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    Francisco vs. HOR Digest

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    Mark Abilo
    The Supreme Court ruled on whether the filing of a second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide within one year was constitutional. The Court held that sections of the House rules allowing a second complaint were unconstitutional based on Article XI of the Constitution, which bars initiating impeachment proceedings against the same official more than once within a year. While the House has sole power to initiate impeachment, the Constitution provides limitations that were not observed here. Filing the second complaint violated the one-year rule, so the Court invalidated the second impeachment proceeding against the Chief Justice.

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    Francisco vs. HOR Digest

    Uploaded by

    Mark Abilo
    11K views3 pages
    The Supreme Court ruled on whether the filing of a second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide within one year was constitutional. The Court held that sections of the House rules allowing a second complaint were unconstitutional based on Article XI of the Constitution, which bars initiating impeachment proceedings against the same official more than once within a year. While the House has sole power to initiate impeachment, the Constitution provides limitations that were not observed here. Filing the second complaint violated the one-year rule, so the Court invalidated the second impeachment proceeding against the Chief Justice.

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    The Supreme Court ruled on whether the filing of a second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide within one year was constitutional. The Court held that sections of the House rules allowing a second complaint were unconstitutional based on Article XI of the Constitution, which bars initiating impeachment proceedings against the same official more than once within a year. While the House has sole power to initiate impeachment, the Constitution provides limitations that were not observed here. Filing the second complaint violated the one-year rule, so the Court invalidated the second impeachment proceeding against the Chief Justice.

    Copyright:

    Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    11K views3 pages

    Francisco vs. HOR Digest

    Uploaded by

    Mark Abilo
    The Supreme Court ruled on whether the filing of a second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide within one year was constitutional. The Court held that sections of the House rules allowing a second complaint were unconstitutional based on Article XI of the Constitution, which bars initiating impeachment proceedings against the same official more than once within a year. While the House has sole power to initiate impeachment, the Constitution provides limitations that were not observed here. Filing the second complaint violated the one-year rule, so the Court invalidated the second impeachment proceeding against the Chief Justice.

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    of 3

    Summary: Francisco vs.

    House of Representatives (GR 160261, 10 November 2003)


    Francisco vs. House of Representatives (GR 160261, 10 November 2003) En Banc, Carpio Morales (J): 1 concurs, 3 wrote separate concurring opinions to which 4 concur, 2 wrote concurring and dissenting separate opinions to which 2 concur. Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Porceedings, superceding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. Four months and three weeks since the filing of the first complaint or on 23 October 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year." Issue: Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings. Held: The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. The "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution. The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S.

    Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official. The people expressed their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution. This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review. There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

    Francisco vs. House of Representeatives G.R. No. 160261 FACTS: Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy in this case was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment provided for by law. ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives is constitutional, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question h; as resulted in a political crisis. HELD: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representativesare unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

    REASONING:In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.

    At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components

    of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it bythe Constitution.

    The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.

    Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.

    The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turnjusticiable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government.

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