inclusion is associated with a decline in the LFP gap by more than 4 percentage points.
Table 3.1.1. Determinants of Income Inequality
Variables
(1)
(2)
Financial inclusion gap
GDP per capita
Financial depth
Financial depth * advanced
economies
Agriculture share of GDP
Government consumption
expenditure
(3)
(4)
(5)
16.038 *** 15.874 *** 12.577 ** 12.628 **

(5.52)
(5.56)
(5.02)
(4.96)
4.065 *** 5.043 *** 3.801 *** 6.923 ***
(0.75)
(1.18)
(1.1)
(2.22)
4.449
15.149 *** 14.029 ***
((4.77))
((4.96))
((4.95))
13.615 *** 11.488 ***
(3.24)
(3.46)
0.359
(0.22)
Constant
Observations
R -squared
89.459 ***
(7 58)
(7.58)
96.596 ***
(10.04)
(10
04)
70
0.42
69
0.43
9.828
(4.81)
7.994
(2.14)
14.461
((4.7))
7.248
(3.62)
0.529
(0.22)
0.524
(0.19)
80.421 *** 113.097 *** 129.694
(9.75)
(9
75)
(22.45)
(22
45)
(22 12)
(22.12)
69
0.55
69
0.57
**
***
***
**
**
***
***
69
0.62
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3.1.2. Determinants of Female Labor Force Participation

Variables
Financial inclusion
gap
GDP per capita
GDP per capita
squared
Education gap
Marriage age
differential
Equal rights to get a
job (dummy)
Female legal rights
index
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.491 *** 0.399 *** 0.319 *** 0.220
(0.068)
(0.075)
(0.078)
(0.077)
0.483 *** 0.67 *** 0.489 *** 0.708
(0.15)
(0.159)
(0.157)
(0.166)
0.025 *** 0.034 *** 0.023 *** 0.036
(0.008)
(0.009)
(0.009)
(0.009)
0 324 *** 00.168
0.324
168
0.219
0 219
(0.1)
(0.104)
(0.101)
0.044 *** 0.022
(0.013)
(0.014)
0.177
(0.047)
Fertility rate
SSA (dummy)
SSA * Financial
inclusion gap
Constant
Observations
R- squared
2.564 ***
(0.662)
(0
662)
137
0.34
3.339
(0 7)
(0.7)
122
0.40
(5)
0.235
(0.078)
*** 0.736
(0.171)
*** 0.037
(0.009)
** 0.202
0 202
(0.102)
0.031
(0.014)
***
***
(6)
0.241
(0.078)
*** 0.678
(0.191)
*** 0.034
(0.01)
* 0.206
0 206
(0.103)
** 0.033
(0.015)
***
***
***
***
**
**
(7)
0.260
(0.070)
0.468
(0.177)
0.023
(0.01)
0.013
0 013
(0.101)
0.042
(0.013)
(8)
0.211
(0.075)
*** 0.529
(0.188)
** 0.026
(0.01)
0.087
0 087
(0.105)
*** 0.04
(0.014)
***
0.045 *** 0.049 *** 0.033 ** 0.039

(0.013)
(0.014)
(0.013)
(0.014)
0.014
0.05 ** 0.029
(0.02)
(0.022)
(0.023)
0.266 ***
(0.055)
0.223
(0.071)
*** 3.003 *** 3.719 *** 3.663 *** 3.292 *** 2.765 *** 2.936
(0.692)
(0
692)
(0.713)
(0
713)
(0 72)
(0.72)
(0 902)
(0.902)
(0 816)
(0.816)
(0 868)
(0.868)
107
99
99
99
99
99
0.40
0.44
0.43
0.43
0.54
0.49
***
***
***
***
**
**
***
***

Note: SSA = sub-Saharan Africa. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
73
Box 3.2. Supporting Financial Development and Inclusion Through Mobile Payments
and Banking Services
Sub-Saharan Africa leads in the adoption of mobile banking. In predominantly rural populations, traditional bank
intermediaries do not reach sparsely populated areas, and costs of their services are frequently prohibitive for lowincome households and small businesses. The recent surge in mobile money observed in many sub-Saharan African
countries has been facilitated by low transaction costs, growing innovations, and a strong increase in mobile phone
subscriptions. In 2014, the share of the population holding mobile bank accounts reached 11 percent in subSaharan Africa, almost twice as many as in any other regions (Figure 3.2.1).
Figure 3.2.1. Mobile Phone Subscriptions in 19992004
Mobile account
60
Bank account
50
40
30
20
Sub-Saharan Africa
Middle East
Asia
Western Hemisphere
10
Europe
Percent of population, age 15+
70
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.
Figure 3.2.2. Kenya: Development in Mobile Payments,

200715
250
3,500
3,000
200
2,500
150
2,000
100
1,500
1,000
50
500
Mar-07
Sep-07
Mar-08
Sep-08
Mar-09
Sep-09
Mar-10
Sep-10
Mar-11
Sep-11
Mar-12
Sep-12
Mar-13
Sep-13
Mar-14
Sep-14
Mar-15
Sep-15
Value of payment transactions, in KSh billions, left scale

Average value of a single transaction in KSh, right scale
Source: World Bank, Global Findex.
The successful experience of mobile operators in Kenya

provides insights on how to leverage mobile technology
to foster financial inclusion (Mbiti and Weil 2011;
IMF 2012a). M-Pesa launched its first mobile phone application to facilitate microcredit repayments in 2007. While
the company was experimenting with the microfinancing,
it developed a framework for payments and savings. The
number of mobile transactions grew rapidly, and quickly
exceeded those of Western Union and via payment cards.
The successful experience of M-Pesa helped to launch new
products, such as M-Shwari and M-Kesho, which use the
M-Pesa platform.1 Although the average value of mobile
payments in Kenya remains relatively small
(at US$24Figure 3.2.2), the system currently allows
sending and withdrawing money at over 123,700 agents,
compared with only approximately 1,440 bank branches
and 2,700 ATMs. By end-2014, the value of mobile
money transactions was higher (at 62 percent of GDP)
than the outstanding deposits of the commercial banks
(at 60 percent of GDP).
The growing provision of mobile payments to the
previously unbanked population in Kenya had positive
spillovers to other related areas. A number of factors facilitated the spread of services offered by M-Pesa, including
inexpensive use of technology, and the policies allowing
the operation of M-Pesa as a parallel payment system. The
legal framework was kept open to allow the introduction
of new products, while limiting the risks related to security
of deposits. Over time, technological innovations have also
facilitated access to health insurance and other saving and
lending products, from which low-income populations
were previously excluded.
There is significant potential to replicate the Kenyan experience in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. The developments in mobile money boost financial inclusion (Mbiti and Weil 2011), complementing traditional bank services
(Figure 3.2.3; GSMA 2014). Outof 28 countries in sub-Saharan Africa for which information is available, in six
countries holders of mobile accounts exceeded 20 percent of the adult population. Kenya leads the region with
M-Shwari is a deposit-lending facility tailored to the poor, which gained 7 million customers over a year of operations.
M-Kesho is a set of financial services available to customers of Safaricom, which does not have a minimum balance or monthly
charges on accounts but pays interest on accounts and offers emergency credit and insurance.
1
74
70
60
50
40
30
20
Kenyya
Ugandda
Tanzania
Zimbabw
we
Cte dIvoirre
Rwandda
Botswanna
South Africca
Ghanna
Maali
Zambia
Namibia
Gaboon
Congo, Dem. Repp.
Senegal
Madagascaar
Sierra Leonne
Nigeer
Malaw
wi
Burkina Fasso
Benin
Nigeria
Camerooon
Congo, Repp.
Toggo
Guineea
Mauritiuus
10
Burunddi
Percent of population, age 15+
Figure 3.2.3 Mobile Accounts in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2014
Source: GSMA Mobile Money Programme.
almost 60 percent of the population holding such accounts. But mobile money transactions are also growing rapidly
in Tanzania and Uganda, where such transactions doubled in the last three years in terms of broad money, reaching
about 30 percent in mid-2015. In several African countries (Cte dIvoire, Kenya, Niger, Tanzania, Uganda,
Zimbabwe), the number of mobile accounts has already exceeded the number of traditional bank accounts (World
Bank 2014). However, access to mobile banking remains uneven in the rest of the region, with less than 5 percent of
the population benefiting from it in several countries.2
The size and variety of mobile financial products have
expanded considerably. The number of banking transactions
12,000
Eastern Africa
Western Africa
via mobile devices almost doubled in the region in the last two
Southern Africa
Central Africa
10,000
years (Figure 3.2.4). East Africa has led this trend, but mobile
8,000
banking has also increased in other parts of Africa. In west
Africa, mobile payments increased by a factor of six, although
6,000
from a low base. Mobile money providers have broadened
4 000
4,000
the range of financial products and services, as transaction
2,000
accounts have served as a gateway to other financial services:
utility bill and tax payments, savings vehicles, and credit and
0
Dec-12
Dec-13
Dec-14
insurance products are gaining momentum in the mobile
Source: GSMA Mobile Money Programme.
market in Cte dIvoire, Mauritius, Nigeria, Tanzania and
Uganda. Products also target specific mobile users. For
example, in Uganda, Orange Money has developed an application for farmers enabling them to buy farming
supplies and receive payments for harvest. In Cte dIvoire, Orange, MTN, Moov, and Celpaid have developed
an application that facilitates the payment of school registration (covering 1.5 million secondary school students).
Increasingly, customers can also make international money transfers.
Millions
Figure 3.2.4 Monthly Mobile Money Transactions
An enabling regulatory environment is essential for supporting the growth in mobile money services and financial
inclusion (IMF 2012a; Klein and Mayer 2011). But there are also risks related to rapidly spreading mobile financial
transactions, as they add to complexity and may give rise to abuse if conducted by unlicensed operators. Five key
areas of risks need to be addressed by supervisors: legal framework, financial integrity, safeguarding funds, operational resiliency, and payment risks (Khiaonarong 2014). Supervisors should also monitor closely mobile money
transaction values and ensure adequate protection of customer funds.
A number of factors have been identified as potential impediments to the development of mobile financial services, including
high costs of using electronic payments, especially for smaller transactions, a policy framework that requires intermediation via
banks, and the lack of interoperability between providers.
2
75
Box 3.3. The Roles of Microfinance in Promoting Financial Inclusion

Microfinance has been growing rapidly in sub-Saharan Africa. Microfinance institutions (MFIs) typically provide
small loans and saving services to the poor and near poor; some also provide micro-insurance and money transfer
services. Following an average growth rate of about 20 percent a year in the number of borrowers and depositors
since 2005, microfinance in the region now serves about 45 million clients in 2014 (Figures 3.3.1 and 3.3.2),1 with
the highest growth of MFI assets in east and southern Africa (Figure 3.3.3). In 201516, the regions microfinance
market is projected to grow by 1520 percent, second only to Asia, which can further support access to finance of
the 350 million unbanked adults in the region (ResponsAbility 2014; Demirg-Kunt and others 2015).
Figure 3.3.1. Growth of Borrowers
80
Figure 3.3.2. Growth of Depositors

Interquartile range
Median
70
60
80
60
50
50
40
40
30
30
20
20
10
10
10
10
200508 201214
SSA
200508 201214 200508 201214

Asia
Sources: MIX database; and IMF staff calculations.
LAC
Note: LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; SSA = sub-Saharan Africa.
Interquartile range
Median
70
200508 201214
SSA
200508 201214 200508 201214

Asia
LAC
Note: LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; SSA = sub-Saharan Africa.
Microfinance has improved a variety of development indicators.2 Overall microfinance activities remain small
relative to those of banks, but their better reach to the poor with little or no collateral, including in rural areas, has
significantly enhanced financial inclusion. MFIs also have had a positive impact on the poor, including through
savings and credits (Ghana, Uganda), investment in microfirms (Kenya, Malawi), and income and consumption
(Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi), although the evidence on its sustained poverty reduction impact is still mixed. MFIs
also enhance gender equality as microcredits typically rely on women group guarantees to overcome the lack of
collateral and missing financial market infrastructure. In 2014, about 60 percent of MFI borrowers were women
in the region, almost twice womens share of formal bank accounts. But this ratio still lags behind that of the bestperforming region of Asia and varies among the subregions, led by east Africa. Studies also find that microcredits by
women have stronger positive impact.
Saving mobilization has outpaced credit services of MFIs. Over the past decade, growth in the number of depositors
has exceeded that of borrowers. In 201314, depositors outnumbered borrowers four to one, while total volume
of deposits also exceeded the gross loan portfolio in all subregions (Figure 3.3.3), reducing MFIs funding needs
from borrowing (less than 10 percent in the region). In contrast, numbers of borrowers and depositors are similar in
other regions on average, and the volume of gross loan portfolios exceeds that of deposits. Moreover, borrowing in
other regions is much higherat about a quarter of total liabilities, with deposits accounting for one-half. Despite
favorable financing costs, MFIs in sub-Saharan Africa encounter higher operational expenses (Figure 3.3.4), largely
driven by the lack of physical and financial market infrastructure.
Data are based on reports of microfinance institutions to the MIX database, and thus the incomplete coverage of such data
indicates that they are more useful in analyzing the trend than the absolute level.
2
For a detailed overview and results see, for example, Beck and Maimbo (2013), Cull, Ehrbeck, and Holle (2014), Roodman
(2012), van Rooyen, Stewart, and De Wet (2012), and Demirg-Kunt and others (2015).
1
76
The declining portfolio quality of MFIs underscores emerging challenges. Despite charging higher interest rates
(Figure3.3.5), MFIs in sub-Saharan Africa produce a portfolio quality similar to the global average. Compared with
other regions, sub-Saharan Africa records a higher loan loss rate, which has risen to about 5 percent in 201214, the
highest of all regions. Although the share of loans at risk is largely at par with the global average, it has risen steadily
(Figure3.3.6). Despite the significant contribution to financial inclusion, MFIs are also subject to boom-bust cycles,
and given that their clients are mostly the poor with less education, the sector is particularly vulnerable to natural
disasters (for example, India, Nicaragua) and Ponzi schemes (Benin). Although the small size of MFIs generally
limits the contingent fiscal risk, any significant shock can affect confidence, undermine financial deepening, and
harm the poor the most. Therefore, strong actions are needed to address the risks in light of several recent crisis
episodes.
Improving financial literacy and financial market infrastructure are fundamental to strengthening MFIs. These
measures help overcome critical information problems that impede access to finance. Also, they enhance the
efficiency of microfinance and smooth the transition to bank finance as microfirms grow (CGAP and MIX 2011).
Figure 3.3.5. Nominal Interest of MFIs
Figure 3.3.3. Microfinance Loans versus Deposits

0.8
35
Gross loan portfolio
Deposits
2009
2014
25
Percent
0.5
0.4
0.3
20
15
SADC
WAEMU
EAC
201314
200506
201314
200506
201314
5
200506
10
0.1
201314
0.2
0.0
2004
30
0.6
200506
Millions of U.S. dollars
0.7
CEMAC
Asia
LAC
MENA
SSA
Sources: MIX database; and IMF, staff calculations.
Figure 3.3.6. Portfolio Quality Indicators
Figure 3.3.4. Financial versus Operational Cost

Financial cost
30
Operation cost
25
20
Loan loss rate average

Portfolio at risk 90-day average
20
Percent
15
10
15
Asia
LAC
SSA
Asia
LAC
MENA
201214
200911
200608
201214
200911
200608
201214
200911
200608
201214
200911
201314
200506
201314
0
200506
201314
5
200608
10
200506
Percent of gross loan
25
SSA
Note: CEMAC = Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa; EAC = East African community; LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean;
MENA = Middle East and North Africa; SADC = Southern African Development Community; SSA = sub-Saharan Africa; WAEMU = Western African
Economic and Monetary Union.
77
Furthermore, these measures help to prevent the borrower overindebtedness that has contributed to repayment
crisis episodes in some countries in Asia and Latin America. In particular, technological innovation and product
diversification can inject further dynamism in microfinance and enhance its growth and poverty impact. Given its
advantage in reducing operational costs by tapping into the fast-growing and high-penetration mobile network,
mobile banking has become a fast-growing business for MFIs (Cte dIvoire, Kenya).
Strengthening supervision is key to addressing consumer protection and financial stability concerns while supporting
financial inclusion. While the test and learn approach to supervision has supported rapid growth of the sector in
many of the regions countries, enhancing risk-based supervision and enforcement is critical to weed out problem
MFIs to support stability and efficiency (BIS 2010; CGAP and MIX 2011; Cui, Dieterich, and Maino 2016).
Some countries made progress in regulating MFIs by activities (Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda,
Uganda, and the West African Economic and Monetary Union), but effective enforcement against small-sized, yet
often more numerous, MFIs requires stronger commitment and commensurate resources by relevant supervisors. In
addition to supervisor monitoring, strengthening professionalism in the microfinance sector is important to mitigate
governance risk. Finally, the high share of MFIs that take deposits in the region also require effective collaboration
between supervisors of nonbank financial institutions and bank supervisors.
Box 3.4. Measuring Financial Development and Inclusion

The financial development index (Sahay and others 2015b); Svirydzenka 2016) combines subindices on financial
institutions and markets along the dimensions of financial depth, access, and efficiency.
Financial Institutions
Depth: Ratios of private sector credit to GDP, pension fund assets to GDP, mutual fund assets to GDP, life and
non-life insurance premiums to GDP.
Access: Commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults, and ATMs per 100,000 adults.
Efficiency: Net interest margin, lending-deposit spread, non-interest income to total income, overhead costs to total
assets, return on assets, and return on equity.
Financial markets
Depth: Ratios of stock market capitalization to GDP, stock market turnover to GDP, international government
debt securities outstanding to GDP, and total debt securities outstanding of private nonfinancial corporations to
GDP.
Access: Percent of stock market capitalization outside of top 10 largest companies, total number of debt security
issuers (domestic and external, nonfinancial corporations, financial corporations).
Efficiency: Stock market turnover ratio (stock market turnover/capitalization).
The underlying series and subindices are combined in a linear manner, with weights being determined by
principal component analysis. Financial depth has a relatively large weight in the financial institutions and
markets subindices. However, for the overall index, financial markets and institutions enter with equal weights.
78
Statistical Appendix
Unless otherwise noted, data and projections presented in this Regional Economic Outlook are IMF
staff estimates as of 25 March, 2016, consistent
with the projections underlying the April 2016
World Economic Outlook.
The data and projections cover 45 sub-Saharan
African countries in the IMFs African Department.
Data definitions follow established international
statistical methodologies to the extent possible.
However, in some cases, data limitations limit
comparability across countries.
Country Groupings
Country classifications have been changed
compared to previous Regional Economic Outlooks.
Countries are aggregated into four (overlapping)
groups: oil exporters, middle-income, low-income,
and fragile countries (see table on page 80 for the
new country groupings).
The membership of these groups reflects the most
recent data on per capita gross national income
(averaged over three years) and the 2014 World
Bank, Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
(CPIA) score.
The oil exporters are countries where net
oil exports make up 30 percent or more of
total exports. Except for Angola, Nigeria,
and South Sudan, they belong to the Central
African Economic and Monetary Community
(CEMAC).
The middle-income countries had per capita
gross national income in the years 201214 of
more than US$1,045.00 (World Bank, using
the Atlas method).
The low-income countries had average per
capita gross national income in the years
201214 equal to or lower than US$1,045.00
(World Bank, Atlas method).
The fragile countries had average CPIA scores of
3.2 or less in the years 201214 and/or had the
presence of a peace-keeping or peace-building

mission within the last three years.

The membership of sub-Saharan African

countries in the major regional cooperation
bodies is shown on page 80: CFA franc zone,
comprising the West African Economic and
Monetary Union (WAEMU) and CEMAC;
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa (COMESA); the East Africa Community
(EAC-5); the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS); the Southern
African Development Community (SADC);
and the Southern Africa Customs Union
(SACU). EAC-5 aggregates include data for
Rwanda and Burundi, which joined the group
only in 2007.
Methods of Aggregation
In Tables SA1SA3, SA6SA7, SA13, SA15SA16,
and SA22SA23, country group composites are
calculated as the arithmetic average of data for
individual countries, weighted by GDP valued at
purchasing power parity as a share of total group
GDP. The source of purchasing power parity
weights is the World Economic Outlook (WEO)
database.
In Tables SA8SA12, SA17SA21, and
SA24 SA26, country group composites are
calculated as the arithmetic average of data for
individual countries, weighted by GDP in U.S.
dollars at market exchange rates as a share of total
group GDP.
In Tables SA4SA5 and SA14, country group
composites are calculated as the geometric average
of data for individual countries, weighted by GDP
valued at purchasing power parity as a share of total
group GDP. The source of purchasing power parity
weights is the WEO database.
In Tables SA27SA28, country group composites
are calculated as the unweighted arithmetic average
of data for individual countries.
79
Sub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Groupings

Oil exporters
Angola
Angola
Benin
Malawi
Burundi
Cameroon
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Mali
Chad
Cabo Verde
Burundi
Mozambique
Chad
Congo, Republic of
Cameroon
Niger
Comoros
Equatorial Guinea
Congo, Republic of
Central African
Republic
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Gabon
Cte dIvoire
Chad
Rwanda
Senegal
Congo, Republic of
Nigeria
Equatorial Guinea
Sierra Leone
Cte dIvoire
South Sudan
Gabon
South Sudan
Eritrea
Tanzania
Guinea
Togo
Guinea-Bissau
Uganda
Liberia
Zimbabwe
Madagascar
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Eritrea
Ghana
Ethiopia
Kenya
Gambia, The
Lesotho
Guinea
Mauritius
Guinea-Bissau
Namibia
Fragile countries
Malawi
Liberia
Nigeria
Mali
Madagascar
Seychelles
So Tom and Prncipe
So Tom and Prncipe
Sierra Leone
South Africa
South Sudan
Swaziland
Togo
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Sub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Regional Groupings
80
The West African

Economic and
Monetary Union
(WAEMU)
Economic and
Monetary
Community of
Central African
States (CEMAC)
Common Market
for Eastern and
Southern Africa
(COMESA)
East Africa
Community
(EAC-5)
Southern African
Development
Community
(SADC)
Southern Africa
Customs Union
(SACU)
Economic
Community
of West
African States
(ECOWAS)
Benin
Cameroon
Burundi
Burundi
Angola
Botswana
Benin
Burkina Faso
Comoros
Kenya
Botswana
Lesotho
Burkina Faso
Cte dIvoire
Chad
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Rwanda
Congo, Dem. Rep
Namibia
Cabo Verde
Guinea-Bissau
Congo, Republic of
Eritrea
Tanzania
Lesotho
South Africa
Cte dIvoire
Mali
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Uganda
Madagascar
Swaziland
Niger
Gabon
Kenya
Malawi
Gambia, The
Ghana
Senegal
Madagascar
Mauritius
Togo
Malawi
Mozambique
Mauritius
Namibia
Rwanda
Seychelles
Seychelles
South Africa
Swaziland
Swaziland
Uganda
Tanzania
Zambia
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Liberia
Mali
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Togo
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Sub-Saharan Africa: Country Classifications

Oil exporters
Angola
Oil importers
MICs
LICs
LICs excluding fragile
X
X
Fragile countries
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cameroon

Chad
Cte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of
X
X
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
X
X
Rwanda
So Tom & Prncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Swaziland
South Sudan
X
X
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
X
X
X
X
X
81
List of Country Abbreviations:

AGO
Angola
ERI
Eritrea
MLI
Mali
SWZ
Swaziland
BDI
Burundi
ETH
Ethiopia
MOZ
Mozambique
SYC
Seychelles
BEN
Benin
GAB
Gabon
MUS
Mauritius
TCD
Chad
BFA
Burkina Faso
GHA
Ghana
MWI
Malawi
TGO
Togo
BWA
Botswana
GIN
Guinea
NAM
Namibia
TZA
Tanzania
CAF
GMB
Gambia, The
NER
Niger
UGA
Uganda
CIV
Cte d'Ivoire
GNB
Guinea-Bissau
NIG
Nigeria
ZAF
South Africa
CMR
Cameroon
GNQ
Equatorial Guinea
RWA
Rwanda
ZMB
Zambia
ZWE
Zimbabwe
COD
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
KEN
Kenya
SEN
Senegal
COG
Congo, Rep. of
LBR
Liberia
SLE
Sierra Leone
COM
Comoros
LSO
Lesotho
SSD
South Sudan
CPV
Cabo Verde
MDG
Madagascar
STP
So Tom & Prncipe
List of Sources and Footnotes for Appendix Tables SA1SA28

Tables SA1SA3, SA6SA19, SA21, SA24SA26
Sources: IMF, African Department database, and IMF, World Economic Outlook database, 25 March, 2016.
1
Fiscal year data.
In constant 2009 U.S. dollars. The Zimbabwe dollar ceased circulating in early 2009. Data are based on IMF staff estimates of price and exchange rate
developments in U.S. dollars. Staff estimates of U.S. dollar values may differ from authorities estimates.
2
Note: ... denotes data not available.

Tables SA4SA5
1

Table SA20
1
Including grants.
Fiscal year data.
3

Tables SA22SA23
Source: IMF, Information Notice System.
1
An increase indicates appreciation.

Table SA27
1
Includes offshore banking assets.

Table SA28
1
Loan-to-deposit ratio includes deposits and loans of commercial banks to the public sector.
82
List of Tables:
SA1. Real GDP Growth....................................................................................................................... 84

SA2. Real Non-Oil GDP Growth........................................................................................................ 85
SA3. Real Per Capita GDP Growth...................................................................................................... 86
SA4. Consumer Prices, Average............................................................................................................ 87
SA5. Consumer Prices, End of Period.................................................................................................. 88
SA6. Total Investment.......................................................................................................................... 89
SA7. Gross National Savings................................................................................................................ 90
SA8. Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants...................................................................................... 91
SA9. Overall Fiscal Balance, Excluding Grants..................................................................................... 92
SA10. Government Revenue, Excluding Grants..................................................................................... 93
SA11. Government Expenditure............................................................................................................. 94
SA12. Government Debt........................................................................................................................ 95
SA13. Broad Money............................................................................................................................... 96
SA14. Broad Money Growth.................................................................................................................. 97
SA15. Claims on Nonfinancial Private Sector Growth (Percent change)................................................. 98
SA16. Claims on Nonfinancial Private Sector (Percent of GDP)............................................................ 99
SA17. Exports of Goods and Services.................................................................................................... 100
SA18. Imports of Goods and Services.................................................................................................... 101
SA19. Trade Balance on Goods............................................................................................................. 102
SA20. External Current Account........................................................................................................... 103
SA21. Net Foreign Direct Investment................................................................................................... 104
SA22. Real Effective Exchange Rates..................................................................................................... 105
SA23. Nominal Effective Exchange Rates.............................................................................................. 106
SA24. External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based................................................................................ 107
SA25. Terms of Trade on Goods........................................................................................................... 108
SA26. Reserves
...................................................................................................................................... 109
SA27. Banking Penetration................................................................................................................... 110
SA28. Banking Sector: Loan-to-Deposit Ratio....................................................................................... 111
83
Table SA1. Real GDP Growth

(Percent)
2004-08
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
17.3
4.2
6.0
5.9
4.4
7.1
3.1
3.3
9.7
1.3
6.1
4.3
1.8
13.0
2.1
11.8
1.3
3.3
6.2
2.9
3.1
4.6
4.0
7.3
5.8
6.1
4.2
4.3
8.3
4.3
5.2
8.6
9.0
5.7
4.5
4.8
5.8
4.8
...
4.4
6.5
2.4
8.3
7.7
7.5
2.4
2.3
7.7
3.0
3.8
1.3
1.9
1.7
4.2
1.8
2.9
7.5
3.3
4.5
3.9
10.0
2.3
6.4
4.8
0.3
3.3
3.3
4.5
5.1
4.7
8.3
4.7
3.0
6.4
0.3
0.7
9.0
6.3
4.0
2.4
1.1
3.2
1.5
...
1.9
5.4
3.5
8.1
9.2
7.5
3.4
2.1
8.6
8.4
5.1
1.5
3.3
3.0
13.6
2.1
7.1
8.7
2.0
3.8
2.2
10.6
6.3
6.5
7.9
1.9
4.4
8.4
6.9
6.1
0.3
6.9
5.4
4.1
6.7
6.0
8.4
10.0
7.3
4.5
4.3
5.9
5.3
3.0
...
1.4
6.4
4.1
7.7
10.3
11.4
3.9
3.0
6.0
6.6
4.0
4.0
4.1
3.3
0.1
2.2
6.9
3.4
4.4
2.0
8.7
11.4
7.1
4.3
14.0
3.9
9.4
6.1
4.5
7.4
1.5
4.9
3.2
3.9
7.1
5.1
2.2
4.9
7.8
4.8
1.9
5.4
6.0
3.2
...
1.2
7.9
4.8
6.8
5.6
11.9
5.2
4.6
4.5
6.5
4.4
1.1
4.6
4.1
8.9
3.0
7.1
3.8
10.7
5.7
7.0
8.7
5.3
5.6
9.3
3.8
1.8
4.6
5.3
8.2
3.0
1.9
0.8
3.2
7.2
5.1
11.8
4.3
8.8
4.5
4.5
3.7
15.2
2.2
52.4
3.0
5.1
5.9
2.6
7.6
10.6
6.8
6.9
9.9
6.6
4.5
1.0
5.6
36.0
5.7
3.5
8.5
3.3
8.7
6.5
3.1
9.9
5.6
4.8
7.3
2.3
0.8
5.7
3.6
8.7
2.3
5.2
2.3
3.2
7.1
5.7
5.3
5.4
4.7
4.0
3.6
5.0
20.7
2.2
29.3
2.9
7.3
5.4
4.0
5.1
4.5
4.8
6.5
3.2
4.0
4.7
1.8
5.9
1.0
6.9
2.0
9.2
6.8
7.9
0.3
5.0
10.3
4.3
0.2
4.0
1.1
2.5
5.3
3.4
0.7
3.3
5.7
7.5
3.6
7.4
6.4
7.0
6.3
7.0
4.5
4.3
6.2
4.6
1.5
2.9
2.5
7.0
5.4
4.9
5.0
3.8
3.0
5.2
0.3
4.0
4.1
1.8
5.9
4.3
1.8
1.0
7.7
2.5
8.6
12.2
4.8
10.2
4.0
4.4
3.5
0.1
4.8
5.6
2.5
0.0
3.0
2.9
6.1
3.4
6.3
4.5
4.0
2.7
6.9
4.0
6.5
4.4
21.5
1.3
0.2
1.7
7.0
5.3
5.0
3.6
1.5
2.5
5.0
3.7
5.0
3.4
2.9
4.9
5.7
0.4
2.2
4.9
4.4
8.5
7.4
3.7
4.5
3.2
2.3
4.5
4.1
4.8
6.0
2.6
2.5
4.1
3.0
5.0
3.8
6.0
4.2
4.9
2.3
6.3
5.0
6.6
3.3
5.3
0.6
7.8
0.5
6.9
5.2
5.3
3.4
2.7
2.7
5.2
4.3
5.7
3.9
3.5
4.6
5.9
1.6
3.3
5.1
4.3
8.0
1.9
3.2
7.0
4.5
3.3
7.7
5.4
5.0
6.1
4.1
4.7
4.5
4.0
5.2
3.9
6.8
5.8
6.9
3.5
6.7
5.5
6.8
3.5
0.7
1.2
8.2
1.1
6.8
5.2
5.7
4.8
3.5
6.8
4.8
6.8
4.0
3.3
3.7
6.6
6.0
6.2
5.0
4.8
5.9
4.3
4.6
5.3
5.2
5.1
6.5
5.1
4.7
5.8
3.4
4.0
4.7
3.0
4.1
4.4
4.0
4.7
5.4
9.2
10.7
5.3
5.6
7.0
1.7
2.0
4.4
8.5
4.2
5.3
6.8
4.6
3.7
5.2
6.6
3.8
2.4
4.7
6.2
5.7
6.5
4.8
6.4
5.9
4.8
4.4
6.1
2.6
2.3
4.0
5.4
2.2
1.8
3.6
5.2
3.4
3.3
4.4
6.0
Excluding South Africa and Nigeria
Excluding low-income fragile countries
Fragile countries
6.9
7.3
6.3
7.7
3.5
3.8
2.5
5.1
6.3
3.3
6.5
5.4
7.0
7.6
5.6
4.5
5.2
6.6
7.6
3.1
4.2
6.0
4.5
6.2
3.4
4.6
5.9
7.1
7.0
7.2
4.6
4.9
6.6
7.2
6.1
2.6
3.8
5.7
7.2
3.9
2.5
4.2
4.7
5.6
4.2
3.4
5.0
5.8
6.5
5.2
CFA franc zone

CEMAC
WAEMU
COMESA (SSA members)
EAC-5
ECOWAS
SACU
SADC
4.6
5.7
3.6
6.2
6.2
7.4
4.8
6.2
2.1
1.1
2.9
5.6
5.2
7.5
1.6
0.5
4.6
4.8
4.4
7.9
7.4
8.8
3.3
4.2
2.3
3.6
1.2
7.1
6.9
5.0
3.4
4.3
6.0
5.4
6.5
5.9
4.6
5.1
2.4
3.7
4.4
2.7
5.9
6.1
5.8
5.7
2.7
4.2
5.7
4.9
6.4
6.5
5.9
6.0
1.8
3.5
4.4
2.0
6.4
6.0
5.8
3.1
1.3
2.7
4.6
2.3
6.5
4.6
6.1
3.2
0.9
2.4
5.2
3.4
6.6
5.6
6.3
4.3
1.5
2.9
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cameroon
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of
Cte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia1
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
So Tom & Prncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
South Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe2
Sub-Saharan Africa
Median
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa
Excluding Nigeria
Oil-importing countries
Excluding South Africa
See sources and footnotes on page 82.
84
Table SA2. Real Non-Oil GDP Growth

(Percent)
2004-08
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
17.6
4.2
6.0
5.9
4.4
7.1
3.6
3.3
6.3
1.3
5.9
5.7
1.8
31.8
2.1
11.8
5.0
3.3
6.2
2.9
3.1
4.6
4.0
7.3
5.8
6.1
4.2
4.3
8.3
4.3
5.2
...
9.0
5.7
4.5
4.8
5.8
4.8
...
4.4
6.5
2.4
8.3
7.7
7.5
8.1
2.3
7.7
3.0
3.8
1.3
2.9
1.7
6.4
1.8
2.8
3.9
2.1
13.0
3.9
10.0
3.3
6.4
4.8
0.3
3.3
3.3
4.5
5.1
4.7
8.3
4.7
3.0
6.4
0.3
0.7
...
6.3
4.0
2.4
1.1
3.2
1.5
...
1.9
5.4
3.5
8.1
9.2
7.5
7.6
2.1
8.6
8.4
5.1
1.5
4.1
3.0
17.2
2.1
7.2
6.5
2.6
1.1
2.2
10.6
13.1
6.5
7.9
1.9
4.4
8.4
6.9
6.1
0.3
6.9
5.4
4.1
6.7
6.0
8.4
...
7.3
4.5
4.3
5.9
5.3
3.0
...
1.4
6.4
4.1
7.7
10.3
11.4
9.5
3.0
6.0
6.6
4.0
4.0
4.6
3.3
0.2
2.2
7.0
7.4
4.8
9.9
8.7
11.4
10.5
4.3
8.4
3.9
9.4
6.1
4.5
7.4
1.5
4.9
3.2
3.9
7.1
5.1
1.3
5.3
7.8
4.8
1.9
5.4
6.0
3.2
...
1.2
7.9
4.8
6.8
5.6
11.9
5.5
4.6
4.5
6.5
4.4
1.1
4.6
4.1
11.6
3.0
7.2
9.7
13.5
0.3
7.0
8.7
7.1
5.6
8.6
3.8
1.8
4.6
5.3
8.2
3.0
1.9
0.8
3.2
7.2
5.1
4.2
5.9
8.8
4.5
4.5
3.7
15.2
2.2
0.8
3.0
5.1
5.9
2.6
7.6
10.6
10.9
6.9
9.9
6.6
4.5
1.0
5.4
36.0
8.0
3.5
8.6
8.1
8.8
3.3
3.1
9.9
7.8
4.8
6.7
2.3
0.8
5.7
3.6
8.7
2.3
5.2
2.3
3.2
7.1
5.7
3.2
8.3
4.7
4.0
3.6
5.0
20.7
2.2
4.1
2.9
7.3
5.4
4.0
5.1
4.5
8.2
6.5
3.2
4.0
4.7
1.8
5.6
1.0
7.1
2.0
9.2
7.9
8.3
0.5
5.0
10.3
5.0
0.2
4.0
1.1
2.5
5.3
3.4
0.7
3.3
5.7
7.5
3.6
7.4
6.4
8.1
7.3
7.0
4.5
4.3
6.2
4.6
1.5
17.5
2.5
7.0
5.4
4.9
5.0
3.8
1.6
5.2
0.3
4.0
4.1
1.8
5.2
4.3
2.9
1.0
7.8
4.8
8.0
0.6
4.8
10.2
4.0
4.4
3.5
0.1
4.8
5.6
2.5
0.0
3.0
2.9
6.1
3.4
6.3
4.5
7.0
3.6
6.9
4.0
6.5
4.4
21.5
1.3
1.2
1.7
7.0
5.3
5.0
3.6
1.5
1.6
5.0
3.7
5.0
3.4
2.9
5.1
5.7
0.5
2.2
5.0
3.0
7.9
2.9
3.7
4.5
5.4
2.3
3.5
4.1
4.8
6.0
2.6
2.5
4.1
3.0
5.0
3.8
6.0
4.2
3.8
3.1
6.3
5.0
6.6
3.3
5.3
0.6
4.9
0.5
6.9
5.2
5.3
3.4
2.7
4.0
5.2
4.3
5.7
3.9
3.5
5.1
5.9
2.6
3.3
5.1
3.2
8.0
2.9
3.2
7.0
6.6
3.3
4.5
5.4
5.0
6.1
4.1
4.7
4.5
4.0
5.2
3.9
6.8
5.8
4.4
3.5
6.7
5.5
6.8
3.5
0.7
1.2
2.9
1.1
6.8
5.2
5.7
4.8
3.5
6.5
5.1
7.4
2.6
3.3
4.8
5.7
6.0
7.0
5.4
5.2
6.5
5.1
4.6
6.1
6.3
5.0
6.8
5.4
4.9
5.9
3.6
4.0
4.7
3.2
3.8
4.3
3.9
4.5
5.3
13.2
5.0
5.3
5.6
6.2
6.2
1.9
4.3
7.5
7.5
5.3
6.9
6.0
7.9
4.9
6.0
5.8
5.5
4.7
6.2
8.3
8.3
4.8
6.4
6.7
5.2
4.4
6.1
3.2
2.0
4.0
5.5
2.8
2.0
3.5
5.0
3.6
3.8
4.2
5.7
Fragile countries
6.6
8.6
6.1
7.7
3.3
1.5
4.4
5.1
6.3
2.9
5.0
6.9
7.2
7.6
5.8
5.0
6.3
6.6
7.6
3.4
5.0
6.3
5.8
6.0
7.2
6.2
7.3
6.3
6.9
6.1
5.2
5.7
6.1
7.3
5.0
3.0
3.8
5.5
7.3
3.6
2.7
4.0
4.7
5.5
4.2
3.4
4.9
5.7
6.5
4.9
CFA franc zone

CEMAC
WAEMU
EAC-5
ECOWAS
SACU
SADC
6.5
9.8
3.6
6.2
6.2
4.4
4.8
6.3
3.4
4.4
2.6
5.6
5.2
3.1
1.6
1.2
5.8
7.3
4.6
7.9
7.4
5.4
3.3
4.8
3.5
6.3
1.0
7.1
6.9
4.9
3.4
5.0
6.4
6.0
6.7
5.9
4.6
6.3
2.4
3.8
5.7
5.7
5.8
6.2
5.8
7.8
2.7
4.7
5.9
5.1
6.6
6.5
5.9
6.8
1.8
3.9
4.9
2.9
6.5
6.0
5.8
3.8
1.3
2.6
4.9
3.2
6.2
4.6
6.1
3.6
0.9
2.2
5.3
3.8
6.4
5.6
6.3
4.1
1.5
3.1
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cameroon
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of
Cte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia1
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
So Tom & Prncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
South Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe2
Sub-Saharan Africa
Median
Excluding Nigeria
85
Table SA3. Real Per Capita GDP Growth

(Percent)
2004-08
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
13.8
1.0
4.6
2.8
2.2
6.4
0.3
1.5
7.0
1.1
3.0
1.4
0.8
9.7
5.2
9.2
1.5
0.4
3.6
0.6
0.9
1.8
3.7
5.7
2.8
3.5
1.0
3.8
5.2
2.9
1.5
5.7
6.8
3.0
1.7
3.7
2.4
3.4
...
3.2
3.6
0.7
4.6
4.7
8.3
0.6
0.6
8.9
0.2
1.4
1.5
0.8
0.2
1.7
1.2
0.1
4.4
0.6
7.2
0.6
8.3
5.9
3.6
2.2
2.9
1.1
0.5
4.3
0.8
7.4
5.3
1.4
2.8
3.4
1.2
4.1
6.1
4.1
1.0
0.4
1.5
1.2
2.9
...
0.1
2.7
0.7
4.5
6.0
6.6
0.4
0.8
7.2
5.6
2.7
1.1
0.8
1.1
10.8
0.9
4.0
5.7
0.6
6.5
1.1
8.8
2.4
3.7
5.2
0.7
2.1
6.1
6.6
1.8
2.5
3.9
2.2
3.9
3.7
4.5
5.1
7.0
4.1
1.5
1.3
3.0
3.3
1.5
...
0.3
3.8
1.3
4.2
7.1
10.4
0.9
0.1
4.8
3.3
1.6
3.3
1.6
1.3
2.4
0.8
3.8
0.5
6.8
0.8
5.2
9.6
3.2
6.9
11.2
1.2
6.8
3.4
4.3
4.7
1.4
1.9
0.2
3.7
4.1
3.5
0.9
2.1
5.7
1.9
1.1
8.2
3.9
1.7
...
0.4
5.3
2.0
3.5
2.5
9.1
2.1
1.8
3.2
3.2
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.1
6.2
0.0
4.0
0.9
7.9
2.8
3.6
7.0
1.4
2.8
6.6
1.2
4.0
1.5
5.0
5.5
0.2
1.0
3.8
2.9
4.2
3.6
8.5
1.5
5.7
1.8
1.5
2.7
13.0
0.7
54.7
1.5
2.7
3.1
0.8
4.3
7.8
3.7
4.1
8.6
4.0
2.1
0.2
3.0
37.3
3.1
0.5
5.3
1.1
5.9
9.1
0.2
8.2
1.7
2.0
4.6
0.3
1.4
2.9
3.3
5.9
0.6
2.3
0.7
3.0
4.2
4.2
2.1
2.6
2.4
1.4
0.6
3.1
18.2
0.6
23.4
1.4
5.2
2.6
0.4
2.0
3.3
1.8
3.8
2.0
0.9
2.2
0.6
3.3
0.9
4.3
1.0
6.0
4.5
5.2
3.0
1.6
8.6
2.8
2.9
1.4
1.4
0.3
2.4
3.2
1.9
0.5
2.7
4.2
3.6
4.5
4.9
3.8
3.5
4.4
1.9
1.4
4.6
2.5
0.0
1.6
1.0
4.9
2.6
1.9
1.9
2.7
0.0
2.6
1.5
1.1
6.4
0.5
3.3
2.3
0.7
1.9
4.6
0.3
5.9
14.5
1.4
8.5
2.5
1.6
0.9
2.3
2.5
2.7
2.2
2.5
0.2
0.1
2.8
3.4
3.4
3.6
0.9
0.1
4.1
1.5
3.4
3.6
22.5
0.5
4.4
0.5
4.9
2.5
2.0
0.5
0.4
0.5
2.5
2.5
2.1
1.0
1.6
2.3
3.7
2.8
0.8
1.9
2.2
5.8
9.8
0.4
2.8
1.7
0.4
1.9
1.5
2.5
3.1
2.3
0.1
1.3
0.1
1.8
3.8
3.1
3.3
1.8
0.4
3.6
2.5
3.6
2.6
3.3
1.0
12.3
0.7
4.8
2.4
2.2
0.3
1.6
0.3
2.7
3.1
2.8
1.5
2.3
2.1
3.9
1.2
0.3
2.0
2.1
5.2
4.5
0.0
5.3
3.1
0.5
5.0
2.8
2.7
3.2
3.8
2.3
1.6
1.1
1.9
3.9
4.0
5.0
3.7
0.7
4.0
3.1
3.8
2.8
2.5
0.4
3.0
0.2
4.7
2.4
2.6
1.6
2.4
Sub-Saharan Africa
Median
4.3
3.0
4.0
1.6
0.7
1.1
4.2
3.2
3.6
2.5
2.3
3.2
1.8
2.7
2.6
2.7
2.6
3.8
2.6
2.4
3.2
0.9
1.4
2.2
0.6
1.9
1.9
1.6
2.6
2.9
Excluding Nigeria
6.2
7.6
3.2
3.0
4.1
1.2
0.1
1.9
5.5
1.2
3.2
4.3
1.7
0.8
3.1
4.0
0.9
0.6
2.5
3.6
2.8
3.4
2.7
3.9
3.1
2.0
2.3
3.6
0.2
0.4
1.8
3.0
0.5
0.9
1.5
2.8
0.6
0.5
2.3
3.6
Fragile countries
4.6
4.6
3.4
4.8
0.9
1.4
0.1
2.4
3.7
0.6
4.1
2.9
4.4
4.9
2.8
2.1
2.6
4.0
5.0
0.4
1.8
3.3
1.9
3.6
0.6
2.2
3.2
4.4
4.6
4.3
2.2
2.4
4.1
4.9
3.3
0.2
1.3
3.1
4.8
1.2
0.1
1.7
2.2
3.2
1.4
1.0
2.5
3.3
4.2
2.4
CFA franc zone

CEMAC
WAEMU
EAC-5
ECOWAS
SACU
SADC
1.7
2.8
0.7
3.5
3.2
4.5
3.4
4.3
0.8
1.7
0.1
3.1
2.3
4.6
3.0
1.4
1.7
2.0
1.5
5.4
4.7
5.9
1.9
2.3
0.5
0.7
1.6
4.6
4.2
2.2
1.9
2.3
3.0
2.5
3.5
3.3
1.6
2.3
0.9
1.7
1.6
0.0
3.1
3.6
3.1
2.9
1.1
2.2
3.0
2.6
3.5
4.0
3.3
3.2
0.2
1.5
1.8
0.2
3.5
3.6
3.2
0.4
0.4
0.7
2.0
0.0
3.6
2.2
3.5
0.5
0.6
0.4
2.6
1.1
3.7
3.1
3.6
1.6
0.0
0.9
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cameroon
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of
Cte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia1
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
So Tom & Prncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
South Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe2
86
Table SA4. Consumer Prices

(Annual average, percent change)
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cameroon
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of
Cte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
So Tom & Prncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
South Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe1
Sub-Saharan Africa
Median
Excluding Nigeria
Fragile countries
CFA franc zone
CEMAC
WAEMU
EAC-5
ECOWAS
SACU
SADC
2004-08
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
20.9
3.7
9.4
3.8
11.4
2.9
2.7
3.5
1.5
4.0
14.7
3.9
3.2
4.4
16.4
18.0
0.9
6.2
13.3
25.0
4.0
8.3
6.9
9.8
12.5
11.5
3.1
7.4
10.2
5.4
4.0
11.6
10.9
20.8
3.3
9.0
12.5
5.6
...
6.2
6.6
3.8
7.5
13.7
39.9
13.7
0.9
8.1
0.9
10.6
1.0
3.0
3.5
10.1
4.8
46.2
4.3
1.0
5.7
33.0
8.5
1.9
4.6
13.1
4.7
1.6
10.6
5.9
7.4
9.0
8.4
2.2
2.5
3.3
9.5
4.3
12.5
10.3
17.0
2.2
31.8
9.2
7.1
...
7.4
12.1
3.7
13.1
13.4
6.2
14.5
2.2
6.9
0.6
6.5
2.1
1.3
1.5
2.1
3.9
23.5
5.0
1.4
5.3
11.2
8.1
1.4
5.0
6.7
15.5
1.1
4.3
3.4
7.3
9.2
7.4
1.3
2.9
12.7
4.9
2.8
13.7
2.3
13.3
1.2
2.4
17.8
4.3
...
4.5
7.2
1.4
4.0
8.5
3.0
13.5
2.7
8.5
2.8
9.6
4.5
2.9
1.2
1.9
2.2
15.5
1.8
4.9
4.8
3.9
33.2
1.3
4.8
7.7
21.4
5.1
14.0
6.0
8.5
9.5
7.6
3.1
6.5
10.4
5.0
2.9
10.8
5.7
14.3
3.4
2.6
18.5
5.0
...
6.1
12.7
3.6
18.7
8.7
3.5
10.3
6.7
7.5
3.8
18.2
2.5
2.4
5.9
7.7
5.9
2.1
5.0
1.3
3.4
6.0
24.1
2.7
4.6
7.1
15.2
2.1
9.4
5.5
6.8
5.7
21.3
5.3
3.9
2.1
6.7
0.5
12.2
6.3
10.6
1.4
7.1
13.8
5.7
45.1
8.9
16.0
2.6
14.0
6.6
3.7
8.8
1.0
5.9
0.5
7.9
1.5
2.1
6.6
0.2
1.6
0.8
4.6
2.6
3.2
6.5
8.1
0.5
5.2
11.7
11.9
0.8
5.7
5.0
7.6
5.8
28.3
0.6
3.5
4.2
5.6
2.3
8.5
4.2
8.1
0.7
4.3
9.8
5.8
0.0
5.6
7.9
1.8
4.8
7.0
1.6
7.3
1.1
4.4
0.3
4.4
0.2
1.9
11.6
1.7
1.3
1.0
0.9
0.4
4.3
10.0
7.4
4.5
6.2
15.5
9.7
1.0
6.9
4.0
9.9
6.1
23.8
0.9
3.2
2.3
5.3
0.9
8.0
1.8
7.0
1.1
1.4
8.3
6.1
1.7
5.7
6.1
0.2
4.6
7.8
0.2
10.3 19.1
0.3
2.0
3.0
3.3
0.9
1.6
5.6
7.6
0.1
0.8
2.7
2.2
5.4
4.9
3.6
3.2
2.0
2.2
1.0
1.7
2.0
2.3
1.2
2.1
3.2
2.0
9.0
9.0
10.1 10.6
0.1
2.5
6.8
8.3
17.2 15.7
8.2
7.9
1.5
2.6
6.6
6.3
4.8
6.5
7.7
8.2
7.4
7.2
21.9 19.7
1.4
1.0
1.3
1.5
2.4
6.0
3.4
5.2
1.0
1.5
9.0 10.4
2.5
4.8
5.3
3.0
0.1
1.2
4.0
2.2
9.0
9.5
4.6
6.5
52.8 212.4
5.0
6.6
5.6
6.1
1.8
2.1
5.8
6.7
10.1 22.5
2.4 1.2
15.2
2.3
3.6
2.0
6.2
1.3
2.2
4.3
3.1
2.2
2.5
2.4
2.0
2.8
9.0
11.6
2.5
7.6
8.9
8.0
2.8
6.0
6.0
8.0
7.0
13.9
1.3
2.1
5.6
6.0
1.5
12.4
5.0
3.5
1.2
2.6
9.0
6.3
21.6
5.9
5.1
2.5
5.9
9.9
1.2
8.8
7.2
9.2
9.8
7.3
9.5
8.2
4.4
6.6
9.5
5.4
10.9
9.3
6.0
9.2
6.6
4.8
5.7
6.4
4.4
5.4
7.0
4.0
6.7
9.0
4.9
9.2
8.3
5.0
6.7
10.9
9.2
7.7
9.3
11.5
8.8
8.6
9.7
12.2
7.8
5.4
6.2
10.0
7.7
9.1
11.9
11.2
8.5
8.0
9.5
7.5
4.9
5.9
5.9
7.1
4.6
5.8
5.6
8.9
8.5
5.6
6.2
12.0
16.6
6.9
7.1
11.5
9.2
6.1
6.0
8.7
9.1
9.3
8.8
8.2
9.7
8.9
10.2
8.0
10.6
8.6
6.5
6.6
5.5
7.0
8.4
8.6
13.3
16.1
7.3
8.6
6.7
12.0
13.6
7.6
7.0
6.2
5.1
5.6
4.1
7.0
6.4
4.3
4.4
3.3
7.2
7.1
6.3
5.6
6.0
9.1
9.7
8.7
6.5
9.9
9.0
7.2
6.2
6.4
4.7
3.1
2.7
3.4
11.5
7.7
10.2
5.8
8.0
2.6
4.5
1.0
13.0
11.6
10.4
7.2
9.8
1.4
2.0
0.8
7.3
5.2
11.1
4.4
6.9
3.1
2.6
3.6
16.0
14.0
9.6
5.2
7.6
3.3
3.8
2.8
11.6
12.6
10.3
5.8
7.2
1.7
2.1
1.3
6.2
6.2
7.6
5.7
6.3
1.2
2.6
0.1
6.0
5.8
7.3
6.0
6.0
1.6
2.4
1.0
6.8
5.8
8.2
4.5
5.5
2.0
2.4
1.7
8.2
6.2
9.2
6.3
8.3
2.1
2.5
1.8
7.3
5.6
10.1
6.1
7.1
See sources and footnote on page 82.
87
Table SA5. Consumer Prices

(End of period, percent change)
2004-08
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2016
2017
17.3
4.1
9.9
4.1
12.5
3.5
3.1
4.7
3.2
4.4
17.2
4.4
3.9
4.3
17.5
19.3
1.1
5.2
13.7
24.6
4.6
9.0
7.2
9.5
13.6
11.6
3.7
7.3
9.2
6.1
5.3
10.4
11.4
21.9
3.8
16.1
12.4
6.4
...
7.7
7.1
4.9
8.4
13.4
...
14.0
0.5
5.8
1.8
4.6
0.4
0.9
1.2
4.7
2.2
53.4
2.5
1.7
5.0
22.2
7.1
0.9
2.7
9.5
7.9
6.4
8.0
3.8
9.7
8.0
7.6
1.7
1.5
4.2
7.9
3.1
13.9
5.7
16.1
4.5
2.5
10.8
6.3
...
4.5
12.2
0.6
11.0
9.9
7.7
15.3
4.0
7.4
0.3
4.1
3.4
2.6
2.3
2.2
6.7
9.8
5.4
5.1
5.4
14.2
14.6
0.7
5.8
6.9
20.8
5.7
5.8
3.6
6.6
10.2
6.3
1.9
6.1
16.6
3.1
1.4
11.8
0.2
12.9
4.3
0.4
18.4
3.5
...
4.5
5.6
3.8
3.1
7.9
3.2
11.4
1.8
9.2
5.1
14.9
3.6
2.7
4.3
10.8
4.9
15.4
1.8
2.0
4.9
12.3
35.9
2.3
4.4
8.4
19.0
3.4
18.9
7.2
11.4
6.9
9.8
5.3
4.9
5.5
7.4
1.4
10.3
8.3
11.9
2.7
5.5
16.9
6.1
...
7.8
19.8
1.5
27.0
7.2
4.9
9.0
6.8
7.4
1.7
11.8
4.1
2.5
5.9
2.1
1.0
2.7
7.5
3.4
2.6
2.9
15.0
2.2
4.9
8.1
12.8
1.6
3.2
5.0
7.7
5.8
34.6
2.4
3.2
2.2
6.4
0.7
12.0
3.9
10.4
1.1
5.8
12.0
5.7
25.2
8.3
12.1
2.9
5.3
7.3
2.9
7.7
1.8
4.1
0.1
9.0
0.1
1.7
5.9
0.9
3.5
1.0
2.1
0.4
4.9
9.5
7.7
3.3
5.5
13.5
10.5
0.1
7.1
5.6
8.5
6.3
23.5
0.0
4.1
3.0
4.9
1.1
8.0
3.6
7.1
0.1
3.4
8.5
5.4
8.8
4.4
5.6
0.4
4.3
7.1
0.3
7.5 14.3 19.2

0.8
2.3
2.2
3.7
3.1
3.6
0.1
1.3
1.6
3.7
7.1 10.7
0.4 0.5
1.0
2.6
2.8
2.2
8.4
6.5
2.5
3.7 1.0
3.0
0.0
3.4
2.2
1.2
0.9
2.5
0.5
2.2
2.3
0.9
1.3
2.1
4.3
2.0
2.0
10.0
9.0
9.0
7.1 10.0 14.0
1.7
0.1
2.5
6.9
6.7 10.0
17.0 17.7 12.4
9.0
7.3
8.5
0.1
2.9
2.5
6.0
8.0
5.8
2.9
5.5
6.4
7.7
8.0
8.3
6.0
7.6
7.1
24.2 24.9 16.0
1.2
1.0
1.0
0.2
1.3
2.0
1.1 11.1
5.6
4.6
3.5
5.0
0.6
2.2
1.2
8.0
9.6 12.0
2.1
4.5
5.0
6.4
4.0
4.0
0.8
0.4
1.2
0.5
3.2
2.8
9.8 10.1
9.5
5.8
4.9
6.9
9.9 109.9 119.1
6.2
4.9
8.9
4.8
6.8
5.4
1.8
1.8
2.3
4.9
6.6
6.8
7.9 21.1 14.3
0.8 2.4 1.1
14.0
2.4
3.6
2.0
2.6
1.5
2.2
2.5
3.0
2.2
2.5
2.5
2.0
2.8
9.0
8.5
2.5
5.2
7.1
7.5
2.5
5.5
6.0
7.7
7.0
9.6
1.5
2.2
5.6
5.7
1.7
12.5
5.0
3.0
0.1
3.1
9.0
5.8
7.5
3.4
5.0
2.5
5.1
8.7
1.2
8.9
7.3
9.5
9.2
4.7
7.7
7.7
5.4
7.3
10.2
7.0
12.3
8.2
5.3
7.0
6.1
4.3
5.2
6.3
3.7
5.4
8.1
4.5
8.5
9.2
5.0
8.5
7.8
3.4
5.7
Excluding Nigeria
9.8
8.4
8.4
10.0
12.2
7.8
7.1
7.7
10.9
8.4
5.5
6.9
9.6
7.5
10.7
13.8
10.6
6.8
6.5
7.1
6.9
4.0
5.5
5.5
7.2
5.2
5.6
5.4
10.2
11.9
6.5
7.4
12.6
14.4
6.8
6.8
11.3
7.9
5.3
5.1
Fragile countries
8.6
9.0
10.2
9.5
9.1
9.4
7.0
8.6
6.5
8.7
7.9
7.4
7.0
7.1
6.4
8.6
8.8
16.1
19.6
7.8
8.2
5.8
8.3
8.6
6.9
6.7
6.2
4.1
4.5
2.7
6.8
6.3
4.4
4.0
4.0
8.1
9.0
7.9
6.8
7.7
9.6
8.7
8.3
7.3
7.9
8.7
6.5
5.0
5.3
3.7
CFA franc zone

CEMAC
WAEMU
EAC-5
ECOWAS
SACU
SADC
3.6
3.2
4.0
12.5
8.4
9.5
6.5
8.4
0.3
2.4
1.6
10.7
9.9
10.7
6.3
8.9
2.9
2.4
3.3
7.8
4.8
10.2
3.6
6.1
3.5
4.0
3.0
18.7
20.3
9.1
6.2
8.4
2.9
3.2
2.7
7.5
6.8
10.2
5.8
6.9
1.1
2.4
0.0
6.2
5.9
7.1
5.3
5.6
1.4
2.6
0.3
5.7
5.1
7.4
5.6
5.6
1.4
1.6
1.3
8.4
7.1
8.7
4.8
7.0
2.0
2.4
1.7
8.3
5.9
10.2
6.7
8.1
2.0
2.5
1.6
6.0
5.1
10.0
5.7
6.6
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cameroon
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of
Cte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
So Tom & Prncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
South Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe1
Sub-Saharan Africa
Median
See sources and footnote

footnoteson
onpage
page82.
82.
88
2015
Table SA6. Total Investment

(Percent of GDP)
2004-08
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
12.6
20.7
30.0
18.5
14.6
36.7
16.5
10.1
22.6
10.7
12.7
20.9
12.8
38.6
15.9
22.7
23.2
21.1
22.0
17.3
6.8
18.9
25.5
...
29.7
19.4
23.7
25.6
21.1
22.6
23.2
17.0
20.1
54.9
26.3
28.6
10.2
20.2
...
22.8
26.3
19.2
29.1
33.2
...
15.2
21.9
37.3
17.9
14.2
36.5
21.0
13.2
30.2
12.4
14.8
22.5
11.6
69.3
9.3
24.7
29.1
19.6
20.7
10.3
6.0
19.3
29.5
...
35.6
24.5
24.4
21.3
15.2
26.5
32.1
21.6
23.6
37.1
22.1
27.3
10.0
20.7
...
14.4
25.1
22.8
27.6
30.3
15.1
14.4
23.1
35.4
18.0
15.1
37.7
20.3
14.3
34.5
15.4
12.3
20.5
14.9
63.8
9.3
25.5
26.1
21.3
25.7
9.4
6.6
20.7
29.0
...
23.4
22.8
26.7
23.7
18.3
24.1
49.5
17.3
23.2
54.3
22.1
36.6
31.1
19.5
...
6.5
27.3
23.9
26.0
29.9
23.9
12.9
24.1
38.7
15.4
14.7
37.2
20.5
12.2
28.5
14.9
12.2
25.3
10.5
56.7
10.0
32.1
29.0
18.9
26.6
13.4
5.3
21.7
35.0
...
17.6
12.4
19.4
26.0
25.7
22.4
43.9
16.2
23.5
42.9
25.6
35.4
42.1
19.1
5.5
4.6
33.2
23.5
29.5
33.6
22.4
14.9
22.7
38.1
14.9
14.3
40.3
20.7
15.0
31.5
16.8
12.7
26.0
16.5
49.2
9.5
37.1
28.2
27.8
32.0
24.6
7.3
21.5
36.7
...
17.6
12.1
18.7
24.8
47.4
26.7
39.5
14.9
25.9
35.6
29.3
38.1
27.9
20.1
10.7
5.4
28.5
23.8
29.5
31.8
13.5
14.7
28.5
32.9
20.8
14.9
39.4
21.6
8.7
27.5
20.4
15.3
30.9
17.0
55.1
8.7
34.1
29.5
20.0
23.5
20.4
7.0
20.1
35.0
...
15.9
12.7
25.4
25.2
54.5
25.1
40.2
14.9
26.5
31.5
27.8
38.5
12.8
20.1
12.5
7.6
30.3
23.6
27.8
34.0
13.0
15.3
25.0
30.6
19.8
15.5
37.4
21.7
10.2
30.5
18.6
15.7
42.2
16.8
47.2
7.9
34.5
34.9
25.2
24.8
9.3
10.8
21.4
33.0
...
15.6
12.0
27.8
23.0
46.2
34.2
40.2
15.8
26.1
25.7
25.1
37.7
13.5
20.4
11.5
9.2
31.0
23.5
26.4
34.9
13.2
9.3
27.8
27.8
14.2
10.6
40.7
21.8
14.5
27.1
18.4
15.6
33.4
18.2
54.4
7.6
39.8
37.8
19.8
23.9
10.1
11.2
22.5
29.8
...
17.1
12.0
24.0
25.5
28.2
29.4
42.1
14.5
25.0
26.2
25.3
31.8
16.3
19.5
9.9
10.9
31.3
24.2
26.5
34.6
13.0
10.5
28.0
29.4
13.2
13.4
42.4
21.4
20.6
37.5
20.9
14.9
37.6
19.4
39.2
7.4
38.8
36.5
22.3
24.0
20.6
10.8
22.4
33.3
...
18.0
13.8
25.5
26.1
38.3
31.8
40.3
13.6
25.5
30.7
26.4
35.6
15.4
18.8
10.7
8.4
31.4
25.6
27.8
30.3
13.6
11.6
27.6
30.4
15.5
15.6
43.9
20.5
17.1
25.3
21.5
16.7
31.7
20.2
28.5
7.2
35.8
36.0
28.4
24.4
33.7
11.9
22.2
33.2
...
19.2
13.1
24.5
26.7
73.5
21.6
40.5
13.2
26.0
26.3
27.1
33.9
15.5
18.5
9.2
6.6
31.7
24.3
29.0
31.6
13.5
Sub-Saharan Africa
Median
19.9
21.1
21.5
22.0
21.9
22.9
20.6
23.2
23.5
20.4
22.9
23.8
20.9
24.7
25.3
20.7
23.5
24.8
21.2
24.2
25.1
20.3
24.0
24.5
20.2
24.7
25.0
20.3
24.4
25.3
Excluding Nigeria
17.6
19.0
21.4
22.3
22.4
24.6
21.7
22.3
18.8
23.2
21.9
23.5
17.3
20.2
22.7
25.1
16.8
21.9
23.9
26.4
16.9
22.3
23.6
25.7
17.8
23.4
23.7
25.7
16.0
20.0
23.6
25.9
15.5
20.6
23.7
26.3
14.7
18.7
24.3
27.3
Fragile countries
19.2
20.6
22.6
24.3
18.2
21.7
22.8
23.1
24.1
19.4
19.7
22.9
24.0
25.6
20.0
19.2
23.0
24.6
29.8
16.2
19.3
24.3
26.3
31.4
18.0
19.0
23.2
26.5
31.8
18.3
19.7
24.2
26.1
31.0
19.1
18.5
22.7
26.3
31.5
18.2
17.9
22.5
27.4
32.0
20.3
17.5
22.1
28.6
33.8
19.8
CFA franc zone

CEMAC
WAEMU
EAC-5
ECOWAS
SACU
SADC
21.0
23.0
19.1
22.8
23.4
17.8
20.7
20.9
25.5
32.8
19.1
23.1
23.2
20.9
21.4
21.3
26.2
30.8
22.2
22.7
24.1
18.7
20.1
20.4
24.4
29.8
19.6
24.4
27.3
17.7
19.9
20.6
25.0
29.1
21.4
25.0
25.7
17.5
20.9
21.3
26.8
30.3
23.7
24.3
25.5
17.1
20.8
21.7
27.2
32.1
23.1
24.6
25.9
17.6
21.2
21.9
26.6
31.3
22.7
26.3
26.4
16.6
20.1
20.2
26.7
31.1
23.2
26.0
26.7
16.2
19.6
20.3
25.0
26.6
23.7
25.7
27.1
16.2
19.1
21.3
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cameroon
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of
Cte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia1
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
So Tom & Prncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
South Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe2
89
Table SA7. Gross National Savings

(Percent of GDP)
2004-08
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
27.3
14.0
40.9
8.1
8.8
27.2
15.5
4.6
23.1
4.4
8.0
18.2
13.9
52.7
19.9
19.7
39.5
12.6
14.7
11.4
5.6
16.4
43.2
...
20.4
12.8
16.5
20.0
10.6
30.0
14.1
30.7
18.4
27.8
16.4
14.8
4.5
16.0
...
19.6
20.9
10.4
24.9
32.1
...
5.2
13.6
29.9
13.2
16.9
21.9
17.6
4.1
21.1
6.2
7.8
8.4
18.3
24.4
9.7
15.4
33.5
7.1
18.4
2.0
0.8
14.9
33.1
...
14.5
20.5
18.0
15.0
4.4
24.9
7.7
26.6
16.4
13.8
15.4
12.5
1.7
18.0
...
2.8
18.3
17.2
21.2
36.2
32.0
23.5
14.9
32.2
15.8
3.7
25.3
17.5
4.1
25.5
15.2
12.8
27.9
16.8
22.7
9.3
24.5
41.0
5.0
19.6
0.1
2.2
14.8
19.2
...
13.7
26.2
15.6
14.3
7.6
20.6
25.5
21.2
17.8
32.6
17.7
17.5
9.6
18.0
...
2.1
21.2
17.6
18.0
37.4
8.0
25.5
16.8
41.5
13.9
1.0
20.9
17.5
4.6
22.8
10.0
9.8
30.2
21.0
34.4
1.2
33.1
44.2
6.7
19.0
11.7
5.8
12.5
20.0
...
10.8
3.8
14.3
13.1
0.3
19.3
21.5
19.2
16.4
17.4
17.6
12.8
17.0
17.0
23.5
2.3
21.6
15.4
19.5
38.3
8.4
26.9
13.2
39.6
7.7
3.7
27.7
17.1
10.4
22.8
12.2
6.4
23.6
15.3
36.3
5.9
31.2
44.1
19.9
16.8
1.4
2.6
13.1
26.5
...
10.7
2.8
16.5
18.5
2.6
20.9
24.8
19.3
14.7
14.3
18.5
16.8
4.0
15.1
5.2
8.6
19.3
16.3
22.7
37.1
11.0
21.4
19.0
41.8
9.8
4.2
34.5
17.7
5.7
18.3
12.2
10.4
26.5
15.7
29.4
3.6
28.1
41.0
9.8
13.5
6.5
2.6
11.2
24.4
...
10.0
4.0
22.6
19.8
15.4
21.1
25.2
18.8
19.1
8.1
17.3
26.3
4.8
14.4
11.3
12.7
14.9
10.5
20.8
33.5
11.0
12.4
15.6
46.3
11.7
2.9
29.4
17.3
4.7
21.6
12.4
7.0
32.7
16.1
25.3
4.0
26.7
42.9
14.3
15.2
16.4
7.4
11.0
24.8
...
15.3
4.0
23.2
18.4
11.8
25.3
24.3
16.0
14.6
1.8
16.1
15.4
7.9
14.9
13.6
12.5
21.7
10.7
16.8
37.1
5.5
0.8
16.7
37.1
8.5
4.4
31.5
16.0
1.7
14.4
14.6
5.5
19.1
16.4
23.9
1.3
27.0
34.8
4.6
15.6
12.3
10.3
14.4
27.0
...
14.9
4.1
21.2
20.4
13.1
19.6
24.1
12.0
11.2
15.0
17.7
17.6
3.9
15.1
7.1
11.4
22.6
11.7
17.7
31.1
4.3
1.1
17.0
31.6
8.0
4.8
32.6
15.7
9.6
24.5
11.2
1.4
14.5
17.5
25.6
4.2
28.2
29.0
11.8
16.8
7.1
12.6
14.2
19.3
...
15.0
3.5
21.5
20.7
4.2
17.4
23.0
10.8
11.3
21.3
20.5
22.4
8.0
14.4
4.6
6.6
23.7
15.4
19.4
26.5
2.9
2.7
17.0
33.3
10.9
9.2
34.3
15.0
6.6
16.5
10.7
5.4
20.9
17.5
26.2
4.8
26.1
29.9
18.2
18.9
8.2
10.9
15.2
23.4
...
14.8
4.5
20.1
21.5
1.0
13.7
22.3
11.5
13.5
16.5
21.3
21.1
4.7
13.6
2.7
5.8
24.3
14.2
20.5
29.9
2.5
Sub-Saharan Africa
Median
22.1
16.4
20.4
19.3
15.4
15.2
19.8
17.6
19.8
19.1
16.9
20.1
18.4
16.4
19.5
17.6
15.5
18.3
16.7
15.2
17.9
14.3
14.9
15.4
13.9
15.2
15.7
14.5
15.1
16.7
Excluding Nigeria
29.9
27.9
17.1
18.0
22.9
13.2
16.7
15.8
22.0
24.4
18.2
18.3
21.2
26.3
17.6
18.0
20.9
25.3
16.6
17.6
19.8
22.5
15.9
16.9
16.8
19.1
16.5
17.5
11.7
10.7
16.3
16.9
10.5
9.6
16.4
17.5
11.4
11.1
16.7
18.3
Fragile countries
23.6
23.9
16.4
18.6
13.3
21.0
17.0
13.1
15.9
10.3
20.5
21.9
17.4
19.7
15.2
19.8
23.3
16.9
21.8
12.6
19.3
23.1
15.6
21.1
9.2
18.2
20.8
15.6
20.0
10.6
16.9
19.6
16.0
20.4
11.6
14.1
15.8
15.0
19.2
10.1
13.0
14.6
16.8
20.7
11.3
13.7
16.4
17.0
21.1
11.7
CFA franc zone

CEMAC
WAEMU
EAC-5
ECOWAS
SACU
SADC
20.4
27.7
13.8
18.4
19.5
25.8
17.5
18.9
17.8
20.3
15.6
15.0
17.5
23.6
18.5
15.8
20.5
24.6
16.9
18.5
17.6
20.0
18.4
19.4
22.1
27.2
17.5
18.2
17.1
18.3
17.8
18.3
20.7
26.6
15.3
18.3
17.0
18.1
16.3
17.3
20.6
24.8
16.9
17.3
14.6
17.6
15.8
16.2
21.0
25.7
16.9
16.9
15.8
15.6
16.7
16.3
18.3
20.4
16.7
17.2
17.4
12.8
16.3
13.8
18.8
20.3
17.6
17.0
18.3
12.4
15.2
12.9
18.7
19.9
17.8
17.7
19.4
13.1
14.5
13.6
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cameroon
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of
Cte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia1
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
So Tom & Prncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
South Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe2
90
Table SA8. Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants

(Percent of GDP)
2004-08
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
4.6
0.6
4.5
0.8
2.7
3.3
8.6
0.5
1.2
1.7
0.3
13.5
1.0
18.4
17.9
3.4
8.5
3.2
4.9
1.5
4.0
1.9
9.0
0.5
2.6
2.3
3.6
3.9
2.9
2.0
7.1
4.9
0.2
24.9
2.5
0.7
2.2
0.0
...
1.4
2.5
1.4
0.8
2.1
3.5
7.4
3.1
13.3
4.7
5.1
5.9
0.0
0.6
9.2
0.6
1.3
4.8
1.4
9.5
14.7
0.9
6.8
2.7
7.0
7.1
4.1
4.3
4.0
10.1
2.5
3.6
3.7
3.6
4.9
0.1
5.3
6.0
0.0
18.1
4.6
4.8
2.3
4.7
...
2.9
4.5
3.9
2.1
2.1
2.1
3.4
0.4
7.5
3.0
3.6
10.7
1.1
1.5
4.2
7.0
2.4
16.1
1.8
5.8
16.0
1.3
2.7
4.7
9.4
14.0
1.6
4.4
4.2
5.7
0.9
1.8
2.6
3.2
3.9
4.6
2.4
4.2
0.4
11.1
4.9
0.5
5.0
4.8
...
8.8
4.8
2.5
5.7
2.4
0.7
8.7
1.3
0.1
1.4
4.2
7.7
2.6
2.4
2.4
1.4
0.5
16.5
5.4
1.0
16.2
1.6
2.5
4.7
7.3
1.3
0.8
4.1
10.6
3.1
2.4
4.1
3.4
3.2
4.8
7.0
1.5
0.4
1.7
11.5
6.1
3.4
4.6
3.9
4.6
3.7
3.6
4.0
2.7
1.8
1.2
4.6
0.3
0.8
3.1
3.8
10.3
1.6
0.0
0.5
3.3
1.8
6.4
3.1
9.0
15.3
1.2
1.6
4.4
11.3
3.3
2.2
5.0
5.0
1.6
2.6
1.8
1.0
1.8
3.8
2.4
1.1
0.2
1.6
10.9
5.2
2.9
5.2
4.1
11.3
3.4
4.1
7.2
3.0
2.8
0.5
0.3
1.9
5.4
3.9
1.8
8.9
4.0
6.3
2.1
17.8
3.0
1.8
2.2
7.5
15.1
1.9
1.8
8.5
12.5
5.3
1.8
5.7
2.5
4.7
4.0
6.4
2.4
3.5
2.6
3.6
2.6
2.3
2.5
1.9
5.5
0.4
2.4
4.0
6.0
0.7
3.9
4.6
4.0
6.2
1.9
6.6
2.3
2.5
1.9
3.7
7.3
4.7
3.0
4.2
0.5
1.3
7.7
2.3
6.7
14.4
2.6
2.7
10.0
12.4
4.2
1.4
7.5
0.6
1.8
2.3
4.8
2.9
3.2
10.7
4.0
8.0
2.1
3.6
5.5
5.0
3.7
3.7
3.8
9.7
1.2
3.0
5.3
3.5
6.0
1.5
4.1
7.9
1.6
1.5
6.9
4.8
5.7
3.1
4.9
4.6
1.9
11.8
3.2
3.0
14.2
2.5
2.3
6.5
5.0
9.0
6.8
8.4
0.1
12.0
3.7
5.9
2.1
3.4
6.0
5.9
7.4
4.0
2.8
6.8
4.8
2.0
4.4
4.0
4.2
5.4
3.7
6.4
2.9
8.1
1.2
7.1
3.8
0.7
3.0
3.3
4.6
7.9
3.5
6.1
6.5
1.1
12.6
3.1
8.1
14.0
3.0
4.8
8.6
3.9
1.3
2.8
7.3
8.1
7.8
3.1
5.0
3.8
2.8
4.0
5.6
6.6
4.7
3.1
10.6
4.2
1.9
5.3
3.8
44.5
5.9
3.6
6.2
4.4
8.3
1.6
6.1
3.8
3.0
3.1
2.4
4.2
6.5
2.7
2.1
7.5
1.1
5.7
3.0
10.3
13.8
2.9
3.8
10.4
1.6
0.4
2.1
6.2
7.4
7.6
3.8
3.2
3.8
2.9
4.3
3.9
4.5
4.3
2.9
1.4
3.7
2.1
3.3
3.6
19.9
4.2
3.0
5.5
4.2
6.3
1.5
Sub-Saharan Africa
Median
1.7
0.7
1.2
4.6
3.6
3.7
3.4
3.4
1.9
1.2
2.6
0.4
1.8
2.2
1.8
3.1
2.6
3.2
3.6
3.7
4.7
4.1
4.4
4.3
4.6
4.6
4.9
4.1
3.8
4.1
Excluding Nigeria
5.6
7.3
0.6
1.2
5.4
4.4
4.1
3.5
2.3
2.4
4.3
3.7
2.2
5.9
3.7
3.6
0.6
1.5
3.7
3.3
2.1
1.7
4.0
3.9
3.1
5.7
4.1
4.3
4.1
4.5
4.1
4.2
5.5
8.1
3.9
3.9
4.7
6.3
3.5
3.4
Fragile countries
2.3
3.1
1.4
1.7
0.5
5.0
4.2
3.2
3.1
2.2
3.6
1.3
2.7
3.4
0.0
1.0
0.9
2.1
2.9
0.1
1.6
1.2
2.5
2.8
1.6
3.2
3.5
2.8
3.3
2.2
3.7
5.7
3.5
3.9
3.2
4.4
5.2
3.2
3.6
3.2
4.9
6.1
3.6
3.7
3.9
4.3
5.0
3.1
3.4
3.0
CFA franc zone

CEMAC
WAEMU
EAC-5
ECOWAS
SACU
SADC
4.9
9.7
0.1
1.6
1.8
3.0
0.3
0.3
2.1
0.8
3.2
2.2
3.7
5.5
4.9
4.8
0.7
1.1
2.5
2.3
4.5
4.4
4.9
3.2
0.4
2.8
3.9
2.6
3.5
0.9
3.9
1.7
1.9
0.9
2.9
2.2
4.1
1.1
3.7
2.0
3.0
3.0
3.1
3.2
4.6
3.2
3.6
2.8
3.6
3.8
3.4
3.8
5.0
2.9
3.5
4.0
4.6
5.3
4.0
4.0
5.6
4.1
4.0
3.7
5.4
7.5
3.8
4.1
5.3
4.5
3.8
3.9
4.4
5.6
3.5
3.6
4.6
4.0
3.6
3.6
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cameroon
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of
Cte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia1
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
So Tom & Prncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
South Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe2
91
Table SA9. Overall Fiscal Balance, Excluding Grants

(Percent of GDP)
2004-08
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
4.4
2.7
3.8
10.2
18.7
9.0
2.3
5.5
0.7
7.8
1.9
13.2
2.0
18.4
24.8
7.5
8.5
4.8
8.3
2.5
12.7
2.9
7.3
0.7
9.2
12.3
6.2
4.2
9.7
1.9
7.6
4.9
10.0
15.0
4.5
1.8
7.5
0.0
...
0.9
7.2
2.7
5.3
5.7
3.5
7.4
6.0
14.3
10.6
24.0
11.0
0.8
5.9
11.9
9.1
3.2
4.5
1.9
9.5
17.3
5.2
6.8
6.9
10.0
7.5
11.8
5.0
7.0
12.6
4.2
11.1
7.8
5.2
13.3
0.4
9.7
6.0
11.5
32.5
7.6
0.8
8.4
4.7
...
3.4
8.1
5.4
4.5
4.5
2.6
3.4
1.8
7.8
7.5
26.3
17.0
1.7
7.0
5.5
7.8
5.7
16.0
2.3
5.8
21.3
4.5
2.7
8.7
11.7
14.4
7.9
5.0
11.5
7.5
2.8
8.2
5.1
3.9
12.1
4.7
7.0
4.2
12.9
29.7
7.4
0.3
10.3
4.8
...
8.9
8.2
4.5
8.2
3.9
0.7
8.7
3.7
0.6
6.4
26.0
10.6
3.1
4.9
0.8
6.0
3.9
15.9
5.8
1.0
19.4
4.8
2.5
9.9
9.4
4.8
7.4
4.6
18.4
4.7
4.3
7.7
6.6
3.9
12.3
7.1
5.2
0.4
12.5
29.4
8.3
0.9
10.1
3.9
1.6
3.7
6.9
7.2
4.4
2.4
1.2
4.6
2.1
0.7
8.0
21.9
13.1
2.0
4.9
2.2
6.0
1.1
6.3
3.7
9.0
16.5
2.9
1.6
13.3
12.8
6.0
4.6
5.5
3.6
4.1
3.8
10.6
1.2
2.5
8.8
2.5
7.2
0.2
10.9
28.6
8.0
1.9
9.0
4.1
15.9
3.3
7.0
8.8
4.9
4.5
0.5
0.3
2.8
5.1
9.3
19.4
11.4
4.3
9.1
4.3
9.7
0.6
2.2
3.6
7.5
15.6
3.4
1.8
10.8
12.9
6.8
5.3
6.2
7.3
7.8
5.3
13.1
5.2
3.9
7.8
3.8
10.6
2.3
11.2
11.0
8.1
4.0
5.0
4.0
12.0
0.3
6.3
7.6
5.1
7.7
1.9
6.6
3.2
2.2
6.1
17.6
9.0
5.0
7.7
6.2
9.9
0.1
8.2
4.6
6.7
14.8
3.7
2.7
13.7
13.1
8.3
10.4
8.0
1.4
8.6
4.6
8.0
5.1
3.3
15.0
4.1
13.5
2.1
11.0
15.8
8.4
0.5
8.0
3.8
15.7
2.8
4.7
7.3
4.6
6.7
1.5
4.1
8.5
1.8
5.0
19.6
7.2
6.1
7.8
8.4
10.2
0.6
11.8
5.2
3.0
14.6
3.6
2.3
8.4
6.3
10.6
11.9
8.8
3.6
23.1
5.2
9.8
4.5
4.1
10.2
5.9
13.3
4.0
9.6
19.8
7.7
1.2
9.7
4.0
11.3
6.1
4.9
8.6
4.3
8.3
1.2
7.1
5.5
1.0
6.8
15.7
6.7
8.2
12.0
10.7
16.0
1.8
13.1
5.0
8.1
14.3
4.1
4.8
12.1
4.9
5.3
4.0
7.7
12.2
17.6
5.3
10.0
6.2
3.1
8.6
5.7
11.7
4.7
8.6
27.8
7.2
0.9
8.9
3.8
81.4
6.4
4.9
8.6
6.3
8.6
1.6
6.1
5.0
3.2
7.6
14.3
5.6
6.8
6.8
5.7
16.9
1.3
6.0
4.8
10.3
14.1
4.0
3.8
14.4
2.3
4.7
9.1
6.6
11.4
13.1
5.9
7.6
5.8
3.2
8.2
4.0
8.8
4.3
6.7
18.3
6.6
0.7
6.6
3.6
36.3
4.7
4.4
7.9
5.4
6.5
1.5
Sub-Saharan Africa
Median
0.4
4.4
1.9
5.7
7.2
6.0
4.3
7.0
4.1
1.9
4.8
2.2
2.5
4.6
3.4
3.8
6.2
4.7
4.2
6.7
6.1
4.8
7.2
5.7
5.4
7.1
6.5
4.7
6.1
5.5
Excluding Nigeria
5.2
5.9
2.4
5.0
5.5
4.7
5.7
6.6
2.3
2.2
5.7
6.7
2.1
5.5
4.9
6.0
0.5
1.0
4.8
5.5
2.3
2.3
5.1
5.9
3.3
6.3
5.1
6.0
4.2
5.0
5.2
5.9
5.7
9.2
5.1
5.7
4.9
7.2
4.5
5.0
Fragile countries
1.8
1.3
6.3
6.9
2.9
5.2
5.0
7.4
7.5
5.0
3.8
2.0
7.0
7.4
3.4
1.1
0.3
5.5
6.7
2.5
1.8
1.8
5.6
6.0
3.9
3.3
4.0
5.7
6.1
4.7
3.8
6.2
6.0
6.2
5.7
4.5
5.7
5.6
5.7
5.8
5.1
6.6
6.4
5.8
7.3
4.5
5.4
5.5
5.3
5.7
CFA franc zone

CEMAC
WAEMU
EAC-5
ECOWAS
SACU
SADC
1.4
7.2
4.6
5.3
5.4
1.9
0.2
0.6
3.9
1.7
6.0
5.3
6.6
6.3
4.9
5.6
2.0
0.6
4.7
5.6
7.6
5.0
5.0
4.0
1.8
2.3
6.3
4.8
6.2
1.5
3.9
2.3
3.2
1.5
5.0
4.2
6.5
1.6
3.8
2.6
4.7
3.5
6.0
4.9
6.5
3.7
3.7
3.4
5.4
4.5
6.2
5.1
6.6
3.4
3.5
4.4
6.4
6.1
6.6
5.4
7.1
4.7
4.1
4.2
7.3
8.5
6.4
5.6
6.8
5.1
3.8
4.5
6.2
6.3
6.1
4.9
5.9
4.5
3.6
4.1
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cameroon
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of
Cte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia1
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
So Tom & Prncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
South Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe2
92
Table SA10. Government Revenue, Excluding Grants

(Percent of GDP)
2004-08
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
45.5
16.6
41.4
13.1
13.9
22.7
18.2
9.4
14.1
14.1
8.6
39.6
17.5
38.3
22.3
13.9
28.7
15.8
13.6
14.1
9.4
18.7
57.0
15.1
11.7
16.4
15.0
19.4
12.7
29.3
13.7
21.8
12.7
27.7
20.8
36.5
8.8
26.8
...
30.5
10.8
16.3
10.9
15.2
6.1
34.5
17.2
36.0
13.6
13.9
21.9
16.7
10.8
12.3
13.9
10.7
29.1
18.0
49.1
13.3
11.9
29.4
16.2
13.4
16.2
9.1
18.1
60.4
20.6
9.9
19.4
15.1
21.2
15.6
31.5
14.3
11.2
12.6
16.3
19.0
32.9
9.1
27.0
...
29.3
12.1
15.8
10.8
13.3
11.4
43.5
17.5
32.1
15.3
14.5
21.7
16.0
11.6
18.9
14.3
12.1
37.5
17.7
34.2
13.3
14.0
25.8
14.9
14.4
15.3
10.8
19.2
44.7
25.0
11.2
21.8
15.2
21.2
17.9
28.4
13.6
12.4
13.0
17.5
19.6
34.2
9.9
26.7
...
20.5
12.0
18.0
10.6
14.2
23.3
48.8
16.4
35.7
15.7
16.2
22.7
17.5
10.8
23.2
16.1
11.8
42.0
18.8
35.1
14.2
13.4
29.0
16.1
17.1
17.1
10.1
19.0
44.4
24.3
9.7
18.4
14.0
20.7
19.8
31.2
14.2
17.7
14.0
18.6
20.5
37.2
11.5
27.0
22.7
20.1
12.3
16.7
12.8
17.1
26.7
45.9
17.4
36.1
17.5
15.6
21.6
17.5
11.5
21.8
19.3
14.4
42.5
18.4
34.8
14.2
13.8
30.1
16.4
17.0
20.1
9.1
18.7
57.9
26.0
9.6
18.3
14.4
20.8
21.9
32.5
15.3
14.3
15.0
16.3
20.5
36.7
11.4
27.2
8.2
29.4
12.7
17.6
11.6
17.0
28.0
40.2
17.7
37.5
18.5
14.2
22.2
17.6
5.7
18.5
15.5
12.9
46.5
18.5
31.8
14.1
14.3
30.2
16.3
16.3
18.7
8.1
19.3
55.6
25.0
9.6
21.6
14.5
21.0
26.3
32.7
16.6
11.0
16.5
20.6
20.1
34.2
10.8
27.6
15.1
28.2
13.1
18.0
11.7
16.2
27.7
35.3
16.5
38.0
17.3
14.6
21.2
18.1
4.9
15.9
14.5
13.3
41.9
18.6
33.7
14.1
13.8
26.1
18.7
17.7
18.2
12.0
19.4
58.5
23.5
10.1
21.8
14.8
20.5
27.6
35.3
17.5
10.5
16.7
15.6
21.4
34.1
10.1
28.2
23.5
28.5
13.3
17.7
12.5
18.1
26.6
24.8
16.4
37.9
16.2
10.3
22.7
17.4
6.8
8.7
15.3
13.6
27.7
17.5
35.2
13.9
15.1
21.4
19.8
18.0
17.9
13.6
19.8
55.7
21.3
10.3
20.9
15.8
21.8
25.2
33.6
17.8
7.8
17.6
15.5
22.2
33.5
10.6
29.7
56.5
27.0
13.9
18.8
13.7
17.3
27.3
21.6
16.6
34.2
17.8
8.8
23.1
15.6
7.7
8.8
14.7
13.8
30.3
17.6
29.4
13.9
14.8
19.8
18.3
19.9
20.4
14.2
20.1
47.1
21.5
11.0
21.8
16.5
22.4
26.3
32.0
18.6
5.9
18.7
16.3
21.4
34.5
10.3
30.1
28.1
23.7
14.7
18.9
14.0
16.7
25.7
23.0
16.7
31.1
18.1
10.8
23.8
15.8
8.1
9.8
14.0
14.3
31.2
17.9
25.2
13.9
15.0
20.2
19.5
19.6
20.4
13.2
20.3
47.2
22.7
11.4
22.3
17.0
22.4
27.1
31.6
19.3
6.8
18.3
16.8
21.5
34.6
10.8
30.2
26.5
24.2
14.8
19.1
14.4
17.1
25.8
Sub-Saharan Africa
Median
23.4
16.1
21.8
19.8
16.0
20.2
20.6
17.5
22.1
23.3
17.7
24.5
21.8
17.6
23.9
20.1
18.5
22.9
19.4
18.1
22.1
17.9
17.9
19.7
16.1
18.7
18.8
16.3
19.3
19.1
Excluding Nigeria
25.9
34.7
21.8
16.5
17.8
30.3
21.1
16.0
19.0
34.8
21.8
16.8
24.5
37.9
22.4
17.6
21.3
36.6
22.3
18.0
17.9
33.4
22.1
18.0
16.3
30.7
22.3
18.3
12.0
23.5
22.7
18.3
9.2
20.4
22.3
18.3
9.9
21.1
22.3
18.4
Fragile countries
25.6
28.2
12.9
13.5
15.8
21.5
25.6
13.2
13.3
15.4
21.9
27.4
14.8
14.1
18.3
24.9
30.8
15.8
14.7
19.7
23.3
30.2
15.5
15.0
18.9
21.2
28.2
15.9
15.8
18.8
20.3
27.0
16.2
15.9
18.8
18.3
22.7
16.3
16.3
17.2
16.1
21.3
16.2
16.4
17.0
16.2
21.5
16.5
16.6
17.5
CFA franc zone

CEMAC
WAEMU
EAC-5
ECOWAS
SACU
SADC
21.4
25.9
16.8
14.8
14.2
20.0
27.6
26.7
20.7
25.0
16.7
14.4
14.3
12.6
27.6
25.7
20.8
24.6
17.0
15.8
14.7
13.3
27.0
26.9
22.6
27.6
17.1
16.2
15.2
17.6
27.5
28.4
22.7
27.6
17.5
16.6
15.1
15.0
27.8
28.5
22.3
26.8
17.8
16.6
15.6
12.5
28.3
27.7
21.4
25.0
17.9
16.7
15.9
12.1
29.0
27.2
18.8
20.2
17.7
17.2
16.5
10.0
30.2
25.9
18.2
18.5
18.0
17.1
17.1
8.7
30.4
25.2
18.4
18.4
18.4
17.3
17.3
9.3
30.4
25.4
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cameroon
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of
Cte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia1
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
So Tom & Prncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
South Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe2
See sources and footnotes on page 82
93
Table SA11. Government Expenditure

(Percent of GDP)
2004-08
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
41.1
19.4
37.6
23.3
32.6
31.7
15.9
14.9
14.9
21.9
10.6
26.4
19.5
20.0
47.1
21.5
20.2
20.6
21.8
16.5
22.1
21.6
49.8
15.8
20.9
28.6
21.2
23.7
22.5
27.4
21.3
16.9
22.7
42.6
25.3
38.3
16.4
26.8
...
29.6
18.0
19.0
16.2
21.0
9.6
41.9
23.2
50.3
24.2
38.0
32.8
17.5
16.6
24.2
23.0
13.9
24.7
19.9
58.6
30.6
17.1
22.6
23.1
23.5
23.7
20.9
23.1
67.4
33.2
14.1
30.5
22.8
26.3
28.9
31.9
23.9
17.2
24.1
48.8
26.6
32.1
17.5
31.7
...
32.7
20.2
21.2
15.3
17.8
14.0
40.0
19.2
39.9
22.8
40.8
38.7
17.7
18.6
24.4
22.1
17.7
21.4
20.0
40.0
34.6
18.5
23.1
23.6
26.1
29.7
18.7
24.2
56.2
32.5
14.0
30.0
20.3
25.1
30.0
33.1
20.6
16.7
25.9
47.3
27.0
34.6
20.2
31.5
...
29.4
20.2
22.5
18.8
18.1
22.6
40.2
20.1
36.3
22.1
42.2
33.3
20.5
15.7
22.4
22.1
15.7
26.1
24.6
34.0
33.6
18.2
26.5
26.0
26.5
21.9
17.5
23.6
62.8
29.0
14.1
26.1
20.6
24.6
32.2
38.4
19.4
17.4
26.5
48.0
28.8
36.3
21.6
30.9
21.1
23.9
19.1
23.8
17.2
19.5
27.8
41.3
19.5
35.4
25.5
37.5
34.7
19.5
16.4
23.9
25.3
15.4
36.2
22.1
43.8
30.7
16.6
28.5
29.7
29.8
26.1
13.7
24.2
61.5
30.1
13.4
28.9
15.5
23.3
30.7
35.0
22.5
14.1
25.9
44.9
28.5
38.6
20.4
31.3
24.1
26.1
19.8
26.4
16.5
21.5
28.5
40.5
20.5
32.4
27.8
33.5
33.6
21.9
14.7
22.9
25.2
12.2
48.7
22.1
39.3
29.7
17.8
28.4
27.1
29.2
25.5
13.4
25.5
62.9
32.8
14.9
34.7
19.7
24.9
34.0
36.5
27.2
13.4
27.6
31.6
28.1
38.2
15.8
31.7
27.1
28.0
19.4
25.5
16.8
23.8
29.6
41.9
19.7
35.8
23.4
32.2
30.2
23.1
12.6
22.1
24.4
13.3
50.1
23.2
40.4
28.9
17.5
23.5
32.5
30.8
26.5
22.4
27.4
59.9
32.1
14.7
29.8
19.9
23.8
42.5
39.4
31.0
12.6
27.7
31.4
29.8
33.6
18.1
32.0
39.2
31.3
18.0
25.0
17.1
24.9
28.1
28.9
24.9
39.7
21.3
29.9
29.9
23.5
14.6
17.1
25.5
14.2
39.6
22.7
38.2
28.5
18.6
23.7
28.2
24.4
28.5
25.5
28.6
59.3
44.5
15.5
30.7
20.3
25.9
35.4
39.6
31.1
11.8
27.2
35.2
29.9
32.3
20.3
33.7
67.9
33.1
18.8
27.4
18.0
25.6
28.5
28.7
22.1
35.2
24.6
24.4
29.8
23.8
19.7
19.5
30.7
15.6
43.3
22.6
37.5
28.2
18.9
24.6
30.4
24.8
25.7
18.1
27.9
59.3
39.1
16.3
31.8
22.6
25.4
34.9
37.6
30.3
10.6
27.3
44.1
28.7
35.4
19.2
33.9
109.5
30.1
19.6
27.5
20.4
25.2
27.3
29.1
21.7
34.3
25.7
25.1
29.4
22.6
14.9
15.5
30.9
15.5
37.3
22.8
35.5
28.0
19.0
24.0
33.9
21.9
25.1
22.3
27.0
58.6
35.8
17.3
29.9
22.8
25.5
35.3
35.6
28.1
11.1
24.9
35.1
28.1
33.8
17.3
33.8
62.7
28.9
19.2
27.0
19.8
23.6
27.3
Sub-Saharan Africa
Median
23.0
21.5
23.7
25.5
23.8
26.2
25.0
23.9
26.2
25.2
24.6
26.6
24.3
26.1
27.3
23.9
27.2
27.6
23.7
27.7
28.2
22.6
28.2
25.4
21.5
27.3
25.3
21.0
27.0
24.5
Excluding Nigeria
20.7
28.8
24.2
21.5
23.3
35.0
26.8
22.6
21.3
32.6
27.5
23.5
22.4
32.4
27.3
23.7
20.8
35.6
27.1
23.5
20.2
35.7
27.1
23.8
19.6
36.9
27.4
24.3
16.2
28.5
27.9
24.3
14.9
29.6
27.4
24.1
14.8
28.3
26.8
23.4
Fragile countries
23.8
27.0
19.2
20.4
18.7
26.7
30.7
20.5
20.9
20.4
25.6
29.4
21.7
21.5
21.7
26.0
30.5
21.3
21.4
22.2
25.0
31.9
21.1
21.0
22.8
24.5
32.2
21.6
21.9
23.5
24.1
33.2
22.1
22.1
24.5
22.9
28.4
21.9
21.9
23.0
21.2
27.9
22.7
22.2
24.2
20.7
27.0
22.1
21.9
23.2
CFA franc zone

CEMAC
WAEMU
EAC-5
ECOWAS
SACU
SADC
20.0
18.7
21.3
20.1
19.6
18.1
27.4
27.4
24.6
26.7
22.7
19.7
20.9
18.9
32.5
31.3
22.9
24.0
21.7
21.5
22.3
18.3
32.0
30.9
24.4
25.3
23.4
21.0
21.4
19.1
31.4
30.7
25.9
29.2
22.5
20.8
21.6
16.6
31.6
31.1
27.0
30.3
23.8
21.5
22.1
16.2
32.0
31.1
26.8
29.5
24.1
21.8
22.5
15.4
32.5
31.6
25.2
26.2
24.4
22.6
23.6
14.7
34.3
30.1
25.5
27.0
24.5
22.6
23.9
13.7
34.2
29.7
24.6
24.8
24.4
22.2
23.1
13.8
34.0
29.5
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cameroon
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of
Cte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia1
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
So Tom & Prncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
South Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe2
94
Table SA12. Government Debt

(Percent of GDP)
2004-08
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
27.8
24.4
7.7
32.6
134.4
73.8
30.1
79.4
24.8
65.1
105.0
114.4
76.6
2.1
146.3
70.8
41.2
107.3
39.3
117.9
197.4
45.2
57.5
548.8
56.6
62.2
29.0
49.5
49.7
23.7
43.3
16.0
47.1
207.2
32.5
140.1
94.1
30.5
...
14.6
33.5
97.4
34.8
20.4
50.6
22.7
25.6
17.6
28.5
25.7
65.2
10.1
32.3
31.7
53.5
93.2
61.6
64.2
6.4
144.6
36.0
23.1
62.6
36.1
89.3
159.2
41.1
37.6
173.9
33.7
42.6
21.0
52.3
41.8
16.3
27.7
9.6
22.4
68.0
34.2
121.3
48.1
30.1
...
10.3
24.4
73.4
19.2
20.5
68.3
44.3
28.7
19.4
29.3
40.3
72.4
11.5
32.3
30.1
50.3
31.9
22.9
63.0
10.1
143.8
39.6
20.5
69.6
46.3
99.6
67.5
44.4
35.2
33.4
31.8
52.9
25.4
52.0
43.2
15.9
24.3
9.6
22.6
75.3
35.5
81.9
46.8
34.7
...
13.5
27.3
49.9
22.9
18.9
63.2
33.8
29.9
20.3
29.8
39.1
78.8
13.2
32.9
29.5
46.1
26.3
33.1
93.3
7.4
133.0
38.2
17.9
77.3
42.6
79.4
49.5
43.0
38.0
29.6
32.6
79.3
25.1
52.3
37.9
24.3
27.8
10.2
23.1
71.7
40.7
77.3
44.9
38.2
0.0
13.9
27.8
49.3
23.6
20.8
51.8
29.5
26.8
18.9
28.3
39.9
91.1
15.4
34.5
28.2
42.5
23.2
34.1
44.8
9.1
127.6
32.8
19.7
77.0
49.1
35.4
52.1
41.7
40.3
27.0
33.7
77.5
25.0
51.5
39.9
24.6
26.8
10.4
20.1
78.3
42.8
82.5
36.9
40.9
4.5
14.4
29.2
49.0
24.2
24.9
56.7
32.9
25.4
17.6
28.7
37.0
100.5
18.7
54.2
30.1
18.1
19.1
38.2
39.9
7.9
128.4
36.9
29.2
83.3
56.2
40.3
53.6
41.6
43.4
27.5
34.0
95.6
25.7
53.9
50.9
24.2
27.2
10.5
26.5
71.3
46.9
68.8
30.8
44.2
12.7
14.8
30.9
51.2
27.7
26.5
54.8
40.7
30.9
17.9
28.6
32.6
111.3
28.0
68.3
36.7
22.3
16.8
47.5
36.6
12.0
126.5
40.7
32.2
101.1
69.0
42.9
55.0
47.0
49.5
33.3
34.7
100.4
30.8
56.1
57.0
25.0
32.9
10.6
29.0
68.9
54.2
68.6
35.9
47.1
20.7
13.7
35.2
57.5
31.2
35.1
51.1
62.3
37.5
17.8
31.0
38.4
119.3
33.5
65.0
39.3
26.7
18.8
64.9
34.7
20.1
127.1
48.6
43.9
91.6
73.3
48.4
57.7
52.7
60.0
40.0
35.6
83.4
36.3
58.1
74.8
27.2
43.5
11.5
34.6
82.5
56.8
68.1
46.1
50.1
56.9
17.4
40.5
61.9
35.4
52.9
53.0
70.1
39.5
15.6
32.6
39.5
121.7
38.0
58.5
43.1
29.2
19.8
78.8
33.0
24.6
125.6
55.4
49.6
96.9
74.1
48.4
48.6
55.2
61.4
45.0
39.2
73.0
35.2
58.3
87.4
30.9
46.9
13.3
41.5
91.9
57.3
64.8
52.5
51.4
40.5
20.1
42.4
61.1
37.9
57.9
55.0
68.7
40.6
11.8
33.0
37.0
122.2
41.3
52.1
38.5
29.6
22.2
69.0
31.5
27.2
127.5
59.0
49.5
99.2
72.2
44.7
45.8
55.0
58.5
47.7
38.1
67.4
36.1
57.6
82.0
31.8
47.9
14.0
43.3
93.8
56.2
58.5
52.1
52.1
30.5
22.8
42.6
63.1
40.2
58.6
54.9
Sub-Saharan Africa
Median
33.3
49.6
46.8
27.3
35.1
35.6
28.1
35.0
36.4
28.6
33.8
34.6
27.9
34.1
32.4
29.1
34.0
34.8
31.2
36.6
39.5
36.4
48.4
48.1
37.2
48.6
50.8
36.8
47.9
50.7
Excluding Nigeria
21.7
34.0
40.6
52.0
14.1
22.7
35.8
40.9
16.1
31.7
36.5
38.4
15.0
24.6
38.9
39.7
14.7
24.2
38.4
36.3
15.8
27.7
40.6
38.0
17.7
35.3
43.7
41.4
22.4
52.6
47.9
46.5
23.2
57.8
49.6
48.7
23.0
56.4
50.0
48.9
Fragile countries
28.1
38.8
57.6
42.7
81.9
23.8
31.0
41.5
29.6
61.8
26.3
36.3
36.6
31.6
46.0
27.5
35.4
33.5
32.0
44.6
26.8
32.2
32.7
31.1
36.7
27.7
34.9
34.6
34.5
36.0
29.5
40.7
38.2
38.8
38.0
34.3
51.6
44.1
45.6
41.7
34.5
54.8
46.6
49.7
41.9
33.9
53.9
47.3
50.8
41.0
CFA franc zone

CEMAC
WAEMU
EAC-5
ECOWAS
SACU
SADC
45.6
39.7
52.0
56.5
41.2
28.1
29.5
33.5
33.7
23.0
43.6
43.3
30.0
20.0
29.1
31.7
29.9
18.0
42.0
38.0
33.3
18.3
33.4
35.2
34.4
18.9
51.5
37.4
33.0
19.8
37.0
36.1
28.0
20.0
36.5
36.0
32.9
17.5
39.3
36.8
29.8
23.7
35.8
37.1
34.5
18.0
42.2
39.1
34.5
31.0
37.8
40.3
39.0
18.3
44.8
42.5
39.8
39.2
40.3
45.8
44.5
20.2
47.7
49.2
42.0
44.7
40.0
48.9
47.1
21.4
48.8
51.0
41.8
44.6
39.7
50.4
47.5
21.4
49.2
50.9
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cameroon
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of
Cte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia1
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
So Tom & Prncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
South Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe2
95
Table SA13. Broad Money

(Percent of GDP)
2004-08
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
21.9
30.4
46.7
23.9
22.3
75.1
19.4
15.9
9.0
25.6
6.6
16.0
11.3
7.3
130.2
44.7
17.0
39.0
22.8
20.2
19.1
35.7
32.6
19.5
23.6
15.8
25.6
98.5
17.0
44.5
15.6
16.5
16.7
33.2
34.7
84.6
16.7
72.5
...
19.8
21.8
33.3
16.5
18.0
10.7
42.5
38.7
52.7
28.0
24.3
77.5
22.3
16.1
11.1
30.4
10.2
22.5
14.1
15.4
121.6
24.8
20.3
48.7
28.0
26.9
24.6
36.5
39.1
31.4
24.5
19.8
24.7
99.5
24.2
65.8
18.5
27.1
17.5
34.9
36.9
55.5
22.6
77.7
...
25.4
23.3
41.3
17.9
17.8
16.9
35.3
41.9
46.6
29.7
25.3
80.1
23.4
17.8
11.5
34.1
10.5
23.8
15.7
15.8
123.2
27.0
19.5
49.9
29.9
38.2
29.7
40.1
39.9
35.5
24.7
22.1
24.5
100.4
24.7
64.4
20.3
20.8
18.5
36.6
39.7
62.1
23.5
75.8
...
25.0
25.1
45.6
21.7
18.4
24.7
37.6
42.8
43.4
29.7
23.8
78.5
24.2
19.2
12.1
34.9
10.7
28.0
18.9
13.2
114.7
27.6
20.5
55.7
30.4
34.3
33.2
40.6
36.2
42.0
26.1
25.1
24.4
98.9
27.7
67.2
20.2
18.8
20.3
34.9
40.0
60.2
23.2
74.6
9.5
24.4
24.7
46.9
19.8
19.1
28.3
35.0
41.5
47.8
30.5
22.1
82.1
22.7
18.3
12.4
38.3
11.6
33.0
15.1
18.4
114.1
25.3
23.2
54.5
30.0
28.9
32.0
40.5
36.1
36.3
25.7
25.7
27.0
100.5
30.6
59.6
22.6
21.3
20.1
38.0
39.9
52.0
22.0
72.7
19.8
23.9
23.8
45.3
19.7
19.6
29.8
36.5
44.8
46.6
31.9
21.1
89.9
23.3
28.1
13.3
36.9
11.5
34.8
15.0
21.4
118.3
27.1
24.8
56.6
28.8
30.9
39.3
42.2
39.4
34.8
25.2
26.0
28.2
99.8
33.4
56.1
23.3
19.3
21.1
38.3
42.6
58.9
20.0
71.1
14.3
25.4
22.7
46.5
20.0
20.5
28.8
41.0
49.7
45.3
34.8
20.2
95.3
24.1
28.7
15.7
38.4
11.9
39.2
15.7
20.3
119.9
28.1
24.4
59.2
32.5
31.2
44.5
43.5
37.4
34.6
25.4
24.5
27.7
102.8
38.5
52.7
27.2
20.9
22.7
40.0
46.0
68.3
22.3
71.0
19.1
24.3
23.4
48.2
21.4
20.9
30.8
46.4
50.7
50.0
39.4
20.2
94.1
25.4
28.8
15.7
43.4
11.6
44.2
16.6
26.3
118.6
29.9
25.8
52.8
34.7
35.2
48.9
43.8
35.9
34.8
26.2
23.8
29.0
104.6
41.7
52.7
29.9
20.9
23.8
40.2
48.9
67.0
24.9
74.6
29.2
24.7
24.6
51.8
21.3
25.5
32.5
50.0
54.1
51.1
41.1
20.2
95.7
25.8
28.8
18.0
41.5
11.6
49.5
17.3
30.8
119.9
30.9
27.2
52.6
34.2
34.7
50.0
45.5
36.4
34.4
26.7
23.1
30.8
106.4
41.1
52.7
32.0
21.5
24.7
40.2
48.4
67.0
25.2
74.1
42.4
24.2
24.5
52.3
22.3
24.3
33.9
47.0
58.3
52.3
44.7
20.2
97.5
26.0
28.8
17.6
41.5
12.2
46.1
18.1
32.1
122.8
31.5
26.1
53.9
33.4
34.7
56.8
47.7
36.7
34.1
26.8
23.2
32.3
106.0
41.9
52.7
30.5
21.7
25.6
40.5
47.9
67.0
25.6
73.8
30.7
24.0
24.9
52.8
24.2
24.5
34.9
Sub-Saharan Africa
Median
35.5
21.8
25.6
40.3
25.1
29.2
37.7
26.2
29.8
36.6
28.0
29.9
36.8
29.8
29.8
35.8
28.8
30.4
36.7
31.2
32.0
38.3
34.7
34.1
38.8
34.4
35.3
38.7
34.1
35.3
Excluding Nigeria
16.9
17.9
47.1
28.0
28.0
30.3
48.9
28.8
22.4
27.1
48.8
30.7
21.0
26.6
48.2
31.0
23.1
27.8
46.8
30.5
21.9
28.8
46.0
30.9
23.8
31.7
46.4
32.1
25.0
36.0
48.2
33.5
26.3
39.5
48.0
34.0
25.8
37.2
47.9
34.8
Fragile countries
38.5
26.6
24.6
27.1
18.5
44.7
33.8
24.1
24.7
21.2
41.0
33.1
26.2
26.9
23.1
40.0
34.2
25.5
26.9
22.9
40.0
33.5
25.9
26.3
24.0
38.7
34.2
26.4
27.2
23.8
39.5
36.1
27.8
29.0
24.9
41.2
38.7
29.4
30.6
26.5
41.5
40.1
30.5
31.3
28.1
41.2
39.7
31.0
32.2
27.7
CFA franc zone

CEMAC
WAEMU
EAC-5
ECOWAS
SACU
SADC
18.6
14.8
22.1
31.3
26.0
18.3
69.8
53.4
22.4
19.0
25.3
28.6
26.7
27.0
75.5
58.6
23.6
19.6
27.2
30.7
29.6
22.9
73.4
56.5
24.7
20.4
28.7
30.9
29.3
21.7
72.2
55.9
25.0
21.9
27.8
30.5
28.9
23.4
70.4
54.3
26.4
23.5
29.0
31.2
29.2
22.0
68.8
53.1
27.9
24.6
30.8
32.1
30.2
23.7
68.5
53.4
30.1
26.9
32.8
33.1
30.8
24.3
71.8
56.2
31.8
29.2
33.8
33.9
31.6
25.0
71.4
56.0
32.2
28.6
34.9
34.9
33.0
25.3
71.1
55.3
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cameroon
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of
Cte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia1
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
So Tom & Prncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
South Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe2
96
Table SA14. Broad Money Growth

(Percent)
2004-08
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
64.6
15.6
17.4
6.9
21.1
12.5
10.5
7.5
23.6
8.1
52.5
28.7
12.0
30.7
11.2
8.4
14.2
16.5
31.3
35.5
25.7
14.9
16.8
33.6
17.2
27.6
5.6
13.0
22.2
30.4
15.7
37.2
23.6
29.8
9.5
7.9
24.5
18.9
...
15.7
22.0
15.7
19.1
25.6
1.4
21.5
6.2
1.3
18.2
19.8
3.5
6.9
11.7
4.6
13.3
50.4
5.0
24.4
29.9
15.7
19.9
2.2
19.4
26.0
25.9
4.4
16.0
17.7
30.6
10.2
23.9
16.0
2.4
34.6
7.0
18.3
17.1
13.0
8.2
10.9
7.0
31.3
1.8
...
26.8
17.7
16.2
16.6
7.7
340.0
5.3
11.6
12.4
19.1
19.4
5.4
11.3
16.1
25.3
19.4
30.8
38.9
19.3
33.5
15.6
24.4
19.2
13.7
34.4
74.4
29.6
21.6
14.5
28.0
9.6
33.9
9.0
6.9
17.6
7.5
22.0
6.9
16.9
25.1
14.1
13.5
28.5
6.9
...
7.9
25.4
16.3
41.5
29.9
68.6
37.1
9.1
4.3
13.8
6.1
4.6
10.6
13.8
14.2
9.6
23.2
34.5
17.2
7.7
14.6
36.5
26.5
11.0
32.2
9.4
39.1
19.1
1.6
41.3
16.4
35.7
15.3
6.4
23.9
13.8
6.2
4.0
26.7
10.4
6.7
4.5
22.6
8.3
...
5.5
18.2
15.9
10.5
21.7
33.1
4.9
9.0
17.6
15.9
10.9
6.3
1.4
1.6
13.4
16.0
21.1
21.1
7.6
57.8
17.9
32.9
15.7
7.8
24.3
1.0
6.0
14.1
7.0
2.1
6.9
22.9
15.2
8.2
25.6
5.3
31.2
29.1
14.0
20.3
6.8
0.6
22.5
5.2
33.9
10.0
12.5
8.9
14.9
17.9
19.9
14.1
17.3
8.5
10.6
11.9
11.4
10.8
5.6
8.6
2.8
18.1
0.7
9.7
7.3
17.5
24.2
6.1
15.1
19.1
14.1
22.5
15.6
21.2
7.6
5.3
35.1
7.4
5.8
21.2
8.5
10.1
1.0
15.5
13.9
8.0
23.7
16.7
5.9
1.6
15.9
10.0
10.3
9.5
20.8
4.6
16.2
16.7
11.3
11.3
8.4
7.4
10.5
14.6
26.5
8.1
14.2
13.1
13.8
14.1
17.2
26.9
1.6
11.2
36.8
12.3
22.4
16.7
4.0
2.1
11.1
20.7
7.1
8.7
27.3
7.6
25.7
20.4
19.0
16.8
11.4
25.8
16.6
7.3
21.2
3.9
15.6
9.8
15.2
12.6
12.6
11.8
7.9
6.5
19.7
1.1
1.0
13.5
11.2
6.4
16.5
6.2
11.5
17.3
6.2
13.9
24.2
0.1
0.9
26.1
20.3
25.1
13.7
3.2
1.7
14.5
21.0
13.2
7.1
21.7
16.0
13.8
5.9
15.8
13.1
13.4
4.3
11.3
10.3
62.4
9.1
18.0
16.2
11.7
38.7
6.0
20.7
14.0
12.5
12.5
11.3
5.5
8.2
12.7
6.3
0.8
6.8
5.4
15.7
1.8
16.0
18.7
3.8
10.1
15.1
11.1
11.7
17.4
10.6
2.1
13.3
18.6
15.3
8.0
10.9
9.6
14.5
14.2
14.7
11.6
7.4
5.6
13.3
6.0
188.0
3.5
12.5
8.7
18.4
19.6
7.1
15.2
15.5
11.7
17.3
9.6
7.0
7.5
12.8
8.2
5.7
12.2
4.8
14.9
8.9
15.7
18.9
5.2
13.5
13.7
15.6
21.2
17.7
11.2
6.7
12.3
18.1
11.6
6.0
14.9
12.1
3.2
16.5
16.1
6.3
7.4
6.2
14.0
7.1
31.6
4.6
13.4
8.6
20.0
16.9
8.0
Sub-Saharan Africa
Median
25.1
17.3
22.0
14.3
16.1
19.7
13.4
19.2
21.6
12.6
14.0
21.2
16.7
14.0
14.8
7.8
10.6
13.3
15.5
13.1
16.2
11.2
13.1
15.0
13.0
11.6
15.2
13.3
12.2
14.0
Excluding Nigeria
36.8
36.3
18.3
17.9
16.3
14.4
12.9
21.4
8.7
13.9
16.9
24.1
9.3
26.0
15.1
19.8
24.3
12.2
11.5
15.6
3.3
9.9
11.2
14.5
18.1
12.2
13.7
17.6
6.7
8.8
14.6
17.0
15.3
18.5
11.3
14.2
15.3
12.0
12.0
14.6
Fragile countries
27.4
26.4
17.3
15.4
19.1
11.8
15.9
24.0
17.8
30.7
10.2
18.0
25.6
24.6
26.7
10.6
22.3
20.1
20.0
20.7
16.4
11.9
17.9
19.2
11.5
6.1
13.2
13.5
14.8
10.2
14.9
14.9
17.6
19.3
14.4
9.6
14.0
16.1
18.1
11.6
12.0
14.4
16.0
14.9
16.8
12.9
13.2
14.8
15.6
12.9
CFA franc zone

CEMAC
WAEMU
EAC-5
ECOWAS
SACU
SADC
14.3
18.4
10.7
17.3
18.6
31.1
19.0
23.8
12.9
8.3
17.1
24.6
16.7
17.9
2.2
11.2
19.0
22.3
16.1
26.2
26.7
10.9
7.2
11.6
14.8
16.5
13.2
22.0
16.9
7.5
8.2
14.7
11.2
16.7
6.3
18.7
13.6
24.3
5.8
8.3
8.9
7.5
10.1
16.4
12.2
4.0
6.3
9.4
10.5
7.5
13.2
17.2
15.9
20.2
7.4
10.7
8.6
1.1
15.2
16.8
14.7
8.9
10.3
12.5
9.8
5.5
13.3
15.5
15.5
14.0
6.4
9.9
10.0
7.0
12.4
16.1
16.3
15.5
7.4
10.2
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cameroon
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of
Cte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia1
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
So Tom & Prncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
South Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe2
97
Table SA15. Claims on Nonfinancial Private Sector

(Percent change)
2004-08
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
71.9
16.4
21.2
14.4
8.4
20.4
8.2
8.7
17.3
11.4
91.1
26.6
9.3
50.1
6.3
24.9
10.0
13.2
44.1
19.2
50.9
19.9
29.2
36.0
24.8
41.2
7.2
15.4
27.5
16.9
26.1
47.0
30.2
53.5
13.1
21.9
35.5
17.8
...
21.4
35.8
8.4
27.5
43.2
5.8
60.5
11.9
10.3
1.7
25.5
11.8
9.1
8.7
21.0
44.1
41.1
30.4
10.8
13.8
1.2
14.5
7.9
10.3
16.2
15.8
24.9
13.9
20.7
31.5
6.5
39.5
11.0
0.5
58.6
10.0
18.4
22.0
5.7
39.3
3.8
9.2
45.4
3.0
...
13.1
9.6
21.3
17.3
5.7
388.2
19.2
8.5
11.1
14.7
30.2
9.0
8.2
30.2
30.2
25.9
19.0
49.3
8.7
30.6
1.6
28.1
1.9
14.8
24.8
43.8
58.2
20.3
26.9
40.1
11.2
52.4
13.5
12.5
18.3
11.1
11.7
5.6
9.9
35.8
10.1
23.6
31.5
3.3
...
0.5
20.0
21.6
41.8
15.4
143.3
28.8
11.5
21.8
23.5
39.3
13.3
28.3
19.2
24.4
8.9
16.7
42.3
0.4
30.7
14.6
25.0
42.0
8.8
29.0
93.4
46.7
30.9
25.1
32.4
7.0
20.5
24.1
12.3
19.4
9.3
16.0
2.6
27.6
15.4
19.0
5.2
21.8
5.7
34.0
26.0
27.2
41.1
28.3
28.2
62.8
24.2
9.4
21.5
24.1
12.4
0.6
2.6
31.0
32.1
22.4
25.6
44.3
12.2
13.6
1.5
37.7
24.1
4.3
32.9
3.2
27.2
10.4
42.2
11.2
4.8
25.4
4.8
17.4
16.0
16.9
24.2
6.6
35.0
11.0
10.0
8.5
6.9
9.3
125.7
1.7
18.2
18.9
11.8
37.0
27.1
15.0
10.6
13.8
26.3
8.3
2.0
14.9
18.1
6.1
12.6
26.5
17.0
22.9
34.3
4.4
10.8
23.6
20.5
29.0
35.0
3.6
20.1
10.3
27.2
16.2
14.4
11.7
14.2
17.5
14.5
4.0
9.4
11.1
3.3
12.6
4.5
11.9
6.6
45.4
20.2
15.3
13.5
6.2
12.6
3.7
1.1
6.0
13.7
18.9
9.1
0.9
14.4
5.4
37.8
10.0
22.7
25.6
21.7
18.4
7.3
19.9
2.0
7.6
42.0
44.0
8.2
22.2
11.8
5.6
18.4
20.0
18.7
2.2
18.2
16.5
10.4
18.0
19.6
1.4
6.4
25.7
5.4
7.2
49.8
9.8
19.4
11.6
14.1
26.4
4.7
17.6
1.8
7.8
7.0
2.9
0.2
7.0
5.3
8.0
13.0
66.3
9.2
26.7
13.9
7.5
26.3
5.2
13.0
24.7
27.1
11.3
18.0
9.2
8.1
16.5
43.0
19.9
8.7
17.6
11.0
15.9
4.4
24.6
3.5
7.1
6.9
3.2
8.3
35.6
5.5
24.8
15.6
15.3
12.2
2.4
Sub-Saharan Africa
Median
29.9
21.3
28.0
16.6
13.8
20.9
8.2
19.1
21.4
12.6
23.5
23.5
13.4
16.9
20.2
12.1
13.5
16.6
15.4
14.1
17.4
11.2
9.2
17.1
Excluding Nigeria
44.1
37.8
21.8
25.1
24.8
32.7
11.2
17.3
0.4
19.4
14.1
22.0
7.6
21.6
16.5
24.1
10.5
21.8
15.5
19.6
11.7
18.2
12.4
16.1
16.1
11.1
14.8
19.5
5.3
8.0
15.7
20.1
Fragile countries
31.3
30.6
25.2
25.9
21.2
15.1
19.7
22.2
13.9
31.8
3.7
17.4
25.9
22.8
28.2
10.2
25.9
21.0
24.2
15.1
11.0
18.7
21.7
22.1
21.0
11.5
19.0
14.1
12.4
18.0
14.5
16.6
18.3
16.6
21.6
8.9
15.4
18.9
19.4
18.8
CFA franc zone

CEMAC
WAEMU
EAC-5
ECOWAS
SACU
SADC
14.9
12.2
18.1
26.7
26.4
18.0
26.9
38.8
10.5
9.8
11.3
12.9
15.2
3.7
20.7
19.5
15.5
11.7
19.9
24.3
11.0
3.9
26.6
0.2
22.7
14.7
32.1
29.1
13.7
6.8
25.8
7.2
13.1
13.3
12.8
14.6
14.8
10.0
21.4
9.2
16.9
16.4
17.5
14.7
10.6
7.4
13.9
12.2
15.8
15.0
16.7
19.1
9.8
7.8
18.3
19.2
11.1
15.4
6.0
19.7
14.1
8.3
21.8
7.8
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cameroon
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of
Cte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia1
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
So Tom & Prncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
South Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe2
98
Table SA16. Claims on Nonfinancial Private Sector

(Percent of GDP)
2004-08
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
8.5
16.3
22.1
16.7
14.1
41.4
9.5
6.9
2.6
8.9
2.1
2.6
14.3
3.1
24.5
11.5
9.1
12.6
11.7
5.8
2.3
23.5
9.4
6.9
10.1
6.7
15.9
75.1
12.4
48.6
8.4
12.4
10.0
24.9
22.5
25.1
4.0
71.4
...
18.7
10.4
18.0
8.2
8.8
3.8
21.5
20.8
28.9
17.0
13.7
58.0
10.8
7.2
3.9
14.8
4.4
4.8
16.4
8.6
16.6
9.3
10.1
15.4
15.5
5.2
5.6
25.8
12.5
12.0
11.3
10.9
15.5
82.7
23.8
48.6
12.2
23.5
11.9
32.8
24.7
20.1
7.2
74.6
...
20.6
13.2
19.8
10.6
10.0
8.4
20.2
22.0
25.3
17.3
15.5
61.9
11.0
8.9
4.2
17.5
4.2
5.5
16.6
8.6
14.8
10.4
8.3
15.9
15.4
6.0
8.2
28.0
14.1
14.8
11.5
13.8
16.0
87.9
24.5
49.2
12.3
15.9
11.9
37.4
25.6
24.4
7.7
70.4
...
18.7
13.7
22.8
12.9
9.2
17.6
20.2
22.9
27.5
18.8
19.2
65.7
13.1
10.1
4.8
17.8
4.0
6.8
17.1
8.7
13.7
9.8
9.8
17.4
15.3
9.6
9.7
31.2
15.8
16.4
11.2
13.9
17.1
91.4
26.4
49.3
13.3
14.2
13.1
37.3
28.8
23.9
7.5
67.6
0.2
21.7
14.4
28.6
13.7
10.0
24.7
22.3
22.3
31.3
20.7
18.1
64.3
12.5
12.3
5.8
20.6
4.5
9.6
16.6
6.6
11.4
9.3
11.9
16.5
16.1
7.8
12.6
30.1
20.9
16.1
10.8
14.6
17.3
100.8
27.0
48.6
14.1
13.3
15.3
37.4
29.5
22.5
5.4
68.4
0.6
19.1
14.7
30.1
13.2
12.0
27.6
23.4
22.7
32.0
24.8
16.7
64.5
13.3
14.7
6.1
21.7
4.8
11.7
18.4
9.7
10.5
8.8
14.8
17.9
16.8
9.8
13.1
32.6
20.8
18.3
11.7
12.5
18.8
108.1
28.5
48.3
13.7
13.0
15.6
32.0
32.9
21.5
4.7
67.4
0.7
21.0
14.6
31.8
13.0
11.7
26.5
22.9
22.9
31.8
28.8
16.0
63.1
14.2
13.8
7.8
23.0
5.4
14.6
20.6
12.6
9.8
8.7
14.0
15.6
19.7
12.7
11.1
35.2
21.2
18.8
12.6
11.7
20.4
100.1
30.6
49.1
14.1
13.8
16.8
28.3
33.9
24.9
4.8
67.2
1.1
21.2
15.6
33.5
13.8
13.4
26.4
27.2
21.3
35.5
29.2
15.4
61.8
14.1
13.1
9.0
25.2
8.2
20.4
23.6
19.9
9.1
9.4
14.1
15.8
20.8
15.1
10.9
36.8
21.5
20.1
13.2
13.4
22.6
103.5
31.9
47.0
15.7
13.7
19.0
26.0
34.1
25.0
4.9
69.3
0.7
20.9
17.3
35.8
14.2
13.2
25.6
Sub-Saharan Africa
Median
28.5
11.0
13.5
32.7
14.2
16.7
29.2
15.5
17.2
28.0
15.8
17.8
28.1
16.1
18.6
27.9
16.8
19.4
28.1
16.8
20.3
29.1
20.1
21.9
Excluding Nigeria
10.9
7.3
39.5
15.4
21.1
14.7
40.9
17.4
15.4
14.0
39.3
18.3
13.9
13.1
38.4
19.4
13.8
15.0
38.5
19.7
13.9
16.3
38.1
20.4
14.6
16.8
38.2
21.4
15.3
19.8
39.2
22.5
Fragile countries
33.5
16.1
10.5
12.1
8.9
38.4
20.8
12.3
13.9
10.5
33.7
20.8
13.3
14.8
11.5
32.3
22.0
13.5
15.4
11.4
32.2
22.8
14.1
15.5
12.5
32.0
24.3
14.4
15.9
13.0
32.1
25.4
15.1
16.6
14.1
33.2
27.6
16.1
17.4
16.1
CFA franc zone

CEMAC
WAEMU
EAC-5
ECOWAS
SACU
SADC
11.4
15.9
6.3
15.1
48.1
67.9
15.5
12.9
13.4
17.8
8.4
17.2
50.8
71.1
16.6
21.7
13.6
18.4
8.3
18.8
48.2
66.9
18.1
16.2
15.0
20.0
9.6
20.5
46.7
64.5
19.3
15.2
15.4
20.3
10.0
20.2
47.5
65.4
19.4
14.6
17.3
22.2
11.7
21.0
46.7
64.3
19.9
14.8
18.9
23.9
13.0
22.5
46.2
64.1
20.3
15.9
20.7
25.4
15.0
23.8
47.9
66.1
21.1
16.2
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cameroon
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of
Cte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia1
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
So Tom & Prncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
South Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe2
99
Table SA17. Exports of Goods and Services

(Percent of GDP)
2004-08
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
77.3
13.7
50.9
10.6
7.8
35.8
27.8
13.2
45.7
14.8
29.5
79.1
48.5
94.5
5.8
14.6
59.1
30.6
23.8
32.6
16.0
23.5
52.1
57.3
26.9
17.1
24.2
55.6
29.0
38.5
17.6
29.0
11.4
11.2
26.3
85.8
15.0
29.6
...
59.9
18.2
37.3
14.6
35.1
27.3
54.9
14.3
40.5
12.6
6.7
33.2
22.0
10.7
35.4
14.5
27.4
67.4
50.7
97.4
4.5
10.6
52.0
25.4
29.3
27.8
18.9
19.9
46.8
40.2
22.4
17.0
20.8
47.0
24.5
42.8
20.3
21.6
11.2
9.8
24.4
108.0
15.0
27.9
...
49.4
18.9
37.8
18.1
32.0
22.1
62.4
17.9
40.6
21.0
8.9
38.3
24.4
11.8
37.9
15.7
43.0
76.7
50.5
94.6
4.8
15.5
59.2
23.8
29.3
32.3
20.1
22.5
43.8
42.1
24.1
19.6
22.8
50.9
24.7
41.7
22.2
21.7
10.9
11.7
24.9
93.8
16.2
28.6
...
45.4
20.6
40.9
17.2
39.7
36.7
65.4
16.0
50.0
26.2
10.1
42.2
28.1
13.5
40.7
16.6
41.6
81.5
53.8
93.4
14.4
18.2
61.3
26.5
36.9
34.9
25.6
23.6
44.5
46.3
26.8
17.6
21.6
51.8
26.5
41.4
20.9
23.8
14.2
11.6
26.4
100.2
18.4
30.4
72.4
44.4
22.4
44.9
20.4
40.1
42.8
62.3
13.8
48.4
23.5
9.4
45.0
27.9
12.5
38.3
14.9
32.8
78.6
48.4
96.8
19.1
13.9
64.5
30.9
40.1
36.8
15.4
21.9
41.9
50.0
29.0
23.8
26.9
52.9
30.6
42.0
21.9
21.0
14.1
12.7
27.9
99.3
32.5
29.7
9.3
44.1
20.9
44.7
20.0
41.2
32.7
55.7
16.2
61.9
25.9
8.9
47.2
27.2
14.3
33.5
15.6
32.3
75.9
41.8
92.6
17.0
12.4
60.4
29.4
33.9
22.9
18.6
19.6
37.1
47.0
30.0
30.5
24.9
47.3
29.8
43.5
22.6
18.7
15.6
16.1
28.3
91.7
36.3
31.0
27.3
45.8
19.4
45.7
20.8
41.4
29.4
48.0
16.4
62.2
25.7
7.3
48.3
27.2
12.9
31.5
16.5
33.8
73.3
41.3
95.6
18.0
11.6
53.7
29.6
39.5
21.9
18.8
18.2
37.7
39.7
32.8
28.8
22.4
49.8
27.5
42.9
19.4
14.7
16.9
26.1
28.3
87.6
31.8
31.3
37.7
47.4
18.9
40.3
17.2
40.8
27.2
33.9
18.0
54.3
25.7
6.7
48.3
23.9
12.5
26.3
17.5
25.8
64.6
40.9
98.0
13.2
9.8
43.0
24.7
43.7
21.0
26.0
18.3
39.9
30.9
31.8
25.3
22.3
52.9
27.4
38.8
17.8
10.2
15.8
28.9
29.1
86.0
18.4
30.9
108.5
47.1
20.7
39.6
20.5
37.6
24.9
34.0
17.1
58.0
25.5
8.3
48.4
20.0
13.4
19.6
17.7
24.2
60.4
39.6
95.5
15.8
9.6
32.0
32.0
41.1
23.1
25.6
17.5
44.5
27.8
33.1
32.4
20.5
53.9
33.2
45.3
16.9
7.3
16.5
27.3
25.5
81.9
29.3
35.4
48.2
51.5
20.9
40.2
21.4
39.2
22.6
36.6
18.4
59.1
25.2
8.2
50.5
20.1
14.3
22.3
17.8
28.7
65.4
39.8
93.9
17.6
10.1
32.1
35.8
42.5
23.4
24.8
17.7
46.7
23.3
32.7
33.6
19.8
54.1
36.3
48.6
17.9
7.7
16.8
27.7
25.6
80.4
30.9
35.0
41.5
52.0
20.9
41.2
21.1
42.3
22.3
Sub-Saharan Africa
Median
32.9
28.4
38.3
28.7
24.5
33.2
30.3
24.8
37.7
33.5
28.1
42.0
31.1
30.6
38.9
29.5
29.8
36.5
27.0
29.6
34.4
23.5
26.3
29.7
21.9
27.8
28.3
22.0
28.7
29.3
Excluding Nigeria
40.3
64.5
28.7
28.0
31.9
51.8
26.6
25.5
32.5
58.4
28.8
29.0
36.8
62.8
31.0
31.5
32.6
58.0
29.9
30.0
29.3
53.2
29.7
28.8
24.5
48.7
29.3
28.0
17.8
38.6
28.2
26.5
13.5
35.0
29.4
26.3
13.9
36.6
29.7
27.1
Fragile countries
35.2
50.2
22.2
18.0
37.0
31.0
43.7
19.6
16.9
33.6
31.6
47.5
23.9
19.2
39.4
34.5
51.6
29.0
21.5
44.8
32.8
50.3
23.7
20.1
36.7
30.9
46.2
23.8
19.7
35.3
28.0
43.6
23.1
18.4
35.2
24.1
37.0
21.4
18.2
31.3
22.3
35.7
20.6
18.1
29.5
22.2
37.0
21.5
18.4
31.1
CFA franc zone

CEMAC
WAEMU
EAC-5
ECOWAS
SACU
SADC
42.4
54.0
30.5
26.0
19.1
28.9
31.0
35.4
38.5
47.1
30.6
22.0
18.5
24.0
29.1
32.4
42.7
52.7
32.5
27.4
19.8
24.0
29.7
34.7
45.7
56.9
33.4
29.4
21.7
26.4
31.6
37.2
45.3
57.5
32.5
26.5
20.5
24.3
31.0
36.4
42.2
53.4
31.1
25.6
19.3
21.8
32.7
36.5
40.0
50.5
30.1
24.5
18.0
18.5
33.1
35.3
35.6
42.1
30.3
22.1
19.1
15.4
32.3
31.6
31.5
35.0
29.0
21.6
19.0
12.7
37.0
34.2
32.0
35.7
29.3
22.5
19.1
12.9
36.9
35.0
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cameroon
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of
Cte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia1
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
So Tom & Prncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
South Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe2
100
Table SA18. Imports of Goods and Services

(Percent of GDP)
2004-08
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
48.3
24.9
40.3
25.4
34.3
64.5
28.4
22.1
44.4
39.5
34.9
52.6
41.2
38.4
41.6
36.3
27.5
45.5
40.0
36.0
27.8
31.9
117.6
191.2
43.4
35.0
32.1
64.2
38.6
41.8
31.2
18.1
26.3
55.2
45.1
95.4
24.4
30.6
...
69.2
26.8
54.7
24.2
30.4
36.5
55.4
27.0
52.7
23.2
28.2
63.4
26.9
23.2
47.9
47.9
36.9
69.2
39.8
69.6
23.4
27.9
34.6
41.9
42.3
30.8
35.3
30.5
123.3
135.9
46.0
31.7
27.5
57.5
39.7
56.0
46.7
18.3
29.1
51.4
41.3
117.0
30.5
27.5
...
62.9
28.4
53.4
28.1
26.7
76.1
42.9
29.2
47.7
28.5
43.4
66.8
27.5
26.5
49.1
49.9
51.9
58.6
43.2
74.8
23.3
33.1
29.5
42.7
43.5
36.7
35.3
33.8
110.5
134.7
37.5
34.9
35.0
63.0
45.2
52.1
49.0
18.1
29.0
57.8
40.3
108.1
43.9
27.4
...
57.8
29.5
57.6
30.6
27.6
61.5
42.2
26.1
53.7
33.0
43.5
73.8
30.9
24.4
48.0
50.3
48.0
55.5
37.3
48.6
23.2
36.5
30.6
41.1
49.3
59.1
34.3
39.0
104.7
132.1
38.0
28.0
29.6
65.6
58.0
50.6
47.8
20.6
34.6
58.0
44.7
116.6
84.7
29.6
30.4
56.7
34.2
66.4
35.3
32.2
78.4
39.7
27.2
60.2
34.7
46.7
68.1
30.8
23.9
49.0
54.3
39.9
54.4
44.2
55.7
22.8
32.8
36.9
44.3
52.5
57.9
28.5
35.5
107.3
119.8
38.7
38.1
31.8
66.0
81.7
55.7
39.4
16.6
34.4
52.5
48.9
117.1
65.9
31.0
34.1
54.4
33.0
58.6
31.5
36.3
62.9
39.4
30.4
61.8
39.0
42.0
63.1
29.9
24.7
43.2
52.0
38.0
59.6
38.8
50.0
22.1
28.8
37.5
41.1
47.1
46.9
29.3
33.6
97.7
108.4
38.7
42.6
39.9
61.6
77.3
59.2
39.1
14.2
32.5
63.4
49.1
99.6
46.6
33.2
26.5
52.4
30.2
65.8
30.3
39.3
59.3
42.2
31.0
55.2
34.7
37.7
65.5
30.6
37.1
44.1
49.8
41.8
64.7
38.5
54.2
21.8
29.2
38.9
49.1
49.8
45.7
31.2
33.7
95.4
126.3
37.2
39.4
38.6
62.2
68.9
63.0
38.2
15.0
33.8
71.1
47.5
103.7
60.6
33.1
31.2
52.9
28.4
59.5
28.4
37.7
52.5
36.1
33.9
54.1
32.4
33.8
67.6
27.6
34.8
43.1
57.1
36.8
62.7
38.6
56.3
19.5
31.7
39.2
50.6
56.1
40.6
32.1
31.9
88.5
112.5
35.6
36.1
35.3
64.2
72.9
59.8
38.4
13.7
33.6
64.9
45.9
93.1
44.8
31.9
115.0
54.3
28.8
58.8
32.0
40.5
50.4
38.4
33.8
61.9
31.0
28.2
67.3
24.4
32.8
40.5
54.7
35.6
67.7
37.7
57.9
18.9
30.1
31.8
51.9
52.2
37.8
31.1
31.0
95.2
105.1
37.9
44.7
33.9
65.2
79.9
68.4
35.7
12.1
34.7
65.6
41.0
88.5
45.0
36.9
66.4
57.3
27.7
57.1
32.2
41.4
47.6
37.5
34.9
61.5
31.1
27.3
68.0
24.2
32.5
37.8
54.7
37.2
58.3
38.9
54.3
20.0
28.8
30.3
57.4
51.2
49.9
32.6
29.8
93.5
82.7
38.7
44.1
33.0
65.2
108.3
64.1
36.9
11.2
31.7
66.0
40.5
86.4
47.3
36.9
52.0
56.1
27.4
58.0
31.3
41.4
47.2
Sub-Saharan Africa
Median
30.5
37.4
38.3
31.5
39.8
41.4
30.4
43.1
41.3
32.6
43.5
42.7
31.8
44.2
42.9
30.6
41.1
41.0
30.6
41.8
41.2
29.6
40.5
40.1
28.9
40.5
39.3
28.0
40.5
39.0
Excluding Nigeria
25.3
40.7
33.8
37.4
29.2
50.3
32.9
37.7
25.6
43.6
33.8
40.3
27.3
40.6
36.7
43.8
24.2
40.9
37.8
43.8
21.9
39.4
38.1
41.7
22.8
41.9
37.8
40.8
20.4
39.0
37.2
40.5
18.0
38.3
38.7
39.6
16.7
36.8
38.8
39.7
Fragile countries
29.7
41.1
34.5
31.5
40.7
30.5
46.1
35.2
30.9
44.1
28.7
43.2
38.6
33.6
47.0
30.6
43.5
41.6
38.1
45.4
29.7
44.2
41.0
38.6
45.4
28.6
42.6
38.8
36.5
42.9
28.7
43.7
38.1
34.6
43.9
27.3
41.8
38.2
35.8
42.6
26.8
41.9
36.5
34.4
40.9
25.4
40.9
37.1
35.1
41.0
CFA franc zone

CEMAC
WAEMU
EAC-5
ECOWAS
SACU
SADC
36.0
35.0
37.1
36.3
28.4
24.2
32.1
34.5
39.8
43.7
36.2
35.7
29.3
24.2
30.0
35.8
41.6
43.8
39.4
38.8
31.7
23.8
29.5
33.7
39.1
40.3
37.9
42.2
36.5
26.4
31.7
35.9
41.7
42.9
40.4
39.1
34.1
23.5
33.4
37.2
41.1
41.2
41.0
37.3
31.9
21.1
35.7
38.4
41.3
43.1
39.6
36.8
31.1
21.3
35.6
38.6
39.5
40.2
38.9
36.4
31.1
20.7
34.4
36.7
37.0
36.9
37.1
35.6
30.3
18.7
39.8
40.1
36.4
34.8
37.6
34.9
29.4
17.8
39.7
40.6
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cameroon
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of
Cte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia1
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
So Tom & Prncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
South Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe2
101
Table SA19. Trade Balance on Goods

(Percent of GDP)
2004-08
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
50.4
10.7
9.5
9.5
16.4
39.0
1.9
4.0
24.5
22.9
0.2
49.1
15.0
68.6
33.9
20.6
41.7
21.3
14.9
3.2
6.0
12.1
43.1
33.1
13.4
12.8
2.7
15.2
5.5
4.0
6.9
15.6
10.4
35.4
18.4
29.8
7.5
0.6
...
3.6
9.8
14.2
8.0
4.7
7.2
24.1
9.9
12.7
5.8
14.5
39.6
1.8
7.8
4.8
28.2
3.2
25.7
17.5
51.3
19.9
15.8
29.8
22.4
8.5
2.6
9.8
13.4
54.8
30.8
19.5
10.3
2.1
17.5
11.3
14.1
14.7
9.4
14.4
37.3
15.9
37.6
14.3
1.1
...
3.7
10.0
13.0
8.1
6.3
47.1
41.1
10.2
7.3
1.5
30.2
40.9
0.9
8.8
8.0
28.8
2.1
42.3
14.5
39.7
19.6
16.3
38.7
22.8
9.2
2.6
8.3
15.6
48.4
30.1
12.3
10.7
6.2
19.5
11.3
9.9
14.2
8.4
13.8
40.9
14.9
39.3
20.2
2.2
...
3.3
9.5
14.1
10.9
13.7
20.3
45.2
9.9
4.6
0.0
29.0
45.1
2.5
5.7
10.9
28.6
2.3
48.0
23.5
59.6
10.3
16.6
40.2
21.2
7.7
12.7
3.7
20.0
43.0
33.3
10.1
7.9
2.6
20.9
17.1
8.8
14.4
8.3
17.4
41.3
17.5
43.0
57.1
1.7
49.1
0.8
12.2
22.4
11.7
9.8
28.7
41.1
13.0
13.5
4.1
32.2
36.6
1.0
6.2
7.7
33.4
0.2
43.4
11.3
58.0
4.6
16.9
39.9
22.0
10.0
4.6
8.0
18.5
49.3
26.9
11.2
11.0
0.9
21.5
26.7
16.4
6.6
9.1
19.1
37.2
20.2
44.4
24.2
1.0
19.6
1.6
13.0
14.2
10.0
6.3
23.3
33.5
12.1
2.3
5.5
29.4
33.7
0.7
7.3
6.6
31.8
0.9
34.6
9.6
58.3
5.7
17.6
34.2
19.1
8.0
13.7
6.0
18.6
46.2
23.5
8.0
8.1
1.9
19.0
27.2
15.6
5.6
8.4
15.3
38.2
20.0
33.9
0.6
1.9
4.4
3.7
12.2
20.5
8.4
5.9
23.1
24.1
10.1
3.4
2.1
24.7
32.2
1.4
18.3
2.8
29.2
0.1
27.1
10.4
59.8
4.2
18.9
27.9
25.7
3.6
15.3
7.8
18.8
44.1
36.7
5.1
7.4
3.0
17.9
23.9
19.5
10.3
3.7
16.1
37.7
18.3
40.2
7.1
1.8
13.2
2.6
11.2
19.6
8.6
6.0
19.2
12.8
11.4
4.4
0.1
20.6
36.4
2.1
16.7
0.1
30.3
3.6
21.7
10.8
61.9
6.4
21.8
17.4
29.5
9.5
11.5
1.3
16.9
36.1
40.5
3.4
7.5
0.5
16.5
28.0
21.2
12.5
0.2
15.6
29.0
16.0
40.2
19.5
0.9
16.9
2.8
10.3
19.6
8.8
0.3
19.0
11.8
12.5
8.9
0.7
15.8
37.3
3.0
14.3
5.7
27.8
4.1
13.4
10.6
62.6
3.1
20.9
11.4
25.9
7.5
6.7
0.9
17.0
38.2
39.7
4.8
7.4
1.0
17.1
38.7
21.7
10.7
2.1
16.8
30.9
14.7
37.5
7.6
1.1
4.7
4.8
9.2
17.3
8.5
0.5
18.4
14.9
11.8
7.1
0.2
15.7
37.2
2.9
13.5
0.4
28.9
1.2
25.8
8.6
62.8
2.2
19.5
12.3
29.5
5.2
13.2
3.0
15.7
34.2
35.6
6.1
6.2
1.3
17.1
57.1
14.6
10.1
1.1
14.8
30.8
14.1
37.2
7.5
1.6
0.6
6.8
9.1
17.3
8.3
3.2
18.6
Sub-Saharan Africa
Median
6.2
7.7
5.8
2.4
10.8
0.7
4.6
10.5
3.5
5.7
10.1
6.7
3.7
11.2
2.7
3.1
8.0
1.8
0.8
8.6
0.1
2.5
10.3
5.0
3.8
8.5
6.2
3.0
8.3
5.1
Excluding Nigeria
23.2
39.5
4.0
7.5
13.4
21.1
4.7
9.7
15.4
32.2
3.1
8.5
18.4
38.4
3.8
9.4
16.3
32.2
6.4
11.1
14.3
27.7
6.7
10.2
8.8
21.6
6.6
9.8
3.4
13.1
7.3
11.4
0.6
10.1
7.7
11.0
1.9
12.7
7.6
10.5
Fragile countries
9.3
16.1
8.2
12.0
5.6
5.9
7.7
11.6
12.1
1.6
7.6
13.1
9.8
11.9
2.3
8.6
17.0
7.3
13.4
8.4
7.3
13.7
12.0
14.8
0.2
6.4
11.2
10.5
14.4
0.7
3.6
8.1
10.3
14.1
0.3
0.1
1.5
12.3
15.4
2.4
1.3
0.3
12.2
15.2
2.8
0.4
1.6
11.9
15.5
1.6
CFA franc zone

CEMAC
WAEMU
EAC-5
ECOWAS
SACU
SADC
14.3
30.1
1.8
9.7
10.5
9.4
0.6
3.8
7.7
16.8
0.6
12.5
11.4
5.6
0.1
1.2
10.0
21.4
1.5
10.0
12.9
5.2
1.2
5.2
14.8
27.6
0.7
11.5
15.9
5.1
0.9
5.8
12.3
26.4
2.7
11.9
15.3
5.5
2.1
3.3
9.6
23.0
3.6
11.2
14.6
5.1
2.6
2.4
7.6
18.7
2.8
11.6
14.4
1.9
2.4
1.0
4.8
12.8
1.8
13.1
13.4
1.4
1.9
1.6
2.7
8.2
1.3
13.2
13.1
2.6
2.3
2.6
3.4
10.5
1.8
11.9
12.3
1.8
2.5
2.3
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cameroon
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of
Cte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia1
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
So Tom & Prncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
South Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe2
102
Table SA20. External Current Account

(Percent of GDP)
2004-08
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
14.7
6.7
10.7
10.4
7.8
9.5
1.0
5.5
0.5
12.0
0.2
2.9
1.1
22.4
3.1
8.4
17.3
8.5
8.1
5.9
1.2
2.5
17.3
14.0
12.0
12.9
7.1
6.3
8.9
6.7
9.2
14.4
3.3
27.1
9.9
13.8
6.9
4.3
...
3.2
6.5
8.8
2.6
1.1
8.5
10.0
8.3
6.3
4.7
1.7
14.6
3.5
9.1
9.2
15.4
6.1
14.1
6.6
23.1
7.6
6.7
4.4
12.5
5.4
8.2
5.4
4.6
3.9
23.2
21.1
10.2
6.4
7.4
10.9
1.5
24.4
5.1
7.1
23.2
6.7
14.8
13.3
2.7
...
11.6
7.6
5.6
5.7
6.0
47.1
9.1
8.2
2.6
2.2
12.2
12.4
2.8
10.2
9.0
5.8
10.5
7.5
1.9
34.4
5.6
1.4
14.9
16.3
8.6
9.3
8.7
5.9
10.0
32.0
9.7
8.6
11.1
10.3
16.1
3.5
19.8
3.9
7.3
21.7
4.4
19.1
22.7
1.5
...
8.6
7.7
6.3
8.0
7.5
16.0
12.6
7.3
3.1
1.5
14.4
16.3
3.0
7.6
5.6
14.0
5.2
4.9
10.5
0.1
0.6
2.5
15.2
12.3
9.0
25.1
4.2
9.1
14.7
27.5
6.9
8.6
5.1
13.8
25.3
3.0
22.3
3.0
7.5
25.5
8.1
22.6
65.3
2.2
18.4
6.8
10.8
8.0
10.0
4.7
30.8
12.0
9.5
0.3
7.2
18.6
12.6
3.6
4.6
8.7
17.6
4.6
2.4
1.2
2.2
2.3
6.9
15.9
7.9
11.7
26.0
11.8
8.4
9.8
21.5
6.9
9.3
2.2
7.3
44.7
5.7
14.7
4.4
11.4
21.3
10.8
21.3
31.9
5.0
15.9
3.1
11.6
7.5
6.8
5.4
24.5
6.7
9.5
8.9
11.0
19.5
4.9
3.9
3.0
9.2
15.9
10.6
4.5
1.4
4.0
0.1
5.9
11.6
10.2
11.9
26.8
7.4
8.9
10.3
28.4
5.9
8.7
2.8
6.3
39.1
4.0
15.0
3.9
7.4
23.4
10.4
12.3
17.6
5.8
1.2
5.1
10.6
13.0
7.0
0.6
23.9
2.9
9.3
15.7
8.0
18.8
8.0
4.4
5.5
8.9
10.7
9.6
9.4
0.7
9.6
0.6
7.9
8.1
10.9
9.6
25.7
3.4
10.4
7.9
31.6
0.3
8.2
4.6
5.6
34.4
8.5
16.0
0.2
11.5
27.5
8.9
22.2
19.2
5.4
2.1
3.3
9.5
12.8
9.5
2.1
18.6
8.5
11.1
9.3
5.6
15.4
9.2
5.8
12.8
12.8
10.2
12.2
14.2
1.7
6.6
2.2
12.8
2.8
15.2
8.3
22.4
0.9
8.2
2.6
39.3
2.2
8.9
2.8
5.1
41.3
9.8
18.0
2.4
13.8
11.3
7.6
14.2
13.8
4.4
12.6
0.5
8.7
12.6
8.9
3.5
17.3
11.6
11.1
2.2
5.3
8.9
9.9
5.7
10.9
13.0
15.2
14.2
23.1
1.8
8.3
0.2
10.7
7.2
10.5
7.2
13.5
1.8
8.3
13.9
39.8
3.0
11.1
4.0
4.5
43.0
14.5
17.3
2.8
14.2
9.4
6.0
13.3
9.7
4.4
6.1
1.8
7.7
10.1
8.4
3.8
16.3
8.8
10.6
2.9
4.6
6.4
9.6
5.5
10.2
8.8
15.7
12.3
10.8
2.7
6.0
0.9
9.7
5.8
10.3
5.4
25.5
1.0
6.9
9.7
39.4
4.4
9.3
4.4
4.6
70.3
7.9
18.2
1.8
12.5
9.8
5.8
12.9
12.8
4.9
6.5
0.8
7.4
10.1
8.5
1.7
16.4
Sub-Saharan Africa
Median
2.1
6.1
0.1
2.8
7.5
7.3
0.8
8.6
3.6
0.6
7.5
2.1
1.8
7.9
4.3
2.4
7.4
5.3
4.1
8.9
6.8
5.9
8.9
9.2
6.2
9.4
9.6
5.5
8.5
8.9
Excluding Nigeria
13.1
10.1
4.3
4.3
0.4
8.9
4.8
6.7
3.6
2.9
3.9
6.4
4.9
8.7
4.8
7.5
4.8
5.6
7.1
9.0
3.6
2.8
7.6
9.0
0.8
3.2
7.3
8.5
3.9
8.1
7.6
9.6
4.5
10.5
7.6
9.3
3.0
7.8
7.8
9.2
Fragile countries
4.0
4.5
6.4
7.1
3.8
1.0
5.3
9.9
7.9
9.1
0.8
0.1
8.5
6.9
6.7
1.1
2.6
8.5
9.4
3.3
0.4
1.2
11.8
12.3
8.5
0.3
0.8
11.1
11.4
8.6
2.5
3.8
10.5
11.4
7.8
4.2
6.4
12.4
12.9
9.8
4.7
7.8
11.4
11.5
9.9
3.7
6.0
11.8
12.4
9.2
CFA franc zone

CEMAC
WAEMU
EAC-5
ECOWAS
SACU
SADC
0.7
6.5
5.2
4.6
3.9
8.4
3.3
1.8
5.4
7.5
3.3
7.9
5.8
2.3
2.9
5.5
4.4
4.2
4.7
5.7
7.1
1.3
1.7
1.4
0.1
2.0
2.0
7.3
9.8
0.6
2.1
1.5
3.0
0.1
6.1
6.6
9.5
1.1
4.7
3.3
4.3
1.8
6.8
7.7
9.2
0.7
5.1
4.6
5.2
4.3
6.1
8.0
10.2
1.7
4.6
5.7
6.6
7.5
5.9
9.7
8.9
3.7
4.0
6.9
7.2
9.4
5.6
9.5
8.5
3.7
4.5
7.8
6.3
6.9
5.9
8.5
7.7
2.9
4.6
7.9
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cameroon
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of
Cte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia2
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
So Tom & Prncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
South Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe3
103
Table SA21. Net Foreign Direct Investment

(Percent of GDP)
2004-08
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
0.6
2.1
4.2
1.6
0.1
9.4
1.8
3.3
3.5
0.6
5.3
22.8
1.8
8.9
1.4
1.4
4.2
9.6
2.9
5.1
1.9
0.5
2.7
5.8
3.6
1.8
1.8
1.6
3.8
6.3
2.3
2.2
1.2
16.6
1.6
11.8
3.9
1.1
...
1.9
3.5
3.1
4.2
5.9
0.7
2.9
1.5
1.9
1.1
0.0
7.0
2.1
2.1
2.7
2.6
1.5
20.2
1.6
9.5
4.9
0.7
5.2
8.1
11.1
3.0
2.1
0.2
4.6
13.4
8.1
0.9
7.3
2.5
8.0
5.7
13.4
2.6
2.2
7.6
2.0
19.7
4.5
2.1
...
1.6
3.7
0.4
4.4
2.8
1.3
5.5
2.8
1.6
0.4
0.0
6.7
1.8
3.1
2.0
1.5
13.3
18.2
1.3
5.4
4.3
1.0
3.5
9.0
7.9
2.2
3.3
0.4
1.7
22.7
3.9
2.3
3.7
127.6
9.8
7.0
17.5
1.4
0.7
24.2
2.0
16.4
9.2
1.0
...
2.9
4.0
1.5
2.5
3.1
1.3
4.9
1.3
9.0
0.4
0.2
5.6
1.8
1.7
1.5
3.8
6.5
21.1
1.1
2.7
1.5
2.0
4.0
6.7
8.1
5.6
2.2
0.8
2.4
22.8
7.8
0.8
4.2
9.0
27.1
7.0
16.5
1.9
1.7
12.4
2.0
13.8
32.4
1.1
0.4
2.1
4.5
14.3
4.3
4.7
3.4
8.4
2.6
5.8
2.3
0.0
3.8
3.1
3.2
3.4
1.7
10.5
16.4
1.2
5.5
1.3
0.6
3.6
11.2
7.9
11.4
0.7
0.5
2.3
19.2
7.8
1.4
3.1
49.5
37.1
8.6
12.1
1.2
2.2
8.3
1.5
40.7
19.1
0.4
0.5
2.0
4.4
7.6
4.7
9.5
2.8
10.5
3.3
5.4
3.5
2.7
3.5
2.9
0.1
2.8
1.4
5.2
18.7
1.3
4.3
1.3
2.6
4.4
9.5
6.7
2.2
1.9
0.9
2.2
22.0
5.2
1.7
2.3
10.1
38.6
6.5
8.1
0.8
3.4
3.4
1.9
10.1
7.4
0.5
3.7
0.6
4.5
4.7
4.5
6.0
2.9
3.2
3.6
2.5
2.3
2.5
6.1
2.9
0.1
3.4
1.3
4.8
19.6
1.9
2.1
1.1
2.6
5.6
9.3
8.7
0.9
1.9
1.7
2.0
11.2
2.9
0.8
1.3
4.4
29.1
4.6
9.1
0.5
3.4
6.5
2.0
14.9
8.0
0.5
0.2
0.6
4.4
3.7
4.2
11.8
3.2
5.6
3.6
2.9
2.3
1.6
7.1
2.1
0.3
4.3
1.3
4.7
15.4
2.1
2.7
1.1
3.6
4.3
8.2
8.0
1.3
1.7
1.7
2.4
13.7
4.5
2.8
1.2
5.4
24.8
2.2
8.2
0.6
4.0
5.3
2.3
9.2
7.4
1.1
4.9
0.8
4.3
4.0
3.9
7.9
2.9
2.6
3.8
3.0
2.3
1.7
7.2
1.8
1.5
7.0
1.3
4.5
16.1
2.9
2.9
1.0
4.1
4.9
10.1
7.7
5.1
1.6
2.3
2.4
11.3
4.8
3.5
1.1
5.9
24.4
7.9
9.1
0.7
4.1
6.6
2.4
12.1
3.3
0.4
0.7
0.6
4.0
4.0
3.8
7.6
2.9
0.3
4.0
3.2
2.3
1.7
7.2
1.6
1.8
3.6
1.3
5.0
9.4
3.3
2.7
0.9
4.5
4.8
9.4
7.5
18.9
1.9
2.2
2.1
13.0
4.8
3.4
1.1
6.3
58.1
5.8
10.4
0.8
4.1
7.9
2.5
13.8
10.7
0.3
3.6
0.6
4.0
4.0
4.1
7.6
3.1
Sub-Saharan Africa
Median
2.1
2.6
2.9
2.8
2.6
3.3
2.7
2.8
4.7
2.1
2.2
2.9
2.1
3.1
3.6
1.3
3.3
2.2
1.5
2.6
3.3
2.0
3.6
4.6
2.2
3.8
4.3
2.4
4.0
4.7
Excluding Nigeria
2.5
3.4
1.9
2.9
2.8
3.2
2.8
3.3
0.6
1.2
4.1
7.3
1.1
0.6
2.9
4.7
0.1
3.1
3.8
6.8
0.7
4.3
3.2
5.1
0.3
0.1
2.7
4.8
1.7
4.8
2.3
4.5
1.3
3.4
2.9
4.6
1.0
1.7
3.7
5.7
Fragile countries
1.9
3.0
2.9
2.7
4.7
2.7
3.4
3.1
3.3
4.0
2.3
5.0
4.3
3.5
6.0
1.5
1.4
4.9
5.6
5.1
1.2
1.9
5.9
6.2
5.7
0.4
0.2
5.3
6.7
4.0
0.9
2.5
4.3
5.8
3.4
1.3
4.4
4.7
5.5
3.9
1.4
4.0
4.7
5.3
4.3
1.3
3.2
6.3
7.3
4.7
CFA franc zone

CEMAC
WAEMU
EAC-5
ECOWAS
SACU
SADC
4.2
6.5
1.9
2.6
2.3
2.3
1.3
1.5
3.4
3.6
3.2
1.7
2.2
3.4
2.2
2.5
3.3
3.6
3.1
9.8
2.0
2.2
1.2
3.2
3.4
4.4
2.2
2.6
2.7
2.7
1.5
1.4
2.9
3.5
2.3
6.3
2.7
2.1
0.8
2.0
3.4
4.1
2.7
3.6
2.9
1.7
0.8
0.6
3.2
4.0
2.4
3.9
3.1
1.3
0.2
1.2
3.2
3.8
2.7
3.7
3.1
1.4
0.9
2.3
3.6
4.3
3.1
3.9
3.2
1.6
0.1
2.3
3.2
3.0
3.4
4.1
3.2
1.8
0.1
2.8
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cameroon
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of
Cte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia1
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
So Tom & Prncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
South Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe2
104
Table SA22. Real Effective Exchange Rates1

(Annual average; index, 2000 = 100)
2004-08
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
179.2
119.4
98.2
111.7
71.3
97.1
110.1
112.4
118.6
119.3
...
118.4
117.2
153.6
107.2
100.1
106.1
56.2
108.9
72.8
112.5
120.6
65.9
85.1
91.1
71.6
109.6
89.1
84.4
105.0
111.3
126.2
77.0
94.2
107.3
81.8
72.3
100.0
...
106.7
69.0
112.2
89.6
149.5
...
249.4
123.2
100.4
120.4
80.4
101.6
116.0
124.3
133.6
121.4
...
128.7
122.1
176.0
164.9
115.1
111.5
56.7
99.6
81.9
119.3
133.2
64.1
91.4
106.6
78.4
117.6
91.7
84.7
101.9
118.1
131.9
90.7
117.5
108.9
60.3
78.8
94.1
...
105.3
72.3
118.8
92.9
155.6
...
235.1
115.2
108.8
110.4
82.5
99.0
108.6
118.5
123.6
115.6
...
124.8
114.7
177.7
182.4
98.4
107.3
55.0
106.3
75.9
115.7
131.4
73.1
92.9
106.3
73.7
111.4
94.6
71.9
114.4
110.1
143.1
88.5
114.2
102.1
63.0
76.1
108.6
...
113.6
68.5
111.5
86.6
164.7
...
242.6
114.4
108.0
112.3
82.0
101.0
108.8
117.3
116.2
115.8
...
124.0
117.0
187.9
190.4
103.4
105.8
50.9
101.0
73.3
118.1
125.7
73.5
92.7
111.9
71.3
111.8
100.5
86.3
112.5
110.1
143.6
85.3
127.6
103.2
58.3
76.5
106.4
...
113.7
63.9
112.3
82.9
160.4
...
268.4
112.4
104.2
111.5
84.3
98.6
105.0
117.5
125.7
110.3
...
120.8
112.2
185.5
211.2
122.7
103.5
49.6
94.5
81.6
115.3
142.7
69.2
101.2
110.6
58.2
112.4
102.0
92.4
108.1
104.2
159.4
87.1
134.0
99.3
57.7
89.2
100.6
...
113.7
74.5
107.8
94.4
165.6
...
285.6
114.1
99.6
113.5
84.4
102.0
108.1
121.2
125.8
114.4
...
129.7
117.2
199.3
230.1
124.2
105.4
45.9
95.2
91.6
117.6
147.6
61.9
100.0
114.6
49.2
113.0
101.9
91.3
98.7
108.1
170.0
85.8
146.6
101.6
68.0
96.5
90.0
...
106.9
80.3
110.2
96.0
171.7
...
297.7
112.8
94.5
118.2
87.9
101.9
109.6
151.2
127.5
113.3
...
129.2
118.4
208.4
251.1
130.0
110.3
41.9
73.8
99.4
116.1
152.6
57.8
100.2
110.8
53.6
115.1
105.0
90.0
92.9
107.7
181.9
81.5
156.9
100.8
65.8
99.5
84.3
...
102.7
82.3
111.5
99.0
164.8
...
300.1
100.3
94.8
111.1
99.2
99.0
106.8
197.1
124.8
94.4
...
125.6
113.3
200.3
301.8
156.9
106.7
41.7
74.8
111.8
113.2
158.9
53.9
122.4
107.9
61.4
111.2
103.8
82.6
91.3
101.3
180.3
88.3
158.0
94.6
73.3
108.2
83.8
...
101.6
78.5
103.6
91.4
149.7
...
Sub-Saharan Africa
Median
109.5
106.4
107.5
113.7
110.2
118.0
118.7
108.7
113.5
118.1
109.4
113.2
123.2
106.4
118.9
124.2
107.5
122.1
125.1 124.8
108.6 105.2
121.9 122.5
Excluding Nigeria
129.1
137.2
99.7
99.8
140.7
167.2
100.2
105.6
147.5
158.9
104.3
102.1
148.4
161.1
102.9
101.2
162.1
168.2
103.7
106.5
172.2
176.5
100.5
108.6
182.5 180.8
182.1 180.1
97.3 97.6
107.4 108.4
Fragile countries
114.7
123.1
90.7
89.2
101.8
117.7
136.1
98.6
95.5
112.5
126.7
135.2
91.3
87.0
107.8
125.9
134.5
91.2
87.0
108.0
130.2
137.8
98.7
96.5
107.6
130.6
141.9
101.1
99.2
110.3
131.0
138.9
103.4
101.4
112.5
130.0
137.8
105.4
103.0
113.0
CFA franc zone

CEMAC
WAEMU
EAC-5
ECOWAS
SACU
SADC
115.0
117.0
113.3
104.1
91.2
119.9
99.8
101.9
122.7
127.2
118.8
114.8
98.3
124.3
94.4
103.6
116.1
121.7
111.3
110.0
94.5
131.2
108.5
111.9
116.6
121.4
112.5
109.6
89.7
131.1
106.4
110.7
114.3
120.2
109.4
120.1
102.1
140.7
100.8
110.0
117.9
124.6
112.3
121.8
106.4
148.6
90.6
104.5
119.8
127.6
113.3
124.5
109.1
153.5
85.0
101.1
114.9
124.6
107.0
131.0
107.9
151.6
84.4
99.8
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cameroon
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of
Cte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
So Tom & Prncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
South Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
See sources and footnote on page 82.
105
Table SA23. Nominal Effective Exchange Rates1

(Annual average; index, 2000 = 100)
2004-08
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
8.8
116.4
77.8
119.8
57.0
105.1
110.6
108.4
114.3
115.2
...
117.5
114.8
122.9
48.9
78.7
109.1
40.7
45.2
39.6
117.0
93.3
99.4
56.4
58.9
40.3
112.9
74.2
53.6
86.3
115.4
67.4
61.1
52.7
112.0
80.5
55.6
84.0
...
90.9
59.2
120.6
82.3
65.7
...
9.2
118.3
64.4
134.5
52.1
105.8
115.3
111.3
119.6
120.8
...
121.5
118.8
130.1
49.5
58.7
111.2
39.7
29.4
28.7
120.0
89.0
82.9
47.5
55.8
38.5
117.9
68.5
48.0
74.7
121.4
57.9
60.5
38.4
116.7
36.6
47.5
67.1
...
80.6
53.4
126.1
72.6
54.8
...
7.7
111.8
67.3
130.1
52.6
103.3
110.2
106.7
116.1
115.6
...
115.5
113.0
124.3
50.4
48.0
107.4
37.7
29.1
23.7
115.9
86.9
93.0
45.9
52.1
34.9
113.5
70.7
37.3
82.5
115.7
56.9
59.4
33.6
111.4
40.1
39.8
76.1
...
86.0
48.8
120.3
67.0
55.0
...
7.3
113.1
64.2
135.6
50.5
104.4
111.5
107.5
117.5
119.0
...
116.8
113.7
126.7
49.8
39.3
107.7
34.6
26.4
19.5
116.4
77.3
91.9
43.6
51.9
32.9
114.9
73.0
41.9
80.5
116.8
53.5
57.7
33.9
112.9
37.5
35.0
73.3
...
84.5
42.7
122.3
57.2
52.2
...
7.5
107.5
59.2
135.3
46.2
102.3
108.1
104.3
114.7
115.7
...
113.4
110.6
120.4
51.8
39.1
105.0
33.2
23.4
19.4
113.9
84.0
83.6
45.8
49.9
23.6
112.7
73.5
45.1
74.9
113.5
54.5
58.3
33.1
110.4
35.6
36.8
67.2
...
80.8
44.2
118.6
59.4
52.1
...
7.5
111.4
54.8
143.6
44.4
106.2
112.1
108.0
117.0
121.6
...
117.8
115.3
123.6
52.5
37.6
108.2
29.8
21.6
19.9
116.7
84.7
72.7
42.9
49.9
15.8
116.8
72.7
44.3
66.8
118.2
55.0
56.9
34.1
114.9
41.1
37.1
58.0
...
75.0
45.3
123.1
59.2
52.0
...
7.4
114.3
50.8
158.4
45.8
107.9
113.9
109.9
118.6
123.4
...
119.5
118.3
123.4
53.2
37.6
109.6
26.2
14.9
20.2
118.1
84.4
65.8
39.6
46.3
14.4
120.2
74.1
44.5
61.3
121.5
55.7
54.6
34.6
117.8
39.8
36.0
52.1
...
70.9
45.0
127.9
60.3
47.7
...
6.9
104.1
50.0
157.3
50.9
106.2
109.7
105.2
114.4
114.8
...
112.2
113.7
112.1
59.5
42.3
106.2
25.0
13.0
21.4
114.3
84.3
60.0
45.3
42.4
14.1
116.8
73.4
40.8
59.5
116.6
51.8
59.2
33.5
113.1
43.5
36.4
50.0
...
69.0
41.7
120.0
54.3
40.6
...
Sub-Saharan Africa
Median
72.2
83.2
68.9
62.8
70.6
63.8
62.4
73.4
59.3
58.9
73.2
55.7
57.9
70.3
55.2
55.9
63.0
54.7
54.1
60.8
53.0
51.4
59.5
51.0
Excluding Nigeria
61.1
47.6
79.6
76.4
55.3
49.6
67.4
67.8
53.1
44.7
68.6
63.8
50.5
43.7
64.6
59.1
51.1
43.5
61.9
58.4
51.7
44.2
57.9
57.5
52.2
44.2
54.1
55.1
48.7
41.6
52.2
53.3
Fragile countries
71.4
64.0
75.6
77.9
84.9
61.3
59.8
69.2
69.6
84.0
62.3
57.0
62.6
62.2
79.1
59.3
54.3
57.6
56.1
77.7
58.0
53.6
57.3
56.8
74.4
55.7
53.2
56.9
56.9
74.0
53.3
50.0
57.1
57.3
73.9
50.2
47.0
56.3
56.7
71.8
114.5
113.6
115.2
75.6
75.7
72.2
83.9
65.7
119.6
118.3
120.6
66.3
69.9
62.8
67.5
55.9
114.5
113.4
115.3
61.9
66.0
61.3
76.1
58.1
115.9
114.7
116.9
55.4
58.2
58.1
73.3
55.6
112.7
111.1
114.1
55.9
61.1
58.1
67.3
52.7
116.9
114.6
119.0
54.4
61.7
58.5
58.4
48.0
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cameroon
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of
Cte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
So Tom & Prncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
South Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
CFA franc zone

CEMAC
WAEMU
EAC-5
ECOWAS
SACU
SADC
See source
onon
page
82.82.
sourcesand
andfootnote
footnotes
page
106
119.9 114.8
116.0 110.6
123.4 118.5
53.5 53.5
61.6 59.0
57.7 53.8
52.6 50.5
44.5 42.1
Table SA24. External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based

(Percent of GDP)
2004-08
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
28.2
20.2
3.5
29.4
120.2
46.0
19.6
63.7
23.5
73.0
88.9
95.5
67.1
2.2
60.0
39.9
30.2
83.7
24.1
91.4
161.7
25.2
44.6
511.9
46.0
42.2
27.6
12.4
46.6
4.7
31.2
9.1
36.8
207.2
28.7
62.0
71.4
7.9
...
12.7
26.7
75.9
23.4
41.6
56.1
20.2
15.0
12.7
25.6
21.2
45.5
5.5
20.6
27.5
51.9
74.8
57.2
53.6
6.6
49.1
13.0
10.3
41.0
19.3
69.6
128.8
20.9
39.4
148.0
26.0
12.9
19.9
10.1
36.7
4.9
19.6
1.5
13.9
68.0
28.2
87.6
28.2
7.2
...
9.9
17.4
55.1
11.1
9.0
66.5
20.6
17.0
10.5
26.2
22.4
51.2
6.2
20.0
24.6
48.9
24.2
20.2
46.5
10.2
45.8
18.0
9.8
39.7
19.4
66.6
37.8
21.5
32.8
10.7
23.6
12.4
21.4
11.8
38.2
4.3
16.9
1.4
13.6
75.3
27.2
49.3
30.4
9.6
...
7.9
19.3
19.8
11.7
7.3
62.2
19.5
15.8
10.9
22.8
21.8
53.2
7.0
18.3
20.7
44.9
20.7
22.2
49.5
6.9
35.8
21.8
8.8
43.0
19.3
72.8
24.4
22.2
30.2
10.7
22.0
11.4
20.1
13.0
33.6
6.4
15.5
1.4
15.7
71.7
27.8
48.1
32.6
9.4
...
7.1
21.1
15.2
12.4
8.0
52.0
18.8
15.7
12.4
23.1
21.7
70.0
9.0
21.1
20.5
40.7
18.3
26.2
28.6
9.3
29.1
17.7
6.9
41.3
21.8
23.3
27.1
19.0
33.6
10.3
23.4
20.1
21.8
13.5
33.1
7.8
17.1
1.4
14.2
78.3
31.2
48.3
25.9
11.4
...
6.9
21.7
17.9
12.6
13.2
48.4
23.6
17.3
12.0
22.1
21.1
79.1
12.1
34.9
21.9
18.5
15.0
33.0
27.1
8.2
25.2
19.8
8.6
43.8
24.0
24.5
26.2
19.4
36.9
11.7
22.6
26.8
21.5
16.1
42.4
7.9
18.2
1.7
20.7
71.3
33.6
39.6
21.5
11.9
...
7.5
22.8
20.8
14.1
12.4
46.6
27.4
18.6
10.3
20.2
17.5
78.4
17.8
32.8
27.1
19.7
13.0
33.8
25.6
6.6
22.1
21.3
25.3
49.9
36.0
24.4
24.7
23.3
41.3
17.9
22.1
29.9
22.7
15.7
45.4
8.1
20.5
1.7
22.3
68.9
37.3
37.1
23.8
13.2
...
7.3
24.8
25.0
14.1
17.2
45.5
33.1
20.6
10.0
23.8
16.4
88.5
22.1
33.9
25.1
24.1
15.2
45.4
30.7
10.5
21.5
25.6
34.5
43.5
43.4
30.3
26.7
27.4
46.6
26.4
24.6
33.1
28.5
16.2
55.5
8.0
29.4
2.2
27.1
82.5
40.2
35.1
31.7
13.4
...
7.6
30.9
29.5
20.0
28.5
47.8
46.8
20.9
9.8
23.2
15.8
91.0
24.7
29.8
25.4
26.5
16.6
52.6
34.1
13.5
19.2
29.0
39.4
35.6
44.7
38.3
25.0
30.9
55.4
32.1
28.7
40.4
28.6
16.0
69.9
11.6
32.8
2.9
34.4
91.9
41.6
34.9
35.3
16.3
...
8.2
33.7
30.1
24.5
38.6
48.4
49.5
20.6
8.7
22.7
13.6
89.7
26.5
26.2
21.6
27.1
19.4
50.6
31.9
16.6
19.3
31.2
39.2
42.4
44.0
43.4
24.4
31.0
53.0
35.8
29.8
38.5
29.0
15.3
75.3
12.1
34.1
2.9
36.8
93.8
40.3
33.3
35.6
16.5
...
8.3
34.5
30.6
26.9
43.7
48.4
Sub-Saharan Africa
Median
19.7
40.7
36.2
13.7
21.1
24.6
11.9
20.4
20.9
11.7
20.7
20.4
11.8
20.8
19.4
12.7
21.5
21.2
14.0
23.0
24.0
16.7
28.0
28.8
19.0
30.5
33.0
19.1
31.1
33.9
Excluding Nigeria
15.4
29.0
22.6
39.1
7.4
18.9
17.7
26.9
5.9
16.8
16.1
22.6
5.9
15.9
15.9
22.5
5.9
16.3
16.4
20.8
7.1
20.1
17.6
21.7
8.1
24.7
19.5
23.6
9.6
30.3
22.5
28.2
10.8
38.9
26.2
31.3
10.8
40.4
26.9
32.0
Fragile countries
14.1
29.3
45.5
31.5
68.5
9.8
20.9
29.3
18.6
49.3
9.3
18.6
24.1
20.3
32.4
9.3
18.4
23.3
21.3
30.2
9.6
17.6
22.0
20.6
25.3
10.4
19.9
23.0
22.9
24.9
11.6
23.9
24.0
24.3
24.8
13.6
29.4
28.0
29.4
27.9
15.7
35.3
30.6
32.6
30.1
15.5
35.9
31.8
34.0
30.3
CFA franc zone

CEMAC
WAEMU
EAC-5
ECOWAS
SACU
SADC
37.7
30.8
44.9
40.1
27.8
20.1
7.9
16.5
26.9
17.5
35.7
24.9
17.4
10.9
7.5
14.6
21.7
12.7
30.8
19.8
18.4
8.1
9.6
13.7
20.5
11.9
29.9
19.7
19.5
7.9
9.5
13.3
18.7
13.2
24.6
18.8
18.3
6.7
11.4
15.0
20.1
15.5
24.7
19.2
19.6
7.1
11.9
16.7
23.3
21.3
25.2
20.6
21.9
7.4
13.0
18.5
28.3
26.6
29.8
24.8
27.0
9.3
13.2
20.9
30.8
29.8
31.5
28.2
30.6
10.1
16.0
25.7
30.4
30.2
30.6
29.6
31.4
9.7
16.1
26.8
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cameroon
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of
Cte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia1
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
So Tom & Prncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
South Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe2
See sources and footnotes on page 82
107
Table SA25. Terms of Trade on Goods

(Index, 2000 = 100)
2004-08
2009
2010
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
131.2
155.1
90.5
63.4
116.0
136.8
115.6
62.4
176.3
105.9
620.8
125.9
89.3
133.3
50.7
57.7
130.5
102.8
148.1
78.6
82.3
82.7
63.8
156.3
142.1
76.6
156.5
109.1
104.8
103.3
120.6
128.8
94.4
119.6
105.9
83.7
103.7
118.2
...
102.8
59.8
78.0
79.0
184.0
80.0
120.2
289.4
83.6
56.0
111.2
118.6
92.8
67.7
186.5
91.8
578.3
86.3
95.7
120.5
38.1
70.4
123.0
76.2
203.2
72.2
57.4
95.7
49.6
144.0
152.5
86.1
180.3
97.5
102.6
115.6
164.6
123.1
108.4
79.2
126.5
82.2
98.2
138.2
...
116.1
83.7
86.4
84.8
170.2
96.8
143.4
368.5
86.0
39.9
168.9
136.4
105.2
67.7
237.8
96.8
681.0
131.0
103.2
151.5
38.3
91.7
143.4
65.0
247.7
81.2
71.6
94.9
49.6
219.6
143.7
93.1
218.7
102.0
114.5
128.8
189.9
134.7
125.8
86.9
126.3
76.9
104.9
148.2
...
102.8
89.5
82.8
82.1
232.2
101.9
188.1
273.7
122.4
47.7
122.2
145.2
116.2
69.4
276.4
137.7
570.6
143.7
104.7
183.9
38.6
120.6
167.2
76.8
290.9
96.6
74.0
74.7
48.6
170.3
155.7
80.4
308.9
98.9
107.0
140.3
179.0
151.5
118.3
117.1
120.2
72.0
104.6
145.8
...
110.2
92.4
120.5
83.8
211.5
104.1
184.9
234.5
158.3
43.1
109.9
127.9
114.6
82.9
298.8
112.9
535.7
149.0
99.3
183.2
38.8
98.9
162.5
89.1
270.5
75.5
55.0
75.2
47.2
171.6
171.7
77.9
257.3
98.1
106.3
145.4
173.4
151.9
141.1
87.7
111.1
72.0
99.3
137.3
...
125.4
89.9
93.7
82.3
198.6
102.3
168.9
224.1
172.1
35.7
138.0
120.2
106.1
89.7
285.7
105.0
584.9
136.3
97.0
158.9
38.8
103.3
149.9
78.0
252.6
79.9
74.1
73.3
46.6
152.4
193.3
78.8
273.7
96.5
104.9
153.8
153.1
147.9
136.4
98.8
113.2
73.4
83.4
133.8
...
125.6
92.2
105.9
92.4
192.9
100.6
98.5
218.2
164.3
34.1
160.4
78.2
97.6
113.7
151.3
117.7
593.1
104.3
101.4
129.5
38.8
105.6
92.7
62.5
224.8
104.1
114.0
83.9
53.0
136.8
184.3
80.5
315.2
107.2
104.4
142.1
151.9
111.1
146.9
137.1
120.1
83.9
68.1
131.4
...
130.1
101.5
116.1
102.2
185.5
104.9
74.6
212.6
175.1
35.6
163.0
65.7
90.5
114.4
122.7
134.6
604.1
92.9
102.3
152.0
38.8
104.4
73.1
87.9
207.4
122.2
128.4
86.3
54.9
164.3
179.8
82.8
326.8
106.1
104.5
136.3
140.4
92.4
142.3
124.5
119.8
94.5
71.5
129.2
...
132.5
106.8
121.5
102.0
171.1
104.2
86.0
201.4
178.0
35.4
160.7
68.7
91.3
105.8
135.7
137.1
592.5
119.9
102.0
172.1
38.8
102.6
84.9
86.1
200.8
123.8
122.2
86.0
58.4
168.0
172.5
76.9
327.0
105.9
101.4
136.3
131.8
101.0
155.9
140.3
119.8
90.0
67.2
124.8
...
130.6
104.6
123.1
99.5
162.8
106.4
Sub-Saharan Africa
Median
126.4
105.3
130.9
131.6
97.9
132.4
147.3
105.1
155.6
157.0
120.3
167.6
153.6
112.0
163.1
149.8
109.7
158.9
131.9
112.4
147.1
123.3
117.1
145.8
125.0
119.8
145.7
Excluding Nigeria
129.8
131.8
124.2
130.3
121.3
117.9
138.2
138.3
137.4
143.8
154.3
160.6
159.8
179.0
154.8
162.6
159.5
177.9
148.5
156.8
152.1
163.0
147.8
157.2
109.0
103.1
150.5
162.4
90.9
85.8
151.8
163.5
100.1
96.7
148.5
160.1
Fragile countries
122.3
120.0
146.0
82.7
195.5
127.1
119.0
149.6
100.1
189.7
141.5
141.5
175.3
111.4
225.2
153.3
163.3
173.7
112.1
229.9
150.6
160.8
166.4
103.8
224.6
144.0
147.2
173.9
104.8
237.2
119.0
118.9
179.2
109.3
244.7
106.4
110.7
182.7
109.4
250.4
109.9
113.8
179.0
107.5
246.6
CFA franc zone

CEMAC
WAEMU
EAC-5
ECOWAS
SACU
SADC
118.3
129.6
106.6
160.6
76.0
125.3
116.3
134.3
123.3
113.9
131.9
151.9
90.8
129.4
135.1
144.6
144.3
142.2
146.4
179.0
93.9
143.3
144.5
160.1
158.7
164.6
152.3
167.5
85.5
160.4
143.9
165.0
150.7
166.8
134.7
163.8
85.7
156.8
137.7
162.3
143.8
153.7
134.5
171.2
87.7
150.4
135.4
162.5
128.1
109.8
143.0
179.6
97.9
121.7
132.5
154.0
124.8
99.1
143.9
180.9
100.1
106.3
131.0
156.4
127.4
108.6
141.3
176.8
99.6
111.8
127.3
154.9
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cameroon
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of
Cte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia1
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
So Tom & Prncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
South Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe2
108
Table SA26. Reserves
(Months of imports of goods and services)

2004-08
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
3.1
6.5
20.7
4.9
3.6
3.2
3.6
4.2
2.0
6.3
0.3
3.7
2.6
6.8
1.0
2.3
4.5
3.7
2.7
0.5
5.3
2.9
4.7
0.4
2.5
1.4
4.6
3.8
4.2
2.0
3.2
10.7
3.5
4.6
3.5
0.8
3.8
3.5
...
2.5
4.8
3.2
5.6
1.8
0.2
4.4
7.4
15.9
6.0
4.4
4.1
6.9
4.6
1.4
6.4
1.1
6.3
3.6
4.1
2.2
1.9
5.4
5.3
2.7
2.4
7.0
3.4
5.4
2.2
3.6
0.6
5.1
4.5
5.0
3.9
2.8
7.5
6.5
6.6
4.9
2.2
3.4
4.6
...
4.0
4.6
4.6
4.9
4.1
0.9
5.0
7.2
11.5
3.6
4.1
3.4
5.3
4.1
1.3
5.7
1.3
6.7
4.6
3.4
2.4
2.0
3.7
5.1
2.9
1.2
5.0
2.9
4.0
2.3
2.6
1.5
4.2
4.3
3.4
3.0
3.0
4.5
5.2
3.9
3.8
2.6
1.6
4.3
...
2.9
4.1
3.4
3.9
3.3
0.6
7.1
6.5
10.9
3.1
3.3
3.7
4.7
4.3
1.9
6.3
1.4
9.8
3.5
3.7
2.8
2.6
4.4
5.1
2.9
3.2
9.3
2.8
3.6
2.3
3.6
1.0
4.2
4.5
2.3
2.9
2.2
5.1
6.5
4.6
3.4
2.7
1.8
4.8
6.3
2.3
3.5
4.4
3.7
3.0
0.6
7.7
3.8
10.0
2.5
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.4
2.5
6.7
1.6
8.1
2.5
6.2
4.1
2.0
4.2
6.0
2.9
2.7
6.4
3.7
4.9
2.2
3.1
1.1
3.0
5.0
2.7
2.8
3.1
7.2
5.6
3.2
3.4
2.8
2.2
5.0
3.9
3.3
3.6
1.8
4.5
3.3
0.6
7.2
2.9
10.6
3.6
3.5
4.5
4.2
3.7
2.3
5.8
1.4
7.0
2.4
6.5
4.0
1.8
4.9
4.8
2.9
2.8
6.0
3.8
5.2
1.9
2.3
2.0
2.8
5.3
3.3
2.2
3.4
6.0
5.1
3.2
3.7
3.6
2.0
5.3
2.7
3.9
3.9
2.1
4.8
3.1
0.5
9.0
2.9
14.4
5.2
3.9
6.2
4.8
6.0
2.7
6.8
1.3
11.8
3.1
6.6
4.7
1.5
5.8
3.0
2.6
3.3
10.7
4.8
6.2
2.2
2.7
3.0
2.5
6.3
3.4
1.9
4.9
6.1
4.3
3.7
4.5
4.3
3.6
6.3
1.7
3.7
4.1
2.8
4.9
4.2
0.5
9.4
2.8
11.4
3.5
2.1
4.9
5.1
4.8
1.1
6.6
1.0
5.0
2.7
3.3
3.5
1.9
5.1
2.0
2.7
2.2
14.0
4.5
6.4
2.4
2.8
2.4
2.6
6.6
3.1
2.6
4.1
5.2
3.6
3.8
4.9
5.1
3.9
6.3
1.7
3.5
4.2
2.3
4.2
4.5
0.5
6.3
2.4
11.7
2.9
1.3
4.7
4.6
3.6
0.6
5.5
0.8
3.4
2.8
2.6
3.7
1.8
4.1
1.3
2.8
2.2
17.3
4.5
5.5
2.9
2.8
3.2
2.6
6.8
2.6
2.1
3.9
3.7
3.3
3.7
4.7
4.9
3.7
6.2
2.6
3.2
4.3
2.1
4.1
3.9
0.6
5.5
2.3
12.2
1.9
2.7
4.6
4.0
2.6
0.6
5.4
0.7
3.1
2.8
2.5
4.6
1.3
3.9
2.4
3.3
2.0
20.1
4.4
4.5
3.1
2.9
3.1
2.7
6.8
2.3
2.2
3.8
3.2
3.5
4.5
4.7
4.9
3.5
6.0
5.3
2.9
4.5
2.0
4.2
3.6
0.7
Sub-Saharan Africa
Median
5.1
3.5
3.8
5.2
4.4
4.2
4.2
3.7
3.9
4.6
3.6
4.3
5.3
3.5
4.3
5.0
3.6
4.1
5.6
4.2
4.9
5.1
3.6
4.4
4.2
3.4
3.7
3.9
3.3
3.6
Excluding Nigeria
7.3
3.7
3.6
3.8
6.6
4.8
4.3
4.0
4.6
4.7
3.9
3.5
5.4
6.1
4.1
3.4
6.9
6.4
4.1
3.3
6.0
6.0
4.1
3.3
6.5
7.4
4.8
3.7
5.7
7.2
4.5
3.4
4.0
5.0
4.3
3.3
3.5
4.5
4.2
3.3
Fragile countries
5.5
4.2
3.2
4.2
2.2
5.6
4.7
3.6
4.3
3.1
4.4
4.5
3.0
3.7
3.0
5.0
5.1
3.2
3.4
3.7
5.9
5.3
2.9
3.3
2.9
5.5
5.1
2.8
3.4
2.5
6.3
6.4
3.0
3.5
3.1
5.7
5.9
2.8
3.3
2.2
4.6
4.7
2.6
3.1
2.1
4.2
4.5
2.6
3.0
2.3
CFA franc zone

CEMAC
WAEMU
EAC-5
ECOWAS
SACU
SADC
4.0
4.1
3.8
2.5
4.1
7.7
4.0
3.7
5.0
5.3
4.7
3.1
4.3
6.5
5.0
4.5
4.3
4.3
4.4
2.7
3.7
4.3
4.5
4.2
4.4
4.9
3.8
2.8
3.4
4.7
4.9
4.8
4.0
5.1
2.9
3.0
4.0
6.2
5.1
5.0
3.9
4.9
3.0
3.0
4.1
5.3
5.4
5.1
4.8
6.0
3.7
3.3
4.6
5.6
6.5
6.1
3.8
4.2
3.4
3.1
4.2
4.8
6.4
6.0
3.4
3.6
3.3
2.9
4.3
3.6
6.2
5.3
3.2
3.2
3.2
2.8
4.3
3.2
6.1
5.0
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cameroon
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of
Cte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia1
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
So Tom & Prncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
South Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe2
109
Table SA27. Banking Penetration
(Total banking sector assets in percent of GDP)

2004-08
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
27.6
33.4
51.4
28.7
28.8
90.0
22.7
12.6
7.3
25.1
6.7
11.5
25.9
10.2
143.7
...
23.6
48.3
29.7
...
11.8
57.4
42.7
...
23.8
15.3
30.9
284.6
33.2
66.4
16.2
28.3
62.7
43.6
118.8
16.2
116.4
...
28.1
24.2
41.3
21.4
24.9
58.4
44.7
64.2
33.4
31.5
98.5
26.1
15.8
9.4
34.4
12.3
16.5
28.7
20.9
126.0
...
26.5
61.7
40.1
...
20.3
54.1
50.1
...
25.6
23.5
33.5
316.8
46.5
94.9
20.9
43.5
...
75.5
47.3
100.0
25.9
120.9
...
34.8
27.7
53.4
23.1
25.9
...
57.4
49.4
56.6
36.7
33.6
103.0
28.7
17.3
10.0
37.6
11.4
18.8
31.5
20.7
124.7
...
23.4
66.8
39.5
...
24.5
56.0
50.3
...
25.5
27.3
35.3
369.9
52.7
92.1
23.3
31.2
...
76.7
50.4
109.3
24.9
116.3
...
33.9
30.0
62.5
26.6
25.5
...
57.2
53.2
53.2
38.9
33.4
111.2
29.7
19.1
10.4
41.5
12.2
23.7
37.2
17.5
113.2
...
25.5
70.5
38.1
...
27.2
57.6
46.4
...
26.2
29.8
33.9
378.2
53.7
93.7
23.6
30.4
...
72.2
52.6
113.0
24.6
115.3
6.7
34.3
28.8
63.7
26.1
25.8
...
56.4
54.8
56.7
40.1
31.2
120.6
28.3
19.2
11.1
44.5
14.0
28.0
35.8
22.4
104.5
...
28.8
70.6
37.3
...
26.8
58.1
45.4
...
26.3
31.8
34.3
377.4
61.0
87.8
24.9
29.2
...
81.7
53.1
102.2
23.0
114.8
14.7
32.2
29.0
68.0
26.9
27.6
...
57.7
59.6
55.0
46.1
30.7
135.1
29.9
25.4
11.8
42.5
14.0
30.8
36.8
25.9
110.4
...
32.3
73.6
39.6
...
29.9
60.9
53.6
...
24.8
31.6
38.5
365.1
63.7
84.9
26.3
30.1
...
81.8
59.8
118.6
21.4
111.6
13.0
34.0
28.8
70.4
28.2
29.2
...
60.5
65.0
53.4
52.9
31.4
136.6
30.6
25.1
14.7
43.1
14.3
35.5
41.3
30.2
...
...
29.9
82.0
46.4
...
27.7
64.2
52.6
...
25.0
30.2
45.8
352.2
71.8
80.7
29.0
30.5
...
81.9
65.8
115.3
23.2
113.3
21.0
33.2
29.5
75.6
29.6
31.9
...
72.7
69.9
64.5
58.4
...
141.3
...
24.4
...
47.5
14.6
...
46.5
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
31.6
65.5
55.2
...
25.3
...
50.1
346.8
79.2
...
30.3
...
...
...
72.3
92.5
25.4
124.2
70.2
35.0
...
80.7
...
36.7
...
Sub-Saharan Africa
Median
44.5
28.3
43.0
51.6
34.4
50.0
54.1
35.3
53.1
53.7
35.7
52.7
54.5
35.1
53.6
56.6
37.6
55.8
57.0
41.3
56.2
70.4
58.4
68.2
Excluding Nigeria
18.8
17.2
50.1
48.0
28.7
26.3
56.6
54.6
27.2
26.5
60.0
58.2
25.1
24.4
60.9
59.1
27.4
27.1
61.3
59.6
29.0
28.8
63.5
62.0
31.6
31.8
63.5
61.9
71.4
71.4
70.3
67.9
Fragile countries
See source
onon
page
82.82.
sourcesand
andfootnote
footnotes
page
59.1
55.9
30.6
31.1
30.9
68.2
65.3
35.8
38.2
35.5
70.6
68.0
38.5
42.0
37.4
71.6
69.2
37.6
43.4
35.9
72.1
69.8
38.6
45.1
37.2
74.4
72.3
40.5
48.3
38.4
74.7
72.6
40.1
53.2
35.7
98.3
95.7
48.6
62.0
41.6
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cameroon
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of
Cte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius1
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
So Tom & Prncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
South Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
110
Table SA28. Banking Sector: Loan-to-Deposit Ratio1

(Percent of deposits)
2004-08
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
42.6
58.4
55.8
92.2
67.7
54.8
69.3
118.0
82.7
49.5
49.7
36.4
78.8
43.0
24.6
...
62.5
38.0
73.3
...
30.8
76.6
26.4
...
...
...
82.0
65.5
53.3
112.3
73.1
76.3
66.7
77.3
30.9
38.7
122.8
...
96.7
52.0
67.5
58.8
50.5
55.8
54.5
55.4
78.4
59.3
72.5
68.3
98.2
85.5
54.2
58.6
38.7
80.0
56.6
25.3
...
59.6
42.1
73.4
...
42.7
72.5
34.9
...
...
...
74.3
67.7
67.7
74.0
83.0
79.1
...
74.9
78.3
30.7
47.2
120.1
...
79.6
64.6
60.6
71.4
60.1
...
72.5
53.3
55.4
69.0
63.5
74.2
69.4
103.7
73.4
57.6
57.5
39.5
73.3
59.0
23.8
...
62.7
43.7
65.5
...
38.9
72.6
36.6
...
...
...
71.5
68.2
74.4
75.9
78.0
64.0
...
108.3
76.7
35.9
47.5
120.7
...
74.4
62.1
59.0
77.2
52.9
...
79.3
51.5
67.5
69.3
80.1
80.2
70.3
99.6
73.5
55.1
68.8
38.3
63.9
68.1
24.0
...
62.9
40.8
57.9
...
66.7
77.8
37.2
...
...
...
82.0
80.9
74.4
75.5
84.3
56.2
...
110.5
78.4
33.9
46.5
113.2
9.8
85.8
67.1
67.1
85.5
56.5
...
89.1
48.6
74.0
71.8
81.1
73.9
80.1
109.1
77.5
56.5
68.0
49.8
63.0
38.0
24.7
...
65.1
39.9
63.2
...
72.9
76.9
50.9
...
...
...
78.9
77.2
71.1
77.5
84.2
54.8
...
82.4
80.0
34.7
40.5
119.0
11.8
79.8
69.9
64.3
79.5
65.2
...
85.8
45.6
79.1
77.4
73.8
64.7
81.4
108.3
80.2
64.7
68.7
59.6
66.6
48.1
23.3
...
77.7
37.5
69.5
...
69.7
80.5
45.3
...
...
...
72.8
72.6
74.4
82.8
76.6
57.4
...
75.4
79.5
28.9
37.0
118.7
15.2
81.7
71.2
66.1
80.0
61.1
...
75.0
40.9
82.5
74.3
73.5
59.2
82.3
108.2
80.9
67.9
71.4
55.3
65.1
54.1
...
...
81.4
30.8
70.6
...
56.9
83.7
47.9
...
...
...
64.6
74.9
73.5
88.8
68.9
65.3
...
58.5
75.1
31.8
34.0
117.3
11.3
86.2
75.6
61.8
74.6
65.7
...
67.2
34.7
76.4
68.1
...
57.2
...
99.1
...
70.0
73.3
...
66.7
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
45.1
87.0
45.7
...
...
...
62.8
68.0
61.7
...
74.4
...
...
...
68.7
42.4
31.4
118.1
7.7
79.3
...
61.9
...
60.1
...
Sub-Saharan Africa
Median
63.7
62.5
61.6
64.9
67.7
62.9
65.2
65.5
63.6
66.8
68.5
65.8
67.0
71.5
65.9
67.3
71.9
66.2
67.3
70.6
65.9
63.6
67.0
61.3
Excluding Nigeria
59.0
56.1
64.8
62.8
63.4
60.8
65.2
63.3
62.9
62.8
65.7
63.8
57.3
57.4
69.4
67.9
58.3
58.8
69.3
67.6
63.2
64.0
68.4
66.7
63.2
62.9
68.4
66.7
37.4
37.4
66.0
63.5
Fragile countries
See source and footnote on page 82.
65.3
62.1
61.9
62.9
61.0
66.0
63.0
63.7
67.5
61.5
67.4
64.5
62.8
66.8
62.9
69.2
66.8
64.4
68.9
63.3
69.2
66.4
64.8
68.1
62.9
70.4
67.7
64.3
67.8
63.0
70.8
68.2
63.6
64.2
62.3
69.8
65.0
58.4
61.5
57.6
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cabo Verde
Cameroon
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of
Cte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
So Tom & Prncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
South Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
111
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Publications of the IMF African Department, 200916

BOOKS AND MONOGRAPHS
2016
Africa on the Move: Unlocking the Potential of Small MiddleIncome States
Lamin Leigh, Ali M Mansoor
15/10
Strengthening the West African Economic and Monetary
Union: The Role of Fiscal and Market Institutions in Economic
Stabilization
Basdevant, Olivier, Patrick A. Imam, Tidiane Kinda,
Aleksandra Zdzienicka
2015
The Quest for Regional Integration in the East African
Community:
Drummond, Paulo, S.K. Wajid, Oral Williams
15/8
Evolving Banking Trends in Sub-Saharan Africa : Key
Features and Challenges
Mecagni, Mauro, Daniela Marchettini, Rodolfo Maino
2014
The Mystery of Missing Real Spillovers in Southern Africa:
Some Facts and Possible Explanations
Basdevant, Olivier, Andrew W. Jonelis, Borislava Mircheva,
Slavi T. Slavov
15/7
Monitoring and Managing Fiscal Risks in the East African
Community
Mauro, Paolo, Herve Joly, Ari Aisen, Emre Alper, Franois
Boutin-Dufresne, Jemma Dridi, Nikoloz Gigineishvili,
Tom Josephs, Clara Mira, Vimal V Thakoor, Alun H.
Thomas, Fan Yang
2013
Building a Common Future in Southern Africa
Mongardini, Joannes, Tamon Asonuma, Olivier Basdevant,
Alfredo Cuevas, Xavier Debrun, Lars Holger Engstrom,
Imelda M. Flores Vazquez, Vitaliy Kramarenko,
Lamin Leigh, Paul R. Masson, Genevive Verdier
2012
Oil Wealth in Central Africa: Policies for Inclusive Growth
Coorey, Sharmini, and Bernardin Akitoby
2009
The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on SubSaharan Africa
African Department
2009
Tanzania: The Story of an African Transition
Nord, Roger, Yuri Sobolev, David Dunn, Alejandro
Hajdenberg, Niko Hobdari, Samar Maziad, Stphane Roudet
DEPARTMENTAL PAPERS
16/2
Trade Integration and Global Value Chains in Sub-Saharan
Africa : In Pursuit of the Missing Link
Cline Allard, Jorge Ivn Canales Kriljenko, Jesus GonzalezGarcia, Emmanouil Kitsios, Juan P. Trevino, Wenjie Chen
16/1
Make Investment Scaling-up Work in Benin: A Macro-Fiscal
Analysis
Barhoumi, Karim, Larry Cui, Christine Dieterich, Nicolas
End, Matteo Ghilardi, Alexander Raabe, Sergio Sola
15/6
Toward a Monetary Union in the East African Community:
Asymmetric Shocks, Exchange Rates, and Risk-Sharing
Mechanisms
Drummond, Paulo, Ari Aisen, C. Emre Alper, Ejona Fuli,
and Sebastien Walker
15/5
Building Resilience in Sub-Saharan Africas Fragile States
Gelbard, Enrique, Corinne Dlechat, Ejona Fuly,
Mumtaz Hussain, Ulrich Jacoby, Dafina Mulaj, Marco Pani,
Gustavo Ramirez, Rui Xu
15/4
Dollarization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Experiences and Lessons
Mecagni, Mauro, Juan S Corrales, Jemma Dridi, Rodrigo
Garcia-Verdu, Patrick A. Imam, Justin Matz, Carla Macario,
Rodolfo Maino, Yibin Mu, Ashwin Moheeput, Futoshi
Narita, Marco Pani, Manuel Rosales, Sebastian Weber,
Etienne B. Yehoue
15/3
Pan-African Banking: Opportunities and Challenges for CrossBorder Oversight
Enoch, Charles , Paul Henri Mathieu, Mauro Mecagni,
Jorge Ivn Canales Kriljenko
15/2
Sustaining More Inclusive Growth in the Republic of Congo
Hakura, Dalia, Adrian Alter, Matteo Ghilardi, Rodolfo
Maino, Cameron McLoughlin, Maximilien Queyranne
117
15/1
Making Senegal a Hub for West Africa : Reforming the State,
Building to the Future
Kireyev, Alexei, Ali M. Mansoor
13/2
Boom, Bust, or Prosperity? Managing Sub-Saharan Africas
Natural Resource Wealth
Lundgren, Charlotte J., Alun H. Thomas, Robert C. York
14/4
Mozambique Rising: Building a New Tomorrow
Ross, Doris C., Victor Duarte Lledo, Alex Segura-Ubiergo,
Yuan Xiao, Iyabo Masha, Alun H. Thomas, Keiichiro Inui
13/1
Restoring Sustainability in a Changing Global Environment:
Options for Swaziland
Basdevant, Olivier, Emily Forrest, and Borislava Mircheva
14/3
The Mystery of Missing Real Spillovers in Southern Africa:
Some Facts and Possible Explanations
Basdevant, Olivier, Andrew W Jonelis, Borislava Mircheva,
Slavi T. Slavov
11/07
Macroeconomic Vulnerabilities Stemming from the Global
Economic Crisis: The Case of Swaziland
Basdevant, Olivier, Chikako Baba, Borislava Mircheva
14/2
Issuing International Sovereign Bonds: Opportunities and
Challenges for Sub-Saharan Africa
Mecagni, Mauro, Jorge Ivn Canales Kriljenko, Cheikh A.
Gueye, Yibin Mu, Masafumi Yabara, Sebastian Weber
14/1
Managing Volatile Capital Flows: Experiences and Lessons for
Sub-Saharan African Frontier Markets
Gueye, Cheikh A., Javier Arze del Granado, Rodrigo GarciaVerdu, Mumtaz Hussain, B. Jang, Sebastian Weber,
Juan S Corrales
13/8
Mali: Achieving Strong and Inclusive Growth with
Macroeconomic Stability
Josz, Christian
13/7
Responding to Shocks and Maintaining Stability in the West
African Economic and Monetary Union
Kolerus, Christina, Aleksandra Zdzienicka, Ermal Hitaj,
Douglas J. Shapiro
13/6
West African Economic and Monetary Union: Financial Depth
and Macrostability
Imam, Patrick A., and Christina Kolerus
13/5
Senegal: Financial Depth and Macrostability
Imam, Patrick A., and Christina Kolerus
13/4
Senegal: Achieving High and Inclusive Growth While
Preserving Fiscal Sustainability
Kireyev, Alexei, and Gaston K. Mpatswe
118
11/06
What Do Fast Job Creators Look Like? Some Stylized Facts and
Perspectives on South Africa
Zhan, Zaijin
11/04
South Africa: Macro Policy Mix and Its Effects on Growth
and the Real Exchange RateEmpirical Evidence and GIMF
Simulations
Canales-Kriljenko, Jorge Ivn
11/02
Measuring the Potential Output of South Africa
Klein, Nir
11/01
In the Wake of the Global Economic Crisis: Adjusting to Lower
Revenue of the Southern African Customs Union in Botswana,
Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland
Mongardini, Joannes, Dalmacio Benicio, Thomson Fontaine,
Gonzalo C. Pastor, Genevive Verdier
10/03
Zimbabwe: Challenges and Policy Options after Hyperinflation
Kramarenko, Vitaliy, Lars H. Engstrom, Genevive Verdier,
Gilda Fernandez, Stefan E. Oppers, Richard Hughes,
James McHugh, Warren L. Coats
10/02
Expenditure Composition and Economic Developments in
Benin
Pani, Marco, and Mohamed El Harrak
10/01
Wage Policy and Fiscal Sustainability in Benin
Lundgren, Charlotte J.
13/3
Banking in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Macroeconomic Context
Mlachila, Montfort, Seok Gil Park, Masafumi Yabara
09/04
The Global Financial Crisis and Adjustments to Shocks in
Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda: A Balance Sheet Analysis
Perspective
Masha, Iyabo
13/2
Energy Subsidy Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa: Experiences
and Lessons
Alleyne, Trevor, and Mumtaz Hussain
09/03
Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Exchange Rates and
Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa
Ben Ltaifa, Nabil, Stella Kaendera, and Shiv Dixit
PUBLICATIONS OF THE IMF AFRICAN DEPARTMENT, 200916
09/02
Spillover Effects and the East African Community: Explaining
the Slowdown and the Recovery
Drummond, Paulo, and Gustavo Ramirez
09/01
Foreign Exchange Reserve Adequacy in East African
Community Countries
Drummond, Paulo, Aristide Mrema, Stphane Roudet,
Mika Saito
POLICY PAPERS
12/14
Pan-African Banks - Opportunities and Challenges for
Cross-Border Oversight
Prepared by a staff team led by Charles Enoch, Paul Mathieu,
Mauro Mecagni.
STAFF DISCUSSION NOTES

15/11
Is the Glass Half Empty or Half Full? Issues in Managing
Water Challenges and Policy Instruments
Kalpana Kochhar, Catherine Pattillo, Yan Sun, Nujin
Suphaphiphat, Andrew Swiston, Robert Tchaidze, Benedict
Clements, Stefania Fabrizio, Valentina Flamini, Laure
Redifer, Harald Finger, and an IMF Staff Team
WORKING PAPERS
16/17
Unintended Consequences: Spillovers from Nigerias Fuel
Pricing Policies to Its Neighbor
Mlachila, Montfort, Edgardo Ruggiero, David Corvino
16/12
Commodity Price Shocks and Financial Sector Fragility
Kinda, Tidiane, Montfort Mlachila, Rasman Ouedraogo
15/268
Exiting From Fragility in sub-Saharan Africa : The Role of
Fiscal Policies and Fiscal Institutions
Delchat,Corinne, Ejona Fuli, Dafina Mulaj, Gustavo
Ramirez, Rui Xu
15/236
Public Investment in a Developing Country Facing Resource
Depletion
Alter, Adrian, Matteo Ghilardi, Dalia Hakura
15/235
Financial Inclusion and Development in the CEMAC
Alter, Adrian, Boriana Yontcheva
15/221
Spillovers from China onto Sub-Saharan Africa: Insights from
the Flexible System of Global Models (FSGM)
Anderson, Derek, Jorge Ivn Canales Kriljenko, Paulo
Drummond, Pedro Espaillat, Dirk Muir
12/13
Economic Diversification in LICs: Stylized Facts and
Macroeconomic Implications
Papageorgiou, Chris, and Nicola Spatafora
15/190
Systemic Risk Assessment in Lo Income Countries : Balancing
Financial Stability and Development
Marchettini, Daniela, Rodolfo Maino
09/20
The International Financial Crisis and Global Recession:
Impact on the CEMAC Region and Policy Considerations
Wakeman-Linn, John, Rafael A. Portillo, Plamen Iossifov,
Dimitre Milkov
15/189
On the Drivers of Inflation in Sub-Saharan Africa
Nguyen, Anh D. M., Jemma Dridi, D. Filiz Unsal,
Oral Williams
09/16
The Global Financial Crisis: Impact on WAEMU Member
Countries and Policy Options
Mueller, Johannes, Irene Yackovlev, Hans Weisfeld
09/14
The Southern African Development Communitys
Macroeconomic Convergence Program: Initial Performance
Burgess, Robert
09/10
Fiscal Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa in Response to the Impact
of the Global Crisis
Berg, Andrew, Norbert Funke, Alejandro Hajdenberg,
Victor Duarte Lledo, Rolando Ossowski, Martin Schindler,
Antonio Spilimbergo, Shamsuddin Tareq, Irene Yackovlev
15/185
Sub-Saharan Employment Developments : The Important Role
of Household Enterprises with an Application to Rwanda
Alun H. Thomas
15/169
Household Financial Acces and Risk Sharing in Nigeria
Carlson, Stacey, Era Dabla-Norris, Mika Saito, Yu Shi
15/149
Network Effects of International Shocks and Spillovers
Kireyev, Alexei and Andrei Leonidov
15/126
Pension Reforms in Mauritius: Fair and FastBalancing
Social Protection and Fiscal Sustainability
Soto, Mauricio, Vimal Thakoor, Martin Petri
119
15/99
How to Improve the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy int he
West African Economic and Monetary Union
Kireyev, Alexei
14/149
Islamic Finance in Sub-Saharan Africa: Status and Prospects
Gelbard, Enrique, Mumtaz Hussain, Rodolfo Maino,
Yibin Mu, Etienne B. Yehoue
15/83
Do Resource Windfalls Improve the Standard of Living in
Sub-Saharan African Countries?: Evidence from a Panel of
Countries
Munseob Lee, and Cheikh A. Gueye
14/143
Africa Rising: Harnessing the Demographic Dividend
Drummond, Paulo, Vimal Thakoor, and Shu Yu
15/49
Remittances and Macroeconomic Volatility in African
Countries
Ahmat Jidoud
15/25
Harnessing Resource Wealth for Inclusive Growth in
Fragile States
Delechat, Corinne, Will Clark, Pranav Gupta, Malangu
Kabedi-Mbuyi, Mesmin Koulet-Vickot, Carla Macario,
Toomas Orav, Manuel Rosales, Renee Tapsoba, Dmitry
Zhdankin, Susan Yang
15/17
Fiscal Policy Implications for Labor Market Outcomes in
Middle-Income Countries
Stepanyan, Ara, and Lamin Leigh
15/12
Revisiting teh Concept of Dollarization: The Global Financial
Crisis and Dollarization in Low-Income Countries
Mwase, Nkunde, and Francis Y. Kumah
14/241
Global Financial Transmission into Sub-Saharan Africa
A Global Vector Autoregression Analysis
Canales Kriljenko, Jorge Ivn, Mehdi Hosseinkouchack,
Alexis Meyer-Cirkel
14/231
Safe Debt and Uncertainty in Emerging Markets:
An Application to South Africa
Saxegaard, Magnus
14/172
A Quality of Growth Index for Developing Countries:
A Proposal
Mlachila, Montfort, Rene Tapsoba, Sampawende J.-A.
Tapsoba
14/159
Introducing a Semi-Structural Macroeconomic Model for
Rwanda
Charry, Luisa, Pranav Gupta, and Vimal Thakoor
14/150
How Solid is Economic Growth in the East African
Community?
Gigineishvili, Nikoloz, Paolo Mauro, Ke Wang
120
14/94
Does Openness Matter for Financial Development in Africa?
David, Antonio, Montfort Mlachila, and Ashwin Moheeput
14/51
Surging Investment and Declining Aid: Evaluating Debt
Sustainability in Rwanda
Clark, Will, and Birgir Arnason
13/261
Natural Gas, Public Investment and Debt Sustainability in
Mozambique
Melina, Giovanni, and Yi Xiong
13/250
Africas Rising Exposure to China: How Large Are Spillovers
Through Trade?
Drummond, Paulo, and Estelle X. Liu
13/239
Money Targeting in a Modern Forecasting and Policy Analysis
System: an Application to Kenya
Andrle, Michal, Andrew Berg, Enrico Berkes,
Rafael A Portillo, Jan Vlcek, R. Armando Morales
13/237
The Investment-Financing-Growth Nexus: The Case of Liberia
Clark, Will, and Manuel Rosales
13/226
Making Monetary Policy More Effective: The Case of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Fischer, Felix, Charlotte J. Lundgren, Samir Jahjah
13/216
Fiscal Discipline in WAEMU: Rules, Institutions, and Markets
Hitaj, Ermal, and Yasin Kursat Onder
13/215
Inclusive Growth and Inequality in Senegal
Kireyev, Alexei
13/201
Africas Got Work to Do: Employment Prospects in the New
Century
Fox, Louise, Cleary Haines, Jorge Huerta Muoz,
Alun Thomas
13/188
Resource Dependence and Fiscal Effort in Sub-Saharan Africa
Thomas, Alun, and Juan P. Trevio
13/176
Benchmarking Structural Transformation Across the World
Dabla-Norris, Era, Alun H. Thomas, Rodrigo Garcia-Verdu,
Yingyuan Chen
13/31
Inward and Outward Spillovers in the SACU Area
Canales-Kriljenko, Jorge Ivn, Farayi Gwenhamo,
Saji Thomas
13/173
Tax Administration Reform in the Francophone Countries of
Sub-Saharan Africa
Fossat, Patrick, and Michel Bua
13/12
Bond Markets in Africa
Mu, Yibin, Peter Phelps, and Janet Stotsky
13/161
Financial Depth in the WAEMU: Benchmarking Against
Frontier SSA Countries
Ahokpossi, Calixte, Kareem Ismail, Sudipto Karmakar,
Mesmin Koulet-Vickot
13/147
Investing Volatile Oil Revenues in Capital-Scarce Economies:
An Application to Angola
Richmond, Christine, Irene Yackovlev, Shu-Chun Yang
13/144
Fiscal Sustainability, Public Investment, and Growth in
Natural Resource-Rich, Low-Income Countries: The Case of
Cameroon
Samak, Issouf, Priscilla Muthoora, Bruno Versailles
13/139
Inclusive Growth: An Application of the Social Opportunity
Function to Selected African Countries
Adedeji, Olumuyiwa, Huancheng Du, Maxwell Opoku-Afari
13/116
Inclusive Growth and the Incidence of Fiscal Policy in
Mauritius Much Progress, But More Could be Done
David, Antonio, and Martin Petri
12/290
Inequalities and Growth in the Southern African Customs
Union (SACU) Region
Basdevant, Olivier, Dalmacio Benicio, Yorbol Yakhshilikov
12/280
Striking an Appropriate Balance Among Public Investment,
Growth, and Debt Sustainability in Cape Verde
Mu, Yibin
12/272
The East African Community: Prospects for Sustained Growth
McAuliffe, Catherine, Sweta Saxena, Masafumi Yabara
12/249
Financing Growth in the WAEMU through the Regional
Securities Market: Past Successes and Current Challenges
Diouf, Mame Astou, and Francois Boutin-Dufresne
12/208
Exchange Rate and Foreign Interest Rate Linkages for
Sub-Saharan Africa Floaters
Thomas, Alun
12/196
A Financial Conditions Index for South Africa
Gumata, Nombulelo, Nir Klein, Eliphas Ndou
13/53
The Quality of the Recent High-Growth Episode in
Sub-Saharan Africa
Mlachila, Montfort, and Marcelo Martinez
12/177
Estimating the Implicit Inflation Target of the South African
Reserve Bank
Klein, Nir
13/51
Benchmarking Banking Sector Efficiency Across Regional
Blocks in Sub-Saharan Africa: What Room for Policy?
Boutin-Dufresne, Francois, Santiago Pea, Oral Williams,
Tomasz A. Zawisza
12/160
Monetization in Low- and Middle-Income Countries
McLoughlin, Cameron, and Noriaki Kinoshita
13/39
Monetary Transmission Mechanism in the East African
Community: An Empirical Investigation
Davoodi, Hamid, Shiv Dixit, and Gabor Pinter
12/148
The Relationship between the Foreign Exchange Regime
and Macroeconomic Performance in Eastern Africa
Stotsky, Janet Gale, Olumuyiwa Adedeji,
Manuk Ghazanchyan, Nils O. Maehle
13/34
Determinants of Bank Interest Margins in Sub-Saharan Africa
Ahokpossi, Calixte
12/141
Exchange Rate Pass-Through in Sub-Saharan African
Economies and its Determinants
Razafimahefa, Ivohasina Fizara
13/32
Exchange Rate Liberalization in Selected Sub-Saharan African
Countries: Successes, Failures, and Lessons
Mhle, Nils, Haimanot Teferra, Armine Khachatryan
12/136
Welfare Effects of Monetary Integration: The Common
Monetary Area and Beyond
Asonuma, Tamon, Xavier Debrun, and Paul R. Masson
121
12/127
As You Sow So Shall You Reap: Public Investment Surges,
Growth, and Debt Sustainability in Togo
Andrle, Michal, Antonio David, Raphael A. Espinoza,
Marshall Mills, and Luis-Felipe Zanna
12/119
Tracking Short-Term Dynamics of Economic Activity in
Low-Income Countries in the Absence of High-Frequency
GDP Data
Opoku-Afari, Maxwell, and Shiv Dixit
12/108
Mobilizing Revenue in Sub-Saharan Africa: Empirical Norms
and Key Determinants
Drummond, Paulo,Wendell Daal, Nandini Srivastava, and
Luiz E. Oliveira
12/94
Monetary Policy in Low-Income Countries in the Face of the
Global Crisis: The Case of Zambia
Baldini, Alfredo, Jaromir Benes, Andrew Berg, Mai Dao,
and Rafael Portillo
12/93
Fiscal Policies and Rules in the Face of Revenue Volatility
Within Southern Africa Customs Union Countries (SACU)
Basdevant, Olivier
12/92
Real Wage, Labor Productivity, and Employment Trends in
South Africa: A Closer Look
Klein, Nir
12/73
Exchange Rate Volatility Under Peg: Do Trade Patterns
Matter?
Lonkeng Ngouana, Constant
122
11/281
Effectiveness of Capital Controls in Selected Emerging Markets
in the 2000s
Baba, Chikako, and Annamaria Kokenyne
11/280
How Costly Are Debt Crises?
Furceri, Davide, and Aleksandra Zdzienicka
11/275
Monetary Policy Transmission in Ghana: Does the Interest
Rate Channel Work?
Kovanen, Arto
11/274
Does Money Matter for Inflation in Ghana?
Kovanen, Arto
11/273
On the Stability of Monetary Demand in Ghana: A Bounds
Testing Approach
Dagher, Jihad, and Arto Kovanen
11/268
Oil-Price Boom and Real Exchange Rate Appreciation: Is There
Dutch Disease in the CEMAC?
Trevio, Juan Pedro
11/266
The Design of Fiscal Adjustment Strategies in Botswana,
Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland
Basdevant, Olivier, Dalmacio Benicio, Borislava Mircheva,
Joannes Mongardini, Genevive Verdier, Susan Yang, and
Luis-Felipe Zanna
11/246
Do Remittances Reduce Aid Dependency?
Kpodar, Kangni, and Maelan Le Goff
12/32
Assessing Bank Competition within the East African
Community
Sanya, Sarah, and Matthew Gaertner
11/233
Determinants of Non-oil Growth in the CFA-Zone Oil
Producing Countries: How Do They Differ?
Tabova, Alexandra, and Carol L. Baker
12/20
Prudential Liquidity Regulation in Developing Countries:
A Case Study of Rwanda
Sanya, Sarah, Wayne Mitchell, and Angelique Kantengwa
11/232
Inflation Dynamics in the CEMAC Region
Caceres, Carlos, Marcos Poplawski-Ribeiro, and
Darlena Tartari
12/18
Capital Market Integration: Progress Ahead of the East African
Community Monetary Union
Yabara, Masafumi
11/207
External Sustainability of Oil-Producing Sub-Saharan African
Countries
Takebe, Misa, and Robert C. York
12/7
International Reserves in Low-Income Countries: Have They
Served as Buffers?
Cripolti, Valerio, and George Tsibouris
11/205
The Cyclicality of Fiscal Policies in the CEMAC Region
Mpatswe, Gaston K., Sampawende J. Tapsoba, and
Robert C. York
11/294
Inflation Differentials in the GCC: Does the Oil Cycle Matter?
Mohaddes, Kamiar, and Oral Williams
11/204
South Africa: The Cyclical Behavior of the Markups and
Its Implications for Monetary Policy
Klein, Nir
11/202
Burkina FasoPolicies to Protect the Poor from the Impact of
Food and Energy Price Increases
Arze del Granado, Javier, and Isabell Adenauer
11/198
De Jure versus De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes in
Sub-Saharan Africa
Slavov, Slavi T.
11/196
Financial Deepening, Property Rights and Poverty: Evidence
from Sub-Saharan Africa
Singh, Raju Jan, and Yifei Huang
11/178
FDI from BRICs to LICs: Emerging Growth Driver?
Mlachila, Montfort, and Misa Takebe
11/176
Determinants of Interest Rate Pass-Through: Do
Macroeconomic Conditions and Financial Market Structure
Matter?
Gigineishvili, Nikoloz
11/174
The Quest for Higher Growth in the WAEMU Region: The
Role of Accelerations and Decelerations
Kinda, Tidiane, and Montfort Mlachila
11/69
Fiscal Sustainability and the Fiscal Reaction Function for
South Africa
Burger, Philippe, Alfredo Cuevas, Ian Stuart, and
Charl Jooste
11/64
Reviving the Competitive Storage Model: A Holistic Approach
to Food Commodity Prices
Miao, Yanliang, Weifeng Wu, and Norbert Funke
11/59
Inflation Uncertainty and Relative Price Variability in
WAEMU
Fernandez Valdovinos, Carlos, and Kerstin Gerling
11/57
Modeling Inflation in Chad
Kinda, Tidiane
11/48
Fiscal Expectations under the Stability and Growth Pact:
Evidence from Survey Data
Poplawski-Ribeiro, Marcos, and Jan-Christoph Rulke
11/40
Growth in Africa under Peace and Market Reforms
Korbut, Olessia, Gonzalo Salinas, and Cheikh A. Gueye
11/172
Fiscal Policy Implementation in Sub-Saharan Africa
Lledo, Victor Duarte, and Marcos Poplawski Ribeiro
11/20
Feeling the Elephants Weight: The Impact of Cte dIvoires
Crisis on WAEMU Trade
Egoum-Bossogo, Philippe, and Nayo Ankouvi
11/149
Post-Conflict Recovery: Institutions, Aid, or Luck?
David, Antonio, Fabiano Rodrigues Bastos, and
Marshall Mills
11/9
Capital Flows, Exchange Rate Flexibility, and the Real
Exchange Rate
Kinda, Tidiane, Jean-Louis Combes, and Patrick Plane
11/104
Ghana: Will It Be Gifted, or Will It Be Cursed?
Aydin, Burcu
10/292
Weathering the Global Storm: The Benefits of Monetary Policy
Reform in the LA5 Countries
Canales-Kriljenko, Jorge Ivn, Luis Ignacio Jcome,
Ali Alichi, and Ivan Luis de Oliveira Lima
11/102
Oil Spill(over)s: Linkages in Petroleum Product Pricing Policies
in West African Countries
David, Antonio, Mohamed El Harrak, Marshall Mills, and
Lorraine Ocampos
11/80
Feeling the Elephants Weight: The Impact of Cte dIvoires
Crisis on WAEMU Trade
Egoum-Bossogo, Philippe, and Ankouvi Nayo
11/73
ICT, Financial Inclusion, and Growth Evidence from
African Countries
Andrianaivo, Mihasonirina, and Kangni Kpodar
10/269
Export Tax and Pricing Power: Two Hypotheses on the Cocoa
Market in Cte dIvoire
Kireyev, Alexei
10/225
What Can International Cricket Teach Us About the Role of
Luck in Labor Markets?
Aiyar, Shekhar, and Rodney Ramcharan
10/217
Performance of Fiscal Accounts in South Africa in a CrossCountry Setting
Aydin, Burcu
123
10/216
Cyclicality of Revenue and Structural Balances in South Africa
Aydin, Burcu
10/210
Mother, Can I Trust the Government? Sustained Financial
DeepeningA Political Institutions View
Quintyn, Marc, and Genevive Verdier
10/195
Islamic Banking: How Has It Diffused?
Imam, Patrick A., and Kangni Kpodar
10/191
A Macro Model of the Credit Channel in a Currency Union
Member: The Case of Benin
Samak, Issouf
10/166
How Do International Financial Flows to Developing
Countries Respond to Natural Disasters?
David, Antonio
10/162
Exchange Rate Assessment for Sub-Saharan Economies
Aydin, Burcu
10/148
Balance Sheet Vulnerabilities of Mauritius during a Decade
of Shocks
Imam, Patrick A., and Rainer Koehler
10/140
Beyond Aid: How Much Should African Countries Pay
to Borrow?
Gueye, Cheikh A., and Amadou N.R. Sy
10/136
Banking Efficiency and Financial Development in
Sub-Saharan Africa
Kablan, Sandrine
10/132
FDI Flows to Low-Income Countries: Global Drivers and
Growth Implications
Dabla-Norris, Era, Jiro Honda, Amina Lahrche-Rvil, and
Genevive Verdier
10/118
The Linkage between the Oil and Nonoil SectorsA Panel
VAR Approach
Klein, Nir
10/115
Short- versus Long-Term Credit and Economic Performance:
Evidence from the WAEMU
Kpodar, Kangni, and Kodzo Gbenyo
124
10/80
Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Low-Income
Countries
Dabla-Norris, Era, Richard Allen, Luis-Felipe Zanna,
Tej Prakash, Eteri Kvintradze, Victor Duarte Lledo,
Irene Yackovlev, and Sophia Gollwitzer
10/66
ICT Equipment Investment and Growth in Low- and LowerMiddle-Income Countries
Haacker, Markus
10/58
The Real Exchange Rate and Growth Revisited: The
Washington Consensus Strikes Back?
Berg, Andrew, and Yanliang Miao
10/49
Firm Productivity, Innovation, and Financial Development
Dabla-Norris, Era, Eramus Kersting, and Genevive Verdier
09/274
Cyclical Patterns of Government Expenditures in SubSaharan Africa: Facts and Factors
Lledo, Victor, Irene Yackovlev, and Lucie Gadenne
09/269
A Framework to Assess the Effectiveness of IMF Technical
Assistance in National Accounts
Pastor, Gonzalo C.
09/260
Improving Surveillance Across the CEMAC Region
Iossifov, Plamen, Noriaki Kinoshita, Misa Takebe,
Robert C. York, and Zaijin Zhan
09/244
A Rule Based Medium-Term Fiscal Policy Framework
for Tanzania
Kim, Daehaeng, and Mika Saito
09/227
Analyzing Fiscal Space Using the MAMS Model: An
Application to Burkina Faso
Gottschalk, Jan, Vu Manh Le, Hans Lofgren, and
Kofi Nouve
09/216
Determinants and Macroeconomic Impact of Remittances in
Sub-Saharan Africa
Singh, Raju Jan, Markus Haacker, and Kyung-woo Lee
09/215
So Tom and Prncipe: Domestic Tax System and Tax
Revenue Potential
Farhan, Nisreen
09/192
The Gambia: Demand for Broad Money and Implications for
Monetary Policy Conduct
Sriram, Subramanian S.
09/98
Understanding Inflation Inertia in Angola
Klein, Nir, and Alexander Kyei
09/182
Understanding the Growth of African Markets
Yartey, Charles Amo, and Mihasonirina Andrianaivo
09/75
Grants, Remittances, and the Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate
in Sub-Saharan African Countries
Mongardini, Joannes, and Brett Rayner
09/180
Credit Growth in Sub-Saharan AfricaSources, Risks, and
Policy Responses
Iossifov, Plamen, and May Y. Khamis
09/37
Dedollarization in LiberiaLessons from Cross-Country
Experience
Erasmus, Lodewyk, Jules Leichter, and Jeta Menkulasi
09/155
Spillovers from the Rest of the World into Sub-Saharan African
Countries
Drummond, Paulo, Flavio Nacif, and Gustavo Ramirez
09/36
The Macroeconomic Impact of Scaled-Up Aid: The Case of
Niger
Farah, Abdikarim, Emilio Sacerdoti, and Gonzalo Salinas
09/148
In Search of Successful Inflation Targeting: Evidence from an
Inflation Targeting Index
Miao, Yanliang
09/27
The Value of Institutions for Financial Markets: Evidence from
Emerging Markets
Akitoby, Bernardin, and Thomas Stratmann
09/146
Introducing the Euro as Legal TenderBenefits and Costs of
Eurorization for Cape Verde
Imam, Patrick A.
09/25
Why Isnt South Africa Growing Faster? A Comparative
Approach
Eyraud, Luc
09/115
The Macroeconomics of Scaling Up Aid: The Gleneagles
Initiative for Benin
Mongardini, Joannes, and Issouf Samak
09/15
The Determinants of Commercial Bank Profitability in
Sub-Saharan Africa
Flamini, Valentina, Calvin A. McDonald, and
Liliane Schumacher
09/114
Sub-Saharan Africas Integration in the Global Financial
Markets
Delchat, Corinne, Gustavo Ramirez, Smita Wagh, and
John Wakeman-Linn
09/113
Financial Deepening in the CFA Franc Zone: The Role of
Institutions
Singh, Raju, Kangni Kpodar, and Dhaneshwar Ghura
09/107
Madagascar: A Competitiveness and Exchange Rate Assessment
Eyraud, Luc
09/14
Bank Efficiency in Sub-Saharan African Middle-Income
Countries
Chen, Chuling
09/11
How Can Burundi Raise its Growth Rate? The Impact of
Civil Conflicts and State Intervention on Burundis Growth
Performance
Basdevant, Olivier
125
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IMF Regional Economic Outlook Sub-Saharan Africa April 2016

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World Economic and Financial Sur veys

Regional Economic Outlook

Regional Economic Outlook

World Economic and Financial Surveys

Regional Economic Outlook

2016 International Monetary Fund

1. Economic forecasting Africa, Sub-Saharan Periodicals. 2. Africa, Sub-Saharan

Publication orders may be placed online, by fax, or through the mail:

REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Sub-Saharan Africa: Real GDP Growth......................................................................................11

Sub-Saharan African Extractive Commodity Exporters: Commodity Terms of Trade,

The following conventions are used in this publication:

REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

WEATHERING THE COMMODITY PRICE SLUMP

FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND SUSTAINABLE GROWTH

1. Time for a Policy Reset

In one-third of countriesall oil-importers

This corresponds to growth remaining within a 1 percent

REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Real GDP growth average 201516, percent

Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.

capital inflows.3 With the external environment

place on the revenue side where there is much

In the broadest of terms, the policy reset required is

Of course, though high commodity prices benefited natural

In the regions market access countries,

For natural resource exporters, a robust and

Source: IMF, Commodity Price System.

1. TIME FOR A POLICY RESET

it is important that fiscal deficits are curtailed,

Source: Bloomberg, L.P.

with other developing regions, the chapter

REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Figure 1.5. Selected Average Commodity Price Changes from 2013

In the 18-month period through end-2015,

Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics.

Peercent change from 2013

Billions oof U.S. dollars, 6-month moving

Figure 1.4. Sub-Saharan Africa: Trade Balance with China, 200515

Sources: IMF, Commodity Price System; and IMF Global Assumptions.

notably cross-border bank loans, on which a

See Table 1.1 for a list of countries classified as oil exporters

1. TIME FOR A POLICY RESET

Change in current account balance, percentage points of GDP

Meanwhile, gains for oil importers have been

Figure 1.7. Sub-Saharan Africa: End-of-Period Inflation, 2014

Change in nominaal exchange rate local

Figure 1.6. Sub-Saharan Africa: Change in Current Account Balance

Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.

Fiscal policy has responded, but as yet not

REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Figure 1.8. Sub-Saharan Africa: Change in Expenditure and Revenue,

Change in government expenditure,

Revenue shortfall >

Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.

electricity shortages have produced an especially

... triggering increased debt financing under

In most oil-exporting and other resourceintensive countries, the decline in commodity

1. TIME FOR A POLICY RESET

Median, percentage points