Right To Food & Budget Guatemala 2008

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Right to Food Unit Guatemala office
Realization of the Right to Food in Guatemala

Case study on Monitoring the Right to Food using the Budget Tool
Coordinator:
Ricardo Zepeda Gaitn
Researchers:
Jorge Santos Contreras Carla Caxaj lvarez
Guatemala, October 2008.
Equivalencies
US$1 = GTQ7.45136 (May 15, 2008) GTQ7.63101 (January 1, 2008)
Source: Bank of Guatemala
1 quintal [100lbs] 1 metric ton
= =
45.36 kgs 0.4 tons 1,016.05 kgs 22.4 quintales[2200lbs]
Abbreviations and Acronyms

AIDPI ASESA CONASAN CGN DESC DIGEPA DTP ERP ENCOVI FONTIERRAS INCAP INE IVA MAGA MINEDUC MINUGUA PAE PRONADE PSAN PIDESC PGIEE SEGEPLAN SESAN SICOIN SINASAN SOSEP VLE Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples Agreement on Socio-economic Aspects of and Agrarian Situation National Food and Nutrition Security Council General Accounting Office Economic Social and Cultural Rights ESCR General Office of Support Programs Budget Technical Board Poverty Reduction Strategy National Survey of Conditions of Life Land Fund Nutrition Institute for Central America and Panama National Statistics Institute Value Added Tax Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Ministry of Education Verification Mission for the United Nations in Guatemala School Feeding Programs National program for the self management for educational development National Food and Nutrition Security Policy International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General State Budget of Incomes and Expenditures General Planning and Programming Secretariat Food and Nutrition Security Secretariat Integrated Accounting System National Food and Nutrition Security System Social Works of the First Lady Secretariat School Glass of Milk Program
The Realization of the Right to Food in Guatemala Case Study and Monitoring of the Right to Food using the Budget Tool
Table of Contents
Introduction................................................................................................................................... 5 I. The national context for the realization of the Right to Food .............................................. 7 a) b) c) d) e) f) g) Political Structure of Guatemala.................................................................................. 7 The access to information situation ........................................................................... 8 The Budget Process ............................................................................................. 8 Legal framework related to the Right to Food .............................................. 10 History of the application of the Right to Food in Guatemala ...................... 12 Levels of poverty and the situation of national food security ....................... 13 The political framework to approach poverty............................................................. 16
II. Methodology of the study.................................................................................................... 18 III. The Right to Food and the Budget ..................................................................... 21 IV. Budget Analysis of the realization of the Right to Food .................................... 23 IV.1 Support to vulnerable groups ........................................................................................... 23 a) The School Food Programs ......................................................................... 23 b) The School Food Programs of the MINEDUC ............................................................... 27 c) The School Food Programs of the MAGA ...................................................................... 29 d) The School Glass of Milk Program.................................................................................. 30 e) Perceptions of the School Glass of Milk Program 37 IV.2 a) b) Access to Land ............................................................................................................. 41 The Land Fund ...................................................................................................... 42 Perceptions on the Land Fund ........................................................................ 48
Conclusions................................................................................................................................... 52 Bibliography................................................................................................................................. 54 Annexes ........................................................................................................................................ 55

Introduction:
This study seeks to use budget analysis as a tool to assess the realization of the Right to Food by the Guatemalan state by monitoring two policies related to this right: the School Glass of Milk Program and the Land Fund. Both programs have a strong relationship with the realization of the Right to Food, as can be observed from the various components stated in the Voluntary Guidelines for the Right to Food. The School Glass of Milk Program can be approached from Guideline 13: support to vulnerable groups, while the Land Fund can be approached from Guideline 8: access to resources and goods, more specifically part 8B: Land. Both policies were designed to respond to the needs of two sensitive populations: the child population living in regions considered food vulnerable, and the peasant population that has historically maintained a strong demand for land. In order to identify the institutions that would be the focuses of this study, we first identified two major aspects of the Right to Food: a) the Right to Live without Hunger, which implies adopting immediate actions for populations in food risk situations; and b) the Right to Adequate Food, which calls for the adoption of long term policies for the consolidation of an adequate environment that allows populations to develop their own capacities to feed themselves in dignity. As a research method, we established a hypothetical deductive process, which starts from the general to the specific, through the identification of a hypothesis established from prior experience and observation. The hypothesis is supported by questions that try to delimit related topics. Likewise, the answers to the inquiries try to combine quantitative as well as qualitative aspects. Existing budget transparency mechanisms in Guatemala will allow for this process to be applied to other areas related to the Right to Food from a rights approach. Clearly, budget analysis does not exhaust all possibilities of policy review, but it constitutes a strong tool in identifying administrative and operational weaknesses, difficulties in policy planning, and inappropriate management of resources. In this regard, budget analysis is directed at strengthening institutions in the medium term. We conducted budget research via the Integrated Accounting System SICOIN [by its Spanish acronym, Sistema de Contabilidad Integrado], which has as a starting point the General Income and Expenses Budget, then goes through the Ministry level until it reaches the programs and projects level. This instrument has the advantage of allowing you to observe in a regularly updated way the levels of expenses of the institutions in the Executive branch, the transfers, and cuts made. It has the limitation of not covering other decentralized institutions, although for approaching the issues established in this research, it was enough. One of the challenges of the research was specifically trying to observe the existing relationship between budget information and information regarding the effects of policies. We searched for qualitative information, starting from interviewing people who are linked to both institutions: firstly, at the political level, secondly the technical level, and finally beneficiaries of theses policies at the community level. The methodological framework of the qualitative research aimed at contrasting the different levels in order to improve the review of the process, so as to elaborate proposals for strengthening it. In terms of challenges, we were faced with the rupture of various political processes in the country, especially in terms of the change of government, which came with a proposal of change in social policies. This situation implied the open questioning in recent months by the new authorities regarding the continuation of the School Glass of Milk Program for example, with the idea of trying out new products, although in the end they decided in favor of its continuation. Another difficulty of importance is that the first months of the year 2008 have been extremely
complex in regards to the national food issue. The prices of basic consumer products have increased at an accelerated pace, making the strong dependency that already exists on the imports of food evident. In regards to this, the new government has made some statements about reviewing the framework of the Food and Nutrition security Policy, although it isnt clear they have done anything about this yet. In broad terms, we can establish that even though an important advance has been made in the political framework to deal with the realization of the Right to Food by the Guatemalan state, the adaptation of these policies to the objectives established is still limited. At a first glance, one can state that the financial allocations to support actions are not enough; a more extensive approach reveals administrative and technical limitations. However, the most evident result of the research shows that the objectives of the programs have a weak relation with the actions carried out. In this way, we can affirm that the limited efforts being made to address the Right to Food of the Guatemalan population are not enough and do not have the effects hoped for. We hope that this study can become a support for the strengthening of both policies. At the same time, we hope that this experience can guide the advancement of budget analysis as a tool that strengthens the processes of social monitoring and demands regarding the realization of the Right to Food in Guatemala.
I. The national context for the realization of the Right to Food a) Political Structure
A decade ago Guatemala emerged from a 36-year internal armed conflict. With the end of the conflict in 1996, compromises reached focused on overcoming the causes that provoked the conflict initially. The Peace Accords were an effort to develop an agenda for a democratic and inclusive1 nation. They implied the recognition of a multiethnic, multilingual and multicultural nation. They also take into account the great inequities that make Guatemala the second most unequal country on the continent. Guatemala is divided into 8 regions, 33 departments and 333 municipalities. Political power is divided between the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches. The Executive is headed by the current President of the Republic, lvaro Colom, who took office on January 14, 2008. The President is elected every four years. The Executive works via 13 Ministries, 13 Secretariats, and 8 Social Funds. There are also various institutions that are autonomous and have diverse ways to choose their representatives. The Legislature is elected every four years and is made up of 158 congresspersons elected by a national listing and a district election. The Judicial branch is elected by the Congress. Thirteen judges are chosen for a period of 5 years and are responsible for administrating the judicial processes in the country. The established channel for citizens demands is the System of Development Councils which is based in the Law on Councils of Urban and Rural Development (Decree No. 11-2002) [Ley de Consejos de Desarrollo Urbano y Rural]. The System has five levels: National Council of Urban and Rural Development, headed by the President. Regional Councils of Urban and Rural Development, which are headed by representatives of the President Departmental Councils of Development, which are headed by the governors of each Department. Municipal Councils of Development, which are headed by the municipal Mayors. Community Development Councils, which are headed by the community Mayors. The system of Development Councils attempts to deal with comprehensive issues for the development of the population; however as a system it has remained very weakened, due to the lack of political support for it to function from recent administrations. As a result, it is not a functional channel. At the municipal level, the systems opens up the possibility of establishing work commissions on issues related to ESC rights. However, weakness displayed by municipal mayors to respond to citizen demands has resulted in conflicts at different levels.2
The Peace Accords cover fundamental Human Rights issues in general. The most relevant cover issues related to Civil and Political Rights, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. There are also agreements on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples; socio-economic issues and the agrarian situation, as well as the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the role of armed forces in a democratic society. 2 A constant problem in the system of Development Councils is the fact that usually the Central Government tries to favor the mayors of their political party, which has implied that mayors of other parties are not able to channel their projects. Also, the weakness of the system has led to the prioritization of projects known as grey work investment in infrastructure, postponing other important actions such as monitoring of processes and audit by citizens.
b)
Access to information
Access to information is guaranteed under Article 30 of the Constitution: All acts of the administration are public. Interested parties have the right to obtain, in any moment, reports, copies, reproductions and certificates, and access files they wish to consult, with the exception of documents containing information on military or diplomatic affairs of national security, or information given by individuals under the guarantee of confidentiality. In general, however, possibilities of accessing public information are very limited, since special legislation in this area is lacking. Most of the information that can be accessed takes too long to be published. In addition, institutions lack adequate methodology for channeling information. While various proposals have been made for the creation of a Law on Access to Information, such have not been approved given the lack of political support for its approval in Congress. There is legislation in place that has allowed for the accessibility of information; however such legislation does not cover all possibilities that are supposed to be guaranteed under Article 30, with regard to promoting adequate processes for social audit. Some of the current laws include: the Law for Contracting by the State (Decree No. 57-92) [Ley de Contrataciones del Estado]; Municipal Code (Decree No 122002) [Cdigo Municipal]; Law on the Council of Urban and Rural Development (Decree No. 11-2002); Organic Law of the General Finance Office (Decree No. 31-2002) [Ley Orgnica de la Contralora General de Cuentas]. With regard to financial information, current open channels allow for some degree of transparency and citizen audit. These channels however, do not include information on all state institutions, such as the Judicial and Legislative organs, nor some decentralized institutions. Another obstacle for social monitoring involves the use of Trusteeships by some state institutions, such as municipal councils.3 The use of trusteeships is in place with the objective of facilitating the hiring of services from private organizations by the state. Nonetheless, monitoring processes are hindered by the state itself.4 It is evident that the state contracts and buys services and materials at overpriced rates, or disregards normal bidding processes, leading to corruption.
c)
The Budget Process
The governing body in the budget system is the Ministry of Public Finances (MFP), through the Budget Technical Board (DTP). However, the budget process involves all the institutions that implement resources from the State. These institutions must elaborate a strategic plan that identifies the activities that are to be undertaken, to allocate adequate resources according to the priorities established and the availability of resources. However, these proposals will be reviewed by the DTP, which analyzes the possibilities and priorities. The organic law for the budget (Decree No. 101-97) establishes six stages for the State budget:
Translators Note [T.N.]: The word used is Municipalidades which translates into municipalities; however the concept is commonly used to refer to the Council, the local government at the municipal level. 4 In 2008, the State of Guatemala manages 16% of its budget through 57 trusteeships, which in turn manage over 5 billion Quetzales. This raises two issues of transparency: first, the General Finance Office can not monitor these since they are funds deposited into the private banking system; second, private banks charge a high commission for managing resources, making the spoils system possible. (trafico de inflencias)
Formulation Formulation is undertaken by the DTP and the General Secretariat for Planning (SEGEPLAN), which exchange information regarding the availability of resources and the prioritized needs in the planning system. This stage involves the setting of goals and corresponding allocation of resources, through two stages: global programming, which establishes macroeconomic bases for defining budget maximums, and the institutional programming, which is done by each public institution that presents budget drafts to the MFP. Discussion and approval: The budget proposal is presented to Congress, which has until November 30th to approve it. The Public Finances and Currency Commission of the Congress must study the proposal and make a statement. It then presents a bill to the full session of the Congress for its approval. If approved, the President of the Republic must sanction or veto the approved budget. If any of these activities will involve the non-approval of the proposal within the established time, the budget of the current year will have to be used. 5 Execution: This stage goes from January 1 to December 31, time during which material and financial resources are mobilized by the State institutions. It involves the dealing with the planned objectives by each institution and their supervision, considering the orientations of the approved budget. This can be considered the principal stage of the budget process, and it is the most difficult to monitor, considering that it involves internal and external transfers, situations that could involve a change in the direction of the planned objectives and activities. Audit: In this stage the MFP should monitor the administration of resources, while the General Finance Office ought to ensure that the resources are being managed in the correct form. To have this control, three levels are managed: a) financial, that related to the behavior of the incomes and outcomes; b) legal, that related to the application of administrative norms and procedures of budget execution; c) physical, through the monitoring of physical implementation reports. Evaluation: SEGEPLAN and the DTP verify the actions and projects elaborated during the execution stage based on qualitative and quantitative criteria, in order to make recommendations and corrections. This is done by monthly, quarterly and annual evaluations, which are presented February 28 of the following year of the fiscal year evaluated. Liquidation: The MFP does the closure of the fiscal year and elaborates a report on each budget entry related to incomes and outflows. This report is presented to the General Finance Office, who later hands it to the Congress of the Republic for its total or partial approval.
This stage has the disadvantage that members of the Congress can make revisions to the original proposal. This means a weakening of the technical criteria that were applied in the formulation stage. On the other hand during the years of closing of government, it is common that the proposal is not approved in the established time. This means that if the budget of the current year is used, the following year requires frequent reallocations by the new government.
d)
Legal framework related to the Right to Food
The State of Guatemala as a signatory of the ICESCR has the obligation to realize the Right to Food. The Voluntary Guidelines are a reference for the State on how to do this.
Box 1 International Treaties ratified by the government of Guatemala related to the Right to Food.
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- Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (Article 25.1) - International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (Article 11) - International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, (Article 5.e.) - Convention on the Rights of the Child (Articles 24 and 27) - ILO Convention 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, (Article 2) - Rome Declaration on World Food Security (Objective 7.1) - Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition - Protocol of San Salvador (Article 12)
In Guatemala, Food and Nutrition Security within the National Food and Nutrition Security System (SINASAN) is defined as: the right of every person to have timely and permanent physical, economic and social access to adequate food in quantity and quality, with cultural relevance, preferably of national origin, as well as an adequate biological use, to maintain a healthy and active life. At the same time, General Comment 12 states that the Right to Adequate Food is defined as: the right to adequate food is exercised when all men, women and children, alone or in common with others have, at all times, physical and economic access to adequate food or to means to obtain it. It is clear the two concepts broadly agree. There is thus an opportunity for the full realization of the Right to Food in Guatemala. The objective of SINASAN is to establish and maintain, in context with the National Food and Nutrition Security Policy (PSAN), a strategic institutional space of organization and coordination to prioritize, organize, harmonize, design and execute actions of Food and Nutrition security through plans. The policies must maintain the same logic and sense, and not contradict the spirit of the PSAN. In particular, the objectives of PSAN are undertaken in strategic plans, programs and projects aimed at the socioeconomic development of the country. PSAN has the following specific objectives: 1. To ensure the permanent and sufficient availability and supply of necessary food for all of the population in quantity and quality, through reasonable balance between national production and food imports. To promote and prioritize all actions oriented at improving the economic, physical, biological and cultural access of the population to food. To favor political, economic, social, educational, environmental and cultural conditions to ensure all of the population a daily consumption of food in adequate quantities and qualities.
2. 3.
OACDH. Immediate obligations of the State of Guatemala in regards to the economic, social and cultural rights, particularly to education, to adecuate housing and nutrition (s.d.e)[T.N: lacking specific information]
4.
To advocate for the improvement of environmental conditions and access to basic services that guarantee all of the population the necessary health and environmental conditions for an optimum biological use of consumed food. To observe the quality of national consumer foods with regard to sanitation, nutrition, and cultural relevance. To implement a regulating, institutional and operational framework for food aid programs, including emergency situations. To implement a permanent and truthful national information system on food and nutrition security in order to identify influencing structural, environmental and human factors with the purpose of executing timely alerts and making political and technical decisions in an opportune way. To develop and strengthen mechanisms of prevention and treatment of food problems as relates to scarcity or surplus, making priority for groups most at riskage, physiological condition, area of residency, socio-economic level, gender and/or cultural identity. To establish coordinating policies and mechanisms between national and international institutions working on the subject matter to implement coherent and coordinated food and nutrition security programs, with aim of optimizing resources and capacities.
5. 6. 7.
8.
9.
As can be observed, because of the issues that PSAN tackles, there are many challenges that have been brought to light. The policy itself constitutes an important starting point to deal with the food problem. Yet even after three years of existence, its actions are very weak. In fact, certain political moves have contradicted the very spirit of PSAN. For example, by encouraging commercial opportunities access to food has been hindered. On the other hand, precarious actions that intend to deal with food problems did not include the involvement of the system and coordinated processes have not taken place. During the administration of Oscar Berger, there were many challenges in building the institutional structure for PSAN; hardly any modifications were made. Later, with the signing of the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America and the Dominican Republic (DR-CAFTA), commercial openings were strengthened. Now, the administration of lvaro Colom has announced changes that could result in the weakening of PSAN. The recent situation with increased food prices globally has resulted in the need to make stronger and more effective policies.7 These actions are seen as risky and are not supported politically by social groups. In spite of its weaknesses, PSAN could become an opportunity for the realization of the right to food.
The government of Alvaro Colom has declared the installation for four years of a Specific social environment Cabinet (Government Agreement 128-2008) in which the topics of food and nutrition security are included; also an Emergency national commission for the creation of employment, food and nutrition security, sustainability of the natural resources and governance (Government Agreement 129-2008). This would imply for the PSAN to loose the political weight it already has, at the same time that the CONASAN weakens its functions.
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Box 2 Structure created by the Law on the National System for Food and Nutrition security The Law on the National System for Food and Nutrition security is responsible for the creation of the National Food and Nutrition Security System (SINASAN). The SINASAN is made up of government institutions and civil society, with technical and financial support by international organisms. SINASANs basic function is to work intergovernmentally, maintaining the spirit of the PSAN. Food and nutrition security initiatives must be executed in a coordinated and planned manner. The following are the institutions created to support these initiatives: CONASAN: The National Food and Nutrition Security Council is the highest entity that is in charge of implementing PSAN initiatives. It is comprised of government and civil society representatives, and receives technical assistance from international cooperation organisms. CONASAN sessions are scheduled on a trimester basis (on the last week of the months of March, June and September). The March session is important because members of SINASAN must submit their operational project plan to the SESAN. SESAN: the Food and Nutrition security Secretariat of the Presidency handles coordination and technical planning for the implementation of the SINASAN Law. This Law is broad in the sense that it expresses that SESAN will be able to select its administrative and operational structure: technical personnel and team that will allow for the realization of work; as well as appropriate government employees in institutions of the CONASAN. INCOPAS: this is considered the communication channel or space for participation, where proposals regarding Food and Nutrition security are presented by civil society. It is composed of one main representative and an alternate, designated by civil society groups linked to Food and Nutrition security (e.g. Indigenous, Peasants, Unions, businesses, Catholic and Protestant Churches, Academic, Nongovernmental organizations, Women organizations, and Professional Associations). Support institutions: are comprised of institutions or bodies that, without necessarily being obliged by or directly linked to the law, belong to the state or collaborate with it. Among these are the international community and those institutions that provide technical support to CONASANs initiatives (e.g. SEGEPLAN, the Budget Technical Board from the Ministry of Finance). These institutions are accredited by SESAN, and can contribute when required.
e)
History of the application of the Right to Food in Guatemala
For decades, food issues in Guatemala were not dealt with in a comprehensive way; rather food issues were oriented toward impoverished children and groups left vulnerable as a result of poorly planned programs. For Guatemala, this translates into a delay in physiological development. With regard to nutrition, one can observe Guatemalas significant regression continent-wide in the last decade, particularly with regard to the consumption of food energy, which decreased from a national average of 2,350 kilocalories per person a day in 1990 to 2,210 kilocalories in 2003. Food programs for school children began in the 1970s and have since included various products. It is evident that programs are based on maximum cost-saving strategies, negatively impacting the very spirit of the programs. The Incaparina, for example, was distributed from 1977 to 1985. Other programs included the School Cookie, Atole and Protemasa.8 However, these programs were not very successful, and were jeopardized by complex policies with regard to coverage, delivery, and corruption.
The Incaparina is a mixture of cereals and grains, cooked with water and sugar. It is a drink similar to atole [a corn or maize drink] regularly accepted by the population. Protemasa is a mixture of various vegetables that looks like ground meat. It is used as a substitute in the preparation of certain foods.
8
11
The government of President Alfonso Portillo (2000-2004) made the first attempt to transfer funds directly to schools. The amount given consisted of a fixed quantity of 3 daily Quetzales per student, while parents would have to match this amount. This approach was also adopted and strengthened by the government of Oscar Berger (2004-2008). During the administration of Oscar Berger, the National Policy for the Right to Food and Nutrition (PSAN), was made public in 2005. It was considered the most relevant initiative with regard to the Right to Food. Nonetheless, in spite of the initiatives to date, such have not yet received the necessary political support. During the inauguration of the PSAN, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Jean Ziegler, visited Guatemala. Mr. Ziegler made a series of recommendations to the state to modify initiatives within the PSAN framework on the Right to Food. 9 Jean Ziegler emphasized looking at the structural causes of hunger and malnutrition, as well as the unequal distribution of wealth and opportunities that primarily affect the indigenous and peasant population. Yet two years after these recommendations were made, it was evident that the Berger administration did not follow through. Likewise, several months have past since the beginning of Alvaro Coloms term, and the recommendations have not yet been addressed. In this sense, we lose the risk of losing valuable contributions that for three years now have served as a guide for social groups to promote the realization of the Right to Food.
f)
Poverty and National Food Security
The most recent National Survey on Living Conditions (ENCOVI 2006) defines Extreme Poverty as a condition in which people can not cover the minimum cost of food, which amounts to 8.78 daily Quetzales per person. General Poverty [Pobreza General] includes those whoe are above the extreme poverty line, but can not cover other essential needs (18.01 daily Quetzales). Using these criteria the percentage of the national population living in poverty comes to 51%. With regard to advances in the Reduction of Poverty, a slight improvement can be observed from the 2000 survey: Poverty decreased from 56% to 51% and Extreme Poverty decreased from 15.7% to 15.2%. In absolute terms, the number of people living in poverty increased by 255,000, of which 185,000 are living in extreme poverty. These facts could be compromising considering that they are taken as a parameter to measure the total poverty, an amount of Q6,574 yearly per person, while for extreme poverty the parameter is Q3,206 yearly. The Basic Food Basket, on the other hand, increased by more than 248 Quetzales in the last year, while from 2005-200810 it increased by 344. Beyond the statement that Poverty has diminished, it is evident that Extreme Poverty has not. Instead of been reduced, Extreme Poverty has been reconfigurated. Even though some advances have been made in regions where the state has focused on reducing poverty, it is important to observe that in the northeast region of the country, extreme poverty doubled. Also, in terms of general poverty, the indigenous population regressed in relation to the non indigenous population.
For more information about the follow-up of recommendations of Relator Jean Ziegler, see the study Misin Guatemala... Combatir el Hambre. CIIDH. Guatemala, 2007. 10 Taking the month of April as a reference, we can observe that in 2008 the cost of the Basic Food Basket went up to Q1,778.44; in 2007 it was priced at Q1,529.76; in 2006 it was priced at Q1,501.21, and in 2005, year during which information was gathered for the ENCOVI 2006, it was priced at Q1,434.28. Information from the National Statistics Institute, INE.
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Table 1 Guatemala: Distribution of poverty by ethnicity (in thousands of people and percentage) Levels of Poverty Characteristic Total Population Poor Not extreme poor 4,649.3 2,366.1 2,276.1 Not poor 6,361.9 1,252.0 5,096.5
Extreme Poor
%
15.2 27.2 7.7
%
35.8 47.6 28.5
%
49.0 25.2 63.8
12,987.8 6,625.9 51.0 1,976.6 National total Indigenous 4,973.1 3,721.1 74.8 1,355.0 Non-indigenous 7,990.8 2,894.3 36.2 618.2 Source: Elaborated using information from the ENCOVI 2006.
Poverty is concentrated in the indigenous and peasant populations. The 2006 ENCOVI shows that the poverty rate among the indigenous population is twice that of the non-indigenous. With regard to extreme poverty, the situation is even more severe. The rate of extreme poverty among the indigenous population is more than three times that among the non-indigenous population. The heavy weight of ethnic origin in the process of wealth concentration is thus very noticeable. With regard to regions, it is evident that in terms of General Poverty the biggest setback is in the northeastern region (more than 50%), although it does not reach the levels of the north and northwestern levels (which are around 80%), and the southeastern and Petn (close to 60%) [sic]. In terms of Extreme Poverty the biggest setback is in the northeast (which goes from 9% to 20%) and Petn (from 13% to 15%). The main advance is in the southeastern region, which goes from 20% to 14% and the northwest (32% to 23%). General Poverty is concentrated in the rural area, which goes from 80% to 71%, while in the urban areas General Poverty goes from 18% to 28%. In terms of the ethnic origin, the indigenous population suffers a slight setback in relation to the non-indigenous population, going from 55.7% to 56.2% in a situation of poverty, while the nonindigenous population goes from 44.3% to 43.8%.
It does not include the population with unknown ethnic identity.

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Graph 1 Guatemala: Levels of poverty by department (in thousands of people)
Jutiapa Jalapa Chiquimula Zacapa Izabal Petn Alta Verapaz Baja Verapaz Quich Huehueten San Marcos Retalhuleu Suchitepq Quetzalten Totonicapn Solol Santa Rosa Escuintla Chimaltena Sacatepqu El Progreso Guatemala
200
400
Pobreza extrema
600
800
Pobreza no extrema
Source: Elaborated using information from the ENCOVI 2006.
In terms of the hunger situation, the number of malnourished persons has practically doubled in a relatively short period of time, going from 1.4 millions of people in 1991 to 2.8 million in 2002. Whereas in the year 1991 Guatemala had 31.1% of Central Americas malnourished, by 1996 it was 37.2%; and for the year 2002 it was 41.8%. Following this tendency, we could state that this year more than half of the hungry in Central America live in Guatemala, and the number has surely surpassed 3 million people. The trend in increasing number of malnourished people has not changed in Guatemala, whereas the trend has leveled in Nicaragua and Costa Rica, and declined in El Salvador.
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Graph 2 Central America Total Malnourished Population
3,000,000 2,500,000 2,000,000 1,500,000 1,000,000 500,000 0 Guatemala El Salvador Honduras Nicaragua Costa Rica 1991 1996 2002
Source:
Elaborated using information from the official website of the United Nations Organization for the indicators to measure progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. http://mdgs.un.org.
In terms of the changes the size of children studying in grade one, it can be observed that in over 15 years there have been important setbacks in the municipalities that were already considered high risk. Contrariwise, municipalities with low risk were the ones to improve the most.
Table 2 Categorization of the municipalities of Guatemala and of the zones of Guatemala city, in relation to the change in the size of children according to the 1986 and 2001 surveys. Number of Municipalities Municipalities N/A municipalities that worsened that improved and zones Very high 59.1 100 118 60 57 1 High 49.2 59.0 57 15 42 0 Moderate 34.5 49.1 87 19 65 3 Low 0.00 34.4 86 4 78 4 Source: Elaborated by CIIDH based on chart 19 of the Second National Size Census. Final Report. Guatemala, 2002. Risk Category Range of frequency %
g)
The political framework to address poverty:
In the framework of political commitments flowing out of the Peace Accords, it was possible to define a Poverty Reduction Strategy (ERP), which since 2001 has had the following objectives to deal with the problem of poverty in the country Economic growth with equity of at least 4% annually through the increase of the fiscal deductions, the rationalization of public expense, the reduction of the fiscal deficit, the attraction of investment and a prudent monetary policy. An increase to 6% of investments in human capital, especially in preventive health, the maternal and infant mortality index, elementary education and the reduction of illiteracy.
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To reach these goals sanitation services will be decentralized and deconcentrated, focusing on the rural sector and the indigenous population. Investments in physical capital, especially in the most disfavored sectors of the rural zones (drinkable water, basic sanitation, energy and means of communication) with participation of municipal administration. Agricultural development will be promoted through the distribution of land and the delivery of fertilizer to small farmers. Also anticipated in the supply of machinery and agricultural equipment. During the government of Oscar Berger, these objectives were redefined, towards a more general format, and thus less specific: 11 Social protection through the provisions of basic services; Strengthening of the human and productive capacities; Generation of social and economic opportunities; Enlargement of the individual and collective heritage of the poorest. In general terms it is considered that the ERP has not been functional due to the fact that the structural causes of poverty have not been addressed. The effect of programs intended to alleviate poverty has been very limited. We start from the point that certain factors, such as the favorable development of the economy, the delivery of resources from immigrants outside of the country and especially the attraction of foreign investment in the country, were contemplated. This last factor is counterproductive in that through the extension of fiscal benefits to transnational businesses, they stop contributing important taxes to the treasury, thus weakening the possibilities of the State to strengthen itself financially. In addition, it is a constant that businesses violate the labor rights of the workers, while the Ministry of Labor is unable to adequately monitor their performance.
11
SEGEPLAN. Estrategia de Reduccin de la Pobreza. Guatemala, 2006.

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II.
Study Methodology
In the elaboration of the study we used the hypothetical deductive method. We started from the experience that despite the policies and actions that have been taken at a national level to address food problems, the latter have failed, which is evidenced in the fact that the levels of hunger and malnutrition nationally have become more pronounced. We can thus pose questions, the answers to which will start to shape a valid hypothesis, whose proof will lead us to the expected answer. The inquiry of the answers, in turn, permits us to establish a deductive logical route, by which a quantitative investigation is made possible, by means of budget analysis, complemented with qualitative character, by means of the assessments contributed by people who have intervened in the policy application processes. To define the range of the hypothesis, we began with general questions, which maintain within themselves a sense of process, made each time more specific.
Box 3 Initial Questions: a) What impact have the Glass of Milk and Land Fund had on the decrease in Malnutrition and Hunger? b) What impact have both programs had on the population they have assisted? c) Has the allocation of resources to these programs been enough to reach the objectives sketched out?
d) Aside from financial aspects, are there other characteristics of the programs (technical, administrative or political) that condition its scope? e) Is it advisable to maintain the current logic of both policies to fulfill the objectives established? Hypothesis: Although the School Glass of Milk Program and the Land Fund could have positive effects in assisting in the realization of the Guatemalan populations Right to Food, they dont have a notable impact on the dimensions of the problems, especially due to the weakness with which they are applied.
a)
Quantitative Investigation:
To try and visualize the Right to Food in the Guatemalan PGIEE implies a complex challenge, in that certain aspects are not yet recognized politically, even though they are broadly linked to the RtF issue; they have not been incorporated into the PSAN. This is evident in regards to the Land Fund: Even though they receive their budget from the MAGA, monitoring of the agrarian issue is not included within the PSAN. Another example is the labor issue, which is even more separated. However, for the present study there was the advantage that both de Glass of Milk Program and the Land Fund have a financial relationship with the MAGA. Budget analysis has a logic that goes from the general to the specific. Moreover, it has a sense of correction from one budgetary year to another. This correction involves control and evaluation processes by the DTP and the SEGEPLAN, during and after the budget year, which should result in adjustments in the next years budget, so that each time the budget becomes more relevant to the fulfillment of the initial objectives.
17
The budget analysis was done starting with the tool denominated Integrated Accounting System, (SICOIN), which is recognized as the most developed and trusted mechanism for monitoring the budget performance by the Executive. Budget performance can be consulted online, where its information in updated on a daily basis.12 Box 4 13 Steps to access information from SICOIN 1 2 Enter into following web page: www.sicoin.minfin.gob.gt . In order to access information it is necessary to be registered as a user. However, there is an option for the press to consult the page, and this is the most used option. On the first page there is a panel where data regarding the user and the password are asked for. Both should be filled out with the word press. Then, the years which can be consulted appearfrom 2004 to 2008. Later, three options for Press Users appear, which are called, CLASSIFIERS, INCOME EXECUTION, EXECUTION OF EXPENDITURES. For the purposes of our investigation we will use EXECUTION OF EXPENDITURES. The option EXECUTION OF EXPENDITURES will open up a subfolder called REPORTS, which opens up three more options: CONSOLIDATED INFORMATION, ACTUAL BUDGET, MANAGEMENT REPORTS. Our option will be CONSOLIDATED INFORMATION. The option CONSOLIDATED INFORMATION opens up ten options, to obtain data that lets us know the totality of Budgetary information from the Executive, with the characteristics to know the resource allocations, reallocations, expenditures made and committed, as well as level of implementation of expenditures. We will opt for the option BUDGET EXECUTION (DYNAMIC GROUPS). The option BUDGET EXECUTION (DYNAMIC GROUPS) will take us to a filter to define the structure of the report we requested. For the focus of our investigation, we will use the following order: in CUT we will choose ENTITY; in GROUP 1 we will choose PROGRAM; in GROUP 2 we will choose ACTIVITY or WORK. Later the months you wish study should be chosen, which can be a range of months or one month in particular. In order to avoid possible changes in the information, we suggest limiting yourself to the month previous to the one in which we are realizing the investigation. In other words, if we are in mid-May, we will limit ourselves to the information available in April. Finally, press the option ACCEPT, and this will produce PDF version of the report we want.
3 4
There can be multiple versions of the reports. However, the one derived from the steps we took has the characteristic that it provides us with information detailed at program and subprogram levels, with information about transfers and executed expenses.
12
However, from experience it has become evident that frequent corrections appear several weeks later for information that we have taken as valid. This means that one needs to do several runs a posteriori, having to prove several times the veracity of the information. 13 With information from Manual de auditora presupuestaria. CIIDH. Guatemala, 2008.
18
b)
Qualitative Investigation:
The more relevant challenge in undertaking the study was to try each time to reach a more precise level concerning the topics analyzed. In regards to this, we tried to support our qualitative research through field studies at the community level in diverse regions, in order to do a comparative analysis of the assessments offered by each. The difficulty of most relevance in this aspect was to try and gain the communities trust, in order to have access and interview a range of personalities who had participated in both programs. We present the general framework for the qualitative research in the following box, where the thematic logic from the perspective of each actor as well as the topics that were considered in the design of the interviews can be seen.
Table 3 Methodological Framework for the Field Work Actors Political Public Officials (FONTIERRAS) Operative Public Officials (FONTIERRAS and School Feeding Programs) BudgetaryIssues Resource sufficiency Options for improvement Critical Assesments Bureaucratic mechanisms Sustainability Administrative Obstacles Considerations regarding Performance Assessments regarding Policies Sufficiency Opinions about improvements Crtical Assessments Social Participation Regarding Performance Advances and setbacks Social participation Assessments regarding impacts Assesments regarding community expectations Assessments regarding intervention (successes/ impacts/ perspectives) Regarding Land Poverty and hunger situation Labor/productive situation Comunity provisions Program considerations Regarding PAEs Situation of children (nutrition) School assistance Parent/ teacher relations
Beneficiaries
The qualitative investigation was done through semi-structured interviews with social actors who are involved at different levels in the processes of both programs studied. In addition, in order to put both programs into context, we included an interview with a Key Informant, an expert on Food Security, who could provide a first contextualization for both programs. With the key informant as well as operative and political public officials, we used open semistructured interviews. At the community level, we did collective, open, semi-structured interviews. The purpouse of the collective interview was to generate a debate among the subjects, thus permitting a diversity of perceptions regarding life as a beneficiary from the greatest number of people possible. At a community level, two groups were selected for each one of the programs studied, in order to do a comparative analysis between the assessments that they were able to offer us.
19
c.
Right to Food and the Budget

The SINASAN law states that, in order to apply the PSAN, the Guatemalan State must assign a half percentage point (0.5%) of what is collected from the Value Added Tax (IVA), to Food and Nutrition Security projects and programs directed to the population in poverty or extreme poverty. These resources will be channeled through entities that the CONASA defines through its Strategic Plan.14 Even though the system has achieved a certain level of stability, this obligation has not been fulfilled, although it is a fact that the amounts it is assumed they should determine usually are superior to this established quantity. However, the more contradictory effect is that the CONASAN is not permitted to propose its sense of the cost, according the needs that can be prioritized in line with its own analysis. Currently, the IVA forms the largest single part of the total tax recollection (51%). It involves a 12 % charge on consumption. However, it is recognized that it is the tax that is most evaded by the sectors that are supposed to pay it. After the Superintendent of Tax Administration, SAT [by its Spanish Acronym, Superintendencia de Administracin Tributaria] began to apply control actions, the amount collected practically doubled in the period of 2001-2007. In the debate about increasing tax collection, business sectors persist in pressuring for an increase to 15%, a position which is opposed by the popular sectors, because it implies an extra charge for the consumer, while, for higher income groups, the tax rates are quite low, given their level of acquisition and consumption.
Table 6 Annual tax collection Period 2001-2007 (in milions of quetzales) Description Total budget IVA contribution the budget 0.5% IVA to 2001 17,120.54 7,983.52 46.63 399.18 2002 20,292.36 9,395.26 46.30 469.76 2003 21,210.08 9,955.03 46.94 497.75 2004 23,329.18 11,530.77 49.43 576.54 2005 25,097.79 12,202.34 48.62 610.12 2006 29,023.36 13,912.54 47.94 695.63 2007 33,720.96 17,179.28 50.95 858.96
Contribution %
While the amounts the government assigns to Food and Nutrition Security surpass the amount established by the law, two aspects need to be raised in the short term:
a) The difficulty of defining with more clarity what could be included within these expenses, since currently various related activities could fall within them; b) The insufficiency of the amount allocated, since it is evident that the half percentage point is not enough given the dimensions of the food issue.
The primary programs designated to assist the populations Food and Nutrition Security, are found in the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAGA) through the Vice-Ministry of Food and Nutrition Security (VISAN), and in the Ministry of Education (MINEDUC), through the School Feeding Programs at the elementary and pre-elementary level. The Ministry of Public Health promotes some curative type actions that have still not been consolidated, especially the
14
SINASAN Law. Article 38.

20
Chronic Malnutrition Reduction Plan (PRDC), which was proposed by the previous government and the new government has announced its reframing. On the other hand, it has recently been announced that the Conditional Transfers methodology will be used. This means the handing out of cash to families considered vulnerable on the condition that their children attend school and they keep a health control. However, this proposal is still at a Pilot Project Stage. The MAGA brings together the majority of programs defined for the SAN [Food and Nutritional Security]. For 2008, the allocation for Agriculture Development and Food Aid activities implies 34.7 % of the total budget. However, as of April it became obvious that the budget advance for this activity is extremely low, barely 0.5%, which seriously compromises the possibilities of taking advantage of these resources. The MAGA is the entity that channels the Land Funds contribution through the non-assignable Entries to programs.
Table 7 Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food (MAGA) Budget Advancement Status Period from January to April 2008 (in millions of quetzales) Description Central activities Amplified competitive agriculture Agriculture development and Food aid Natural resource sustainability Entries non-assignable to programs Total Source: Allocated 52.13 327.58 409.92 28.20 412.69 1,230.51 Modified + 9.40 - 20.56 + 25.01 + 1.70 + 7.45 + 23.00 In force 61.53 307.02 434.93 29.90 420.14 1,253.51 Amount executed 13.33 11.16 2.10 1.95 76.59 105.13 Advances 21.7% 3.6% 0.5% 6.5% 18.2% 8.4%
SICOIN. Report at April 30th 2008.
Box 4.
Vice-Ministry of Food and Nutrition Security (VISAN) Activities, May 2008
The VISAN reports that as of May the VISANs Food Aid Program handed out 10,153 tons of food to 75,821 people from 17 departments considered to be vulnerable. This is equivalent to 6 kgs of food per person on average. During 2007 the Food in exchange for Actions Program handed out a total of 32,286 quintales of food to 232,868 people, the equivalent to 6.3 kgs per person on average. Currently it has been present in only 6 communities from 2 departments that are not included among the most food vulnerable (Guatemala and El Progreso). This has benefited 3,072 people with 232 quintales of food, the equivalent to 3.4 kilos of food per person. Another action, called Food Aid for persons affected by the crisis, which is implemented through these programs in coordination with the World Food Program (WFP), has distributed 16,956 quintales of food to 47,530 persons in 7 departments (Chiquimula, Escuintla, Izabal, San Marcos, Solol and Zacapa) - on average 16.2 kgs per person. During the February to May period, the School Glass of Milk Program distributed 19.9 millions portions, surpassing the 35.0 millions that were distributed during all of 2007. For this year, 460,854 students from 3,757 schools in 104 municipalities from 19 departments have benefitted. It is considered to cover 76 days of the school cycle. The handout of food in coordination with the PMA is of 36,900 quintales for 315,390 persons, or 5.3 kgs per person.
Synthesis of the VISAN activity Report. May16, 2008.
21
IV. IV.1
Box 5.
Budget Analysis in the realization of the Right to Food in Guatemala Support for vulnerable groups:
Voluntary Guideline 13: Support for vulnerable groups 13.2 States are invited to systematically undertake disaggregated analysis on the food insecurity, vulnerability and nutritional status of different groups in society, with particular attention to assessing any form of discrimination that may manifest itself in greater food insecurity and vulnerability to food insecurity, or in a higher prevalence of malnutrition among specific population groups, or both, with a view to removing and preventing such causes of food insecurity or malnutrition.
a)
School Feeding Programs [Programas de Alimentacin Escolar, PAE]
The situation of children is a reflection of the inequality that prevails among the Guatemalan population. This situation is even more critical since the disruption in production that has primarily affected indigenous and peasant populations. Indicators of chronic malnutrition among the Guatemalan child population remain among the highest in the world. This has meant serious regression and stagnation in the physical and biological development of children.15 In this regard, School Feeding Programs serve as one policy within an overall strategic approach to the situation. In 1956, UNICEF and the U.S. Government initiated food aid distribution in Guatemala. The country can trace the establishment of School Feeding Programs to the 80s. Diverse operational strategies and actions have been used, and there have been many changes in focuses in successive administrations. Until 1985, the School Snack [refaccion escolar] consisted of a daily glass of Incaparina, a mixture of degermed corn flour with cotton seed flour. Vitamins and iron were later added to this mixture. To facilitate the management of this program and to reduce costs, a School Cookie [galleta escolar] was introduced (and formulated) by the Nutrition Institute for Central America and Panama (INCAP) in 1986. Until 1996, the School Cookie was considered a school snack, contributing between 7% and 10% of daily energy and protein requirements. In 1997, a School Breakfast Program was introduced; operations were led by local support committees, made up of parents and supported by teachers and school directors. These local support committees were organized in official rural school settings, as part of the National Program for the Self management for Educational Development (PRONADE).16 Items such as milk, vegetables, pastas and cooking oils were donated in varying degrees by the community, as well as contracted distributers, private foundations and international cooperation organisms.
15
It is currently recognized that 49% of Guatemalan children suffer from some degree of chronic malnutrition. By disaggregating this figure, one can observe rates higher than 70% in the Departments of Solol and Totonicapn. Furthermore, by doing analysis by ethnic groups, it becomes clear that groups such as the Tektiteko, Ixil and Chort have indices higher than 80%, while the Chuj and Mam groups surpass 70%. 16 PRONADE is an educational program designed to extend educational coverage to rural areas and in places where official education systems dont exist. Although it had been assumed that PRONADE would be a strategy of a temporary or emergency nature, the low costs it incurred in comparison with normal education resulted in its consolidation. The current government of lvaro Colom has announced the end of PRONADE and has called for the incorporation of its teachers in to the official system.
22
The School Breakfast Program began by offering coverage to 4 Departments. It extended its services to the entire country in 1999although in reality, it was only able to cover approximately 10,000 schools at a cost of 11 cents (of a dollar) per ration with a budget allocation of 16.8, 67.7, and 92.4 million Quetzales in each of the three years. Interestingly, in 1999, 4,150 schools in urban areas were served a snack that included the fortified cookie and Incaparina, reaching an investment of 125 million Quetzales for both programs that year. There were logistical problems with the School Breakfast Program, and the beneficiary population voiced dissatisfaction with the beverage and cookie. This was enough to justify the introduction of a new model in 2000, which consisted of private sellers bidding to provide breakfasts. This led to big losses due to irregularities in delivery and food spoilage. As a result, in 2001, the distribution of the fortified cookie and Incaparina became universal. In 2000, 149.5 million Quetzales were spent on school breakfasts and lunches, which amounts to 0.70 Quetzales per day per capita during a 180-day cycle, assuming a minimum coverage of 1.2 million students. In 2001, 92.6 million Quetzales were spent only on breakfasts; in other words, a per capita expenditure of less than 0.40 Quetzales per day. In 2002, a new program on school lunches began. It was designed by the recently-created The National Food and Nutrition Security Council (CONSAN), and served nearly 3,250 schools of 106 municipalities in 17 departments. A new operational approach was adopted for this program, by which money was transferred in the form of cash to school committees within the regular system, and educational committees within PRONADE. Both were in charge of preparing the food. Initially, an allocation of 3 Quetzales was proposed daily for each student. In 2003, School Feeding Programs (PAE) were moved from the Ministry of Education (MINEDUC) to the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food (MAGA), transferring to the MAGA the role of delivering lunches to 331 municipalities. In addition, separate contracts were granted for the distribution of the cookie and atole, a drink made of cornstarch. In the budget approved for 2002, 150 million Quetzales were allocated to the School Feeding Programs (PAE) for breakfasts for Pre-primary and Primary school populations. On the other hand, 169.2 million Quetzales were allocated for lunches, but actual expenditures were limited to breakfasts only. For the 2003 budget, 333.3 million Quetzales were approved with a goal of serving 48,647 students in Pre-primary levels and 1,791,353 students in Primary grade levels. In other words, only 13% of Pre-primary students and 84% of Primary students would be served. In 2005, the bulk of School Feeding Programs were reincorporated back into the Ministry of Education (MINEDUC), leaving the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food (MAGA) in charge of various supplementary programs, such as the distribution of bean flour [harina de frijol], the fortified beverage and the School Glass of Milk [Vaso de Leche Escolar].
23
Chart 8 Historical Evolution of Investment in School Feeding Programs (PAE) 1997 Enrolled students (in thousands) MINEDUC budget expenditure (millions of Quetzales) MAGA budget expenditure (millions of Quetzales) Total Budget expenditure (millions of Quetzales) Real annual investment in school food programs (millions of Quetzales) Annual per capita investment in current value (Quetzales) Annual per capita investment in real terms (Quetzales) Daily per capita investment (180 day cycle) Real daily per capita investment (180 day cycle) 16.8 67.7 92.4 149.5 92.6 185.6 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007
1,440.7 1,587.4 1,786.5 1,852.8 2,359.1 2,469.4 2,706.5 2,781.5 2,852.9
16.8
67.7
92.4
149.5
92.6
185.6 233.5 233.5
216.3 55.3 271.6
337.6 79.2 416.8
437.2 70.7 507.9
16.8 11.7 11.7 0.06 0.06
63.0 42.6 39.7 0.24 0.22
82.2 51.7 46.0 0.29 0.26
127.3 80.7 68.7 0.45 0.38
73.3 39.3 31.1 0.22 0.17
139.8 75.2 56.6 0.42 0.31
158.0 86.3 58.4 0.48 0.32
173.7 97.6 62.4 0.54 0.35
257.0 146.1 90.1 0.81 0.50
297.2
Source: Own analysis of statistics from MINEDUC school registration; MINFIN [from its Spanish acronym, Ministerio de Finanzas, Minstry of Finances] budget expenditures; Inter-institutional Coordination for the Rights of the Child (Coordinacin Interinstitucional por los Derechos del Nio, CIPRODENI), September 2000 report, Execution of School Food Programs 1997 to 1999: CIEN 2003 Report; SICOIN, budget expenditure reports; BANGUAT, Internal Gross Domestic Product based on National Accounts base 93 (Producto Bruto Interno segn Cuentas Nacionales base 93); INE National Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadsticas), data on inflation. Note: 2003 is omitted because data on budget expenditure for the School Feeding Programs are not available; this was also the year such programs were handled exclusively by MAGA. Note: Investment carried out by PRONADE is not included. Note: For 2007, figures on per capita investment are omitted because of a lack of reliable data on school registration for that year.
As can be seen from Chart 8, there has certainly been an increase of public investment in School Feeding Programs in the decade since the signing of the Peace Accords, most notably during the 1997-2000 period. Since 2000, however, the rate of increase plummets significantly, indicating a fragile pattern in social programs. It is important to note that food programs have continued in spite of turbulent situations produced by changes from various administrations, different political parties in power, significant opposition, and international environmental pressure to push for financial strengthening of the public sector destined for education. It is also important to note that Chart 8 does not include investment carried out by the National Program for Educational Development (PRONADE) since it operates under the mandate of the System of Integrated Accounting (SICOIN), for which, relevant past studies are unknown.
24
Chart 9 Investment in Education and School Feeding Programs (PAE) in relation to Gross Domestic Product and Public Spending (millions of Quetzales)
1997 GDP Total Central Government Spending MINEDUC Expenditure Annual investment in PAE MINEDUC spending in relation to GDP MINEDUC spending in relation to total expenditure PAE as a percentage in institutional budget PAE in relation to GDP PAE in relation to total expenditure
0.13 0.41 0.49 0.76 10.16 1.31 10.16 4.00 11.47 4.31 12.80 5.90
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
146,977.8 162,506.8 174,044.1 190,440.1 208,293.9 230,271.7 255,856.6 12,618.2 16,637.0 18,685.4 19,801.2 1,282.6 16.8 1,690.9 67.7 2,143.6 92.4 2,534.0 149.5 22,182.2 3,062.1 92.6 2.08 13.80 3.02 0.06 0.42 23,512.3 3,157.8 185.6 1.94 13.43 5.88 0.11 0.79 1.95 12.30 27,542.1 3,386.7 27,068.5 3,691.0 233.5 1.94 13.64 6.33 0.12 0.86 30,885.0 4,280.4 271.6 2.05 13.86 6.34 0.13 0.88 36,494.5 4,920.8 416.8 2.14 13.48 8.47 0.18 1.14 39,543.8 5,415.5 437.2 2.12 13.70 8.07 0.17 1.11
Source: Own analysis of data from BANGUAT, Internal Gross Domestic Product based on National Accounts base 93 (Producto Bruto Interno segn Cuentas Nacionales base 93); Ministry of Finances (MINFIN), budget expenditures. Note: 2003 figures are omitted because data on budget expenditure for School Feeding Programs (PAE), handled by MAGA, are not available. Note: Investment carried out by PRONADE is not included, except for exceptional 2007 data included later. Note: For 2004, investment in School Feeding Programs was handled by MAGA and as such, is presented in relation to the Ministry of Educations (MINEDUC) spendingPAE flow through MAGA.
Data in Chart 917 again shows deliberate policies adopted by the various administrations following the signing to the Peace Accords in their prioritization of spending on education. It is important to highlight the growing investment in school feeding programs, showing a more continuous and steady rhythm in relation to the MINEDUCs spending. Investment between 1995 and 1996 is unclear, however, due to the establishment of a Program on Reconstruction, following the damages caused by Hurricane Stan. There were issues with the handling of accounting reports, particularly by the MAGA, which reported information on actions to rebuild damaged communities as regular expenditures on School Feeding Programs (PAE).
17
Relations to GDP are limited to the years in which official information exists, since BANGUAT has not yet published values dating before 2001. This will serve as the foundation for the new System of National Accounts 93 (Sistema de Cuentas Nacionales 93).
25
Chart 10 Budget Expenditure in School Feeding Programs (PAE) 2004 2008 (In Quetzales) Year Ministry Program
Pre-primary Breakfast
Approved
31,176,381 124,615,101 177,536,683 Total 333,328,165 74,647,154 275,196,746 33,391,868 0 383,235,768 58,253,496 299,821,030 20,224,691 61,000,000 439,299,217 58,253,496 299,821,030 61,000,000 419,074,526 125,016,400 421,435,233 70,340,000 616,791,633
Variation
0 -45,786,159 -23,767,031 -69,553,190 -52,578,954 -76,202,706 -11,000,000 +32,889,748 -106,891,912 -1,262,361 -13,755,547 -2,000,000 0 -17,017,908 -7,802,156 +23,469,408 +46,066,689 +61,733,941 0 0 0 0
Actual
31,176,381 78,828,942 153,769,652 263,774,975 22,068,200 198,994,040 22,391,868 32,889,748 276,343,856 56,991,135 286,065,483 18,224,691 61,000,000 422,281,309 50,451,340 323,290,438 107,066,689 480,808,467 125,016,400 421,435,233 70,340,000 616,791,633
Expended
29,408,442 56,155,426 147,982,488 233,546,356 21,783,434 194,489,697 22,391,868 32,889,748 271,554,747 55,754,021 281,844,686 18,224,691 61,000,000 416,823,398 42,260,735 293,766,530 107,041,276 443,068,540 2,942,409 5,766,514 5,293 8,714,216
% % spending/ expended approved

94.3 71.2 96.2 88.5 98.7 97.7 100.0 100.0 98.3 97.8 98.5 100.0 100.0 98.7 83.8 90.9 100.0 92.2 2.35 1.37 0.01 1.41 1.41 105.7 94.9 70.9 70.1
2004
MAGA
Primary Breakfast School lunches
MINEDUC
Pre-primary Feeding Primary Feeding
2005
MAGA
Fortified beverage Glass of Milk (Vaso de Leche) Total
MINEDUC
2006
MAGA
Fortified beverage Glass of Milk (Vaso de Leche) Total
MINEDUC
2007
MAGA
Glass of Milk (Vaso de Leche) Total
MINEDUC
2008
MAGA
Glass of Milk (Vaso de Leche) Total
Source: Integrated Accounting System (SICOIN). All years from January to December included, except for 2008, with figures through April 31.
b)
School Feeding Programs of the MINEDUC
School Feeding Programs (PAE) of the Ministry of Education consist of transferring funds (cash) through bank transfers to School Committees within the mainstream education system and to Parent Committees within the National Program for the self management for Educational Development (PRONADE). A new temporary program was added by mandate of the law on budget restructuring on March of 2007, which called for the transfer of funds to directors of schools lacking established committees; this was in addition to the distribution of powdered milk [leche en polvo] donated by the World Food Programme (WFP). The official system of recognized educational centers consists of: 23,784 Pre-Kinder (Prvulos), Pre-primary, and Primary schoolsincluding those in the municipal sector. Close to 6,060 schools function in and are annexed to Pre-primary and Primary schools.18
18
This data is taken forme an oficial source (General Board for Education Planning DIGEPE). Eventhough this source includes a fast count of students registered in 2007 that information is not taken into consideration since it does not coinicide with the information registered in the MINEDUCs web page for 2006 [sic]. However in this report we have used the information regarding the number and distribution of schools.
26
In 2007, 18,720 Pre-Kinder (Prvulos), Pre-primary, and Primary schools (including the municipal sector) were served by the Ministry of Educations (MINEDUC) School Food Programs and the General Office of Support Programs (DIGEPA) and PRONADE. That is, 78.7% of total schools were served. Financial disbursement rose to 437.23 million Quetzales of which 338.67 million Quetzales were handled by DIGEPA and transferred to the regular system, while 98.56 million Quetzales were handled by PRONADE. Service coverage within the regular system (including municipal sector) rose to 71.8% of total schools, whereas PRONADE reports 100% coverage. The most important explanation for the low coverage is the fact that the program requires as a pre-condition the establishment of School Committees in order for the school to receive funds from the various programs, among them the feeding program. This is also a basic pre-condition required by PRONADE, but being a program of extended coverage the pre-condition to create Educational Committees COEDUCAS applied to each new school prior to its opening, while within the regular system the condition applies since 2002. Requests for renewals of agreements take place annually. In order to request a renewal, Educational Committees must be active and need to have already renewed their memberships, turned in a satisfactory accounting report of funds received, and fulfilled administrative requirements. The latter means they must maintain accounts and separate checkbooks for each program as well as keep back-up documentation for expenses greater than 100 Quetzales. Given these administrative requirements, of the 9,900 registered agreements with DIGEPA, only 7,756 remained active in 2007. There was also resistance by groups of students parents to form Educational Committees. The resistance was largely due to the time and responsibilities involved in having to purchase and prepare food, as well as follow administrative procedures of programs they must execute. The data gathered for this report consists of the total transfers processed by DIGEPA and PRONADE to schools within the regular system during 2007. With regard to a future program to accompany donations from the World Food Programme, we were only able to obtain the number of beneficiaries of such program, without any further details. In spite of the efforts made, all we know is that a check of 35 Quetzales was added to the powdered milk donation for each registered student in beneficiary schools. The total number of beneficiaries was 141,748, dispersed throughout 8 departments: 29,587 in Baja Verapaz; 9,317 in Chimaltenango; 7,645 in Quich; 41,662 in Huehuetenango; 8,688 in Quetzaltenango; 35, 297 in San Marcos; 4,677 in Solol; and 4,875 in Totonicapn. One can infer that the total investment amounted to less than 5 million Quetzalesthe budget allocation for this remains unknown. While 337,597,459 Quetzales were transferred through DIGEPA (serving 12,578 schools), 98,562,636 Quetzales were transferred through PRONADE (reaching approximately 6,142 schools). The actual number of beneficiary students does not appear in the information we obtained. While we could make an estimate based on the amount allocated per capita for each program, such data would be imprecise because of the significant degree of irregularities observed in the implementation of such programs. For example, a number of schools have not received the entire amount of expecting funds, which could be due to penalizations for failing to render accounts. Other schools have been hit with adjustments in the number of beneficiaries. In many cases, there are disparities that lead one to believe that new procedures may have been added to the original agreement and may apply to annexed schools, for example. The program managed by DIGEPA has transferred to Educational Committees 234.0 Quetzales per year for each enrolled student in rural areas and 194.0 Quetzales to urban schools. In other words, 1.30 and 1.08 Quetzales respectively were transferred daily during the 180-day school year. Fund transfers processed by PRONADE amount to 237.5 Quetzales per year per enrolled
27
student (or 1.32 Quetzales per day for the 180-day school year). While beneficiary schools should be located in rural settings, we found that was not always the case. By contrast, according to calculations from the Human Rights Omubudsmans Office presented in the 2006 Report on the Management of the Ministry of Educations Food Program, 2.80 Quetzales per day were needed to provide 570 calories per day to each child.
c)
School Food Programs of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food (MAGA)
In 2003, School Feeding Programs consisted of breakfasts and lunches for Pre-primary and Primary students and were transferred from the Ministry of Education to MAGAs Special Unit on School Feeding (Unidad Especial de Alimentacin Escolar). With an allocation of 319.2 million Quetzales, the initial proposed goal was to serve 2.2 million students, assigning 2 Quetzales per student per day in the 207 most vulnerable municipalities according to the Census on Height (censo de talla) and 1 Quetzal for the remainder. Results for 2003 are unknown, and the year 2004 not only brought a change in administration but a budgetary adjustment as well. A new budget was not approved in 2004, and as a result, allocations for School Feedingd Programs were reduced to 236.6 million Quetzales, changing the makeup of such programs. Bean flour and the fortified beverage were substituted for school breakfasts and lunches. Initially, these substitutions were programmed to be distributed in 12,129 schools in 22 departments. While details of the results are unknown, SICOIN reports a 70%+ achievement rate with regard to MAGAs School Feeding Programs. In 2005, the fortified beverage was reincorporated into MINEDUCs program and continued under constrained circumstances. According to official information from MAGA, in 2005 15.9 million Quetzales were invested toward the distribution of the beverage destined to reach 92 municipalities of 10 departments, while in 2006, 17.8 million Quetzales were invested among 105 municipalities of 16 departments. The Glass of Milk (Vaso de Leche Escolar, VLE) began as a pilot project in 2005, directed at 1,108 schools of 37 municipalities in 5 departments (Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz, Guatemala, Jalapa and Jutiapa) and two zones in the capital (6 and 17), amounting to an investment of 32.9 million Quetzales. Since 2007, the VLE is the only School Feeding Program carried out by the MAGA, given the elimination of the fortified beverage service. Since 2005, the criterion with regard to servicing schools through School Committees and Educational Committees (COEDUCA) has been applied universally, as a strategic decentralization component promoted by the Berger administration. Beginning in 2004, first MAGA, later DIGEPA, transferred resources to School Committees, while PRONADE transferred funds to COEDUCAs. In general, School Food Programs carried out by MAGA were put in place to respond to different conditions in municipalities with higher degrees of vulnerability as relates to malnutrition. Distribution of the fortified beverage, for example, is not meant to serve as a substitute for extending MINEDUCs School Feeding Program coverage to schools that do not receive food resources. Yet 35% of schools enjoyed double the benefits, while approximately 25% of schools did not benefit from any coverage. As can be observed from Chart 11, only 35 of the 93 municipalities that were served in 2005 were located in high risk departments. This translates to 21.5% of total number of beneficiary students. In 2006, the number of students served in high risk areas diminished to 12%. The
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number of students served in lower risk areas for both years is near 60%, although in 2006, there was an important increase in the number of beneficiaries in high risk situations.
Chart 11 Distribution of the Fortified Beverage 2005 2006 Degree of Vulnerability

HUEHUETENANGO SAN MARCOS SOLOLA TOTONICAPAN CHIMALTENANGO ALTA VERAPAZ BAJA VERAPAZ JUTIAPA QUETZALTENANGO RETALHULEU ESCUINTLA JALAPA PETEN ZACAPA GUATEMALA SANTA ROSA SUCHITEPEQUEZ Total Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Sum High High High High High Sum Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Sum Low Low Low Sum
Municipalities served 2005 2006 12 11 4 8 35 1 21 4 2 8 12 5 31 5 7 8 6 26 10 13 23 27 7 6 14 3 9 3 6
Beneficiary students 2005 34,716 20,534 7,170 29,948 92,368 4,179 2006 3,328 23,432 18,214 22,245 67,219 65,503 7,263 20,093 66,507 20,449 179,815 34,393 32,558 76,526 20,062 163,539 113,697 16,429 27,990 158,116
13 9 23
37,003 25,583 66,765
12 12
95,739 95,739 135,581 39,099 174,680
93
105
429,551
568,689
Source: Own analysis of data from VISAN, MAGA.
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d)
School Glass of Milk Program (Vaso de Leche Escolar, VLE)19
The Glass of Milk program was officially announced as part of government social strategies in response to the issue of food insecurity affecting the school population. This program services the most vulnerable sector and contributes to improving the quality of life of children and their nutritional status by delivering a glass of fortified liquid milk daily. The program is also meant to complement, support and develop the production of milk in Guatemala. The following are some of the objectives for this program: General Objetive Provide a daily glass of fortified milk to school-aged students in areas characterized as high risk for Food Insecurity. Specific Objectives Contribute to improving the nutritional state of students in Pre-primary and Primary levels in areas categorized as high risk for Food Insecurity. Provide support to the milk sector in areas located near populations being served in order to guarantee the delivery of liquid milk. Develop organizational mechanisms for consumers and producers in order to create effective logistics in the personnel service and delivery of the glass of milk. The School Glass of Milk Program (VLE) was introduced as an initiative from the National Dairy Chain, part of the Chamber of Milk Producers (Cadena Lctea Nacional integrada por la Cmara de Productores de Leche), the group of dairy and ice cream producers of Guatemala, and the Chamber of Commerceall of which sought to re-activate the national dairy industry, pushing for investments in farms and cold chains, commercialization and distribution of its products with international competition in mind.20 The program started as a pilot project in 2005, reaching 1,108 schools in 35 municipalities of 5 departments and two zones in the capital city. In 2006, the program was formally established. That year, the program expanded its services to 92 municipalities in 16 departments, plus two zones in the capital cityall in all, serving 3,253 schools. In 2007, the program extended its services to include 100 municipalities and including the two zones of the capital, it served a total of 3,525 schools.
Chart 12 Implementation of the School Glass of Milk (VLE) Pilot Project 2005 Beneficiary School population Departament Municipalities schools served Alta Verapaz 6 284 29,351 Baja Verapaz 6 331 34,713 Guatemala 10 197 49,764 Jutiapa 8 120 14,056 Jalapa 5 152 14,114 Zonas 6 and 17, Capital city 2 24 7,583 35 1,108 149,581
19
The information compiled in this report was taken from official report from VISAN on Glass of Milk expenditures from September 28, 2006 to June 8, 2007. Although it does not include full data for the year, one can draw general observations with regard to coverage and focuses based on conditions of vulnerability and program costs. 20 Document from the Vice-Ministry of Feeding (Vice Ministerio de Alimentacin), VISAN, MAGA 2006.
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As can be observed from Chart 13 and Figures 3 and 4 below, there is inconsistency between the needs of the programs recipients and the achievements of the program itself. The success of the School Glass of Milk Program is hindered by the availability of contracted transportation services, delaying meeting the needs of the most vulnerable children. Rations provided to departments considered highly vulnerable amount to only 8.88% of the total. In contrast, rations given to departments considered low risk amount to 33.16%. It is necessary to note that in spite of efforts to help situations of food vulnerability and poverty, these findings have not been taken into account as refrence to define this policy.
Chart 13 Glass of Milk (Vaso de Leche) Distribution National levels by order of malnutrition vulnerability 2007
Department Schools Quantity 149 0 118 180 41 65 315 350 372 219 48 210 164 0 266 0 161 0 158 276 143 293 3,528 % School Population Quantity % Very High Risk Departments 4.22 18,775 4.18 0 0 0 3.34 13,691 3.05 5.10 24,654 5.49 1.16 7,666 1.71 1.84 9,401 2.09 High Risk Departments 8.93 37,760 9.92 39,530 10.54 23,176 6.21 20,856 1.36 7,665 5.95 31,026 8.41 8.81 5.16 4.65 1.71 6.91 Rations provided Quantity 241,000 0 63,910 1,136,871 412,593 774,113 3,063,809 2,710,024 1,574,053 1,820,369 431,419 2,177,313 1,805,249 0 2,296,115 0 1,273,206 0 1,676,096 2,233,153 773,951 5,123,029 29,586,273 % 0.81 0 0.22 3.84 1.39 2.62 10.36 9.16 5.32 6.15 1.46 7.36 6.10 0 7.76 0 4.30 0 5.67 7.55 2.62 17.32 100.00
Huehuetenango Chimaltenango El Quich Solol Totonicapn San Marcos Alta Verapaz Baja Verapaz Chiquimula Jalapa Quetzaltenango Suchitepquez Petn Izabal Retalhuleu Sacatepquez Santa Rosa El Progreso Escuintla Jutiapa Zacapa Guatemala Total
Moderate Risk Departments 4.65 24,014 5.35 0 0 0 7.54 28,098 6.26 0 0 0 4.56 14,745 3.28 0 4.48 7.82 4.05 8.30 100 Low Risk Departments 0 0 19,874 4.43 27,664 6.16 10,011 2.23 90,282 20.11 448,888 100
Source: Area of Information for Food Security (rea de Informacin de Seguridad Alimentaria), MAGA.
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Figure 3 Glass of Milk (Vaso de Leche) Coverage Guatemala 2007
Figure 4 Prevalence of Chronic Malnutrition Guatemala 2001
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Chart 14 Implementation of School Glass of Milk (Vaso de Leche) through September 28, 2006 By Departments Department Alta Verapaz Baja Verapaz Chiquimula Escuintla Guatemala Jalapa Jutiapa Peten Quetzaltenango Retalhuleu San Marcos Santa Rosa Solol Suchitepquez Totonicapn Zacapa Municipality 7 6 4 5 13 5 9 4 10 4 2 2 10 6 3 2 92
Schools served 315 348 360 158 289 221 276 165 48 266 65 161 180 210 41 143 3,246
Rations 4,324,128 4,084,710 2,943,202 2,841,784 11,545,474 3,024,527 4,003,682 3,112,739 939,088 3,975,472 965,339 2,241,875 2,567,339 3,301,618 962,864 1,441,210 52,275,051
Investment (Quetzales) 9,012,126 8,207,560 6,348,450 5,171,254 18,053,712 5,731,479 7,586,978 7,439,447 1,493,148 7,772,048 1,969,291 4,248,354 4,653,862 6,240,057 1,530,953 2,947,274 98,405,993
Chart 15 Implementation of School Glass of Milk (Vaso de Leche) through June 8, 2007 By Departments Department Alta Verapaz Baja Verapaz Chiquimula Escuintla Guatemala Huehuetenango Jalapa Jutiapa Petn Quetzaltenango Quich Retalhuleu San Marcos Santa Rosa Solol Suchitepquez Totonicapn Zacapa 100
Source: Own analysis of data from VISAN, MAGA
Municipality 7 6 4 5 13 5 5 9 4 10 3 4 2 2 10 6 3 2
Schools served 315 350 372 158 290 149 219 276 164 48 118 266 65 161 180 210 41 143 3,525
Rations 3,414,836 2,710,024 1,574,053 1,677,096 5,123,029 241,000 1,784,369 2,233,153 1,805,255 431,421 63,910 2,296,115 774,113 1,273,206 1,136,871 2,177,313 412,593 773,951 29,902,308
Investment (Quetzales) 7,541,222 5,906,312 3,895,782 3,769,642 8,479,471 521,361 3,622,535 4,443,973 6,083,338 664,385 105,452 4,713,924 1,722,401 2,533,680 1,875,415 4,692,109 635,394 1,661,673 62,868,069
It is worth noting the significant differences in SICOINs reporting of expenditures for the program, from the start. For 2006, MAGA reported expenditures of 61.0 million Quetzales; yet 102.2 million had been allocated for the program. Up until September 28 of that year, 98.4 million Quetzales were reported as expenditures. In 2007, 107.0 million Quetzales were reported
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as expenses, of which 61.4 milllion Quetzales had been spent through June 8yet 120.5 million Quetzales had been earmarked. These inconsistencies raise questions and doubts about the management of this program and how funds were accounted for. To this, one can also add the lack of transparency with regard to undeclared figures. It is important to highlight the financial share of the School Glass of Milk Program within the School Feeding Programs, accounting for 22.3% of total investments in 2006 and 24.2% in 2007 (excluding PRONADE). With the aggregate of data available for 2007, PRONADE invested 18.2% of the total, while the School Glass of Milk Program only comprised 19.8% of total investment. With regard to the efficiency of the program itself, the cost of rations under the School Glass of Milk Program (Vaso de Leche Escolar) is clearly higher than the amount of money that DIGEPA and PRONADE transferred to School Committees. According to information we collected, the average cost per serving of 200cc of liquid milk served under this program rose from 1.88 Quetzales in 2006 to 2.10 Quetzales in 2007. These figures are relatively higher than what DIGEPA and PRONADE transferred to School Committees in 2007, for example: 1.30 and 1.32 Quetzales respectively to rural areas, and 1.08 to urban settingsestimated for a full 180-day school year. In addition, while the Ministry of Educations (MINEDUC) programs provided coverage to nearly 2 million boys and girls, the School Glass of Milk Program only benefitted roughly 450,000 children. The unequal nature of the program is further evidenced by analyzing costs and number of days in which the glass of milk was provided in schools. In 2006, the price per serving varied significantly throughout the countryfrom 2.39 Quetzales in Petn to 1.59 Quetzales in the majority of municipalities in Quetzaltenango, Totonicapn and Guatemala. The number of days in which the glass of milk was served, on the other hand, also varies considerably157 days in San Manuel Chaparrn in Jalapa at a unit cost of 1.89 Quetzales, to 73 days in Tamah at a cost of 1.99 Quetzales per serving.
Chart 16 Coverage, cost and frequency of the School Glass of Milk (VLE) 2006
Department Municipalities 7 6 4 5 13 5 9 4 10 4 2 2 10 6 3 2 Existing schools 886 666 448 338 558 339 500 179 437 336 87 205 203 303 190 182 Schools served 315 348 360 158 289 221 276 165 48 266 65 161 180 210 41 143 3,246 Rations 4,324,128 4,084,710 2,943,202 2,841,784 11,545,474 3,024,527 4,003,682 3,112,739 939,088 3,975,472 965,339 2,241,875 2,567,339 3,301,618 962,864 1,441,210 52,275,051 Investment (Q) 9,012,126 8,207,560 6,348,450 5,171,254 18,053,712 5,731,479 7,586,978 7,439,447 1,493,148 7,772,048 1,969,291 4,248,354 4,653,862 6,240,057 1,530,953 2,947,274 98,405,993 Average cost / ration 2.08 2.01 2.16 1.82 1.56 1.90 1.90 2.39 1.59 1.96 2.04 1.90 1.81 1.89 1.59 2.04 1.88 Average days served 113 104 129 143 130 147 145 130 124 141 105 150 107 116 127 144 127
Alta Verapaz Baja Verapaz Chiquimula Escuintla Guatemala Jalapa Jutiapa Petn Quetzaltenango Retalhuleu San Marcos Santa Rosa Solol Suchitepquez Totonicapn Zacapa
92 5,857 Source: Own analysis of data from VISAN, MAGA
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From Chart 16, we can observe discrepancies in terms of the lack of efficiency and equality that characterize the program. Information available for 2007 does not allow us to draw the same observations since data is only available for half of that year. We can note, furthermore, that the extension of services to 8 municipalities in Huehuetenango and Quich started behind schedule. Aside from rising costs associated with the program (i.e. production, storage and distribution of the product), there are noticeable disparities in the costs of service between each municipality and the increase in such costs. These disparities show that accessibility to schools is a limiting factor in the coverage of students. Last, one should keep in mind that the individual capacities of each school to store and preserve the product is a conditional factor, as well as the problems sorrunding waste management that each school has to address.
Chart 17 Cost Evolution
2006
Rations Investment (Qutzales) 9,012,126 8,207,560 6,348,450 5,171,254 18,053,712 5,731,479 7,586,978 7,439,447 1,493,148 7,772,048 4,248,354 4,248,354 4,653,862 6,240,057 1,530,953 2,947,274 Cost per ration 2.08 2.01 2.16 1.82 1.56 1.90 1.90 2.39 1.59 1.96 2.04 1.90 1.81 1.81 1.59 2.04 Rations
2007
Investment (Quetzales) 7,541,222 5,906,312 3,895,782 3,769,642 8,479,471 3,622,535 4,443,973 4,648,516 664,385 4,713,924 2,533,680 2,533,680 1,875,415 4,692,109 635,394 1,661,673 Average cost/ ration 2.21 2.18 2.48 2.25 1.66 2.03 1.99 2.57 1.54 2.05 2.22 1.99 1.65 2.15 1.54 2.15
Alta Verapaz Baja Verapaz Chiquimula Escuintla Guatemala Jalapa Jutiapa Petn Quetzaltenango Retalhuleu San Marcos Santa Rosa Solol Suchitepquez Totonicapn Zacapa
4,324,128 4,084,710 2,943,202 2,841,784 11,545,474 3,024,527 4,003,682 3,112,739 939,088 3,975,472 2,241,875 2,241,875 2,567,339 3,301,618 962,864 1,441,210
3,414,836 2,710,024 1,574,053 1,677,096 5,123,029 1,784,369 2,233,153 1,805,255 431,421 2,296,115 1,273,206 1,273,206 1,136,871 2,177,313 412,593 773,951
Source: Own analysis of data from VISAN, MAGA
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e)
Perception of the School Glass of Milk Programs Performance

Chart 18 Synthesis of General Perceptions of the School Glass of Milk Program Sufficiency The number of beneficiary students is not sufficient in comparison to the total number of boys and girls, and their nutritional needs VLE is a complement to the PAE. Achievements Critical Assessments Limitations Areas of improvement The VLE has improved as a result of the increase in population served, as well as the presentation, distribution, management and preparation and increase in production in the national dairy industry Milk should be provided each school day and should not stop being delivered on days when transportation companies decided to take unofficial vacation MAGA should provide support to companies so that they take responsibility in waste management.
Functionaries
Promotes staying in schools. Existence of logistical infrastructure within MAGA and participating institutions.
Limited budget At times there have been problems with the quality of milk.
Grupo Beneficiario I
The school beverage needs to be complemented in 3 areas: VLE; PAE; Voluntary support by students parents
Girls like the beverage. Serves as supplement because School Feeding Programs do not suffice. Good reception of the chocolate flavored milk. It doesnt require preparation or additional costs.
Milk does not reach schools when companies take nonofficial vacations on days that schools are in session and awaiting the milk. Companies do not assume responsibility for waste management. It is, each time frequent that milk comes in packages with holes or is spoiled and/or expired. The company does not replace these lost portions.
None of the contributions are sufficient, but going from nothing to something, something is better There is never enough for people with hunger. The school beverage needs to be complemented in 3 areas: VLE; PAE; Voluntary support by students parents
Group of Beneficiaries II
Contributes to students staying in school.21 It doesnt require preparation or additional costs.
Milk does not reach schools when companies take unofficial vacation on days that schools are in session and awaiting the milk. At times, milk comes in packages with holes, milk is spoiled and/or expired. The company does not replace these lost portions.
Resources should be used to a maximum for people in real need: girls and boys going to schools.
21
According to the Director, retention in schools has not been measured, but can be observed.
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In the interviews with the operative public officials of the VLE, three people participated, each with a diverse perspective about the program. The interview was planned with the programs General Coordinator, for which he had answers prepared ahead of time. He invited the Quality, Harmlessness and Socialization Coordinator as well as the Region III Technician to respond any other question presented for the investigation. In addition, the coordinator ordered these two employees to contact and accompany the two interviews with the schools beneficiaries to the program. The three employees evaluated in a very positive manner the VLE in terms of its adequacy and the publics reception of the same. According to the coordinator, The teachers, parents, and children, confirm the nutritional benefits, decrease in school desertion, improves learning, complements the different school feeding programs, benefits the family economy, and for these reasons they request its continuity and amplification. In the first beneficiary school interview, besides the school principle, two representatives of the school snack comity participated. According to the principle, the two representatives are the people who have the most knowledge about the VLE in the school. The principle said he was aware of how fortunate the school is to be beneficiary of the VLE and the PAE, considering that there are many schools that are not beneficiaries to either program. Much of the discussion was centered on the problems surrounding the PAE, primarily, the limited quantity of 30 to 48 cents of a Quetzal per girl per day, which is not enough to be able to provide breakfast every day. What they receive from the PAE, they have to compliment with a voluntary contribution given by the parents, and even with this it is still not enough money to be able to feed the girls on a daily basis. On the days on which breakfast is not given, it is supplemented with the glass of milk. According to the two women interviewed, the reception of the milk on behalf of the girls is good, primarily with those that arrive to school without breakfast. Never the less, this acceptance varies according to the flavor distributed. According to one of the interviewed, the strawberry and vanilla flavored milks do not have a good acceptance with many girls who even prefer to give it away rather than having to drink it. On the contrary, the chocolate flavored milk seems to have the highest degree of approval. Although, the women did point out that if the milk was going bad it gets sour. In order to know that the milk is sour, in many cases the students, as well as the teachers, have to taste the decomposing milk in order to find out that it is in fact decomposed. One of the comity representatives stated that she and student had gotten very sick with diarrhea just from tasting a bit of milk to confirm that it was in fact going bad. In the second beneficiary school, in difference to the first, there was no trusting atmosphere, reason for which no other people besides the principle participated in the interview. The answers were direct and precise. It is important to point out that the presence of the two VLE employees, conditioned the atmosphere during the interview. Even so, there were a lot of consistencies between both interviews. Some of these consistencies include the boys and girls preference of the chocolate flavored milk. This interview focused on one general idea: There is never enough for people with hunger but... From nothing to something, something is better. This idea surrounding the insufficiency of the VLE was backed up at all the levels interviewed. In terms of its coverage and as a nutritional source for children in school, it is recognized that the VLE is insufficient or lacking. Even so, at all levels it is recognized that the glass of milk dose contributes to children staying in school. The Principle from the school in Mixco22, clarified this by stating that the permanence of children in school has not been measured to back this up but it is observable. This is the main achievement of the VLE pointed out by the people interviewed. The other achievement of most relevance mentioned was the preference for the glass of milk as opposed to other food programs, primarily because it comes already prepared and packaged. One of the principles interviewed pointed out that even though there are other
22
Translators note: Mixco is a municipality in the department of Guatemala.

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things that could be more nutritious and less expensive, other foods require that the schools pay someone to prepare it or it implies that a teacher must invest time on the preparation instead of teaching. According to the government employees, milk is the best nutritional option, but they do admit that it is only a COMPLEMENT for other school feeding programs that may already exist in the schools. According to the beneficiaries, it is not necessarily the most nutritious option but it contributes to what little they can give to the students. At all levels, it is recognized that the glass of milk is a complement to other nutrition sources, and yet at all levels it is evidenced that there is no coordination with the School Feeding Programs. Both schools coincided on the main problems facing the VLE. In both, there are cases of the handing out of bad quality milk and bags of milk that have burst. In the School from Mixco, the principle pointed out that these were rare cases, while in the first school, it was stated that these cases become each time more frequent. The general coordinator of the VLE indicated that Very rarely there have been problems with the milks quality, and when this happens, the company is in charge of withdrawing from each of the schools the corresponding lot and returning the same quantity of milk to the school, that is why a monthly control is done of the lots of milk in each of the companies and schools. Despite this, the school snack commission perceives that each time there are less quality verifications done. The perception is based on the fact that besides the expired milks, there are also rotten milks with dates on the labeling that indicate that it has not yet expired. As a response to this problem, the MAGA employee ordered the schools to store samples of the milk. Upon this request, the commission highlighted, how unhygienic this was for them, considering they have no way to store the spilt milk from the bags that have burst, or a place to store expired milk that releases bad odors and provokes the inflated bags to burst. In addition to this, in reality the companies do not replace the portions, for boys and girls who are then left without their glass of milk. The lack of compliance of other responsibilities on behalf of the supplier company stands out among the problems of most relevance mentioned in the interviews with the beneficiary groups. This includes the absence of milk and waste management plans, even though in 2006, corrections were made to the delivery contracts, in which it was stated that the dairy companies had to formulate some programs within the schools for the handling of milk and waste management. According to the program coordinator the milk and waste management plan is elaborated and executed by the dairy industry. In one of the two schools, they state that they did not receive a plan but they did receive training session about the handling of milk, while in the other school they received neither. Waste management represents a serious problem for the schools, considering that the supplier company Chibolac, refuses to give them garbage bags or receive the garbage produced form the bags of milk, because they say they have no recycling plant. The garbage collection implies an additional cost for the schools that must then deduct this cost from what little they receive from other budgets. Regarding this problem, the company has offered to pay half of the cost for garbage collection, but has never done so. This problem has been mentioned to high level MAGA personnel, who have offered to solve the problem, yet to this date, there has been no answer to it.23 As a measure to improve the program, beneficiary groups have indicated the necessity for the MAGA to demand of the companies to fulfill the obligations established regarding the quality of milk, waste management and additionally, the delivery of milk on all school days that are not official holidays.24 And yet, with the contradictions found between the conditions established in
23
The claim was made on the International Glass of Milk Day celebrated at the Ernestina Mena Viuda de Reitz School for Girls Number 57. 24 Translators Note: In Guatemala, it is a common custom for government offices and private companies to establish what is called a bridge day. When a holiday arrives on a Tuesday or Thursday, in order to elongate the holiday for
38
the contracts and what really goes on in the schools regarding these topics, it is clear that there is very little communication between the schools and the VLE employees. With respect to these obligations, the program representatives appears to be completely unaware, if they are fulfilled or not. In general, the assessments made by the representatives of both beneficiary schools regarding the improvement of the VLE, and in general for all the PAE, are centered on the utilization of the resources granted, in the best possible way so that it is the school children who are benefited.
more than one day, until the weekend comes, a bridge day is enforced for the Monday or Friday. On those bridge days, children go to school, but the companies do not deliver the milk.
39
IV.2 Access to Land:

Box 6. Guideline 8: Access to resources and assets Guideline 8B. Land 8.10 States should take measures to promote and protect the security of land tenure, especially with respect to women, poor and disadvantaged segments of society, through legislation that protects the full and equal right to own land and other property, including the right to inherit. As appropriate, States should consider establishing legal and other policy mechanisms, consistent with their international human rights obligations and in accordance with the rule of law, that advance land reform to enhance access for the poor and women. Such mechanisms should also promote conservation and sustainable use of land. Special consideration should be given to the situation of indigenous communities.
The Voluntary Guidelines on the Right to Food address the promotion of actions to enable the population to acquire resources to develop their productive capacities. They emphasize the thematic areas of Labour, Land, Water, Genetic resources for food and agriculture, Sustainability and Services. With regard to Guatemala, access to land has substantial importance, especially because the country has historically relied on agriculture for its social and economic development. The direct relationship between the agrarian thematic and realization of the Right to Food is justified in two senses: the land is a means of work, directly or indirectly, for more than half of the Guatemalan population; and the land is the means of producing food for all of the Guatemalan population. It is also necessary to mention the strong cultural link that groups of Mayan origen have to land. In this sense the Land in Guatemala is at the root of strong historical pressures and demands by the peasant population, and land holding is an indicator of national economic power. At the same time, the Guatemalan peasantry suffered a prolonged process of expulsion from their land, a process which has deepened in the last decade due to the introduction of large-scale agriculture aiming at export of agricultural products.25 Currently land concentration in Guatemala is considered to be among the highest in the world. For 2003 it is estimated that 93% of the farms of less than 10 manzanas (7 hectares) encompass 21.8% of the land, while the 1.9% of farms larger than one caballera (45 hectares) occupy 56.6% of the remaining land. While there exist 47 farms larger than 3,700 hectares, 90% of producers survive on less than 1 hectare.26 Currently, the Gini Index on the concentration of landholding is 0.84, one of the highest in the World, with 1 signifying total inequality. By the same token, 78.7% of the cultivable land is not being worked, which means that the country, in spite of having the possibility of fulfilling the land needs of the peasant population, is not taking the appropriate steps to do so. It is notable that the forces necessary to challenge such concentration of land are insufficient.
25
Sols, Fernando. El nuevo campo. El quiebre estructural y relaciones sociales de produccin en el agro guatemalteco. CIIDH. Guatemala, 2008. 26 CNOC/ CONGCOOP. Propuesta de Reforma Agraria Integral. Serie Cuadernos de Guatemala, nmero 2. Guatemala, 2004. With information from the Agriculture and Livestock census 2003.
40
Chart 19 Structure of land tenancy Agriculture and Livestock Census 2003 Category Number of producers % of producers Area (Mz=0.7 hectares) % of the land Average area of the farm (Mz)
Less than subsistence 375,708 45.2% 172,412.75 3.2% 0.46 (less than 1 Mz) Subsistence 388,976 46.8% 989,790.71 18.6% 2.5 (1- 10 Mz) Above subsistence 50,528 6.1% 1,145,318.00 21.6% 22.7 (10 64 Mz) Commercial 15,472 1.9% 3,008,316.31 56.6% 194.4 (larger than 64 Mz) Total 830,684 100% 5,315,838.37 100% 6.4 Source: Informe alternativo sobre el cumplimiento del Derecho a la Alimentacin en Guatemala. CIIDH. Guatemala, 2005.
Given that the thematic of access to land is not included in the PSAN, the latter takes on a special significance for the realization of the Right to Food in Guatemala, given that more than half the Guatemalan population is devoted to small farming or to activities on the farm. Moreover, half the population belongs to one of the national indignous groups who have a strong cultural tie to the land. In this sense the inclusion of the theme of access to Land in the PSAN constitutes a challenge which needs to be addressed, especially because it is already addressed through the Land Fund.
a)
The Land Fund:
The Land Fund (FONTIERRAS) was created through Decree 24-99, on 13 May 1999, growing out of the Agreement on Socioeconomic Aspects of and Agrarian Situation (ASESA), and the Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples (AIDPI). It emphasizes that large segments of the Guatemalan population, particularly the indigenous peoples, are landless peasants or peasants with insufficient areas of land, which makes it difficult for them to access better living conditions, in liberty, justice, security, and peace for their full development. In this sense, it promotes access to land for the peasant population, through the purchase and lease of land.
ASESA decrees that a Firm and Durable Peace ought to be founded on the basis of a
socioeconomic development oriented to the common good, that responds to the needs of all the population, with the goal of overcoming situations of poverty, extreme poverty, discrimination and social marginalization. Also, it decrees that it is necessary in the rural areas that there be a successful integral strategy that facilitates access to land and other productive resources, one that offers legal security and favors the resolution of conflicts.27 The agreement states that resolution of the agrarian problem and rural development are fundamental and inescapable if the country is to respond to the situation of the majority of the population that lives in rural areas (). Transforming the structure of landholding and land use ought to have as its objective the incorporation of the rural population into economic, social and political development, so that land would constitute, for those who work it, the basis of their economic stability, the foundation of their progressive social well-being, and the guarantee of their liberty and dignity.28
27 28
ASESA. Paragraph 1, Mxico, 6 May 1996. ASESA. Chapter III, numeral 27.
41
The said agreement establishes, in the part on Access to Land and Productive Resources, the creation of a land trust within a participatory banking institution for credit assistance and to encourage savings, directed primarily to micro, small and medium-sized entrepreneurs. Furthermore, it says that: the Land Fund will focus the power of public finance on the acquisition of land, favor the establishment of a transparent market in land, and facilitate the development of plans for land redistribution. The adjudication policy of the fund will prioritize the award of land to peasants who organize for that purpose, keeping in mind the criteria of economic and environmental sustainability.29 This is how the Peace Accords provided a minimum standard for addressing causes of agrarian conflict. Among the efforts that have been made to realize the Accords is the Joint Commission on Land-related Rights of Indigenous Peoples (COPART), which suceeded in 1999 in getting the Land Fund Law approved. The Land Fund is an institution that, as is described below, will be responsable to design and implement public policy on access to credit for buying productive land, and for the regularization of land ownership in the country, taking over the functions previously held by the Nacional Institute of Agrarian Transformation (INTA). In addition to 30 FONTIERRAS, it succeeded in creating an agrarian institution that has supported and pursued 31 the demands for land by peasant and indigenous groups. At the present time the Secretariat of Agrarian Affairs handles cases of agrarian conflict which grow out of the weak legal structure supporting possession of land and pressure from peasant movements so that the State responds to these demands.
Box 7. Objectives of the Land Fund. Article 3.
a. To design and implement public policy related to access to land, in coordination with the States rural development policy. b. To administer public finance programs directed to facilitate various forms of access to productive land for peasants, either in individual or organizacional form, who are without land or have insufficient land. c. To facilitate access to land ownership by peasants in individual or organizationial form through adequate financial mechanisms, as well as through the use of the natural resources of such lands, in line with the criteria of economic and environmental sustainability. d. To promote the accessibility of resources for financing the purchase of land by beneficiary groups, ensuring that this permits the financial sustainability of the Land Fund and of the productive projects of the beneficiaries. e. To coordinate with other State institutions the development of investments complementary to those related to access to land, in order to guarantee the attainment of integral projects related to agriculture and livestock industry, forestry and aquaculture. f. To define the policy and promote programs to facilitate access of women to credit for buying land and for productive projects related to the same.
ASESA. Chapter III, clause B. The Institutional Commission for the Development and Strengthening of Land Ownership (PROTIERRA) was created on 9 April 1997 (Governmental Agreement 307-97). The following institutions are part of it: the IUSI Unit of the Ministry of Public Finance (MINFIN); the National Geographic Institute; the Registry and Cadastre section of the MINFIN; the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Food (MAGA); the Secretariat of Peace (SEPAZ); FONATIERRA and the Presidential Commission of Legal Aid and Resolution of Land Conflicts (CONTIERRA) (now Secretariat of Agrarian Affairs) and the General Ownership Registry. 31 Center of Studies and Projects for Development and Peace (CEIDEPAZ). Proposal on the Regularization of Communal Indigenous Land registered in the name of Municipalities. Guatemala, 2006.
30
29
42
FONTIERRAS, for the purposes of the beneficiary groups, is divided into two programs: Regularization of Land and Access to Land. Regularization is a program through which, as FONTIERRA defines it, legal certainty with regard to land awarded by the State, will be executed for those having possession. The program of Access to Land is divided into three areas: Access to Collective Land, Access to Individual Land, and Leasing. The first two respond respectively to the collective or individual purchase of small farms. The third was created in 2004 and called the Land Leasing Trust. For the purpose of synthesizing the interviews presented in Box 23, and respecting the terminologies used in those interviews, access refers to the Access to Collective Land and Access to Individual Land programs, and leasing to the Land Leasing Trust. FONTIERRAS began its activities not only through its legal creation, but through the GTPE 5446
project, with an amount of US$23million, which was the first phase of a three phase/successive projects program supporting instruments of land access to the poor in rural areas of Guatemala as defined in the Peace Accords and the Land Fund Law. This first project sought to support the government of Guatemala to: Establish a program to facilitate access to land by the beneficiaries Support access by the beneficiaries to technical and financial assistance for productive sub-projects Improve the legal and institucional standard for land markets to enable them to develop into more efficient forms.32 However, there currently exists a general consensus that FONTIERRAS, with the conditions and resources with which it has developed its institutional task, is not successful in promoting access for peasant or indigenous population that is without land or with insufficient land. With information up to 2005, FONTIERRAS had an accumulation of 421 dossiers in process, 502 dossiers that were inactive or not followed up by the petitioners, and only 214 fully processed dossiers.33 Added to this administrative incapacity to give the attention to peasant groups without land, is the onerousness of the debt assumed by these groups. In the majority of cases, the debt for the purchase of land is not repayable. This, in addition to putting into place a situation of high risk for the beneficiary groups, seriously compromises the financial sustainability of the Land Fund, which in principle, according to article 26 of the FONTIERRAS Law, will cease to receive annual allocations from the State as of 2008.34 As for the establishment of a Guarantee Fund, it is decreed that: Additionally, the Government of the Republic, with the objective of facilitating alternative mechanisms of finance for land purchase, via the Ministry of Public Finance and in coordination with the Bank of Guatemala, will establish a Guarantee Fund via an amount of three hundred million Quetzals, which will constitute a complementary guarantee to the approved credit entities which extend credit to qualified peasants through FONTIERRAS, during the stipulated period () which includes 1999 to 2008.35 Various organizations that represent groups of peasants that have been FONTIERRAS beneficiary groups have requested through the Central Government from that account forgiveness of the agrarian debts these groups have acquired. Added to that, FONTIERRAS has
32
Gauster, Susana and Byron Garoz. Balance de la Aplicacin de la Poltica agraria del Banco Mundial en Guatemala. 1996-2005. CONGCOOP. Guatemala, 2005. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Article 27 de Guarantee Fund.
43
seen its budget allocation decreased, since the Government realized that it is not managing to reach the objectives planned in the law which gave it life. FONTIERRAS in the period from 2000 to 2004, was allocated only 53.5% of what it requested, received only an average of 84.2% of the approved amount, and in the same period used only 90% of that amount.36 Thus, the budget allocation was seriously decreased until in 2005 the allocation was Q 217.5 millon. Last year the allocation was only Q 99.3 millon, amounting to a reduction of Q 118.2 millons, which in relative terms is a 54.3% reduction.
Chart 20 Allocations for FONTIERRAS 2005-2008 (In millions of quetzals)
Approved 2005 Approved 2006 Description Land Fund 217.5 180.4 Support to the Cadastre, Regulation and Registry 0.0 194.4 Secretariat of Agrarian Affairs 2.0 8.2 CONTIERRAS 0.0 37.6 Total 219.5 420.6 % of GNP 0.11 0.18 207,723.5 229,406.3 GNP
Source: own analysis of SICOIN data
Readjusted 2007 180.4
Actual 2007 Approved 2008 99.3 141.4
194.4 12.8 37.2 424.8 0.17 256,536
111.1 13.8 33.5 257.6 0.10
158.5 5.8 14.6 320.4 0.11 285,046
For 2008 the allocation provided in the budget approved by the Congress in November 2007 came to Q 141.4 millon, which would increase the FONTIERRAS budget. However, that would still be much less than the approved budget for the 2005-2007 period. It must be emphasized that even though this amount was approved last year, it can be modified in the course of the year, just as happened in 2007 when the amount allocated was Q 180.4 million, but this was later reduced to Q 81.1 million, weakening still further the share of the Fund. In summary, the total of the budget allocations for FONTIERRA, Support for Cadastre, Regulation and Registry, the Secretariat of Agrarian Affairs and CONTIERRA, represent on average 0.13% of the Gross National Product (GNP) during the 2005-2008 period. Such a budget throws doubt on the capacity of the Guatemalan State to solve the grave crisis that land is going through, which, in turn, jeans there is a high risk that the right to food is systematically violated by the Guatemalan State.
36
Ibid.
44
Chart 21 The share of FONTIERRAS expenditures relative to total expenditures 2004-2008 In percentage
Description FONTIERRA General expenditure % of the total expenditures 1.0 2,004 291.7 28,825.6 2005 217.5 32,385.2 0.7 2006 180.4 37,704.0 0.5 2007 180.4 40,198.2 0.4 2008 141.8 42,535.5 0.3
Source: Own anlisis of SICOIN data
For its part, in analyzing FONTIERRAS budget, we can see that its share in relation to total expenditures for the 2004-2008 period represents on average 0.5% of the total. It starts at the highest point in 2004 as 1% of total expenditures, and continues to decline, with the lowest percentage being in the current year, where it is only 0.3% of total expenditures.
Chart 22 MAGA-FONTIERRAS Report on fiscal and financial situation Component of access to land January to December 2007
Fiscal situation Components and products Trust for the purchase of land (groups) Subsidy for work capital, food assistance (groups) Subsidy for technical assistance (groups) Trust for leasing land (individual) Trust for purchase of land (individual) Subsidy for work capital, food assistance (individual) Subsidy for technical assistance (individual) Financial situation Actual to Dec. Beneficiaries
Approved
Executed
% advance
Approved
Executed
% advance
Men
Women
100
18
18
14.09
78
377
36
500
413
83
17.38
17.38
14.36
83
377
36
8 12.023
6.231 8.56
98 100
9.93 24.04
7 17.13
7 17.13
100 100
5475 4031
756 4538
800
40
800
27.81
800
7.77
Source: Own analysis on the basis of fiscal and financial situation data, Unit on Follow-up and Evaluation. Land Fund.
Looking at only 2007, what is evident is FONTIERRAS very limited administrative capacity to adequately implement the scarce resources that are allocated to it. In Box 22 you can see that out of all of the components, only three succeeded in achieving 100% implementation, whereas others, such as subsidies for work capital and food assistance to individuals did not manage to spend anything in 2007. As for the rest of the components, the Trust for the Purchase of Land spent Q14.09 million out of Q18 million allocated to it for 2007, while the Subsidy for Work Capital and Food Assistance
45
was allocated Q17.38 million, but spent only Q14.36 million. With respect to the beneficiary population in 2007, it is evident that of the 15,626 beneficiaries, 65.6% were men, while the remaining 34.4% were women, denoting gender inequality and inequity. As far as the design of its annual budget, article 34 of the Regulation of the FONTIERRAS law indicates that the General Management should present the first draft of the budget (revenue and expenditures) for the following year by 31 May. Then the Directive Council should approve the draft before 10 June, in order to present it to the Ministry of Finance. In 2000 the UN Verification Mission for Guatemala (MINUGUA) had already noted that FONTIERRAS performance was limited, mostly for financial reasons. One of the principal obstacles confronting FONTIERRAS is the scarce financing for fiscal year 2000. The commitment, signed October 12th 1998 by members of the Paritaria Commission on Rights relative to Land of the Indigenous Peoples, to allocate to the Fund a minimum of Q300 million annually in the fiscal years 1999 and 2000 has not be kept. The actual allocation as of April 2000 was barely Q103 million. This limited budgetary allocation creates a very grave situation, particularly in light of the magnitude of the demand. Given the average price of land, this reduces the possibility that the Fund will be able to benefit any significant number of families. 37 Moreover, there was reference to the insufficiency of the funds intended for purchase of land: According to calculations derived from the experience of the Fund and other similar institutions, if you take away the operation costs, technical assistance and social compensation, there will remain no more than Q80 million to buy land. Given the average price of land, with this one could acquire a maximum of 6.700 hectares (See para. 21). Assuming an average of 5 hectares per family, a calculation which is very optimistic given the poor quality of land on offer, it will be possible to acquire land for less than 1,500 families. That is to say, less than 5% of the already registered demand. ()38
Report of MINUGUA on the State of fulfillment of the Peace Accord in the matter of Land. Guatemala, 2000. Numeral 19.
38
37
dem. Numeral 20.

46
b)
Perceptions of FONTIERRAS performance

Chart 23 Synthesis of General Perceptions of the Land Fund Sufficiency Critical Assessments Achievements Positive advantage for the beneficiaries in the area of land leasing, with positive changes in their lives as a result of increased production. Limitations Low budgets as a result of lack of implementation, bureaucratic processes in this and other institutions. Response to only 51% of leasing requests because of budget limitations. The lack of legal certainty impedes the legalization of land. Very limited implementation of the budget as a result of slow, bureaucratic processes in this and other institutions Exclusion of women, including in the policy Only 1 woman on the DC. Without rural women on the DC, their struggle cannot be fought. Many people are in debt, and stay outside the program because they think that the credit is money given. Slow process of land measurement Exclusion of women With only leasing, there is no legal certainty, and it gives no benefit to future generations. There is no security for production affected by climate factors. Payment of credits does not coincide with times when payments are needed for leasing or harvesting. Areas of improvement Make implementation processes more agile in order to meet objectives. Education for the population, including business principles for generating funds to become self-sustaining and independent of the program.
Member of the Directive Council (DC)
Public Official
The land problems are too great for FONTIERRAS to be able to handle
The leasing subsidies are sufficient, but without access to land and without legal certainty, the program is insufficient.
51 % of the beneficiaries of the leasing program are women. The 2 cuerdas given for leasing allow 1 to be used to respond to the food security needs of the woman and her family, and 1 for sale.
Clarification of the law: define the policy, make it more precise and accessible to everyone working in all the institutions involved in the process of land acquisition. Sensitize people on the payment of credits.
There isnt sufficient support offered to enable women to get access to land
The leasing program permits an improvement in terms of family capital, but without access to land there is nothing for the future. The interest rates are better than those of the banks.
Group of Beneficiaries
That there should always be women peasants represented in the DC, because they always have to struggle for access to land
The public official from FONTIERRAS, who was interviewed, is currently the Director of Leasing Subsidy. As a general assessment to the program he said that the Leasing Program is flexible in its response to the population that is vulnerable, multilingual, pluricultural, without land or with insufficient land. However, the same person confirmed that the lack of advancements in the Access Program and the lack of implementation of the budget, limit the fulfillment of FONTIERRAs goals. This was the focal point of the interview, considering that the majority of assessments presented are directly related to the low budget that with each passing year decreases through low implementation. In the same manner as with the government employee, the interview with the representative of the Directive Council was centered on issues surrounding the lack of advancements and
47
implementation of the Access Program. As the only women official representative39 on the FONTIERRA Directive Council, she highlighted how all obstacles presented in FONTIERRA are that much more substantial for women. As a result, she focused in the interview on the necessity of clarification of the law and policy of FONTIERRAS to make access to land more flexible, particularly for women in rural areas. It is important to point out that she herself was the contact for the interview with the beneficiary group. The interview with the FONTIERRAS beneficiary group was a collective interview which took place in the house of one of the members of the association, which currently functions as the association headquarters. The Hope and Faith Integral Womens Association (Asociacin Integral de Mujeres Fe y Esperanza) began as an initiative of 30 women who wanted to learn how to read. With the growth of the association, the creation of a directive board became necessary in order to be legally recognized and so be able to be beneficiaries of different projects. Currently, they are benefited by two: The first is an artisans project with the Indigenous Development Fund, (FODIGUA), and the second, is one they call Productive Agriculture for Food Security. The food security project is carried out on the plots of land they lease individually through FONTIERRA. The project consists primarily of taking one of the two cuerdas40 leased to grow crops (primarily corn and beans) for family consumption, and using the other cuerda to produce crops to sell. In addition, some people work with animals, raising them for consumption and for sale. They initiated this project in 2003, year in which their relationship with the fund begins with 80 beneficiaries.41 According to the association representatives present during the interview, the main problems of their communities relate to the exclusion of the women, a problem which they consider engraved culturally in the Mayan worldview. The problems are focused on the restricted right to ownership of land, specifically for women living in rural areas. At an individual level, they say that each woman faces such problems by demanding and defending her rights within the family, even though having to face, in some case, domestic violence. At the collective level, along with strengthening the partners on issues such as self-esteem, one of the mechanisms has been the fight in FONTIERRAS to be able to access land and have ownership rights. In spite of a slow and limited process, as they themselves describe it, one of the fruits of the struggle has been having, for the first time, an indigenous woman as an official representative on the Directive Council of FONTIERRAS. In spite of advances made in the Area of Land Leasing, in the Area of Access to Land, they have seen no improvements. The interview was centered on this theme. For them, land leasing is a good program for the short term, for now, but in the long term, to really begin to address the problems of land tenure, FONTIERRAS ought to make more flexible the processes for access to land, with legal certainty for the women peasant population programs in which there are still no responses for the peasantry, and much less for the women peasants. It is in this failure to really address the agrarian issue, to which the Access Program ought to respond, that at a general level the beneficiary group, the representative of the Directive Council and the public official agree that what FONTIERRAS is doing is not sufficient. In their critical assessments, all the participants have indicated that the major achievements of the Fund have been reached in the Leasing Program. The achievements pointed out by government official are centered on an improvement in the lives of the beneficiaries through
39 40
There is one other women on the council, with the difference that she is a substitute. Translators Note: A cuerda, is a measurement unit of area used Guatemala. It varies in size according to different regions in the country. For these particular communities, 1 cuerda is equal to 0.6987squred meters. 41 Currently, the association has 80 associates from 7 communities from Patzn Chimaltenango: Patzn, Merced, Chatzan Alto, Chatzan Bajo, Chipiacul, Panibaj, El Sitio and Chinimachicaj. In addition, the association lends support to 220 non- associated women from these same communities and other surrounding ones.
48
augmenting the production of basic grains. According to him, the addition could be from approximately 15kg of basic grains per family per year to 25 or 30 kg/family/year. The representative of the Directive Council, as well as the beneficiary group, support this idea, indicating that there has been an improvement in family capital, via the division of the leased plots of land to produce crops for consumption and for sale. The women stress, that if there are no advancements in the Access Program, the achievements in the Leasing Program are not sufficient. Parallel with these assessments, all of the major limitations point to deficiencies in the access programs, centered on the low implementation of the budget and the exclusion of women. According to the beneficiary group and the Directive Council representative, the FONTIERRA policy promotes the exclusion of women. Beginning with the selection profile, there are basis for such exclusions. The criteria, as the official indicated are: To be a farmer; to be the head of the family (proven with birth certificates of dependants); only one person per family; preferably from a rural area. This profile provokes two main obstacles. The first is with the prerequisite of being a farmer. In many municipalities or town councils, women are automatically registered as housewives or as being dedicated to domestic care, thus creating a motive for rejection as a beneficiary because in their Identification Cards they are not recognized as farmers. The second obstacle is with the prerequisite of being the head of the family as the only beneficiary per family. The limitation comes when, as the women indicated, that the Fund, like any other institution that lends support in the agrarian issues, given the option to choose a man or a woman as the official beneficiary, always selects the man. The other main limitation, the low implementation of the budget, appears to be directly linked to the bureaucratic land acquisition process. According to all the people interviewed, this slow process begins from within the FONTIERRA and through all the institutions that the procedure must pass. The beneficiary group indicated that the administrative personnel of the FONTIERRA make the process even more difficult, considering that they do not even inform people if there is data missing when they hand in their paperwork. This implies that many people must travel constantly to the city to verify where and why the process has been brought to a standstill. According to the official and the Directive Council member, these obstacles in the Access Program, limit the implementation of the global budget as well as the response to only 51 % of the applications made to the Leasing Area. Because of this low response to applications, there is also a limited quantity of technical personnel. The personnel of the Funds technical team, was motive for criticism by the people interviewed. The director, indicated that despite the fact that the technicians do not go to the villages, they are well received42, considering that the people are conscience that the technicians do all that they can. According to the director and all the other people interviewed, the main function of the technicians is to supervise the fulfillment of the credit payments. And yet, according to one of the beneficiaries, the debts occur because of the technicians. The women from the beneficiary group, as well as the Directive Council representative, indicated that the technicians are never really supervised in what they do. According to them, the technicians and their supervisors agree on what days they will have a supervised visit, because generally they do not go all the way to the communities. On a positive aspect, the women stated that in the Leasing Program, all the technicians and Regional Coordinators are Indigenous and speak the local language. Considering that most of the beneficiaries in this program are women that do not speak Spanish or speak it limitedly, this strengthens womens participation in the Leasing Program. On the
According to the Director of Leasing Subsidy Director, when they decided to rotate the technicians, the beneficiaries requested that the previous technicians return. This, according to the director, indicates that there is a good reception of the technicians in their areas of work.
42
49
contrary, in the Access Area, the technicians are ladinos43 because the contact is generally with beneficiary men who speak Spanish, whether they are indigenous or ladinos, promoting in this manner even more so the exclusion of indigenous rural women from that program. For the improvement of FONTIERRA, the one thing constant with all the people interviewed was the need for the improvement of the process for the implementation of the Access Program. All expressed, that they considered that the Fund, in order to really be able to reach its goals of making access to land possible for the peasant population, has to improve the process in the Access Program, all with different opinions on how to do so. The official expressed emphasis on education for the population in order to be self sustainable. The Directive Council representative emphasized the way by means of the clarification of the law and its policy as well as the disclosure of that policy to the general population. The beneficiaries highlighted the importance of the representation of women within the Council, who is at the forefront for womens right to land access, because they consider that there is no answer for the right to food of the most vulnerable population if there is no judicial certainty of land for women.
43
Translators Note: Ladino is a term used in Guatemala generally referring to the non indigenous population.
50
Conclusions:
1. In spite of the Peace Accords that implied the opening and redefinition of social policies in the sense of overcoming discriminatory and repressive actions by the State, social inequality has deepened, while social indicators denote profound differences within the population, which particularly affect the indigenous and peasant populations. 2. ENCOVI 2006 evidenced that the small advances in reduction of poverty in focused populations seem diminished in the context of a strong growth in poverty in non-priority zones. In this sense the levels of poverty change geographically while the populations most affected continue to be the indigenous and peasant populations. The most important conclusion to draw from ENCOVI 2006 is that a minimum decrease in general poverty appears to be accompanied by the maintenance of extreme poverty. 3. Although the State has succeeded in making institutionally visible some of its commitments related to the Right to Food, most of the means through which this right could be realized are lacking. The recent nature of the installation of the institutionalization that operates PSAN could explain the existence of certain technical and political gaps to effectively realize all of the implications of the Right to Food. However, in general terms, it is possible to observe that efforts to make PSAN adequate in the sense of the Right to Food are not being realized. 4. The implementation of the school feeding programs of MINEDUC and MAGA are insufficient to mitigate malnutrition and to close the historical gaps in social inequality prevailing in Guatemala. The financial investment to acquire sufficient quantities of food to satisfy the caloric needs of the students is still far from what is necessary. The coverage of the programs is partial, leaving almost a quarter of the school establishments without service. The conditions of inequality with which the PAE programs are currently developing add a factor of injustice and vulnerability to the universal right to food. 5. Coverage by municipalities demonstrates that, in the design of the VLE, priority was not given to the population most vulnerable to malnutrition. VLE has been created with distinct intentions then to solve the situation of malnutrition affecting students. Therefore, it does not pay attention to food planning criteria, which have been traditionally directed by a concern to identify mechanisms that reduce costs and widen coverage. 6. In 2006 little more than a quarter of the municipalities assisted by VLE (25 out of 92) were in the High Risk category. At the same time, more than 57% of the schools and beneficiary population live in 56 municipalities at moderate or low risk, and 66% of the resources were directed to them. Really, only 35% of VLEs program was directed to the zones in the country that were at higher food risk, giving partial coverage to students and schools in those assisted municipalities (450,000 students out of an estimated 630,000 and only 2,893 schools from a total of 5,320). 7. FONTIERRAS has practically failed in the political objective for which it was created. We are able to observe this not only from the steep budgetary decreases which year after year have been undermining its investment possibilities, which contravenes the sense of the laws which created it, but also through the weak results of its programming. The objectives of FONTIERRAS have also suffered from an important turn towards prioritizing actions directed towards the leasing of land rather than actions directed towards access to land. 8. The fact that FONTIERRAS is the only state policy for access to land for the peasant population demonstrates the weakness which this issue has acquired for the State of
Guatemala. For 2008 it is assumed that resources will no longer be directed towards it, without any announcement up until this point of proposals for follow-up. On the other hand, agrarian conflicts continue to grow, which indicates a virtual abandonment of the needs of the peasant population. 9. Finally we can affirm that despite the existence of political channels that could make possible the Right to Food of the Guatemala population, the actual policy of the last governments has indicated a progressive retrogression in support for the two entities that have been studied. This situation becomes especially counterproductive in the context of the world food crisis, which could mean greater retrogression and growth in the vulnerable population. In this sense it is evident that the Guatemalan State still violates the Right to Food of its population despite two instruments which could constitute an important link in the fight against Hunger and Malnutrition.
52
Bibliografa:
Banco Mundial. La Pobreza en Guatemala. Un estudio del Banco Mundial sobre pases. Washington, 2003. COSAN/ COPRE/ MINEDUC. Segundo Censo Nacional de Talla de Escolares de Primer Grado Primaria de la Repblica de Guatemala. Informe Final. Guatemala, 2002. CNOC/ CONGCOOP. Propuesta de Reforma Agraria Integral. Serie Cuadernos de Guatemala, nmero 2. Guatemala, 2004. FAO. Directrices Voluntarias en apoyo de la realizacin progresiva del derecho a una alimentacin adecuada, en el contexto de la seguridad alimentaria nacional. Roma, 2005. Gauster, Susana y Byron Garoz. FONTIERRAS: El modelo de mercado y el acceso a la tierra en Guatemala. CONGCOOP/CNOC Guatemala, 2002. Gauster, Susana y Byron Garoz. Balance de la Aplicacin de la Poltica agraria del Banco Mundial en Guatemala. 1996-2005. CONGCOOP. Guatemala, 2005. INE. Encuesta Nacional sobre Condiciones de Vida, 2006. Informacin preliminar, Guatemala, 2007. ONU. Comit de Derechos Econmicos, Sociales y Culturales. Misin a Guatemala. Informe del Relator Especial del Derecho a la Alimentacin, Jean Ziegler. Enero de 2006. ONU. Observacin General 12. El Derecho a una Alimentacin Adecuada. Artculo 11 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Econmicos, Sociales y Culturales. Estados Unidos, 1999. Santos; Jorge y Jos Pedro Mata. Manual de auditora presupuestaria. CIIDH. Guatemala, 2008. SESAN. Poltica Nacional de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional; Ley del Sistema de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional; Reglamento de la Ley de Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional. Guatemala, 2006. Sols, Fernando. El nuevo campo. El quiebre estructural y relaciones sociales de produccin en el agro guatemalteco. CIIDH. Guatemala, 2008. Zepeda, Ricardo y Nadia Sandoval. Alimentacin, derecho desnutrido. Anlisis de la Poltica de Seguridad Alimentaria en Guatemala. CIIDH. Guatemala, 2006. Zepeda, Ricardo; Nadia Sandoval y Orlando Blanco. Misin Guatemala: combatir el hambre. Informe de seguimiento a las Recomendaciones del Relator Especial para el Derecho a la Alimentacin en Guatemala, Jean Ziegler. CIIDH. Guatemala, 2007. Zepeda, Ricardo y Martn Wolpold-Bosien. Avances en la Promocin del Derecho a la Alimentacin en Guatemala. Iniciativa Amrica Latina y Caribe sin Hambre. FAO/ FIAN/ CIIDH. Santiago de Chile. 2007.
53
Annexes:
Annex 1 Interviewees Program Vice Ministry Of Food Security (VISAN) Level of the interview Key informant Operative Public Official Land Fund (FONTIERRAS) Political Public Official Beneficiary group I Operative Public Officials School Glass of Milk Program (VLE) Name of participants Danilo Cardona Bernardo Vsquez Role of participants Advisor to the Vice-minister of Food Security Director of Leasing Subsidy Official representative of MAGAs Agriculture and Livestock National Council Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo Agropecuario (CONADEA), del MAGA on the Directivo Council of FONTIERRA. Members of de la Asociacin Integral de Mujeres Fe y Esperanza. General Coordinator Quality, INOCOUS and Socialization and Coordinator Regin III Tecnitian Principal at the Ernestina Mena Viuda de Reitz School for girls No. 57. Members of the Snack comisin at the Ernestina Mena Viuda de Reitz School for girls No. 57. Principal at the Jos de San Martin Federation School.
Elena Cocn
7 representatives Gelbert Adalberto Flores Revolorio Lourdes Olivet Espaa Alex Patal Juan Salvador Borges Reinoso 2 representantes44 Salvador Castallenada
Beneficiary group I Beneficiary group II
Annex 2 Areas of collective interviews with Beneficiary Groups Program FONTIERRA Level of interview Beneficiary group I Beneficiary group I Beneficiary Group II Participant group Asociacin Integral de Mujeres Fe y Esperanza. Ernestina Mena Viuda de Reitz School for Girls No. 57. Jos de San Martin Federation School Location Patzun, Chimaltenango Zona 6, Guatemala, Guatemala Mixco, Guatemala
PVLE
44
The 2 people representatives of the feeding commiityLas 2 personas representantes del comit de alimentacin de la escuela no dieron sus nombres en la entrevista.
54
Annex 3 Coverage and implementation of VLE 2006

Department / MUNICIPALITY School Services Number of Existing Schools. Schoools assisted Investment (Q)
Rations
Days served
ALTA VERAPAZ
COBAN SAN CRISTOBAL VERAPAZ SAN MIGUEL TUCURU SANTA CRUZ VERAPAZ SANTA MARIA CAHABON TACTIC TAMAHU 6,333 7,473 2,212 3,945 12,570 2,824 2,403 385 100 94 51 165 51 40 36 50 26 27 140 15 21 870,564 892,652 270,646 493,624 1,304,985 315,895 175,762 137 119 122 125 104 112 73 1,732,422 1,776,198 538,586 982,312 2,988,416 644,426 349,766
BAJA VERAPAZ
CUBULCO PURULHA RABINAL SALAMA SAN MIGUEL CHICAJ SANTA CRUZ EL CHOL 9,605 6,229 7,958 6,906 6,212 1,839 158 143 106 147 67 45 100 73 52 61 35 27 825,186 754,574 949,835 767,572 636,356 151,187 86 121 119 111 102 82 1,683,379 1,539,331 1,890,172 1,527,468 1,266,348 300,862
CHIQUIMULA
CAMOTAN JOCOTAN OLOPA SAN JUAN LA ERMITA 8,274 7,902 4,069 2,230 148 147 87 66 118 128 70 44 1,102,651 1,065,494 482,254 292,803 133 135 119 131 2,249,408 2,397,362 1,104,362 597,318
ESCUINTLA
IZTAPA LA GOMERA NUEVA CONCEPCIN PUEBLO NUEVO TIQUISATE PUERTO SAN JOS 1,481 4,331 8,871 1,213 3,978 25 57 147 52 57 12 26 90 7 23 212,528 618,090 1,260,737 173,799 576,630 144 143 142 143 145 402,741 1,171,281 2,164,741 339,777 1,092,714
GUATEMALA
CHINAUTLA CHUARRANCHO FRAIJANES MIXCO PALENCIA SAN JOSE DEL GOLFO SAN JOS PINULA SAN PEDRO AYAMPUC SAN PEDRO SACATEPQUEZ SAN RAYMUNDO SANTA CATARINA PINULA Zone 17 Zone 6 11,987 1,709 3,393 18,471 8,259 1,091 7,361 8,030 6,442 5,605 8,676 5,180 3,141 52 19 35 123 85 16 52 42 31 43 36 16 8 21 12 12 46 47 12 31 24 15 27 18 16 8 1,570,756 225,367 459,919 2,328,829 1,085,137 147,762 925,873 1,039,078 848,460 742,039 1,094,543 667,333 410,378 131 132 136 126 131 135 126 129 132 132 126 129 131 2,418,964 358,334 731,271 3,586,397 1,725,368 234,942 1,472,138 1,652,134 1,349,051 1,179,842 1,685,596 1,027,693 631,982
55
JALAPA
MATAQUESCUINTLA MONJAS SAN LUIS JILOTEPEQUE SAN MANUEL CHAPARRON SAN PEDRO PINULA 5,184 2,491 3,037 776 9,522 85 63 57 32 102 56 24 46 16 79 735,740 366,513 440,814 121,704 1,359,756 142 147 145 157 143 1,394,227 694,542 835,343 230,629 2,576,738
JUTIAPA
ASUNCIN MITA ATESCATEMPA COMAPA CONGUACO EL ADELANTO MOYUTA SAN JOS ACATEMPA SANTA CATARINA MITA YUPILTEPEQUE 4,644 1,182 5,969 3,443 520 8,060 673 2,328 1,145 101 44 74 58 12 108 17 57 29 59 14 53 33 4 80 3 19 11 680,076 171,911 827,599 494,217 77,400 1,151,995 99,459 338,830 162,195 146 145 139 144 149 143 148 146 142 1,288,744 325,771 1,568,300 936,541 146,673 2,183,031 188,475 642,083 307,360
PETEN
FLORES SAN BENITO SAN JOSE SANTA ANA 8,749 8,930 1,329 5,021 64 48 11 56 59 43 11 52 1,013,591 1,328,387 180,802 589,959 116 149 136 117 2,422,483 3,174,845 432,117 1,410,002
QUETZALTENANGO
ALMOLONGA CANTEL LA ESPERANZA OLINTEPEQUE QUETZALTENANGO SALCAJ SAN CARLOS SIJA SAN JUAN OSTUNCALCO SAN MIGUEL SIGUILA ZUNIL 186 1,853 752 1,609 813 348 96 272 687 995 11 52 15 29 110 25 92 72 12 19 1 13 4 7 3 2 2 4 2 10 25,334 238,660 87,272 189,006 101,402 40,880 12,234 32,526 79,894 131,880 136 129 116 117 125 117 127 120 116 133 40,281 379,469 138,762 300,520 161,229 64,999 19,452 51,716 127,031 209,689
RETALHULEU
CHAMPERICO RETALHULEU SAN ANDRS VILLASECA SAN FELIPE 5,957 11,333 8,147 2,753 72 131 101 32 58 99 89 20 819,517 1,594,168 1,163,048 398,739 138 141 143 145 1,602,156 3,116,598 2,273,759 779,535
SAN MARCOS
AYUTLA OCOS 3,234 6,167 40 47 24 41 357,687 607,652 111 99 729,681 1,239,610
SANTA ROSA
CHIQUIMULILLA TAXISCO 9,474 5,345 134 71 104 57 1,453,119 788,756 153 148 2,753,661 1,494,693
SOLOLA
PANAJACHEL SAN ANTONIO PALOP SAN JUAN LA LAGUNA 2,165 2,949 2,040 12 31 19 10 30 16 254,972 287,822 221,505 118 98 109 407,955 572,766 354,408
56
SAN LUCAS TOLIMAN SAN MARCOS LA LAGUNA SAN PABLO LA LAGUNA SAN PEDRO LA LAGUNA SANTA CATARINA PALOP SANTA CRUZ LA LAGUNA SANTIAGO ATITLN
4,761 704 1,814 1,412 933 1,375 6,590
41 4 8 12 10 13 53
34 5 6 10 10 13 46
447,482 80,278 209,566 170,097 103,948 126,668 665,001
94 114 116 120 111 92 101
890,489 128,445 335,306 272,155 166,317 202,669 1,323,352
SUCHITEPEQUEZ
CHICACAO CUYOTENANGO PATULUL SAN JOSE EL IDOLO SANTO DOMINGO SUCHITEPEQUEZ ZUNILITO 8,087 8,807 3,257 1,527 8,255 1,093 64 83 34 22 81 19 40 63 17 16 63 11 826,365 893,422 398,260 189,557 836,005 158,009 102 101 122 124 101 145 1,561,830 1,688,568 752,711 358,262 1,580,049 298,637
TOTONICAPAN
SAN ANDRES XECUL SAN CRISTOBAL TOTONICAPAN SAN FRANCISCO EL ALTO 2,723 4,572 371 48 53 89 14 25 2 341,468 573,358 48,038 125 125 129 542,934 911,639 76,380
ZACAPA
GUALAN LA UNION 5,315 4,696 414,673 5,857 122 60 3,246 95 48 786,825 654,385 52,275,051 148 139 1,609,057 1,338,217 98,405,993
57
Annex 4 Coverage and implementation of VLE 2007

Department/MUNICIPALITY ALTA VERAPAZ COBAN SAN CRISTOBAL VERAPAZ SAN MIGUEL TUCURU SANTA CRUZ VERAPAZ SANTA MARIA CAHABON TACTIC TAMAHU BAJA VERAPAZ CUBULCO PURULHA RABINAL SALAMA SAN MIGUEL CHICAJ SANTA CRUZ EL CHOL CHIQUIMULA CAMOTAN JOCOTAN OLOPA SAN JUAN LA ERMITA ESCUINTLA IZTAPA LA GOMERA NUEVA CONCEPCIN PUEBLO NUEVO TIQUISATE PUERTO SAN JOS GUATEMALA CHINAUTLA CHUARRANCHO FRAIJANES MIXCO PALENCIA SAN JOSE DEL GOLFO SAN JOS PINULA SAN PEDRO AYAMPUC SAN PEDRO SACATEPQUEZ SAN RAYMUNDO SANTA CATARINA PINULA Zona 17 Zona 6 HUEHUETENANGO SAN JUAN ATITAN SAN RAFAEL PETZAL SAN SEBASTIAN HUEHUETENANGO SANTA BARBARA SANTIAGO CHIMALTENANGO 2,781 1,871 5,757 7,225 1,141 25 32 57 60 20 20 14 50 50 15 28,684 17,077 60,880 123,183 11,176 10 9 11 17 10 63,095 36,271 130,220 267,346 24,429 11,987 1,709 3,393 19,391 8,259 1,106 7,361 8,030 6,442 5,605 8,676 5,180 3,141 52 19 35 123 85 16 52 42 31 43 36 16 8 21 12 12 46 47 12 31 25 15 27 18 16 8 668,441 91,665 201,448 1,035,681 497,590 63,106 430,786 459,309 395,783 317,923 497,259 297,804 166,234 56 54 59 53 60 57 59 57 61 57 57 57 53 1,069,506 157,205 345,483 1,657,090 853,367 108,227 738,798 787,715 678,768 545,238 795,614 476,486 265,974 1,481 4,331 8,871 1,213 3,978 25 57 147 52 57 12 26 90 7 23 132,355 341,662 748,613 96,827 357,639 89 79 84 80 90 263,386 679,907 1,536,902 196,733 1,092,714 8,274 7,902 4,069 2,931 148 147 87 66 118 128 70 56 562,994 534,909 262,991 213,159 68 68 65 73 1,393,410 1,323,900 650,903 527,569 9,605 6,229 8,710 6,918 6,212 1,839 158 143 106 147 67 45 100 73 54 61 35 27 573,525 372,353 645,838 508,892 471,097 138,319 60 60 74 74 76 75 1,276,093 828,485 1,391,781 1,096,662 1,015,214 298,077 6,333 7,473 2,212 3,945 12,570 2,824 2,403 385 100 94 51 165 51 40 36 50 26 27 140 15 21 545,034 657,452 172,509 319,155 1,304,985 236,442 179,259 86 88 78 81 104 84 75 1,174,548 1,416,810 383,833 687,779 2,988,416 509,533 380,303 Students served No. of existing schools Schools assisted Rations Days served Investment (Q)
58
JALAPA MATAQUESCUINTLA MONJAS SAN LUIS JILOTEPEQUE SAN MANUEL CHAPARRON SAN PEDRO PINULA JUTIAPA ASUNCIN MITA ATESCATEMPA COMAPA CONGUACO EL ADELANTO MOYUTA SAN JOS ACATEMPA SANTA CATARINA MITA YUPILTEPEQUE PETEN FLORES SAN BENITO SAN JOSE SANTA ANA QUETZALTENANGO ALMOLONGA CANTEL LA ESPERANZA OLINTEPEQUE QUETZALTENANGO SALCAJ SAN CARLOS SIJA SAN JUAN OSTUNCALCO SAN MIGUEL SIGUILA ZUNIL QUICH CHICHE PATZITE SAN ANTONIO ILOTENANGO RETALHULEU CHAMPERICO RETALHULEU SAN ANDRS VILLASECA SAN FELIPE SAN MARCOS AYUTLA OCOS SANTA ROSA CHIQUIMULILLA TAXISCO SOLOLA PANAJACHEL SAN ANTONIO PALOP SAN JUAN LA LAGUNA 2,165 2,949 2,040 12 31 19 10 30 16 97,087 135,431 79,264 45 46 39 153,397 213,981 125,235 9,400 5,345 134 71 104 57 792,156 481,050 84 90 1,576,390 957,290 3,234 6,167 40 47 24 41 265,188 508,925 82 83 590,043 1,132,358 5,866 11,333 8,147 2,753 72 131 101 32 58 99 89 20 472,412 938,064 665,633 220,006 81 83 82 80 969,862 1,925,845 1,366,545 451,672 6,285 1,670 5,736 62 15 48 57 16 45 25,340 8,218 30,352 4 5 5 41,811 13,560 50,081 186 1,871 752 1,609 813 384 96 272 687 995 11 52 15 29 110 25 92 72 12 19 1 13 4 7 3 2 2 4 2 10 11,160 104,337 42,342 90,484 43,932 22,834 6,144 15,288 32,978 61,922 60 56 56 56 54 59 64 56 48 62 17,186 160,679 65,207 139,345 67,655 35,164 9,462 23,544 50,783 95,360 8,749 8,930 1,329 5,006 64 48 11 56 59 43 11 51 655,983 675,737 99,926 373,609 75 76 75 75 1,689,156 3,174,845 257,309 962,028 4,644 1,182 5,969 3,443 520 8,060 673 2,328 1,145 101 44 74 58 12 108 17 57 29 59 14 53 33 4 80 3 19 11 404,485 106,380 447,851 271,997 41,110 636,640 53,167 181,068 90,455 87 90 75 79 79 79 79 78 79 804,925 211,696 891,223 541,274 81,809 1,266,914 105,802 360,325 180,005 5,184 2,491 3,012 776 9,393 85 63 57 32 102 56 24 45 16 78 415,806 224,806 269,010 69,840 804,907 80 90 89 90 86 827,454 447,364 535,330 138,982 1,673,405
59
SAN LUCAS TOLIMAN SAN MARCOS LA LAGUNA SAN PABLO LA LAGUNA SAN PEDRO LA LAGUNA SANTA CATARINA PALOP SANTA CRUZ LA LAGUNA SANTIAGO ATITLN SUCHITEPEQUEZ CHICACAO CUYOTENANGO PATULUL SAN JOSE EL IDOLO SANTO DOMINGO SUCHITEPEQUEZ ZUNILITO TOTONICAPAN SAN ANDRES XECUL SAN CRISTOBAL TOTONICAPAN SAN FRANCISCO EL ALTO ZACAPA GUALAN LA UNION
4,761 704 1,814 1,412 933 1,286 6,590 8,087 8,807 3,257 1,527 8,255 1,093 2,723 4,572 371 5,315 4,696 449,170
41 4 8 12 10 13 53 64 83 34 22 81 19 48 53 89 122 60 6,176
34 5 6 10 10 13 46 40 63 17 16 63 11 14 25 2 95 48 3,525
245,159 34,218 88,405 61,198 38,990 36,839 320,280 619,852 568,607 208,598 107,963 578,318 93,975 143,688 247,448 21,457 459,926 314,025 29,902,308
51 49 49 43 42 29 49 77 65 64 71 70 86 53 54 58 87 67
421,673 54,064 139,680 96,693 61,604 58,206 550,882 1,335,781 1,225,348 449,529 232,660 1,246,275 202,516 221,280 381,070 33,044 987,461 674,212 62,868,069
60
Annex 5 Implementation of VLE 2006 by groups at risk

MUNICIPALITY SAN CRISTOBAL VERAPAZ TACTIC TAMAHU RABINAL CAMOTAN JOCOTAN OLOPA SAN JUAN LA ERMITA SAN PEDRO PINULA ALMOLONGA CANTEL SAN MIGUEL SIGUILA ZUNIL SAN ANTONIO PALOP SAN JUAN LA LAGUNA SAN LUCAS TOLIMAN SAN MARCOS LA LAGUNA SAN PABLO LA LAGUNA SANTA CATARINA PALOP SANTA CRUZ LA LAGUNA SANTIAGO ATITLN ZUNILITO SAN ANDRES XECUL SAN CRISTOBAL TOTONICAPAN SAN FRANCISCO EL ALTO Students served 7,473 2,824 2,403 7,958 8,274 7,902 4,069 2,230 9,522 186 1,853 687 995 2,949 2,040 4,761 704 1,814 933 1,375 6,590 1,093 2,723 4,572 371 86,301 2,212 3,945 12,570 9,605 6,229 6,212 5,969 1,609 8,087 1,527 4,696 62,661 6,333 6,906 1,839 11,987 1,709 8,259 7,361 6,442 5,605 5,184 2,491 3,037 3,443 No. of schools 100 51 40 106 148 147 87 66 102 11 52 12 19 31 19 41 4 8 10 13 53 19 48 53 89 1,329 94 51 165 158 143 67 74 29 64 22 60 927 385 147 45 52 19 85 52 31 43 85 63 57 58 Schools assisted 50 15 21 52 118 128 70 44 79 1 13 2 10 30 16 34 5 6 10 13 46 11 14 25 2 815 26 27 140 100 73 35 53 7 40 16 48 565 36 61 27 21 12 47 31 15 27 56 24 46 33 Rations 892,652 315,895 175,762 949,835 1,102,651 1,065,494 482,254 292,803 1,359,756 25,334 238,660 79,894 131,880 287,822 221,505 447,482 80,278 209,566 103,948 126,668 665,001 158,009 341,468 573,358 48,038 10,376,013 270,646 493,624 1,304,985 825,186 754,574 636,356 827,599 189,006 826,365 189,557 654,385 6,972,283 870,564 767,572 151,187 1,570,756 225,367 1,085,137 925,873 848,460 742,039 735,740 366,513 440,814 494,217 Investment (Q) 1,776,198 644,426 349,766 1,890,172 2,249,408 2,397,362 1,104,362 597,318 2,576,738 40,281 379,469 127,031 209,689 572,766 354,408 890,489 128,445 335,306 166,317 202,669 1,323,352 298,637 542,934 911,639 76,380 20,145,562 538,586 982,312 2,988,416 1,683,379 1,539,331 1,266,348 1,568,300 300,520 1,561,830 358,262 1,338,217 14,125,501 1,732,422 1,527,468 300,862 2,418,964 358,334 1,725,368 1,472,138 1,349,051 1,179,842 1,394,227 694,542 835,343 936,541 Days served 119 112 73 119 133 135 119 131 143 136 129 116 133 98 109 94 114 116 111 92 101 145 125 125 129 118 122 125 104 86 121 102 139 117 102 124 139 117 137 111 82 131 132 131 126 132 132 142 147 145 144 Grade of risk Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high
SAN MIGUEL TUCURU SANTA CRUZ VERAPAZ SANTA MARIA CAHABON CUBULCO PURULHA SAN MIGUEL CHICAJ COMAPA OLINTEPEQUE CHICACAO SAN JOSE EL IDOLO LA UNION
High High High High High High High High High High High
COBAN SALAMA SANTA CRUZ EL CHOL CHINAUTLA CHUARRANCHO PALENCIA SAN JOS PINULA SAN PEDRO SACATEPQUEZ SAN RAYMUNDO MATAQUESCUINTLA MONJAS SAN LUIS JILOTEPEQUE CONGUACO
Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate
61
EL ADELANTO SAN JOS ACATEMPA YUPILTEPEQUE SAN JOSE SANTA ANA QUETZALTENANGO SALCAJ SAN CARLOS SIJA SAN ANDRS VILLASECA SAN FELIPE PANAJACHEL SAN PEDRO LA LAGUNA CUYOTENANGO PATULUL SANTO DOMINGO SUCHITEPEQUEZ
520 673 1,145 1,329 5,021 813 348 96 8,147 2,753 2,165 1,412 8,807 3,257 8,255 115,337 1,481 4,331 8,871 1,213 3,978 3,393 18,471 1,091 8,030 8,676 776 4,644 1,182 8,060 2,328 8,749 8,930 752 272 5,957 11,333 3,234 6,167 9,474 5,345 5,315 5,180 3,141 150,374
12 17 29 11 56 110 25 92 101 32 12 12 83 34 81 1,829 25 57 147 52 57 35 123 16 42 36 32 101 44 108 57 64 48 15 72 72 131 40 47 134 71 122 16 8 1,772
4 3 11 11 52 3 2 2 89 20 10 10 63 17 63 796 12 26 90 7 23 12 46 12 24 18 16 59 14 80 19 59 43 4 4 58 99 24 41 104 57 95 16 8 1,070
77,400 99,459 162,195 180,802 589,959 101,402 40,880 12,234 1,163,048 398,739 254,972 170,097 893,422 398,260 836,005 14,603,113 212,528 618,090 1,260,737 173,799 576,630 459,919 2,328,829 147,762 1,039,078 1,094,543 121,704 680,076 171,911 1,151,995 338,830 1,013,591 1,328,387 87,272 32,526 819,517 1,594,168 357,687 607,652 1,453,119 788,756 786,825 667,333 410,378 20,323,642
146,673 188,475 307,360 432,117 1,410,002 161,229 64,999 19,452 2,273,759 779,535 407,955 272,155 1,688,568 752,711 1,580,049 26,410,141 402,741 1,171,281 2,164,741 339,777 1,092,714 731,271 3,586,397 234,942 1,652,134 1,685,596 230,629 1,288,744 325,771 2,183,031 642,083 2,422,483 3,174,845 138,762 51,716 1,602,156 3,116,598 729,681 1,239,610 2,753,661 1,494,693 1,609,057 1,027,693 631,982 37,724,789
149 148 142 136 117 125 117 127 143 145 118 120 101 122 101 129 144 143 142 143 145 136 126 135 129 126 157 146 145 143 146 116 149 116 120 138 141 111 99 153 148 148 129 131 136
Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate
IZTAPA LA GOMERA NUEVA CONCEPCIN PUEBLO NUEVO TIQUISATE PUERTO SAN JOS FRAIJANES MIXCO SAN JOSE DEL GOLFO SAN PEDRO AYAMPUC SANTA CATARINA PINULA SAN MANUEL CHAPARRON ASUNCIN MITA ATESCATEMPA MOYUTA SANTA CATARINA MITA FLORES SAN BENITO LA ESPERANZA SAN JUAN OSTUNCALCO CHAMPERICO RETALHULEU AYUTLA OCOS CHIQUIMULILLA TAXISCO GUALAN Zona 17 Zona 6
Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low
62
Annex 6 Implementation of VLE 2007 by groups at risk

MUNICIPALITY SAN CRISTOBAL VERAPAZ TACTIC TAMAHU RABINAL CAMOTAN JOCOTAN OLOPA SAN JUAN LA ERMITA SAN JUAN ATITAN SAN RAFAEL PETZAL SAN SEBASTIAN HUEHUETENANGO SANTA BARBARA SANTIAGO CHIMALTENANGO SAN PEDRO PINULA ALMOLONGA CANTEL SAN MIGUEL SIGUILA ZUNIL CHICHE SAN ANTONIO ILOTENANGO SAN ANTONIO PALOP SAN JUAN LA LAGUNA SAN LUCAS TOLIMAN SAN MARCOS LA LAGUNA SAN PABLO LA LAGUNA SANTA CATARINA PALOP SANTA CRUZ LA LAGUNA SANTIAGO ATITLN ZUNILITO SAN ANDRES XECUL SAN CRISTOBAL TOTONICAPAN SAN FRANCISCO EL ALTO Students served 7,473 2,824 2,403 8,710 8,274 7,902 4,069 2,931 2,781 1,871 5,757 7,225 1,141 9,393 186 1,871 687 995 6,285 5,736 2,949 2,040 4,761 704 1,814 933 1,286 6,590 1,093 2,723 4,572 371 118,350 2,212 3,945 12,570 9,605 6,229 6,212 5,969 1,633 94 51 165 158 143 67 74 No. of schools 100 51 40 106 148 147 87 66 25 32 57 60 20 102 11 52 12 19 62 48 31 19 41 4 8 10 13 53 19 48 53 89 1,079 26 27 140 100 73 35 53 Schools assisted 50 15 21 54 118 128 70 56 20 14 50 50 15 78 1 13 2 10 57 45 30 16 34 5 6 10 13 46 11 14 25 2 Rations 657,452 236,442 179,259 645,838 562,994 534,909 262,991 213,159 28,684 17,077 60,880 123,183 11,176 804,907 11,160 104,337 32,978 61,922 25,340 30,352 135,431 79,264 245,159 34,218 88,405 38,990 36,839 320,280 93,975 143,688 247,448 21,457 6,090,194 172,509 319,155 1,304,985 573,525 372,353 471,097 447,851 Investment (Q) 1,416,810 509,533 380,303 1,391,781 1,393,410 1,323,900 650,903 527,569 63,095 36,271 130,220 267,346 24,429 1,673,405 17,186 160,679 50,783 95,360 41,811 50,081 213,981 125,235 421,673 54,064 139,680 61,604 58,206 550,882 202,516 221,280 381,070 33,044 12,668,110 383,833 687,779 2,988,416 1,276,093 828,485 1,015,214 891,223 49 78 81 104 60 60 76 75 High High High High High High High Days served 88 84 75 74 68 68 65 73 10 9 11 17 10 86 60 56 48 62 4 5 46 39 51 49 49 42 29 49 86 53 54 58 Grade of risk Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high Very high
SAN MIGUEL TUCURU SANTA CRUZ VERAPAZ SANTA MARIA CAHABON CUBULCO PURULHA SAN MIGUEL CHICAJ COMAPA
63
OLINTEPEQUE CHICACAO SAN JOSE EL IDOLO LA UNION
1,609 8,087 1,527 4,696 62,661 6,333 6,918 1,839 11,987 1,709 8,259 7,361 6,442 5,605 5,184 2,491 3,012 3,443 520 673 1,145 1,329 5,006 813 384 96 8,147 2,753 2,165 1,412 8,807 3,257 8,255 115,345 927
29 64 22 60 565 385 147 45 52 19 85 52 31 43 85 63 57 58 12 17 29 11 56 110 25 92 101 32 12 12 83 34 81 1,829 794
7 40 16 48
90,484 619,852 107,963 314,025 4,793,799 545,034 508,892 138,319 668,441 91,665 497,590 430,786 395,783 317,923 415,806 224,806 269,010 271,997 41,110 53,167 90,455 99,926 373,609 43,932 22,834 6,144 665,633 220,006 97,087 61,198 568,607 208,598 578,318 7,906,676
139,345 1,335,781 232,660 674,212 10,453,041 1,174,548 1,096,662 298,077 1,069,506 157,205 853,367 738,798 678,768 545,238 827,454 447,364 535,330 541,274 81,809 105,802 180,005 257,309 962,028 67,655 35,164 9,462 1,366,545 451,672 153,397 96,693 1,225,348 449,529 1,246,275 15,652,284 73
56 77 71 67
High High High High
COBAN SALAMA SANTA CRUZ EL CHOL CHINAUTLA CHUARRANCHO PALENCIA SAN JOS PINULA SAN PEDRO SACATEPQUEZ SAN RAYMUNDO MATAQUESCUINTLA MONJAS SAN LUIS JILOTEPEQUE CONGUACO EL ADELANTO SAN JOS ACATEMPA YUPILTEPEQUE SAN JOSE SANTA ANA QUETZALTENANGO SALCAJ SAN CARLOS SIJA SAN ANDRS VILLASECA SAN FELIPE PANAJACHEL SAN PEDRO LA LAGUNA CUYOTENANGO PATULUL SANTO DOMINGO SUCHITEPEQUEZ
36 61 27 21 12 47 31 15 27 56 24 45 33 4 3 11 11 51 3 2 2 89 20 10 10 63 17 63
86 74 75 56 54 60 59 61 57 80 90 89 79 79 79 79 75 75 54 59 64 82 80 45 43 65 64 70 69
Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate
IZTAPA LA GOMERA NUEVA CONCEPCIN PUEBLO NUEVO TIQUISATE PUERTO SAN JOS FRAIJANES MIXCO SAN JOSE DEL GOLFO SAN PEDRO AYAMPUC
1,481 4,331 8,871 1,213 3,978 3,393 19,391 1,106 8,030
25 57 147 52 57 35 123 16 42
12 26 90 7 23 12 46 12 25
132,355 341,662 748,613 96,827 357,639 201,448 1,035,681 63,106 459,309
263,386 679,907 1,536,902 196,733 1,092,714 345,483 1,657,090 108,227 787,715
89 79 84 80 90 59 53 57 57
Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low
64
SANTA CATARINA PINULA Zona 17 Zona 6 SAN MANUEL CHAPARRON ASUNCIN MITA ATESCATEMPA MOYUTA SANTA CATARINA MITA FLORES SAN BENITO LA ESPERANZA SAN JUAN OSTUNCALCO PATZITE CHAMPERICO RETALHULEU AYUTLA OCOS CHIQUIMULILLA TAXISCO GUALAN
8,676 5,180 3,141 776 4,644 1,182 8,060 2,328 8,749 8,930 752 272 1,670 5,866 11,333 3,234 6,167 9,400 5,345 5,315 152,814 1,787
36 16 8 32 101 44 108 57 64 48 15 72 15 72 131 40 47 134 71 122 1,087
18 16 8 16 59 14 80 19 59 43 4 4 16 58 99 24 41 104 57 95
497,259 297,804 166,234 69,840 404,485 106,380 636,640 181,068 655,983 675,737 42,342 15,288 8,218 472,412 938,064 265,188 508,925 792,156 481,050 459,926 11,111,639
795,614 476,486 265,974 138,982 804,925 211,696 1,266,914 360,325 1,689,156 3,174,845 65,207 23,544 13,560 969,862 1,925,845 590,043 1,132,358 1,576,390 957,290 987,461 24,094,634 72
57 57 53 90 87 90 79 78 75 76 56 56 5 81 83 82 83 84 90 87
Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low
65

Right To Food & Budget Guatemala 2008

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Right To Food & Budget Guatemala 2008

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Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Right to Food Unit Guatemala office

Realization of the Right to Food in Guatemala

Guatemala, October 2008.

1 quintal [100lbs] 1 metric ton

45.36 kgs 0.4 tons 1,016.05 kgs 22.4 quintales[2200lbs]

Abbreviations and Acronyms

The Budget Process

Legal framework related to the Right to Food

History of the application of the Right to Food in Guatemala

Poverty and National Food Security

It does not include the population with unknown ethnic identity.

Graph 1 Guatemala: Levels of poverty by department (in thousands of people)

Source: Elaborated using information from the ENCOVI 2006.

Graph 2 Central America Total Malnourished Population

The political framework to address poverty:

SEGEPLAN. Estrategia de Reduccin de la Pobreza. Guatemala, 2006.

Right to Food and the Budget

SINASAN Law. Article 38.

SICOIN. Report at April 30th 2008.

Vice-Ministry of Food and Nutrition Security (VISAN) Activities, May 2008

School Feeding Programs [Programas de Alimentacin Escolar, PAE]

1,440.7 1,587.4 1,786.5 1,852.8 2,359.1 2,469.4 2,706.5 2,781.5 2,852.9

185.6 233.5 233.5

216.3 55.3 271.6

337.6 79.2 416.8

437.2 70.7 507.9

16.8 11.7 11.7 0.06 0.06

63.0 42.6 39.7 0.24 0.22

82.2 51.7 46.0 0.29 0.26

127.3 80.7 68.7 0.45 0.38

73.3 39.3 31.1 0.22 0.17

139.8 75.2 56.6 0.42 0.31

158.0 86.3 58.4 0.48 0.32

173.7 97.6 62.4 0.54 0.35

257.0 146.1 90.1 0.81 0.50

% % spending/ expended approved

Primary Breakfast School lunches

Pre-primary Feeding Primary Feeding

Fortified beverage Glass of Milk (Vaso de Leche) Total

Pre-primary Feeding Primary Feeding

Fortified beverage Glass of Milk (Vaso de Leche) Total

Pre-primary Feeding Primary Feeding

Glass of Milk (Vaso de Leche) Total

Pre-primary Feeding Primary Feeding

Glass of Milk (Vaso de Leche) Total

School Feeding Programs of the MINEDUC

Chart 11 Distribution of the Fortified Beverage 2005 2006 Degree of Vulnerability

Municipalities served 2005 2006 12 11 4 8 35 1 21 4 2 8 12 5 31 5 7 8 6 26 10 13 23 27 7 6 14 3 9 3 6

37,003 25,583 66,765

95,739 95,739 135,581 39,099 174,680

Source: Own analysis of data from VISAN, MAGA.

School Glass of Milk Program (Vaso de Leche Escolar, VLE)19

Figure 3 Glass of Milk (Vaso de Leche) Coverage Guatemala 2007

Figure 4 Prevalence of Chronic Malnutrition Guatemala 2001

92 5,857 Source: Own analysis of data from VISAN, MAGA

Source: Own analysis of data from VISAN, MAGA

Perception of the School Glass of Milk Programs Performance

Contributes to students staying in school.21 It doesnt require preparation or additional costs.

Translators note: Mixco is a municipality in the department of Guatemala.