(Cisco) Deploying 802.1X For Lan Security (2003) (PPT)

Deploying 802.
1x for LAN Security

Session SEC-2005
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2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
Copyright 2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Printed in USA.
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Overview and Agenda

Looking at the Concepts of Authentication Applying Them to Network Access Control Understanding the Protocols and Mechanisms behind 802.1x Understanding Various Authentication Methods Understanding PKI Certs in the Context of 802.1x Authentication Understanding Authorization and Policy Enforcement with 802.1x
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What We Wont Be Covering
AAA authentication on routers IPSec authentication
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Threat Model Overview
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Risk Assessment Potential Cost of External Threats

In the 2002 CSI/FBI survey: Over 90% of over 400 participants reported security breaches 223 reported security incidents totaled losses over $455 million Source: CSI/FBI 2002 Computer Crime and Security Survey Providing Authentication and access control on network ports can significantly reduce the potential attacker community
Keep the Outsiders Out

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Easy Unauthorized Access

User connects to network Requests an IP address Gets one via DHCP Gets access to network resources Nice and Flexible; Great for Mobility
Unfortunately, This Works for ANYONE

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Risk Assessment Potential Cost of Internal Threats

In the 2002 CSI/FBI survey: Highest source of loss was theft of proprietary informationover $170 million alone Of the top causes of loss, insider misuse of resources was in top 5 Insider attack by disgruntled employees was listed as likely source by 75% of respondents Source: CSI/FBI 2002 Computer Crime and Security Survey Providing policy enforcement, compartmentalization, and usage monitoring can further reduce that number
Keep the Insiders Honest

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Unauthorized Use of the Network

Authorized User/Employee
Enterprise Network
Authorized User/Employee
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Understanding Authentication
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What Is Authentication?
The process of establishing and confirming the identity of a client requesting services Authentication is only useful if used to establish corresponding authorization Model is very common in everyday scenarios
Id like to withdraw $200.00 please. Do you have identification? Yes, I do. Here it is. Thank you. Heres your money.
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Some Important Points on Authentication

The process of authentication is used to verify a claimed identity An identity is only useful as a pointer to an applicable policy and for accounting Without authorization or associated policies, authentication alone is pretty meaningless An authentication system is only as strong as the method of verification used
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Whats This Authorization Thing?
The concept of being able to differentiate services amongst groups or individuals If everyone had the same rights, then we wouldnt need authorization
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Why Do We Care?
Because differentiation of services and rights control is critical in network environments Not everyone has the same privileges; not all resources or information have the same level of confidentiality Unauthorized access, theft, and misuse of computer resources accounted for over $2 billion in losses in 2001
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An Operational Overview of Network Authentication
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Port-Based Network Authentication

Have the client (a user or a device) request a servicein this case access to the network Verify the clients claim of identity authentication Reference the configured policies for the requesting client Grant or deny the services as per the policyauthorization
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Applying the Authentication Model to the Network
Id like to connect to the network Do you have identification? Yes, I do. Here it is. Thank you. Here you go.
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Device Authentication and 802.1x

The CA Issues and Signs a Cert for the IP Phone The CA Issues and Signs a Cert for the AAA Server
Hello Hello, AAA Cert, Request for Phone Cert, Signed MD5 Hash of AAA Cert Phone Cert, Signed MD5 Hash of Phone Cert Great, I Know You Are Phone w/MAC 00-0c-12-34-56-78
IP Phone
Great, I Know You Are My AAA Server
AAA Server
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Wired Access Control Model
Client and Switch Talk 802.1x
Switch Speaks to Auth Server Using RADIUS
Actual Authentication Conversation Is between Client and Auth Server Using EAP; the Switch Is Just a Middleman, but Is Aware of Whats Going on
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A Closer Look
Login Req. Send Credentials Accept Forward Credentials to ACS Server Authentication Successful Policy Instructions Actual Authentication Conversation Is between Client and Auth Server Using EAP; the Switch Is Just a Middleman, but Is Aware of Whats Going on
802.1x
RADIUS
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Wireless Access Control Model
Login Req. Send Credentials Accept Forward Credentials to ACS Server Authentication Successful Policy Instructions Actual Authentication Conversation Is between Client and Auth Server Using EAP; the Switch Is Just a Middleman, but Is Aware of Whats Going on
802.1x
RADIUS
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Protocols and Mechanisms
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IEEE 802.1x?
Standard set by the IEEE 802.1 working groupratified in December of 2001 Designed to address and provide port-based access control using authentication Describes a standard link layer protocol used for transporting higher-level authentication protocols (i.e. EAP) Actual enforcement is via MAC-based filtering and port state monitoring
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Some IEEE Terminology
IEEE Terms Supplicant Authenticator Authentication Server
Normal People Terms Client Network Access Device AAA/RADIUS Server
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What Does It Do?

Transport authentication information in the form of Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) payloads The authenticator (switch) becomes the middleman for relaying EAP received in 802.1x packets to an authentication server by using RADIUS to carry the EAP information Three forms of EAP are specified in the standard
EAP-MD5MD5 Hashed Username/Password EAP-OTPOne-Time Passwords EAP-TLSStrong PKI Authenticated Transport Layer Security (SSL)
Ethernet Header
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802.1x Header
EAP Payload
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What Is EAP?
EAPThe Extensible Authentication Protocol A flexible protocol used to carry arbitrary authentication information Typically rides on top of another protocol such as 802.1x or RADIUS (could be TACACS+, etc.) Specified in RFC 2284
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Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)

0 Code Data 8 Identifier 16 Length 31
Initially developed for PPP Authentication Code is Request, Response, Success, or Failure Identifier is used to match responses with requests Format of the data field is determined by the code field
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EAPOL (EAP over 802.1x) Frame Format
0
Destination MAC Length
6
Source MAC Body
12
14
EtherType Version
15
Type
16
18
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Different EAPOL Frame Types
EAPOL-Start EAPOL-Logoff EAP-Packet EAPOL-Key EAPOL-Encapsulated-ASF-Alert
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Current Prevalent Authentication Methods

EAP-MD5: Uses MD5-based Challenge -Response for authentication EAP-TLS: Uses x.509 v3 PKI certificates and the TLS mechanism for authentication EAP-MSCHAPv2: Uses username/password MSCHAPv2 Challenge Response authentication LEAP: Uses username/password authentication PEAP: Protected EAP tunnel mode EAP encapsulator; tunnels other EAP types in an encrypted tunnelmuch like web-based SSL EAP-TTLS: Other EAP methods over an extended EAP-TLS encrypted tunnel EAP-GTC: Generic token and OTP authentication
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Understanding EAP-MD5
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EAP-MD5 Challenge Response System

Password is never transmitted Client identity is transmitted in clear Random is generated on AAA server and sent as a challenge Client MD5 hashes the challenge using their password as the key AAA server receives response from client; compares MD5 hash result to that using stored password as key If they match, client used the right password
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EAP-MD5
Client Process
Identity Request Identity Reply MD5 Challenge MD5 Response Auth Success Identity Reply MD5 Challenge MD5 Response Access-Accept
NAS Process
AAA Process
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EAP-MD5 Pros and Cons

Pros Well supported mandatory in all EAP implementations Simple username/ password scheme Lightweight on processing Cons In theory, security weaknesses requires the storage of plaintext or reversible passwords on the AAA server Single factor auth only Being phased out by MSFT
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Understanding EAP-TLS
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EAP-TLS Authentication
Passwords arent used at all Instead TLS public key cryptographybased RSA handshake is used AAA Server authenticates client, but client can also authenticate AAA Servermutual authentication AAA server receives cert from client, verifies authenticity of cert (using CA public key), then verifies bearer identity using TLS handshake
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EAP-TLS and PKI Certificates
EAP-TLS is the EAP implementation of the Transport Layer Security Protocol (similar to SSL) TLS uses public key certificates to authenticate clients Certificates must be x.509 v3 PKI certificates to be usable
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Certificate Authorities
A CA can be sourced by an enterprise internal or external trusted structure It just needs to be trusted by the users The responsibility of the CA is to verify the identity of the certificate holder PRIOR to handing out a certificate for them Internal structures can be set up using commercial products:
VeriSign Entrust Microsoft CA
External CAs are services:

VeriSign GTE Thawte
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The TLS Authentication Model (RSA-Based)

The CA Issues and Signs a Cert for Fred The CA Issues and Signs a Cert for Mary
Hello
Hello, Marys Cert, Request for Freds Cert, Signed MD5 Hash of Marys Cert
Freds Cert, Signed MD5 Hash of Freds Cert Great, I Know You Are Fred Great, I Know You Are Mary Fred Trusts the ABC Inc. CA Mary Trusts the ABC Inc. CA
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How Fred Authenticates Mary

How does Fred Authenticate Mary?
Marys cert is signed by the ABC Inc. CAs private key. Fred should already have a copy of ABC Inc. CAs public key. He can use that to verify the validity of the cert by performing a digital signature check with the CAs public key.
But how does Fred know that the entity that presented the cert is really Mary, and not someone with a copy of Marys cert?
At the end of Marys reply, Mary includes an MD5 hash of her cert and some other information unique to this communication session, that is signed with her private key. Fred uses the public key contained in the cert to verify the signature by the private key. If this works, he can now believe that the presenter of the cert with whom he is speaking to is also the bearer of the correct private key, meaning, by inference that the other person is indeed Mary.
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How Mary Authenticates Fred
How does Mary authenticate Fred?

Exactly the same way Fred authenticated Mary, except the opposite; Mary also uses the CAs public key to verify the authenticity of the cert, but she will use Freds public key to validate his signature
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Common Questions
Is key distribution needed?
No, there is no need for a key distribution scheme; all that is needed is for Fred and Mary to each have a copy of the CAs public key cert, and to trust that CA. Fred doesnt have to have previous knowledge of Marys public key or vice-versa.
Aside from issuing the certs, is there any other CA interaction required?
No, the CA only exists to issue the certs to the parties using TLS to authenticate. It is not actively needed in the authentication process. In some schemes it may also be used to periodically provide updates on revoked certs.
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EAP-TLS
Client Process
Identity Request Identity Reply, TLS Hello TLS Hello, Server Cert, Cert Request Client Cert Auth Success Identity Reply, TLS Hello TLS Hello, Server Cert, Cert Request Client Cert Access-Accept
NAS Process
AAA Process
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EAP-TLS Pros and Cons
Pros
One of the strongest forms of authentication in existence Can be made a two factor system; sometimes more
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Cons
Can be more complex to deployneeds PKI Computationally intensive
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Understanding PEAP
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PEAP Authentication
PEAP doesnt do client authentication on its own PEAP tunnels other EAP methods within an encrypted tunnelyou still need to choose an EAP method to use within it PEAP uses the same TLS mechanism as EAP-TLS, but adds the record protocol for encryption The encrypted tunnel only exists for the duration of the authentication interaction, not all traffic
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Conceptual Overview of PEAP
TLS Handshake
TLS Handshake
TLS Record Protocol-Based Encrypted Tunnel Additional EAP Methods within Tunnel
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PEAP Setup
Client Process
Identity Request Identity Reply, PEAP Request TLS Hello, Server Cert, Cipher Change Cipher Change, Session Key Start Embedded EAP Auth Identity Reply, PEAP Request TLS Hello, Server Cert, Cipher Change Cipher Change, Session Key
NAS Process
AAA Process
Start Embedded EAP Auth
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RADIUS in 802.1x
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How Is RADIUS Used Here?

RADIUS acts as the transport for EAP, from the authenticator (switch) to the authentication server (RADIUS server)
IP Header UDP Header RADIUS Header EAP Payload
RADIUS is also used to carry policy instructions back to the authenticator in the form of AV pairs
IP Header UDP Header RADIUS Header EAP Payload AV Pairs
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Understanding Microsoft Environments
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Windows Boot Cycle Overview
Inherent Assumption of Network Connectivity
Power Up
Load NDIS drivers
DHCP
Setup Secure Channel to DC
Update GPOs
Apply Computer GPOs
Present GINA (Ctrl-Alt-Del) Login
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Microsoft and Machine Authentication

What is Machine Authentication?
The ability of a Windows workstation to authenticate under its own identity, independent of the requirement for an interactive user session
What is it used for?

Machine authentication is used at boot time by Windows OSes to authenticate and communicate with Windows Domain Controllers in order to pull down machine group policies
Why do we care?
Pre-802.1x this worked under the assumption that network connectivity was a given; post -802.1x the blocking of network access prior to 802.1x authentication breaks the machine-based group policy modelUNLESS the machine can authenticate using its own identity in 802.1x
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Windows Machine Authentication
Power Up
Load NDIS drivers
802.1x Authenticate as Computer
DHCP
Update GPOs
Apply Computer GPOs
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Machine Authentication and 802.1x
Access- Accept EAP- TLS Authentication Computer Identity Identity Req.
Access- Accept EAP- TLS Authentication Computer Identity
Authenticate to Domain Controller Request Group Policy Updates Group Policy Updates
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Machine Authentication EAP Methods
Follows method chosen for user authentication For EAP-TLSwill use machine certs For EAP-MD5 or EAP-MSCHAPv2will use machine account and password
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Different Modes of Authentication in Microsoft Environments

Controlled by registry keys Authentication by machine only
No need for user authentication if machine authentication is successful
Authentication by user only

No machine authentication taking place at allbe careful, this breaks group and system policies
Authentication by user and machine

Uses authentication of both user and machine; switches contexts when going from one to the other
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Microsoft Issues with DHCP

DHCP is a parallel event, independent of 802.1x authentication With wired interfaces a successful 802.1x authentication DOES NOT force an DHCP address discovery (no media-connect signal) This produces a problem if not properly planned DHCP starts once interface comes up If 802.1x authentication takes too long, DHCP may time out
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DHCP Timeout Problem
802.1x AuthVariable Timeout DHCPTimeout at 62 Sec.
Power Up
Load NDIS Drivers
DHCP
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How to Address DHCP Timeout with 802.1x?

Use machine authenticationthis allows the initial machine authentication to obtain an IP address Force an IP address renewalusing a script, using a service, disconnect/ reconnect interface Dont plug in Ethernet interface until you are ready to log in
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Identity-Based Policy Enforcement
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Authorization
Authorization is the embodiment of the ability to enforce policies on identities Typically policies are applied using a group methodologyallows for easier manageability The goal is to take the notion of group management and policies into the network Basic policy enforcement is the ability to allow or disallow access to the network
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Dynamic VLAN Assignment

Dynamic VLAN assignment based on identity Allows VLAN assignment, by group, or individual, at the time of authentication VLANs assigned by nameallows for more flexible VLAN management Allows VLAN policies to be applied to groups of users (i.e., VLAN QoS, VLAN ACLs, etc.)
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Example Solution AAccess Control and User Policy Enforcement

Switch Applies Policies and Enables Port Lookup local HR VLAN Found itHR = VLAN 5 Set port VLAN to 5
User Has Access to Network, with Applicable VLAN Login Request Credentials Login Good! Apply Policies
Check with Policy DB
This Is John Doe! He Goes into HR VLAN

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Commonly Asked Questions
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Most Commonly Asked Questions

Does the Catalyst XXX support EAP-XXX?
The switches are transparent to the EAP method used. The switch typically does not need to support an EAP method.
Does Catalyst Cisco IOS for 6K/4K support feature XXX?

If the feature is any newer than 6 months old probably not. Cisco IOS is on a different (read: much slower) development cycle than CatOS.
Does 2950/3550 Cisco IOS support feature XXX?

DSBU IOS is on a separate development cycle from CatOS and 6K/4K Cisco IOS. Its faster than 6K/4K IOS but currently slightly behind CatOS. Most features for DSBU IOS are 3 months behind CatOS. The goal is to get DSBU IOS and CatOS at par
Will the Catalyst XXXX XL platform get 802.1x?

No. There will be no upgrades or enhancements to the Catalyst XL switches to add 802.1x or any identity features. This is primarily because of a hardware limitation problem. There isnt enough code space to include 802.1x features and fix any potential bugs later on.
How does our 802.1x strategy fit with our VoIP solutions?
This topic gets its own slide
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802.1x and VoIP

Two phases of VoIP and 802.1x support
802.1x with VVIDUnauthenticated Voice VLAN (VVID) access, Authenticated Data VLAN (PVID) access; this leaves voice no better than it is today, but allows 802.1x and VoIP to co-exist at the same time 802.1x supplicants in IP phonesCommitted for next gen phones (7965) work in progress for existing phones (7960)not yet committed; phones will act as passthrough for PVID authentication
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In the Context of IP Phones and 802.1x

The CA Issues and Signs a Cert for the IP Phone The CA Issues and Signs a Cert for the AAA Server
Hello Hello, AAA Cert, Request for Phone Cert, Signed MD5 Hash of AAA Cert Phone Cert, Signed MD5 Hash of Phone Cert Great, I Know You Are Phone w/MAC 00-0c-12-34-56-78 Great, I Know You Are My AAA Server
IP Phone
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AAA Server
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Operating System 802.1x Support?

Windows XPnow, ships with support Windows 2000currently available with SP3 + Hotfix from KB Article 313664 Windows NT/98/Melimited availability or 3rd party (MeetingHouse) Linuxopen source
http://www.open1x.org
Solaris3rd party via MeetingHouse Communications http://www.mtghouse.com Applecoming soon!

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What Platforms Support This?
Catalyst 5500basic 802.1x only Catalyst 6000/4000all features* Catalyst 2950/3550all features* Aironet WLAN APsall features* Cisco 800 seriesspecialized feature set
* Features Will Be Limited by Platform Capabilities

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Deployment Example
Creating Value out of All the Pieces
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Example Solution AAccess Control and User Policy Enforcement

Switch Applies Policies and Enables Port Lookup local HR VLAN Found it HR = VLAN 5 Set port VLAN to 5
User Has Access to Network, with Applicable VLAN Login Request Credentials Login Good! Apply Policies
Check with Policy DB
This Is John Doe! He Goes into HR VLAN

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Deployment Example Overview

Windows XP clients CiscoSecure ACS 3.2 Authenticating to Active Directory Controlling access via switches Dynamically assigning VLANs based on group membership in AD Using username and password to authenticate via PEAP/EAP-MSCHAPv2
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Scenario Dependencies
WinXP clients: require Service Pack 1 installed Windows 2000 server for ACS 3.2: requires all current service packs and patches CatOS switches: CatOS 7.5.1+ Cisco IOS switches: Cisco IOS 12.1(EA1)13+ Enterprise PKI (i.e. MS CA) or trusted 3rd party (i.e. Verisign) certificate for ACS
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Authentication Server Configuration

CiscoSecure ACS for Windows CiscoSecure ACS Appliance
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ACS Configuration
Adding the Network Access Device
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ACS Configuration
Adding the Network Access Device
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ACS Configuration
Server Certificate Setup
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ACS Configuration
Server Certificate Setup
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ACS Configuration
Server Certificate SetupPKCS #7 Certificate Request
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ACS Configuration
Server Certificate Request (MS Certificate Services)
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ACS Configuration
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ACS Configuration
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ACS Configuration
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ACS Configuration
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ACS Configuration
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ACS Configuration
Server Certificate Installation
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ACS Configuration
Server Certificate Installation
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ACS Configuration
Global Authentication SetupEAP Method Selection
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ACS Configuration
External User Database Configuration
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ACS Configuration
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ACS Configuration
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ACS Configuration
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ACS Configuration
External User Database Group Mapping
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ACS Configuration
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ACS Configuration
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ACS Configuration
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ACS Configuration
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ACS Configuration
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ACS Configuration
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ACS Configuration
User Interface Option Configuration
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ACS Configuration
User Interface OptionsRADIUS AV Pair Configuration
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ACS Configuration
Group Policy Configuration
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ACS Configuration
Group Policy ConfigurationVLAN Assignment
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Authenticator (Switch) Configuration

Catalyst 6500/4500/4000 Catalyst 2950/3550
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Switch Configuration
CatOS ConfigurationGlobal Commands
# RADIUS configuration set radius server <ip_address> auth-port 1812 primary set radius key <key> # Global 802.1x configuration set dot1x system-auth-control enable set dot1x quiet-period 10 (default: 30) set dot1x tx-period 10 (default: 30) set dot1x supp-timeout 5 (default: 30) set dot1x server-timeout 5 (default: 30) set dot1x max-req 4 (default: 2) set dot1x re-authperiod
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CatOS ConfigurationPer-Port Commands
# Port Level 802.1x configuration set port dot1x <mod/port> port-control auto set port dot1x <mod/port> port-control force-authorized set port dot1x <mod/port> multiple-host enable/disable set port dot1x <mod/port> re-authentication enable/disable
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IOS ConfigurationGlobal Commands
# RADIUS configuration radius-server host <ip_address> radius-server key <key> aaa new-model aaa authentication dot1x default group radius aaa authorization default group radius aaa authorization config-commands # 802.1x Global Commands dot1x system-auth-control dot1x max-req dot1x timeout quiet-period dot1x timeout tx-period dot1x timeout re-authperiod dot1x re-authentication
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IOS ConfigurationPer-Port Commands
# IOS Per-port configuration dot1x port-control auto
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Client Supplicant Configuration

Windows XP SP1
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Supplicant Configuration
Network Connection Properties
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Network Interface Authentication Properties
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Authentication MethodPEAP Configuration
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Interface StatusDisconnected State
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Interface StatusConnected/Authenticating State
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Interface StatusAuth Successful/Connected State
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Troubleshooting
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Authentication Server Troubleshooting
Set logging in ACS to full detail Enable logging of passed authentications (disabled by default) Logs available in ACS GUI, but additional detailed information is available in logging directories
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Logging Detail Level Configuration
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General Logging Configuration
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Additional Logging File Directories
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CatOS Authenticator Troubleshooting
Enable 802.1x tracing on CatOS platforms

set trace dot1x <level> level is a detail level value between 015 15 will do a full packet dump! 10 is usually good enough for most troubleshooting Dont forget to disable tracing once you are done! set trace all 0
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Cisco IOS Authenticator Troubleshooting

Use the debug command like on Cisco IOS routers
debug dot1x <option> option can be: all: All 802.1x events authsm: The authenticator FSM backend: AAA Backend Communications besm: backend FSM events core: core 802.1x subsystem reauthsm: re-authentication FSM
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Windows XP/Windows 2000 Troubleshooting

Enable tracing and logging in the supplicant
netsh ras set tr * enable Enables supplicant tracing and logging Creates logging debug files in %systemRoot%/tracing Disable it with the command netsh ras set tr * disable
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Windows Troubleshooting Tracing Directory
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Windows Troubleshooting Tracing Files
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Examining the EAPOL Log

[1496] 16:30:35: ElMediaEventsHandler entered [1496] 16:30:35: ElMediaEventsHandler: Calling ElMediaSenseCallback [1496] 16:30:35: ElMediaSenseCallback: Entered [1496] 16:30:35: ElMediaSenseCallbackWorker: For interface (Intel(R) 82559 Fast Ethernet LAN on Motherboard), GUID ({0D7295D2-F5F1-4A62-A494AA3D4239CF49}), length of block = 94 [1496] 16:30:35: ElMediaSenseCallbackWorker: Callback for sense connect [1496] 16:30:36: ElIoCompletionRoutine called, 60 bytes xferred [1496] 16:30:36: ElReadCompletionRoutine entered, 60 bytes recvd [1496] 16:30:36: ProcessReceivedPacket entered, length = 60 [1496] 16:30:36: ProcessReceivedPacket: EAP_Packet [1496] 16:30:36: ProcessReceivedPacket: EAPOLSTATE_CONNECTING [1496] 16:30:36: TIMER: Restart PCB Time: 2097148 [1496] 16:30:36: FSMAcquired entered for port Intel(R) 82559 Fast Ethernet LAN on Motherboard - Packet Scheduler Miniport [1496] 16:30:36: TIMER: Restart PCB Time: 30
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[1496] 16:30:36: FSMAcquired entered for port Intel(R) 82559 Fast Ethernet LAN on Motherboard - Packet Scheduler Miniport [1496] 16:30:36: TIMER: Restart PCB Time: 30 [1496] 16:30:36: ElEapEnd entered [1496] 16:30:36: ElEapBegin entered [1496] 16:30:36: ElEapBegin done [1496] 16:30:36: ElEapWork: EapolPkt created at 00137008 [1496] 16:30:36: ElEapMakeMessage entered [1496] 16:30:36: ElParseIdentityString: Packet length 5 less than minimum 5 [1496] 16:30:36: ElGetIdentity: Userlogged, Prev !Machine auth [1496] 16:30:36: ElGetIdentity: Userlogged, <Maxauth, Prev !Machine auth: !MD5 [1496] 16:30:36: ElGetUserIdentity entered [1496] 16:30:36: ElGetEapUserInfo: Get value succeeded [1496] 16:30:36: ElGetEapUserInfo: Get value succeeded [1496] 16:30:36: ElGetUserIdentityOptimized: Got identity = ESELABS\Administrator [1496] 16:30:36: ElGetUserIdentity: ElGetUserIdentityOptimized got identity without user module intervention
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[1496] 16:30:36: ElGetUserIdentity completed with error 0 [1496] 16:30:36: ElGetIdentity: Userlogged, <Maxauth, Prev !Machine auth: No Error: User Auth fine [1496] 16:30:36: Identity sent out = ESELABS\Administrator [1496] 16:30:36: ElWriteToPort entered: Pkt Length = 32 [1496] 16:30:36: ElWriteToPort: pPCB = 0009FE78, RefCnt = 3 [1496] 16:30:36: ElWriteToInterface entered [1496] 16:30:36: ElWriteToInterface completed, RetCode = 0 [1496] 16:30:36: Setting state ACQUIRED for port Intel(R) 82559 Fast Ethernet LAN on Motherboard - Packet Scheduler Miniport [1496] 16:30:36: FSMAcquired completed for port Intel(R) 82559 Fast Ethernet LAN on Motherboard - Packet Scheduler Miniport [1496] 16:30:36: ProcessReceivedPacket: Reposting buffer on port {0D7295D2F5F1-4A62-A494-AA3D4239CF49} [1496] 16:30:36: ElReadFromPort entered [1496] 16:30:36: ElReadFromPort: pPCB = 0009FE78, RefCnt = 4
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[1496] 16:30:37: ProcessReceivedPacket entered, length = 1030 [1496] 16:30:37: ProcessReceivedPacket: EAP_Packet [1496] 16:30:37: ProcessReceivedPacket: EAPOLSTATE_AUTHENTICATING [1496] 16:30:37: TIMER: Restart PCB Time: 2097148 [1496] 16:30:37: FSMAuthenticating entered for port Intel(R) 82559 Fast Ethernet LAN on Motherboard - Packet Scheduler Miniport [1496] 16:30:37: TIMER: Restart PCB Time: 30 [1496] 16:30:37: ElEapWork: EapolPkt created at 00150308 [1496] 16:30:37: ElEapMakeMessage entered [1496] 16:30:37: ElMakeSupplicantMessage entered [1496] 16:30:37: EAPSTATE_Working [1496] 16:30:37: ElEapDllWork called for EAP Type 25 [1496] 16:30:37: EAP Dll returned Action=EAPACTION_Send [1496] 16:30:37: ElEapDllWork finished for EAP Type 25 with error 0 [1496] 16:30:37: ElWriteToPort entered: Pkt Length = 12 [1496] 16:30:37: ElWriteToPort: pPCB = 0009FE78, RefCnt = 3 [1496] 16:30:37: ElWriteToInterface entered [1496] 16:30:37: ElWriteToInterface completed, RetCode = 0
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[1496] 16:30:39: ConnectionStatusChanged completed [1496] 16:30:39: FSMAuthenticating completed for port Intel(R) 82559 Fast Ethernet LAN on Motherboard - Packet Scheduler Miniport [1496] 16:30:39: TIMER: Restart PCB Time: 2097148 [1496] 16:30:39: ElProcessEapSuccess: Got EAPCODE_Success [1496] 16:30:39: ElEapEnd entered [1496] 16:30:39: ElEapDllEnd called for EAP Index 1 [1496] 16:30:39: ElProcessEapSuccess: Authentication successful [1496] 16:30:39: FSMAuthenticated entered for port Intel(R) 82559 Fast Ethernet LAN on Motherboard - Packet Scheduler Miniport [1496] 16:30:39: ElEapEnd entered [1496] 16:30:39: FSMAuthenticated: Queued ElIPPnPWorker [1496] 16:30:39: Setting state AUTHENTICATED for port Intel(R) 82559 Fast Ethernet LAN on Motherboard - Packet Scheduler Miniport [1496] 16:30:39: FSMAuthenticated completed for port Intel(R) 82559 Fast Ethernet LAN on Motherboard - Packet Scheduler Miniport
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[1496] 16:30:39: ElZeroConfigNotify: Handle=(0), failcount=(0), lastauthtype=(0) [1496] 16:30:39: ElZeroConfigNotify: RpcCmdInterface failed with error 2 [1496] 16:30:39: ElProcessEapSuccess: ElZeroConfigNotify failed with error 2 [1496] 16:30:39: ElProcessEapSuccess: Called ElZeroConfigNotify with type=(5) [1496] 16:30:39: WZCNetmanConnectionStatusChanged: Entered [1496] 16:30:39: QueueEvent: CoCreateInstance succeeded [1496] 16:30:39: ConnectionStatusChanged completed [1496] 16:30:39: ProcessReceivedPacket: Reposting buffer on port {0D7295D2-F5F1-4A62-A494-AA3D4239CF49} [1496] 16:30:39: ElReadFromPort entered [1496] 16:30:39: ElReadFromPort: pPCB = 0009FE78, RefCnt = 3 [1496] 16:30:39: ProcessReceivedPacket: pPCB= 0009FE78, RefCnt = 3 [1496] 16:30:39: ProcessReceivedPacket exit [1940] 16:30:39: ElIPPnPWorker: DHCPHandlePnPEvent successful [1940] 16:30:39: Ip6RenewInterface: CreateFileW failed with error 2 [1940] 16:30:39: ElIPPnPWorker: Ip6RenewInterface returned error 2
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Examining the RASTLS Log

[1496] 16:30:36:119: PeapReadConnectionData [1496] 16:30:36:119: PeapReadUserData [1496] 16:30:36:119: RasEapGetInfo [1496] 16:30:37:301: EapPeapBegin [1496] 16:30:37:311: PeapReadConnectionData [1496] 16:30:37:311: PeapReadUserData [1496] 16:30:37:311: [1496] 16:30:37:311: EapTlsBegin(ESELABS\Administrator) [1496] 16:30:37:311: State change to Initial [1496] 16:30:37:311: EapTlsBegin: Detected 8021X authentication [1496] 16:30:37:311: EapTlsBegin: Detected PEAP authentication [1496] 16:30:37:311: MaxTLSMessageLength is now 16384 [1496] 16:30:37:311: EapPeapBegin done [1496] 16:30:37:311: EapPeapMakeMessage [1496] 16:30:37:311: EapPeapCMakeMessage [1496] 16:30:37:311: PEAP:PEAP_STATE_INITIAL [1496] 16:30:37:311: EapTlsCMakeMessage [1496] 16:30:37:311: EapTlsReset
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Examining the RASTLS log

[1496] 16:30:37:311: No Cert Store. Guest Access requested [1496] 16:30:37:311: No Cert Name. Guest access requested [1496] 16:30:37:311: Will validate server cert [1496] 16:30:37:311: MakeReplyMessage [1496] 16:30:37:311: SecurityContextFunction [1496] 16:30:37:311: InitializeSecurityContext returned 0x90312 [1496] 16:30:37:311: State change to SentHello [1496] 16:30:37:311: BuildPacket [1496] 16:30:37:311: << Sending Response (Code: 2) packet: Id: 2, Length: 80, Type: 13, TLS blob length: 70. Flags: L [1496] 16:30:37:311: EapPeapCMakeMessage done [1496] 16:30:37:311: EapPeapMakeMessage done [1496] 16:30:37:331: EapPeapMakeMessage [1496] 16:30:37:331: EapPeapCMakeMessage
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Whats Next?
The Future Directions of Identity-Based Networking
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Moving ForwardWork in Progress

Enhanced policy enforcement for better identity-based networking Increased integration into directory services Increased device support for identity networking Tighter integration into other Cisco solution sets
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Recommended Reading
Network Security Principles and Practices
ISBN: 1587050250
CCIE Security Exam Certification Guide

ISBN: 1587200651
CCIE Practical Studies: Security

ISBN: 1587051109 Available on-site at the Cisco Company Store
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Recommended Reading
Managing Cisco Network Security
ISBN: 1578701031
Cisco Secure Internet Security Solutions

ISBN: 1587050161
Designing Network Security, Second Ed.

ISBN: 1587051176 Available in Oct 2003 Available on-site at the Cisco Company Store
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Please Complete Your Evaluation Form

Session SEC-2005
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SEC-2005 8136_05_2003_c1

(Cisco) Deploying 802.1X For Lan Security (2003) (PPT)

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What are some of the threats discussed in the document?

What are some of the threats discussed in the document?

How does 802.1x authentication work?

How does 802.1x authentication work?

Deploying 802.

1x for LAN Security

2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Overview and Agenda

What We Wont Be Covering

AAA authentication on routers IPSec authentication

2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Threat Model Overview

2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Risk Assessment Potential Cost of External Threats

Keep the Outsiders Out

Easy Unauthorized Access

Unfortunately, This Works for ANYONE

Risk Assessment Potential Cost of Internal Threats

Keep the Insiders Honest

Unauthorized Use of the Network

2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Some Important Points on Authentication

Whats This Authorization Thing?

2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

An Operational Overview of Network Authentication

2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Port-Based Network Authentication

Applying the Authentication Model to the Network

2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Device Authentication and 802.1x

Great, I Know You Are My AAA Server

2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Wired Access Control Model

Client and Switch Talk 802.1x

Switch Speaks to Auth Server Using RADIUS

2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Wireless Access Control Model

2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Protocols and Mechanisms

2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Some IEEE Terminology

IEEE Terms Supplicant Authenticator Authentication Server

Normal People Terms Client Network Access Device AAA/RADIUS Server

2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

What Does It Do?

2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)

EAPOL (EAP over 802.1x) Frame Format

2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Different EAPOL Frame Types

EAPOL-Start EAPOL-Logoff EAP-Packet EAPOL-Key EAPOL-Encapsulated-ASF-Alert

2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

Current Prevalent Authentication Methods

2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

EAP-MD5 Challenge Response System

2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

EAP-MD5 Pros and Cons