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UN THE
INFLUENCE OF AUTHORITY
IN
MATTERS OF OPINION
I.OXDON rniXTKD «Y
:
8PCTTISW0ODE AND KEW-STIIKET

CO., SQI'AIIE
AND VARLlÛIIiST STREET
:
AN ESSAY
ON THE
INFLUENCE OF AUTHORITY
IN
MAITERS OF OPINION.
BY
GEORGE CORNEAVALL LEWIS, ESQ.
SECOyn EDITION.
LONDON
LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
1875.
AH rhjhts r':ierve>l.
6J3
V *V L. o.
\\
DEC 91955
10 2 9 2 21
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
ON TUE NATVKK OF AUTHORITY IN MATTERS OF OPINION.

8KCTI0.V PAGB
1. Distinction between matters of fact and matters of opinion . . . 1
2.
3.
Subject of the Essay :
Relation between this subject and logical science .....

authority in matters of opinion explained . . 2
5
CHAPTER H.
ON THE EXTENT OF OPINIONS FOUNDED UPON AUTHORITY.
Children derive their opinions from the authority of their parents

1.
2.
.'i.
ICxtent to which these opinions are modified in after-life
Disposition to follow the crowd in mattei-s of opinion .
....10
, .
. 7
8
4. Disposition to defer to the authority of others, arising from the habit of

holding opinions without remembering their grounds . . .11
5. Derivation of opinions from authority in matters of practice . . .13
CHAPTER HI.
ON THE MARKS OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY.
1.
2.
Elements of credibility in a witness to a fact. Distinction between
testimony and argument as to moral character
How far anonymous testimony may have weight
....
.... 15
16
3. Cases in which testimony is strengthened by special training 18
4. Distinction between testimony, argument, and authority 18
5.
G.
Comparative frequency of qualities which render a man a credible wit
ness, or an authority in matters of opinion
Qualifications of an authority in matters of opinion
.... 18
19
7. Fii-st qualification that a person must have studied the subject care^
:
fully in theory, or have had experience of it in practice . 19

8.
i>.
subject ...........
Second qualification that his mental powera must be adequate to the
Tiiird qualification :
:
lliat his moral feelings must be in a proper state

21
24
—
VI CONTENTS.
6KCTIOX PAGE
10. Process
determined ...........
bv which the existence of these
11. Additional indications of trustworthy authority

qualifications in
:
any person is
28
(1.) Agreement or consensus of competent judges . . . .29

12. (2.) Marks of imposture in professors of science . . . .35
13. (3.) The countries whose opinion is to he considered . . .41
14. The guides to opinion are chosen volimtarily . . . . .43
1 6. Supposed opposition between reason and authority . . . .44
CHAPTER IV.
ox THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PPaXCIPLE OF AUTHOKITT TO QUESTIONS
OF RELIGION.
1. Gradual progress to agreement in scientific matters . . . .46

2. All nations agree in recognising the existence of a God . . .46
3. All civilised nations agree in recognising some form of Christianity . 48
4. But they form or mode of Christianity
differ as to the . .48. .
5. Causes of the existence of numerous Christian churches and sects 49 .
C.
agreement ...........
The various Christian sects remain distinct, and do not tend to an
50
7.
8.
tian belief ...........
Attempts which have been made to bring about an agreement in Chris-
One portion of the Christian world makes the teaching of the true church
52
the standard of religious truth 63

9. Differences of opinion as to the marks of the true church .53. .
10. Differences of opinion as to the organs of the true church .58 . .
11.
Apostolic age ...........
Differences of opinion as to the tradition of true doctrines from the
60
12.
matters of faith ..........
Differences of opinion as to Fundamentals and Non-fundamentals, in
02
13.
the Hef/ulri Fidei ..........
Differences of opinion between Roman Catholics and Protestants as to
63
14.
matters of truth ..........
No Christian church or sect can lay claim to a paramount authority in
60
15.
10.
sect is limited to its own members .......
In the absence of a general agi-eemeut, the authority of each church or
General results as to church authority and private judgment

69
70 . .
Notes to Chapter IV 72
CHAPTER V.
ON TTIE rxnÎTT and proper PROVINCE OF AtTTHORITT.
1.
2.
Extent to
.........
which an independent opinion can be formed by each person
on scientific .'subjects
Deference due to the opinions of competent and experienced judges .
77
78
3.
tions ............
Expediency of being guided by the opinions of others in practical ques-
80
CONTENTS. vu
SKCTiON PAOR
4. Advantapre of pmfessional advice 81
adnsers 84
5. KuU'S
G. Orijriii
fur the sflectiou of professional
of the prejudices apiinst professional advice . ... 84
7.
8.
cular confession
Mode
..........
Voliiiitarv advice of friends upon domestic and private concerns. Auri-
of obtaiuiui; advice iu the piu'chase of goods . . . .87

85
9. Advice in joint deliberation 88

10. Deliberation relates to the future. Extent of our powers of prediction 91
11.
12.
guiding action ..........
The advice of competent judges assists in determining the future, and
The superstitious reject such advice, and seek to determine the future
98
13.
14.
by means of divination
Duty of counsellors to give honest advice
Marks of a trustworthy historian
...... 99
100
100
Note to Chapter V 107
CHAPTER yi.
ON THE IftTMBER OP THE PEBSONS COIIPETEXT TO GUIDE OTUSJO'S ON ANT BXJB-

JECT, AS COMPARED WITH THE NtTMBER OF THE REST OF THE COMMtTNITT.
1. The competent judges on each subject are comparatively few in number 110
2. The opinion of the body of the people on each subject is devoid of
authority 110
3. The authority of each competent judge is limited to his own class of
subjects 113
4. Everybody is a competent judge on some subject 115
5. No set of persons are competent judges on all subjects . . . . 115
G. The prevalence of an opinion is not a proof of its soundness . . . 116
7. Circumstances which give weight to a prevalent opinion . . . 118
8. A high degree of knowledge and virtue cannot be formed by the aggre-
gation of numerous individuals of ordinary qualities . . . 121
9. The value of proverbs as the expression of popular opinion . . . 122
10. Importance of numerical preponderance as a fact . . . . . 124
11. Its importance in political aHairs 125
12. In language
13. In style of composition
14.
and eloquence .......
But the popular taste is not the criterion of excellence in the arts .
126
126
128
15. The control of public opinion over individuals in matters of taste ought
to be exercised lenieutlj' 130
CHAPTER VII.
ON THE APPLICABILITY OP PRINCIPLE OF AFTHORITY TO THE DECISIONS

THT'^
OF POLITICAL BODIES.
1. In the decisions of political bodies opinions must be counted, and not

weighed # • • • ^"^^
2. Sketch of the origin and nature of political bodies . . . .132
—
VIU CONTENTS.
SECTION PAGB
3.
4.
Advantages and disadvantages of
And
and judicial bodies .
in legislative bodies
.........
. .
plui-ality
.
of
.
members in administrative
. . . . .139
136
5. Manner in which the decision of a political body is made 140 . . .
6. In administrative and judicial bodies unanimity is sometimes required,

but they generally decide by a majority 141
7. Legislative bodies always decide by a majority 142
8. The modes in which the majority of votes in a political body is deter-
9.
mined
Reason for decision
10. Defects of this mode
by a majority
of decision
....
........
in political bodies
143
145
147
—
11. Oirciunstances
........
which tend
and administrative bodies
12. Secondly, in legislative bodies
to counteract these defects first, injudicial
147
148
14. And
..........
13. It is expedient that a decision
acquiesced in
by a majority, when made, should be
that a political body, having adopted a measure, should not throw

. 152
the responsibility upon its advisers . . . . . . .153
......
15. Securities for right decision in the case of
by the majority of a constituent body
16. Contrivances
an election of a representative
adopted to modify the simple numerical principle in the

153
summation of votes :
(1.) Voting by composite units . . . . . . .158

17. (2.) Plurality of votes to certain members 159
18. The excesses of a sound principle ought to be counteracted . . . 162
Notes to Chapter VII 1(;U
CHAPTER VIII.
ON THE EELATION OF TliE PRIN^CIPLE OF ATJTHORITT TO THE DEMOCRATIC

PRINCIPLE, AND TO THE REPRESENTATIVE STSTEil OF GOVERNMENT.
1.
2.
The theory of
Special Fitness ..........
aristocratic government
Objections to this theory as applied to govermuent

is founded on the principle of
. . . .175
171
3. The numerical principle of government is controlled in various ways by

the principle of Special Fitness . . . . . . .179
4. Especially through the .-tystem of political representation . . . 183
5. The supposed ill efl'ects of the tyranny of the majority of the people 187 .
G. The representative system of government is founded on a compromise

between the Numerical Principle and the principle of Special Fit-
ness difficulty of arranging the terms of this compromise in each
;
individual case 191
Notes to Chapter VIII 193

COXTE^'TS. IX
CHAPTEIi IX.
ON THE PROPAGATION OF POUND OPINIONS, Bt THE CREATION OF

A TRUBTWOHTnT AUTHORITY.
BKCnOS TAGX
1. The chief pennanent influences for the authentication of opinions 107 . .
2. I. The civil <rovernmeut. iJuty of the state to encourajre truth and

discourage error, examined 198
3.
4.
The duty
upon
Power
its power ..........
of the state with respect to religious truth and error depends
of the state to promote religious truth by punishment . .

200
201
'
5. By reward . . . . .204
0. liy endowment 205
7. By public instruction . . . . . . . . . .211
8. And by a censorship of the press . . . . . . . .212
0.
means ............
The state cannot etlectually promote religious truth by any of these
213
10.
11. .........
Objections made to the neutrality of the state in religious questions
Answer to these objections
. 213
215
12.
.......
Power of the state to promote truth in secular matters by literary en-
dowments and public instruction 218
13.
14.
..........
Extent to which the government ought to attempt to influence opinion
in secular matters
Moral authority of the government and effect of its example . .
221
222
15. A government may countenance sound opinions by upholding good in-
stitutions
16. Censorship of the press in secular aflairs ...... 224
225
17. The qualitications of
18. II.
mas and degrees ..........
professional persons may be
Churches and ecclesiastical bodies. The influence of the heads of

authenticated by diplo-
227
each church is exercised over the members of that church exclu-

sively
19. Authentication of ministers of religion by ordination .... 228
229
20. III. Voluntary associations for
Their influence upon opinion
21. Universities and places of learning
........
political, scieutiflc, and literary piu'poses.
230
232
22. Political parties 233
— Origin and history of newspapers
23. IV. The periodical press.
24. Influence of newspapers upon opinion
25. The chief characteristic of newspapers
.......
is, that they are anonymous
. .
.
233
236
23(5
20. Keasons of this peculiarity. Its evil consequences, and their cor-
rectives 230
27. Reviews and literary journals. Transactions of learned societies.
Publications appearing in a series or
set. Encyclopaedias 245 . .
28. The powers udgment ought to be impartially exercised

of literary j 247 .
20.
is most important ..........
Classes of subjects upon which the general diffusion of soimd opinions
249
X CONTENTS.
OHAPTEE X.
Oy THE ABrSES OF THE PRIXCIPLE OF ATJTHORITT.

SECTION PAGE
1.
.........
Reasons for illustrating the
principle of authority
evils wliicli arise from the abuses of the
2.53
2. The reverence
cessive ............
for the authority of scientific teachera must not be ex-
25.3
3.
.......
Distinction between excessive reverence for authority and conscious
adoption of a defective philosophy 255
4.
of aged men...........
Distinction between opinions handed down from antiquity, and opinions
257
5. The
.........
chief question at present as to the authority of antiquity concerns
political institutions 259
6.
7.
Soimd
.......
legislative refonns are
thority of established institutions
impeded by opposite
Authority of parties and party leaders in politics. Its abuses

errors as to the au-
. .
2G4
265
8.
9.
10. Concluding remarks

......
Difference between the slow and rapid propagation of opinions
..........
Influence of numbers in deliberative bodies
. . 270
272
275
APPEXDIX.
ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ARISTOCKACT AND DEMOCRACY, AND ON THE
PROVINCE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.
1. Aristocracy is usually defined to be a government of the minority, and
democracy to be a government of the majority of the people 279 . .
2. The distinction between these two forms of government is a distinction,

not of kind, but of degree 280
3. Necessity of caution in laying
aristocratic and democmtic government
down
......
general propositions respecting
284
4. The
rendered political science uncertain .......
neglect of proper precautions in speculations upon government has
280
5.
6.
and ideal or speculative politics
Importance of treating these two branches of
.......
Province of political science. Its division into positive or descriptive,
political science separately

289
294
Errata.
P. .54, lino \i from foot, /or to extend read of extending.

P. 108, last line, /or septengintos read septiugentos.
ON
THE INFLUENCE OF AUTHOEITY

IN
MATTERS OF OPINION.
CHAPTER I.
ON THE NATURE OF AUTHORITY IN MATTERS OF OPINION.
§ 1 . As the ensuing Essay relates to matters of opinion, it will

be necessary for me, at the outset, without entering upon disputed
questions of mental philosophy, to explain briefly what portion of
the subjects of beliefis understood to be included under this
appellation, and what is the meaning of the generally received

distinction between matters of opinion and matters of fact a ;
distinction which, though not scientifically precise, is, with a

little explanation, sufficient!}' intelligible for the purposes of the
present inquiry, and which marks, with tolerable accuracy, a
distinction leading to important practical consequences.
By a Matter of F'act I understand anything of which we obtain
a conviction from our internal consciousness, or any individual
event or phenomenon which is the object of sensation. It is true
that even the simplest sensations involve some judgment: when
a witness reports that he saw an object of a certain shape and size,
or at a certain distance, he describes sometliing more than a mere
impression on his sense of sight, and his statement implies a
tlieoryand explanation of the bare phenomenon. When, however,
this judgment
is of so simple a kind as to become wholly uncon-
scious,and the interpretation of the appearances is a matter of

general agreement, the object of sensation may, for our present
purpose, be considered a fact. A fact, as so defined, must be
B
2 ON THE NATURE OF AUTHORITY [ch.
limited to individual sensible objects, and not extended to general

expressions or formulas, descriptive of classes of facts, or sequences
of phenomena, such as that the blood circulates, the sun attracts
the planets, and the like.* Propositions of this sort, though de-
scriptive of realities, and therefore, in one sense, of matters of fact,
relate to large classes of phenomena, which cannot be grasped by
a single sensation, which can only be determined by a long series
of observations, and are established by a process of intricate
reasoning.
Taken in this sense, matters of fact are decided by an appeal
to our own consciousness or sensation, or to the testimony, direct
or indirect, of the original and percipient witnesses. Doubts,
indeed, frequently arise as to the existence of a matter of fact, in
consequence of the diversity of the reports made by the original
witnesses, or the suspiciousness of their testimony.A matter of
fact may again be doubtful, in consequence of the different con-
structions which may be put upon admitted facts and appearances,
in a case of proof by (what is termed) circumstantial evidence.
Whenever such doubts exist they cannot be settled by a direct
appeal to testimony, and can only be resolved by reasoning ; in-
stances of which are afforded by the pleadings of lawyers and the
upon contested facts. When an indi-
disquisitions of historians
vidual doubted upon reasonable grounds, its existence
fact is
becomes a matter of opinion. The existence of such a fact, how-

ever, is not a general or scientific truth, but a question to be
decided by a consideration of the testimony of witnesses.
§ 2. Matters of Opinion, not being disputed questions of fact,
are general prepositions or theorems relating to laws of natiu'e or

mind, principles and rules of human conduct, future probabilities,
deductions from hypotheses, and the like, about whicli a doubt
may reasonably exist. All dou))tful questions, whether of specu-
lation or practice, are matters of opinion. With regard to
these, tlie ultimate source of our belief is always a process of
reasoning.^
The proper mode of conducting this process, of guarding
'
Soo Whcwell's Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, 13. I. c. i., B. VIII. c. i., and
B. XI. c. iii.
? I rememl;er it was with extreme difficulty that I could bring my master to

'
understand the meaning of the word opinion, or how a point could be disputable ;
because reason taught us to affirm or deny only whore we are certain, and beyond our
knowledge we cannot do either. So that controversies, wranglings, disputes, and
I.] IN MATTERS OF OPINION. 3
ajjînst errors of induction and dediietion, of tostin<^ the soundness

of existinjj; arguments, and of estulilisliing new truths by ratio-
cination ; is the province of logical science. The science of logic,
having and penetrating genius of
lieen created Ity the inventive
Aristotle, and afterwards systematised by the Schoolmen, was
enlarged by the sagacious divinations of Bacon, who indicated its
applications to natural philosophy, and freed it from much of the
needless subtlety of the schools. Since the publication of the
Novum Organon, the fundamental processes of thought connected
with reasoning have been explored by Locke, Leibnitz, and the
metaphysicians who have followed in their steps and of late :
years, logical science has, in this country, received much illus-

tration and improvement, from the writings of Archbishop
Whately, Dr. Whewell, and Mr. John Mill of whom, the iirst :
has improved the form of the scholastic logic, and adapted it to

the wants of modern students the second has expounded the ;
philosophy of induction, and of its subsidiary processes, as applied

to the whole field of the physical sciences while the latter has ;
determined the province of logic with precision, has established

its first principles on a sound basis, and has systematised the
methods of observation and deduction, for all the subjects of

scientific research.
Upon the field of logical science, as defined by the writers
whom I have referred to, I do not propose to encroach. The
positiveness in false or dubious propositions, are evils unknown among the Houyhn-
hnms.' — Swift.
The essential idea of npinum seems to be that it is a mutter about which doubt can
reasonably exist, as to wliich two persons can without absurdity think ditferently.
The existence of an object before the eyes of two persons would not be a matter of
opinion, nor would it l)c a matter of opinion that twice two are four. But when
testimony is divided, or uncertain, the existence of a fact may become doubtful, and,
therefore, a matter of opinion.For example, it may Ije a matter of opinion whether
therewas a war of Troy, whether Komnlus lived, who was Iho man in the iron mask,
who wrote Junius, &c. So the tendency of a law or form of government, or social
institution, the probability of a future event, the quality of an action or the character
of an historical personage, may
be a matter of opinion.
Any proposition, the contradictory of M'hich can be maintained with probability,
is a matter of opinion.
The distinction between matters of fact and matters of opinion is recognised by
Bacon, Advancement oj Learning, vol. ii. p. 42, ed. Montagu. See also Locke, Essay
on the Understanding, B. IV". c. x\-i. § 5 0« ; the Conduct oj the Understanding, § 24 ;
and Whately, Rhetoric, Part I. c. iii. § 3.

In the language of jurists, questions of fact are opposed to questions of law. Hence
the maxim of our law Do jure respondent judices, de facto
:
' jurati.' On this subject,
see Bentham On Judicial Evidence by Dmiiont, B. I. c. v.

B 2
—
4 ON THE NATUJ{E OF AUTHORITY [cii.
object of tbe following pages will be of a subordinate and more

limited kind. Without entering into any inquiry into tbe process
of reasoning, or attempting to throw any light upon scientific
method, it will concern a portion of the application of logical
science, which has often been discussed in a detached or frag-
mentary manner, but which seems of sufficient importance to
deserve a connected consideration.
It is fiimiliarly known, that, in our progress from childhood to
manhood, during the course of our education, and afterwards in
the business of life, our belief, both speculative and practical, is,
owing to our inability or unwillingness to investigate the subject
for ourselves, often determined by the opinions of others. That
the opinions of mankind should
so often be formed in this manner,
has been a matter of regret to many writers others again have :
enforced the duty of submitting oiu- convictions, in certain cases,

to the guidance of fit judges but all have admitted the wide
;
extent to which the derivation of opinions upon trust prevails,

and the desirableness that the choice of guides in these matters
should be regulated by a sound discretion. It is, therefore, pro-
posed to inquire how far our opinions may be properly influenced
by the mere authority^ of others, independently of our own con-
viction founded upon appropriate reasoning.
When any one forms an opinion on a question either of specu-
lation or practice, without any appropriate process of reasoning,
really or apparently leading to that conclusion, and without com-
pulsion or inducement of interest, but simply because some other
persons, whom lie believes to be competent judges on the matter,
entertain that opiiiion, he is said to have formed his opinion upon
authority.
If he is convinced by a legitimate process of reasoning — as by
'
This use of the word aidhorifi/ is in accordanco with its sense in ehissical writers.
One of the meaninp;s of aucforitas is explained hy Facciolati, as follows: '
Item pro
pondere ac n:ioniento quod habent res legitime, sapienter, ac prudenter constitutse, ut
sunt leges, decreti senatus, responsa prudentum, res praeclare gestae, sententiae clarorum
virorum.' — See Cic. Top. c. xix.
An auctor meant the originator or creator of anything. Hence A'irgil speaks of
the deified Augustus as '
Auctorom frugum tenipestat unique potcntem.' {Grnrg. i. 27 ;)
and Sallust says that unequal glory attends '

Scriptorem et auetorem rerum,' {Cat.
c. ii.)Hence any person who determines our belief, even as a witness, is called an
auctor. Thus Tacitus, in quoting Julius tJsesar as a witness with respect to the
former state of the Gauls, calls him .Summus auctorum,' {Germ. c. 28,) i.e.. tho
'
highest of authorities. As writers, jwrticularly of liistory, were the authorities for

facts, 'auctor' came to mean a writer. Hence Juvenal speaks of a preceptor of tho
I.] IN .MATFERS OF OPINION. 5
on the subject his opinion does not

stuiJyiuj^ a scientific treatise —
rest upon authority. Or if he adopts any opinion, either sincerely
or professedly, from motives of interest, or from fear of persecution,
he does not found Ids opinion upon authority. He who believes
upon authority, entertains the opinion simply because it is enter-
tained by a person who appears to him likely to think correccly
on the subject.
Whenever, in the course of tliis Essay, I speak of the Prin-
ciple of AutJcovity^ I shall understand the principle of adopting
the Itelief of others, on a matter of opinion, without reference to
the particular grounds on which that belief may rest.
In pursuing the incpdry, thus indicated in general terms, I

shall attempt, first, to describe the circumstances under which
opinions are usually derived from authorit}^, and next, to ascertain
the marks of sound or trustworthy authority in matters of opinion.
Having shown what are the best indications of the competent
judges in each subject, I shall iuiûire as to their numerical ratio
to the rest of the community, and shall afterwards offer some
remarks upon the application of the principle of authority to
questions of civil government. Lastly, I shall make some sugges-
tions upon the best means of creating a trustworthy authority in
matters of opinion, and of guarding against the abiises to which
tlie principle of autliority is liable.
§ 3. shown presently that a large proportion of the

It will be
general opinions of mankind are derived merely from authority,
and are entertained without any distinct understanding of the
evidence on which they rest, or the argumentative grounds by
which they are supported. Moreover, the advice of professional
persons, or other competent judges in any subject matter, has
great influence in questions of practice, both in public and private
life. An inquiry, therefore, into the legitimate use of the prin-
ciple of authority, and the consequences to which it tends, must
be admitted to relate to an important subject. The importance

of investigations in the field of logical science is undoubtedly far
superior, inasmucli as logic furnishes the idtimate tests for the
discovery of truth. The rules of logic, considered as an art, are a
g!iide to the mind in the conduct of all processes of independent
reasoning and intellectual investigation. A complete and philo-
sophical scheme of logic is, theiefore, a powerful instrument for
Roman youth heing required, Ut legal Iiistorias, iuictores noverit omnes, Tamqunni
'
—
ungues digitosqup suos.' VII. 231. Compare Quintilian, Inst. Oral. I. 8, § 18-21.
6 NATURE OF AUTHOllITi' IX MATTERS OF OPINION. [ch.
facilitating the confutation of existing errors, and the discovery of

new truths. It thus opens the way to the progressive advance-
ment of science all accurate knowledge must ultimately be de-
;
rived from sound methods of investigation. For all scientific

truths we must be indebted to original researches, carried on
according to logical rules. But when these truths have been dis-
covered by original inquirers, and received by competent judges,
it is chiefly by the influence of authority that they are accredited
and diffused. Now, it is true that when a person derives an

opinion from authority, the utmost he can hope is to adopt the
belief of those who, at the time, are the least likely to be in error.
If this opinion happens to be erroneous, the error is necessarily
shared by those who receive it upon mere trust, and without any
process of verification. For example, before the Copernican
system of the world was demonstrated, and accepted by all com-
petent astronomers, persons ignorant of astronomy naturally be-
lieved in the truth of the Ptolemaic system, which was received
among all astronomers of authority. Until men of science had,
by independent observation and reasoning, overthrown this erro-
neous doctrine, and established the true system of the world, the
opinions of all those who relied upon authority were necessarily
misled. It mvist be admitted that the formation of opinions by
authority can never (except by indirect means), produce any
increase or improvement of knowledge, or bring about the dis-.
covery of new truths. Its influence is at best confined to the

diffusion and extension of sound opinions, ivken they are in exist-
ence ;and the utmost that any rules on the subject can eflfect is
to ena])le an uninformed person to discern who are the most com-
petent judges of a question on which he is unable, from any
cause, to judge for himself. But it is, nevertheless, of paramount
importance that truth, and not error, should be accredited that ;
men, when they are led, should be led by safe guides and that ;
they should thus profit by those processes of reasoning and inves-

tigation, which have been carried on in accordance with logical
ndes, but which they are not able to verify for themselves.
With the view of arriving at the best means for the accom-
plishment of this desiral)le end, we shall proceed, first, to indicate
the extent of the opinions necessarily founded on authority, and
shall afterwards endeavour to trace the manner in which the prin-
ciple of autliurity can be so applied as to be most conducive to the
welfare of liiiman society.
j
II. EXTENT OF Ol'JNlUNS FOUNDED Ul'ON AUTHORITY.
CHAPTER II.
ON THE EXTENT OF THE OPINIONS FOUNDED UPON AUTHORITY.
§ 1. The opinions of all children and young persons are neces-

sarily derivedfrom tiieir parents and teachers, either without any J
knowledge, or with a very imperfect knowledge, of the grounds ^ §
on which they rest, or the objections to which they may be liable. ^ '
Even in cases where the reason is given with the opinion, the
belief of a child is often determined rather by the authority of
the teacher, than by the force of the argument. The subjects
connected with the relations of physical objects, as well as with
morals and religion, which are early presented to the mind of a
child, often involve considerations so numerous, so complex, and
80 remote from his limited experience, that a full explanation of
them would necessarily bewilder, rather than enlighten his under- j^^
standing. Much instruction, too, is conveyed to a child in Ian- § .^
guage, the full import of which he cannot comprehend. Words
are often counters, not money, to children. They counterfeit
processes of thought, rather than represent them. Much of the
benefit of such early tuition consists in its familiarising the child
with the names of ideas, which in its mind are still invested only . » .c
with a vague and shadowy form, and in habituating it to the use "^
^
of the great instrument of thought and discourse — language. ^ ^
Hence, in the education of children, a respect for the teacher as
teacher, and for his precepts, independently of his reasons for
them, is necessary and it is important to inculcate principles
:
and truths, even though the evidence of them is not, and cannot
be, fidly understood.'
-^ ^
In this manner a person grows up, having imbibed, almost
unconsciously, from his parents, teachers, and friends, the opinions
' Af I To7j iOfaiv iix^"' KaXajs rii' irtpl KaXwv ko.\ ZiKaiaiv KoX ZXws twv noKiTiKoii'
UKovtri^tvov iKavw'i. apxv "yaprh Urt, ndl €i rouro iâiVoiTO apKovirrttis, ovîv wpoaSfrjiTfl
rov 5i(iTi. 6 5« toioDtos tj txf ^ Ao/3ot hf apx,as j>aSius. — AhistoT. Et/i, Nic. i. 2.
— —
8 ON THE EXTENT OF THE OPINIONS [ch.
and sentiments on religion, morality, government, history, and

the relations of external nature, which are current in liis country,
at his time, among the persons under whose tuition he has been
placed, and with whom he has associated.'
This transmission of opinions from one generation to another,
in a lump, (like the succession of property per universitatem^
according to the expression of the Roman lawyers,) \^hich results
from family influences and the authority exercised by the parent
and the senior upon the mind of the child and the junior, doubt-
less contains a considerable alloy of evil, inasmuch as it perpetuates
error in combination witli truth, and affords no test for their dis-
crimination.^ But it is mainly this process which, in each com-
munity, connects tlie present with the past, and creates a unity
and continuity of national character and feeling. It is the insen-
sible and incessant propagation of opinions from the old to the
young within the circle of every family, and the uninquiring
adoption by the growing generation of the moral and intellectual
ideas of their immediate predecessors, which give to each nation
its distinctive attributes —
which enable it to maintain its charac-
teristic peculiarities, and which prevent the general level of
civilisation throughout the country from receding or becoming
irregular.^ The traditions of civilisation, if we may use the
expression, are, to a great extent, perpetuated by the implicit
faith of children in the authority of their parents.
§ 2. a man, when his reason becomes mature,
To what extent
and he emancipated from parental control, will modify tlie
is
opinions with which he has been imbued during his childhood,

depends upon the circumstances of his subsequent life.
If he belongs to the working-classes, he will probably, unless
his circumstances be peculiar, retain these opinions through life,
with little verification or enlargement. His opportunities for
observation will be principally confined to his relations with his
'
Ceteri primum ante tenentur adstricti, quani, quid csset optimum, judicare
potxierunt : doinde iufirmissimo tempore aetatis, aut obsocuti amico cuidam, aut un&
alicujus, quern primum audierunt, oratione capti, de rebus incogiiitis judicant, et ad
quamcunquo sunt disciplinam quasi tempestate delati, ad cam, tamquam ad saxum,
adhfcrescunt. Cickro, Acad. Prior. II. 3.
^ Ratio ilia humana, quam habemus, ex nudt&
tide et multo etiara casu, necnon ex
quas prinio hausimus, notlonibus, farrago qusedam eist et congeries.

piierilibus,
Bacon. Nov. Orrj. Lil). I. aph. 97. Compare Locke, On fhe Conduct of the Vnder-
standin(j. (5 41.
' Compare Comte. Cour.s de Philosophie Po.ii/ice, torn. iv. p. !>8\.
'
n.] FOUNDED UPON AUTHORITY. 9
employer, together with the manual operations in which he is

occupied. Owin;;- tu the cheapness of newspapers and tracts, he
may occasionally obtain inipertV-ct and partial glimpses into some
of the political questions of the day ; but he can rarely exercise
any independent judgment, except upon the matters with which
his lal>our makes liiiu personally conversant. This description
applies particularly to the agricultural labourers, who are not
within the influence of the more stirring life of towns. 'A great
part of mankind,' (says Locke,) 'are, by the natural and unalter-
able state of things in tliis world, and the constitution of human
affairs, unavi)idably given over to invincible ignorance of those
proofs on which others build, and whicii are necessary to establish
those opinions ; the greatest part of men, having much to do to
get the means of living, are not in a condition to look after those
of learned and laborious inquiries.'
With the middle classes, there is more opportimity for the
independent formation of opinions, by the acquirement of know-
ledge and observation of the world. Their time is, however, from
an early age, engrossed with their industrial pursuits. Their
daily business, combined with the care of their families, neces-
sarily consumes the chief part of their attention, and leaves few
opportunities for study and reflection. Such knowledge, however,
and fitness for judgment as springs from special skill, and from a
familiar acquaintance with the mechanical processes of certain
arts, trades, and manufactures, will often be found in this class.
With regard to the wealthier classes,'^ comprising a large
number of persons who have received a liberal education, and
have leisure and means for study, observation, investigation, and
reflection, the facilities for the independent formation of opinions
are greater. But many of these, particidarly the more energetic,
are occupied with business and the affairs of active life, which
either leave little time for reading and thought, or restrict it to
one subject. Others consume a large portion of their time in
amusements, or, at the most, in pursuits of mere curiosity and ;
still more acquiesce, without examination, in the opinions current
amongst their friends and associates. Even persons of a specu-

lative turn of mind, having leisure for speculation, confine their
thoughts to a limited class of sid)jects, and entertain on all other
subjects opinions mainly derived from autliority. For example,
'
Essay on the Undirstanding, E. IV. c. xx. § 2.
''
Sre the rcmarkfs of Lock*', ili. § C.
—
a raathematician takes his historical and political opinions, a

moral philosopher or an liistorian takes his physical opinions, on
trust. The difficulty and labour of original thouglit and investi-
gation are great the number of subjects is enormous every year
; ;
adds to the stock of known facts, both in history and physics.

The invention of printing and paper, by multiplying and per-
petuating the records of facts and opinions, has rendered it impos-
sible even for a professed student to explore more than certain
portions of the field of knowledge. Hence (as we shall show more
fully lower down '), the use of reviews, manuals, compendia, ency-
clopaedias, and other books of reference, which serve as guides to
the character of works, which contain results and opinions without
the scaffolding by which they were constructed, and abridge intel-
lectual labour.
§ 3. Men in general, with regard even to their opinions, are
influenced by the prevailing fashion. They fear singularity more
than error ; they accept numbers as the index of truth ; and they
follow the crowd.2 The dislike of labour, the fear of unpopularity,
the danger even of setting up individual opinion against esta-
blished convictions and the voice of the multitude, contribute to
strengthen tliis inclination. In the voting of political bodies, it
is necessary (as we shall see hereafter) to make tlie decision de-

pend upon the numerical majority. But although everybody is
aware that numbers are not a test of truth, yet many persons,
while they recognise this maxim in theory, violate it in practice,
and accept oiDinions simply because they are entertained by the
people at large. It may be added, that a state of doubt, or sus-
pense, as to opinions, particularly on important subjects, is painful
to most minds, and men are impatient of the delay, or unwilling
to make the exertion needful for the independent examination of
the evidence and arguments on both sides of a disputed question.
Hence, they are prone to cut the knot by accepting without veri-
fication, or with a very partial examination of its grounds, the
opinion of some person whom, for any reason, they look to with
respect, and whom they consider a competent judge in the matter.
This feeling is naturally much strengthened by a conviction which
'
CliJipter IX.
- Pendemvis toti ex alieiiis jndii'iis, el iil optitiuim nolu's viilttur, qnoil petitores
laudatorcsque ninltos liabit, noii id, quod laiKl.indiim pcti'iuliinKHiP est. Nee riain
boDum ac nialani per so a-stiniarons, M-d furbi vi'stigiorimi, in quibus nulla sunt re-
deuntiuni. Senkca dc Ot. S<qnent.c. xxviii.
—
n.l FOUNDED TPON AUTIIOKITY. 11
the modesty and candour of most persons will suggest to them

viz., that if they do their best to form an independent
judgment,
they are not more likely to be right than other persons who have
previoufily examined the subject, and whose opinions are known.
§ 4. There is a further motive which induces us to rely upon

the judgment of persons whom we believe to have previously
examined a subject with care and attention, and to be competent
to form a sound opinion upon it. Even if we have, at some
former time, gone through a process of study and examination,
and have arrived at a given conclusion, the reasons for that con-
clusion do not always remain present to our mind. We may hold
the opinion, rather upon the recollection of our having once
ascertained it to be well grounded, than from a present perception
of its grounds. ' I confess, (says Locke,) in the opinions men
have, and tirraly stick to, in the world, their assent is not always
from an actual view of the leasons that at first prevailed with
them it being in many cases almost impossible, and in most very
;
hard, even for those who have very admirable memories, to retain
all the proofs which, upon a due examination, made them embrace
that side of the question. It suffices that they have once with
care and fairness sifted the matter as far as they could, and that
they have searched into all the particulars that they could imagine
to give any light to the question, and with the best of their skill
cast up the account upon the whole evidence and thus, having
;
once found on which side the probability appeared to them, after

as full and exact an inquiry as they can make, they lay up the
conclusion in their memories as a truth they have discovered ;
and for the future they remain satisfied with the testimony of
their memories, that this is the opinion that, by the proofs they
have once seen of it, deserves such a degree of their assent as they
aflford it. that the greatest part of men are capable of
This is all
doing in regidating their opinions and judgments unless a man ;
will exact of them either to retain distinctly in their memories all

the proofs concerning any probable truth, and that, too, in the
same order and regular deduction of consequences in which they
have formerly placed or seen them, wliicli sometimes is enough to
till a large volume on one single question or else they must re-
;
quire a man, for every opinion that he embraces, every day to

examine the proofs, both which are impossible. It is luiavoid-
able, therefore, that the memory be relied on in the case, and
that men be persuaded of several opinions, whereof tlie proofs ai'e
not actually in their thoughts — nay, which perhaps they are not
able actually to recal. Without this, the greatest part of men
must be either very sceptics, or change every moment, and yield
themselves up to whoever, having lately studied the question, offers
them arguments, wliich, for want of memory, they are not able
presently to answer. '
^
As is very clearly explained in the preceding passage of Locke,

oiu: belief in amatter of opinion often rests upon our memory of
an investigation which we have formerly made we rely on a pro- ;
cess of reasoning which we remember that we went through, though

we cannot now recollect its several steps, and only recal its final
result we know that we had once sufficient reasons for the opinion,
:
though the reasons themselves are no longer in our thoughts so ;
that we believe, as it were, upon our own authority ; we refer to

a foregone process of inquiry, as a ground of present belief, in the
faith that it was adequately performed, but without feeling the
force of the reasons by which oiu" mind was originally satisfied. If
men did not thus back upon their own authority if they did
fall ;
not for a time hold to an opinion in the confidence that their pre-
vious assent to it had been founded on adequate reasons, though
these reasons may have faded from their memory, they would, as
Locke truly remarks, be perpetually floating about in doubt, or
they would be at the mercy of any person who had a readier and
more retentive memory than themselves, or who happened from
accidental circumstances to have mastered the arguments on one
side of the question. There is one class of cases in particular,
which may be referred to as illustrating our habit of entertaining
opinions without any accurate memory of their grounds. This is,
the estimates whicli we form of the characters of persons either
in private or public life; our judgment of a man's character is
derived from observing a number of successive acts, forming in
the aggregate his general course of conduct. Now in proportion
as our opportunities for observâtion are multiplied, our judgment
is likely to be correct ; but the f;icts from which our ultimate
opinion is collected are so numerous,
and often so trivial in tliem-
selves, thathowever sound the opinion may be, a large part of
them necessarily soon vanisli from the memory.
Being thus familiarised witli the habit of entertaining an
opinion without any present consciousness of its grounds, and from
' On the f'tiffrrsftnitlinq. B. IV. c. xvi. §!; 1 and 2.

II.] FOUNDED UPON AUTHOIilTY. 13
a more remembrance of a process of investigation which we for-

merly went throu^'h, it is easy to transfer this orijîn of ])elief to
another j)erson, and to accept an opinion because that other per-
son, (whom, moreover, we believe to be more competent to judge
in tlie matter than ourselves) has gone througli a similar process
of investigation. Being accustomed to treat his former self as a
sort of (liter erjo^ and practically to divide his own identity, a man
can easily apply the same mode of reference to another person.
At all events, such a ground of belief is quite legitimate until we
are able- to examine the questiou for ourselves and is far prefer-
;
able to the alternative of a temporary suspension of belief, (which

in practical matters may tend to serious evils,) or subjection to a
sophistical advocate whose business it is to present one side of the
case in a favourable point of view.
§ 5. In the preceding remarks, we have had chiefly in view
those general opinions whicli are termed speculative
and which, ;
although they in fact ultimately determine men's conduct, yet

have not an immediate bearing upon practice. The extensive
department of Practice, however, also involves a constant succes-
sion of questions which cause a man to hesitate as to the course
to be pursued, which give rise to diversity of opinions, and
require the interference of a competent judge for their solution.
In many of the affairs of private life, it is customary to follow the
advice of professional and otlier persons having had an appropriate
training and peculiar experience in the subject matter. Thus a
physician is consulted in questions of health, a lawyer in legal
questions, an architect or engineer in questions of building, a
gardener in (juestions of horticulture, a sailor in questions of
navigation, and the like. There is likewise frequent occasion in
the administration of justice, and the transaction of public
business, for appealing to the opinion of persons of professional
and special knowledge. In practical atfairs, too, many opinions
are formed upon authority of the civil government, of public
tlie
bodies and persona in conspicuous and respousiljle positions, of the

heads of churches and religious bodies, of universities, academies,
and places of learning, and of leaders of parties, and other volun-
tary associations.
For the present, we merely indicate these sources of authority,
as influencing the opinions of numerous persons and we merely :
point out, in general terms, the extent of the opinions accepted

upon trust, and formed ^vithout independent investigation, or a
14 EXTENT OF OPINIONS FOUNDED UPON AUTHORITY. [ch.
knowledge of the grounds on which they rest. We shall now

attempt to distinguish the cases in which this mode of forming
opinions is properly applicable, and thus to determine the proper
province of authority. As a first step in this inquiry, it will be
necessary to consider what are the marks by which trustworthy
authority in matters of opinion may be recognised, and what are
the qualifications of a competent guide in questions of speculative
truth and practical conduct.
— ;
in.] ON THK MARKS OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 15
CHAPTER III.
ON THE MARKS OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY.
§ 1. In the first chapter, we adverted to tlie received distinc-

tion between matters of fact and matters of opinion ; and we
showed that, although this distinction may be wanting in scientific
precision, it nevertheless classifies the objects of belief in a manner
suitable to the purposes of this Essay. Before, therefore, we pro-
ceed to enumerate the marks of trustworthy authority in matters
of opinion, it will be convenient to ascertain the marks of trust-
worthy testimony in matters of fact, and to compare the qualifi-
cations which render a person a credible witness with those which
give weight to a person's opinion, as such, independently of his
reasons.
The credibility of a witness to a fact seems to depend mainly
on the four following conditions viz. :
1. That the fact fell within the range of his senses.
2. That he observed or attended to it.
3. That he possesses a fair amount of intelligence and
memory.
4. That he is free from any sinister or misleading interest
or if not, that he is a person of veracity.
If a person was present at any event, so as to see or hear it
ifhe availed himself of his opportunity, so as to take note of what
passed if he has sufficient mental capacity to give an accurate
;
report of the occurrence ; and if he is not influenced by personal

favour, or dislike, or fear, or the hope of gain, to misreport the
fact ; or if, notwithstanding such influence, his o^vn conscience
and moral or religious principle, or the fear of public opinion,
deters him from mendacity, such a person is a credible witness.
Upon considering these conditions for veracious testimony, we
see that, with respect to statements of fact, everything depends
on the som-ce from wliich they emanate. They rest entirely on
:
16 ON THE MARKS OF [ch.
the credit due to known or assignable witnesses. But with argu-

ments it is different. They have a probative force quite indepen-
dent of the person by whom they are invented or propounded.
They depend on the relation of premises and conclusion, of ante-
cedent and consequent. For the truth of his premises the author
of an argument may be personally responsible : but the sequence
of his conclusion is a matter quite independent of his individual
veracity. I-iOgic, tlierefore, as a science, or art, of reasoning, has
no concern with moral cliaracter all arguments, as arguments, ;
and reduced to their bare logical elements, are equally conclusive,

whatever may be the source from which they proceed. Thus, in
judicial proceedings, an advocate may argue with equal force on
either side of a question, though without any personal conviction
on the subject. He may handle arguments (as a fencer handles
his sword) with the skill of a practised disputant, regarding them
merely as instruments for the attainment of his end, but without
making himself responsible for the soundness of his conclusions.*
So a person may, as a rhetorical exercise, or for the purpose of
eliciting the truth by the juxta-position of conflicting views,
compose an argument on opposite sides of a question. Examples
of this species of composition are afforded by all writings in the
form of a controversial dialogue, such as the dialogues of Plato
and Cicero and the Minute Philosopher of Berkeley. A person
who produces an argument, produces something which can be
judged without reference to himself, and which is not necessarily
either confirmed or enfeebled by his individual qualities or cir-
cumstances. A new demonstration of a mathematical problem
would in no way depend on the character of its inventor. But
the witness to a fact can only depose truly to that fact he can- ;
not, like the arguer, choose his ground hypothetically and the ;
credibility of his testimony depends solely on his own personal

circumstances and moral character.
§ 2. Anonymous testimony to a matter of fact, is therefore
wholly devoid of weight ; unless, indeed, there be circumstances
' '
.Sir Jiimcs Johnston li:ippciieJ to say that lie paid no rcganl to arguments of
counsol at the bar of the Hotise of Commons, because they were paid for speaking,
Johnson :
" Nay, sir, argument is argument. You cannot lielp paying regard to their
arguments, they are good. If it were testimony, you miglit disregaj'd it, if you
if
knew were purcliased. Tliere is a beautiful imago in Uacon upon this subject
that it
'Testimony is like an arrow shot from a long-bow the force of it depends on the —
strength of the hand that draws it; argnment is like an arrow from a cross-bow,
which has great force though shot by a child.'
" '
— BoswKix's Juh)ison„vo\. viii. p. 281.
rii.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 17
which render it prohaMe that a trustworthy witness lias adequate

motives for coiicealinent, or extraneous circumstances may support
and accredit a statement, whicli, left to itself, would fall to the
ground.
Thus an anonymous communication may put a man on his
guard, or may induce him to make inquiries in a certain direc-
tion, when it appears probable from the contents of the communi-
cation, or from other circumstances, that it may proceed from
some quarter in which secrecy is rendered inevitable by a powerful

interest. Such was the letter to Lord Monteagle concerning the
(iunpowder Plot ; such are threatening letters, or letters giving
j)rivate information respecting the conduct of individuals, in a
public or private capacity. happens that impor-
Occasionally, it
tant suggestions are conveyed in this manner; but,

for the most
part, information given anonymously turns out, on investigation,
to be utterly worthless. An anonymous work, too, may some-
times exhibit internal evidence of truth ; that is, theremay be
certain marks in the writing which give it an air of veracity,
though the author may have deemed it prudent to withhold his
name from the public. It is in this manner that anonymous
statements of facts in newspapers are authenticated the periodical :
appearance of the newspaper and the character which its manage-

ment may have acquired for correctness of intelligence, serving as
guarantees for the truth of its statements.* Statements in an
anonymous pvd)lication may likewise acquire credibility from
their remaining uncontradicted by persons who have an interest
in contradicting them, and are acquainted with the facts of the
case. It may may be anonymous, from the
be added that a work
loss of the author's name, though its original publication may not
have been anonymous. For instance, the Acts of the Apostles,

and many chronicles of the middle ages, are now anonymous,
though there is no reason to suppose that the authors concealed
their names from their contemporaries.
—
With these exceptions which are rather apparent than real
— it is essential to testimony that we sliould know the vjitness as
well as the fact^ and be able to estimate his individual qualifica-

tions, as a testifier or relator. Whereas, in the case of an argu-
ment, its conclusiveness, considered without reference to the truth
of its premises, and judged merely by logical rules, is wholly
independent of its author.
' Seo this subject further pursued in Chapter IX.
C
—
18 ON THK MARKS OF [ch.
This independence of an argument with respect to the cha-

racter of its author, implies, however, both that its inferential
force thoroughly understood, and that the truth of its premises
is
is conceded. Whenever this is not the case, the character of the

person who advances the argument is a most material considera-
tion ; and it is to cases of this sort that our present inquiry
relates — that is where an opinion is accepted out
to say, to cases
of confidence in the person who holds it, and without any full
comprehension of its grounds.
§ 3. It may be added that for all purposes of philosophical
observation, a knowledge of the proper science, and a peculiar
training of the senses, are requisite, and therefore that a witness
who is far more credible than one
possesses these qualifications
who is For example, a scientific naturalist
destitute of them.
who reports that he has seen an undescribed animal or vegetable
in a remote country, is far less likely to be mistaken than a
common traveller, ignorant of natural history. A skilled witness
of this sort may
be considered, in a certain sense, as a ivitness of
authority, inasmuch as his previous study and habits of observa-
tion give a peculiar weight to his report of the phenomenon.
§ 4. The distinction between testimony, argument, and autho-
rity, may be briefly summed up thus :
In questions of testimony, I believe a matter of fact, because

the witness believes it.
In questions of argument, I believe the conclusion to be

true, because it is proved by reasons satisfactory to my
\mderstauding.
In questions of authority, I believe a matter of opinion, be-
cause it is believed by a person whom I consider a com-
petent judge of the question.
§ 5. Now, on looking at the qualities which render anyone a
credible witness to a matter of fact, we may remark that they are
of common occurrence. For testimony, nothing further is in
general required than opportunity of observation, ordinary atten-
tion and intelligence, and veracity.Almost every person of sound
mind, who has reached a certain age, is a credible witness as to
matters which he has observed, and as to which he has no imme-
diate interest in deception or concealment.' F'or purposes of
'
For the administration of justice, it is important that there should be some
recognised tests of the credibility of \ritncsses to facts in dispute before the court. In
almost all systems of judicial procwlure, an attempt has been made to lay down
III.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 19
scieiitiHc ubstM-vation, indeed, (as has lêen remarked,) a certain

skilland practice beyond that possessed by ordinary persons is
requisite ]»ut when this has been acquired, no extraordinary
;
(jualifications are ne<'ded.

The qualities which render a person a competent authority in
matters of opinion are of rarer occurrence. Many of them are,
separately, not frequent; and the combination of them in the
same individual is necessarily more imconimon a person whose ;
testimony to a fact would be unimpeachable, might be utterly

devoid of authority as a gûide of opinion. Besides, a person who
is a credible witness for one matter of fact, is equally credible for
all others which may fall under his observation ; whereas (as we
sliall .see hereafter) no man is eqjially competent as a guide of
opinion in all subjects, and, in general, the authority of each
person is, compared with the sum
as total of human affairs, con-
fined within a narrow range.
§ 6. The first fûalification is, that a person should have de-
voted much study and thought to the subject-matter, if it be
merely speculative and that if it be practical, he should also
;
have had adequate experience respecting it.

Secondly, his mental powers must be equal to the task of
comprehending the subject, and they must be of the sort fitted
to it.
Thirdly, he ought to be exempt, as far as possible, from per-

sonal interest in the matter or, if he be not exempt, his honesty
;
and integi-ity ought to be such as to afford a reasonable security

against the perversion of his opinions by views of his individual
advantage.
The three qualifications
§ 7. just stated may now be examined
with somewhat more of detail.
I. If the subject be extensive — if it be one of the great depart-
ments into which human knowledge is divided a careful study —
of it, continued for several years, or even for a large part of a life,
combined with frequent meditation, and, if possible, personal
ol)servation, is requisite in order to enable a man to understand it
Thus, in some cases, the concurrent testimony

inflexible leg;il rules on this suLjcct.
of two witnesses to the same
has been rendered necessary; the evidence of persons
fact
standing in a near degree of affinity to one of the parties, or having a pecuniary
interest in the cause, has been excluded. But experience has shown that, however
useful maxims of this sort may be as guiding the discretion of the court in weighing
the credibility of witnesses, the entire exclusion of evidence on such grounds obstructs
the adnlini^t^ltion of justice.
C 2
thoroughly and to treat it with a souud and comprehensive judg-

ment. All the great luminaries of science, whether mathematical,
physical, metaphysical, ethical, or political, have fulfilled this
condition. None of them would have acquired the authority,
which their opinions, as such, independently of their reasons,
possess, if they had not applied all their mental faculties during
a large part of their lives to the subjects on which they wrote.
The extent and complexity of the more important departments
of science are so great, that no person, however penetrating his
intellect, can master any of them without years of patient study
and Each science involves the consideration of a vast
reflection.
number of particular facts and phenomena, which the mind can
only apprehend by passing uver them in succession, and examining
them separately. In order that the foundations of a science
should be duly laid, and its superstructure raised and enlarged,
this process must be frequently repeated, either for parts or for
the whole. The institution of proper experiments, and the veri-
fication of the experiments of others, are likewise often slow and
delicate processes though they are powerful aids, of which the
;
physical sciences enjoy the exclusive use. In the moral sciences,

new facts, and combinations of facts, are constantly presenting
themselves but the observation of these, and their verification,
;
together with the subsequent elimination of such concomitant

phenomena as do not properly enter into the problem, require
patient and sustained attention on the part of the scientific
inquirer.
If the subject be one, not of mere speculation, but of know-
ledge to be applied in practice, a further condition is requisite.
Not only must the guide of ojiinion have studied the subject
theoretically, not only must he, if a lawyer, for example, have
rendered himself familiar with the system uf law, if a physician,
have learned the science of medicine, but lie must have practised
it he must have acquired the ability of applying this theoretical
;
knowledge to actual cases, which experience alone can confer. In

order that a person should be eminent in a learned profession, it
is necessary that he should combine a knowledge of its principles,

with that judgment, tact, dexterity, and promptitude of applying
them to actual cases, which are derived from habits of practice.
The like may be said of persons conversant in the constructive
arts, as architects and engineers, of the military nnd naval ser-
vices, of agriculturists, gardeners, manufacturers of different sorts.
III.] THUSTWORTHY .AT TIIORITY. 21
&c. In onlt-r tliat may

sumid advice with respect to
tlwv jîvi-
any practical question lielonîng to tlieir own department, it is

necessary that they should combine actual experience with abstract
knowledfê. In some cases, that experience implies even manual
skill, which can only be acquired by practice. For example, a
surgeon would not be a competent judji;e on a question of practical
suriêry, unless his judûu-nt were assisted and corrected l)y actual
manipuhition of his instruments. In like manner, a person cannot
be a competent jndge of works of art, such as statues, pictures,
coins, and eni^ravings ; or of articles of trade, as horses, wines,
plate, c^c, without practical observation and experience. In these
cases, a certain training of the sight is necessary, analogous to the
training of the hands and limbs in a mechanical employment or
trade requiring ])odily dexterity. The senses can be educated so
as to discern marks which are invisible to the unpractised ob-
server. There are sliglit indicia, which guide the judgment of the
man of experience, and which no merely theoretical teaching can
enable a person to detect. The occupation of the hunter or the
an actual observation of the habits of the
fisher, again, recjuires
animals to l)e caught, in order to guide the judgment. In this

minor species of warfare, a practical knowledge of the probable
movements of the enemy, and of the best means of diverting or
lulling his attention, of falling on him unawares, and of over-
whelming him with a superior force, is as necessary, for success,
as in naval or military tactics. A similar practical knowledge is
a necessary qualification for tluise who are entrusted with tlie care
and training of animals, as shepherds, horsebreakers, &c. For
purposes of scientific observation, a training of the senses is like-
wise necessary. A scientific observer must be not only familiar
with the terminology of his science, and be able to apply its tech-
nical terms readily to tlie proper objects, but he ought likewise
to have acquired that delicacy, rapidity, and correctness of discern-
ment which the habit of observation, combined with knowledge,
can alone confer.'
§ 8. II. In order that a person should originate sound opinions
on a subject of speculation and science, he ought not merely to
have devoted a long time to the assiduous study and contempla-
tion of the subject, but his mental powers ought to be superior to
the average. His mind ought to be more wide-ranging and far-
'
See this subject well explained by Dr. Wliowull, Philos. of Ltd. Sciences, B. XII.
c. ii. §§ 26, 27.
:
22 ON THE ]\IARKS OF [en.
seeing. He ought to be able to take a comprehensive or synop-

tical view of an extensive subject, and also to trace the remote
consequences of an insulated principle. That high degree of
intellectual power, which we call genius, and which the ancients
attributed to the inspiration of the gods, is in itself inexplicable,
and can only be judged by its effects. But some ray of that light
is requisite in order to enable a person to be classed among the
original teachers and guides of mankind.
Moreover, a man ought, in order to acquire authority as an
inventor in matters of speculation, not merely to be superior in
point of intellect to the average of men, but he ought also to
possess the peculiar mental qualities which the subject demands.
For example, in order to be pre-eminent in mathematical science,
it is not sufficient for him to possess the faculties which fit him
for the observation of outward nature. Nor will he be enabled to

excel in speculation by powers which fit him exclusively for the
solution of practical questions and the actual business of life.
And, indeed, a person may be qualified to shine in one depart-
ment or branch of a science, who has no aptitude for other portions
of the same subject. As Pope expresses it in his Essay on
Criticism
Oue science only will one genius fit,
So vast is art, so narrow human wit.

Not only bounded to peculiar arts,
But oft in those confined to single parts.
(v. 60-63.)
Such eminence of intellectual power as enables a person to

discover and establish important principles in the physical and
moral world is of rare occurrence, and it is not necessary to qualify
one who has studied a subject, to comprehend the views and
reasonings of others, and to form a competent judgment upon
their soundness. Having fulfilled the previous condition of study
and reflection, a person of fair capacity may accredit speculative
opinions, and serve as a safe guide to others in his capacity of a
discriminating judge, although he may not be able to lead them
on as an inventor. Such a person may be able to separate truth
from error among existing opinions, though he might not be able
to discover the truth, if imknown, and proclaim it to the world.
Or he may be able to arrange and systematise existing knowledge ;
to expound it with perspiciuty to improve subordinate parts of

;
a science, and to correct errors in accessories, without attempting

to grapple with fundamental questions.
;
III.] TIU'STWoIMUY AITHORITY. 23
For practice aiâiii, cmiiU'nt intellectual superiority is not

essential and experienct,' altini", couiUiiied with stu(l\% if there be
;
a fair amount of ability, will stiffice. A. huge number of the

jxMsons practising the learned professions are justly considered as
safe and prudent guides in the subjects with which they are con-
versant, although their general mental powers may not be greatly
superior to those of the mijority of the educated classes in their
own country. The same may be said of sailors, architects, en-
gineers, and otlur classes of persons having a special training and
aptitude for judnnient with respect to tlieir own sidyect In each
profession, however, eminence can only be attained by remarkable
ability, fitting its possessor for the peculiar department of practice
which l)e As opposed to unprofessional men generally,
has chosen.
the judgment of any professional man, whatever may be his
natural talents, is of weight but among men of the same profes-
;
sion, the opinion of those who are peculiarly fitted by nature, in

addition to the advantages of experience, is that which is most
highly valued.
not sufficient for success in practice that a person should
It is
have mastered a science, and should comprehend its theory or ;
even that he should attempt to apply its ndes to actual cases. A

certain dexterity and aptitude for the application of theory to
practice is Not every man who has studied a system of
requisite.
rhetoric, and made some speeches, can become a successful orator
not every man who has studied law and medicine, and attended to
the application of his knowledge, can be a good practising lawyer
or physician. But, on the other hand, mere practical aptitude
can never enable a man to practise a profession with success, un-
less he is well grounded in its principles. By dexterity, and a
sort of legerdemain, he may conceal his defects, and divert atten-
tion from his weak points but he never can be permanently
;
successful. The great practitioners, whether in war, politics, law,

medicine, the fine arts, or any other department of applied know-
ledge, have all combined a careful study of principles, and patient
observation, with practical genius. Practicians, who are ignorant
of the principles of their profession or art, instead of acting
according to general maxims, of which they understand the
grounds, steer their course (and sometimes merely grope their
way) by means of analogies that is to say, they argue from one
;
case or instance to another, without being able to bring both of

them under one general rule or premise. The practical man, who
;
24 ON THE MAKKS OF [cii.
has studied the theory of the subject iu which he is employed,

combines that tact which results from experience, with the know-
ledge of general principles. He is not only imbued with the
theory, but he has also learned to apply it in practice, and he has
acquired the facility, promptitude, correctness, and confidence of
judgment, which result from habit and experience in the practical
application of a sound theory in the use of an art founded upon
;
a matured science.'
§ 9. III. The third qualification for rendering a person an
authority in matters of opinion, adverted to above, is honesty
the absence of personal interests likely to deprave his judgment,
or an integrity sufficient to overcome such influences.
Even if a man has devoted much time and attention to the
study of a subject, and is thoroughly conversant with its theory
and practice ; if his intellect is powerful, and he possesses the kind
of ability suited to the subject ; still it is fui'ther necessary, in
order that his authority should be trustworthy, that he should be
exempt from the operation of any misleading interest, or, at least,
be proof against its influence.
Exemption from such misleading interest, with respect to an

opinion, may be owing to the nature of the subject. For example,
if the question relate to the mathematical or physical sciences,
and have no close and immediate bearing on the concerns of life,
it is not likely that the affections or desires should bias the mind
in regard to it,^ In questions of this sort, it is mainly the ardour
of contention, the desire of gaining an argumentative victory over
an antagonist, the dislike of a confession of error, or sometimes
the jealousy of a rival or a superior, which can blind the judgment.
The exemption may likewise arise from the circumstances of the
individual. A subject which has a direct bearing on the interests
of one person may have no connection, or only a remote connection,
with the interests of another. It is universally admitted that no
man ought to be a judge in his own case. But, if the case were
not his own, his competency to form a judgment upon it might be
indisputable. So, if any political measure be proposed which
affects the interests of a profession, it may liappen that persons
belonging to that profession, though peculiarly competent to form
'
rompare Mill's St/Ktcm of Logic. B. VI. c. xi.
^ Crodiliile pst illos pariter vitiisque locisque

Altius liiinianis exsoruisse caput,
says Ovid, in speaking of astrononiors.
;
111.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHoKIl Y. 2o
an opinion respecting it,on account of tlieir experience and know-

U'lige, art" disqiialitied on account of the prolnibk- bias of their
judgment by personal considerations ; and that the requisite
iii/lifference is only to }>e fojuid among thosewho do not belong
to the profession. Such out-lying persons may ]:)e the only impar-
tial judges in the matter.
Even, however, if personal interests should tend to obscure or
distort the judgment, that tendency may be resisted by a con-
sciousness of the natural bias, and a strength of moral principle
sufficient to overcome it. A knowledge of the character of parti-
cular persons may induce us to rely on their integrity, and to
reckon on their resistance to such misleading influences. But as
such virtue and strength of purpose is rare, its absence must be
presumed until it is known or jjroved to be present.
been stated above, that the qualities which render a
It has
man a trustwortliy autliority in matters of opinion, are much
rarer than those which render a man a credible witness in matters
of fact. Accordingly, the honesty which induces a man to speak
the truth, is more common than that which induces him to form
sound opinions. There are many men who, under ordinary cir-
cumstances, would never be seduced by interest to report a fact
falsely, or to express an insincere opinion, whose judgment might,
nevertheless, be perverted by interest. It is commonly said that
the independent of the will, that is, of the desires or
l)elief is
inclinations and every one must be conscious that he cannot,

;
change tlie state of his belief, on matters either of fact or opinion,

by merely wishing it to be otherwise. But the operation of a
personal interest, bearing closely and directly upon the question,
generally causes a man, unless he be remarkably honest or per-
spicacious, insensibly to adopt prejudices, or partial and unex-
amined opinions.' The dislike of listening to unpalatable truths,
induces liiin to shut his ears against evidence and arguments
opposed to the views whicli he considers favoin-able to his own
interest while, on the other hand, the desire of hearing evidence
;
of a difTerent character, leads him to read only the Ijooks, and to

frequent only the company of persons, where opinions, in accord-
ance with his interest, are likely to be expressed.'^ The operation
' See on tliis subject the remarks of Mr. Mill, Si/sfem of Logic, 13. V. c. i. § 3.
^ ' Wo
know some men will uot ruud a letter wliicli is supposed to bring ill news
and many men forbear to cast up their accounts, or so much as think upon their
estates, who h.tvo reason to fear their affairs are in no very good pobture.' LocKii on —
th; Undeniaixiinf/, 15. IV. c. xx. § 6. See also §§ 12 an<l 16.
of a personal interest in jiervertiug the judgment is so insidious,

that great honesty, combined with perpetual vigilance, is necessary
in order to guard against its influence. Men utterly incapable of
telling a deliberate untruth, or deliberately expressing an insincere
opinion, are nevertheless liable to be warped by personal interest
in the deliberate formation of opinions. When a strong bias of
this sort exists, their minds, ready to receive every tittle of evi-
dence on one side of a question, are utterly impervious to argu-
ments on the other. Hence, we see opinions founded on a belief
(and often a radically erroneous belief) of self-interest pervade
whole classes of persons. Frequently, the great majority of a
profession, or trade, or other body, adopt some opinion in which
they have, or think they have, a common interest, and urge it
with almost unanimous vehemence against the public advantage.
On occasions of this kind, the persons interested doubtless convince
themselves of the reasonableness of the view which they put for-
ward they are guilty of no hypocrisy
; or insincerity ; but their
judgment is warped by their belief as to their interest in the
question. however, their view be in fact unsound and unten-
If,
able, the more intelligent members of the class or body cannot

fail, occasionally, to catch a few glimpses of the truth ; in search-
ing for confirmations of their opinion, they must sometimes
stumble upon proofs of its weakness, and they must hence feel a
misgiving as to the soundness of their cause. This mixed state
of insincerityand interested prejudice is, probably, not imcommon
in questions where the judgment is sul)ject to a bias; but, in
general, the errors of mankind, both in opinion and action, so far
as they arise from considerations of personal advantage, are to be
attributed rather to sincere, tliough interested prejudice, than to
the direct suggestions of conscious interest.
When we speak of a man's conduct or opinions being deter-
mined by his interest, we of course mean, by his own opinions as
to his interest. It is manifest that a man's real interest may
differ from his apparent or supposed interest. In other words,
the judgment of a foolish or ignorant man, with respect to his
interest, may from that of wise and well-informed men on
differ
the same subject. When
a man acts upon an enlightened view of
liis own interest —
upon well ascertained groimds, and in accord-
ance with the advice of judicious and discreet counsellors be is —
said to act jjrufUnthj. An impriidenf man may, however, equally
act from views of personal advantage, though upon hasty, ill-
III.] TRUSTWOliTIlY AUTIIOUITY. 27
considered, and uninfoiined views. The practical judji^mcut of

men, in private affairs, is constantly lialtle to be misled by erro-
neons opinions of self-interest, which, however, are to a great
extent obviated and counteracted by professional and skilled
advice. In political affairs, it is necessary, for reasons which will
be considered in another chapter, to give a freer scope to the
opinion of eaeli individual respecting his interest. The operation
of this principle is, however, (as we shall see hereafter,) counter-
acted by niuneroiis influences, in public as well as private
affairs.*
It may be remarked, that many luisound opinions have a

certain affinity with one another, and are formed in knots and
clusters. Hence, if one of these is adopted from interested
motives, it natm'ally leads a person to the others ; so that a small
portion of unconscious interest will sometimes leaven a man's
opinions with a whole mass of error.
of a personal interest in perverting the judgment
The influence
may be resisted by steady honesty and integrity, even where the
imderstanding is not remarkably strong. On the other hand, the
moral sentiments may be so ill-dii'ected as to deprave the judg-
ment, even when the understanding is remarkably strong. Men
of this sort may be r/reat, but cannot be ivise for by ivisdom we ;
mean the power of judging, when the intellectual and moral

faculties are both in a sound state. Napoleon affords a striking
instance of the corruption of the judgment, in consequence of the
misdirection of the moral sentiments. His intense selfishness and
imscrupulous restless ambition seem at last to have completely
The ancients observed, that a man
distorted his mental vision.
who had acquired great power and eminence in a State, being
rendered giddy by his elevation, often lost his self-command, cast
away the maxims of sobriety and moderation, by which he had
been restrained when in a less exalted position, and thus came to
a speedy downfall. His newly-acquired power depraved his moral
— the depravation of
character his moral character destroyed his
judgment — and, having lost his judgment, his career became like
that of a ship without a rudder. But, in accounting for this
sequence of events, according to their popular religion, they said
that the gods, being envious of his greatness, predetermined his
ruin, and in order to effect his ruin, filled his mind with vain and
'
See Chapter VIII.
—
28 ON THE MARKS OF [cii.
foolish thoug-bts : thus representing his folly as the consequence

of a precedent decision tliat he was to be bumbled, and not as its
sole and ultimate cause.
Generally, it may be said tliat the undue ascendancy of any
passion or affection by which the calmness of the reason is dis-
turbed, necessarily for a time impairs the judgment, by deranging

itsequilibrium. Tlie state of mind most favourable to the for-
mation of a sound opinion is, that a person should be eager about
—
a subject that he should (according to the common phrase)
take an interest in it but that his mind should not, in the con-
;
sideration, be influenced by any suggestions of personal advantage.

' To be indifferent which of two opinions is true, (says Locke,)
is the right temper of the mind that preserves it from being
imposed on, and disposes it to examine with that indifferency, till

ithas done its best to find the truth, and this is the only direct
and safe way to it. But to be indifferent whether we embrace
falsehood or truth, is the great road to error.''
For questions of practice, perfect honesty and freedom from
personal bias are equally necessary in order to ensure trustworthy
advice. Whether it be the opinion of a professional man in an
individual case, or the exhortations of a public speaker in a deli-
berative assembly, integrity of purpose, and an exclusive regard
for the interests of those whom he advises, are qualifications re-
quisite to render him worthy of their confidence.^
§ 10. In order, therefore, to determine whether a person is a
• On the Conduct of the Understanding, § 12.
On Ton est
' indifferent a la chose qu'on juge, et des lors on est rans attention et
sans esprit pour la Lien juger ou Ton est vivement afifecte de cette meme chose, et
;
c'est alors I'interet du moment qui presque toujoui's prononce nos jugements. Une
decision juste suppose indifference pour la choso qu'on juge, et desir vif de la bien
juger. Or, dans I'etat actuel dos societ6s, peii d'hommos eprouvcnt ce double sentiment
de desir et d'indifference, et se trouvent dnns I'heiirouse position qui le produit.'
Helvktius de V Homme, 8. IX. c. xviii.

^ Cicero de Off. II. ix. § 8, describes the qualities whicli render a man trustworthy
in matters of practice. The qualities arc prohif^, (justitia,) and prudoicc or wisdom,
(pmdentia.) '
lis fidem habemus, quos plus intclligcro quam nos arbitramur, quosqxio
ot futura prospicere credimus, et cum res ngatnr, in discrimcnque ventum sit, expedire
rem, et consilium ex tempore capero posse.' Of these qualities he considers the former
as the roost important. Honesty without sagacity has considerable authority, but
cleverness without honesty inspires n> faith. Ilarum igitur iluaruni ad fiilem facien-
'
dam justitia plus pollet : quippc cum ea sine prudentiA satis habeat auctoritatis,
pmdentia sine justitifl, nihil valeat ad faciendam fidem: quo enim quis versutior et
Ciillidior est, hoc iuvisior et suspi\'ti(jr, iletraciA opinione probitatis.' — Compare

Topica, c xix.
;
III.] TRUSTWOinilV AL'TIIOKITY. 29
compett'iit autliorily on ;i doubtful (jucstiou, either of speculation

or practice, it is necessary, as in the case of a witness to a fact, to
go throu;^h a certain proctss of investigation and reasoning. With
regard to a witness, we must satisfy ourselves that the alleged fact
occurred within the range of his senses ; that he took note of it
that he apprehended properly what he observed ; and that he

reported it With regard to an authority in a matter
faithfully.
of opinion, we must be assured that he had time to study and
consider the subject ; that he availed himself of his opportmiity ;
that he understood what he studied and that he judged correctly.

;
The process of investigating a person's competence as a guide in

matters of opinion is, however, less difficult and tedious than an
examination of the subject itself. F'or example, it would be much
easier to ascertain who is a competent authority upon a question
of mechanics or astronomy, than to master mechanical or astro-
nomical science. Moreover, in practical questions, experience,
which implies time, is indispensable. Thus, if any unprofessional
person wished to form an independent judgment upon a medical
or surgical case, with a view to its treatment, he would be unable
to decide and act with safety, however powerful and cultivated
his understanding might be, and wliatever diligence he might be
willing to use in the study of the disease. The process of deter-
mining who is a competent authority is likewise, though a process
of reasoning, not appropriate to the question. The truth of the
opinion rests on evidence, which would be equally conclusive if
the person whose authority is adopted had never existed. It is a

second-best indication of the truth ; but nevertheless, in a vast
number of cases, the only guide which is practicable.
§ Whenever, therefore, we seek to determine who is a
11.
competent authority to guide our opinion on any subject, we
should select a person who combines the qualifications which have
been just enumerated. We should look out for a man able,
honest, and well- versed in the subject. Some further indications
of trustworthy authority, derived from other considerations, may
however be obtained, which will assist us in tliis search.
With respect to subjects of speculation and science, the exist-
ence of an persons having the above quali-
afjreement of the
fications most important matter.
is the If all the able and
honest men who have diligently studied the subject, or most of
them, concur, and if this consent extends over several successive
— ;
generations, at an enlightened period, and in all or most civilised

countries,' then the authority is at its greatest height.
The agreement of competent judges upon a speculative opinion
isanalogous to the agreement of credible witnesses in their testi-
mony to a fact. If ten credible witnesses agree in their testimony
to a fact, the value of their concurrent testimony is more than ten
times the value of the testimony of each.^ So the joint probability
of the agreement of ten competent judges in a right opinion is far
greater than the sum of the probabilities of the rectitude of the
opinion of each taken separately. On the other hand, the joint
probability of their agreement in error is far less than the sum of
the probabilities of the erroneousness of the opinion of each taken
separately. Supposing that each person carefully checks and
verifies the process of investigation, it is highly improbable that
every one, of a considerable number, should overlook an un-
grounded assumption, or a flaw in the reasoning, which may have
escaped the attention of the original investigator it is also very ;
improbable that a tendency to error, which one person may have

contracted, from peculiar habits of thouglit, or defective means of
observation, should be shared by many others. Therefore, as the
agreement in a scientific opinion among competent judges widens
its area, the chances of rectitude increase, and the chances of error
diminish, in a perpetually accelerated ratio.'
Astronomy furnishes an example of a science, as to which there
has been a general agreement of its professors for more than a
century. Additional have been made during that
discoveries
period, and subordinate removed but, as to
differences have been ;
the foundations of the science, there has, during that time, been a
general agreement, and now even in details. This agreement
extends to all scientific astronomers in all civilised countries.
The astronomers of Berlin, Vienna, Milan, Paris, London, and
New York, are agreed as to the motions of the bodies composing
the solar system, and their mutual relations in space. The astro-
nomical almanacs, calcidated in different places, proceed on the
'
With I'espect to the influenco of tlio political divisions of independent stiites in
preventing the adoption of opinions without due examination, see Hume, Essay XIV.
Works, viil. iii. p. 134.
« See Whately's Rhe/oric, Part I. c. ii. § 4.
' '
In the unanimous or general consent of numerous and impartial inquirers,' Mr.
Austin finds 'that mark of trustworthiness which justifies reliance on authority,
wherever wo are debarred from the opportunity of examining the evidence for our-
selves.' Prov. of Jurisprudence Determined, p. 84.
—
iii.J TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 31
same principles, aii<l coincidi* in their predictions. Tliese pre-

dictions, moreover, are always confirmed by the events.'
On the other hand, the dissensions of scientific writers, — of
acute and disinterested men minds with
wlio have applied their
earnestness and patience to the cultivation of any science show —
that tliis science is still in an imperfect and unsettled state, and
diminisli tlie value of the authority of all parties.
Stich was the case with a large part both of the ethical and
physical sciences among the ancients. The divisions of the pliilo-
sophical sects into Academic, Stoic, Epicurean, &c., the peculiar
tenets which each sect adopted, upon the fundamental principles
of moral and natural science, the pertinacity with wliieh tliese
peculiarities were maintained, and tlie length of time during
which they were transmitted in schools by a succession of teachers
and disciples, weakened the authority of each, and rendered it
difficult for an inquirer to give a preference to any, without learn-
ing and comparing the opinions of all.'*
At present, tliere is a prevailing approach to agreement in the
sciences founded on an observation of outward nature. When
controversies arise in these sciences, they are generally confined to
limited questions, and to points upon which attention has been
recently turned ; and after a time they are settled by investigation
and reasoning. In the moral and political sciences, there is a less
general consensus than in the physical.^
*
Thus the science of
political economy a — science which for nearly a century has been
cultivated by various writers of great ability — is still (particularly
with reference to certain branches of it) in a controverted and
unsettled state ; and, hence, tlie writers on political economy who
have arrived at true conclusions do not carry the authority which
is due to them, because those conclusions are still disputed by
other scientific writers.

P'or this difference between the moral and political sciences
on the one hand, and the physical sciences on the other,* there
Upon the present agreement of astronomical predictions with observation, see

'
Whowell, Hist, of the hid. Sciences, B. VII. c. vi. § 6.

^ Sec Lucian's diiilogue of Iltrnwtimus, a summary of wliich is appended as a note
to Chapter IV. Compare wliat Cicero says of the sceptical method of the New-
Academy. Acad. Prior. II. 3.
* The reasons why autiiority in the moral and political sciences is less trustworthy
than authority in the physical sciences, are ably set forth by Mr. Austin, Province of
Jurisprudence Determmed, pp. 63-67. Compare Mill, Sy.'^tcm of Logic, B. VI. c. i.
* The ancients
differed and doubted more as to physics than ethics. Ut enim '
32 ON THE MAKKS OF [ch.
are many reason^;, Nvhicli do not belong to this inquiry ; but there
is one, which, as it concerns tlie formation of a body of authority
on the suViject, may be here noticed. The physical sciences (with
the partial exception of medicine) are cultivated exclusively by
scientific persons, who pm-sue the subject merely in the interests
of truth and for purposes of discovery, or expound it systematically
for purposes of education. They either seek to enlarge science by
new observations and inferences, or they digest existing knowledge
into text-books for learners. Such, for example, is the case with
mechanics, optics, geology, mineralogy, chemistry, anatomy,
natural history. The treatment of these subjects is therefore
always scientific. Even wlien tlie exposition is rendered popular,
in order to extend the circle of learners, yet it is always based on
scientific principles.
Now the moral and political sciences are, it is true, treated in
a scientific manner by speculative writers. The principles of
these sciences, however, are involved in the practical questions, to
which the daily business of life gives birth, and which are dis-
cussed in newspapers and pamphlets, at public meetings and in
The best-ascertained principles are
large legislative assemblies.
therefore constantly liable to be disputed, misinterpreted, or mis-
applied, by persons imperfectly acquainted with tlie subject, who
take it up and with a special object, and who are acted on
hastily
by gusts of popular passion, or by the interests of particidar indi-
viduals or classes. In this manner, opinions on moral or political
subjects are multiplied, the authority of sound and scientific prin-
ciples is weakened, the judgment of the public is distracted and
perplexed, the difficulty of a selection of safe guides is increased,
and an anarchical state of public opinion is created. On the other
hand, it ought not to be overlooked that mvmicipal or positive
law, among the political sciences, receives an exclusively scientific
and professional treatment and hence the utility of institutions
;
which promote an enlightened spirit among the leaders of the

legal profession, and the importance of improvements in juris-
prudence, as directing the moral sentiments of a nation.
The inconvenience of a popular treatment of the moral sciences,
proceeding concurrently and in a parallel line witli their scientific
treatment, is illustrated by Dr. Whewell's remarks upon those
niodo dixi, (says the academic interlocutor in Cicero's diaioguo Dc Naturd Deorum,)
omnibus fere in rebus, ct maximc in phi/KU-is, quid non sit citius, quam quid sit,
dixcrini.' I. 21. (.'ompare Groto, Hist, of Gr., vol. i. pp. 498, 499.
ml TRUSTWORTflY AlTTIIORlTV. 33
technical tonus, \vlii(."li have a jiojuilar acceptation in common

discourse as well as a precise scientific import. * Since (he says)
tlu'V liave a ineanin;jj in comnion laiiyîiajê, a careless reader is
l)rone to disregard the technical limitation of this meaning, and

to attempt to collect their import in scientific books, in the same
vague and conjectural manner in which he collects the purpose of
words in common cases. Hence the language of science, when
thus resembling common language, is liable to be emplo^'ed with
ail al)sence of tliat scientific precision which alone gives it value.
Popidar writers and talkers, when they speak oi force, vwmentum,
action, and reaction, and the like, often afford examples of the
inaccuracy thus arising from the scientific appropriation of
common terms.'' In like manner, the scientific discussions of
questions in the political and ethical sciences often lose their
precision and value, when all the principal terms come to be ex-
pounded according to their loose and fluctiiating applications in
popular language. The practical result is, that the writer on the
moral sciences is nearly debarred from the use of technical terms,
or that his use of them is unaccompanied with the advantage
which from them in the physical sciences. When he has
results
affixed a precise and restricted meaning upon a term, and has
framed a definition, not taken from his own arbitrary notions of
clearness, but founded on an investigation of the properties of the
class which it represents, his labour is vain as soon as the term
comes to be employed in popular language its precision and ;
restriction are lost as soon as it slips from his hand, and passes
into the mouths of the multitude and the propositions into which
;
he has introduced it, with a technical sense, become, as they are

now interpreted, either pointless and unmeaning, or paradoxical
and false.
The diversities of opinion generated by popular discussion
are further aggravated by the rival pretensions of theorists and
practicians to be considered as guides and authorities in practical
affairs. Theorists, by an observation of particulars, and by
generalising upon them, attempt to construct a system of scien-
tific propositions with respect to a certain subject upon which ;
system a set of rules intended for the guidance of practice may be

founded. These rules form an art. Many scientific investigations
have l)een conducted, and scientific treatises composed, by persons
unpractised in the corresponding art thus, Aristotle composed a
;
' I'hilos. of Ind. Sviejiccs, vol. i. p. 52.
D
34 ON THE MARKS OF [cH.
treatise on rhetoric, though not himself an orator and practical

rhetorician. Clerk's work on naval tactics is another instance of
a scientific treatise by an unprofessional writer. In other cases,
scientific inquiries and treatises are due to practicians, as on
medical and physiological subjects.'
When a science has been fully developed, and tlie principles of
the corresponding art fixed, its rules are recognised or adopted
with little dispute, and the practice is in as good a state as the
bounds of our knowledge permit. The arts of navigation and of
geodesy may be cited as examples in point. When an art is in
this matiued state, there is an agreement between theorists and
practicians, and the rules of the latter conform with the principles
laid down by the former. But when a science is still in an im-
mature state, or when its conclusions are still unrecognised, the
practical men continue to follow certain traditional maxims wliich
have become current among the people, and have obtained
authority. A conflict then takes place between these two classes
as to the standard by which practice is to be tried. The theorists
urge the application of their doctrines to practice the practicians ;
deny their competency as judges, and contest their capacity of

applying their principles to actual life. Sometimes this conflict
arises from the real difficulty which exists in applying all abstract
principles and rules to concrete cases inasmuch as they are neces- ;
sarilyfounded on hypotheses, which do not exhaust all the circum-

stances of the actual case. But while a theory is still in an
imperfect state, practical men, attempting to apply it in reality,
discover its defects, and often condemn it overhastily in toto, be-
cause they have satisfied themselves that a part is erroneous.
Now, a precipitate and indiscriminating rejection of a theory,
which contains the seeds of truth, though mixed with error, is
always to be regretted, for it is by the successive experiments of
practical men, verifying what is sound in a theory, rejecting what
is unsormd, and suggesting the requisite corrections, that sciences
are established and enlarged. Art, indeed, in an empirical form,
or a technical practice of some sort, is necessarily, in almost every
case, anterior to the corresponding science ; the principles and
maxims of which are suggested by the facts with which the art
has to deal.'^
' On tho relations of Bcienco and art, or of theory and practice, see Comte, Cours
dr. Pfiilo.t. Posilivr, Tom. iii. p. 280; Tom. vi. pp. 751, 870. Mill, Sydcm of Logic,
B. VI. r. xi.
^ See WluMcll, Hist, of Ind. Seioiccs, vol. i., p. 333.

m.] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 35
When any science is iu an impert'ect but constantly advancing

state, the weight of anthority increases as the tendency to agree-
ment begins to exliibit itself; as the lines of independent thought
converge ; as rival opinions coalesce under a common banner ; as
sects expire ; and modes of thought and expres-
as national schools
sion disappear as the transmission of erroneous and unverified
;
opinions from one generation to another is interrupted by tlie

recognition of newly-ascertained truths. It is by the gradual
diminution of points of difference, and ])y the gradual increase of
points of agreement, among men of science, that they acquire the
authority which accredits their opinions, and propagates scientific
truths. In general, it may 1)0 said that the authority of the pro-
fessors ofany science is trustworthy, in proportion as the points of
agreement among them are numerous and important, and the
points of difference few and unimportant.
The doctrine of Agi'eement applies to scientific or speculative
opinions ; it does not apply to advice given on a single question
of practice. In the latter case, the professional person consulted
advises about the facts of a given case, and as his opinionis founded
on a knowledge of those no general agreement can exist. It

facts,
is only indirectly that the doctrine of agreement applies to opinions
on practical questions. When a person has mastered the system

which is sanctioned by the general consent of competent judges,
and has combined experience with this knowledge, he is likely to
advise well in any question belonging to his subject.
§ 12. A further assistance in the selection of guides to opinion
may be derived from a consideration of the marks of Impostm-e or
Charlatanism, in respect both to science and practice. If such
marks can be found, they will afford an additional means of dis-
tinguishing mock sciences from true ones, — the charlatan from the
true philosopher or sound practitioner.
In the we may observe that mock sciences are re-
first place,
jected, after a patient examination and study of facts, and not
upon a hasty first impression, by the general agreement of compe-
tent judges. Such was the case with astrology, magic, and divi-
nation ofall sorts, at the beginning of the last century which, ;
having been reduced to a systematic form, and received by the

general credulity, liave since yielded to the light of reason.' The
' Upon tho prcvaloncc of the belief in astrology among ochicnted and cnliglitenod
persons at tlie end of the 17th century, see sonic remarks by Dr. Johnson, in his Li/c
of Butler.
D 2
—
36 ON THE iVIARKS OF [cii.
errors of the ancients in natural history, which were repeated by

subsequent writers after the revival of letters, have been exploded
by a similar process. The same may be said of the influence of
the heavenly bodies upon diseases, believed at no distant date by
scientific writers.' Mesmerism, homoeopathy, and phrenology, have
now been before the world a suflBcient time to be fairly and fully
examined by competent judges and as they have not stood the
;
test of impartial scientific investigation,and therefore have not

established themselves in professional opinion, they may be safely,
on this gi'ound alone, set down imder the head of mock sciences ;
tliough, as in the case of alchemy, the researches to which they

give rise, and the new hypotheses which they promulgate, may
assist in promoting genuine science.^
True sciences establish themselves after a time, and acquire a
recognised position in all civilised countries. Moreover, they con-
nect themselves with other true sciences ; analogies and points of
contact between the new truth and truths formerly known are
perceived. Such has been the case with Geology, which has only
taken its place as a science founded on accurate and extensive
observation during the present century. But while it has assumed
an independent position, it has received great assistance from com-
parative anatomy and other. apparently unconnected sciences, and
has thrown light upon them in return. Discoveries in medicine,
too, which rest on a firm basis, as vaccination and the operation
for aneurism, are after a few years brought to a certain test, and
make their way in all countries. Pseudo-sciences, on the other
hand, are not accredited by the consentient reception of professional
judges, but remain in an equivocal and unaccepted state. No
analogies or affiliations with genuine sciences are discovered ; the
new comer continues an alien, unincorporated with the established
system if any connection is attempted to be proved, it
scientific ;
iswith another spurious science, as in the case of phreno-mes-

inerism, where one delusion is supported by anotlier. Mock
sciences, again, not making their way universally, are sometimes
confined to a particular nation; or, at all events, to a limited body
'
See Dr. Mead's treatise concerning the influence of the sun and moon npon
human and the diseases thereby produced. Medical Works, p. 151.
bodies,
' See lôv. Org. I. aph. 85, whore Bacon applies to the alclicniists the fable of
the
old man, who told his sons, on dying, that a treasure was concealed in Iiis vineyard,
but ho had forgottfn the place; whereupon tliey fell to di^'ging tlie ground in all
directions, and found no gold, but improved tiic cultivation of the vines.
—
ni.] TRUSTWORTin- AUTHORITY. 37
of sectarians, wlio stand aloof from the professors of the established

science.
Another means of distinpîiishingreal from unreal sciences, may-
be found in the character and objects of the persons by whom they
are re><pectively cultivated. Tlie professors of genuine sciences,
for the most part, make the investijâtion or the communication
of truth their primary object. Even teachers, who are remimerated
for their services, are in general careful to communicate only true
and sound opinions to their disciples, and would consider the in-
culcation of error as a breach of their duty. The desire of knowing
the truth is, indeed, no preservative against error. No such pre-
servative exists. But the desire of ascertaining the truth is a
necessary condition for ascertaining it. He who does not seek will
not find. The charlatan, on the other hand, is almost invariably
actuated by the love of gain. His purpose is to dupe the world,
and to extract money from the pockets of his dupes. Paracelsus
and Mesmer aftord an example on a large scale a village mounte- ;
bank on a small one. Occasionally, there may be the love of

attracting attention, for its own sake, and a disinterested pleasure
in cheating the world but gain is the leading motive.
;
Some indications may likewise be derived from the form and

method in which a new science is propounded. Genuine science
is in general simple, precise, perspicuous, devoid of ornament, dry
and unattractive, modest in its pretensions, free from all undue
contrivances for exciting applause or obtaining attention. Charla-
tanism, on the other hand, is tricky, obtrusive, full of display
now wearing the mask of impassioned enthusiasm —now assuming
an aspect of solemn gravity, vague and mystical in its language,
sometimes propounding elaborate schemes of new classification and
nomenclature, dealing in vast promises and undertakings.^
•
There are three forms of Bpeaking, which are, as it were, the style and phrase
'
of imposture. The first kind is of them who, as soon as they have gotten any subject
or matter, do straight cast it into an art, inventing new terras of art, reducing all into
divisions and distinctions ;thence drawing assertions or positions, and so framing
oppositions by questions and answers. Hence issueth the cobwebs and clatterings of
the schoolmen.
'
The second kind is of them who, out of the vanity of their wit, (as church poets,)
do make and devise all variety of tales, stories, and examples, whereby they may lead
men's minds to a belief, from whence did grow the legends and infinite fabulous
inventions and dreams of the ancient heretics.
'The third kind is of them who fill men's cires [qu. cffn«] with mysteries, high
panibks, allegories, and illusions, which mystical and profound form many of the
heretics nl.so made choice of. By the first kind of these the capacity and wit of man
-38 ON THE MAEKS OF [ch.
Imposture, however, particularly in the cases where it is com-

hined with mysticism, is rarely altogether intentional, and the
result of mere knavery. There is a close affinity between impos-
ture and credulity : a credulous man is generally a deceiver, and
believes the delusions with which he ensnares the faith of others.*
This is often the case with philosophical as well as religious enthu-
siasts. Pythagoras, for example, so far as we can discern him in
the dim distance, may apparently be taken as a type of the union
between the man of science and the impostor and the same may :
doubtless be said of Van Helmont, and many of the other profes-

fe-ors of mystical medicine, alchemists, astrologers, diviners, theo-
sophs, and masters of occult sciences, whose lives are collected in
the seven volumes of Adelung's curious History of Human Folly. '^
Nothing is more striking, in this repertory of self-deceit and im-

posture, than the gigantic dimensions of the supposed discoveries
of these pseudo-philosophers, compared with their actual perform-
ances,and with the powers which man really possesses over outward
nature. At every turn we meet with infallible remedies, with
universal medicines —
with receipts for changing one substance into
—
another with new methods of a universal philosophy. The per-
formances of these homines vaniloqui et phantastici,' who, partly
'
from credulity, and partly from imposture, 'genus humanum pro-

missis onerarunt,' stand (according to Bacon's comparison) in tlie
same relation to the works of genuine philosophers, as the exploits
of Amadis de Gaul or King Arthur, to those of Julius Csesar or
Alexander the Grreat.^
No species of imposture is so captivating, so well-suited to the
present time, and consequently so likely to meet with temporary
success, as that whicli assumes the garb, and mimics the phraseology,
of science. As hypocrisy has been said to be the homage which
vice renders to virtue, so is the imitation of- scientific forms the
homage which imposture renders to science ; it is, however, a
species of homage by which the vassal often obtains, for a time, a
superiority over the lord. Still, the existence of a scientific spirit,
is and entangled by the second, it is trained on and inveigled by the third, it

fottorod ; ;
is astonisliL'dand enchanted but by every of them the while it is seduced and abused.*
;
— Lord Bacon, Of the several Kinds of Imposture. Works, vol. i. p. 2 1 4 ed. Montagxi. ;
Sco Adv. of Learning, vol. ii. p. 42.

'
* Gcschichto der nienschlichen narrheit, oder lebensbesehreibungcn bcriihmtcr

si.'hwarzkiinstlcr, goldmachcr, tiul'elsbanner, zeidun-und liiiiendeuter, schwiirmer,
walirsager, und andcrcr philosopliischcr uidioldin. Leipzig, 17So-9. 7 vols.
' yov. Or(J. I. aj.)h. 87.
'
on wliich the delusion rests, proves, in the end, too stronjj^ for tlie
dt'lusion itself. Those who, with a mere smattering of scientific
knowledge, seek to impose on the multitude by a parade of mysti-
cal jargon, and a whole apparatus of learned phraseology, are
(juickly detected l»y competent and instructed judges. Their mode
of proceeding is, in fact, only one degree removed above that of
the well-known impostor in the novel, with his quotations of
Greek and his appeals to .Sanchoniathon and Berosus. ' Qui
Btultis videri eruditi volunt, stulti eruditis videntur.'
Even, therefore, if we are unable, from want of time or oppor-
tunity, or the requisite knowledge, to form an independent judg-
ment upon a new scientific system, we may nevertheless be able to
judge if the writer has pursued a sound and correct method of
investigation, and if he has conformed to the rules by wliich the
most eminent discoverers in that branch of science have been
guided. If we find that a vicious method has been pursued, and
that the requisite securities and precautions against error have not
been adopted, we may reasonably distrust his fitness to guide our
judgment.
Nothing is more characteristic of the pretender to philosophy
than his readiness to explain, without examination or reflection,
all phenomena which may be presented to him. Doubt, hesitation,
suspense of the judgment, inquiry before decision, balancing of
apparently opposite facts, followed, perhaps, by a qualified and
provisional opinion, — all these are processes utterly foreign to his
mind, and indicative, in his view, of nothing but weakness and
ignorance. Inasmuch as his real knowledge is shallow, limited, and
imprecise, it is nearly as easy for him to explain one thing as
another ; and his universal systems of philosophy are doubtless
equally true for all subjects.^
It has been already remarked that, in the present state of our

knowledge, the physical are better ascertained than the moral
sciences. There is, however, one important exception to the
> Quintil. Hint. Orat. X. 7, § 21.

' Foutonellc, Hist, des Oracles, Diss. I. ch. iv., a^tor narrating tlie story of the
boy with the supposed goMen tooth, as an example of the ingenuity of pliilosopliors
in explaining false facts, proceeds thus Ricn n'est plus naturel que d'en faire aiitant
:
'
sur tcjutes sortes de niatiercs. Je ne suis pas si convaincu de notre ignorance par les
choses qui sont, et dont la raison nous est inconnue, quo par celles qui ne sont point,
et dont nous trouvons la raison. Cela veut dire quo, non sculement nous n'avons pas
les principes qui menent au vi'ai, niais nous en avons d'autrcs qui s'accommodent tres
bien avcc lo faux.'
—
40 ON THE MARKS OF ["t.
comparative certainty of the physical sciences — viz., the science and

art of medicine. The anatomy has been care-
of the human body
fully studied, and is well understood. Pathology and tlie nature
of diseases have likewise been carefully explored, and reduced to
system; but they are still enveloped in much obscurity. Still more
are the diagnosis of diseases in the living subject, and the treatment
of them, (or therapeutics,) subject to great uncertainty. Different
opinions as to the nature of the malady with which any living
person is afflicted, and as to the mode of treating it if ascertained,
may be held by eminent professors of medicine, recognised by their
profession as competent judges. Moreover, even in a case where
there is a generally received mode of treatment, and where the
diagnosis is certain, the patient, from ignorance of the limited
powers of the medical art, is often unreasonable in his expectations,
and dissatisfied with th'^ proceedings of the regular practitioner.
Being unable, from defect of knowledge, to judge of the mode of
treatment, he judges merely by the event, and if this does not
correspond with his anticipations, he condemns the pliysician.
Owing to tliese causes, medical practice always has been the
favourite field of charlatans,^ and their success is proportionate to
the credulity and ignorance of the public. Medical impostors
generally deal largely in panaceas and specifics in infallible and —
universal remedies. —
Their success so far as they are able to im-
—
wse upon the public is owing partly to the difficulty of ascertain-
ing the true origin and nature of disease during life, and to the
still greater difficulty of finding any means of removing or mit igat-
'
Aec(>r>ling to the fiible of Phsedni?, a bad cobbler, un:ible to gain a livelihood,
took to practising medicine. The king sent for him, and proposed to iiim to find an
aiitit'.ote for a cup of poison ;
Timore mortis ille tunc profes.sus est,

Non artis ulld medictc sc prudcnti^,
Vcrum stuj)ore vu/i/i, factum nobilem.
(I. U.)
Lord I'acon remarks of medicine, tliat its subject (the human body) being s<»
'
variable, hatii made the art by consequence more conjectural an art being conjectural ;
halh made so much the more place to be left for imposture.' Other arts are judged
by their acts or masterpieces, but physicians, and perhaps politicians, arc judged only
by the event. We see the weakness and credulity of men is such, as they will often
'
prefer a mountebank or witcli before a learned physician. ... In all times, in the
opinion of the multitude, witclies and ol<l women and impostors have had a competi-
tion with physicians.' Adv. of Learn, vol. ii. p. 159. M. Comto, (Cours de Phil.
Pdsilive, torn. iii. p. 612-14,) remarks upon the prevalence of charlatfinism in
medicine, which ho iitlributcs to tlie nnsi tiled .md unsatisfactory state of physio-
logical sciiuce.
Ill] TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 41
in^ tlie disease when ascertained. The success of the cliarlatan is
^'euerally pntpuitioned to the obscurity of tlie

malady, and the un-
certainty of the treatment. Hence, he selects medical rather than
surjîcal cases and among medical cases, those wliich are chronic
;
and constitutional, rather than those which are acute, and have a
clearly defined seat.'
§ 13. Lastly, it is worthy of consideration, what countries are
important with reference to the general agreement of opinion.
In determining the question as to the existence of a consensus
of opinions on any speculative subject, it would be absurd to take
communities into the account. Whether

l»arbarous or halt-civilised
the question concerned the physical or the moral sciences, it would
be needless to inquire what are the opinions of Australian savages,
or of the native African or American tribes, or even of the Chinese,
the Hindus, the Persians, or the Turks, on the subject. For,
although these Oriental nations are not to be confounded with un-
civilised societies, and although they have, at different periods,
made considerable progress in literature and the useful arts, yet
tiieir and scientific know-
progress, both in political institutions
ledge, has been so limited, as to place them on a low intellectual
level. ' The prevalence of vague, visionary, and barren notions
among these nations,' (says Dr. Whewell,) 'cannot surprise us for ;
we have no evidence from them, as from Europeans we have, that

they are capable, on subjects of physical speculation, of originating
sound and rational general principles. The arts may have had
their birth in all parts of the globe but it is only Europe, at
;
particular favoured periods of its history, which has ever produced

^
sciences.'
Our field of vision may therefore be narrowed to the civilised
nations of Europe, at the head of which we may place the Greeks,
together with the Romans, whose scientific and literary cultivation
' The words which express the idea of charlatan geniTally agree in the common
idea of loquacity and noise ; a clamoroiis attempt to attract the attention of a crowd
is a leading characteristic of the charlatJin.
The Greek 7<{7js was originally a sorcerer, wlio howled over his magic rites. In
Italian, ciarlatano is from ciarlaro, to chafter (hence the French charlatan) : cantiim-
lianco and saltimbanco derive their names from the habit of standing on a bench to
address the people and exhibit their drngs, &c., like the English mountebank.Quack-
salbcr, German, and quacksalver, English, (whence quack, by abbreviation,) arc
derived from the garrulity of the itinerant vender of drugs and nostrums. The
German quaekeln corresponds to our cackle, 'kyvfrni^, a collector of alms or money,
resembles the Latin circulator, a vagrant mountebank.
* Hist, of Ind. Sciences, vol. i. p. 302.
42 OX THE 3IAEKS OF [ch.
was of Hellenic origin. All the branches of knowledge, not even

excepting the moral sciences, have made an immense, though an
vmequal, progress since the close of ancient history : the world has
likewise, since that era, obtained the experience of many centm'ies,
in which contemporary facts have been recorded with more or less
diligence and accm:acy. Nevertheless, the origin of all positive
science and philosophy, as well as of all literature and art, in the
forms in which they exist in civilised Europe, must be traced to
the Grreeks, and therefore the opinions of that extraordinary people
can never be indifferent to us, even on subjects in which they have
been far outstripped by modern dicovery. They made the first
great step from barbarism to scientific knowledge, which, perhaps,
is more difficult and more important than any further advance
which they left to be made by their successors.

On turning our eyes to modern nations, it can scarcely be dis-
puted that France and G-ermany, on the continent of Europe, to-
gether with England, stand at the head of contemporary science
and literature. Whatever and excellences may belong
peculiarities
to the national character of each, the decision of competent judges
in these three countries must be admitted to be of paramount im-
portance. With these may be ranked, as partaking of the same
degree of civilisation, and enjoying free institutions in education and
religion, Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland, together with the three
Scandinavian nations of Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. Italy, to
whom Eui'ope owes so large a debt of gratitude for the revival of
literature, of the arts, and of philosophy, after the stagnation of the
mediseval period, has, on account of the long-continued suppression
of free discussion and education by its various governments, lay
and former and well-merited pre-eminence.
ecclesiastical, lost its
The benumbing influence of the Inquisition, of a severe censorship
of the press, reaching uninterruptedly from the sixteenth to the
nineteenth century, and of despotic governments administered
(with some remarkable exceptions) in a jealous and coercive spirit,
has reduced Italy to a secondary intellectual position ; though it
has never been able to extinguish all sparks of the fire wliich she
had derived from her early cultivation. Let us hope, however,
that the recent political changes may lead to her intellectual
emancipation and improvement, without exposing her to the evils
of civil war, revolution, and social anarchy. The Spanish Penin-
sula has been reduced to intellectual decrepitude by the same causes
wliicli operated in Italy, but more intense in their force, and there-
fore acting witli more decisive effect. Besides, after the revival of
letters, Spain had, in every department of science and art, shown
less mental vijôur and activity than the kindred peninsula to the
East. It had, therefore, less elasticity of force opposed to a more
powerfid compression, and hence, independence of thought, which
had only been crippled in Italy, was fairly anniliilated in Spain.'
Tlie kingdom of Greece has been too recently released from its
Turkish yoke, and made a member of the European family of
nations, to hold, as yet, any place in the intellectual scale. In
Russia, civilisation is still an exotic, and it has never fairly taken
an independent root among this semi-oriental people.
In the United States of America, the places of education are
gradually forming a body of scientific professors the study of ;
jurisprudence and of some branches of politics has made great

progress the physical sciences are not neglected, and an active
;
taste for literature pervades the whole country. The other Ameri-
can States appear to have no mental cultivation, and are even
below their parent States, Spain and Portugal. As to the colonies
and settlements of the European nations, so far as they are young
communities, occupied Avith taming the wild earth, and performing
the functions of pioneers of civilisation, they cannot enjoy much
leisure or opportunity for mental cultivation. But they are in-
sensibly imbued with the opinions and culture of the mother
country, and, by degrees, take their place in the great civilised
community.
§ 14. We have now endeavoured to show what are the indica-
tions by which trustworthy authority, in matters of opinion, may
be best recognised. As has been already remarked, there is a
necessity for inquiry, and room for judgment and discretion, in the
application of these tests, and thus we may observe that judicious
and discreet persons generally choose safe and able guides, in
matters where they cannot, or ought not, to judge for themselves;
whereas unwise persons select unsound guides, who, from ignorance,
inexperience, or weakness of judgment, are incapable of giving
them good advice. Sometimes, indeed, tlie latter class of persons
are so credulous that they fall into the hands of impostors, who
intentionally mislead them for interested piu-poses.
In the choice of guides of opinion, a double option is exercised.
First, a person decideswhether he will judge for himself, or rely
on the opinion of others and secondly, having decided in favour
;
' Conip.iro Comte, Cours de Vhilusophle Positive, Uim. vi. pp. 32, G31-G12.
—
of the latter alternative, he has an option as to the guide whom

he will select. Even when he has made this selection, he may, if
he think fit, reject the opinion of the person whom he has selected.
Nothing, therefore, can be more exclusively a man's own act than
the choice of his guides and the adoption of their opinion. But,
partly because the mind, when the choice has once been made, is
passive in following an opinion, and partly because the word
authority sometimes signifies compulsory power, it seems to be
believed that a deference to authority, in matters of opinion,
implies some coercive influence on the understanding. If, how-
ever, such a belief is ever entertained, it is erroneous. The sub-
mission of the understanding to the opinion of another is purely
voluntary, at more than one stage. The choice of a guide is as
much a matter of free determination, as the adoption of an opinion
on argumentative grounds. If I believe a truth in astronomy or
optics because men of science believe it — if I adopt the advice
of a physician or lawyer in a question of practice, my decision is
as free and unconstrained as if I judged for myself without

assistance, although I arrive at the conclusion by a different road.
§Hence, too, we may see that the opposition which is
15.
sometimes made between Authority and Reason rests on a con- ^
fusion of thought. Authority is undoubtedly opposed to reason-

ing, if, by reasoning, we understand a process of appropriate
inquiry conducted by the person himself. But between Authority
and Reason there is no opposition, nor does the one exclude the
other.
In the first place, as has been just remarked, a person who
chooses his o"\vn guides, cliooses them by the light of his own
reason ; he exercises a free and unconstrained choice ; and
although the process of reasoning through which he travels does
not bear directly upon his conclusion, it bears directly upon the
means of leading him safely to that conclusion. From the
ultimate responsibility of this determination nothing can relieve
him. A Roman Catholic, who relies implicitly upon the authority
of his own church, must decide for himself to prefer that authority
to the authority of other churches or (what comes to the same,) ;
to deny to other religious communions the appellation of cliurches.

In the last result, he is driven of necessity to the exercise of private
' See, for example, Hume's Essay XVI., near tlie beginning Works, vol. iii,
p. 561 ; WhewcU's Hist, of t/te Ind. Sciences, vol. i. p. 312 ; and the Pasquinade of
Boiieaii, citid by him, vnl. ii. p. 138.
III.] TUUSTWOIJTIIY AUTHORITY. 45
individual judgment. Tlie appropriate grounds of decision may

be removed from us a few steps ))y an intermediate process ; but
the selection of our autliority, and our reliance upon it, must be
the work of our own reason.
In the second place, it cannot be presumed, generally, that an
appropriate process of reasoning upon any subject is a better or
wiser principle of judgment than a recourse to the authority of
others. Even in speculative subjects, a person whose time, or
habits of thought and study, do not incline him to a particular
department of knowledge, may reasonably adopt the views of
persons who are conversant with it. In practice, however, where
special attainments and experience are necessary for a safe decision,
a man who prefers his own judgment to that of competent advisers
certainly does not follow either a wise or a usual course. It surely
cannot be laid down as a general thesis, that a private individual
is likely, in professional matters, to judge better than professional
men. A person who thinks that in legal matters his own judg-
ment is better than that of a lawyer, in medical matters better
than that of a physician, in questions of building better than that
of an architect, &c., is not likely to find that the rectitude of his
practical decisions corresponds with the independence of his judg-
ment. In such cases, (as we shall show more fully in a subsequent
chapter,) reason does not forbid, but prescribes a reliance upon
authority. Where a person is necessarily ignorant of the grounds
is an act of suicidal
of decision, to decide for himself folly. He
ought to recur to a competent adviser, as a blind man relies upon
a guide.
46 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRLNCIPLI-: OF [ch.
CHAPTER IV.
ON THE ArPLICABILITT OF THE PEINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY TO

QUESTIONS OF RELIGION.
§ 1. In the preceding chapter a description has been given of

the process by which, in scientific matters, an agreement of the
competent judges, and consequently a body of trustworthy au-
thority, is gTadually formed.^
In each subject, the first attempts at a scientific treatment are
crude, imperfect, and alloyed with rash hypotheses ; and there is
much hasty induction from single facts or partial phenomena.

Numerous discordant opinions thus arise, and there are rival
schools and sects, each with its own set of distinctive tenets. But,
by degrees, some system or body of doctrine acquires the ascen-
dancy ; there is an approach to agreement in important matters ;
a progressive improvement, a gradual advance, are visible ; the

controversies begin to turn chiefly on subordinate points, and
peculiar no longer handed down in schools by a
opinions are
succession of masters and disciples. Certain doctrines cease to
predominate in certain countries they are no longer hereditary
;
or local, but are common to the whole scientific world. They are
diffused by the force of mere evidence and demonstration acting
upon the reason of competent judges not by persecution, or —
reward, or the influence of the civil government. A trustworthy
authority is thus at length formed, to which a person, uninformed
on the subject, may reasonably defer, satisfied that he adopts those
opinions which, so far as existing researches and reflection have
gone, are the most deserving of credit.
§ 2. This description, however, is not applicable to religion,
or at least is only applicable to it within certain limits.
All mankind, at all times, and in all countries, (with the ex-
' Thcro is an Essaj' hy Lord Eolinp;lirolce conccrninq Authority in matters of

Jiclig'wn, vols. vi. .ind vii. of his Works; Imt its contents do not correspond witli its
title.
^
IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 47
ception, perhaps, of some of the lowest tribes of savages,) have

agreed in recognising some form of religious belief. All nations
have believed in the existence of some supernatural and supersen-
sual beings, wliose favour they have sought to obtain, and whose
displeasure they have souglit to avert, by sacrifices, prayers, and
other ceremonies of worship. The ai'gument of consensris gentium
applies with peculiar force to the belief in a divine power, and
accordingly it has always been placed in the front rank by writers
on Natural Keligion. Thus Cicero, speaking of the existence of a

supreme God, says, Quod nisi cognitum comprehensumque animis
'
Ijaberemus, non tara stabilis opinio permaneret, nee confirraaretur

diuturnitate temporis, nee una cum sa?culis setatibusque hominum
invL'terare potuisset. Etenim videmus coeteras opiniones fictas
atque vanas diuturnitate extabuisse Opinionum enim
comraenta delet dies, naturae judicia confirmat. '' A passage from
the Dissertations of Maximus Tyrius, a Greek philosopher who
lived in the age of the Antonines, has often been quoted by modem
writers as a proof of the general diffusion of a religious belief
among the ancient nations : — ' In the midst of universal disagree-
ment and discord as to the divine attributes, and as to laws and
customs, (he says,) one uniform maxim and doctrine may be seen
in evei-y land —that there is one God, the supreme governor and
father of all, and many Gods, his sons and joint rulers. This the
— —
Greek says this the barbarian this the dweller on the mainland
and the dweller on the sea-coast the wise and foolish,' —
Among modern writers it is sufficient to cite the words of
Bishop Burnet —
That there is a God, is a proposition which, in
:
'
all ages, has been so universally received and believed, some very
few instances being only assigned of such as either have denied or

doubted of it, that the very consent of so many ages and nations,
of such difterent tempers and languages, so vastly remote from one
another, has been long esteemed a good argument to prove that
either there is somewhat in the nature of man, that by a secret
sort of instinct does dictate this to him : or that all mankind has
descended from one common stock, and that this belief has passed
down from the first man to all his posterity. If the more polite
nations had only received this, some might suggest that wise men
' Be Naf. Dear. II. 2.

^ Diss. XVII. 6, vol. i.
p. 316 Reiske. ; Compare Cudworth, St/st. Intellect, vol. i.
p. 68o ; 1773; and Leland, Advantage and Necessity of the Christian
od. Mo.sheim,
JicrdalioH shown from tlie Htate of Religion in the. Ancient World, toI. i. p. 422.
'
48 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [ch.
had introduced it as a mean to govern human society, and to keep

it in order : or if only the more barbarous had received this, it
might be thought to be the effect of their fear and their ignor-
ance ; but since all sorts, as well as all ages, of men have received
it, this alone goes a great way to assure us of the being of a God.'
It is, undoubtedly, true that, in the positive religions, and in
the sacred rites, practices, and doctrines of the pagan world, the
greatest diversity has existed; and not only between barbarous
or half-civilised tribes, but among the Greek and Eoman philoso-
phers, whose controversies on the natm-e of the gods were intermin-
able.2 But in the substantial recognition of a Divine power,
super-human and imperceptible by our senses, all nations have
agi'eed.
§ 3. The agreement, moreover, does not stop here. All the

civilised nations of the modern world, together with their colonies
and settlements, in all parts of the earth, agree, not merely in
believing in the existence of a God — a belief which they have in
common with Mahometans, Hindus, and heathens generally —but
in recog-nising some form of the Christian religion. Christendom
includes the entire civilised world — that is to say, all nations
whose agreement on a matter of opinion has any real weight or
authority.
§ 4. When, however, we advance a step beyond this point, and
inquire how far there is a general agreement throughout Christen-
dom with respect to any particular form of Christianity, and
whether all Christians are members of one church, recognising the
same set of doctrines, we find a state of things wholly different.
We perceive a variety of churches, some confined to a single
country, some common to several countries, but each with its own
ecclesiastical superiors and peculiar creed, and each condemning
the members of other churches as heretics, schismatics, separatists,
and dissenters, or, at least, as infected with grave errors, and
sometimes not even recognising them as Christians.^
Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles.

'
On Art. I.
Qui voro deos esse dixerunt, tanta sunt in varietate ac dissensione, ut eorum
*
molestum sit dinumer.are sententias. Nam et do figuris deorum, et do locis atque

sedibus, et actions vitao multa dicuntur deque his summa philosophorum dissensione
:
certatur. —
Ciceuo de Nat. Dear. 1. \.
' For a complete accoiiiit of the distribxition of the severr.l Christian communions
over the world, the constitution and tenets of each church, their mutual relations, .and
other characteristics, see the Kirchliche Sfatis/ik of Dr. AViggors, 2 vols. 8vo. Ham- ;
liurg, 1842 and 1843. According to a calculation cited hy him in vol. i. p. 22, tho
chief divisions of Christendom con.'sist of the following numbers :
—
—
IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUF:STI0NS OF RELIGION. 49
§ 5. Various causes have conspired to prevent a general agree-

ment throughout the civilised world respecting the particular
doctrines of Christianity. The Christian religion first assumed a
dogmatic form in the hands of the later Greeks, who had received
from their ancestors the inheritance of a subtle, refined, and al)-
struse metapljysical pliilosophy. This instrument of reas(»nin;^
and exposition they applied to the Christian religion, and particu-
larly to its more mysterious portions ; sucli as the doctrine of the
Trinity, the relations of the three Divine persons, and their com-
mon essence or substance ; the union of the Divine and human
natures in the Saviour ; and the procession of
Holy Ghost. tlie
At a later time, the Christian theology, now reduced to a more

systematic form, passed through the hands of the schoolmen, and
was treated in the spirit of the scholastic philosophy.' Afterwards,
the Keformation awakened new controversies, or gave increased
im['ortance to old ones, concerning the eucharistic sacrament, the
communion of the laity in both kinds, and the alleged substantial
change and real presence in the consecrated elements also as to ;
the natm-e and operation of grace and good works, and the theory
of original sin, regeneration, justification, and predestination.
These, combined with other questions as to church autliority,
tradition, general councils, the power of the pope and of national
churches, episcopal government, ecclesiastical ceremonies and
vestments, monastic vows, ordination, celibacy of the clergy,
auricular confession, purgatory, baptism, individual inspiration,
&c., have served to divide Christians into numerous churches and
sects, and to keep up continual controversies between their
Roman Catholics 142,145,000

Protestants 62,785,000
Greek Church
Armenians, Copts, &c. .... 57,110,000
5,850,000
' '
It was gravely said by some of the prelates in tl»e Council of Trent, wliere tlie
doctrine of the schoolmen bare great sway, that tlie schoolmen were like astronomers,
which did feign eccentrics and epicycles, and such engines of orbs, to save the pheno-
mena, though they knew there were no such things and, in like manner, that the;
schoolmen had framed a number of subtle and intricate axioms and theorems to save
—
the practice of the Church.' Tôrd I5acon, Essai/ XVII.
In his Novum Organon he speaks of theTheologi Scliolastici qui cum theologiam — '
(satis pro potestate) in ordinem redegerint et in artis formam effiuxerint, hoc insuper
effeccrunt, ut pugnax et spinosa Aristotelis philosophia corpori religionis plus quam
par enit immisceretur.' Lib. Aph. 89. Compare his Apophthegms, 274, 275, where
I.
a dictum of some Roman divines concerning the canons of the Council of Trent
is reported that they were beholden to Aristotle for
;
' many articles of their faith.'
£
respective advocates, which have never received any final settlement,

and, when intermitted, are rather discontinued than decided.
The difficulty of determining the controversies respecting the
different questions to which the interpretation of the Christian
records has given rise in great measure, owing to the fact that
is,
religion, as such, is conversant with matters which are neither the

subjects of consciousness or intuition, nor within the range of the
senses. This is necessarily the case with all questions concerning
the nature of the Deity and his attributes; his permanent rela-
tions with mankind and the state of human existence after death.
;
Upon these subjects, we have no experience, derived either from

internal consciousness or external sensation, to guide us ; and,
accordingly, not only the abstract reasonings of natural religion,
but the interpretation of the records of revealed religion, give rise
to questions, for the settlement of which it is difficult to find any
decisive rule of judgment.
§ 6. Owing to the operation of these causes, the various
Christian churches and sects into which the civilised world is
divided continue to co-exist side by side with one another, and

show little or no tendency to coalesce into a common belief, or to
recognise a common organ of religious truth. Religious opinions
thus become hereditary, and national or local they sometimes
;
run on for centuries in parallel lines, without converging to a

central focus of agreement.
may spring from
Opinions on scientific matters, althougli they
different sources,and follow for a time distinct courses, at last
flow together into one main stream whereas the distinctive tenets
;
of the several Christian churches not only spring from different

sources, but continue to run in different channels.
The religious Europe since the Reformation bears
state of
witness to the truth of description. The boundaries of re-
tliis
ligion, which were fixed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,

remain more unchanged than those of states.' A peculiar form of
Christianity is, in each district of Europe, handed down faitbfully
from one generation to another. National laws and constitutions,
and forms of civil government, undergo fundamental changes.
Even national manners and usages are modified by the reciprocal
intercourse of persons and ideas which trade, literature, and news-
papers promote, and ]>y progressive inventions and improvements
'
On this subject, see tlio romnrks of Mr. Miicaulay, Essai/s, vol. ii, p. 304. (On
Lord Baron.)
—
IT.] AUTHOKITV TO QUESTIONS OF KKLIOION. . > 1
in the arts of civilised lite. J Jut national and loial chunlies

propag-ate tlieir peculiar modes of faith and ecclesiasticiil discipline,
without feelinj^ the influence of the ideas which are luovin;^ in

external spheres. Each continues to revolve in its own orVnt,
without alterinjjf its course, or approximating to other bodies.'
We may discern a certain analogy between the perpetuation
of a particular form of Christianity, and the perpetuation of a
particular language. Botli belong to a class of which the forms
are various but each variety, having once arisen, is unchanging,
;
and, when adopted by a nation, remains. Both prevail locally,

and are transmitted, by a faithfid tradition, from father to son.
Moreover, it often happens that l>otli are diffused by colonisation
or conquest.
The diversity of Christian creeds is the more apparent, when
it is contrasted with the general imiformity upon moral questions
which prevails throughout the civilised world. Amongst all
imiform standard of morality is recog-
civilised nations, a nearly
nised the same books on ethical subjects are consulted for the
:
guidance of life and if the practice differs, the difference is not,

;
in general, owing to a diversity of theoretical rides of conduct.'^

It will be observed, that the gi'eat controversies between the
Christian sects either turn upon questions which have no direct
bearing upon human conduct, (such as the doctrines of the Trinity
and transubstantiation,) or upon forms of church government and
discipline, which are matters of positive institution. They rarely
turn upon the moral doctrines which are involved in Christianity.
Upon these, there is a prevailing tendency and approximation to
an agreement.'
Scientific opinions follow a certain law of progressive develop-
ment. While error is gradual!}' diminished, truth is established,
by a continually enlarging consensus, like the successive circles
made upon the surface of water. Opinion, however, in the several
' With respect to tho fusion of the peculiar creed of each nation with its native
institutions, and tho present equilibrium of opposite forces in the Christian world, see
the observations of Prof. Ranke, in Note A at tho end of the chapter.
* Compare the celebrate(l passage of Cicero, on tlie universality of the moral law
as to time and place. De Jiep. III. 22.
* Perhaps one of tho most practical of the tenets controverted between the Roman
and Protest-int churches is that relating to marriage, with respect to its imlissolubilitv
and its contraction within certain degrees of affinity. The Predestinarian doctrines,
as has been often remarked, exercise little influence upon conduct.
E 2
—
52 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PEINCIPLE OF [cri.
Christian churches, with respect to their distinctive tenets, is
rather variable than progressive. It oscillates backwards and for-

wards, but does not tend by a joint action to a common centre.
This permanent diversity of religious opinions throughout
Christendom, exists not only in spite of the attempts which have
been made to produce uniformity of belief, but partly even in con-
sequence of them. Governments have attempted to extirpate
religious error by persecution, and to favour religious truth by
endowment but as the governments of different coimtries adopted
;
different creeds, that which was considered religious error by one

government was considered religious truth by another. Hence,
although governments have succeeded to a certain extent in pro-
ducing uniformity of faith in their own territory by persecution,
(as in Italy and Spain,) yet they have not been able to prevent
other governments from encouraging the opinions which they dis-
couraged. This has been the case with communities immediately
contiguous to each other, and included even within the same
national federation. Thus, after the thirty years' war, some of
the Grerman States remained Protestant and others Catholic, and
the mutual rights of the two confessions were guaranteed by
solemn treaty. And the Catholic and Protestant Cantons of
Switzerland remain as they were left by the great reformation. In
other countries, as in Ireland, the faith of one sect has resisted all
attempts of the government to produce uniformity, and the ancient
landmarks of religion have been maintained in defiance of the
endeavours of the civil power to obliterate them.
§ 7. Now, must not be supposed that this diversity of re-

it
ligious opinions, and the existence of heterodox sects within the

pale of Christianity, has escaped the notice of the heads of the
church. On the contrary, it has attracted the incessant attention
of theologians and theological politicians for ages, as indeed is
sufficiently apparent from the ineffectual attempts of governments
to produce uniformity of religious belief, already alluded to. It
has always been perceived and admitted that diversity of opinion,
in religious as well as in scientific matters, is necessarily a mark of
error, and that, of several conflicting or discordant opinions, one
only can be true.' It has, therefore, been the great aim of writers
' Cicero makes the remarks upon the diversity of the religious opinions
folio-wing
of his time :
' qua tantopero non solum indocti, sed etiam docti dis-
Res nulla est do
sentiant quorum opiniones cum tarn variae sint, tamque inter se dissidentes, alterum
;
fieri profccto potest, ut carum nuHn, alforuni certo non potpst, ut plus una vera sit.'
:
IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF ItELIGION. 53
on theology, to whatever sect or denomination they might V)elong,

to discover one standard or canon of religious truth, which shoidd
be universally applicable to the Christian world, should serve as a
decisive autliority in matters of faith, and thus give unity to the
church.' All Christians, whatever miglit be their creed, would be
glad to find any living person, or body of persons, whom they
could conscientiously recognise as an infallible organ and exponent
of religious truth. The general feeling on this subject is bluntly
expressed by Dryden, in his Relig'io Laid, —
Such an omniscient church wo wish indeed ;
'Twcre worth both Testaments, cast in the Creed.
§ 8. A large portion of the Christian world, viz., the Church

of Rome and tlie Eastern Cliurches, together with that section of
the Chiu-ch of England which approximates to the Roman doctrine,
make the standard of religious truth to consist in the teaching of
the church. They profess to be able to lay doAvn certain marks of
the true church ; and having determined the true church by means
of these marks, they hold that whatever this church teaches is true,
and is entitled to belief without examination, simply because the
church so teaches.'*
But when these marks come to be examined, it will be
§ 9.
found that they are so vague and obscure as merely to shift the
groimd of controversy, and that there is as much doubt and dif-
ference of opinion respecting the determination of the marks, or
their application to a particular church, as concerning the doctrines
which that chiu-ch teaches.
De Nat. Dear. I. 2. Bossuet lays down the same maxim with respect to Christianity
•Lorsque, parmi les Chretiens, on a vu des variations dans I'exposition de la foi, on les
a toujours regardeos eommo une marque de faiissete ct d'ineonsequenco (qu'on mo per-
metto ce mot) dans la doctrine exposee.' — Variations des Egliscs Protest antes. Prof. § 2.
'
Sir T. More told his son-in-law and biographer, Roper, that if three things were
well established in Christendom, he wished he were put into a sack and thrown into
the Thamo«. The second of these three wishes was, that ' whereas the church of
Christ is at present sore afflicted willi many errors and heresies, it were well settled
in perfect —
uniformity of religion.' Lord Camphi'VLl's Lives of the Chaiicel/ors, vol. i. ch.
xxxii. See also Lord JJacon's Essay on Unity in Religion, and his 2Vact on Church
Controversies, vol. ii. p. 28-60.
See Mohler's Syinholik, § 37 Palmer's Treatise on the Church of Christ, Part I.
•'
;
c. ii. Burnet on Art. XIX. The marks of the true church, adopted by the Church of
;
Rome, (see Catcchismus Cone. Trid., Pars I. c. x.,) and ret;tinod by Mr. Palmer, are,
that it is Una, Sanctii, Catholica, and Apostolica. These marks are, as may be seen,
too vague to characterise any church for a practical purpose. For example, every
religious institute, not merely of Christendom, but of Maiiometans and heathens, since
tin- beginning of the world, has claimed to be '
holy.'
— — — '
54 ON THE APPLlCAT5ir.lTY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [ch.
first place, an attempt is made to determine the true

In the
church by representing it as catholic or ' universal.' But it ' '
cannot be disputed that, from the Apostolic age, there have been
divisions among Christians, and separatist or heretical bodies,
which prevented the universal reception of any one orthodox faith
amongst tlie professors of the Christian religion.' Even in the
first centuries, there never was a universal or catholic church, in
the strict acceptation of the word ^ and since the separation of the ;
Eastern and Western and the great reformation of the

Chiu'ches,
iGtli century, the non-existence of one universal church, having
external communion and membership, and recognising common
ecclesiastical superiors, is still more apparent. To assume, there-
fore, that there is a really existing ' catholic ' or ' universal
church, one and indivisible, which acts as a body, and is capable
of pronouncing decisions and expressing opinions, implies a mani-
fest disregard of notorious facts ; and to found practical conclusions
' '
heretics, or secedcrs from the primitive clnirch, were extremely various, Jit
The
leMst inname, and there is no period in ecclesiastical history in which dissent has
appeared under so many denominations as tlio earliest.' Waddington, History of the
Church, vol. i. p. 138 ed 2. These diffei-ences of opinion were, however, confined to
;
small knots and sections of dissidents, who disappeared in the larger and more impor-
tant heresies which came in the following centuries.
^ As to the origin of the name Catholic, which signified the prevailing and most
widely spread church, as opposed to local and partial heresies, see Bingham's
Antiquities of the Christian Church, B. I. ch. i. § 7-
Pearson on the Crejd, Art. IX., (vol. i. p. 584, ed. Oxford,) explains the catholic-
ism of the church to '
consist generally in universality, as embracing all sorts of
persons, as to be disseminated through all nations, as comprehending all ages, as con-
taining all necessary and saving truths, as obliging all conditions of men to all kinds
of obedience, as curing all diseases, and planting all graces, in tlie souls of men.'
Mr. Palmer states that the universality of tlie church 'does not suppose a physical
and absolute universality, including a// men,' [sed qu. all Christians?] All that is
meant is a moral universality,' which he explains to be a power of obtaining adher-
'
ents in all the nations of tlie known world, and to extend its limits in proportion as
new nations and countries are discovered. On the Church of Christ, Part I. ch. vii.
Walter, Kirchenrecht, § 11, (ed. 9,) gives a similar explanation. He says that the
ohurcii is called catholic or universal, because the M'ork of salvation is destined for all
nations and times, and the cluirch has always made this hor aim. Klee, Katholische
Doffiiiatii; vol. i. p. 93, says, that the catholicity of the church refers to its being in-
tended for mankind at all places and times, and its including everything holy on eartli
and in heaven. Tlie catechism of tiie Council of Trent is more distinct in its definition
of catholica ecclesia. '
Nequo eiiim, ut in hunianis rebus publicis aut hfereticoruin
conventibus, unius tantuin regni tcrminis, aut uiio hominum gonere ecclesia definita
est; verum omues homines, sive illi barbari sint sivo Scythie, sive servi sive liberi,
sive masculi sive fomiuse, caritatis sinu complectitur. . . . Univer.xalis etiam ob earn
causam dicitur, quod omnes, qui salutem acternam conscqui ciipiunt. cam tenere et
amplecti dcbeant.' Par." I. c. x. qii. 14.
—
IT.] AUTHORITY TO QUI-^TIONS OF RELIGION. 55
upon this ungrouuded assiuoptiou is a barreu labour, which can

only satisfy those who are already convinced of the proposition to
Ije proved.
No two churches whose tenets are substantially different agree
as to the marks of the true church.* The Church of Rome holds
that it is alone the true and catholic or universal church, aud that
no person who is not in communion with it is a member of the
true church. All such persons it considers schismatics or heretics,
unless they be Mahometans or heathens.^ This position is denied
by all Protestant churches. Many Protestant theologians hold that
the Church of Rome is not even a portion of the true church.' One
school of An<^lican divines maintains that the Eastern Churches,
the Church of Rome, and the Established Church of England and
Ireland are members or portions of the true and catholic church ;
but that the dissenting chiu-ches of England, the Presbyterians of

.Scotland and Ireland, and the Protestant churches of Germany,
Holland, France, Switzerland, and North America are not included
in the true church.'* It is, however, the general doctrine of Pro-
testant divines, that (with a few exceptions, as Quakers, Unitarians,
&c.) all the Protestant churches belong to the true church, and
form an integral part of Christendom, though some of them may
err in minor questions, both of faith and discipline.
But no church or sect, whatever its doctrines may be, can ever
admit any definition of the marks of the true or universal church,
' Properly speaking, nothing is true but propositions. Truth c-au only be predi-
cated where something is affirmed or denied. It is, therefore, an elliptical expression
to speak of the true church. What is meant is, that the religious community in
question can be alone truly said to constitute a church whereas other communities, ;
calling themselves cliurches, are not churches in fact. Thus, in cases of forgery, we
speak of the true or genuine document or signature, as opposed to the false or counter-
feit one hence crim<:n falsi. The true church does not mean the church which teaches
:
the truth, though it may accidentally possess that attribute. '

A true church (says
Bishop Burnet) is, in one sense, a society that preserves the essentials and fundamen-
tals of Christianity : in another sense, it stands for a society, all whose doctrines are
true, that has corrupted no part of this religion, nor mixed any errors with it.' On
Art. XIX. p. 237.
^ Besides the infidels, and the heretics and schismatics, who are without the pale
of the Church of Rome, there are also excommunieatetl persons, {Cat. Cone. Trid.
Pars I. c. X. qu. 8 ;) but their exclusion may be considered as penal and temporary.
* Even Mr. Palmer admits that thosewho deny the claim of the Roman to the
title of a true church since the Reformation 'are not without some probability on their
side.' — Part I. ch. xi. § 2. See on this subject, Bossuet, Variations des K/l. Prot.
XV. 26.
* See Palmer On the Church of Christ. Part I. ch. ix. ; ch. x. § 4 : ch. xi. § 2 :
xii. § 4 ;
ch. xiii. § I ; Part II. ch. t.
56 ON THE APPLICATilLITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [ch.
which exckides itself from that communion. No approach, there-

fore, is made to the recognition of a common authority, or the
establishment of Christian unity, by laying down the maxim that
all that the true church teaches is true. There is as much dif-
ference of opinion respecting the truth of the church, as respecting
the truth of the doctrines which Those questions it teaches.' '
(says Bishop Jeremy Taylor) which are concerning the judge of

questions, must be determined before you can submit to his judg-
ment and if you can yourselves determine those great questions
;
which consist much in universalities, then also you may determine

the particulars, as being of less And while we pro- difficulty.' ^
fess to give to each Christian a short and easy method of avoiding

controversies, too abstruse and complex for ordinary men, we in-
volve him in questions equally hard of solution. Of what avail is
it to tell a man that the judgment of the universal church is in-

fallible,^ if the means of determining the imiversality of the chvirch
are as much disputed between the contending sects, as the tenets

to which this test of soundness is to be applied ? It is only with
regard to that intangible and indeterminate standard —the opinion
of the universal church — that a claim is made for an infallible
authority. With respect to the doctrines of particular churches,
every church admits the possibility of error — except, indeed, for
itself. Thus, the Church of England lays it down in Art. XIX.
that ' as the churches of Jerusalem, Alexandria, and Antioch,
have erred, so also the Church of Rome hath erred, not only in
'
Eurnet, on Art. XIX., (p. 234, ed. Oxford,) after adverting to the method of
dctermininc; the true church by certain marks or notes, proceeds thus :
'
Upon all
this endless questions will arise, so far will it be from ending controversies and
settling us upon If all these must be believed to be the marks of the
infallibility.
infallible church, upon the account of which we ought to believe it and submit to it,
then two inquiries upon every one of these notes must be discussed, before we can V)o
obliged to acquiesce in the infallibility first, whether that is a true mark of infalli-
:
bility or not? and next, whether it belongs to the church which they call infallible
or not? And then' another very intricate question will arise upon the whole, whether
they must all be found together? or how many, or which of them together, will give
us the entire characters of the invisible church ?' Afterwards he adds: 'Thus it
appears that these pretended notes, instead of giving us a clear thread to lead us up
to infallibility, and to end all controversies, they do start a groat variety of questions
that engage us into a labyrinth, out of •which it cJinnot be easy for any to extricate
themselves.' In this view, lUirnet agrees with Jeremy Taylor, whom he has followed.—
LUjcHij of Proj)/irsj/i>iff, Sect. IX. .leremy Taylor lays it down generally, that the
church, in its diffusive capacity, is incompetent to bo the judge of controversies.
* Liherti/ of Prophc)ii/i»<j, Sect. IX.
' See Palmer, Part IV. c. 4.
J
IT. AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RKLIOION. 57
tlifir liviiifi^ and manner of ceremonies, but aluo in matters of

faitli.'
The rule of faith laid down by Vincentius of Lirinum, in the

fifth century, Quod uhique, quod sempei'y quod ah omnibus, is
inapplicable as a practical guide; because none of the distinctive

tenets of the Christian sects — none of the doctrines which divide
Christianity, answer this description. No article of faith has been
held by all and in all places. None com-
Christians, at all times,
bines the three attributes required by him, of universality, anti-
quity, and agreement.' If, in order to make this maxim
applicable, we arbitrarily exclude a certain portion of those who
have laid claim to the appellation of Christians ; if we call cer-
tain sects heretical and schisraatical, and thus eliminate them
from the aggregate body whose consent constitutes authority, then
our reasoning proceeds in a circle. We begin by assuming as
solved, the very problem of which we are seeking the solution.
We propose to test the soundness of certain doctrines by the judg-
ment of a certain tribunal, and we make the constitution of the
tribunal depend upon those very doctrines. We exclude a part of
the Christian world from our definition of ' all Christians,' on ac-
coimt of the unsoundness of their doctrines, in order to ascertain
what sound doctrine. We say that a certain doctrine is true,
is
because was held at all times and in all places and when we
it ;
find that it was not held by a certain Christian sect at a certain

time and place, we say that they are not to be considered, because
they are not a part of the true chiu-ch ; but when we inquire why
they are not a part of the true chm'ch, we learn that it is because
they do not hold the very doctrine in question. If the student
asks what is the doctrine on the subject of the Trinity, which ful-
lils the condition. Quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus,
he is told that it is the Athanasian. If he then points to the
Arians as having been a large portion of the Christian world who
held a different doctrine, he is told that they were heretics, and
not to be reckoned as a part of the church. he asks why they If
are heretics, and excluded from the church, the answer is, because
they rejected the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity.'^
' Univcrsitas. antiquitas, conserisio.
* C'ompare the circular rtxisoning of those ethical philosophers, adverted to l)y Mr.
I\Iill, who take for their standard of moral truth what they deem to bo the natural or
i/i.stinr/ivf sentiments of mankind, and explain away the numerous instances of diver-
gence, liy saying that they are cases in whicii the perceptions are unhealth;/ or ^tn-
iiatural. - Si/stcin of LAigic, vol. JI. p. '466.

58 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PKINCIPLE OF [ch.
The doctrine of a ' catliolic '

or ' universal ' church, when those
terms are used, not as mere appellatives sanctioned by historical
usage, or in some vague and mystical sense, but as an argument to
establish the paramount authority of the church in matters of
faith, is, in fact, nothing more than an attempt to give to a
majority a decisive voice with respect to a question of opinion, as
against a minority. Whether the majority be large or small, the
catholic chm'ch is, as so understood, nothing more than a
majority of Christians ; its universality, in the view even of its
advocates, is merely a preponderance of numbers over the heretical
sects ; and, therefore, an appeal to the catholicity of the church,
in proof that its doctrines are true, is an appeal to the voice of
the multitude upon a dispute as to truth. ' The characteristic of
the heretic,' (says Bossuet,) ' that is to say, of the man who has
formed a private judgment, is, that he holds to his own notions ;
the characteristic of the catholic, that is, of the universal, is, that
he prefers to his own opinions the common opinion of the entire
churcli.'^ In the very passage in wliich Bossuet thus attempts to
determine the question against the heretics, by assuming the
universality of his own churcli, he opposes the catholics to the
heretics, and virtually admits the claim of both to be Christians.
At the same moment, therefore, that he is claiming to his own
church the attribute of universality, he confesses that this uni-
versality is nothing more than a niuuerical majority. Yet it has
been thought that, by marks such as these, tlie true chvu'ch could
be discerned, and that the truth of the Grospel could be made
to rest upon the authority of the catholic church. Hence the
celebrated declaration of Augustine Ego vero evangelio non :
'
crederem, nisi me ecclesioe catholicai commoveret auctoritas.'

§ 10. But even if we admit the maxim, that wliat the true '
churcli teaches is true,' and are further agreed as to the marks by

wliich the true church is to be recognised, there may still be
serious differences of opinion within the precincts of that very
what constitutes tlie authoritative voice of the church,
churcli, as to
and by marks its valid decrees are to be determined. Thus,
wliat
among Roman divines, some hold tliat tlie decision of the pope, as
head of the church, is sufficient, without the concurrence of a
' '
Le propre de I'liert^tique, c'est-a-diro, do celui qui a une o])iiiion particuliire,
eat de 8'iittiicher a, sos propres ponsces ; et, le propre dii Ciitholiqiio, c'est-a-dire, de
Tuniversel, est de pr^f^ror a ses .sentimeiis le f-entinient comniun de toute I'Kplisp.'—
Nisf. (IcK raria/ioni>,Fri.'{. g 29.
IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELICflON. 59
council ; utliers require tlie concurrence of a council with the pope ;
wliile others hold that a council without the pope is infalliljle.'
There are again further disputes as to what constitutes an oecu-

menical or universal council as to the authority by which it is ;
summoned, the members of which it is to be composed, the means

i>y which it is to decide, and as to the necessity of a subsequent
consent of the universal church to its decrees.' 'There are so

many i[uest ions '
(says Jeremy Taylor) ' concerning the efficient,
the form, the matter of General Councils, and their manner of
proceeding, and their final sanction, that after a question is deter-
mined l»y a conciliary assembly, there are perhaps twenty more
(piestions to be disputed before we can, with confidence, either
believe the council upon its mere authority, or obtrude it upon
others.'' Witli regard to General Councils, the Church of
England holds that when they be gathered together, (forasmuch
'
as they be an assembly of men whereof all be not governed with

the spirit and word of God), they may err, and sometimes have
erred, even in things pertaining unto God.' (Art. XXI.)
The doctrine of the Church of England on the subject of churcli
authority is contained in Article XX. ; ' The chiurch hath power
to decree rites or ceremonies, and authority in matters of faith.
And yet it is not lawful for the church to ordain anything that is
contrary to God's word written expound one ; neither may it so

place of Scripture, that it be repugnant to another.' In com-
menting upon this passage, Bisliop Burnet says Here a dis- — '
tinct i<jn is to be made between an authority that is absolute, and

founded on infallibility, and an authority of order. The former
is very formally disclaimed by our church, but the second may be
well maintained, though we assert no unerring authority. . . .
When any synod of the clergy lias so far examined a point as to

settle their opinions about it, they may certainly decree that such
is their doctrine ; and as they judge it to be more or less important,
'
The infallibility of the pope is stated by tlie higiiest authorities to be still an
unsettled doctrinal question in the Cliurch of Rome. See Walter's Kirckciircc/if, § 178.
L"onii>are Bossuet, Variations dts P.(]l. Vrot. XV. 165. That 'the church is infallible,'
is a dogma univer.siUy admitted in tlie Church of Rome. The same doctrine is held
liy the Anglo-catholic school. See Palmer, Part IV. c. 4. But as soon as we procee*!
another step, and inquire how the infallible voice of the church is to be ascertained,
the discordance of opinions, even within the Church of Rome, becomes irreconcileablo.
See the quotations in Palmer, Part IV. c. 12.
- Palmer. Part IV. ch. 7.
• Lihrrli/ of Prophefying, g 6. See also lUiriiit and Toniline on Art. XXI., and
Brrl .Schneider. D'>r/,iiati/,\ vol. 1. § -43.
'
they may either restrain any other opinion, or may require positive
declarations about it, either of all in their commimion, or at least of
all whom they admit to minister to holy things. This is only an
authority or order for the maintaining of union and edification ;
and in this a body does no more, as it is a body, than what every

single individual has a right to do for himself. He examines a
doctrine that is laid before him, he forms his own opinion upon it,
and pm-suant to that he must judge with whom he can hold com-
munion, and from whom he must separate. When such definitions
are made by the body of the pastors of any church, all persons
within that church do owe great respect to their decision
This is due to the considerations of peace and union, and to that
authority which tlie chm-ch has to maintain it. But if, after all
possible methods of inquiry, a man cannot master his thoughts, or
make them agree with the public decisions, his conscience is not
under bonds since this authority is not absolute, nor grounded
;
iipon a promise of infallibility.'

§11. The argiunent in favour of establishing a true ehrurch, as
is further supported by an attempt
a soiu-ce of infallible autliority,
to represent it as having maintained a continuous succession from
the Apostles, and having handed down the true doctrines of
Christianity, and the true interpretation of Scriptm-e, by an unin-
terrupted tradition.^
Here, again, we meet with the same method of proving inceHum
per incertius, and of solving one indeterminate problem by sub-
stituting for it another equally indeterminate. There is no
general agreement as to what constitutes authentic and catholic
tradition or as to the distinction between the private opinions
;
and inferences of the fathers of the chiurch, by whom the doctrines

are recorded, and tradition derived from an Apostolic source. The
witnesses to whom reference is made often differ, and it cannot be
proved that any constant and invariable oral tradition, ascending
to the origin of Christianity, has continued to the present time.'
' Tomlinc upon Art. XX., -who agrees vrith Burnet.

See, further,
For the Koraan and Anglo-catholic doctrine of church tradition, see Walter,
*
Kirchcnrccht, § 17 Kloo, Katholischc Dogmaiik, vol.1, pp. 271-84

;
Mohler, Si/mholik,
;
§§ 38, 3t» and Palmer on the Church, Part II. c. 6 Part III. c. 3.
; ;
* See J. Taylor's Lih.

of Prophesying, § 5. As to the doctrine of the reformed
churches, compare Bret-'êhneider, Dngmatik, § 43.
'
The custom is so universal amongst those wJio wrestle to support the strength of
every opinion in religion, to appeal to tiic judgment and the practice of the primitive
times, that standcrs-by are apt to believe that every one of the litigants know very
—;
IV.] AUTHORITY TO QL'ESTIONS OF RELIGION. 61
Besides, the Christian clnirch never professed to be in possession

of a secret and mysterious doctrine, inaccessible to the rest of the
world, and preserved in its exclusive custody. It cannot, in this
sense, be a tradux traditionum. The doctrines of Christianity
have always been published and promulgated and there is no reason;
to suppose that a holy tradition would have been more faithfully

preserved among the living members of the church than in the
Ixioks and writings in which it was originally recorded. In fact,
where there are contemporary records, the office of oral tradition
ceases. Under such circumstances, oral tradition can only be
supplementary to the written record where it agrees, the agree-
;
ment gives little confirmation, on account of the superior certainty

of an authentic contemporary record, and the unfaithfulness,
imperfection, and liability to foreign admixture, of tradition
where it differs, its claim to a Divine origin cannot be admitted
imtil it is proved by direct evidence equal to contemporary
attestation.
If the rule of faith is to consist both of Scripture and tradition,
both of the written and the unwritten word of God, it is necessary
that those doctrines which are referred exclusively to tradition as
their origin, which are derived merely from the verbum Dei non
scriptum, should be distinctly traced to their source, and that the
tradition should be proved, by authentic evidence, to be not of
a subsequent growth, but to be founded on a contemporary recol-
lection of the fact recorded.' A may be handed
historical event
down by oral tradition as well as by a contemporary written re-
cord ; but, in that case, satisfactory proof must be given that the
well where to find the judge to whom he appeals and yet there was never any diffi-
;
culty reconciled and determined by that judicatory nor in truth do the appellants
:
well understand what themselves mean by the appeal they make nor would have
;
reason to acquiesce in the judgment if they could receive it by agreeing upon it.'
Lord Ci.AnKNnox, Essay on the Rcvererwe due to A)itiquiti/, p. 218.
Van Espen, as quoted by Walter, uf/i sup. § 176, affirms that this is the case
'
:
'Indubitatum est ecclesiam Catholiciim eandem semper et ubique fidem ex traditione

apostolicA sive scripto sive sine seripto conservasse, nee circa articulos fidei quidquam
novi post tempora apostolorum aceidisse.' Compare Bossuet, Variations, Pref. § 26.
This position is disputed by all the Protestant churches. For example, Protestants
would not admit that such doctrines as purgatory, works of supererogation, transub-
stJintiation, the sacrifice of the mass, and adoration of images, can be proved by
authentic evidence to have been taught by Christ, and to be of apostolic institution.
The theory of a grailual development of tiio Christian doctrines from certiiin seminal
principles, which was propounded a few years ago by Mr. Newman, is, if not peculiar
to himself, at all events quite inconsistent with the systems both of the Church of
Rome and of Protestantism.
tradition is derived from contemporary witnesses.' The mere pre-

valence of a belief in a certain tenet within a church does not
prove that tenet to have been derived from an authentic source,
as Bossuet assiunes ^ its pedigree must be deduced from the
;
first ancestor, must be proved' by positive evidence, not by

and it
general presumptions, to have formed a part of primitive and

Apostolic Christianity.
§ An additional support of the doctrines of an infallible
12.
universal church, and of an authoritative chiuch-tradition, is sought
to be derived from the distinction between Fundamentals and
Non-Fundamentals, or (in other words) between matters of faith,
to be held defide, and matters of mere opinion. It is affirmed,
that the authority of the true church, and of church-tradition,

is decisive with respect to fundamentals and matters of faith, but
that, in other things, entire agreement is not necessary; so that

a Christian who rejects any of the latter, does not incur the sin
of heresy.
But here, again, the difficulty is merely shifted, not solved ;
it is transferred to another point, but not diminished. There

it is
is no received or certain test for distinguishing between funda-

—
mental and non-fundamental doctrines between matters of strict
faith and matters of mere opinion. That which one divine or one
church may consider fundamental, another may consider imma-
terial, and the converse. We know from experience, that the
most discordant views as to the character and extent of fundamentals
have been taken by different theologians of authority in different
countries, and under the influence of different general views on
the Christian scheme.
' Unity in the fundamental articles of faith,' (says Dr. Water-
land, wlio has treated this subject ex professo,) was always strictly
'
insisted upon as one necessary condition of church-membership ;
and if any man openly and resolutely opposed those articles, or

any of them, he was rejected as a deserter of the common faith,
and treated as an alien Hence it is, that we liave almost
as many different rules for determining fundaTnentals, as there
are different sects or parties and tliat wliicli miglit otherwise
;
'
See Note B. at the end of the chapter.
' 'Toutea les fois qu'on trouvcra on uncertain temps une doctrine etaMie dans
toute I'eglise catholique, co ne sera jamais que par erreur qu'on croira qu'elle est
nouvelle.'— Trtr. drs F.gl. Pro/. XV. 97.
'
,v.] ALTIKHCITY To QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. G3.
serve (if all men were reasonable) to end all differences, lias itself
lêen too often made one principal bone of contention.'

* A distinction,' (says Burnet,) ' is to ])e made between tli<jse
capital and fundamental articles, without which a man cannot be

esteemed a true Christian, nor a chiurch a true church ; and other
truths which, being delivered in Scripture, all men are, indeed,
obliged to believe them, yet they are not of that nature tliat the
ignorance of them, or an error in them, can exclude from
salvation.'
' Here,' (he continues,) ' a controversy does naturally arise,
that wise people are unwilling to what articles are meddle with —
fundamental, and what are not ? The defining of fundamental
articles seems, on the one hand, to deny salvation to such as do
not receive them all, which men are not willing to do. And, on
the other hand, it may seem a leaving men at liberty as to
all other particulars that are not reckoned up among the
^
fimdamentals.'
§ 13. The attempt to give authenticity to religious opinions
by defining the church, and to establish a living standard and
canon for the right interpretation of Scripture, independently of
the intrinsic grounds of the decision, never met with entire suc-
cess inasmuch as there were heretical sects, who denied the
;
authority of the predominant, or self-styled orthodox catholic

church, from the earliest period of Christianity. Its failure was,
however, rendered most conspicuous by the Reformation in the
sixteenth century, when rival churches were set up, under the
protection of the state, in the most civilised countries of Europe,
contesting the pretensions of the Church of Rome, and, indeed,
denouncing and unchristian.
it as false
The leaders of the Reformation, and the Protestant churches
'
A Discourse of Fundamentals, Works, vol. VIII. p. 90. Waterland, however,
proposes his own enumeration of fundamentals. Compare Palmer on
the Church,
Parti, ch. .5; App. Various writiugs on the subject of fundamentals are cited by
Waterland ; others are mentioned in Bretschneider, Bogmatik chr Luthcrischevangel-
ischen Kirche, vol. I. § 47.
Mr. Gladbtonp, The State in its liclatiovswith the Church, cli. 2. § 10,5 ; ch. 7. § 97,
(ed. 4,) agrees as to the uncertainty of the definition of fundamentals. Dr. Hampden,
Hampton Lectures, p. 352, ed. 2, condemns tho distinction as being a remnant of
scholasticism. Klee, on the other hand, Katholische Bogmatik, vol. I. p. 60, (ed. 3.)
considers it a Protestant invention, and rejects it as inconsistent with the Catholic

doctrine. Compare Chillingworth, Works, vol. I. ch. 3. Hallam, Lit. of Fait., vol.
II. ch. 2, § 31.

» On Art. XIX.. (p. 236.)
in general, rejected the maxim that ' the church,' (however deter-
mined,) is the decisive authority for religious truth ; and they
laid little or on the doctrines of tradition and Apostolic
no stress
succession as guides in the interpretation of Scripture. For the
most part, the Protestant churches framed certain authoritative
summaries of their faith, (such as the Augsburg Confession, the
Thirty-nine Articles, &c. ;) but they founded the authority of
their creeds, and the obligation of Christians to adopt them, not
on the teaching of their church, and its possession of an authentic
tradition and an authoritative voice, but on their accordance with
Scripture.*
The creeds of all the reformed churches are particularly ex-
plicit which was, indeed, a fundamental and
on this point,
characteristic doctrine of Protestantism. Instead, like the Church
of Eome, of recognising a compound rule of faith, which compre-
hended both Scripture and oral tradition, and placed the two upon
an equal footing, the Protestant churches, however they might
differ in other respects, agreed in establishing a simple rule of
faith, consisting exclusively of Scripture. This principle is ex-
pressed in the clearest terms in the Articles of the Church of
England, and, indeed, pervades their whole substance. Art. VI.
states that ' holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to
salvation ; so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be
proved thereby, is not to be required of any man, that it should
be believed as an article of faith, or to be thought requisite or
necessary to salvation.' ^ Art. VIII. declares that the three creeds
— the Nicene, Athanasian, and Apostles' creed— 'ought thoroughly
to be received and believed,' not because they were received by the
early church, and founded upon an authoritative tradition, but
because ' they may be proved by most certain warrants of Scrip-
ture.' So, again. Art. XX. lays it down that the church cannot
ordain or decree anything contrary to holy writ, or enforce any-
• With respect to the doctrines of tlie early reformers on Scripture and tradition,
and their condemnation by the Council of Trent, see Sarpi, Hist, dii Concile de Trente,
1. n. c. 43-6, o6, trad, do Courayer. Sarpi states that one of the members of the
council urged their laj-ing down, '
that every Christian is bound to believe in the
;
Church ' but that this proposition was unanimou^*ly rejected, partly on the ground
that the heretics would protend to be the true church, to which so much authority was
given, c. 45. Compare Miihler, Symbdlik, § 44-51 ; Bretschneider, Dogmatik, vol. I.
§ 33 ; Walter, Kirckcnrecht, § 35.

* See Burnet's commentsiry on this article, as to the antithesis between the doctrines
of the church of Rome and that of England on this head. A similar view is taken
by Bishop Tomline on the same article.
—
IT.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. Co
things heJiith tlie samo, to be l)elieved for necessity of salvation ;
and Alt. XXI. deeitles, that tilings ordained l)y General Councils
as necessary to salvation have neither strength nor authority, unless
it may he declared tliat they V)e taken out of holy Scripture.'
Again, Art. XXXIV. says that ' it is not necessary that traditions
and ceremonies be in all places one, or utterly like, for at all times
they have been <liverse, and may be changed according to the
diversity of countries and men's manners, so that nothing be
ordained against God's word.' In all these passages, the reference
to Scripture as the paramount and exclusive standard of faith is
manifest.
The distinctive theories of the Church of Rome and of the
Protestant cliurches on tliis subject, may be stated thus :
According to the Church of Rome, there are certain marks by

which the one true Christian church can be recognised.
Those marks exist in the Church of Rome, and in no other.
The true and genuine doctrines have been preserved by an un-
interrupted tradition in the true church.
Therefore, whatever the Church of Rome teaches is true, and
her autliority is a legitimate ground of belief in things spiritual.
All Christians who reject her authority in matters of faith are
heretics, and without the pale of the church.
On the other liand, the Protestant chm-ches hold that tlie
Scriptures of the Old and New Testament contain everything which

goes to make up Christianity, and that they are the exclusive and
ultimate rule of faith. They deny the existence of any uninter-
rupted and exclusive transmission of true doctrine in any church
since the time of the Apostles. Each Protestant church lays down
certain doctrines, wliich it considers to constitute, in the aggregate,
the true exposition of the Christian religion ; but it claims Divine
authority to this body of doctrines, simply on the ground that tliey
are all expressly contained in Scripture, or can be inferred from it
by a legitimate process of deduction.
It was on account of tliis exclusive reference to Scripture, that
the Protestant divines laid more stress on the inspiration of the
holy writings than the theologians of the Chiu'ch of Rome ; and
that tlie Protestants were accused of l)i])liolatry.
Owing to this deposition of church authority, and to the
Commenting on this article, Burnet says of the early councils—

•
We
reverence those
•
councils for the sake of their doctrine, but do not believe the doctrine for the authority
of the councils.'
F
6G ON TUE ArrLICABILITY OF THE PRINCirLE OF [ch.
adoption of the maxim that ' the Bible only is the religion of
Protestants,' ^
it has been commonly asserted that the reformed
churches have admitted the right oi 'private judgment in religious
matters.
Now, in a certain sense, every church which possesses a fixed
written confession of faith predetermines the most important
articles of Christian and therefore can hardly be said to
belief,
leave a free judgment.^ But the reformed
scope to private
chmrches agree in making the Scriptures the exclusive canon of
religious faith they admit that their creed is only entitled to
;
acceptance so far as it is supported by Scripture and they do not ;
assume that their church, in its collective capacity, is alone com-

petent to decide on the correct interpretation of the Divine records.
In this sense, therefore, the reformed churches admit the right of
private judgment. They do not claim for the decrees of any
church an authority independent of, or extraneous to, Scripture.
It has been stated by an eminent text writer, that, when the two
forms of belief are reduced to their elements, Catholicism is the
complete recognition of the authority of the church ; while
Protestantism is the negation of that authority, and the substi-
tution of the private judgment of each individual.^ But although
a Protestant denies the authority of the Church of Eome, he
recognises the authority of his own Church. The difference
properly does not consist in the recognition of the principle of
authority by one party, and the rejection of that principle by the
other, but in the recognition of different authorities.
§ 14. On looking back to what has been said, it will be seen
that no one church can justly make any claim to authority in
matters of religious belief, upon the groimds on which opinions in
matters of science acquire authority. There is no consent of com-
petent judges over the civilised world. Inconsistent and opposite
forms of Christianity continue to exist side by side. There is not
'
CliillingworUi, Tkcligion of Protestants, cli. 6, § 56, (vol. ii. p. 450.)
- Tho Church of England declares that 'they aro to Le accursed that presume to
say that every man sliall bo saved by the law or sect whicii ho profcsseth, so that he
bo diligent to frame his life according to that Luv and the liglit of nature,' (Art.
XVIII.) This article, however, appears from its sequel to refer to heathens, or others
not professing Christianity, and to bo intended to exclude from salvation only tho.so
who aro not Cliristians. It docs not affect those who claim to be Christians, thouglv
they may not be members of tlio Cliurcli of England. As to the sense in whicli Pro-
testantism involved tho principle of private judgment, sec the remarks of Mr. Hallam,
Literature of Kiirojw, vol. i. ch. 0, § 33.
» See Klee, Kat/i. I)ogm. vol. i, p. 312.
IT.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONH OF KELIOIOX. 67
any poncral ajj^rcement amonjr divines of different churches, as

there is anion^ men of science as to their respective sulijccts in
different countries ; and scarcely even any tendency to such an
agreement.' Attempts at mutual conversion on a large scale
entirely fail while those which are limited in their numhers give
;
rise to questions as to the motives of the converts, and add but

little strength to the church which receives them.'* P]ven a
government cannot safely adopt any autliority in ecclesiastical
matters, or assume the exclusive truth of any one form of Christi-
anity. It must look mainly to the numhers of each religious
persuasion, in deciding the question of endowments for religious

and educational purposes and to the religion of parents in
;
est;i}>lishing the ndes for determining the creed in which children,

incapa])le of judging for.tliemselves, are to be brought up.^
The Church of Kome makes boldly the claim of authority for
its own decisions. But there is a large, and that not the least
enlightened and intelligent, portion of the Christian world which
peremptorily denies this claim. Moreover, even among its own
members, there is great difference of opinion as to the organs of
that authority. The ultramontane doctrines differ on this head
from those of some of the national churches. Decisions, which
some classes of Roman-catholics consider as authoritative, otliers
refuse to admit as genuine expressions of the voice of the church.
Even if it is conceded that the teaching of the church carries
with it an authority binding upon the consciences of all the faith-

ful, yet there is no general agreement as to the extent of the
church, or the communion signified by this term. The member
of the Church of Rome limits the acceptation of cliurch to his
' Compare Note C. at the end of the eliapter.

* L<jrd Clarendon, in his Essay Against the Miiltiph/ing Controversies, remarks
upon the fact, 'that all the conferences held, and all the books written, between those
of the Roman and those of the reformed religion, for the space of above 150 years, by
men of unquostionalilo knowledp;c and virtue, should not work upon any one man, for
ought appears, to change the opinion he brought with him ; for of those who run from
one communion to another, they are such who do not pretend to judge of arguments,
or such who seldom give an account of their true inducements,' &c., p. 241, ed. fol.
And in his History of the lichellion, lie says —
Our observation and experience can give
'
us few examples of men who have changed their religion, and not fallen into some
jealousy and distrust, or disreputation, even with those with whom they side, that
have made their future life less pleasant and delightsome; which, it may be, happens
oidy bocauHo wo have rare instances of men of extraordinary parts, or great iiiinda,
who have cntortained those conversions,' vol. 317, ed. Vlmo.
iv. p.
* On this ûI>jl c^, some furtlicr remarks arc made in Chapter IX.
F 2
own clmreli ; Protestants include under it different ecclesiastical

communities, agreeing only in the profession of the Christian
faith, or agreeing in certain fundamental tenets, such as the
—
Athanasian doctrine of the Trinity or in a certain form of church
government, such as episcopacy. Even as to the term ' Catholic
cluirch,' there is no general agreement in Christendom. The
historical usage limits this term to the Church of Rome, which
never was a universal church, in the sense of its including, de
facto, all Christians but was universal, or Catholic, only in the
;
sense of its claiming to be orthodox, and therefore to include, de

jure, all Christendom, and also as not being a merely national
church, but comprehending several nations and countries. Pro-
testant divines in general, however, extend the term Catholic
church either to all Christendom,^ or they limit it by some con-
dition, as to which there The Catholic
is a variety of opinion. '
chm'ch,' or ' modern Oxford school, is a

Catholic consent ' of the
perfectly arbitraiy standard, which can satisfy no marked denom-
ination of Christians. Of what avail is it to imagine an invisible
ideal church, formed of such heterogeneous and mutually repelling
bodies, as the Church of Rome, the
Chm-ch Grreek Church, and the
of England ? What agreement exists, or can exist, between them,
and how can it be defined or expressed ? The Church of Rome,
by its authentic organs, proscribes the Church of England as
heretical, and will hold no communion or church-memhersliip
with it. The Church of England lays it down, in an equally
authentic manner, that the Church of Rome has erred in matters
both of faith and discipline and authoritative divines of the
;
Anglican Chiuch teach that the Church of Rome is a clnu'ch

without a religion. Under these circumstances, no practical
solution of sectarian differences can be derived by a reference to
' Catholic consent,' so determined.
It follows that no person can accept the doctrines of tlie
Church of Rome, upon the mere authority of the rulers and
doctors of that church, with the same well-foimded security
against error which he possesses for his belief in adopting the
established truths of astronomy or mechanics, upon the mere
credit of mathematicians and men of science.
'
As to the claim of the reformed churches to bo mombors of the Catliolic church,
and the dechirations on the subject in their confessions, see Klee. Kathol. Dognutlil-,
vol. i. p. 98. Sec Brctschneidcr, Glauhcnshhrc, § 55, for the rieMs of tho modern
German Prote.'itjuits on the meaning of 'Cafliolic church.' As to Jurieu's doctrine,
see Palmer. %-ol. i. p. 128.

IT.J AUTHORITY To QUI'^sTIOXS OF KKLKilON. 69
The same objection, t'ouiuK'd on Llic ;il».si'nct.' ot' a j^cniTjil

tendency to agreement, amonj^ the principal theo-
ajj^reement, or
logians of Christendom, ai)plies also to each of the l^rob'stant
creeds. The existence of the non-Protestant sects weakens the
authority of the divines of the Protestant churches ; the existence
of tlie non-Catholic sects weakens the authority of the divines of
the Church of Kome. The authority of each Protestant church
is, again, still further weakened by the existence of mutual differ-
ences between Protestants as to their respective tenets.'
Besides wliich, the Protestant writers lay less stress on the
authoritative teaching of the church they admit that national
;
churches have erred and they hold that no doctrine of any chiux'h
;
is binding, imless it can be proved by Scripture. The teaching

of the church is not, as such, according to them, decisive it must ;
be demonstrably founded on Scripture authority. Add to whicli,

that while they refer to Scripture as their exclusive canon of
religious truth, they scarcely claim to possess any rule of inter-
preting Scripture, or of resolving doubts as to the signification of
particular passages. For the interpretation of Scriptm'e, each
Protestant church relies upon the expositions of approved com-
mentators, and, in doctrinal passages, principally on those of its
own communion, but without setting up any infallible rule or

standard of interpretation.''
§ 15, On account of the intrinsic obsciuity and transcendental
nature of the leading ideas in theology, and of the difficulty of
arriving, even with the aid of revelation, at distinct and intelli-
gible conclusions on subjects lying without the domain of human
consciousness or sensation, it would be extremely desirable, for the
guidance of people in general, that a consentient authority in
(questions of Christian theology should exist. The attempts to
remove error, to enlighten dissidents from the true faith, to create
a trustworthy authority in things spiritual, and to produce a unity
of the church, have been ill-devised and unsuccessful — but they
have almost invariably been sincere. They have originated in a
sense of the evils springing from diversity of religious opinion,
without a common living point of reference, and of the advan-
tages likely to accrue from uniformity of faith and church disci-
pline. Instead, however, of resorting to conciliatory courses, and
' See Bossuot, Variations des Plglvics Protestantes, Prof. sect. 16.
* See tlio ProtcsUmt doctrine of .Scripturo-interprotiitiou explained iit large, liy
JercHiy Taylur, in the Liberty of VropJicsijing, sect. 4.
—
of endeavouring- to diminish diflf'erences by amicable explanations
and mutual concessions, the teachers of theology and leaders of

churches and sects have, in general, condemned diversities of
opinion with asperity, and in a confident and intolerant spirit,
which has provoked retaliation and perpetuated division. By
seeking thus to propagate truth in a matter in which allowances
ought peculiarly to be made for difference of opinion, divines
have multiplied controversies beyond all reasonable limits so that ;
the most patient student is bewildered in the labyrinth of dis-

cussion, and the most deferential inquirer is at a loss to which
authority he is to bow. When, however, a person, either from a
firm reliance on the creed of the church in which he has been
brought up, or from independent examination, is satisfied of the
general truth of the doctrines of any particular church, he will
naturally regard with respect the divines who are considered as
authorities within that religious communion. In all controversies
and on between members of the same
discussions, too, carried
chiuch, the works of the received text-writers and leading divines
of that church will be referred to as a common authority and
standard of decision. It is in this sense that the Church of
England, according to the opinion of the best expositors of its
articles, claims authority in matters of faith, (Art. XX.) Its
authority is limited to its own members.
This is, which is
in substance, the view of church authority
taken by Hooker. In determining the Rule of Faith, he places
Scripture in the first rank and, in the next, such direct and
;
manifest inferences from it as each person may make by his own

unassisted judgment. The last place he assigns to the authority
of the church, which he justly considers as more competent, in a
corporate capacity, to decide doubtful questions thun any of its
individual members.'
§ 16. On reviewing what has been said above on the state of
religious o])inion in Christendom, and the claim to authority
' Be it matter of the one kind or of the other [i. e., matter of order or of doctrine],
'
what Scripture doth phiinly deliver, to tliat the first place both of credit and obodieuce
is due the next whereunto is whatsoever any man can necessarily conclude by
;
force of reason ; after these the voice of the I'iiat which the church
church succcodoth.
by her ecclesiastical authority shall and define to be true or good, must
probably tJiink
in congruity of reason overrule all other inferior judgments whatsoever.' EccL Pol. b.
V. cii. viii. § 2. Compare also Pref. c. iii. §§1,2, and b. ii., where, confuting the ex-
aggerations of the Puritans, he shows that human reason is the ultimate test in judging
of Scripture. A similar view of church auihorily is taken by l)p. Uumixlen, Bamjpton
Lecture.^, Lcct. 8, p. 372, od. 2.
—
IT.] Al'TIIOUITY TO QUF:STI0NS OF REUGION. 71
possessed by any one of its churches or sections, we are led to the

followin<^ conclusions :
1. That no airreement as to the distinctive or characteristic

doctrines of the several Christian sects exists among tlie theo-
logians of Christendom, and, consequently, that no church or
(k-nomination of Christians can claim assent to its tenets, and hy
its legitimate authority command the belief of a conscientious
inquirer, on the grounds on which a reasonable deference may bs
paid to authority in secular matters.
That altliough there is no agreement as to the peculiar
2.
doctrines of any Christian church, there is an agreement among

all civilised nations in accepting some form of Christianity, and
in recognising the Christian revelation according to some con-

struction of its eflfect and intent.
The practical deduction from these results seems to be, that
the mere autliority of any chiu-cli or sect cannot of itself reason-
ably command assent to its distinctive and peculiar tenets, while
tlie present divisions of Christendom continue and that a person ;
l)orn in a Christian country can only with propriety adopt one of

two alternatives — viz., either to adhere to the faith of his parents
and predecessors, and that of the church in which he has been

educated, or, if he is unwilling to abide by this creed, to form Ids
own judgment as to the choice of his sect by means of the best in-
dependent investigation which his understanding and opportunities
for study enable him to make.
This conclusion is, in the main, identical with the result at
which Jeremy Taylor arrives in his Liberty of Prophesying, with
whose words I will conclude this chapter.
* Although,' (he says,) ' we are secmêd in fundamental points
from involuntary error, by the plain, express, and dogmatical
places of Scripture, yet in other things we are not, but may be
invincibly mistaken, because of the obscm*ity and difficulty in the
controverted parts of Scriptiu-e, by reason of the uncertainty of
the means of its interpretation ; since tradition is of an uncertain
reputation, and sometimes evidently false ; councils are contra-
dictory to each other, and therefore certainly are equally deceived
many of them, and therefore all may
and then the popes of;
Rome but cannot ascertain us of

are very likely to mislead us,
truth in matter of question and in this world we believe in part,
;
and prophesy in part and this imperfection shall never be done

;
away till we be translated to a more glorious state : either we

— —
72 ox THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF [ch.
must throw our chances, and get truth by accident or predestina-

tion, or elsewe must lie safe in a mutual toleration, and private
liberty of persuasion, unless some other anchor can be thought
upon, where we may fasten our floating vessels, and ride safely.'
Sect. VII., ad fin.
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV.
Note A. (page ol.)
' It is, indeed, true that the prevalence of internal differences disturhed the
unity of collective Christendom ; hut, if we do not deceive oiu'selves, it is another
universal law of human things that this distui'hance prepared a higher and a
larger development of the hmuan mind.
In the press of the universal struggle, religion was conceived by different
'
nations after the different varieties of its dogmatical forms. The peculiar dogma
adopted was incorporated with the feeling of nationality, as a possession of the
—
community of the state or the people. It was won by the sword maintained —
amidst a thousand dangers it had become part of the life's blood of the nations.
;
* Hence it has come to pass, that the states on either side haê grown into
great ecclesiastico-political bodies, whose individuality is marked on the —
Catholic, by the measm-e of their devotedness to the Roman see, and of the
degree of toleration or exclusion of non-Catholics ; but still more strongly on the
Protestant, where the departure from the symbolical books adopted as tests, the
mixture of the Lutheran and the Calvinistic creeds, the greater or less approx-
imation to an episcopal constitution of the church, form so many striking and
obvious distinctions. The first question in every country is what is its pre- —
dominant religion ? Christianity appears imder various forms but, however ;
gi'eat be the discrepancies between them, no party can deny to another the pos-
session of the fundamentals of faith. On the contrary, these several forms are
guaranteed by compacts and by treaties of peace, to which all are parties, and
which are, as it were, the fundamental laws of a univei-sal republic. Never more
can the thought of exalting the one or the other confession to universal supremacy
find place among men. The only consideration now is, how each state, each
people, can best proceed from the basis of its own politico-religious principles to
the development of its inteUectiial and moral powers. On this depends the
future condition of the world.' R.vnke's Popes of Rome, vol. ii. ad Jin. Engl.
Transl.
Note B. (page G2.)
The transmission of the evidence for an historical fact by oral tradition may
be illustrated by the celebrated story of the ring, which the favourite Essex is
said to have sent to Queen Elizabeth before his execution. Tins story
was handed down by tradition in the family of the Vav\ of Monmouth, and
was first published, in an authentic form, by Mr. Rirch, in 174'.). Tlie
Cuimtc'SS of Nottingham, who appears as a priuciiwil party in the transaction, was
—
IV.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RKLIGION. 73
the wife of the Ix)rJ Ili^'h Admiral, and sister of Robert, luirl of Monmouth.
Henry, Earl of Momuouth, eon of luirl lioljert, had a daughter Martha, who
married John, ICarl of Middk-ton. I^tdy IClizalx'th J^pelman was the daufrhter
of the I'jirl and Countofs of Middletun and from her report, (who was the grreut-
;
frranddauf.'hter of the Countess of Xottinjrham's brother,) Birch published the

jiarticulars of the timlition in the rei<rn of George II. {Xeyotiatioiis, p. 20G.)
The story had, however, obtained publicity at an earlier period
it was loiown ;
in the reign of Charles I.Mr. Hyde, who disbelieved it to Sir Dudley

to —
Carleton, who told it to Prince Maurice in Holland, (see Birch's Memoirs of
(iueen Elizabeth, pp. 481, 400,) and to Francis Osborn, who published it in his
Traditional Memoirs on the Reign of Queen Elizabeth, in 1G58, pp. 92-5.
According to these versions of the story, the ring was sent by Fssex to the
Countess of Nottingham, to be given to the Queen but according to Lady ;
l"'lizal)eth SjK'lman'a vei-sion, the ring was sent to Lady Scrope, and given by
mistijke to her sister. Lady Nottingham. Upon the evidence of the tradition
l>ubli.><hed by Birch, the story has been accepted as true by Hume and other
historians.
Note C. (page G7.)
It is curious to compare the difficulties started by Lucian with respect to the

choice of a particular sect among the several schools of ancient philosophy. The
impossibility of personally investigating the doctrines of each sect, and the
aljsence of all a jmori authority in favour of an}', are urged by huu with his
usual ingenuity and power of sarcasm in the dialogue entitled //erwioifwH/s, 7rfj»i i)
nipfffUDi'. In this dialogue, Ilermotimus, a Stoic philosopher, is pressed by his

friend Lyciuus to state his reasons for selecting the Stoic sect in preference to
the others. The following is an outline of the argument :
Lycinus begins by asking Ilermotimus what induced hun, when there were
so many philosophic schools, to prefer the Stoic sect, while he was still a common
man, an Iciwrrig, and ignorant of philosophy ? Were you (he says) directed to
it by the voice of an oracle ? (c. 15.) Ilenuotimus answers that he made the
choice upon his own judgment, and that, in choosing the true philosophy, he
was guided by the numbers of its adherents. Being asked how he knew that the
Stoics were more munerous than the Epicureans or Peripatetics, and whether he
counted them as at a public vote, (KnOA-rip ivroli; xf^po^''vinic,) he says that he
guessed their number. Lycinas remarks upon the unsatisfactory nature of this
test, and Henuotinuis then adds that he had another reason he had heard every-
;
body say that the Epicureans were addicted to pleasiu-e, that the Peripatetics
were fond of money, and the Platonics fidl of conceit but that the Stoics were
;
enduring and wise, .and that their followers were the only perfect men, (c. 16.)
Having furnished this second test, he is forced to admit that he did not take this
favourable character of the Stoics from the Stoics themselves, or the imfavour-
able clmracter of the other seels from those sects and he does not deny that ho
;
toojv it fnjm the ignorant and illiterate. Upon Lycinus expressing his wonder
that any one should have deprived his opinions respecting philosophy fi'om such
an authority, Ilermotuuus tries another ground. He had always observed (he
says) that the Stoics were decent and serious in their demeanour, properly
clothed, holding a fit medium between efl'eniinacy and negligence, with their
heads close shaveu. Lycinus inquires whether we are to judge of merit merely
74 ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PEINCIPLE OF [ch.
by frravity of Siirely (he says) there must

deportment, dress, and long beards.
be some iiiiiA-ersal by and y\-e are not left to decide whether
criterion to judge ;
a man is a good or bad philosciplier by his outward appearance, (c. 18, 10.)
Lyciuiis, unable to obtain from his friend any satisfactory mark of the true
sect, says that he will try to discover it for himself, (c. 21.)
lie proceeds to compare philosophy with a happy and well-governed city,
and to represent himself ae seeking the way to it. Many persons offer themselves
as guides, and point out different roads —
one leading to the east and another to
the west one to the south and another to the north one passing through a
; ;
pleasant country, others rough and laborious, but all supposed to bring the
traveller to the same city, (c. 22-5.) ' Thus I am still left in doubt and un-
certainty, for at the entrance of eveiy path I am met by a man, worthy no doubt
of all confidence, who stretches out his hand and desires me to follow him, telling
me that his is the only right way, and that all the other guides are wandering in
ignorance, having neither come from the city themselves, nor being able to
direct others to it. The next and the next I meet tells me the same story of his
own path, and abuses the other guides and so will every one of them. It is
;
this variety of ways which distracts and confounds us where each guide con- ;
tends for and praises his own, I caimot tell which to follow, or how I am ever
to arrive at this happy city,' (c. 26.)
Ilermotimus now says that he can remove all his friend's doubts let him :
trust those who have gone the joiu'ney before him, and he cannot eiT. Lycinus,
however, is not satisfied with this receipt each guide (he says) praises his own
:
road exclusively: one takes Plato's, another Zeno's, but no one knows more
than his own, and it is impossible to be sure that the road leads, after all, to the
right cit}' the guide may be mistaken, (c. 27.)
:
Ilermotimus then assiu-es him that he may go the whole round, but he wiU
never find better guides than the Stoics. Let him follow Zeno and Chry-
sippus, and they wiU lead him aright, (c. 29.)
Lycinus repeats that this assurance is unsatisfactory, and that a similar one
would be given by the Platonists and Epicm'eans of t/ieir leaders. Each thinks
his o"\^"n sect the best, and vaunts his o-rti guide. Besides, you are only acquainted
with your own doctrines, and you condemn those of the other sects without
knowing them. Ilermotimus denies this. The Stoic teachers (he says) in their
lectm-es always mention the tenets of the other schools, and refute them,
(0.32.)
Lycinus ti'eats this argmneut as futile. The other philosophers would not
(he replies) be content to be so judged. Yom- philosophers set up men of straw,
in order that they may be
knocked do\\ii. Such a controversy is no real
easily
conflict, but a sham which the victory is certain beforehand. 'In short,
tight, in
(concludes Lycinus,) while it remains uncertain which is the best sect in philo-
sophy, I am resolved not to follow any one, as that would be an affront upon aU
tlie rest,' (c. 34.)
Ilermotimus insists that it is needless to study the other philosophies. Truth
(he says) may be learnt from the Stoics without going to all the other sects.
If a man told you that two and two are four, it would not be necessary for you
to saspend your belief until you had consulted all persons versed in arithmetical
iicience, (c. 35.)
Lycinus denies the appliuibility of this argmucnt. The subjects about which
—
IT.] AUTHORITY TO QUESTIONS OF RELIGION. 75
tlio pliilosopliic soctd dill'tT nro iloulitful ; there is no mode of reeohing the doubt,
niid no common afrreement, (c. •'?<!.)
tlie only nmn (iw continues") in whom I can re-

AVith repird to philosnjihy,
pose confidence one who hius mastered tlie doctrines of all the sect^, has tried
is
them all, and ha^ chosen that which, hy his own experience, he is satisfied is the
only one which can jruide him to true happiness. If we can meet with such a
man, our labour is at an end. But such a man (says Ilermotimus) cannot easily
)je found, (c. 4G.)
The two disputants then enter into a calculation as to the length of time
which must be allowed for obtaining a familiar knowledge of the tenets of each
sect,and they reckon ten sects at twenty years each, (c. 48.) Ilermotimus re-
nuirks that,make what reiluction they will, veiy few persons woidd be able to
go through all the sects, though they began as soon as they were Ixjrn. On this
Lvcinus repeats, that unless a man knows all the systems, he cannot select the
best, except by chance ; he can only stmuble upon it accidentally in the dark,
(c. 49.)
Ilermotimus complains that Lycinus requires impossibilities. lie will neither
accept the opinion of those who judge for themselves, unless they have lived the
life of a phcenix, nor will he follow those who are satisfied -R-ith the consent of
the multitude. Lycinus asks who are the miUtitude ? If it consists of men
who understand the subject, one will suffice but if of the ignorant, their ninn-
;
Ix-r does not infiuence his belief, (c. 53.) Hennotimus then retui-ns to self-judg-
ment. It may be right (he admits) to inquire into the opinions of each sect, but
the length of time assigned by Lycinus is excessive. judgment may be A
formed from a portion or sample ex unyue leonem. Lycinus replies that when
the whole is known, it can be judged from a part ; but in this case the whole is
not known. If the philosophers had thought their principles simple and easy of
acquisition, they probably would not have WTitten so many thousand volumes,
(c. 54-G.) He adds, that if his friend is impatient of the time and labour neces-
sary for examination, he had better send for a diviner, or draw lots for the best,
(C.57.)
Ilermotimus inquires if he to give up the matter in despair, unless he can
is
live a hundred years? (c. 03.) Lycinus then undertakes to point out the quali-
fications rwjuisite for inquiring into the subject. These are acuteness of mind,
long-continued hibour and study, and perfect uupartiality, (c. G4.) Even with
these qmiliiiaitious, a person is not secured against error. It is possible that all
the different sects of philosophy may be in error, and that the truth has not yet
been discovered, (c. G5, GG.)
l^ycinas then proceeds to another objection. He asks his friend whether, in
all the sects, there are not teachers who say that they alone understand the sub-
ject, and that all the othei-s are mere pretenders to knowledge. Ilermotimus
assents to this jn-oposition, and admits that it is diflicult to distinguish between
the and the impostoi-s, (c. G8.) If, therefore, (says Lycinus,)
ti-ue i)hilosophere
you meet with a master who himself Imows, and can teach you the art of
ciin
demonstration, and how to determine in doubtfiQ cases, yoiu* labour is at an end,

for then what is good and true will innuediately appear falsehood will be de- ;
tecttH.1 ydu will be able to make choice of tlus best philosophy will acquire that
;
—
ha])piness which you have so long been in search of, and possess everything (hat
is desirable, llcnuotimus is delighted with this view, and declares that he will
76 APPLICABILITY OF AUTHORITY TO RELIGION. [ch.
inylantly look out for such a guide, (c. 69.) Lyciuiuj, however, immediately
destroys his satisfaction by showing that this man, if found, coidd not be relied
on, until another pei-son was discovered, who could decide if he was a safe giude,
and so on, to a third. His demonstrations, too, woidd be called in question;
everything would revolve in a circle of uncertainty, and nothing would be deter-
mined, (c. 70.)
After some fm*ther arguments of Lycinus against the Stoic system in particu-
lar, llermotimus owns that he is convdnced of his error, and declares his intention
to renounce philosophy henceforth, (c. 83.) Lycinus adds that he should have
used precisely the same arguments if his friend had belonged to any one of the
other philosophic sects, (c, 85.)
v.] UTILITY AND rROPER PROVINCK OF AUTHORITY
CHAPTER V.
ON THE UTILITY AND TROrER TROVINCE OF AUTHORITY.
§ 1. It lias been shown briefly in Chapter II., that a large

portion of the opinions of mankind are necessarily derived from
authority. Children necessarily imbibe the opinions of their
parents and teachers the time and means for the independent
;
investigation of speculative opinions on a large number of subjects

are wanting and on questions of practice it is necessary for a
;
man to be guided by the advice of professional persons, having had

a special training and experience in the matter.
We have, in a subsequent chapter, attempted to trace the
marks of a trustworthy authority in matters of speculation and
practice, and have described the means by which trustworthy
autliority is gradually formed. This description, as we have
further shown, does not apply, without considerable qualifications,
to religious questions.
We now turn to consider what are the proper uses of authoritv,
and what are the circumstances in which it can be resorted to with
advantage, for the guidance of opinion, and the management of
the affairs of life, both private and public.
As to speculative questions of science and philosophy, every
person ought, as far as his leisure and opportunities for reading
and reflection will permit, to attempt to form for himself an in-
dependent judgment. Every person, however, will find in numer-
ous subjects that he is unable to go through the processes neces-
sary for forming such a judgment and, with respect to these, he
;
ought, in tlie choice of his authority, to be guided by the maxims

stated above. Vita brevis, ars longa^ says the old Hippocratean
aphorism ;
' and even when a person succeeds
in mastering a great
variety of subjects, the result is not always satisfactory. Men of
' See Hippficnit., Aphorism. I. § l,(t'in). iv. p. 4")8, I'd. Littro.)
78 ON THE UTILITY AND [ch.
encyclopacdiacal minds are not always perspicuous or precise ; still
less often are they original and inventive. Multum legere, non
viulta, is a good maxim for all who desire to extend the bounds
of a science, or to be sound practitioners in any art or profession.
The division of scientific labour, like the division of mechanical
labour, increases both and its precision.
its productiveness
Where the attention is concentrated upon the same intellectual
object, the result is a performance at once more finished and more
complete. It is, however, necessary that men of comprehensive
minds should survey the whole circle of the sciences, should under-
stand their mutual relations, and adapt them to each other, as, in
the progress of discovery, they change their respective positions.
Those who devote the chief part of their thoughts and studies to
one science, ought to be aware of its place in the scientific system,
and to appreciate the extent to which it may be influenced by the
cultivation of other sciences. They ought to avoid that narrow-
ing influence which is produced by restricting the mind to the
exclusive contemplation of one subject. Above all, every person
should, as far as his means extend, make himself master of the
methods of scientific investigation, so as to be able to judge
whether, in the treatment of any question, a sound and correct
method, conformable to the precepts of a philosophical logic, has
been observed. Provided with this organon or instrument for
determining the truth, he may, after applying it to subjects lying-
out of his own special province, rest satisfied with a knowledge of
the results, without attempting a verification of all the steps by
which they have been obtained,'
§ 2. Even in cases where a person undertakes to form an in-
dependent judgment for himself, by an examination of the appro-
priate evidence, and by the proper logical processes, he ought to
treat with respect the opinions of competent judges, and yield a
reasonable deference to their authority. Upon all doubtful
questions, in which the elements of decision are numerous and
complex, and the evidence conflicting, the opinion of able and
honest judges is entitled to great weight, and will cause any
candid and cautious person, if he comes to an opposite conclusion,
to distrust his own judgment, and enounce his own opinion witli
modesty and hesitation.
Whenever a person, luiving formed an opinion upon grounds
'
Comparo Comto, Cours dc Vhilosaphie Positive, toin. i. pp. 29—32 ; torn. iv. p.
2U ; torn. vi. pp. 102, 475 ; WliowtU, I'lul. of Ind. Sciences, h. XI. c. G, § 9.
— —
T.} PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 79
whicli appear satisfactory to himself, asserts it confidently, and
adheres to it resolutely, without showing due deference to tlic

authority of otliers, he is justly exposed to the charge of arror/aiice
or presuiiiptioji in judging.' The opinion of experienced men,
having a special acciuaintance with the subject, is always entitled
to weight, even if it be unsup])ort«'d by argument.' Hence, all
young persons, who attempt to judge for themselves, either are,
or apjx'ar to be, arrogant ; as they can scarcely fail to set at
nttuglit the (j)inions of persons more experienced and of greater
authority than tla-msi'lves. It is ditlicult for a young man, on
account of the narrow circle of his experience, to discriminate

l)etween the cases in whieli lie ought to judge for himself, and
those in which he ought to defer to the opinions of others. He
ought not to form, in youth, a habit of blind submission to
authority, such as the Jesuits inculcated upon their disciples but ;
a spirit of docility, and respect for the opinions of their elders,

undoubtedly becomes the yoimg and it is certain that their ;
opinions, especially on practical questions, however formed, will

in general be of very little value to others,^ however important it
' The appeal

to authority is callid by Locke argnimntum ad verecundiam, be-
cauiso thought a breach of modesty to question the opiuion of men of authority.
it is
Estai/ on (he Vndfrxlandlng, b. iv. c. 17, § 19.

" A«r Ttpoaixi^y T&ii' ifiirtiptov Kal itpiafivrepdiv ^ (ppovi/jLUV Ta?r avairoSe'iKTOis ipafffai
Kol h6^cus ovx ITTOV Twv kitoSd^fwy. 5ia yap rh «X*'*' *'' ''"'J^ e/UTreipi'as vfifia dpwfftv
opOus. --AmsTOT. Eth. Xic. \1. 12.
Tlie wisiloin of the a^red in council has been proverbial from antiquity downwards.
Concerning ôv\a\ y(p6vTuv, see Eurip. Melanipiy. fr. 23. 'Quod senior loquitur,
omnes consilium putant,' s;iys Publius Syrus, v. 672. Anciennete a autorite, is a
French proverb in Leroux do Lincy, torn. ii. p. 173. Compare Cicero dc Senect. c. 6
and 17. Apex seneetutis est auctoritas habet senectus, honorata prresertim,
. . .
tantiim auctoritatem, ut ea pluris sit, quam omnes adolesccntire voluptates. Wisdom

in council belongs to ago and experience, according to Hobbes, Leviathan, II. c. 2a,
p. 247. '
If the comparison do stmd between man and man, whicli shall hearken
unto other ; sith the aged for the most part are best experienced, least subject to
rash and unadvised passions, it hath been ever judged reasonable that their sentence
in matter of counsel should be better trusted, and more relied upon than other
men's. Sharp and subtle discour.ses of wit procure many times very great applause,
. .
but being laid in the balance with tliat which the habit of sound experience plainly
deliveretli, they are overweigheil.' IIookkk, Eccl. Pol. b. v. c. T, § 1.
' Young men understand geometry, &c., but are not wise or prudent, because
wisdom is concerned about particulars, which are derived from experience, and for
experience a lapse of time is requisite. —
Akistot. Eth. Nic. vi. 9. Compare I. 1,
where lie says that a young man is not able to understand social science, for it relates
to human and conduct, of whicli he is inexperienced. In Bhct. II. 12, § 14, he
life
says that young men always violate tlio maxim, ^TjSej/ &yav no quid nimis. Tliey —
love in excess, and liate in excess, and do everything in excess. For the same reason,
—
may be to themselves to cultivate a habit of independent and

conscientious judgment.
Persons who have formed habits of independent thought and
examination likewise generally subject themselves to the same
—
reproach inasmuch as they often attach an undue weiglit to a
chain of reasoning which they have gone through in their own
minds, as compared with the opinions of persons who appear to be
entitled, by their experience, to pronounce authoritatively on the
subject. It is no easy matter to define the point where pre-
sumption, arrogance, and obstinacy end, and where firmness,
and proper self-reliance begin. It is difficult, again,
resolution,
to discriminate between teachableness, humility, and reverence
for high authorities, and a tame and passive submission of the
understanding.
Universally, indeed, it may be said, that no person ought to
express a confident opinion upon speculative grounds, until he
lias ascertained, by careful investigation, the unsoundness of the
reasons for a different opinion, held by practical and experienced
men. If, however, after a due examination, he differs from their
conclusion, he cannot, even if he be wrong, justly be taxed with
arrogance. To persist in error after proper inquiry and reflection,
is not presumptuous, although it may imply other moral or intel-
lectual defects.^
§ 3. Undoubtedly, it is to be desired that a man should be
able to judge for himself; and he ought to avoid any undue
reliance on the authority of others. The general soundness of
opinions will be promoted by the prevalence of a free exercise of
private judgment, in cases where the means of arriving at a cor-
rect conclusion exist. But in a large number of subjects, and in
multitudes of practical questions, an independent judginent is
impossible, or inexpedient and a great part of practical wisdom

;
consists in the judicious selection of authorities, and in a steady
they think thej' know everything, and assert it with confidence. Hence the precept
of Cicero: Est igitur adolescentis majorcs natu vorori, cxque his deligero optinios ot
probatissimos, quorum consilio atque auctoritate nitjitur. Ineuntis autem aetatis
inscitia senum constituenda et regenda pnidentia est. I)e Off. I. 34.
'
On the want of humility charged to the Puritans, see some remarks of Dr.
Arnold, Lectures on Modern History, pp. 209-10. The cxccllenco of veneration (he
'
says) consists purely in its being fixed upon a worthy object when felt indiscrimin-
;
ately, it is idolatry or insanity. To tax anyone, therefore, witli want of reverence

because he pays no respect to wliat we venerate, is cither irrelevant, or is a mere con-
fusion.' — p. 210.
— — —
T.] PROPER PROVINCR OF AUTHORITY. 81
reliance ujxni lliuii" opinion. 'That man,' (s;iy.s llcsiinl,' in sunif

celebrated verses, which ae<|nire(l in antiijuity alnKtst an oracnhxr
authority,) — 'that man is the most excellent, wIjo can always
think for himself. He, too, is a good man who will tiike sound
advice from others. But he who can neither think for himself,
nor will listen to the sound advice of others, is a worthless man.'
If a person lias not the capacity, or time, or means, requisite foi*
forminj^ an independent judgment on any question, speculative or
practical, his lirst endeavour ought to be, to select as his guides
those who are most likely to have judged correctly for themselves,
or to give him sivfe advice. If, as Hesiod says, he can neither form
a correct opinion for himself, nor select as his guides such persons
judge soundly on the matter, his conclusion cannot
as are likely to
but be erroneous.
With respect to decisions having an immediate bearing upon
practice, every man of sense and prudence will, in a large number
of cases, defer to the opinion of others. On legal questions, he
will consult a lawyer on medical questions, a physician on
; ;
pecuniary questions, a banker, a broker, or a land-agent on the ;
education of his children, a person engaged in tuition on the ;
management of his garden, a horticulturist on the building o^ ;
his house, an architect —

and so on. The advantage of taking
professional advice in practical questions, requiring special know-
ledge and experience, is attested by the universal habit of resorting
to it, where the means of payment exist; and also by such proverbs
as, ' He who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client.' ^
§ 4. The practical convenience which results from the power

of consulting a class of persons who make a particular subject their
especial study and the business of their life, is also shown by the
• Op. ct Di. 291. Compare Herod, vii. IG and Soph. Antig. 719-23. ; Sapion- '
tissimum esse dicunt eum cui quod opus sit ipsi veniat in mentem proximo aceedero ;
ilium, qui alterius bene invontis obtemperct.' Cicero, Cluent. c. 31. 'Siepe ego audivi,
milites, eum primum esse virum, qui ipse consulat quid in rem sit ; secundum eum
qxii bene monenti obediat: qui nee ipse consulere, nee alteri parere sciat, eum extremi
ingenii esse.' Livy, xxii. 29.
* Men obey willingly a person whom tliey consider wiser than thomsolvos. For
example, the sick are anxious to call in a pliysician to prescribe for them, and those in
a ship gladly obey the steersman ; and travellers arc reluctant to be loft by those who
know the ways better than themselves. Xkn. Cyrop. I. 6, § 21.
Aussi le nouveau Consul parut-il avoir sur toutes choses, ou une opinion faite, ou
'
una opinion qui se faisait avec la rapiditc de I'dclair, surtout apres avoir entendu les
hommcs speciaux, qui etjiient les seals qu'il ecouldt, ct uniqueniont sur I'objet qui cou-
cernait lour sp^cialitd.' Of B(ynttparte, Thikks, Hist, du Consulat et de P Empire, liv.
i. (torn. i. p. 2o.)
G
— —
82 ON THE UTILITY AND [ch,
which takes place within a profession.

furtlier subdivision of labour
Additional accuracy and produced by an exclusive attention
skill is
to a certain sub-department of a subject. Thus, in England, the

medical profession is divided into physicians, surgeons, apothe-
caries, accoucheurs, oculists, aurists, dentists ; the legal profession
is divided into barristers practising in the common law courts,
those practising in the courts of equity, conveyancers, special
pleaders ; attorneys and solicitors. Similar subdivisions of labour
take place in other branches of practice as civilisation advances,
and the means of remunerating skilled advice increase.
In disputed questions before courts of justice, involving pro-
fessional or scientific knowledge, persons having the requisite
acquirements are often called as witnesses, not as to the matter of
fact, but to guide the court by their opinion. Thus, in questions
of violent death by dro^vning, wounds, poisoning, or other means,
medical men are examined in cases of value of property, survey-
;
ors and in various branches of trade, the persons belonging to

;
each. Witnesses of this sort are called by the Italians periti, and
by the French experts ; there is no appropriate name for them in
our law, but the practice equally prevails.^
The judgment of professional men, generally, is respected, as
compared with unprofessional men, on their own subject. But, as
compared with one another, the opinion of some professional men
carries weight in the profession, and of others does not. Thus, in
the legal profession, tliere are certain text-writers and eminent
judges and jurists, to whose opinion the practising members of the
bar would generally defer, and whose dicta they would cito' in
argument, as carrying authority ^ and in other professions, such ;
' enumerating the lircumstances which give authoritj' to testimony,

Cicero, in
places and afterwards, ingenium, opes, setas, fortuna, ars, usus, necessitas,
first, virtus,
and sometimes concursio renim fortuitarum. With regard to the hitter of these, he
sj,ys_'Sed rcliquis quoque rebus, qiiamquani in iis nulla species virtutis est, tamen
intenlum confirniatur fides, si aut ars qua-dain adhibctur, (inngua enim est vis ad per-
suadendum seienti.e,) aut iisus plerumque enim credit ur iis qui experti sunt.'
;
Topica. c. 19.
- '
Lorsque les autcurs se contraricnt, ce n'est pas toujours I'opinioii du plus grand
nombro qu'il convient d"adopter. Les opinions, en -pareil cas, s'apprecient et ne se
eoniptent pns. II pent se faire qn'iin seal ait raison. pendant que dix antrcs auront
erre. C'est alors, qu'aide du .savoir et de I'erudition, I'csprit pent montrer tout ce que
pent la sagacite et la jiistesse du rai.'ônnenient niais lorsque les auteurs sont uiia-
;
nimes, il faut etre bien siir de ses talens. pour se flatter qu'on fera juger contra Icur
sentiment. Leurs suflrngcs aeeumides font comme uii contrepoids qui Temporte neces-
sairement.' IÎk.ri.in, Ripcrtoirc dv Jurhprmhncc. .Art. Aiitorite. § 7 {of Opinions of
Tcai-vrifers.)
T.] PROPER PROVINTE OF AUTHORITY. 83
as till' iiiilitaiy, naval, medical, Sic, a similar pro-emiuejice would

bt* concedeil to certain persons by the general agreement of practical
men.
The advantage of taking professional advice, on certain classes
of practical sidtjects, is so generally recognised as not to require
proof, ^^'hen cases of this sort arise, every man who is inops coii-
sdil feels his own helplessness, and flies for advice to a person who
has knowledge and experience in the matter. But many persons,
in taking professional advice, forget that, by so doing, they virtu-
ally surrender their own independent judgment; and instead of
observing faithfully the course prescribed to them, pursue a track
compoundetl out of the advice of the professional man and their
own Such a proceeding as this can, however, rarely lead
notions.
to a good and is always contrary to the dictates of reason.
result,
—
The discretion of the layman the IBlcottjs is to be exercised in —
the choice of the professional man whom he consults Imt having ;
made his choice, he should give his confidence to his adviser, and
follow the rules prescribed for his guidance. And if his choice
has been carefully made, he should not (unless an urgent case may
render a different course expedient) be ready to withdraw his con-
fidence, and try a new adviser, even if the results of the advice
should appear at first sight unsatisfactory, and sliould not corre-
spond to the hopes which he originally entertained. It is par-
ticularly in the choice of a medical adviser, that the levity of
judgment which induces the trial of successive persons is observable.
Patients labouring under incurable or chronic maladies expect a

rapid cure ; and if this impossibility is not accomplished, they
change their physician. On the other hand, it would be absurd to say
that, where there has been a manifest error of judgment, or want of
success in the treatment of a medical case, the patient shoidd
never resort to fresh advice. Perhaps one of the best practical
rules is this that where a medical man proves on trial to have
:
taken an erroneous view of a case, and does not perform what he

undertook at the commencement, a change of advisers should be
tried; ])ut that his treatment should not be condemned, until
his own promises and predictions can ])e compared with the event.'
I/ord IJacon gives tlio following precepts rcspi'Cliiig the choice of n, pliysician
'
:
'Phywicians are, bomc of thorn, so pleasing aad conformable to the liuinour of the
patient, as they press not tlio true euro of the disease and some other are so regular in
;
])roeeedingHccording to art for the disease, as tliey respect not sufficiently tlie condition
of the patient. Take one of a middle temper, or, if it n)ay not be found in one man,
G 2
— — ;
§ 5. Much discretion is requisite in the selection of advisers in

professional and other matters requiring special qualifications, and
in turning- their advice to good account. "SVhen we see one man
almost always selecting good advisers, and acting on good advice,
and when we see another man always selecting bad advisers, and
acting on bad advice, we may be sure that this difference is not
owing to accident. There is sometimes as much practical wisdom
in choosing good counsellors as in judging for one's self. The
marks of a trustworthy guide in matters of practice are, indeed,
(as we have shown in a previous chapter,) tolerably distinct but ;
in the application of these, there is ample scope for the exercise

of a discreet judgment. Hobbes, it must be admitted, exagger-
ates the difficulty of this choice when he says, that we cannot
safely select an adviser, without being able to judge of the sound-
ness of his rules. * To know (he says) who knows the rules almost
of any art is a great degree of the knowledge of the same art

because no man can be assured of the truth of another's rides, but
he that is first taught to understand them.' By pursuing the ^
indications of a trustworthy adviser, which we have formerly

adverted to, a selection may unquestionably be made with less
labour than would be requisite for forming an independent judg-

ment upon the rules of the art. The authentication of practition-
ers by diplomas, and by other marks of public sanction, likewise
serves as a guide to the unprofessional person.^ Nevertheless, the
discrimination between sound and unsound counsellors, implies
attentive thought and inquiry. Good advice, too, when given,
does not always thrive in foolish hands. It is often misapplied, or
misunderstood, or neglected. It is like good tools in the hands of
an artisan ; though indispensable in itself, it cannot be used with-
out skill.
§ 6. There is, or at least has been, much popular prejudice

against the learned professions and this feeling has been fo-
;
mented by satirists and writers of comedy, who have ridiculed their

weaknesses and failings, such as their pedantry and their gi'ound-
less pretensions to science. It is thought that, as lawyers and
combine two of either sort and forget not to call as well the best acquainted with
;
your body, as the best reputed of for his faculty.' Essai/ XXX., on IJcfjimcn of Health.
' Leviathan, part ii. c. 30, p. 339. Cicoro says nearly to the same effect — ' Quod
dicunt omnia se credere ei quern judicent fuisse sapientem; prob.arem si id ipsuni
rudes et indocti judicarc potuisscnt. Statuerc cnimqui sit sapiens, vel niaximo vidclur
esse sapienlis.' Acad. Prior. II. 3.
- See further, on tliis subject, Chapter IX. § 17-
— ;
v.] PKOPEIi PROVINCE OF AUTUOlilTY. 85
physicians live upon the follies, the (|iuinelrf, and the diseases of
mankind, they have an interest in augmenting the pabulum on
which they subsist. But the truth is, that the legitimate and
recognised end of these professions is to provide preventives and
remedies for the ills to which human nature and human society
are suViject. The ills are inevitable ; but they can be mitigated
by prudence and good management. Now this mitigation is what
professional advice undertiikes to provide, and, in fact, to a great
extent does provide.' It is not to be expected that all the mem-
bers of a large profession should be morally perfect, or that there
should not be casies in whichprompted by an
their advice is
interested motive. But that the public
on the whole, essen- is,
tially benefited by the advice of professional men is apparent from

the earnest and universal desire to obtain their services, and from
the pecuniary sacrifices made for the pui'pose of obtaining tliem.
According to the Italian proverb
Quei consigli son prezzati,

Che son cliiesti e beu pagati.
A similar inference may be drawn from the provision made by

governments for the gratuitous supply of jDrofessioual advice,
where it cannot be procured without charitable assistance. In
almost all countries, medical attendance is provided in this man-
ner for the poor, to a greater or less extent ; and, in certain cases,
advocates are furnished at the public expense to enable poor
litigants to recover their rights.
§ 7. A custom similar to that of professional advice is adverted

to by liacon, as having existed among the liomans. Speaking of
the Wisdom of Business — that is, of the discreet management of
private affairs, he remarks as follows :
— ' Of this wisdom,
it seemeth
some of the ancient liomans, in the sagest and wisest times, were
professors ; for Cicero reporteth that it was then in use for senators
that had name and opinion for general wise men, as Coruncanius,
Curius, La3lius, and many others, to walk at certain hom-s in the
place, and to give audience to those that would use their advice
and that the particular citizens wouhl resort unto them, and con-
sult with them of the marriage of a daughter, or of the employing
of a son, or of a purchase, or bargain, or of an accusation, and
every other occasion incident to man's life. So as there is a
' '
L^gistes, (locteurs, mtiJoeins, qiicUo cliuto pour vous, si noii.s pouviiaisi tons nous
donner lo mot do dovonir eagus '— La !
Buuvtiui;, c. 12. But until this oliange is

effected, it is fortunate that there should be u substitute ibr individual wisdoiu..
— '
wisdom of counsel and advice even in private causes, arising out

of an universal insight into the affairs of the world ; which is used,
indeed, upon particular causes propounded, but is gathered by
general observation of causes of like nature.'
The system of auricular confession and the direction of con-
sciences, as practised in the Church of Kome, is founded on a
theory similar to that on which the custom of professional consul-
tations rests.^ The confessor may be considered as a vicarious
conscience, manner as professional advice is vicarious
in like
prudence. If the penitent makes a full and true confession, the
confessor or spiritual director pronounces or advises with a com-
plete knowledge of the circumstances of the case, probably with a
knowledge of the penitent's character and position, and ahvays
—
with the impartiality of a judge free from personal concern in
the matter, and unbiassed by passion or interest. Seeing how
blind and partial a judge each man is in his own case, and how
unconsciously the moral judgment with respect to our own actions
is perverted by the inclinations, it cannot be doubted tliat such a
counsellor, in ambiguous cases of conduct, such a ductor dubitan-

tmm, would be generally beneficial, if the moral code which he
administers was well framed, and if his opinion or advice was
always honest and enlightened. Unfortunately, however, it hap-
pens, that the system of moral rules which guides the discretion
of the Catholic confessor is founded on a narrow-minded and some-
what superstitious theology, so far as it proceeds upon the dis-
tinctive tenets of the Church of Rome and that the desire of ;
domestic dictation, and of regulating the affairs of families,^ so

natural in an unmarried clergy, gives too often an improper bias
to the influence of the spiritual director. The theory is alluring,
but the practice disappoints the expectation. The only admissi])l(^
substitute for self-judgment, in domestic affairs and questions of
'
.-iclv. of Lrarninri, vol. ii. p. 260. Compare Cic. dc Orat. III. 33, 34.
^ Sfo Malebrjincho, Eechcrchc dc la Vcritc, eel. 13, sur liv. iii. npon the Coitsitlfa-
tion of Phi/sicians and Coiiftssors.
^ Je vois Lien que le gout qu'il-y-a ;i ilcvenir lo deposiUiirodu secret iles families,
'
a sc rendre iieeessaire pour Ics r&onciliations, a procurer des commissions ou a placer

des domestiques, a trourer toutcs les portes ouvcrtes dans les niaisoiis des grands, a
manger .souvent a de bonnos t<ables, a sc promcnor en c-irrosso daii.s une graudo villo,
et a faire do delieieusos retraites a la campagne, a voir plusieurs personnes de nom
et de distinction s'interessfT a sa vie et a sa sante, et a menagcrpour les autres et pour
Hoi-mcme tons les interrts liumains je vois bien, encore une fois. que cola seul a fait
;
imaginer le specieux ct irri'pn'lionsiblo pretexte dn soin des anies, et sem^ dans le

nionde cetle pepinicrf intarissaldc do directcurs.' La Bbvykuk, Caractcrcs, ch. 3.
— —
V.J PKOl'KR PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 87
private conduct, is tlie advice of relations and trustworthy friends.*

To these a person can with safety and propriety unbosom liimself,
and from them he will receive the l>est advice which, undei: such
circumstances, he can oLtain.
It may be here remarked, that an unjust prejudice has not
unfreriuently been raised in Protestimt countries aînst the
treatises which are prepared for the use of confessors in the Chiu-ch
of Kome. When confession, and the judgment of the confessor
up<in sins confessetl, exists as an institution of the church, the
office of the priest becomes judicial, and it is necessiiry, in order
to prevent erroneous decisions, and to preserve consistency, that a
system of rules should be laid down for the general guidance of
his discretion. The more difficult and doubtful of the cases likely
to come before the confessor have been discussed separately, and
have given rise to the branch of practical divinity called easuistri/.'^
Casuistry is the jurisprudence of theology ; it is a digest of the
moral and religious maxims to be observed by the priest, in ad-
vising or deciding upon questions which come before him in con-
fession, and in assigning the amount of penance due to each sin.
As confession discloses the most secret thoughts and acts of the
penitent, and as nothing, however impure, is concealed from the
confessor, it is necessary that he should be furnished with a manual
in which these subjects are discussed. Now such a manual, if
properly considered, is not more justly obnoxious to the charge of
gratuitous indecency, than a legal or medical treatise, in which
similar subjects are expounded without any reserve of language.
The necessity for treating the subject in this manner, and the
danger of suggesting wliat it is intended to discourage, may be
reasons against the practice of confession ; but if the expediency
of this practice is once admitted, the rest follows by a necessary
consequence.
§ 8. One important part of the practical dealings of life
consists in the purchase of such articles as each person requires
'
'Plurinium in amicitia aniicorum bene suadentium valeat auctoritas : oaquc ad-
liiLcatur ad monendum non modo nperte, sed etiani acriter, si res postulet.' (.'iceko
de Amic. c. 13. 'Monorc et moncri proprium est vene aniicitiaj : et alturum libere
facero, uon a«pere alterum palientcr accipero, non repiignanter.' Ih. c. 25.
;
' For the history of ca.suistry, see the Art. Caauistik in Erscli and Grubi-r's Eiioj-
clop'ddie, vol. xxi. p. 117. Casuistical tlieology was not abandoned by the Protestant
churches till a considerable time after the Keformation and several casuistical treatises
;
were written by Protestant divines. Compare llalliim, Lit. of FMrapi', vol. III. c. 4,
§§ 1-20,
for the use and consumption of liimself and his family. If he

is capable of judging for himself as to the quality and value of
the goods which he purchases, he will thus avoid imposition.
If he is not, he will (vmless he calls in the advice of some
competent judge) either be imposed upon, or he must pay
what ]Mr. Babbage has called the Price of Verification.' That
is to say, he must deal only at shops whose honesty can be safely
relied upon, and which, inasmuch as they take the trouble to

verify their own goods, and guarantee the quality of them, charge
an additional sum for this trouble and responsibility. The ad-
ditional payment is a species of insurance against fraud and mis-
take. A shop of this sort may be considered a shop of authority :
the knowledge of its managers as to their trade, and their

integrity, render it probable that their articles are of excellent
quality, and induce the customer to pay an additional price on
this accovmt. Wanting the requisite knowledge himself, he is
willing to pay a certain sum for authenticating the quality of the
article which he buys. For example a person ignorant of jewels
;
would give an additional sum in purchasing them from a jeweller

of established character and reputation, lest, if he bought them of
an unknown dealer, he might be cheated by the substitution of
paste or glass for genuine stones. On the other hand, a person
possessing this knowledge might rely on his own judgment, and
spare himself the cost of throwing on others the task of verifica-
tion. In like manner, a bookseller, by making a careful and
judicious selection of the books which he publishes, might create
so much confidence in the goodness of his publications, as to en-
able him to charge an extra price for them.
In some cases, the determination of value is so laborious and
difficult a process, that it has given rise to a separate class of pro-
fessional men, as land-valuers, surve3"ors, appraisers, &c. In these
valuations, the price of verification is not a small percentage, con-
founded with the price of the article, but it is of sufficient import-
ance to stand apart, and form a substantive item.
§ 9. Besides professional advice, there is another species of
advice not less important, which is given with the grounds assigned,
but in which tlie practical conviction is generally produced by a
mixture of reasoning and authority. This is advice given in joint
deliberation and consultation, or debate.
' Bkonomj of Machine rif and Manufactures, c. 14.

T.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 89
Deliberation is concerning a future practical conclusion it i8 ;
un inquiry concerning a course of action to be adopted, in a matter

undetermined and uncertain, but believed to ])e witliin the power
of those whose conviction the adviser seeks to influence. It con-
sists sometimes in recommending, sometimes in dissuading, a
certîin course,and occasionally in a mere statement and examina-
tion of ditfereut courses. In oral deliberation, tlie end is attained
by reaching the conviction of the hearer through his understand-
ing or feelings; and a statement of reasons for the course indicated,
or of incentives to it, is presented to his mind. On the other hand,
in the cases of professional consultation noticed above, the advice
is in general given absolutely, without reason assigned. Sometimes
the reasons of professional advisers are even intentionally concealed,
lest they should deter the ignorant or timid consulter from follow-
ing the advice; as is usually the case in the practice of physicians.
Professional advice is followed, as such, blindly, and without any
comprehension of grounds, upon the mere authority of the
its
adviser, just as a stranger follows the advice of a native as to the

choice between roads, in a country with which he is unacquainted.
Deliberation takes place, in particular, on the most important
practical conclusions of public interest, as it is wich respect to
these that men most distrust their own judgment. Thus, there
are deliberations of legally-constituted bodies, as councils of state,
parliaments, courts of justice, municipal bodies, and synods of
divines ; in free countries, also, many questions of general or local
concera are deliberated upon in voluntary meetings and associa-
tions. In all organised political bodies, which have a corporate
and a common place of meeting, and which decide by a
action,
is transacted by a joint deliberation
majority of votes, the business
and consultation of the members.' Deliberation may likewise
take place among professional advisers, or friends of the parties,
upon private affairs.
Deliberation or consultation always has a practical end in view,

and never mere speculative truth. We may discuss scientific
truths, but we do not deliberate or consult about them. This
distinction may be illustrated by comparing a philosophical
dialogue with a parliamentary debate. If a scientific society
discuss a question of astronomy, geology, or natural history, they
do not deliberate ; but they may deliberate about the management
'
Ou tliis Bubjcct, SCO further, Cluiptor VII. § 1 2.
•
90 ON THE UTILITY AND [cii.
of their funds, or the appointment of their officers. The exerci-

tations of a rhetorical school, or the discussions of a debating
society, are not deliberations.'
As discussion about abstract truths differs from deliberation or
consultation about practical conclusions, so the qualities requisite
for producing conviction differ in the two cases. In the former,
mere intellect suffices ; a peculiar faculty for observation of facts,
or for inductive or deductive reasoning from them, will alone
render a man fit for discussing questions of pure science, witliout
reference to his moral qualities or character. But in joint deliber-
ation it is In order that a man should convince in
otherwise.
deliberation, he ought not merely to be al)le and experienced, but
also honest and, moreover, the audience ought to feel that he is
;
not indifferent to the welfare of the persons whom the decision is

to affect, but that he has their interest at heart. By exhibiting
he will acquire a weight and ascendancy in
tliese qualifications,
their counsels,and his advice will be adopted, partly on account
of the reasons which he addresses to them, and partly on account
of the authority which his opinion carries by itself. The amount
of the confidence which his audience, or a large portion of it, may
place in his opinion, independently of his reasons, is governed by
a vast variety of circumstances, whichit is impossible to enumerate,
or bring under a general description. They are, in fact, as

numerous and different as those which enable us to form an
estimate of a man's moral and intellectual worth. For example,
with respect to the various reasons which may induce a council of
state to place confidence in the advice of a particular minister,
'The subject of delilieration (/SouAeuiris) was carefully considered by Aristotle, to

wliom many of the remarks in the text are due. Sec Eth. Nic. iii. o vi. 8, 10 Magn. ; ;
Mor. i. 17, 18; Eth. End. ii. 10 and Elict. i. 3; and compare Quintilian, Inst. Or.
;
iii. 8. Concerning tlie ends of deliberation in political matters, sec Grotius, J. B. ct P.

II. 24. § T).
Deliberation, strictly speaking, may be confined to a single person ; it may signify

llie reflections of an individual upon tiic future practical conduct of hijnself or others.
Thus, in the fine verses of Milton, applied by 8ir J. Mackintosh to Mr. Pitt —
Deep on his front engraven
Deliberation sat, and public care.
In tlio text, however, I have used deliberation exclusively with reference to oral
deliberation in the presence of other persons. It is in this sense that we speak of
delil)prative oratorj-, a deliberative assembly, &C.
Ilobbes, Ijcviathan, part I. c. 6, following Vossius, says that deliberation is so called
• because it is a putting an end to the lUicrtt/ we had of doing or omitting, according
to our own appetite or aversion.' But the word seems, in fact, to bo derived from
libra, a balance, and to siguify wciijh'utf/ in the mind.
— — —
v.] PROPER PROVINCE OF AUTHORITY. 91
a council of war to place confidence in the advice of a particular

general, a legislative assembly to place confidence in the advice
of a jKirtinilar inein])er, as such, independently of his reasons,
it can only he said, that their confidence is owing to their belief,
founded on antecedent events, that liis judgment is likely to be
sound, and disposition honest.'
Addresses to a court of justice or a judicial body, by a paid
advocate, although they tend to a practical conclusion, do not fall
luider the head of deliberative oratory. The advice is not given
upon tlie personal credit and authority of the speaker, nor is he
\mderstood to speak his own convictions, but merely to follow his
instructions, and and the applica-
to present the facts of the case
tion of the law to most favourable to his clit-nt.
it, in the light
Hence, a paid advocate speaks without moral weight, and his
arguments merely pass at their intrinsic value, without deriving
any additional force from the source from which they proceed.
Whenever a lawyer, in pleading a case, attempts to strengthen it
by throwing in the weight of his personal conviction and character,

he exceeds his proper province he attempts to gain an advantage ;
in argimaent, without, in fact, undertaking the responsibility which

his assurance ought to imply, and, in so doing, he violates the
principles upon which the very beneficial system of hired advocacy
is founded.
§ 10. In all deliberations, we seek to determine the best mode
of dealing with some practical question, which is as yet undecided,
and, therefore, our consultation, as has been already remarked,
concerns the future. Now it is th(! uncertainty of the future
wliich is the main cause of the difficulty of judgment in practical
decisions ; and, hence, in the cases where the future events are
the most uncertain, and the least reducible to laws of regular
se(iuence,we are most disposed to rely upon the advice of sagacious
—
and honest counsellors of persons whose foresight and clearness
of mental vision has been proved by experience.
' On tho impDrtiinco of moral charaotcr ill dclilicrativo oratory, sec Aristot. lihet.
ii. 1, § 3. In § 5, he enunienites the qualitios wliich the dclibcrativo orator ought to
possess \\7.., virtuo, wi.sdom, and good inclination towards his audience. So Quin-
tiliiin : 'Valet in consiliis auctoribis plurinium. Nam et prndentissimus e.«so haberi-
qno, et optimus is debet, qui sontontine suse de utiliLus atquu honostis credere omnes
Vflit. In judiciis enim vuigo fas habetur indulgero aliquid studio suo : consilia nemo
est qui neget secundum mores dari.' Inst. Oral. iii. 8, § 12. See also Whately's
Jihrtnric, part II. oh. 3, §§ i, 5. As to the qualifications of a good counsellor, soo
Ilobbfs, Lev. jMirt II. c. 26.
92 ON THE UTILITY AND [cu.
The subject of prediction is too extensive to be considered
here at length ; besides, it belongs generally to the province of

logic and method, and specially to the respective sciences
scientific
and arts conversant about each branch of knowledge and practice.

A few remarks may, however, properly be introduced, witli refer-
ence principally to the peculiar difiiculty of prediction which is
supposed to be inherent in the moral sciences.
In some departments of physical science, not merely hypo-
thetical but actual problems consist of so few, so simple, and so
well ascertained elements, that their solution can be completely
effected. are the whole set of actual circum-
Whenever the data
stances, and the problem admits of solution, the future can be
predetermined wdth certainty, and all the sequences of the phe-
nomena exhausted by a preliminary view. This is eminently the

case with the science of astronomy, which lias now been brought
to such a pitch of perfection that all the important events relat-
ing to the motions of the solar system can be predicted with
unerring precision. In consequence of the movement of these
bodies being round a centre, the events of astronomy, and those
dependent upon them, such as the course of the seasons, and the
inequality of day and night on the earth, recur in constant cycles.
In other departments of physics, also, the data of real problems
can be reduced to so great simplicity, that future events, though

not recurring in cycles, can be determined beforehand with a close
approach to certainty. Thus, (with a small margin of allowance
for the operation of those causes which we are compelled to group
together under the name of chance,) we can predetermine the
gi-owth of a plant ; being able, from a knowledge of its habits, to
suit our management to its nature. So, the elementary facts
upon which the sciences of mechanics and chemistry are founded
are completely within our grasp, and we can command them for
the future, from oiu' experience of the past. The experiments
relating to the lever, the inclined plane, the wheel, and the pen-
dulum, as well as those relating to the composition of water, gases,
&c., can all be repeated at pleasure. So, our knowledge of the
laws of optics is not only sufficient to enable us to foretell the
principal phenomena of light, but also, by the help of tliis know-
ledge, to construct telescopes, microscopes, and other optical
instruments.
Extensive, however, as our command over nature has become,
and wide as is the domain of the useful arts, still every fresh in-
'
v.] PKOPER I'ROVINCF OF AUTnORITY. 93
vi-ntion, wlietlior mocliaiiif;il or cliciiiical, is of uncertain piircess

until it lias been verified by actual
and experiment. It is trial
almost as difficult to predict the workin;;^ of a new machine, as of

a new law or social institution. Wbi-n tlie problem is simple,
calculation can master it but wben the elements are numerous
;
and complex, and when we are not sure that all the influencing
circumstances are included, the result is uncertain, and requires
verification by experiment, in physics as well as politics. The
ablest writers on tlie physical sciences, however they may differ
in many of their philosophical views, agree, indeed, in trying the

soundness and value of a scientific theory, by its power of pre-
dicting the future. Tims, Dr. Wliewell says that 'it is a test of
true theories, not only to account for, but to predict phenomena.'
Comte, in his Cours de Philosophie Positive, lays it down re-
iSI.
proper end of all science. Science,

])eatedly, that prediction is the
he says, proceeds on the assumption of the recurrence of phe-
nomena in an invariable sequence and, if this sequence has once ;
l)eendetermined completely for the past, the determination will

hold good for the future. What distinguishes science from mere
erudition or learning is, that the former aims at prevision, whereas
the latter relates facts without reference to the futiu-e. Science
leads to prediction, and prediction to action.^
Such, undoubtedly, is the goal which science strives to reach,
but, in a large proportion of cases, its effort is unsuccessfid.
Every science attempts to predict, but its predictions are often
mere approximations to the truth. A theory which has attained
a high degree of perfection may, nevertheless, when it comes to be
applied in practice, be imder the necessity of dealing with so
many data, that it may be unable to cope with the problem, and
may furnish imperfect, and even inconsistent, predictions in the
hands of different theorists. Notwithstanding the advanced state
of mechanical theory, we know that engineers differ widely in
their plans for constructions, machines, and other practical works,
and that there are practical problems which mechanical science
cannot effectually solve.
Such are the limits upon prediction, even in those physical
sciences which have reached a high degree of theoretical perfection,
liut there are other departments of pliysics in which observation
'
Ajt/i. 12, eoncfi-nint; Science. Phil, of Ike hul. Scunces, vol. i. p. xxxix.
"^
Sec torn. i. pp. G2, G:} ; toni. ii. pp. 28, 401, 126, 128 ; torn. iii. pp. 10, 304. 407,
413; torn. vi. p. 723.
is more difficvilt, in \Yliicb many of the phenomena ehide om-

powers of investigation, and whose theory, therefore, is not better
ascertained than that of the moral sciences. Such, for example,
is meteorology, which has for its subject the successive states of
the earth's atmosphere, and of the vapours, moisture, &c., which
it contains. The climate of each place can be reduced to certain
laws, and the deviations from these can be brought within assign-
able limits, so as to guide the works of the farmer and gardener ;
but the temperature of any place, and the nature of tlie weather
on any given day, cannot be predicted with any approach to
precision. An equal imcertaiuty besets the science of medicine.
The functions of the living body, which physiology undertakes to
describe, are in great part, so long as they are in action, with-
draA\n from the observation of the senses, and are not, like our
mental processes, the subject of consciousness. These functions,
therefore, even while the organs are in a healthy state, to a great
extent defy our powers of observation when they assume a morbid
;
action, the diagnostics of the disease are often obscure and ambi-
guous and even supposing the nature and seat of the malady to
;
be accurately determined, there is further uncertainty as to the

mode of treating it — regimen,
as to the influence of medicines,
iScc, upon the organs Hence, the most experienced
affected.
physicians are often unable to detect the source of a malady, to
foretell its course, or to judge as to the effect of a complex set of
influences acting on the human body. Still less are they in
general able to determine the laws for the diffusion of an epidemic

disease —
to predict the course which it will take, or the time for
which it will last. Altliough tlie average value of human life at
successive ages can be approximatively calculated, yet it cannot be
predicted with certainty how long any given person will live and ;
it is only by a compensation of errors that companies for life-in-
surances can subsist.

In practical questions, lying within the scope of the moral and
political sciences, prediction is always peculiarly difficult, partly
on account of the immense number of influencing circumstances
whicli it is necessary to take into consideration, and partly on
account of the uncertainty whicli belongs to all events dependent

on human volition. Xot only do moral and political problems
consist, in general, of more numerous and complex data than those
which grow out of the physical sciences, but the matter to which
they refer is different. The matter of a physical problem is either
insentient, and follows an invarialilc antl incclianical law of se-

quence ; or,where it concerns animal and vejjêtaLle life, it deals
only witli a livin;^ orj^ânisation, destitute of the power of free
moral volition and progressive intelligence. The matter of a
moral and political problem, when it concerns practice, is always
the human will and thouu^h tlie {êneral tendencies of human
;
nature can be determined, so that it is properly a subject of

science,' yet the operation of peculiar feelin<;^s, fancies, wishes,
caprices, and inclinations, in individuals, and their influence upon
others, are uncertain and incalculable.
When a physical problem has been once solved, it is solved for
ever. The theorems of Archimedes upon the lever, and the ob-
upon animals, retain their truth, \maffected
servations of Aristotle
by the lapse of ages. If the habits of bees, which Virgil describes
in his fourth Georgic, had been true of the Italian bees in his
own time, they woidd be true of bees at the present time. But
bees, though a gregarious and (as they have been called) a po-
litical, are not a progressive animal. Man alone, among organised
beings, possesses the moral and intellectual qualities which render
one generation of human beings unlike another, and which enable
him to alter his own condition and that of others by self-culture.
Hence he alone, of all living beings, possesses a history; other
tribes of aniuKils are described by enumerating all the properties
of their species or kind, and when this task has been completely
accomplished, the problem is exhausted, except so far as varieties
may be produced by domestication. One generation of elephants,
or monkeys, or lions, has nothing to distinguish it from another.
But man, in addition to that physiological character which he
has in common with other animals, and which, like their physical
type, is unvarying, has also attributes which distinguish one com-
—
mvmity of men from another and, again, one generation of the
same community from another generation. It is the sum of the
acts of a society, as they occur in succession, which constitutes its
history, and distinguishes its state, not only from that of other
societies, })ut also from its own states, both anterior and sub-
setjueut.
With respect to the determination of the future in human
affairs, there are two cases, which, though they do not admit of
being very precisely distinguished from each other, yet require to
be considered separately.
' See Mill's Si/gfem of Loyic, b. \'I. c. 3.
96 ON THE UTILITY AND [cH.
The first is, when, from a view of all tliose circumstances

which, taken in the aggregate, constitute the actual state of any
society, we predict its state at some definite future period.
Although a philosophical survey of the course of history may lead
to certain general results as to the progress of society, and the
order in which certain political and social changes may be expected
to follow one another, yet it is impossible to predict a future social
state with any approach to certainty :
'
Prudens futuri temporis cxitum

Caliginosa uocte premit Deus.
Such anticipations, even of the most sagacious judges, can have

scarcely better claim to confidence than the predictions of a weather-
almanac. For example, who, in the year 1788, could have predicted
the social and political state of France and a large part of Europe at
any period of the Eevolution, the Consulate, or the Empire ? That
extensive and profound study of history did not necessarily give an
insight into this futurity, is proved by the remark of Gibbon upon
the early stages of that great change. ' How many years,' (said
he, writing at the end of 1789,^) 'before France can recover any
vigour, or resume her station among the powers of Europe !
' And
even he had then predicted the great development of popular
if
and military energy which ensued in France upon the invasion of

the French territory, and the attempts to restore the royal aiithorit}'^,
his prediction must have been founded on such imcertain and
arbitrarily chosen grounds, as to deserve little more than the name
of a guess. Who,
in January, 1848, could have predicted the
series of eventswhich have occm-red on the continent of Europe
since that period and who, if he had happened to conjecture
;
something near the truth, could have ventured to say that his
prediction was derived from sure data ?
But, secondly, in the practical management of atfairs, the
problem for our solution presents itself in a less intricate and more
tractable shape. We are commonly called upon to predict the
etlfects of some given cause, viz., of some proposed legislative or
administrative measure, or of a treaty or war with a foreign
country. Predictions of this sort, with respect to the body politic,
are analogous to the predictions of the effects of a certain medicine
'
Upon the meaning of 'a state of society,' and the extent to whicli it can lio pre-
dicted, see Mill's Synt. nf Lot/ic, h. VI. c. 10.
i
Milnian'H Life of (Hhhou, p. 338.
or diet with respect to the body natural. They are also analogous
to predictions with respect to the workinj^ of a new and untried
machine, or instrument. been framed by means of in-
Ilavinj^
ferences from observed and generalised facts, they approximate
more or less closely to the truth but the plan requires a process
;
of verification before its actual working can be securely ascertained.

In human affairs, whether relating to public or private in-
terests, such predictions, (as Mr. Mill has truly remarked ') can
never lie absolute ; they must be limited to the affirmation of

tendencies^ and not venture to lay down positive effects. In deal-
ing with human actions, we can only presume to say that a certain
cause, if not counteracted, will produce a certain effect ; and that,
therefore, its tendency is to produce that effect. But those future
miscellaneous causes which we cannot calculate, and which we are
forced to set down to the account of chance, are so numerous, as
to prevent us from saying that it will produce that effect. Even
our predictions of tendencies, moreover, in the great majority of
cases, can only be made by empirical maxims by propositions —
not true universally, but qualified by considerations of time and
place. For example, the expediency of a new legislative proposal
must be judged by very different criteria in England and in
Hindostan. The differences of climate, race, religion, degree of
mental and moral culture, political habits and institutions, state
of the useful arts, and other determining circumstances, would
necessitate the application of different rules of judgment, and
different canons of prediction, in the one case, from those applic-
able in the other.
It may be remarked, that those things which are comprehended
under the denomination of news which are collected in news- —
papers, and circulated in this shape, for the information of the
public —
belong in general to the class of events to which our
powers of prediction apply either imperfectly, or not at all. Some-
times a newspaper may describe tlie appearances of an eclipse, or
other remarkable celestial phenomenon, which astronomers have
foreseen ; but no newspaper informs its readers of the course of
the seasons, the succession of day and night, the rising and setting
of the stars, or the alternation of the tides. Storms, hurricanes,
earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and other similar incalculable
events in the realm of nature, together with the acts and fortunes
System of Logic, vol. ii. pp. 523, 565.
H
98 ON THE UTILITY AND [ch
of men, both in a political and a private character — battles, re-

volutions, debates of senates, trialsby courts of justice, accidents,
crimes, voyages, births, marriages, deaths, &c. compose the intel-
ligence which a newspaper furnishes. The avidity for news is
owing to the difficulty or impossibility of foreseeing the events :
in proportion as the events are important and unexpected, is our

curiosity to learn them.
Even, however, with the assistance of all those means which
the admirable inventions of modern science have contrived for the
accelerated despatch of intelligence, we are hardly ever, in any
complicated case, informed at the moment of decision and action
with respect to all the contemporaneous events. Circumstances
are changing, more or less, at every instant and we are left to
;
infer the present state of things from their state at a recent period.
Hence the necessity, according to the just remark of Turgot, of
predicting the present our belief as to the immediate present
:
must always be founded, to a certain extent, upon conjectures

derived from an antecedent period. A general, for example, when
he issues his orders successively in a battle, cannot know the state
of things, at each naoment, so exactly and completely as he may
ascertain them after the battle, from the information of different
persons and the comparison of their several accounts.
§ 11. Now in the attempt to predetermine the future, with
reference to some practical measure, the deliberation of competent

judges affords the best security though we see, especially from
;
the debates of legislative assemblies, to what an extent their

judgments and predictions conflict with respect to practical affairs.
Do what we will, the future, to a great extent, eludes our grasp,
in all matters dependent upon the volitions of other men. Never-
theless, by careful deliberation and the adoption of prudent
counsels, and by a rigid adherence to a sound method of observa-
tion and reasoning —
or by following the advice of persons who
themselves adhere to sucli a method, we can reduce the amount of
uncertainty ; we can eliminate many elements of chance, and, to
a considerable extent, bring the future under oiu* control. From
time to time, undoubtedly, great catastrophes occur, whicli no
prudence could have anticipated, and whose consequences, not
having been guarded against, must be endured. Such great moral
convulsions are like storms and luirricancs in tlic physical world,
which, tliough doubtless tlicy have their ajipropriate and constant
laws not less than the equable course of the weather, yet defy the
predictions of the meteorologist. But, in tlie ordinary course of

human affairs, the future can, to a gi-eat extent, be anticipated for
practical purposes; care, prudence, sagacity, practical wisdom, anil
good counsel, can be recognised by their good fruits neglect, ;
rashness, folly, shortsightedness, and bad counsel, can be recognised

by their bad fruits.
§ 12. In proportion, therefore, as men's conduct in doubtful
questions of practice is influenced by reason, they will defer to the

opinion of the most competent advisers where their own judgment
is at fault. By these means they will, as far as is practicable,
subject the future to their control. If they are ignorant and
superstitious, they will be impatient of merely human advice, and
unwilling to resign themselves to the guidance of a judgment
which does not lay claim to infallibility. They then fall into the
hands of diviners and soothsayers, who undertake, by supernatural
aid, and by some occult method, to prognosticate tlie future.^
Hence the prevalence of the arts of divination by auguries, auspices,
omens, oracles, dreams, necromancy, evocations of spirits, judicial
astrology, cabbala, magic, palmistry, second-sight, &c., which at
one time flourished among the civilised nations of Eiu'ope,'' and
still exercise a potent sway over the Oriental and savage nations.
The desire to penetrate into the future by supernatural means is

particularly manifested upon the eve of uncertain events of great
moment ; hence, in antiquity, diviners always accompanied armies,
and were consulted before a battle.
These arts of foretelling the future doubtless, in owe their part,
and neglect-
success to the fallacy of attending only to the lucky,
ing the unlucky predictions of counting the hits, and not count-
;
ing the misses ^ in part, also, to the use of an obscure and

;
ambiguous phraseology, which can be accommodated to the event

however it may turn out.'* But granted the desire to know the —
'
See Adelung, Geachichtc der Mcnschlichcn Narrheit, vol. ii. p. 27.
* The Ijclief in divination is ably defended by Q. Cicero, according to the Stoic
doctrine, in the first book of Cicero's Dialogue dc Divinationc.
See Mill, Si/sfcm of Logic,
* h. V. c. iv. § 3. Compare Wachsniuth, HcUenische
Altcrthumskunde, II. ii. p. 270.
* See Aristot. Rhct. III. v. § 4, whore ho remarks that diviners do not individual-
ise objects, but deccribe them by generic terms. Ambiguity and indistinctness are
the general characteristics of the ancient oracular prophecies. Compare Cic. de Divin.
II. 54. It is scarcely necessary to reftrtosuch predictions as Kpui(roy"AAw Stafias
fi(ydKi)v ^pxV 8«aXu(rei, and Aio

'
te iEacida Romanos vincere posse.' See also Ade-
lung, lit xiip., on the obscurity of the predictions of Gauricua and Nostradamus, two
astrologers of the sixteenth century, vol. ii. p. 261; vol. vii. pp. 125, 135. Compars
— ;
future — their chief foundation is a belief in the supernatural

character of the som-ce from which they emanate, which induces
the consulters of the oracle to resort to any shift for saving its
honour, in case its predictions do not prove true.
§ 13. As it is the part of prudence and wisdom to follow, in
practical questions, the advice of good counsellors, so is it incum-
bent on those who assume the ofl&ce of counsellor to discharge it
with a due sense of the moral responsibility which they undertake.
In all matters of professional or deliberative advice, the counsellor
ought to look exclusively to the benefit of the persons whose
interest is in question, and by whom he is consulted. As trust is
reposed in his practical judgment,^ he ought to advise without any
view to his own advantage, and upon a full knowledge of the
circumstances of the case. It is only by complying with these
conditions, and by a consciousness of the binding nature of the
obligation which he contracts, that the professional man, in
advising his client — or the deliberative counsellor, addressing a
coimcil of state or a legislative assembly, can acquire authority for
his opinion, independently of his reasons.
§ 14. It would be improper to close this chapter without
adverting to the marks of trustworthiness in a historian inasmuch
;
as his province does not distinctly fall under any of the heads
above considered.
Before, however, we attempt to assign the qualifications of the
trustworthy historian, it will be necessary first to settle what is his
proper province for the progress of knowledge, the extension of
;
literature, and the increased habit of recording successive changes

in the same object, have of late given an enlarged and somewhat
indefinite meaning to the term History.
By History, is properly understood a narrative of the acts of a
political community, or nation, as represented by its government,
and of events important to it in its collective capacity.
The works of tlie great historians of antiquity as Thucydides —
—
and Tacitus which have served as the types of history since the
revival of letters, describe the Greek and Koman States in action
their wars, negotiations, treaties, intestine tumults, public deliber-
ations, legislation
vol. iv. p. 212. Some further remarks on this subject will bo found in Note A. at the
end of the chapter.
• It was on account of the importance of this trust, and the oliligations growing
out of it, that the sacrrdness of counsel was proverbial from an early time amtmg the
Greeks, {Uphy i] avuôvKi], Zknoii. IV. 40, cum not.)
—— — — — :
Res gestffi rogumquc ducumque et tristia bolla.
These form the proper subject-matter of history. Geographical

and ethnographical descriptions,' accounts of the social state of the
people, of its wealth, manners, literature, religion, and the like,
however interesting and instructive they may be in themselves,
cannot be considered as forming strictly an integral part of politi-
cal history, and ought only to be introduced incidentally, as illus-
trating the course of the narrative. History is essentially dramatic

it describes a series of actions ; and is distinguished from biography
in taking for its sulyect a nation, not an individual.^ Hence,
liistoryhas been considered a species of composition peculiarly
suited to an orator, because he is able to describe a succession of
events with perspicuity and vividness.'
An historical narrative, so understood, is usually conceived as
following the chronological series of events, and as comprehending
a sufficient portion of them to be interesting and instructive. If
the number of events be small, or confined to a particular class or
subject, the work is considered rather as materials for history than
as history itself ; and falls into the subordinate category denomin-
ated by the Frencli, Memoires pour servir a lliistoire.* On the
other hand, a history may narrate events connected only by
chronological co-existence or sequence, and not linked together
by any mutual dependence. In this respect, a history differs
' The ancient on account of the defective knowledge of geography then

historians,
existing, and the total want or comparative
sciircity of geographical treatises, were
forced to introduce geographical descriptions into their works to a greater extent than
modern historians. See Polyb. III. c. 36, 37.
* According to the definition in Gellius, N. A., V. 18, history is 'rerum gestjirum
narratio.' The oflSce of history is to narrate, according to Plin. Epist. V. 8. Lucian,

Quom. Hist, sit conscrib. c. 55, says that with the exception of the proem or intro-
duction, history is nothing but a long narration. The following definitions from
modern dictionaries present the same leading idea: — "Storia: Diffusa narrazione di
cose seguito.' Voc. delta Crvsca. 'Histoire: Narration des actions et des choses
dignes de memoire.' Diet, de V Academic. '
History: A narration of events and facts,
delivered with dignity.' Johnson's Diet. '
L'histoire est I'exposition ou la narration,
temp^rie quant a la forme, et saviinte quant au fond, liê et sui\'ie des faits et des
evenemens memorables les plus propros a nous faire connaitre les homnies, les nations,
les empires, etc.' Diet, des Synonymes de la Lavgiie Fran{aise, eil. Guizot, torn. i. p. 469.
All those definitions are wanting in precision ; they all, for example, include biogmphy
as well as history. The word IffTopla first occurs, in its modern souse, in the Poetic of
Aristotle, c. 18; 38, ed. Tyrwhitt.
* According to Cicero de Leg. I. 2. History is '
opus oratorium maxime.' Com-
pare De Orat. II. 12.
* Accortling to Uacon, '
memorials ' are '
history unfinished,' 'the first or rough
draughts of history,' or 'preparatory history.' Adv. of Learning, vol. ii. p. 106.
102 ON THE UTILITY AND [t-n.
(according to the remark of Aristotle *) from an epic poem, wliich

must relate to a complete and connected action.
History, again, if it be worthy of the name, ought to be com-
posed with a due regard to impartiality, and with a requisite
amount of sobriety and calmness of judgment. Without these
attributes, it becomes a mere party pamphlet, or the pleading of
an advocate. History, like science, ought to be treated without
any view to a practical application, and merely for its own sake.
It ought to narrate, and illustrate its narrative by appropriate
comments but to abstain from all precepts.
;
Such appear to be the essential constituents of our idea of

history ; and, to a person who writes such a composition, we
properly give the appellation of a historian. But the use of the
term has been extended beyond these bounds and almost any ;
narrative describing the successive changes in any object may be

called a history. Thus, there are histories of philosophy and
literatm'e of languages of the mathematical and physical
; ;
sciences of the useful and the fine arts and of particular in-
; ;
ventions, as of the printing-press, the steam-engine, &c. ; of

nautical discovery, commerce, and geography. There may even
be histories of the changes in the earth's surface. In political
history, the nation and its government, considered as a moral
person and agent, is the central point of the narrative : in the
other sort of histories, the subject is a science, for example, or an
art, or a mechanical invention, round which, as a centre, the
narrative turns, and whose successive changes, under the influence
of different men and minds, are described. Accordingly, liistories
of the latter sort belong more properly to the special subjects

about which they are concerned, than to the general province of
the liistorian. Thus, a history of languages is the work of a
philologist ; a history of mathematics is the work of a mathema-
tician ; a history of medicine, the work of a physician ; a history
of the earth, the work of a geologist ;
political history alone is
the work of the historian, properly so called.'^
' Poet. c. xxxviii. ed. Tyrwhitt.

* See Wlif well's P/iihsopki/ of Indiwfio7i, h. X. c. i.; Bacon, Adv. of Learning, vol.
ii. p. 102. The term Natural History may have assisted in extending the applica-
' '
tion of the word history to the physical sciences, but it had a special and accidental
origin, quite unconnected with the latter use of tlio word. Aristotle's work on Animals
was entitled irepl rSiv ^tfwv iffropiai, '
Inquiries (or KcKca rcfics) concerning Animah.''
which has, in the modern editions, been literally rendered into Liitin, as Nufuralis
Historia. The encycluptrdiacal work of I'liny, too, was called by the comprehensive
;
The following remarks, therefore, will be confined to the

political historian ; leaving tlie other class of historians to be dis-
tributed under the departments of their respective subjects.
A historian, then, as so imderstood, may, in the first place, be
looked upon as a chronicler and recorder of contemporary events,
of which he is either a direct and personal witness, or of which he
collects the evidence himself from original witnesses.'
The original witnesses, from whose information the contempor-
ary historian builds up his narrative, cannot themselves be styled
historians, although their materials are necessary for his work.
They are, to the historian, what the quarryman and mason are to
the architect. A short-hand writer, who reports a parliamentary
debate, or the proceedings before a court of justice; a person who
procures intelligence for newspapers ; a collector of statistical facts,
sueh as those relating to population, public revenue and expen-
diture, military and naval force, exports and imports, currency,
&c. ; and framers of pedigrees registrars of births,
also heralds ;
deaths, and marriages, and other civil facts; keepers of judicial

records and journals of parliament compilers of proclamations, ;
laws, charters, deeds, wills, state-papers, treaties, and other

authentic documents copiers of inscriptions and coins
; all ; —
belong to that useful class of persons, who prepare the materials
out of which the framework of political history is constructed.
Such functions do not, indeed, themselves deserve the name of
history but we ought not to forget that it is to these obscure,
;
though important, services that we owe the superior certainty and

completeness of modern, as compared with ancient history. Every-
thing in history depends upon the accuracy and fulness of the con-
—
temporary records upon the sufficiency of the means adopted by
title of Naturalis Historia, '

A Descrijjtion {or Exposition) of Nature.' On account of
the titles of these two celebrated works, the term Natural History has been applied to
a Bcientific description of animals and other natural objects. But (according to a just
remark of Mohs, cited by Dr. Whewell, Hist, of hid. Sciences, vol. iii. p. 486), ' Natural
history, when systematically treated, rigorously excludes all that is historical, for it
cliisses objects by their permanent and universal qualities.' The essence of history,
properly so ciiUed, is, that it narrates a series of successive stîtes, all differing from
one another. In this sense, the history of a science or an art is properly a history
but not a description of the species of animals, and of their characteristic differences
and resemblances.
'
Gellius, a. A., V. 18, mentions an opinion that historia, as distinguished from
annales, a narrative of events by a contemporary witness
is :
'
Earum proprie rorum
sit liistoria, quibus rebus gerondis iiiterfucrit is qui narret.' lie n marks, however,
that this limitation was not consistent with the received use of the term.
— ;
the origiual witnesses for perpetuating the memory of the events.

Without an authentic memorial derived from the actors in the
events, or from contemporary observers, history is a fiction, more
or less specious. Without this solid foundation of well-attested
fact, it is, at the best, but an historical romance, in which a
genera] probability of manners, institutions, and state of society,
is maintained. A contemporary events is like
faithful registrar of
a painter of portraits or landscapes after nature the author of :
fictitious history is like the painter of an ideal history-piece, which

may resemble the truth, but does not portray it.
The first approach to contemporary history, properly so called,
is the composition of diaries, journals, and personal memoirs
narratives of events in which the writer plays a part himself, or of

which he is merely a passive spectator. When these are confined
to a particular transaction — as a siege, a battle, the negotiation of
a treaty, the deliberations of a synod, the formation or overthrow
—
of a government they hold, in general, an intermediate place
between the materials for liistory and history itself. When, how-
ever, they include a long series of memorable events, affecting the
destinies more nations, they rise to the dignity and
of one or
amplitude of history. As examples of the latter class, it will be
sufficient to mention such periodical works as the Annual Eegister,
and other previous publications of the same sort and such —
histories as those of Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Polybius,
Sallust, Caesar, Tacitus, Froissart, Comines, Sleidan, Gruicciardini,
Thuanus, Sully, Clarendon, Burnet, &c. Works of this sort are
valuable as original testimony, and constitute the materials out of
which other histories are formed, not less than mere collections of
state papers or documents. Their most essential quality, there-
fore, is veracity, and contemporary historians are mainly to be
considered as witnesses and relaters of events. They may have
other good qualities besides veracity they may show disci'ction in
;
selecting, and skill in arranging facts; their style in narration may

be perspicuous and inipi'essive tliey may judge events and charac-
;
ters with sagacity and penetration but it is principally as authen-

;
t ic witnesses and recorders of contemporary facts that they are

important.' If we did not consider their testimony as true, we
' Sinre the time of Thucydides, (see I. 21, 22.) tlie essence of liistory has been
iiiiulo lo consist in its voracity. Thus, Cicero says that History is '
testis tomporum,
lux veritatis, vita uieinoria;, niagistra vitse, nunciu vctust;itis.' De Orat. II. 9. Again:
'
Quis uescit primani esse historiac Kgoni, nu quid falsi dicoro audoat? deinde, ne quid
—
T.] PROPER FROVIN'CE OF AUTUURITY. 105
sliould pay no rc^rd to their writings. ' It is the true office of

history (^ly^' Iîrti liacon) to represent the events themselves,
together with the counsels, and to leave the observations and con-
clusions thereupon to tlie liberty and faculty of every man's judg-
ment.' '
In order to determine how far a historian of this class is trust-

worthy, we should apply to him the tests which are used for trying
the credibility of testimony. This process may lead only to un-
certain results, and there may be, as in evidence before a court of
justice, conflicting considerations but the con- on the question ;
tt-mporary historian and annalist mainly to be regarded as a is
witness, or a collector of original evidence, and to be estimated as

such.
There is, however, another class of historians, who are not them-
selves witnesses, or the original collectoi'S and reporters of the oral
testimony of others. For the most contemporary part, they are not
with the events which they describe and when they are, it is ;
usually as narrators of the history of foreign countries, in which

case they have to deal with what Madame de Stael called con- '
temporary posterity.' These are what may be termed the Learned

Historians who compile history from the recorded testimony of
:
original witnesses, and the contemporary monuments and accounts.

—
Among the Greeks Ephorus, Timaeus, Diodorus, Dionysius,
Plutarch, and Arrian among the Latins: Livy, Cornelius Xepos, —
and (ûintus Curtius among the moderns Machiavel, Raleigh,
; —
Muratori, Giaunone, Mariana, Hume, Robertson, Gibbon, Rollin,
Tcri non audeat ? nequa suspicio gratiae sit in scribendo? ne qua simultatis ? haee
scilicet fundamenta nota suut omnibus.' lb, c. 15. So Lucian {Quom. Hist, sit con-
acrib. c. 9.) lays it down that the end of history is utility, which arises from truth
alone. The two principal qualifications of a historian (he says) are penetration and
judgment in pfjlitical affairs, and a good style of writing (c. 34) moreover, a his- ;
torian ought to have had some civil and military experience. Truth is the goddess to
whom alone he must sacrifice and he must be impartial, independent, and incorrupt,
;
80 as not to distort facts either from fear or favour, (c. 37-41.) Polybius likewise
says, that as an animal is rendered useless by the loss of its sight, so history, without
truth, is an idle tale, (I. 14, § 6.) In another place he says, that the end of tnigedy
is to produce emotion by fiction —
the end of history is to convey instruction by truth,
(II. 56, § 11.)
Dr. Arnold, in his Lectures on Modern History, (lect. viii.,) also lays it down that
* the one great qualification in a historian is an earnest craving after truth, and utter
impatience, not of falsehood merely, but of error,' (p. 293.) He adds, that these
and are as incompatible with great feeble-
qualities 'are intellectual as well as moral,
ness of mind as they are with dishonesty,' (p. 21)7.)
' Advancement of Learning, vol. ii. p. 114.
;
Sismondi, Niebuhr, &c., may serve as examples. Their business

consists in collecting and collating tbe evidence of the original
witnesses, either preserved by contemporary writers, or handed
down by a faithful oral tradition in balancing inconsistent or
;
contradictory accoimts in illustrating past events and past states

;
of society by the light of subsequent experience and knowledge

and in tracing the successive steps in which the progress of man-
kind consists. It is to this class of historians that we principally
owe that which is styled philosophical or etiological history ; that
is to say, historyaccompanied with deductions of causes and
effects, often extending over long periods of time, and therefore
only possible upon a retrospect of past ages. Writers of this class,
having no value as witnesses or original reporters of events, seem
peculiarly required to comment upon the transactions which they
describe and being, as judges, exempt from the passions and
;
interests of contemporaries, and necessarily free from all personal

bias, their comments ought, on this account, to be the more
enlightened and impartial.
For success in this difficult and important department of his-
tory, a writer ought to possess qualifications similar to those indi-
cated above with respect to science he ought to have studied the
;
subject with attention for a considerable time he ought to have

;
ability sufficient to master it, and also an honest desire of arriving

at the truth, and not perverting the evidence to suit his own in-
terests or inclinations.
Looking to the unsettled state of many portions of the moral
and political sciences, and to the unpractical nature of the reveries
in which speculators on an ideal commonwealth have indulged, it
is natural that writers of history should be the chief guides of
opinion on questions of government. As the historian's subject
keeps him in perpetual contact with facts, his general conclusions
always possess some value, and represent some fraction of truth,
even when they are founded on an imperfect induction, or derived
from a mass of contemporary facts not sufficiently dissected and
decomposed. Besides, if the facts are fully and faithfully stated,
his conclusions may be corrected and limited by liis premises,
wliich is never the case where the forms of an ideal state arc con-
structed out of first principles, according to what Mr. Mill has
styled the Geometrical INIetliod of Political Ivoasoning. The in-
creased tendency of modern times to historical studies, to the
collection of a well-ascertained body of facts respecting the succes-
—
bive states of a civil community, and to their pliilosophical appre-

ciation, as illustrating the progress of society, corresponds with the
t**ndency to careful observation and induction in the physical
sciences.' Hence, with the exception of the writers on the law of
nations, on positive law, and on political economy, historians are
now the great teachers of political wisdom — of civills sciential
And it is only by a close examination of the results obtained by
trustworthy and enlightened historians, and by a careful generali-
sation from them, assigning each effect to its proper cause, that
Political Philosophy can ever be placed on a sound basis.
NOTE TO CIIArTER V.
Note A. (p. 100.)
SoMU of the numerous {niesses of diviners have, as is not wonderful, hit the
trutlj with great e.xactness. Thus John Cario, the astroloorer of Joachim I.,
elector of liraudenburg, published in the year 15:?:? a Proynosticatio, constructed

nccordinjr to the rules of the art, in which he predicted a destructive inundation,
famine, pestilence, and civil and ecclesiastical troubles, for the year 1524,' and
the birth of Antichrist for the year 1G93. But the year 1789 was to be the
most tenible of all. In this year, there were to be great and marvellous events,
changes and catastrophes. Adelung, who reports this prediction in a volume
' M. Comto, Cours de Phil. Pos. torn. iv. p. 284 upon the
See the just remarks of
benefits to be anticipated from the historical tendency of the present age.
- The following remarks of Bacon illustrate the applicability of history to practical
politics :
—
The form of writing which of all others is fittest for this rariable argument
'
of negotiation and occasion, is tliat wliich Machiavel chose wisely and aptly for govern-
—
ment namely, discourse upon histories or examples ; for knowledge drawn freshly, and
in our view, out of particulars, knoweth the way best to particulars again and it hath ;
much grejiter life for practice when the discourse attendeth upon the example, than
•when the example attendeth upon the discourse. For this is no point of order, as it
Bcemcth at first, but of substance ; for when the example is the ground, being set down
in a history at birge, it is set down with all circumstances, which may sometimes con-
trol the discourse thereupon made, and sometimes supply it as a very pattern for
action whereas the examples alleged for the discourse's sake are cited succinctly, and
;
without particularity, and awry a servile aspect toward the discourse which they are
brought in to make good.' Adv. of Learninq. vol. ii. p. 266. Legal precedents, in
like manner, are of little value, unless the case cited has been reported fully, so that
it can bo seen whether the ride of law, said to have been laid down, was necessarily
involved in the decision of the case.
• It seems that the astrologers had predicted the destruction of the world by in-
undation in 1524, and that some persons had pro\'ided themselves with ships in order
to be prepared against the calamity. —
Bouix. de Rrp. IV. c. ii.
— — — — :
published in 1787, does not doubt that the astrologer wiU prove to be as much
luistaktn with respect to the year 1789, as he had already proved to be with re-
spect to the year 1693. Geschichte der Xarrheit, a'oI. iii. p. 118.
There is likewise a curious prediction of the extinction of the independence
of Venice, in the Satire of Luigi Alamanni, an Italian poet, who died about the
middle of the sixteenth century, and whose poems were published at Lyons in
1532-3. In Satira xii. is the following address to Venice :
Se non cangi pensier. Tun secol solo

Non contera sopra'l millesimo anno
Tua liberta, che va fuggendo a volo.
Ginguen^, who first called attention to this passage, (^Hist. LittcrairecT Italic,
tom. ix. p. 144, ed. 2,) first doge falls in 697 ;
remarks, that the election of the
and that epoch we add 1100 years, we obtain the year 1797, which is
if to this
the precise year next after that in which Venice ceased to be independent.
Few predictions, however, were so lucky as those of Carlo for the year 1789,
and of Alamanni for the year 1790 and, accordingly, it was in general necessaiy
;
to alter them after the event, in order to produce a close agreement between the
prediction and the thing foretold. Thus in the Quatrains of Nostradamus, first
published in 1555, there was the following stanza :
Gand et Bruxelles marcheront contre Anvers,

Senat de Londres mettront a mort lem* roy
Le sel et vin luy seront a I'envers,
Pour eux avoir le regne en desarroy.
After the execution of Charles I., this passage of Nostradamus was applied
in France to the striking event, and it was long considered by his admirers as a
strong proof of his prophetic power. Adelung, however, considers the supposed
prophecy as taking its origin in the troubles in Flanders, which were contem-
poraiy with its composition and he refers leur roy to the Flemish cities, not
;
'
'
to the senate of Loudon. He tmderstands Nostradamus to have meant, that the

English govermuent would put to death some supposed King of Flanders. Ut —
8up. \o\. vii. p. 133.
Another more remarkable example of the subsequent perversion of a pro-
phecy, in order to adapt it to an important event, may be added German : —A
writer, named Caspar Brusch, published the following prophetic verses in the
year 1553 :
Post mille expletos a partu \-irginis annos,

Et post quingentos rm-sus ab orbe datos,
Octogesimus octavus mirabilis annus
Ingi'uet is secum tristia fata trahet.
:
Si non hoc anno totus mains occidet orbis,

Si non in nihilum terra fretumque rueut :
Cuucta tamen mundi sursuni ibunt atque deorsum

Imperia, et luctus undique grandis erit.
The most remarkable event of the year 1588 was the Spanish Armada. The
prediction was forgotten for two hundred years, and wivs reprinted in tlie Mercure
(Ic France in the middle of the last century, with the !>ubstilulion of 'septengiu-
— —
tos' fi)r ' post quinpentos/ in v. 2, and a storj- alwutit» havinfr Leon fcnuul in the
tomb of Htxîoniontanus, at Liska, in Ilunfrar)'. Since the French revolution
which —
supposed jmiphecy the true oriffin of the
recallwl attention to the
verses, and the nature of the fraud, have Wen pointed out. Bio(/. Univ. in
BriLM'h. It is sin<ruhir that, bv some similar adaptation, a Jacobite should not
have apjilieil it to the Endish revolution of \('iXf<. Compare the remarks of Mr.
rSrot*', Hint, of (ir. vol. vi. p. '1\\, upon the flexibility of the Greek prophecies,
and the manner in which they were moulded to suit any striking occuiTence.
We must not, however, suppose that all astroloirical diviners were conscious
impostors, and intentionally fabricated their predictions in such a manner as to
admit of no certain interpretation. Many, or perhaps most, of them doubtless
believed, to a certain extent, in the reality of the art which they practised. Thus
Andrew Goldmayer, who was oflered the professorship of
mathematics at Stras-
burp in the year 1035, composed a chronicle of that city upon astroloprical prin-
ciples. He complained that ordinary historians paid no attention to the state of
the stars, in connection with the events which they narrated whereas these events
;
could not 1)e understood without their causes, and their causes could only be
explained by astrolo^rv'. lie began, therefore, to compose, not only a history of
Strasburg, but also a imiversal history, according to this method, and believed
that he woidd thus throw great light both upon astrology and history. For this
purpose, he extracted the chief events out of chronicles he calcidated the :
position of the stars baclcwards, and believed himself, by this process, to have
discovered the true cause of every important event. —
ADELrxG, m^ sup. vol. iv.
p. 215. The process here described is a scientific process, and was an attempt to
found judicial astrologj' upon inductive reasoning. It therefore proves the good
faith of the astrologer. Compare also Kepler's astrological doctrine in Bethune's
Life of Kepler, c. vii. ; and the opinions of Bodinus de Eep. IV. c. 2.
110 NUMBER OF THE PERSONS COMPETENT [ch.
CHAPTER VI.
ON THE NUMBER OF THE PERSONS COMPETENT TO GUIDE OPINION ON

ANY SUBJECT, AS COMPARED WITH THE NUMBER OF THE REST
OF THE COMMUNITY.
§ 1. It has been shown, in the preceding' pages, that the men

of special information and experience, combined with the proper
moral and intellectual qualifications, are tlie competent judges on
each branch of knowledge, and therefore the legitimate guides of
opinion. Now if we take each subject, whether of speculation or
practice, in succession, these persons must always be a small section
of the commrmity in fact, a mere handful, as compared with the
;
entire population. In sciences and arts, the persons versed in

those particular departments of knowledge, in history, historians;—
in general literature, literary men and poets in practical questions ;
of law, medicine, architecture, navigation, &c., the men of the re-

spective professions —who form respectively the standard and canon
of authority, are but few in number, if set against the body of their
fellow-countrymen. Moreover, even with respect to each of these
classes, it is principally the ablest, the most learned, the most ex-
perienced, the most skilful, whose opinion constitutes authority.
So long as we admit the maxim, ' Unicuique in sua arte creden-
dum,' the class or body of persons competent to judge in each
matter must be numerically insignificant in comparison with the
whole people. If we divide the nation into two parts — one con-
sisting of a profession, or body of persons specially conversant with
a particular subject, the other consisting of the rest of the popula-
tion, the numbers of the latter portion will immensely prepon-
derate :
Tlio few, by nature formed, witli learning frauglit,
Born to instruct, as others to be taught.
§ 2. In each sulvject, therefore, the opinion of the groat bidk

of tlie people is, taken as a standard of truth and rectitude, un-
— —
Ti.] TO GUIDE OPINION ON ANY SUBJECT. Ill
worthy of consideration, and destitnto of weij^lit and authority. It

is the opinion of uninformed and inexperienced persons, whose
incapacity to judge is not cured by the multiplication of their

numhers. mere agpfref^âtion of incompetent judges will not
Tlie
produce a right judgment, more than the aggregation of persons
who have no knowledge of a matter of fact will supply credible
testimony to its existence.'
This is equally the case, whether the multitude agree in opinion

with the few competent judges, or disagree with them.
If they agree, the opinion of the unscientific or unprofessional
many, whether right or wrong, can scarcely fail to be derived,
more or less remotely, from that of a few persons either being, or
considered to be, competent judges. Now, whether the opinion
be soimd or unsound, it is in general derived witliout any adequate
process of examination or verification, and is held merely upon
tnist so that the concurrence of the multitude adds little or no
;
weight to the judgment of the former.'^ Thus, at present the New-

tonian system of the world is accepted by the people at large, in
all civilised countries, who therefore believe that the world moves
round the sim. But they entertain this opinion merely on the
authority of the agreement of scientific astronomers, and with no
better knowledge of the grounds of their l)elief than their ances-
tors, who recognised the Ptolemaic system, and believed that the
sun moves roimd the earth. On the other hand, the agreement
between men of science and the multitude may exist in cases
where the opinion is erroneous and it may arise from the absence
;
of original research and of an enlightened scepticism, from the

passive retention of ancient errors and the blind adherence to tra-
ditionary prejudices. Of this state of things, the history of the
physical sciences in antiquity and the middle ages afifords numer-
ous examples, which would be useless to particularise, and many
it
examples might be cited from the moral sciences at the present

time.
If they disagree, the preference is justly due to the opinion of
the few competent judges, and tlie opinion of tlio luiinformed and
inexperienced multitude is inferior in autliority to that of the
' '
An quicquara stiiltius quam quos singulos (sicut operarios, Imrbarosqiio,) con-
tomnas. cos esse aliqui<l putaro universos?' Cicero, Tusc. Qitcest. V. 36.
Lcs liommcs, en general, approuvent ou condamnent au hasard, et la verity menie
"^ '
est, par la plupart d'entro ciix, re(,-uo comme I'erreur, sans oxameii et par prejuge.'
HFXVKTifs de r Homme, sect. XI. eh. 8.

— —
112 NUMBER OF THE PERSONS COMPETENT [cw.*
select body. In cases where there is an agreement of opinion

between the competent few and the incompetent many, the con-
currence adds little or no weight to the opinion of the former. In
cases wliere there is a conflict of opinion between the same two
classes ot persons, tlie preference must be given to the latter, as a
measure of truth, and a canon for the judgments of others.
So numerous are the cases in which the opinion of the mul-
titude conflicts with that of the few competent judges, that a
majority of voices has, in questions not involving a legal decision,
been considered as a mark of error. ' Argumentum pessimi turba,'
says the Latin proverbial verse, cited by Seneca.' It has been
said, not only that a majority of voices is no conclusive proof of
rectitude,and that moral questions cannot be decided, like ques-
by a division of the ayes and noes
tions in a legislative assembly,
but that a person ought to be ashamed of finding his opinion or
conduct approved by tlie midtitude, and that the concurrence of
the many raises a presumption of being in the wrong.'^ Pessimura '
' '
Est turba semper argumentum pessimi.'
PtiBLius Syrtjs, v. 190.
That is to say, the concurrence of the crowd is a proof of the worst side,'
'
Compare Seneca, Be Vit. Beat., e. 1, 2. Sanabimur, si modo separemur a coetu :

'
nunc vero stat contra rationem, defensor mali sui, populus. Itaque id evenit, quod in
iidem qui fccere mirantur, quum se mobilis favor
comitiis, in quibus eos factos prsetores
circumegit. Eadera probamus, eadem reprehendimus hie exitus est omnis judiiiii, in :
quo secundum plures datur. Quum de beata vita agitur, non est quod mihi illud dis-
cessionum more respondeas " Hsec pars major esse videtur." Ideo enim pejor est.
:
Non tam bene cum humanis rebus agitur, ut meliora pluribus placeant : argumentum
pessimi turba est.'
There is likewise a verse of the old tragedian, Attius :
'
Probis probatum potius quam multis fore.'
P. 201, ed. Bothe.
Cicero gives the following description of the manner

which opinions were formed
in
in his time :
— ' The seeds of virtues are (he says) planted by nature in our minds ;
but as soon as we are born, we are surrounded with false opinions, so that we almost
imbibe error with our nurse's milk. As our education proceeds, we contract further
errors from our parents and teachers, and we learn the fables of the poets, which take
root in our mind " Cum vero accedit eodem quasi maximusquidani magister, populus,
:
atque omnis undiquo ad vitia consentiens niultitudo, turn plane iiificimur opinionum
prantate, a naturaque desciscimus.' " Tusc. Qiuest.lll. 1, 2. Compare a simihvr
passage in De Off. I. 32.
"^
Plutarch relates a celebrated saying of Phocion, who, on receiving the applause
of the people for a speech which he had made in the Athenian assembly, turned round
tx) his friend.s, and expressed his fear that he had said something which he ought not
to have .said, {Phocion, c. 8.)
Speaking of the Optimates, or aristocratic party in the Roman State, about the
time of the Gracchi, Cicero says 'Qui autem adver.sabantur : ei generi [to the popular
— — — —
I.] TO GUIDE OPINION ON ANY SUIUECT. 113
omnium est augîrium (says Lord Bacon) quod ex consensu capitur

in rebus iutelloctualibus exceptis divhiis et politicis, in quibvs
:
aitffragiorum jus eat. Nihil enim multis placet, nisi imagina-

tionemferiat, aut intellectimi vuliiârium notionura nodis astrinfat.
Itaque optime traducitur illud I'liocionis a moribus ad intellectu-
alia ; ut statim se examinare debeant homines, quid erraverint aut
peccaverint, si multitudo consentiat et complaudat.' ' This in-
ference, liowevcr, liolds good only in cases where the majority put
themselves under the guidance of bad leaders, and 'reject the advice
of tlie persons best qualified to form a sound judgment. It is only
wlien tlie public array themselves against the opinion of the fittest
counsellors, that they are more likely to be wrong than right.
§ 3. We have already had occasion to advert to the old adage
*Unicuique in sua arte oredendiun as expressive of the doctrine '
—
that the competent few, and not the incompetent many, constitute
the standard of authority. There is another proverb, equally
handed down to us from antiquity ' Xe sutor ultra crepidam ^ — '
which forms, as it were, the complement of the other. As the

former teaches us to place confidence in the qualified few, in sub-
jects within theirown province, so the latter warns us not to rely
party], graves et magni homines haLebantur : sed valebant in senatu multum, apud
bonos viros plurimum ; multitudini jucundi non crant : suffragiis ofFendebatur sjepe
eorum voluntas : jdausum viro ctiamsi quis corum aliquando acceperat, 7ic quid peccassct,
pcrtimescebut.Attamen, si qua res erat major, idem ille populus horum auctoritato
maxiroe eommovebatur.' Pro Sextio, c. 49.
Plufareh, De
advises that youths should not be allowed to listen to
Lib. Educ. c. 9,
popular speeches or discourses at the public festivals: rh yap To7i itoWols apetrKtif,
Tois <ro<f>o1s i(TTtf iirapfaKfif. He citej also some verses of Euripides, showing the
opposition between wisdom in council, and fitness for popular oratory.
The opposition between philosophy, or science, and popular opinion is well-known
and established. Thus, Cicero says :

'
Est enim philosophia paucis contentii judicibus,
multitudinem consulto ipsa fugiens, eique ipsi et suspeeta ct invisa.' Tiisc. Disp. II,
1 Hence the paradox, that it is better even to err with a great philosopher, than to
.
be right with inferior minds. Errare mehercule malo cum Platone

'
quam cum . . , ,
istis vera sentire.' lb. I. 17. A similar sentiment occurs in a letter of Hume to Adam
Smith :
'
A wise man's kingdom is his own breast or, if he ever looks farther, it will
;
only be to the judgment of a select few, who are free from prejudices, and capable of
examining his work. Nothing, indeed, can be a stronger presumption of falsehood
than tlie approbation of the multitude and, Phociou, you know, always 'suspected ;
him.self of some blunder, when he was attended witli tlio applauses of the populace.'
Buhton's Life and Correspo7idence of Hume, vol. ii. p. 57.
' iVof, Org.
aph. 77. The exception for religious questions refers to the
lib. i.
decisions of councilsand synods of divines, by a majority of voices,

* See the story of Apelles, in Plin. H. X. xxxv. 36, § 12. Compare the verse of
Euripides, Fragm. Inccrf, 94. Dindorf. TtKTwu yap iiv (irpaffffts ov ^vXovpyiKu
and of Aristwph., J'csp. 1431, fpSoi tIs %v (Ka^Tos (iSdij rtx^V, rofe.Tod to by Cieoro,
I
:
114 NUM13ER OF THE PERSONS COMPETENT [ch.
on their judgment with respect to other subjects. Similar in its

import is tlie sound maxim ' Auctoris aliud agentis parva est auc-
:
toritas '
—a rule of construction useful in estimating the value of
an authority who is cited in proof of any position. The opinion
of each person is only good for the purpose to which it professedly
and directly relates it must not be applied to incidental and
:
collateral matters. Subjects not bearing immediately upon the

main question may have been considered imperfectly, or passed
over without consideration and, therefore, ought not to be treated
;
as decided, although the opinion may, from the generality of its
terms, appear to include them.

In considering the seat of authority, it should be borne in
mind, on the one hand, that no man is a competent judge on all
subjects; and, on the other, that every man is a competent judge
on some.
The authority of every scientific or professional man, every man
having a special aptitude of judgment, is limited to his own sub-
ject or class of subjects. Out of this range his opinion is worthless,
or, at all events, only on a par with that of any other man of sense,
and of practised habits of thought, having no special knowledge
or experience of the matter. The opinion of an astronomer or a
geologist upon a question of jurisprudence, of a lawyer upon
medicine, of an agriculturist upon military or naval tactics, of a
sailor upon chemistry upon navigation,
or painting, of a botanist
woidd certainly be of no more value than that of any other person
taken at random from the midst of society. Every man, however
highly endowed by nature, and however qualified by study, re-
flection, and experience, to pronounce on a particular subject, is a
mere undistinguislied ciplier, only one of the great multitude, upon
all other subjects. Upon tliese, liis opinion ranks with that of
any ordinary person. A scientific or professional man may, there-
fore, be compared to a court of limited jurisdiction, which is com-
Tusc.l. 18. 'Bene cnim illo Grseconun provorbio prrecipitur, " Quam quisquc novit
flTtem, in hac so oxerceat.' " Iloraco gives this precept twice over
Optat ephippia bos, piger optat arare caballus :
Quam scit iiterque, libens, censebo, exerceat artem.

i>. I. ll.v. 13.
f Navem agere ignanis navis timet. Abrotonum segro

"
Non audct, nisi qui didicit, daro. Quod medicorum est
Protnittunt niodici. Tractant fabrilia fabri.
Ep. II. 1. vv. 11 1-G.
Ti.] TO GUIDE OPINION ON ANY SUBJKCT, llo
petont to pronounce on one class of questions, but is without power

of deciding on any others.
§ 4. On the other hand, there is scarcely any man — however
uncultivated his facidties, and however limited his powers of ob-
servation —
who is not qualified to form an opinion upon some
subject — not of speculation, at
if least of practice. An unskilled
labourer, an artisan, a domestic servant, or a petty trader, each
in his own calling, becomes acquainted with certain facts and pro-
cesses, acquires a certain experience, and is thus qualified to form
a judgment on that particular and comparatively
subject, confined
simple as it may be. A
remark applies to the knowledge
similar
of household management, the care and nurture of children, and
the tending of the sick, which falls peculiarly within the province
of women. Knowledge of this kind may be disregarded by those
who have mastered more abstruse and difficult subjects but it is ;
essential to the conduct of life, and the persons who possess it are
as much entitled to be considered authorities in their own depart-
ment, as those who have pursued more elevated studies in their
branches of science.
§ 5. It follows, from these remarks, that there is no one body
of persons who are competent judges on all subjects, and who are
qualified to guide all sorts of opinion that there is no one intel-
;
lectual aristocracy, separated from the rest of the community, and

predominating over them indiscriminately. Every subject, in
turn, has its own peculiar set of competent judges, which vary for
each and he who belongs to this select body for one science or
;
art, or other practical department of knowledge, is confounded

with the crowd in all others. Again, a person whose opinion is
without authority on this, and that, and the other subject, at last
arrives at some branch of knowledge, or some portion of the busi-
ness of life, on which his opinion has a claim to attention.
Inasmuch as each person has his own special department, as —
an astronomer reckons with the peasant on a question of law or
—
medicine and as a lawyer or physician, on questions of military
or naval warfare, is unpi-ofessional and destitute of authority,
every man ought to know the bounds of his own subject, and not
venture to pronounce an authoritative and independent opinion on
questions lying out of his proper province ; 'Non parum est scire
quid nescias.' Upon questions of this sort a man ouglit to defer
to the opinions of others, who may be wholly unacquainted witli
his own subject, and wlio, witli respect to that sul)ject, ouglit, iii
I 2
• —
their turn, to defer to his opinion :

' Hanc veniam petimiisque
dam usque vicissim.' Even the infallibility of the Pope
is, Ly the
most rigid theologians of the ultramontane school, not extended

beyond matters of faith.
§ 6. As the acceptance of an opinion by the multitude does not
afford presumptive evidence of its truth, unless it be also enter-

tained by the competent judges; so the mere prevalence of an
opinion does not prove its soundness.
Prevalent opinions may have sprung from the most impiu'e
sources. Mere unauthenticated rumour or tradition, imperfect
and unverified observation, hasty and illogical generalisations from
from facts in a limip, uncorrected by any
single facts, or inductions
analytical process, and even deliberate imposture, are often the
originating causes of wide-spread opinions. Sometimes these
errors are deeply rooted in the popular conviction, and descend
from generation to generation.
We know that false and unfounded opinions have been enter-
tained by entire communities, without question, for ages. Not
merely has this been the case with respect to false religions,^ and
legendary accounts of early history, interwoven with the religious
and patriotic feelings of the people, but even with respect to facts
in the natural sciences, which admitted of being verified by easy
and simple observations or experiinents. The works of the ancient
naturalists (as Pliny and .^lian) abound with such accredited fables,
many of which retained their hold on popular belief till a late
period, as maybe seen by the collection in Sir T. Browne's Vulgar
Errors : Permit me to ask you, sir, (says Bayle to his antagonist)
'
if you have es'er paid attention to the midtitude of authors who

have said, one after anotlier, that " a man weiglis more when fiist-
ing than after a meal," that " a drum of sheepskin bursts at the
sound of a drum of wolfskin," tbat " vipers kill their mothers at
their birth, and their fathers at the moment when they are formed,"
'
Non pravissiinum est, test imnni urn mtiltitudinis. In omni cnim arte, vol studio,
vfl qmivis scicntiA, A'cl in ipsA virtute, optiniuni quidquo rarissimum est. Cickho dc
Fin. II. 2rj.
* Sic obscrvatio crevit,

Ex atAvis quondam male conpta ; doinde secutis
Tradita temporilms, sorisqup nepotibus auct.-i.
Traxcruiit longam corda inconsnlta catcnani,

Mosqiio tonolirofiis vilio.sa in ssrcida fliixit.
PuT'DKNTius contra Symm.\ch. I 240-4, witli roppeot to

the ancient lioatlicn ivligioii of Italy.
' ;
VI.] TO GUIDE OPINION ON ANY SUBJECT. 117
and several other things of the same nature. Not only have these
i>een reported as ascertained facts, hut attempts have been made
to determine their cause they have been the subject of wonder
:
moral s;i\vs have been deduced from them advocates have referred ;
to them at the bar preachers have drawn multitudes of com-

;
parisons from them endless themes on these subjects have been

:
proposed in the classes of schools. Nevertheless, they are all

things contrary to experience, as those who have had the curiosity
to investigate them have ascertained.'
and other mock sciences of divination
Tile belief in astrology,
— in the ominous nature of eclipses and comets, as well as in witch-
craft, sorcery, and magic, prevailed in Europe for many centuries.
Yet no one would think of alleging tlie former prevalence of this
belief, or the popular faith in ghosts and fairies, as a proof of the
reality of these unseen influences and existences. In like manner,
many of the popular opinions respecting the communication of
diseases by contagion and infection, which have served as the basis
of an intricate system of Quarantine regulations, derive their origin
from fanciful analogies, or rash inferences from imperfect and ill-
ascertained data.^
In the above cases, the erroneous opinion has been permanent
in its character ; it has made its way slowly, and has yielded by a
similar process to the gradual inroads of science and reason. At
other times, popular delusions appear in the form of a transient
influence, powerfully affecting the minds, or rather the nervous
susceptibilities, of the multitude, and propagating itself in all
directions, like an infectious disease. Such, for example, was the
panic which seized the Athenians in the affair of the Mercuries ;
such the dread of the Untori at the plague of Milan, described by

Manzoni and such
; the wicked delusion of the Popish Plot. The
opinions of some fanatical sectaries have likewise been diffused by
a similar process.
So great is the influence of authority in matters of opinion,
that tlie extensive diffusion of any belief does not prove that
numerous persons have examined the question upon its own

merits, and have founded their conclusion upon an independent
• Pensees mr les Cometes, § 46. (Euvres, torn. iii. p. 35.

* '
Even in what is willed natural astrology, the dependence of the weather on the
heavenly bodies, it is easy to see what a vast accumulation of well-observed facts is
requisite to establish and it is well known how long, in spite of facts,

any true rule;
false and groundless rules (as the dependence of the weather on the moon) may keep
their hold on nieu'.s minds.' — Wiitwiii./., IJist. nf Ind. Set., vol. i. p. 301.
— —
118 NUMBER OF THE PERSONS COMPETENT [cii.
investigation of the evidence an opinion may be held by a large

:
number of persons, but they may all have been misled by some
erroneous authority — they may have all mechanically followed the
same blind guide so that their number ; ' has, in fact, no weight,
and they are no more entitled to reckon as independent voices,
than the successive compilers who transcribe a historical error are
entitled to reckon as independent witnesses.^
§ 7. Whenever the people can be considered in tlie light of a
—
body of witnesses whenever they are capable of verifying an
opinion by a simple and easy process of observation —their con-
currence is Moreover, the preponderance of numbers
of weight.
in favour of any opinion is always an imposing fact, and it is often
attended with the most important practical consequences. The
opinions of a large body of people are likewise always sincere, and
' Nihil magis prssstandum est, qiiain ne, pecorum ritu, sequamur antecedentium
gregera, pergentes non qua eundum est, sed qua itur Quod in strage hominura
magna evenit, quum ipse so popuhis premit, nemo ita cadit, ut non alium in se attra-
hat: primi exitio sequentibus sunt: hoc in omni vita accidere videas licet: nemo sibi
tantiunmodo errat, sed alieni erroris et Nocet enim applicari

causa et auctor est.
antecedentibus : et dum unusquisque marult credere, quam judicare, nunquam de vita

judicatur, semper creditur Versatque nos et praecipitat traditus per manus error,
:
alieuisque perimus exemplis. Seneca de Vit. Beat. c. 1.

- Illud etiam de consensu fallit homines, si acutius rem intros})iciant.
' Verus
enim consensus is est qui ex libertate judicii (re prius cxplorata) in idem conveniento
consistit. At numerus longe maximus eorum, qui in Aristotelis philosopliiam consen-
serunt, ox prsejudicio et auctoritate aliorum se illi mancipavit; ut sequacitas sit potius
et coitio quam consensus.'— Bacos, Nov. Org. I. aph. 77.
'
Que ne pouvons nous voir ce qui se passe dans 1' esprit des hommes, lorsqu'ils
choisissent une opinion ! Jo suis sur que si cela etait, nous reduirions le suffrage d'une
infinite de gens a I'autorite de deux ou de trois personnes, qui, aj-ant debite une doc-
trine que Ton supposait qu'ils avaicnt examinee a fond, Tout persuadê a plusieurs
autrespar le prejuge de Icurmerito, et ceux-ci a plusioui-s autres, qui ont trouvemieux
leur compto, pour lour paresse naturellc, a croire tout d'un coup co qu'on leur disait,
qua Tcxamincr soigneusement. De sorte que lo nombre des sectiteurs credules et
parcsseux, s'augmcntant do jour en jour, a et6 un nouvel engagement aux autres
hommes, de une opinion qu'ils voyaicnt si g^nerale, et
se delivrer de la peine d'examinor
qu'ils se persuadaient devenue telle, quo par la solidite des raisons
bonnemcnt n'etre
desquelles on s'etait servi d'abord pour I'etablir, ct enfin on s'ost vu redvit a la neces-
sity de croire co que tout le mondo croyait, de peur de passer pour un factieux, qui
veut lui Boul en savoir plus que tons Ics autres ot contrediro la v<5nerable antiquity si :
Lion qu'il y a eu du m^rite a n' examiner plus rien, et a s'cn rapporter a la tradition.
Jugez vous-meme si cent millions d'hommes engages dans quolque sentiment, de la
mani6rc quo jo viens de ropr6ponter, pcuvent le rendre prol>able, et si tout lo grand pre-
jug6 qui s'elfeve sur la multitude de tant de sectateurs, no doit pas ctre reduit, faisai t
justice iV cbaquc cho.so, a I'autorit^ de deux ou trois personnes qui apparemment ont
cxaminii ce qu'ellcs enseignaient.' Bayle, (Euvrcs, torn. iii. p. 12.
Hooker makes similar remarks with respect to the Church. Ecc. Pol. Pref.
c. b 5 8.
— —
Ti.J TO GUIDE OriNION ON ANY SUBJECT. 119
tlu*y tlms obtain that j:(iiarantee for truth, so far as it extends,

which is ati'onled by sincerity. From these various causes has
arisen the modem acceptation of the proverb. Vox jpopuli, vox
Del. Tliis proverb, in its original sense, appears to be an echo of
some of the sentences which attribute a
in tlie classical writers,
divine or prophetic character to rumour words common fame or :
casually tlirown out, or predictions flying about the mouths of

the people, were supposed hy the ancients to spring from a
supernatural source.' This was the proper sense of the adage in
question ' but of late years it has assumed a different meaning,
;
and has been taken to express the supposed unerring truth of

popular opinion. Understood in this general sense, the proverb is
'
^M'J 5' ot/Tiy Truixirav airuKKvTat, Ijvriva noWoi
Aaol <pr]fjii^w<n' 6(6s vv ris iar\ Kal avT-q.
Ilesiod, Op. 764.
These verses are quoted by Aristot., Eth. N. vii. 14, to illustrate the position, th;it
pleasure is the summum bonum, because all men and animals seek it. The univer-
sality of the feeling is taken as a proof of its divine origin. Compare iEschin.,
Timarch. § 127-8, where the divine and prophetic attributes of popular fame are
illustrated. Virgil, JEn. iv. 173, deifies fame. See also Ovid Met. xii. 39-63. The
sudden appearance of a popular feeling, -without apparent reason, was ascribed to
divine influence: hence <f>6ôs iravtKSs ; in the same manner that epilepsy and sneezing
were thought divine. The views of the Greeks on this subject are copiously illustrated
by Mr. Grote, Hist, of Gr. vol. v. p. 260, note.
* " Vox populi, vox Dei," in vulgarem ob id jactatum est scrmonem, quod populus
'
intcrdum aliquid temere ac intempestive fundere soloat, quod perinde quasi divinasset,
evenit. Cujusmodi vaticiuium fuit illud populi Judaici supplicium Christi affectantis,
cum repente exclamavit, " Sanguis ejus super nos, et super filios nostros." [^Maith.
xxvii. 2.5.] Id quod imprecationis plane contigit, et usque nunc durat, nam haud it;i
multo post insigni affecti cal.-.mitate a Vespasiano et Tito, tanti sceleris poenas digno
impietatis pretio, ut Hegesippus ait, persolventes, fere omnes cum patria periere.
Unde est cunctis seculis observatum, non usquequaque vanum evadere, quicquid fuerit
vulgi rumore jactatum, perinde Deus mortidium ora (ftaa.si ante immittat, quod brevi
in
tempore sit futurum.' Poi.idor. Vihgil. Adagia Sacra, No. 199. [Pi'uface dated
Ixjndon, 1519. The allusion in this passage appears to be to a Litin translation of

part of the Jewish War of Josephus, which was publislied under the name of Hegesip-
pus, in 1.511.]
Machiavel refers this saying to the supposed pro-
also, writing at the same time,
photic qualities of popular opinion :
'
E
non senza cagione si assomiglia la voce d'un
popolo a quella di Dio, perch6 si vedo una opiniono universale fare effotti maravigliosi
nei pronostici suoi, talche pare cho per occulta virtu ei prevegga il suo male e il suo
bene.' Disc. I. 58.
The Italian proverb, 'Voce di Dio, voce di popolo,' is in Pescftti, Prov. It. et Lat
(1G18) p. Voix du pcuplc, voix do Dieu,' is cited by Leroux de Lincy, (torn. i.
13 b. '
p. 16,) from a collection of French proverbs of the sixteenth century. Korte, SpricJi-
VLirter der Deiitfchfn, Y). ioi), gives the German proverb, 'Volkcs Stimme, Gottes
Stiinnie;' but his fxplanation. which refers it to the interpretation of omens by
heathen priests, seems untenable.
— — — '
120 NUMBEE OF THE PERSONS COMPETENT [ch.
manifestly untrue: the utmost that can be said is, that the opinion
of the multitude is sometimes right and sometimes wrong ;
according to the dictum of Horace

Interdum rulgus rectum videt, est ubi peccat. {Ep. II. 1, 63.)
Popular opinion (as has been just remarked) is peculiarly

deserving of attention in cases where the people can be considered
in the light of separate and independent witnesses ; where the
opinion relates to some fact, whicli admits of being observed and
verified by each person for himself. Accordingly, (as Machiavel
has said,) popular opinion is more often right on particulars than
on generals. Thus, the judgment of the public is more correct on
questions of morality, and individual behaviour and conduct, than
on questions of speculation and abstract truth, or of general ex-
pediency and a course of policy.^ Thus, too, in affairs of state,
the opinion of the people is entitled to greater weight with respect
to the existence of political evils, than with respect to their re-
THiedies. The people can, by their own feelings and observation,
ascertain the existence of physical and patent evils
as famine, —such
high prices, mercantile ruin and panic, oppressive taxes, corrupt
and partial administration of justice, inseciu-ity of life and property.
But what are the proper remedies for these evils, or, indeed, how
far they may
be remediable by the power of the government, the
people are in general less able to form a correct opinion. Accord-
ingly it may be observed that, when once satisfied that the ex-
istence of the evil is admitted, they are often disposed to defer to
the authority of statesmen and political leaders with respect to the
choice of a remedy. It should be added, that popular opinion is
more to be relied on in reference to complaints against old^ than

against Tieiy laws and "institutions. With respect to the former,
the people judge, in general, from observed facts; against the
latter, they are sometimes prejudiced by a few interested or
passionate leaders, before the institution has been established, or
the law been carried into effect, in such a manner as to be fairly
judged by its residts and a popular clamour, not founded on any
;
real suffering or inconvenience, is thus excited.^
' Discorsi, i. 47.

' 'The geneml voice of mankind,' (says Dr. Whcwcll.) '
whicli may often serve as
a giiide, because it rarely errs widely or permanently in its estimate of those who are
prominent in public life, is of little value when it speaks of tilings belonging to the
region of exact science.' Hist, of hid. Set., vol. i. pref., p. x.
'The people cannot see, but they can feel
'
;
The people are deceived by names,
'
'
but not by thinp.s.' Harrinoton's roliticd AphorUnis, (cd. 1737,) p. 616.

— ;
Ti.] TO GUIDE OPINION ON ANY SUBJECT. \2l
Generally, it is true that public opinion is of trreat vahu*, where

itcan be resolved into the testimony of a multitude of witnesses
with respect to a matter of fact. Many persons on the look-out
can observe better than a few ; and hence it is more easy to de-
ceive one than many,' except, indeed, in cases where special know-
ledge is requisite. For example it would be easier to deceive a :
himdred ordinary persons by false jewels than a single jeweller;

or a hundred ordinary persons by a copy of an old picture, than a
single connoisseur in painting.
It may be observed, too, that popular sentiment, including
large nimabers of persons, is for the most part directed towards
may seek those objects by

objects of extensive interest, though it
inadecjuate or perverse and that there is often something
means ;
generous, humane, and comprehensive in its sympathies.*

§ 8. Ai'istotle, in several passages of his Politics, speaks of the
defect of virtue, or knowledge, in the people, or majority of a state,
considered as separate individuals, being supplied by their aggre-
gate number
upon the ground that, though each person's share of
;
virtue and good sense is small, yet, when these separate amounts
are added together, they make a large quantity. In this manner,

he thinks, the wisdom and virtue of the many may, in the aggre-
gate, exceed those of the wise and virtuous few as a feast formed —
of contributions of the guests may be more splendid than a ban-
quet glrcu by a single person. So, in judging of anything, the
' '
Jlelius omnibus quani singulis creJitur. Singuli enim decipere et decipi possunt
nemo omnes, neminem omnes fefellerunt.' Pljn. Pan. c. 62. Also Rochefouciiuld,
Max. 416: 'On peut etre plus fin qu'un autre, mais non pas plus fin que tous les
autres.' On the other hand, there is the proverbial verse of Publius Syrus, v. 698
'
Saepe oculi et aures vulgi sunt testes mali.'
Sous quelque \die de leg^ret^ et d'inconsid^ration qu'on se plaise a nous repre-

* '
eenter le peuple, j'ai (!'prouve que souvent il embrasse a la verity certaines vues, vers
lesquellcs il sc porte avec chaleur, ou plutot avec fureur; mais que ces^vues ont pour-
taut toujours pour objet un interet commun, ct d'une certaine generalite, jamais un
interet puremeut particulicr, comme peuvent etro les ressontimens et les passions d'un
snul homme, ou d'un petit nombre do personnes. Jo hasardc memo do dire, que surce
point, lu jugo le moins faillible est la voix de co pcuplo meme.'- Sully, Manoires, lib.
xiv. (torn. iv. p. 341 ; ed. 1778.)

According to Livy, xlii., 30, 63, the people generally favours the weaker side. It
shows this disposition even in the pul^lic games. On the other hand, Juvenal says
that tho Komun people always sympathised with the strong against the weak.
Scd quid
Turba Remi ? Sequitur furtunam, ut semper, et odit
Damnatos. (x. 72.)
— — ;
122 NinVIBER OF THE PEESONS COJÎPETENT [ch.
unskilled many may be equal or superior to the skilled few ; for

judge of different portions, and the judg-
different persons will
ments of the body, when put together, will exhaust the entire
subject.^
It is true that, in cases where each person is, to a certain extent,
capable of forming an opinion, an increase in the number of the
judges may compensate the separate deficiency of each. But when-
ever either eminent virtue or wisdom is required, this process of
arithmetical addition will not avail to produce a large amount, by
clubbing the intelligence and honesty of many persons, each of
whom is destitute of these qualities in a high degree.^ We can-
not create great political ability and fitness by combining the
opinions of a large body, as military power can be created by
rendering an army or navy numerically strong, or as a large sum
of money can be produced by the subscriptions of many persons of
small means. As well might we attempt to make one great poet
by combining the efforts of several minor poets ^ or a great ;
painter, by employing several inferior artists on the same picture

or a great captain, by combining the ideas of several military
officers of moderate powers. For political and other purposes, in
wliich capacity of a high order is requisite, there must be single
persons possessing that degree of power, in order to arrive at sound

practical conclusions. This want cannot be supplied by numbers,
more than a wall could be battered down by musket-balls, how-
ever thickly poured in, though the same weight of metal, cast into
cannon-shot, would instantly lay it prostrate.
§ 9. One form in wliich the general voice and sentiment em-

bodies itself is Proverbs, or apophthegms whose authority is derived
' III. 6. 8.
Speaking of a chaDge in the financial department made in France in 1,594-, by
*
which a board of eight members was substituted for t!ie former office of superintendent,
Sully observes,- first, that the measure was ill-devised, because it is more difficult to
find several persons fit to manage the finances than one. He proceeds to say 'L'cr- —
reur n'est pas moins visible dc s'imaginer, que toutes ccs personnesy apportant chacune
de leur c6f6 unc bonne qualite differcnte, il en r&ultera le memo effit que d'un homme
qui les auroit toutes: puisquee'est supposerquo cotte bonne qualite no sera pas rendue
inutile ct par ses propres defauts, et p;ir coux de ses associes.' Mvinoircs, lib. Vll.
tom. II. p. 427.
'L'on n'a guere vu jusques a present un clu^f-d'couvre d'esprit qui soit Touvrago
de plusieurs.' La BRTJYiiRE, Caractercf, c. 1. It has been justly objected to the
Wolfian hypothesis respecting llio Homeric poems, that it assumes the possibility of
—
putting the (/cuius of Homer in commission. Compare the remarks of Comte, Cours de
rhilosnphie Positive, tom. IV. p. 614-6.
Ti.] TO GUIDE OPINION ON ANY SUBJECT. 123
from tlieir popular .reception.' Pôr this reason, the attention, both
of philosopliers and practical men, has from an early date been
directed to proverbs. Their importance has been recognised, as
representing and concentrating the experience of many men, and
even of many generations and pointed expres-
; as being the brief
sion of the inferences which popular observation and sagacity have
collected from Imman life. The Jews were guided by the proverbs
of their wise king, and a moral apophthegm was attributed to each
of the seven sages of Greece. Aristotle even thought that proverbs
were the remains of the philosophy of an extinct race of men, which
had been preserved on account of their conciseness and wisdom.^
Every modem nation possesses its collection of proverbs many of ;
which are, with the necessary changes of expi'ession and form, com-
mon to all the European languages, and have a general currency
by a sort oijus gentium.
Proverbs being maxims, in the nature either of observation or
of precept, upon human life or conduct, are accredited by the tacit
verification which they have undergone in their tradition from one
individual and one generation or nation to another. If their truth
or soundness had not been recognised by those who used them,
and handed them on, they would soon have gone into obli\ôn.
In general, however, proverbs express only empirical laws of
human nature ' — that is to say, being generalisations from partial
experience, they are only true within certain limits, and subject
to certain conditions. Before, therefore, a popular proverb can be
safely used for philosophical pm-poses as evidence of a general truth,
it must undergo a process of analysis ; it must be limited accord-
ing to the mental tendencies which it involves, and the circum-
stances in which it is applicable. In this manner, proverbs wliich
are apparently contradictory may be reconciled, and the partial
trutli wliich they contain will be extracted and rendered profitable.
Thus, to take a familiar example of opposite proverbial pre-
cepts there are adages in all languages warning against precipi-
:
tation —
as ' Festina lente ' Hatez-vous lentemeut ' Eile mit
; '
;
'
vveile ' Koramt zeit, kommt

; ' rath ' The more haste, the worse ;
'
speed
;
' ' Haste makes waste.' On the other hand, there
are proverbs against procrastination and delay, as Bald- — '
gethau ist wohlgethan ; ' ' Delay not till to-morrow what may be
' '
The wit of one man, and the wisdom of many,' is a definition of proverbs attri-
buted to a living titiitesman.
Set- Schncidewin, Praf. ad TartPm. Gr.
''
p. 1. Compare Jihct. II. 21.
' Sif Mill's System of Logic, I.. HI. o. IC ; b. VI. o. 5, § 1.

— —
124 NUMBEE OF THE PERSONS COMPETENT [ch.
done to-day;' 'A stitch in time saves ninQ.' These opposite

maxims, though absolute and universal in their form, require to
be limited and qualified, in order to adapt them respectively to
the cases in which it is expedient to act with deliberation and
caution, and those in which a rapid glance and speedy decision are
requisite. In order to make this adaptation, the circumstances of
the several cases must be analysed, and the causes of tlie difference
in the mode of treatment for each class must be investigated. By
this process, the empirical law will be converted into a scientific
law, and the generalisation will be restricted to the limits within
whicli it holds good.
80, if we compare the following French proverbs Force passe — '
droit,' ' Sagesse vaut mieux que force,' Chose forcee de petite
'
duree,' ^ we may easily see that each expresses a partial truth, but
is not true universally. Again, such adages as ' II est plus facile —
de conseiller que de faire,' Familiarity breeds contempt,' ' Neces-
'
sity is the mother of invention,' ' The town for wealth, the country
for health,' and the Italian proverb cited by Bacon
Di danaro, di senno, e di fede,
C'e ne manco che noncrede
are doubtless often true ; but they are generalisations from a

limited and variable experience, and not scientific truths expres-
sive of tendencies in human

Hence, these abbreviations
nature.
of past experience, these concise expressions of popidar wisdom,
cannot be used as substitutes for scientific inquiry ; nor can they
take their place in a system of accurate knowledge without under-
going a process of correction and adaptation.
§ 10. Wherever, in the preceding pages, the opinion of the
skilled or enlightened few has been preferred to that of the unin-
formed many, and the judgment of the general public has been
treated as unimportant, the remark must be understood to be con-
fined to popular opinion considered as a standard of triifh. Ee-
garded as a fact, popular opinion, whether right or wrong, must
always be important, since there are many things in which the
preponderance of numbers necessarily exercises a decisive influence.
It is always a material consideration when we can say of any party,
or body of persons, what Cicero said of the Epicurean sect, ' Qui
auctoritatera minimam habet, maximam vim, populus cum illis
2
facit."
' Leroiix de Lincy, torn. II. pp. 201, 221, 316.
2 Vc Fin. II. 14.
T1.] TO GUIDE OriNION ON ANY SUBJECT. 125
§ 11. Tims, with respect to affairs of state, the acquiescence of

the majority of the population in government, or
tlie acts of the
and their consequent desire to resist,
their dislike of these acts,
tliwart, or evade them, must always command attention. The
state of feeling among the people towards their government is
always a matter of moment, whether its acts be intrinsically right
or wrong. The existence of a disaffected or rehellious spirit among
the people can never be a subject of trifling (concern, however just,
wise, and politic the conduct of the government may have been,
and however unmerited th*» disfavour into which it may have
fallen. So, with respect to the imposition of a tax, and the ad-
ministration of criminal law, it is not sufficient that the fiscal
measure, or the scale of punishments, sliould be defensible on

rational grounds —
it is necessary that they should enjoy some
portion of popular favour, or, at least, not shock the feelings and
prejudices of the public. Unpopularity, in short, in all political
matters, is and even

a fact whicli never can be safely overlooked ;
where the measures of a government, or the conduct of a states-

man, may have been misunderstood and misjudged, merely be-
cause tliey were founded on views in advance of public opinion, it
must always be taken into account as a material element in all
political calculations. Popularity is as important in affairs of
government as numbers are in war and it would be as impossible
;
for a statesman to succeed who could not obtain the support, or at

least the acquiescence, of a large portion of the population, as for
a general to gain a victory with a handful of men against over-
whelming forces.
The stability and success of every government must mainly
depend upon tlie approbation, or acquiescence, with which its
measures are viewed by the great mass of the community. By
internal concord, a small state may become powerful by internal ;
discord, a large state is sure to be rendered weak.

Although the
theory of the social compact is groundless, yet government rests
ultimately on a tacit agreement for a common end. It exists
by the voluntary obedience of the majority of the people, and,
armed with that support, it enforces its laws against each indi-
vidual who successively violates them. The introduction, there-
fore, of the numerical principle, in one form or other, becomes
necessary for every government wliich is to be established on a
firm basis. As to the manner in which this principle is legally
recognised in the constitution of free States, and in whicli its
126 KUMBER OF THE PERSONS COMPETENT [ch.
operation is modified in practice, more will be said in the following

chapters.
§ There are other subjects, besides government, in which
12.
the predominant practice, or usage, or taste, of the great body of
the people is a matter of sovereign importance, as establishing a
standard, whether good or bad, for the guidance of all those whose
business it is to supply the wants of tlie public, in the way either
of comfort, or amusement, or intellectual gratification, or by speech
and writing to reach their feelings and convictions.
For example : in questions of language, the usage of the greater
number is practically the standard of decision, according to the
well-known dictum of Horace. In order that a person should be
intelligible, it is necessary that he should conform to the gram-
matical forms and significations of words generally recognised by
those whom he addresses. Even here, however, the judgment of
the learned few has great weight ; on questions of grammar,
—
grammarians on questions of the meaning of words, lexico-
graphers and philological writers are consulted and their ;
authority is recognised as guiding usage, and determining its

correctness. In fixing the sense of a word, its etymology, and the
use of early writers, are attended to, and not merely the popular
acceptation. It is admitted that there are vulgarisms and inac-
curacies in language, for which general use affords no sufficient
justification. It is true that, in dealing with common words, the
scientific writer is bound to respect existing usage — to regard
language as a precious depositary of ancient observations and
ideas, and not to deface or falsify the coins which constitute its
currency.^ Yet, in seeking to restrict vague popular meanings
without departing from their prevalent tendency, and in aiming
at scientific precision, without imposing an arbitrary signification
merely for the sake of clearness, he will find it neces?ary to look
beyond the mere contemporary usage he must ascend to the ;
origin of the term, and pursue its history through the various
changes it has undergone, and the writings of the several authors
by whom it has been used. In this research, therefore, the
language of the learned few, as well as of tlie unlearned many,
will serve as his guide.
§ 13. Again, as to questions of style and eloquence, the
judgment of the people, or at least of the persons to wliom the
'
Soo this subject treated witli great ability liy Dr. Wht'WcM, PhUosopht/ of In-
ductive Scknccf, b. III. c. 10, § 8; and Mr. Mill, Si/s/im of Logic, b. IV. c. 4, § 6.
—
Ti,] TO GUIDE OPINION ON A.Vi' SUBJIXT. 127
composition is addressed, must be taken as the test of its answer-

ing the purpo.<e for wliieh it is intended ; since, in the department
of rhetoric, the object is to make an impression on the hearer or
reader, and thus to influence his conviction or rouse his feelings.

According to the maxim quoted by Lord Bacon ' Loquendum ut :
vulgus, sentiendum ut sapientes.' '
But for all compositions, involving an appeal to the reason or

the emotions of a circle of readers or hearers, there are two ques-
tions to be considered ; one, as to success — the other, as to the
means by which the success is effected. With regard to success,
popular favour is the only criterion, as it is in acting, painting, or
any other art which is addressed to the public at large. In this
respect, the poet, the orator, or the painter, is in the same condition
as a manufacturer or mechanic with respect to his customers. He
is the most successful, whose work
is most admired by the persons
for whom it is destined. As to the goodness of any work of skill,

or product of industry, the person who consumes or uses it, and
not merely the artist or mechanic who fashioned it, must practically
be the ultimate judge. A person who cannot build a house or a
carriage will decide for himself whether a house or carriage is
built to his liking ; and the test of a good dinner is the approba-
tion of the guests, not of the cooks. '^
On the other hand, it is the business of the philosophical in-

quirer to determine the causes of success, either in oratory or
written composition, and to frame a system of rules which will
assist the speaker or writer in expressing himself with perspicuity
and energy — in adapting his discourse to the taste and feelings of
his audience, and in arranging his topics in a convenient order.^
'
Dc Avgm. Scient. 1. V. c. 4 also, Advancement of Lcnniing, vol.
; II. p. 192.
* Sec Aristot. Pol. III. 11 ; and the epigram of Martial, IX. 82 :
Lector et auditor nostros proLat, Aule, libellos :
Scd quidam exactos esse poeta negiit.
Non iiimium euro; nam cajnse fercula uostrae

Malim conviNns qiuam placuisse coquis.
'Dans toute judicieuso division du travail,' (says M, Comte,) 'il est clair que
I'usage d'un in.strument quelconque, materiel ou intellectuel, ne peut jamais etro

rationnellemcnt dirigc par ceux qui I'ont construit, mais par ceux, au contraire, qui
doivcnt remjiloycr, et qui pcuvont seuls, par cela meme, en Lien comprendre la ATaie
destination spuciale.' Cours de Phil. Pos. torn. III. p. 384.
^ The question as to t!ie test of the goodness of oratory — whether it is to be judged
by the applause of critical judges or of the public — is fully discussed by Cicero, Brut.
c. 49-51. lie states distinctly that the goodness of oratory can only be tried by its
success, and that the critical judge can only inquire into the causes of that success.
128 NIBIBER OF TEE PERSONS COilPETENT [ck.
§ 14. But although, in the liberal arts, success depends on

the multitude of admirers, yet it does not follow that the standard
by which the multitude judge is correct. In the creations of the
poet, the orator, the painter, the sculptor, and the architect, not
merely the judgment of the multitude, but also that of persons of
cultivated and refined taste, concerning the particular object, is to
be considered.
With respect to composition, both oral and written, there are
canons of criticism, which are established by those who have de-
voted their minds to a special study of the subject and there are :
tests of excellence independent of popular approbation. An im-

pure style of speaking and writing does not recommend itself to
fastidious and refined judges, merely because it pleases a popular
audience, or a wide circle of readers.^ A discourse full of tawdry
ornament, false brilliancy, far-fetched metaphors, and turgid ex-
ao'geration, which might obtain the applauses of an uneducated
audience, would offend the taste of a more instructed class of
hearers. The same may be said of many popular writings, whose
ephemeral success is not a proof of their excellence, tried by a right
standard. So, again, when we get below the class of persons who
have cultivated a taste for art, a collection of painted wax figures
would certainly attract more spectators than a museum of Grecian
statues and a set of highly-coloured pictures, full of contortion
;
'Etenim necesse est, qui ita dicat ut a multitudine probetur, eundem doctis probari.
Nam quid in dicendo rectum sit aut pravum, ego judicabo, si modo is sum qui id possim
aut sciam judicare qualis vero sit orator, ex eo quod is dicendo efficiet, poterit intel-
;
ligi. .Itaque nunquamde bono oratore, aut non bono, doctis hominibus cum populo
. .
dissensio fuit. ... Id enim ipsum est summi oratoris, summum oratorem populo
videri. Denique hoc specimen est popularis judicii in quo nunquam fuit populo
. . .
cum doctis intelligentibusque dissensio. Cum multi essent oratr)res in vario genere
dicendi, quis unquam ex liis excellere judicatus est vulgi judicio, qui non idem a docMs
probaretur, (c. 49, 50.) Qui prsestat igitur intelligcnsimperito? magn& ro et difficili ;
si quidem magnum est scire quibus rebus efficiatur amittaturvo dicendo illud quioquid
est, quod aut effici dicendo oportet aut amitti non oportet.'— c. 54. Compare De
Orat. I. 3.
' Sjepe stylum vertas, iterum quae digna legi sunt
Scripturus ueque, te ut miretur turba, labores,
;
Contentus paucis lectoribus.

Sat. I. 10, 72. Compare Ep. I. 19, 37-40.
Horace seems by the juxtaposition of these two precepts, that a cirefully

to imply,
polished style is not acceptable to the general body of readers.
This view ccrtainl}'
appears to be inconsistent with experience. His own universil and long-sustainod
popularity has been in great measure owing to his c7iriosa fdicitas (as it is called by
—
Pctronius) to his laboured felicity of language; and the same may be said of Pope
and Gray.
— ; ;
Ti.] TO CfUIDE OriNION ON ANY SUIUECT. 129
and melti-dramatio j)ostuivs, would ca])tivate a larger multitude

than a series of paintiiij^s by Raphael. And, even in the culinary
art, the taste of a student of the Almanack des Gourvianils is,
doubtless, more refined than that of a clown ; and, in spite of

Martial's saying, the judgment of a professed cook is to be re-
garded, although there may be many guests who would not appre-
ciate his skill.
True excellence in each art is to be decided by the judgment
of persons of exercised taste and observation in that art, and not
by the opinion of the multitude. Nevertheless, as has been stated,
success is measured by popidar favour, and is often (at least for a
time) independent of excellence tried by the correct standard.'
Artists cannot, in general, afford to be teachers ; they are com-
pelled to adapt their powers of invention and imitation to the
varying demands of the popular temper. Actors must accommo-
date their representations to the public fancy, and must be con-
tented to amuse tlieir audience in the manner in which they
desire to be amused, without undertaking to purify or elevate
their taste.
The drama's laws the drama's patrons give
For we who live to please, must please to live.
Even artists, however, of all sorts, who are compelled to adapt

their performances to the public taste, appreciate the approbation
of cultivated and refined judges, and often pursue a disinterested
love for the higher departments of their art, without reference to
profit or immediate fame. JNIen of genius, likewise, may create
new and form in the public a new oesthetical sense. But
tastes,
this power, both of forming the appetite, and furnishing the food
which it demands, is given to few.^
' is said to have expressed his wonder that, among the Greeks, profes-
Anacharsis
sional actorsand musicians contended in the theatres for tlie prize, and that unprofes-
sional judges decided on their merit —
Diog. Laert. I. 103, where tlie commentators cite
a passage from Quintilian Felices artes essent, si de illis soli artifices judicarent.'
:
'
Gellius tells the following anecdote of Menandor :

'
Menander a Philemone, nequaquam
pari script-ore, in certaminibus comcediarum ambitii gratiaque et factionibus ssepemimero
vincebatur. Eum cum forte habuisset obviam Quaeso, inquit, Philemon, bona venia,
;
die mihi, cum me non erubescis?' (N. A. XVII. 4.) Ariistotle, however, says
vincis,
that the multitude are the best judges of the productions of music and poetry, Pol.
III. 11.
* Valerius Maximns, III. 7, ext. 1, tells an anecdote of Euripides having been re-
quired by the .\tlienia!ipeople to expunge some sentiment from one of his tragedies
whereupon he came forward in the theatre, and said that he was in (he habit of com-
po.sing tragedies in order to instruct the people, not in (irdcr to learn from them.
K
— — ;;
Similar remarks apply to the works of the useful arts. Pro-

ducts of this kind must fall in with the general taste, and be
suited to the wants and convenience of numbers, in order to be
appreciated, and be in demand. In all vendible commodities,
public favom- is the test of success. The empire of fashion, with
respect to taste in building, furniture, dress, gardening, and decor-
is notoriously as capricious as it is paramount
ation of all sorts,
and the shifting of public taste in these respects may sometimes
remind us of the F'rench proverb, that fools invent fashions, and
wise men follow them.' We may thus often find that the taste of
the public is works both of the fine and the
erroneous ; tliat, in
useful arts, the people may admire contrary to the opinion of comi-
petent judges and may find excellence in works which the latter
;
condemn, and fail to appreciate what the latter esteem highly

yet the general taste must be accepted as the criterion of success,
whether deserved or undeserved.
The arbitrium popularis aurce is decisive as a test of success,
where a person seeks to obtain followers, supporters, admirers, or
customers. But where he desires to submit his opinions to the
standard of truth, it ought to be disregarded, in comparison with
the sentence of the few competent judges, either contemporary or
future.
§ 15. As the majority of the public are enabled to give cur-
rency to their own opinions and tastes, by making a conformity
with t-hem the condition of success and worldly prosperity, or, at
least,the surest road to its attainment, they ought to be satisfied
with this important influence, without attempting to enforce their
own standard upon a reluctant minority. ' Experience,' (says Mr.
Mill,) ' proves that the depositaries of power, who are mere dele-
gates of the people — that is, of a majority —are quite as ready
(when they think they can count on popular support) as any
Comparo, also, the anecdote of AntigenicLis, a musician, ib. 2, who, -when a promising
disciple of his own was not apprfciated by the people, said to him: '
Mihi cane et
Musis,'
' '
Lcs fous inventeut les modes, et les sages les suivent.' Lerocx de Lincy,
Proverbes Fm7iâis, torn. I. p. 160. Lord Bacon has a similar remark on superstition.
' The master of superstition is the people, and in all superstition wise men follow
fools.' Essay XVII.
II est dtonnant qu'avec tout I'orgueil dont nous sommes gonfles, et la haute opin-
'
ion que nous avons de nous-meraes et de la bont6 de notre jugcment, nous negligions
de nous en sen-ir pour prononcer sur le merite des autres. La rogue, la favcur popu-
laire, celle du prince, nous entraincnt commc un torrent. Nous louons ce qui est lou^,
hien plus qive cc qui est louablc.'— La BmvEHK. Cariatcrcs, c. 12.
'
Ti.] TO GUIDE OPINION ON ANY SUBJECT. 131
organs of olijârchy to assume arbitrary power, and encroatli un-

duly on tlie lil)orty of private life. The public collectively is
abundantly ready to impose, not only its generally narrow views
of its interests, but its abstract opinions, and even its tastes, as
laws binding upon individuals. And our present civilisation tends
so strongly to make the power of persons acting in masses the only
substantial power in society, that there never was more necessity
for surrounding individual independence of thought, speech, and
conduct, witli the most powerful defences, in order to maintain
that originality of mind and individuality of character which are
the only source of any real progress, and of most of the qualities
which make the human race much superior to any herd of
animals.'
As soon as we are out of the province of civil government, it is
most important to assert the principle of individual independence
in matters of opinion, taste, and judgment, as against the prin-
ciple of numerical preponderance. Whether an individual exer-
independence by forming his own conclusions, or choosing
cises this
his own guide, it is equally desirable that the majority should not
force their opinion upon him against his inclination, by the semi-
penal sanction of the popular censure.
• Principles of Political Econoiny, vol. II. p. 508 ; compare vol. I. p. 248. See also
Bome similar remarks of Mr. Grote, in reference to the Funeral Oration of Pericles,
Hist, of Greece, vol. VI. p. 201-2.
132 AITLICABILITY OF THE TEIKCirLE OF AUTHOEITY [ch.
CHAPTER VII.
ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY TO THE

DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES.
§ 1. From what has been said above as to the qualifications of

a trustworthy authority, and the province for its proper exercise,
we perceive that the best guide is the opinion of persons specially
conversant with a subject, and not the general opinion of persons
having no peculiar information or experience in the matter that, ;
whenever an individual acts for himself, and is not fettered by

legal rules, he ought to weigh opinions, and not to count them.
Whence it follows, that the persons whose opinion on any subject
is endowed with authority, always form a small minority as com-
pared with the entire community.

There is, however, one subject in which it is necessary that
opinions should be counted and not weighed that the greater ;
number should prevail over the less, without reference to the in-
trinsic value of their opinions, and shoidd decide the practical
course of action. This subject is Civil Government, so far as it
depends on the decisions of Political Bodies. In the following re-
marks, I propose to examine the causes of this necessity, and the
extent to which its consequences are moderated and counteracted
in practice by a voluntary deference to the contrary principle.
§ 2. For this purpose, it will be necessary to trace briefly the
historical origin of Political Bodies, and of the principle upon
which their mode of action is founded.
In the earliest governments which history presents to us, viz.,
those of tlie great empires of Western Asia, everytliing, from the
monarch down to the lowest civil fimctionary, was organised on
the principle of individual action. Being all absolute or despotic
monarchies,' the principle of a political body was, indeed, neces-
'
As to all tho Orientiil gorcrnments of antitjuity living despotisims, see the passagos
Quoted by Cfrotju.s Dc J. B. d P. I. 3, § 20 ;
particularly Aristot. Pof. III. 14. See
—
VII.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 133
sarily exchuled from the form of tlieir supreine government ; the

sovereignty always resided in a single person, and not in any
council of nobles or popular asseraljly. But no trace of corporate
action — no vestige of the existence of any ])oard, or jury-court, or
collegium —
can be discerned even in any suhordlmite part of the
system of the purely Oriental States nor have they, at
political ;
the present day, advanced beyond this very simple and primitive
org-anisation. government exactly re-
In this respect, their civil
sembles our military and naval constitution.' There is, it is true, a
gradation of powers, and a subordination of authority, descending
from the Emperor, or Kajah, or Shah, or Sultan, down to the petty
head of a village, or the collector of revenue ; but each officer acts
for himself, on his individual responsibility, without colleagues,

and not as a member of a body. In the Oriental States, whenever
councils are mentioned, they either are consultative councils of
the sovereign or of his minister, destitute of legal power, capacity
for corporate action, and real freedom of speech ; or else they are
assemblies of high officers of state, (like the levees of European
princes) in which each person attends in order to pay his court to
the Sovereign, or to receive his audience on occasions of state cere-
mony. In authentic Oriental history, there is no example of an
harangue or pul)lic address to a constituted deliberative body.
Oriental civilisation has never yet reached the stage which is
compatible with discussion concerning common interests, by a
body of counsellors possessing equal rights, each of them entitled
to give advice to the rest, and to express an independent opinion.^
The qualities essential to oral discussion in a numerous assembly
are, toleration of contradiction and censure, with such a power of
self-command and suspension of the judgment, as enables a person
to listen to, and understand, arguments hostile to his own views
to treat them with deference, and to give them a suitable answer.
If these qualities do not prevail throughout the assembly, the as-
sertion of adverse opinions, and their comparison and examination,
are rendered impossible the speaker is interrupted by clamour,
;
and threats the entire assembly be-

vociferation, denials, insults, —
comes a scene of turbulence and confusion, and intelligible debate
is at an end. It is partly from the absence of the qualities just
also the remarks of Heeren upon the character of the Asiatic despotisms, Ideen, I. 1,
p. 423-8.
' The reason why the military and naval services, in civilised States, are organised
upon this prinrlple, is stated lower down.
^ See Note A. at the end of the chapter.
:
134 ATPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHOEITY [ch.
described, (which, even in highly-civilised countries, are not very

common,) that no Oriental country has ever arrived at discussion
in a public body. The absence of deliberative councils or assem-
blies in Oriental Kingdoms has arisen, however, in part, from the
confirmed habit of advdation, and servile compliance with the
wishes of the prince, which their despotic system has established.
It is true of every Oriental ruler, what Tacitus says of Vitellius
' quicquam
Ita formatis principis am-ibus, ut aspera quae utilia, nee
nisijucundum et Isesurum acciperet.' ^
The Greeks were, it seems, the first nation who formed a dis-
tinct conception of political management by a Body, and carried
it into practical effect. Without this arrangement, a free or
popular constitution, such as began to exist in their small city
communities before the dawn of authentic history, could not have
arisen. Originally, in the Grecian States, the assem])ly of free
citizens was merely convened and consulted by the kings at their
pleasure, and did not exercise any legal power but, in process of ;
time, it obtained a potential voice in the constitution, and its

decisions acquired the force of law. This principle of corporate
action, and of decision by a majority of voices, was not confined,
in the Greek republics, to the general assembly of the citizens, but
it was extended to courts of justice, and to smaller councils
and administrative bodies, such as the Athenian senate and board

of generals, the Spartan Gerusia and board of ephors.^
The principle of corporate action in political affairs was bor-
rowed from the Greeks by the republic of Carthage, a colony of
the Asiatic Tyrians,^' and also, perhaps, in later times by the
' Hist. III. 56. Compare the statements as to Artemisia and Goes, in Herod.
AÎII. 67-9, and IV, 97 also Dohsson, Tableau de F Empire Ofhomayi, torn. VII. p.
;
229, vrith reference to the council of the grand visier Les memhres du conseil sont
:
'
arretes par la crainto de contrarier les intentions dii premier ministre. C'est en vain
qu'il les exhorte, qu'il les prcsse de parler, qii'il invoque Icur zele pour le bien de la
religion et de I'etat ; on lui repond qu'il est plein de lumi^res, qu'il possMe la confiance
et lee pniivoirs du maitre de I'empiro, que c'est ii lui a prononcer. a commander,
et que I'oliîssance est leur unique partage. S'il insiste, ils iuelincnt de nouveau la
tete, et portent la main sur la Louche et sur le front.'
* See Note B. at the end of the chapter.
It appears from Aristot. Pol. II. 11, that the assembly of citizens at Carthnge
*
had both power of debate and decision on questions brought before it by the magis-
trates. Also, that there was a Gerusia like the Spartan, and a council of 104 members.
Compare Bcitticher, Gcschichte dcr Cartfiager.'pp- 48-51. These institutions could not
have been Phoenician, as Hcercn supposes. Idem, II. 1, p. 115, but were doubtless
borrowed from those of the neighbouring Greek republics in Sicily and Italy, In like
manner, the influence of Greek ideas and civilisation liad reacted from an early
— —
Tii.J TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL IJODIES. 135
Jews.' licinii: common to all the Hellenic commonwealths of

Greece, Asia Minor, and Italy, it was adopted ]>y tlie Romans,"
who, in the development of their empire, gave it all the solidity

and definiteness which political and legal institutions acquired in
their hands.
The principle of decision by a political body was known both
to the Gauls and Germans in their semi-barbarous state; whether
as a native institution, or as derived from the imitation of the
Greek and Roman usage, is uncertain.' But the national assem-
blies of the Germanic and Gaulisli trilies have exercised little in-
fluence upiui ptisterity ; it is principally tluough the municipal

institutions of the free towns of the middle ages, and partly, also,
period upon the Phoenicians in their own country. See Movers, Die Pkonizier, \o\. I.
pp. 82-3.
The Phcenjcian citiesformed a league, of which T3Te was the leading member ; and
in it (at leiist in later times) w;is held a sort of diet, or federal council, having largo
powers of deliberation. Diod. XVI. 41. Tyre, however, and the other cities, were
each under the government of hereditary kings, (Josephus cont. Apion. I. §§ 17, 18;
Herod. VIIL 67 Diod. XVI. 42, 43 Arrian, Al. Exp. II. 24 ;) and although the in-
; ;
fluence of commerce (as Heeren conjectures, Idcen, I. 2, p. 20) may have created
we;illhyand powerful families, and thus have placed some checks upon the reg-al
{Mjwer— and although they may have acquired from tlieir intercourse with the Greeks
8unie practicjil notion of a free government, yet, in early times, the constitution of
each city was doubtless purely monarchical, after the Orient:d model. The detiiled
account, in Diodonis, XVI. 41-o, of the treachery of Tennes, the Sidonian king, at
the time of the revolt against Ochus, shows that the government was, even at that late
period, purely monarchical. The silence of Aristotle respecting Tyre, in his Politics,
likewise proves that its constitution was not popular, like that of Carthage.
' The Sanhedrim, or Synedrion, in the Jewish commonwealth, was a body consisting
of seventy-two members, whose functions were chiefly judicial. How its decisions
were formed does not appear. It is first expressly mentioned at the time of Antipater
and Herod, or, at the earliest, in the lime of the Seleucidaj. If it decided by a majority,
(which is not probable,) its constitution had doubtless been influenced by the con-
tagion of Greek notions.
^ Dionysius states that, according to the institution of Komulus, it was the province
of the king to convene the senate, to assemble the people, to preside over their delibera-
tions, and to carry into eiFett the decision of the majority. A. R. II. 14. He adds,
that the king gave only a single vote in the senate, and that the majority decided ;
which institution Komulus borrowed from Lacedajmon. See also what is stated of
Lucius Junius Brutus, in VIl. 30, 39.
Concerning the Koman mode of voting, see Diet, of Gr. and li. Ant. in Suffragium.
In the Koman law, a board or political body was termed a colleyium. A collegium
was either a suljordinate body under the State, as the collegium augurum, or a fra-
ternity, guild, &c., for a scmi-public or political purpose. A similar body was also
called uiii\ersitas. Both these words are now, in English, ^limited to places of
education.
* See Note C. at the end of the chapter.
———
136 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [ch.
through the coiiucils of the church,' that corporate action has

det:cended from the Romans to the civilised nations of the modern
world, and has become one of the most familiar ideas and habits
of our political existence.'^
§ 3. The principle of corporate action is, perhaps, the most
important improvement which, since the dawn of civilisation, has
been introduced into practical politics, and it is the chief instru-
ment of a popular constitution ; but, like other political refine-
ments, accompanied with many serious difficulties in the
it is
working. The complexity of the mechanism sometimes deranges

and impedes its action.
In the case oi judicial and cvclmmistrativehodxe^, the plurality
of members ^ tends to insure a more careful and deliberate con-
sideration of the question to be decided,^ on account of the
diversity of opinions which are likely to be brought to bear upon
it, as well as of the variety of appropriate knowledge and inform-
ation, and of individual character and disposition.

The number of counsellors concurring in the decision, and
responsible for it, is a considerable secm-ity against precipitate,
' The expression to vot-' was borrowed from the practice of tlie councils of the
church, according to Sarpi, 1. II. c. 30. (Courayer, torn. I. p. 212.)
^ As to the nature of a persona moralis, compounded of several individual persons,
but acting as a corporation or political bodj-, see PuiFeudorf, Law f N. and y. I. 1,

§§ 13, 14. Compare Note D. at the end of the chapter.
Ancient writers, both sacred and profane, concur in recommending plurality of
'
counsellors. Thus, Proverbs, XI. 14 'In the multitude of counsellors there is safety.'
:
XVI. 22 Without counsel, purposes are disappointed but in the multitude of

:
'
;
counsellors they are established.' So Apollon. Rhod. IV. 1336: iroAeW 5e' re firJTis
apelwv. Pliny the Y'ounger says, in reference to the influence of an assembly upon
the speaker who addresses it 'In numero ipso est quoddam maûm collatumque con-
:
silium quibusque singulis judicii parum, omnibus plurimum.'

; Epist. VII. 17, § 10,
Compare, however, the remarks above, in ch. 6, § 8.
* Things will have their first or second agitation if they be not tossed upon the
'
:
arguments of counsel, they will be tossed upon the waves of fortune, and be full of in-
constancy, doing and undoing, like the reeling of a drunken man.' Bacon's FJssay ou
Counsel.
Bou\r;j' Sirarroy npayixdros irpoXdfJiâvf,
is a verse attributed to Menandcr, Sentent, Sing. v. 70.
Deliberandum est diu, quod statuendum est semel,

Deliberare utilia, mora tutissima est,
arc two proverbial verses of Publius Syrus, v. 166-7. But all such maxims as these
must lie taken with the limiution, that the deliberation ought to be long and full,
where the case admits of delay, and there is no need of prompt action, as in military
affairs.No one would call a council to deliberate what was to be done to save a burn-
ing house or a sinking ship.
——
uiiinfonned, and incatitious jiulj;mt'nts, fuimded upon partial data.

' We are all (sa3's Locke) short-sij^hted, and very often see but one
side of the matter ; our views are not extended to all that has a
connection witli it. From this defect I tliinkno man is free. We
see but in part, and we know but in no part, and therefore it is
wonder we conclude not from oiu: partial views. This

riglit
miglit instruct the proudest esteemer of his own parts liow useful
it is to talk and consult with others, even such as come short of
him in capacity, quickness, and penetration for since no one sees ;
all, and we generally have different prospects of the same thing,
according to our different, as I may say, positions to it it is not ;
inconsistent to think, nor beneath any man to try, whether another

may not have notions of things which have escaped him, and
which his reason would make use of if they came into his mind.' '
Hence, when a plan, prepared by one or two persons, is submitted

to a consultative body for discussion, the advantage of a number
of counsellors is particidarly seen, in the amendment of details, in
the removal of partial blemishes, and the improvement of subor-
dinate parts. Here numbers do not confuse, if the imity of the
original plan is preserved.'* The number of counsellors also pre-
vents the decision from being determined by the caprices, and the
personal friendships or dislikes, of an individual. With respect
to an executive body it is likewise often important, that delibera-
tions respecting the application to practice of any general enact-
ment should be assisted by that knowledge of public feeling and
expectation on the subject, and of the circumstances of different lo-
calities, which is afforded by a plurality of counsellors.^ The deci-
sions of an executive body may, therefore, be expected to carry more
weight, to command more respect, and to be more in accordance
'
0)1 (he Conduct of the Understanding, § 3.
* '
Reason is of two parts, invention and judgment :
Judgment is most perfect in an assembly.

Invention is most perfect in cmo man.
In one man, judgment wants the strength which is in a multitude of counsellors.
In a multitude of counsellors, invention is none at all.'
Habbikgton's Political Aphorisms, Nos. 1 1 1-1 7, p. 522.

* '
And thoughwere confessed that reason would be better discovered and stated,
it
and conclusions easier made, by a few than by a greater number, yet when the execu-
tion depends on the many, and the general interpretation so much depends on the
8ucc<^88, and the success on the interpretation, wo see those counsels most prosperous,
whereof the considerations and deliberations have been measured by that standard
which is most publicly acknowledged and received.' Clarkndon, Hist, of lith. b.
VII. vol. IV. p. 2S7, fd. 1 mo.
— — —
138 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [ch,
with general sentiment, than those of a single functionary, and

thus to meet with more ready obedience from the community.
On the other hand, joint deliberation and consultation, and
the process of reconciling discordant opinions by compromises and
modifications of plans, lead to slowness, irresolution, vacillation,
and inaction.* Hence, in war, where rapidity of decision, and
energy as well as unity of action, are indispensable for success, it
is preferable to vest the chief command in a single person, and not
in a plurality of generals.^ Councils of war are proverbially said
' Clarendon, Hist, of Reh. b. III. (vol. I. p. 319), after dwelling on the too great
facility in 'By this
admitting persons into the king's privy council, proceeds thus: —
means the number hath been increased, which in itself breeds great inconveniences,
since a less number are fitter both for counsel and despatch in matters of the greatest
moment, that depend upon a quick execution, than a greater number of men equally
honest and wise and for that and other reasons of unaptness and incompetency, com-
;
mittees of dexterous men have been appointed out of the table to do the business of
the table. . . . And though it hath been, and will be, always necessary to admit to
those counsels some men of great power, who inill not take the pains to have great
parts, yet the number of the whole should not be too great, and the capacities and
quiUities most should be fit for business that is, either for judgment and
of the —
—
despatch, or for one of them at least and integrity above all.'
Hence the proverb Deliberando ssepe perit occasio.'— Pcbl. Strus, v. 165.
:
'
A person is sometimes admitted into a consultative body, in order to neutralise his

opposition, by advising with him in the first instance. A character such as that de-
scribed by Tacitus is, unfortunately, not very uncommon Consilii quamvis egrngii, :
'
quod non ipse adferrct, iuimicus, et adversus peritos pervicax.' Hist. I. 26.
^ Accordingly, Homer, who looked on a king chiefly as a commander in war,
says :
ovK ayaOhv iroKvKotpavir] •

fls Koipavos icrru,
iis âcrtXeis. Iliad, II. 201.
Compare the advice of Ilermocratcs to the Syracusans concerning their fifteen generals,
Thueyd. VI. 72, and the proverbial verse:
TToWol CTTpaTi^yo] Kap'iav awwXfaau.

DlOGKNIAN. VII. 72.
In the year 309 u.c, the consuls, T. Quinctius and Agrippa Furius, being sent on
an expedition against the il'qui, the latter consented that the entire command should
be entrusted to his colleague. Livy, describing this event, says In exercitu Romano :
'
quum duo consules essent potestate pari quod sivlubcrrimum in administrationo mag-
;
narum rerum est, summa imperii, coucedente Agrippa, penes collegam erat.' III. 70. —
Again, in 329 u.c, three tribunes, with consular power, wore sent against the Fiden-
ates and Vcientines, and tiieir dissensions caused the expedition to fail, on whicii Livy
remarks: Tres, delectu habito, profecti sunt Veios, documentoque fuere, quam plurium
'
imperium bello inutile esset. Tendendo ad sua quisque cousilia, quum aliud alii
videretur, aperuerunt ad occasionem locum hosti.' — IV^. 31. See the comment of
Macliiavelli, Di^c. III. 16, upon the.se passages, lie concludes thus: 'II die h contra-
rio a quello che oggi fanno questo nostre repuhbliche o principi, di mandare ne'luoghi,
per ministrarli meglio, piii d'un rominissario e piu d'un capo, il che fa una iuestimabile
—
VII.] TO TUE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 139
never to fi^lit.' The siiine reason applies, indeed, to tlie entire

organisation of the military and naval services, from the highest
to the lowest. It is to be borne in mind, that unity of command
does not exclude voluntary consultation with others. A military
commander, having an undivided power, is not, indeed, encumbered
with field deputies, whose consent he must obtain or a council, —
in which the voices of others are equal to his own but there is ;
nothing to prevent him from gathering the opinions of others, or

asking advice from those competent to give it.^
From these few remarks, it will be seen that the governments
of civilised nations act wisely in intrusting judicial and adminis-
trative powers, sometimes to one person, and sometimes to a body
of several persons, according to the nature of the functions to be
performed.
§ 4. The advantages arising from a plurality of members, in-
dicated above, exist also with respect to a legislative body ; but in
this case there is another important reason for the adoption of the
corporate constitution. Unless a Dictator, voluntarily chosen by
confusione. E se si cercasse la cagiono della rovina cle li eserciti Italiani e Francesi

ne'nostri tempi, .si troverebbc la potissinia cagione essere stata qiiesta.' Compare al.so
the remarks of Mr. Macaulay, Hist, of England, vol. I. p. 542, who refers to the well-
known example of tlie Dutch deputies. Livy, in comparing the Roman captains with
Alexander the Great, points ont, among the disadvantages to which the former were
subject, the short period of their command, and their liability to have their plans
hindered by the incapacity or ill will of a colleague. '
At, hercule (he continues) reges
non solum impedimentis omnibus, sed domini remm temporumque, trahunt con-
liberi
eiliis cuncta, non sequuntur.' —
IX. 1 8. The unity of command in war is at its maximum,
when the general is not only unincumbered with a colleague or a council, but is also
the sovereign of the country, and therefore receives no instructions from home. Now
this state of things, as in the cases of Frederic the Great and Napoleon, is the most
favourable for military success.
'
In the earliest, as well as, perhaps, the most interesting council of war which is
on record — viz., that held before the battle of Marathon, the decision was carried in
favour of fighting (as was stated in a previous note) only by the casting vote of
the Polemarch Archon.
Clive called a council of war before the battle of Plassy, which decided by a
majority of thirteen to seven against fighting. Clive, however, disregarded the de-
cision of the council, in which he had himself concurred, and commenced the
action. On this occasion Orme remarks It:
'
is very rare that a council of war
decides for battle ; for as the commander never consults his officers in this authentic
form but when great bo surmounted, the general communication
difficulties are to
increases the sense of risk and danger, which every one brings with him to the consul-
tiition.' IlUt. of Hind. vol. 11. \k 171. See Thornton's Hist, of the Brit. Empire in
India, vol. I. pp. 235, 281.
^ Quid fi(!ri debeat tractato cum multis : quid vero facturus sis, cum paucissimis
ac fidclissimis, vel potius ipse tecum. —VtxiKTius de lie Mil. III. c. who includes
20,
this rule among the general maxims of war.
—
the people, is to be considered a popular form of government,'

without a corporate action of the supreme legislature, a popular
constitution cannot exist. Whatever advantages, therefore, belong
to a popular or non-despotic form of government, whether aristo-
cratic ordemocratic, they can only be obtained by vesting the
supreme power in a body of persons. Without this arrangement,
no government except a pure monarchy or despotism can exist.
Supreme political bodies have, even in ancient times, generally
delegated to single functionaries, or to small boards or tribunals,
the chief part of their executive powers ; so that the only part of
their power which they exercise constantly is their legislative power.
Now, in general, the necessity for immediate action does not exist
with respect to the making of laws ; and therefore a legislative
body possesses the advantages of consultation which arise from a
number of counsellors, without the disadvantage of hindering
prompt and decisive action, which springs from the same cause.
It may be added, that a sovereign body generally delegates to
subordinate officers the power of making subsidiary laws, the nearest
to practice, in which delay is most inconvenient, and which require
the most frequent alterations.^
§ 5. Now, whenever any deliberative political body, or col-
legium, exists, whether its fimctions be legislative, judicial, or
administrative, there arises a necessity of determining the manner
in which its decisions are to be formed ; that is to say, whether
' See Grote, Hist, of Greeer, vol. III. p. 130. In the Greek republics, such a
dictator was called an a:(Tvfxv7}T7]s. alperr] rvpafvis. —Aristot. Pol. III. 9, 10 ; cf.
IV. 8.
* '
La difference qu'il y a entre la monarcliie et les deux autres formes do gou-
veruemont, et qui rend (a premiere beaucoup plus commode que les deruieres, c'est quei
dans les democracies et dans les aristocracies, il faut qu'il y ait certains lieux regleSi
pour pouvoir d^liberer et fairo dcs ordonnances, c'est a dire, pour exercer actucUement
I'autorite souveraine : au lieu que dans uno monarcliie, du moins lorsqu'elle est absoluo,
le souverain pent d^liberer et donnor ses ordres en tout temps et en tout lieu, de sorte
que, comme le disoit un ancien, "Rome estpartout ou so trouve I'Empereur." En offet
le peuple, et les senateurs, n'etant qu'un corps moral, ne pcuvent agir sans s'assembler.
Au lieu que le monarque est une seule persoune physique et individuelle ; et par con-
sequent il a toujours un pouvoir prochain, d'exercer les actes de la souverainete.'
Ptjffkndorf, Droit de la Nature et des Gens, VII. 5, § 9 ; trad, de Barbeyrac.
If this argument held good, the superiority of a purely monarchical to a popular
form of government would be unquestionable. But the difficulty here indicated is, in
limited monarchies and republics, obviated by a delegation of the executive power to
single functionaries, the only power which requires to be exercised on a sudden. In
general, no serious inconvenience arises from the necessity of convening an assembly
for the exercise of the hcji^latiiê sovereignty. Even these rare exceptional cases are
provided for in modern free constitutions.
Til.] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 141
the concurrence of all, or only of a portion, of the members, and

if so, of what portion shall be required.
§ 6. In the case of a court of justice, or an administrative
board, consisting of a small number of persons, it may be some-
times possible to render unanimity necessary to its decisions.
Trial by jury, as organised in England and the United* States,

affords an example of an unanimous decision l)y a judicial body of
twelve persons; and a large part of the civil and criminal juris-
diction of these countries is founded on this antique institution.
It gives rise in practice to many inconvenient results, such as un-
meaning compromises, tossing up for verdicts, the necessity of
urging the jury to a decision by debarring them from food while
they are in consultation but it has been found consistent with a
;
regular, if not a very intelligent, administration of -justice. In

other countries, where trial by jury has been long practised or re-
cently introduced, the rule of unanimity has not been followed,
and the verdict of a simple majority, or some other proportion, of
the jury has been received. According to the law of Scotland, the
jury in criminal cases (except that of treason) consists of fifteen,
and they decide by a simple majority. In Jersey and Guernsey

the Royal Court, consisting of twelve jurats, also decides by a
simple majority. In France, before the Revolution of 1830, the
jiiry, in criminal cases, consisting of twelve, decided in the same
manner ; but, by an alteration made in 1831, a majority of two-
thirds, or of eight to four, ^Yas required.'
The difficulty of obtaining an unanimous decision, even from
small judicial and administrative bodies, indeed so great, that
is
(however desirable it might be to require unanimity) the almost

imiversal rule is, that their decision is made by a simple majority.
The necessity of unanimity in a small body, judicial or adminis-
trative, does not, it may be observed, ensure a careful consideration,
as the agreement may be the result of a blind reliance on the
opinion of one or two of the members of the body, or it may be
produced by a senseless compromise. Lord Campbell, in his Lives
of the Chancellors, says of Lord Eldon ' I have heard him cite :
with great glee, a saying of Lord Thurlow that the decrees of —

the Scotch judges were least to be respected wlien they were
imaninioiis, as in that case they probably, without thought, had
followed the fust of their number who had expressed an opinion ;
'
Cock d'I)is/r. Crim. Art. 347.
whereas, where they were divided, they might be expected to have

paid some attention to the subject.' ^
§ 7. In bodies belonging to, or composing, the supreme legis-

lature, (such as the Ecclesia in the Grreek Kepublics, the Roman
Senate, the Houses of Parliament in England, the Chambers in
France; Belgium, &c., the various legislative bodies of the United
States,) it has been the constant practice for the decision to be
determined by a mere majority. The same rule likewise obtains
in subordinate legislatures, as in colonial Houses of Assembly.
In legislative assemblies, as in judicial and administrative
bodies, it woxild doubtless be desirable to obtain the concurrence
of all the members to the decision. In many simple questions,
and in which the feelings or interests of the members of the body
are not involved, this unanimity is practicable, and often occurs.
But in other questions, and those the most important, irreconcile-
able differences of opinion always prevail among the members of
such an assembly, and unanimity of decision is therefore im-
possible. To require unanimity for the acts of such a body, would
be to renew the evils of the Tribunitian power of Rome, or the
Liberum Veto of the Polish Diet ; ^ it would place the assembly
at the mercy of any perverse, factious, or corrupt person, who hap-
—
pened to be one of its members as he might, by his single voice,
arrest its action and paralyse all its proceedings. Entire unanimity,
therefore, is plainly inconsistent with the habitual working of such
a body and so great are the difficulties of obtaining the concur-
;
rence of a large body of men, to a uniform plan of political man-

agement, or even to a complex legislative measure, amidst the
distractions and disturbances caused by the alternations of popular
feeling, that it has been found inexpedient to require the consent
of more than a majority in supreme legislative bodies, and the
practice of deciding by a plurality of votes has met with universal
acquiescence.
It seems scarcely necessary to prove that, if the decision is not
to be unanimous — if the concm'rence of all the members of the
body is not required — it must be made by a majority, and not by

a minority, however determined. If a minority coidd prevail over
the majority, those who were in favour of a proposition would vote
'
Vol. VII. p. 665.
' Concerning the Liberum Veto, pee Lord Brougliam's Political r/iilofopl///, vol. II.
p. 81. The United Provincos, on que.'itions of great iniiM)rt;vnce, also admitted this
mode of voting. See Barltyruc's note on Piiffondorf, Vll. 2, g 15.
Til.] TO Tin-: DECISION'S OF POLITICAL BODIES. 143
aînst it, or would abstain from votinj:^, in order to insure a mi-

nority to tlieir side of the question. Besides, there would be
no
inducement to discuss a question, if, by converting a person to
your opinion, you did not strengthen your side in the division
when the votes came to be counted. It woidd be unprofitable to
pursue this argument fiuther, as it is obvious that the hypothesis
of the minority of a political body prevailing, by their votes, over
the majority, leads to all sorts of practical absiurdities.
§ 8. Whenever the mode of deciding by a majority of votes
obtains, whether it be a legislative assemV)ly, a court of justice, or
an administrative board, the opinion of the
gi-eater number of the
members of the body, properly ascertained and authenticated,
acquires the legal effect and power of the opinion of the entire
number.
is, in general, any number greater than half tlie
This majority
entirenumber: for example, 51 out of 100 votes. "WTien the
numbers on both sides are even, the president or chairman may
have a casting vote," or the question may be lost,^ or (in the case of
a judicial proceeding) the accused party may be acquitted.' Some-
times a majority of two-thirds, or some number greater tlian a
bare excess over a moiety, may be required.'* This has been the
' A casting vote may moan either one of two things. It may mean that the presi-
dent may give a second vote in case of equality; or, that he may only give his one
vote, in Ciises where, without his vote, the numbers are equal. Concerning a casting
vote, see Ruthorforth, ib. § 3.
* The rule of the House of Lords, in case of equality of votes, is — Semper
' prse-
sumitur pnj negante.'— May's Law of Parliawcnt, p. 215.
* The rule that, where the votes were equal, the accused was acquitted, obtained
both in the Athenian and Eoman law. Eum. 752-3; Eurip. El. 1268-9;
Soo Êsch.
Aristot. Problem. XXIX. 13 Big. 42, t. I. 1. 38.
; Numerous reasons for tiiis huraano
regulation are assigned by Aristotle, ibid. Also, Senec. Epist. 81, § 25. Reus sen- '
tentiis paribus absolvitur, et .semper quicquid dubium est, humanitas inclinat in melius.'
Compare Grotius, ib. § 18 Puflfendorf, VII. 2, § 17 Ruther forth, ib. § 3. The Athe-
; ;
nian legend supposed the last white ball, in the trial of Orestes by the court of
Areopagus, to have been placed in the urn by Minerva, which vote rendered the num-
bers efjual, and thus Orestes was acquitted. As tliis vote decided the question, the
^<pos 'Adrivas, or calculus Minerva?, came to mean a casting vote generally. See Dio
Cassius, LI. 19. I cannot accede to the interpretation of Otfried Miiller, in his Dis-
sertation on the Eumetiides, § 73, who supposes that the votes of the Areopagites are
equal, and that Minerva gives the thirteenth vote. According to this view, Orestes
would have boon already acquitted before she gave her vote, and the all-import<iut
calculus Minervae would have decided nothing. The rule of acquittal by equality of
votes is evidently understood to be in exi.'^tence at the trial of Orestes and the de- ;
cisive or casting vote was called the vote of Minerva by the Athenians, on iiccount of
her sup|)OHod decision on this celebrated occasion.
* CJrotiuj', ib. § 20.
rule of voting ill some confederations of States,^ where, on account

of the imperfect fusion of the members, the minority is unwilling
to be bound by the act of tbe mere majority. According to the
canon lawj'the pope is elected by the votes of two-thirds of the
cardinals.2 A similar majority was required, in certain cases, for
the votes of the Athenian judges, and is sometimes rendered neces-
sary by our law in the voting of municipal bodies. In the con-
stitution of the United States, this rule of voting occurs several
times. Thus, a member of either house of congress may be ex-
pelled by the votes of two-thirds of the members ; a bill which
has been rejected by the president becomes a law, if it is passed,
on re-consideration, by two-thirds of each house the president ;
can make treaties with the consent of two-thirds of the senators

present when two-thirds of both houses concur, a convention for
;
making amendments in the constitution may be called, and these

amendments may be made by three-fourths of the States.
In reckoning the majority, the body maybe considered as con-
sisting of its entire numher of members, as the English grand jury,
which is properly composed of twenty-three members, and, there-
fore, a verdict of less than twelve cannot be received. Or it may
be considered as consisting only of the members voting on the
particular question. The latter is the ordinar}^ rule but, in this ;
case, a minimum number, or quorum, whose presence is necessary,

is established.' Thus it may be laid down that, in the case of a
some other proportion of the entire body,
division, one-half, or
must be present and voting. According to the Roman law, the
act of a majority of a collegium was only valid when two-thirds of
the entire body were present.'* In the English House of Commons,
there must be at least forty members voting in a division.
Moreover, the votes of the members actually present at the
meeting of the body may alone be received, or absent members
may be allowed to signify their vote in writing, or to vote by
proxy, as in the House of Lords.'
' For example, the German and Swiss.

2 Walter's Kirclienrecht, § 228.
' As to the reasons for estalilishing a quorum, sec Story's Commentaries on the
Constitutim of the U. S. vol. II. §§ 832-3.
* Big. III.
4, § 3 Cod. X. 32, § 46.
;
According to the commmi law of England,
the act of the major part of a corporation is esteemed the act of the whole 1 IJIackst.
Com. p. 478 ; and by 33 Hen. VIII. c. 27, the act of the '
more part' of every college
or other corporation is valid, uotwithstjinding that the local statutes may have given
power to a single member to prevent sudi act.
* Conceruing the votes of absent member.^, see Gr^tius, ib. 20; Rutjierlorth.
§
ih, 8 5,
— — — —
Til] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. U.5
§ 9. Decision by a majority places all the members of the body

upon the same footing, and |:îves an equal value to the opinion of
each. It makes no distinction between them as to competency,
but allows the same weight to the vote of the persons most able,
and of those least able to form a correct judgment upon the ques-
tion to be decided. It therefore proceeds upon a principle directly
opposed to the principle adopted voluntarily by those who are not
restrained by legal rules —
in guiding their practical conduct by
the opinions of others, they look not to numbers, but to special
fitness.'
The
necessity, however, of having recourse to this principle
arises from the nature of political government, and the expediency
of a coercive supreme power which it implies. WHienever the
ultimate decision is vested in a body, there is, by the supposition,
no ulterior authority which can, in case of difference of opinion,
determine who are competent judges and who are not. There is,
therefore, no other alternative than to count the numbers, and to
abide by the opinion of the majority. The contrivance may be
rude, but it is the least bad which can be devised.'^
A decision by the majority of a political body is, in some re-
spects, analogous to a battle between the armies of two indepen-
dent nations. It settles a question which must be settled, and
which cannot be settled in any other manner. The one is an
—
appeal to physical force the other is an appeal to moral force it ;
' Anachareis is reported to have expressed his wonder that, in the legislative
assemblies of the Greeks, the wise spoke and the ignorant decided. Plutarch,
Solon, c. 5.
Referring to a decision of the Roman

which he did not approve, Pliny
senate, of
the Younger says :
'
Sed hoc pluribus visum est. Numorantur enim
sententise, non
ponderantur nee aliud in publico consilio potest fieri in quo nihil est tarn inaequale
: :
quam aequalitis ipsa. Nam quum sit impar prudentia, par omnium jus est.' Epist.
II. 12.
Cicero lays it down, not with reference to votes, that citizens must be weighed, and
not counted. 'In dissensijne civili, quum buni plus quam multi valunt, expendeudos
civos, non numerandos puto.' De Rep. VI. 4. There is no reason fur limiting this
remark to times of civil war.
Bodinus is of opinion, that the principle of decision by a majority is incurably de-
fective. Arguing against the probability that tlie voices of the bettor citizens will
predominate, either in an arititocracy or a democracy, ho says: Utrumque imperio '
inutile est, propterea quod in omni ccetu ac univcrsit-itc, seu optimatum, seu populi
totius. sutFragia non ad pondus exiguntur, sed ad numerum ac optimorum bona pars ;
semper a detoriore superalur quo fit ut optimorum paucitas in magii4 multitudino,

:
perindo ut salis scnptulus in lacu, nullam vim exserore possit.' De Hep. VI. 4,
(p. 1103.)
^ See Note E at the end of tlio chapter.
L
— —— :
is the right of the stronger reduced to a legal expression. This

view is implied in the verses of Prudentius, quoted by Grotius
Infirma minoris
Vox cedat ntimeri, parvaqiie in parte silescat.
Contra Symmach. I. 606-7.
Nobody, however, supposes that such a decision does more t1ian

determine the legal question nobody imagines that it concludes
;
the moral question of what ought to have been the decision, more
than a battle decides the question as to the righteousness of the
cause of the victorious army it hardly raises a presumption in
:
^
favom* of the winning side. No historian, in discvissing the

justice or propriety of any decision of a legislative body, or of a
com-t of justice, thinks of defending the decision of the majority
by saying that it luas the decision of the majority.
Hence, too, in the management of a popular assembly, there is
a tactic which is beyond the mere argumentative defence or attack
of a legislative measure, or course of policy. There is a skill
analogous to that of the military commander and there is a ;
triumph in success, which is not always dependent on the mere

goodness of the cause. The same remark applies, though in a
minor degree, to the arguments of advocates addressed to a judicial
tribunal deciding by plurality of votes.
A supreme political authority might, after having referred a
question to several persons, be guided by the opinion of the most
competent judges among them, disregarding the preponderance
of numbers. In like manner, a court of appeal woidd naturally
be influenced in its decision by the character of the judges in the
inferior com-t, and not merely by their number, in case those
judges were divided in opinion. But this discrimination is only
possible, because these are subordinate and not supreme bodies.^
'
Thou shalt not follow a multitiuie to do evil,' {Exod. xxiii. 2,) is an ancient
'
maxim, which has never been disputed, however often it has been violated.
R faut /aire coinme les aid res: niaximo suspecte, qui signifie presque touj ours,
^
ilfaut malfaire, des qu'on I'etend au-dela de ccy ohoses purement ext6rieurcs qui n'ont
point de suite, qui dependent de I'usage, de la mode, ou des bienseances.' La Bhutere,
Caractires, ch. 12. The verse of Juvenal, (II. 46)
'
Defendit numerus, juncta?que umbono phalanges '
is the expression of the fact, not its justification.

* It has been remarked, above, that the Pope is elected by two-thirds of the con-
clave of cardinals. The canon law, however, adds that this rule does not apply to
other cliurchcs, where the opinion, not only of the majority, but of those whose judg-
ment is the soundest, is to prevail. Puffendorf, Law of X. and N. VII. 2, § 16,
—
Til] TO THK DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 147
§ 10. Tlie necessity of decision by a majority in a political

body,' whether its power be legislative, judicial, or administrative,
is a defect inlieront in the nature of corporate action. There is,
indeed, no infallible security for the right decision of practical

questions in politics, as in other matters. Unfortunately the judg-
ment of the wisest counsellors is very far from infallible.* But
the decision of competent judges is less likely to be erroneous than
that of incompetent ones and if any means of discriminating
;
between them could would undoubtedly be desirable that

exist, it
the decision should be confined to those who are most able to form
a sound opinion.
There are, however, several circumstances, both in legis-
§ 11.
lativeand executive bodies, which, in spite of the principle just
mentioned, tend to guide the body to a right decision, and to give
a considerable degree of weight to the opinions of the more com-
petent judges.
and in
First, in courts of Justice, consisting of several judges,
administrative bodies, joint consultation by necessarily exists ;
which means the opinions of the ablest, the most experienced, and
best informed members, will naturally be brought before the entire
body, and will in general produce their effect in gaining the
assent of the other members. In any tolerably numerous executive
body, however composed, the persons of sound practical judgment,
combined with the appropriate knowledge and experience, may be
always expected to be in a minority ; but their opinion is likely to
be voluntarily adopted by the majority. Moreover, the members
of a judicial or administrative body generally divide the business
among one another, according to their respective qualifications ;
properly remarks, that this rule is only possible in cases where there is a superior to
decide who are the persons having the soundest judgment. Walter, Kirchenrecht,
§ 226, states that it is no Ion .ler observed, as it would lead to interminable discust'ions.
'
The remarks in the text are limited to political bodies ; but they apply equally
to councils, synods, and other ecclesiastical bodies ha\'ing the xdlimate decision of
questions of religious doctrine. Whatever claim they might make to a supernatural
guidance, their decision has, in fact, been determined by the numerical majority of
votes. See, on this subject, the dictum of Seldon, in his Table-talk, Art. Council.
They ajiply likewise to voluntary societies — of a private nature — exercising for them-
selves the power of decision.
* ' Quaiito sieno false molto volte Ic opininni de li uomini, I'hanno visto e veggono
coloro elu- si trovano testimoni dcllo loro deliberazioui, lo quali molte volte se non sono
deliberate da uomini eccellenti, sono contrarie ad ogni verita.' Mach. Disc. II. 22.
Bayle, (Euvres, t. III. p. 205, also has a passage on the erroneous decisions of popular
assemblies, and remarks that the liability to err is not confined to those of antiquity.
J. 2
^
80 that each person is principally occupied about those questions

with which he is most conversant.'
wherever the members of courts of justice and ad-
Secondly :
ministrative bodies are selected by the government, in a civilised

State, the selection is made under circumstances which insiuê a
considerable degree of fitness on the part of the person appointed.
The choice, even in the European countries under a despotic
government, is influenced by a sense of responsibility to public
opinion, and often by a sincere desire to appoint a fit person, even
if it is merely for the sake of facilitating the operations of the
governing power. In many cases, too, the choice of the govern-
ment is practically limited to persons having the requisite pro-
fessional qualifications — as in the appointment of members of
military or naval boards, or of com'ts of justice. Although the
person appointed may not be absolutely the best whom the pro-
fessionmight have supplied, yet he has the special qualifications
suited to the office. Consequently, in an executive body, the
number of persons qualified to form a correct opinion upon the
questions submitted to it may be expected to be a large proportion
of the whole — the quantity of dross, as compared with that of the
purer metal, is likely to be small.
§ 12. In a supreme legislative body, the decisions are always
preceded by joint consultation and debate ; and therefore (as in
executive bodies) the opinions of the ablest and wisest members,
particularly if they possess the gift of eloquence, or even of per-
spicuous and forcible statement, are likely to influence the rest of
the assembly. Hence, although each question is decided by the
votes of the majority, the votes of the majority are generally de-
termined by the opinions of the minority.
The manner in which the opinions of the majority of a numer-
ous legislative assembly are influenced by the opinions of the
minority, depends upon its constitution and character. In the
' This is iinalogous to tho reference, in a legislative assembly, of certain questions

to select committees ; of which more will be said lower down.
- LMplace, Etisdi l'hil'>sop/ii(jue siir Ics Probubilifes, p. lo8, ed. 6, admits that the
probability of tho decisions of an assembly cannot bo subjected to calculationbut ho ;
lays down, as a general maxim, that if the quest'on is of such a nature that it is
it
more than an even chance that each member of the assembly will form an erroneous
opinion upon it. then tho decision of the assembly will probably be \iTong. Hence
he concludes that numerous assemblies ought to decide only upon questions which are
witiiin the comprehension of tho multitude. This reasoning entirely overlooks the
f.ict, that memliers of an assembly who do not understand a subject may place them-
selves under the guidance of persons on whose judgment they may safely rely.
— ;
II.] TO THE DECISIONS Oi- ^VhiLlCAL iiOUiyjP. 14\)
assemblies of tlie ancient repul>lic9, wliich consisted of the entire

body of citizens, the attendance was uncertain and infrequent, the
numbers were large, and no system of political party could be or-
ganised amongst the persons who met for the occasion. In Athens,
and the Greek democracies generally, the popular assembly was
for the most part guided by some powerful leader and orator,
whose influence was sometimes beneficial and sometimes mischiev-
ous, but who swayed the judgment of the people by his counsels,
and gave a practical effect to the principle of authority. At Rome,
the ereat party leaders —by their military successes, their enor-
mous wealth, and consequent means of acquiring popularity — were
able to enlist numerous adherents to their cause, and to determine
the elections of magistrates and the vote of the popidar assembly,
but, their following was piurely personal —
the attachment was to
Svlla, or Marias, or Caesar, or Pompey, and not to any public
cause and the system was essentially unlike the party organisation
;
of modern .States.' The same was also the case, to a great extent,
with the parties in the Italian republics. Although the Guelfs
and Ghibellines, the Bianchi and Neri, &c., professed to have a
principle, in a short time they had only a name and the party ;
divisions were mere struggles for political power under rival

leaders.
In the legislative assemblies of modern States, the system of
political party is organised in such a manner, as to afford a
more effectual assistance to the disposition of the majority, to
defer to the opinions of the most competent judges within its own
circle. Unlike the niunerous and fluctuating assemblies of citizens
in the ancient republics, a representative assembly consists of a
limited and comparatively small number of persons whose attend- —
ance is more and who thus acquire a sort of pro-
or less regular,
fessional acquaintance with the business and forms of legislation.
They are thus able to form themselves into parties and knots of
members, who are in the habit of consulting and acting together
they likewise become aware of each other's characters and capaci-
ties and they are able to estimate fairly the wôight due to the
;
opinion of each upon the subject to which it relates. The person

whom each party select as their leader guides their proceedings
'
Speaking of iho popular assemblies of the Romans, Cicero says Concio, qure
:
'
ex imperil issimia constat, tamen judicaro solet quid inlersit inter populanui, id
est, assentatorem et levem civem, et inter constant«m, sevenim, et graveni Dc '
Amic. c. 25.
;
loO APPLICABILITY OP THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [ch.
by his advice, appears as their organ in the public deliberations,

and generally determines their vote by his opinion. If tlie leaders
of the several sections and parties in the assembly are well selected,
the inconveniences arising from the naked operation of the nume-
rical principle of decision are powerfully counteracted.
The system of parties in a legislative body leads to preliminary
and separate discussions among its members, out of the chamber,
upon the questions to be discussed within it, and to a prior settle-
ment of the course which each party is to take. This renders the
assembled body less accessible to the influence of speeches delivered
in its debates, and prevents it from being carried away by the
sudden and vehement impulse of an impassioned appeal to its feel-
ings. A greater ascendancy is thus secured to calm and prudent
counsels than in the ancient republics — where the citizens generally
came together without any iixed opinion, and were convinced by
• the speech of the most eloquent demagogue.
To a great extent, however, the proceedings of every legislative
assembly are influenced (particularly after the debate) by the
public discussions of its members ;and, in proportion as the ablest,
the wisest, and the most competent to guide its coimsels, take a
prominent part in its deliberations, the greater is the probability
of its decisions being correct, and its policy consistent and steady.
It may be observed that the effect of deliberations, in inducing the
bulk of the assembly to adopt the opinions of its ablest and wisest
members, is materially assisted by the publication of the debates,
through reports in the daily newspapers. The arguments advanced
on both sides of a question can thus be sifted and compared at
leisure by the public, out of doors ;the chances of justice being
done to a sound and well-supported argument are increased
really
the nature of factious and dishonest votes is more generally under-
stood, and the conduct of those who resist good advice is better
appreciated. Unquestionably, the success of a representative
system of government has been materially facilitated by the in-
vention of printing.
Another check upon the majority of a deliberative assembly is
derived from the forms of its proceedings. These forms are gener-
ally so arranged, as to secure to the minority the power of stating
their objections both to the principle and details of every measure
proposed for adoption by the asseml)ly, and of retarding its pro-
gress by adverse criticism, and the moving of ameuduieuts. The
fr>rms of the Euglisli House of Commons are avowedly contrived
Til.] TO TIIK DECISIONS Ol" POLITICAL liODlii-:. 151
for the protection of minorities ; and they are so effectual for their
purpose, as frrqiiently to defeat the will of the great body uf the
House, and to enable a few racral)ers to resist, at least for a time,
a measure desired by the majority.
The precise nature of the regulations for conducting the
business of a deliljerative assembly not here in question but it
is ;
is important to observe, that the seciu*ing of due weight to the
opinions of the minority, and a limitation of the immediate action

of the majority, listening to no compromise, and proceeding straight
to its end —
admitted to be a legitimate object of the forms of
is
such a body. Even the permission sometimes given to members

of a minority to enter protests, in an authentic form, against the
decisions of the majority is, to some extent, a security against im-
proper or hasty decisions. In general, however, (as we shall see
presently,) it is desii-able that, when the
decision has once been
made, no steps should be taken weakening its effect, and that
for
it be considered as the decision of the whole, and not merely of a
part of the body.
Another contrivance in the proceedings of a legislative assembly,
for obviating the evils of decisionby an uninformed majority, and
securing due weight to the opinion of a few competent judges, is
the reference of subjects to the deliberation and examination of
select committees of its members. The members of the body se-
lected for acting on such committees are naturally those who are
best qualified, by their experience, knowledge, and mental capacity,
to form a right judgment on the matter. The opinion of such a
committee, although consisting only of a small fraction of the
entire body, generally carries weight with the majority, in pro-
portion as the credit of its members stands high for good sense
and intelligence, and for peculiar qualifications in the given case ;
and also according as they have investigated the subject with

diligence and impartiality.
A further support to the minority of a legislative body is
afforded by the institution of a double chamber, or what some

writers have termed bicamerlsm.^ W'henever the majorities of
both chambers are agreed on any question, this effect is not
produced but if they happen to differ, the majority of one
;
chamber may support the minority in the other. If this state

of things was permanent, or even frequent, the legislative power
' Sec this subject fully discussed in Story's Conwientarics on fhe Const, of tlw U- S.
h. III. c. 8.
152 APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORIT!^ [ch.
would be paralysed, the constitution woidd not work, and a revo-

lutionary struggle would be the consequence but if the differences ;
between the two houses are not serious or frequent, and (when
they 0CC1U*) are terminated by amicable compromises, some pro-
tection to a minority in one of the houses may for a time be
afforded.
From these considerations it results that, although the decision
by a majority, both in executive and legislative bodies, is opposed
to the principle which we generally follow for obtaining rectitude
of judgment, where our course is free, and unfettered by legal
rules, nevertheless it is necessary for securing the advantages of
corporate action ; and that the evils flowing from the plan of
counting votes, without reference to their intrinsic value, are
counteracted and neutralised, to a great extent, not only by the
forms of business contrived for the purpose of controlling the direct
and simple action of the nimierical principle, but also by the spon-
taneous homage of the individual members of the body to the
principle of authority.
§ 13. In all cases where the act of the majority of any political
body is valid, it is highly desirable that the decision, when come
to, should be considered as the act of tlie entire body ; that the
comparative numbers of the majority and minority should not
be adverted to as a ground for impugning the decision ; and that
the law or other act should be obeyed without any question of
its on the ground of the smallness of the majority
validity,
by which may have been carried. Decision by a majority
it
is a mode of cutting a knot which cannot be untied it is, ;
therefore, on every account expedient that the knot should be cut

effectually.
For a similar reason, it is fitting that any section of a delibera-
tive body, who may be unable to induce the majority to adopt
tlieir propositions, should acquiesce in its decisions, and should
continue to attend its meetings, without seceding, on the ground
that tlieir advice is disregarded. In every popular assembly there
is a minority which is unable to carry its views ; and if such mino-
rities were to be discouraged by the rejection of their motions, and
to withdraw from their duties, the ultimate success of their opin-
ions could never take place, at least, not in consequence of their
exertions. Unless a defeated minority is willing to act upon this
principle, the unity of the body is weakened and impaired, and a

disruption is produced, similar to that which took place in the
—
Tu.] TO TH1-: DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 153
Roman State when the Ple]>3 separated themselves from the rest
of tlie citizens, and seceded to the Mons Sacer.'
§ 14. It is likewise fitting that the members of a majority

should bear in mind, that their assent to the propositions of the
leaders of the assembly is voluntary ; that the advice which is
tendered to them by members of their body is merely advice,

which they can reject or adopt, as they think fit ; and that, when
any measure has been sanctioned by the deliberate vote of the as-
sembly, it becomes the act of the entire body, whoever may have
been ita author and proposer. Unless this principle is kept in
view, there is a tendency, when any measure has proved unsuccess-
ful, (either from its own defects, or from untoward circumstances,
or from the unskilfulness or jaeglect of the persons charged with

its execution,) to throw the blame upon its originator, and to
forget that it was deliberately approved and accepted by the

entire body.'^
§ 15. It has been remarked above, that with respect to the
'At the congress of the Achaean League, in 198 b.c, when the proposal of an alli-
ance with the Komans was made, no one would speak. Axistaenus the praetor, after
urging them to deliver their opinions, concludes his exhortiition thus: Ubi semel '
decretum erit, omnibus id, etiam quibus ante displicuerit, pro bono atque utili foedere
—
defeudendum.' Livr, XXXII. 20. Compare Thirlwall, Hist, of Gr. vol. VIII. p.
301. In Polyb. V. 49, and Dion. Hal. A. R. XI. 56, there is likewise the expression
of the same principle. Pliny states that, in the proceeding on a complaint of the
Bithynians against Varenus, their pro-consul, a question was decided in favour of
Varenua by the senate, and was afterwards, on an appeal to the emperor, remitted by
him to the senate for their re-consideration. When the point was discussed on this
re-hearing, most of the members who had voted against Varenus on the former occasion
now voted for him alleging that they were bound by the act of the majority
; Sin- :
— '
gulos enim, integr^ re, dissentire fas esse peract&, quod pluribus placuisset, cunctis
;
tuendum.' Epist. VI. 13. Mr. Grote, Hist, of Gr. vol. IV. p. 478, remarks upon 'the
admirable conduct of the five dissentient generals [at Marathon], when out-voted by
the decision of the polomarch against them, in co-operating heartily for the success of
a policy which they deprecated.' Story, Comm. on the Const, of the U. 3. § 833, also
speaks of the '
baneful practice of secession.'
* Xenophon, Eep. Ath. II.
§ 17, complains that, if any evil consequence results
Irom a measure agreed to by the people, they attribute it to the authors and advisers
of the measure, who, they allege, persuaded them to it, contrary to their interest.
Machiavel also remarks upon the tendency of the people to visit the failures caused
by its own rash and foolish counsels upon the heads of its instruments, Disc. I. 53.
He points out, in another place, the disposition of men to judge merely by the result,
and the consequent danger of advising either a pinnce or a people; for if tlie advice
turns out the blame is imputed to the counsellor, even by those who voluntarily
ill,
adopted having the power of rejection. Hence, he recommends every counsellor to

it,
give his advice with moderation and calmness, so that the people or prince who adopts
it may seem to adopt it voluntarily, and not in consequence of the importunity of the
adviser. -III. 35.
—
members of an Executive body, the mode of their selection offers a

considerable secm-ity for their special fitness, and, consequently,
for rectitude of decision by the majority. In cases, however,
where the members of a supreme assembly are determined by the
choice of a popular constituency, the chances against a selection of
fit persons are more numerous.
The principle of decision by a majority is requisite, as well for
the choice of a representative by a constituent body, as for the
acts of an executive board or a legislative assembly. The same
reasons apply in this case as in the case of smaller bodies, only
with more force. Unanimity, in a body which may consist of
several thousand persons, is plainly impossible ; decision by a
majority is therefore necessary. But many of the securities for
guiding the majority to a soimd judgment, which exist in a legis-
lative assembly, are here wanting joint deliberation is nearly im- ;
possible, and the vote of each elector is frequently determined by

accidental considerations, affecting his individual position. The
decision is accordingly formed by an imperfect process.^
' Cicero describes in strong terras the inconstancy of the people in the choice of
magistrates, and the uncertainty of the event of an election in the coiuitia :
' Non
enim comitiis judicat semper popuhis, sed movetur plerumque gratia cedit precibns : :
faeit eos a quibus est maxima ambitus. Denique, si judicat, non delectu aliquo aut
sapientia ducitur ad judicandum, sed impetu nonnuuquam, et quadam etiam temeritate.
Non est enim consilium in Tulgo, non ratio, non discrimen, non diligentia: semperque
eapientes ea, quae populus fecisset, ferenda, non semper laudanda duxerunt.' Pro
I'lancio, c. 4.
Again, in the oration Pro Murcnd, c. 17, he dwells on the uncertain event of the
popular choice: 'Quod enim frc-tum, quem euripuni tot motus, tantas, tam varias
habere putatis agitationes fluctuimi quantas pcrturbationes et quantos ?estus habet
;
ratio comitiorum ? Uies intermissus unus, aut nox interposita, S8f?pe perturbat omnia ;
et totam opinionem parva nonnunquam commutat aura rumoris. Saepe etiam sine uUa
aperta causa fit aliud atque existimamus, ut nonnunquam ita factum esse etiam popu-
lus admiretur: quasi vero non ipse fecorit. Nihil est iucertius vulgo, nihil obscurius
voluntate hominum, nihil fallacius rationo totA comitiorum.' Compare also Seneca, de
Vit. Beat. c. 1, cited above ; c. 6, § 3.
'
Non ego vcntosce plchi.s sufFragia venor,' says
Horace, Ep. I. 19, 37, who, in his first ode, speaks of the mobiles Quirites. Our word
mob M'as abbreviated from the Latin, mobile vulgiis, in the reign of Charles the Second,
as wo loam from North's ExiDiicn. The expression seems to have been borrowed from
the verse of Claudian: 'Mobile mutatur semper cum principe vulgus,' De IV. Cons.
Honor. 302, which certainly is a singular origin for a saying upon piopular instability.
For a curious illustration of the arts practised in canvassing a numerous con-
stituency in ancient times, see the monitory tract Vc Pcfitione Consulatus, addressed
by Q. Cicero to his brother, when about to come forward as a candidate for the consul-
phip. On the election of magistrates by the senate under the empire, see Pliny, Epist.
III. 20.
Mr. Macaulay says that the common people are constant to their favourites, but
almost always choose them ill. flisf. of Engl. vol. I. p. G31.
II.] TO THE DIX'ISIUNS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 155
Tlie choice of a candidate by the majority of a popular con-

stituency is tluis sulyect to tliesame remark as the decision of a
question by the majority of a popular assembly. It solves the
practical problem, but leaves the question as to the real compara-
tive merits of the candidates undecided. This imperfection is,
however, inseparable from popular election, and it is counter-
balanced by the advantages which result from the representation
of apparent interests, and from the deference to the numerical
principle in government. Moreover, in a popular constituency,
tlie majority is practically influenced by the opinions and wishes
of a minority, altliough tins influence operates in a diti'erent
manner from that in which a legislative assembly is acted upon.
There is, again, another serious difficulty in the way of an en-
lightened choice of representatives by a popular constituency, a
difficulty, it may be observed, which extends to evei^ mode of
selection, and equally besets the choice of members of a house of
peers by the Crown.
The subjects which may
be submitted to the decision of a
supreme legislative assembly are unlimited, not only in number,
but also in kind. It has not, like an administrative board, a
special department, but it exercises a general control over all the
branches of the administration, and it superintends every function
of the government. It is called on to decide questions involving
relations with foreign states and dependencies, the management of
the army and navy, the defences of the country, its trade, agricul-
ture, and manufactures, its finances and currency, and
its religious
ecclesiastical concerns, the civil and criminal law, and the judicial
procedure, the state of public health, the internal communications,
and, in short, all the other interests of life. There is no depart-
ment of knowledge which may not be put in requisition for guiding
the decision of a legislative body. Consequently, no special or
professional training to fit member of such an
a person to be a
assembly is and the choice of the popular constituency
practicable ;
is not directed to any definite class or section of persons, or guided
by any obvious and easily recognisable qualifications, such as those

of a physician, a soldier, or an architect, in their respective lines.*
The possession of sucli varied and extensive knowledge and
experience as would render a person competent to judge for him-
self upon all the questions which may be submitted to a legislative
' This subject is pursued further iu cli. 8, § 2.

—
assembly being impossible, the nest best qualification is, general

soimdness of judgment and perspicacity of understanding. These
will render a person least likely to err in the midst of the hetero-
geneous multitude of practical questions, to the decision of which
he may have to contribute. But the qualities just described are
often not easily discerned, and, moreover, do not obtrude them-
selves upon the public attention. Qualities of a more conspicuous
and attractive character, particularly if accompanied with activity
and energy, are likely to arrest the attention and obtain the favour
of a popular constituency. Mere facility of elocution or impres-
siveness of manner is likewise often mistaken for wisdom in counsel.'
A large aggregate of persons, acting together casually, and not

forming a deliberative body, may likewise be captivated by earnest
and often repeated, though insincere, professions of a regard for
the public welfare, or their own peculiar interests.^
Notwithstanding these difficulties, the choice of fit representa-
tives is, in itself, easier and less subject to error than the decision
upon a long series of public measures ; and it must be admitted

that a popular constituency is better qualified to discharge the
former than the latter duty with success.^ Besides, thez-e are cer-
tain circumstances which tend to guide the choice of constituencies
in the election of their representatives, and to induce them to give
a preference to fit over unfit candidates.
In the first place, no person who has not received a fair educa-
' Plato calls eloquence ipaivofiifTj ffotpla.

* Bodinus, in his treatise De Republicd, maintains that the best and -wisest men
can never be chosen as rulers in any commonwealth. ' Quod si populum (liP says) ad
haec ipsa virtutis suffragia cieri placeat, sui dissimiles, id est optimos, non seJiget; sed
quam maxime similes, id est, stultos, improbos, impudontes, cum boni ac sapientes
viri, si modo sunt aliqui, minimum officiant uViiquo civium numerum. Quid autem
turpius, quam sapientium dccus ad dignitatem pendoro ab insipientium judicio dicam,
an tomeritate ? Demus tamen esse bonos aliquot ac sapientes in civitiite viros, con-
spectum coTtb fugient improborum ac desipientis multitudinis, nee si ad comitia venient,
seipsos sapientes judicabunt.'— II. 6, (p. 340.) The experience of represcntjitire
governments does not confirm these views.

' Le peuple est admirable pour clioisir coux a qui il doit confier quclquo partie de
'
Bon autorit^. II n'a a se determiner que par les choses qu'il ne pent ignorer, et des
faits qui tombent sous les sens. Comme la plupart des citoyens, qui ont asscz de
. .
suffinance pour elire, n'en ont pas assez pouretrc 61us; de meme le peuple, qui a assoz
do c«pacit6 pour se faire rondre compto de la gcstion des autres, u'est pas propre a
gerer par lui-meme.' Momtksquietj, Esprit des Lois, 1. II. ch. 2. The broad dis-
tinction is correctly taken in this passage ; but the facility of a choice of fit persons for
a public trust is stated too strongly. See also a similar passage in 1. XI. ch. 6 :
'
II
y avail un grand vice.' &c., where the superiority of the representative principle over
the direct voting in the ancient ro]>ublic.s is pointed out.
II.] TO THE DI'X'ISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 157
tion can, in the ordinary state of thing^s, present himself as a

candidate for tlierepresentation of a larjjje popular body. The
necessity of addressing the people, and of expounding iiis opinions
orally, excludes any person who is unable, from defect of education
or intelligence, to make such a statement as is suited to a tolerably
critical audience. In the next place, the members of a legislative
assembly, particularly of the more important ones, must make such
time and money, as are scarcely compatible with the
sacrifices of
means of those who do not belong to the educated classes of society.
Besides which, there is a disposition prevalent throughout a con-
stituency, to select as their representatives persons who, from their
social station, are distinguislied from the mass, and are, on that
account, better known and more conspicuous than persons of a
hum])ler position in society.'
These safeguards for the discreet exercise of the power of
selection by a popular constituency, may be expected to produce
an assembly containing an amount of intelligence and wisdom
beyond the average of the educated classes, in the country over
which it presides. Besides, the variety of experience and inform-
ation, which no one person can possess, is in some degree supplied
by the presence in the assembly of members belonging to dififereut
professions and pursuits, and familiar with different branches of
knowledge. In this manner, attention to each separate subject is
insured, and some immediate professional advice. But it is to be
borne in mind, that there is no security that the professional per-
sons who become members of the assembly will be the most emin-
ent in their respective professions ; and, after all, it will probably
be necessary to considt professional men not members of the
' 'There is an unconquerable, and to a certain extent (in the present state of
society at least) a beneficial proneness in man, to rely on the judgment and authority
of those who are elevated above himself in rank and riches. From the irresistible
associations of the human mind, a feeling of respect and deference is entertained for a
superior in stJition, which enhances and exalts all his good qualities, gives more graco
to bis movements, more force to his expressions, more beauty to his thoughts, more
wisdom to his opinions, more weight to his judgment, more excellence to his virtues.
.... Hence the elevated men of society will always maintain an ascendancy, which,
without any direct exertion of influence, will affect the result of popular elections; and
when to this are .added, the capabilities which they possess, or ought to possess, from
their superior intelligence, of imprfssing their own opinions on other classes, it will
bo seen that, any sort of despotic control were justifiable, it would bo superfluous for
if
any good purpose.'— Baylky's Rationale of Represent. Govenuiient, p. 269-70. It

siiould not, however, be overlooked, that the feeling of deference to superior social rank
(described in the above extract) is liable to bo counteracted by a variety of political
influences.
assembly. It may, moreover, happen, that a professional man of

unsound judgment in an assembly, (particularly if he has a power
of persuasive address,) may lead it to an erroneous decision, by in-
ducing it to reject the advice of more competent judges, who, not
being members of the assembly, cannot attend it in order to sup-
port their own views.
§ 16. The objections to decision by a mere numerical majority,
without reference to the competency or qualifications of the voter,
have naturally presented themselves to politicians, both speculative
and practical ; and various contrivances have been devised to
modify and mitigate its operation, retaining, however, the corporate
principle.
One of these is the method of voting by composite units.^
Thus, when the Eoman people were in Comitia Tributa, the votes
of each tribe, which consisted of several thousand citizens, were
taken separately, and the decision of the tribe was thus formed.
The votes of the several tribes, considered as units, were then
taken, and the ultimate decision depended on the majority of the
tribes. Now, if some of the tribes were considerably smaller than
others, and if the members of a particular order or section of the
people were predominant in the small tribes, they would have a
greater legal influence on the decision than the citizens included
in the larger tribes. The influence of the Italians, when admitted
to Eoman citizenship by the Julian law, was at first neutralised by
this contrivance.
In the constitution of Servius, a similar result had been pro-
duced by the distribution of the people into centuries the cen- :
turies of the rich contained fewer persons than the centuries of

the poor but the vote of each century (determined by a majority
;
within its own body) reckoned as one. By this contrivance it was

provided, (according to Cicero's expression), ' Ne plurimum vale-
ant plurimi.' ^ The absolute numerical majority of the people did
not prevail in counting the votes.
A system of voting, founded upon the same principle, was
adopted in some of the councils of the church. Inasmuch as the
bishops from distant provinces did not attend a council in so large
a number as those who came from the neighbouring provinces, a
'
On this mode of voting, see Bodinus, Dc Rep. II. 7. p. 360.
* De Rep. II. 22. Comppre Liry, I. 43 : Non viritim suffragium eadeni vi eodem-
'
qnojurc proniiscuo omnibus datum est; sod gradus facti, ut ueque oxclusus quisquam
suflfragio videretur, et via omnia penes primoros civiUitis es.<<et.'
rule was established that the vote should be taken by nations —

t'tat is to say, the bishops of each nation decided the vote of
first
e nation by a majority of voices ; and tlien the general decision

as made by a majority of nations. This mode of votin<^ was ob-
served at the councils of Constance and Basle.'
The votes of independent nations in a federal council have
generally been regulated in the same manner. Each nation has
been taken as a unit, and has exercised one vote, whatever might
be its power and importance as compared with others. In
the Amphictyonic League, for example, the confederate States
were all on an equality, so that Sparta and Athens had not
more votes than the smallest town which was a member of the
league.'
In the American confederation of 1781, each State was to be
represented in Congress by not less than two nor more than seven
members, but to have only one vote.^ But in the constitution
which was ultimately adopted, a compromise between the national
and federal principles was introduced. The members of the House
of Kepresentatives were determined by the population of each
State but each State, whatever its size, returned two members to
;
the senate. A similar principle has been established in the Facte

Federal of the Swiss Cantons, as recently remodelled.
The structure of the English House of Commons, and of other
representative chambers, is partly arranged upon an analogoas
principle, in so far as each member is considered as exclusively
representing his own constituents. For in apportioning the mem-
bers to the several constituencies, a preference is given to certain
classes of the people, or to certain parts of the coimtry.
§ 17. Another contrivance for obviating the evils of a simple

enumeration of the voters is the giving a plurality of votes to
certain members of the body. This mode of voting was sometimes
employed in the ancient Greek republics and it is called by ;
Aristotle the timoo'atic principle —that is, the government accord-

ing to the TLfirjfia, or assessment of property ."•
Sometimes likewise, a
'
SeeSarpi, 1. ii. c. 30.
* See Grote, Hist, of Gr. vol. II. p. 325- G.
• See Story's Commentaries, § 231.
« See Eth. Nic. VIII. 12. Hermann, Pol. Ant. § 59, n. 8. Aristotle says that the
domocmtic principle was, that the majority of all the citizens should decide the ;
oligarchical principle, that the citizens having the largest valuation should decide.
Ho proceeds to illustrate his meaning, as to the latter principle, thus There arc ten : —
rich and twenty poor six of the rich and five of the poor vote on one side
; four of ;
;
federation of independent States was formed upon this principle.

Thus, in a league between the city of Cibyra and three neighbour-
ing towns, it was arranged that, whereas these latter had one vote
each in the federal congress, the former should have two votes, on
account of her furnishing a larger share of the federal army.* The
same was with the league of twenty- three cities in
also the case
Lycia, the largest of which had three votes ; those of middle size,
—
two and the others, one the contributions to the common federal
;
treasury being in the same proportions.'^ In modern times, like-

wise, this principle of voting has been sometimes applied to a con-
federation of States on account of their unequal importance thus, :
in the Smalcaldic league, the electorate of Saxony had a double

vote.^ In general, however, this principle has been confined to
cases where the main purpose of the body is the administration of
a common fund, and where the weight of each member is deter-
mined by the amount of his contribution or share. Thus, in the
poor-law of England, Scotland, and Ireland, this mode of voting
has been established for the election of the managing body by the
rate-payers, because the rate-payers are considered as interested in
the management of a common fund for the relief of the poor. The
same principle is recognised by our legislation for the election of
managing bodies, in the case of town improvements and sanitary
measures.'' The members of railway and other companies for pur-
poses of public improvements likewise vote according to a property
scale ^ and the same is the rule of voting for the Court of Pro-
;
prietors of the East India Company.

The equity of this arrangement for the administration of a joint
stock is recognised by Grrotius,^ as well as by Dr. Eutherforth, who
remarks, that The equity of the case seems to be on tliis side
'
as it is equitable to allow each person a weight, in determining

upon any question, proportionable to the interest which he has
that the whole stock should be rightly managed. But (the same
writer adds) the reason of the thing is on the other side ; since
the rich and fifteen of the poor on the other ; then, if the valuations of each are added
on both sides, that side is to prevail whoso aggregate valuation is highest.— (Po/.
VI. 3.)
' Strabo, XIII. ad fin-
» Stra1)0, XIV. 3.
• Grotius, note on Jus B. it P. II. 5, 22.
* See 10 and 11 Vie. c. 16, § 24.
* Sec 8 and 9 Vic. c. 1 6, § 75.
• J. B. cl P. II. 5, § 22.
vii.J TO TUE DECISIONS OF POUTICAL BODIES. ICA
thore is no more likelihood that a man should judge riy,htly about

the maniigement of such stock because he has ten shares in it, tlian
tliere would have been if lie had been possessed of no more than
one share.' '
This remark is often true, but it must be taken with many

last
qualifications. For example, if two persons of equal wealth are
joint contributors to a common fund, and if one contributes his
entire fortune, while the share of the other is onl}' a small part of
his capital — it is manifest that the former has a stronger interest
in a prudent and cautious management than the other for, if the ;
entire fund was lost in some hazardous enterprise, the former would
be deprived of his means of subsistence, whereas the loss of the
latter would bo inconsiderable in proportion to his means. Besides,
the one can afford to forego all present income, and can postpone
his returns to a distant period, whereas the other cannot. On the
other hand, if the share of each person is sufficiently large to give
him a strong interest in the proper management of the fund, there
isno reason why he should not have an equal vote with those who
have larger shares. The principle of the widow's mite seems
equally applicable to the interest in a common fund.
With regard to the distribution of political franchises and
rights, the timocratic principle, so far as it rests upon the doctrine
of a proportionate interest in a common object, cannot be admit-
ted without large qualifications. All persons, whatever their
amoimt of property, have in fact an equal interest in the well-
being of the State, provided that interest be well understood.
Nevertheless, the establishment of a property franchise, and the
exclusion of all who do not possess it, is a virtual adoption of this
principle. Suppose a body of a thousand persons, of whom four

hundred possess a certain amount of property, and six hundred do
not. According to the timocratic principle, each of the four hun-
dred would have plural votes, and each of the six hundred would
have one vote. But the same result is even more effectually at-
tained, if each of the four hundred has one vote, and the otliers
are not enfranchised.
• Tnstifutes of Natural lav, h. II. c. 1, § 4, (vol. II. p. 9.) Aristotlo, Pul. III. 5,
romarks, that this would be true if men formed a political society merely for the sake
of property. But ho adds, that the end of a stîte is more extensive, and therefore the
arf,aimcnt of the oligarchs in favour of timocracy is unsound.
The by the amount of
principle of regulating the political franchises, exclusively
prf)perty, is examined at length in Bayley's Rafionale of Political Representation, pp.
243-8. Sec also Lord Brougham's Pol. Phil. vol. II. c. 10.
M
162 ArPLICABILIir OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHOEITY [ch.
Owing to the importance of securing the rights of property,

and the indistinct notions which exist on this subject among the
working classes, a property qualification for political franchises has
been found advisable in the European States having free constitu-
tions. In the ancient democracies, this problem was to a great
extent solved by the fact, that the working classes were slaves,
and excluded, not only from political franchises, but from civil
rights.
§ 18. It has been the main object of this chapter to show that,
in the constitution of a Political Body, and in its mode of decision
by a majority of votes, the Principle of Numerical Equality among
its members —
which its constitution and mode of decision generally
—
imply is in practice counteracted and modified, to a great extent,
by the Principle of Special Aptitude, which attributes a greater
weight to the qualified few than to the unqualified many. It has
been explained how, partly by subordinate legal regulations and
rules of procedm-e and partly by voluntary arrangements on the
part of the members of the body themselves, the direct and crude
action of the one principle is neutralised and corrected by the
other. It may, however, be objected, that any institution which
is founded upon a conflict of opposite principles —
whose predo-
minant legal character tends in one direction, and whose practical
—
working tends in another labours under some inherent and in-
curable defect. Why, it may be asked, do you first establisli a
principle, and then counteract it by another antagonist principle ?
It would have been surely better, either not to establish the ori-
ginal principle at all or, having established it, to give it free play,
;
and encourage its full development.

To this objection it may be answered, tliat, in moral and po-
litical matters, nothing is more common, or more beneficial, than
to establish a principle, on account of certain effects which it pro-
duces, and, as far as regards tliese effects, to allow an imimpeded
course to their action but with respect to otlier effects, which
;
would, permitted to arise without restraint, be productive of

if
mischief, to try to neutralise and impede them by adverse and

repressing influences. Upon this subject I may cite some judicious
and discriminating remarks of Mr. Mill, in reference to the style
of reasoning upon political (questions which prevails among French
writersand speakers. ' The common-places of politics in France,
(he observes,) are large and sweeping practical maxims, from
which, as ultimate premises, men reason downwards to particular
— '
vii] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 163
applications, and this tluy call beinfj^ logical and consistent. For
instance, they are perpetually ar«îiing that such and such a
measure ought to be adopted, because it is a consequence of the
principle on which the form of government is founded of the —
principle of legitimacy, or the principle of the sovereignty of
the people. To which it may be answered, that if these be really
practical principles, they must
upon speculative groimds the
rest :
sovereignty of the people (for example) must be a right foundation

for government, because a government thus constituted tends to
produce certain beneficial effects. Inasmuch, however, as no
government produces all possible beneficial eSects, but all are at-
tended with more or fewer inconveniences, and since these cannot
be combated by means drawn from the very causes which produce
them, it would be often a much stronger recommendation of some
practical arrangement, that it does not follow from what is called
the general principle of the government, than that-ît does. Under
a government of legitimacy, the presumption is far rather in favour
of institutions of a popidar origin —
and in a democracy, in favom-
of arrangements tending to check the impetus of popular will.
The line of argumentation so commonly mistaken in France for
political philosophy tends to the practical conclusion, that we
shoiUd exert oiur utmost efforts to aggravate, instead of alleviating,
whatever are the characteristic imperfections of the system of

institutions which we prefer, or under which we happen to live.'
An apt illustration of these remarks may be drawn from the
Spartan .State. The institutions and laws of Sparta were framed
with a view of training the citizens into good soldiers, and of
making the republic efficient for military pnrposes. Looking to
the peculiar circumstances of Sparta, this policy might have been
useful and commendable up to a certain point ; but a wise legisla-
tor, having once established the principle, would have moderated
its excesses by introducing institutions of a different tendency
instead of giving to the city of Sparta the character of a camp,
of making its public education little more than a military drill,
and uf l)anishing literature and science, and all that tends to re-
fine the taste and elevate the understanding which was the course
;
actually pursued.
The organisation of a modern army will serve as an additional
illustration. It is the policy of a general to create among his
' Si/stem of Locjic, vol. II. p. 618.
M 2
164 .VPPLICABILITY OF THE PRIXCirLE OF AUTHORITY [ch.
and promptitude in attacking,

soldiers a spirit of forward corn-age,
harassing, and pursuing the on the other hand, it is neces-
enemy :
sary that this spirit should be controlled by an exact discipline, by

a ready obedience to orders, and by a habit of imreasoning sub-
mission to the will of the commander. It may be difficult to
combine the courage of a hero with the regularity of a machine.
Yet it is by the due admixture of these opposite qualities that the
modern soldier is formed.
Another striking exemplification of the same view is afforded
by the institution of a poor-law :
—
The object of a poor-law is to
relieve the various forms of destitution and want out of a fund
created by compulsory taxation. Its principle is, to take the
property of the wealthier and to divide it among the
classes,
poorer, upon the petition of the latter, and without obtaining

from them any equivalent. Now, that the relief of severe distress
is a legitimate object of public policy cannot be disputed it has, ;
to a greater or less extent, and in one form or another, been

recognised as such in all countries. The principle of a poor-law
is, therefore, laudable and beneficial. But if this principle be
carried beyond a certain limit ; if it be not carefully guarded by
counteracting forces ; if precautions be not taken, with the ex-
and
press intention of deterring applicants for the public bounty,
of keeping the numbers of the state-paupers within reasonable
""Dounds —
a poor-law will become a system of legal spoliation,
which will impoverish one part of the community in order to cor-
rupt the remainder.
In these, and many other cases, we set in motion a principle
from which, while it is under control, we derive signal advantage,
but which, if it breaks loose, and follows its own tendencies un-
checked, is highly dangerous of which we may say, as of fire,
;
that it is a good servant, but a bad master. In the moral, as in

the physical world, we perpetually act by the composition of
forces ;and by repressing, governing, and guiding, an impetus
which we have created. In almost all cases, the moral sentiments
require to be impelled in a given direction, but to be restrained
from pursuing that path beyond a certain point. They need, not
simultaneously indeed, but at short intervals, both the spiur and
the bit. Courage must not be permitted to proceed as far as
foolhardiness, or caution as far as timidity. Liberality must not
degenerate into profusion, or frugality into parsimony. Firmness
must not Itecome obstinacy or churlishness, nor mildness and for-
vii] TO THK DECISIONS OF POIJTICAL BODIES. 165
boarance become weakness. Even benevolence, thougli in itself it

cannot l)e excessive, yet re(juires to be regulated by prudence and
wisdom. It lias, in fact, become a common-place of morality to
say that extremes are to be avoided that moderation is virtue
; ;
and that excesses are dangerous. There is scarcely any practical

principle in politics or ethics, wliicli (however good it may be in
its general tendency, and when placed under proper regulation)
may not be carried to a vicious excess.
Sunt ccrti deniqao fines,
Quos ultni citnique nequit consistero rectum.
In applying these remarks to the case of decision by a majority

of votes, we may perceive that the principle of a body, invested
with supreme political power, is attended with important advant-
ages,and atfords the best solution of the most difficult problem in

government. P'or the action of such a body, decision by a major-
ity, as a legal rule, is a necessary condition. Decision, however,
by a majority is, as we have already seen, a very imperfect mode
of arriving at a conclusion, and is, in general, opposed to the prin-
ciple of judgment, which reason and usage equally prescribe.
What, then, is the inference which a prudent politician, mindful
of practical consequences, and regardless of an apparent logical

consistency, will draw from these premises ? He will neither, on
the one hand, rigorously follow out the principle of decision by a
majority to all its most remote conclusions, and enforce them with
inflexible consistency nor, on the other, will he abandon the sys-
:
tem of a political body, because it involves, as necessary to its

working, a principle which, if logicall}' developed, and fairly pur-
sued to its ultimate results, would lead to practical inconveniences.
But, having secured the establishment of a political body on
account of its important advantages, and, as a necessary condition
for the action of such a body, recognised the principle of decision
by a majority, he will seek to regulate and temper that principle ;
he will encourage its good and mitigate its evil tendencies, and
counteract the latter by subordinate influences and checks, derived
from tlie adverse principle of special aptitude. Having recognised,
as a rule of law, the principle of perfect numerical equality in the
members of the body, and given the legal ascendency to the simple
majority of votes, he will modify the practical operation of that
principle by tlie principle of authority, and of the moral superior-
ity of the most competent j udges.
—
NOTES TO CHAPTER MI.

NoiE A. (page 133.)
A COUNSELLOR of King David is mentioned in 1 Satn. xxiii, 23, and counseUore

of King Nebuchadnezzar in Dan. iii. 27 but such counsellors are meant as
;
Histiajus was of Darius, (Herod. V. 24,) and not members of a council of state,
liaviug defined powers, and forming a constitutional check upon the royal
omnipotence.
The Persian king might sometimes summon mere consultative councils, par-
ticularlyon such an occasion as that described by Herod. VIII. 67-9, when a
council of war was held before the battle of Salamis it was, however, under- :
stood that, even at such a crisis as this, the person who gave ad\'ice contrary to
the supposed wishes of the king, gave it at the risk of his life. The debate of
the seven Persian conspirators about the best form of government, and its de-
cision in favom- of monarchy, against aristocracy and democracy, by a majority of
votes, as described by Herodotus, (III. 83,) are circumstances which he has
borrowed from Grecian ideas, and which could not have had any foundation in
reality. (Compare Grote, Hist, of Gr. vol. IV. p. 300.) The same may be said
of his account of long harangues in a council of Persian grandees, convened by
Xerxes to deliberate upon his proposed invasion of Greece, VII. 8-1 1. Heeren,
Ideen, I. I, p. 469, remarks, that there was no council of state, properly so called,
in the ancient Persian empire. A sunilar absence of organised political bodies
prevailed thi'oughout all the Asiatic nations of antiquity, so far as our accoimts
reach, not even excepting Pho-nicia ;
and the primitive government of Egj-pt
was doubtless also formed upon the Oriental type.
The Indian Idng is directed, by the laws of Menu, to appoint seven or eight
ministers of state. "With them, (says Mr. Mill, Hist, of India, vol. I. p. 179,)
'
he is cormiianded perpetually to consult on the affairs of his government but a :
singular mode of deliberation is prescribed to him —not to assemble his coimcil,

and laying before them, as in the cabinets of European princes, the subject on
which the suggestions of theii" wisdom are required, to receive the benefit arising
from the mutual commimication of their knowledge and ^êws a plan, ap- :
parently more ai'tful and cunning, more nearly allied to the siu'ipicious temper
and narrow views of a rude period, is recomnu^nded to consult them apart, and
hear the opinion of each separatehj ; after whieli, lidriiuj consulted them in com-
mon, when each man is swayed by the opinion he liad formerly given in private,
and has a motive of interest and vanity to resist the light wliieli might betlirowu
upon the subject by othei'S, the king himself is to decide.' The plan of consulta-
tion here dt^scribed is mainly dictated by the drernl of corporate action on the
part of an Oriental despot, and by the desire of preventing such a union among
the members of his council as miglit lead to the formation i>f a checlv upon his
power. —
(See Institutes of Menu, VII. 64, 56, 57, ed. Haughton, Compare
IVjhlen, Altes Indien, vol. II. p. 63.)
This very mode of consultation is, however, reconnnended by Ricon, even to
iMiropean jtrinct's, in liis J'Jssni/ on Counsel : '
It is ol" lingular use to princes if
they take tlu' opinions of tlieir CDUncil both S(>parately and togetlier; for private
opinion is more free, but opinion before ntliers is more reverend. In private,
— —
VII. ] TO THE DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIES. 1G7
iiu'ii arc more lx)lJ in their own men are more oLnoxious
luuuours, and in consort
to others' huiaours ; good to take both : and of the inferior sort
therefore it is
rather in private, to preserve freedom —

of the <rTeater, ratlier in consort, to pre-
serve resjR'ct,' Similar advice is also }riven bv Ilobljes, Leriathau, I'urt II, c,
'Jiy, p. 24" 8uj)iM>sin'; the number of counsellors equal (lie says,) a man ia
:
'
better counselbnl by heariiifr them aprt, than in an assembly.' lie proceeds to

give detailetl reasons for this precept, which, however, apply rather to a large
popular jv^sembly than to a small cabinet council.
The modernkin<r of Pei"sia is absolute there is no constitutional check upon
:
his power; no assembly or council in his kingdom. Malcolm's History of

Persia, vol. II, p. 428-0. In some of the independent wandering trilies of the
Pei-sian territory, important judicial questions are entertained by a council of
elders, and decided by a majority of votes. lb. p. 459.
The Turkish Divans are sometimes consultative councils of the Sultan or the
Grand Vi/ier, (în which, however, no real freedom of discassion exists,) or they
are occasions of public audience, for administering justice, or recei\-ing officers of
state and foreign ambassadors. See Dohsson, Tableau de FEnipire Othoman,
tom. VII. p. 211-32. With respect to the meaning of the Arabic word divan,
see dllerbelot, Bibl. Or. in v. The Indian durbar appears to be its equivalent.
The Emperor of China has two councils one, the great coimcil of state;
—
the other a select or privy council, (Davis's Chinese, vol. I. p, 211); but it can-
not Ije supposed that these councils possess any legal powers, by which the acts
of the Emperor are controlled. There are likewise six chief administi'ative
boards, Q'b.) which are, doubtless, merely executive departments, consisting of
numeroas members, but presided over by their proper heads. An account of an
assemblage of the great officers of state in China, to do honour to the emperor,
is cited from Sir G. Staunton, ib. p. 208.
Note B, (page 134.)
As to the character of the Homeric or heroic ecclesia, see Grote, vol, II. pp.
01-2 vol. III. p. 7. Aristotle, Pol. IV. 4, describes the people acting as a body,
;
by comparing it with a monarch M6i>ap)(os 6 Srjfios ylverai, a-vvderos eis sk iroWav'

:
ni yap ttoXXoI Kvpioi flatv, ovx ^s (Kaaros, aX\a navrfs. He then goes on to ob-
.•*erve that, when Homer speaks of -irokvKoipaverj being a bad thing, it is uncertain
whether he means this sort of plurality of rulers, or where there are several
rulers acting singly. It may seem presumptuous to decide a question of this sort,
which Aristotle left in uncertainty but I can hardly doubt Homer's meaning to
;
have l>een, that there should not bo several kings acting independently of each
other, especially as commanding in war. His poems contain no trace of a political
body, (see Odi/sseij, VIII. 390, on the Phaeacian kings,) nor do they mention
voting. As the Athenian courts decided by a majority in later times, /Eschylus
supposes the Areopagus to have voted on the trial of Orestes, (Eumen. 748-53 :)
thus carrying back this comparatively recent principle to the heroic age. Other
cases of a similar proclironism occur. Thus, l*>phorus {ap. Utrab. IX. 2, § 4)
tells a mythical story relating to Dodona, in which a vote of a judicial court,
consisting of three men and three women,is introduced. Again, Mvscelus of
Argos, the founder of Crotona, is said to have been condemned to death, bv the
unanimous votes of the judges, for the crime of preparing (o leave his native city.
— :
1G8 APPLICABILITY OF THE PEINCIPLE OF AUTHOKITY [en.
Hercules chang-ed the colour of the pebUes from black to white, aud thus saved
the culprit.— Ovid, Met. XV. 19-48 :
Mos erat antiquus, niveis atrisque lapillis,

His damnare reos, illis absolvere culpa.
"W'here there was a board consisting of several functionaries, the ancient

practice probably was, that the powers were divided among them, aud that each
exercised certain functions separately, as in the case of the Athenian archons.
Aristotle lays it down generally, that the principle of decision by a majority
applies to all republics, whether oligarchies or democracies : to S' Sti tiv bo^tj rois
TrXf loaiv, iv iraaais VTrdpxft' <o.l yap iv oXiyapxia Koi ev dpiaTOKparia Koi iv Brjuois, on
av 86^1] T(S TrXeiovi p,4pei Tcbv peTe\6vTa)v rfjs TroXtreias, tovt ecrri Kvpiov. IV. 8, of.
IV. 4. KoX yap iv rals oXiyapxtais koi Travraxov to TrXeoi/ fiepos Kvpiov. Also, VI.
2. For an example of this principle in a treaty between independent states, see
Thucyd. v. 30 elprjfxevoi' Kvpiov elvai on av ro irkr^Bos to>v (rvppdx(i>v y^T](p[arjrai.
:
Compare Grotius, de J. B. ct P. II. o, § 17 III. 20, § 4, with Barbeyrac's notes.

;
Before the battle of Marathon, the ten strategi were equally divided in opin-
ion. The polemarch archon (who, Herodotus says, had from early times an
equal vote with the generals) gave his vote in favour of fighting, and decided
the question, upon which the minority acquiesced. (IIeeod. VI. 109.) This is
the earliest decision by a majority of votes recorded in authentic history. AVe

know from Thucydides, that the Spartan kings had not each a double vote in
the Council of Thirty, though such was the popular belief throughout Greece in
his time.^ — I. 20. The five Spartan ephors decided by a majorit}- of votes
hence, if three agreed, the consent of the board was obtained. — Xi;x. Ilellen. II.
4, § 29.
The Greeks voted openly, by holding up the hand ; and in the Spartan as-
sembly, by shouting. For secret voting, pebbles, potsherds, aud sometuues
leaves, were used.
Note C. (page 135.)
In a German tribe, (according to Tacit. Germ. c. 11,) during peace, the

supreme decision of its ailairs was vested in a general assembly of the fighting
men, the subjects having pre'viously been considered in a smaller council of the
chiefs. One of the chiei's addressed the general assembly, which expressed its
opinion, not by a regular vote, but by a murmur, or a clashing of arms: the
former, in token of disapprobation — the Latter, of approbation. Tliis state of
things corresponds witli the second form of the Greek ccclesia, after it had parsed
out of the Ilonioric stiige, and had acquired a supreme, though not strictly
defined power. It closely resembles the Spartan ecclesia, as described by
Thucydides, in which the magistrates alone spoke, and which expressed its
decision by shouting, and not by a division with counted votes. (Kpivova-i ôfj
Ka\ ov îi(})<o. —
Tiiuc. I. 87. See Miiller, J)u>: III. T). §§ 9, 10.) In the caê
referred to, tlie eplior, not satisfied with this rude nietliod of voting, required tlie
ayes and tlie noes to stand ajwirt, in order that tlieir respective nmnbers miglit
be seen. As to the ( Jerman concilia, see Gibbon, DvrUiic and Fidl, vol. 1. pp.
2!»0-l ; Ul:ort, aeogr. III. 1, p. 231 ; (irimm, 1). li. p. 214; INIannert, (ie.'^rhichte
der alien Donlxchen, vol. I. p. 02, who says that counting votes would have been
too tedious a process; and observes that, in the Hungarian Diet, the ancient
] — —
VII. TO TIIK DECISIONS OF POLITICAL BODIRS. 169
luoile of votin}r was still retaiaed. .Vs U) tho national assemblies of the early
(leriiian empire, Kiehhorn, D. R. und R. Geschichte, vol. I. §§ 1.37, 161, 220.
There was likewse an assembly or concilium in the trilws of Gaul in Ciesar 8
time, as well as a senate. li. CS. \\. 20, 23 Ukert, Cewjr. II. 2, pp. 24H, 2o0,
;
2oo. Concilia of the Cisalpine (Jauls lu-e also mentioned, Livy, XXI. 20. A
con<rres9 of (mllic deputies w.is held at Bibi-acte, at which Verciii^'etorix was
chos«'n commander by a majority of voices. — C.Ks.vn, J5. G. VII. <).'j. 'Multi-
tudiuis suHrajjiis res permittitiir.' It is not unlikely that the practice of a
n-^'ulnr vote may have been learned by the Gauli.*h trilx'S from their intercourse
with tho Greek and Koman republics in their vicinity. Thus, the Gauls bor-
rowed from the Massiliots the important invention of alphabetical writing",
and used Grcfk letters both for public and private purposes. B. G. VI. 14.
Note D. (page 136.)
One important incident of a political body is, that it is preserved, by the per-
petual substitution of new members in the vacancies as they occur, against the
eflects of natural death, and is kept in constant existence. Hence, there is no
ground for holding that its acts liave only a temporary force, or that treaties
and other engagements made with it are not perpetual. (See Grot, de J. B. et P.
II. y,§3.)
There may, indeed, be a continual succession of single persons, and each
newly-substituted indindual may regard himself only as a link in a chain, and
may be bound by the acts of his predecessors. But the doctrine of the English
law respecting a corporation sole is only suited to a refined state of society, and
in the succession of individual riders the tendency in rude times has been to a
different doctrine. In the Oriental Governments, the acts of a sovereign or
minister are almost invariably set aside by a successor when it suits his purpose;
and the doctrine of mere personal responsibility in political matters Ls, in Asia,
fully established. A similar doctrine obtained to some extent among the Greeks
and Romans, particularly in the case of absolute princes, whose acts were gener-
ally set aside when they were killed or dethroned. (Cic. ad Att. XIV. 6, 9. 14.)
It is well known, that, in our early history, impoilant laws made by one king
were often expressly renewed by his successors.
So treaties made with kings have been frequently disavowed by their succes-
sore, on the ground that the engagement was merely personal. See Grot, de J, —
B. et P. II. 10, § 16; Vattel, §§ 183-97.
The non debut/:, factiDti v(det, is of great importance iu
principle o? Jieri
politics. AVhen once a government has been established, its acts are legal, how-
ever unjust or inexpedient; and although it may be displaced by a violent revo-
lution, or otlier sudden change, it is desirable that its acts should be recognised
anil be only altered, when necessary, by legislative amendment.
Note E. (page 145.)
The rtiason for tlie rule of decision by a majority is thus given by Grotius:
'Omnino ea credenda est fuisse voluntas in societatem coeimtium, ut ratio aliqua
esset t'xpediendi negotia : est autem nianifeste ?';//</»»/«, ut pars major sequatur
minorcm : quare iiadiraliter, et seclasis pactis ac legibus qua; Ibrmam tnictandis
— — ——
170 RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [ch.
negotiis iiupouuut, pars major jus liabet iutegri.' De J. B. et P. II. 6, § 17.
Tliis explanation amounts merely to saying, that it is natural and equitable that
the vote of the majority should prevail over that of the minority. Dr. Ruther-
forth is more on the subject
explicit The next question will be, whether it is
:
'
more reasonable and more equitable that the minority should be bound by the
act of the majority, or the contrary ? The answer to this question is ob\-ious.
It is plainly most consistent with reason, that the sentiments of the majority
shoidd prevail and conclude the whole because it is not so likely that a greater
;
number of men should be mistaken, when they concur in their judgment, as that
a smaller number should be mistaken. And this is likewise most consistent
with equity because, in general, the greater number have a proportionally
;
greater interest that the pvu-poses of the society should succeed well, and have
more at stake if those purposes should miscarry or be disappointed.' Institutes
of Nat. Lair, 11. 1, § 1. Of the two propositions here laid down by Dr. Ruther-
forth, the first is decidedly false. It cannot be affirmed generally, either that a
larger number of men is le.«s likely to be mistaken than a smaller number, or that
a smaller number is less likely to be mistaken than a larger nimiber. The second
proposition, with respect to the interest of the majority, is subject to the de-
duction, that by interest must be understood their ti-ue interest as determined by
competent judges, and not their interest as conceived by themselves. The truth
is, that no explanation can be given of this rule, except that it is resorted to as
the only possible expedient. The problem is well solved by Puflendorf, whose
remarks exhaust the question :
' Dans toutes les assemblees, ce qui a passe a la pluralite de voix est regards
comme I'avis de chacun des membres ;
non que cela soit necessaire en vertu du
droit naturel, mais parcequ'il u'y a presque point d autre expedient pour terminer
les aflaires, et pom* prendre quelques mesures quoique par la il arrive quelque-
;
fois, que le sentiment le plus honnete et le plus avautageux a I'Etat est rejet^.
Coimue les affaires humaines sont souvent fort diversifiees et fort embrouillees,
et que dans ces sortes d'assemblees etablies pour en decider, il n'est pas possible
de trouver quelque voie qui soit sans aucun inconvenient, il faut prendre le parti
ou il y en a le moins, et qui est d'ordinaire le plus avautageux. C'est done en
vain qu'on objecte qu'il repugne a la natiu'e, que Tavis des moins sage prevaiUe
sur celui des plus sages, parceque ceux-ci se trouvent en plus petit nombre, et
que les premiers meme puissent obliger les autres a faire, contre leur propre senti-
ment, quelque chose de mal concerte. J'avouc qu'en matiere de verites specula-
tives il faut peser les voix, et non pas les compter et que souvent meme I'ap- ;
probation de la multitude est regaixltê aêc raison comme une marque d'en-eur.
Mais on ne sauroit appliquer cette raaxime a la decision des affaires, qui sont enti'o
les mains d'une assemblt5e, dont les membres ont tous un droit ^gal. En effet,
qui di?cidera hiquelle des deux opinions est la plus conforme aux regies de la
prudence ? Oe ne seront pas les parties memes car aucuue ne voudra recevoir :
I'autre pour juge en sa propre cause. Et y a-t-il quelq'un qui ne se croie pas
plus I'^claire et plus habile que les autres ? ... 11 n'y a guere luoyeu non plus do
s'en remettre au jugement d'un tiers: car on pent aisement contester sur
rhabil(!tt5 ou sur rinti-grite de Tarbitre ; et alors voila une nouvellc dispute, pour
la decision de laquelle il faudroit un autre arbitre, et ainsi de suite.' Droit de la
Nature et des Gens, trad, de lijirbeynvc, ^'11. '2, § 15. See also Grot, dc Imp.
Summ. Pot. circa Sacra, cap. 4, § 6; Bayle, (Euvres, torn. III. p. 104.
— ; —
v.ii.] TO UKMOCIIACY AND IlKPRESENTATION. 171
CHAPTKli VI ir.
ON THE RFLATION OF TIIK ruiNCIl'LE OF AUTHORITY TO THE DEMO-

CHATIC rUIN'Cll'LE, AND TO THE KEPKESENTATIVE SYSTEM OF
GOVEU^MENT.
§ 1. In the prccedinj^ cliapter, we have considered the bearing

of the principle of authority upon the action of a political body,
and have shown how its mode of decision, though contravening
that principle formally, brought more or less into
is, in practice,
conformity with and that the legal method of counting the
it,
votes is counteracted by many moral influences. It is proposed

now to pursue the same subject further, and to inquire how far
this principle serves as a basis for other political arrangements
and whether a similar conflict of forces may not be discerned in
other departments of civil government.^
The question as to the principle of special fitness, and its
opposition to the principle of a simple ai-ithmetical majority, is
not confined to the action of political bodies, but it extends to

some of the fundamental considerations atfecting the structure and
composition of a government, and the collocation of tlie sovereign
power.
In former chapters, we have contrasted the small number of
the competent judges on each subject —
the guides to opinion who
constitute authority —
with the large majority who are uninformed
and inexperienced in the matter, and luifit to guide others by
their judgment. Now, the opposition between these two classes
has always been recognised with respect to fitness for exercising
the powers of government. Tlie antithesis, in its various forms,
more or less distinctly conceived, of
The fow wise, and the many foolish ;
Tlu! few gO(Hl, iind tlio in;iny bad ;
The few learned, and the many ignorant

The few philosophers, and the many anti-thinkers ;
; ;
172 EELATION OF THE PKINCirLE OF AUTHORITY [ch.
The few competent, and the many incompetent

The few professional, and the many non-professional,'
has been the foundation of all the arguments and instincts in

favour of aristocratic as against democratic rule,^ so far as
they have not had an interested origin, and have not arisen from
a desire of retaining political privileges for a class to which the
individual himself belonged.
On this principle, the words, cfyaOoi, apiaroi, KaXoiKayaôi,
ivisiKsh, iadXoL, oo<ôi, ^£\TL(TToi,xpv<^Toi,honi, optimi, optimates,
were used by the Greeks and Romans to signify the governing
few, while the majority, or mere people, were called kuko^, irovrjpoL,
BeiXoi, mall cives, &c. By degrees, the former words lost their
primitive moral acceptation, and came to signify merely the oli-
garchical class.^ In like manner, the term afjiaTOKparia,'^ which
originally, as used by Plato and Aristotle, sig-nified the government
of the best citizens, has come to mean the government of the Few,
in a sense equivalent to oligarcliy. Expressions similar to those
just mentioned occur in more modern times, as the German boni
homines ^ and probi homines, or gude manner, the Italian buon-
uomini, the French prudhommes, and the Witena-gemot of the
Saxons, as applied to magistrates and governing persons. The
councils of old men in antiquity, (ySoi/X?) yspovTcov in Homer, the
gerusia of Sparta, the senate of Kome,'') and the seniors and aider-
men of the nations,' had likewise the same meaning
Germanic
inasmuch wisdom, the fruit of experience, was considered the
as
attribute of old age, and the peculiar characteristic of aged
councillors. On the other hand, many words which denoted
originally a low class in society have, by a reverse process, ac-
quired in modern times a moral signification thus villain, rogue, ;
'
Oi' ISiurai, according to the Greek phrase. The word laj-nian, \aiK6s, though
properly opposed to a clerg}Tiian, is in English sometimes used in the general sense
of noil -professional.
* Compare Lord Brougham's chapter on the Ncitural Aristocracy. —Pol. Phil. vol.
II. c. 4.
' See Welcker's Prof, to Thwgnis, § 9-17 ; Groto, //('.si. of Greece, vol. III. p. 62.
Pindar, Pyth. II. 160, calls the Few (as distinguished both from the One and the
Many) oi ao(poi.
* Sue Mr. Stanley on apio-To/tpaTia, Classical Museum, vol. IV. p. 286.
* On the German Loni homines,— Grimm I). liichtsaltcrthilmcr, p. 294.
* Boi/Aij yn,6vTU)v among the Greeks, Iliad II. 53 among tlio Trojans, J II. 119
; 52.
Sallust, Bell. Cat. c. 6, says of the Roman senate :
'
Delecti, quihus corpus annis infir-
inum. ingenium sapicnti& validum erat, reipublicfc coiisultabant. Hi vel setuto vel
ciiKe similitudino Patres appellabantur.' Compare Bodin. De Rep. III. c. 1.
' See Grimm, ib. pp. 266, 268.
;
Till.] TO DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION. 173
and caitiff, from capticus, have

rascal, scoundrel, cattivo, chetif,
been transferred from baseness of social condition to baseness of
conduct.
It was upon tlie view just stated, that the opinions of the
Socratic school of philosophers concerning government were mainly
founded. Tlu-y looked upon government as an art, which was to
be exercised by the ablest and mo.st virtuous men in the .State for
the general benefit, in the same manner that a ship was steered
by the l)est pilot for the sake of all the crew. Thus, Xenophon,
in his tract upon the Athenian State, completely identifies the
aristocratic and popular parties respectively with the good and
bad in a moral sense: ' In every country (he says) the best por-
tion of the citizens is hostile to the democracy for among the ;
best citizens there is the least dishonesty and irregularity of con-

duct, and the greatest strictness of principle, while among the
people there is the greatest want of intelligence and of good con-
duct, and the least virtue.' In another passage, he remarks that
^
the people wish to be governed by a person of bad character and

without education, but well-disposed to them, rather than by a
person of good character and education, but hostile to them.^
Elsewhere, he considers government in the light of a craft, for
which nothing more than dexterity and management are requisite.
In the introduction to his Cyropadia, he contrasts the proneness
of men to revolt against their rulers with the obedience of horses
to their grooms, and of cattle and sheep to tlieir herdsmen
whence he infers, that man is the most difficult of all animals to
govern ; example of Cyrus, he thinks that
but, on considering tlie
the government of men is not an impossible, or even a difficult

task, provided it be performed luith shilL^ So Plato founded his
arl'<tocracy, or Perfect State, not on the family, or wealth, but on
the intelligence of the ruling body.'* Aristotle says that '
aristo-
cracy is the government of the best men absolutely, tried by the
standard of moral virtue, and not by some arbitrary standard
of excellence.' is a government in which
{Pol. IV. 5.) 'It
the magistracies are distributed according to virtue and moral
worth (III. 3). Xenophon and Aristotle agree in thinking that
'
' De Rep. Ath. c. 1. § 1-9, 14-15. Soe particularly § 5.

'§7.
• &v Tij iitiarafifuus joxno iipiaaiff. I. 1, 3.
* Seo Rittor, Gesch. der Phil. vol. II. pp. 444-6.

:
174 RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [cit.
f>-overnment is an art to be exercised by the best men in the

State, for the benefit of the community.^
Tliis view of the most perfect commonwealth prevailed gener-
ally amongthe ancient philosophers, of all sects. They agreed,
almost universally, in holding that a State ought to be governed
by the wisest and best citizens, selected from the entire body on
account of those qualities. This opinion is shared by Cicero, and
is expounded by him in his treatise De Reqûblicd. He shows,
moreover, how this moral notion of government is obliterated in
process of time. As virtue (he says) is not only confined to a
'
few, but can be recognised and discerned only by a few, the people
beo'in to think that men of large possessions, as well as those of
noble descent, are the best men. Accordingly, when, on account
of this popular error, the wealth, not the virtue, of a few has come
to govern the State, these great men continue to keep a firm hold
on the name of Optimates, though they are devoid of the reality.
For no form of government is worse than that in which the richest
are considered the best (I. 34). Nor does Cicero treat this as a
'
mere speculative and ideal distinction, but he applies it in practice.

In his oration Pro Sextio, in the celebrated passage on the oppo-
sition between the Optimates and Populares in the Eoman State,
in his own time, he rests the distinction mainly on moral grounds
'
Those who said and did what they thought would be acceptable
to the multitude were called Populares whereas they who so ;
conducted themselves that their advice received the approbation

of all the best men, were called Optimates.'' He proceeds to say
that the latter class are numerous, and are to be found in every
rank of citizens, from the leaders of the senate to men residing in
municipia and the country, traders, and even freedmen. He con-
cludes by declaring, that although this class of persons is widely
diffused through the community, their character may be summed
up in this brief definition Omnes optimates sunt, qui neque
:
'
nocentes sunt, nee natura improbi, nee furiosi, nee malis domesticis
impediti,' (c. 45.)
Many writers who witnessed the working of the popular influ-
ence in the republics of antiquity, and in those of Italy during the
Middle age, have expressed, in strong terms, their sense of the
imfitness of the people for guiding and governing the State. Tliey
have dwelt upon its ignorance, its incapacity, its want of virtue
'
Xen. Mctn. III. 2 ; Aristot. Pol. III. 4.
—
VIII.] TO DEMOCRACY AND KEPKESENTATION. 175
and moral principle, its inexperience in public affairs, and its in-
ability to form a sound judgment, or to devise useful measures in re-
ference to tliem, its pront-ness to be acted upon l)y sudden passions,
its turbidence, and its blind headlong violence, which hurries it
forward like a winter torrent. It would be as reasonable, they say,

to consult tlu' multitude about tlie management of public affairs,
as to expect sanity of mind from a madman.'

More modern writers have (with Cicero) remarked that the word
people may have a double signification : it may either signify the
populace, or tlie multitude, as opposed to tlie ricli and great ; or
it may mean ordinary persons, as opposed to the wise, the able,
and the virtuous ; in which latter case it includes members of all
classes in society, high as well as low.^ -
In the free States of recent times, the direct action of the

mass of the people upon tlie government has been moderated by
the representative system, which has established an intermediate
stage between the popular suffrage and the legislative measme.
This circumstance, combined with the invention of printing, and
the consequent diffusion of knowledge, has caused the democratic
action to be regarded with less alarm. Nevertheless, a certain
amoimt of intelligence and education has almost always been
pointed out as a qualification for the exercise of the powers of
government and the existence of a franchise founded on property
;
has been defended, in part, on tlie ground of its securing a requi-

site amount of education. This feeling in modern societies has
likewise been sharpened by the fact, that the entire community
consists of freemen, and that the working classes, forming the bulk
of the poor population, are not slaves, as in the ancient republics.
The alleged defect of capacity for government, and of a respect
for order and the rights of property, in the multitude, has
repeatedly been urged as a reason for excluding them from political
power.
§ 2. The theory we have now described
of government, which
in general terms, proceedson the assumption, that there is a com-
plete analogy between the choice of governors and the choice of
• See Note A. at the end of the chapter.

* '
Qui dit lo peuplc dit plus d'unc chose; c'est une vaste expression ; et Ton s'eton-
neroit do voir co quelle embrasse, et jusques ou ello s'^tend ; il y a le peuplo qui est
opposi aux grands — c'est la populace et la multitude : il y a lo peuplo qui est oppose
aux sages, aux habiles, aux vertucux ; ce sont Ics grands comme les petits,' La
BuuYKRK, C'aracteres, c. 9.
— — —
176 EELATIOX OF THE PRINCirLE OF AUTIIOllITY [cii.
persons skilled in any profession, art, or handicraft ; and that the

choice of rulers can he made on the same principle as the choice
of a lawyer, or physician, or skilled artificer. The analogy, how-
ever, fails in several essential points :
First The province of government is so vast it comprehends

: —
so many, and such multifarious subjects, that it scarcely admits of
any special training.^ The very idea of a sovereign government
is, that it can regulate all the concerns and interests of its sub-
jects that its iield of power is unlimited in the matters which it

;
embraces ' The union of several heads of families (says Grotius)

:
into a Nation or State, gives to the body the greatest power over
its members which it can possess for it is the most perfect of —
societies and there is no external act of a man which does not,
;
of itself, refer to that society, or which may not refer to it under

certain circumstances.' ^ There is no branch of human knowledge,
no art or applied science, which may not be put in requisition for
the purposes of civil government. For this reason, (as has been
already remarked,) no special or professional training can be de-
vised which will fit a person for a civil governor, in the same
manner as a person may be fitted for the profession of a lawyer, a
physician, a soldier, or a clergyman. To a certain extent, indeed,
a person may qualify himself professionally for the career of a
statesman. He may study political science and political history
he may acquire some knowledge of general jurisprudence, and of
the positive law of the country — he may, by experience, learn all
the practical questions of the day —he may become conversant

with the forms of business, and the proceedings of parliamentary,
judicial, —
and official bodies he may study public opinion in its
various manifestations —he may watch the character and feelings
of the different classes and sections of the community —he may
observe international relations, the changes and interests of foreign
states, and the commerce of the world. It can scarcely be dis-
puted that such a habit of mind as this will fit a person for the
work of government better than an entire absence of such a direc-
tion of the thoughts. Such qualifications are, however, to a cer-
tain extent, possessed or claimed by almost every educated man,
' See altovp, c. 7, § 15. Aristotle refers to an idea ciittTtîined by s<3nio that tlioro
is a tmining proper to a ruler ; thus, l;e says, the sons of kings are tjuight the manage-
ment of horses, and politieal knowledge ; and ho cites some lines of Euripides liearing
on the subject. I'ol. III. 2. As to the inexpediency of the profession of politician,
see Lord Brougham's Po/. Phil. vol. II. pp. 29-33.
» B. J. a P. II. 5, § 23.
;
Tin.] TO DEMOCRACY AND HErRESENTATION. 177
and every reader of a newspaper ; and it is difficult to judge as to

their comparative dejjjree.'
It is true that there may lie a special training for persons em-
ployed in subordinate executive offices under a government as —
judges, soldiers, sailors, &c. Each one of these may cjualify him-
self, by study and experience, for a definite and limited department
of public business and he may continue to discharge his functions,

;
undisturbed by the changes which affect the persons composing

the supreme legislative body. But the difficulty stated above
arises, because the supremo government of a country has no limited
department, (like a subordinate executive functionary,) but has a
sphere of action perfectly indefinite.
Secondly where we consult a professional person, or
: in cases
perituSf on a question relating to his own art, we invest him with
no power over ourselves. We ask his advice upon a matter await-
ing our decision, and if we think fit ^ê abide by that advice. The
physician prescribes a certain regimen of health, and we follow his
prescription ; a lawyer advises us to bring an action, in order to
establish or defend a right, and we commence legal proceedings
accordingly. But in both cases the decision is our own ; we act
voluntarily, although we may follow the advice blindly, and with-
out understanding its grounds. In the choice of our rulers, how-
ever, the case is widely different. By appointing persons to exer-
cise the sovereign government of tlie country, we give them an
absolute, unlimited, and irresponsilde jiower over us, so far as
legal seciu-ities are concerned. However extensive may be their
knowledge of politics, and however good their private character
and morals, tliey cannot be treated as mere artists in government
the temptation to the abuse of their power, for their own benefit
and that of their own class, cannot be altogether overlooked.'^ The
Greek demagogues, who acquired political power by defending the
people against the oligarchical party, and afterwards abused the
confidence thus obtained by investing themselves with despotic
'
Aristotle remarks that to perceive a political evil in its germ, before it has bo-
come consideraldo, requires a statesman, and is beyond the reach of an ordinary man :
rb iv &PXV yiv6ixfvov KaKuv yywvai oh rov tvx^vtos dWo iroXniKov avdp6s. Pol. V, 8. —
Mr. Henry Taylor's able work, entitled the StaUsman, is in fact a collection of
practical maxims witli respect to the transaction of official businrss, and the conduct
of a public man in office ; very valuable and instructive, as being the result of long,
intelligent observation ; but it is confined within these limits. —See Note B. at the end
of the chapter.
* See Note C. at tho end of the chapter.
N
—
178 RELATION OF THE PEINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [en.
power, were doubtless, in many eases, originally men of patriotic

sentiments, who yielded to the temptations of their position.^
it were true (as several speculators on politics have thought)
If
that, by some contrivance of constitutional checks, and balance of
powers, the supreme government of a country can be legally
limited, this ol)jection might, to a certain extent, be got over.
The liability to abuse might be repressed by the system of checks ;
and the ruler might be chosen merely for his skill and dexterity,
as we choose the pilot of a ship. But unfortunately all these
speculations are vain —there is no power to which a sovereign
government is legally subject ; it is only controlled by moral in-
fluences, and the force of public opinion.^

Thirdly it must be borne in mind that, even in cases where
:
persons are disposed to select their governors on the principle in

question, their choice is generally limited by considerations of
political party. They may be willing to select their own party
leaders, or persons recommended by their party leaders, or belong-
—
ing to their own party but they will not raise to power persons
who are connected with a political party opposed to their own.
Fourthly : it must not be overlooked that, in questions of
government, it is often important to conciliate siipport to public
measures, by giving to persons a voice in the decision, and by
interesting them in the proper execution and success of the law,
even altliough their advice or opinion may be intrinsically of little
value. Besides, the opinions of the enlightened few may prescribe
measures so distasteful to the bulk of the people, and founded on
principles so little admitted by the general public, that great
danger would arise from their adoption in a pure and unmodified
shape ; the principle of authority and special fitness, if stretched
far in matters of government, miglit lead to violent resistance, not
because the measures of the government were bad, but because
they were too good. It was on this accoimt that the reforms of
Joseph II. produced an insurrection in Austrian Flanders. Some
temperament is necessary, in order to insure to the less advanced
and enlightened part of the community, always a numerous body,

their due share in the conduct of the government. In public
'
Soo Herod. III. 82 Grnte, Ilisf. of Gr. vol. III. pp. 25, 29 oomp. Aristot. Pol.
; ;
VI. 1 : isl yap (rjTovffi jd tffou Koi rh 5/Katoi/ ot I)ttoi»v, oi St Kparovvrfs oiiStv
<ppOVTi(ÔV(Tl.
2 IM.ijcstas est summ.a in civos ac subdito-s lepihiisquc soluta potestas. BoDtirus, —

De Jiep. I. 8, (p. 113.) Sunimus dicitur qui nulliu.s imperio tenetnr, et cseteros cives,
turn universos, turn singulos, coercore pottst. Id. II. 2, (p. 292.)
— —
viii] TO DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION. 179
affairs, people do not defer blindly to the judgment of their ruler?,

as in the Civse of professional advisers ; nor
is there always an easy
and direct appeal to the works of skilled artificers.

result, as in the
A prudent rider will not always adopt the course which he thinks
most conducive to the jêneral interest, if it is highly unacceptable
to the body of the people.'
In order that the analofi^y between the choice of rulers and the
choice of professional men having
special aptitude should be com-
plete — government should be considered as
in order that political
an art, and its exercise regulated on the same principles as an art
it would be necessary that the governors should be designated by
—
some extraneous influence enlightened, well-affected to the State,
and incorruptil)le and should be renewed by the same choice if
;
they were found wanting to their duties, and if they yielded to the
temptations of their situation. A practical solution of the" problem
would be found, if the rulers could be appointed and removed in
the same manner as a guardian for a minor is appointed and re-
moved by a court of justice. But, as no such external superin-
tending influence can be obtained as no foreign nation can or —
will be trusted in such a matter'^ —
recourse must be had to other
securities, and another principle of selection.
§ 3. The only principle which presents itself for adoption, is

the representation of individual interests, irrespective of the fitness
of each person to judge of them, or the simple numerical principle
of government.'
In considering the manner in which this principle is to be ap-
' See Bacon's remarks on the danger of an ideal standard of perfection in practical
politics. Adv. of Learning, vol. II. p. 27. Cato, optimo aniino utens, et sumnia fide,
n<x;ot intcrdum rcipublicfe. Dicit enim tamqiiam in Platonis iroAtreia, non tamquam
in —
Romuli fajco, senttntiam. Cic. ad Alt. II. 1, § 6.
* The Italian podesta was a chief magi.strate, with extensive powers, chosen from
a neiglibouring State. The office was annual, and was intended to secure a person free
from the partialities with which a citizen of the republic would be infected. In certixin
cases, he was not to marry, or have any kinsman resident within the territory over
which he presided, and was even prohibited fi'om eating or drinking in tlie house of a
citizen. (See Muratori, Diss. 46 and Ilallam's M. A. vol. I. 386.) This singular
;
inbtitution was an attempt to secure such an impartial influence as is described in the

text.
*According to M. do Tocquoville, the power of the majority in the United States
restson the following foundations L' empire moral do la majority so fonde en partie
:
'
8ur cette id6e, qu'il y a plus do lumitres ot de sagosse dans beaucoup d'honimes quo
dans un seul— dans lo nondtro des l^gislateurs que dans lo clioix. Cost la theorie do
râlitc appliquee aux intelligences. Cette doctrine attiique I'orgueil de I'homme dans
son dernier asylo : aussi la minorite I'admet-elle avec peine ; elie no s'y habitue qua
la longuo. . . . L'cnipirc moral de la majorite se fonde encore sur ce principe, que les
— —
180 EELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [ch.
plied, and the extent to which it is to be carried, we may observe,

that great concessions have been made to the opposite principle
of fitness, on the ground of special qualification, even in those
States where tlie system of numerical equality has been carried to
the farthest point.
Beginning witli the ancient republics, we see that, even in
those which admitted the numerical or democratic principle to tlie
fullest extent, there was, in the first place, a total exclusion of the
numerous class of slaves, and, secondly, an exclusion of all free
women and males under a certain age. By these deductions from
the principle of an universal comprehension of individual interests,
the body of citizens exercising political franchises was reduced to
a fractional part of the entire population. For example, in the
Athenian State, dm'ing its purely democratic period, the numbers
would stand thus :
Adult male free

Free
Slaves
women and children ........
citizens, exercisiug political franchises. . . 21,000
63,000
400,000
In the modern European States, and in the northern States of

the American Union, there is no slave-class, and the entire com-
munity is personally free. But the pure numerical principle is,
by the elimination of
in all these communities, seriously infringed
the women and children and in the European States, the num-
' ;
ber of adult males exercising political franchises is reduced by

various qualifications of property, residence, taxation, &c. In all
these cases, the exclusion is made on the ground of unfitness for
interets du plus grand nomhre doivent etre preferes a coux du petit.' La Dimocratie
en A'/neriquc, vol. II. pp. 139-40.
V>y interest is meant wliat each person supposes to be his interest what he wishes —
— not what a competent judge might consider as his true interest, looking to remote
consequences, and taking a wide view. See Note D. at the end of the chapter.
'
Mr. Bayley, in his work on the Rationale of Political Kcprescntation, discusses at
length the question of the exclusion of women from the elective franchise, (pp. 236-42.)
He discards at once the argument, that their interest is involved in that of the male
sex; since, as he truly states, the interest (or at least the supposed interest) of men
and women is often not identical. He might have added, that if the interests of men
and women are identical, there is no apparent reason why the women should not
govern, and the men be excluded from the franchise. Mr. Bayley is a good deal
embarrassed by this question and after showing an inclination to the qualified ad-
;
mission of women, ho ends by deciding the question, with reference to England, on

special grounds. Women, ho remarks, in boroughs, not being in general householders,
would not be entitled to vote and the franchise might be conferred on widows and
;
single women, keeping houses of tlie requisite value. With respect to the admission
of women into a supreme legislative assemtdj', ho says nothing.
—;
VIII.] TO DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION. 181
exercising the powers of government. The principle of fitness is
further practically recognised by popular constituencies, as well as

Ity popular representative assemblies, in thu manner pointed out
in tht' lust chapter.
The system of party, as has already been remarked, is one of
the most potent means by whicli tlie principle of authority is
rendered predominant over numbers, and the votes of the majority

are brought under the control of a few persons. In almost all free
States, the community — so far as it takes an active concern in
public a'fairs —
is divided into two or more parties, each provided
with chiefs or leaders, who guide their policy, and each recognising
some common doctrine or principle of action. In the ancient re-
publics, these parties were founded on the distinction between the
aristocratic and democi-atic interests, that distinction being differ-
ently determined at different historical periods —at one time, a
few noble families against the rest of tlie citizens at another, the —
rich indiscriminately against the middle class and the poor. In
the Italian republics, the celebrated party division of Guelfs and
Ghibelliues was derived from the conflict between the Emperor
and the Pope afterwards other party distinctions, as that of the
;
Neri and Bianchi at Florence, were founded on incidents peculiar

to each State. The party distinctions of modern times, beginning
in England with the Civil War, and pervading both State and
Churcli, are too well known to require more than a reference to
them. It has been perceived from an early time, that organisation
is as necessary for success in political as in military affairs and ;
that any political cause or principle is more like^ly to prevail, if its

adherents, sinking minor points of difference, act together under a
common leader.' The interest of persons desirous of establishing
certain political principles, has thus led them to merge their own
individuality in the body, and to defer spontaneously to the prin-
ciple of authority.
We are now looking at political party on its favourable side
but the benefits which it tcaids to produce, by reducing to unity
the discordant actions of a multitude, and by substituting the
ascendancy of qualified leaders for the unchecked operation of tlie
Livy describes the plebeians, in their secession to the MonsSacer, after the affiiir
'
of as unable to answer the messengers of the senate, not because they had
Virjîiiia,
nothing to say, but because they had no loader (III. DO). ITpon which event, Macliiavol
remarks 'La qual cosadimostraappunto la inutilila d'una nioltitudiiie senza capo.'
:
J)Uc, I. 44. SSeo above, c. 7, § 12.

: ; ;
182 EELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [ch.
Dumerical principle, are subject to serious deductions on account

of the abuses to which it is liable. These abuses are so serious, as
often to outweigh the advantages which would otherwise spring
from the system. They may, for the most part, be referred to two
heads viz., 1st, the choice of bad leaders, and, 2nd, the hatred of
:
the opposite party on both which subjects we shall make some

;
remarks lower down, in connection with the abuses to which the

principle of authority is incident.^
A leader of a political party, or a person in whom the people
have confidence, and for whom if he they entertain respect, may,
be inclined, often soothe them, and incline them to reasonable
counsels when in a state of excitement ; according to the well-
known description of Virgil
Ac veluti magno in populo cum ssepe coorta est

Seditio, ssevitque animis ignobile vulgus ;
Jamque faces et saxa volant ; furor arma ministrat

Turn pietate gravem et meritis si forte virum quern
Conspexere, silent, arrectisque auribus adstant
lUe regit dictis animos, et pectora mulcet. {JEn. I. 148.'^)
Similar in its nature to the system of political party (as sub-

ordinating the minds of many to a few, and turning them to a
common object), is the system of association within a State
for a definite political purpose. Associations of this sort have
been often formed in free States, and have been attended
with important effects. It has been, for some time
past, a con-
stant practice in this country to form associations for accom-
plishing certain public ends, and agitating certain political
questions, whether connected with the reform of the law, the
education of the people, pauperism, emigration, health, trade, or
other subjects of general interest. In the United States, numerous
associations have likewise been formed for similar purposes.^ By
and energies of
associations of this sort, the political influence
large nimibers are collected into a single focus, and brought to
bear on a common point. They likewise call public attention
forcibly to the policy or measme which they are desirous of pro-
• Below, c. 10, § 7.
* kjce Machiarcl, Disc. I. 54, who refers to some historical examples.
' M. de Tocqucville, La Dimucratic en Aviiriqtie, torn. III. p. 231, appears to
think that the United States are the only country in which the principle of political
jissociations is extensively used: II n'y a qu'une nation sur la terre (he says) on Ton
'
use chaquo jour de la liberie illimitê de s'associer dans les vues politiques.' liut
this assertion is equally true of England.
;
Tin.] TO DOIOCRACY AND REPRF:SENTATI0N. 183
motin;^; and they are often the means of tlirowing mucli light
upon it, by bringinj)^ into existence, and training up, a set of per-
sona wlio devote a hirge part of their time and thoughts to its
illustration.' The influence of such associations is further increased

by their preparation and diffusion of printed works, and their con-
nection with the newspaper press, of which more will be said
presently. The whole of this influence is necessarily set in motion
and directed by a few minds, whom the body of the members of
the association follow as their leaders for this limited object.
Generally it may be affirmed that, in proportion as the mass
of the people are in a reasonable and well-disposed state of mind,
they willmake a good choice of their political leader that they ;
willwatch his conduct and scrutinise his motives with an en-

lightened jealousy, but will, to a considerable extent, defer to his
judgment, if his general behavioiu: should show him to be worthy
of confidence.
§ 4. The numerical principle is further controlled by the prin-
ciple of special fitness, through the agency of the representative
system of government.
In the small city republics of antiquity, every citizen could,
with little or no difficulty, attend the general assembly, the ecclesia
or comitia, and the popular courts of justice. There was, there-
fore, in these minute and simply organised commonwealths, no
physical impediment to a direct personal exercise, by each citizen,
of his share of the sovereign power. When, however, the domin-
ion of Rome was
extended to the whole of Italy, and the Italian
allies had fought their way to the rights of citizenship, it was
found that the old system of government was no longer applicable,

and the Roman world submitted to a monarchical regimen. Since
the middle age, a partition of the governing powers was, to a cer-
European States under a royal chief
tain extent, recognised in the
and the power of granting supplies or aids to the Crown, and, to
some extent, of concurring in the enactment of laws, was generally
' Twquevillo, La Bemocratie en Ameriqiic, torn. II. p. 31 :

'
line a.ssociation con-
Bisto seulement dans I'adlK-siijn puLliquo que donnent un certain nonibro d'individus a
tcllo.s ou tcUcs d<jctriues, et d;ins rengjigement qu'iLs coiitraetent de concourir d'une
ccrUiine fa(;on a les fairo prevaloir. . Quaiid uno opinion e.st representee par une asso-
ciation, elle est obligee de premlre une forme plus nette et plus precise. Elle compte
ees partisans et les compromct dans sa cause. Ceux-ci apjirennent eux-niemes a so
connahre les uns les autres, et leur arileur s'accroit de leur nonibre. L'association
reunit en faisceau les efforts des esprits divergens, et les pousse avcc vigueur vers
un soul but cLiiremout iudiquo par elle.' See below, ch. 9, § 20.
^ — — :
admitted to reside in the estates of the realm the clergy, nobles, —

and commons. Hence arose naturally the expedient of deputing
delegates from these bodies, or from the more numerous of them
—
the Commons to represent the entire estate in negotiating with
the Crown.
Such was the origin of the representative principle of govern-
ment, which has become the foundation of the political edifice in
—
the modern civilised world has spread over a large part of Europe
since 1815, and is likely to become universal in all countries above
the semi-barbarous stage of society.
This system, while it secures to the popular voice a decisive
share in the conduct of the government, tends, by the several
means described above, to give considerable weight to the opinion
of a few fit judges, and to substitute a firmer and more fixed rule
of decision for the fluctuating and unconnected opinions of a large
multitude. That tendency is further strengthened, if it be admit-
ted that a representative is to judge for himself on public questions,
taking for his general standard the welfare of the entire commu-
nity,and not to act as the mere organ or delegate of his own
constituency.
Those, indeed, who wish to give the widest effect to the
numerical principle of government, maintain that the representa-
tive ought to be a sort of envoy, sent from his constituents to treat
with the other members of the supreme assembly and, moreover, —
an envoy bound by his instructions, and not an envoy plenipotenti-
ary.^ But in taking this view of the functions of a deputy to a
supreme legislative body, they can scarcely have fully considered
the consequences which it involves, or attempted to reconcile it
with the working of such an assembly. Unless tlie proceedings of
a legislative assembly are to be so paralysed as nearly to deprive
it of all independent action, its members must be allowed to ori-
ginate motions and propositions, and numerous questions will be

brought before it by petition or message from other quarters. To
'
Tlie principles of representative government are stated in Lord lirougham's Pol.
Vhi'. vol. III. p. 33.
^ Acrf)riling to M. de Tocqueville, this view of the position of a rcpre.sentative is
gaining ground in the United Stites II se repand de plus en plus aux Etats-Unis
:
'
une coutiime qui finira par rendre raines Ics gsiranties du gouvernement representatif
il arrive tres fr^quemnient, quo les 6Iecteurs, en nommant un d^putt^, lui tracent uu
plan de condiiitc rt lui iniposent un certain nonibro d'ohligations positives dont il ne
saurait nnlkment s'eoarter. Au luinulto pres, c'est conime si la niajonte elle-meme
delibiniit sur la place puldi<jue.' La Democratic en Amirlque, torn. III. p. 138.
vm.] TO DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION. 185
these may bt- adik-d, ([uestions respecting the mode of transacting

its business, the appoiLtment of select committees, and other mat-
tersndating to the procedure of the asseinlily. By tliese various
means, numerous questions will arise from day to day which could
not be anticipated, and as to which reference must be made by
each member to his constituents. In whatever way these references
were disposed of, a delay would ensue, which would render the
transaction of business to any large amount, by a body so fettered,
wholly impracticable. Furtliermore, wlien the question has been
remitted to the constituency for its decision, how is the decision
to be obtained ? A constituency is not a deliberative body, which
can meet in one place, discuss a question, and come to a vote upon
it. Every such question would have to be decided, without joint
deliberation, by a poll. The cumbrousness, imperfection, and even
expense, of this process would render such a mode of government
intolerable. An attempo to govern the United Kingdom by
polling every constituency, upon all the questions involved in the
daily business of Parliament, is so manifestly absurd, that the
mere statement of it is a sufficient refutation. The Diet of a
Federal Union might transact business on these terms but only ;
provided that the questions were few in number, and the instruc-
tions were decided by a small deliberative assembly sitting in each
State.' If, however, an assembly consisted only of members acting
on positive instructions, it would be without any deliberative

character, as its decision would, in each case, be predetermined,
and each deputy would only have to vote a.s directed. An assem-
bly composed of such puppets would be destitute of dignity or
importance, and might as well not exist. It would be sufficient
for a central office to collect the votes of the several constituencies,
and to add them together, without giving each constituency the
trouble of sending a messenger to convey its decision. It may le
'
This is the case with the Swiss Diet, according to the description of Mr. Grote,
in his Letters on the Politics of Switzerland : '
It is to be remarked that every deputy
present votes, not agreeably to any opinion of his own, but to instructions received
from tho Great Council, or supreme legislative authority, in his own Canton which ;
may sometimes, though this does not often happen, confer upon him plenary powers
of self-docision upon some given suljject ; but, excepting in these cases, the instructions
prepared in each separate Canton include conditions, or adopt modifications, different
from each other, which usually prevent any number of deputies from concurring in one
substantive proposition In fact, the forms and language of the Diet consider
each deputy as an ambassador from his Canton ho is always styled " Der Gesandte
;
dts Staudes— " by the president, when inviting the opinions of every one at the table
seriatim, and most frequently so styled throughout the course of discussion.' (p. 28.)
— ;
added that, even in the case of ambassadors, or other representative

agents employed by a sovereign government, where instructions to
a certain extent are necessary, experience has shown that the most
successful plan is to select a person of ability, prudence, and
honesty, and to give him a considerable latitude of discretion.
Those governments and those ministers have, in general, been
best served who have been careful in the selection of their instru-
ments, but have given them large powers, and have treated them
with confidence and consideration and a similar remark is ap- ;
plicable to the relation of a constituency and its representative.

It has long been the established doctrine among constitutional
authorities in this country, that a member of the Commons' House
of Parliament represents the entire kingdom, and not merely the
district for which be is returned.* The question of instructions
or pledges has, however, been agitated for a long series of years ;
though the public have always returned to the conviction, that

any legally binding restraint upon the conduct of members of
Parliament is neither expedient nor practicable. Hume ^ re-
marked long ago that this question is, in fact, one of degree ; all
admit, he says, that a member ought to attach some weight to the

views of his constituents all admit that he is not absolutely bound
;
by their instructions. The difficulty is, to hit the right mean be-
tween these extremes. It cannot, indeed, be disputed, that it is
the duty of every representative to watch over the peculiar in-
terests of that district which he more immediately represents, and
to which he is directly responsible and to secure, so far as he is
;
able, that a due regard be paid to its interest, in connection with

the general interests of the community. But he must not pursue
that interest exclusively, or make it his paramount object, as if Le
belonged to a federal diet, in which each member is an ambassador
from a sovereign and independent State, treating with the other
ambassadors according to his instructions.^
•Speaking of the Commons' Ilouse of Parliament, Blnckstone says: 'Every

member, tliough chosen by one particular district, when elected and returned serves
for the whole realm. For the end of his coming thither is not particular, but general
not barely to advantage his constituents, but the <w«?/«d» wealth And theroforo
he is not bound, like a deputy in the United Provinces, to consult with, or take the
ad\nce of, his constituents upon any particular point, unless he himself thinks it proper
or prudent so to do.' ConiDicnt. vol. I. p. 159 ; and see Lord Brougham, Pul. I'hil.
vol. III. c. G.
2 Es8(ti/s, Part I. Ess. 4. {Works, vol. III. \\ 36.)
' The subject of instructions to representatives, in a supreme legislature, is dis-
—
nii.J TO DEMOCRACY AND RErRESENTATION. 187
The practice of bindinf^ members by peremptory instructions

obtains in the Hungarian Parliament and it cannot properly be ;
considered as l)elunging to a democratic, more than to an aristo-

cratic form of government. It is, in fact, the mark of a narrow
and jealous spirit, not comprehending the true spirit of the repre-
sentative system, and it is sure to give way in proportion as that
system is well understood.
By the various means which have been adverted to, the prin-
ciple of simple numerical equality within a representative assembly
and a popular constituency is powerfully coutrolk-d and modified,
in practice, by the principle of personal worth and fitness. In
most countries, too, where a representative constitution exists, the
principle of numerical equality is fm'ther encroached upon by
limitations, more or less considerable, of the political suffrage.'
be proper here to advert to the remarks made by
§ 0. It will
M. de Tociiueville, ujDon the ill efifect of what he has termed the
' omnipotence,' the ' tyranny,' and the despotism,' of the majority
'
in the United States ;

^ inasmuch as they bear directly upon the
subject we are now considering.
cussed by Mr. Bayley, in his Eationale of Representative Government, p. 122-37 ; and
as to pledges, see pp. 313-26. As to the representation of local interests, see p. 137.
' Respecting the limitation of the elective suifrage by qualifications founded ou
property and age, see Bayley, Rationale of Repris. Government, p. 230-5.
Arist<jtle remarks, that the oligarchical principle of personal worth dependent on
wealth, and the democratic principle of entire political equality, Trere, in general,
carried too far in the Greek oligarchiesand democracies the Few thought that, be- :
cause they were unequal in something, they ought to be unequal in everything; the
Many, that because they were equal in something, they ought to be equal in every-
thing. Uence, they drove these principles to extremes, and the governments were un-
stjible. Wherefore, he adds, the principle of (absolute) numerical equality ought to
be mixed with the principle of (proportionate) equality, according to personal worth.
Pol. V. 1.
* '
La tout^-puissance me semble en soi une chose mauvaise et dangereuse. Son
exercico me j>arait au-dessus des forces de I'homme, quel qu'il soit, et je ne vois que
Dieu qui puisse sans danger etre tout-puissant, parceque sa sagesse et sa justice sout
toujours egales a son pouvoir. II n'y a done pas sur la terre d'autorite si respectable
en elle-meme, ou revetue d'un droit si sacre, que je voulusse laisser agir sans controlo
et dominer sans obstacles Ce quo je reprochele plus au gouvernementd6mocra-
tique, tel qu'on I'a organis6 aux Etuts-Unis, ce n'est pas, comme beaucoup de gens lo
pr^tendent en Europe, sa faiblesse mais au rontraire sa force irresistible. Et ce qui
;
me repugne le plus en Amerique, ce n'est pas I'extreme liberie qui y r^gne, c'ost le
peu de garantie qu'on y trouvo contro la tyrannie.' La Dimocratie en Amerique, torn.
II. p. 148. The whole of this reasoning is founded on the erroneous supposition that
it is possible, in ang form of government, to make the sovereign government legally
responsible. The majority in the United Stjites is omnipotent in the same sense in
which the Parliament in England is said to be omnipotent that is to say, its power —
is subject to no legal limitation.
— ;
We have already had occasion to observe that, whatever is the

supreme governing power in a State, its action is legally uncon-
trolled. If this be what is meant by tyranny, the power of the
Many is tyrannical in a democracy but it is only tyrannical ;
in the sense in which the power of the One is tyrannical in a

monarchy, and of the Few in an aristocracy. To speak of tyran-
nical power in such a sense is, in fact, merely to affirm the admit-
ted fact, (or rather the identical proposition,) that a sovereign
government is not subject to any legal control.
Those, however, who complain of the tyranny of the majority
in the United States, probably have in view chiefly its moral influ-
ence, and not its legal power — or, at least, the combination of the
one with the other.^
Now, it is inevitable that the prevailing opinions and senti-
ments of the people, in every country, should influence the public
expression of thought. This is not in any way peculiar to
America. The main difference between the United States and
many European countries is, that in the former the press is legally
free, while in the latter it is (or was till lately) subject to severe
restrictions. That there are many subjects on which, in the United
States, a writer, perhaps without independent means of subsistence,
may be unwilling to offend public opinion, cannot be doubted ;
but similar prudential considerations will be found to influence

the writers of all countries.^ For the expression of political
'
'De nos jours, les soiiverains les plus absolus de I'Eui'ope ne sauraient empechfr
certaines pensês hostiles a leur autorite, de circuler souidenient dans leurs Etats ot
jusqu'au sein de leurs coiirs. II n'en est de meme en Amerique : tant que la majority
est douteuse, on parle ; mais des qu'elle s'est irr^vocablement pronon9ê, chacun se tait
et amis conime enuemis semblent alors s'attacber de concert a son char. . . . Je ne con-
nais pas do pays ou il r^gno en general moins d'independance d'esprit et de Tcritîble
liberte de discussion qu'en Amerique En Amdrique, la majority trace un cercle
formidable autour de la pensee. Au dedans de ces limites, I'^crivain est libre, m.ais
malheur a lui s'il ose en sortir. Ce n'est pi^s qu'il ait a craindre un auto-da-fe, [or, it
may be added, a prosecution by the government, or a seizure by the police.] mais il
est en butte a dos degouts de tous genres, et a des pers(^cutions do tons les jours. La
carri^re politique lui est fermdo ; il a offens^ la seulc puissance qui ait la facultt^ de
I'ouvrir ; on lui refuse tout, jusqu'a la gloiro.' La Democratie en Amii-ique, torn. II.
pp. 152-4.
* For a proof (if any be noelcd) of tho discouragement afforded by public opinion
to mon of science and original tiiinkers. in countries not democratic, see Montesquieu's
description in liis Lettrcs I'crânrs, No. 145. Ho says tiiat formerly every man of
science was accused of magic ; he is now accused of irreligion :
'
S'il 6crit quelquo
histoirc, et qu'il ait de la noblesse dans I'esprit, et quelquo droituro dansle coeur, on lui
suscite millo persecutions. On ira contro lui soulover le niagisfrat, sur un fait qui
s'est pass6 il y a millo ans ; cf on vnudra quo sa plume soil captive, si elie n'est pas
—
Till] TO DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION. 189
opinions in tlie United States, there appears to l)e the utmost

practical liberty, and the fullest opportunity. Every section and
shade of opinion, every local interest, every part of the country,
seems to possess its orgim in the press. On the question of slavery,
opinion has of late years been peculiarly envenomed, and attempts
have been made by the predominant slaveholding interest to sup-
press the a<j;îtation of the question of emancipation by force but ;
these efforts have been only partially successful, and have met
with much resistance. On philosophical questions, there may be
less libiirty of thought ; but this, as we shall remark below, is only
common America with other countries.
to
complained that the omnipotence of the majority
It is further
in the United States creates a habit of adulation towards the
people, which lowers the morality of public men, by rendering
them servile and insincere and, in short, by giving them the
;
character of the mob-courtier.'

But it is vain to hope that this evil can be prevented by any
constitutional arrangement by any modification of the form of
;
government. Men will, in every State, find out the real seat of
power and many will seek to gain the favour of its possessors by
;
flattering their vanity, by exaggerating their good qualities, and

by practising the various arts of cajolery, and affected attachment,
and simulated deference, which are likely to serve tlieir immediate
purpose. off*ered up on every altar,
Incense of this sort will be
whatever may the divinity to whose worship the temple is dedi-
l)e
cated. Certainly, there never yet has been any country where
power has not had its interested worshippers. In America, how-
ever, as in other free countries, the mere opposition of parties
renders nearly certain, that no defect in the conduct of the
it
government will long remain unnoticed ; and whatever sensitive-

ness the people may there exhibit with respect to the exposure of
T^nale.' Ho concludes thus: 'Enfin il faut joindre a une reputation equivoque, \a.
privation des plaisirs, et la perto de la sante.'

Monarchies (says Hume) receiving their chief stability from a superstitious rever-
'
ence to prii;8ts and princes, have commonly abridged the liberty of reasoning with re-
gard to religion and politics, and consequently metiphysics and morals. All these
form the most considerable branches of science.' Essai/.s, Part I. Ess. 14.
' Tocquoville, La Diinocratie en Ameriqxie, torn. II. pp. I08, 160. M. de Tocqueville
makes at the end this admission : 'Pour nioi, je crois quo dans tous les gouverne-
mens, quels qu'ils soient, la basse.«so s'attachera a la force, et la flatterie
au pouvoir.
Vx jo ne connais qu'un moyen d'empecher quo les hommes no se degradent c'est do :
n'accorder a persynno, avec la touti-jtuisscnne, le souverain pouvoir do les avilir.' p.

161. The question, therefore, returns to the former diflBculty whether it is possible
:
to impose any legal check on a sovereign government.

—
190 RELATION OF THE PEINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY [en.
their own defects,' it is certain that this has not been either a
universal or even a common weakness in national character. The
people of Athens assembled to hear themselves unmercifully ridi-
culed, and even personified on the stasê, in the witty comedies of
Aristophanes and Machiavel accounts for the erroneous belief as
;
to the peculiar inconstancy and folly of the people, by saying that,

under a popular government, every one speaks ill of the people
with freedom and without fear whereas no one speaks of an ;
absolute Prince without a thousand fears and precautions.^

In all countries, the prevailing tone of public opinion will ex-
ercise much influence on the expression of thought. Its influence
will perhaps be greater in free countries, as in these the govern-
ment has power of protecting an unpopular minority. But
little
the only eflfectual remedy for the evil, is the diffusion of a tolerant
principle of judgment, and the disposition to respect the opinions
of those who are qualified to form sound conclusions on each sub-
ject, and who give to the public the result of diligent, conscientious,
and independent investigations. It is impossible that all men
should be equally well-informed, and equally competent to judge
for themselves but it is possible that they should learn to treat
;
with lenity the opinions of a dissident minority.

The virtuous man, firmly anchoi'ed to his own principles, not
tossed about on the waves of popular favour or caprice, nor making
liimself the organ of the fury or folly of the people, but pursuing
their interest against their wishes, is a subject of just admiration.
On the other hand, it is men have
to be remembered that good
been persecuted by rulers, as well as impelled to error or crime
by the populace and that it is an equally edifying spectacle to see
;
wisdom, or patriotism, or virtue, struggling against the oppression

of the Few, as resisting the impetuous violence of the Many.
Justum et tenaccm propositi virum

Non ci\'ium ardor prava jubentium,
Non vultus instantis tyranni,
Mente quatit solidA.
' '
Chez les nations les plus fibres de I'ancien mondo, on a public dos ouvragcs des-
tines a peindre fid^lement les yices et les ridictiles des contemporains. . , . Mais la
puissance qui domine aux Etiits-Unis n'entend point ainsi qu'on la joue. Le plus
leger reproche la l)lesse, la moindre verity piquanto rcffarouche et il faut qu'on loue ;
depuis les formes de son langage jusqu'a scs plus solides vcrtus. Aucun ecrivain,
quelle que soit sa ronommee, no pcut &happer a cetto obligation d'enconser ses co'i-
citoyons.' La Dhnocratie en Aiiuriqiic, torn. II. p. 155.
' L'opinione contro ai Popoli uasce i
erdie de' popoli ciascun dice male senza jiauia e
— —
vm.] TO DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION. 191
§ 6. It follows, from what has been said in this and the pre-
ceding chapter, that popular government, as now understood and
carried iuto effect, for lartê territories, by means of the represen-
tative system, is and theoretically,
to a great extent founded, legally
upon the numerical principle but that, morally and in practice,
;
the working of this principle is modified, counteracted, and crossed

in various directions, liy the influence of tlie antagonist principle
of special fitness.' In arranging the terms of this compromise,
and in adapting them to a given community, lies the secret of a
free constitution.
A compromise of this kind (as we have already had occasion to
remark in reference to the subject of Decision by a majority),
necessarily implies a junction and an amalgamation of opposite
principles. It supposes that sufficient weight will be given to the
numerical principle, for interesting the bulk of the community in
the existing order of things, and attaching them to the govern-
ment ; while such an admixture of the principle of special fitness
will be secured, as will prevent the government from falling into
the hands of persons who, from their ig-norance, inexperience, or
want of judgment, are incapable of properly directing its course.
The practical solution of this problem, so as to be attended

with a reasonable amount of success, is perhaps the highest achieve-
ment of statesmanship, especially as it is always involved, to a
greater or less extent, in a circidus vltiosus, from which no
ingenuity can find an effectual escape. The difficulty to which
we allude will appear from the following explanation.
In proportion as any community is in a low state of civilisa-
tion— as the people are turbulent, lazy, ignorant, improvident, and

poor — as life and property tre insecure, and as the different classes
liberamente montre che regnano ; de' Principi si parla sempre con mille paure e mille
rispetti. Disc. I. 68.

' '
Notliing appears more surprising to those who consider human affairs with a
which the many are governed by the few, and
philosophiciil eye, than the easiness with
the implicit submission with which men resign their own sentiments and passions to
those of their ruUrs. When we inquire by what means this wonder is effected, we
shall find that, as force is always on the side of the governed, the governors have
nothing to support them but opinion.' Hu.me, Essai/s, Part I. 4 Of the first Prm- :
ciple.1 of Government.
Upon consideration it will, I think, appear, that no means so effectual for giving
weight to the opinion of a few competent persons as representative institutions have
ever been devised. In the first pliice, each constituency select a person in whom they
and by whom they are willing
confide, to be represented ; in the next place, the as-
sembly formed of these representatives is in great measure guided by the opinions of
the persons who lead the respective parties or sections of which it is composed.
— '
192 RELATION OF THE rRI>X'irLE OF AUTHORITY [ch.
of society are alienated from each other — in the same proportion

is the need of a good and enlightened government great, and the
advantages to be derived from its action important.
Nevertheless, the chances of its being well governed are in the
inverse ratio of the magnitude of the need, and of the advantage.
When the people are in the state described, it is not likely that
they will make a good choice of representatives or leaders. The
government resulting from their selection is not likely to enact
wise laws, or to administer the laws with equity, discretion, im-
partiality and integrity ; nor, if they fail in these respects, is it
probable that they will be impelled into a riglit com-se by the

pressure of public opinion. The action of the people upon their
representatives may be expected to realise the image of the blind
leading the blind.
On the other hand, if a community has arrived at an advanced
stage of civilisation — and is orderly, frugal, industrious, well-in-
structed, and wealthy, it may indeed be seriously injured by a bad
government, but can scarcely hope to receive much benefit from a
good one. Nevertheless, its government is more likely to be good
than that of the other community inasmuch as the people are ;
likely to choose good representatives, and public opinion will

exercise a beneficial control upon them and the executive govern-
ment, when elected and acting.
The practical result is, that a community is least likely to ob-
tain a good representative government when it is most wanted, and
most likely to obtain one when it is least wanted.
Hence it might be thought, that a nation in a low state of
civilisation is most likely to be well-governed by an absolute
monarch and many persons, contemplating the ineffectual
;
struggles after an improved management of public affairs made

by such a community, have sighed after an enlightened despotism.
Setting aside the advantages to be derived from the gradual politi-
cal training of a people by free popular institutions, it may be
admitted that a really enlightened despotism would, in such a
' Speaking of the fêneral boclj* of electors in any country, Mr. Bayloy says: '
In
proportion to their ignorance, will they easily surrender tliemselves to the delusions of
crafty impostors, and the designs of clover but unprincipled men. In the same
proportion, also, will they be liable to be the sport of sudden impulses and violent
gusts of passiftn, beyond the control of reason and virtue. No political arrangements
can transmute the effects of ignorance into those of knowledge, or bring it to pass that
an unenliglitoned people can be as well governed under free institutions as an enlight-
ened one.' liationale of Rep. Government, p. 21G.
Till.] TO DEMOCKAl'Y AND RKI'JMISKNTATION. I'JiJ
case, often be the surest and most direct road to gôod govern-
ment. But tlie difficulty is, to insure an enlightened despotism ;
for experience certainly does not lead us to believe tjiat wise and
good despots are easily found. It is by the dextrous assumption
of this very doulitful question that Darius, in the supposed debate
of the seven Persian conspirators, reported in Herodotus — the
earliest upon the respective advantag-es of the thrfe
discussion
—
forms of government proves the superiority of absolute monardiy.
* Upon the hypothesis (he says) that each government is the best
of its kind —
that there is the best monarch, the best oligarchy,
—
and the l)est people 1 affirm that monarchy is the preferable form
of government.' If this hypothesis be admitted to the advocate
'
of despotism, his main difficulty is removed. For the chief ob-

jection to a pure monarchy is, that it leaves to chance the charac-
ter of the sovereign; whereas, in an aristocracy and a democracy,
some securities exist for a due selection of the persons exercising
the supreme power. To which it may be added, that in a country
in a low state of civilisation, an enlightened despot would find his
measures counteracted by the resistance of the people, or marred
in their operation by the want of tit instruments for their enforce-
ment.
NOTES TO CII.VPTKIl VIII.
NoTK A. (page 17o.)
See the .speech of Me;âl)yzu.-«, in Ilerod. III. 81, reconinioiulinjj oligarchy : 6î\in>
yap d)(pr]inv ovbfv ((Ttiv d^vverwTfpni' nvdf vjipicTToTtpov kS)S yap *n>
yivoiCTKni, Of ovr' (8i^d\6q ovSe oiSe kuXov ovSef ouS' oIkijiop ; ujdefi re ifnvfaiiiv tii
irpijyfinTa avtv v6ov, )(tifx(ipp(^ iroTap.a ((ceXov. Conipai'o Demoslh. dc lulls. Loif,
p. .'i-^;!
With respect to popular government in the Italian republics, Mur.itori uialccs

the following remark :
'
Ilassi ora di osservare che quautunque non si possa ue-
gare, che molti comodi e beni talora provveanero dal rjjggimento popolare ;
tuttavia certo e altresi, che non lievi iucomodi se ne provarono una volta percho ;
non 6 atto abhtstanza il popolo ignorante e rozzo, e nulla pratico del politico
governo, e sovente suggetto a torbide passioni, di prendere saggie ed utili ri.-5olu-
zioni ue' grandi atlari o niassinuimente se inters iene a' coU'îgli la niatta feccia
;
del popolo, e dalla pluralila de* voti dipende la detorniinazion delle cose.' He
then cites following passage from Ferreto's Cmuica, respecting a war of the
the;
Paduans against Venice: Ad liaic plebiscita vocati sunt plebis magistratus, et

'
'
IKtoiI. hi. 82.
——
194 RELATION OF THE PRINCirLE OF AUTHORITY [ch.
inauis populi mnltitudo, qui, velut sestuans dict;ibat impetus, fieri prorsus densis
vocibus clamitabiiut. Nempe vesana est Aulgi latrautis opiTiio,quum imperite
judicium prcfert de rebus incognitis. Quid euim buic cum virtute, cum pruden-
tiii? Quid temperatum aut forte est? Veudaut opifices, emautque merces
sordidas. Fabri incudes feriant, et ceteri illiberalium cultores artium sua lucra
provideant uou se gravibus optimisque Airis, quoties de wtute agitur, stolidi
;
inserant quod uon intelligunt, discutere nolint nee velut putant, id bonum esse
;
;
iateantm-.' (Mvratoki, Diss. d2 torn. III. p. 128.) This passage contains a

;
distinct statement of the doctrine that the government ought to be -s'ested in the
intelligent and i-irtuous few, and that the ignorant and turbulent many ought to
be excluded. There is likewise mixed with it the ancient Greek prejudice
asrainst rix'"^'- ^dvavaoi.
The same views occur in the treatise of Bodiuus On Govenimpuf : Et qui- '
dem mirum debet videri, si plebs imperita, iti est, multorum capitum immanis
quEedam hydra, rectam uUam sententiam ferat. Certe quideni ab imperita mul-
titudine consilium rerum gerendarum petere, aliud nihil est, quam a furioso sani-
tatem. . Quid autem absurdius, quam pro legibus habere levis et imperitfe
. .
multitudiuis temeritatem, quae ad mandaudos honores cteco ssepius et incon-

siderato impetu quam certo et explorato judicio fertm-? Quid magis furiosum,
quam extremis reipublicse periculis ab iusana plebe consilium petere ? nihil euim
injussi magistratus obire possunt uec si possint, veliut et ut velint tamen [non]
; ;
audeut, perterriti furore plebis, qure ad versos casus au sua peccata regent in ipsos
magistratus.' —BoDiNUs de Hep. YI. 4, pp. 1087, 1088. This treatise was pub-
lished in 1576, See Bayle, Diet, in v. Note D.
Note B, (page 177.)
'
In choosing persons for all emplojnuents, they have more regard to good
morals than to great abilities ; for, since government is necessary to mankind,
they believe that the common size of understanding is fitted to some station or
other, and that Providence never intended to make the management of public
afiairs a mvstery, to be comprehended only by a few pei-sons of sublime genius,
of which there seldom are three born in an age. But they suppose truth, justice,
temperance, and the like, to be in every man's power, the practice of which
virtues, assisted by edperienve and a good intention, would qualify any man for
the service of his country, except where a course of sfiuli/ is required. But they
thought the want of moral Airtues was so far from being supplied by superior
endowments of the mind, that employments could never be put into such danger-
ous hands as those of persons so qualified and, at least, that the mistakes com-
;
mitted by ignorance, in a virtuous disposition, would never be of such fatal con-

sequence to the public weal as the practices of a man whose inclinations led him
to be corrupt, and who liad great abilities to manage, to multiply, and defend his
corruptions." Gullivtt^s Travels, Lilliput, p. 81.
The above remarks of Swift represent what may be considered, at present, as
the popular and prevailing view of the subject. seems to be generally thought,
It
that ijood iutentioiis in a ruler are the first consideration, and that, provided he
desires to benetit the connnunity, his capacity for jud(/i)if/ of the best means for
nc'complishing his end is of secondary importance. Nevertheless, experience has
— — — —
vm.] TO DEMOCRACY AND RKPRESICNTATION. 19-5
shown thiit tlio delusiuns of short-sifrhted benevolence have been productive ot

very mischievous consequences to nations.
Elsewhere, Swift expresses siiniliir opinions as to the sufliciency of unaided
common sense for conducting.' the nH'uii-s of civil jrovernment.
'lie confined the knowledge of governinfr within very narrow bounds — to
common sense and reason, to justice and lenity, to the speedy determination of
civiland criminal causes, with some other obvious topics, which are not worth
considering. And he gave it for his opinion, that whoever could make two ears
of corn, or two blades of grsiss, to grow upon a spot of ground, wliere only one
grew Ijefore, would deserve liettor of mankind, and do more essential service to
his country, than the whole race of politicians put together.' lb., Brubdir/nat/,
p. 228.
According to an improving farmer would confer a greater
this last doctrine,
benefit on his country than themost enlightened and patriotic statesman. This
is not Cicero's opinion ' Neque enim est uUa res in qua propius ad Deorum
:
numen virtus accedat humana, qiiam civitates aut condere novas aut conservare
jam conditas.' De Rep. I. 7.
The following passage likewise refers to the prevalence of the opinion, that
common sense is sullicient for the affairs of government :
*
In homme d'esprit n'est point jaloux d'un ouvrier qui a travailM
une bonne
^p«5e, ou d'un statuaire qui vieut d'achever une belle figure. II sait qu'il ya dans
ces arts des regies et une mdthode qu'ou ne define point qu'il y a des outils a ;
manier dont il ne conuoit ni I'usage, ni le nom, ni la figure et il lui sutfit de ;
penser qu'il n'a point fait I'appreutissage d'un certain metier, pour se consoler de
n'v etre point maitre. II pent au contraire etre susceptible d'envie et meme de
jalousie contre un mimstre et contre ceux qui gouvernent, comme si la raison et

le bon .sens, qui lui sont communs avec eux, etoient les seuls instruments qui
servent a regir un etat et a presider aux afi'aires publiques, et qu'ils dussent sup-
pl«5er aux regies, aux pruceptes, a I'experience.' La Bkuyicre, Caracteres, c. 11.
Note C. (page 177.)
Aristotle, Pol. VI. 4, says that one of the best forms of government is when
all the citizens have the right of judging, and calling the magistrates to account,
and electing the magistrates ;
but there is a property qualiticatiou for the chief
offices. The result of this is, that while the people exercise their due influence,
the best men govern, but are subject to responsibility ; and irresponsibility, he
remarks, is too great a trial for the depravity of human nature : to yap eVai/aKpe-
fxavOai, Koi fir] nav f^tivai ttokIv on av 86^rj, crv/jicfifpov fcmV* t) yap iôvcria tov
7rpuTT€iv on tiv iQ^Xij t\s ov bCyuTai. (fivXc'iTTfii' to iv (kckttco tcov dvOpwrrcov (^nvXov.
(oiTTf avayKa'iov (rv/^t/SaiVeiv ontp eanu d>ff>f\ifj.(i)TaTov ev Tals TroXireuny, tlpâu Toiis
inuiKfii uuafiapTrjTovi oirras, firjdfv eXarrovfieuov tov irXijdovs.
In another place, the same philosopher points f>ut the fallaciousness of au
argument, founded ou the su})posud analogy between goxerniuent and arts. It
had been allege<l, as an arguuient in favour of an arbitrary king, as opposed to a
government according to laws, that a physician ought not to be bound by written
rules, but should be left to his own To which Aristotle answers, that
discretion.
pfiysicians gain their pay for curing a sick man, and have no motive of favour to
deprave their judgment ; but that persons invested with political power do many
— —
196 RELATION TO DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION. [ch.
tilingsfrom grounds of affection or dislike. Even physicians, lie says, when sick,
and trainers for the games employ other trainers, as dis-
call in other physicians,
trusting their own judgment about themselves. (Pol, III. 11.)
Note D. (page 180.)
The principle of numerical equality in government, as the characteristic of

democracy, is clearly opposed to the principle of special worth or fitness by
Aristotle, in the following passage :
TO b'lKaiov TO BrjfiOTiKov TO 'i(Tov rêti' ((tti kut api6)jiOV, aXka firj kut d^laV
TovTov S' ovTos Tox) SiKOiov, TO TrXrjBos dvayKoiov fivai Kvpiov, Koi on av 86^t] toIs
TrKdocri rovr' eivai koi TeXos, koi tovt^ eivai to diKaiov' (j}aa\ yap beiv 'icrov e;^«i'
fKcaTov Tcbv TToXtTwi'. Pol. VI. 1 ; and lower down he says, that to dUaiov t6
hrip.oKpaTi.Kov is TO 'Icrov exftf arravTas Kar dpi6p6v.
Bt.] PROPAGATIONS OF SOUND OPINIONS. 197
CHAPTER IX.
ON THE FROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE CREATION

OF A TRUSTWOllTUY AUTHORITY.
§ 1 . New opinions, founded on a legitimate process of observa-

tion and inference, are generally worked out in solitude by persons
of studious and reflective habits and they are, when once accre-
;
dited and established among men of science, expounded, illustrated,

and diffused, by popular writers. The two provinces of discovery
and diflfusion are usually divided for the power of original;
thought, and the power of perspicuous elementary exposition, are

often not combined in the same mind.
Kespecting opinions so formed and so propagated, no general
proposition can be laid down. Their character as to soundness
will depend on the peculiarities of the several persons with whom
they originate and the reception which they meet with from the
;
public will be determined by its capacity to form a judgment on

the matter. For example the existence of a man with such
:
mighty powers of discovery and demonstration as Newton, and the

recognition of his doctrines among his contemporaries, depend upon
causes which do not admit of being generalised. The same remark
applies to individual writers belonging to professions, or specially
conversant with any subject, who treat the question with the
authority derived from their own appropriate knowledge and fitness.
In this chapter, it is proposed to consider what are the chief
permanent influences, in modern civilised country, for the
a
authentication of opinions ; from what authoritative sources opin-
ions are chiefly diffused ; and what securities exist for rendering
those guides of general opinion trustworthy. It may be observed,
however, that in treating this question, it is difficult always to
distinguish the diff'usion of opinions by authority, from their
diffusion by argument for that which is argument to one man, is
;
often authority to another. A reasoned proof of a certain position

—
198 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [cH.
is put forward in writing, or in oral discourse ; one person may be

convinced by the reasoning, while another, who has not followed,
or perhaps even become aware of the argument, adopts the con-
clusion, because he has confidence in its promulgator. All opinions
are diffused by a mixture of self-conviction and authority B be- :
lieves a general truth, because A has proved it and C believes it ;
likewise, because B is satisfied with the proof. Thus, in a battle,

when one part of an army has yielded before an overwhelming
attack, the other parts retreat — not because they are attacked, but
because the remainder has been repulsed.
Independently of single writers (who cannot be brought under
any general description,) the principal agents in the authorisation
and diffusion of opinions may be classed under the four following
heads :
I. The supreme civil government of a country, and the persons

exercising public functions under it.
II. The heads of an established church, and of other churches

or religious bodies.
III. Subordinate associations for political, scientific, literary,
and other miscellaneous purposes, including universities and places

of learning.
IV. The periodical press : daily, weekly, monthly, and
quarterly.
We will now attempt to ascertain how far each of the influences
in question operates, and to what extent its operation is beneficial,
or otherwise, for the purpose under consideration.
§ 2. I. Be ore we can examine the influence of a government
in authorising and propagating opinions, we have first to consider

—
the preliminary question how far is it the duty of a government
to diffuse and encourage truth, and to repress and discourage error ?
—
This question divides itself into two branches, viz., the encourage-
ment or discouragement ot opinions on religion, and the encourage-
ment or discouragement of opinions on secular subjects.
In one sense, the province of a government is unlimited. There
is no subject within the circle of human affairs and interests which
it does not comprehend. The State is called omnipotent that —

is to say, it can exercise for any purpose, and to any extent, the
powers which are at its command. But altliough its province is

theoretically unlimited, and its powers theoretically unl)ounded,
there are in practice limits, not only to its powers, but to the
purposes to wliicli tlicse powers can be applied with propriety and
I J.] CRH\T10\ OF TRUSTWORTHY AITHORITY. 199
advantage. There is no subject with which it cannot legally in-

terfere ; but there are many subjects with which it cannot fitly in-
terfere. Now, when we speak of the duty of the State to interfere
with any matter, there is no other criterion for trying this duty
than the fitness of the interference. If the interference is likely
to be attended with advantage to the community — if the end to
which it is directed be good, and it be likely to promote that end,
then the duty of the State is to interfere. But if, although the
end admitted to be good, the interference of the State is not
is
likely to promote its accomplishment, and may even tend, on the

whole, to counteract it, then it is not the duty of the State to in-
terfere. For example, it may be conceded to be a desirable object
that the maritime slave-trade should l^ suppressed all over the
world. But whether it be the duty of any particulai- State to
take active steps for the suppression of that trade, is a question
which depends on the probable success which would attend the
attempts made for this purpose, and their general result.
The question as to the duty of the State, with respect to the
enco\u"agement of truth and the discouragement of error, must be
decided on these grounds. Everybody admits that (provided his
own standard of judgment be adopted) it is right and fitting to
encouraore truth and discourage error. About the desirableness of
the end there is an universal agreement. That the promotion of.
this end lies, within the province of the
theoretically and legally,
State — that a government possesses
powers which can be directed
towards this object is certain. —
It follows that, if tlie attempt is
likely to be attended with success, and to be, on tlie whole, ad-
vantageous to the community, it ought to be made ^ but that, if ;
the attempt and the cause of truth is not likely to

is likely to foil,
be promoted by it, the State ought not to interfere. The question,
therefore, which we have to consider is, whether the State is likely
to succeed in promoting truth and repressing error.
Barlamaqui, Principles of Xat. and Pol. Law, part III. c. 2, lays it down, that as
'
men's opinions influence their conduct, and thus stronjly contribute to the good or
evil of the State, it is the duty of the sovereign to neglect nothing that can contribute to
the education of youth, to the advancement of the sciences, and to the progress of truth.
Further, ho assigns to the sovereign a right of judging of the doctrines publicly taught,
and of proscribing all those which may be opposite to the public good and tranquillity.
Hence he infers, that it belongs to the sovereign alone to establish academies and
public schools of all kinds, and to authorise the respective professors also to take ;
care that nothing be taught in them, under any pretext, contrary to the fundamental
maxim.s of natural law, or to the principles of religion or good politics in a word, —
nothing capable of producing impressions prejudicial to the happiness of the ."^tate.
— —
200 PROrAGATION OF .SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [ch.
In order to arrive at a solution of tliis problem, we will confine

ourselves, first, to the influence of the State with respect to re-
ligious truth — that portion of the subject upon which the greatest
discrepancy of opinion prevails.
§ 3. In considering this question, we may limit ourselves to
Christianity — the religion of the civilised world ; and we may
begin by observing, that the government of every civilised com-
munity may be expected to protect the ministers and congregations
of all the recognised Christian sects in the public exercise of their
religion,and to confer on them all the rights necessary for this
purpose. It will, likewise, impose penalties upon certain acts
which are condemned by all the different forms of Christianity,
such as blasphemy, and the violation of the Lord's Day. An in-
terference to this extent is implied in the general recognition of
Christianity.
In order, however, to ascertain how far the State is fit to per-
form the function of encouraging religious truth, and discouraging
religious error, we must confine our view to the distinctive mai'ks
of the severnl Christian confessions and by religious truth and ;
error, we must imderstand the truth of the peculiar tenets of one

sect as distingui^hed from the errors of another sect. Now the
fitness of the State for the performance of this function depends
upon the efficacy of the means at its command, applicable to the
purpose. These means may be reduced to the five following
heads:
1. Punishment for religious error.
2. Reward for religious orthodoxy.
3. Endowment of clergy and of public worship.
4. Public instruction.
5. Censorship of the press.'
Upon the efficacy of these means, or some of them, for the
' Mr. Gladstone givts tlie following enumeration of tiie modes in wliich it is
possible for the State to lend aid to religion :
'1. By tlie example of its prjfession and worship.

'
2. By the adaptation of its laws to the rules of religion, wherever the same sub-
ject matter is within the view of both.
'
3. By the constitutional recognition of a clorioal cstiito as one of the great forces
of society, and suitable provision for its action in that capacity.
'
4. By .supplying the temporal or pecuniary means for the propagation of the
national creed.
'
6. By repre.ssive measures, such as the hiws against blasphemy.
'
C. By such general and indirect influences upon the quality of subjective religion,
ftnd upon the permanency or purity of sacred institutions, as result from a connection
— —
ni.] CREATION OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 201
establisbraent of the true form of Christianity in a country, as

opposed to erroneous, heterodox, and heretical forms, the question
before u.s turns.
§ 4. Until the ao;e of the Reformation, the received doctrine
in Christian Europe was, that the State was bound to treat religious
error as a crime, to legislate jpro salute ardmcB, and to punish
heresy as it would punish homicide or theft. Every Christian
State acted upon the received interpretation of the famous text,
compelle entnire,^ and drove into the fold of the Church all sheep
wliich liad eitlier strayed, or belonged to any other shepherd.
Conformity, exile, or death, were the three alternatives which it
presented to the heterodox believer, owning its allegiance, and
resident within its territory.
That the system of enforcing religious truth by pimishment

the system which its enemies call religious persecution has been, —
to a great extent, successful, cannot be disputed. It is impossible
to doubt that, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the pro-
testant or reformed faith was greatly checked by the temporal
power of the catholic governments. It was checked in two ways :
by preventing its entrance into a country, (as in Italy and Spain,)

and by expelling it from countries in which it had taken root, (as
in Southern Germany, France, and Flanders.)^ The transportation
of the Moriscoes from Spain, the expulsion of the Jews from
several countries, and the destruction of the Christians in Japan,'
afford other examples of the success of forcible measures for the
extirpation of a creed which the government deemed erroneous.
The protestants, being in general the weaker party in the age
of the reformation, and having set the example of dissenting from
the established faith protected by the State, were, both by their
logical position and their interest, led to question the received
between the Cliurch and tlieStiite.' The State in its Relations with the Church, vol. I.
ch. 4, § 65.
The second, and sixth of these moiles would be satisfied by a general recog-
fii'tli,
nition of Christianity, without giving a preference to any peculiar form of it. The
first, third, and fourth, amount merely to the endowment of the clergy of a particular
sect.
' St. Lxikc, XIV. 23. See B.-iyle's Dissurtation, (Eiivrcs. torn. II. p. 357. Compare
Mr. Gladstone, ih. vol. II. ch. 8, §§ 91-3, where the progress of legij^lation in Europe
with respect to religion is accurately deduced. On the duty of a prince to punish
heretics, see B.iyle, ib. p. 416; and on the degrees of severity with which religious
error was repressed, ib. p. 414.
' See Riinke's Popes.
* See I'ayle. Diet, art. Jofon, note E.
doctrine as to the employment of force for the propagation of

religious truth. Xevertheless, the ancient rule was upheld for a
long time by protestant, as well as catholic governments and ;
enlightened writers of protestant confessions called it in question

with hesitation and Thus, Jeremy Taylor, in his Liberty of
fear.
Prophesying, (1647,) discusses the question, ' Whether it be lawful

for a prince to give toleration to several religions ? (sect. 16 ;) and '
G-rotius, in his treatise De Jure Belli etPads, (1625,) examines

the similar question, ' "Whether it be permitted to make treaties
and alliances with those who are not of the true religion,' (II. 15,
§§ 8-22.) It is remarkable, too, that, notwithstanding the com-

plaints justly made by the presbyterians and puritans of England
and Scotland, with respect to their treatment by the Established
Church, they nevertheless, when they had the power, showed a
similar disposition to enforce their own faith by penal sanctions.*
By degrees, a different standard of duty, with respect to the
enforcement of religious truth by penal sanctions, was established,
and more tolerant notions as to freedom of conscience and discus-
sion, in questions of religion, became prevalent. It was seen that
religious error could not be effectually suppressed by severity, in-
asmuch as regarded as error, another
that which one nation
regarded as truth, and no common effort of the European
governments wôuld be made to put down or set up any one
form of Christianity.^ Moreover, the principle of leaving
opinion free, where it does not tend to some act immediately and
manifestly detrimental to society, has been gradually gaining
strength since the sixteenth century, and has included religion*
opinions in its operation. The attempt to propagate religious
truth,and to crush religious error, by the criminal law and by
penal inflictions, though it has, to a certain extent, met witli a
very decided success, is subject to strong counteracting forces. A
man who attests the sincerity of his religious faitli by the sacrifice
of his life, or of his native country, his worldly possessions, and his
means of gaining a subsistence, is respected for his fortitude, dis-
' Concerning the generalrecejition of the maxim, that Christian princes are bound
to enforce religionby the civil sword, sec Palmer on the Church, part V. c. 5, who
still upholds the maxim. Concerning persecution by Protestant princes, see Bayle,
(Euvres, torn. II. pp. 411, 500, 554. And as to the general maintenance of this prin-
ciple by the refonners, thoxigh with progressive remonstrances against it, see Hallam,
Uiaf: of Lit. of Europe, vol. II. §§ 29-32
c. 1, vol. Ill c. 2, §§ 50-2.
;
* This conviction, brought about by the long continued miseries and devastations
of the thirty years' war, was finally embodied in the treaty of Westphalia.
IX.] CREATION OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 2()3
interestedness, and lionesty, even by those who do not share his

opinions. He is not regarded as a common malefactor, whose overt
acts have l)een dangerous and pernicious to the security and peace
of society, and have drawn down upon him the deserved punish-
ment of the law. There is a sympathy with his sufferings, and a
consciousness that tlie State, instead of gaining his conviction by
the legitimate weapons of persuasion and reason, has, being the
stronger, used its strength for causing its own opinion to prevail.
A man who, like Galileo, makes a feigned and insincere submission
to tlie opinion of the supreme power, and reads his recantation
untler duress, is and liis conver-
scarcely considered a free agent,
sion confers but little ci-edit upon the coercing party.' Hence,
the use of force to diffu.se religious opinions, by admitting tlie
failure of reason in the individual case, has seemed to raise a pre-
sumption that reason was on the weaker side. True opinions in
religion can, in the long run, only be propagated by reason, and
that voluntary deference to authority which implies reason but ;
false opinions in religion can be as well propagated by force as

true ones. The sword, the stake, or the gibbet, are as good argu-
ments in behalf of Mahometanism as of Christianity. In this way,
the use of the civil power to repress religious error, has been ac-
counted almost as an admission that the other side were in the
right martyrdom has been regaided as a sign of truth as well as
;
of sincerity and the infant church has been said to have been
;
watered by tlie blood of its martyrs.

From the combination of these causes, the system of enforcing
religious doctrines by the civil sword, has been condemned by the
general opinion of the civilised countries of Europe, and penal
sanctions are no longer extended to the profession of a creed not
authorised by the State. Both the reason and feelings of mankind
are outraged, by applying to the diffusion of truth means which
are used reluctantly and sparingly even for the punishment of overt
acts against society.
Cum ventum ad vcnim est, sensus morcsquc rcpxignant,

Atquo ipsa utilitas, jiisli prope mater et a>qui.
The system of exterminating heresy by capital executions and

wliolesale deportation, may be considered as exploded in civilised
Europe; but the discouragement of religious error by civil disa-
bilities — by exclusion from certain political rights — still maintains
'
Upon the insincerity c.-uised by religious persecution, see Bayle, ul sup. p. 399.
,
204 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [ch.
its ground in some cases. Deprivation of civil rights is a species

of penal infliction, and has been so considered in all systems of
criminal law. The objection to its use for the purpose of repress-
ing religious error, though less in degree, is therefore the same in
principle.
§ 5. Penal measures for enforcing religious truth are, from
their nature, directed exclusively against those who are without
the pale of the orthodox church ; they are intended partly, by
their direct operation, to reduce the obstinate heretic to a right
course — and partly, by their example, to deter those who are within
the pale from straying out of it. Kemuneratory measures, on the
other hand, tending in the same direction, leave the obstinate
heretic in his error, but seek to allure the more flexible, or more
interested, adherent of heterodoxy to the adoption of the true
faith, by the attraction of temporal advantage. Such, for instance,
would be pecuniary rewards to any member of an erroneous faith
who adopted the orthodox faith or an offer of employment in the
;
public service on the same terms. Of this nature were some of

the measures in the penal laws against the Irish catholics such as ;
that which enabled a son who changed his creed to take possession
of his father's property. JNIeasiues of this sort are, however, con-
sidered as a sort of seduction, or tampering with a man's consci-
ence the witnesses to the truth so obtained are regarded as
;
purchased by a species of subornation, and their testimony is not

of much weight. As it has always been thought the part of a
courageous and conscientious man, not to surrender his religious
opinions at the dictation of superior force, so it has always been
considered disgracefid for a man to become an apostate from his
religion for pecuniary gain. JNIartyrdom for opinion's sake has
ever been accounted and proselytism effected by
honourable ;
bribery is by those who are members of the

rarely eulogised, even
churcli into wliich the convert has been received. Hence the sense
of honour, operating in a proscribed sect, holds its memlx>-rs
together, and restrains them
from swallowing the tempting
baits held out to their cupidity by the State. The attempt to
draw away persous from the camp of error by direct reward, and
to induce them by a bounty to enlist under the banners of truth,
obtains, tlierefore, only a limited and partial success. So far,
however, as pecuniary temptations connect(>d with the transmission
of" piopfriy, iind rewards otfrred by a gdvcrnmrnt in flu; way of
IX.] CREATION OF TRUSTWORTnY AUTDORITY. 205
official emolument and puhlic honours, exercise any proselytising

influence, the proselytes are chiefly to be found among the wealthier
classes. James II. had succeeded in giving the Roman-catholics
If
of England a monopoly of all puMic employments and distinctions,
he would doubtless have gained over many converts in the upper
ranks of society but the body of the people (as in Ireland, under
;
a similar system) would have retained their religious convictions

unchanged.
§ 6. But, besides punishment and reward, the State can like-
Endowment as a means of encouraging religious truth.
wise employ
The endowment of the clergy, the provision of funds for the build-
ing and maintenance of churches, or for the support of ecclesiastical
seminaries, and other similar applications of the national property
or income, may be considered as serving the double purpose of
consolidating and confirming the religious community which is
thus exclusively assisted by the State, and of attracting into it the

members of the other unendowed churches.
That an ecclesiastical endowment will diffuse religious truth,
where apathy and indifference on religious matters exist, and
where religion is untaught because there is no provision for teach-
ing it, cannot be doubted. Where the ground is unoccupied, the
endowed teacher will step into possession, and cultivate his allotted
district. If he be industrious and skilful, his seed, being thrown
into a field ready to receive it, will take root, and spring up and
bear fruit. But it will be otherwise if the ground be already
occupied by others, who contest the possession with him. In this
case, his seed will be scattered to the winds, and there will be
little orno harvest to gather into his garner.
Whenan endowed clergyman supplies a void which otherwise
—
would remain unfilled when he affords religious instruction to
persons who would otherwise be uninstructed —
when he preaches
religious doctrine to persons who would otherwise hear no religious
doctrine, — his influence in the propagation of the opinions of his
confession cannot fail to be felt, provided that he addresses persons
of the requisite amount of intelligence and information. But if
—
he comes into conflict with unendowed clergymen if he addresses
persons who already receive religious instruction from others, whose
minds are preoccupied with the doctrines of a different sect, and
whose conscience is bound to the practice of other religious rites
—
and observances his influence becomes less important, and may
206 TROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [cH.
perhaps be nearly imperceptible. If religion was a subject on

•which all men were agreed, or if there was any one living authority
on religious questions to which they were willing to defer if re- —
ligious opinions were not a matter of conscientious conviction, and
—
maintained from a sense of moral obligation if, when religious
instruction and the means of religious worship were provided
gratuitously by the State, every person might be expected to use
them, rather than incur the expense of providing them for himself
— if people flocked to the lessons of the endowed clergyman, as
they would flock to the distribution of relief by the State, or as the
—
Romans went to the public games if men looked upon religion
as an article to be procured at the cheapest cost, and for which
—
they would make no pecuniary sacrifice then the influence of
Endowment, in propagating the peculiar religious opinions of the
endowed would be decisive. But these necessary conditions
sect,
for its success, as a means of gaining over converts from other
confessions, are wanting and we accordingly find that it has
;
failed, as an engine of proselytism. The most striking and deci-

sive example is the case of the Irish Established Church a com- —
plete system of exclusive endowment, founded on a territorial
division of parishes, fm'nishiug Protestant Episcopalian clergymen
and churclies, gratuitously, over the whole of Ireland, and intended
to bring over the entire population to its creed. And yet, although
it has existed since the Eeformation, and has been assisted by active
persecution and penal laws, it has never made any sensible impres-
sionupon the Presbyterian and Roman-catholic portions of the
community, aad it cannot, even at present, reckon among its ad-
herents a ninth part of the population.
Dr. Chalmers has pointed out, with great clearness, the error
of supposing that, if religious instruction be left to the natural
laws of demand and supply, it will be obtained like any other
marketable commodity. He remarks that, in the case of food or

clothing, or any other article of necessity or comfort, tlie want is
felt the more keenly the longer it remains unsatisfied ; but that if
a person has received no religious instruction, and is not in the
habit of attending a place of religious worship, he does not require
the services of any minister of religion, or seek to provide them
for himself, if not provided for him by a public endowment.
Hence, Dr. Chalmers speaks of the aggressive influence of an en-
dowed clergy: he says that they must, by their teaching, create
the very want which they satisfy and he adverts to the efforts of
;
— —
IX.] CREATION OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 207
missionaries, wlm are paid by the country which sends tliem out,
not by the country which receives them.'
The ar<îments of Dr. Chalmers on this subject are undoubtedly
sound, so far as an o|)enin;i^ to the labours of an endowed clerg^y is
afforded })y relijpous inditference, or tlie absence of other relijîous
teachers. But if the endowed ministers are of a creed different
from that of the people among whom they are planted, their
aggressive efforts will probably not produce conversions to their
own faith, but will merely irritate their hearers by the revival of
slumbering controversies, and create divisions and discord, without
increasing tlie numWrs of their own flock. The same remark
applies to Christian missionaries in a heathen country. Without
an endowment, temporary or permanent, they cannot exist but ;
it is by no means certain that their efforts will be successful, or
that their aggressions, even on the most mischievous and degrading

forms of superstition, will be successful.*
More may be said in favour of the influence of endowment in
imparting solidity and coherence to a religious body, in maintain-
ing the consistency and purity of its doctrine, and in preventing
defections from its ranks. Even in this respect, however, its
efficacy is probably less than often supposed.
There is, in
is
general, a tendency to overrate the influence of wealth and power

in giving ciurency to opinions.^ Eeasoning and new doctrines
have a sort of electric force they penetrate unseen from mind to
;
mind, and give a shock to intelligences far removed from the origin
of impulse. This subtle influence not only despises the seductions
' See his Lectures oh National Churches, pp. 50-2, 72; 0?i Endowments, pp. 113,
118.
' According to Warburton, Alliance of Chunh and State, b. II., c. 3, the reasons
of a public endowment for the ministers of a church are as follows :
'1. To render tlie religious society, whose assistance the State so much wants,
more firm and durable.

2. To invite and encourage the clergy's best service to the State, in rendering
*
those committed to their care, virtuous.

'3. And principiUy, in order to destroy that mutual dependency between the
clergy and people, which arises from the former's being maintiiined by the voluntary
contributions of the latter.'
Warburton does not appear to consider the propagation of religious truth, by con-
version, as one of the ends of a church endowment.
» Tims Pius VÎ., when he visited the Emperor Joseph at Vienna, in remonstrating
against his measures of ecclesiastical reform, is reported by Botta to have used (among
others) the following argument: '
Altra dover esser la eondizione dellachiesa ristretta,
l>overa, e pcrseguitaUi, altra quella della chiesa estesa quanto il monJo, ricca, e trion-
fante.' Storia d'ltalia dal 1789 al 1814, torn. I. p. 11.
— —
20S PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS P.Y THE [cH.
of wealth and station, but even defies tlie threats of power. It is

therefore dangerous for any church to rely on the mere agency of
endowment, in maintaining it against adverse forces. Unless the
lives and doctrines of its clergy are such as would influence the
minds of their hearers, supposing the church were imeudowed, it
runs the risk of seeing its sphere of action curtailed. Up to the
Revolution of 1789, the P>ench Catholic Church had every ad-
vantage which could be derived from the countenance, assistance,
protection,and favour of the State. It was established by law ;
it was exclusively and richly endowed its clergy were numerous, ;
held a high social position, and enjoyed important political

privileges. Dissidents were discountenanced, oppressed, and
scarcely tolerated. Everything that the State could do, or could
give — exclusive favour, rank, wealth, consideration, political power,
persecution of rivals and enemies — was done for and given to the
French Cluu'ch. Yet we know what was the result. It nursed
up within bosom a body of writers, who attacked not only
its
Catholicism, but Christianity, with every weapon of argument,

irony, ridicule and invective, and whose attacks circulated through-
out Europe, and gave the tone to all aristocratic society and
literature. And when the Revolution broke out, and the old
French government was destroyed, the whole ecclesiastical system
of France —
establishment, endowment, and all their appendages
was swept away, as being a part of the political abuses against
which the popular frenzy was directed and it was found that ;
whatever religious feeling survived, owed its continuance to causes

wholly independent of the State endowment. Even in England,
during the last century, much apathy and neglect of duty pervaded
the Established Church, notwithstanding its endowed clergy ; and
their exertions were much stimulated by the disinterested efforts
of the unendowed preachers called into action by Wesley and
Whitefield.'
In fine, where there is a large body of people hesitating which
' '
In general, eveiy religious sect, when it has once enjoyed for a century or two
the security of a legal establishment, has found itself incapal)le of making any vigorous
defence against any new sect which chose to attack its doctrine or discipline.Upon
such occasions, the advantage in point of learning and good writing may sometimes
be on the side of the Established Church ; but the arts of popularity, all the arts of
gaining proselytes, are constantly on the side of its adversaries. In England, lliose
arts have been long neglected by the well-endowed clergy of the Est;iblished Church,
and are at present ciiiefly cultivated by the dissenters and by the metliodists.' Smith,
yVealth of Sativns, b. I. ch. 1, art. 3. The example of the Church of Eomc might
;
,X.] CREATION OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 209
creed to adopt, (as was the case iu England diirinj^ th(! reign of
Klizabetli,) or where there is indifference or ignorance about re-
ligious matters, arising from the want of pastors, (as is the case in
some of our large towns and manufacturing districts,) a State-en-
dowment may he effectual in propagating religious doctrine. But
where the boundaries of sects are well-defined, and their religious
convictions deeply rooted where an active, zealous body of unen-
;
dowed clergy exists where there is no religious indifference, but,

;
on the contrary, a jealous maintenance of the distinctive doctrines

of the particular creed, and a sensitive abhorrence of proselytism
where every meml)er is regarded as the property of the congrega-
tion, whose defection to another sect is regretted as a common loss,
and whose seduction is resented as a common injury there the —
endeavours of an endowed clergy to draw the entire people within
their fold, however earnest and unremitting, will certainly fail of
success.
Upon an impartial consideration of the question, it will prob-
ably be seen that the beneficial influence of endowment, in religious
matters, is felt less in the promotion of truth, than in improving
the moral character of the minister as respects his flock, and in
elevating and purifying the style of his teaching. A clergy de-
pendent on the voluntary donations of their congregations are less
likely to exercise a wholesome and independent influence upon
their hearers, to abstain from fanatical appeals to their fears and
hopes, and to preserve a sober and even course, than a clergy whose
means of subsistence are derived from a fixed endowment. This
effect of Endowment, however, does not properly belong to its
power of propHgating opinion, and therefore need not be hei-e
examined.
When a government tolerates no other creed than that which
itself thinks good, and extirpates all other sects, diversity of re-
ligious opinion is prevented, and the opinion of the ruling power
is the declared standard of religious truth. But when the govern-
ment tolerates all religious opinions, and thus permits the existence
of a plurality of sects, it must, if it desires to endow the clergy of
one church exclusively, select the creed of the majority of the
people.* If its choice was made solely on the ground of its
alone have convinced Adam Smith, that his proposition as to established churclics re-
quired much limitation. But these remarks indiaite the advantnges of zeal, w hiih
may belling to an unendowed cler^ry.
' Vattel, Lrtw ('/ Anr/on-f, (5 130, lays it down gentrally, tiiat the rt-ligion of the
P
.
210 PROPAGATrON OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [ch.
obligation to promote religious truth, it could not consistently stop

at an endowment of the ortliodox creed, but must proscribe the
heterodox sects.
Now, on merely political grounds, there is much to be said in

favour of endowing the clergy of the numerical majority of the
people. If the endowment is to be exclusive, this is the most
equitable and useful application which the State can make of the
church property. But this system, though productive of con-
siderable practical advantages, is nevertheless liable to serious
objections. In the first place, the opinion of the majority of the
population is not a correct, or, indeed, a recognised standard of
belief, even in secular matters. In religious matters, it is still less
applicable. The smaller sects, each of which constitutes an incon-

siderable minority of the population, utterly repudiate any such
measure of truth, and recognise only their own conscientious con-
victions, and the dicta of the teacliers whose authority they rever-
ence. By adopting this criterion, the State admits its own unfitness
to judge of religious truth and yet it refers to no other judge of
;
acknowledged competency. In the second place, exclusive endow-

ment, though less oppressive and intolerant than a proscription of
religious error, and less offensive and vexatious than a system of
State proselytism, nevertheless implies political inequality on re-
ligious grounds, and therefore creates a certain amount of religious
discontent and discord. The unendowed sects, though they cannot
complain of the intolerance of the government, yet complain of its
partiality and transfer to the political institutions of the State a
;
portion of the dislike with which they regard a rival, but more
fa vol ired ch urch
Owing to these difficulties, botli in theory and practice, two
other plans have been resorted to by the governments of countries
in whicli there is a plurality of Christian sects. One of them
sacrifices the principle of church endowment — the other widens its
operation. The one is, for the State to abstain altogether from
majority of thu pnople oiiglit to bo esliihli^licd l)y law, and become tlio religion of the
State. The case of Ireland may tieeman exception to this rule, inasmuch as, in practice,
Ireland is treated as a separate country : but

mind that the arrange-
it is to bo borne in
uient was made by the Protestant government of England and the defenders of the ;
Established Church of Ireland generally refer to its union with that of England, and
say tliat the population of both countries ought to be taken jointly, in which case the
Protestants are a majority. If Ireland had been an independent State, the entire
chiirch-endowmenl wnnld not li:ive been given by its government to the Protestant
elercy.
IX.] CREATION OF TKU.STWORTIIY AUTIIOKITV. 211
the recognition of any religious l)ody, from the establishment of

any political standard of religions truth, and from the endowment
of any church ; the other is, for all the Christian churches and
sects to be concurrently endowed by the State. Both of these
plans avoid the evils of relijîous ine<juality by admit- — the latter
ting, the former by rejecting, all sects Neither
indiscriminately.
of them sets up the opinion of the majority of the people or any
other political standard of religious truth. The former is adopted
in France, Belgium, Prussia, and other continental Sta,tes, and, to
a certain extent, in the United Kingdom inasmuch as the Epis- ;
copal Protestant Church is established in England, while the

Presbyterian Church is established in Scotland, and endowed in
Ireland '
—
not to mention the colonies. The latter plan is adopted
in the United States. The old system of exclusive toleration still
subsists in the purely Catholic States of Southern Europe.
§ 7. Besides endowing the clergy of a particular sect, and

defraying the expenses of its public worship, the State may also
seek to promote religious truth by an interference with Public
Instruction. may establish schools having a certain religious
It
character, may afiford facilities for religious instruction of
and it
the same complexion. Its influence over public instruction may

be exercised for the purpose of favouring the doctrines of a certain
religious persuasion, so as to confirm some children in their actual
faith, and to convert others to that faith.
Arguments similar to those which have been used above, in
the case of ecclesiastical endowments, apply in the case of public
instruction. Where children remain untaught in religion, from the
want of teachers, and from mere neglect and indifference about
religion, there the establishment of schools by the State, and the
supply of religious instruction, will promote the spread of the
peculiar religious opinions which may be inculcated in such
schools but where a spirit of sectarian repugnance exists, and
:
the religious doctrines taught in the schools are considered by the

people as unsound, parents will not send their children to receive
the instruction, even gratuitously, or permit them to become at-
tendants for the purpose of learning what they themselves believe
to be error. Hence the esta})lishment of government schools, for
purposes of religious proselytisra, may be expected to be attended
' Mr. Glad-stono, The Utate in its Ililations with the Church, eh. 3, § 47, sees no
diclsivi- objection to this systpin. lie thinks that the connection of the State need not,
in all oases, bo oxeinsivel)' with one church.
r 2
212 rnOPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [ch.
with no better success than tluit wliieli accompanied the Protestant

Charter Scliools of Ireland.
The objections to an exclusive assistance of the schools of one
religious denomination by the State, when the fimds granted come,
not from a permanent endowment, but from the annual taxation,
have been so strongly felt, that in most modern countries, whicli
give a public aid to instruction, the grant has been divested of an
exclusive chaiâcter, and has been made indiscriminately to schools
The principle of Concurrent Endowment,
of all religious sects.
which has been more reluctantly admitted with respect to the
maintenance of public worship, has been more readily applied to
the assistance of public instruction.
§ 8. Besides punisliment and reward, endowment of the clergy
and public instruction, the only means available to the State for
the promotion of religious truth, and the repression of religious
error, is the Kegulation of the Press by a Censorship. A censor-
ship of the press, rigorously and consistently exercised, may im-
questionably do much for preventing the circulation of heterodox
religious opinions in a country. It did much for this purpose in
most parts of Europe, in the tirst centuries after the invention of
priuting,^ and it still does much for the same purpose in Italy and
Spain. A censorship of the press has, however, at all times been
met by evasions and indirect violations, and thus has been found
an imperfect means of preventing the circulation of religious ideas.
Books prohibited in one country were printed in anotlier they ;
were introduced clandestinely, and were sought with the greater

eagerness on account of the prohibition the interest of the smug- :
gler defeated the zeal of the censor.^ The Eeformers of the six-
'
See Sarf'i, 1. VI. c. 5. The entire passage, with the answer of Pallaviciiii, is
given in Brivschar, Controversen Sarpi's mid Pallainchii's iii der Geschichte des Trientir
Coneils, vol. II, pp. 347-58. See also Iloffinanu, Gcttchichte der Biichercensiir, (Berlin,
18J9,)c. 2; 'B.i\\\a.xa,LUcratureofFJur(rpe,XiA, II, c. 8. §§ 69-72; Disraeli, Curiosities
of Literature, p 250. ed. 10.
2 Madame de Stael makes the following remarks upon the efficacy of the censor-
ship of the press in the last century On so plait a dire en France que c'est. precis^-
:
'
jnent par egard pour la religion et pour Ics mceurs qn'on a de tout temps eu des censeurs,
et neaninoins il suffit de comparer I'esprit de la littt^rature en Angleterre, depuis que
la liberie de la presse y est ctablie, avec les divers
tVrits qui oiit paru sous le r^gne
arbitraire de Charles II., et sous celui du Regent et Louis XV. en France. La licence
des Merits a ite portce chez les Franâis, dans lo dernier eiecle, a un degr^ qui fait
horreur. II en est de m^me en Italie, ofi, de tout temps, on a soumis cepondant la
presso aux restrictions les plus gSnantfs. L'ignoraucedans la masse, et Tiudi^pcndauce

la plus rdonnee dans les csprits ("istinguc^s, est toujours le
de.s( resultiit de la contrainte.'
— ConsirUrutioiia xi'i In He vol ul ion Frnnâi-r, part XL c. 5.

—
IX.] fREATION OF THl'STWOnTItV AI'THoRITY. 213
teentli and seventeenth, and the Kreethinkcrs of the eighteenth

century, were al)le to inundate Europe with their writings, in spite
of the Catholic censors of the press.

At present, a consorsliip of tlie press, either for religious or
other purposes, would not be submitted to by the countries which
enjoy a popular government. In those States of Germany which
have retained a censorship, it has been lately applied almost ex-
clusively to the current political discussion, and has left a wide
latitude to theological controversy. Practically, therefore, a cen-
sorship of the press can scarcely be enumerated among the engines
which a government can now use for the repression of religious
error. The same remark applies with still greater force to a Law
of Libel, the practical effect of which, in regulating serious argu-
mentative controversy on religious questions, may be considered as
nearly insensible.
§ 9. The general result, therefore, at which we arrive is, that
although the promotion of religious truth, and the repression of
religious error, are universally admitted to be desirable objects, yet
the State is not able, by the means at its disposal, to compass them
effectually and that not only will its attempts to attain them be
;
wholly or in great part unsuccessful, but that they will be attended

with serious incidental evils. For the fruitless efforts made by
the State are not merely so much labour wasted and thrown away :
the attempts to propagate its own religious creed disturb civil

society — they aggravate and embitter the existing dissensions and
animosities of the rival sects, and create new causes of discord,
which would not otherwise have existed.*
§ 10. This result, however, which establishes the practical
doctrine, that the State is to be neutral in questions involving re-
ligious truth and error, startles many persons, both practical states-
men and speculative reasoners. It seems to them to involve the
consequence that, by being neutral, the State declares its indiffer-
ence to religious truth, or even its hostility to religion. They
think that the State, by its omission to take a part in the con-
troversy, implies an opinion that the question at issue is unim-
portant. The abstinence of the State from identifying itself with
' Stilly represented to the king — ' Qii'il y aviiit assoz long temps quo la diiferonce
(les religions donnait en France les scenes Ics plus fragiques ;
qn'elle etait une source
do cahiniifes et de detiordres, par I'aversion qu'on inspirnit au pcuple coiitro coux (|ui
riaiont dune crf>yance differento de la sicnne: ce qui se pr.itiquait egalenunt <K- la
jiart d- s cntlioliqncs et d«/s proffstans.' Mvot"i,-fs, liv. V. \'<m. V. p. lf;.'».
—
214 TROPAdATION OF SOUND OPINIOKS BY THE [cm.
one of the rival cliurclies, appears to them in the liglit of a sinful

neglect of religious duty — or even a profession of religious unbe-
lief. The following seems to be the train of tliought by which
they are led to this conclusion :
' The State is the highest, most important, and most compre-
hensive of all societies. Its ends and its powers are unlimited. It
embraces the whole circle of human interests. It commands the
whole sum of human faculties and powers. The mind and the
body, the hopes of a future, and the reality of the present life, are
equally within tlie scope of its influence. All other societies are
limited in their objects. A church is limited to religion, a muni-
cipality to the care of its local interests, a university to learning,
a mercantile company to trading, a scientific society to science,
and so on. All other societies are limited likewise in their powers.
They are all subordinate to the State ; they derive their legal
rights from its grant, and are restricted by its control to a defined
province. But a State is its objects and its
nnlimited, both in
powers. It may any end it may employ any means for
select ;
compassing that end. It may assume any character it may, if it ;
thinks fit, make the cultivation of literature, art, or science, one

of its objects, and direct all its political agents and powers towards
the attainment of that object.
Now, the noblest and most exalted end of the State is, to
'
make its citizens virtuous and happy, and to promote, not only
their temporal, bat also their eternal happiness. This object is
best accomplished by making them religious; and, therefore, if a

State observes neutrality in religious affairs, and leaves them ex-
clusively to the care of the cliurcli — if it does not establisli a
political standard of trutli, and a political conscience, in matters
of religious faith, it abandons its highest duty, it desecrates its
noblest functions, and it allows the largest powers, applicable to
the most important object, to lie unused. The most valuable
talent committed to its keeping is suffered, through its culpable
neglect and indifference, to remain in the napkin. The State is not
merely an institution for the protection of life and property: it
compielionds higher interests it seeks to make men good, as well
;
as safe and rich ; merely to protect tlieir bodies, but

it seeks, not
also to improve their minds and benefit their souls it aims at —
spiritual, as well as secular and temporal ends. At all events,
tliougli its agencies be laic, it lias a religious character, and
recognises religiuu as the l)asis of civil ])olity. It is a persona
IX.] CRKATION OF TIU'STWORTIIY AUTHORITY. 215
vioralls, ami, as such, it has a corporate conscience in atlairs of

relig;iou.'
§ 11. Such appears to be a summary of the principal argu-

ments used against the neutrality of the State in questions in-
volving religious truth. Assuming it to be a correct representa-
tion of their gent'ral tenor, I would remark that, although the
basis may be admitted to be sound, the superstructure is of very
different materials. It is true that the State is not necessarily
limited to the protection of life and property:
objects are units
limited, not less than the means

There is nothing
at its disposal.
in the nature or essence of a State which would prevent it from
making the promotion of religious truth one of its ends, and from
seeking to attain that end by all the means in its power. Un-
questionably, the State might propose to itself the same end, and
assume the same duties as the church it might lay down articles ;
of faith, regulate forms of worship, condemn propositions ; in

short, exercise all the spiritual functionswhich are exercised by
the pope, if it thought fit so to do.^ In the middle ages, it was
considered the duty of a Christian State to prevent Jerusalem from
remaining in the possession of a Mahometan nation. It is com-
petent to a State to adopt this, or any similar religious end, and
to pursue it at any sacrifice of life, treasure, and temporal tran-
([uillity or prosperity, provided such sacrifice were needed for the
attainment of the religious end.

But, (as we have shown in the preceding remarks,) experience
has proved that the State is not fit for the ofiice of promoting re-
ligious truth, and repressing religious error that these functions ;
are not successfully discharged by the civil magistrate, and that

they are better performed when left to the exclusive care of
spiritual and ecclesiastical teachers.^ There is nothing in tlio
' The treatise of Grotius, Dc Imperio Summnrum Pofestatum circa Sacra, lias for
itH object to prove, tliat things sacred and spiritual are subject to the dominion of the
sovereign of the State, and tliat the Church is not independoiit of the Civil power .see :
c. 1 . and 8. It is directed against those writers of tlie Churcii of Rome who maintained
tlie and temporal supremacy of the Cliurch in things eoclosiaslical and si)iritual.
legal
As supremacy of the civil sovereign in things spiritual as well as temporal, see
to the
hurlamaqui. Principles of Nat. and Pol. Law, part 111. c. 3 Vattel, Latv of Natio>i.i, ;
l>§ 139, 140.

- Wjirhurton, in his Alliance of Church and State, h. II. c. 1, lays it down, tl:;it
'
tlio cure of civil society extends only to tlie liody anl its concerns, and tlie care of i"e-
ligious society only to the soul.' His wliole theory is accurately summed up in Mr.
Gladstone's treatise. On the Relations of Church and State, ch. 1. §§ Hi, 17. Mr.
Gladstone remarks upon it: ' It is a very low theory of B ivcrnment whicii teaches.
constitution or essence of a State which is inconsistent with its

being a judge of religious truth, but it discharges this duty ill.
It is capable of doing the work of the church but the work is ;
better done by the church without its assistance. The State ought
to abstain from the assumption of a sectarian character, and from
undertaking to decide on disputed questions of religious truth, for
the same reason that it ought to abstain from carrying on trade or
manufactures. It is capable of trading, but it makes a bad trader ;
it is capable of manufacturing, but it makes a bad manufacturer.
So the State h capable of acting the part of a theologian, but it

makes a bad theologian. Hence, it is a manifest sophism to infer
that, because a person does not wish to see the State undertake to
promote religious truth, he is inditferent or hostile to religion.
As well might it be inferred that, because he does not wish to see
the State engage in trade, he is hostile to trade. If he thinks
tbe promotion of religious truth a function unsuited to the State,
—
and suited exclusively to the church if he thinks that it ought
to be performed by an ecclesiastical, and not by a political agency,
he cannot, supposing him to be friendly both to Church and State,
desire to see it assumed by the latter.
There is a constant tendency, not only among the contrivers
of political Utopias and ideal commonwealths, but also among
practical politicians, to over-estimate the capabilities of a govern-
ment to assume that it can exercise a greater influence over the
;
community than it really possesses and to forget that it can only

;
act within a sphere determined by certain conditions, and is en-

dowed with legal omnipotence in no other sense, than that its
powers have no legal limit. If the practical province of a State,
in matters involving truth, had been considered with greater atten-
tion —
if facts, and not ideas, had been consulted, it would not have
been invested with a character which is unsuited to it, and been

loaded with so many moral obligations to which it is not properly
subject.
that it has only tho care of the body and l)odily goods, and might almost seem to imply
that all physicians are more peculiarly statesmen.' Warlnirton. however, probably
never meant to teach th:it the mind, considered with reference to its temporal and
secular relations, was not within the legitimate province of the State.
Warbuilon's doctrine is borrowed from Locke, who, in his Letters on Toleration,
lays it down, that a commonwealtli is institnted for civil interests, and that its care
does not extend to the salvation of
.souls. —
Works, vol. VI. pp. 10 and 120. Compare
pp. 211-18, where he answers the objection that the State cumpn-honds spiritual ends.
Ix>cke here resorts to his favourite resource of a fiction by which the ends of the State
are limited.
X
—
IX.] CREATION OF TRU.><TW0RT1IY AUTHORITY. 217
The error of those politicians who exaggerate and misapprehend

the powers of a government over the people may Le compared, as
to its results, with the error of those speculators who, in the middle
ages, exaggerated their command over external nature. \N'hile
the alchemists, the astrologers, and the practisers of occult sciences,
undertook to transmute metals, to cure all diseases, to reanimate
the dead, and to predict the course of the weather and the fates of
men and empires, they overlooked, while engaged in the pursuit
of these unattainable objects, the discovery of such processes of
nature as lie within tlie reach of our faculties, and can be made
available for our service. and statesmen,
80 political theorisers
who, from an ignorance of the true limits to the practical powers
of a government, extend its action beyond its proper province,
not only waste its resources in vain efforts, but withdraw its effect-
ive powers from the subjects to which they are properly applicable,
and thus diminish its efficiency in its own field.
The aversion to the neutrality of the State in controverted
questions of religion —
the belief that it is bound to assume a re-
ligious character, and to promote religious truth, may perhaps be
founded on the assumption, that the State ought to use its powers
for furthering all the good ends to which its powers are applicable,
whether its attempt is likely to be successful or not.' The promo-
tion of religious truth is a good end the State is capable of ap-
;
plying its powers to the promotion of that end therefore, if it ;
neglects so to apply them, it is guilty of a sinful omission, and of

practical unbelief. Such i^ the simple argument on which many
minds seem to rely but if they will extend the same mode of
;
reasoning to of her subjects, they will soon be startled l)y the con-
sequences to which it will lead them, and will thus be brought to
doubt of the soundness of their premises. If we only leave out of
our calculation the probability of success, and require the State
• .Speaking of the speculators on a pei-fect or ideal pattern of civil government,

Warliurton says :
'
The end of government conning first under consideration, and the
general practice of society seeming to declare this end to be only, (what, in truth, it
is,) security to our Umporal and property ; the simplicity of it displeased, and
liberty
the plan appeared defective. They imagined that, hy enlarging the bottom, they
should ennoble the structure, and therefore formed a romantic project of making civil
society serve fj)r all the good purposes it was even accidentally capable of protlucing.
And thus, instead of giving us a true picture of government, they jumbled together all
sorts of societies into one, and confounded the religious, ihe literary, the mercantile,
the convivial, with the civil.' Al/iance of Church and State, h. I. ch. 3.
The hp'culators to whom WarV)urton alludes were, however, right in supposing,
that the ^lAte pot en tia/ty includes all these objects.
—
218 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS EY THE . [ch.
to undertake the proraotion of all objects which are intrinsically

good, whether they be attainable by it or not, we shall soon lind it
engaged in a multiplicity of impracticable pursuits, which might
fillan academy of Laputa with envy. The State, like subordinate
societies,and like individuals, is dispensed from the pursuit of
unattainable goods. There is no moral obligation which binds a
ruler to make an attempt, where success cannot reasonably be ex-
pected. A forlorn hope may be sometimes necessary in war but ;
it forms no part of the functions of a State, in the ordinary ad-

ministration of its affairs.
Writers who dwell on the religious functions of the State —who

(like Dr. Arnold) almost identify the State and the Church, and
merge the one in the other, are considered on that account as
friends to religion ; while those who take a different view of the
province of the State, are treated as hostile to religion and the
Church. But all experience shows that, where this intimate union
of the Church and State exists, instead of the Church spiritualising
the State, the State secularises the Church. Where the political
and Qcclesiastical powers are exercised by the same hands, the
former are sure to prevail over the latter. Practically, the religious
theory of government will end in perfect and therefore Hobbism ;
no enlightened friend to religion will seek to confound the province

of the State with that of the Church,' or to confer upon the State
spiritual, and upon the Church political, functions.
Having arrived at the conclusion, that it is not the
§ 12.
province of the State to diffuse religious truth and to discoiuâge
religious error, we need not dwell at equal length upon its duty in
diffusing truth and discouraging error as to matters other than re-
ligion. Even those who have attached the greatest importance to
the enforcement of religious truth by the State, have not, in
general, thought that it was the office of the State to diffuse
truth on secular matters. It has rarely been maintained that, in
questions of science, history, literature, art, &c.,
it is incumbent
on the State to establish a standard of sound opinions, and to use

its power for the purpose of maintaining and diffusing the trutli.'^
' '
Articles of faitli, as well as all oilier spiritual matters, it is evident enough, are
not within the proper department of a temporal sovereign, who, though he may be very
well qualified for protecting, is seldom supposed to bo so for instructing the people.'
Smith, Wealth of Nations, b. V. ch. 1, art. 3.
* The Ptolemaic system of the world was taught till a fuw years ago in the univer-
sity of Salamanca but tiie prohiliition of the Newtonian system was doubtless made
;
on riHaioHi> grminds -in the siime manner that the Jesuiteditors of Newton's rrincipia
fx.] CREATION OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 219
By founding universities, and other places of education ; hy endow-

ing professorsliips and lectureships ; by creating literary academies;
hy patronising literature and science, and by assisting public in-
struction, it lias, indeed, contributed powerfully to the ditfusion of
opinions on many important subjects ; but it has left, in general,
to the several professors and teachers the liberty of forming their
own judgment as to the opinions which they would incvilcate, and
has not sought to induce tliem to make the matter of their teach-
ing square with a prescribed standard.
Without going the length of saying, that a government ouglit
to be wholly indifferent to the character of the opinions diffused
—
under its superintendence without adopting the maxim. Si 'popu-
his vult decipi, decipiatur — we may affirm that, after it has taken
effectual encouraging the diffusion of knowledge, and
means for
for promoting the selection of fit teachers, it ought to exercise
extreme reserve in regulating the opinions of the persons so em-
ployed. And we may here add that, if the State ought not to
prescribe the opinions of endowed teachers of scientific, literary,
and historical branches of knowledge in most of which tliere are —
recognised standards, and a generally admitted authority still —
less ought it to take a decisive part in religious questions, as to
which there is no common authority generally received and re-

spected by all the Christian sectr.
It is by scientific and literary endowments, in connection with
universities, places of learning, academies, observatories, botanical
gardens, museums, public libraries, and similar institutions, that
the best provision can be made for those men of science and letters,
whoi-e pursuits are not of such a nature as to afford them the
means of a decent and permanent subsistence.' Poets, writers of
found it necessary to declare that, in illustrating the propositions relative to the helio-
centric theory, they treated it as a mere hypotliesis, and they professed, with a erare
irony, their submission to the decrees of the church against the motion of the earth :
'
Caeterum latis a summis Pontificibus contra telluris motum decretis nos obsequi pro-
fitemur.'The works of Galileo and Copernicus wore inserted in the index of prohibited
books; and to this day the Ptolemaic system is the official doctrine of the Church of
Rome.
Lord Racon, Adv. of
'
Learnbir/, vol. II. p. 04. speaks 'of the defect which is in
jiublic lectures; namely, in thesmallness and meanness of the salarj' or reward which,
in most places, is assigned unto them ; whether they be lectures of arts or profci^sions.
I'or it is necessary to the progression of sciences that readers [i.e. lecturers] bo of tho
most able and sufficient men as those which arc ordained for generating and propa-
;
gating of sciences, and not for transitory use. This cannot be, except their condition
and endowment bo such as may content the ablest man to appropriate his whole
fiction, and others, who can amuse and delight tlie public, may
derive a profit from their literary works ; those, again, who digest
and arrange existing knowledge for the instruction of their readers,
may obtain considerable pecuniary rewards for their laboiu's, in
the present state of civilisation ; but those who originate new
ideas, who explore the untrodden, and cultivate the waste tracts of
science, cannot expect to reap any profit from their exertions. Un-
less they possess tlie means of independent support^ the best main-
tenance for them is a literary endowment, of the sort just described ;

professors, too, in a place of learning, wlio are remunerated for the
lectures which they give, can study a subject in order to teach it,
and devote their spare time to the composition of books.' Why

teachers should not be rewarded for their services, I can see no
valid reason ; the objection of Socrates to the paid teaching of the
Sophists of his time s'êms to have been partly founded in liis opin-
ion, that their lessons were valuelcos, and partly in the Greek
prejudice against illiberal arts.'^
As has been just remarked, the State may, as with respect to

religious instruction, interfere for the support and patronage of
the secular instruction of the young, so as to give currency to
certain opinions on subjects unconnected with religion.
Aristotle,^ apparently, approves of the Lacedaemonian system,
according to which all free children, after a certain age, were
taken out of the care of their parents, and placed under the dis-
cipline of the State. This system, however, had almost exclu-
sively a military object.'* Though carried, for a long time, into
labour, and contiinie his whole age, inthat function and attendance; and thorif>re
must have a proportion answerable to that mediocritj- or competency of advancement
which may be expected from a profession, or the practice of a profession.'
Mr. John Mill, in his Principles of roHtical Economy, vol. I. p. 468, throws oxit
'
a doubt whether there is not 'something radically amiss in the idea of authorship as
a profession ; and whetlier any social arrangement, under which the teachers of m.in-
kind consist of persons giving out doctrines for bread, is suited to lie, or can possibly
be, a permanent thing.' Compare Comte, Cours de Th'l. Pos. torn. VI. p. 466.
Adam Smith was led, by the abuses of universities in his time, and by their lazy
''
and uniniproving spirit, to underrate the advantages of literar3' endowments, iu pro-

muting the cultivation of those branches of knowledge which are not useful, (in the
vulgar sense of the word,) — that is, which do not yield an immediate return to the
learner, by fitting him for a gainful occupation, {Wealth of Nations, b. V. ch. 1, art. 2).
Ho admits, however, the advantage of an endowment for the instruction of the poor.
See, with respect to this subject, the instructive work of Dr. Chalmers, On Eidow-
vients.The recent history of the Germin universities suificiently proves, that liter.iry
endowments do not necessarily lead to the abuses adverted to by Adam Smith.
=•
Kth. Mr. X. 10; Pal. VI n. 1.
* Aristot. Po>. VII. >. fV.-npire c. 14.

— ;
IX.J CREATION OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 221
eflfect by tlie siuyjulaily riîJ spirit of tliat little coramonwealtli, it
was too extensive an interference with parental authority and

natural art'ection for imitation, even by the most military republics
of antiquity, such as the Komans ; and, in modern times, no such
entire substitution of the political for domestic control over
children is likely to be seriously entertained.
The chief patronage which the State, in modern times, gives
to instruction, isby appointing and endowing teachers, of different
sorts and degrees, from universities and colleges, down to elemen-
tary schools for the poor.' This assistance is afforded on the
assumption, that some public contribution is requisite for enabling
the parents to instruct and train their children in their respective
callings and walks of
and that the State has an intere.st in
life ;
the proper education, moral and intellectual, of its members.
Aids afforded from the public puise, for the establishment and
maintenance of astronomical observatories and botanical gardens ;
for scientific voyages and travels for the formation of museums ;
of natural history and antiquities, of public libraries, and of col-

lections of works of art for the publication of expensive books
;
for the encouragement of literature and for the support or remu- ;
neration of pernons connected with these several institutioris or

purposes, fall under the same general head. Public expenditure
of this sort is intended to afford to the cultivators of sound know-
ledge and learning facilities which they could not derive, in an
ecjual degree, either from their own means or from private
patronage.'
§ which the government inter-
13. In every case, however, in
feres to assistand encourage science and learning, or to diffuse
secular knowledge, it ought to avoid predetermining any set of
opinions to be adopted by the teacher, or other object of its
patronage. It ought to abstain from stereotyping any modes or
formulas of thought from imposing any test, or requiring an
;
'
The c/ises in which the State maintains as well as Uachcs the scholar, and there-
fore stands to him in loco parentis, are those in wliich a ch Id is destitute, tlirough
the death or desertion of his parents. The assumjition of the parentîl authority by
the State, in these cases, is not sought, but forced upon it.
* The establishment of the observatories of Paris and Greenwich, in 1667 and

1675, 'may be considered (says Dr. Whewell) to be a kind of public recognition of tlie
ustroucniy of observation, as an object on which it was the ailvanfcige and the duty of
nations to bestow their wealth,' I'hil. of Ind. Sci. vol. II. p. 432. See also his account
of public observatories, of patronage of astronomy by governments, and of astronomical
expeditions m<ide at the public expense, in liis His/0,1/ nf the Inductive Scimcrs, b. VII.
c. 6, §§ 2, 4, and a.
;
222 PEOPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [ch.
adhesion to any party or section, scientific, literary, or historical.
The persons wlio may be thus assisted by the State, ought merely
to receive facilities for prosecuting an independent and unpreju-
diced search after truth, but ought not to be expected to work up
to a prescribed conclusion.
The influence of a government, as an authority in matters of
opinion and practice, is greatly enhanced by its confining itself to
its legitimate province, and not attempting to pronounce on ques-
tions which it is not competent to decide. A court of. justice,
which was highly esteemed for its judgments on questions of law,
would render itself ridiculous, and shake its authority, even within
its own sphere, if it attempted to determine questions of science
or literature. If a government should suborn, as it were, its en-

dowed teachers, by inducing them to take its own opinion, and
not truth, as their standard, it would impair their influence with
tlie public, and at the same time diminish its own authority upon
questions, as to which its judgment would otherwise be respected

and valued.
§ 14. For a government, although it cannot regulate opinion
as it can fix the rates of the public taxes, the forms of judicial
procedure, or the scale of legal punishments, can yet exercise a
considerable influence upon its movements and direction. With-
out undertaking to pronounce definitively a precise judgment upon
disputed questions of speculation, or to enforce that judgment by
its and coercive powers, a government possesses a moral
legal
authority, by which it can stamp a character of public approbation
upon certain acts and certain opinions. It is placed on a high

and conspicuous eminence its voice will be heard far and wide
;
many people will incline to imitate its tendencies and its ;
judgments, on subjects upon which it is competent to judge, will

not produce a powerful impression on the ])ublic.
fail to
A
government, considered as a source of autliority, furnishes a
model, or pattern, and does not act by compulsory and imperative
laws. Its subjects fashion tlieir actions, by a voluntary and self-
imposed imitation, according to the type which it places before
—
Ihem like the pupils copying a model in a school of design. They
are not coerced into uniformity by the voice of command, like
soldiers at drill.
In absolute monarchies, the personal influence of the monarch,
or of his court, in establishing a standard of manners and morals,
as well as of taste, and in determining the aim and course of per-
—— — —
IX.] CRKATIDN OF TRrSTWORTUY AUXnORITY. 223
soual ainljition in the numerous aspirers to honour and public

employment, has often been most extensive. In constitutional
monarchies, and other free government?, the rtiling power is more
divided, and its influence less concentrated but, even here, its ;
moral weight, in determining public opinion and conduct, is not

inconsiderable.
Bad examples set by rulers are almost invariably followed, to a
greater or less extent, by their sul»jects. And, on the other hand,
a good moral influence, in respect either of conduct or opinion, on
tiie part of a government, can scarcely fail to produce a beneficial
etlVet.'
Indirectly, in the way of example and patronage, by the re-

muneration of merit and the distribution of honours, a government,
and persons in eminent stations, can do much to countenance sound
opinions, to establish a correct standard of conduct, and to
' jr<5A;y '/ap ^(TtI iruffa tcD r]yovft.fvwv,
(TTparos T€ avtiiras' oi 5" aKotr/xovvTes fiporuv

SiScuT/cdAciic \oyoiai yiyvovTai Kcucoi.
(Soph. Phil. 386-8.)
Cicero particularly dwells on the moral effect produced by the example of the chief
persons in the State 'Nee ehim tantum mali est peccare priucipes (quamquam est
:
magnum hoc per se ipsum malunri) quantum illud, quod permulti imitîtores principum
c.\istunt. Nam licet videre, si velis replicare memoriam temporum, qualescumque
summi civitiitis viri fuerint, bilem civitatem fuisse: qurecunque mutatio morum in
principibus extiterit, eandem inpopulo secutam Pauci, atque admodum pauci,
lionore et glori4 ampjifieati, vel corrumpcre mores civitatis, vel corrigere possunt.'
Be Lg. III. 14. Chiudian applies the same sentiment to the imperial period :
Coniponitur orb is
Regis ad exempium ; nee sic inflectere sensu.s
Humanos edicta valent, ut vita regeutis.
Mobile mutitur semper cum principe vulgus.
{De IV. Cons. Honor. 299-302.)
Machi.ivel repeats these views, with examples derived from more recent times :
'
Non
si dolgliino i principi d'alcun peccato clie facciano abbiano in govemo, i popoli cli'egli
{lerelie tali peccati conviene che nasehino o per sua negligonza, o per esser egli
macchiato di simili errori. E chi discorrera i popoli che ne' nostri tempi sodo stiti
tenuti pieni di ruborie e di simili peccati, vedra che sara al tutto nato da quelli che li
governavano, che erano di simile natura. La Romagna innanzi che in quella fussero
spenti da Papa Alessandro VI. quelli signori che la comandavano, era un esempio
d'ogni scelleratissima \\i&, perche quivi si vedeva per ogni leggiera cagione seguiro
uccisioni e rapine grandissime. II che misceva dalla tristizia di que' Principi, non
dalla natura trista de li uomini, come lore dicevano." Lisc. III. 29, where the follow-
ing verses of Lorenzo dei Medici are also quoted :
'
E quel che fa il Signor fanno jK)i molti,
Clio nel .'îgiior sun lulti li oi'chi voki.'
encourage persons of genuine merit. But a government has little

direct power of influencing opinion, except by preventing the free
expression of thought, and by thus producing an intellectual stag-
nation, such as prevails in Spain, and, to a certain extent, even in
Italy. Xo government of a civilised countiy, for example, could
now, either by punishment or reward, by persecution or endow-
ment, restore a general belief in the Ptolemaic system of the world,
or in judicial astrology, within its dominions. Adam Smith re-
marks, that the most richly endowed universities have been the
slowest in adopting improvements in the different branches of
philosophy, and have been the most prone to retain exploded
errors in their course of education.^ Even if this statement were
true, it would not prove that the endowment produced the effect
of giving currency and authority to antiquated errors and obsolete
systems. The probability is that the endowment, thus misapplied,
would be merely wasted and that the doctrines taught would gain
;
little or no acceptance among the public, if it was known that they
were rejected by the competent scientific judges, and that they

were still maintained by the university merely through the influ-
ence of its endowed chairs.
§ 15. A government may likewise countenance sound opinions
by upholding institutions which imply those opinions, and are

founded upon them. A criminal law in which the definitions of
crimes, and the gradations of their punishments, are derived from
correct principles respecting the grounds of moral imputation and
the measure of moral guilt, tends powerfully to establish a good
ethical standard in the minds of the community. The same may
be said of the ci\'il law : its definitions of contracts, rights of
property, fraud, &c., tend to fix and enlighten men's ideas as to
honesty and good faith in their mutual dealings. The theory of the
criminal and civil law, audits application in practice, when governed
by sound principles, thus contribute materially to the estiiblish-
ment of a good code of morals for the public. In like manner, the
observance of good faith by the government, in its relations with
foreign countries, tends to accredit sound maxims of international
law, and to inculcate their observance upon other nations. Every
good system of municipal laws, faithfully administered every —
steady observance of sound rules of international law tends to —
' WenUh of Nations, h. V. eli. 1, art. 2. On this sulijoct, so far as reganls ilio
Enijlisli univ(!rsities, see tlio remarks of Dr. Wlifwoll, Hist, of the Ird. Sri'irrs. \>.
Vil. c. 3. § 2.
— —
IX.] CREATION OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 22.5
create a real, not an ideal, model of ffoverninent, wliieh serves tor

the imitation of other nations and fnture times.'
On the other hand, a government, by adopting erroneous opin-
ions as the basis of its legislation, may not only give them the
currency arising from its coimtenance, but also that strength
which arises from the existence of vested interests. This is par-

ticnlarly perceptible with regard to tlie economical principles,
which are involved in legislation upon commerce, navigation, tax-
ation, public charity, &c.
§ 16. But although (as we remarked above) it has not been

thought the duty of the State to take an active and impidsive part
in propagating tlie trutli upon secular subjects, it has not been
held that the State coidd with propriety be equally passive with
respect to the permission of error. The censorship of the press
was, from the first invention of printing, exercised by all the
European governments for preventing the circulation of dangerous
and unsound opinions. As has been already stated, it was em-
ployed, in the first instance, and principally, for the repression of
religious error ; but it has also been used for the prohibition of
writings upon philosophical, political, and historical subjects. It
was thought, at one time, that the government rendered itself
responsible for the errors which it permitted to be propagated
through the press ; and that one of its duties was to protect the
public against the diffusion of false opinions by means of books, as
it was its duty to adopt measiu-es for preventing the diffusion of
pestilential diseases, or the passing of false coins.^ There is no
' Adam Smitli adverts to tlie good moral influence exercised upon tlio character of
the Romans, Ly tlio excellent constitution of their judicatories :
' The superiority of
character in theRomans over that of the Greeks, so much remarked by Polybius, and
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, was probably more owing to the better constitution of
their courts of justice, than to any of the circumstiinces to which those writers ascribe
it.' Wealth of Nations, b. V. c. 1, art. 2. See Polyb. VI. 56. The influence of laws
upon the morals and usages of a people is considered by Matter, in his treatise De
rinjlucnce dcs Mceurs sur Ics Lois, et de I'ltijlucnce des Lois sur les Mceurs. (Paris,
1832.) Part lU.
* On the censorship of books, see Hoffmann's Treatise ; and Bcckmann, Hist, of
Inv. vol. III. p. 93, art. Book Censors. In p. 98, a passage is quoted from a letter of
Hermolaus Barbaras, written in 1480, in which he expresses an opinion favourable to
the adoption of Plato's recommendation in his Laws, that no person should publisli
anything without previous examination and permission of persons appointed by the
government. The present multitude of inferior books, he says, causes good authors
to bo neglected: 'Et quod calamitosissimum &&t, jieriti juxta imperitique Ae si\v\\\H
impuno ac promiscuo judicant.' The passage of Plato refers to poets exclusively, but
sujiposes a regular censorship. Leg. VII. p. 801.
Q
— —
226 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [en.
doubt that this office was undertaken by the European governments

with a sincere desire of purging the productions of the press from
all peccant matter, and of performing a preliminary work of selec-
tion, by authorising useful and suppressing pernicious books. But,
as in the case of religion, experience has proved that the State
cannot advantageously discharge the office of a censor of public
discussion in matters of a secular character, and that society makes
more progress towards the discovery and recognition of truth when
it is unassisted by the well-meant, though ill-directed, effijrts of a
government censorship of the press. At present, it is only in the

Italian States and Austria that philosophical and historical discus-
sion is regulated by the censorship. In Prussia and the other
Grerman States, in which a censorship of the press has, until lately,
subsisted, its practical exercise has been limited to the current
political discussion of the day and it has, in fact, been used by
;
the government only as a means of suppressing unfavourable criti-

cism upon their own acts and policy. It was to this purpose that
the censorship of the press was turned by Napoleon, who, however,
did not content himself with suppressing all adverse criticism, but
retained in the pay of the government all the writers whose articles
were permitted to appear in the newspapers. By thus poisoning
all the channels of information at their source, he rendered the
periodical press the mere engine of his despotism and all securi- ;
ties for truth of statement, and fairness or completeness of discus-

sion, were thvis, during his ascendancy, suspended in France.^
If the State be fitted at all for establishing a standard of opin-
ion, there is no function which it can so properly assume as tliat
of authorising printed works, or prohibiting their publication.^
In discussing the question of the prohibition of books at the Cotmcil of Trent, one
of the members observed, that there had been already too many books printed since
the invention of printing ; and that it was better to prohibit a tliousand books which
did not deserve it, than to permit one which deserved to be prohibited. Sarpi, 1. VI.
c. 5, (t. II. p. 139, ed. Couraycr).
•
For an account of the measures of Napoleon for regxilating and managing the
press, see Madame

de Stael, Consid. sur la Revol. Framâise, Part IV. ch. 4 and 16.
* He [the king of P>iobdignag] laughed at my odd kind of arithmetic, as he was
'
pleased to call it, in reckoning tho iiuuiLers of our people by a computation drawn
from tho several sects among us in religion and politics, lie said lie know no i-cjison
why those who entertain opinions prejudicial to the public should be obliged to change,
or sliould not be obliged to conceal them. And as it was tyranny in any government
to require the first, so it was weakness not to enforce the second ; for a man may be
allowed to keep poisons in his closet, but not to vend them about for cordials.'
Swift.
A similar image is employed in the I?ull of I.eo X. Hgainst the abuses of the press,
If it is ever to make itself tho promoter of trutli and the dis-

courager of error, no less objectionable instrument than a censor-
ship of the press can ])e devised. The practical abandonment of
this S3'stem in all countries under a free government, and the
general discredit into which it has foUen over the civilised world,
afford a strong ground for thinking that the State is incapable of
discharging the duty of a censor of opinion with success — that the
accumulation of experience is adverse to the system, and that
there is a radical defect in the theory which extends the dominion
of the State over the regions of speculative truth.
§ 17. Xot only may the State, by its patronage, assist in
promoting the diffusion of sound knowledge, both in the upper
and lower strata of society but it may also authenticate certain
;
persons, as possessing a competent amount of skill for the practice

of a profession or calling.
Thus
may, by proper examinations, ascertain the qualifica-
it
law and upon those

tions of candidates to practise medicine or ;
who come up to the prescribed mark of fitness, it may confer

diplomas, or other authorities to practise. A similar process^may
be applied to schoolmasters and teachers of youth, to masters of
merchant-vessels, and others who have difficult and important
functions to perform. The granting of diplomas by universities,
or other learned bodies, 'proceeds on the supposition, that the
public require some assistance to their judgment in the choice of
professional services, and that such an official scrutiny into the
qualifications of practitionersis a useful security against the im-
post! u-e or incompetency of mere pretenders to skill. For the

practice of medicine in particular, a pul)lic authentication, by a
board of competent and disinterested examiners, cannot fail to be
an important safeguard against imposture, inasmuch as the public
are scarcely able to form an unassisted judgment as to the quali-
fications of medical men.' Such degrees or diplomas, however, do
not of themselves import more than an authentication by duly
appointed public officers they are like a public seal or stamp
;
issued in the year 1515: '

Nos itaque (tlio Popo says), uo id, quod in Dei gloriam et
fidei arpiiineiilum ac Lonarum artiiini propagationoin salubriter est inventum, iu con-
trarium convortatur, ac Christi fidelium taluti detrinientum pariat, super librorum
improssione curani nostram habendam fore du.vimus, ne dc ccBtiro cum bonis seminibus
gpiniB coalcscant, vel medicinis veticna inicrmisceantur.' — Hdfkmann, vbi sup. p. 47.
' See tho remarks of Dr. Cullen upon value of medical degrees, in answer to
tlie
Adam Smith, cited in note XX. to Mr. JM'CuUoch's edition of the Wealth of Nations,
p. 687.
Q 2
affixed to goods for the purpose of attesting their genuineness, or

like the mark impressed on the coin of the State, in order to serve
as a public guarantee of its weight and fineness. Hence, they are
not necessarily licences to practise, and do not imply any exclusive
right. In this country, for example, any quack doctor may legally
practise medicine : the diplomas of the public bodies which preside
over the medical profession merely serve as guides to the public
in the choice of their medical advisers.
M. Dunoyer, in his work On the Liberty of Labour, maintains,
not only that medical diplomas ought to confer no exclusive right
of practising medicine, but that they serve merely as screens for
incapacity, and substitutes knowledge, and ought therefore
for real
to be discontinued altogether.^ But although the examinations
and licences of artisans, and the exclusive rights of members of
guilds, have been rightly abolished by modern nations, it does not
follow that a public authentication of medical practitioners is
either mischievous or superfluous. People in general can, by
projjer means, form a judgment as to the products of the useful
arts without the assistance of the government ^ the appointment :
of public weighers and measurers, the stamping and marking of

goods before sale, and other legislative interferences between the
buyer and seller, intended to prevent fraud, and to insure the
quality of goods, are indeed, (except in such cases as those of coin
and plate,) productive of more harm than benefit. But where
intellectual fitness is concerned, the public may have less facility
for guarding against imposture ; and they may be aided in the
by the certificate of a board of
selection of their medical advisers
competent examiners, who have ascertained the qualifications of
the practitioner, and given them a solemn and authentic
attestation.
§ 18. II. With respect to the influence exercised by the heads

of a church, or religious community, over opinion in religiousand
ecclesiastical matters, we refer generally to the remarks in
Chapter IV.
As has been there shown, no merely human authority is recog-
nised by all the Christian churches. The authority of the heads
and doctors of each church is confined to the members of their
own communion, and does not pervade all Christendom. Each
church or section of Christianity possesses its own autliorities.
' Dc la Libertl' du Travail, toni. III. p. 47-55.

* See above, p. 88.
;
X.J CRKATION OF TKUSTWOKTIIY AUTHORITY. 229
Thus, Church of Kome appeals to some of the Greek fatliers,

tlie
as Origen, Athanasius, and Chrysostom and to the Latin fathers, —

as Lactantius, Ainl)ro?e, Jerome, and Augustine to the leading —
schoolmen, as Thomas Aquinas and Peter Lombard, and to some
later theologians, as Bellarmine. For the Lutheran Church, Luther
for the Swiss or Reformed Church, Calvin and Zwingli are the
main guides. The Church of England considers as its chief
luminaries those divines who have excelled among its own clergy
— as Hooker, Ussher, Hall, Jeremy Taylor, Pearson, Bull, Burnet,
Butler, Waterland, &c. Among the Protestant Dissenters of
England, Baxter, Wesley, Whiteficld, and other leaders of later
date, are the chief guides of doctrine. Each of these teachers
has, however, a jurisdiction which is limited to the members of his
own confession, and which other churches either wholly repudiate,
or recognise only with large qualifications and restrictions. If
they are quoted by writers of a different religious creed, it is prin-
cipally in their cliaracter of recognised leaders and representatives
of their own churches, and for purposes of controversy and refu-
tation. Thus, a member of the Church of England, or any other
Protestant church, would deny any decisive autliority to a passage
from Thomas Aquinas or Bellarmine and a polemical writer of ;
the Cluu-ch of Kome would probably think that he had made a

large concession, in admitting that any Protestant divine was even
a Christian. The Church of Rome, which formally prohibits the
reading of all heretical books, places the writings of the Reformers
in the Index Libroriim Prohibltorum. Every Roman Catholic
who reads a book included in this list, incurs the penalty of excom-
munication latce sententice.^ The Protestant churches, in like
manner, discourage the reading of heterodox and erroneous
writings but they have never gone the length of publishing an
;
Index of condemned books.'^

§ 19. An important influence is exercised by the heads of a
church, or by certain members of it invested with a delegated
power, in ascertaining the fitness of candidates for the Christian
ministry or priesthood, and in stamping them with the public
character of the sacred profession. The character conferred by the
process of ordination is, in some churches, indelible by âw, and in
Seo Sar[)i, VI. 5. Excomtnuniciition latce sententi<p is the same as wliat, in our
'
law books, is called excommunication ipso facto ; i.e., excommunication following im-
mediately upon tlie offence, without tlio sentence of a court.
" See Palmer, On the Church, Part IV. c. 17.
—
nearly all by custom. It is accompanied, moreover, with a renun-

ciation of many secular pursuits ; and, in the Church of Eome, the
obligation of celibacy is likewise imposed -upon ordained priests.
The importance of the selection thus made mainly depends on the
judicious exercise of the discretion confided to the ordaining
parties, and on the qualifications which it guarantees. Whether
the ordination is further sanctified by an uninterrupted succession
from the Apostles, is a question upon which theologians and

churches differ, and which does not belong to the present inquiry.
In episcopal churches, the ordination is effected by the bishops
in j)resbyterian churches, by the presbyteries and in other Pro- —
testant churches by boards, sometimes mixed, of ministers and
laymen. Thus, Cromwell established a board of commissioners
called Triers, whose business it was to examine candidates for
ecclesiastical benefices, and to admit them, if deemed worthy of
approbation.'
§ 20. III. We have next to consider the influence of Voluntary
Associations for political, scientific, literary, and other purposes,
in the diffusion and authentication of opinions.
Both in England and the United States, it has been for some
years (as has been before observed) ^ the practice to form voluntary
associations for certain political objects. Such associations have
generally an internal organisation — arrangements as to meetings,
order of proceedings, committees, and the like, together with
officers and funds of their own. Sometimes they are concerned in
the party questions of the day, and seek to influence the govern-
ment and by appealing to and agitating public opinion
legislature
against some existing law. At other times, their object is to
procure the introduction of some philanthropic measure as for —
abolishing slavery or the slave-trade, for improving education or
health, for diffusing knowledge, for promoting public order and
morality. Voluntary associations of this sort bring together
persons are interested in the pursuit of a common end
who they ;
tend to create and foster, by the mutual communication and

emulation of their members, a body of enlightened opinion and
accurate information on the given subject ; and thus, independently
of the arguments which they may lay before the public, they
promote the formation of a centre of authority on the matter,
which is likely to exercise an influence in various directions. It is
'
iSee Neal's Hist, of ihe Puritans, vol. II. pp. 621-9.
- Above, p. 182.
;
XX.] CREATION OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 231
probable, indeed, that the active members of such an association

may be prompted to the pursuit of their object by a zeal not suffi-
ciently tempered with discretion, and that they may overrate the
importance and utility of the end at which they aim still, with ;
these deductions, the honest conviction of the leaders of such a

body will scarcely fail to exercise an influence on some portion of
the ptiblic.
This effect is particularly perceptible in societies formed for
scientific and literary purposes, whose proceedings are of a more

tran(iuil and less controversial character than those of political or
semi-political associations. The earliest of the learned societies is
the Museum founded at Alexandria, in the third century before
Christ, by Ptolemy Philadelphus, which was assisted by a public
endowment, and encouraged by the royal patronage. Societies for
the cultivation of literature, science, and the fine arts were, how-
ever, first estal>lished on an extensive scale in modern Italy. The
Italian Academies, which began even in the fifteenth century,
directed their attention to every department of the field of know-
—
ledge from mathematics and physics to painting and music and —
from them the learned societies afterwards established in the other
European States, such as the Academie Franâise and the
Academic Royale des Sciences, the Society of Antiquaries and the
Royal Society, the Berlin Academy, &c., were imitated. Some of
the most important of these societies obtain pecuniary assistance
from the government but their number has, during the last
;
century, been greatly multiplied by voluntary efforts, and their

utility has been increased by the direction of their efforts to
limited and definite subjects.'
Bodies of this sort concentrate a large mass of skilled opinion
upon tlie subject to which their combination refers, and their cor-
porate judgment accordingly carries withit a deserved authority
among example, the Reports of the French

the public. P'or
Academie des Sciences upon new works and discoveries belonging
to the department of physics, have obtained great weight in the
scientific world. Dictionaries of the Italian, Spanish, and French
languages have been published by academies the Academia della —
Crusca, the Royal Academy of Madrid, and the Academie Franâise
' Full detiiils respf.cting literary and scientific societies may be found in the
Penny Cycloptfdia, Arts. Acadiwxj and Societies, mid in the Conversationslcxikon, Arts.
Akadcmic and Kunstschiden. Compare Hallam. Lit. of Europe, vol. I. p. 654 vol. II ;
J).
602 ; vol. IV. J))). 89, 6G0-3. IJcthuno's Life of Gcdiliv, c. 9.
—
232 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [ch,
it being thought that the combined opinion of such a body

would give authority to their exposition of the usage and signification
of words. For a simihir reason, treatises or collections of papers
published or circulated by learned societies, derive an additional
weight from the patronage under which they appear, and the
authentication which they thus obtain. The scientific congresses,
which have grown up in Europe since the Peace, differ from the
former societies with like objects, principally in having a more
cosmopolitan character, and being independent of national
divisions by which means the consent of their members, when
;
they agree, is calculated to inspire greater confidence, as being

free from all suspicion of local prejudice or partiality.^
Academies for the cultivation of the arts of design have,
imdoubtedly, contributed to promote that end, though they have
been accused of a tendency to confine and pervert the natural
taste and genius of the young artist. Academies of painting may,
it is true, give autliority and currency to a certain style and
manner, which, by frequent repetition, ajid by the imitation of

successive disciples, may degenerate into a sort of mechanical and
insipid ideal, wanting the freshness, variety, and truth of natiu'e.
Such an effect of academic teaching is not, however, necessary ;
and it must be considered an accidental abuse of the system,

which might be prevented by a proper method of instruction not —
a vice inherent in academies.'^
§ 21. The influence exercised upon opinion by universities
and
places of learning may besame head these are
referred to the :
bodies containing studious and learned men, competent to pro-

nounce a judgment on the subjects which form a part of the
academical course of reading and instruction and, by their ;
collection in one placo, concentrating a mass of light on

these subjects. Every such body ought to be a luminous point,
diff'using its rays in all directions to the rest of the com-
' As au«.l tlicir iufluence upon opinion, see the remarks of

to Kcicntific societies,
i)r. Whewell, of Ind. Scienas, b. YII. c. 6, § 3 and as to their beneficial effects,
Hist, ;
Laplace, cited by Weld, Hist, of Royal Society, vol, I. p. 27. With respect to the
scientific congresses, compare the observations of M. Corate, Cours de Phi Pos. torn.
.
VI. p. 478.
* See the remarks of Mr. Payne Knight, upon the cramping influence of academies
of painting, and the mannerism which they tend to generate. Priimiples of Taste, Part
II. c. 2, §§ 116-19. He admits, however, that if 'academical science and precision

can be united with feeling and sentiment, there is no doubt that the result would be a
degree of perfection hitherto unknown to the art.'
— ;
muiiity.' The
universities and othir leiuneil bodiis
efticieiiey of
may be and promoted by a public endowment, and by

assisted
the countenance of the government, in the manner which has
been aheady illustrated.
§ 22. Political parties likewise are, properly speaking, volun-
tary associations for the promotion of certain opinions. This end
they attain by their or*(anisation, numbers, and activity, and by
the ability, zeal, and character of their leaders. On the means
by which they exercise a moral authority, some remarks have been
made in a former chapter, in reference to the working of a poli-
tical body and we shall have occasion to revert to the subject, in
;
treating of the abuses to which that influence is liable.'*

§ 23. IV. We have, lastly, to consider the influence of the
Periodical Press, through its various organs, so far as it affects
the belief and convictions of the public by the weight of its
authority.
The extensive circulation of periodical publications is a pheno-
menon of comparatively recent date. The general diffusion of
literary journals was prior, in point of time, to that of political
newspapers ; but neither reached a considerable height until
a long time after the invention of printing. A censorship of
the press was, as we have seen, an institution universally estab-
lished throughout Europe soon after the introduction of printing
and wherever a censorship of the press exists, political newspajiers
are restrained within narrow limits. A government, exercising a
censorship o\'er the press, may permit considerable freedom of
discussion upon religion, philosophy, and the history of past ages
but \vith regard to the events of the day, and its OAvn acts, its
enforcement of silence is in general inexorable. In England, the
censorship of the press was substantially maintained imtil the
reign of William III., and therefore it was not until after this
period that political newspapers could assume any importance. A
'
may perhaps be worth while to remark, that if we except the poets, a few
'
It
orators,and a few historians, the far greater part of the other eminent men of letters,
both of Graecc and Rome, appear to have been either public or private teachers
generally either of philosophy or of Theioric.'—yVcalth of Nations, b. V. ch. 1, art. 3,
near the end. This remark of Adam Smith's is more applicable to tho Greeks than to
the Romans. Dr. Chalmers also observes, that much more than half the distinguislied
authors of Scotland have been professors, (Om Endowments, y). ^S.) Respecting the
English universities, and the readiness with MJiich they have adopted new opinions in
science, see AVbewell, ut step. b. VII. c. 3, § 2.
^ Above, di. 8, § 3 ; below, eh. 10, § 7.
——
234 PEOrAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [cii.
great variety of flying sheets of news were, indeed, issued during

the Civil War ; ^ but Milton in vain attempted to persuade the
Long Parliament to abolish the licensing of books.
Newspapers appear to have liad the same origin in all the
countries of Europe. They were at first mere manuscript collec-
tions of intelligence respecting the events of the day,^ which were
compiled for the use of readers and either passed from hand to;
hand, or were exhibited in an office, where public notices and

advertisements were sometimes also received and registered.^ In
England, these manuscript papers were called neivs-letteri? and, ;
after the institution of posts, copies of them were often sent into
the country, like other letters. By degrees, these news-letters
began to be circulated in print at first at irregular intervals, —
then weekly, and at last daily but, till after the middle of the
;
last centur}'^, they were confined to the statement of a few articles

of news, of general interest, and such as could be obtained without
much expense, or the maintenance of an extensive correspondence
or staff of reporters.'* The names of newspapers (as Neius-letter^
Diurnal, Journal.) Giornale, Mercury, Coitrant, Courier, Public
Intelligencer, Intelligenz-hlatt, Postreiter, Relation, Corre-
spondent, Zeitu7ig) allude to their character as vehicles of intelli-
gence concerning the passing events of the day — such as might be
sent privately by correspondents through the post, or by a mes-
senger."'' Some periodical essays of a political character, as the
Examiner, Freeholder, Craftsman, &c., were, indeed, published
in England as early as the reign of Queen Anne, and even
earlier ^ and a bill to restrain the licentiousness of the press was
;
ordered to be brought into the House of Commons on the 2nd of

' See Chalmers' Life of Tiuddiman, pp. 102-2-1, and App. 6; Disrneli's Curiosities
of Literature, p. 55 (ed. 10) Johnson's Life of Addison, vol. VII. p. 429. On the
;
meaning oineivs, see above, p. 97.

* Called at Venice oioticie sctitte, wliere they were first circulated, about the year
1563. Tlic German liehttioiitn were first published in the same centui-y, in the form
of letters. The earliest known authentic newspaper printed in England is of the date
1619. See Kniglit's Political Dictionary, art. Newspapers.
See Beckmann, Hist, of Liventions, vol. II. p. 481, ed. 8vo, (art. Tapers for con-
*
veying Intelligence!) Upon the combination of advertisements with newspapers, sco

the Idler, No. 40, (Jan. 20, 1759.)
^ Upon the news-letters, see Macaulay's History of England, vol. I. pp. 388-91.
* Newsp.npers were sometimes printed so as to resemble manuscripts Tatler, No.
178 (1710); or a blank page was left, on which a letter could be written. Knight's
I'ol. Diet, uhi sup.
* For this class of Essayists, see the account in Chalmers' Preface to the Guardian.
—British Essayists, vul. XVI. pp. xxvi. — xlvi.
June, 1712, tor its main ul)jt'ct the prevention of anony-

liavin<jj
mous which was doubtless directed against writings

publications,'
of this class. But the importance of the daily newspapers, as
vehicles of political discussion and as organs of political party, in
addition to tiieir function of registersof news, dates in this country
from about the close of the American war.^ On the Continent,

none of the political jomnals contained more than a mere state-
ment of news before the era of the French Revolution. The
Allijemeinc Zeitung, the first newspaper of Germany which added
original discussion to reports of events, was established in 1798.
Even, however, in England, where the licensing of publications had
been abolished for a century, the intellectual character of the
newspaper press was at a low ebb at the outbreak of the revolu-
tionary war and it is principally since the Peace that the standard
;
of its writers has been raised. From that time, it has been pro-
gressively rising, and, for several years past, all the current poli-
tical questions have been discussed in the daily and weekly papers
with great ability, research, and intelligence. During the same
period, its character as a vehicle of information has also been much
improved. Not only domestic news, but full and accurate reports
of important public proceedings, and accounts of contemporary
events in all the countries of the world, furnished by competent
correspondents together with criticisms of newly-published books,
works of art, &c., are to be found in a well-conducted modern
newspaper.
§ 24. The extraordinary cheapness of the newspaper, in propor-
tion to the cost of its contents,^ the regidarity as well as celerity
of its publication, its circulation gratuitously, or at low rates of
postage, through the Post-office, and the variety and interest of its
information, and of its comments on passing events, cause it to be
'
6 Par;. Hist. 1141.
* With respect to English newspapers, con.sidered as mere vehicles of intelligence,
Bee the remarks of Johnson in the Idler, No. 7, 27 May, 1758. He there says 'All —
foreigners remark that the knowledge of the common people of England is greater
than that of any oilier rulgar. This superiority we undoubtedly owe to the rivuleta
of intelligence which are continually trickling among us, which every one may catch,
and of which every one partakes.' As to the news-writers in Queen Anne's time, see
Taller, No. 18, (by Addison.) On the avidity for news. Spectator, No. 452, (1712.)
Compare No. 457. See also Connoisseur, No. 45, (1754.)
The profit derived from the advertisements in a newspaper lowers its price to the
public, and improves its quality. If there were no advertisements, the price of a news-
paper of equal quality with the present must bo greatly inci'eased, and probably no
such newspaper could be published.
—
diffused widely,and to be read by a large part of the public ; to

whom not only furnishes the materials out of which their
it
opinions on the questions of the day are chiefly formed, but often
suggests the opinions themselves.
A newspajêr affords every day the intelligence which each
person wants, without the interruption of a visitor or messenger
and suggests opinions on political and other subjects, without the
formality or apparent presumption of a personal adviser. It is a
daily supply of information and discussion, of which everybody
can take as much or as little as he pleases, and at the times most
convenient to himself, without being guilty of any slight or breach
of propriety.
In every civilised country, therefore, in which the newspaper
press is not strictly coerced by the government, it exercises a great
influence upon the opinions of the community at large, in different

directions and by different means partly by supplying facts as
;
the groundwork of opinions, partly by argumentative discussion,

and partly by its mere authority.
§ 25. Now, in looking on the newspaper press as one of the
principal guides of public opinion, and as an authoritative source
of practical convictions to a large part of the community, the most
prominent characteristic which strikes the observer is, that it is
—
anonymous that all the writers officially connected with a news-
paper are unknown to the reader, and strictly maintain their
incognito. This is certainly the general character of the news-
paper press in The editorial articles are always
all countries.
anonymous in form, and generally anonymous in fact though, in ;
some cases, their authorship may be disclosed in private, or may

be ascertained upon inquiry.
§ 26. The anonymous character of the newspaper press is so
important and distinctive a feature, and is so closely connected
with the nature of its influence as an authoritative guide to
opinion, that it is necessary to inquire what are the motives
and causes, and what the operation of this system.^
It may be said, in general, that the author of a writing is
desirous that his authorship should be known. If the composition

contains nothing of which he is ashamed, there is no reason why
he should not avow his own production. He probably thinks that
the publicity of the fact will contribute to his reputation. There
'
Coiui'arc tlic remark!^ upon anonytiHUi!? tcf^limony above, ch. 111. § 2.
must, therefore, he some cogent reason for the universal and

studious concealment of authorship practised by newspaper
writers.
This reason is to he found in the facilities which it affords for the
free expression of opinion on contemporary transactions. A news-
paper writer undertakes the invidious office of a public censor. He
cites before his tri})unal kings, potentates, statesmen, churchmen,
demagogues, officers of the government, members of political
bodies, and men in every variety of relation in which tliey play
any public part, however exalted or however humble. The high
are formidable by their influence and station — the low, by their
numbers and powers of union. Having no powêrful party or con-
nections to support him in undertaking a conflict, in which the
superiority of strength is so much against him, it is necessary that
he should, by self-concealment, avoid the retaliation which he is
sure to provoke. Being unequally matched against so great a pre-
ponderance of force, he is compelled to fight in ambush in order to
gain the victory. He throws down his gauntlet in the lists, and
challenges all tlie world to the combat ; but before he enters
the he is forced to lower his vizor.

field,
Writers in newspapers resemble the guests at a masquerade,

who, by disguising their faces, are able to comment with freedom,
and without fear of consequences, upon the errors or tuibles of
their neighbours. They are, as it were, disembodied voices,
admonishing people of their faults or omissions
like ' the airy —
tongues that syllable men's names,' which, in times of alarm and
superstition, have been heard to give warning of public danger.
In this respect Junius, the raagnl nominis umbra, the mysterious
monitor and castigator of men in high stations, who was never
identified with any living person, is the prototype of the newspaper
press.
The anonymousness of newspaper wi'iting rests on the same
ground by ballot for electoral purposes viz., the pro-
as the vote —
tection against intimidation or undue influence which, in either
case, the secrecy affords. Both in writing upon public events,
and in giving a vote at a public election, secrecy is vindex tacitse '
libertatis.' Unless the writer concealed his name, he would in

.many cases be exposed to personal quarrels and threats, and, in
still more, to personal solicitations and remonstrances, if he wrote
with freedom. If, on the other liand, he avowed his authorsliip,
he would find it necessary, or at least prudent, to suppress
—
unpleasant truths, to spare certain individuals, to avoid giving

offence to the powerful, and, in short, to make the same sacrifices
to personal feeling and interest, as are made by those who discuss
openly the conduct and character of their contemporaries. That
this would be the case is proved by the practice, not only of editors
and the regular paid contributors to newspapers, but also of most
of their casual correspondents, who write under assumed names. If
the descendants of every celebrated person of a former age thought
it their duty to defend their ancestor's memory, and to fasten a
quarrel upon a historian who censured him without reserve, it

would be necessary for historians of the past to conceal their
names, not less than the contemporary chroniclers who write in
newspapers, Bayle, who wrote at a time when it was dangerous
for a man to discuss philosophical and religious subjects -with
freedom, resorted to various devices of false dates and ficti-
tious prefaces, in order to divert suspicion and to conceal his
authorship.
As an example of the dangerous hostility which a free-spoken
newspaper writer may excite, the case of Junius may be cited. Sir
William Draper, v,'hen attacked with severity by Junius, called
upon him to drop his anonymous character, and to decide the
quarrel by arms. Junius declined this challenge, saying in reply,
that it was by
' no means necessary that he should be exposed to
the resentment of the worst and the most powerful men in this
;
country and that
' while Sir William Draper woidd fight, there
'
Were others who would assassinate.' {^Letter 25.)'
Hence, a person attacked by a newspaper is in the same posi-
tion as a knight in a tale of chivalry, who finds himself, through

the arts of an enchanter, assailed by the blows of an invisible
hand, whicli he feels without being able to perceive their author.
Under cover of their concealment, these writers can pass every-
where unimpeded they can act as the privileged spies of the
:
public, without being subject to the danger of being hanged, if

caught within tlie enemy's lines. They have tlie same defence of
obscurity which the goddess is described as conferring on ^neas
and his companions, in order to enable them to enter the walls of
Carthage with safety, and to scrutinize its inhabitants without
being stopped or challenged by the guards.
'
Oil Junius's concealment, see Jolinson on the Falkhiml Islands, vnl. VI. p. 204.
ix.J CREATION OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 239
At Venus obscuro pradientes acre saepsit,

Et multo upbulsD circum den fudit amictu ;
Ccrnere ne quis eos neu quis contingerc posset,

Molirire moram aut voniendi poscere causas.
The newspaperpress, so far as it is an organ of opinion, is a

politicaland moral censorship, assumed voluntarily, and exercised
l»y concealed agents. Its operations may be considered as those
of a modem Vehmic tribunal, adapted to a civilised state of society.
It works by secret instruments, and its sentences are carried into
effect with almost resistless force, but by unseen and unknown
hands. In a certain sense, the public stands to the newspaper
press in the same relation as that in which the government stood
to the informers at Venice it opens a lion's moutli, into which all
:
public accusations can be thi'own, without the disclosure of the

complainant's name.
The concealment of authorship by newspaper writers exempts
them from many of the feelings which distui-b the judgment of
contending in the open arena of public life. For
rival politicians,
example, being withdrawn from public notice, they are free from
personal vanity or rivalry, and from all love of distinction they ;
cannot be actuated by a desire of display, or of personal triumph

— by the love of power for its sordid advantages or by a spirit —
of interested faction. It is only so far as they are connected with,
or set in motion by, the leaders or followers of political parties,
that newspaper writers can be influenced by these motives.
That there must be strong reasons of expediency in favour of
a practice so generally adopted, so firmly maintained, and so
peaceably acquiesced in, cannot l)e doubted. On the other hand,
it an unquestionable evil that the public mind should, with
is
respect to the events and public characters of the day, be guided

to a great extent by persons who, writing in studied concealment,
are exempt from tlie check of personal responsibility, and can
gratify private resentment, private friendship, or any other
private feeling, good or bad, at the expense of the public interest,
or of the reputation and peace of individuals, without the prospect
of moral accountability to any human tribunal — and even in tlie
event of the conviction of the publisher for libel, with no fear of

individual exposure.*
' Some strong remarks on the evils arising from the anonymousness of the news-
paper press, may be seen in Lord Brougham's Pol. Phil. vol. II. p. 41 ; vol. III. pp.
— ;
The concealment of authorship likewise encourages, or permits,

the adoption of a censorious tone of assumed superiority, of dis-
interested regard for the public welfare, and of championship of
the nation against the acts of the government, which would per-
haps not be consistent with the writer's true position and character
if he were known to his readers. In many cases, probably, the
assumed is as imlike the real character of the writer, as the cha-
racter of the tragedy-hero to that of the actor who represents him.
It might be thought that, as the original articles in newspapers
are all anonymous, they would pass merely for the intrinsic value
of the facts and arguments which they contain, and that they
would be devoid of any extrinsic and adventitious authority. Such,
however, is not the fact ; newspapers are not like single anony-
mous placards, issuing from an tmascertained source. In some
cases, indeed, the authority of a newspaper may even greatly
exceed that of a statement or argument supported by the author's
name. A newspaper, it is to be observed, by its continuous
publication at the same office, and under the same title,' and
by a unity of management under the same proprietar}^,
acqviires a species of individual character, similar to that of
a corporation, or club, or regiment, or mercantile partnership,
or other voluntary in existence by the per-
association, kept
petual succession and renewal of members. It is, like them, a
its
persona TYioralis and although its writers do not appear before

;
the public in their personal identity, and in many cases, doubt-

less, are unknown to one another, yet they all depend on a common
centre they are selected and remunerated by a common employer

;
their several movements are regulated by a common mind, and

according to a uniform plan. In this manner, a newspaper can
acquire a corporate character for accuracy and extent of intelli-
gence, for correctness of statement, and even for soundness of
judgment and strength of reasoning which character is com- —
122, 177. Compare also somo olisorvations on the same subject, in tlie collection of
essays entitled 'Friends in Council,' p. 163.
'
Any title or other mark by which a newspaper or other vendible article is dis-
tinguished, is recognised by our law as the subject of property, and a court of equity
will restrain all unauthorised persons from pirating it. Johnson, in his Life of
Addiso7i, speaking of the newspapers published in England during the civil war, states,
that when any title grew popular, it was stolon by the antagonist, who, by this
'
stratagem, convoyed his notions to those who would not have received him, luid he not
worn the appearance of a friend. Works, vol. VII. p. 429. The same fraud con-
'^
tinued to bo practised in the next century : see Addison's Freeholder, No. o5.
—
IX.] CHRATION' OF TRUSTWOHTIIY AUTHORITY. 241
po.iite— (lio jTênoral re.'^tiU of its m:ina<êment ; and it is form'^d

from tlio aj(^^r«^âte writinpfs of its contributors, but is distinct
from that of any one of them.
Now, by takinp^ advantajre of this corporate character, but at
the same time sheltering himself under the cover of anonymous
authorship, the official newspaper writer secures the protection of
secrecy, while he writes, nevertheless, with a considerable wei<>ht
of authority. He obtains all the adventitious strength which may
be derived from the character, connections, and influence of tlie
newspaper, considered as a moral entity while he escapes from all ;
personal responsibility, and is not known by, or accountable to, any

one but his own employer.
Another important incident of the corporate character of a
newspaper, and of its continuous existence, is, that it may be the
organ of a certain political party or interest, and may thus come
to be regarded as the authentic representative of their views. In
this way, again, it may acquire an authority extrinsic to the mere
anonymous effect of the arguments or opinions which it circulates.
From the relation in which newspapers stand to the public
being dependent on their sale for their very existence it is •
—
natural that they should seek to render their opinions acceptable
to a large number of purchasers, and thus they often follow, as
well as lead, public opinion. Even in these cases, however, they
contribute to give it a more clearly marked form, and to turn it
into a more and their authority with their

definite course ;
readers is enhanced, rather than diminished, by a dextrous adapta-

tion of their suggestions and censures to pre-existing opinions or
sentiments.
We see, therefore, that by its continuity of character, by
l)ecoming a party organ, and by sometimes following as well as
leading public opinion, a newspaper obtains a considerable
authority, independent of the force of its reasoning, and that this
authority is directed by writers who, being anonymous, are exempt
Irom all sense of personal responsibilil3\
Such is the reverse of the picture which we have contemplated
above. Such are the principal evils incideiital to the anotiyinous
authorship of newspapers.
The system itself, however, rests, as we have seen, on a solid
It is true tliat the advertisements foi'ni a large pai-t of tlio profits of a modern
'
English newspaper, but the numbpr of advertisements depends chiefly on the extent of
the circuliitioi).
—
242 FROrAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [ch.
basis of expediency. The public has a paramount interest in the

free expression of opinion upon passing events, and in the free
censure of the public acts of contemporaries ; and, without anony-
mous writing, this freedom cannot practically exist. Besides, any
attempt to compel the true writers to disclose their names would
be futile.' The law can only compel some responsible party to
undertake the paternity of a newspaper article; but it cannot
make the paternity a question of fact. It can do nothing for
creating a moral and personal responsibility in the real writers. It
cannot get beyond the registered editor and the publisher. By
these means, the author escapes, while the newsvendor suffers
reversing the proverbial fate of the great and little :
LoTv skulks the hind beneath the rage of power,

And leaves the -n-ealthy traitor iu the Tower.
The conclusion at which we arrive is, that however liable to

abuse the anonymous authorship of newspapers may be, the
pi'actice is necessary, in order to secure the most important
purpose of a newspaper, and therefore ought to be acquiesced in,
even if it could be easily prevented by law, which is not the case.

The proper object, therefore, to be aimed at is, to provide securi-
ties against the abuses of the system, and to obtain its advantages
with as little admixture of evil as practicable — to extract all the
honey, and to neutralise some of the poison.
One important protection against the abuses of this anony-
mous writing is derived from the vigilant watch which the several
newspapers are led, by the spirit of competition, to keep upon one
another. The rivalry of trade prevents them from combining for
any common purpose ; and the censure which they cast on each
other is at least as severe and unsparing as that which they direct
against any member of the public.
This mutual rivalry of newspapers affords to the public many
securities against the abuses, which the absence of personal
to
responsibility in the writers would otherwise give rise. The
private feelings and interests of one writer are not shared by
others and as the newspapers do not make common cause, both
;
sides of a question can obtain a hearing through tlieir columns.

Wliat one newspaper attacks, another defends what one asserts, ;
'
Ah was stated above, page 234, an attempt was made in Queen Anne's reign to
conapelanonymous writers to disclose tlieir names ;
but llio bill introduced into parlia-
ment for this purpose was dropped.
ix.J CREATION OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 243
another contradicts : tlicre is argument against arjîiment, decla-

mation a<i;ainst declamation, ridicule against ridicule, invective
against invective. All misstatements of fact, all misrepresen-
tations and exaggerations, may be exposed all sophisms may be ;
refuted by this rude but effectual process of pleading, the

;
question at issue is fully discussed, even if the truth is not at last

worked out and the sentence of the judiciuni popidare is given
;
after hearing the arguments of all parties. Hence, the competi-

tion existing between the various newspapers raises their character,
by rendering them careful in their statements and reasonings. Being
constantly watclied by rivals, who are not likely to treat their
failings with tenderness, they seek to make their performances
come up and to furnish the accurate informa-
to their professions,
tion and enlightened opinions which they undertake to propagate.
If, for example, any newspaper were to falsify a document which
it reprinted, in order to support a particular view of a political

question, it would infallibly be exposed by other newspapers and ;
its circulation would probably be diminished, by the want of con-

fidence in the accuracy and honesty of its information which such
conduct would create among the public. The deliberate falsifica-
tions, as well as suppressions of truth, which the Moniteur
in
indulged under Napoleon's direction, could not have been at-
tempted with a free press. The certainty of detection, as well as
the disclosure of the truth from other sources, would have given to
the public an effectual security against such a system of fraudulent
misrepresentation, intended to mislead the people with respect to
matters in which they were deeply interested. In this manner,
tiie mutual censorship of the newspapers —a censorship not less
rigid tlian tliat wliich they exercise over the community at large
— increases their fitness to seive as guides of opinion, and raises
their authority with the public, both as reporters of facts, and as
judges of public ati'airs.
It may be added, that the same newspaper, by inserting com-

munications and documents on opposite sides of a question, and by
r(;porting public discussions inwhich speakers of ditl'eront opinions
take a part, contributes to furnish materials for a fair jrdgment,
and to neutralise the effect of a too exclusive advocacy. A news-
paper thus often supplies both bane and antidote — ' Una manus
vobis vulnus opemque feret.'
It is only in countries governed by popular institutions, that
the newspaper press is free ; and in these countries, although the
;
2-44 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS BY THE [ch.
conduct of public men is constantly open to anonymous censure in

the newspapers, they have an opportunity, in parliamentary and
other legally-constituted assemblies, of explaining and justifying
their own acts and opinions ; and as these statements are made by
persons in a conspicuous and recognised station, and subject to
the completest personal reponsibility, they outweigh, in authority,
the remarks of antagonists who maintain their anonymous posi-
tion, and do not come forward as accusers. When the accused
appears in person, to defend himself against the charges of an
uuavowed accuser, lie enjoys, at least, the advantage of a position
of credibility and authority.
superior Although he cannot
retaliateupon unknown assailants, he has at least the command of
the most effectual means of self-defence. Ultimately, therefore,
the balance between an unacknowledged attack and an acknow^-
ledged defence may be fairly struck.
Another preventive of the ill effects resulting from the anony-
mous authorship of newspapers is to be derived from remembering,
that they are merely the organs of the proprietors, and are written
—
by persons whom the latter employ and that they are not invested
with a representative character. Without tliis caution, the
abstract '
we ' of a newspaper — in this context, an impersonal
pronoun of unknown reference — is likely to impose upon an
unreflecting reader ; and, at all events, the concealment of the
writer's name may, upon the omne ignotum pro
principle of
mlrifico^ create an impression some mysterious agency an
of —
effect of secrecy similar to that which induced Walter Scott to
conceal the authorship of his novels. Above all, a newspaper
ought never to be considered as the exponent of national opinion,
nor, without decisive evidence, as the accredited organ of a govern-
ment. Unless this caution be observed, the indiscretion of a
single editor —
writing without any due sense of personal responsi-
bility — might, if Ills volunteer assumption of the representative
character were recognised abroad, give deadly offence to foreign
nations, and render his own government accountable for his
opinions.
The general results of the above remarks on newspapers may
be —
summed up thus: 1, That, in spite of their anonymous
authorship, newspapers acquire an extensive influence over
(ipinion, by the authority derived from their corporate character
2, That the anonymous authorship places tlie public under the
direction of guides wlio liavc no sense of personal responsibility ;
IX.] CHKATION OF TKUSTWORTIIY AITUORITY. )H5
but, 3, That this evil must be endured for the sake of insuring
a free censui'e of pas^siu^ events and that our main efforts should
;
be aimed at the establishment of the best practicable securities

against tlie incidental abuses of the concealment of authorship.'
§ 27. With regard to Reviews and Magazines, the other
important branch of the periodical press, the same observations as
to their continuous character may be made as in the case of news-
papers. They and essays, on
consist of a set of original critiques
and other subjects, which
literary, scientific, historical, political,
are written by contributors selected and employed by an editor,
and are published at stated periods imder liis directions. Tlie
editor is in general unknown to the public but the previous ;
management of the Review, and the character which it has thus

acquired, afford a reasonable ground for expecting, that the selec-
tion ot the papers for future numbers will be made on similar
principles, and with equal discrimination.
Tlie early political jom-nals, as we liave already seen, contained
mere announcements of news, without comment or discussion. The
literary journals, on the other hand, from their first establishment,
aimed at higher objects. Being less exposed to the jealousy and
suspicion of the government, they were allowed to pursue a more
unimpeded career. The literary reviews and miscellanies, which
began to appear at the end of the seventeenth and commencement
of the eighteenth century, gave not only accounts of books, but
judgments upon them. They entered into free and intelligent
criticism of the most important subjects of speculation, and they
bound all the States of Europe into a republic of letters, by circu-
lating througli it a knowledge of all important works, wherever
published. By these means in which they were materially —
assisted by the recent institution of government posts they helped —
to counteract the narrow repulsive spirit of political, sectarian,
and national divisions.'^
Periodical publications of this class are often devoted to a
special department of literature or science, or to some professional
subject, such as divinity, law, medicine, the military art,
' The views of M. Comte, upon tlie influence of the ncMspapor press, may be seen
in his Cours de Phil. Pos. torn. VI. p. 410.
* The Journal des Savans was establislied in lG6o ; Biiylu's Nouvclles de la lUnuh-
liqiie dcs Littres, in 1684 ; Leclerc's Bihliuthapte Univcrsille, in 1686; the Lelpsic Acta
Eruditorum, in 1682 ; the Genlleman' s Mayuzinr and the Londun Magazine were nor
established ill! 1731 and 1732 ; the Monthly Review, in 1749. Upon the early i-cviews.
see Hallani, Lit. of Europe, vol. IV. c. 7. §§ 24-7 ; Dii-raeli, Curiosities of Lit. p. 4.
agriculture, mathematics, &c. In this case, the periodical work has

an authority, derived not only from its previous management, but
also from its limitation to a definite department, and its possession
of a professional character. There are likewise newspapers
devoted to a special subject (as medicine or horticulture), but they
are less numerous.
Articles in Reviews generally appear with the names of the
authors, in France, Germany, and the other continental countries.
In England and the United States, reviews are almost always anony-
mous but the secrecy of authorship is not so strictly maintained
;
as newspapers.
in In either case, an article appearing in a
Eeview, possesses whatever authority it may deri\e from the
previous character of the periodical work in which it is
published.^
A remark applies to the Transactions of learned
similar
societies. Such societies confer an authority upon the paper of a
member or contributor, by selecting it for the honours of publica-
tion, and giving it to the world under their auspices.
All publications which appear successively in a connected
Series involve the same principle they imply a systematic and
:
imiform management, and the deliberate selection of an editor or

manager, whose endorsement gives a currency to each number.
The celebrated collections of essays, which once had so lai-ge a
circulation in this country —
from the Tatler and Spectator to
tlie Rambler, Idler, and Connaisseur were founded on this —
principle.^ There was unity of management, and the excellence
of some numbers compensated for the inferiority of others, while
the spirit of was similar. The well-known series of theological
all
tracts published by Mr. Newman and his friends, at Oxford, like-

wise derived a portion of tlieir importance from tlie circumstance,
tliat they were all the authentic exponents of the opinions of a
certain school, vouched ibr by their admission into the collection.
'
Speiikiug of Young's optical discoveries, pronnilgatod in the ejirly part of this
century, Dr. Whcwell says— 'There was in England no visible body of men fitted by
tiioirknowledge and character to pronounce judgnicut on tûoh a question, or to give
tlio proper impulse and bias to public opinion. The Royal Society, for instance, had
not for a long time, by custom or institution, possessed or aimed at such functions.
—
The writers of "reviews" alone self-constituted and secret tribunals claimed tliis —
kind of authority .'—//j.s^ of Ind. Sci. vol. II. p. 431.
'^
Upon the origin of tlie class of periodical publications, known liythe name of the
Essfii/i.'i/.s, SCO the remarks of Johnson, in Iiis Life of Addimm, and Chalmers' Preface
to his collection. The 'Jailer combined tiie Essai/ist and the Ncws-leticr.
It isfrom this principle that the collections of works published by

societies (such as the Society forPromoting Christian Knowledge,
the Society for the Diffusion of Usefid Knowledge, and otlier
similar associations) derive their importance.'
Encyclopaedias, airanged in an alphabetical order, are an im-
portant cliiss of publications, which have sprung up since the
beginning of the eighteenth century, and have been formed in

general by the contributions of numerous writers, each writing
upon the subject with which he is best acquainted.'^ The autho-
rity of any sucli derived from a cause similar to that
compilation is
which gives authority to a periodical work viz., the continuity —

of management, and the general discretion and consistenc}'^ shown
in tbe choice of writers and materials.
§ 28. It is scarcely needful to add, that those who assume to
exercise the function of literary censors, through the periodical
press,ought to exercise it with an honest and conscientious judg-
ment, and that they ought not to abuse the privilege conferred
by anonymous writing, for tlie purpose of unduly depressing or
elevating a new work by unmerited praise or blame. Private
friendship, private enmity, party feeling, literary jealousy, and the
partialities of booksellers, however, frequently bias the judgment of
critics. Even tlie sense of personal responsibility is no safeguard
against the operation of such disturbing motives ; as we know from
too many examples in literary history. The influence of such
motives is more anonymous writing, and ought to
to be feared in
be carefully guarded against by a judicious and candid editor.
Judges of literature and science, although they do not, like those
who exercise a criminal and civil jurisdiction, decide on the lives
—
and fortunes of men nevertheless, by their arguments and
authority, influence the reputation of authors, and the fate of
books and opinions, and thus affect the serious interests of society.
Their function ought, therefore, to be discharged with a due sense
of its importance their sentences ought to bo given with inde-
;
pendence, and without favour and affection, but, at the same time,
in a spirit of fairness and candour, and without jealousy, malice,
or love of detraction.
The abuses of the system of literary puffing —a mischievous
perversion of this power — having survived the well-known ridicule
' See Conversationslexikim, Mi. Vereinc zur verhreit mi (/ g titer bucher.
* For the hi.'<tory of oncycUipadias, sec Macvcy Niipicr's Introduction to the Ency-
clojxedia Britnniika, ed. 6.
248 PROPAGATION OV SOUND OPINIONS EY THE L^^h.
of Sheridan, have been argumentatively exposed by Mr. Macaulaj,

from whose able essay I borrow the following remarks (vol. I.
p. 277):
The opinion of the great body of the reading public is very
'
materially influenced, even by the unsupported assertions of those

who assume a right to criticise. Nor is the public altogether to
blame on this account. Most, even of those who have really a
great enjoyment in reading, are in the same state with respect to
a book, in which a man, who has never given particular attention
to the art of painting, is with respect to a picture. Every man
who has the least sensibility or imagination derives a certain
pleasure from pictures. Yet a man of the highest and finest intel-
lect might, unless he had formed his taste b}' contemplating the
best pictures, be easily persuaded by a knot of connoisseurs that the
worst daub in Somerset House was a miracle of art. If he
deserves to be laughed at, it is not for his ignorance of pic-
tures, but for his ignorance of men. He knows that there
is a delicacy of taste in painting which he does not
possess ; that he cannot distinguish hands, as practised judges
distinguish them ; that he is not familiar with the finest models ;
that he has never looked at them with close attention ; and that,
when the general effect of a piece has pleased him or displeased
him, he has never troubled himself to ascertain why when, there- :
fore, people whom

he thinks more competent to judge than
himself, and of whose sincerity he entertains no doubt, assure him
that a particular work is exquisitely beautiful, he takes it for
granted that they must be in the right. He returns to the
examination, resolved to find or imagine beauties and if he can ;
work himself up into something like admiration, he exults in his

own proficiency.
Just such is thf manner in wliich nine readers out of ten
'
judge of a book. They are ashamed to dislike what men, wlio

speak as liaving authority, declare to be good. At present, liow-
ever contemptible a poem or a novel maybe, there is not the least
difficulty in procuring favoiu-able notices of it from all sorts of
publications, daily, weekly, and monthly. In the meantime, little
or nothing is The author and the publisher
said on the other side.
are interested in cryingup the book. Nobody has any very strong
inrerest in crying it down. Those who are best fitted to guide
the public opinion think it beneath them to expose mere nonsense,
IX.] CUKATION OF TlCUbTWOKTlIY AUTHOKITY. 249
:iud coiiit'oit themselves by reflecting that sucli popularity cannot

last;
§ 29. Wc liave now traced the principal centres from which

opinions are diffused in the present state of society, and have en-
dea\oured to show how far the guides of opinion are invested with
authority, and whence this authority arises. We have also at-
tempted to indicate the means by which that authority may be
renderetl more trustworthy, and what are the limits within which
it can be properly trusted.
AVith respect to the influence of the government upon the
opinions of the people, we have seen tliat one essential postulate
for wholesome operation is, that it should not outstep its
its
proper jjrovince. A government may, as in the Oriental countries,

keep down its subjects by mere force it may, as has been done
;
in some free States, conciliate support by corruption but both ;
these are short-lived expedients. The only stable foundation for a

government is its moral authority. So long as it is looked up to
with respect, confidence, and esteem, by the body of the people, it
stands on a rock. Xow, for a government to acquire a real moral

authority, it must two (among other) conditions. It must
fulfil
do well those things which it is fitted to do and it must abstain

;
from attempting to do those things which it is not fitted to do.

In general, a government violates both these rules. It attempts
many things which it is ill-qualified, if not wholly unable, to per-
form and having wasted its force upon distant impossibilities, it
;
omits to discharge those functions which lie close within its reach.
If, however, it keeps steadily within its proper province, and within
that province exercises its powers with ability, discretion, and

public spirit, it can scarcely fail to acquire weight and authority
with the people, and will thus be able really to guide their opinions,
so far as it is competent to guide them.
With respect to public instruction, (whether it be controlled
by learned bodies, or churches, or voluntary associations,) the
cardinal maxim is, that as all men cannot be judges of all things,
the IciiiiKi- bliuuld bo instructed in the conclusions and results at
which the most eminent authorities in each department of know-
ledge have arrived, and should, as far as possible, be furnished with
an instrument for testing the soundness of the method which each
original inquirer may employ. To the application of this maxim
there appears to be no limit. It maybe extended from instruction
in logic, and the metliods of scientilic investigation, to the cautions

against current delusions and other impostures which may be given
to the children of a village school; from the rules for the selection
of counsellors on state affairs and of professional advisers, to the
marks by which even the working-classes might be taught to dis-
tinguish honest and well-intentioned guides, from persons who seek
to make a profit by practising on their credulity.
The newspapers, and other publications of the periodical press,
thougli they may be conducted by persons writing under an im-
perfect sense of responsibility, have nevertheless, both in this
country and on the Continent, assumed a new character, and risen
to a higher intellectual level, since the Peace of 1815. Indepen-
dently of the opinions which they circidate, they furnish a large
repertory of positive facts, authenticated by the endorsement of
respectable publishing establishments ; and they form a powerfid.
counter-influence to the superstitious fancies and flying rumours
which prevail in countries destitute of an accurate daily chronicle
of contemporary events.
In attempting to find the means of giving currency to sound
opinions, by the influence of a predominant authority, it is to be
borne in mind, that there are certain classes of opinions which it
is more important to diffuse among the community than others.
In many cases, the knowledge of a subject may be confined to a

few persons, and yet the public may derive as much benefit from
it as if it were generally diffused. Provided that the knowledge
is on record, and that it is not concealed from the public, it is
immaterial that many persons should make themselves masters of

the subject. It is be wished that the knowledge should be ac-
to
cessible to all the world; but not that all the world should actually
possess it. Thus, when we say that a court of justice is open to
the public, we do not expect tliat all the public will demand ad-
mission. Most mechanical and other inventions connected with
pliysical science, as well as remedies ])elonging to the practice of
medicine, under this head. So long as the contrivance or work
fall
can be produced, and it is not one of the artes deperdltce ; so long-

as the medical remedy or treatment is known it can be obtained;
by piu'chase, or by the employment of a professional man, without

any knowledge or understanding of its principles. Little advantage
would arise if the wliule community iniderstood tlie art of manu-
facturing glass, or gunpowder, or of making watclies. Tlie diflusion
of the practice of these arts would not tend to their perfection ;
IX.] CREATION OF TUUSTWURTHY AUTHORITY. 251
it would not cheiipeii their pioduets, or extend their use ; on the

contrary, the diffusion of such practical knowledge would counter-
act the division of labour, by which production is facilitated and
cheapened. 80, wlien the knowledge of the Roman formulae of
actions, wliicli had been kept secret by the patrician order, was
divulged by the theft of the scribe Flavius, the public were bene-
fited by the disclosure, though the number of persons who actually
studied them was small. The knowledge of Sanscrit, likewise, was
at one time preserved as an inviolal)le secret by the Brahmins ; at
last itwas divulged and the world has since obtained all the
;
advantage which can be derived from a knowledge of Sanscrit,

although the number of persons who have noastered the language
has l)een very limited.
But if the subject be one on which each person is required to
act for himself, and he cannot procure what he wants by exchange
from others, then it is important that correct opinions in relation
to it should ]ye diffused through the community, and that all
people should be able to guide their judgment in the matter by a

reference to a trustworthy authority. This is the case with most
of the opinions by which men steer their course, both in public
and private life. In all cases where a man is called upon to act,
or to decide, he ought to have such a store of those opinions whicli
immediately preside over practice, as will enable him to direct his
own course with safety or, if he be not so provided, he ought to
;
know how to chuse competent and honest giudes.

If, by a judicious combination of the means above indicated,
this end could be approximately attained, the influence of impos-

tors would be diminished ; violence would be more rarely resorted
to, especially by crowds and organised bodies the utility of a ;
strict observance of law and order, for all classes, would be more
generally recognised the evidence of positive facts and the light
;
of experience would be more uniformly consulted reason woidd ;
be more in the ascendant, and would constantly exercise a greater

influence over a larger portion of the population and discussion ;
of :iil sorts uould be at once more free, more tolerant, more intel-
ligent, and more fruitful of results. As a consequence of these
influences, public opinion would be more enlightened and wary,
and less prone to run headlong after an ephemeral object of
admiration or hatred. Its general character would be less puerile
and more manly.
To whatever extent the changes which have been just indicated
252 PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS. [ch.
may ever actually take place, it is certain that the movement of

Western Europe, but especially of England, duriug the last thirty-
five years, has been in a direction coincident with this progressive
tendency. The movement may have been retarded, counteracted,
and crossed by numerous influences, some intentional, some
fortuitous but such has been the constant inclination of its
;
course, and such it may be expected to continue, perhaps with an

accelerated velocity.
X.] ABUSES OF TIIK TRINCIPLK oF AUTUOKITY. 2.03
CHAPTER X.
ON THE ABUSES OF THE miNCirLE OF AUTHORTTT.
§ 1. In previous parts of this Essay, an attempt has been

made to trace out the proper province of authority in matters
of opinion —
to show what are the cases in which we ought to be
guided by the opinion of others, as well as to give practical tests
for selecting the persons who are most competent to act as
guides, in questions both of speculation and practice, and for dis-
tinguishing them from impostors or pretenders to knowledge,
who would only mit^lead their followers. If these indications are
sufficient, they would operate as preservatives against abuses of
the principle of authority ; if the right use and application of the
principle is secured, its perversion is avoided. Nevertheless, the
evils arisingfrom a misdirection of confiding followers, by persons
exercising an influence over their opinion, are so great and nume-
rous, that it may be useful to exemplify in detail some of the
more prominent forms of the abuse in question.
§ 2. It has been already sliown, that great respect is due
to tlie opinions of persons who have devoted their lives to the

study of sciences, have employed upon it the powers of an acute
and vigorous intellect, and have l)een actuated by an honest desire
of discovering and teaching the truth. This respect, however,
should be the willing obedience of a freeman not the blind sub- —
mission of a slave the teacher to whose authority we bow ought
:
to be regarded rather as an adviser and counsellor, than as a

dictator and master. Tliere may be an excessive reverence for
scientific doctrineshanded down from a former age, and received
among may check the due freedom of
existing philosophers, which
investigation, perpetuate error, prevent originality of thought and
tlie discovery of new trutlis, and maintain science in a stationary
and unimproving state. 'Although (says Lord Bacon) the position

— — — :
254 ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OE AUTHORITY. [ch.
be good, " oportet discentein credere," yet

must be coupled witb it
this, "oportet edoctum judicare "

do owe unto — for disciples
masters only a temporary belief, and a suspension of their own
judgment, imtil they be fully instructed and not an absolute —
resignation, or perpetual captivity.' Whatever deference is '
justly due to great names and competent judges, they are not to
be regarded as infallible — as the oracles of a scientific religion
or as courts of philosophy without appeal. Those who come after
the great discoverers of truth, and teachers of mankind, may,
tliough endowed with same
inferior intellectual gifts, retread the
ground — they may verify wliat what is
is correct, and reject
erroneous or doubtful. They may remove subordinate defects, and
complete parts which have been left imperfect, in systems which
tliey could not have conceived. Although they could not have
designed the plan, or laid out the foundations, they may assist in
bringing the edifice to perfection.
The great and successful insurrection against the authority of
a defective scientific system, was in the two centuries wliicli suc-
ceeded the invention of printing —when tlie scholastic philosophy,
founded chiefly upon the logical and metaphysical writings of
Aristotle,and developed under the influence of the Church, was
dethroned.^ This revolution, although it had been prepared by a
long series of minor insurgents, as well as by the positive
researches of Gralileo and Descartes, was mainly consummated by
Bacon and he may be considered as the t}ê of this great intel-
;
lectualmovement. According to the poetical tribute of Cowley,

JBacon was the main author of this triumph of Keason over
Authority.
Authority — wliieli did a body boast,
Tlioiin^h 'twas but air condensed, and stalk'd about,
Like some old giant's more gigantic gliost,
To terrify the learned rout
' Adv. of Learning, b. I. (vol. I. p. lo.) Compare Cieoro, De Kat. Dcnr. I. .")
'Quin etiam obost plerumquo iis qui disccro volunt auctoritas eorum qui se docero
profitcntur. Desinunt enim suum judicium adhibore id habent ratiini quod ab eo
:
quem probant, judicatum vidcnt.' See also Sir T. Browne's Vn.hjar Errors, h. I. c.
6& 7.
'
Oportet in ed re maxinio, in qui vit.-c ratio vcrsntur, sibi qucmque confidere, suo-
que judicio aapropriis sensibus niti ad invo^ti!;andam et pcrpendendam voritatem,
quamcroilentem alienis erroribus decipi, tanijuani ipsuiu rationis exiiertcni.' Lactant.
niv. Inst. II. p. 1-lG; ed. Spark.
^ See Wlicwcll's rhilo.faphii nf Inductive Scicncra, b. XII. c. 7-Compare a passage
from the preface to the tir.st vol. of the IVansactions of the Academy of Sciences at
; —
X.] ABUSES OF TUE rUlNCIPLE OF AUTnORITY. 25/5
With the plain magic of truo Keason's light,

Ho chased out of our sight
Nor siiffereil living mon to bo mislod
By tlie rain shadows of tho dead :
To graves, from whence it rose, tho conqtiered phantom fled.'
§ 3. When, however, we speak of the triumph of Reason over

Authority, accomplished by the establishment of the J3aconian
inductive method in the place of the scholastic philosophy, and
adopt the received language on this subject, we must be carefid
not to confound, under tlie name of submission to authority, two
distinct intellectual defects.
A blind spirit of routine in philosopliy, and a passive assent to
existing dogmas, witliout verification, or a really independent
scrutiny, is not identical with belief on the principle of authority.
By Authority, we have in this Essay understood, in conformity
with general usage, the influence which determines the belief
without a comprehension of theproof.^ But the scientific student,
who servilely follows a beaten track, does not necessarily accept
opinions upon the mere credit of his master, and witliout under-
standing the evidence on which He may, on the they rest.
contrary, have gone through all the reasonings propounded l)y his
—
guide may have perused and reperused all his writings have —
commented select portions of them interpreted the obscure, and —
illustrated the concise passages and reproduced his doctrines in —
compends and epitomes. He may be a slavish follower, but a
slave both voluntarily and upon conviction.
Paris, qxioted by Dr. Whewell, ih., vol. II. p. 428; also Hallam, Lit. of Europe, vol.
JI. c. 3.
'
Cowley's Epistle to the Royal Society. Compare Dryden's versos, in his Epistle to
Dr. Charleton —
Tlio longest tyranny tliat ever swayed
Was that wherein our ancestors betrayed
Their freeborn reason to the Stagirite,
And made his torch their universal light.
* * »
Among the assertors of free reason's claim
Our nation's not the least in worth or fame.
Tho world to Bacon does not only owe
Its present knowledge, but its future too.
Vol. XI. p. lU; ed. Scott.
* Thus, Cicero speaks of his belief being influenced, not merely by tho arguments,
but by the authority of great philosojihers Nee -solum ratio ac disputatio impulit, ut
:
'
ita crederum sed nobilitis ctiam suuimoruni phiiosophorumetaxictoritas.' Be Senect.

;
c. 21.
—
2.50 ABUSES OF THE TRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. [cir.
Now the revolution in philosophy, wliich is represented by tlie
name of Bacon, must be considered mainly as a change of scien-

tificmethod, and the consequent substitution of a set of sound
doctrines, of wliich the proof was understood, for a set of unsound
doctrines, of which the proof was equally understood. The Arabian
and scholastic philosophy, which had prevailed during the long
stationary period after the extinction of Greek civilisation, was
doubtless founded upon the writings of Aristotle but the scientific ;
writers of that period did not bow to the authority of Aristotle,

without examining, understanding, and reproducing his reasons.
They were, as Dr. Whewell has remarked,' distinguished by their
commentatorial spirit — they translated the Aristotelian treatises,
and illustrated them with elaborate expositions they reduced the —
logical, physical, and metaphysical theories of their teacher into a
connected system but their assent was given to the argument,
:
not to the conclusion without the proof. They repeated the

Aristotelian philosophy as a system of deductive science, not as a
series of axioms. In truth, the schoolmen adopted the physical
tenets of Aristotle, as a modern astronomer adopts the Princi'pia
of Newton ; they studied the system, understood the proofs, and
assented to the conclusions.^ Men such as Thomas Aquinas
cannot be charged with a tame and sluggish acquiescence in con-
clusions, without troubling themselves to examine their connection
with tlie premises. The error of the schoolmen, in fact, consisted
in the adoption of a defective scientific method — in the imin-
quiring acceptance of first principles, false, indistinct, and
unverified — and in reasoning deductively from propositions, whose
truth had not been established by proper preliminary processes.
They received the Aristotelic treatises as the sum of a perfect
pliilosophical system, not as the provisional researches of a pro-
gressive science. This error is not identical with a servile defer-
ence to authority. The schoolman wlui drew all his lessons from
Aristotle the —
Maestro di color che sanno,' as he was called
'
by Dante — might have believed nothing on the mere anthority of

the philosopher; unless those first principles, which he doubtless
considered as intuitive truths, may be considered as derived from
'
See liis nccoiint of physical science during tlio stationary period of the middle
ages, in liis Hint, oj the hid. Sci. b. IV.
* 'Almost the whole career of the Greek schools of philosophy of the schoolmen —
f)fEurope in the middle ages— of the Arabian and Indian philosophers, shows us that
M'e may have extreme ingenuity nnd subtlety, invention and connection, demonstration
and metiio.l and yet that out of these germs no physical science may be developed.'
;
WnKWKi.r,, I/inf. of fnd. Sci. vol. I. p. 8.

—
X.] ABUSES OF TT!K I'KINCiri.K OF AUTIIoRFrY. 257
this source. He mastered the philosopliical system in vogue, and

understood its logical connection ; but it was Ijuilt upon an unsound
basis — and into the sufficiency of this basis, owing to the fault i-
ness of hismethods of investigation, he omitted to inquire. A
modern student, who has access to the results of a better method,
may exhibit eqiial want of originality of thought, and may merely
repeat the deductions of his predecessors without verification or
improvement; but if the conclusions are correct, he would not be
censured for an undue submission to authority. On the one hand,
then, a man who never adopts a speculative opinion without under-
standing its grounds may, from sectarian prejudice or some other
cause, be infect'jd with the intellectual slavishness of the scholastic
or Arabian period, and may receive syllogisms as if they were the
responses of an oracle. Hut, on the other hand, a man who is
strongly imbued with the progressive principle of science — who

verifies by a rigid scrutiny within a certain circle of
all results
subjects, may, with respect to other subjects, cherish the principle

of authority, convinced that he has not time for all things.
§ 4. Bacon is very explicit and earnest in refuting the fallacy,
which confounded a respect for opinions handed down from
antiquity, with the respect due to the opinions of the aged.^ At
a time when a superstitious veneration for traditionary doctrines
in philosophy still prevailed, there was a confusion between the
age of a man and the age of the world and it was supposed that, ;
as an old man is more experienced, and therefore more able to

judge, than a young man, so a remote generation, as being move
ancient, is wiser than the existing one. Bacon exposed this some-
what obvious fallacy by the pithy sentence Antiquitas sieculi :
'
juventus mundi '

—justly remarking, that each generation is older
than its predecessor, on the same principle that an aged man is
older tiian a youth ; and that the latest generation ought to be the
wisest, as being furnislied with the most ample stock of experi-
ments and observations. The mistake arose from not perceiving
See Adv. of Ijcarning, vol. II. p. 46 Nov. Org. 1. I. apli. 83.
'
; The remark had
been previously inado by Giordano Bruno. See Wliewoll's Vhd. of Ind. Sri. vol. II. p.
301. Compare Hallam, Lit. of Eiinqx; vol. IV. eh. 0, § 4a. Pascal, Poiseis, Part I.
art. 1.
Lact.intins complains that the heathen religions were maintained simply on account
o{ their antiqrtit:/ : '
Hse sunt roligiones, qnas sibi a majoribus suis traditas, pertina-
cissimi tueri ac defendere perseverant: nee eonsiderant quales sint, sod ex hoc proba-
tjjs atquo veras esse confidunt, quod ea.s veteres tradiderunt : tiintaque est aucforit.i.M
vetustatis, lit inquirero in earn scelus e.sse dieatur.' Biv. Ivst. II. u. 144 Coinparo
above, p. 79.
8
—
258 ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. [ch.
that, in order to compare the age of the world with that of a man,
we ought according to which
in each case to reckon doivnvjavds ;
mode of calculation, the nineteentli centur}^ is older than the six-

teenth, and the sixteenth than the eleventli.' Eacli successive
generation enjoys the benefit of the exiêrience and knowledge of
its predecessors, together with its own and if science be in a pro- ;
gressive state, the judgment of the most i-ecent generation ought

to be the maturest and best. It is by eflbrts which, being succes-
sive, require time by the gradual rejection of errors, and dis-

;
covery of new truths by the combined attempts at forming and

:
perfecting a technical vocabulary and a philosophical arrangement,

that sciences are advanced. Hence Truth may, with Bacon, be
called the daughter of Time rather than of Authority.'^ In an
enlightened and progressive state of society, sound opinions
gradually, in the long run, and in the majority of cases, prevail
over error for, if they were not thus predominant, society would
;
cease to be progressive. Through the knowledge and skill of the

steersman, they generally make at last a successful voyage down
the great stream of time while false theories, though they may at
;
first be driven on by a favom-able gale, are allowed soon to drift
upon the quick-sands and breakers, and to be lost in oblivion.^

'
The nature of tliis mistake may be illustrated Lj comparing two chronological
eras — in one of which the years are reckoned backwards, in the other, forwards : for
example, the years before and after the birth of Christ. Wo must not suppose that,
because tlie year 150 a.d. is later than the year 100 a.d., therefore the year InO n.c. is
later than the year 100 b.c. In like manner, we must not suppose that, because a man
of sixty was born before a man of tMenty, tliereforo tlie sixteenth century is older than
the eighteenth.
^ Auctores voro quod attinet, summae pusillanimitatis est, .auctoribus infinitatribu-
ere, auctori autem auctorum, atque adeo omnis auctoritatis, Tempori, jus suum dene-
gare. Recto enim Veritas, Tcmporis illia dicitur, non Auctoritatis. Nov. Orcf. lib. I.
aph. 84.
* Lord Bacon expresses a different view on this point, which is scarcely consistent
with his own dictum, as to Truth being the daughter of Time. Another error .... '
is a conceit that of former opinions or sects, after variety and examination, the best
hath still prevailed, and suppressed the rest; ... as if the multitude, or the wisest
for the multitude's sake, were not ready to give jxissage rather to that wliicli is popular
and superficial, than to that which is substantial and profound for the truth is, that ;
tivie feemcth to be "f the vature of a rirrr or sfrcatn, which carrieth down to us that
which is light and blown up, and sinketh and drowncth that which is weighty and solid.'
— Adv. of Learning, vol. II. p. 47. Compare A'oy. Org. 1. I. aph. 77: Sod temjwribus '
inserjuontibus [after Cicero], ex inundationo barbarorum in imperium Romanum, post-

quam doctrina humana velut naufragium perpessa essct, turn demnm philosophiae Aris-
tiitelis et Plalonis, tanquam tabidce ex materid leviore et minus solidd, per fliiitus tem-
porum sorvatse sunt.' It seems to me that, if this view wore correct, all impi'ovcmcnt
of nvinkind, in succ.'S.'-ive ages, vonM bo iini'iissibje.
X.] ahusf;-^ of Till-: imjincji'li: of AUTHoRrrv. '2.y.i
§ 5. NN'hatfViT errors may arise from a liliml and tauatical

submission of tlie judgment to the opinions of leaders of sects and
parties —a subject to which we sliall advert more at length
presently — tliere is no danger, in the present age, of philosophic
truth being obstructed, and error perpetuated, by a generally pre-
vailing superstitious veneration for traditionary theories and the
authority of great names. An habitual freedom of thought exists
throughout the scientific world a system of discussion concerning
;
matters of science —not conducted in a controversial and acri-

monious spirit, but directed mainly to the legitimate ends of
science — has been Every philosophic question is
established.'
now, after a time, upon its merits. It is principally
fairly tried
in the domain of civil government and positive law that men's
minds are now practically divided and embarrassed, as to the

amount of respect due to antiquity and prescriptive autliorit3\
Now, with respect to political institutions and laws if we —
look merely to their origin, the same remark holds good as with
respect to philosophy. The generation which enacted a new law,
or established a new institution, had no better means of judgment
on the subject tlian ourselves on the other liand, we have not
;
only their knowledge, but the experience of subsequent years and

of our own time, to guide us. To speak of tlie wisdom of our
ancestors, as if they had some peculiar means of knowledge
beyond ourselves, or were more likely to be right than the present
generation, is a manifest fallacy. The generation who lived in
the time of George were not Aviser than those who lived in the
I.
time of George III.; nor were those who lived in tlie time of
George III. wiser than the present generation.- All laws were
new when they were first made and when tliey were made, they ;
were made by persons wlio were not wiser tlian succeeding genera-
tions, and liad, as to that untried law, no special experience to
guide them.
When we speak of an ancient institution, we may mean either
one of two wholly distinct ideas. We may mean an institution 113
longer existing, whicli existed at a former period of liistory. In
this sense, the Athenian ostracism, the Roman tribunate or
dictatorship, the mayor of the palace under the iMerovingian
'
See Whewcll's rhilosophy of hid. Scietice-'^, b. XII. c. 4.
- '
Ncc quia nos illi tcinporibus aiitocessoriint, sapienliA quoqiie antecesserunt ;
qiiiu
si oniiiiliiis a-quiilitur 'latui', occupari ab antecedentibus non potest,' siys Lu-t:uitius,
ret'irrliig to tho prectding nonorations, Dit<. List, 11. p. 146.
8 2
—
2fi0 ABUSES OF THE PWNCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. [ch.
kings, the podesta of the Italian republics, the Vehmic tribunals

of Grermany, Alfred's law of mutual pledge, or the liberum veto of
the Polish Diet, is an ancient institution. According to this
acceptation of the term, any institution which existed at an early
date, however short its duration may have been, is an ancient
inptitution. Or, we may mean an existing institution which
dates back from a remote period, and has had a long continuous
existence. In this sense, trial by jury in England is an ancient
institution. Now, with respect to an ancient institution of the
first of these two classes, its antiquity, as such, raises no presump-
tion in its favour. The mere fact of an institution having existed
at an early period, does not prove that it
is suited to our present
wants and circumstances. On the contrary, the desuetude of an

ancient law may have arisen from the very fact of its unsuitability
to the actual state of things.' But the other class of ancient
institutions stand on a different footing. Having been long in
existence, either with few or no intervals or suspensions, they have
been tried by a long experience, and have, by a gradual and
intelligent, though almost insensible process, been adapted to the
interests, habits, and feelings of the community. Their good
parts have been developed their bad parts eliminated or counte-
;
racted usage and custom have reconciled people to their defects,

;
and rendered theoretical absurdities, which shock the philosophical

bystander and speculative reasoner, comparatively innocuous. By
the mutual action of the people on the government, and the
government on the people, they have been worked into a form
which is more or less suited to the state of society, and with
which the community have become familiar. They have thus
acquired a sort of prescriptive title to their possession, and they
are often cherished by the people witli a feeling of veneration and
affection, of which the mere utility of the institution is the condi-
tion rather than the cause.
In the domain of science, an opinion on a subject lying beyond
' '
D'ou vient que la loi ne plait pas egalomeut dans tous Ics temps, et qu'ainsi quo
la bcaute, elle est sujette a rieillir? Quand le souverain I'etalilit, son intention est
certainement quelle suLsiste jusquVi co qu'il lui plaise do la r^voquor cependant, ;
combien de lois n'avons-nous pas qui n'ont jamais ete r^voqiiôs, ct qui maintenant
n'ont ni force ni vigueur. L'4ge, au lieu de lesfaire respecter, semble au contraire les
avoir rondues ridicules, au point qu'on n'ose pas nieme les citer, et encore moins log
proJuire Ainsi dis qu'une loi coiitrarie les mcours actiicllcK, elle 6prouve un
choc auquel olio no pout resistor. H seniMe que tous les csprits tombent d'acciu'd pour
ne la plus observer ; le souveraiu lui-meme se voit force de rabandonucr.' Mkrux,
Jti'prrloirc de Ji'risprudivcr ; art. Antoriir. § 1.
;
X.] ABUSES OF THE PRINX'IPLE OF AUTHORITY. 2G1
the ranjê of our experience, insiy be handed down, llirough a

series of generations, with implicit faith, but without undergoing
any process of examination or veri6cation, and consequently
without acquiring any confirmation of its truth. For example,
the Greeks, in their ÎDsopiau fables, represented the lion as the
king of beasts, and gave him the royal attributes of clemency,
mercy, and magnanimity. This belief having been propagated
through antiquity, was received and repeated in the middle ages,
among nations which knew the lion only from books ; and it was
not till late years that the observations of travellers and more
accurate naturalists corrected the error, by showing that the lion
is characterised by the ferocity, cowardice, and treachery, which
are qualities common to all the feline tribe. An opinion such as
this derives no authority from its antiquity, and its passive recep-
tion by successive generations. Eut no law or political institution
can remain in force for a long series of years, without being sub-
jected to the test of a severe and searching experience. It can
only be enforced by intelligent agents acting upon sentient
beings ; and this process, when repeated on a large scale, for
a long time, and in numerous cases, must produce a gradual
adaptation to the state and feelings of the people. Tliose parts of
the law which are felt as oppressive, or vexatious, or inconvenient,
will be resisted, openly or passively, or counteracted, or evaded
the voluntary contracts and agreements between private persons,
and the settlements of property, will be arranged with a view of
defeating these provisions : while the the government,
officers of
from a desire either to do good, to avoid unpopularity, or to save

trouble, will often allow such portions of the law to remain
unenforced, or, if enforced for a time, to fall at last into disuse. In
a case of tliis sort, the executive functionaries sometimes stand to
the legislature in the same relations as the soldiers described by
Tacitus stood to their generals, who preferred 'jussa ducura inter-
pretari quam exsequi.'' On the othcn- hand, full effect will be
given to those enactments which are felt to be beneficial ; and in
the enforcement of these, the public functionary will be assisted
by the spijntancous action of the community. Some discretion in
the administration of laws must necessarily be intrusted to the
executive authnities; and if this be exercised with wisdom, or
even with ordinary judgment, it cannot fail to give to the new law
a form as suitable to tlie wants of the people, and to the state of
'
Hist. II. :vj.
262 ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. [ch
society, as tlie general directions of the legislature will permit.'

If the legislature be well-inteutioued and vigilant, it will second
these attempts at voluntary adaptation ; it will abrogate or amend
those provisions which experience has shown to be bad ; it will
extend and develop those which have proved beneficial, and suit-
able to the wants of the people. Where the legislature is
indifferent or unobservant, courts of justice, by forced interpreta-

tions, by fictions of law, and other jurisprudential contrivances,
frequently modify institutions rendered obsolete by changes of
manners, or introduce new regulations required by new circum-
stances. In countries, too, which have free constitutions, legislative
measures are frequently, if not usually, the result of a compromise
between opposite political parties a mode of proceeding which, —
if not always defensible in strict argument, generally leads to an
adjustment of conflicting claims, and the establishment of a

medium state of things, favourable to tranquillity and stability.
It is by a series of comjDromises of this sort that the balance of
poivers in a State is,though no such exact
in fact, maintained ;
mechanical equilibrium of political forces can be provided by the

forms of a constitution, as some speculators on politics have
brought themselves to believe.
The celebrated apophthegm of Bacon Naturae non imperatur — '
nisi parendo '

^
— is to a certain extent true of political govern-
ment. A people can only be governed by adapting the laws to its
circumstances, wants, feelings, and wishes ; and tluis all ancient

laws, having complied with this condition, may be presumed to be
suited to the community.
The experimental and tentative process of adaptation just
described will be the more and complete, in proportion as
effectual
the government is mild and enlightened, and the people are inde-
pendent and intelligent but it must go on, to a certain extent,
;
even luider tlie most rapacious and mutable Oriental despotism,

and in the most passive and improvident commimity. Every
' '
When any li.it; i'nr any reason found its wny into the frame of a
gross iibsunlity
government, seems to be called forth a protective or propliylaetic power in the
'tliere
system, analogous to tliat by which the natural body throws olt' any noxious or any
extraneous matter introduced into it ; and if mischief cannot be prevented, there is
exerted another power like the vis niedicatrix of the natural frame — a power of mak-
ing some secondary provision, which may counteract the mischievous effects of the
malcon formation, and enable machine
tlie to go on working, wiiicli otlicrwise must bo
Hopped or desiroyed." Lonn BnorciHAM, Pol. P/ii/. vol. I], p. 81.
2 yoi: Orff. J aph. lli'.l.
— —
X.J ABUSES OF TUE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 2G3
institution, therefore, which has ])een long in existence acquires a

certain presumption in its favour, by the process of adaptation to
wliicli it is necessarily subjected. No new and untried law can,
by possibility, possess this recommendation ; and, to this extent,
there is a certain authority in favour of all laws which have been
in operation ft^»r a Icuj^th of time, and liave proved, on the whole,
beneficial.' It is the observation of this process which lias
iiitiuenced the jurists of the historical school ; who contend that
all laws ou^ht to spring from a historical basis of gradual deve-
lopment, and not come fidl-grown from the head of a legislator
who hold that there ought always, in legislation, to bo a continued
chain of connection between the past and the future, through the
present. The same notion has been expressed, though in more
obscure and metaphorical language, by those who have compared
the gradual progress and development of political institutions with
the growth of a tree. They have been struck by the process of
adaptation which arises from the action of the people upon its
laws and and they have therefore comimred the

institutions,
gradual and coherent result of this action to the organism of
vegetable growth. This quasi-organic creation tliey have con-
trasted with the formation of a government or an institution by a
single act of legislation, which is produced uno fiatit, as a metal
statue is cast in a foundery.
A similar contrast has been jjointed out between the legends of
mythology and a romance or tale of fiction. The former, it is
said, are developed by the spontaneous and unconscious action of
the popular mind, and are the natural and undesigned offspring of
a certain religious belief: the latter are the conscious inventions
of a single mind, formed upon a preconceived plan, for a definite
' '
The -world -will nut eiuluro to hear that ^ve are -wiser than any have been -which
went Lefore. In -whicli consideration tiiere is cause -why -we should be slow and un-
•willing to chanfê, without very urgent necessity, the ancient ordinances, rites, and
long-approved customs, of our venerable predecessors. The love of things ancient
doth argue staycdness. but levity and want of experience makoth apt unto iunovations.
That -which -wisdom did and hath been with good men long continued,
first begin,
cliallengeth allowance of them that succeed, although
it plead for itself nothing. That
which is ncM', if it promise not much, doth fear coudemnation before trial till trial, ;
no man doth acquit or trust it, -what gooel soever it pretend and promise. So that in
this kind tliero are few things known to be good, till such time as they grow to be
ancient.' Hookkr, I'.'ccl. Pol. V. 7, 3.
It may be observed that, in this passage. Hooker has not kept quite clear of the
confusion between old times and old men. 'Our vcnernhh; predecessors' are, in fact,
no more entiiled to our vener.-ition than our contemporaries, although they nia^ have
livcd at an earlier piriod of llie world's history.
—
264 ABUSES or THE PEINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. [ch.
purpose. But iu the case, both of mythological legends, and of

j:olitical institutions which have been formed by a gradual accre-
tion, each step in the process is the result of intelligence, and is
prompted by a distinctly-understood motive though the end may ;
be limited and immediate, and the person concerned may not

contemplate the entire structure to which his work is a
contribution.
It may be added, as a further element in the authority of
ancient institutions, that if they are, on the whole, beneficial,
and have been really adapted, l)y the hand of the legislator and
administrator feeling its way as it advances, to the interests, cir-
cumstances, habits, and opinions of the generality, they have pro-
bably acquired a hold on the affections of the people ; so that
their maintenance is not a matter of mere calculation of balance —
of individual gain and loss —
but is exalted into a patriotic senti-
ment, which prompts the citizen to action in the moment of need
without waiting to consider consequences.
§ 6. In the management of public affairs, every legislative
proposition for the removal of admitted or alleged evils is in
general placed between two opposite and extreme parties ; which
(if it were allowed to coin new words, in order to avoid cir-
cumlocution) might be designated as the Panacelsts and the
Ruinlsts the former underrate the authority of existing institu-
:
tions, and overrate the probable effect of new legislative projects

— the latter fall into the opposite errors. The panaceist, dis-
regarding the minute but numerous and powerful ties by which
existing laws are attached to the habits and feelings of the people,
proceeds to the enactment of extensive and systematic changes,
founded probably on some one principle, which he introduces
everywhere, ami which he expects to prove a complete and imme-
diate remedy for numerous political ills of the most discordant
natures.* He does not see how much of the evil tendencies of
existing institutions has been neutralised by the process above
'
The following remarks of Lord I'acon upon panaceas for the human body, are
equally applicable to panaceas for the State :
— ' It is a vain and flattering opinion to
think any inedirine can be so sovereign and happy, as that the receipt or use of it can
work any great upon the body of man. It were a strange speech, which spoken,
ettbct
or spoken oft, .«hoiild reclaim a man from a vice to wliich he were by nature subject.
It is onler, pursuit, sequence, and interchange of apidication, which is mighty in
nature; which, although it require more exact knowlo'lge in pruscribing, and more
exact obedience in observing, yet is recompensed with the magnitude of effects.' Adv.
of Lenrning, vol. II. p. l<iS.
— ;
x] ABUSES OF THE PKINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. '265
described ; to wluit exteut tlity liave been counteracted by the

vulimtary action of the coniuuiiiity. He therefore exaji^<iferate!j
the amount of evil produced l)y tlie laws in force, and, by a connate
error,he exaggerates the advantages, which, in a sanguine delusion,
he anticipates from his own legislative panacea. It is this error
which has upon
imj>osL'd so many well-meaning authors of pajjer-
constitutions and organic
and has led to their disappointment
laws,
and that of the credulous persons who confided in them. On the
other hand, the politician of the opposite school entertains a
blind veneration for ancient institutions, without perceiving that
the changes of manners, opinions, social state, international rela-
tions, ormechanical inventions, necessitate corresponding chances
in legislation. Hence, he sees nothing but ruin and destruction
in measures of reformation prepared in a safe and prudent spirit
and confidently predicts the must disastrous conse ûences from
alterations suggested by the great innovator Time. He forgets —
how great, according to his own theory, is the power possessed by
a community, of adapting institutions to its wants he overlooks ;
the fact, that the vis coiiseirvatrix reipuhliccB, which has been
employed in the digestion and assimilation of existing laws, will
also operate upon laws to be made hereafter; and he argues on
the assumption that every tendency in a new law will proceed,
imchecked and unresisted, to its full and natural development
as if men would always be willing instruments in the execution of
laws which would really produce sucli effects as he anticipates. An
establislied law is judged by its actual operation, and therefore
according to its administration by intelligent persons, exercising
a reasonable discretion as to the enforcement of its provisions. But
a proposed legislative measure is in general judged by all the
possible absurd consequences to which it might lead, if enforced
by persons destitute of prudence and foresight, or even of common
sense. Hence it generally happens, that not one tithe of the
disastrous consequences anticipated of a law before it is passed
really occur when it is carried into effect. by optimists and
It is
pessimists of these opposite sorts — by persons who think their own
plans the best possible, and by persons who think the plans of
others the worst possible — that
the legitimate authority which
belongs to existing institutions misconceived ; imduly depre-
is
ciated by one party, unduly magnified by the other.

§ 7. It has been remarked above, that the principle of venera-
tion for antiquity, as such, does not now in general mislead the
26G ABUSES OF THE PRlNCirLE OF AUTHORITY. [ch.
philosophical world, though iu politics much practical confusion

of ideas on the subject. The factitious authority and
exists
importance which opinions derive from being the formulas and
cries of parties, or the dicta of party-leaders, is a more besetting
evil of modern times, and requires a separate consideration.
When the party end isa good one, the facilities for attaining
it which the part}' spirit and combination afford cannot fail to be
beneficial. The increased ardour in the common pursuit, the
co-operation, the division of labour, the mutual regulation, and
submission to a common leader, when
worthy directed to a
purpose, must be instruments of good. formed So long as a party,
for such an object, continues imder- the direction of virtuous and
able leaders, the opinions which it accredits will be sound and
useful in their tendency, and its authority will be employed in
giving strength and circulation to these maxims.
But iu all parties, whether political or otherwise, there is a
tendency to forget the end for which the combination exists, and
to i^refer to it the means to think onlji of the confederation and
;
the body, and not of the purpose for which the body exists.' Hence
it sometimes happens, that the leaders who keep the proper end
of the association steadily in view are after a time deposed, and

that others, who look merely to the party as a party, who care
little about the general objects at which it professes to aim, are
substituted for them. These latter persons are followed and

admired, as adopting a course which is to strengthen and consoli-
date the party union, and thus to make the party triumphant and
powerful. Those, on the other hand, who urge that such a policy
sacrifices the end to the means, and that the attainment of
the purpose of tlie association is rendered secondary to the
maintenance of the association itself, are disregarded and set
aside.
In ])olitical affairs, it is indeed often dangerous for a party-
leader to give honest advice to his followers, and to turn the
authority of his opinion in a good direction. P'or if, from the
occurrence of imtoward events (which perhaps defied all calcula-
tion), the result of his advice proves unfortunate, or is even mis-
understf)od and misrepresented, they attribute all the blame to
'
Whcu a party abanduns pul)lic and general iiids, and dovotes itself only to the
personal interests of its mcinbcrs and Icailers, it is called a fttction, and its policy is
said to ho factious. See Boliiigbroke, Dissert at inn on Parties. —Works, vol. III. p. 11 ;
td. 8vo.
;
X.J AHUSEiJ OF Tin: I'lClNCll'LE OF ALTIIOJJIJ V. 2(i7
liiiu,- ami visit tlie failure ujion his iicad ; turgcttiny that they
wiluutarily atlujited his recoLuiatiiihitioii, and were i)aities to liis
act.' This is a sort of revenge which the subordinates of a party

iuHict on their leader, for his eminence and their obscurity, 'iliey
think that Uiey are entitled to a compensation for their want of
influence over the counsels of the party, in a comparative exemp-
tion from responsibility for its acts. As long as things prosper, and
turn out according to their wishes, they not only make the
leader's views their own, and identify themselves with his opinions,
)»ut they glory in being his atlherents. As soon, however, as a
change takes place, and fortune becomes adverse, they often sepa-
rate themselves from him, disavow all connection with his advice,
and treat the former acts of the entire party as the acts of
the individual leader. A party-leader cannot reckon on the
friends of his prosperity being always the friends of his adversity.
Diftugiuut c:tdis
Cum fece siccatis amici,
Ferre juguin pariter dolosi.
from a consciousness of the difficulty of inspiring

It is partly
into a large and luiorganised body a sense of common responsi-
bility —
and partly from the greater facility of leading people
where they are desirous of going, than where they ought to go,
that ]>arty chiefs often become the flatterers and courtiers of the
multitude, humour their caprices, encourage rather than check
their evil tendencies, abstain from giving them good but unpala-
table advice, and thus, in fact, end in being their followers rather
than their leaders. Bad counsels are often acceptable ; the wise
and safe course is not always the most specions and attracti\'e
jjrudence can often be decried as timidity or indolence ; and
rashness may recommend itself under the guise of spirit and
energy.'^ The moral authority of a party leader, arising from the
conhdence of his Jiarty, from his supposi-d desire to promote their
interests, and from his peculiar knowledge of their proceedings, is
great, whatever the extent or importance of the party may be so :
long as he continues their leader, the prestige of his name must

go for something and hence the obligation upon him of using his
;
influence for good purposes, of consulting the lasting interests,

both of his party and the public, and of not allowing his jiidgiueut
to be perverted Ity objects of mere personal or corporate ambition.
'
S(.'c aliovc, c'li. 7. § 1-t.
' Sex Much. JJu-'c. 1. oo, .37 ; IJ. 22.

268 ABUSES OF THE PKINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. [ch.
This is the best return which he can make for the allegiance of
his followers.
Indeed, where the leader of a party, or founder of a sect,
is influenced only by good motives, and his conduct is actuated by
a conscientious sense of duty, he may sometimes become the
object ot an excessive veneration on the part of his followers ; his
very excellences tend to create an enthusiastic admiration of him,
which carries his followers beyond the bounds of a reasonable
deference and respect. In religion, a life of unspotted purity
and ascetic devotion in philosophy, a penetrating, inventive,
;
and comprehensive genius in politics, a disinterested, steady,

;
and patriotic career, may exalt the authority of a leader above the
credit due to fallibility. Unfortunately, however, the excessive
veneration of a leader is not confined to good leaders. Fanaticism,
mysticism, and other forms of error, conscious and unconscious,
often impose on the credulity of followers, and induce them to
place in their guide an unlimited and unsuspecting confidence.
Hence, if the chief of a party or sect has, by fair or unfair means,
fascinated the minds of his adherents, they walk blindly in his
footsteps, and refuse to listen to argument against his dicta to —
question which is, in their eyes, almost an act of impiety. Thus
the Pythagoreans decided all controversies by an appeal to the
avTos £(pa, tlie ipse dixit, of their great master and Cato com- ;
^
pared the Eomans to a flock of sheep, on account of their head-

long and gregarious tendency to follow a leader, contrasted with
the difficulty of guiding them when scattered singly.^
On is sometimes
the other side, the leader of a party or sect
unduly prejudiced in favour of his followers his opinions are ;
reflected in them, and they repeat, circulate, and extol his doc-
trines so that, by mutual praise and support, they inflame each
;
other's self-esteem, and increase the tendency to sectarian exclu-

siveness.^ Tendencies of this kind, if not repressed, may increase
'
Nee vcro probare soleo id quod de Pythagoreis accepimus : qiios ferunt, si quid
affirmarent in disputando, cum ex iis quteieretur, quaro iUi esset, respondere solitos,
'
Ipse dixit
:
ipse autem erat Pythagoras.
' Tantum opinio pnejudicata poterat, ut
—
etiam sine ratione valeret auctoriuis. Cic. dc Nat. Dear. I. 5.
The ainhs not oidy by Cicero, but by Quintilian (Inst. Oral. XI. 1,
e<pa is referred,
27) and otliors, to the followers of Pythagoras. There is, however, another exphma-
tion,which attributes the saying to Pythagoras himself; in which case the ouris is
supposed to be the god who inspired him. See j\Ienage oti Dint/. Laert. VIII. 46.
^ Plutarcii, Cat. Maj. c. 8.
' Tovs /JLtv fTalpovs fiytv taovi fxaKaptaai Ofoicnv,

Tols h'&Wovi 757<'^t' ot/T «t' \6yif oUt' iv a.f)tdfi.ij>.
X.] ADUSES OF THF-: PHIXrirLK OK AUTHORITY. 2^9
the authority of a Uailcr amongst his own followers, but will
inevitably diminish it with the rest of the world.

It may ])0 observed, that the opinions of a party are often pro-
pagated in a The authority which belongs to the aggre-
cluster.
gate body of a party or sect, and to its leaders, prevents the
requisite di>crimiiiation, and causes people to accept from them a

set of opinions or doctrines, many or most of which may be true,
but some can scarcely fail to be false.' Both in political and
philosophical parties, there is often a disposition to imitate the
practice of religious sects, and to establish a definite formula of
faith, the acceptance of which constitutes orthodoxy and its —
rejection, heterodoxy. If any neophyte attempts to exercise an
independent judgment, or to make a selection among the articles
of the prescribed creed, he is in danger of being visited with the
moral pains of heresy.
When the corporate spirit of a party has been worked up to a
high pitch by the exhortation and zeal of its leaders, the concen-
tration of its sympathetic feelings within is generally accompanied
by an aggravation of its anti-social feelings without. Combination
implies repulsion.^ When the passions of political parties are
effectually roused, the principle or end of the union is nearly for-
gotten — the confederation uppermost in the minds of its
itself is
members. The two rival parties are like two hostile armies,
each contending for victory, and regardless of the cause for which
they are fighting. Hence the savage conflicts of political parties
in the Greek repul)lics of antiquity, and in the Italian republics of
the middle age, which rendered it impossible for them to co-exist
in the same commonwealth, and therefore the defeated party
usually went into exile.^ When tlie animosity of faction reaches
this height, the opinions of its leaders, and the cause which it
represents, can derive no authority from its support in the minds
of impartial persons.
Now, with the subject of party generally, its character, causes,
and effects, we are not at present concerned. We have to consider it
—
mainly under a single aspect viz., the moral weight and influence
of the party leader, as arising from his position. This, however,
verses concerning Pythiigoras, cited in Groto, Hisf. of Gr. vol. IV. p. ,547.
'
Whately, Bampton Lecturcx, p. 54.
2 Whately, ih. p. 10.
*
Tl (puyf). I fuoriisciti. Owing to tho fierce animosity and enduring hatred be-
tween political parties so situated, it has been maintained that three parties are more
cnsily managed than lum. — Jôdinus I)e Hep. p. 508.
;
270 ABUSES OF THE TRTNCIPLE OF AUTHOKTTY. [ch.
though only a portion, is an important portion of tlie subjecr.

No party can exist unless it be provided with leaders. Without a
spokesman, a guide, and an organiser without a person to repre- ;
sent them —
to collect, and express their opinions to marshal —
their movements —
to direct their proceedings to form a common —
point of refei'ence —to watch while others sleep — to reconcile
differences — to arbitrate between rival pretensions — and to give
imity, order, and concert to the actions of the many-headed body,
— a multitude are powerless for anything but a transient impulse.^
Hence, when a person has occuiDied this position with success, the
authority of his opinion is great from his experience and his
;
peculiar means of information, he is believed to be better qualified

to judge what is good for his party than any private mem])er of it
and a large confidence is thus reposed in his discretion and advice.
For tliis reason he ought always to bear in mind the responsibility
of his situation to remember that all his advice comes recom-
;
mended by a weight of authority far greater than the mere logical

reasons which support it and that he has a power of doing good
;
or ill, proportioned to his influence over his followers.*

§ 8. We have now called attention to some of the most pro-
minent abuses of the principle of authority, and we might properly

—
here conclude our inquiry if there were not another question, not,
indeed, closely connected with the influence of this principle, but
still having some affinity with it, upon wliich it seems desirable to
offer a few remarks.

In comparing the rapidity with wliich the knowledge of
matters of fact, and a belief in opinions, are respectively propa-
gated, a great difference is observable. Matters of fact, if inte-

resting to about with the speed of the wind."' Fame,
tlie pul)lic, fly
according to VirgiFs similitude, sits on an eminence, and speaks

in a voice audible to whole cities. The modern inventions of news-
papers, steam-presses, railways, and electric telegraphs, diffuse
intelligence as to events over a whole kingdom in a few hours.
Discoveries in science, likewise, so far as tiiey are dependent <>u
mere observation, such as discoveries in the heavens made by
more powerful telescopes, or in minute objects by more powerful
' Mach. Disc. I. 44 o7.

,
= On party generally, see Time. III. 82-3 Bacon, Essai/ 51

; ; Bolingbroke, vol.
III. ; Lord Bpou;i'nni's Political Philosophy, vol. II. c. 5.
' The Itiliivns have a proverb, (which, perhaps, recurs in other langiingos,) '
Le
male nuove presto vanno.' Both good and bad news travel fast, bnt when gool news
nrrives, nobody complains of its coming too soon.
—
x] AursE^ OF Tin-: ruiNcirrÊ of authority. 271
iniL'iosciipes, or m'W species in the animal or vegetable kingdom

are made knuwn with great celerity.
But opinions are propagated at a slower rate of velocity. At
first their diffusion is the result of examination and mature reflec-
tion L»y competent judges —a process which requires time. And
wlien the general agreement of competent judges has accredited a
new opinion, it is not diffused instantaneously by their authority.
The public at large adhere tenaciously to their old opinions, and
only surrender their convictions reluctantly and slowly. In
eitlier case, the area of opinion is only enlarged by a gradual
extension.'
Such is the manner in which sound opinions are diffused.
Being addressed to the understanding and reason, and being
founded on an induction of facts, often numerous, dissimilar, and
complex, the examination and verification of the reasons by which
they are supported, is necessarily a slow and tedious process.
Whenever we see opinions diffused rapidly, by a sort of electric or
mesmeric influence of a leader upon the minds of his followers,
their soundness may be suspected. There is a tendency in the
mind to catch opinions when in a state predisposing to the' recep-
tion of them, analogous to the tendency in the body to take
diseasesby infection. An influence is produced on the nervous
system by impassioned and impressive addresses, and by sympathy
with tlie enthusiasm of other listeners, which causes the whole
audience to take fire, and to accept, on a sudden, impressions and
opinions which each one, separately, would not have received from
the self-same impulse.^ This increased sensibility of a numerous
audience arises from the stimulus which the feelings of eacli
receive from witnessing the excitement of others, and from the
consciousness, again, that his own feelings are reflected on their
minds. If, for example, we could suppose an audience composed
of persons isolated from all the rest (by a contrivance such as the
separate stalls in the chapel of some of the newly-constructed
prisons), ignorant of each other's feelings, and incapable of
'
With resfect to the reception of the Newtonian tlieory in Eng\Tnd ami on tiie
Continent, see Whewcll, Hist, of Jnd. Sci. b. VII. c. 3, §§ 2, 3 ; of the Liunaean

system, ih., b. XVI. c. 4, § 6 and of Harvey's discovery, ih., b. XVII. c. 2, § 3.
; On
the slow diffu.sion of true opinions, see Ilelvetius, Be. C Homme. § 9, ch. 8.
^ The pas.sion.s of men, which asunder are motlerate, as the heat of one branl, in
'
an asseniljly are like many briind.s that inflame one another, e.«pecially wlun they blow
one another with orations, to tlie .sotting of the commonwealth on fire, under pretence
of counselling it.' — Ilobbes, Leviathan, part II. c. 2.5.
—
sympathy, no effect such as this couUl be produced.' On the other

hand, i>trong examples of the contagious effect of nervous impres-
sions, communicated through the mind, have occurred among the
illiterateaudiences addressed by fanatical preachers, the effects of
which have been similar to the imitative and sympathetic orgasms
produced by the Dancing Mania of tl)e Middle Ages — by the
influence of the tomb of the Abbe Paris upon the French convul-
sionnaires —
and by the mesmerisers of our own time.^ All
opinions which are diffused rapidly, by impressions on the nervous
susceptibilities of a numerous audience, are to be suspected all ;
practical decisions procured by such means are likely to prove

unsound. The liability to such impressions increases, in propor-
tion as the temperament approaches to the hysterical and femi-
nine habit. But nobody, however robust his mind, is proof
against this influence and all men ouglit to distrust, not only
;
the judgment of others, but tlieir own judgment also, when formed
under such circumstances.^
§ 9. The mental disposition just described is important with
reference to the numbers of a deliberative body. A large body is
much more liable than a small one to this nervous conflagration

to this contagious intoxication of the emotions and judgment ; for
example, a numerous public meeting than a jury or a vestry.

Wliere the address is to the reason and understanding, a body con-
sisting of a moderate number is best fitted for deliberation — not a
great multitude, such as used to crowd the ecclesia or comitia of
the ancient republics, the numbers of which, as all adult male
citizens were members of it, were practically unlimited. A defined
limit to the numbers of a legislative assembly has been secured by
the contrivance of a representative government, and is one of tlie
best results of that excellent political system. On the other
hand, wliere the appeal is, properly and avowedly, to the feelings,
emotions, and taste of the audience, not to their practical reason
—
and judgment where their moral and aesthetic sentiments, not
their deliberative faculties, are called into action, tlie numbers of
•See Wliately's Rheforic, part IV. ch. 3, § 8. Compare above, p. 117.

*Upon the l)ancing Mania of the fourteenth and following centuries, and other
impetuous nervous aftcctions produced by sympathetic causes, see tlie interesting
account in ITecker's Epidemics of the Mi(hUe Atjcs, translated by Dr. Babington, pp.
87-l;')2. particularly c. 4. Concerning mesmerism, see Burdin et Dubois, HLsfoire
Academiqiie du Mafjnetisme Animol, Paris, 1811.

« Sec Hume's f>Kat/s, vol. III. p. 572 ; Lord Broiigb.ani"^ P^ I. P/iil. vol. III. p. 09 ;
Grotp, ///.«/. r^l' fir. vol. TV. pp. .')0,'). 6.

X.] ABUSFIS OF THE PRINCIPLP: OF AUTHORITY. 273
the assembly can scarcely be too ^leat, provided that they comply
with the mechanical conditions necessary for hearin<^ and seeinj^.
Such, for example, are all theatrical representations, which consist

in dramatic performances, and are not (like combats of gladiators,
bull tights, or dancing) addressed merely to the sight.
The drama is an embellished portraiture of life, serious or
comic, intended, not to create illusion, as represented on ths
stage, but to produce a vivid efiect upon the feelings of the
audience, by the closeness of the resemblance and the truth of
the imitation. This impression is greatly strengthened by the
simultaneous influence of the acting upon the audience, and the
sympathetic play of their feelings. Laughter, as we know, is
essentially a social emotion. No man can laugh in solitude. A

comedy which would convulse a whole theatre with laughter,
would be read in the closet without a smile. The same is also the
case, to a groat extent, with the emotions of compassion and grief.
Many more tears would be shed over the mimic sorrows of Juliet
or Desdemona in the theatre than in the study.'
The art of the actor consists in working upon the emotions,
either of pity, or admiration, or tenderness, or ridicule — in gently
exciting the moral sensibilities of his audience, or in awakening
mirth. These effects he produces by recitation and gesticulation,
and by personating an assumed character and in this his whole ;
art is summed up. He aims at no ulterior object.

The deliberative orator speaks in his own person and although ;
he may use as instruments what the actor regards as ends —

although he may arouse the passions and move the mirth of his
hearers, yet he addresses their understanding, and seeks to
influence their practical judgment. The histrionic powers of the
orator are worthless in themselves they are valuable only so far
;
as they assist him in —

accomplishing his end the conviction of
his hearers.^ In a theatre, the actors have alone a part to perform ;
' '
Ut ridentibus adridenr, it-i flentibus adflent
Hum.'ini vultus.' Hokace.
'There is a current mistake as to a saying of Demosthenes upon oratory, which is
rf-portfd by Cicero in two different passages {De Orat. lll..,f)6; Brut. 38). Being
asked what is the first thing in orator}', and what the second, and what the third, lie
repliefl always actii<. This is usually translated action, which, according to the com-
mon word in our language, would mean the motion of the body in
acceptation of the
speaking. ought to be translated actitig, or rather, as we should say, delivery.
It
Plutarch, in his Lives of the Ten Orators, c. 8, and Valerius Maximus, VIII. 10, est. 1,
in relating the same anecdote, use the Greek wor<l (j-ndKpKris while Quintilian, XI. 3,
;
§ 6, renders it by prommciatio. Actio, or virSKpiiris, was defined by the ancients to
T
:
the audience are the passive recipients of the dialogue which passes
on the stage. They sit by and listen, and, as it were, overhear it
though substantially intended for their amusement, it is not
addressed to them in form.^ Their enjoyment is derived from
hearing a good dramatic composition recited with suitable tones,
gestures, and feeling, and with a faculty which identifies each
actor with the character represented by him. In producing this
enjoyment, the whole business and purpose of a theatrical perform-
ance consists the audience have nothing to do, or to decide they
: ;
have merely to take delight in the imitation. But, in a deliberative

assembly, the orator speaks as one of the body he tenders his ;
counsel as on a matter in which all the members deliberating have

a common interest he does not stand on a stage, aloof from the
;
others, to be gazed at and admired nor does he play a part dis- ;
tinct from the rest of the assembly. He attempts to lead them to

his view of a practical question, in the decision of which they are
all to concur. His words are directly and pointedly addressed to
his audience, and intended to influence their convictions. How-
ever he may, by his rhetorical powers, gratify the taste of his
hearers —however he may charm them by his brilliancy, or amuse
them by his wit, still his work is not completed by the mere
enjoyment communicated to them : they have a part to perform as
well as himself; they are equally actors in the drama ; their col-
lective act decides the question at issue ; and they have a judg-
ment to pass on the arguments and declamations addressed to
them. His influence upon them, moreover, depends, to a great
extent, upon their belief in his sincerity ; if they think, or suspect,
that his earnestness and impetuosity are feigned, and that he is
merely acting a part, he will never reach their convictions.

It is manifest, therefore, that in theatrical representations the
sympathetic play of the emotions is an advantage, inasmuch as it
heightens th effect of the dramatic imitation upon each spectator;
stimulates the actor to a more lively and impassioned performance
of his part ; and contributes essentially to the success of the entire
work of art. But in deliberative assemblies, where the orator who
consist in all that belonged to voice anil gesture. Thus Cicero, in his Orator, c. 17,
Bays — ' Est enim actio quasi corporis qunedam eloqucntia, quum constet e voce atque
motu.' Compare Erncsti, Lex. Techn. Ixit. in agrre ; Lr.r. Techn. Gr. in {nriKpi<ns ;
and Quintil. XL 3, § 1. Undoubtedly, the characteristic excellence of a speech, as

distinguished from a writt<'n composition, consists in the delivery.
' The parabasis of tlio ancient Greek comedy was a violation of the theatrical con-
ventions, and of dramatic propriety.
;
x] ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 275
(Itliveishis opiniou leads bis hearers to a practical conclusion,

there uo place for the exhibition of histrionic skill, or the mere
is
indulgence of a?sthetic feelings the play of sympathies excited in

;
a large audience disturbs the judgment, and produces a mental

anarchy.
Where instruction is conveyed to an audience, who listen in
respectful silence to the words of the teacher, it is immaterial
how numerous they may be. In schools and churches, the pupils
and congregation are, indeed, a necessary part of the assembly
but as they exercise no power, and indulge in no expression
of feeling, inconvenience cannot arise from numbers. With
regard to schools, indeed, the emulation of the pupils may contri-
bute essentially to enforce the lessons of the master ; and some
assistancemay be derived from mutual instruction so that ;
numbers are an important element in scholastic instruction.
§ 10. The inquiry undertaken in this Essay has now been
brought to a close. The different subjects proposed in the first

chapter for investigation have been passed under review and an ;
attempt has been made to determine the marks by which trust-

worthy guides in matters of opinion may be recognised to ascer- —
tain the legitimate province of authority —
and to discover the
conditions most conducive to its beneficial influence.
Before, however, we take a final leave of the subject, it may
seem natural to ask whether, after having looked at the Principle
of Authority under so many aspects, and after having traced it in
so many of its applications, we have arrived at any simple and
practical maxim as the fruit of our researches.
The most important general formula which appears deducible
from this inquiry is, that one of the main elements of civilisation
is ivell-placed confidencp,.
One leading condition improvement of mankind, both
for the
in their public is to find the means of pro-
and private relations,
moting confidence in other persons, and of teaching how these
yjersons can be properly selected. A disposition to confide, com-
bined with a knowledge how to choose competent guides, and with
a careful exercise of that choice, is both a mark of a civilised state
of society, and a means of further social improvement. On the
other hand, a general tendency to distrust and suspicion, combined
with occasional blind deference to dishonest and unfit guides, is a
T 2
;
276 ABUSES OF THE PRINCirLE OF AUTHORITY. [ch.
mark of a backward state of society, and a hindrance to ulterior

jjrogress.
The state of things last described may arise, either from a
practical resistance to the Principle of Avithority in every form ; or
from a misplaced confidence, and the choice of an unsound autho-
rity. Both of these failings may be seen, on a large scale, in an
Oriental country. A general prevalence of a habit of unfounded
distrust can only be rectified, when men, instead of permitting
' the proud feebleness of their understanding '
(to use the words of
a modern philosopher) to mislead them into judging upon
matters on which they are not competent to form an independent
judgment, evince a disposition to defer to the opinions of guides
selected with care and discretion. Perhaps, however, the preva-
lence of distrust is more often owing to the want of fit guides than
to a popular dislike of the Principle of Authority. It appears to
be a frequent occurrence, in a backward state of society, that men
are willing to waive their exercise of tlie right of private judgment,
but place their faith in impostors and misleaders, who are candi-
dates for their confidence, but are unworthy of it ; who seek to act
as their trustees, but are unfit for the trust.
That there is a strong iuclination to the adoption of the
opinion of competent judges, when competent judges can be clearly
discerned to exist, is plain from the deference which is universally
paid to the authority of the great luminaries of physical science.
If there was a body of authority upon moral and political subjects,
equally fulfilling the conditions which entitle it to public respect
if the choice of the people was not distracted by the wide diver-
gence of opinions upon fundamental questions in this department
of knowledge it may be presumed that they would be equally
;
inclined to place themselves under tliat guidance.

The extension of well-placed confidence is not only wliolesome
in our domestic and private relations —in those points of conduct
and management of our worldly affairs to which professional advice
is applicable — in our pecuniary dealings, where Ave are unable, of
ourselves, to ascertain the valueand quality of commodities and —
even in speculative opinions, as to which our time and opportu-
nities for study do not permit the safe exercise of private judg-
ment ; but it is also productive of eminent benefit in political
affairs, in which a due selection of and a steady reliance
leaders,
upon their advice, is a far more effectual metliod of arriving at
good governineut, than can ever be derived from those barren and
X.J ABUSES 01- THE PRI>"C1PLE OF AUTIIOKITY. 27 7
wearisoiUL' changes in mere political forms, which practical states-

men s«) (tften introduce blindly, at the suggestion of the fabricators
of ideal commonwealths.
Well-placed confidence, in questions of opinion and conduct, is
what sound credit is in mercantile affairs. Credit does not create

wealth ; neither does confidence create rectitude of judgment.
The material commodity, and the mental capacity, must both
pre-exist ; but, in each case, the confidence turns it to the best
account, and converts to a useful purpose that which might other-
wise be locked up unproductively in the coffers or in the breast
of its possessor.
In proportion as the circle of our confidence is enlarged, the

probability that this confidence will meet with a fair return
increases. He who confides justly in others, may expect that they
will confide justly in him. At all events, it is only by evincing a
disposition on one side to relax the precautions of mutual dis-
trust, that the foundations of a general system of mutual reliance?
ascending from private to political, and from political to inter-
national relations, can ever be securely laid.
In the present state of the civilised world, the progress of
society will depend in partupon legislative improvements, and
upon those measures which a government can command or
influence it will depend still more upon the substitution of
; but
competent incompetent guides of public opinion ; upon the
for
continued extension of their influence and upon the consequent ;
organisation of a sound authority in all the departments of theory

and practice. Every one may, within his own sphere, and by
means of his own vocation, contribute his share to the accomplish-
ment of this great end and mankind may thus approach more
;
and more to a state in which opinion will constantly predominate

over in which reason will hold the ascendancy over
violence,
passion,and wisdom will be diffused from various sources through
a thousand channels. Under the operation of these influences, it
will be found that the increased mental activity which accom-
panies progressive civilisation is not inconsistent with social tran-
quillity ; that the extension of knowledge among the people does
not promote anarchical doctrines ; and that the principle of moral
authority is too strong for the principle of political revolution.
;
APPENDIX.
OX THE DLSTIXCTIOX BETWEEX ARISTOCRACY AXD DEMO-

CRACY, AXD OX THE PROVIXCE OF POLITICAL SCIEXCE.
§ 1. In ch. YIII. of the preceding Essay, the Democratic form of

government, and the power of the Majority of the People, as character-
istic of that form, have been referred to, as something clearly under-
stood, and having a recognised meaning. The subject is, however, still
involved in some obscurity, notwithstanding the frequent use of the
terms, and our apparent familiarity with the ideas which they represent
and I have, therefore, thought it advisable to append to the Essay, some
remarks, in which an attempt will be made to ascertain, in what the
received opposition between aristocracy and democracy, as generally
understood, really consists.
The difference between governments in which one person exercises
the entire sovereign power, and governments in which this power is
shared among several persons, is obvious and precise. It is analogous

to the difference between the singular and plural numbers in grammar.
The former are called Absolute or Pure Monarchies, or simply Despot-
isms : the latter are called Limited Monarchies and Republics, and are
generally known by the common name of Free Governments.
There is, however, greater difficulty in defining the distinction be-
tween the two varieties of the latter class of governments, which are
respectively called Aristocracies and Democracies.
The distinction between these two forms of government is com-
monly made to depend on tlie sovereign power residing, or not
residing, in a majority of the people. If, it is said, the sovereign
power is vested in the people at large, or a Majority of the
in
people, the government is a democracy * : if only in a Minority of the
people, the government is an aristocracy.
1 Aristotle, in more than one place, speaks of tlie sovereign power of the majority of tJie
people bcinfj the mark of a flemocraey, iW. iv. I. v. 9. lii (idining the three forms of
government, he say?, Ono, or the Few, or the Jlany, mu.st \n-
'
-iovereign.' Ih. III. 7.
Bodinus </< /?<•;>. 11. 6, 7, clc tines aristocrac\ and democracy thus :
— ' Aristocratia reipuh-
—
280 ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN [apben.
Now, from what has been stated above, in chapter VIII. (p. 180) it
isapparent that, in speaking of the Majority of the People, we mean
not the majority of the entire population, but a majority of a certain
portion of the community. It is necessary, in the first place, to strike
off all the women and children, and in States where slavery exists, all
the slaves ; '
the residue, consisting of the free adult males, constitutes
the people, for the purpose of determining the form of government.
§ 2. Having, by these eliminations, obtained the body which
practically constitutes the peoj)le, we have next to consider whether
the distinction between aristocracy and democracy turns upon a precise
demarcation of the majority and minority of this body.
Now, (waiving, for the present, the question whether a right of
voting for a representative in a supreme assembly can be fairly con-
sidered a portion of the sovereign power,) is it possible to found the
distinction betwêen aristocracy and democracy on any such minute
difference ? Mr. James Mill, in his JEssay on Government, has ap-
parently taken the words in this rigorous acceptation for he has ;
argued in favour of democracy, on the ground that each member of the

majority of the people will have an interest in governing well, because
lie -will have less than one person to oppress whereas, each member of ;
a minority of the people will have an interest in governing ill, because
JjcDB forma qureilnni est, in qua minor pars civiiim in universes et singulos cives suniniie
potestatis jus haljet." (P. 339.) Respublica popularis est, in qua cives imiversi, aut
'
maxima pars civium, cmteris omnibus non tantum siniûlatim sed etiam simul eoacervatis
et collectis, imperancU jus liabent.' (P. 359, and compare another version of tlie same
definition, in p, SUi.) He rightly remarks tluit tliere can be only three forms of govern-
ment, determined by the number of tlie rulers (p. 3G6) and lie objects to tlie system of
;
Aristotle, which makes the distinction between oligarchy and democracy depend partly on
the comparative wealth and poverty of the governing section of the citizens. (P. 356,
364.) 'Sive igitur optimi (he says) sive rtagitiosissimi, sive ditissimi, sive nohilissinii,sive
egentissimi, sive bellicosissimi summum imperium teneant, modi) civ'ntin pars minor extiterit,
aristocratiam appellamus,' (P. 341.) He lays it down that the decisive mark of an aris-
tocratic government is, that the rulers should be less in number than half the entire com-
munity. — ' Igitur in optimatum statu civium paucitatem spectare nihil est necesse, niodo
ii, qui in cwteros dominationem habent, dimidio pauciores sint universis.^ (P. 342.)
1Keferring to slaves and freedmen, Aristotle says that all are not to be considered as
citizens, without Avhoni a state could not exist ov Trdtra? Oereov ttoAiVos, !>v avev ovk ar ei7|
:
jroAcs, Pol. HI. Again, he remarks, that in order to determine the proper size of a state,
.'i.
as to population, we must
look, not to tlie number of slaves and r. sident aliens, but to those
who comjionent parts an<i njcmbers of the state So-ot noXeut el<7i /xepo? Kal
arc, in fact, the :
«f if avvC-jTarai rroAis oifceioji- fiopiui'- H'- VII. 4. So he savs that in calling a state fi"ppt/,
we must look not to a part, but to all tiie citizens: fvSaUoi-a Si iroAu- ow<c tU /le'po? n
Ât^/ai-Ta? Stl kiyeif al'Tr)<, iW
eU Trdi-Tas tov< TroAi'ra?, I'i'l. YII. 9. Ilo means, however, to
—
exclude all wlio are not strictly free citizens; i.e. all aliens, freedmen, and slaves, the
great numerical majority of tlie population. Com])are Grot. J. D. et P. I. 3, § 8, n. 6.
Quid quod nulla respublica adeo repcrta est popularis, in qua non aliqui aut valde inopes
aut cxterni, tum vero ct foeminfc et adolescentcs, a delihcrafionibus publicis arceantur.'
Where sec Harlicyrac's note. Servos antea ex albo civium eximi omnium picne popu-
'
loruni consensu diximus,' says Uodinus de Rep. III. 8. p. 544 who however stales it to he ;
his own opinion, that slaves ought to be admitted to political rights.

A1PE.S.J AKISTOCIUCY AND DE.MOCUACY. 281
he will have more than one pcraon to oppress.' But the ordinary
usage of the words appeai-s to uio to be le^s precise, and it is doubtful
whether, even in scientific reasoning, they can be advantageously used
with greater strictness.
The distinction between aristocracy and democracy, as commonly
conceived and understood, is not a logical distinction of hind, founded
on a precise line of separation, but merely a distinction of derjree.

Aristocracy and democracy cannot be considered as describing govern-
ments in which a majority or minority of the people is sovereign, such
majority or minority to be determined with numerical precision, like
the numbers of voters in a parliamentary assembly, or at a popular
election. Let us, for example, suppose that, in an independent State,
there are 20,000 adult males, and that a law for the regulation of their
political sufifrage is in question. Everybody wonld feel that there was
a wide and practical difference between a suffrage co-extensive with
this entire body,{i.e. universal suffrage,) or a suffrage dependent on a
high property qualification, which would limit the voters to 1000 or

1500. The former would be properly called a democratic, the latter an
aristocratic arrangement. But no one would consider it of any im-
portance whether the suffrage extended to 10,001, or to 9,999 persons ;
and it would plainly be a distinction founded on a merely fanciful and
unpractical line, if the difference between aristocracy and democracy
was made depend on such an imperceptible shade.

to
In cases where an assembly decides by a majority of votes, the
difference between a majority and a minority founded even on a single
vote, may, in a particular case, be all-important. But, where men are
thrown into large masses, where public opinion acts iri'egularly, and by
impulses, and where no legal effect is given to the numei'ical majority
of the aggregate, but the constituent body is divided into distinct
sections, all reference to the precise preponderance of numbers is
nugatory. It wonld be as futile as an attempt to make the distinction
between heat and cold depend on the thermometer being above or below
some fixed degree in the scale. We know that the variations of the
thermometer, for a few degrees above or below a medium point of tem-
perature, are scarcely perceptible : but we can, nevertheless, distinguish
between frost and summer's heat.
Where a few persons, nobles, or rich men, monopolise the entire
governing power, and give themselves important and exclusive
privileges, thei-e everybody recognises an aristocracy.'*
' Suppt. to Enc. Brit. vol. IV. p. uOO-1.

' In the dufinitions of aristocracy and democracy, Ijotli in ancient and modern writers,
there is no reference to a precise demarcation. The People, the Many, or tlie Poor.
often
are spoken of as liavin;; tiie ciiief power in a democracy ; —the Noliles, the Rich, the Senate,
or the Few, in an aristocracy.
Pindar opposes the aoiôi to the Aa/Spo? ffTparo?, Pytii. IF. I.i7. Tacitus sajs 'Cundas
:
nalionpF et urVjcs /m/"//"."; aiil priinorcs MiK sim/nli rcgiin\.' —.-l/i)/. 1 V. 33. Seneca names
— — — — —
282 ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN [appen.
Where the great body of the people possess poHtical rights and
fi-anchises, and a complete civil and political equality prevails, there
everybody perceives democracy.
But these two political states pass into one another by insensible
degrees — like the conditions of rich and poor —and cannot be marked
offby a precise boundary. Accordingly, it is often said, that a con-
stitution is more or less aristocratic or democratic ;
^ meaning that it
approaches nearer to one or the other extremity of the scale, the oppo-
site ends of which are thus characterised. Whereas, if the distinction
were founded on a logical difference, a gradation such as this would not
be possible. A number is either odd or even, and it cannot be more
odd or more even. It is conceivable, likewise, that a government
might be so tempered, that it has no decided inclination either to aris-
tocracy or democracy it might occupy that middle part of the scale
;
to which neither designation could with confidence be applied, and

which would correspond to the degi*ecs of a thermometer which are
styled temperate, to the period of life which is called middle age, and
is neither old nor young, to the crepuscular state, which is neither night
nor day, and the like.'^

Consistent with this view, is Aristotle's definition of a democracy,
and its distinction from an oligarchy. He says, that the former is a
government in which the poor, the latter, a government in which the
rich are rulers.^ That is to say, in order to characterise the form of
government, he looks to the opposite extremities of the social scale,
populus, senatiis, andsivijidi. —

Epist. 14, § 0. (iiiintilian names popnlus, pauci, and unus.
— Inst. Or. V. 10, § fi3. Cicero names urius, de/ecti, and populus. De Hep. I. 26. Montes- —
quieu saj's that wlien the people in a body has the sovereij^n power, it is a democracy when ;
the sovereign power is in the hands of a part of tlie people, it is an aristocracy. Esp. des
Loix, I. 2. PuU'endorf says, that in a democracy, the peojile is sovereign in an aristocracy, ;
the principal persons of the state. Law of N. and N. VII. 5, § 3.

1 .\ristotle says that seditions take place concerning the dift'erent degrees of oligarchy
—
and democracy whether a government shall he more or less oligarchical or democratical.
en Trepi toC iJ.aK\ov Kai ^ttoi' olov ij bkiyapxCav oBcrai' eis to fxaWoi' oAiya<5X"0'S'" V ''* ''° ^TTOf, r)
SrjfjLOKpaTiavovaav ct? to fxaWov Siqfj.OKpaTî<70aL rf tt? to ^TTOf. I of. V, 1. AgaUl, in V. J,

he speaks of the most democratic democracies. („ Tai; fiTjô/tpanais raU ndXiara tlvai SoKova-ai^
SrinoKpaTi-KaU. So, Montes({uieu, on aristocracies Plus une aristocratic aiiprochera de la
:
'
democratic, plus clle sera parfaite et elle le deviendra moins il niesure ([u'elle approchera
;
de la monarchic.' Esp. dvs Loix, 1. II. ch. 3. Montesquieu here conceives aristocracy as
oscillating between the extremes of monarchy and deniocrac}' between the government of —
—
the one and that of the mani/ and as capable of resting at any point intermediate between
these two limits.
2 Grotius refers to a middle state of this kind, as freipuMitly creating uncertainty in the
moral sciences he compares it with the t/attJ/i, an intornu'iliate staU' between nigiit and
:
daj-, and with water in a lukewarm state, between licat and cold.— 7>>e J. B. et P. II. 23,
^ 1. PuffiMidorf, in commenting on this passage, remarks that a medium state of this kind
is called, in tlic schools, a purticipalire mean, as partaking of tiie two extremes in both
directions. Law of N. and N. I. 2, § 0.
5 Pill. III. rt, IV. 3. He reconciles this with the nnnierical dclinition l)j' saying, tliat
drmncriiry is when the tVef citi/.ens and the poor, being the majority, are sovereign ; oligarchy,
when the ricii and noble, being few in number, are S"vereigu.
ippim.] ARISTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY. 283
without adverting to the middle class of citizeus of whose impoi-tauce ;
he is, nevertheless, well aware.' He speaks, indeed, in many places, of

the danger of making a govenuuent too democratic, or too oligarchical,
by inclining too exclusivt-ly to the interest of llie rich or the poor. He
con.siders it fortunate for a commouwcaltli when the middle class of
citizens is largo and powerful, and he advises that
this class should
always, when it is with political power, so as to
possible, be invested
make a constitution mixed of oligarchy and democracy.^
It may be added, that aristocracy aud democracy ai-e, properly
fonns of government ; and that, in distinguishing between
BiJeaking,
them, the distribution of the sovereign powers, or of the political
suffrage, must alone be considered.
But, inasmuch as certainstates of societij are in general found to
accompany these forms government, a people is sometimes called
of
aristocratic or democratic, although its. form of government may not
be entitled to bo so called. For example, M. de Tocqueville, in his
work on the United States, often calls the English people, or state of
society, aristoci-atic and the French people, or state of society, demo-
;
cratic. There is more social equality, in point of actual wealth, among

the upper and middle classes in France than in England ^ but looking ;
I
Pol. IV. 11 ami 12.
' In Pol. IV. remarks, that 'in all states the community consists of three
11, Aristotle
parts —the very very poor, and those between these two classes.' In this and the
rich, the
following chapter, he enlarges, at length, on the advantages arising from investing with
power the middle class of citizens. Again, in V. 8, he dwells on the importance of a
vwderate constitution, avoiding the extremes both of oligarchy and democracy, but
founded on the interests of the middle class. Aristotle, however, remarks, that of the two
extremes, the oligarchical is the most dangerous the excesses of the rich destroy the State
:
(he says) more often than the excesses of the people (IV. 12). Oligarchies are likewise
more instable and short lived than democracies (V. 1 and 12). A moderate constitution,
in which the rights of all thu citizens are regarded, founded mainly on the support of the
middle class, but inclining to democracy, is what Aristotle calls a woAiTîa (V. 7).
'&oi\m\i», de Rijmb. II. 6 (p. 345), thinks: Civitates optiniatum imperio nioderatas,
'
stabiliores esse quam populares and, indeed, he says

; ' aristoeratise semper diuturniores
:
'
fuerunt in quibus pauciores erant oi)timates.' —

VI. 4, p. 1102.
Muratori likewise speaks of the mixture of aristocracy and democracy in the Italian
republics : Non una sorte di governo stabilimente si conservb una volta nelle citt^ libcre
'
d'ltnlia, ma di tre different! spezie di governo or I'una or I'altra si pratieb. h'Aristocratico

fu de' soli nobili, con esclusione della plebe, come tuttavia si osserva nelle rei)ubbliche di
Venezia, Geneva, e Lucca. II democrntico del solo popolo, esclusi i nobili, come sovente
avvenne in Siena, e talvolta anche in Genova, Bologna, &c. II misto coniposto di nobili e
popolari, con dividere fra loro gli utizj il che si osservb non rade volte i)er quasi tutte le
;
iibere citti. I/Italia e la Grecia anticamente diedero esempli di questi tre governi.'
— MuKAToRi, Diss. b"2, (tom. III. p. 119).
5 Qiuind un peuple a an c'tat social democratique (sajs M. dc Toc(iueville), c'est h.

'
dire qu'il n'existe plus dans son sein de castes ni de classes, et que tons les citoyens y sont
a pcu pres e'gaux en lumiirvs et en biens.'- -La Dem. en Am. tom. IV. p. 243. There is,
however, no country in which the people are ucarl}- equal in intelligence and knowledge.
By a democratic state of society, is meant a state of ooiety in which there are no privileged
;
orders, anrl in which there is an !i|i|)roxiinalion to an equal di>tribution of property where :
the Irgnl e<iuality is complete, and the social inequality is not consideral)le.
— —
284 ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN [appin.
to political institutions —to the power of the crown, the extent of the
suffrage, the liberties of the subject, the facility of political association,
the freedom of the press, &c., England was, when M. de Tocqueville
wrote, more democratic than France. So the state of society in France,
before the revolution of 1789, is usually called aristocratic, although
the government was a pui-e monarchy.
An aristocratic or democratic period is likewise spoken of, meaning
a period chai-acterised by the existence of those political institutions,
and that social state, which natui'ally result from these several forms
of government, or by a tendency to their adoption.
§ 3. If the preceding view of the difference between aristocracy and

democracy is correct — if the distinction between them is of degree, and
not of l-ind, it follows that much caution ought to be used in laying
down general propositions respecting them.
Unquestionably, there are certain tendencies which are common to
all aristocracies and all democracies. "Where the powers of government
are confined to a few, there is a tendency to political inequality to a —
system of privilege for the persons possessing those powers, and prob-
ably to social inequalities of wealth, hereditary rank, &c. Where they
are common to a large nuviber —to an actual majority or a large minority
of the people, there is a tendency to political equality, to the absence
of privilege, and to social equality in respect of wealth and private
position.
From these distinctions cei-taiu consequences may be derived,
which it may be possible to express in general terms. By carefully
analysing the phenomena which accompany the aristocratic and demo-
cratic foiTns of government by excluding those which are traceable to
;
other causes, (such as religion, race, geographical position, state of the

useful arts, &c.) by thus isolating the residuary phenomena, and re-
ferring them to their true cause ; certain general theorems respecting
the several tendencies of these two forais of government may be
constructed.'
After all, however, nothing more than general or prevailing tendencies
can be predicated.'^ It can only be aflBrmed that, supposing men who
have the power will use that power as men hitherto have for the most
part used it, such and such consequences will follow. For it is con-
ceivable, for instance, that in a narrow aristocracy, the ruling body
might, under the guidance of some far-sighted and public-spirited
leader, administer the government upon liberal and popular principles.^
' 'So great is the force of laws, nnrl of particular forms of fiovernnient, and so little
dependence have they on the humours and tempers uf men, that consequences almost as
general and certain may sometimes be deduced from them, as any which the niathmnatical
sciences atfnrd us.' IIlmk, Esaays, Part I. Essay 3 That Politics maybe reduced to a
Science. See also. Mill, Syslrni of Lnr/ir, h. VI. c. <>.
-'
See above, p. 97.
•" '
It iias ollen haiipencd {-ays Aristotle) that llic constitution according to law is not
— —
APPKN.] ARISTOCRACY AM) DKMOCRACY. 2H.5
Of snch a process of reasoning, confined within its proper limits, no

better example can, perhaps, yet be nameil, thjvn the anuh'sis of the
Greek oligarchies and democi-acies, in Aristotle's Folitics. Even his
inferences require, in many cases, to be limited by the peculiar data of
his problem.
Amongst the modern speculators on Politics, several have, how-
and have
ever, carried the attempt too far, selected, as distinctive marks,
or invariable accompaniments, of aristocracy and democracy, or of free
governments generally, circumstances which do not belong to the
essence of these forms of government, and only are in certain cases
accidentally found in connection with them.'
Thus, it cannot be laid down universally, with Montesquieu, that
Virtue is the principle of democi-atic, and Moderation of aristocratic
governments.' Neither can it be affirmed, with him, generally, that
luxury is advantageous to monarchies, and detrimental to aristocracies
and democracies ^ or, that the Catholic religion best suits a monarchy,
;
and the Protestant religion a republic.'*

Some of the theorems respecting free or popular government, laid
down by Hume, in his Essays, appear, in like manner, to be derived from
an imperfect induction, and therefore not to admit the generality which
he assigns to them. Thus, he lays it down, as a general truth in politics,
'
invaiiable by the humour or education both of subject or sovereign,'
that free governments, though commonly the most happy for those who
partake of their freedom, are the most ruinous and oppressive to their
provinces, The provinces of absolute monarchies (he adds) are always
'
better treated than those of free States.' * That many free States, as
well aristocratic as democratic, have misgoverned their dependent pro-
vinces, cannot be disputed and it may, perhaps, be admitted, that the
;
popular ; but, a.s to its spirit and conduct, isadministered in a popular manner and again, :
in other cases, the constitution has been according to law of a popular tendency ; but in its
spirit and conduct is rather oligarchical.' Polit. IV. 5.
In like manner, Bodinus, De Hep. II. 2 (p. 295) :
'
Optimates pauci rempublicani popular!
modo rcgore possunt, si cives omnes omnium magistratuum
participes fecerint aut aristo- :
cratice, paucis quil)usdani, [paucos quosdani V] qui aut virtute, aut censu, aut nobilitate
si
caeteris ])rx'stent.' He makes the same remark with respect to a king, viz. that he may —
govern the State either on popular or on aristocratic principles.
Hume remarks, that many of .Macliiavel's general inferences on political forms are
'
founded on too narrow an induction for general application: 'Machiavel (he says) was
certainly a great genius ; but, having confined his study to the furious and tyrannical
governments of ancient times, or to the little disorderly principalities of Italy, his
reasonings, especially upon monarchical government, have been found extremely defective ;
and there is scarcely any n\axini in his Prince, which subsequent experience has not
entirely refuted.' —
Part I. Kssay 12 Of Civil Liberty.
i Exprit dcs Loir, liv. III. ch. 3, 4 ; V. 2-8.
5 lb. 1. VII. c. 2, 3, and 4. He
concludes the latter chapter thus 'Tout ceci mfene h, :
une rdllexion les re'publiques finissent par le lu.xe, les monarchies par la pauvret^.' Under
;
republic, Montesquieu includes both aristocracy and democracy.

* lb. 1. 24, ch. 5.
* Kxsays, Part I. Kssay 3 — That Pulltics may Ite reduced t<i a Science.
— —
280) ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN [appkn.
peculiar opinions and customs of a dependent communitj ai'e more

likely tobe treated with respect wliei'e the paramount nation is governed
by a monarch, than where it is under an aristocrati-^ or democratic
regimen though the treatment of Flanders and the American provinces
;
by Spain affords a remarkable proof of a similar tendency in a despotic

government. But it cannot be conceded, that there is anything in the
essence of a free government (i.e. a government which is not an absolute
monarchy ^), necessarily tending to produce oppression of dependencies.
Hume himself, on the other hand, refutes a position which he found
laid down by many writers, that the arts and sciences never can flourish
but under a free government.* He likewise questions the universality
of another established opinion on the same subject, that trade can only
flourish under free institutions though he admits, that this latter
;
opinion rests on a wider observation than the former one.^ Elsewhere,

however, he lays it down, that it is impossible for the arts and sciences
'
to arise, at first, among any people, unless that people enjoy the blessing
of a free government and that, though the only proper nursery of
:
' '
those noble plants [the arts and sciences] be a free state, yet may they
be transplanted into any government ; and that a republic is most
favourable to the growth of the sciences, and a civilised monarchy to
that of the polite arts.' * Positions such as these, i*especting the at-
traction or repulsion, of either monarchy on the one hand, or of aris-
tocracy and democracy on the other, for the arts and sciences, and
for commerce, seem to me scarcely to admit of satisfactory
demonstration.
ISTo one, however, has carried this mode of reasoning so far as M.
de Tocqueville, in his work on Democracy in America. In this able

treatise he attempts to lay down a number of general propositions
respecting democracy, and a democratic people or age not confined to ;
the more immediate and palpable effects of the form of government,

but extending to very remote consequences, and comprehending sub-
jects having no obvious connection with political institutions.
For example, he lays it down that a democratic age has a natural
tendency to pantheism; he believes that this philosophic or religious
system has a peculiar atti'action for a democi-atic peopl(>.'^ He thinks
that democratic nations are passionately fond of abstract and generic
' * in Cdmnion fi|)]iell;Uion.s [pnrlnnro?] receives tho a ppi II ;i-

Tlic fiovcninu'iit, whii'Ii
tion of free, which admits of a i)artiti()n of power anion:^ several ineniliers, wiiose
is tliat
united iiuthority is no less, or is cnmnionly greater, than that of any monarch but who, ;
in the usual course of adniinistr ition, must net by general and equal laws, that are
jireviously known to all the members, ami to all their subjects.' Hiimb, Part I. Ess.a}' 5
— OJ" the Origin of Government.
» Tart 1. Essay Vi—Of Civil Lilicrly.
5 ll„d.
* Part I. Essay 14 Of the Ifi.ie utiii Progress of the Arts mnl Seiences.
* La Jicviornitie en Amerique, toni. III. p. h[>.
APPK!».] ARISTOCRACY AND ItEMOCRACY. 2^7
ti'nns.^ Again, with regard to the fine arts; lie is of opinion that
a love for nnnierous small works of painting or scalpturo, executed
by infei-ior artists, characterises a democratic people.' He thinks
likewise that in architecture the democratic taste inclines to bnildinrrs
devoid of solidity, and made only for ontwai'd show. As an example
of the latter, he refers to a row of small palaces, of Grecian architecture,
near the shore, at New York, which at a distance he supposed to be of
white marble, but on a near appnjach he discovered to be of brick and
wooden columns.' As to poetry, he fears that,
plaster, with ])ainted
finding no fit subject for it in the real life of his country, a democratic
poet will depart widely from nature, will lose kimself in the clouds, and
pursue the wild, the monstrous, and the exaggerated.* He aflBrms
that a democratic nation despise the coarse and noisy amusements
which please the common people in an aristocracy, but that they cannot
appreciate the intellectual and refined amusements of the aristoci'atic
classes ; that they require something productive and substantial even
in their divei'sions.* He thinks farther, that a democratic asre is
by a fondness for easy successes and present
peculiai'ly characterised
enjoyments.*' He even believes that, in an aristocracy, every person
has a single object which he pursues without cessation whereas in ;
a democratic society each person follows several objects at the same

time.^
Now, on considering these and similar general propositions with
which M. de Tocqueville's ingenious and suggestive work abounds,
it is easy to see that he has not sufficiently borne in mind a caution
which he has himself laid down, as a guide in inquiries, such as that

which he has undertaken. He remarks elsewhere, that it is necessary
not to confound that which is democratic with that which is only
American. He warns his readers against seeing all democratic nations
under the type of the American people. He says that he cannot con-
sent to sepai"ate America from Europe, notwithstanding the ocean
which divides them. For that he considers the people of the United
States as only a portion of the English people, employed in clearing
the forests of the New World ; while the rest of the nation, possessed
of greater leisure, and less engrossed with the care of procuring a
livelihood, can occupy itself more with mental pursuits.*
In these just remarks, M. de Tocqueville indicates the necessity of
attending to other circumstances than political institutions in charac-
terising the acts and dispositions of a community. He shows that he
bears in mind the important influence which national origin, race, re-
ligion,manners, climate, geographical position, as well as the state of
the useful arts, cannot fail to exercise upon the opinions, feelings, acts,
' La Demnrratie en Ainerique, toin. III., p. 135. ^ ](,_ p_ jqq^

5 Jb. p. 101. * lb. p. 15i. '>
lb. toin. IV. p. 118.
8 Tom. III. p. 29. 7 'fom. IV. p. 122. » Tom. 111. pp. (18, 70, 71
288 ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN [appek.
and character of a political society. He points to the many features of

resemblance between the people of England and that of the United
States, notwithstanding that the one (according to his view) is an
aristocratic, the other a democratic commnnity.
It would, perhaps, be not difficult, if this were the proper place, to
trace many of the phenomena, selected by M. de Tocqueville, to various
unconnected sources, wholly independent of democratic or other po-
litical influences. For instance, the prevalence of pantheistic opinions
(so far as they are prevalent) is to be songht for in the diffusion of the
—
modern German philosophy the taste for cheap works of art in
numerous mechanical inventions for facilitating theii' production. In
order to see at once that M. de Tocqueville's theorems respecting
aristocracy and democracy are, in fact, founded on an imperfect in-
duction —that he has not disentangled all the antecedent facts con-
curring in the production of the observed phenomenon — and that he
has generalised the single case of America, or, at most, of America and
France, it is only necessary to test his propositions by the aiicient
repuhlics.
Iôw, nobody would think of saying that, in the Grecian demo-
cracies, the people had any tendency to pantheism, or to the use of
abstract terms and certainly it could not be affirmed of Athens, in the
;
age ''^ Pericles, that its taste in poetry ran into the unnatural and
grotesque, or that its taste in sculpture and architecture was turned to
petty and perishable works. So the row of white plaster palaces at
New York, which M. de Tocqueville considered a mark and consequence
of democracy, has, I fear, many parallels, and probably patterns, in
aristocratic England.
M. de Tocqueville doubtless saw that most of liis general apoph-
thegms concerning democracy, were not applicable to the republics
which the ancients regarded as democratic, and which the moderns
have generally recognised as such. Accordingly, he considers the
governments, both of Athens and Rome, at their most popular periods,
as being, in fact, aristocratic on account of the exclusion of the slaves
from political rights.'
It is no doubt right, in reasoning upon the ancient democracies,
and in instituting a comparison between them and modern democracies,
to bear constantly in mind the important fact, that the former contained
a numerous class of slaves, and that the free citizens were only a small
minority of the entire population. But it would, in my opinion, be a
disturbance of the established landmarks of history, and an unauthor-
ised departure from the received language of all writers, ancient and
modern, to treat the Athenian and Roman governments, in their de-
' Tom. HI. \>. 122. In like mannor, he says, that the Americans who inhabit the States
where slavery docs not exist, nlono jiresent the complete iniajê of a democratic society,
tom. IV. p. 147.
—
Ai'i-KN.] ARISTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY. 289
velopcd forms, as nrlstocracies. Nor, indeed, would even this plirase-

ology render M. de Toe(ineville's generalisations correct for assuming ;
these governments to be aristocratic, it will be found that his general

affirmations respecting aristocracies are often as inapplicable to those
ancient republics as other of his general affirmations respecting
democracies.
The utmost caution is requisite in laying down general propositions
respecting the tendencies of aristocratic and democratic governments,
or the characteristics of aristocratic and democratic communities.
Even the induction of Aristotle, which was necessarily confined to the
Greek and other republics on the shores of the Western Mediterranean,
is, in many cases, inapplicable to modern Christian communities,
having no class of slaves, and acquainted with the use of gunpowder,
printing, the compass, and the steam-engine. M. de Tocqueville re-
marks, that two neighlx)uring nations cannot have the same demo-
'
cratic social state without adopting similar opinions and manners.' ^

Admitting the truth of this remark, (which, however, I must be per-
mitted to think veiy questionable,) it does not follow that this similarity
will exist in cases where communities are separated, not only by wide
intervals of space, but also by wide intervals of time, and whose religion,
race, language, and civilisation, are widely different.
§ 4, It is by a neglect to observe the cautions above indicated by —
hasty attempts to generalise without a sufficient basis of facts, and to
found universal theorems upon a complex but undissected phenomenon
—by the consequent establishment of imaginary laws of connection
between related
facts each other only by juxtaposition
to place or in
time— and by subjecting problems of
intricate causes the plurality of to
direct inductive method, without verification or correction, that the
Science of Politics has been rendered uncertain and uninstructive, and
that practical politicians and statesmen have been deterred from re-
garding it as resting on a sure foundation, or as tending to useful ap-
jjlications.'^ If political science be properly understood — if it be con-
fined within the limits of its legitimate province — and if its vocabulary
bo well fixed by sound definitions and a consistent usage, there is no
reason why it should not possess the same degree of certainty which
belongs to other sciences founded on observation.
§ 5. Political science may be conveniently distributed into tlic
following three great departments :
1. The nature of a sovereign government, and its relations with

the individual persons immediately subject to it.
2. The relation of a sovereign government to a political community
dependent upon it.

> Tom. IV. p. 243.
2 As to the ordinary methods of iiroof in the mornl scirnoes, see
(Iffcctivpiiess of tlic tl-c
xiHisition of Mr. Mill, Si/ntem of Loyic, h. I II. c. 10, § 8 b. V. c. J, § 1 b. VI. c. 7.

; ;
U
—
290 ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN [ApuiN.
3. The mutual relatious of tlie sovereign goverumeiits of indepeu-

dent comniuuities.
Each of these departments admits of being considered iu a double
point of view. Each may be either treated merely as something
existing, as something which is, Avithout reference to its tendencies,
or to any standard of redltude ; or, again, it may be assumed that the
existing state of each is known, and it may be treated with reference
to its probable future tendencies and effects, as well as with reference
to its most improved and perfect state, or what it oiight to he. The
former may be called I'osltive or Descrii)i'ive, the latter, Ideal or Specu-
lative Politics,
The science of Positive or Descriptive Politics would, with regard
to the first of the threedepartments above mentioned, comprehend an
exposition of the structure of a sovereign government, and
its powers
the nature of laws and of their execution the nature of leoral

o rights
o —
and obligations, and their classes, and other cognate subjects. This
exposition would be generally applicable to all governments, laws,
rights, obligations, &c,, without reference to their comparative goodness
or badness, or to their conformity with some ideal standard ; it would
treat political society merely as a subject of observation, and political
institutions as something be noted and described.' Portions of
to
Aristotle's Politics, of Cicero's Pepahlic, ofHobbes' Leviathan, of the
works of Grotius and Puffendorf on the Law of Nations, and of their
followers, fall under this head. Most of the writers on general juris-
prudence likewise contain an exposition of the nature and action of a
sovereign government. On the ofhcr hand, the Republic and Laws of
Plato, a large part of Aristotle's Politics, the works of Bodmus, Machia-
vel, Montesquieu, Sir T. More, and others, are occupied almost exclu-
sively with considering the tendencies and effects of certain political

forms and institutions, or the best form of government.
The second departmeut above njentioned, viz. that which concerns —
the relation between a ] aramouut or imperial community, and its de-
])endency, has been considered more or less at length by many writers,
but has been generally treated in connection with the question of
colonics, both. as respect.s the actual form of the relation, and the rules
of expediency by which it ought to be governed.
Tlie third, department, viz. —
that of the Law of Nations, or Inter-
national Law, may be regarded under the same double aspect. It may
be either considered as an actually existing system of moral rules, to
which the governments of civihscd nations usually conform in their
mutual relations, and to which they habitually appeal as something
recognised in common. Or it may be considered as an ideal or theo-
' Mieneral jiiri.-'pruflenco, or the philotiopliy of positive law, is concerned with law as it
necessarily is, rather than with law as itought to he with law as it must be, be it good
-.
or bad, rather than with law as it must be, it' it be good.'— At'STi.v, Outline of
Lrcliirrs nil Gincnil Jiiri.tfiiiilriirr, ji. .".
—
Appen.] aristocracy AND DEMOCRACY. 2'Jl
which the practice of iiiclfpcnJent nations ought to con-

retical type, to
form. Such, for example, would bo a system of conventional rules fi>r
the prevention of war between civilised nations, and for the settlement
of international dilferences without an appeal to arms. The former of
these has been called the Positive Law of Nations ; the latter might be
called Speculative International Law. In the earlier writers, as Grotius
and his imitjitors, tlie Law of Nations as it is, and the Law of Nations
as it might to be, are frequently confounded ; and, indeed, scarcely any
attempt is made to separate them. By the more recent writers on this
important branch of political science as Martens and "Wheaton — —this
distinction has been generally ob.served.'
The Positive or Descriptive Branch of Political Science, (whether
it treats of the relations of a sovereign government to its immediate
subjects, or of its relations to its dependencies, or of international law,)
is concerned merely with the past and present. It considers exclusively
what a sovereign government is, and must be what is neces.sarily its ;
mode of action ; what are its relations, in every conceivable state of

things, with tho.se who are subject to its power. In like manner, it
describes the rules which have been actually observed and recoo-nised
by sovereign governments in their relations with each other. It is
partly founded on facts observable, and within the reach of our senses,
and partly on facts recorded in history.
This portion of political science admits of as much certainty as
the physical sciences ; and it might, by duo
and the attention,
absence of political prejudice, be brought immediately to scientifio
perfection. "Within its proper province, there is no fact or phenom-
enon requiring notice which eludes observation nor is there any ;
combination of facts for wliich an adequate general expression cannot

be found.
Let us, for example, take such propositions as the following :
A sovereign government is free from all legal restraint.

A positive law is a general command, proceeding dii-ectly or in-
directly from a sovereign government.
A legal right is conferred, a legal obligation is created, by a sove-
reign government,
A dependency is a political community under a subordinate govern-
ment.
International law is not enforced by any tribunal common to two or
more independent nations.
Such propositions as these are as certain, and rest on as o-ood evi-
dence, as general propositions in mechanics, optics, or chemistry. Tf
1 The distinction betweon the Positive nnd the Natural I„i\v of Nations
rlo.-.rlv laid i.^
down by Vattcl (I.nw of Xatioiis, §§ 21-7), and lie .says: W'c shall be careful to ilistin-
'
fiiii.xh tliem, without, however, treatinj,' of Ihem sei-nrately.' Martens points out the .same
distinction, and dwells on its ini)iort!ince. — T.air «/ Xatlmis, Introd. §§ 3 4.
V 2
;
292 ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN [Appen.
they are not true, the fault must be imputed, not to the subject-matter,
but to imperfect or inaccurate induction, or defective language. The
factsupon which these propositions are founded lie as open to observa-
tion,and are determined with the same amount of certainty, as those
which support propositions in physical science. It is true that political
science cannot be made the subject of experiment we cannot arrange ;
the phenomena at will so as to test a certain principle but the ;
relations of government and society, in a state of equilibrium, are all

within the range of our senses, and can be determiued with scientific
certainty.
Politics, considered as a descriptive and positive science, deals
merely with the relations of men to one another. All these are
manifested in outward acts, and are, therefore, exempt from the ob-
scurity which envelops the internal processes of thought, the subject of
—
metaphysics and the operation of our vital organs, the subject of
physiology.!
The prevalent belief in the inferior certainty of political, as com-
pared with, physical science, arises in part from a confusion between
the certainty and the precision of sciences. It has been truly remarked
by M. Comte, that a proposition may be certain without being precise,
and precise without being certain.^ There is such a thing as precise
falsehood ; and in cases where we can only approximate to the truth,
a statement which is true may be couched in vague and general terms.
—
Thus, in politics, many of the definitions such as those of aristocracy
and democracy, illustrated in this Appendix —are founded on distinc-
tions of degi-ee, and are, therefore, necessarily unprecise. Many, if
not most, political forms are separated from one another rather by
gradation than by a logical limit. Yet the distinctions which they
indicate, though wanting in the sharpness and rigour of geometrical
determinations, are just as real and certain as lines, angles, surfaces,
and solids.
The speculative orideal branch of pohtical science, on the other
hand, (with whatever department of politics it may be occupied,)
considers the tendencies, actual or possible, of governments, political
institutions, and laws ; what are the best and most
it also considers
perfect political forms or what a government and
and institutions,
its acts ought to he. It is concerned primarily and directly with
the future, and only incidentally and by reference with the past.
It professes to furnish the statesman with a manual of legislation
to teach how States ought to be constituted, organised, and governed
what rules ought to be observed in the intercourse of independent
nations and, generally, to lay down the maxims which should guide
;
1 Compare Mill's System of Logic, vol. I. p. 537.

' Cours de Phil. Positive, toni. I. . 103.
;
Appen.] aristocracy AND DEMOCRACY. 293
raankiud in all the rtlations and forms which political govoniinent

can assume.
Positive and speculative politics stand to one another in the same
relation as that in which the descriptive and preceptive departments
of ethics stand to each other in which an account of the passions and
;
moral sentiments stands to a set of moral rules for the eruidance of life,
and the fommtiou of a virtuous character or in which anatomy and
;
pathology stand to therapeutics.

The speculative branch of politics, from its nature, does not admit
the same amount of certainty as the positive branch. While the latter
treads on the sure and firm ground of the past, the former partakes
of the uncertainty and obscurity which generally cover the future. It
professes to describe the tendencies of political institutions, collecting
them from the past by a process of observation and inference. But
when the theory so established is applied to any practical case, it be-
comes necessaiy to consider whether the tendency will operate un-
checked, or whether its operation will be counteracted, either wholly
or partially, by opposing and disturbing forces. In politics, as in other
sciences, the probable consequences of any efficient cause can only be
expressed in general terms, by supposing that cause to act freely, and
without impediment or resistance. But, in applying such a general
theorem to practice, allowance must be made for the action of the oppos-
ing or retarding influences and it is in the detection of these influences,
;
in then- due appreciation, and in the calculation of their number, dura-

tion, direction, and intensity, that the practical skill of the politician,
to a great extent, resides. The same is the case with the science of
mechanics, in which the tendencies of bodies in movement, or of
meclianical powers, are calculated without reference to friction and ;
with the science of medicine, which teaches the probable effect of a

drug or other remedy when the human body is in an ordinary state,
but leaves to the skill of the physician to judge how far these
effects will be heightened or diminished by an abnormal state of the
system.
Thus, for example, it may be affirmed that the natural tendency of
aristocracy is to produce political inequality, and of democracy to pro-
duce political equality ; that certain forms of criminal law and systems
of pnni.shment tend to repress crime, and that others fail in thisres])ect
that high duties counteract, and low duties facilitate, the importation
of good.s. But cannot be predicted with confidence, i)i any individual
it
produce its natural effect. Thus,

case, that each of these tendencies will
an aristocratic government may abolish slavery, while a democratic
government may maintain it. A high duty may be so far neutralised
by smuggling, as to bo inoperative; wliile the natural tendency of low
duties to encourage importation may be frustrated by a deficient sup-
ply, by high freights, or by maritime insecurity. In like manner, the
—
294 ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN [AppKy.
natural tendency of mankind, in a state of imperfect civilisation, is to
increase their numbers at a more rapid rate than their means of subsist-
ence. But this tendency may, in any given country, and at a given
time, be effectually counteracted by prudence, industry, the love of ac-
cumulation, and judicious political and domestic arrangements. The
genei'al tendency of monastic institutions is to produce laziness and
ignorance in their members nevertheless, some monastic bodies
;
have been distinguished for their learning, and, during the dark
ages, such learning as existed was principally to be found in
convents.
In practical polices, moreover, there is the additional difficulty,
that not only is the future hard to determine, even where time is
afforded for the inquiry, on account of the multitude, intricacy, and

diversity of the influences to be considered, but it often happens that a
decision must be made on the spur of the moment, and with imperfect
information.' This difficulty, however, besets every department of
active life, and is not peculiar either to politics or ethics. A traveller
in an unknown country must act on such information or indications as
he can obtain in order to reach his destination, or perhaps to save his
life. A commander of a vessel, threatened with shipwreck, must judge,
as he best can, how to extricate it from its peril. The general of an
army must regulate his manoeuvres according to the best information
he can obtain respecting the state of the roads and bridges, the feelings
of the people, the supply of food, and the enemy's movements.
Moreover, in practical politics, as in the conduct of private affairs,
there is much intentional deceit. False reports are circulated, and
false information sent, in order to mislead the government ; false testi-
mony is given, in order to pervert the course of justice ; documents are
forged, and other contrivances are resorted to, for the purpose either
of concealing the truth, or accrediting falsehood. From this source of
error, the physical sciences are nearly free the as- —the chemist,
tronomer, or the optician, has to deal with natural phenomena, in
which there is no motive or opportunity for deception and, even ;
in medical science, the risk of intentional fraud is not in general

considerable.
§ 6. Inasmuch as the positive and speculative branches of politics
aim at different objects, and on evidence of unequal certainty, it is
rest
advisable to treat them scpai'ately, and to keep their pi-ovinccs distinct
in discussion as much as possible.'* Positive politics may be taught as
1 See, on this .subject, the remarks of PutTendorf, Lnw of N. and X. 1. I. ch. 2, § 4.

* '
Speculntive systems have, in ages of the world, been adopted for reasons too
all
frivolous to have determined the judgment of any man of common sense, in a matter of the
smnllcst pccuiiiarj- interest. Gross sophistry has scarce ever had any intiuencc iifion the
opinions of maiiiund, except in matters of ))hilosoiihy and si)eculation and in these it has
;
trequcntly hail the greatest.' ff'cnlth of Xotionx h. V. ch. I, art. 2.

Uiidoulili'dly, men have Lcen, and continue to bo, di-ccivcd by gross sopliistry in spccii-
Appkn.J AKlSToCJiACY AND UKMOCIUCY. 295
u system, iu connection with jai ispiudcuce and law. It may be reduced

to a small number of elementary priuci})les, liable to little doubt or
controversy ; it admits of as much certainty and simplicity as other
sciences, which enter into the course of a liberal education and it ;
ought any questions calculated to

not, if properly handled, to involve
arouse party feelings, or to alarm established authorities iu Church or
State. To which it may be added, that a judicious selection from the
best existing works on political philosophy, the law of nature and
nations, and general jurisprudence, will furnish most of the materials
which are needed for such a scientific exposition. Speculative politics,
on the other hand, is a subject which requires a gentle and cautious
treatment. Its province is vast, and almost unbounded its problems ;
are nearly indeterminate it has been cultivated without a due regard

;
to the laws of scientific analysis, and has been overlaid with fanciful
and unsound theories, by writers whose very genius has only served to
give currency to their errors, without guiding or illuminating their
way it is likewise, in each country, connected with some of the most
;
stimulating questions by which political, religious, and historical parties

ai-e divided from and embittered against each other.
If, by a science of government, is meant a science which teaches
what is the one best form of government, at all times, in all countries,
and under all circumstances, I agree with Mr, Mill,* that no such
science can exist. In like manner, the science of mechanics cannot
show what is tlie best machine for accomplishing a given purpose, in
every combination of circumstances the science of navigation cannot
;
teach how a ship is to be navigated, in every combination of circum-

stances the science of strategy cannot teach how an army is to be
;
moved, or a fortress attacked, in every combination of circtimstances.

The science of government, as it has been treated by the speculators on
ideal states, stands in nearly the same relation to positive politics, as
that in which the sacred theories of the earth propounded by Burnet
and others, and the systems of the Plutoniaus and Xeptnnians, stand to
the modern descriptive geology or as that in which the speculations
;
on the philosopher's stone and the elixir vitse stand to modem chemistry
and medicine. But if, by the science of government, is understood the
science of legislation, such a science can and does exist although its ;
lative matters. Hut I cannot perceive exemption from the dominion of

that entire
hO]»hi.stry in fjuestions of practice which Adam Smith believes to exist. That there have
been popular delusions, of tlie most dangerous kind, in practical matters vhere fear
operates, is notorious. Religious impostures, divination, astrolofry, witchcraft, have also
exercised, and in many countries continue to exercise, an almost unbounded swaj-. Nor
has pecuniary interest (as Adam Smith seems to think) been any preservative against
error. —
Commercial buijbles of all sorts from the South Sea scheme downwards make a —
long chapter and surely the various economical delusions, which Adam Smith himself
;
exposed, and which are still to a great extent current, have a close connection with
practire.
' See his Si/ntrm of L'^gir. vol. I[. p. J7S. Compare p. b'J%.
296 DISTINCTION BETWEEN .iRISTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY. [Apfen.
objects are different from those of positive politics, and its certainty
importance is greater.
inferior, while its
In whatever manner we look at these two departments of political
—
science whether we compare their objects, the evidence on which they
rest, or the subjects with which they are connected it is manifest —
that the cultivation of positive politics has everything to lose, and
nothing to gain, by an association with its more ambitious and pre-
tending neighbour.
These remarks, however, are not intended to discourage the in-
vestigation of that important class of subjects which fall under the
domain of speculative politics, or the science of legislation. Their
purpose is merely to recommend the separation of departments of
knowledge, which are in their nature different. The field of political
science will be better ctdtivated, if its sevei'al portions are clearly
marked off, and placed under appropriate labourex'S.
The speculative branch of politics, consisting of inquiries into
the tendencies of political forms, the probable effects of certain laws
and and the best means of promoting the welfare of a
institutions,
civil must be combined, to a great extent, with historical
society,
and statistical researches and, perhaps, some of its most useful
;
and soundest theories are to be found in connection with avowed

collections or narratives of facts. With the prevailing tendency of
the civilised world to look in all things scientific for a positive basis
of fact, historical writers, in all the various forms which the registra-
tion of hiunan transactions can assume, and not speculators on the
most perfect form of government, are the principal teachers of poHtical
wisdom.'
It ought not, however, to be overlooked, that a distinct, precise,
and complete conception of positive politics, and of the ideas involved
in it, is a necessary preliminary to a successful excursion into the region
of speculative politics. In order that a person should describe the
character, trace the effects, and predict tlie probable future operation,
of political forms and institutions, he must previously understand wliat
they are, how they arise, and in what they consist. He must have a
familiar knowledge of the tools with which he is to work he must ;
know the value of the coins with which his traffic is to be carried on.
If, therefore, the separation of these two departments should tend to
give greater clearness and certainty to those fundamental ideas on

wliich all political science is built, it would, in its consequences, prove
an effectual assistance to Political Speculation.
1 Sec above, p. 1(n;.
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M.A. Fourth Edition. Vol. I. Svo.

and Disease. Ecp. Svo. is. 6d, \
I2s. Vol. II. nearly rccuiy.
My Home Farm. By The Patentee's Manual

Mrs. John Hii.l Burto.v. Crown a Treatise on the Law and Practice of
Svo. 3A bd. Letters Patent, for the use of Patentees
and Inventors. By J. Johnson and
Rents and Purchases ; or,
J. H. Johnson. Fourth Edition,
the Valuation of Landed
Property; enlarged. Svo. price \os. 6d.
Woods, Minerals, Buildings, &c. By
JOH.N Scott. Crown Svo. 6s. Willich's Popular Tables
Arranged in a New Form, giving Infor-
Economic Studies. By mation <S:c. equally adapted for the Office
the late Waltkr Bagehot, M.A. and the Library. 9th Edition, edited
Edited by R. H, HuTTON. Svo. los. 6d. by M. Marriott. Crown Svo. loj.
INDEX.
Abbey 6* Overton's English Church History 14 Ayre's Treasury of Bible Knowledge 20
Abney's Photography 10
Acton's Modern Cookery 20 Bacon's Essays, by Whately 5
A. K. H. D. Essays of 7 Life and Letters, by Spedding ...
5
y'/Z/cw" J Flowers and their Pedigrees 11 Promus, edited by A/z-j. Pott 5
Amott's Elements of Physics 9 Works 5
Alpine Club Map of Switzerland 17 Bagehot's Biographical Studies 4
Guide (The) 17 Economic Studies 2r
Amos' s lurisprudcnce 5 Literary Studies 6
Primer of the Constitution 5 Bailey's Festus, a Poem 18
50 Years of English Constitution 5 Bain s ]a.mts Mill and J. S. Mill 4
Anderson's Strength of Materials 10 Mental and Moral Science 6
Armstrong' s Organic Clicmistry 10 on the Senses and Intellect 5
Arnolds (Dr.) Lectures on Modem History i Emotions and Will 5
Miscellaneous Works 15 Baker's Two Works on Ceylon 17
Sermons 15 fidiZ/'j Alpine Guides 17
(T.) English Literature 6 P^lements of Astronomy
5(i//'5 lo
Atelier (The) du Lys 18 ^drry on Railway Appliances 10
Atherstone Priory 18 Z?<z«<rrwrT»'j Mineralogy 10 & 11
Autumn Holidays of a Country Parson ... 7 Beaconsfield's (Lord) Novels and Tales 17 tSc i8
.
22 WORKS published by LONGMANS &> CO.
Beaconsfield's (Lord) Speeches i Dewes's Life and Letters of St. Paul 15

W'it and Wisdom 6 Dixon's Rural Bird Life 11&19
Becker s Charicles and Gallus 7 Doyle's English in America i
Beesly's Gracchi, Marius, and Sulla Dresser's Arts of Japan 12

3
Black's Treatise on Brewing 20
Blackley's German-English Dictionary 7 Eastlakes Hints on Household Taste 13
Bloxam &= Huntington s Metals 10 Five Great Painters 13
Boultbee on 39 Articles 14 Foreign Picture Galleries 13
's History of the English Church... 14 Edershcini s 'ê's,\x'=> the Messiah 16
Bournes Works on the Steam Engine...i3&i4 Edmonds's Elementary Botany 11
Bawdier' s Family Shakespeare 19 Scripture Commentaries
£//i£rc?«'i 15
Bramley-Moore s Six Sisters of the Valleys . 18 Lectures on Life of Christ 15
Bramston if Leroy's Historic Winchester . 2
Elsa and her Vulture 18
Brande's Diet, of Science, Literature, & Art 11 Epochs of Ancient History 3
Brassey's British Navy 13 English History 3
Sunshine and Storm in the East 17 Modem History ,....
Voyage in the 'Sunbeam' 3
17 Evans's Bronze Implements 11
iJnryj Elements of Morality 16
Ewalds Antiquities of Israel 15
Browne's Exposition of the 39 Articles 14 Apostolic Age 15
Browning's Modern "Englawd. 3 Christ and His Times 15
Buckle's History of Civilisation 2
History of Israel 15
Buckton's Food and Home Cookery 21
Health in the House 12&21
BulVs Hints to Mothers 21 Fairbairns Information for Engineers 13
Maternal Management of Children 21 Mills and Millwork 13
Burgomaster's Family (The) 18 Farrar's Language and Languages 7
Burton's Home Farm 21 Eitziuygram on Horses 19
Francis's Fishing Book 19
Freetnati's Historical Geography 2
Cabinet Lawyer 20 United States 16
Calvert's Wife's Manual 16 Froude's Caesar 4
Cafes' s Age oi \.\\e Antonines 3 English in Ireland i
Early Roman Empire 3 History of England i
Carlylc s Reminiscences 4 Luther 3
Life 4 Short Studies 6
(Mrs.) Letters and Memorials ... 4
Cates's Biographical Dictionary 4
Cayley s l\\2L.d oi Homer 19 Gairdner's Houses of Lancaster and York 3
Changed Aspects of Unchanged Truths ... Ganot's Elementary Physics 9
7
Chesney's Waterloo Campaign 2 Natural Philosophy 9
Christ our Ideal 16 Gardiiier's History of England 2
Church's Beginning of the Middle Ages ... Outline of English History 2
3
Colenso's Pentateuch and Book of Joshua . 16 Puritan Resolution 3
Commonplace Philosopher Thirty Years' War 3
7
Conder's Handbook to the Bible (Mrs.) French Revolution 3
15
Glazebrook's Physical Optics 10
Coniiigton s Translation of Virgil's Êneid 19
Prose Translation of Virgil's Goethe's Faust, by Birds 18
Poems 18 bySelss 18
Contanseau s Two French Dictionaries ... 7
by Webb 18
Conybeare And Howson's Si. Paul 15 Goodeve's Mechanics and Mechanism 13
Cotta on Rocks, by Lawrence 11 Gore's Electro-Metallurgy 10
Counsel and Comfort from a City Pulpit... Gospel (The) for the Nineteenth Century . 16
7
Cox's (G. W.) Athenian Empire Grant's Ethics of Aristotle 5
3
Crusades University of Edinburgh 6
3
General History of Greece 2 Graver Thoughts of a Country Parson 7
Greeks and Persians Gr«//7/<:' J Journal i
3
Creighton s Ageof Elizabeth Griffin's Algebra and Trigonometry 10
3
England a Continental Power Grove on Correlation of Physical Forces... 9
3
Papacyduring the Reformation 2, 14 Gw ill's Encyclopaedia of Architecture 13
Shilling History of England ...
^———— Tudors and the Reformation
3
3 Hale's Fall of the Stuarts 3
Cresy's Encyclopaedia of Civil Engineering 14 Halliwell-Phillipps's Outlines of Shake-
Critical Essays of a Country Parson 7 speare's Life 4
Culley's Handbook of Telegraphy 13 //,/w/7/y«'.( (Sir W.) Life 4
Curteis's Macedonian Empire 3 Hart's (Bret) In the Carquinez Woods ...
Hartwig's Works on Popular Natural
Davidson's New Testament History, &c lo&ii
14
Dead Shot (The) 19
HassaU's Climate of San Remo \7
De Caisne and Le Maout's Botany 11 Hatton's Whom Nature Leadeth 17
De TocquevilW s Democracy in America-.^ Haughton's Physical Geography ib
5
WORKS publisfud by LONGMANS 6- CO. 23
J/ealon's Memoir 3 Macaulay's (Lord) Life and Letters

Heer s Primeval World of SwitzerLind 4
11 Miscellaneous Writings 6
Helmholtz's Scientific Lectures
9 Speeches 6
Henchtrs Outlines of Astronomy 8 Works
•
1
JL'tarfs Medical I-anguage of St. Luke... 6 Writings, Selections from 6
Hope's Because of the Angels M'CulLii;h's Tracts
17
//4>/^/«/i Christ the Consoler 9
16 A/cCiirM/i Epoch of Reform
Horses and Roads 3
lo McCulloch's Dictionary of Commerce 8
y/<w///'j Visits to
Remarkable Places Macfarren on Musical Harmony
19 12
Hullah's History of Modem Music 11 Macleods Economical Philosophy
4
Transition Period
Iliilmes Art- Instruction in England
H Elements of Banking 31
13 Elements of Economics. 21
Hume's I'hilosophicU Works 6 Theory and Practice of Banking 21
Macnamara's Himalayan Districts 17
Ihne's Rome to its Capture by the Gauls... q Mademoiselle Mori
la the Olden Time ig
17 Mahaffy's Classical Greek Literature
Ingelaw's Poems '.....'. 3
18 Manning's Mission of the Holy Ghost ... 16
Afari/iwa«'j Life of Havelock
y^/ô'j Inorganic Chemistry 4
12 Martineau's Christian Life 16
'Jameson's Sacred and Legendary Art 12 •
Hours of Thought 16
y^-^T/Vj' Stor>' of my Heart 6 Hymns ^ 16
Jenkins Electricity and Magnetism 10 Maunder' s Popular Treasuries
Johnson's Normans 20
inEurope 3 Mjjrw^//" J Don John of Austria 2
Patentee's Manual 21 Theory of Heat
Johnston's Geographical Dictionary
,»... 10
8 Mays History of Democracy „,. i
Jukes's New Man History of England
1^ i
Second Death 15 Melville's (Whyte) Novels and Tales 18
Types of Genesis i^ Mendelssohn s Letters
4
Merivale's Fall of the Roman Republic ... 2
AaZ/jfA'^ Bible Studies
j^ General History of Rome 2
Commentary on the Bible 15 Roman Triumvirates
Path and Goal 3
5 Romans under the Empire 2
Keary's Outlines of Primitive Belief 6 Merrifields Arithmetic and Mensuration... 10
Kellers Lake Dwellings of Swiueriand.... 11 Miles on Horse's Foot and Horse Shoeing
Kerts Metallurgy, by Crookes and Rohrig. 19
14 on Horse's Teeth and Stables iq
A'c^j/ZZ/^'i Life of Luther Mill (J.) on the Mind
4 4
Miirs{]. S.) Autobiography
Landscapes, Churches, &c 4
7 Dissertations & Discussions
Latham's English Dictionaries 5
7 Essays on Religion 15
Handbook of English Language "
7 Hamilton's Philosophy
Lecky's History of England 5
i Liberty
Eiu-opean Morals g
2 Political Economy
Rationalism 5
2 Representative Government
Leaders of Public Opinion 5
4 Subjection of Women
Leisure Hours in Town 5
7 System of Logic 5
ZL«//V J Political and Moral Philosophy 6
... Unsettled Questions 5
Lessons of Middle Age Utilitarianism
7 5
Z,«^«' J History of Philosophy 2 Millard's GrdLmmax of Elocution
£«</« on Authority 7
6 Miller's Elements of Chemistry 12
iL?a'(f^//and5<:o//'i Greek-English Lexicons 8 Inorganic Chemistry
Lindley and Moore's Treasury of Botany ...
lo&ia
20 Social Science Readings 21
Lloyd's Magnetism Wintering in the Riviera
9 17
Longmans W.) Chess Openings
(F.
Frederic the Great
20 Milncr's Country Pleasures
Mitcheirs Manual of Assaying
n
""^~~ 3 14
German Dictionary ... 7 Modem Novelist's Library 18
(W.) Edward the Third 2 Monck's Logic e
Lectures on H
istory of England 2 Monselfs Spiritual Songs 16
St. Paul's
Cathedral 12 Moore's Irish Melodies, Illustrated Edition la
——
Loudon's Encyclopcedia of Agriculture
Gardening...ii&i4
... 14 Lalla Rookh, Illustrated Edition..
Morris's Age of Anne
12
;— Plants II Mozley's Reminiscences of Oriel College...

3
4
Lubbock's Origin of Civilisation 11 Muller's Chips from a German Workshop.
Ludlow's American War of Independence 7
3 Lectures on India
Lyra Germanica 7
16 Origin &c. of Religion 16
Science of Language
A/acrt/w/^/j Vertebrate Animals 7
10 Science of Religion 16
Macaulay's (Lord) Essays i Selected Essays
— History of England ... i
7
Lays, Illus. Edits. ...12 & 18 Neison on the Moon 8
Cheap Edition.,. 18 Nevile's Morses and Riding 19
24 WORKS published by LONGMANS 6- CO.
New Testament (The) Illustrated 12 Smith's (Dr. R. A.) Air and Rain 8
Newmans Apologia pro Vita Sua 4 (J.
Shipwreck of St. Paul 15
Nicols's Puzzle of Life 11 5tJ«//;6y J- Poetical Works 19
Northcott's Lathes & Turning 13 &^ Bowles's Correspondence 4
Stanley's Familiar History of Birds 11
. Oliphant's In Trust 17 5to/ on Diseases of the Ox 19
5/^/,%<:«'j Ecclesiastical Biography 4
Our Little Life, by A. K. H. B 7
Anatomy and Stotiehenge, Dog and Greyhound 19
Owen's (R.) Comparative
Physiology of Vertebrate Animals 10 St abbs' s Early Plantagenets 3
i Experimental Physiology ... 10 Sunday Afternoons, by A. K. H.B 7
Evenings with the Skeptics ... 6 Supernatural Religion 6&1S
(J.) Swinburne' s Picture Logic 5
/•(yw'i Thicker than Water ^^
/'^rry'jGreek and Roman Sculpture 12 Tancock's England during the Wars,
Payen's Industrial Chemistry 13 1765-1820 3
Pewtner's Comprehensive Specifier 20 Taylor s History of India 3
P/wj^'j Art of Perfumery 14 Ancient and Modem History ... 3
Pole's GameWhist of 20 {Jeremy) Works, edited by Eden 16
Porter's Knights of Malta 2 Text-Books of Science 10
Powells Early England 3 Thomi's Botany 10
Preece 8c Srjewri^/ifs Telegraphy 10 Thomson s Laws of Thought 6
Present-Day Thoughts 7 Thorpe s Quantitative Analysis 10
Proctor s Astronomical Works 8&9 Thorpe and Mtiir's Qualitative Analysis ... 10
Scientific Essays 11 Three in Norway 16
Public Schools Atlases 8 Thudichiini s Annals of Chemical Medicine 12
Tilden's Chemical Philosophy 10
Practical Chemistry 12
Qiiain's Dictionary of Medicine
7>«;'^/>'(Z«'j Life of Fox i
Trollope's Warden and Barchester Towers i3
Rawlinson's Ancient Egypt 2 Twiss's Law of Nations in Time of War... 5
Sassanians 2 Tyndalls (Professor) Scientific Works... 9& 10
Recreations of a Country Parson 7
Reeve's Cookery and Housekeeping 20
Reynolds's Experimental Chemistry 12 Unawares i3
^«VA' J Dictionary of Antiquities Under Sunny Skies, a Novel 17
7
Rivers' s Orchard House 11 Unwin's Machine Design 10
Rose Amateur's Guide 11 Ure's Arts, Manufactures, and Mines 14
Robinson's Arden, a Novel ^^
Rogers's Eclipse of Faith and its Defence 15 Villeon Artificial Manures ... 14
Roget's English Thesaurus 7 Von Bothcncr's Aut Caesar Aut Nihil 17
Ronalds' Fly-Fisher's Entomology 19
^(Tw/^yj Rise of the People 3
Settlement of the Constitution ...
3 Walker on Wliist 20
Rutley's Study of Rocks lo&ii Walpole's History of England i
Warburton s Edward the Third 3
"
Watson's Geometry 10
Saltouti's (Lord) Scraps 4 Watts' s Dictionary of Chemistry 12
.S(Z«rfar/i Justinian's Institutes S Webb's Celestial Objects 8
Sparta and Thebes
.Sa«/io''i 3 Weld' s Sacred Palmlands 17
Schellen'sSpectrum Analysis 9 Wellington's Life, by Gleig
Rents and Purchases
iVi?/^'i 21 4
Whately's English Synonymes 7
Seaside Musings 7 Logic and Rhetoric
Seebohm's Oxford Reformers of 1498 2 5
White's Four Gospels in Greek 15
Protestant Revolution 3 and Riddle's Latin Dictionaries ... 8
. Village Community 5 Wilcocks's Sea-Fisherman 19
Sennctl's Marine Steam Engine 13 H^/7//'<z»tj'j Aristotle's Ethics
Seth b' Haldane' s Philosophical Essays ... 6 5
Williclis Popular Tables 21
Sewelts Passing Thoughts on Religion ... 16
H^//jo«' J Studies of Modern Mind 6
Preparation for Communion 16
Witt's Myths of Hellas, translated by
Stories and Tales 18
Younghiisband
Seymour's Hebrew Psalter 16 3
Wood's Works on Natural History 10
Shelley's Workshop Apphances 10
Church History
5A^>r/'j 14
Stmcox's Latin Literature 2 Yonge's English-Greek Lexicons ,.... 8
SkobelefT and the Slavonic Cause 4 Youatt on the Dog and Horse 19
Smith's {Sydney) Wit and Wisdom 6
R P). )Carthagc & the Carthaginians
( . 2
Rome and Carthage 4 Zeller's Greek Philosophy q
Spottitwood* 6f* Co. Printers, New-street Square, London.

BD Lewis, Sir George Corne-
wall, b&rt.
U7 An essay on the in-
1875 fluence of anthority in
matters of opinion 2d ed.
PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE

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•

The LIFE and LETTERS of LORD INIACAULAY. By his

The IXDIAN ALPS and HOW WE CROSSED THEM; a

A JOURNEY of a THOUSAND MILES THROUGH EGYPT

The LIFE, WORKS, and OPINIONS of HEINRICH HEINE.

DISCOVERIES at EPHESUS, including the Site and Eemains

The SEVENTH GREAT ORIENTAL MONARCHY, or a History

'The FROSTY CAUCASUS;' an Acconnt of a Walk through

TYROL and the TYROLESE : being an Account of the People

ITALIAN ALPS ; Sketches from the Mountains between the

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, HIS LIFE and HIS PHILO-

LECTURES DELIVERED in A:\IERICA in 1874. By Charles

CHIPS from a GERMAN WORKSHOP. By F. Max Muller,

LECTURES on the SCIENCE of LANGUAGE. By F. Max

SOCIAL STATICS, or the ABSTRACT LAWS of HUMAN

HISTORY of the REPUBLIC of FLORENCE. Translated from

The LAW of NATIONS CONSIDERED as INDEPENDENT

The HISTORY of MODERN MUSIC, a Course of Lectures

The TRANSITION PERIOD of MUSICAL HISTORY: a

HIGGLEDY-PIGGLEDY ; or, Stories for Everybody and Every-

GENERAL HISTORY of ROxME from the Foundation of the

GENERAL HISTORY of GREECE from the Earliest Epoch to

The NEW REFORMATION ; a Narrative of the Origin, Rise,

Professor HELMHOLTZ on the SENSATIONS of TONE, as a

London : LONGMANS & CO,

8PCTTISW0ODE AND KEW-STIIKET

GEORGE CORNEAVALL LEWIS, ESQ.

ON TUE NATVKK OF AUTHORITY IN MATTERS OF OPINION.

Relation between this subject and logical science .....

ON THE EXTENT OF OPINIONS FOUNDED UPON AUTHORITY.

Children derive their opinions from the authority of their parents

4. Disposition to defer to the authority of others, arising from the habit of

ON THE MARKS OF TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY.

fully in theory, or have had experience of it in practice . 19

lliat his moral feelings must be in a proper state

11. Additional indications of trustworthy authority

(1.) Agreement or consensus of competent judges . . . .29

1. Gradual progress to agreement in scientific matters . . . .46

5. Causes of the existence of numerous Christian churches and sects 49 .

the standard of religious truth 63

10. Differences of opinion as to the organs of the true church .58 . .

General results as to church authority and private judgment

ON TTIE rxn^ITT and proper PROVINCE OF AtTTHORITT.

of obtaiuiui; advice iu the piu'chase of goods . . . .87

9. Advice in joint deliberation 88

Note to Chapter V 107

ON THE IftTMBER OP THE PEBSONS COIIPETEXT TO GUIDE OTUSJO'S ON ANT BXJB-

ON THE APPLICABILITY OP PRINCIPLE OF AFTHORITY TO THE DECISIONS

1. In the decisions of political bodies opinions must be counted, and not

5. Manner in which the decision of a political body is made 140 . . .

6. In administrative and judicial bodies unanimity is sometimes required,

that a political body, having adopted a measure, should not throw

the responsibility upon its advisers . . . . . . .153

adopted to modify the simple numerical principle in the

(1.) Voting by composite units . . . . . . .158

Notes to Chapter VII 1(;U

ON THE EELATION OF TliE PRIN^CIPLE OF ATJTHORITT TO THE DEMOCRATIC

Objections to this theory as applied to govermuent