People v. Livara
People v. Livara
People v. Livara
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6201
any passenger, especially a finance officer like the accused. The alleged loss
was obviously a ruse to conceal his defalcations. As a matter of fact, even
before the Manila trip he was already in the red, as shown by the testimonies
of Lt. Bernabe Cadiz, commanding officer of the 83rd PC company and Lt.
Damaso C. Quiao, adjutant, supply and finance officer, of Romblon.
If the portfolio had actually been lost as recounted by appellant, he would
not be responsible for the money. Yet he admitted his liability, made efforts
to pay it, even used for that purpose a false check payable to Colonel Selga
of the Constabulary.
Counsel for the appellant contends that the Court of First Instance of
Romblon had no jurisdiction over the case, arguing that the alleged crime of
malversation of public funds occurred during the incumbency of the accused
as an officer of the Philippine Constabulary. Such contention is without merit.
The civil courts and courts-martial have concurrent jurisdiction over offenses
committed by a member of the Armed Forces in violation of military law and
the public law. The first court to take cognizance of the case does so to the
exclusion of the other (Grafton vs.U.S., 11 Phil., 776; Valdez vs. Lucero, 42
Off. Gaz., No. 112835). The accused-appellant having been first tried and
convicted of the crime by the Court of First Instance of Romblon he cannot
now claim that the criminal action should have been brought before a courtmartial.
The constitutionality of the last paragraph of Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code is likewise assailed. It reads:
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds
or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such
missing funds or property to personal uses.
Defense counsel maintains the view that this provision is contrary to the
constitutional directive that in criminal prosecutions the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proven.
This contention deserves no merit, inasmuch as the validity of the said
article has already been discussed and upheld in People vs. Mingoa, 92 Phil.,
856, wherein this court through Mr. Justice Reyes declared: "there is no
constitutional objection to the passage of a law providing that the
presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption
founded upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence
shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence."