History

History of Chemical Warfare
Chapter 2
HISTORY OF CHEMICAL WARFARE
COREY J. HILMAS, MD, PhD*; JEFFERY K. SMART, MA; and BENJAMIN A. HILL, Jr, DO, MS, MEd
INTRODUCTION
CHEMICAL CONCOCTIONS USED IN BATTLE
Chemical Warfare Proposals in the US Civil War
WORLD WAR I
THE 1920s
THE 1930s: GROWING THREAT OF CHEMICAL WARFARE
WORLD WAR II
THE 1950s
THE 1960s: DECADE OF TURMOIL
THE 1970s: THE NEAR END OF THE CHEMICAL CORPS
THE 1980s: RETURN OF THE CHEMICAL CORPS
THE 1990s: A NEW AGE OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AND TERRORISM
PREVENTING CHEMICAL WARFARE AND TERRORISM IN THE 21st CENTURY
SUMMARY
*Research Pharmacologist and Physician, Neurobehavioral Toxicology Branch, US Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense, 3100 Ricketts
Point Road, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland 21010-5400
Command Historian, US Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command, 5183 Blackhawk Rd, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Edgewood Arsenal,
Maryland 21010-5423
Lieutenant Colonel, US Army Medical Corps; Physician Faculty, Chemical Casualty Care Division, US Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical
Defense, 3100 Ricketts Point Road, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland 21010-5400
9
Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfare
Introduction
A chemical agent is a substance intended for use years. Some scholars suggest that the English colonists
in military operations to kill, seriously injure, or inca- at Jamestown were poisoned with arsenic trioxide by
pacitate man because of its physiological effects.1(p1-1) Spanish operatives intent on maintaining a monopoly
Chemical warfare agents cause injuries directly by in the New World. Throughout history, individuals
irritation, burning, or asphyxiation, and indirectly used plant poisons and chemicals to remove romantic
by contaminating ground so that it cannot be safely and political rivals, despotic rulers, prisoners, and even
occupied, creating smoke screens to obscure opera- unwanted spouses. Despite these small-scale uses of
tions or reduce the accuracy of an enemys firepower, chemical poisons before the 20th century, military
and damaging an enemys equipment by incendiary use of chemicals was rare. In the early 20th century,
action. In short, chemical warfare is the use of any World War I changed the face of warfare with the use
synthetic compound or material designed and used of chemicals on a massive scale.
for the purpose of harming others. In the modern era, This chapter, the first in a series of three chapters on
chemical agents have been divided into five categories: the history of chemical warfare, focuses on the histori-
nerve agents, vesicants, choking agents, blood agents, cal development of chemical warfare, its large-scale
and incapacitants. Excluded from consideration in this use during World War I, postWorld War I incidents
chapter are riot control agents, chemical herbicides, of chemical warfare, legislative efforts to ban chemi-
and smoke and flame materials. cal agent use, chemical warfare plans during World
Chemical warfare evolved from studies of plant War II, and chemical warfare and terrorism today. The
poisons by ancient Egyptian and Indian civilizations discussion will emphasize the historical experiences of
to the studies of Aristotle, Mithridates, Galen, da Vinci, the United States on the battlefields of Europe, Asia,
and Nobel scientists at the turn of the 20th century.2 and North Africa. It will be followed by Chapter 3,
The concept that chemicals can be used as deadly History of the Medical Management of Chemical
poisons on a small scale has been understood since Casualties, and Chapter 4, History of the Chemical
the start of written civilization, and evidence of their Threat, Chemical Terrorism, and the Implications for
use has pervaded myth and history for thousands of Military Medicine.
Chemical Concoctions Used in Battle
Toxic Smokes Pleistos, the main water supply to Kirrha, poisoned

with hellebore roots, causing diarrhea that led to the
The first recorded history from civilizations in defeat of the besieged city (as described by Pausanias in
Egypt, Babylon, India, and China contain references to 150 bce). Thucydides described the first use of chemical
deadly poisons. The first pharaoh, Menes, cultivated, warfare in Western civilization, by Sparta against Ath-
studied, and accumulated poisons from plants, ani- ens, in his History of the Peloponnesian War (431404 bce).
mals, and minerals in 3000 bce. Egyptians also investi- During the siege of Plataea in 428 bce, wood was satu-
gated the lethal effects of hydrocyanic acid.2 Beginning rated with pitch and sulfur to generate arsenic smoke,
in 2000 bce, the great dynasties in India used smoke and then burned under the walls of the city to produce
screens, toxic sleep-inducing fumes, and incendiary poisonous choking fumes (as well as fear and panic).
devices on a large scale during battle.2,3 Chinese writ- A rainstorm minimized the effect, but the strategy was
ings from 1000 bce contain recipes for the production successfully employed again by Sparta and its allies
of poisonous, noxious, and irritant vapors for use in during the siege of Delium, an Athenian fortification,
war, including arsenic-containing soul-hunting fog. in 424 bce. Dating from the 4th century bce, Mohist
The Chinese also developed stink bombs of poisonous sect manuscripts in China describe chemical tactics
smoke and shrapnel, along with a chemical mortar that employed against entrenched, well-defended armies
fired cast-iron stink shells.4 in caves and tunnels, using bellows to pump smoke
The powerful city-states of ancient Greece also from burning balls of mustard and other toxic plants.3,4
experimented with chemical concoctions. During the Chemical warfare was also practiced during the time
First Sacred War in 590 bce, Athens and Sicyon plotted of the Roman empire. About 200 bce, the Carthaginians
to lay siege to the fortified city of Kirrha in retaliation left mandrake root in wine to sedate the enemy.4 Inhab-
for the harassment of pilgrims to the Oracle of Apollo itants of Ambracia in Epirus used toxic smoke to deter
at Delphi. Solon, the sage of Athens, had the River the Romans from breaching their walls.5 Between 82
10
and 72 bce the Romans used a toxic smoke that caused filled with sulfur, tallow, rosin, turpentine, saltpeter,
blindness and choking pulmonary symptoms when and antimony were used to start fires in sieges. Similar
inhaled, similar to phosgene.6 This tactic allowed the toxic smoke projectiles were designed and used dur-
Romans to defeat the Spanish Charakitanes in only 2 ing the Thirty Years War (16181648). In 1672, during
days. During the 15th century ce, arsenic smokes were his siege of the city of Groningen, Christoph Bernhard
used by Christians against the invading Turks at the van Galen, the Bishop of Mnster, employed several
siege of Delium. Austrian historian von Senfftenberg different explosive and incendiary devices containing
wrote about the arsenic cloud: It was a sad business. belladonna alkaloids intended to produce toxic fumes.
Christians must never use so murderous a weapon In response to the use of poison projectiles, the French
against other Christians. Still, it is quite in place against and Germans signed the Strasbourg Agreement just
Turks and other miscreants.7(p7) 3 years later on August 27, 1675. This was the first
documented international agreement to ban the use
Greek Fire and Flaming Concoctions of perfidious and odious toxic devices.4 In addition
to their use as gaseous poisons, militaries also used
The Greeks found ways to use their static burning chemicals to gain an advantage under the cover of
concoctions of pitch, sulfur, tow, and resinous wood thick haze. In 1701 Charles XII of Sweden used chemi-
chips with incendiary arrows, flaming pots shot from cal smoke screens to obscure his crossing of the Dvina
catapults, and fire cannons mounted on boats. The most River under a gas cloud.9
famous of all the ancient methods of chemical warfare, In 1854 Lyon Playfair, a British chemist, proposed a
Greek fire, helped ensure the success of the Byzantine cacodyl cyanide artillery shell for use against enemy
Empire. Although the exact formula for Greek fire has ships as a way to resolve the stalemate during the siege
been lost to history, the ingredients included resin, of Sevastopol. Although British Prime Minister Lord
pitch, sulfur, naphtha or petroleum, quicklime, and Palmerston considered the idea, the British Ordnance
saltpeter. Discharged from tubes in the bows of ships, Department rejected it, calling it as bad a mode of
the mixture ignited on contact with water and burned warfare as poisoning the wells of the enemy.10(p22)
on the surface of the sea. Greek fire was invented by Playfairs response was used to justify chemical war-
Kallinikos (sometimes called Callinus), who arrived in fare into the next century:
Constantinople in 668 ce after fleeing Muslim-occupied
Syria. The Byzantines had used naphtha siphons and There was no sense in this objection. It is considered
squirt guns in 513, but Kallinikoss idea to pump pres- a legitimate mode of warfare to fill shells with mol-
surized naphtha through bronze tubes to ignite enemy ten metal which scatters among the enemy, and
ships broke the Muslim siege of Constantinople in 677 produced the most frightful modes of death. Why
a poisonous vapor which would kill men with-
ce, enabling the Byzantine navy to rule the seas and the
out suffering is to be considered illegitimate war-
Byzantine empire to flourish for many years.3 fare is incomprehensible. War is destruction, and
the more destructive it can be made with the least
Poison Projectiles in Siege Warfare suffering the sooner will be ended that barbarous
method of protecting national rights. No doubt in
The Renaissance spawned an interest in novel war time chemistry will be used to lessen the suffering
machines and chemical weaponry. Leonardo da Vinci of combatants, and even of criminals condemned to
proposed a machine in the 15th century to fire shells death.10(pp2223)
filled with a powder mixture of sulfur, arsenic, and
verdigris (copper acetate).8 Aimed at ships galleys, the A few years later, citizens of the fragmenting United
projectiles poisoned the lungs of anyone in the vicinity States began considering the first American proposals
of the dispersed powder. In the 1600s incendiary shells for chemical warfare.
Chemical Warfare Proposals in the US Civil War
New York schoolteacher John Doughty is credited ward off the attacks of iron-clad vessels and steam
with developing the first American proposal for chemi- rams.9(p6) Doughty added:
cal warfare. Pitching his idea to the War Department in
1862, Doughty advocated the offensive use of chlorine If the shell should explode over the heads of the en-
gas by launching an artillery shell filled with 2 to 3 emy, the gas would, by its great specific gravity, rap-
idly fall to the ground: the men could not dodge it,
quarts of liquid chlorine. After the shell exploded, the
and their first intimation of its presence would be by
chlorine gas would rout an entrenched enemy or its inhalation, which would most effectually disqual-
11
ify every man for service that was within the circle During the 1864 siege of Petersburg, General Ul-
of its influence; rendering the disarming and captur- ysses Grants army was stalled outside the city. For-
ing of them as certain as though both their legs were rest Shepherd, a professor of agricultural chemistry
broken.11(p27) at Western Reserve University, proposed mixing
hydrochloric and sulfuric acids to create a toxic cloud
Although Secretary of War Edwin M Stanton ap- to defeat the entrenched Confederate defenders.11
parently never answered it, Doughtys letter was Because chemical warfare was viewed as inhumane
later published in the Journal of the American Military at the time, Grant never acted upon the plan. Other
Institute.9 The idea was one of many suggestions such ideas were recorded during the war. Union
and inventions flooding the War and Navy Offices Army Captain EC Boyton proposed the use of a
during the time, including a proposal by Joseph Lott cacodyl glass grenade for ship-to-ship fighting. 11
of Hartford, Connecticut, for using hand-pumped Lieutenant Colonel William W Blackford, a Confed-
fire engines to spray chloroform on Confederate gar- erate engineer, designed a sulfur cartridge for use as
risons to anesthetize troops prior to their capture.12 a counter tunneling device.13 The Confederates also
Over 50 years after Doughtys original proposal, the considered using Chinese stink bombs against the
German army developed chlorine gas cylinders and Union troops. With the possible exemption of Black-
eventually chlorine bombs to combat trench warfare fords cartridge, none of the proposals were applied
in World War I. on the battlefield.
World War I
Chemical Warfare Use by France, Great Britain, bullets less useful and reduced mobility, but poison
and Germany gas could uproot a well-entrenched enemy.
All of Europe was caught in the crisis of 1914 after
Most casualties in warfare from the Middle Ages the murder of Archduke Francis Ferdinand at Sarajevo.
until the First World War were the result of cold steel, Declarations of war among Austria-Hungary, Serbia,
wooden projectiles, and fast-moving metals propelled Germany, France, Russia, and Great Britain soon fol-
by explosives. World War I ushered in a new style of lowed (Figure 2-2). The United States remained neutral
fighting involving stalemates of trench warfare (Figure for several years under President Woodrow Wilsons
2-1), and synthetic chemists tested new chemical weap- policy. Although few expected the 19th century chemi-
ons in the arena of no mans land. Trenches made cal proposals to become instrumental in tactical op-
erations on the battlefield, the highly skilled research
scientists and chemists of the principal combatants
quickly adapted chemicals as primary weapons. Early
in the war, French intelligence and captured German
prisoners warned the Triple Entente (the United King-
dom, France, and Russia) of the numerous German
factories being built along the Rhein that were capable
of synthesizing vast quantities of toxic chemicals for
use on the battlefield. Despite international efforts to
restrict chemical weapons in the late 19th and early
20th centuries (see Chapter 4, History of the Chemical
Threat, Chemical Terrorism, and Its Implications for
Military Medicine), as both sides became rooted in
their labyrinth of trenches in the early stages of World
War I, the armies turned to chemical warfare.
Early Allied Chemical Warfare Plans
Despite the long-held belief that Germany was the

Fig. 2-1. Trench warfare. American Expeditionary Forces
Second Division soldiers alerted to the sounds of gas alarms. first to use chemical agents during World War I, the
US Signal Corps photograph. French were actually the first; in August 1914, they
Photograph: Courtesy of US Army Military History Institute, fired toxic gas from rifles in the form of ethyl bro-
Carlisle, Pa. moacetate tear gas grenades. The French had tested
12
Fig. 2-2. Map of western Europe in World War I. Symbols depict major cities, lines indicating the furthest extent of German
occupation, and battles where the American Expeditionary Forces engaged German lines in chemical warfare.
Map: Courtesy of Dr Corey J Hilmas, United States Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense.
ethyl bromoacetate grenades before the war, and they sulfur dioxide cloud against the Germans, a smoke
continued to use tear agents against the Germans screen to provide cover, and gas-proof helmets for
throughout the conflict. However, the ineffectiveness British troops. Churchill rejected the plan but formed
of these weapons caused poison agents to remain un- a committee the following month to discuss the use of
noticed until the Second Battle of Ypres in 1915. smoke on land and sea.14
The British also examined their chemical technol-
ogy for battlefield use in the early stages of the war, German Chemical Warfare Plans
investigating tear agents but later turning to more
toxic chemicals. In January 1915 several chemists at Possibly aware of the Allied interest in chemical
the Imperial College gassed a representative of the weapons, the Germans also pursued war applications
War Office, successfully demonstrating the use of for chemical technology. The strong German dye in-
ethyl iodoacetate as a tear gas. A suggestion for us- dustry and the plethora of scientists in Berlin created
ing sulfur dioxide as a chemical weapon, after being an ideal situation for developing offensive chemical
rejected for the army by Field Marshal Lord Kitchener, weapons. Professor Walther Nernst, recipient of the 1920
was presented to Winston Churchill at the admiralty Nobel Prize in chemistry, suggested placing trinitrotolu-
in March 1915. The proposal included a plan to use a ene (TNT) in a 105-mm shrapnel shell with dianisidine
13
chlorosulphonate, an agent known to cause irritation to did not widely report it to their Western allies because
the mucous membranes.15 Germans called these Nernst of its failure. The Germans again attempted to use T-
Ni-Shrapnel or ni-shells, partly derived from the shells on the western front at Nieuport in March 1915,
German word for sneezing powder, niespulver. with similar results.14,17,18 Although unsuccessful, these
After the French deployed tear gas, Germany saw no experiments provided Germany with the experience
reason to refrain from using its own chemical weapons. to improve future attempts. Poison gas next appeared
with much greater success on the western front in April
Western Front: The Battle at Neuve-Chapelle 1915, during the Second Battle of Ypres .
Germany first tested the Nernst weapon on the Development of Chlorine

western front. On October 27, 1914, 3,000 of these
shrapnel irritant shells fell on British and Indian troops Fritz Haber, professor at the Kaiser Wilhelm Physi-
near Neuve-Chapelle in Northern France. Although cal Institute of Berlin (and later the 1918 Nobel Laure-
the British were unprepared for such an attack, the ate in chemistry), directed German field operations
soldiers suffered no ill effects. The Germans remained involving chemical warfare (Exhibit 2-1). Haber is
convinced that chemicals had merit, however, and con- credited with the concept of creating a toxic cloud from
tinued to experiment with new gas formulations.15 chemical cylinders in late 1914. Learning the lessons
from von Tappens T-shells, Haber suggested the use
Eastern Front: T-Shells at the Battle of Bolimov of large commercial gas cylinders as a delivery system
instead of artillery shells, which were in short supply.
Three months after Neuve-Chapelle, the Germans He also postulated that gas from storage cylinders
tried xylyl bromide (a form of tear gas) on the Russian would cover a far broader area than gas dispersed from
front in Poland. The Battle of Bolimov, launched on artillery shells. In addition, neither the T-shell nor the
January 31, 1915, preliminary to the Second Battle of chlorine gas cylinders technically violated the Hague
the Masurian Lakes, was the site of the German armys ban on projectiles. Haber selected chlorine because it
first extensive use of poison gas. Germany employed a was readily available from the German dye industry
new gas shell (Tappen-shell, T-shell, or T-Stoff) and satisfied requirements for military application: it
that contained an explosive charge for producing a was lethal, immediately effective, nonpersistent, and
duel shrapnel and poison effect, designed by Professor volatile. Chlorine could form a toxic gas cloud dense
Hans von Tappen of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for enough to resist dilution in a moderate wind but with
Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry in Berlin. For no prolonged influence over the terrain.15
the new weapon, von Tappen made two improvements
to Nernsts shells. First, he stabilized the chemical liq- The Second Battle of Ypres
uid within the shell casing to reduce tumbling when
fired from a standard 15-cm howitzer, increasing the During October and November 1914, the French,
shells accuracy and range. Second, he designed a shell British, and Belgian forces had stopped the advance
casing to prevent accidental mixing of the extremely of Germanys Schlieffen Plan, at great costs to both
reactive chemical substances inside. Each shell con- sides. The First Battle of Ypres had resulted in a
tained 7 lb of xylyl bromide, a burster charger for stalemate, with each side entrenched. Germany se-
splinter effect, and a lead lining to prevent contact be- lected the front of the Fourth Army facing the French
tween the burster charge and the chemical payload.15,16 at Ypres as the location for a gas attack (see Figure
However, the firing of 18,000 shells at Russian 2-2). On March 10, 1915, Pioneer Regiment 35, under
positions around Bolimov proved entirely unsuccess- Habers guidance, placed 1,600 large and 4,130 small
ful. The Russians easily repulsed the overconfident cylinders (containing a total of 168 tons of chlorine)
German attack and the German gas failure halted any opposite the Allied troops defending Ypres.15 The
further assaults on Bolimov. The chemical failed for chosen site was a sector between Bixschoote and
several reasons. The winter weather was too cold to Langemarck in Belgium (Figure 2-3), a tactical weak
cause the liquid to vaporize to the gaseous state, and point where French and British forces joined.9 The
the agent was either blown back towards the German English-speaking troops consisted of Canadians and
lines or fell harmlessly to the ground. Also, xylyl the British 28th Division. The French troops were the
bromide was a weakly irritating tear gas, and the liq- 87th Territorial and 45th Algerian Divisions.9 Pioneer
uid could not be dispersed in sufficient concentration Regiment 35 waited for winds to shift to the west
to cause damage. Although aware that the Germans toward Allied trenches before the actual gas attack
had attempted an attack with poison gas, the Russians was delivered late in the afternoon on April 22,14,15,17,19
14
Exhibit 2-1
War of the Chemists
During World War I, chemists on both sides investigated over 3,000 chemical substances for potential use as weapons.
The war between the nations was just as much a war between the chemists. Germany had two future Nobel Laureates
in chemistry on their side, and France had one as well. The adoption of poison gas by the Germans in World War I is
attributed to Professor Walther Hermann Nernst, a well-known physical chemist in Berlin. In recognition for his services
to the German Empire, he was made a count late in the war. However, World War I was the setting for a strategic match
between rival chemists, with Germanys Fritz Haber pitted against his French counterpart, Victor Grignard.
Fritz Haber played a major role in the development of chemical warfare in World War I. He developed early gas masks
with absorbent filters and masterminded the first chlorine attacks at Ypres, Belgium. In his studies of the effects of
poison gas, Haber discovered a simple mathematical relationship between the concentration (C) of the gas and the
amount of time (t) it was breathed in, expressed as C t = k, where k is a constant. In other words, exposure to a low
level of gas for a long time can cause the same result (eg death) as exposure to a high concentration for a short time.
This relationship is known as Habers rule.
Habers rival was Francois Auguste Victor Grignard, a French chemist and professor at the University of Nancy. Dur-
ing World War I, he was transferred to the new field of chemical warfare and worked on the manufacture of phosgene
and the detection of mustard gas. His Nobel Prize in chemistry was awarded for devising a new method for creating
carbon-carbon bonds in organic synthesis termed the Grignard reaction, which allowed the means of synthesizing
larger organic compounds from smaller starting materials.
Habers wife opposed his work on poison gas and committed suicide with his service weapon after he personally
oversaw the first use of chlorine in Ypres, Belgium. Haber defended gas warfare against accusations that it was in-
humane, saying that death was death, by whatever means it was inflicted. In the 1920s he developed the cyanide gas
formulation Zyklon B, which was used as an insecticide, especially as a fumigant in grain stores. The Nazis later used
Zyklon B (hydrogen cyanide) gas chambers disguised as shower stalls beginning with the first and longest running
Schutzstaffel camp at Dachau. In 1934, the Nazis forced Haber, a German Jew, to emigrate. Haber was a patriotic German
who was proud of his service in World War I, for which he was decorated. He struggled to cope with the new reality
that his enormous contributions to German industry were disregarded during his vilification by the Nazi regime. He
died in exile in Basel after a grave illness.
Data sources: (1) Haber LF. The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World War. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press; 1986:
1540. (2) Heller CE. No. 10 chemical warfare in World War I: the American experience, 19171918. In: The Leavenworth Papers. Fort
Leavenworth, Kan: Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College; 1984: 67. (3) Szllsi-Janze M. Pesticides
and war: the case of Fritz Haber. Eur Rev. 2001;9:97108. (4) Harris R, Paxman J. A Higher Form of Killing: the Secret History of Chemical
and Biological Warfare. New York, NY: Random House; 2002.
when the weather and wind patterns were ideal for The German gas-aided capture of Hill 60 on May 5
a toxic cloud (Figure 2-4). was a significant blow to the Allies.
The Allies claimed that 5,000 troops fell victim Although the Allies expressed great indignation
to the chlorine cloud (although this number was about this inhumane and unfair weapon (despite their
probably inflated for propaganda purposes).9,20 The own development of chemical weapons), the Germans
gas attack was successful, but the Germans grossly believed their use of nonprojectile shells to form gas
underestimated the chlorines effects and, lacking clouds was within the guidelines of the Hague ban.
sufficient supplies and reserves for an assault, failed The comments of General von Deimling, command-
to capitalize on the retreating Allied positions.14,15,17,19 ing general of the German Fifteenth Corps at Ypres,
Any further possible German advance was stopped by written sometime after the war, reflected the reason
Canadian troops at Kitcheners Wood while the British for initiating chemical warfare:
and French hastily organized a defensive front during
the next 48 hours.9 I must confess that the commission for poisoning the
Two days later, Germans conducted a second chlo- enemy, just as one poisons rats, struck me as it must
rine gas attack against the Canadian First Division any straight-forward soldier: it was repulsive to me.
northeast of Ypres, near Saint Julien, and four more If, however, these poison gases would lead to the
cylinder gas attacks during May in the Ypres sector. fall of Ypres, we would perhaps win a victory which
15
Fig. 2-3. Map of Belgian-French border showing the location of the French, Belgian, British, and German armies at the time
of the Second Battle of Ypres.
might decide the entire war. In view of such a high spotted the gas cylinders in the German trenches, were
goal, personal susceptibilities had to be silent.21(p5) also unprepared.21 One British soldier remarked:
Despite the numbers of Allied casualties and prison- Nobody appears to have realized the great danger
ers, the battle was a mixed success. The Germans failed that was threatening, it being considered that the
to take advantage of their success, but the Allies, made enemys attempt would certainly fail and that what-
aware of the pending gas attack when British pilots ever gas reached our line could be easily fanned
16
Fig. 2-4. Detailed map of Ypres, depicting the German, British, Canadian, and French fronts along the outskirts of town. This
was the location of each major division prior to the release of chlorine shells on April 22, 1915.
away. No one felt in the slightest degree uneasy, and Allied chlorine gas attack).
the terrible effect of the gas came to us as a great After the success at Ypres, Haber turned German
surprise.22(p3) attention back to the eastern front to atone for the
failure of xylyl bromide T-shells. In May 1915 German
Another observer, however, realized a profound troops again attacked Russians at Bolimov, releasing
change had occurred: The most stupendous change 263 tons of chlorine gas from 12,000 cylinders along a
in warfare since gunpowder was invented had come, 7.5-mile line, killing 6,000 Russian soldiers. Two more
and come to stay. Let us not forget that.23(p3) gas cloud attacks on the same positions caused 25,000
Although chlorine had its disadvantages and the more Russian casualties.15 The Russians had initially
German attack against Ypres halted short of its objec- devoted few resources to the development of chemical
tive, chemical warfare became a mainstay of German protective equipment. Consequently, they were more
assaults and Allied counterattacks on the Ypres salient vulnerable to gas attacks than the British and French
throughout the rest of the war (Figure 2-5). The Ypres and suffered the greatest number of chemical casual-
sector became an experimental stage for the Germans ties in World War I.
to develop and test new gases on other battlefronts. All of the first chemical attacks of World War I
A third battle occurred at Ypres in 1917 (at which the were in the form of chemical vapor clouds projected
young Adolf Hitler was seriously wounded during an from cylinders, totaling nearly 200 by the end of the
17
Fig. 2-5. A French cylinder attack on German trenches in

Flanders. The critical importance of the wind is apparent.
Condensation of water vapor caused the cloud-like appear- Fig. 2-6. Prevention of animal casualties during gas warfare
ance of the gas. was a concern. Photograph depicts gas masks on mule and
Photograph: Courtesy of Chemical and Biological Defense soldier. Dun sur Meuse, Meuse, France. November 21, 1918.
Command Historical Research and Response Team, Ab- US Signal Corps photograph. Photograph: Courtesy of US
erdeen Proving Ground, Md. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pa.
war. Although the largest chlorine attack occurred in cyanogen chloride. In July 1917 the Germans intro-
October 1915 at Reims, when the Germans released duced mustard agent to provide a persistent vesicant
550 tons of chlorine from 25,000 cylinders, chemicals that attacked the body in places unprotected by gas
delivered by artillery shells soon became the norm.9,15 masks. Both sides also mixed agents and experimented
The Germans learned that a vapor cloud was depen- with camouflage materials to prevent quick agent
dent on wind direction and strength, neither of which identification.4
could be predicted with any amount of accuracy. These
initial chemical attacks also proved that an infantry The Battle of Loos
attack synchronized with a discharged vapor cloud
was extremely dangerous. In the aftermath of Ypres, it became apparent that
lacking an offensive gas capability would impair troop
Allied Chemical Warfare Retaliation morale, and the British cabinet approved the use of
chemical agents. It took 5 months to plan the large-scale
Only weeks after recognizing the potential of chemi- gas attack at Loos, which involved chlorine-filled cyl-
cal weapons at Ypres, the British and French began inders clustered in batteries along the front rather than
planning a chemical retaliation, which became a three- spaced far apart in one continuous line. The British had
pronged strategy to develop their own (1) protective a major numerical advantage against the Germans,
devices for troops (Figure 2-6); (2) offensive toxic gas reaching 7-to-1 in some places along the front. British
weapons; and (3) systems to deliver the toxic gases to commander General Douglas Haig began the offensive
enemy lines. The Allies developed their first protec- with a 4-day artillery bombardment by six divisions,
tive mask the day after the first German chlorine at- planning to follow the bombardment with the release
tack, and in September 1915 they launched their own of 5,500 cylinders containing 150 tons of chlorine gas
chlorine attack against the Germans at Loos, Belgium. from the British front line.15(p11),20(p1417)
These moves initiated a deadly competition to develop The gas attack occurred on September 24 with only
better protective masks, more potent chemicals, and minimal success. Unfavorable and shifting winds re-
long-range delivery systems to disperse the agents duced the effectiveness of the chlorine gas cloud, the
more widely. The Germans quickly replaced chlorine number of chlorine cylinders was insufficient to cover
with phosgene, which was more effective. In May 1916 the front line, and inadequate reserve divisions were
the Germans started using diphosgene, and 2 months available to exploit a breakthrough (a lesson learned
later the French tried hydrogen cyanide (HCN), then by the Germans at Ypres).20 A British shell shortage also
18
Exhibit 2-2
Phosgene
Chlorines deficiencies were overcome with the introduction of phosgene, first used by Germany in December 1915.
Phosgene, also known as carbonyl chlorine (COCl2), is a highly toxic gas first synthesized by the chemist John Davy
(17901868) in 1812 by exposing equal quantities of carbon monoxide and chlorine to sunlight. Phosgene comes
from Greek, literally meaning generated by light. Phosgene is colorless and 18 times more potent than chlorine. It
is often only detected by its characteristic moldy hay odor. One disadvantage of phosgene as a chemical warfare
agent was that it was lightweight and readily dissipated, but this problem was surmounted by addition of the heavier
chlorine. The chlorine supplied the necessary vapor to help eject phosgene from containers. The British employed a
chlorine-phosgene mixture they codenamed white star, which was used heavily during the Battle of the Somme.
Phosgene is a particularly insidious poison, as exposure often has no initial symptoms. Symptoms usually appear
within 24 hours, but can take up to 72 hours to manifest. The gas combines with water in the tissues of the respiratory
tract to form carbon dioxide and hydrochloric acid. The acid then dissolves the membranes in the lungs. Fluid fills
the lungs, and death results from a combination of blood loss, shock, and respiratory failure. Phosgene was far more
lethal than any other common-use gas weapon; 85% of western front soldiers were killed as the result of chemical
attack by phosgene.
prevented sustained artillery barrages.15 On the other chemicals beyond a trench line using grenades, mor-
hand, British Commander-in-Chief Sir John French tar bombs, and artillery shells. These realizations led
acknowledged that although it failed to penetrate the to the introduction of the Livens projector and the
German lines, the gas attack met with marked suc- Stokes mortar, critical advancements to chemical war-
cess, and produced a demoralizing effect in some of fare. Both sides also achieved satisfactory protection
its opposing units.15,16,23,24 against chlorine and began looking for newer, deadlier
Ultimately, both sides recognized the need to avoid chemicals.
vapors blowing backward and learned to launch
Phosgene
Phosgene was the next chemical to debut on the

western front at the close of 1915 (Exhibit 2-2). The Brit-
ish, warned by intelligence in midsummer 1915 that
Germany planned to use a new choking gas (Figure
2-7), had several months to make defensive prepara-
tions, including development of a new gas mask. The
phosgene attack took place on December 11, 1915,9 near
the Wieltje ruins of the Ypres salient. The British were
ready for the new gas, and the Germans lost a major
opportunity to gain a decisive victory. Although gas
masks could protect troops against its harmful effects,
phosgene proved to be a very effective gas throughout
the war, causing more deaths than any other gas in
World War I.
The Germans may have used phosgene earlier, in late
May and early June 1915, against Russian troops in the
vicinity of Bzura and Rawka, and they used it exten-
sively at Verdun in 1916.15 The white star mixture of
phosgene and chlorine (chlorine supplied the necessary
Fig. 2-7. Gassed, a purportedly staged photograph under
the direction of Major Everts Tracy, Engineer Corps, to il- vapor to carry phosgene) was commonly used on the
lustrate the choking effects of phosgene. Location unknown. Somme. When newer gas masks gave adequate protec-
US Signal Corps photograph. Photograph: Courtesy of US tion against chlorine and phosgene, both sides realized
Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pa. that the vapor clouds were better suited as psychological
19
Exhibit 2-3
Diphosgene
Trichloromethyl chloroformate (ClCO2CCl3) was developed soon after the first use of phosgene in World War I. Like
phosgene, it was also known as green cross because of the distinct markings on German shells containing the chok-
ing gas. The official German name was perstoff. The British used it under the name superpolite or diphosgene,
while the French called it surpalite. It is a colorless, oily liquid with a distinct odor. It is similar to phosgene because
it can break down under certain conditions to form two molecules of phosgene, but it does have an added tear-gas
effect. Diphosgene, classified as moderately persistent, remains at the point of release for over 10 minutes.
weapons to create panic in the lines. development, Germany introduced mustard gas
(sometimes referred to as Yperite) on July 12, 1917,
Diphosgene against Canadian troops near Ypres. Mustard gas was
distinguished by the serious blisters it caused both
The Germans introduced diphosgene, another internally and externally several hours after exposure.
pulmonary agent, to their growing deadly arsenal in Protection against mustard gas proved more difficult
May 1916. This effective lung irritant and choking gas than against either chlorine or phosgene (Figure 2-8).
was dispersed via green cross shells, named for the The first large-scale mustard gas attack occurred just
shells distinct markings. As poisonous as phosgene over a week after its first use, when the Germans at-
and sometimes considered more toxic (Exhibit 2-3), tacked the British at Nieuport, resulting in over 14,000
diphosgene was developed because the vapors could casualties, 500 of whom died within 3 weeks. The
destroy the gas mask filters in use at the time, and it next month the Germans fired 100,000 mustard shells,
had greater persistence in the environment than phos- marked with a yellow cross, against the French Second
gene. Germany eventually deployed combinations of Army, causing 20,000 casualties.25
phosgene, diphosgene, and diphenylchlorarsine. In September 1917 Germany employed mustard-
laden artillery shells against the Russians at Riga.
Mustard Gas The Allies did not use mustard until that November
at Cambrai, after the British captured a large stock of
Remaining consistently ahead in gas warfare German yellow cross shells. It took nearly a year for
the British to reach large-scale mustard production on
their own; they then used it extensively in breaking the
Hindenburg line in September 1918.25
Major General Amos A Fries, head of the Gas
Service of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF)
in France and later chief of the Armys Chemical
Warfare Service (CWS), recognized that mustard gas
completely changed gas warfare. Although it was first
used to produce casualties and fragment enemy troop
concentrations, mustard caused 20,000 casualties in
only 6 weeks after its introduction. Despite remaining
potent in soil for weeks after release, making capture
of infected trenches a dangerous undertaking, sulfur
mustard lived up to its nickname as king of the war
gases on the battlefield (Exhibit 2-4). The Germans
caused 5,000 French casualties alone in a matter of 10
days during shelling of Verdun in September 1917. Ger-
many continued to use mustard gas to great advantage
throughout the winter of 19171918, producing casual-
Fig. 2-8. American casualty from mustard being carried into ties, creating confusion, and lowering morale among
gas hospital. US Signal Corps photograph. enemy ranks. In March 1918, during the last great Ger-
Photograph: Courtesy of US Army Military History Institute, man offensive (Operation Michael), the German army
Carlisle, Pa. used mustard to neutralize the strongly defended city
20
Exhibit 2-4
Mustard: King of the War Gases
Sulfur mustard was used extensively because it caused more casualties than any other chemical in World War I. The
countermeasures against mustard were ineffective because gas masks did not afford protection against skin absorp-
tion.
Mustard takes its name from the unpurified form, which is yellow-brown with an odor resembling mustard, garlic, or
horseradish. Other names for mustard are yellow cross, sulfur mustard, hun stoffe (HS), Distilled Hun (HD),
senfgas, blister agent, Yperite, S-LOST, or Kampfstoff LOST. LOST is derived from Lommel and Steinkopf,
who developed the process for mass producing mustard during wartime use at the German company Bayer AG. Mus-
tard is a thioether with the formula C4H8Cl2S. The compound eliminates chloride ion by intramolecular nucleophilic
substitution to form a cyclic sulfonium ion. This reactive intermediate is detrimental to cells of the body as a mutagen
and carcinogen because it can bind to the guanine nitrogen in DNA strands, leading to cell death, cancer, and genetic
alterations.
The term mustard gas is a misnomer; the agent is not a true gas. Dispersed as an aerosol, mustard is not water-
soluble but contains high lipid solubility, contributing to its rapid absorption into the skin. Blister agent exposure over
more than 50% body surface area was fatal during World War I; however, mustard was lethal in only 1% of cases. As
a persistent agent, mustard can remain in the environment for days and continue to cause casualties. This property
enabled its use as an area-denial weapon, forcing soldiers to abandon heavily contaminated positions. Contaminated
clothing from one soldier could spread to others during battle.
Mustard gas is perhaps best known for the Bari disaster. A US stockpile on the SS John Harvey was bombed in Bari, Italy,
in 1943 during World War II. This disaster exposed thousands of civilians and Allied troops to the chemical agent.
of Armentieres. During the battle, mustard was said to against the United States, was intercepted by the
have run in the gutters like water.9(p15) British, leading to public indignation and hastening
Although the first gas attack on a US unit did not the entry of the United States into the war. President
involve mustard exclusively, American soldiers feared Wilson asked Congress for a formal declaration of war
mustard the most. Despite the many warnings, mus- on Germany on April 2, 1917. Congress declared war
tard agent injured over 27,000 Americans.25 on Germany on April 6, and on Austria-Hungary in
December 1917.
US Experience with Chemical Warfare
US Preparation for Chemical Warfare
The use of chemical warfare at Ypres in April, fol-
lowed by the sinking of the Lusitania by a German The United States entered the war a full 2 years after
U-boat off the Irish coast on May 7, 1915, rocked the the German armys first successful chlorine gas attack
United States. Americans began to take greater interest against the Allies. Although the US Army was aware of
in the nature of warfare taking place in Europe and the increasing use of chemicals on both fronts, it made
elsewhere. In May 1915 President Wilson proposed no effort to prepare for gas warfare until 2 months
that Germany halt chemical warfare in exchange for before the American declaration of war. As a result,
the British ending their blockade of neutral ports. Both the Army began the war with no doctrine or adequate
Germany and Great Britain refused to comply.26 training program for chemical warfare, depending on
the Allies for gas-related equipment. However, once
US Declaration of War begun, preparations advanced quickly.
Only a day after Wilsons call to war, Congress
Isolationism left the United States outside what established a subcommittee on noxious gases under
was initially perceived as a European conflict. How- the leadership of the director of the US Bureau of
ever, German mistakes resulted in America throwing Mines. The subcommittee included Army and Navy
its weight toward the Allies. Early in 1917 Germany ordnance and medical officers as well as two members
resumed its policy of unrestricted submarine warfare. of the chemical committee of the National Research
The Zimmerman telegram, a proposal to the Mexican Council. Its mission was to investigate noxious gases,
government initiated by Germany to form an alliance the generation of chemical warfare agents, and the
21
discovery of antidotes for war purposes.19,27,28 Within functions relating to toxic chemicals.
a short time, the subcommittee began organizing The CWS was organized into seven main divisions:
chemical agent research at universities and industries (1) The research division, responsible for most of the
across the nation, while mobilizing a large portion of weapons and agent research during the war, was lo-
the chemists in the country. This initial phase laid the cated at American University near Washington, DC. (2)
groundwork that later led to the establishment of the The gas defense division, responsible for the produc-
CWS, the precursor to the Chemical Corps. tion of gas masks, had a large plant in Long Island City,
The countrys civilian scientists, engineers, and New York. (3) The gas offense division was responsible
chemistry professors played a significant role in pre- for the production of chemical agents and weapons, its
paring the Army for chemical warfare. Eventually, main facility located at Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland.
the War Department also began to plan for chemical (4) The development division was responsible for
warfare, spreading responsibilities initially among carbon production and pilot plant work on mustard
the Medical Department, Ordnance Department, and agent production. (5) The proving ground division
Corps of Engineers. When General John J Pershing and (6) the training division were located together at
began organizing the AEF in France, however, he Lakehurst, New Jersey. (7) The medical division was
placed responsibility for all phases of gas warfare in responsible for the pharmacological aspects of chemi-
a single military service and recommended that the cal defense.
War Department at home do likewise. On September The AEFs offensive chemical unit, the 1st Gas Regi-
3, 1917, the AEF established a centralized Gas Service ment (formerly the 30th Engineers), was organized at
under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Amos A American University under the command of Colonel
Fries.27,28 EJ Atkisson in 1917, and sent to France in early 1918
(Exhibit 2-5).19,27 The US Army finally had an organi-
Creation of the Chemical Warfare Service zation that controlled offensive chemical production,
defensive equipment production, training, testing, and
In the spring of 1918 the US government began basic research, along with a new chemical warfare unit
centralizing gas warfare functions in the War Depart- unified under a single commander. This organization
ment under a senior Corps of Engineers officer, Major helped lead the AEF to victory, although much of
General William L Sibert. President Wilson transferred its work, including the construction of facilities for
the Bureau of Mines research facilities to the War De- producing toxic gas, filling plants, and producing
partment, and on June 28, 1918, the CWS was formally gas masks, was only partially completed by the end
established under Sibert as part of the National Army of the war.
(the wartime Army, as distinguished from the Regular America entered the Great War in bleak circum-
Army), with full responsibility for all facilities and stances. The failed French offensive in the spring gave
Exhibit 2-5
Earliest reported description involving chemical warfare on the American
Expeditionary Forces
The Germans attacked on February 2, 1918, using a bombardment of 25 phosgene or diphosgene shells. The shells
were recognized by their swish and wobbly sound in passage, fired harmlessly by the German army near the 6th
Field Artillery in Hazelle woods in the late afternoon. The first American offensive instruction to attack with gas was
issued that same day by Major General Bullard. The 1st Division engaged in a long barrage of 6,750 high explosive
shells, with the German artillery in retaliation, and fired 80 gas shells on seven German batteries, consisting of No. 4
(cyanogen chloride) and No. 5 (phosgene) gas shells. The French disapproved of this tactic because the firing was fast
and long-lasting. This marked the first gas volley between German and US armies. Several days later, on February 6,
1918, the Germans fired one shell containing mustard gas along with numerous high explosive shells, marking the
first time that mustard was used on American forces. The first gas casualties were tallied from that shell; three soldiers
of the 6th Field Artillery, Battery A, were evacuated with acute conjunctivitis the following day, and a gunner with a
burned buttock was evacuated 2 days later.
Data source: Spencer EW. The History of Gas Attacks Upon the American Expeditionary Forces During the World War, Part I. Edgewood
Arsenal, Md: Chemical Warfare Service, US War Department; 1928: 3233.
22
Table 2-1
World War I American Expeditionary Forces in Offensive and Defensive Battles
Involving Chemical Warfare
Date Battle Participants
November 20December 4, 1917 Cambrai (France) 11th, 12th, and 14th Engineers
March 21April 6, 1918 Somme defensive (France) 3rd Division; 12th, 14th Engineers; 2nd, 3rd, 4th
Pursuit Groups
April 927, 1918 Lys (Belgium) 11th, 16th Engineers; 3rd Pursuit Group
May 27June 26, 1918 Aisne-Marne defensive (France) 2nd Division, 3rd Division
June 913, 1918 Montdidier-Noyon defensive (France) 1st Division
July 1518, 1918 Champagne-Marne defensive (France) 3rd, 26th, 28th, 42nd Divisions; 369th Infantry;
66th Field Artillery Brigade; 42nd, 44th Artil-
leries; 1st Corps Artillery Park; 322nd Field
Signal Battalion; 406th Telegraph Battalion; 1st
Corps Observation Squadron; 3rd, 5th Corps
Observation Groups; 1st Pursuit Group; 1st
Corps Balloon Group
July 18August 13, 1918 Aisne-Marne offensive (France) 1st Division; 2nd Division; 3rd Division; 4th
Division; 26th Division; 28th Division; 32nd
Division; 42nd Division; 369th Infantry; 66th
Field Artillery Brigade; 1st Corps Artillery
Park; 1st Gas Regiment (B & D Companies); 1st
Battalion Trench Artillery; 2nd Cavalry; 308th,
322nd Field Signal Battalions; 14th, 29th, 40th,
308th Engineers; 1st Pioneer Infantry; 52nd,
406th, 411th Telegraph Battalion; 1st, 3rd, 5th
Corps Observation Groups; 1st Pursuit Group;
1st, 3rd Corps Balloon Groups
August 8November 11, 1918 Somme offensive (France) 27th Division; 30th Division; 33rd Division;
318th Field Signal Battalion; 412th Telegraph
Battalion; 301st Battalion Tank Corps
August 18September 17, 1918 Oise-Aisne (France) 28th Division; 32nd Division; 77th Division; 370th
Infantry, 57th Field Artillery Brigade; 1st, 2nd
Corps Artillery Parks; 55th, 56th Artilleries;
308th Field Signal Battalion; 14th, 308th En-
gineers; 1st Pioneer Infantry; 52nd Telegraph
Battalion
August 19November 11, 1918 Ypres-Lys offensive (Belgium) 27th Division, 30th Division, 37th Division, 91st
Division, 412th Telegraph Battalion
September 1216, 1918 Saint Mihiel offensive (France) 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 26th, 30th, 33rd, 36th, 42nd,
78th, 80th, 82nd, 89th, and 90th Divisions; oth-
ers (organizations not assigned to divisions); 1st
Gas Regiment (A, B, C, D, E, and F Companies)
September 26November 11, 1918 Meuse-Argonne offensive (France) 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th,
30th, 32nd, 33rd, 35th, 36th, 37th, 42nd, 77th,
78th, 79th, 80th, 81st, 82nd, 89th, 90th, 91st, and
92nd Divisions, and others
October 24November 4, 1918 Vittorio Veneto (Italy) 332nd Infantry
23
way to mutinies within the ranks. The British attacks

on Messines Ridge, Ypres, and Cambrai failed in their
primary objectives, leading to significant casualties
and low unit morale (Table 2-1). Initially, the British
and French primarily wanted US infantry to reinforce
the lines, but General John J Pershing resisted break-
ing up American units and using them simply as
reinforcements. The first American units, members of
the AEF 1st Division, arrived in France in July 1917. Ill-
prepared to use or defend themselves against chemical
weapons, the American troops found gas warfare an
inescapable fact of life in the trenches, with chemicals
contaminating clothing, food, water, equipment, and
the trenches themselves. American officers were re-
luctant to employ chemical agents for fear of inviting
German retaliation.
Cambrai Fig. 2-10. Proper gas training to avoid becoming a casualty

was routine for the American Expeditionary Forces in World
Three American engineer regiments, the 11th, 12th, War I. US Signal Corps photograph.
and 14th, were engaged in construction activity behind Photograph: Courtesy of US Army Military History Institute,
British lines at Cambrai in November 1917 when they Carlisle, Pa.
became the first AEF units to experience conditions
in the trenches. (Even before the Cambrai offensive
began, two AEF soldiers from the 11th Engineers in dugouts trapped behind the German advance while
became the first American battle casualties in France others used their picks and hand tools to fight. Most of
when they were wounded by German artillery shells the AEF units returned to take up defensive positions
on September 5, 1917.29) On November 30 German to halt the German advance. Six soldiers of the 11th
gas shelling intensified in the vicinity of the three AEF Engineers were killed from shelling (high explosive
regiments. British officers ordered a withdrawal, but and gas), 11 were wounded, and 13 were taken pris-
the AEF engineers were taken by surprise. Some hid oner.29 These casualties were counted as British gas
casualties in the final statistics because they would not
Fig. 2-9. US troops receiving gas mask instruction in 1918 Fig. 2-11. US soldiers receiving instructions from French of-
before entering the trenches. 329th Infantry. US Signal Corps ficers in early 1918 on quickly donning gas masks. US Signal
photograph. Corps photograph.
Photograph: Courtesy of US Army Military History Institute, Photograph: Courtesy of US Army Military History Institute,
Carlisle, Pa. Carlisle, Pa.
24
have been funneled through American field hospitals. issued both the French M-2 gas mask and the British
Cambrai represented the first participation by the AEF small box respirator (Figure 2-12). The French warned
in active fighting. the Americans about Germanys use of mustard gas
and the importance of using their respirators. After
Sommervillier and Ansauville additional training in the Sommervillier section in
Lorraine with units of the 18th French Division, the
Pershing sought an area near Lorraine where the 1st Division relieved part of the 1st Moroccan Division
AEF could concentrate, train in gas warfare with help in the Ansauville sector, where it experienced the first
from the French (Figures 2-9, 2-10, and 2-11), and reported gas attack on the AEF.
eventually fight. The 1st Division trained in gas de- The attack took place on February 26, 1918, between
fense exercises from September 1917 to January 1918, 1:20 and 1:30 am, when the Germans fired some 150
and a preliminary gas organization was set up in the to 250 phosgene and chloropicrin projectiles against
division in December 1917.30,31 As it began training in the Americans near Bois de Remieres, France (Exhibit
the practice trenches at Gondrecourt, the division was 2-6). Some projectiles exploded in the air, others on
the ground. A second, similar attack occurred about
an hour later. However, a discrepancy appears in the
literature over the type and number of projectors and
trench mortar bombs involved. Sources state that phos-
gene and chlorine were employed, but contain varying
accounts of the number of projectors involved.30
Although the 1st Division received the most rigor-
ous combat and gas training of any American division,
inexperience still led to mistakes. Major General Robert
Bullard, head of the 1st Division, remarked on the gas
training his division received at Ansauville:
Gas is such an intangible thing that men are only

with great difficulty made to guard themselves
against it. A state of instruction adequate against
the danger is extremely hard to obtain. . . . Our gas
officers were almost hysterical in their efforts to
teach and impress our new troops; but knowledge
and real efficient training came only after hard
experience.32(p5)
The Americans suffered 85 casualties, including

eight deathsapproximately a third of their battal-
ionin the aftermath of the attack. Although reports
stated that from the time the bright lights of the crash-
ing projectiles hit to the elaboration of gas, soldiers
had no time to don either the M2 or British small box
respirator, the majority of the casualties were prevent-
able through better discipline. The lack of discipline
was the result of four factors. First, some soldiers
could not find their gas masks in time (Exhibit 2-7).
Second, some noncommissioned officers let soldiers
remove their masks too quickly, only a half hour after
the last shell fell. Third, other soldiers switched from
the effective but uncomfortable small box respirator
to the more comfortable but less effective French M2,
Fig. 2-12. Early American Expeditionary Forces training in
1917. American Expeditionary Forces soldier training with
receiving gas in the process. Fourth, soldiers continued
a bayonet while wearing the British small box respirator. US to work unmasked in the woods as late as 48 hours
Signal Corps photograph. after the attack, despite the odor of phosgene in the
Photograph: Courtesy of US Army Military History Institute, air.33 Determined not to be caught by such an attack
Carlisle, Pa. again in the Ansauville sector, the 1st Division made
25
Exhibit 2-6
First Projector Attack on the American Expeditionary Forces
The earliest written account of an attack involving projectors and trench mortar chemical bombs on the American Ex-
peditionary Forces occurred on February 26, 1918. A projector was a device that lobbed a football-sized gas projectile
into enemy trenches. The objective was to get the gas as far from friendly forces as possible before releasing it. Two
attacks involving trench mortar bombs and projectiles occurred between 1:20 and 1:40 am. The trench mortar attack
consisted of two salvos of phosgene bombs. The projectiles used were mixtures of phosgene and possibly chloropicrin,
based on their odors. General Bullard stated that two volleys, each consisting of 100 18-cm shells, mostly phosgene,
crashed with a loud explosion and bright flare of light. Rudolf Hanslian and records of the 78th Reserve Division in
Germany indicated a much larger gas assault by the 35th Pioneer Battalion, involving 810 projectors loaded with phos-
gene flasks and 10 with the new diphenylchloroarsine gas, along with 80 high explosives, to produce casualties with
almost 14 tons of phosgene. This discrepancy in the number of projectiles can be explained from the accounts of two
German prisoners, who deserted on March 20. They reported that 900 projectors were employed, one half of which fell
in their own front lines, keeping them out for 2 days. The 35th Pioneer Regiment never completed the elaborate raid,
code-named Einladung, that immediately followed the projector attack on the American Expeditionary Forces.
Data source: Spencer EW. The History of Gas Attacks Upon the American Expeditionary Forces During the World War, Part I. Edgewood
Arsenal, Md: Chemical Warfare Service, US War Department; 1928: 3751.
continuous efforts to spot projector installations and quickly scored a breakthrough. Chemical warfare with
neutralize them. gas shells was a major component in this German of-
fensive. These Hutier tactics involved brief but sig-
Lys Defensive nificant artillery shelling of enemy front and rear lines
with high explosive and chemical weapons, followed
General Erich Ludendorff, deputy chief of the gen- by light infantry advancement. The British situation
eral staff for Germany, still hoped to destroy the hard- was desperate for some days, but Ludendorff called
hit British army before it had a chance to recover from off the offensive on April 29. About 500 Americans
the effects of the Somme drive. This was the purpose participated in the campaign, including members of
of a new German attack launched April 9, 1918, on the 16th Engineers, 28th Aero Squadron, and 1st Gas
a narrow front along the Lys River in Flanders. The Regiment.34,35 Chemical casualty statistics are poor for
Germans committed 46 divisions to the assault and this period; however, AEF divisions suffered higher
Exhibit 2-7
First Airplane Gas Attacks on American Forces
Although some historians erroneously state that chemical warfare involving aircraft did not occur in World War I, Ger-
man forces did drop chemical bombs from airplanes during the conflict. The first gas attacks on American Expedition-
ary Forces from German planes took place in the village of Seicheprey, part of the 1st Division sector. Up to that point,
chemical warfare involving planes had never been described. At Ansauville, a German plane dropped gas balloons,
described as balls 18 inches in diameter and filled with liquid mustard, on 1st Division batteries entrenched across Hill
246 on March 19, 1918. A second airplane gas attack occurred on March 23, 1918, as part of a series of daily mustard
gas attacks on the town from March 21 to March 25. American Expeditionary Forces watched a German airplane drop
gas bombs over the Beaumont-Jury road and release gas balloons that exploded in the air, liberating a reddish-blue
cloud. It was later reported that neither the gas balloons nor the bombs seem to have caused any casualties.
Data source: Cochrane RC. The 1st Division at Ansauville, JanuaryApril 1918; study number 9. In: Gas Warfare in World War I. US
Army Chemical Corps Historical Studies. Army Chemical Center, Md: US Army Chemical Corps Historical Office; 1959.
26
Fig. 2-13. Members of the 26th Infantry, 2nd Brigade, 1st

Division, leaving a trench to go over the top during Battle of
Cantigny, May 1918. US Signal Corps photograph.
Photograph: Courtesy of US Army Military History Institute,
Fig. 2-14. US gas casualties from the 1st Division evacuated
Carlisle, Pa.
after the Battle of Cantigny, May 29, 1918. US Signal Corps
photograph.
chemical casualties in the early months of the war Carlisle, Pa.
compared to the later months.
First American Victory: the Battle of Cantigny 4 (when the 1st Division suffered close to 900 chemical
casualties among its ranks, predominantly in the 18th
The first sustained American offensive of the war, Infantry, in a single night) that it was unable to carry
although a minor action, was fought between May 3 out the mission. Consequently, Pershing charged the
and June 8, 1918, by the AEF 1st Division under Major 28th Infantry to take Cantigny instead.36 On May 28 the
General Bullard. The Battle of Cantigny was part of 1st Division captured the village of Cantigny, held by
the Third Battle of the Aisne, a large-scale German the German 18th Army and commanded and strongly
offensive to win the war before the full build-up of fortified as a German advance observation point by
US troops in France. Chemical attacks inflicted major General Oskar von Hutier.
casualties on the AEF 1st Divisions assault and re- Rexmond Cochrane summarizes there was a total
pulsion of numerous German counterattacks (Figure of between 2,199 and 2,708 chemical casualties at
2-13). Pershing initially tasked the 18th Infantry to take Cantigny (Figure 2-14).36 Chemical warfare played a
Cantigny, but it was so decimated by mustard shells significant role in the prelude to battle, capture, and
(around 15,000) at Villers-Tournelle between May 3 and defense of Cantigny. The number of high explosive
Exhibit 2-8
An Attack on a Platoon of the 28th Division
An entire platoon of infantry in the 28th Division became gas casualties before reaching the front. While moving
forward toward Chateau-Thierry, the soldiers stopped to rest in shallow shell craters near the road, a common occur-
rence, before decontaminating them. The obvious garlic smell, emanating from holes made by yellow cross shells, was
diluted from recent rains. Unbeknownst to them, the holes were contaminated by mustard. The soldiers awoke with
backs and buttocks so badly burned that the skin appeared to be flayed.
Data sources: (1) Spencer EW. The History of Gas Attacks Upon the American Expeditionary Forces During the World War, Parts I-III. Edge-
wood Arsenal, Md: Chemical Warfare Service, US War Department; 1928. (2) Cochrane RC. The 3rd Division at Chateau Thierry, July
1918; study number 14. In: Gas Warfare in World War I. U.S. Army Chemical Corps Historical Studies. Army Chemical Center, Md: US
Army Chemical Corps Historical Office; 1959: 14, 84, 86.
27
Fig. 2-15. Overview and detailed maps of 2nd and 3rd Division operations in Chateau-Thierry and Belleau Wood.
28
Fig. 2-16. Company A, Seventh Machine Gun Battalion,

guarding the Marne from Chateau-Thierry, France. At the
time this photograph was taken, Chateau-Thierry was under
bombardment from German lines across the river. June 1,
1918. US Signal Corps photograph.
Carlisle, Pa.
shells used against the 1st Division was 7-fold that of

gas shells, and the reported chemical and wounded
casualty statistics were similar. The Germans predomi-
nantly used chlorine, bromine arsenic, mustard, and
phosgene shells on the AEF at Cantigny.
Aisne Defensive
Fig. 2-17. US Field Artillery, 2nd Division sending over
French 75-mm gas shells into the Bois de Belleau, France,
The significance of the Cantigny victory was over- during the Battle at Belleau Wood. June 30, 1918. US Signal
shadowed by the battle along the Aisne, some 50 miles Corps photograph.
to the northwest, where the Germans broke through Photographs: Courtesy of US Army Military History Insti-
nine British and French divisions with the aid of gas tute, Carlisle, Pa.
and captured 50,000 Allied soldiers (Exhibit 2-8). The
French and British defenders were taken by surprise,
and their positions were quickly overrun on a 40-mile (Figures 2-16, 2-17, and 2-18) launched a counterattack
front. The German army progressed rapidly, capturing on June 34 with the assistance of the French 10th
Aisne bridges completely intact along the way. Their Colonial Division. This offensive pushed the Germans
thrust toward Rheims failed, but Soissons was taken, back across the Marne to Jaulgonne.35,38 During the
and by May 31, the German army reached the outskirts defense of Chateau-Thierry, the 3rd Division suffered
of Chateau-Thierry on the Marne, less than 40 miles from 1,777 chemical casualties.37
Paris (Figure 2-15). If the AEF had not quickly plugged the
breach in this line at Chateau-Thierry and Belleau Wood, Belleau Wood
the Germans would have marched the 40-mile track to
Paris unchallenged along the Paris-Metz Road.35,37,38 The 2nd Division (5th and 6th Marine regiments)
captured the Bois de Belleau Wood under heavy gas
Chateau-Thierry shelling, mostly mustard, from June 6 to 26. The casu-
alties on the first day of the assault (Figure 2-19) were
Chateau-Thierry formed the tip of the German ad- the highest in Marine Corps history until the capture
vance towards Paris. The AEFs 2nd and 3rd divisions of Japanese-held Tarawa in November 1943.35,38,39
29
Fig. 2-19. Treating American gas casualties, mainly mustard,

during the attack of Belleau Wood. 1918. US Signal Corps
photograph.
Fig. 2-18. Linemen of the 5th Field Signal Brigade, 3rd Divi- Carlisle, Pa.
sion, repair broken wire during a gas attack. Chateau-Thierry,
France, June 21, 1918. US Signal Corps photograph.
Photograph: Courtesy of US Army Military History Institute, (1,246).40 By July 18 the German offensive was halted
Carlisle, Pa. once more, and the initiative passed to the Allies. The
German war effort never recovered from the tremen-
dous psychological blow of this failure.
The Germans took back the sector, which changed
hands six times before the Germans were expelled. Aisne-Marne Offensive
The 2nd Division suffered 3,152 chemical casualties
in the Chateau-Thierry sector during the capture of Several days before the Germans launched their
Belleau Wood, Vaux, and Bouresche,39 and the French abortive Champagne-Marne drive, the French high
renamed the wood Bois de la Brigade de Marine, command made plans for a general converging of-
in its honor. fensive against the Marne salient. France issued orders
on July 12 for the attack to begin on the 18th, with five
Champagne-Marne Defensive French armies taking part. Five divisions of the French
XX Corps, accompanied by the American 1st and 2nd
The Allies were prepared for the two-pronged Ger- AEF divisions (see Figure 2-20), led the assault.35,41,42
man assault on each side of Rheims on July 15 (Figure Early on July 18 the two American divisions and a
2-20). Plans for the attack had leaked out of Berlin, and French Moroccan division launched the main blow
Allied airplanes had detected unusual activity behind at the northwest base of the salient near Soissons. By
the enemy front. Marshal Ferdinand Foch, commander July 28 the American contingent included the 3rd,
of the Allied forces, had time to draw up reserves, 4th, 28th, 32nd, and 42nd divisions (see Figure 2-20).
and Henri Philippe, the French commander, skillfully The Germans retreated across the Aisne and Vesle
deployed his troops in defense-in-depth tactics.35,41 rivers, resolutely defending each strong point as they
Consequently, the German drive east of Rheims fell went. By August 6 the Aisne-Marne offensive and the
far short of its objective. The attack west of the city German threat to Paris were over. The eight AEF divi-
succeeded in pushing across the Marne near Chateau- sions in the action spearheaded much of the advance,
Thierry once again, but was checked there by French demonstrating offensive gas capabilities that helped
and American units. The primary AEF units involved inspire new confidence in the war-weary Allied armies
in this action were the 3rd and 42nd divisions, with (Figures 2-21 and 2-22). About 270,000 Americans took
support from the 26th and 28th divisions and the 369th part in the battle. Heavy losses were incurred by the
Infantry.41 (The 3rd Divisions 38th Infantry became 3rd Division (2,146 chemical casualties) and 28th Divi-
known as the rock of the Marne at this battle.35,41) The sion (1,092 chemical casualties).37 The 32nd Division
3rd and 28th Divisions suffered 789 and 378 chemical suffered nearly 1,300 chemical casualties in the taking
casualties, respectively, during the defense.37 The 42nd of Fismes, the key to the advance from the Vesle to the
incurred the largest number of chemical casualties here Aisne River.42
30
Fig. 2-20. US participation in the Second Battle of the Marne. (a) Champagne-Marne defensive . (b) Aisne-Marne offensive.
31
Fig. 2-21. American troops firing on German positions while

under heavy gas attack in the trenches of France during the
Aisne-Marne offensive. US Signal Corps photograph.
Carlisle, Pa.
Oise-Aisne Offensive
In mid August, the French started a series of drives

on their front, which extended about 90 miles from
Reims westward through Soissons to Ribecourt on Fig. 2-22. American infantrymen of the 167th Infantry, 42nd
the Oise River (Figure 2-23).35,43 Coordinating with the Rainbow Division marching through German gas wearing
British, five French armies advanced on the Somme Boche gas masks and box respirators near Bouvardes, France.
July 29, 1918. The mounted soldiers in the counter-marching
to the north and the Americans advanced to the east.
procession are French dragoons returning from patrol. US
The AEFs 32nd Division and part of the French 10th Signal Corps photograph.
Army spearheaded the penetration of the enemys Photograph: Courtesy of US Army Military History Institute,
main line on August 22 and captured the town of Carlisle, Pa.
Juvigny, a key high ground, on August 30. The 32nd
completely breached the German front, forcing them
to abandon the Vesle River line.35 The American III (see Figure 2-2). American units from Flanders to Swit-
Corps (28th and 77th divisions) fought with the French zerland were shifted into the area near the salient.35,43,45
6th Army east of Soissons, which, in late August, held Fourteen American and four French divisions assigned
the western part of the Vesle River sector extending to the First Army for the operation contained ample
from Braine to Courlandon. As the Germans retreated infantry and machine-gun units for the attack; how-
from the Vesle northward to the Aisne valley in early ever, because of the earlier priority given to shipping
September, the III Corps took part in the aggressive infantry (at the urging of the British and French), the
pursuit operations. During the Oise-Aisne offensive, First Army was short of artillery, tank, air, and other
the AEF suffered 2,776 casualties, 573 of which were support units essential to a well-balanced field army.
attributable to chemical agents.44 At Pershings insistence, this was the first major opera-
tion carried out by an independent American force,
Saint Mihiel but it was subordinated to the much larger Meuse-
Argonne offensive in late September.43,45
By September 1918, with both the Marne and the The Saint Mihiel offensive began on September 12
Amiens salients eliminated, one major threat to lateral with a 3-fold assault on the salient. The main attack
rail communications behind the Allied lines remained: was made against the south face by two American
the old Saint Mihiel salient near the Paris-Nancy line corps. On the right was the I Corps, on the left, the
32
Fig. 2-23. US participation in the Oise-Aisne offensive.

IV Corps (Figure 2-24). A secondary thrust was car- near Verdun and the western edge of the high, rough,
ried out against the west face along the heights of the and densely wooded Argonne Forest (Figure 2-26).38,50
Meuse by the V Corps. The AEF used scant offensive Pershing hoped to launch an attack with enough mo-
gas because shelling would have negated their sur- mentum to drive the elaborate German defense lines at
prise attack, but it suffered significant casualties from Montfaucon, Cunel, and Barricourt into an open area
German gas. Data from the division gas hospitals beyond and, in a coordinated drive with the French
state that the 90th Division alone experienced 1,390 Fourth Army on the left, effectively cut off the Sedan-
chemical casualties (460 mustard and the rest from Mzires railroad. The Meuse-Argonne offensive oper-
lachrymators [tear gasses] and sternutators [sneezing ated over four phases because of stalled gains and the
agents]) during the 5-day battle, compared to 275 replacement of exhausted and depleted divisions. By
from the 26th Division.45,46 November 11, 1918, the AEF closed up along the Meuse
and, east of the river, advanced toward Montmdy,
Meuse-Argonne Briny, and Metz, ending hostilities.35,47
General Pershing summarized the results of the
At the end of August, Marshal Foch submitted plans Meuse-Argonne campaign, the greatest battle in
to the Allied commanders for a final offensive along American history up to that time, in his final re-
the entire western front (see Figure 2-2, Figure 2-25). port:
Pershing and the AEF struck a zone about 20 miles
wide between the heights of the Meuse on the east Between September 26 and November 11, 22 Ameri-
33
Fig. 2-24. Overview and detailed map of US participation in the Saint Mihiel offensive.
34
Fig. 2-25. Overview of Meuse-Argonne offensive.

35
Fig. 2-26. US infantry advancing under gas bombardment

against German entrenched positions. US Signal Corps
photograph.
Carlisle, Pa.
can and 4 French divisions, on the front extending

from southeast of Verdun to the Argonne Forest, had
engaged and decisively beaten 47 different German
divisions, representing 25 percent of the enemys en-
tire divisional strength on the western front.
The First Army suffered a loss of about 117,000 in

killed and wounded. It captured 26,000 prisoners, 847
cannon, 3,000 machineguns, and large quantities of
material.48
Fig. 2-28. Blinded by sulfur mustard. Gassed American

Expeditionary Forces soldiers with eyes bandaged, at Field
Hospital No. 13. Near Caply, France. July 2, 1918. US Signal
Corps photograph.
Carlisle, Pa.
Approximately 20,000 chemical warfare casualties

were reported among the divisions of the First Army
during the Meuse-Argonne campaign (Figure 2-27).49
Gas casualties accounted for 22% of all casualties in
the campaign. The 3rd Division suffered 1,237 chemi-
cal casualties, the 26th Division 1,942,46 and the 33rd
Division 2,400.50
Aftermath of Battle
Fig. 2-27. American doctors treating a soldier wounded in
head, 1918. US Signal Corps photograph. The armistice of November 1918 ended the worlds
Photograph: Courtesy of US Army Military History Institute, first chemical war. Of the approximately 26 million
Carlisle, Pa. casualties suffered by the British, French, Russians,
36
Fig. 2-30. Members of the Sixth Field Artillery, first Division,

in action among bursting shells near Exermont, Ardennes,
France. October 4, 1918. US Signal Corps photograph.
Carlisle, Pa.
chemical agents in retaliation and during offensive

operations (Figure 2-30). At the end of the war, the
United States had developed the best protective mask,
abundant munitions, and trained troops (Figure 2-31).
The CWS had 1,680 officers and 20,518 enlisted person-
nel controlling the Armys chemical warfare program.27
Fig. 2-29. An American gas casualty in the front line trenches

of the Toulon Sector in France. March 21, 1918. US Signal
Corps photograph.
Carlisle, Pa.
Italians, Germans, Austro-Hungarians, and Ameri-

cans, around a million were gas casualties. Of the
total 272,000 US casualties, over 72,000, or about one
fourth, were gas casualties (Figure 2-28). Of the total
US gas casualties, approximately 1,200 either died in
the hospital or were killed in action by gas exposure.
No casualties or deaths were attributed to biological
warfare, which was also used in World War I.25 With the
Fig. 2-31. Members of the Chemical Warfare Service decon-
aid of the CWS, the US Army successfully recovered taminating a typical mustard-laden shell hole near Hanlen
from its early poor performance and survived repeated Field, Marne, France. December 4, 1918. US Signal Corps
toxic chemical attacks against its troops (Figure 2-29). photograph.
Likewise, by the end of the war, the 1st Gas Regiment Photograph: Courtesy of US Army Military History Institute,
and numerous US artillery units successfully used toxic Carlisle, Pa.
37
Table 2-2
Historical Summary of Chemical Warfare Agents Used in World War I
Common Names Chemical Date

Type of Agent Chemical Agent and Shell Markings Formula Introduced Comments
Sneezing/ Dianisidine chlo- Niespulver C14H16N2O2ClSO3 October 27, Used in Ni-Shell at Battle of
vomiting, rosulphonate 1914 Neuve-Chapelle
respiratory (Germany)
irritant, or Diphenyl chloro- Sternite; DA; Clark I; (C6H5)2AsCl July 10, 1917 Discovered in 1881 by Michae-
sternutating arsine Blue Cross (Germany) lis and LaCoste; introduced
agents at same time as mustard gas
Diphenyl cyano- Sternite; DC; CDA; (C6H5)2AsCN May 1918 Developed in May 1918 as an
arsine Clark II; Blue Cross (Germany) improvement over Clark I
No. 1
Ethylcarbazol (C6H4)2NC2H5 July 1918 Introduced at the Battle of the
(Germany) Marne
Diphenylamine- DM; Adamsite (C6H4)2NHAsCl Never used Patented by Leverkusen Farb
chloroarsine on battle- werk in 1915; synthsized by
field German chemist Wieland
during WWI; discovered
by American chemist Major
Roger Adams during war
Phenyldichloro- Sternite; Blue Cross C6H5AsCl2 September
arsine No. 1 1917
(Germany)
Ethyl dichloro- Dick; ED; Blue C2H5AsCl2 March 1918 First called Yellow Cross 1 but
arsine Cross (Germany) not as effective as a vesicant,
later incorporated into Green
Cross 3 artillery shells
Ethyl dibro- C2H5AsBr2 September Used only as a mixture with
moarsine 1918 ethyl dichloroarsine in Green
(Germany) Cross 3
Methyl dichloro- Methyldick; MD; CH3AsCl2 Never used
arsine Blue Cross on battle-
field
Tearing or Ethyl bromoac- CH2BrCOOC2H5 August First combat gas used in
lacrimatory etate 1914 WWI
agents (France)
Xylyl bromide T-Stoff; White Cross C6H4CH3CH2Br January First used in artillery shells
1915 fired against Russians at
(Germany) Bolimov
Benzyl bromide Cyclite; T-Stoff; C6H5CH2Br March 1915
White Cross (Germany)
Bromomethyl- Homomartonite; Bn- CH3COCH- July 1915
ethyl ketone Stoff; White Cross BrCH3 (Germany)
Ethyl iodoac- SK (South Kensing- CH2ICOOC2H5 September Principal lacrimator used by
etate ton, England) 1915 (Great British; first used at Battle of
Britain) Loos September 24, 1915
Benzyl iodide Fraissite C6H5CH2I November
1915
(France)
(Table 2-2 continues)
38
Table 2-2 continued
Bromobenzyl- Camite; CN C6H5CHBrCN July 1918 Only tear gas manufactured by

cyanide (France) CWS in any quantity during
WWI
Chloroacetophe- CN C6H5COCH2Cl Postwar Discovered by Graebe in 1869
none (United
States)
Chloroacetone Tonite; A-Stoff; White CH3COCH2Cl November Substitute for ethyl bromoac-
Cross 1914 etate in hand/rifle gas gre-
(France) nades
Bromoacetone Martonite; BA; B- CH3COCH2Br July 1915
Stoff; White Cross (Germany)
Iodoacetone Bretonite CH3COCH2I August
1915
(France)
Acrolein Papite CH2CHCHO January
1916
(France)
Chloropicrin N i t ro c h l o ro f o r m ; CCl3NO2 July 1916 Lacrimator
Aquinite; PS; NC; (Germany);
Klop August
1916
(Russia)
Phenylcarbylam- Phenylisocyanide May 1917

C6H5CNCl2 Lacrimator
ine chloride chloride (Germany)
Pulmonary Chlorine Bertholite; Red Star; Cl2 April 22,
agents (lung Chlor 1915
irritants or (Germany)
choking Methylsulfuryl Villantite; C-Stoff ClSO3CH3 June 1915 First to be successfully used
gases) chloride (Germany) in projectiles (trench mortar
bombs & hand grenades)
E t h y l s u l f u r y l Sulvanite ClSO3C2H5 June 1915
chloride (France)
C h l o r m e t h y l - Palite; K-Stoff; C- ClCOOCH2Cl June 18, K-Stoff when used in shells,
chloroformate Stoff 1915 C-Stoff when used in trench
(Germany) mortars and projector
bombs
Dimethyl sulfate Rationite; D-Stoff (CH3)2SO4 August
1915
(Germany)
Perchlormethyl- Carbon tetrachlorsul- SCCl4 Septem- Introduced at Battle of Cham-
mercaptan fide; Clairsite ber 1915 pagne; first use of gas shell
(France) by French army
Phosgene Carbonyl chloride; COCl2 December White Star used extensively
Collongite; CG; D- 19, 1915 by British in 1916 Battles of
Stoff; White Star (Germany), the Somme
(Phosgene + Chlo- possibly
rine); Green Cross earlier in
May 1915
against
Russia
39
Table 2-2 continued

Diphosgene Trichlormethylchlo- ClCOOCCl3 May 1916 First used at Verdun in retalia-
ro f o r m a t e ; S u r- (Germany) tion of French phosgene used
palite; Superpalite; February 1916
P e r s t o ff ; G re e n
Cross
Thiophosgene L a c r i m i t e ; G re e n
Cross
Chloropicrin N i t ro c h l o ro f o r m ; CCl3NO2 July 1916 Discovered by English chem-
Aquinite; PS; NC; (Germany ist Stenhouse in 1848; British
Klop & Allies); called it vomiting gas
August
1916
(Russia)
Phenylcarbylam- Phenyl isocyanide C6H5CNCl2 May 1917
ine chloride chloride (Germany)
D i c h l o r o d i m - Labyrinthic sub- (CH2Cl)2O January Exerts a peculiar action on the
ethyl ether & stances; Bibi; Cici (CH2Br)2O 1918 labyrinth of the ear, altering
dibromodim- (Germany) equilibrium
ethyl ether
Phenyldichloro- Sternite C6H5AsCl2 September The first toxic lung-injuring
arsine 1917 agent
(Germany)
Ethyldichloro- Dick; ED C2H5AsCl2 March 1918
arsine (Germany)
Phenyldibro- C6H5AsBr2 September
moarsine 1918
(Germany)
Vesicants Dichlorethylsul- Sulfur mustard; S(CH2CH2)2Cl2 July 12,
or blister phide LOST; Yperite; HS; 1917 (Ger-
agents Yellow Cross many)
Ethyldichloro- Dick; ED C2H5AsCl2 March 1918
arsine (Germany)
C h l o r v i n y l d i - Lewisite CHClCHAsCl2 Never used The major American contribu-
chloroarsine on battle- tion to the chemical weapon
field inventory but never used
in war time; developed by
Captain Winford Lee Lewis
of the CWS in 1917; Germans
claim they manufactured it in
1917 prior to the American
discovery
Methyldichloro- Methyldick; MD; CH3AsCl2 Never used Discovered by Baeyer in 1858;
arsine Blue Cross on battle- Americans studied it in-
field tensely at the end of WWI;
not used by either side
D i b ro m o e t h y l Brom LOST S(CH2CH2)2Br2 Never used Studied by Germany in the
sulfide on battle- closing days of the war
field
Systemic or Hydrogen cya- Hydrocyanic acid; HCN July 1, 1916 Exclusively used by French in
blood agents nide Vincennite; Man- (France) WWI; usually mixed with
ganite; Forestite other chemicals (arsenic
trichloride, stannic chlo-
ride, and chloroform) to in-
crease its stability and make
it heavier
40
Table 2-2 continued

Cyanogen Ce (Austrians); CB CNBr September
bromide (British); Campillit; 1916
Campilite; E-Stoff (Austria)
Cyanogen Vitrite; Mauginite CNCl October Maybe used as early as July
chloride 1916 1916; exclusively used by
(France) French army in WWI; often
mixed with arsenic trichlo-
ride
Phenylcar- Phenylisocyanide C6H5CNCl2 May 1917
bylamine chloride (Germany)
chloride
CWS: Chemical Warfare Service

WWI: World War I
However, the potential for future chemical wars now defense must consider the use of gas to have been in
loomed, as expressed by one US Army officer: its infancy. He must draw very few lessons for the fu-
ture use of gas based on past performances. He must
only use those lessons as pointing the way and not as
Gas was new and in an experimental stage through-
approaching a final result. The firing of steel as shell
out the war and hence the man who plans for future
passed its zenith with the passing of the Argonne fight.
Never again will the world see such a hail of steel on
battlefields, but in its place will be concentrations of
gas and high explosives as much greater than the
Exhibit 2-9 World War as that was greater than the Civil War.51(p4)
HOW TO TELL THE GASES, by Major In contrast, Fritz Haber, the Nobel laureate chem-
Fairfax Downey, Field Artillery ist who, more than anyone else, was responsible for
the development and fielding of chemical weapons
Grandma smelled geranium, for use by Kaiser Wilhelm IIs army, downplayed the
Started feeling kind of bum, importance of chemical warfare as a weapon of mass
Sure, you guessed the trouble right destruction. In an interview published in New York in
Grandma whiffed some lewisite. 1921, he concluded, Poison gas caused fewer deaths
than bullets.52(p10) General Pershing summed up his
Dont you find my odor sweetish? opinion of the new chemical warfare shortly after the
Said flypaper to the fly.
conclusion of World War I, saying, Whether or not gas
I smell just like chloropicrin,
And youll think youd like to die. will be employed in future wars is a matter of conjec-
ture, but the effect is so deadly to the unprepared that
Maud Miller on a summer day, we can never afford to neglect the question.48(p77)
Smelled the odor of new-mown hay, A comprehensive list of chemical warfare agents
She said to the Judge who was turning green, used by and against the AEF during World War I, along
Put on your mask! That theres phosgene! with their dates of introduction, is provided in Table
2-2. A more humorous description of the major gases
Apple blossoms, fresh and dewy? experienced by the AEF in World War I can be found
Normandy and romance? Hooey!
in Major Fairfax Downeys poem, How to Tell the Gases
For the charming fragrance then known,
Now is chloracetophenone. (Exhibit 2-9).9
Never take a chance if American Expeditionary Forces Chemical Warfare

Garlic you should strongly sniff. Casualties
Dont think Mussolinis passed,
Man, youre being mustard-gassed. Gas was responsible for approximately 2% of the
Reproduced with permission from: Waitt AH. Gas Warfare: the deaths in World War I, but it caused considerably
Chemical Weapon, its Use, and Protection Against it. New York, greater numbers of battlefield casualties (Figure 2-32).
NY: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce; 1943: 49. Nevertheless, it is difficult to account for the total num-
41
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Fig. 2-32. American Expeditionary Forces gas casualties in World War I. Casualty statistics reflect those Americans treated in
American, French, British, and Belgian field hospitals. The categories Not Distributed and Other reflect those American
units not organized into divisions.
ber of gas cases in the surgeon generals records. Base neurotic malingerers feigning illnesses to leave the front
hospitals of the French and British divisions received lines. Although pulmonary intoxication from chemical
many of the early AEF chemical casualties. Therefore, weapons was common, death was often the result of
these American casualties were either not statistically influenza, a major problem in World War I. Chemical
recorded as chemical casualties or were counted under toxicity as the result of inhalational or dermal exposure
British or French statistics. to agents often led to bacterial infection and death.
In addition, gas officers, who were responsible Base hospitals underestimated the effects of chemicals
for compiling chemical casualty statistics, arrived on casualties because many mortalities were tallied
in Europe after the first few AEF divisions. Conse- as death secondary to influenza, rather than from the
quently, they were unable to tally chemical casualty initial chemical insult. The majority of the gas casualty
statistics early in the war, when lack of discipline in reports filed included immediate deaths only (most
the trenches caused the greatest numbers of chemical likely due to a combination of shrapnel and gas); they
casualties. often did not include deaths from gas exposure that
Also, chemical casualties from inhalation were diffi- occurred days or weeks later. Chemical shelling was
cult to prove because only pulmonary signs and symp- also the cause of many cases of psychoneuroses. Food
toms were evident. Medical personnel viewed soldiers contamination from dispersed chemicals in the air was
with no clear dermatological signs and symptoms as a major paranoia among World War I soldiers.
The 1920s
An international push to ban chemical weapons into operation. During the Russian civil war and Allied
followed the conclusion of the war (see Chapter 4). intervention in the early 1920s, both sides had chemical
Despite the treaties, rumors of chemical warfare attacks weapons and isolated chemical attacks were reported.
plagued the world throughout the 1920s. Besides the Later accounts accused the British, French, and
United States and the major World War I powers, sev- Spanish of using chemical warfare at various times
eral other countries began to develop chemical warfare during the 1920s.4,53 The Berber-led resistance move-
capabilities, and some countries put their capabilities ment against French and Spanish colonialism in
42
North Africa had resulted in key victories against the offense, defense, and preparedness gained during the
Spanish army, forcing their retreat to the Moroccan war. During congressional hearings, Secretary of War
coastline by 1924. The following year, France forged Newton D Baker testified, We ought to defend our
a counterattack with Spain to subdue the rebellion. army against a gas attack if somebody else uses it, but
Fighting lasted a year, with the alleged use of mus- we ought not to initiate gas.58(p3) Baker and Chief of
tard gas by Spain and France against the Berbers, Staff General Peyton C March used this philosophy
who were eventually defeated.54 Also in 1924, the to recommend abolishing the CWS and outlawing
Italians established the Centro Chemico Militaire, a chemical warfare by a treaty.59 Even General Sibert,
unified chemical warfare service, and began produc- when asked about the need for a permanent CWS
ing chemical agents, which attracted US attention.5557 and the possibility of chemical warfare in the future,
replied, Based on its effectiveness and humaneness,
Survival of the Chemical Warfare Service [chemical warfare] certainly will be an important
element in any future war unless the use of it should
The CWS, originally organized by the Army as a be prohibited by international agreement. As to
temporary war measure, was part of the National the probability of such action, I cannot venture an
Army only, not the Regular Army. Its temporary sta- opinion.60(p87)
tus was due to expire within 6 months after the end Several prominent civilian and military leaders
of the war (later extended to June 30, 1920). However, lobbied for a permanent chemical warfare organiza-
if the CWS disbanded, the US Army would almost tion (Figure 2-33). Lieutenant Colonel Fries, one of the
certainly forget the extensive experience of chemical strongest proponents of a permanent organization,
Fig. 2-33. Advertisement for the US Chemical Warfare Service.

Photograph: Courtesy of US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pa.
43
stressed the need for a central establishment, one that After 1919 almost all the work of the CWS moved
covered all aspects of chemical warfare. He drew on to Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, with only the head-
the lessons learned from the Great War, saying: quarters remaining in Washington, DC. Edgewood
became the center of training, stockpiling, and research
Had there been a chemical Warfare Service in 1915 and development. Initially, the CWS was authorized
when the first gas attack was made, we would have to train only its own troops in all aspects of chemical
been fully prepared with gases and masks, and the warfare while other Army elements were permit-
Army would have been trained in its use. This would
ted defensive training only. The CWS protested this
have saved thousands of gas cases, the war might
easily have been shortened six months or even a year,
limitation and finally in May 1930, the judge advocate
and untold misery and wasted wealth might have general ruled that both offensive and defensive train-
been saved.61(p4) ing was allowed for all troops.64
Leftover stocks of chemicals from World War I were
Fries also disagreed with the premise that treaties deemed sufficient for the Armys stockpile. In 1922,
could prevent warfare: to comply with the Limitation of Arms Conference,
the War Department ordered that the filling of all
Researches into poisonous gases cannot be sup- projectiles and containers with poisonous gas will be
pressed. Why? Because they can be carried on in out- discontinued, except for the limited number needed
of-the-way cellar rooms, where complete plans may in perfecting gas-defense appliances.65 The CWS was
be worked out to change existing industrial chemical only allowed to continue limited research and develop-
plants into full capacity poisonous gas plants on a ment based on predictions of future wars.65,66
fortnights notice, and who will be the wiser?23(p3) At the close of the 1920s, the CWS formalized the
standardization of chemical agents. Seven chemical
Although Friess comments were persuasive and agents and smokes were selected as the most impor-
eloquent, a young lieutenant more graphically ex- tant. The seven, with their symbols, were as follows:
pressed the opinion of those who understood the
nature of chemical warfare in a 1919 poem: mustard agent (HS; H for Hun-Stoffe,
S for the 25% solvent added to form crude
There is nothing in war more important than gas mustard. D later replaced the S, signifying
The man who neglects it himself is an ass
distilled or purified mustard);
The unit Commander whose training is slack
Might just as well stab all his men in the back.62(cover iv) methyldifluorarsine (MD);
diphenylaminechlorarsine (DM);
Proponents for a chemical warfare service won the chloroacetophenone (CN);
debate. On July 1, 1920, the CWS became a permanent titanium tetrachloride (FM);
part of the Regular Army. Its mission included de- white phosphorus (WP); and
veloping, procuring, and supplying all offensive and hexachlorethane (HC).
defensive chemical warfare material, together with
similar functions in the fields of smoke and incendiary Phosgene (CG) and lewisite (L) were considered less
weapons. In addition, the CWS was made responsible important. Chloropicrin (PS) and chlorine (Cl) were
for training the Army in chemical warfare and for or- rated the least important.4
ganizing, equipping, training, and employing special
chemical troops.27,63 New US Policy
Lean Years for the Chemical Warfare Service Further international attempts to ban not only the
use of chemical weapons but also all research, produc-
Despite having gained permanent status, the years tion, and training elicited a response that developed
after 1920 were lean ones for the CWS and the Army as into a new US policy on chemical warfare. Army
a whole. The CWS was authorized 100 Regular Army Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur stated
officers but never actually achieved that number. The the policy in a letter to Secretary of State Henry L
low point was 64 officers in 1923. Enlisted strength Stimson in 1932:
dropped to a low of 261 in 1919 and averaged about 400
In the matter of chemical warfare, the War Depart-
the rest of the decade. Civilian employees numbered
ment opposes any restrictions whereby the United
less than a thousand. The low point in funds was in States would refrain from all peacetime prepara-
1923, when the budget was $600,000.27 tion or manufacture of gases, means of launching
44
gases, or defensive gas material. No provision that more, the existence of a War Department agency
would require the disposal or destruction of any engaged in experimentation and manufacture of
existing installation of our Chemical Warfare Ser- chemical warfare materials, and in training for un-
vice or of any stocks of chemical warfare material foreseen contingencies is deemed essential to our
should be incorporated in an agreement. Further- national defense.59(p118)
The 1930s: Growing Threat of Chemical Warfare
The use of chemical weapons in the name of and wounded soldiers.6779

imperialist expansion awakened the international The chemical weapons devastated the unprepared
community during the 1930s, when Italy and Japan and unprotected Ethiopians, who had few antiaircraft
deployed their offensive chemical stockpiles against guns and no air force. Selassie described the situation
unprotected neighbors. In addition, a new chemical to the League of Nations:
threat emerged with the discovery of nerve agents,
poisons of extraordinary potency, by Dr Gerhard Special sprayers were installed on board aircraft
Schrader in Germany. While some countries used so they could vaporize over vast areas of territory
a fine, death-dealing rain. Groups of 9, 15, or 18
chemical weapons, others stockpiled them. No inter-
aircraft followed one another so that the fog issu-
national attempts to ban chemical warfare occurred ing from them formed a continuous sheet. It was
during the 1930s. thus that, as from the end of January 1936, soldiers,
women, children, cattle, rivers, lakes, and pastures
Italian-Ethiopian War were drenched continually with this deadly rain. In
order more surely to poison the waters and pastures,
The first major use of chemical weapons after World the Italian command made its aircraft pass over and
War I came in 1935 during the Italian-Ethiopian War. over again. These fearful tactics succeeded. Men
Italys fascist dictator, Benito Mussolini, launched an and animals succumbed. The deadly rain that fell
from the aircraft made all those whom it touched fly
invasion of Ethiopia from its neighbors Eritrea, an
shrieking with pain. All those who drank poisoned
Italian colony, and Italian Somaliland, that lasted ap- water or ate infected food also succumbed in dread-
proximately 7 months starting October 3. Viewed as ful suffering. In tens of thousands the victims of Ital-
a prelude to World War II, the Italian-Ethiopian War ian mustard gas fell.72(pp151152)
proved the effectiveness of chemical weapons and the
ineffectiveness of the League of Nations. By May 1936 Italys army had completely routed
Ethiopia protested the invasion to the League of the Ethiopian army. Italy controlled most of Ethiopia
Nations, which in turn imposed limited economic until 1941, when British and other allied troops recon-
sanctions on Italy. These sanctions, although not crip- quered the country. The US Army closely followed the
pling, put pressure on Italy to either win the war or war and sent Major Norman E Fiske to observe with
withdraw. The initial Italian offensive from Eritrea was the Italian army, and Captain John Meade to observe
not pursued with enough vigor in Mussolinis opinion, with the Ethiopian army. Their different conclusions
and the Italian commander was replaced. The new as to the role of chemical warfare in the conflict re-
commander, Marshal Pietro Badoglio, was ordered to flected the sides they observed. Major Fiske thought
finish the war quickly. He resorted to chemical weap- the Italians were clearly superior and that victory for
ons to defeat the Ethiopian troops led by Emperor them was assured. The use of chemical agents in the
Haile Selassie. Despite the Geneva Protocol of 1925, war was nothing more than an experiment. From
which Italy had ratified in 1928 (followed by Ethiopia my own observations and from talking with [Italian]
in 1935), the Italians dropped mustard bombs and junior officers and soldiers, Fiske reported, I have
occasionally sprayed mustard from airplane tanks. concluded that gas was not used extensively in the
They also used mustard agent in powder form as a African campaign and that its use had little if any ef-
dusty agent on the African desert sands to burn the fect on the outcome.77(p20) His opinion was supported
unprotected feet of the Ethiopians. There were rumors by others who felt that the Ethiopians had made a
of phosgene and chloropicrin attacks, but these were serious mistake in abandoning guerrilla operations
never verified. The Italians attempted to justify their for a conventional war.
use of chemical weapons by citing the exception to the On the other hand, Captain Meade thought that
Geneva Protocol restrictions that referred to acceptable chemical weapons were a significant factor in winning
use for reprisal against illegal acts of war, stating that the war. They had been used to destroy the morale of
the Ethiopians had tortured or killed their prisoners the Ethiopian troops, who had little or no protection,
45
and to break up any attempts at concentrating forces. program, the Japanese had an extensive chemical
It is my opinion that of all the superior weapons weapons program and produced agent and munitions
possessed by the Italians, mustard gas was the most in large numbers by the late 1930s. During the war with
effective, Meade said. It caused few deaths that I China, Japanese forces reportedly began using chemi-
observed, but it temporarily incapacitated very large cal shells, tear gas grenades, and lacrimatory candles,
numbers and so frightened the rest that the Ethiopian often mixed with smoke screens. By 1939 the Japanese
resistance broke completely.77(p20) had reportedly escalated to using mustard agent and
Major General JFC Fuller, also assigned to the Italian lewisite. The weapons proved effective against the
army, highlighted the Italian use of mustard agent to untrained and unequipped Chinese troops. The Chi-
protect the flanks of columns by denying ridgelines nese reported that their troops retreated whenever
and other key areas to the Ethiopians. He said that in the Japanese used smoke, thinking it was a chemical
place of the laborious process of picketing the heights, attack.53,81
the heights sprayed with gas were rendered unoccupi-
able by the enemy, save at the gravest risk. It was an Organophosphorus Compounds
exceedingly cunning use of this chemical.74(p143)
Still another observer stated: After the Italian-Ethiopian War, the possibility of
war in Europe became the primary concern of the US
I think [where mustard] had [the] most effect was on
Army. The CWS closely studied the chemical war-
animals; the majority of the Ethiopian armies consist-
ed of a number of individual soldiers, each with his fare capabilities of Germany and Italy, but it clearly
donkey or mule on which he carried rations. These overlooked the secret German development of nerve
donkeys and mules ate the grass and it killed them, agents. Although largely isolationist in policy, the
and it was that which really broke down morale more United States began gradually increasing its military
than anything.75(p81) posture because of the deteriorating political situation
in Europe. Official policy, however, remained against
BH Liddell Hart, another military expert, reconciled the employment of chemical warfare, and initially the
the two schools of thought, concluding that the facts CWS met with much resistance. Public opinion con-
of the campaign point unmistakably to the conclusion tinued to be solidly opposed to any chemical weapon
that mechanization in the broad sense was the foun- use, and President Franklin D Roosevelt refused to
dation on which the Italians military superiority was permit the redesignation of the CWS as a corps in
built, while aircraft, the machine gun, and mustard gas 1937. The US Army chief of staff finally approved two
proved the decisive agents.76(p330) CWS battalions just before the beginning of World
All observers seemed to agree that the Italian mili- War II.59
tary superiority would eventually have won, whether While Italy and Japan employed conventional
chemical agents were used or not. In general, the US chemical weapons during their respective invasions,
Army learned little from this war. The CWS annual Germany pioneered new chemical warfare technology
report for 1937 stated that situations involving the through the development of nerve agents. The history
employment of chemical agents have been introduced of nerve agent development had its roots with the Cala-
into a greater number of problems.78 The CWS Chemi- bar bean, used initially as an ordeal poison in witch-
cal Warfare School concluded that the use of gas in craft trials by African tribal peoples,8284 and later used
Ethiopia did not disclose any new chemical warfare medicinally.85 By 1864 the active compound, isolated
tactics,79 but only reconfirmed existing tactical use by Jobst and Hesse, was termed physostigmine.82
expectations. One senior Air Corps officer, perhaps not- This is the earliest use of a substance that works like a
ing Italys successful use of spray tanks, commented on nerve agent through inhibition of the enzyme cholin-
the schools class for Army Air Corps personnel, We esterase. Physostigmine, a member of the carbamate
want that course repeated again and again until all of class of reversible cholinesterase inhibitors, was sepa-
our people are thoroughly awake to the necessity for rately isolated in 1865 by Vee and Leven and called
training and preparation.80(p153) eserine.82
The first organophosphorus (OP) cholinesterase in-
Japanese Invasion of China hibitor was tetraethyl pyrophosphate, synthesized by
Wurtz and tested by Clermont in 1854.86 Later chemists
The next war that drew the interest of chemical made contributions to the science of OP compounds,87
warfare experts began when the Japanese invaded 90
but the toxic nature of such compounds was unreal-
China in 1937. In addition to their biological warfare ized until the 1930s, when an investigation into both
46
cember 23, 1936, Kukenthal tested the new compounds

Exhibit 2-10 on leaf lice and noted one to be particularly potent.
All of the insects died after being sprayed with a con-
ORGANOPHOSPHORUS
centration of only one part in 200,000 of the deadly
CATEGORIZATION
substance.20,84 During preliminary manufacture of the
compound, Kukenthal noticed its equally impressive
Altogether, there are five organophosphorus com- effects in humans. A spilled droplet from a solution
pounds recognized as nerve agents, designated GA could constrict the pupils and cause labored breathing
(tabun), GB (sarin), GD (soman), GF (cyclosarin),
immediately. Even Schrader and his colleague felt the
and VX by their North Atlantic Treaty Organization
effects upon themselves, requiring several weeks to
military abbreviation. The G series is so named be-
cause these compounds originated in Germany. The A recover. This was the first of the nerve agents or gases,
through F designation was based on the chronological called tabun.
order of synthesis of each agent. Soman was termed In 1936 tabun was reported to the chemical weapons
GD rather than GC because the latter acronym had section of the German military prior to patenting. As a
already been established in the medical literature, pos- colorless, odorless poison, tabun was an ideal chemi-
sibly reserved for gonococcus. GF was the fourth agent cal weapon. In May 1937 Schrader demonstrated its
synthesized, but interest in this nerve agent declined deadly effects to Colonel Rdiger, a German ordnance
in favor of the other organophosphorus compounds.
officer and director of the Heereswaffenamt (HWA
The fifth agent (VX) was named for being venomous
[German army weapons agency]). The military was
and was synthesized many years later at Porton Down,
England, in 1952. Only tabun, sarin, and soman were impressed with the effects of the compound on the
categorized as the Trilon group. The toxicity and nervous system and classified the project for further
lethality of these three nerve agents on the civilian research. The military assigned various names to the
population can be approximated based on their lethal new substance, including Trilon-83, Le100, Pr-
doses. The lethal dose for oral ingestion of tabun is parat 9/91, Nr 100, Gelan, Grnring 3, Stoff
roughly 100 to 200 mg min/m3, and 50 to 100 mg min/ 83, and Stoff 100, but tabun was the name that
m3 for sarin. Only 200 to 1000 mg of tabun applied to stuck.20,91 After World War II, the CWS designated it
the skin is sufficient to kill an adult human. The 12,000
GA, for German agent A.
tons of tabun stocks alone that were reported at the end
of the war could kill 60 billion individuals.
During a 2-year period between 1937 and 1939, the
HWA assigned a large number of chemists to evaluate
Data source: German Munition Plants and Depots During World tabun and work on developing new nerve agents.4,92,93
War II. Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md: US Army Chemical
and Biological Defense Command; 1996.
The next step was mass production by the military, so
the HWA built a test plant in Mnsterlager. Schrader
filed a patent on August 2, 1938, but it was kept secret
until September 1951.94 Schrader continued to synthe-
size esters of fluorophosphoric acid, including diiso-
carbamate-type (eg, physostigmine-type, reversible) propyl fluorophosphate, which Lange and Krueger
and OP-type (irreversible) cholinesterase inhibitors had synthesized in 1932 and 1933.
led to a series of monumental discoveries by German On December 10, 1938, 2 years after the discovery
scientists (Exhibit 2-10). of tabun, Schrader discovered a second lethal agent.
The earliest reported incident of OP toxicity from This nerve agent was initially designated T-144, the
inhalation came from the laboratory of Willy Lange building number at the Dyhernfurth plant responsible
at Friedrich Wilhelms University. In 1932 Lange and for its pilot production.20 It also went by the codenames
his student, Gerde von Krueger, prepared dialkyl Le 213, Trilon-46, and Grnring 4.20,91,95 The com-
monofluorophosphates and noted their toxic fumes.84,86 pound was eventually dubbed sarin after the four
They described the effects of the vapors on themselves, individuals involved in the initial production process
reporting breathing difficulties and blurred vision (Gerhard Schrader, Otto Ambros [IG Farben board
that lasted many hours before subsiding. Toward member], Colonel Rdiger [HWA], and Hans-Jrgen
the close of 1936, at the chemical and pharmaceutical von der Linde [HWA]). Some believe the R is named
conglomerate IG Farbenindustrie, Gerhard Schrader for fellow German chemist Franz Ritter.95,96 Animal
accidentally discovered powerful OP compounds testing showed sarin to be five to ten times as lethal
during his investigation into new insecticides. After as tabun. As the second nerve agent to be synthesized,
preparing them, Schraders biologist colleague, Hans sarin was later designated GB, for German agent
Kukenthal, tested them for insecticidal activity. On De- B, by the United States.
47
World War II
The start of World War II in 1939 and the rapid Berlin prepared the first samples of sarin, the German
collapse of France in the spring of 1940 stimulated a army launched its invasion of Poland in September
major increase in the rate of American rearmament. No 1939. Hitlers speech in Danzig on September 19, 1939,
major use of chemical agents occurred, but rumors and alluded to Germanys new weapons of war, against
reports of incidents of chemical warfare attracted the which enemies would be defenseless. Although the
attention of intelligence officers. The possibility that construction had begun earlier, full capacity produc-
massive chemical attacks could happen any day kept tion of the first toxic agents did not begin until May
CWS officers pushing for preparedness. A newspaper 1943.102 The third and most deadly nonpersistent nerve
article reflected the common prediction circulating in agent, soman, was synthesized in 1944 by Richard
the press, saying, European military authorities have Kuhn, a research director at the Max Planck Institute
predicted that gas would be used in the present war, for Medical Research in Heidelberg. Soman is sug-
if at any time the user could be sure of an immedi- gested to have been named after either the Greek word
ate and all-out success from which there could be no for sleep or the Latin word for bludgeon.84
retaliation.97(p37) Major General William N Porter, the The resources, organization, and quality of chem-
new chief of the CWS, warned that Hitler was likely to ists thrust into this top secret mission to synthesize
use chemical weapons at any moment. He also felt nerve agents, develop new ones, and provide coun-
that no weapon would be too bad to stop or defeat termeasures against their devastating effects was on
Hitler,98(p31) and wanted to fight fire with fire in the par with the American team of physicists working on
event an enemy chooses to use poison gas.99(p36) the Manhattan Project. Tons of nerve agent munitions
Although much of Germanys and Japans chemical were synthesized and stockpiled in Germany during
weapons programs did not become known until after World War II, and neither the United States nor Great
the war, their actual threat was impressive. Building Britain were aware of them at the time. Meanwhile,
on its experience in chemical agent use in China, Japan no country on the Allied side possessed a weapon that
produced about 8,000 tons of chemical agents during could match the lethality of nerve gas.
the war, loading mustard agent, a mustard-lewisite
mixture, and phosgene in shells and bombs and HCN British Development of Nerve Agents
into glass grenades and mortar and artillery shells. This
effort was dwarfed by the German capability. While Germany was a decade ahead in the race
to synthesize nerve agents, British scientists Bernard
German Production Charles Saunders and Hamilton McCombie stumbled
upon the toxic effects of esters of monofluorophos-
During the war, Germany produced approximately phoric acid.104 Diisopropyl fluorophosphate, a lethal
78,000 tons of chemical warfare agents, including inhalant, was of particular interest to Saunders and
about 12,000 tons of tabun between 1942 and 1945 McCombie. Saunders reported his findings on the
and about 1,000 lb of sarin by 1945. Key nerve agent toxicity of diisopropyl fluorophosphate to the Ministry
weapons were the 105-mm and 150-mm shells, the 250- of Supply in London on December 11, 1941. Among the
kg bomb, and the 150-mm rocket. The latter held 7 lb findings were pupillary constriction and a fast onset of
of agent and had a range of about 5 miles when fired action. The first American report on the mechanism of
from the six-barrel Nebelwerfer launcher. Mustard action by diisopropyl fluorophosphate came out im-
agent was produced in the greatest volume and used mediately after the war.105 Nevertheless, tons of nerve
to fill artillery shells, bombs, rockets, and spray tanks. agent munitions were synthesized and stockpiled in
Phosgene, of somewhat less importance, was loaded in Germany during World War II, and neither the United
250-kg and 500-kg bombs. About 2,000 tons of nitrogen States nor Great Britain were aware of them at the time.
mustards were produced and used in artillery shells Meanwhile, no country on the Allied side possessed a
and rockets. Germany also captured a large amount weapon that could match the lethality of nerve gas.
of chemical munitions from France, Poland, the Soviet
Union, Hungary, and other occupied countries.4,28 Why Germany Did Not Authorize Use of Chemical
Germany began constructing extensive factories Weapons
in Germany (Raubkammer, Falkenhagen) and later
Poland (Dyhernfurth) for the massive production of The reason Hitler did not give an order to use nerve
tabun, sarin, cyanogen chloride, hydrocyanic acid, and agents in World War II, a major blunder for Germany,
N-Stoff (chlortrifluoride).20,96,100,101 Just as scientists in remains a mystery. Nerve agents could have altered the
48
course of the war, slowing the Allied D-Day invasion I. Furthermore, Hitler ordered the output from the
by several months, enough time for the introduction of nerve agent factories to increase in 1943, despite the
long-range V-weapons to Great Britain. Hitler decided limited availability of material required to synthesize
early in the war not to use chemical weapons on the the agents. Hitler dedicated extensive resources to
battlefield because he initially wanted peace more filling shells with nerve agents for his army and air
than he wanted to wipe out targets. When he finally force.
thought about using them late in 1944, he no longer Others speculate that the German high command
possessed the air supremacy to drop poison gas bombs. mistakenly believed the Allies had developed the
The reverse scenario was true for the British, who had nerve agents simultaneously and feared Allied re-
the means to deliver gas on the Germans. Early in the taliation as the Axis retreated. Albert Speer, the chief
war, the British did not have enough stock produced architect in Nazi Germany and minister of armament
to support a gas war. By the time they had the stocks in Hitlers cabinet, and Otto Ambros were called to
of weapons to slow the blitzkrieg in 1944, the British Hitlers eastern front headquarters in May 1943 and
were already on the offensive with air supremacy and again in 1944 to discuss the use of gas. Ambros and
gas could only hamper their march into France and Speer argued against gas. Ambros believed that the
Germany. Allies could produce more traditional chemical agents
A popular explanation for Germanys reluctance to than Germany. When later addressing the Nuremburg
use gas is that Hitler, a victim of a chlorine gas attack War Crimes Tribunal, Ambros said that he warned
during World War I, disliked poison gas and would Hitler about using nerve agents.107 Ambross affidavit
only use chemical agents as a last resort. Hitler was regarding his conversation with Hitler stated that the
wounded on at least two occasions in World War I formulas for tabun and sarin were already known by
when he served as a dispatch runner with the rank of the Allies because the nature of nerve agents had been
corporal. In Mein Kampf, Hitler described his own gas disclosed in technical journals dating back to 1902. He
experience after being blinded by a mustard gas attack said, I have justified reasons to assume that tabun, too,
in Flanders at the third battle of Passchendaele: is known abroad. I know that tabun was publicized as
early as 1902, that Sarin was patented, and that these
In the night of October 13, the English gas attack on substances appeared in patents.107(p1044)
the southern front before Ypres burst loose; they Ambros was aware that the Americans knew the
used yellow-cross gas, whose effects were still basic precursor compounds in the years prior to the
unknown to us as far as personal experience was
war but had not appeared to continue work in the
concerned. In this same night I myself was to be-
come acquainted with it. On a hill south of Wervick,
field. The Germans may have speculated this was an
we came on the evening of October 13 into several attempt at censorship and a further indication that the
hours of drumfire with gas shells which continued United States had developed an arsenal equal to that
all night more or less violently. As early as mid- of Germany. Ambros argued that assumption caused
night, a number of us passed out, a few of our com- Germany to shelve nerve agents, a costly decision in
rades forever. Toward morning I, too, was seized light of Allied knowledge regarding nerve agents at
with pain which grew worse with every quarter the time. In reality, scientists at Edgewood Arsenal and
hour, and at seven in the morning I stumbled and Porton Down (Edgewoods British counterpart) did
tottered back with burning eyes; taking with me my
not know about either agent nor about the German
last report of the War.
A few hours later, my eyes had turned into glow-
antidote, atropine. It is unknown whether Ambros was
ing coals; it had grown dark around me. Thus I telling the truth about his meeting with Hitler, but it is
came to the hospital at Pasewalk in Pomerania, and now known that tabun was kept secret until 1951 and
there I was fated to experiencethe greatest villainy sarin was never patented.
of the century.106(p118119) In his Nuremburg testimony, Speer pointed to Paul
Joseph Goebbels, Hitlers propaganda minister, and
When Germany surrendered, Hitler was angry, feeling Robert Ley, a former chemist and head of the German
that his physical pain and the deaths of his comrades Labor Front, as the main proponents of gas. Martin
were suffered in vain. However, he never states an Bormann, head of the Nazi party chancellery and
aversion to the use of gas. Hitlers private secretary, and Hermann Ochsner, com-
Hitler also alluded to Germanys potential to use manding general of all German chemical troops, were
nerve agents in public speeches. Hitlers actions and other prominent figures who advocated the instigation
words did not give the perception that he was afraid of chemical warfare against the Allies. When Speer was
to use nerve agents, despite his negative personal questioned about proposals to use poison gas warfare,
experiences with gas on the battlefields of World War he responded:
49
I was not able to make out from my own direct ob- 3-fold. First, trench warfare necessitated the use of gas
servations whether gas warfare was to be started, but to break a stalemate, but gas led to only minimal gains
I knew from various associates of Leys and Goeb- in territory. Second, gas was more advantageous to de-
bels that they were discussing the question of using fensive positions. Third, large advances were possible
our two new combat gases, Tabun and Sarin. They
with lightning strikes using tanks and a highly mobile
believed that these gases would be of particular ef-
ficacy, and they did in fact produce the most frightful military, and this strategy would allow fewer casualties
results. We made these observations as early as the by overwhelming the opponent at the point of attack.
autumn of 1944, when the situation had become criti- Advancing into an area covered with persistent agents
cal, and many people were seriously worried about would hinder the mission. However, one could argue
it. . . . All sensible army people turned gas warfare that defensively drenching the beaches of Normandy
down as being utterly insane, since, in view of their with nerve agent might have slowed the Allied D-Day
[the Allies] superiority in the air, it would not be long invasion until the arrival of reinforcements. After the
before it would bring the most terrible catastrophe war, General Omar Bradley admitted his dread about
upon German cities.108(pp527528)
such a defense, saying, When D-Day finally ended
without a whiff of gas, I was vastly relieved. For even
Speer also cites his concerns about protecting the a light sprinkling of persistent gas on Omaha Beach
German soldiers from the effects of nerve agents. On would have cost us our footing there. [Gas would
the question of nerve agent production, effects, and have] forced a decision in one of historys climactic
preparations made for use in the war, Speer shed light battles.110(p237)
on the implementation of possible German plans:
Capture of German Facilities and Scientists
I cannot tell you that in detail. I am not enough of an
expert. All I know is that these two gases both had
a quite extraordinary effect, and that there was no Upon capture of a German ammunition dump in
respirator, and no protection against them that we April 1945 (Figures 2-34 and 2-35), Allied scientists at
knew of. So the soldiers would have been unable to Porton Down became aware of German tabun gas and
protect themselves against this gas in any way. For its physiological effects for the first time.111 Only then
the manufacture of this gas we had about three fac- did the Allied command believe in the existence of Hit-
tories, all of which were undamaged and which until lers new war gas, despite intelligence gathered from
November 1944 were working at full speed. When a captured German scientist on May 11, 1943, in Tuni-
rumors reached us that gas might be used, I stopped
sia. The captured chemist worked at the nerve agent
its production in November 1944. I stopped it by the
following means. I blocked the so-called preliminary
laboratory at Spandau and provided valuable informa-
production, that is, the chemical supplies for the
making of gas, so that the gas-production, as the Al-
lied authorities themselves ascertained, after the end
of December to the beginning of January, actually
slowed down and finally came to a standstill. Begin-
ning with a letter which is still in existence and which
I wrote to Hitler in October 1944, I tried through legal
methods to obtain his permission to have these gas
factories stop their production. The reason I gave him
was that on account of air raids the preliminary prod-
ucts, primarily cyanide, were needed urgently for
other purposes. Hitler informed me that the gas pro-
duction would have to continue whatever happened,
but I gave instructions for the preliminary products
not to be supplied any more.108(p527)
Despite nerve agent testing, manufacture, and stock-

piling by the German military during World War II,
chemical weapons were never deployed. Many argue
Fig. 2-34. Storage of approximately 2,000 German tabun
that the Nazi philosophy of blitzkrieg accounted for
bombs shipped into Schierling Chemical Depot after the
the reluctance to use nerve agents:109 a quick strik- occupation of West Germany by American troops in the af-
ing offense with tanks would only be slowed by an termath of World War II. Photograph: Courtesy of Chemical
engagement using poison gas. The lessons Germany and Biological Defense Command Historical Research and
learned about chemical warfare from World War I were Response Team, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.
50
a Soviet army also captured factories producing tabun

and sarin, in addition to extensive documentation on
the agents research and manufacture.20,103,109 The So-
viets reassembled one of the German factories in Rus-
sia, resuming production of tabun and sarin by 1946.
Eisenhowers decision not to enter Berlin before
the Soviet army seemed costly in terms of the German
facilities and intelligence captured by the Soviet Union;
however, the Allies capture of the majority of German
scientists may have been a larger prize. The organized
capture and detainment of German military scientists
at Kransberg Castle was known as Operation Dust-
bin. Notable captured Germans included most of the
chemists and technicians from Dynhernfurth, Heinrich
Horlein, Gerhard Ehlers, Wilhelm Kleinhans, Werner
b
von Braun, Albert Speer, Richard Kuhn, Walter Hirsch,
Otto Ambros, and Gerhard Schrader. The Allies also
captured coveted documents relating to the large-scale
manufacture of nerve agents. Just prior to the fall of
Falkenhagen, its director hid thousands of documents
concerning Dyhernfurth, laboratory notebooks, and
technical reports related to nerve agent production,
which were later discovered by Allied intelligence.
The British also obtained critical documents related
to the tabun and sarin pilot plants at Raubkammer
from German scientists there and later shipped the
disassembled plants to Porton Down.103
Evidence of Gas Use in Germany
Although gas was not used on the battlefields of

World War II, HCN gas (trade name Zyklon B), devel-
Fig. 2-35. Decontamination of weaponized nerve agents after oped by Fritz Haber, was used in Nazi concentration
World War II. The sequence depicts a Green Ring 3 tabun-
camps first for delousing to control typhus and later
filled aerial bomb about to be vented, drained, and decon-
for killing prisoners during the Holocaust. (The first-
taminated. May 1946. (a) Team members pour a mixture of
sodium hydroxide and bleach into a pit. (b) The pit that will generation cyanide insecticide, known as Zyklon A,
contain the fully decontaminated tabun as it drains from the contained methyl cyanoformate as the active agent.)
bomb. Photograph: Courtesy of Chemical and Biological Upon exposure to air, the substrates in Zyklon B elabo-
Defense Command Historical Research and Response Team, rated vapors of HCN. In Nazi gas chambers, Zyklon B
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md. facilities were disguised as shower and decontamina-
tion rooms. In 1941 experiments with Zyklon B were
performed in Auschwitz I as well as other camps such
tion about tabun.20,103 Other captured German chemists as Dachau, the longest running concentration camp.
also revealed the existence of the antidote, atropine. Zyklon B was provided by the German companies
Kuhn, who had discovered soman, was taken into Degesch and Testa, under license from patent holder IG
custody when American troops arrived in Heidelberg. Farbenindustrie.103 After the war, two directors of Tesch
After initially denying any involvement in military were tried by a British military court and executed for
research,103 Kuhn told interrogators that all documents their part in supplying the chemical.
concerning soman were buried in an abandoned mine
shaft east of Berlin. The Soviet army entered Berlin be- German Plans for Gas
fore the Americans and the documents were recovered
by Soviet Colonel VA Kargin, who took them back to the Both sides in the war had active plans to use chemi-
Karpov Institute in Moscow.20,103 Capturing the prized cal weapons in the event that the other side used
soman documents in Berlin was a major coup. The them first. The Soviet chemical arsenal was seriously
51
lacking compared to the stocks available to Germany, a cold-blooded calculation made as to how it would
and Soviet gas masks had technical defects, which pay to use poison gas. . . . One really must not be
may explain Stalins no-first-use policy. 109 During bound within silly conventions of the mind whether
the war, the Soviets lacked chemical discipline and they be those that ruled in the last war or those in
reverse which rule in this. . . . We could drench the
adequate protective equipment to instigate a chemi-
cities of the Ruhr and many other cities in Germany
cal war. During retreats in 1941, many Soviet troops in such a way that most of the population would be
discarded their gas masks and other equipment to requiring constant medical attention. . . . It may be
lighten their loads. By the end of 1941 fighting had several weeks or even months before I shall ask you
reached a stalemate around Leningrad. Germany to drench Germany with poison gas, and if we do it,
planned to breach the Soviet defenses by means of a let us do it one hundred per cent. In the meantime,
chemical attack along 20 kilometers near the city, but I want the matter studied in cold blood by sensible
had insufficient supplies of artillery and gas shells to people and not by the particular set of psalm-singing
carry out the maneuver.109 uniformed defeatists which one runs across now here
now here now there.113(p501)
In September and December of 1942 General Her-
mann Ochsner, chief of Germanys chemical warfare
division, carried out two attacks with a nonlethal gas US Policy and Plans for Gas
to smoke out Soviet guerillas hiding in caves along
the Kerch peninsula, a stretch of land forming the While planning for a traditional, European-style
opening to the Sea of Azov. The Soviet government war, the CWS also monitored Japans use of chemical
claimed the German army was responsible for thou- weapons in China, which increased the US Armys
sands of deaths and had used chemical weapons in interest in chemical warfare preparation.114 The CWS,
the attack.109 however, was still unprepared to fight a major chemical
Chemical weapons were not used by either side war on the level of World War I. Increased budgets and
during fierce fighting at Moscow. After defeating personnel helped with war planning, but to actually
German troops at Moscow, Kursk, and Stalingrad, field chemical weapons and build chemical stockpiles
a change from defense to offense in Soviet military first required industrial mobilization and massive
strategy renewed an interest in chemical weapons. production.
Soviet intelligence before the Battle of Kursk warned President Roosevelt established a no-first-use
of German use of the chemical weapons. Chief of Staff policy for chemical weapons early in the war, which
AM Vasilev wrote this directive [translated]: was reiterated in an official statement in 1943: We
shall under no circumstances resort to the use of
The general staff possesses information to the effect such weapons [chemical] unless they are first used
that the German command has recently heightened
by our enemies.115(p6) The policy was backed up
the preparedness of its forces for the use of chemi-
cal weapons. . . . There are enough risk takers in the
by a statement of warning: Any use of gas by any
German command who, relying on the fact that they axis power, therefore, will immediately be followed
could catch us by surprise, might decide on a des- by the fullest possible retaliation upon munition
perate gamble and use chemical weapons against centers, seaports and other military objectives
us.112(p91) throughout the whole extent of the territory of such
axis country.115(pp67)
British Plans for Gas US plans for the final invasion of Japan, code-
named Operation Downfall, called for the invasion
Prime Minister Churchills position on gas warfare of Kyushu Island in the fall of 1945, followed by an
is evident in a four-page memo sent to his chief of staff, invasion of the main island of Japan in the spring
General Hastings Ismay: of 1946. Planners predicted that the attack would
lead to a major chemical conflict because Japan had
I urge you to think very seriously over the question already used chemical weapons against China. The
of poison gas. . . . It is absurd to consider morality Army Air Force plans called for the use of persistent
on this topic when everybody used it [gas] in the last
100-lb bombs (mustard gas) and nonpersistent 500-
war without a word of complaint from the moralists
lb bombs (60% phosgene, 40% cyanogen chloride).
or the Church. On the other hand, in the last war the
bombing of open cities was regarded as forbidden. After Germanys surrender in May 1945, the CWS
Now everybody does it as a matter of course. It is contemplated augmenting their current arsenal of
simply a question of fashion changing as she does chemical bombs with captured stocks from Germany
between long and short skirts for women. . . . I want to address shortages based on required estimates for
52
a chemical attack of Japan. Mustard gas, phosgene, Demobilization and the Creation of the Chemical
and tabun were shipped back to the United States Corps
to be punched, drained, and used to fill American
ordnance rounds.116 It was subsequently determined The Army began demobilization activities almost
that US shells were unsuitable for tabun, but German immediately after the president proclaimed the end
10.5-cm projectiles could be used in US howitzers of hostilities. By early 1946 the CWS was effectively
(105-mm) with worn tubes because German shells demobilized and its military strength approached pre-
were slightly wider than US 105-mm shells.117 In the war levels. One observer commented, Gas warfare is
end, Japan surrendered after nuclear bombs were obsolete! Yes, like the cavalry and horsedrawn artillery,
dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima, and chemical it is outmoded, archaic, and of historical interest only.
warfare in the Pacific was averted. This is the atomic age!124(p3)
Although neither Germany nor Japan chose to initi- However, CWS chief Major General Porter advo-
ate chemical warfare with the United States, the CWS cated for the CWS before an Army board considering
spent the war training troops; designing chemical, postwar organization, resulting in the permanency
incendiary, smoke, explosive, and flame weapons and long sought by the chemical program: a corps desig-
protective equipment; and planning for a chemical nation. The Army finally agreed that the CWS, along
war. In addition to the M2 4.2-in chemical mortar,4,28,118 with the other technical services, should continue its
the CWS possessed 75-mm, 105-mm, and 155-mm existence as a distinct entity in the peacetime Army.
chemical rounds filled with mustard or lewisite. The On August 2, 1946, Public Law 607 changed the name
US Air Force had 100-lb mustard agent bombs; 500-lb of the CWS to the Chemical Corps.125
phosgene or cyanogen chloride bombs; and 1,000-lb After World War II, as Western defense became
phosgene, cyanogen chloride, or hydrocyanic acid increasingly based on the threatened use of nuclear
bombs. In addition, the new M33 spray tank could weapons, the Chemical Corps mission expanded to
hold 750 to 1,120 lb of mustard agent or lewisite. include radiological protection as well as chemical
None of these chemical weapons was used on the and biological research and development. At the same
battlefield during the war,4,119,120 but the prepositioning
of chemical weapons in forward areas resulted in one
major disaster and several near mishaps. The disaster
occurred December 2, 1943, when the SS John Harvey,
loaded with 2,000 M47A1 mustard agent bombs, was
destroyed during a German air raid at Bari Harbor,
Italy. The only members of the crew who were aware
of the chemical munitions were killed in the raid.
As a result of the ships destruction, mustard agent
contaminated the water in the harbor and caused
more than 600 casualties, in addition to those killed
or injured in the actual attack. The harbor clean-up
took 3 weeks and required large quantities of lime as
a decontaminant.121
US Lessons Learned
After the war, the phrase had the United States

been prepared for war in 1939, there would not have
been a war122(p24) was taken as a self-evident truth.
The CWS needed to be a permanent organization that Fig. 2-36. Decontamination of captured chemical stockpiles.
concentrated on training, research and development, A 250 KC (chemical cylinder) phosgene bomb as it drops into
and chemical warfare preparedness. This same lesson, a water tank, where the phosgene is neutralized by hydroliza-
from a slightly different angle, was reflected in the tion. The bomb has been vented prior to decontamination,
words of Under Secretary of War Kenneth C Royall to and the phosgene vapor can be seen escaping into the air.
Schierling, Germany. May 1946.
the chemical warfare specialists: The better job you
Photograph: Courtesy of Chemical and Biological Defense
do the less likely it is that you will have to put to actual Command Historical Research and Response Team, Ab-
use the products of your work.123(p41) erdeen Proving Ground, Md.
53
time, the corps concentrated on producing and fielding prevail in the future.126
nerve agent weapons and the assorted detection and
decontamination equipment required. Demilitarization of Captured Weapons
Major General Alden H Waitt, who replaced Porter
in November 1945, assessed the future of chemical At the end of the war, the United States was actively
warfare in 1946: involved in the demilitarization of the thousands of
captured munitions from German stockpiles (Figure
The fact that toxic gas was not used in the late war
[on the battlefield] does not justify a conclusion that 2-36). Following the occupation of Germany and Ja-
it will not be used in the future. Gas has not been pan, the Allies initiated a sea-dumping and weapons
out-moded as a weapon. The Germans developed disposal program to eliminate the large stockpiles of
new gases during World War II. The magnitude of captured chemical agents. Ships containing German
their preparedness for gas warfare is indicated by weapons were sunk in the North Sea as part of Op-
the fact that they had amassed more than a quarter eration Davy Jones Locker, but not all the German
of a million tons of toxic gas; their failure to use this weapons were destroyed. Between 1945 and 1947,
gas against us is attributable largely to their fear of some 40,000 of the 250-kg tabun bombs, 21,000 mus-
our retaliatory power. We cannot count upon other
tard bombs of various sizes, 2,700 nitrogen mustard
nations refraining from the use of gas when it would
serve their purpose. There were numerous instances rockets, and about 750 tabun artillery shells of various
in the late war in which the use of gas might have sizes were shipped to the United States. In addition to
had far-reaching results. Thus, there is no good rea- disposing of the enemy stockpiles, the United States
son for assuming that the considerations which pre- dumped the US lewisite stockpile into the sea during
vented the employment of gas in World War II will Operation Geranium in 1948.4,127
the 1950s
Korean War used for biological tests by the Russians in North Ko-
rea. These allegations have yet to be confirmed by the
With the onset of the Korean War in June 1950, Russians and were vigorously denied by the North
the Chemical Corps participated in its first military Koreans.129 The United States did not change its policy
action. The corps quickly implemented an increased about no first use of chemical weapons.
procurement program to supply the Army with defen- At the end of the Korean War, the Chemical Corps
sive equipment and a retaliatory chemical capability. was in a much stronger position than it had been at
Within a short time, however, the Armys policy on the end of World War II. Although the corps slightly
chemical warfare and the lessons learned from the past reduced its units and personnel and terminated many
were disputed, particularly as the military situation in of its procurement contracts in the months following
Korea changed. The action in Korea raised the question the 1953 armistice, Major General Egbert F Bullene, the
of whether to initiate chemical warfare to save lives. new chief chemical officer, summed up the feeling of
Many of the Chemical Corps supporters favored the the corps regarding the Korean War and the Cold War
use of chemical weapons as humane weapons of war, in general: Today, thanks to Joe Stalin, we are back
particularly to offset the enemys superior numbers. in business.130(p8)
One officer stated bluntly that the use of mustard,
lewisite and phosgene in the vast quantities which we Changes in the Chemical Corps
are capable of making and distributing offers the only
sure way of holding Korea at the present time. We are During the 1950s the concept of chemical warfare
not playing marbles. We are fighting for our lives. Lets continued to change radically. The phrase that one
use the best means we have to overwhelm the enemy could push a button to start a war became popu-
scientifically and intelligently.128(p3) lar. The lesson learned from the Korean Warthat
Although the North Koreans and Chinese alleged a limited war, fought without nuclear weapons and
that US forces employed chemical weapons on the possibly against satellite states, not the real enemy
battlefield, there is no evidence that the Chemical determined much of the Armys future planning. The
Corps used them, although it did use smoke and flame, fact that two wars had come and gone without the
as well as riot control agents to quell riots by prisoners employment of chemical weapons made it necessary
of war. In 1968 a Czech general who defected to the for successive chief chemical officers to continually
United States reported that US prisoners of war were remind the Army and the country that the capabilities
54
of the Chemical Corps constituted insurance against The Chemical Corps gave top priority to the in-
the possibility of chemical attack in the future. vestigation of these compounds. Of the compounds
Throughout the 1950s the Chemical Corps con- investigated, VX was selected in 1957 for pilot plant de-
ducted several extensive studies to improve its or- velopment and dissemination studies. It was standard-
ganization and training capabilities. A new training ized in December 1957. The annual report for that year
center at Fort McClellan, Alabama, opened in 1951 concluded the reign of mustard gas, which has been
and offered more space and training options. After called the King of Battle gases since it was first used in
more than 30 years in Maryland, the Chemical School July 1917, will probably come to an end.134(p100)
moved to Fort McClellan early in 1952.4 The emphasis The corps initially planned to contract with private
on individual training for chemical warfare resulted industry for a 10-ton-per-day production plant. A later
in the elimination of the unit gas officer, who had decision put the plant at the inactivated Dana Heavy
previously been responsible for chemical training and Water Plant of the Atomic Energy Commission at
readiness, in 1954. After the change, troop command- Newport, Indiana, within the Wabash River Ordnance
ers assumed the responsibility and were expected to Works. Construction was delayed because of a patent
include chemical and biological training in all their dispute that resulted in a restraining order. In 1959
field exercises and maneuvers.131 Food Machinery and Chemical Company, the low bid-
der, won the contract and construction was planned
Nerve Agent Production and Development for 1960. Shortly after the approval, the Chemical
Corps supplemented the contract to provide for a VX
In 1950 the Chemical Corps began constructing its weapon-filling plant.134,135
first full-scale sarin production complex based on pilot The remainder of the 1950s was spent developing
plant work accomplished at the Army Chemical Center new delivery systems and new protective gas masks
(formerly Edgewood Arsenal). The production of sarin and improving chemical detection systems, decontami-
was a 5-step process divided between two sites. For nating methods, and treatments, as well as weaponiz-
the first two steps of the process, the corps constructed ing sarin. Although delivery systems for VX nerve
a plant at Muscle Shoals, Alabama, later designated agent were initiated during the 1950s, no system was
Site A, or the Muscle Shoals Phosphate Development standardized. In addition, many of the sarin delivery
Works, which was completed in 1953. The last three systems took longer to develop than planned and some
steps of the process were conducted at a new plant at were never standardized.
Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Colorado. In 1951 the corps
fully standardized sarin, and by 1953 it was producing Medical Research on Human Volunteers
the agent. After only 4 years of production, the plants
stopped manufacturing because the stockpile require- Concerned with the effects of nerve and other
ments for the agent had been met. The plants then went chemical agents on soldiers, the Chemical Corps began
into inactive status with layaway planned. The related extensive studies to determine the dangers of exposure
munitions filling plants also went into standby status and the proper kinds of treatment. These studies ex-
a year later.4,132 posed soldiers to low levels of agents to demonstrate
Part of the reason for the sarin plants closure was the effects of treatment and to investigate the agents
the development of a new nerve agent. While searching affects on humans.
for new insecticides, chemists at Imperial Chemicals Before the 1950s the use of humans in testing had
Limited in the United Kingdom came across com- been conducted on an ad hoc basis and little documen-
pounds extremely toxic to humans. The British shared tation survived. During the 1950s a more formal vol-
the discovery with the United States in 1953. The unteer program was established at the Army Chemical
Chemical Corps examined the new compounds and Center that drew on local military installations and
determined that a new series of nerve agents had been utilized a specific consent procedure, ensuring that
discovered that were more persistent and much more each volunteer was briefed prior to the experiment.
toxic than the G-series agents. This new series was Between 1955 and 1975 over 6,000 soldiers participated
designated the V-series in 1955 because the agents in this program and were exposed to approximately
were venomous in nature. These agents enter the body 250 different chemicals.136
through the skin, bypassing protective masks. They
were 1,000-fold more toxic than sarin when applied The Incapacitant Program
to the skin, and 2- to 3-fold more toxic when inhaled.
A drop the size of a pinhead on bare skin could cause During the 1950s the Chemical Corps also became
death within 15 minutes.4,133 interested in developing chemical weapons that
55
incapacitated rather than killed its targets. In 1951 rocket, atomic, thermo-nuclear, chemical and bio-
the Corps awarded a contract to the New York State logical weapons.140(p26) In 1959 Major General Marshall
Psychiatric Institute to investigate the clinical effects Stubbs, the new chief chemical officer, assessed the
of mescaline and its derivatives. The contractor tested growing Soviet chemical threat, saying:
6 derivatives and the corps tested 35 derivatives. The
results of the investigation indicated that mescaline Soviet chemical weapons are modern and effective
and its derivatives would not be practical as agents and probably include all types of chemical muni-
because the doses needed to bring about mental confu- tions known to the West, in addition to several dis-
sion were too large.137 semination devices peculiar to the Russians. Their
ground forces are equipped with a variety of pro-
In 1955 the Chemical Corps formally established a
tective chemical equipment and they are prepared
project called psychochemical agents. The next year, to participate in large scale gas warfare. They have
the program was redesignated K-agents. The objec- a complete line of protective clothing which will
tive was to develop a nonlethal but potent incapacitant provide protection in any gas situation and a large
that could be disseminated from airplanes in all envi- variety of decontaminating equipment. . . . I believe
ronments. The program was conducted at the Army that I have given you enough to make you aware
Chemical Center and examined nonmilitary drugs like that they pose a threat to the free nations of the
lysergic acid (LSD) and tetrahydrocannabinol (related world.141(pp 89)
to marijuana). None of these drugs, however, were
found to be of military worth.134,137139 The next year Major General Stubbs talked to
various groups around the country about the need for
The Growing Soviet Threat greater urgency in attaining chemical preparedness.
Contending that to both military and civilian popu-
While addressing the Communist Party Congress lations the threat of chemical warfare was as great
in Moscow in 1956, Soviet Defense Minister Georgi as the threat of nuclear warfare, he reported that the
Zhukov warned, [A]ny new war will be charac- Soviets had about one sixth of their total munitions in
terized by mass use of air power, various types of chemical weapons.142
The 1960s: Decade of Turmoil
In January 1961 Secretary of Defense Robert S troops were structurally separated from the corps,
McNamara initiated about 150 projects to provide an particularly in the areas of research, development,
appraisal of US military capabilities. Two of these, and training.143
Project 112 and Project 80, had significant impact Colonel John M Palmer, head of the Chemical Corps
on the chemical and biological weapons program. Training Command, reflected on the problem in 1960:
Project 112s objective was to evaluate chemical and
biological weapons for use as strategic weapons and The quickest way to reduce the effectiveness of a mil-
for limited war applications. The result of this study itary training program is to train without purpose or
sense of urgency. Unfortunately, for 40 years an aim-
was a recommendation to highlight chemical weapons
less approach has largely characterized unit chemi-
and particularly to increase long-term funding, which cal warfare training in the U.S. Army. . . . Much of
was approved for immediate action by the deputy the Army still appears to visualize chemical warfare
secretary of defense. One of the responses was the . . . as an annoying distraction from normal combat
creation of Deseret Test Center, Utah, intended for training.144(p28)
extra-continental chemical and biological agent testing,
including trials at sea, and arctic and tropical environ- The 1962 Army Reorganization
mental testing. The new center was jointly staffed by
the Army, Navy, and Air Force, with testing scheduled Based on the problems associated with training
to begin in 1962. combat troops for chemical warfare, the Defense
Project 80 resulted in a committee to review the Department ordered a far-reaching realignment of
organization of the Army. The project committee functions in 1962. Most of the technical service head-
eliminated the technical services and distributed quarters establishments, including that of the Chemical
their functions to various elements of the new Army Corps, were discontinued, and their functions merged
organization. McNamara felt that the Chemical Corps into three field commands. The training mission of the
knowledge, experience, and training was not being chief chemical officer was assigned to the Continental
infused into the rest of the Army because the combat Army Command; the development of doctrine was
56
assigned to the new Combat Development Command; the Army to make clear the differences between lethal
and the logistical function, including all arsenals, and nonlethal chemicals.
laboratories, and proving grounds, was assigned to The expansion of hostilities in Vietnam caused a
the new Army Materiel Command.145 gradual rise in the level of development and procure-
The effects of the reorganization were quickly felt. ment of chemical-warfarerelated items. By virtue of
Within 2 years, the chemical warfare training program their training and specialized equipment, Chemical
had significantly improved. One junior officer, A Har- Corps personnel were able to make a number of con-
rigan, described the changes: tributions, primarily in the areas of riot control and
flame weapons.
We have set up special 40-hour or 80-hour schools
so that we can have a trained CBR [chemical-biolog- Yemen Civil War
ical-radiological] officer and noncommissioned offi-
cer in every company-sized unit. We have assigned
While the United States was becoming involved
a chemical officer down to brigade, and a chemical
operations sergeant down to battalion. We set aside
in the Vietnam War, a small war in the Middle East
a certain number of hours annually for classroom brought the subject of chemical warfare back from the
instruction for the troops. We set up special blocks hypothetical. In September 1962, just after the death
of instruction for surveying and monitoring teams. of Imam Ahmad, a military coup of Yemeni dissidents
We list CBR defense as a subject integrated into our overthrew the royalist monarchy and declared a repub-
training schedules, and we may even throw tear gas lic. The new imam escaped assassination and retreated
grenades or other agents at troops in the field.145(p16) with his royalist forces into the mountains of northern
Yemen, initiating a counter revolt against the repub-
Harrigan, however, concluded that more realistic field lican forces. Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser
training was still required to prepare soldiers for the recognized the new republic and sent military forces to
modern battlefield with nuclear weapons and nerve help defeat the royalist troops, who were supported by
agents.145 the kingdoms of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and later Jordan,
straining inter-Arab tensions, mainly between Saudi
Beginning of the Vietnam War Arabia and Egypt.148,149
Egyptian efforts to defeat the royalist forces and
The growing guerrilla war in South Vietnam made destroy their civilian support bases proved particu-
the Army again reexamine its training program, chemi- larly difficult in the mountainous terrain of northern
cal warfare readiness, and no-first-use policy. In 1963 Yemen. Frustrated by the successful royalist guerrilla
one observer stated that, after years of almost total tactics, Egypt employed chemical weapons they had
lack of interest, the U.S. has taken up guerrilla warfare developed in the 1950s and obtained from the Soviet
training as though it were something new under the Union; defensive equipment was also obtained from
sun.146(p12) As part of that sudden interest, the role of the Soviets.150 Egypt was the first Arab state to use
chemical weapons again came under intense scrutiny chemical weapons. Despite having signed the 1925
and debate. That same year, Harrigan wrote in the Geneva Convention, which outlawed the use of chemi-
Armed Forces Chemical Journal, the best way for the U.S. cal weapons, Egypt employed chloroacetophenone
to achieve its military aims in Southeast Asia would tear gas, mustard blistering gas, phosgene, and nerve
be to rely on chemical warfare.146(p12) He described agents repeatedly from 1963 to1967.151
how soldiers could sanitize a large area with gases Some of these chemical weapons were made in mili-
and sprays that killed everything from vegetation to tary plant no. 801 in Abu-Zaabal, near Cairo. Egypt re-
humans.146 ceived mustard-gasfilled KHAB-200 R5 aerial bombs
In 1966 a retired US Army general suggested that and phosgene-filled AOKh-25 aerial bombs from the
mustard gas be used to clear Vietnamese tunnels. He Soviet air force and secured numerous mustard-filled
thought the use of low-lethality chemicals would save shells from British stocks abandoned in Egypt after
both American and Vietnamese lives by rendering the World War II.149,152,153 Some accounts attributed the
tunnels useless.147 Other observers and authors also chemical weapons to German scientists, usually de-
recommended revising the no-first-use policy. Public scribed as Nazis, who had been brought to Egypt by
opinion and national policy opposing the use of toxic President Nasser. Several sources reported that the
chemicals was apparently the deciding factor against Soviet Union, through its friendship with Egypt, used
their employment. The Army did, however, utilize Yemen as a testing ground for its chemical research
defoliants and nonlethal riot control agents in large program. Other reports mentioned Communist China
quantities. The negative worldwide response required as the supplier.154161
57
Egypt denied ever using chemical warfare during June finally attracted world attention to the events in
its support of the new republican forces, but early ac- Yemen. The Saudi government protested the Egyptian
counts and evidence of chemical warfare came from use of chemical weapons to the UN. U Thant, secre-
journalists in the area. On June 8, 1963, Soviet-made tary general of the UN, sought to confirm the use of
Egyptian air force airplanes dropped chloroacetophe- chemical weapons with the Egyptians, but they denied
none tear gas bombs on numerous royalist villages it. The UN apparently took little further notice of the
south of Sadah, near Saudi Arabia. Egypt allegedly situation. At the height of the conflict, Egypt had 75,000
used the bombs to terrorize or kill not only the vil- troops in Yemen, but the Six-Day War with Israel and
lage inhabitants but also the royalists hiding in caves subsequent defeat in June 1967 forced it to withdraw
and tunnels. An alleged attack took place in July 1963 troops from Yemen and negotiate a peace deal. The
against the village of Al Kawma and killed seven civil- Yemen civil war officially ended with the Compromise
ians. The United Nations (UN) investigated the allega- of 1970, a political agreement between the republican
tion by sending an observation team to Yemen, but its and royalist factions. A republican government was
report found no evidence of a chemical attack.154 formed in Yemen, incorporating members from the
Newspaper articles described additional chemical royalist faction but not the royal family.154161
attacks taking place from 1963 to 1967, although most Much of what the US Army learned from the Yemen
disagreed on the dates, locations, and effects of the civil war was negative. Reports of possible chemical
attacks. In January 1965 Egypt used a combination of use in certain areas of the world, particularly those
chloroacetophenone and mustard gas for the first time areas inaccessible to official and technical observers,
on villagers in the Mount Urush region. A concoction were difficult to confirm or even condemn without ac-
of phosgene and mustard was dropped on citizens curate and verifiable information. News reports alone
in the Sherazeih region, northeast of Sana, between proved informative but unreliable. Even samples from
March and July. The United States, involved in its own the alleged attacks apparently did not lead to further
controversy concerning the use of riot control agents political or military action. Most importantly, with the
in Vietnam, took little notice of the reports. world distracted by the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War and
In January 1967 an attack occurred on the Yemeni events in Vietnam, politics discouraged a universal
village of Kitaf. During this air raid, bombs were condemnation and follow-up response. In effect, the
dropped upwind of the town and produced a gray- world powers let the event pass much as they had
green cloud that drifted over the village. According to when Italy used chemical warfare against Ethiopia
newspaper accounts,165159 95% of the population up to in the 1930s.
2 km downwind of the impact site died within 10 to 50
minutes of the attack. All the animals in the area also Six-Day War
died. The estimated total human casualties numbered
more than 200. Another reported attack took place on The 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War came very close
the town of Gahar in May 1967, killing 75 inhabitants. to being the first major war in which both combatants
Additional attacks occurred that same month on the openly used nerve agents and biological warfare. On
villages of Gabas, Hofal, Gadr, and Gadafa, killing June 5, 1967, fearing a pending attack from its Arab
over 243 occupants. In addition, two villages in Saudi neighbors, Israel launched a preemptive strike against
Arabia near the Yemen border were bombed with Jordan, Egypt, and Syria. They invaded the Sinai Pen-
chemical weapons. insula, Jerusalems Old City, Jordans West Bank, the
Shortly after these attacks, the International Red Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights.
Cross examined victims, soil samples, and bomb frag- Reports soon appeared alleging that the Egyptians
ments and officially declared that chemical weapons, had stored artillery rounds filled with nerve agents
identified as mustard agent and possibly nerve agents, in the Sinai Peninsula for use during the war. Israelis,
had been used in Yemen. Much like the progression reflecting on Egypts possible testing of the weapons
of chemicals used during World War I, the Egyptians in Yemen earlier in the year, suddenly realized that
allegedly started with tear gases, which were meant to their troops and cities were vulnerable to attack. The
terrorize more than kill, before progressing to mustard fact that chemical weapons were not used during the
agents, which caused more serious casualties, and war was possibly due to Israels preemptive action or
finally to nerve agents, which were meant to kill large to the newspaper reports of the Yemen civil war. Israel
numbers quickly. This was the first use of nerve agents placed orders for gas masks with Western countries.
in combat. The combination of the use of nerve agents However, a UN-sponsored ceasefire ended the fighting
by the Egyptians in early 1967 and the outbreak of war on June 10, 1967, and the potential chemical war did
between Egypt and Israel during the Six-Day War in not occur.73,155,156,161
58
Development of Incapacitating Chemical Agents damaging, congressional outrage.
While concern over the use of chemical agents Operation CHASE

grew during the 1960s, the United States continued
its chemical agent production program. Although the The second event involved a series of sea dumps of
Newport VX production plant was completed in 1961 surplus chemical warfare agents, primarily mustard
and began producing agent, it operated for only 7 agent and some nerve agent, and a problem weapon
years before being placed on standby.4 system, the relatively new M55 rocket system. Al-
The only incapacitating agent (excluding riot control though the M55 had been standardized only 7 years
agents) standardized by the Army completed develop- before, the thin aluminum head design proved faulty
ment in 1962. Designated BZ, 3-quinuclidinyl ben- for long-term storage. The problem of leaking rockets
zilate was a solid but was disseminated as an aerosol. started in 1966, and a year later the Army began dispos-
The major problem with using the agent for military ing of the rockets, sealed in concrete vaults in the hulls
purposes was its prolonged time of onset of symptoms, of ships that were then sunk in ocean-disposal sites.
estimated at 2 to 3 hours, before the enemy became Operation CHASE, an ongoing program for disposing
confused and vulnerable. A second problem was the of conventional ammunition, began accepting chemi-
visible cloud of smoke produced during dissemination, cal weapons in 1967. That year, CHASE 8 disposed of
which limited the element of surprise.143 mustard agent in ton containers and M55 sarin rockets.
In June 1968 CHASE 11 disposed of sarin and VX in
Public Hostility Toward Chemical Weapons ton containers, along with additional M55 sarin and
VX rockets. In August 1968 CHASE 12 disposed of
The growing protests over the US Armys role in mustard agent in ton containers.4
Vietnam, the use of defoliants, and the use of riot These dumps created significant environmental
control agents both in Southeast Asia and inside concerns throughout the country, including fears of
the country, as well as heightened concern for the an accident during transportation of the weapons by
environment all gradually increased public hostility train from storage depots to loading docks, and envi-
toward chemical weapons. Three events particularly ronmental and commercial concern about the sunken
galvanized public attention: the sheep-kill incident agents effects on marine life.
at Dugway Proving Ground, Operation Cut Holes
and Sink Em (CHASE), and an accident with sarin Accident at Okinawa
at Okinawa.
On July 8, 1969, the Army announced that 23 US
Dugway Incident soldiers and 1 US civilian had been exposed to sarin
on Okinawa. The soldiers were cleaning sarin-filled
The first event, according to Dugway Proving bombs preparatory to repainting them when the acci-
Grounds incident log, started with a telephone call dent occurred.4 Although none of the individuals died,
on Sunday, March 17, 1968: the public announcement created two controversies.
First, up until that time, the Army had kept secret the
At approximately 1230 hours, Dr. Bode, University forward positioning of chemical weapons on Okinawa,
of Utah, Director of Ecological and Epidemiological and this acknowledgment created international con-
contract with Dugway Proving Ground (DPG), called cerns. Second, the accident pointed out the dangers
Dr. Keith Smart, Chief, Ecology and Epidemiology
of storing chemical weapons. With chemical weapons
Branch, DPG at his home in Salt Lake City and in-
formed him that Mr. Alvin Hatch, general manager
known to be stored at sites in the continental United
for the Anschute Land and Livestock Company had States near cities and residential areas, the fear of an ac-
called to report that they had 3,000 sheep dead in the cident escalated. On July 22, 1969, in response to these
Skull Valley area.162(pA-1) concerns, the Defense Department announced that it
would accelerate the previously planned removal of
Skull Valley was adjacent to Dugway, one of the the chemical agents from Okinawa.163
Armys open-air testing sites for chemical weapons.
Although the findings were not definitive, the general Changes to the Chemical Warfare Program
opinion was that nerve agents had somehow drifted
out of the test area during aerial spraying and had In April 1969 the secretary of defense tried to explain
killed the nearby sheep. Whether the Army was guilty the US chemical warfare policy to both the general
or not, the result was bad publicity and, even more public and to Congress, stating:
59
It is the policy of the United States to develop and civilians in adjacent areas.165(p16) The committees only
maintain a defensive chemical-biological (CB) capa- major concern was the movement of chemical agents
bility so that U.S. military forces could operate for by truck on public roads. It recommended resump-
some period of time in a toxic environment if neces-
tion of lethal agent open-air testing at Edgewood.165
sary; to develop and maintain a limited offensive ca-
pability in order to deter all use of CB weapons by the Before testing resumed, however, Congress passed
threat of retaliation in kind; and to continue a program Public Law 91-121 in November, imposing controls
of research and development in this area to minimize on the storage, testing, and disposal of agents outside
the possibility of technological surprise.164(p193) the United States and the testing and transportation
of chemical agents within the country. Further open-
Despite this statement, the UN released a report on air testing of lethal chemical agents was effectively
chemical weapons that July condemning the produc- banned.4
tion and stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction. In November 1969 President Richard Nixon took
Six days later, the United States acknowledged the action against chemical warfare, effectively stopping
Okinawa accident.4 On July 11, 1969, Congress re- the production of chemical weapons in the United
vealed that the Army was conducting open-air testing States.166 First, he reaffirmed the no-first-use policy
with nerve agents at Edgewood Arsenal (the name for chemical weapons, saying, I hereby reaffirm
of the Army Chemical Center had reverted in 1963) that the United States will never be the first country
and at Fort McClellan during training events. Shortly to use chemical weapons to kill. And I have also ex-
after the disclosure, more than 100 people protested at tended this renunciation to chemical weapons that
the gates of Edgewood Arsenal. Three days later the incapacitate.166(p5) Second, he decided to resubmit
Army announced suspension of open-air testing at the 1925 Geneva Protocol to the US Senate for ratifica-
the two sites and promised to conduct a safety review tion. The Senate had refused to ratify the treaty when
of all such testing. However, the public was again it was first signed, and President Harry S Truman
displeased when the Army revealed that it had also had withdrawn the treaty from the Senate in 1947.
conducted nerve agent testing in Hawaii between 1966 Nixon explained his future hopes: Mankind already
and 1967, something it had previously denied.4 carries in its own hands too many of the seeds of its
In October the secretary of the Army announced own destruction. By the examples that we set today,
that the safety review had been completed, with the we hope to contribute to an atmosphere of peace and
following conclusion: The lethal testing program at understanding between all nations.166(p4) (The US
Edgewood Arsenal during the past two decades has Senate did not grant Nixons request till 1974, and
compiled an enviable record for safety. The testing President Ford officially signed the protocol on Janu-
procedures that have been evolved are clearly ef- ary 22, 1975, after exempting riot control agents and
fective in minimizing danger to base personnel and herbicides from the agreement.4 )
The 1970s: the Near End of the Chemical Corps
The events of 1969 had a severe impact on the the 1970s, demilitarization was not an easy project. One
future of the US Army chemical warfare program. In last sea dump took place in 1970 when, despite much
February 1970 President Nixon added toxins to the negative press, CHASE 10 disposed of more M55 sarin
list of banned weapons and ordered all existing stocks rockets. (CHASE 10 had originally been scheduled to
of toxin agents destroyed. About a month later, the start earlier; although now out of numerical order, the
Army revealed it had conducted chemical testing in designation was unchanged.) Two years later Public
Alaska but reported that the testing had stopped. The Law 92-532 prohibited the sea dumping of chemical
Army also announced that the chemical weapons on munitions.167
Okinawa would be moved to Umatilla Army Depot A senior Department of Defense official reflected
in Oregon, which triggered a series of lawsuits that on the impact the restrictions had during the 1970s:
attracted the congressional concern. The next year, During most of the 1970s, the United States allowed
Public Law 91-672 prohibited the Army from mov- its chemical retaliatory capability to decline, did
ing the weapons from Okinawa to anywhere on the little to improve chemical protection, and neglected
US mainland. Finally, Operation Red Hat moved the relevant training and doctrine. The United States has
stockpile on Okinawa to Johnston Atoll, a small US not produced lethal or incapacitating chemical agents,
island in the South Pacific, for long-term storage and or filled munitions since 1969.167(p3) The Army made
eventual demilitarization.167 plans to abolish the Chemical Corps entirely. In 1973,
Because of heightened environmental concerns in with the Paris Peace Accords and the end of the draft,
60
the Army recommended reducing the Chemical Corps Restoring the Chemical Corps
in size and eventually merging it with the Ordnance
Corps. As the first step, the Army disestablished the The decline of the US Army Chemical Corps,
chemical school at Fort McClellan and combined combined with the discovery of sophisticated Soviet
it with the ordnance school at Aberdeen Proving chemical defense materiel and the Soviets capability
Ground. Congress, however, blocked the complete for waging chemical war, made corrective action neces-
disestablishment of the corps.168171 Still, one observer sary. The Army concluded the following:
noted: As an additional ordnance career field, the
chemical specialty almost withered and died at To offset this, U.S. chemical/biological (CB) defense
Aberdeen.171(p15) materiel must not only provide a protective system
equivalent to or better than that of any potential
Yom Kippur War enemy but the physiological and logistics burdens
must be such as to permit long-term use. To cope
with the hazards of any potential CB-threat environ-
The Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War lasted only from
ment requires the development of an integrated CB
October 6 to October 24, 1973, but it brought chemi- defense system. This system must contain items for
cal warfare preparedness back to public attention and individual protection, collective protection, decon-
its ramifications for the US chemical program lasted tamination, warning and detection, and safe devices
much longer. Egypt had several years to stockpile and and concepts to achieve realistic training. An effec-
increase its arsenal to plan an attack on Israel involv- tive technological base is needed from which such
ing chemical weapons. Syria, Egypts ally in the war, materiel, responsive to user needs, can be quickly
began stockpiling a chemical arsenal, receiving sarin developed.173(p34)
from Egypt in 1972. The Egyptian and Syrian attack
against Israel on Yom Kippur and the successful Is- In 1976 the secretary of the Army reversed the
raeli counterattacks ended with a ceasefire. Both sides decision to abolish the Chemical Corps, citing the
took enormous losses in personnel and equipment. heightened awareness of the Soviet Unions capabil-
However, chemical weapons were not employed by ity to wage chemical warfare as the primary reason.
either side. In 1977 the United States started a new effort to reach
Following the war, the Israelis analyzed the Soviet- an agreement with the Soviets on a verifiable ban on
made equipment they captured from the Egyptians chemical weapons, but the effort was unsuccessful. The
and Syrians. They discovered portable chemical-proof chemical school was reestablished at Fort McClellan in
shelters, decontamination equipment for planes and 1979 partly as a result of this failure.167,177181
tanks, and air-filtration systems that removed toxic
chemicals on most Soviet vehicles. They also found a Growing Danger of Chemical Warfare
Soviet PKhR-MV chemical agent detector kit for medi-
cal and veterinary services. The kit, which consisted of Starting in about 1975, reports of the use of chemi-
a hand pump, detector tubes, reagents in ampules, dry cals and toxin agents in various skirmishes and wars
reagents, test tubes, and accessories, was designed to in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan began to attract
detect nerve, blister, and blood agents. US specialists US attention. Interviews with villagers in Laos
determined that it could detect low concentrations of suggested that Vietnamese and Soviet forces might
nerve agents, mustard agent, cyanide, lewisite, and have used chemical and possibly toxic weapons
heavy metals in aqueous solutions. It could also detect against the Hmong. Starting in 1978, similar reports
the same agents, plus cyanogen chloride and phosgene, from Kampuchea claimed that the Vietnamese and
in the atmosphere. However, procedures for using the their allies had killed over 980 villagers using chemical
kit were extremely difficult to carry out while wearing weapons. Reports began circulating that Soviet troops
a protective suit. In addition, the glass ampules were were using chemical weapons against Afghan soldiers
fragile and broke easily.172 even before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan began
Overall, the experts reported finding sophisticated in December 1979.
chemical defense materiel and a superior quantitative Although they had signed the Geneva Protocol
capability for waging a chemical war.173(p3-4) The indi- in 1928, the Soviets argued that their use of chemical
cations were that the Soviets were ready for, and might weapons was legitimate because Laos, Kampuchea, and
actually be planning to instigate, extensive chemical Afghanistan were not signatories. The Soviet Union,
warfare in a future war. Soviet division commanders Laos, and Afghanistan signed the Biological Weapons
were thought to already have the authority to initiate Convention in 1975, but the allegations of toxin use were
chemical warfare.173176 never acknowledged by the Soviets or their allies. When
61
the Soviets signed the Biological Weapons Convention, logical Weapons Convention. If toxins were considered
they added, the Soviet Union does not possess any chemical agents, then the Soviets would be permitted
bacteriological agents and toxins, weapons, equipment under the Geneva Protocol to use them in retaliation or
or means of delivery.182(p6) Other intelligence sources against nonsignatories.183 Their use of chemical weapons
thought that the Soviets considered most toxins to be was taken as an indication that the Soviets were continu-
chemical agents, and therefore not subject to the Bio- ing an active chemical program.
The 1980s: Return of the Chemical Corps
The Haig Report throughout the 1980s, often thinking of it as the

Soviets Vietnam. The lessons learned from this war
Despite denials by the governments involved, about chemical warfare provided extensive support to
the United States publicized charges that chemical the US chemical defense program. The Soviets tended
warfare had been used in Southeast Asia and Af- to use chemical weapons much like the Italians did
ghanistan in 1980. Problems with the collection of in Ethiopia and like the US Army had used nonlethal
samples and the remoteness of the sites, however, agents in Vietnam. One military writer summed up
prevented definitive evidence from being obtained. the general lesson learned:
Furthermore, the later identification, discussion, and
media debate over the origin of possible trichoth- The use of chemical weapons by Soviet forces in Af-
ecene mycotoxins in Southeast Asia also distracted ghanistan is also significant. The use of these weap-
public interest from the alleged use of conventional ons in Afghanistan confirms, not surprisingly, that
the Soviets find them put to their best use against un-
chemical munitions.
protected subjects incapable of retaliation. Afghani-
In 1982 Secretary of State Alexander M Haig, Jr, stan is proof positive that the Soviets do not consider
presented a report titled Chemical Warfare in South- these devices as special weapons. Considerations
east Asia and Afghanistan to the US Congress. After of utility and not morality will govern Soviet use of
describing the evidence, he concluded: them in a future conflict.184(p27)
Taken together, this evidence has led the U.S. Gov- Despite the use of chemical weapons, the Soviets
ernment to conclude that Laos and Vietnamese forc- were unable to win the war and, in December 1988,
es, operating under Soviet supervision, have, since met with rebel forces to discuss a withdrawal of Soviet
1975, employed lethal chemical and toxin weapons troops from Afghanistan. In January 1989 the Soviets
in Laos; that Vietnamese forces have, since 1978,
announced the final withdrawal, which was completed
used lethal chemical and toxin agents in Kampuchea;
and that Soviet forces have used a variety of lethal a month later.185
chemical warfare agents, including nerve gases, in
Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion of that country Iran-Iraq War
in 1979.182(p6)
The United States continued to propose chemical
Based on this evidence, senior Defense Depart- treaties with the Soviet Union, its primary chemi-
ment personnel concluded that the Soviet Union cal warfare rival. However, the Iran-Iraq War began
possesses a decisive military advantage because changing this situation. On September 22, 1980, Iraq
of its chemical capabilities.167(p3) The Haig report, launched an invasion against neighboring Iran. The
however, was not able to galvanize world opinion. Iraqi army, trained and influenced by Soviet advisors,
As in the Yemen civil war, the United States was had organic chemical warfare units and a wide variety
unable to prove that chemical agents and toxins of delivery systems. Neither side achieved dominance
had been used in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. and the war quickly became a stalemate.
Instead, the accusation became a political debate To stop the human-waveattack tactics of the
between the United States and the Soviet Union Iranians, the Iraqis employed their home-produced
during President Ronald Reagans administration. chemical agents as a defensive measure against the
much-lessprepared Iranian infantry. The first reported
Afghanistan and Iran-Iraq Wars use of chemical weapons occurred in November 1980.
Throughout the next several years, additional reports
Afghanistan War of chemical attacks circulated, and by November 1983,
Iran began complaining to the UN that Iraq was using
The US Army monitored the war in Afghanistan chemical weapons against its troops.186189
62
After Iran sent chemical casualties to several Additional Reports of Chemical Warfare
Western nations for treatment, the UN dispatched a
team of specialists to the area in 1984, and again in The end of the Iran-Iraq War did not prevent new
1986 and 1987, to verify the claims. The conclusion chemical warfare reports from circulating. Within a
from all three trips was the same: Iraq was using month of the wars end, the Kurds, a minority group
chemical weapons against Iranian troops. In addi- in Iraq seeking autonomy, accused Iraq of using chemi-
tion, the second mission stressed that Iraqs use of cal weapons against them. Shortly before, rumors
chemical weapons appeared to be increasing. The circulated that Libya had used chemical weapons
reports indicated that mustard and tabun were the obtained from Iran during an invasion of Chad. The
primary agents used, and that they were generally United States rushed 2,000 gas masks to Chad in re-
delivered in bombs dropped by airplane. The third sponse. There were also reports of the Cuban-backed
mission (the only one allowed to enter Iraq) also government of Angola using nerve agents against
reported the use of artillery shells and chemical rebel forces.194197
rockets and the use of chemical weapons against
civilian personnel.190192 Chemical Training
In the letter of transmittal to the UN after the con-
clusion of the third mission, the investigators pointed In addition to establishing a retaliatory capability, the
out the dangers of this chemical warfare: US Army significantly improved its chemical training
capability by constructing a new facility at the chemical
It is vital to realize that the continued use of chemi- school and conducting more realistic field training. In
cal weapons in the present conflict increases the risk 1987 the Chemical Decontamination Training Facility
of their use in future conflicts. In view of this, and as started live chemical agent training in a controlled
individuals who witnessed first hand the terrible ef- environment. Major General Gerald G Watson, the
fects of chemical weapons, we again make a special schools commandant, was the first American to
plea to you to try to do everything in your power to wear the battledress overgarment in a toxic chemi-
stop the use of such weapons in the Iran-Iraq con-
cal environment198(p15) when he entered the facility
flict and thus ensure that they are not used in future
conflicts. . . . In our view, only concerted efforts at on February 19, 1987. Realistic field training, such as
the political level can be effective in ensuring that all Operation Solid Shield 87199 (see Chapter 3, History of
the signatories of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 abide the Medical Management of Chemical Casualties) was
by their obligations. Otherwise, if the Protocol is ir- conducted, resulting in changes in Army policy.
reparably weakened after 60 years of general inter-
national respect, this may lead, in the future, to the Soviet-US Agreement
world facing the specter of the threat of biological
weapons.190 The increase in the US retaliatory and defensive
capability for chemical warfare, along with internal
Another analyst echoed these sentiments, saying, changes in the Soviet Union, helped convince the So-
In a sense, a taboo has been broken, thus making it viets to look closely at a new chemical weapons treaty.
easier for future combatants to find justification for In 1987, after admitting possession of chemical agents
chemical warfare, this aspect of the Iran-Iraq war for the first time, the Soviet Union announced it was
should cause Western military planners the gravest halting chemical weapons production. In September
concern.193(pp5152) 1989 the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
The Iran-Iraq War failed to reach a military conclu- Between the Government of the United States and
sion despite Iraqs use of chemical weapons. Roughly the Government of the USSR Regarding a Bilateral
5% of the Iranian casualties were caused by chemical Verification Experiment and Data Exchange Related to
weapons. Although Iranian use of chemical weapons Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, otherwise known
was rumored, less attention was devoted to verifying as the Wyoming MOU, started the talks between the
those reports. In August 1988 Iraq finally accepted a two countries.4 The US demilitarization program con-
UN ceasefire plan.185 tinued, despite problems (see Chapter 4).
The 1990s: A New Age of Chemical Warfare and Terrorism
Persian Gulf War chemical warfare (see Chapter 4), world events again
brought chemical weapons to daily news reports. On
Despite the ongoing political efforts to abolish August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein sent Iraqi troops into
63
Kuwait, allegedly in support of Kuwaiti revolutionar- missiles, which were already hitting Israel and Saudi
ies who had overthrown the emirate. On August 8 Iraq Arabia, could be armed with chemical, biological, or
announced that Kuwait had been annexed and was nuclear munitions. While visiting the United Kingdom,
now a part of its country. In response, President George Vice President Dan Quayle reportedly told the prime
Bush ordered US forces to be sent to Saudi Arabia at minister that the United States had not ruled out the
the request of the Saudi government as part of what use of chemical or nuclear weapons.209 Likewise, the
became Operation Desert Shield, the buildup phase of United States reportedly threatened to target Hussein
the Persian Gulf War. personally if he used chemical weapons against UN
The US response to Iraqs invasion put the Armys coalition forces.209,210 In turn, Iraq reportedly threatened
chemical warfare experience, training, production to use chemical weapons against coalition forces if they
program, and lessons learned in the limelight. Not continued the high-level bombings against Iraqi troops.209
since World War I had US troops been sent to face an When coalition forces began the ground war on Feb-
enemy that had used chemical weapons extensively ruary 23, 1991, chemical and biological defense special-
within the last few years and had publicly announced ists anticipated the worst. Chemical alarms frequently
its intentions to use them against the United States. went off across the battlefield, but all were dismissed as
William H Webster, director of the Central Intelligence false alarms. On February 27 coalition forces liberated
Agency, estimated that Iraq had 1,000 tons of chemical Kuwait City and finished destroying the Iraqi divisions
weapons loaded in bombs, artillery rounds, rockets, originally in Kuwait. No known chemical or biological
and missiles. Much of Iraqs biological weapons pro- attacks were made by the Iraqis.
gram remained unknown until after the war.200202 A number of reasons surfaced after the war for
By 1991 Iraqs production facility at al-Hakam had why the Iraqis had not initiated large-scale chemical
produced about 125,000 gallons of agents that cause warfare. Vice Admiral Stanley Arthur, commander of
botulism, anthrax, and other illnesses. After stating for US naval forces, thought that because the wind sud-
years that the plant was used to produce animal feed, denly changed at the start of the land battle, the Iraqis
in 1995 the Iraqis admitted it was a biological warfare realized that chemical weapons could harm their own
production facility. In addition to producing biological troops. Some thought the speed of the campaign was
warfare agents, the Iraqis also conducted live-agent the critical reason. Others reported that the combina-
tests on animals. The Iraqis later admitted they had tion of coalition bombing and the resulting Iraqi logisti-
prepared about 200 biological missiles and bombs.203206 cal chaos prevented the chemical weapons from ever
To prepare for the military phase of the Persian Gulf reaching the front lines. General H Norman Schwarz-
War, the United States had to consider all the chemical kopf, commander of coalition forces, mentioned that
and biological threats. Troops were given the Mark Iraq might have feared nuclear retaliation.202,209,211
I (Meridian Medical Technologies Inc, Bristol, Tenn) After the war, allegations of chemical exposures
nerve agent antidote kit, consisting of an atropine began to surface. The Department of Defense initially
autoinjector and a pralidoxime chloride autoinjector denied that any chemical exposures had taken place,
to treat nerve agent poisoning. Atropine blocks the but veterans of the war claimed the opposite and their
effects of nerve agent poisoning on the muscles, and ailments collectively became known as Gulf War syn-
pralidoxime chloride reactivates acetylcholinesterase. drome. By 1996 newspapers reported that almost 60,000
Pyridostigmine bromide tablets were also provided as veterans of the Persian Gulf War claimed some sort of
a nerve agent pretreatment.207 US troops moving into medical problem directly related to their war activi-
the area were given vaccines for anthrax and botuli- ties. Extensive research by the Department of Defense
num toxin.208 All military units were fully equipped failed to find any single cause for the problems.212,213
with the latest chemical and biological defensive One controversial example of possible exposure
equipment, and training was continuous. occurred on March 4, 1991, at the Kamisiyah arsenal,
The actual attack on Iraq on January 16, 1991, as part northwest of Basra, involving the US Army 37th Engi-
of the UN-mandated effort to free Kuwait, was des- neer Battalion. After capturing the site, the engineers
ignated Operation Desert Storm by the United States. blew up the Iraqi storage bunkers. According to news-
The attack escalated fears of a new chemical war to paper accounts, engineers claimed that their chemical
levels not seen since World War I. The initial air attack agent detectors went off during the explosions. Later
concentrated on Iraqi chemical production facilities, the same year, a UN inspection team reportedly found
bunkers, and lines of supply. While the air attacks were the remains of chemical rockets and shells in one of
ongoing, daily news accounts addressed the potential for the bunkers in addition to traces of sarin and mustard
chemical and biological warfare. On January 28 Saddam agent. In 1996 the Department of Defense acknowl-
Hussein told Peter Arnett of CNN News that Iraqi Scud edged that one of the bunkers probably contained
64
sarin- and mustard-agentfilled munitions, and that using the chemicals. Thus, despite the end of fighting,
as many as 20,000 US soldiers may have been exposed Iraqi chemical weapons continued to be a problem for
to chemical agents as a result.214 Afterward a Pentagon the world.215,216
spokesperson, commenting on the continuing research US intelligence sources also detected increased
into the possible exposure, said, Our understanding chemical development activity in Libya. A Libyan
of this episode is still partial.213(pA-10) chemical weapons plant at Rabta had produced about
100 tons of agent by 1990, when Libya claimed that
Additional Allegations of Chemical Warfare the plant was destroyed by a fire. New disclosures
surfaced in 1996 that Libya was constructing a second
Shortly after the fighting between Iraq and coali- chemical production plant at Tarhunah. US intelli-
tion forces ended, reports circulated that Hussein was gence sources claimed that this would be the largest
using chemical agents against rebellious Kurds and underground chemical weapons plant in the world,
Shiite Muslims. The United States intercepted a mes- covering roughly 6 square miles and situated in a
sage ordering the use of chemical weapons against the hollowed-out mountain. Because Scud missiles have
cities of Najaf and Karbala. President Bushs response a range of 180 to 300 miles, Libyas neighbors were
was that such use of chemical weapons would result considerably threatened. Libya strongly denied the
in air strikes against the Iraqi military organization US accusation.217,218
Preventing Chemical Warfare and Terrorism in the 21st Century
Despite the signing of long-sought Chemical Weap- depicting chemical agents killing dogs, but they did
ons Convention by the United States, Russia, and other not discover any chemical weapons.
countries, and the start of large-scale chemical weap-
ons destruction programs in the 1990s (see Chapter 4), Russian Use of a Nonlethal Chemical Agent
the beginning of the 21st century saw a sudden and
dramatic change in the interest in chemical warfare. Throughout 2002 Russia continued to experience
The events of 2001 made US post offices, government terrorist incidents related to its war in Chechnya. In
buildings, hospitals, and media headquarters the front October Chechnyan terrorists took over a Moscow
lines in a new war on terrorism. theater and held over 900 people hostage. The terror-
ists strapped on explosives and positioned themselves
Operation Enduring Freedom among the hostages. After failing to obtain their objec-
tives, the terrorists began executing hostages. Russian
The new war began on September 11, 2001, when security forces flooded the theater with a chemical
four commercial planes were hijacked. Two crashed agent identified in the press as fentanyl, a nonlethal
into the World Trade Center, one into the Pentagon, gas. Russian special forces stormed the theater and
and one crashed in rural Pennsylvania before reach- most of the terrorists were killed by gunfire; however,
ing its apparent target in Washington, DC. Nearly over 118 of the hostages died from the effects of the
4,000 people died in the destruction and aftermath, gas.
including many first responders. Almost imme- At first the Russian government kept the identity of
diately Al Qaeda, under the control of Osama bin the gas secret from the world and from its own medi-
Laden, was identified as the perpetrator. Although cal facilities. It was not until a week after the incident
the terrorists were protected by the ruling party in that the Russians finally identified the gas, leading
Afghanistan, the Taliban, the United States began a to a strong public debate about whether Russia had
military counterstrike. violated the Chemical Weapons Convention.
In October 2001 the United States launched massive
air attacks against Afghanistan. Special Forces troops Operation Iraqi Freedom
entered the war to assist the Northern Alliance in their
ongoing rebellion against the Taliban. In November Dissatisfied with Iraqs noncompliance with the
Osama bin Laden notified the world that he had UN mandates that concluded the Persian Gulf War,
chemical and nuclear weapons, but would only use the United States repeatedly bombed Iraq throughout
them if the United States used them first. A few days 2000 and 2001. Of particular concern to the United
later, the Northern Alliance captured Kabul. During States was Iraqs failure to report all its chemical war-
additional campaigns in Afghanistan, coalition forces fare research and weapons productions. Iraq report-
discovered a chemical laboratory and training films edly restricted its chemical weapons programs after
65
UN monitors withdrew from the country. Some commentators speculated that the Iraqis had
In 2002 both President George W Bush and Brit- purposely misled the world about their weapons of
ish Prime Minister Tony Blair publicly warned mass destruction as a bluff to prevent military action
the UN that Iraq had reinstated its weapons of against them. Other reports indicated that some of the
mass destruction program. The UN, however, chemical weapons may have been shipped to Syria or
was unconvinced of the charges and debated the other countries friendly to Iraq. Because the Chemical
need for a new resolution concerning Iraq. In the Weapons Convention prohibited the use of tear gas in
meantime, the US Congress authorized President combat, world debate arose when US forces used tear
Bush to use force against Iraq if necessary. A large gas during security operations in Iraqi cities. However,
coalition force assembled in Kuwait in prepara- the Chemical Weapons Convention allowed tear gas
tion for future military action. This force was well use in domestic riot control, which is how the United
equipped with the latest chemical defense equipment. States had used it.
Unable to obtain UN support for a military attack, Iraqi insurgents stepped up terror attacks on the
the Unites States launched Operation Iraqi Freedom streets of Taji, north of Baghdad, in February and
in 2003 with an unsuccessful attempt to eliminate March 2007. On February 21, 2007, insurgents used
Saddam Hussein. Allied troops then invaded Iraq, tak- conventional explosives to detonate a tanker carry-
ing great precautions in case chemical weapons were ing chlorine, creating a toxic cloud. Baghdad secu-
used against them. Although a few Scud missiles were rity spokesperson General Qassim Atta reported five
launched against forces in Kuwait, none contained deaths from the blast and 148 casualties from the gas.
chemical agents. The occupation of Iraq was quickly The following day, suspected Sunni Arab insurgents
accomplished without any known use of chemical detonated a car carrying an explosive device attached
weapons. On May 1 President Bush publicly declared to chlorine gas canisters on a road leading to Bagh-
the end of hostilities; however, US casualties contin- dads airport. The gas cloud killed two and left 33 oth-
ued to occur. At least one roadside attack involved the ers feeling ill. The chlorine gas cloud suggested new
detonation of a sarin-filled artillery projectile, but no and coordinated tactics with unconventional weapons.
casualties resulted. A raid in Fallujah in late February 2007 revealed a
Despite an extensive search, no large stockpiles of homegrown factory for car bombs and cylinders of
chemical weapons were discovered in Iraq. Investiga- toxic chlorine gas and other chemicals. This discovery
tors did find protective masks, nerve agent antidote caused the United States to fear future tactics with
injectors, decontamination kits, and protective cloth- chlorine bombs, and fears were confirmed as addi-
ing. Interviews with captured Iraqi scientists and tional attacks involving three chlorine gas car bombs
other leaders indicated that the chemical weapons were carried out in western Iraq on March 16, 2007,
programs had been shut down prior to the invasion. killing two and injuring hundreds of Iraqi civilians.
Summary
Although chemical warfare has not been repeated on To prevent such an event, US military forces must con-
the scale that occurred during World War I, incidents of tinue to learn about chemical warfare and how to accom-
chemical weapons used on the battlefield have continued plish their missions on chemical battlefields and chemical
throughout the 20th and into the 21st century, and the terrorist fronts throughout the world. In the words of
potential for a major escalation remains. Terrorist attacks General Pershing, we can never afford to neglect the
with chemical weapons are an even more likely scenario. question48(p77) of chemical preparedness again.
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History of Chemical Warfare

CHEMICAL CONCOCTIONS USED IN BATTLE

Chemical Warfare Proposals in the US Civil War

THE 1930s: GROWING THREAT OF CHEMICAL WARFARE

THE 1960s: DECADE OF TURMOIL

THE 1970s: THE NEAR END OF THE CHEMICAL CORPS

THE 1980s: RETURN OF THE CHEMICAL CORPS

THE 1990s: A NEW AGE OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AND TERRORISM

PREVENTING CHEMICAL WARFARE AND TERRORISM IN THE 21st CENTURY

Chemical Concoctions Used in Battle

Toxic Smokes Pleistos, the main water supply to Kirrha, poisoned

Chemical Warfare Proposals in the US Civil War

Early Allied Chemical Warfare Plans

Despite the long-held belief that Germany was the

Germany first tested the Nernst weapon on the Development of Chlorine

Fig. 2-5. A French cylinder attack on German trenches in

Phosgene was the next chemical to debut on the

Date Battle Participants

way to mutinies within the ranks. The British attacks

Cambrai Fig. 2-10. Proper gas training to avoid becoming a casualty

Gas is such an intangible thing that men are only

The Americans suffered 85 casualties, including

Fig. 2-13. Members of the 26th Infantry, 2nd Brigade, 1st

Fig. 2-16. Company A, Seventh Machine Gun Battalion,

shells used against the 1st Division was 7-fold that of

Fig. 2-19. Treating American gas casualties, mainly mustard,

Fig. 2-21. American troops firing on German positions while

In mid August, the French started a series of drives

Fig. 2-23. US participation in the Oise-Aisne offensive.

Fig. 2-25. Overview of Meuse-Argonne offensive.

Fig. 2-26. US infantry advancing under gas bombardment

can and 4 French divisions, on the front extending

The First Army suffered a loss of about 117,000 in

Fig. 2-28. Blinded by sulfur mustard. Gassed American

Approximately 20,000 chemical warfare casualties

Fig. 2-30. Members of the Sixth Field Artillery, first Division,

chemical agents in retaliation and during offensive

Fig. 2-29. An American gas casualty in the front line trenches

Italians, Germans, Austro-Hungarians, and Ameri-

Common Names Chemical Date

(Table 2-2 continues)

Table 2-2 continued

Bromobenzyl- Camite; CN C6H5CHBrCN July 1918 Only tear gas manufactured by

Phenylcarbylam- Phenylisocyanide May 1917

(Table 2-2 continues)

Table 2-2 continued

Table 2-2 continued

CWS: Chemical Warfare Service

Never take a chance if American Expeditionary Forces Chemical Warfare

Fig. 2-33. Advertisement for the US Chemical Warfare Service.

The 1930s: Growing Threat of Chemical Warfare

The use of chemical weapons in the name of and wounded soldiers.6779

cember 23, 1936, Kukenthal tested the new compounds

Despite nerve agent testing, manufacture, and stock-

a Soviet army also captured factories producing tabun

Evidence of Gas Use in Germany

Although gas was not used on the battlefields of

After the war, the phrase had the United States

The 1960s: Decade of Turmoil

Development of Incapacitating Chemical Agents damaging, congressional outrage.