GROWING the Democratic Toolbox:

CITY Council Vote Tracking

Jeromy Anton Farkas September 20, 2013

KEY POINTS
Taking voluminous data that can be in difficult formats and parsing it into robust statistical indicators of performance is challenging, but surmountable. The system has been developed with other cities in mind, and the Foundation intends to grow this pilot to other cities in the coming years. The main challenge is that Council votes do not always contemplate familiar political divides explicitly and unambiguously. For example a decision to discount a user fee is a decision to increase taxes, but this is not stated explicitly, so judgment must be used. The methodology involves a combination of behavioural analysis (such as attendance and support for in camera time), coalition analysis (who regularly votes with and against whom?) and policy analysis (in this case who most regularly supports higher or lower taxes and spending). In systems with political parties, the public choice is simplified by candidates signing up for the values of a political party. In Calgary, and likely other cities, there is strong opposition to slates and parties entering the political sphere. An initiative such as this may offer the best of both worlds by helping to understand how independent candidates vote on the issues.

Key Findings relevant to the calgary Pilot

1. 19 per cent of Calgary council business is conducted in camera, and most council meetings (78%) proceeded with at least some portion being behind closed doors. The topics most commonly discussed in camera are issues relating to personnel, intergovernmental relations, and procurement, sales, and leases. 2. Councilors attitudes toward taxing and spending vary strongly, with some routinely voting for less spending and others voting for more expenditures. 3. There are two clear voting blocs on the Council that regularly vote together, one of which is much more successful than the other in getting motions passed. There is also a third group who vote more randomly in respect of other councillors. 4. Ten Council members get their way about 70% or more of the time while the remaining five get their preferred outcome much less often. Councilors odds in passing motions vary strongly, with some consistently winning and others usually voting against successful motions. 5. Five councilors abstained themselves from Council business due to a pecuniary interest, with Councilor Mar accounting for most declarations of conflict. 6. Most councilors will vote in favour of most of motions brought forward, while two in particular will usually vote against. 7. There is a large variation in the number of questions asked at question period, with Councilor Chabot accounting for a quarter of the total questions asked, while other Councilors generally ask few. 8. Attendance seems very high, with the most meetings missed by any Councilor being six, or an average of just over two per year. Reasons for absences are generally not given in Council minutes.

GROWING the democratic toolbox

What do CalGarians Want, Policy-Wise?
Last October, as part of its Municipal Governance Project, the Manning Foundation conducted a large poll of over 4,000 people to identify Calgarians policy priorities.1 Among the results of this poll were several results related to the democratic process: Calgarians rank making city hall more accountable fourth behind congestion, affordability, and safety Calgarians very strongly oppose a party system in municipal politics Calgarians generally favour the Council holding the line on taxes as opposed to raising them. In view of these results, the Manning Foundation has initiated an ambitious project to measure statistically whether Calgary City Councilors vote in accordance with the wishes of Calgarians,
4

and analyze the general patterns of voting, attendance, and behavior. The Manning Foundation regards democratic accountability as vital to modern society. Essential to democratic accountability is the ability of the public to monitor the representation they receive. However, this monitoring is an immense challenge for the public, whose time is valuable and who face many demands. In one year a council can meet for 300 hours in total, while considering thousands of motions, some of which have policy implications and many of which are merely procedure. The aim of this project is to develop a methodology that simplifies and summarizes voluminous data emanating from Canadian council chambers and presents it to the public. At the provincial and federal levels of government, and in some municipalities, this information is filtered through party lenses, so it is easy for the public to see what general

positions an elected representative is likely to take. However in Calgary and likely in other municipalities, there is great opposition to this kind of party organization at the municipal level. The intent here is to provide the best of both worlds: independent candidates, and highly accessible information about how they vote. This pilot report is a first attempt at this ambitious project. It is designed to show what is possible by assembling quantitative data on a law making body where representatives do not vote along party lines. The research uses a selection of seventy-three votes taken from eighty City of Calgary Council Meetings3 from November 8th, 2010 to April 22, 2013.4 The intention is that this pilot will develop a technology and methodology that can be expanded to other municipalities in Alberta and across Canada.

Our research conducted incorporates: Coalitions (who votes with whom?) Vote analysis (who votes to raise or lower spending?) Win rate (who votes with the pack, who votes against?) Motion support (are some Councilors motions more likely to succeed?) Time spent in camera (how much of Councils meeting time is behind closed doors?) Opposition to secrecy (do any Councilors routinely oppose moving in camera?) Topics discussed in secret (what are the most common topics discussed in camera?) Question period/language complexity (are some Councilors easier or more difficult to understand than others, and what are they talking about?) Pecuniary declarations (who abstains themselves from proceedings because they have a conflict of interest?) Attendance records (who attends the most meetings, and what are the reasons given for absences?)

Methodology
These motions used for this report are not a scientific sample, and instead were selected to be votes on issues judged to command the public interest. Such a selection is necessary for any exercise such as this because a great many votes are procedural and tell us little about the policy positions that City Council is pursuing. As such, this report should not be reported as a definitive conclusion on the behavior of any particular Councilor, however the sample does show some strong themes (see key findings).

section A: The voting record

What votes matter to the public?
When given a list of relevant issues, Calgarians expressed concern about the citys cost of living and demonstrated a preference to hold the line on taxes rather than increase taxes to improve city services. In addition, it is comparatively easy to assess whether fiscal votes align with public preferences, because there is a large pool of them to sample, and they tend to be identifiably for or against higher spending. For these reasons, the seventy-three motions selected for this report were votes that dealt in some way with spending or taxation. Penalty abatement for late payment of property taxes, due to the postal strike. Lost on 2011-06-20. City Council pay increases. Passed on 201201-23. The change of the Golf Course Operations mandate from fully self-sufficient to tax supported. Passed on 2012-10-15. Addition of $12.2 million in new capital for Cycling Strategy Implementation. Passed on 2011-11-21.

Results
Figure 1 uses a taxpayer friendly score to depict how often, out of the seventy-three votes selected, each Councilor voted to hold the line on, or reduce, spending when given the opportunity. For example, Councilor Chabot voted in such a way for 55 of the 73 votes considered, earning a score of 75.3%.

Examples of motions selected

A property tax rate increase of 10.4% for municipal purposes. Passed on 2011-04-11. A property tax rate increase of 5.1% for municipal purposes. Passed on 2012-03-19. A property tax rate increase of 13.0% for municipal purposes. Passed on 2013-04-22. A scoping study to determine a better structure for the taxi industry. Passed on 2011-04-18.
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FIGURE 1
taxpayer friendly score
Percentage scale. 100 points means that the individual always votes to hold the line 0n, or reduce spending when given the opportunity.

58.9

28.8

21.9

16.4

20.5

21.9

28.8

31.5

34.2

42.5

49.3

50.7

63

68.5

75.3

section B: voting ANALYSIS

While the seventy-three votes considered for this project are not exhaustive or definitive, they provide an opportunity to gain some further insights on how members of City Council interact with one another on important issues. This section provides a glimpse into those interactions by showing whether Councilors are likely to move or second motions, vote no against a motion, and vote with or against the majority. Figure 2 demonstrates that there are three distinct groups, with six Councilors who rarely move or second motions, four who do sometimes, and five who are regular movers and seconders.

FIGURE 2
Movers and seconders
Number of motions put forward and seconded, by council member.
Note that not all proposed motions or amendments are seconded.

Moved

Seconded 3 3 8 9 9 16 6 9

2 4 2 5 2 5 4 9 2 9

4 1

10 5

Figure 3 demonstrates that most Council members (thirteen of fifteen) are more likely to vote in support of a given motion than against it. Councilors Chabot and Hodges are the exception in that they are not only significantly more likely to vote against motions than their peers, but they also vote no more than they vote yes in absolute terms.

FIGURE 3
Percentage scale depicting frequency of no votes, by council member.

No votes

46.6

37.0

34.3

34.3

34.3

32.9

34.3

35.6

37.0

38.4

39.7

42.5

46.6

56.2

57.5

Figure 4 depicts the general win rate for each council member, or in percentage terms how often they were on the winning side of either passing or blocking a motion. Councilors Chabot and Demong are the only council members that are usually on the losing side of a given vote. Councilor Pootmans is the most likely to be on the winning side of a vote.

FIGURE 4
Percentage scale depicting win rate as a voter, by council member.

Success Rate as a voter

83.6

69.9

71.2

10

41.1

45.2

50.7

60.3

65.8

74

75.3

78.1

79.5

83.6

84.9

90.4

Figure 5 depicts the general win rate for motions attached to individual council member as either a mover or seconder, or in percentage terms how often they succeeded in getting a motion passed. While moving and seconding may be seen as an arbitrary task undertaken as a matter of protocol, note that the Councilors with lower win rates generally also have lower rates for votes that they move.

FIGURE 5
Percentage scale depicting win rate for motions attached to council member.

Success rate as a mover or seconder

100

100

100

66.7

9.1

26.7

42.9

57.1

61.5

64.7

66.7

75

89.5

90.9

100

11

Figure 6 uses a matrix in order to depict the individual agreement between council members. This table highlights the likelihood in percentage terms that a given person will vote the same way as another (either both in support or in opposition to a given motion).

FIGURE 6
Percentage scale depicting agreement on votes, by council member. Shading scales from red (0%) to orange (50%) to green (100%)

Who Votes with whoM

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Figure 7 uses an index to represent how often each Councilor is in agreement with their peers (the cumulative voting data as taken from the previous figure). A higher score on this index means that that individual more often votes with with the rest of council, while a lower score shows they vote with their peers less often.

FIGURE 7
Sum of data from Figure 6, by council member.

AGREEMENT Index

747

792

842

915

921

947

951

968

973

977

979

981

982

1005

1032

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Figures 8-A to 8-D visualize the data from the previous figures in order display individual breakdowns by council member. For example, the graph Who votes with Nenshi shows that Councilor Farrell votes with Mayor Nenshi 47 per cent of the time, whereas Councilor Carra votes with him 73 per cent of the time.

FIGURE 8a
Council AND MAYOR VOTING COMPARISONs
Percentage scale comparison of who votes with Nenshi, Carra, and Colley-Urquhart.

WHO VOTES WI TH N EN SHI

62 59 56 49 47 49 55 56 58 59 60 62 71 73

WHO VOTES WI TH CA R R A
55 59 62 63 66 70 71 73 74 79 81 84

WHO VOTES WI TH COL L EY-U R QU HA R T

38 40 47 49 52 56 63 63 63 67 67 68 73 78

14

32 38

FIGURE 8B
COUNCILOR VOTING COMPARISONS
Percentage scale comparison of who votes with Chabot, Demong, Farrell, and Hodges.

85

25 25 26 32 36 40 42 45 51 55 56 62 68

WHO VOTES WI TH FA R R EL L
25 32 37 47 55 58 70 71 73 74 79 85 89 89

27 32 32 37 38 47 47 49 52 56 58 62 71

WHO VOTES WI TH HODGES

55 48 52 55 58 59 62 63 68 71
15

37

37

38

40

85

WHO VOTES WI TH CHA B OT

WHO VOTES WI TH DEMON G

FIGURE 8C
COUNCILOR VOTING COMPARISONS
Percentage scale comparison of who votes with Jones, Keating, Lowe, and Macleod.

WHO VOTES WI TH JON ES

59 58 52 55 55 56 58 59 60 62 63 68 70 78

WHO VOTES WI TH KEATI N G

51 52 55 55 56 59 62 62 62 63 64 67 68 71

WHO VOTES WI TH L OWE

36 37 37 49 55 55 62 66 71 77 78 81 85 89

WHO VOTES WI TH MA CL EOD

48 51 58 59 59 68 70 73 84 85 85 88 26 27

16

FIGURE 8D
COUNCILOR VOTING COMPARISONS
Percentage scale comparison of who votes with Mar, Pincott, Pootmans, and Stevenson.

WHO VOTES WI TH MA R
45 49 55 59 62 63 63 63 66 67 70 70 70 71

WHO VOTES WI TH PI N COTT

25 32 40 52 55 58 63 64 67 77 79 81 88 89

WHO VOTES WI TH POOTMA N S

42 47 52 62 67 67 67 70 71 73 77 77 79 81

WHO VOTES WI TH STEVEN SON

51 52 56 58 58 62 63 64 64 66 70 70 71 78
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section C: COALITIONS
Using the previously determined who votes with whom data, we can compare Councilors outlook toward the rest of council to see if they, as groups, tend to disagree or agree with certain individuals. The following six case studies examine the voting relationships between Councilors. Figure 9 demonstrates a pronounced difference in how Councilors Farrell and Chabot vote, and is used as the first case study. Farrell and Chabot rarely vote the same way (25%). They were chosen for this case study because they have the most marked difference in how they vote out of any of the fifteen members of council. Councillors who vote more often with one are more likely to vote against the other.

FIGURE 9
How Councilors Chabot and Farrell vote versus the rest of council.
100 85 74 56 47 32 73 68 58 55 62 55 36 26 100 89 85 71 45 25 89 79 70 51

Coalition Case study 1

40 25

32

37 25

42

Chabot
18

Farrell

Figure 10 demonstrates the similarities in voting behaviour between Councilors Farrell and Macleod, and is used as the second case study. Farrell and Macleod very often vote the same way (85%). Both councilors vote with Chabot, Demong, and Hodges less than half of the time. Farrell tends to vote more often with Pootmans and Stevenson, and Macleod tends to vote more often with Carra and Nenshi. Farrell and Macleod both vote very often with Pincott and Lowe.

FIGURE 10
How Councilors Farrell and Macleod vote versus the rest of council.
100 84 74 59 47 26 25 32 27 85 73 68 48 37 59 58 55 51 89 85 100 85 71 70

Coalition Case study 2

89 88

79 73

70 58

Farrell

Macleod
19

Figure 11 demonstrates an overall similarity in how Councilors Jones, Keating and Mar vote, and is used as the third case study. Jones, Keating, and Mar tend to agree with each of the other council members around 50-70% of the time. Despite having similar outlooks regarding their fellow Councilors, these three individuals voting patterns are not necessarily similar. While they may agree and disagree with other Councilors on a similar number of votes, they do not not necessarily agree and disagree on the same votes.

FIGURE 11
Coalition Case study 3
How Councilors Jones, Keating, and Mar vote versus the rest of council.

100 100 70 62 59 71 56 49 71 58 55 70 59 51

100 70 67 78 70 64

62 60 59

63 56 52

62 55 45

63 59 55

68 63

68 62

66 55

63 62

63 58 52

Jones

Keating

Mar

20

Figure 12 demonstrates that Carra, Colley-Urquhart, Farrell, Lowe, Macleod and Pincott appear to have closely shared agreement in regards to the rest of council, and is used as the fourth case study. There is a close overlap between these six council members. Colley-Urquhart is more inclined to agree with Demong or Chabot than the rest of the group (but still at less than 50%), and less inclined to agree with Pincott and Macleod (but still at 67% and 68% respectively). Carra is generally more supportive of Nenshi. They regularly vote together and against all others, including Nenshi, Jones, and Mar but especially against Chabot, Demong and Hodges.

FIGURE 12
Coalition Case study 4
How Councilors Carra, Colley-Urquhart, Farrell, Lowe, Macleod, and Pincott vote versus the rest of council.

100

100 78 73 68 67
63

100 89 85
74 73 55 62 59 58 55 52

100 89 85 81 78
71

100 88 85 84 68 71 70 70 66 63

100 89 88 81 79 67
81 79 77 73 67

73

59 55 49 47

84 79 74 71 63

40 36 26 25
32

47
38 37 32 27

48 40 38 37

56 55 52 51

59

70 66 64 63 62 58

Carra

Colley-Urquhart

Farrell

Lowe

Macleod

Pincott

21

Figure 13 demonstrates significant commonality in how Councilors Chabot, Demong, and Hodges vote, and is used as the fifth case study. Chabot and Demong are more likely to agree with each other, but they are not as likely to agree with Hodges. Chabot, Demong, and Hodges vote against Carra, Colley-Urquhart, Farrell, Lowe, Macleod, and Pincott more than half the time. Hodges tends to be more likely to vote the same way as Nenshi (71%) than Chabot (58%) and Demong (56%).

FIGURE 13
Coalition Case study 5
How Councilors Chabot, Demong, and Hodges vote versus the rest of council.

100 100 85 71 58 56 68 55 38 32 47 40 38 85 62 37 32 25

100 71 63 62 37 36 48 27 26

68 62

59 56 55

55 49 45

40 32 25

52 47 42

58 52 51

Chabot

Demong

Hodges

22

Figure 14 depicts how the remaining council members Mayor Nenshi, and Councilors Pootmans and Stevenson vote, and is used as the sixth case study. Similar to case study 3, these three individuals are not particularly more supportive of each other as a rule. In contrast to Pootmans and Stevenson, Nenshi tends not to vote the same way as Colley-Urquhart, Lowe, and especially Farrell (less than 50%). In contrast to Stevenson and a larger extent Nenshi, Pootmans tends to vote more often with Pincott, Macleod, Lowe, Farrell, and Carra, and against Chabot and Demong. In consideration of Figure 12, Pootmans votes would fit well with Carra, Colley-Urquhart, Farrell, Lowe, Macleod and Pincott.

FIGURE 14
Coalition Case study 6
How Mayor Nenshi, and Councilors Pootmans and Stevenson vote versus the rest of council.

100 81 73 66 79 70 47 71 58 52 78 70 60 67 64 62 77 62 49 73 59 58 70 67 59 77 64 55

100 100 71 62 71 56

62 56

67 63 49

56 51 42

58 52 47

Nenshi

Pootmans

Stevenson
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section D: SECRECY
Time spent in Camera
City Council met for a total of about 697 hours between November 2011 and the end of April 2013. Nearly a fifth (18.5%) of that time 129.5 hours spanning about 368 agenda items was conducted in camera: in secret and closed to the public. The majority of meetings (79%) were closed to the public for at least some portion. City Council made votes to move their deliberations in camera 96 times, notwithstanding votes to return to the chamber immediately after breaks. Of these instances, there was failed opposition to such moves 15 times (16%), and successful opposition once (1%). Occupy Calgary (2011-11-14 as an item of urgent business). Golf courses (various dates). Calgary Kart Racing Club (2011-12-19) A New Program for Low Income Children (2011-11-14). Airport tunnel (various dates) Composting (2013-04-15) Attainable homes (2011-09-19 as an item of urgent business) Personnel items/appointments/reviews (various dates) Auditors reports (various dates) Seed funding for the Calgary Centre for Performing Arts (2011-09-19)

Examples OF in Camera Topics

Updates on negotiations with the Province (various dates). Proposed acquisitions, sales, leases (various dates). Downtown revitalization (various dates)

Opposition to In Camera
Figure 15 depicts opposition to such moves by council member. Alderman Mar was most likely to oppose moves to chamber; if the move to chamber was opposed, he would be more likely to be opposing (9 times out of 16) than supporting it.

24

FIGURE 15
Amount of times opposed to moving deliberations in camera, by council member.

Opposition to In Camera

9
25

FIGURE 16
Breakdown of topics of items discussed in camera, as classified by the Manning Foundation.

TOPICS IN CAMERA

Inter Municipal, Regional, Provi nci al 13% Appoi ntment, Personnel, Pa y 29%

Procurement, Sale, Lease 10%

Tra ns it, Infrastructure, Taxi 6% Progra m, Pol icy 5%

Study, Revi ew 6% Ins urance, Legal 2% Uti l ities 2% Bus iness, Regulation 1% Ai rport 4% Innovate Ca lgary 2% Ci vi c Pa rtner, Community 2% Stra tegy, Pl an 4%

Growth, Development 5% Budget, Funding 4%

Governa nce 2% Arts , Pa rks , Recreation 1%

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FIGURE 17
Breakdowns of meetings and time spent by Council, in camera and out.

Time spent by council

No pa rt wa s held i n s ecret (17 meeti ngs)

Some part was hel d i n secret (63 meetings)

Ti me s pent i n camera (129.5 hours )

Ti me s pent i n public (567.5 hours )

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section E: QUESTION PERIOD

During the period identified as Question Period in the record, 101 questions spanning about 5,000 words were asked by members of council. This section provides analysis on the questions asked, their topics, as well as the language used. Figure 18 lists the number of questions asked during Question Period, by council member. Figure 19 breaks down the questions asked during Question Period, by topic.

FIGURE 18
Questions asked
Number of questions asked during Question Period, by council member.

28

12

13

25

FIGURE 19
Breakdown of topics of items in Question Period, as classified by the Manning Foundation.

TOPICS in QUESTION PERIOD

Snow 8% Tra ns it, Traffic 14%

Bus iness, Sales, Leasing 8%

Infra structure, Ma i ntenance 18%

Pers onnel 5% Wa ter 7%

Emergency 3% Recycl i ng, Waste 5% Procedural 8%

Pol i cy, Byl aw, Zoning 24%

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LANGUAGE COMPLEXITY
As an experiment, we took a look at the complexity of language used for the questions asked by members of council during Question Period. Councilors Macleod, Demong and Hodges asked too few questions to incorporate into this analysis.

Nonetheless, they are a simple reminder that City Council must honour its own commitment to plain language.

Examples of questions ASKED

There have been a lot of mixed messages from the media with respect to consumption of alcohol on public playing fields by baseball leagues. Can you confirm whether the City is moving to zero tolerance on this issue or whether enforcement is based on a complaint basis? (Nenshi, 2011-05-16) Releasing the dam on the Glenmore Reservoir caused flooding downstream. Why does The City of Calgary wait for a major rain event before the dam is released rather than releasing it slowly over a period of time to prevent flooding? (Jones, 2011-06-13) What security measures could be taken to ensure the late night safety of Transit Operators, and what would be the cost implications? (Chabot, 2011-09-12) What is the approximate number of street lights in the City of Calgary? (Pootmans, 2011-10-03) Has the construction of the McKnight Boulevard and Centre Street bus lanes made a difference to the congestion in this area? (Macleod, 2013-01-14)

METHODOLOGY
Figure 20 demonstrates two different ways to assess language: The Flesch-Kincaid Score assesses language composition in a positive light, or in terms of education level: describing it as high school, college, or college graduate level. The score corresponds with the required grade level of the audience. The Gunning Fog Index audits language complexity in a negative light, or in terms of confusability: a higher score relates to more complex (or foggy) language that is generally harder to comprehend and made of longer words with many syllables. Because this analysis is based off of small samples of speech, and largely depend on how many questions the Councilors asked over the period studied, these results may not be perfectly representative of the individuals speech.

30

FIGURE 20
Flesch-Kincaid and Gunning Fog scores, by council member.

Language Analysis

12.5

12.6

13.2

13.5

13.9

11.4

9.6

9.7

10.7

11.4

11.6

12.2

12.5

13.8

14.3

15.6

F L ESCH-KI N CA ID GR A DE L EVEL

11.6

11.8

14

15.4

16.2

17.5

17.8

GU N N I N G F OG I N DEX

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section F: Conflicts of interest

Collectively, council members spent 19 hours and 37 minutes away from deliberations due to a declared conflict of interest (recorded in council minutes as Declaration of Pecuniary Interest). Only Mayor Nenshi, Councilors Mar, Stevenson, Keating, and Macleod had conflicts to disclose that were found within the minutes. Figure 21 breaks down the amount of time away, by Council Member. Figure 22 breaks down the the reasons cited for the conflict in council minutes.

FIGURE 21
Time away due to conflict
In minutes, time spent away from deliberations due to declaration of pecuniary interest, by council member

NENSH I

MAC L EOD

12

K EATI NG

174

STEVENSON

211

MAR

32

775

FIGURE 22
Breakdown of topics of reasons cited for declaration of pecuniary interest.

Reasons for conflict

owns property i n a rea bei ng discussed 20%

i s i nvolved i n business rel a ting to matter being di s cussed 44%

i s a member of the orga nization being di s cussed 20%

ha s made a n application for s econdary s uite 16%

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section E: Attendance
There were collectively 31 official absences from Council meetings out of the 80 meetings studied. Usually, the missing council member was excused from attendance without reason by courtesy of Council, save for once when the council member absent was performing other council business. Council members were occasionally not present at the meeting for various durations, but not noted in the minutes to be officially be absent. This analysis is based upon what is noted in the official record at the end of each set of council minutes.

FIGURE 23
Number of Council Meetings missed, by Council Member

Council meetings missed

6 4 2 1 1 1 0 0 0
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FIGURE 24
Percentage scale attendance rate, by Council Member.

Attendance record

100

100

100

98.8

98.8

98.8

97.5

95

92.5

92.5

95

96.3

97.5

98.8

100

35

Conclusions
Despite the inherent challenges, this pilot project has shown that it is possible to: Simplify and summarize, in a highly accessible way, the large amount of raw data being produced by Canadian council chambers. Generate a tentative report card focused on a specific issue, in this case, the level of taxes and spending. Produce robust statistical indexes of Councillor behaviour, performance, interactions, and voting positions. Use technology in order to better understand the substance of what is being discussed by City Council, both in public session and behind closed doors. Develop additional tools to enable voters to monitor the effectiveness of the representation they receive. The project will now aim to expand to tackle more policy issues and to other municipalities in Alberta and across Canada.

36

Notes
1. For more information regarding the poll and its methodology please visit the Municipal Survey Report, hosted online at: http://www.manningfoundation.org/Docs/Municipal-Survey-Report.pdf 2. For an expanded digital version of this report containing database copies of all the votes studied, as well as the data used to build each of the 24 figures composing this report, please see: http://www.manningfoundation.org/ourwork 3. The following eighty general, special, organizational, and strategic meetings of council were used to generate this report: 2010-10-29. 2010-11-08. 2010-12-06. 2010-12-13, 2011-01-10. 2011-01-17. 2011-01-24. 2011-01-31, 2011-0207. 2011-02-14. 2011-02-15. 2011-03-01, 2011-03-07. 2011-03-21. 2011-04-05. 2011-04-11. 2011-04-18. 2011-05-03. 2011-05-09. 2011-05-16. 2011-05-20. 2011-06-07. 2011-06-13. 2011-06-14. 2011-06-20. 2011-06-28. 2011-07-04. 2011-07-25. 2011-09-12. 2011-09-19. 2011-09-27. 2011-10-03. 2011-10-24. 2011-11-07. 2011-11-14. 2011-11-21. 2011-1205. 2011-12-12. 2011-12-19, 2012-01-09. 2012-01-23. 2012-01-30. 2012-02-06, 2012-02-27. 2012-03-12. 2012-03-19. 2012-04-09, 2012-04-23. 2012-05-07. 2012-05-14. 2012-05-28, 2012-06-11. 2012-06-25, 2012-07-16. 2012-07-24, 2012-07-30. 2012-09-10, 2012-09-17. 2012-09-24, 2012-10-01. 2012-10-05, 2012-10-15, 2012-10-16, 2012-10-19, 2012-10-22, 2012-11-26, 2012-12-03, 2012-12-10, 2012-12-17, 2013-01-14, 2013-01-28, 2013-02-04, 2013-02-11, 201302-25, 2013-03-04, 2013-03-18, 2013-03-19, 2013-04-08, 2013-04-15, and 2013-04-22. 4. Records of meetings of Council and its Committees that have occurred since October 31, 2010 can be viewed on ELMS, the City of Calgarys Electronic Legislative Management Solution, hosted online at: http://agendaminutes. calgary.ca/sirepub/meetresults.aspx

37

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

JEROMY ANTON FARKAS is a student and researcher

based in Calgary, where he has served as a research team lead and data analyst for a variety of projects with the Faculties of Communication and Culture (Arts), Medicine, and Veterinary Medicine at the University of Calgary. He has also worked at the University of Calgary for the past five years as the Administrator for the Israel Studies Masters and Ph.D. Program.

38

UPCOMING Reports
The Manning Foundation is building intellectual capital for municipal governance in five streams of public policy enquiry. Each stream will include a series of public policy reports designed to stimulate new thought about the role of municipal government in society. Manning Foundation research reports are placed in the public domain via the Foundations website and are available for review, debate, criticism and support by Canadians regardless of their political affiliation.

1. Organic Cities
An enquiry into how cities grow and what role government should play in regulating growth and providing infrastructure, with the goals of economic efficiency and liveability. Much of the debate around municipal development is based around what urban forms are desirable, with sprawlers and smart growthers alike arguing that land-use regulation and infrastructure provision should favour their optimal urban form. The Organic Cities project takes a different perspective: that what is important is not the urban form that emerges, but the processes that are in place, particularly the role of government. On this view, it is more important that the market is left free to serve consumer demand, with the important constraints being property rights and the real costs of infrastructure provision rather than land-use regulations. Upcoming reports include enquiries into the economics of consultation processes so in vogue at city halls across the country and the effects of future advances in vehicle technology.

2. Appropriate Activities
An enquiry into the optimal role of government, with a positive analysis of what municipal government currently does and a normative analysis of what roles government is best equipped to fill. These roles broadly divide into an ownership role, a regulatory role, and an expenditure role each of which can be over or under played. This stream builds on concepts such as market failure, public goods and subsidiarity to identify which activities municipal government does or does not have a comparative advantage over other levels of government. Upcoming reports include enquiries into the proper role of municipal government as a regulator and as a distributor of wealth.

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3. Citizen Sovereignty
An enquiry into how well citizens can hold government to account, including monitoring of its activities and protecting their natural rights. This stream investigates standards of municipal accounting and performance reporting, open government, public safety and intergenerational equity. It considers concepts such as open government and open data, and property rights. Future reports in this series include enquiries into the quality of performance reporting, intergenerational equity with respect to municipal government and open data projects.

4. The Open Society

Open societies share power among a range of different institutions, unlike closed societies where it is vested in just one. The Open Society is an enquiry into the role of different institutions in the city, including the church, charities and associations. This stream has a historical element, it considers how these different elements have interacted in the past and may do so in the future. Already released reports include Wikicity: Calgarys Many Contributors, an account of the role of civil society in building Calgary.

5. Municipal Issue Reports

This stream covers basic elements of public policy, including an introduction to the role of government at municipal level, briefings on areas of municipal policy and issue reports framed in terms of values, facts and ideas of conservatism applied to municipal policy. Already released policy reports include The Role of Municipal Government, Decongestion: Getting Calgary Moving, and Keeping Calgary Safe.

MANNING FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION www.manningfoundation.org info@manningfoundation.org 403.536.8585 514 11 Ave SW Calgary, AB T2R 0C8 40

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