APPLIED ETHICS 

applied ethics is, in the words of Brenda Almond, co-founder of the Society for
Applied Philosophy, "the philosophical examination, from a moral standpoint, of
particular issues in private and public life that are matters of moral judgment". It is
thus a term used to describe attempts to use philosophical methods to identify the
morally correct course of action in various fields of human life. Bioethics, for
example, is concerned with identifying the correct approach to matters such as
euthanasia, or the allocation of scarce health resources, or the use of human
embryos in research. Environmental ethics is concerned with questions such as the
duties of humans towards landscapes or species. Business ethics concerns
questions such as the limits on managers in the pursuit of profit, or the duty of
'whistleblowers' to the general public as opposed to their employers. As such, it is a
study which is supposed to involve practitioners as much as professional
philosophers.[1]

Applied ethics is distinguished from normative ethics, which concerns what people

should believe to be right and wrong, and from meta-ethics, which concerns the
nature of moral statements.

An emerging typology for applied ethics (Porter, 2006) uses six domains to help
improve organizations and social issues at the national and global level:

 Decision ethics, or ethical theories and ethical decision processes

 Professional ethics, or ethics to improve professionalism
 Clinical ethics, or ethics to improve our basic health needs
 Business ethics, or individual based morals to improve ethics in an
organization
 Organizational ethics, or ethics among organizations
 Social ethics, or ethics among nations and as one global unit
CONSEQUENTIALISM
Consequentialism refers to those moral theories which hold that the consequences of a particular
action form the basis for any valid moral judgment about that action (or create a structure for
judgment, see rule consequentialism). Thus, from a consequentialist standpoint, a morally right action
is one that produces a good outcome, or consequence. This view is often expressed as
the aphorism "The ends justify the means".

Consequentialism is usually understood as distinct from deontology, in that deontology derives the

rightness or wrongness of an act from the character of the act itself rather than the outcomes of the
action, and from virtue ethics, which focuses on the character of the agent rather than on the nature or
consequences of the action itself. The difference between these three approaches to morality tends to
lie more in the way moral dilemmas are approached than in the moral conclusions reached. For
example, a consequentialist may argue that lying is wrong because of the negative consequences
produced by lying—though a consequentialist may allow that certain foreseeable consequences might
make lying acceptable. A deontologist might argue that lying is always wrong, regardless of any
potential "good" that might come from lying. A virtue ethicist, however, would focus less on lying in
any particular instance and instead consider what a decision to tell a lie or not tell a lie said about
one's character and moral behavior.

CONSEQUENTIALIST - Under a consequentialist theory, the consequences of

an action determine its moral value. A key question in consequentialist theory is
how to measure the moral worth of the consequences. Consequences can be good,
neutral, or evil. Another relevant question is which consequences count (intended
or actual). If only actual consequences count, then do all consequences count?
Consequences can be distinguished by direct/indirect, individuals/objects affected,
influence of complicating factors, etc.

All of these considerations go into shaping the ethical theory. For example, Jeremy
Bentham and John Stuart Mill were both act utilitarians. So they judged individual
an action to be good or bad depending on the actual consequences of that action.
Bentham defined good as pleasure and evil as pain. (Bentham) Thus when choosing an
action, according to Bentham, one should the action which produces the greatest
amount of pleasure compared to pain for all affected. Since pleasure and pain were
the foundation for good and evil, “all affected” would include all sentient things. J.
S. Mill differed from Bentham in that he believed that happiness and unhappiness
were the basis for good and evil. (Mill) Under his evaluation then, while pleasure and
pain were important considerations, they were only the basic minimum. This sets
up an ability for Mill to claim that consequences to more sentient beings may be
more important than those to less sentient beings and to characterize some
pleasures as higher than others.
Benefits - 1. Consequentialism is grounded in actual effect. So, moral action
always improves life on earth (in some manner). Acting morally can improve your
lot in life. So, there is an incentive to act morally even if you do not believe in an
afterlife. 2. Consequentialist theories are often attentive to the particulars of the
situation. 3. These theories will allow for exceptions to the rule when warranted by
the outcome. 4. Utilitarianism follows the cause and effect reasoning in science. It
can be proven wrong or right by referring to empirical evidence, instead of a
theoretical ideal. 5. All sentient beings understand pain and pleasure. Thus many
have claimed that utilitarianism is transcultural. 6. On a related note, utilitarianism
avoids the charge of speciesism in ethical theory by using a moral foundation that
is shared by other species, thus requiring their consideration.

Problems - 1. Consequences are difficult to predict. Your actions may have good
intentions and a high probability of causing good results. But, if something
happens and the consequences are actually bad, then your action was morally
wrong. Also, as the situation involves more people and alternatives, it becomes
more difficult to determine which action would produce the best consequences.
How can we ever know that we actually chose the “best” alternative. There is no
opportunity for comparison of actual cases, just similar ones. 2. "Does the end
always justify the means?" A consequentialist theory would justify many actions
that we normally would consider wrong, if it turned out that the consequences were
good. 3. This theory undermines trust in others and intimate relationships since we
can never be sure that the consequences might not justify a betrayal of trust and in
many of these theories, each individual is treated the same regardless of one's
relationship. So, for example, one’s duty to prevent pain to a stray cat would be
equal to one’s duty to prevent pain to one’s own cat.

Utilitarianism
 

Summarily, Jeremy Bentham states that people are driven by their interests and their fears, but their
interests take precedence over their fears, and their interests are carried out in accordance with how
people view the consequences that might be involved with their interests. "Happiness" on this account
is defined as the maximization of pleasure and the minimization of pain.

Historically, hedonistic utilitarianism is the paradigmatic example of a consequentialist moral theory.

This form of utilitarianism holds that what matters is the aggregate happiness; the happiness of
everyone and not the happiness of any particular person. John Stuart Mill, in his exposition of
hedonistic utilitarianism, proposed a hierarchy of pleasures, meaning that the pursuit of certain kinds
of pleasure is more highly valued than the pursuit of other pleasures.[6] However, some contemporary
utilitarians, such as Peter Singer are concerned to maximize the satisfaction of preferences, hence
"preference utilitarianism". Other contemporary forms of utilitarianism mirror the forms of
consequentialism outlined below.

]Ethical egoism and altruism

Ethical egoism can be understood as a consequentialist theory according to which the consequences
for the individual agent are taken to matter more than any other result. Thus, egoism will prescribe
actions that may be beneficial, detrimental, or neutral to the welfare of others. Some, like Henry
Sidgwick, argue that a certain degree of egoism promotes the general welfare of society for two
reasons: because individuals know how to please themselves best, and because if everyone were an
austere altruist then general welfare would inevitably decrease.[7]

Ethical altruism can be seen as a consequentialist ethic which prescribes that an individual take
actions that have the best consequences for everyone except for himself.[8] This was advocated
by Auguste Comte, who coined the term "altruism," and whose ethics can be summed up in the
phrase: Live for others.[9]

Teleological ethics
Teleological ethics (Greek telos, “end”; logos, “science”) is an ethical theory that holds that the ends
or consequences of an act determine whether an act is good or evil. Teleological theories are often
discussed in opposition to deontological ethical theories, which hold that acts themselves
are inherently good or evil, regardless of the consequences of acts.

Teleological theories differ on the nature of the end that actions ought to
promote. Eudaemonist theories (Greek eudaimonia, "happiness") hold that ethics consists in some
function or activity appropriate to man as a human being, and thus tend to emphasize the cultivation
of virtue or excellence in the agent as the end of all action. These could be the classical virtues—
courage, temperance, justice, and wisdom—that promoted the Greek ideal of man as the "rational
animal", or the theological virtues—faith, hope, and love—that distinguished the Christian ideal of man
as a being created in the image of God.

Utilitarian-type theories hold that the end consists in an experience or feeling produced by the
action. Hedonism, for example, teaches that this feeling is pleasure—either one's own, as in egoism
(the 17th-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes), or everyone's, as in universalistic hedonism,
or utilitarianism (the 19th-century English philosophers Jeremy Bentham,John Stuart Mill, and Henry
Sidgwick), with its formula of the "greatest pleasure of the greatest number."
Other utilitarian-type views include the claims that the end of action is survival and growth, as
in evolutionary ethics (the 19th-century English philosopher Herbert Spencer); the experience of
power, as in despotism (the 16th-century Italian political philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli and the 19th-
century German Friedrich Nietzsche); satisfaction and adjustment, as in pragmatism (20th-century
American philosophers Ralph Barton Perry and John Dewey); and freedom, as in existentialism (the
20th-century French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre).

The chief problem for eudaemonist theories is to show that leading a life of virtue will also be attended
by happiness—by the winning of the goods regarded as the chief end of action. ThatJob should suffer
and Socrates and Jesus die while the wicked prosper, then seems unjust. Eudaemonists generally
reply that the universe is moral and that, in Socrates' words, “No evil can happen to a good man,
either in life or after death,” or, in Jesus' words, “But he who endures to the end will be saved.”

Utilitarian theories, on the other hand, must answer the charge that ends do not justify the means. The
problem arises in these theories because they tend to separate the achieved ends from the action by
which these ends were produced. One implication of utilitarianism is that one's intention in performing
an act may include all of its foreseen consequences. The goodness of the intention then reflects the
balance of the good and evil of these consequences, with no limits imposed upon it by the nature of
the act itself—even if it be, say, the breaking of a promise or the execution of an innocent man.
Utilitarianism, in answering this charge, must show either that what is apparently immoral is not really
so or that, if it really is so, then closer examination of the consequences will bring this fact to light.
Ideal utilitarianism (G.E. Moore and Hastings Rashdall) tries to meet the difficulty by advocating a
plurality of ends and including among them the attainment of virtue itself, which, as John Stuart
Mill affirmed, "may be felt a good in itself, and desired as such with as great intensity as any other
good."

this describes an ethical theory which judges the rightness of an action in terms of
an external goal or purpose. So, according to a teleological theory, consequences
always play some part, be it small or large, in the determination of what one should
or should not do. Not all teleological theories are consequentialist. John Rawls'
theory of justice is teleological, but not consequentialist because it claims that
consequences are only part of what must be considered when determining what
policy is morally just. (Rawls)

Benefits - 1. There is room in some theories for good intentions, even if the action
didn’t active the desired end. 2. Active attempt to connect morality with the “real”
world. 3. By allowing for the consideration of consequences, teleological theories
can adapt to different circumstances and situations. (Also see “utilitarianism”)

Problems - Depends on the theory. See “utilitarianism” for an example.

DEONTOLOGICAL - This type of theory claims that there are features within
the actions themselves which determine whether or not they are right. These
features define the extent to which the actions conform with recognized moral
duties. For example, driving while drunk violates the duty to “above all do no
harm.” The duties derive from various sources, such as religion, biology,
psychology, metaphysics, culture, language, etc. Depending on the deontological
theory, these duties may be absolute (no exceptions), prima facie (can only be
overridden by a more important duty), or conditional (only hold under specified
circumstances).

Deontological theories do not consider consequences to be important when

determining whether or not an action is ethical. It doesn’t matter if the drunk driver
made it home safely. Driving drunk was still wrong because the intention to drive
drunk was wrong (or to drink alcohol when one knows one needs to drive).

Immanuel Kant's ethical theory is deontological. He claims that actions are only
morally right when they are done out of duty. He sees moral duties as unchanging
laws for human conduct. He believes that morality is derived from the ability to
think rationally, which enables beings to be free. If one is not free, then one cannot
be held responsible. Thus only free individuals are moral agents and all free
individuals are capable of acting out of reason. Kant’s moral theory is largely
focused on protecting and promoting the free action of rational beings. Three
formulations of his categorical imperative are derived from this moral
foundation: (Kant)

 Always act out of duty, in accordance with a good will (I.e. One does the
right thing because one recognizes that it is the right thing to do, not because
it pleases you to do it or will promote good consequences.). (pp. 25-26.)
 Always act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a
Universal Law of Nature (i.e. Are you willing to allow any other rational
being to act on the same reasoning you used to justify your action?) (p. 49.)
 Act as to treat the capacity for rationality, whether in thine own person or in
that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only. (i.e.
Never treat a rational being as a mere means to an end.) (p. 62.)

Benefits - 1. Right and wrong actions are easily determined by considering one's
duties. In some cases, these are explicitly spelled out (i.e. religion). However, the
use of judgement is usually necessary to determine which duties apply and how. 2.
Unlike utilitarianism, the end does not justify the means. Deontological theories
provide a sound basis for inalienable rights and inherent value. 3. Since duties do
not change, there is a greater sense of security/predictability in the accepted
behavior of others. Right and wrong don’t vary with the consequences, although
there may be a various according to circumstances (i.e. in the case of conflicting
duties). 4. Good motives are valued, even if the outcome wasn’t what you
expected..

Problems - 1. There is no agreement on a single standard for morality. 2. Ignoring

consequences can cause pain and suffering. 3. The imposition of a specific moral
belief system on others has been a cause of significant harm throughout history.
Some deontological theories are not equipped to respect diverse beliefs. However
there are some deontological theories that incorporate respect for the beliefs of
others. There are even some religious-based theories which, while espousing one
true way also respect diverse beliefs amongst individuals (i.e. Buddhist ethics).

Virtue ethics
Both teleological and deontological ethical theories are called deontic or action-based
theories of morality because they focus entirely upon the actions which a person performs.
Those theories focus on the question, "Which action should I choose?" Virtue ethics,
however, take a very different perspective.

theories place less emphasis on which rules people should follow and instead focus on
helping people develop good character traits, such as kindness and generosity. These
character traits will, in turn, allow a person to make the correct decisions later on in life.
Virtue theorists also emphasize the need for people to learn how to break bad habits of
character, like greed or anger. These are called vices and stand in the way of becoming a
good person.

Recently virtue ethics has not been a very common topic for study, but it dates back to the
ancient Greek thinkers and is thus the oldest type of ethical theory in Western philosophy.
Plato discussed four key virtues: wisdom, courage, temperance and justice. The first
systematic description of virtue ethics was written down by Aristotle in his famous
work Nichomachean Ethics. According to Aristotle, when people acquire good habits of
character, they are better able to regulate their emotions and their reason. This, in turn,
helps us reach morally correct decisions when we are faced with difficult choices.

One reason why virtue ethics can be popular and why they make an important contribution
to our understanding of morality is that they emphasize the central role played by motives
in moral questions. To act from virtue is to act from some particular motivation; thus to say
that certain virtues are necessary for correct moral decisions is to say that correct moral
decisions require correct motives.

Neither teleological nor deontological moral theories require motives to play a role in our
evaluation of moral decisions — but encouraging correct motivations is very often a key
component of the moral education of young people. We are taught that we
should desire certain outcomes and that we should want to accomplish certain goals by our
actions.

Another reason why virtue theories are so attractive is that the other moral theories share
in common the difficulty in dealing with complicated moral calculations over what actions to
take or which moral duties to emphasize. Virtue theories promise that once we are
successful in creating the sort of person we want to be, arriving at the correct moral
decisions will come naturally.

Key questions which virtue ethical systems ask include:

What sort of person do I want to be?

What virtues are characteristic of the person I want to be?

What actions will cultivate the virtues I want to possess?

What actions will be characteristic of the sort of person I want to be?

Problems With Virtue Ethics

The reality of virtue ethics isn’t as neat and simple as some might imagine. Although many
common moral decisions may indeed come more easily to a person of the “right” moral
character, the fact of the matter is that many moral dilemmas require a great deal of careful
reasoning and thinking — simply having the right character cannot be enough to even make
the right decision likely, much less assured. The fact that rule based and duty based ethical
systems are complicated and difficult to employ does not make a person of good character
more likely to make the right choices.

Another problem with virtue-based ethical systems is the question of what the “right” sort
of character is which a person should have. Many, if not most, virtue theorists have treated
the answer to this question as self-evident, but it is anything but. One person’s virtue may
be another person’s vice and a vice in one set of circumstances may be a virtue in another.

Some advocates of virtue ethics suggest that we determine the right virtues by asking a
virtuous person, but that is just an exercise in question begging. Others might suggest asking
a happy person, but that assumes that happiness and virtue always coincide — by no means
an obvious truth.

Perhaps a key to understanding virtue theories of ethics is to regard them as ways to

approach moral psychology but not moral epistemology. What this means is that virtue
theories should not be contrasted with theories about how to make moral choices, like the
teleological theory of John Stuart Mill or the deontological theory of Immanuel Kant.

Instead, virtue theories of ethics should be treated as ways to understand how we become
moral creatures, how we develop the means by which we make moral decisions, and the
process by which moral attitudes develop. More importantly, virtue theories may be able to
teach us how morals themselves should be taught, particularly in the earliest years when
the more complicated decision-making processes are not yet possible.

Deontology and Ethics: What is Deontology, Deontological Ethics?

Deontological moral systems are characterized by a focus upon adherence to independent

moral rules or duties. To make the correct moral choices, we have to understand what our
moral duties are and what correct rules exist to regulate those duties. When we follow our
duty, we are behaving morally. When we fail to follow our duty, we are behaving immorally.
Typically in any deontological system, our duties, rules, and obligations are determined by
God. Being moral is thus a matter of obeying God.

Deontological moral systems typically stress the reasons why certain actions are performed.
Simply following the correct moral rules is often not sufficient; instead, we have to have the
correct motivations. This might allow a person to not be considered immoral even though
they have broken a moral rule, but only so long as they were motivated to adhere to some
correct moral duty.

Nevertheless, a correct motivation alone is never a justification for an action in a

deontological moral system and cannot be used as a basis for describing an action as
morally correct. It is also not enough to simply believe that something is the correct duty to
follow. Duties and obligations must be determined objectively and absolutely, not
subjectively. There is no room in deontological systems of subjective feelings; on the
contrary, most adherents condemn subjectivism and relativism in all their forms.

Perhaps the most significant thing to understand about deontological moral systems is that
their moral principles are completely separated from any consequences which following
those principles might have. Thus, if you have a moral duty not to lie, then lying is always
wrong — even if that results in harm to others. For example, you would be acting immorally
if you lied to Nazis about where Jews were hiding.

The word deontology comes from the Greek rootsdeon, which means duty, and logos, which
means science. Thus, deontology is the "science of duty." Key questions which deontological
ethical systems ask include:
What is my moral duty?
What are my moral obligations?
How do I weigh one moral duty against another?

Problems With Deontological Ethics

A common criticism of deontological moral systems is that they provide no clear way to
resolve conflicts between moral duties. a deontological moral system should include both a
moral duty not to lie and one to keep others from harm, for example, but in the above
situation how is a person to choose between those two moral duties? A popular response to
this is to simply choose the "lesser of two evils," but that means relying on which of the two
has the least evil consequences and, therefore, the moral choice is being made on a
consequentialist rather than a deontological basis.

Some critics argue that deontological moral systems are, in fact, consequentialist moral
systems in disguise. According to this argument, duties and obligations which set forth in
deontological systems are actually those actions which have been demonstrated over long
periods of time to have the best consequences. Eventually, they become enshrined in
custom and law and people stop giving them or their consequences much thought — they
are simply assumed to be correct. Deontological ethics are thus ethics where the reasons for
particular duties have been forgotten, even if things have completely changed.

A second criticism is that deontological moral systems do not readily allow for grey areas
where the morality of an action is questionable. They are, rather, systems which are based
upon absolutes — absolute principles and absolute conclusions. In real life, however, moral
questions more often involve grey areas than absolute black & white choices. We typically
have conflicting duties, interests, and issues that make things difficult.

Another common criticism of deontological ethical theories is the question of just which
duties qualify as those which we should all follow, regardless of the consequences. Duties
which might have been valid in the 18th century are not necessarily valid now, but who is to
say which ones should be abandoned and which are still valid? And if any are to be
abandoned, how can we say that they really were moral duties back in the 18th century?

If these were duties created by God, how can they possibly stop being duties today? Many
attempts to develop deontological systems focus on explaining how and why certain duties
are valid at any time or at all times and how we can know that. Religious believers are often
in the difficult position of trying to explain what believers of the past treated certain duties
as objective, absolute ethical requirements created by God but today they aren't — today
we have different absolute, objective ethical requirements created by God. These are all
reasons why irreligious atheists rarely subscribe to deontological ethical systems, though it
can't be denied that they can at times have ethical insights to offer.

The fallacies of egoism are: 1) egoistic moralism (or moralistic egoism), the sense that it is a
moral duty to pursue one's own interests (Ayn Rand sounds like this, and many earlier
moralists, including Kant, posit a category of "duties to self," such as Jefferson properly
denies above); and 2) egoistic [moral] aestheticism, the sense that no moral duty exists to
restrain the actual pursuit of one's own interests (sounds like Nietzsche but is not Rand).
Egoistic aestheticism eliminates all moral duties to others, leaving only prudent or
"enlightened" self-interest to govern relations with them. An egoistic aestheticism which is
not a moral aestheticism would simply mean that goods for the self are worthy of pursuit;
and that is not a moral fallacy. Egoistic moralism and egoistic aestheticism can actually be
combined, which would make it a duty to pursue self-interest whatever the cost to others.

Moral duty does arise where goods for others, which may or may not overlap goods for the
self, are concerned. Moral duty consists of respect for the autonomy of others, which
means allowing the free exercise of the innocent, competent will of others in regard to
their own interests.

"Allowing the free exercise" means the use of neither fraud (deception) nor force (coercive
threat of violence or actual violence) against the will of other persons in the disposing of
their interests.

"Innocent" means that the other is not actually committing or effecting a wrong, whether or
not they intend wrong (although they actually are morally innocent if they do not intent
wrong and are not negligent). The intentional or negligent commission of a wrong entails
loss of some rights of autonomy and self-interest both in order to prevent the active
commission of the wrong and in order to extract retribution (through the loss of goods,
proportional to the wrong) as just punishment for wrongs committed.

"Competent" means mentally able to rationally evaluate and pursue one's own self-interest.
Incompetent persons do not lose rights of self-interest and only lose rights of autonomy in
so far as their self-interest can be better evaluated and pursued, in their behalf, by others.

"Their own interests" are self-defined in the areas or matters where, according to the types
of interests considered below, we have rights of possession, use, and exchange.
It has become common to say that people have rights wherever they have interests, but this
principle does not allow for "compossibility," the possibility that the rights can all be
exercised at the same time, since many interests overlap and conflict. Such "rights" must
necessarily be abridged, a dangerous characteristic, since any rights can then be abridged
for any expedient reason. If not all interests are protected by rights, however, then rights
can be moral and legal claims that cannot be abridged.

This formulation of the nature of moral duty is functionally similar to Immanuel

Kant's version of the moral law as requiring one to act always to treat others as ends also
and never as means only. Since treating others as means is to use them to further one's own
self-interest (or some other interest), and this can be done in many completely innocent
ways, the crucial question is what treating someone as an "end also" amounts to. An "end"
clearly stops the action of the will, so that the will does not continue to some further good.
That makes the "end" a good-in-itself. While we may value others as goods-in-themselves,
we usually do make use of them for ulterior ends; and the only way to reconcile their
function as both end and means is if they are willing to pursue some ulterior end in our
behalf. Thus, Kant's formulation calls on us to respect the autonomy and dignity of persons,
allowing them the freedom to help or not to help us in the pursuit of goods. If they are not
willing to help us, then we cannot use them as means to our self-interested ends. That
complements the version of moral duty given above. There we leave people alone to pursue
their self-interest, while with Kant we do not force them to pursue ours.

I should note, however, that this interpretation of Kant is not consistent with Kant's own
view of the moral law; for Kant actually states the rule as "Act so that you treat humanity,
whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means
only" [Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Lew White Beck translation, Library of the
Liberal Arts, 1959, p.47]. Thus, one should treat oneself as an end also as well as means.
Since it doesn't make any sense that one could violate one's own will, Kant needed to have
in mind more than just autonomy as the content of the self as an end. Since that is the area
where Kant's theory seems indefinite, leading to endless interpretations over the years
(including rejection by Schopenhauer as indeterminately vague), and would in any case
involve duties to self, which don't exist, I do think that part of Kant's moral law can be
amputated without real loss, and that it is appropriate to do so. Respecting the autonomy of
others is a simpler, more definite, and more defensible principle than whatever it would
mean to respect oneself, as well as another, as an end in itself. [note]

Leonard Nelson, although essential to the treatment of ethics here, with his theories of ideal
ethics and of moralism, stuck too closely to Kant's first version of the moral law (to act so
that the maxim of one's action can be universalized without contradiction), which is
moralistic, and produced a moralistic formulation of the moral law himself. Thus, he calls
the moral law "the principle of abstraction from the numerical determination of persons"
[System of Ethics, Yale, 1956, p. 113] and says:
If we suppose that all interests affected by our action are those of a single person, if we
suppose, in other words, that the interests of the person affected by our action are ours as
well, we would favor the preponderating interest regardless of whether it is our own or that
of the other person. [ibid. p. 114]

This makes Nelson's theory actually teleological, for right action is then to bring about the
"preponderating interest" among all those affected by an action, though, dealing with actual
affected interests, this is not quite as absurd as teleological theories that simply require that
the "greatest good" be effected in every situation, which is actually beyond the scope of
human cognition or action. Nelson's theory, nevertheless, is moralistic both because every
action then becomes a moral issue, where the "preponderating interest" must be
calculated, and because it can make some non-moral interest of others into the
consideration which determines moral action, for there is nothing to prevent the
"preponderating interest" from being a non-moral interest. Nor can the "preponderating
interest" even bedetermined in a theory of value where most goods, the goods of ideal
ethics, are not absolute and will often not, and could not, be agreed upon by different
persons. Only where a moral issue is already involved will there be a "preponderating
interest" that is absolute, determinable, and preemptive over non-moral and personal
goods; and such a moral issue, as above, will always involve the respect for the innocent,
competent will of others with respect to their own interests.

It is a shame that Nelson errs when it comes to the content of the moral law, but this
provides an important lesson how mistakes can be made even in the context of a theory
that is sound and fruitful. Similar problems occur with Nelson's view of Socratic
Method and non-intuitive immediate knowledge.

A reconcilation of teleological and deontological ethical theories is possible when we note

that some ends are not to be attained but simply, as already attained, to be respected. That
will occur withpersons as ends-in-themselves. A Utilitarian or other teleological theory that
allows persons to be used, simply as means for some ulterior end, overlooks the status of
persons as ends already. It has always been possible to argue for a teleological theory by
saying that individual rights, etc. are among the appropriate ends that teleological ethics
would be pursuing. One need merely add that they are not among "appropriate" ends but
are absolute ends which absolutely restrict morally acceptable action. Since persons as ends
are not purposes to be realized through action but are features of the moral universe that
absolutely restrict action, it is more straightforward and revealing to see morality in
deontological rather than teleological terms. Now, however, these can be translated into
one another, and teleological theories that allow for expediency rather than morality can be
revealed as relativizing, not morality in some abstract sense, but the moral worth of
a person as an absolute end-in-itself and good-in-itself.

Goods for the self are interests of person, property, and contract. These translate
into rights. "Interests of person" are the possession and control by a person of their own
body, labor, and other attributes of their personal status (e.g. reputation, civil rights, etc.).
"Interests of property" are the possession and control by a person of tangible and intangible
assets, distinct and separable from the person, the ownership of which is recognized in
custom and law, usually giving the owners powers of exclusive possession, use, and
exchange. Interests of person and property impose duties of respect to refrain from the use
of fraud and force against the person and property of others. "Interests of contract" are the
agreements and promises through which interests of person and property are usually
managed and altered, and so respect for person and property also becomes respect for
contract.

Interests of person and property in general forbid wrongs of commission, i.e. fraudulent or
violent damaging acts against persons and property, by others. Moral duty also forbids
wrongs of omission -- or posits duties of commission (or duties to act) -- requiring positive
actions for the sake of another because of contract (see below) or where fundamental
interests, such as life and limb, are endangered. The distiction between duties of omission
and commission is ancient, as Thomas Jefferson noted in 1813, in a letter to John Adams,
about rabbinical law:

From the law of Moses were deduced six hundred and thirteen precepts, which were
divided into two classes, affirmative and negative, two hundred and fourty-eight in the
former, and three hundred and sixty-five in the latter.

The duties of omission (the negative ones) thus constitute 60% of the total. This may
indicate their more fundamental and straightforward nature, as the Ten Commandments
themselves mostly begin with "Don't" (Lô' in Hebrew). The duty to act in the cases of
commission involves the judgment that the other person is in some respect physically
unable or mentally incompetent to help themselves. The pursuit of goods for others
is altruism.

The fallacy of altruism, or altruistic moralism (or moralistic altruism), is the sense that there
is a general duty, or that morality as such requires us always, to act in the interest of others.
On the other hand, an "altruistic moral aestheticism" [or, simply, "altruistic aestheticism"] is
not a moral fallacy; for this only means that a person may act for the good of others if this
seems good, which is unobjectionable as long as the action respects the autonomy of
others, i.e. is not against their innocent and competent will. The asymmetry between
egoistic and altruistic moral aestheticism, that one is a fallacy and the other isn't, is due to
the circumstance that morality limits the pursuit of self-interest and posits respect for
others. The removal of moral constraint in aestheticism thus would be motivated for the
self, which can then gain through wrong, but would not be motivated for others, who were
protected from wrongful loss.
Altruistic moralism is often a tempting doctrine because the rule for the specification of
non-contractual duties of commission appears to be complex. There will be such a duty on a
person only where:

The other is unable to help themselves,

the other is in danger of serious and irreversible harm,

there is no one else present who has a more defined contractual obligation to help the
other (e.g. lifeguard, parent, physician, policeman, etc.) and who is able to do so, and

a person is able to act competently to prevent that harm without comparably endangering

either themselves personally or the interests of those who are contractually dependent
upon the agent for support (e.g. children or other family, etc.). [This will be
simplified below.]

A person who does more than is required by these conditions, i.e. who acts even at the cost
of endangering themselves or damaging their own interests of comparable magnitude to
those originally endangered, acts with supererogation, i.e. beyond the requirements of
moral duty. Altruistic moralism denies supererogation. Since non-contractual duties of
commission involve judgments ofincompetence or physical disability, altruistic moralism
implies paternalism, i.e. the judgment that the agent knows better the interests of others,
and how to pursue them, than they do themselves. Paternalism and altruistic moralism thus
will lead to basic violations of moral duty as the actual innocent and competent
autonomous will of others may be abridged by force. That is a general problem
with any form of altruism, that the self-defining character of what is good is transferred
from the other to the altruistic agent, always raising the danger that another may be
judged incompetent simply because their judgment about what is good for them may differ
from the agent's.

Entrepreneur Vs Manager

When you compare managers and entrepreneurs you need to first look at the definitions of
both titles. A manager is someone who directs a team and an entrepreneur is someone who
organizes, manages, and assumes the risks of a business or enterprise. With these
definitions you can surmise that an entrepreneur can be a manager but a manager can not
be an entrepreneur. The reasons for this are plentiful, but it basically comes down to the
type of person you are. If you like to control all aspects of a situation then you are generally
a manager, but if you are someone who works through problems with people then you are
more likely an entrepreneur.

A manager is someone who is what is known as a micromanager. They like to control all
aspects of their workplace. Each person is given their assigned tasks and a manager will look
over your shoulder until you finish it. They do not like to give up control enough to find out
if you could do it on your own because they think if you make a mistake that it will come
down on them. Unfortunately, with this attitude the people who work for a manager are
less likely to grow in their career and will either stagnate or leave the company or position
quickly. This will help to perpetuate the feelings of the manager that no one can measure of
to him in their skill levels. This type of demeanor works well when you have a person that
needs to be consistently supervised. Someone who can't take a task and see if through on
their own, they need to have it explained to them step by step.

An entrepreneur is generally considered a leader versus a manager. They will give people
tasks and a deadline and generally leave them alone until it is completed. They will trust
people to get the job done without having to constantly look over their shoulder. When
they hire someone they believe that they have hired someone who is qualified to handle the
tasks before them, so they don't think they should have to ask for status reports on an
hourly basis....