Object 1

Introduction
TrueCrypt is a software system for establishing and maintaining an on-the-fly-encrypted volume (data
storage device). On-the-fly encryption means that data is automatically encrypted or decrypted right
before it is loaded or saved, without any user intervention. No data stored on an encrypted volume can be
read (decrypted) without using the correct password/keyfile(s) or correct encryption keys. Entire file
system is encrypted (e.g., file names, folder names, contents of every file, free space, meta data, etc).
Files can be copied to and from a mounted TrueCrypt volume just like they are copied to/from any normal
disk (for example, by simple drag-and-drop operations). Files are automatically being decrypted on the fly
(in memory/RAM) while they are being read or copied from an encrypted TrueCrypt volume. Similarly,
files that are being written or copied to the TrueCrypt volume are automatically being encrypted on the fly
(right before they are written to the disk) in RAM. Note that this does not mean that the whole file that is
to be encrypted/decrypted must be stored in RAM before it can be encrypted/decrypted. There are no extra
memory (RAM) requirements for TrueCrypt. For an illustration of how this is accomplished, see the
following paragraph.

Let's suppose that there is an .avi video file stored on a TrueCrypt volume (therefore, the video file is
entirely encrypted). The user provides the correct password (and/or keyfile) and mounts (opens) the
TrueCrypt volume. When the user double clicks the icon of the video file, the operating system launches
the application associated with the file type – typically a media player. The media player then begins
loading a small initial portion of the video file from the TrueCrypt-encrypted volume to RAM (memory)
in order to play it. While the portion is being loaded, TrueCrypt is automatically decrypting it (in RAM).
The decrypted portion of the video (stored in RAM) is then played by the media player. While this portion
is being played, the media player begins loading next small portion of the video file from the TrueCrypt-
encrypted volume to RAM (memory) and the process repeats. This process is called on-the-fly encryption/
decryption and it works for all file types, not only for video files.
Note that TrueCrypt never saves any decrypted data to a disk – it only stores them temporarily in RAM
(memory). Even when the volume is mounted, data stored in the volume is still encrypted. When you
restart Windows or turn off your computer, the volume will be dismounted and files stored in it will be
inaccessible (and encrypted). Even when power supply is suddenly interrupted (without proper system
shut down), files stored in the volume are inaccessible (and encrypted). To make them accessible again,
you have to mount the volume (and provide the correct password and/or keyfile).
 Beginner's Tutorial
How to Create and Use a TrueCrypt Container
This chapter contains step-by-step instructions on how to create, mount, and use a TrueCrypt volume. We
strongly recommend that you also read the other sections of this manual, as they contain important
information.

Step 1:
If you have not done so, download and install TrueCrypt. Then launch TrueCrypt by double-clicking the
file TrueCrypt.exe or by clicking the TrueCrypt shortcut in your Windows Start menu.

Step 2:

The main TrueCrypt window should appear. Click Create Volume (marked with a red rectangle for
clarity).
Step 3:

The TrueCrypt Volume Creation Wizard window should appear.

In this step you need to choose where you wish the TrueCrypt volume to be created. A TrueCrypt volume
can reside in a file, which is also called container, in a partition or drive. In this tutorial, we will choose
the first option and create a TrueCrypt volume within a file.
As the option is selected by default, you can just click Next.

Note: In the following steps, the screenshots will show only the right-hand part of the Wizard window.
Step 4:

In this step you need to choose whether to create a standard or hidden TrueCrypt volume. In this tutorial,
we will choose the former option and create a standard TrueCrypt volume.
As the option is selected by default, you can just click Next.

Step 5:

In this step you have to specify where you wish the TrueCrypt volume (file container) to be created. Note
that a TrueCrypt container is just like any normal file. It can be moved, copied and deleted as any normal
file. It also needs a filename, which you will choose in the next step.
Click Select File.
The standard Windows file selector should appear (while the window of the TrueCrypt Volume Creation
Wizard remains open in the background).

Step 6:

In this tutorial, we will create our TrueCrypt volume in the folder D:\My Documents\ and the filename of
the volume (container) will be My Volume (as can be seen in the screenshot above). You may, of course,
choose any other filename and location you like (for example, on a USB memory stick). Note that the file
My Volume does not exist yet – TrueCrypt will create it.
IMPORTANT: Note that TrueCrypt will not encrypt any existing files. If you select an existing file,
it will be overwritten and replaced by the newly created volume (so the overwritten file will be lost,
not encrypted). You will be able to encrypt existing files (later on) by moving them to the TrueCrypt
volume that we are creating now.*

Select the desired path (where you wish the container to be created) in the file selector.
Type the desired container filename in the File name box.
Click Save.
The file selector window should disappear.

In the following steps, we will return to the TrueCrypt Volume Creation Wizard.
Step 7:

In the Volume Creation Wizard window, click Next.

Step 8:

Here you can choose an encryption algorithm and a hash algorithm for the volume. If you are not sure
what to select here, you can use the default settings and click Next (for more information, see Chapters
Encryption Algorithms and Hash Algorithms).
Step 9:

Here we specify that we wish the size of our TrueCrypt container to be 1 megabyte. You may, of course,
specify a different size. After you type the desired size in the input field (marked with a red rectangle),
click Next.

Step 10:

This is one of the most important steps. Here you have to choose a good volume password.

Read carefully the information displayed in the Wizard window about what is considered a good
password.
After you choose a good password, type it in the first input field. Then re-type it in the input field below
the first one and click Next.
Note: The button Next will be disabled until passwords in both input fields are the same.

Step 11:

Move your mouse as randomly as possible within the Volume Creation Wizard window at least for 30
seconds. The longer you move the mouse, the better. This significantly increases the cryptographic
strength of the encryption keys (which increases security).
Click Format.
Volume creation should begin. TrueCrypt will now create a file called My Volume in the folder D:\My
Documents\ (as we specified in Step 6). This file will be a TrueCrypt container (it will contain the
encrypted TrueCrypt volume). Depending on the size of the volume, the volume creation may take a long
time. After it finishes, the following dialog box will appear:

Click OK to close the dialog box.

Step 12:

We have just successfully created a TrueCrypt volume (file container).

In the TrueCrypt Volume Creation Wizard window, click Exit.
The Wizard window should disappear.

In the remaining steps, we will mount the volume we just created. We will return to the main TrueCrypt
window (which should still be open, but if it is not, repeat Step 1 to launch TrueCrypt and then continue
from Step 13.)
Step 13:

Select a drive letter from the list (marked with a red rectangle). This will be the drive letter to which the
TrueCrypt container will be mounted.

Note: In this tutorial, we chose the drive letter M, but you may of course choose any other available drive
letter.
Step 14:

Click Select File.

The standard file selector window should appear.
Step 15:

In the file selector, browse to the container file (which we created in Steps 6-11) and select it.
Click Open (in the file selector window).
The file selector window should disappear.

In the following steps, we will return to the main TrueCrypt window.

Step 16:

In the main TrueCrypt window, click Mount.

Password prompt dialog window should appear.
Step 17:

Type the password (which you specified in Step 10) in the password input field (marked with a red
rectangle).
Step 18:

Click OK in the password prompt window.

TrueCrypt will now attempt to mount the volume. If the password is incorrect (for example, if you typed it
incorrectly), TrueCrypt will notify you and you will need to repeat the previous step (type the password
again and click OK). If the password is correct, the volume will be mounted.
Final Step:

We have just successfully mounted the container as a virtual disk M:

The virtual disk is entirely encrypted (including file names, allocation tables, free space, etc.) and behaves
like a real disk. You can save (or copy, move, etc.) files to this virtual disk and they will be encrypted on
the fly as they are being written.
If you open a file stored on a TrueCrypt volume, for example, in media player, the file will be
automatically decrypted to RAM (memory) on-the-fly while it is being read.

Important: Note that when you open a file stored on a TrueCrypt volume (or when you write/copy a file to/
from the TrueCrypt volume) you will not be asked to enter the password again. You need to enter the
correct password only when mounting the volume.
You can open the mounted volume, for example, by double-clicking the item marked with a red rectangle
in the screenshot above.
You can also browse to the mounted volume the way you normally browse to any other types of volumes.
For example, by opening the 'Computer' (or 'My Computer') list and double clicking the corresponding
drive letter (in this case, it is the letter M).
You can copy files to and from the TrueCrypt volume just as you would copy them to any normal disk (for
example, by simple drag-and-drop operations). Files that are being read or copied from the encrypted
TrueCrypt volume are automatically decrypted on the fly (in memory/RAM). Similarly, files that are
being written or copied to the encrypted TrueCrypt volume are automatically encrypted on the fly (right
before they are written to the disk) in RAM.
Note that TrueCrypt never saves any decrypted data to a disk – it only stores them temporarily in RAM
(memory). Even when the volume is mounted, data stored in the volume is still encrypted. When you
restart Windows or turn off your computer, the volume will be dismounted and all files stored on it will be
inaccessible (and encrypted). Even when power supply is suddenly interrupted (without proper system
shut down), all files stored on the volume will be inaccessible (and encrypted). To make them accessible
again, you have to mount the volume. To do so, repeat Steps 13-18.
If you want to close the volume and make files stored on it inaccessible, either restart your operating
system or dismount the volume. To do so, follow these steps:

Select the volume from the list of mounted volumes in the main TrueCrypt window (marked with a red
rectangle in the screenshot above) and then click Dismount (also marked with a red rectangle in the
screenshot above). To make files stored on the volume accessible again, you will have to mount the
volume. To do so, repeat Steps 13-18.

How to Create and Use a TrueCrypt Partition/Device

Instead of creating file containers, you can also encrypt physical partitions or drives (i.e., create TrueCrypt
device-hosted volumes). To do so, repeat the steps 1-3, but in the step 3 select the second or third option.
Then follow the remaining instructions in the wizard. When you create a device-hosted TrueCrypt volume
within a non-system partition/drive, you can mount it by clicking Auto-Mount Devices in the main
TrueCrypt window. For information pertaining to encrypted system partition/drives, see the chapter
System Encryption.
 Plausible Deniability
In case an adversary forces you to reveal your password, TrueCrypt provides and supports two kinds of
plausible deniability:
1. Hidden volumes (see the section Hidden Volume) and hidden operating systems (see the section
Hidden Operating System).
2. Until decrypted, a TrueCrypt partition/device appears to consist of nothing more than random data
(it does not contain any kind of "signature"). Therefore, it is impossible to prove that a partition or
a device is a TrueCrypt volume or that it has been encrypted (provided that the security precautions
mentioned in the chapter Security Precautions are followed). A possible plausible explanation for
the existence of a partition/device containing solely random data is that you have wiped (securely
erased) the content of the partition/device using one of the tools that erase data by overwriting it
with random data (in fact, TrueCrypt can be used to securely erase a partition/device too, by
creating an empty encrypted partition/device-hosted volume within it). However, note that for
system encryption, the first drive track contains the (unencrypted) TrueCrypt Boot Loader, which
can be easily identified as such (for more information, see the chapter System Encryption). In such
cases, plausible deniability can be achieved by creating a hidden operating system (see the section
Hidden Operating System).

Although file-hosted TrueCrypt volumes (containers) do not contain any kind of "signature" either
(until decrypted, they appear to consist solely of random data), they cannot provide this kind of
plausible deniability, because there is practically no plausible explanation for the existence of a file
containing solely random data. However, plausible deniability can still be achieved with a file-
hosted TrueCrypt volume (container) by creating a hidden volume within it (see above).

Notes
• When formatting a hard disk partition as a TrueCrypt volume, the partition table (including the
partition type) is never modified (no TrueCrypt "signature" or "ID" is written to the partition table).
• There are methods to find files or devices containing random data (such as TrueCrypt volumes).
Note, however, that this does not affect plausible deniability in any way. The adversary still cannot
prove that the partition/device is a TrueCrypt volume or that the file, partition, or device, contains a
hidden TrueCrypt volume (provided that you follow the security precautions listed in the chapter
Security Precautions and subsection Security Precautions Pertaining to Hidden Volumes).
• Whenever TrueCrypt accesses a file-hosted volume (e.g., when dismounting, attempting to mount,
changing or attempting to change the password, creating a hidden volume within it, etc.) or a
keyfile, it preserves the timestamp of the container/keyfile (i.e., date and time that the
container/keyfile was last accessed* or last modified), unless this behavior is disabled in the
preferences.

* Note that if you use the Windows 'File Properties' tool to view a container/keyfile timestamp (e.g., by
right-clicking the container/keyfile and selecting 'Properties'), you will alter the date and time that the
container/keyfile was last accessed. Also note that if you view thumbnails of files in the Windows file
selector (for instance, when selecting a container or keyfile in the Thumbnail file selector mode),
Windows may modify the timestamps of the files (date and time that the files were last accessed).
 Hidden Volume
It may happen that you are forced by somebody to reveal the password to an encrypted volume. There are
many situations where you cannot refuse to reveal the password (for example, due to extortion). Using a
so-called hidden volume allows you to solve such situations without revealing the password to your
volume.

The layout of a standard TrueCrypt volume before and after a hidden volume was created within it.

The principle is that a TrueCrypt volume is created within another TrueCrypt volume (within the free
space on the volume). Even when the outer volume is mounted, it is impossible to prove whether there is a
hidden volume within it or not*, because free space on any TrueCrypt volume is always filled with
random data when the volume is created** and no part of the (dismounted) hidden volume can be
distinguished from random data. Note that TrueCrypt does not modify the file system (information about
free space, etc.) within the outer volume in any way.

The password for the hidden volume must be substantially different from the password for the outer
volume. To the outer volume, (before creating the hidden volume within it) you should copy some
sensitive-looking files that you actually do NOT want to hide. These files will be there for anyone who
would force you to hand over the password. You will reveal only the password for the outer volume, not
for the hidden one. Files that really are sensitive will be stored on the hidden volume.
A hidden volume can be mounted the same way as a standard TrueCrypt volume: Click Select File or
Select Device to select the outer/host volume (important: make sure the volume is not mounted). Then
click Mount, and enter the password for the hidden volume. Whether the hidden or the outer volume will
be mounted is determined by the entered password (i.e., when you enter the password for the outer
volume, then the outer volume will be mounted; when you enter the password for the hidden volume, the
hidden volume will be mounted).
TrueCrypt first attempts to decrypt the standard volume header using the entered password. If it fails, it
loads the area of the volume where a hidden volume header can be stored (i.e. the bytes 65536–131071,
which contain solely random data when there is no hidden volume within the volume) to RAM and
attempts to decrypt it using the entered password. Note that hidden volume headers cannot be identified,
as they appear to consist entirely of random data. If the header is successfully decrypted (for information
on how TrueCrypt determines that it was successfully decrypted, see the section Encryption Scheme), the
information about the size of the hidden volume is retrieved from the decrypted header (which is still
stored in RAM), and the hidden volume is mounted (its size also determines its offset).
A hidden volume can be created within any type of TrueCrypt volume, i.e., within a file-hosted volume or
partition/device-hosted volume (requires administrator privileges). To create a hidden TrueCrypt volume,
click on Create Volume in the main program window and select Create a hidden TrueCrypt volume. The
Wizard will provide help and all information necessary to successfully create a hidden TrueCrypt volume.
When creating a hidden volume, it may be very difficult or even impossible for an inexperienced user to
set the size of the hidden volume such that the hidden volume does not overwrite data on the outer
volume. Therefore, the Volume Creation Wizard automatically scans the cluster bitmap of the outer
volume (before the hidden volume is created within it) and determines the maximum possible size of the
hidden volume.***
If there are any problems when creating a hidden volume, refer to the chapter Troubleshooting for possible
solutions.

Note that it is also possible to create and boot an operating system residing in a hidden volume (see the
section Hidden Operating System).

Provided that all the instructions in the TrueCrypt Volume Creation Wizard have been followed
and provided that the precautions mentioned in the subsection Security Precautions Pertaining to
Hidden Volumes are followed.
** Provided that the options Quick Format and Dynamic are disabled and provided that the
volume does not contain a filesystem that has been encrypted in place (TrueCrypt does not allow
the user to create a hidden volume within such a volume). For information on the method used to
fill free volume space with random data, see chapter Technical Details, section TrueCrypt Volume
Format Specification.
*** The wizard scans the cluster bitmap to determine the size of the uninterrupted area of free
space (if there is any) whose end is aligned with the end of the outer volume. This area
accommodates the hidden volume and therefore the size of this area limits the maximum possible
size of the hidden volume. On Linux and Mac OS X, the wizard actually does not scan the cluster
bitmap, but the driver detects any data written to the outer volume and uses their position as
previously described.
 Protection of Hidden Volumes Against Damage
If you mount a TrueCrypt volume within which there is a hidden volume, you may read data stored on the
(outer) volume without any risk. However, if you (or the operating system) need to save data to the outer
volume, there is a risk that the hidden volume will get damaged (overwritten). To prevent this, you should
protect the hidden volume in a way described in this section.
When mounting an outer volume, type in its password and before clicking OK, click Mount Options:

In the Mount Options dialog window, enable the option 'Protect hidden volume against damage caused by
writing to outer volume '. In the 'Password to hidden volume' input field, type the password for the hidden
volume. Click OK and, in the main password entry dialog, click OK.

Both passwords must be correct; otherwise, the outer volume will not be mounted. When hidden volume
protection is enabled, TrueCrypt does not actually mount the hidden volume. It only decrypts its header (in
RAM) and retrieves information about the size of the hidden volume (from the decrypted header). Then,
the outer volume is mounted and any attempt to save data to the area of the hidden volume will be rejected
(until the outer volume is dismounted). Note that TrueCrypt never modifies the filesystem (e.g.,
information about allocated clusters, amount of free space, etc.) within the outer volume in any way.
As soon as the volume is dismounted, the protection is lost. When the volume is mounted again, it is
not possible to determine whether the volume has used hidden volume protection or not. The hidden
volume protection can be activated only by users who supply the correct password (and/or keyfiles)
for the hidden volume (each time they mount the outer volume).
As soon as a write operation to the hidden volume area is denied/prevented (to protect the hidden volume),
the entire host volume (both the outer and the hidden volume) becomes write-protected until dismounted
(the TrueCrypt driver reports the 'invalid parameter' error to the system upon each attempt to write data to
the volume). This preserves plausible deniability (otherwise certain kinds of inconsistency within the file
system could indicate that this volume has used hidden volume protection). When damage to hidden
volume is prevented, a warning is displayed (provided that the TrueCrypt Background Task is enabled –
see the chapter TrueCrypt Background Task). Furthermore, the type of the mounted outer volume
displayed in the main window changes to 'Outer(!) ':

Moreover, the field Hidden Volume Protected in the Volume Properties dialog window says:
'Yes (damage prevented!)'.

Note that when damage to hidden volume is prevented, no information about the event is written to the
volume. When the outer volume is dismounted and mounted again, the volume properties will not display
the string "damage prevented".

There are several ways to check that a hidden volume is being protected against damage:
1. A confirmation message box saying that hidden volume is being protected is displayed after the
outer volume is mounted (if it is not displayed, the hidden volume is not protected!).
2. In the Volume Properties dialog, the field Hidden Volume Protected says 'Yes':
 3. The type of the mounted outer volume is Outer:

Important: When an adversary asks you to mount an outer volume, you, of course, must not mount the
outer volume with the hidden volume protection enabled. You must mount it as a normal volume (and
then TrueCrypt will not show the volume type "Outer" but "Normal"). Note that during the time when
an outer volume is mounted with the hidden volume protection enabled, the adversary can find out that
a hidden volume exists within the outer volume (he/she will be able to find it out until the volume is
dismounted).

Warning: Note that the option 'Protect hidden volume against damage caused by writing to outer volume'
in the Mount Options dialog window is automatically disabled after a mount attempt is completed, no
matter whether it is successful or not (all hidden volumes that are already being protected will, of course,
continue to be protected). Therefore, you need to check that option each time you attempt to mount the
outer volume (if you wish the hidden volume to be protected):

If you want to mount an outer volume and protect a hidden volume within using cached passwords, then
follow these steps: Hold down the Control (Ctrl) key when clicking Mount (or select Mount with Options
from the Volumes menu). This will open the Mount Options dialog. Enable the option 'Protect hidden
volume against damage caused by writing to outer volume' and leave the password box empty. Then click
OK.
If you need to mount an outer volume and you know that you will not need to save any data to it, then the
most comfortable way of protecting the hidden volume against damage is mounting the outer volume as
read-only (see the section Mount Options).

Security Precautions Pertaining to Hidden Volumes

If you use a hidden TrueCrypt volume, you must follow these security precautions:
• If an adversary has access to a (dismounted) TrueCrypt volume at several points over time, he may
be able to determine which sectors of the volume are changing. If you change the contents of a
hidden volume (e.g., create/copy new files to the hidden volume or modify/delete/rename/move
files stored on the hidden volume, etc.), the contents of sectors (ciphertext) in the hidden volume
area will change. After being given the password to the outer volume, the adversary might demand
an explanation why these sectors changed. Your failure to provide a plausible explanation might
indicate the existence of a hidden volume within the outer volume.

Note that the issue described above may also arise, for example, in the following cases:
• The file system in which you store a file-hosted TrueCrypt container has been
defragmented and a copy of the TrueCrypt container (or of its fragment) remains in the free
space on the host volume (in the defragmented file system). To prevent this, do one of the
following:
• Use a partition/device-hosted TrueCrypt volume instead of file-hosted.
• Securely erase free space on the host volume (in the defragmented file system) after
defragmenting.
• Do not defragment file systems in which you store TrueCrypt volumes.
• A file-hosted TrueCrypt container is stored in a journaling file system (such as NTFS).
A copy of the TrueCrypt container (or of its fragment) may remain on the host volume. To
prevent this, do one the following:
• Use a partition/device-hosted TrueCrypt volume instead of file-hosted.
• Store the container in a non-journaling file system (for example, FAT32).
• A TrueCrypt volume resides on a device that utilizes a wear-leveling mechanism (e.g. some
USB flash drives). A copy of (a fragment of) the TrueCrypt volume may remain on the
device. For more information on wear-leveling, see the section Wear-Leveling in the
chapter Security Precautions.
• Make sure that Quick Format is disabled when encrypting a partition/device within which you
intend to create a hidden volume.
• On Windows, make sure you have not deleted any files within a volume within which you intend
to create a hidden volume (the cluster bitmap scanner does not detect deleted files).
• On Linux or Mac OS X, if you intend to create a hidden volume within a file-hosted TrueCrypt
volume, make sure that the volume is not sparse-file-hosted (the Windows version of TrueCrypt
verifies this and disallows creation of hidden volumes within sparse files).
• When a hidden volume is mounted, the operating system and third-party applications may write to
 non-hidden volumes (typically, to the unencrypted system volume) unencrypted information about
the data stored in the hidden volume (e.g. filenames and locations of recently accessed files,
databases created by file indexing tools, etc.), or the data itself in an unencrypted form (temporary
files, etc.), or unencrypted information about the filesystem residing in the hidden volume (which
might be used e.g. to identify the filesystem and to determine whether it is the filesystem residing
in the outer volume). Therefore, the following guidelines and precautions must be followed:
• Windows: Create a hidden operating system (for information on how to do so, see the
section Hidden Operating System) and mount hidden volumes only when the hidden
operating system is running.

Note: When a hidden operating system is running, TrueCrypt ensures that all local
unencrypted filesystems and non-hidden TrueCrypt volumes are read-only (i.e. no files can
be written to such filesystems or TrueCrypt volumes).* Data is allowed to be written to
filesystems within hidden TrueCrypt volumes.
• Linux: Download or create a "live CD" version of your Linux operating system (i.e. a "live"
Linux system entirely stored on and booted from a CD/DVD) that ensures that any data
written to the system volume is written to a RAM disk. Mount hidden volumes only when
such a "live CD" system is running. During the session, only filesystems that reside in
hidden TrueCrypt volumes may be mounted in read-write mode (outer or unencrypted
volumes/filesystems must be mounted as read-only or must not be mounted/accessible at
all). If you cannot use such a "live CD" version of the operating system or if you are not
able to ensure that applications and the standard version (as opposed to a "live CD"
version) of your operating system do not write the above types of sensitive data to non-
hidden volumes (or filesystems), you should not mount or create hidden TrueCrypt volumes
under Linux.
• Mac OS X: If you are not able to ensure that applications and the operating system do not
write the above types of sensitive data to non-hidden volumes (or filesystems), you should
not mount or create hidden TrueCrypt volumes under Mac OS X.
• If you use an operating system residing within a hidden volume (see the section Hidden
Operating System), then, in addition to the above precautions, you must follow these security
precautions:
• You should use the decoy operating system as frequently as you use your computer. Ideally,
you should use it for all activities that do not involve sensitive data. Otherwise, plausible
deniability of the hidden operating system might be adversely affected (if you revealed the
password for the decoy operating system to an adversary, he could find out that the system
is not used very often, which might indicate the existence of a hidden operating system on
your computer). Note that you can save data to the decoy system partition anytime without
any risk that the hidden volume will get damaged (because the decoy system is not installed
in the outer volume).
• If the operating system requires activation, it must be activated before it is cloned (cloning
is part of the process of creation of a hidden operating system — see the section Hidden
Operating System) and the hidden operating system (i.e. the clone) must never be
reactivated. The reason is that the hidden operating system is created by copying the
content of the system partition to a hidden volume (so if the operating system is not
activated, the hidden operating system will not be activated either). If you activated or
reactivated a hidden operating system, the date and time of the activation (and other data)
might be logged on a Microsoft server (and on the hidden operating system) but not on the
 decoy operating system. Therefore, if an adversary had access to the data stored on the
server or intercepted your request to the server (and if you revealed the password for the
decoy operating system to him), he might find out that the decoy operating system was
activated (or reactivated) at a different time, which might indicate the existence of a hidden
operating system on your computer.

For similar reasons, any software that requires activation must be installed and activated
before you start creating the hidden operating system.
• When you need to shut down the hidden system and start the decoy system, do not restart
the computer. Instead, shut it down or hibernate it and then leave it powered off for several
minutes before turning the computer on and booting the decoy system. This is required to
clear the memory, which may contain sensitive data. For more information, see the section
Unencrypted Data in RAM in the chapter Security Precautions.
• The computer may be connected to a network (including the internet) only when the decoy
operating system is running. When the hidden operating system is running, the computer
should not be connected to any network, including the internet (one of the most reliable
ways to ensure it is to unplug the network cable, if there is one). Note that if data is
downloaded from or uploaded to a remote server, the date and time of the connection, and
other data, are typically logged on the server. Various kinds of data are also logged on the
operating system (e.g. Windows auto-update data, application logs, error logs, etc.)
Therefore, if an adversary had access to the data stored on the server or intercepted your
request to the server (and if you revealed the password for the decoy operating system to
him), he might find out that the connection was not made from within the decoy operating
system, which might indicate the existence of a hidden operating system on your computer.

Also note that similar issues would affect you if there were any filesystem shared over a
network under the hidden operating system (regardless of whether the filesystem is remote
or local). Therefore, when the hidden operating system is running, there must be no
filesystem shared over a network (in any direction).
• If the BIOS, EFI, or any other component logs power-down events or any other events that
could be related to events logged in Windows logs, you should either disable such logging
or ensure that the log is securely erased after each session.

In addition to the above precautions, you must follow the security precautions listed in the following
chapters:
• Security Precautions
• How to Back Up Securely

• This does not apply to filesystems on CD/DVD-like media and on custom, untypical, or non-
standard devices/media.
 Hidden Operating System
If your system partition or system drive is encrypted using TrueCrypt, you need to enter your pre-boot
authentication password in the TrueCrypt Boot Loader screen after you turn on or restart your computer. It
may happen that you are forced by somebody to decrypt the operating system or to reveal the pre-boot
authentication password. There are many situations where you cannot refuse to do so (for example, due to
extortion). TrueCrypt allows you to create a hidden operating system whose existence will be impossible
to prove (provided that certain guidelines are followed — see below). Thus, you will not have to decrypt
or reveal the password for the hidden operating system.

Before you continue reading this section, make sure you have read the section Hidden Volume and that
you understand what a hidden TrueCrypt volume is.

A hidden operating system is a system (for example, Windows Vista or Windows XP) that is installed in
a hidden TrueCrypt volume. It is impossible to prove that a hidden TrueCrypt volume exists (provided that
certain guidelines are followed; for more information, see the section Hidden Volume) and, therefore, it is
impossible to prove that a hidden operating system exists.
However, in order to boot a system encrypted by TrueCrypt, an unencrypted copy of the TrueCrypt Boot
Loader has to be stored on the system drive or on a TrueCrypt Rescue Disk. Hence, the mere presence of
the TrueCrypt Boot Loader can indicate that there is a system encrypted by TrueCrypt on the computer.
Therefore, to provide a plausible explanation for the presence of the TrueCrypt Boot Loader, the
TrueCrypt helps you create a second encrypted operating system, so-called decoy operating system,
during the process of creation of a hidden operating system. A decoy operating system must not contain
any sensitive files. Its existence is not secret (it is not installed in a hidden volume). The password for the
decoy operating system can be safely revealed to anyone forcing you to disclose your pre-boot
authentication password.*
You should use the decoy operating system as frequently as you use your computer. Ideally, you should
use it for all activities that do not involve sensitive data. Otherwise, plausible deniability of the hidden
operating system might be adversely affected (if you revealed the password for the decoy operating
system to an adversary, he could find out that the system is not used very often, which might indicate the
existence of a hidden operating system on your computer). Note that you can save data to the decoy
system partition anytime without any risk that the hidden volume will get damaged (because the decoy
system is not installed in the outer volume — see below).
There will be two pre-boot authentication passwords — one for the hidden system and the other for the
decoy system. If you want to start the hidden system, you simply enter the password for the hidden system
in the TrueCrypt Boot Loader screen (which appears after you turn on or restart your computer). Likewise,
if you want to start the decoy system (for example, when asked to do so by an adversary), you just enter
the password for the decoy system in the TrueCrypt Boot Loader screen.
Note: When you enter a pre-boot authentication password, the TrueCrypt Boot Loader first attempts to
decrypt (using the entered password) the last 512 bytes of the first logical track of the system drive (where
encrypted master key data for non-hidden encrypted system partitions/drives are normally stored). If it
fails and if there is a partition behind the boot partition, the TrueCrypt Boot Loader (even if there is
actually no hidden volume on the drive) automatically tries to decrypt (using the same entered password
again) the area of the first partition behind the boot partition where the encrypted header of a possible
hidden volume might be stored. Note that TrueCrypt never knows if there is a hidden volume in advance
(the hidden volume header cannot be identified, as it appears to consist entirely of random data). If the
header is successfully decrypted (for information on how TrueCrypt determines that it was successfully
decrypted, see the section Encryption Scheme), the information about the size of the hidden volume is
retrieved from the decrypted header (which is still stored in RAM), and the hidden volume is mounted (its
size also determines its offset). For further technical details, see the section Encryption Scheme in the
chapter Technical Details.
When running, the hidden operating system appears to be installed on the same partition as the original
operating system (the decoy system). However, in reality, it is installed within the partition behind it (in a
hidden volume). All read/write operations are transparently redirected from the system partition to the
hidden volume. Neither the operating system nor applications will know that data written to and read from
the system partition is actually written to and read from the partition behind it (from/to a hidden volume).
Any such data is encrypted and decrypted on the fly as usual (with an encryption key different from the
one that is used for the decoy operating system).
Note that there will also be a third password — the one for the outer volume. It is not a pre-boot
authentication password, but a regular TrueCrypt volume password. It can be safely disclosed to anyone
forcing you to reveal the password for the encrypted partition where the hidden volume (containing the
hidden operating system) resides. Thus, the existence of the hidden volume (and of the hidden operating
system) will remain secret. If you are not sure you understand how this is possible, or what an outer
volume is, please read the section Hidden Volume. The outer volume should contain some sensitive-
looking files that you actually do not want to hide.
To summarize, there will be three passwords in total. Two of them can be revealed to an attacker (for the
decoy system and for the outer volume). The third password, for the hidden system, must remain secret.

Example Layout of System Drive Containing Hidden Operating System

Process of Creation of Hidden Operating System

To start the process of creation of a hidden operating system, select System > Create Hidden Operating
System and then follow the instructions in the wizard.
Initially, the wizard verifies that there is a suitable partition for a hidden operating system on the system
drive. Note that before you can create a hidden operating system, you need to create a partition for it on
the system drive. It must be the first partition behind the system partition and it must be at least 5% larger
than the system partition (the system partition is the one where the currently running operating system is
installed). However, if the outer volume (not to be confused with the system partition) is formatted as
NTFS, the partition for the hidden operating system must be at least 110% (2.1 times) larger than the
system partition (the reason is that the NTFS file system always stores internal data exactly in the middle
of the volume and, therefore, the hidden volume, which is to contain a clone of the system partition, can
reside only in the second half of the partition).
In the next steps, the wizard will create two TrueCrypt volumes (outer and hidden) within the first
partition behind the system partition. The hidden volume will contain the hidden operating system. The
size of the hidden volume is always the same as the size of the system partition. The reason is that the
hidden volume will need to contain a clone of the content of the system partition (see below). Note that
the clone will be encrypted using a different encryption key than the original. Before you start copying
some sensitive-looking files to the outer volume, the wizard tells you the maximum recommended size of
space that the files should occupy, so that there is enough free space on the outer volume for the hidden
volume.
Remark: After you copy some sensitive-looking files to the outer volume, the cluster bitmap of the volume
will be scanned in order to determine the size of uninterrupted area of free space whose end is aligned
with the end of the outer volume. This area will accommodate the hidden volume, so it limits its
maximum possible size. The maximum possible size of the hidden volume will be determined and it will
be verified that it is greater than the size of the system partition (which is required, because the entire
content of the system partition will need to be copied to the hidden volume — see below). This ensures
that no data stored on the outer volume will be overwritten by data written to the area of the hidden
volume (e.g. when the system is being copied to it). The size of the hidden volume is always the same as
the size of the system partition.
Then, TrueCrypt will create the hidden operating system by copying the content of the system partition to
the hidden volume. Data being copied will be encrypted on the fly with an encryption key different from
the one that will be used for the decoy operating system. The process of copying the system is performed
in the pre-boot environment (before Windows starts) and it may take a long time to complete; several
hours or even several days (depending on the size of the system partition and on the performance of the
computer). You will be able to interrupt the process, shut down your computer, start the operating system
and then resume the process. However, if you interrupt it, the entire process of copying the system will
have to start from the beginning (because the content of the system partition must not change during
cloning). The hidden operating system will initially be a clone of the operating system under which you
started the wizard.
Windows creates (typically, without your knowledge or consent) various log files, temporary files, etc., on
the system partition. It also saves the content of RAM to hibernation and paging files located on the
system partition. Therefore, if an adversary analyzed files stored on the partition where the original system
(of which the hidden system is a clone) resides, he might find out, for example, that you used the
TrueCrypt wizard in the hidden-system-creation mode (which might indicate the existence of a hidden
operating system on your computer). To prevent such issues, TrueCrypt will securely erase the entire
content of the partition where the original system resides after the hidden system has been created.
Afterwards, in order to achieve plausible deniability, TrueCrypt will prompt you to install a new system on
the partition and encrypt it using TrueCrypt. Thus, you will create the decoy system and the whole process
of creation of the hidden operating system will be completed.
Note: TrueCrypt will erase the content of the partition where the original system resides by filling it with
random data entirely. If you revealed the password for the decoy system to an adversary and he asked you
why the free space of the (decoy) system partition contains random data, you could answer, for example:
"The partition previously contained a system encrypted by TrueCrypt, but I forgot the pre-boot
authentication password (or the system was damaged and stopped booting), so I had to reinstall Windows
and encrypt the partition again."
 Plausible Deniability and Data Leak Protection
For security reasons, when a hidden operating system is running, TrueCrypt ensures that all local
unencrypted filesystems and non-hidden TrueCrypt volumes are read-only (i.e. no files can be written to
such filesystems or TrueCrypt volumes).† Data is allowed to be written to any filesystem that resides
within a hidden TrueCrypt volume (provided that the hidden volume is not located in a container stored on
an unencrypted filesystem or on any other read-only filesystem).
There are three main reasons why such countermeasures have been implemented:
1. It enables the creation of a secure platform for mounting of hidden TrueCrypt volumes. Note that
we officially recommend that hidden volumes are mounted only when a hidden operating system is
running. For more information, see the subsection Security Precautions Pertaining to Hidden
Volumes.
2. In some cases, it is possible to determine that, at a certain time, a particular filesystem was not
mounted under (or that a particular file on the filesystem was not saved or accessed from within) a
particular instance of an operating system (e.g. by analyzing and comparing filesystem journals,
file timestamps, application logs, error logs, etc). This might indicate that a hidden operating
system is installed on the computer. The countermeasures prevent these issues.
3. It protects the integrity of a filesystem that is mounted under both the decoy system and the hidden
system when one or both of the systems are/is hibernated.
If you need to securely transfer files from the decoy system to the hidden system, follow these steps:
1. Start the decoy system.
2. Save the files to an unencrypted volume or to an outer/normal TrueCrypt volume.
3. Start the hidden system
4. If you saved the files to a TrueCrypt volume, mount it (it will be automatically mounted as read-
only).
5. Copy the files to the hidden system partition or to another hidden volume.

Possible Explanations for Existence of Two TrueCrypt Partitions on Single Drive

An adversary might ask why you created two TrueCrypt-encrypted partitions on a single drive (a system
partition and a non-system partition) rather than encrypting the entire disk with a single encryption key.
There are many possible reasons to do that. However, if you do not know any (other than creating the
hidden operating system), you can provide, for example, one of the following explanations:
• If there are more than two partitions on a system drive and you want to encrypt only two of them
(the system partition and the one behind it) and to leave the other partitions unencrypted (for
example, to achieve the best possible performance when reading and writing data, which is not
sensitive, to such unencrypted partitions), the only way to do that is to encrypt both partitions
separately (note that, with a single encryption key, TrueCrypt could encrypt the entire system drive
and all partitions on it, but it cannot encrypt only two of them — only one or all of the partitions
can be encrypted with a single key). As a result, there will be two adjacent TrueCrypt partitions on
the system drive (the first will be a system partition, the second will be a non-system one), each
encrypted with a different key (which is also the case when you create a hidden operating system,
and therefore it can be explained this way).

If you do not know any good reason why there should be more than one partition on a system drive
at all:
 It is generally recommended to separate non-system files (documents) from system files. One of
the easiest and most reliable ways to do that is to create two partitions on the system drive; one for
the operating system and the other for documents (non-system files). The reasons why this practice
is recommended include:
• If the filesystem on one of the partitions is damaged, files on the partition may get
corrupted or lost, whereas files on the other partition are not affected.
• It is easier to reinstall the system without losing your documents (reinstallation of an
operating system involves formatting the system partition, after which all files stored on it
are lost). If the system is damaged, full reinstallation is often the only option.

• A cascade encryption algorithm (e.g. AES-Twofish-Serpent) can be up to four times slower than a
non-cascade one (e.g. AES). However, a cascade encryption algorithm may be more secure than a
non-cascade one (for example, the probability that three distinct encryption algorithms will be
broken, e.g. due to advances in cryptanalysis, is significantly lower than the probability that only
one of them will be broken). Therefore, if you encrypt the outer volume with a cascade encryption
algorithm and the decoy system with a non-cascade encryption algorithm, you can answer that you
wanted the best performance (and adequate security) for the system partition, and the highest
possible security (but worse performance) for the non-system partition (i.e. the outer volume),
where you store the most sensitive data, which you do not need to access very often (unlike the
operating system, which you use very often, and therefore you need it to have the best possible
performance). On the system partition, you store data that is less sensitive (but which you need to
access very often) than data you store on the non-system partition (i.e. on the outer volume).
• Provided that you encrypt the outer volume with a cascade encryption algorithm (e.g. AES-
Twofish-Serpent) and the decoy system with a non-cascade encryption algorithm (e.g. AES), you
can also answer that you wanted to prevent the problems about which TrueCrypt warns when the
user attempts to choose a cascade encryption algorithm for system encryption (see below for a list
of the problems). Therefore, to prevent those problems, you decided to encrypt the system partition
with a non-cascade encryption algorithm. However, you still wanted to use a cascade encryption
algorithm (because it is more secure than a non-cascade encryption algorithm) for the most
sensitive data, so you decided to create a second partition, which those problems do not affect
(because it is non-system) and to encrypt it with a cascade encryption algorithm. On the system
partition, you store data that is less sensitive than data you store on the non-system partition (i.e. on
the outer volume).

Note: When the user attempts to encrypt the system partition with a cascade encryption algorithm,
TrueCrypt warns him or her that it can cause the following problems (and implicitly recommends
to choose a non-cascade encryption algorithm instead):
• For cascade encryption algorithms, the TrueCrypt Boot Loader is larger than normal and,
therefore, there is not enough space in the first drive track for a backup of the TrueCrypt
Boot Loader. Hence, whenever it gets damaged (which often happens, for example, during
inappropriately designed anti-piracy activation procedures of certain programs), the user
must use the TrueCrypt Rescue Disk to repair the TrueCrypt Boot Loader or to boot.
• On some computers, resuming from hibernation takes longer.
• In contrast to a password for a non-system TrueCrypt volume, a pre-boot authentication password
needs to be typed each time the computer is turned on or restarted. Therefore, if the pre-boot
authentication password is long (which is required for security purposes), it may be very tiresome
to type it so frequently. Hence, you can answer that it was more convenient for you to use a short
 (and therefore weaker) password for the system partition (i.e. the decoy system) and that it is more
convenient for you to store the most sensitive data (which you do not need to access as often) in
the non-system TrueCrypt partition (i.e. in the outer volume) for which you chose a very long
password.

As the password for the system partition is not very strong (because it is short), you do not
intentionally store sensitive data on the system partition. However, you still prefer the system
partition to be encrypted, because potentially sensitive or mildly sensitive data is stored on it as a
result of your everyday use of the computer (for example, passwords to online forums you visit,
which can be automatically remembered by your browser, browsing history, applications you run,
etc.)
• When an attacker gets hold of your computer when a TrueCrypt volume is mounted (for example,
when you use a laptop outside), he can, in most cases, read any data stored on the volume (data is
decrypted on the fly as he reads it). Therefore, it may be wise to limit the time the volume is
mounted to a minimum. Obviously, this may be impossible or difficult if the sensitive data is
stored on an encrypted system partition or on an entirely encrypted system drive (because you
would also have to limit the time you work with the computer to a minimum). Hence, you can
answer that you created a separate partition (encrypted with a different key than your system
partition) for your most sensitive data and that you mount it only when necessary and dismount it
as soon as possible (so as to limit the time the volume is mounted to a minimum). On the system
partition, you store data that is less sensitive (but which you need to access often) than data you
store on the non-system partition (i.e. on the outer volume).

Safety and Security Precautions Pertaining to Hidden Operating Systems

As a hidden operating system resides in a hidden TrueCrypt volume, a user of a hidden operating system
should follow all of the security precautions that apply to normal hidden TrueCrypt volumes. These
precautions, as well as additional precautions pertaining specifically to hidden operating systems, are
listed in the subsection Security Precautions Pertaining to Hidden Volumes.
WARNING: If you do not protect the hidden volume (for information on how to do so, refer to the section
Protection of Hidden Volumes Against Damage), do not write to the outer volume (note that the decoy
operating system is not installed in the outer volume). Otherwise, you may overwrite and damage the
hidden volume (and the hidden operating system within it)!
If all the instructions in the wizard have been followed and if the security precautions mentioned in the
subsection Security Precautions Pertaining to Hidden Volumes are followed, it will be impossible to prove
that the hidden volume and hidden operating system exist, even when the outer volume is mounted or
when the decoy operating system is decrypted or started.

* It is not practical (and therefore is not supported) to install operating systems in two TrueCrypt volumes
that are embedded within a single partition, because using the outer operating system would often require
data to be written to the area of the hidden operating system (and if such write operations were prevented
using the hidden volume protection feature, it would inherently cause system crashes, i.e. 'Blue Screen'
errors).
† This does not apply to filesystems on CD/DVD-like media and on custom, atypical, or non-standard
devices/media.
System Encryption

TrueCrypt can on-the-fly encrypt a system partition or entire system drive, i.e. a partition or drive where
Windows is installed and from which it boots.
System encryption provides the highest level of security and privacy, because all files, including any
temporary files that Windows and applications create on the system partition (typically, without your
knowledge or consent), hibernation files, swap files, etc., are always permanently encrypted (even when
power supply is suddenly interrupted). Windows also records large amounts of potentially sensitive data,
such as the names and locations of files you open, applications you run, etc. All such log files and registry
entries are always permanently encrypted too.
System encryption involves pre-boot authentication, which means that anyone who wants to gain access
and use the encrypted system, read and write files stored on the system drive, etc., will need to enter the
correct password each time before Windows boots (starts). Pre-boot authentication is handled by the
TrueCrypt Boot Loader, which resides in the first track of the boot drive and on the TrueCrypt Rescue
Disk.
Note that TrueCrypt can encrypt an existing unencrypted system partition/drive in-place while the
operating system is running (while the system is being encrypted, you can use your computer as usual
without any restrictions). Likewise, a TrueCrypt-encrypted system partition/drive can be decrypted in-
place while the operating system is running. You can interrupt the process of encryption or decryption
anytime, leave the partition/drive partially unencrypted, restart or shut down the computer, and then
resume the process, which will continue from the point it was stopped.
To encrypt a system partition or entire system drive, select System > Encrypt System Partition/Drive and
then follow the instructions in the wizard. To decrypt a system partition/drive, select System >
Permanently Decrypt System Partition/Drive.
The mode of operation used for system encryption is XTS (see the section Modes of Operation). For
further technical details of system encryption, see the section Encryption Scheme in the chapter Technical
Details.

Operating Systems Supported for System Encryption

TrueCrypt can currently encrypt the following operating systems:

• Windows Vista (SP1 or later)
• Windows Vista x64 (64-bit) Edition (SP1 or later)
• Windows XP
• Windows XP x64 (64-bit) Edition
• Windows Server 2008
• Windows Server 2008 x64 (64-bit)
• Windows Server 2003
• Windows Server 2003 x64 (64-bit)
See also: Supported Operating Systems

Hidden Operating System

It may happen that you are forced by somebody to decrypt the operating system. There are many
situations where you cannot refuse to do so (for example, due to extortion). TrueCrypt allows you to
create a hidden operating system whose existence will be impossible to prove (provided that certain
guidelines are followed). Thus, you will not have to decrypt or reveal the password for the hidden
operating system. For more information, see the section Hidden Operating System in the chapter Plausible
Deniability.

TrueCrypt Rescue Disk

During the process of preparing the encryption of a system partition/drive, TrueCrypt requires that you
create a so-called TrueCrypt Rescue Disk (CD/DVD), which serves the following purposes:
• If the TrueCrypt Boot Loader screen does not appear after you start your computer (or if your
Windows does not boot), the TrueCrypt Boot Loader may be damaged. The TrueCrypt Rescue
Disk allows you restore it and thus to regain access to your encrypted system and data (however,
note that you will still have to enter the correct password then). In the Rescue Disk screen, select
Repair Options > Restore TrueCrypt Boot Loader. Then press 'Y' to confirm the action, remove the
Rescue Disk from your CD/DVD drive and restart your computer.
• If you repeatedly enter the correct password but TrueCrypt says that the password is incorrect, it is
possible that the master key or other critical data are damaged. The TrueCrypt Rescue Disk
allows you to restore them and thus to regain access to your encrypted system and data (however,
note that you will still have to enter the correct password then). In the Rescue Disk screen, select
Repair Options > Restore key data. Then enter your password, press 'Y' to confirm the action,
remove the Rescue Disk from your CD/DVD drive, and restart your computer.

Note: This feature cannot be used to restore the header of a hidden volume within which a hidden
operating system resides. To restore such a volume header, click Select Device, select the partition
behind the boot partition, click OK, select Tools > Restore Volume Header and then follow the
instructions.

WARNING: By restoring key data using a TrueCrypt Rescue Disk, you also restore the password
that was valid when the TrueCrypt Rescue Disk was created. Therefore, whenever you change the
password, you should destroy your TrueCrypt Rescue Disk and create a new one (select System ->
Create Rescue Disk). Otherwise, if an attacker knows your old password (for example, captured by
a keystroke logger) and if he then finds your old TrueCrypt Rescue Disk, he could use it to restore
the key data (the master key encrypted with the old password) and thus decrypt your system
partition/drive
• If the TrueCrypt Boot Loader is damaged or infected with malware, you can avoid running it
by booting directly from the TrueCrypt Rescue Disk. Insert your Rescue Disk into your CD/DVD
drive and then enter your password in the Rescue Disk screen.
• If Windows is damaged and cannot start, the TrueCrypt Rescue Disk allows you to permanently
decrypt the partition/drive before Windows starts. In the Rescue Disk screen, select Repair
Options > Permanently decrypt system partition/drive. Enter the correct password and wait until
decryption is complete. Then you can e.g. boot your MS Windows setup CD/DVD to repair your
Windows. Note that this feature cannot be used to decrypt a hidden volume within which a hidden
 operating system resides.

Note: Alternatively, if Windows is damaged (cannot start) and you need to repair it (or access files
on it), you can avoid decrypting the system partition/drive by following these steps: Boot another
operating system, run TrueCrypt, click Select Device, select the affected system partition, select
System > Mount Without Pre-Boot Authentication, enter your pre-boot-authentication password and
click OK. The partition will be mounted as a regular TrueCrypt volume (data will be on-the-fly
decrypted/encrypted in RAM on access, as usual).
• Your TrueCrypt Rescue Disk contains a backup of the original content of the first drive track
(made before the TrueCrypt Boot Loader was written to it) and allows you to restore it if necessary.
The first track of a boot drive typically contains a system loader or boot manager. In the Rescue
Disk screen, select Repair Options > Restore original system loader.

Note that even if you lose your TrueCrypt Rescue Disk and an attacker finds it, he or she will not be able
to decrypt the system partition or drive without the correct password.
To boot a TrueCrypt Rescue Disk, insert it into your CD/DVD drive and restart your computer. If the
TrueCrypt Rescue Disk screen does not appear (or if you do not see the 'Repair Options' item in the
'Keyboard Controls' section of the screen), it is possible that your BIOS is configured to attempt to boot
from hard drives before CD/DVD drives. If that is the case, restart your computer, press F2 or Delete (as
soon as you see a BIOS start-up screen), and wait until a BIOS configuration screen appears. If no BIOS
configuration screen appears, restart (reset) the computer again and start pressing F2 or Delete repeatedly
as soon as you restart (reset) the computer. When a BIOS configuration screen appears, configure your
BIOS to boot from the CD/DVD drive first (for information on how to do so, please refer to the
documentation for your BIOS/motherboard or contact your computer vendor's technical support team for
assistance). Then restart your computer. The TrueCrypt Rescue Disk screen should appear now. Note: In
the TrueCrypt Rescue Disk screen, you can select 'Repair Options' by pressing F8 on your keyboard.
If your TrueCrypt Rescue Disk is damaged, you can create a new one by selecting System > Create
Rescue Disk. To find out whether your TrueCrypt Rescue Disk is damaged, insert it into your CD/DVD
drive and select System > Verify Rescue Disk.
 Parallelization
When your computer has a multi-core processor/CPU (or multiple processors/CPUs), TrueCrypt uses all
of the cores (or processors) in parallel for encryption and decryption. For example, when TrueCrypt is to
decrypt a chunk of data, it first splits the chunk into several smaller pieces. The number of the pieces is
equal to the number of the cores (or processors). Then, all of the pieces are decrypted in parallel (piece 1
is decrypted by thread 1, piece 2 is decrypted by thread 2, etc). The same method is used for encryption.
So if your computer has, for example, a quad-core processor, then encryption and decryption are four
times faster than on a single-core processor with equivalent specifications (likewise, they are twice faster
on dual-core processors, etc).
Increase in encryption/decryption speed is directly proportional to the number of cores and/or processors.
When your computer has a multi-core processor/CPU (or multiple processors/CPUs), header key
derivation is parallelized too. As a result, mounting of a volume is several times faster on a multi-core
processor (or multi-processor computer) than on a single-core processor (or a single-processor computer)
with equivalent specifications.
Note: Parallelization was introduced in TrueCrypt 6.0.

Pipelining
When encrypting or decrypting data, TrueCrypt uses so-called pipelining (asynchronous processing).
While an application is loading a portion of a file from a TrueCrypt-encrypted volume/drive, TrueCrypt is
automatically decrypting it (in RAM). Thanks to pipelining, the application does not have wait for any
portion of the file to be decrypted and it can start loading other portions of the file right away. The same
applies to encryption when writing data to an encrypted volume/drive.
Pipelining allows data to be read from and written to an encrypted drive as fast as if the drive was not
encrypted (the same applies to file-hosted and partition-hosted TrueCrypt volumes).
Note: Pipelining was introduced in TrueCrypt 5.0 and it is implemented only in the Windows versions of
TrueCrypt.
 Encryption Algorithms
TrueCrypt volumes can be encrypted using the following algorithms:
Block Mode of
Key Size
Algorithm Designer(s) Size Operatio
(Bits)
(Bits) n

AES J. Daemen, V. Rijmen 256 128 XTS

R. Anderson, E. Biham, L.
Serpent 256 128 XTS
Knudsen
B. Schneier, J. Kelsey, D.
Twofish Whiting, 256 128 XTS
D. Wagner, C. Hall, N. Ferguson
AES-Twofish 256; 256 128 XTS
256; 256;
AES-Twofish-Serpent 128 XTS
256
Serpent-AES 256; 256 128 XTS
256; 256;
Serpent-Twofish-AES 128 XTS
256
Twofish-Serpent 256; 256 128 XTS
For information about XTS mode, please see the section Modes of Operation.

AES
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) specifies a FIPS-approved cryptographic algorithm (Rijndael,
designed by Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen, published in 1998) that may be used by US federal
departments and agencies to cryptographically protect sensitive information [3]. TrueCrypt uses AES with
14 rounds and a 256-bit key (i.e., AES-256, published in 2001) operating in XTS mode (see the section
Modes of Operation).
In June 2003, after the NSA (US National Security Agency) conducted a review and analysis of AES, the
U.S. CNSS (Committee on National Security Systems) announced in [1] that the design and strength of
AES-256 (and AES-192) are sufficient to protect classified information up to the Top Secret level. This is
applicable to all U.S. Government Departments or Agencies that are considering the acquisition or use of
products incorporating the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to satisfy Information Assurance
requirements associated with the protection of national security systems and/or national security
information [1].
 Serpent
Designed by Ross Anderson, Eli Biham, and Lars Knudsen; published in 1998. It uses a 256-bit key, 128-
bit block, and operates in XTS mode (see the section Modes of Operation). Serpent was one of the AES
finalists. It was not selected as the proposed AES algorithm even though it appeared to have a higher
security margin than the winning Rijndael [4]. More concretely, Serpent appeared to have a high security
margin, while Rijndael appeared to have only an adequate security margin [4]. Rijndael has also received
some criticism suggesting that its mathematical structure might lead to attacks in the future [4].
In [5], the Twofish team presents a table of safety factors for the AES finalists. Safety factor is defined as:
number of rounds of the full cipher divided by the largest number of rounds that has been broken. Hence,
a broken cipher has the lowest safety factor 1. Serpent had the highest safety factor of the AES finalists:
3.56 (for all supported key sizes). Rijndael-256 had a safety factor of 1.56.
In spite of these facts, Rijndael was considered an appropriate selection for the AES for its combination of
security, performance, efficiency, implementability, and flexibility [4]. At the last AES Candidate
Conference, Rijndael got 86 votes, Serpent got 59 votes, Twofish 31 got votes, RC6 got 23 votes, and
MARS got 13 votes [18, 19].*

• These are positive votes. If negative votes are subtracted from the positive votes, the following
results are obtained: Rijndael: 76 votes, Serpent: 52 votes, Twofish: 10 votes, RC6: -14 votes,
MARS: -70 votes [19].

Twofish
Designed by Bruce Schneier, John Kelsey, Doug Whiting, David Wagner, Chris Hall, and Niels Ferguson;
published in 1998. It uses a 256-bit key and 128-bit block and operates in XTS mode (see the section
Modes of Operation). Twofish was one of the AES finalists. This cipher uses key-dependent S-boxes.
Twofish may be viewed as a collection of 2128 different cryptosystems, where 128 bits derived from a
256-bit key control the selection of the cryptosystem [4]. In [13], the Twofish team asserts that key-
dependent S-boxes constitute a form of security margin against unknown attacks [4].

AES-Twofish
Two ciphers in a cascade [15, 16] operating in XTS mode (see the section Modes of Operation). Each 128-
bit block is first encrypted with Twofish (256-bit key) in XTS mode and then with AES (256-bit key) in
XTS mode. Each of the cascaded ciphers uses its own key. All encryption keys are mutually independent
(note that header keys are independent too, even though they are derived from a single password – see
Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count). See above for information on the individual cascaded
ciphers.

AES-Twofish-Serpent
Three ciphers in a cascade [15, 16] operating in XTS mode (see the section Modes of Operation). Each
128-bit block is first encrypted with Serpent (256-bit key) in XTS mode, then with Twofish (256-bit key)
in XTS mode, and finally with AES (256-bit key) in XTS mode. Each of the cascaded ciphers uses its own
key. All encryption keys are mutually independent (note that header keys are independent too, even
though they are derived from a single password – see the section Header Key Derivation, Salt, and
Iteration Count). See above for information on the individual cascaded ciphers.
 Serpent-AES
Two ciphers in a cascade [15, 16] operating in XTS mode (see the section Modes of Operation). Each 128-
bit block is first encrypted with AES (256-bit key) in XTS mode and then with Serpent (256-bit key) in
XTS mode. Each of the cascaded ciphers uses its own key. All encryption keys are mutually independent
(note that header keys are independent too, even though they are derived from a single password – see the
section Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count). See above for information on the individual
cascaded ciphers.

Serpent-Twofish-AES
Three ciphers in a cascade [15, 16] operating in XTS mode (see the section Modes of Operation). Each
128-bit block is first encrypted with AES (256-bit key) in XTS mode, then with Twofish (256-bit key) in
XTS mode, and finally with Serpent (256-bit key) in XTS mode. Each of the cascaded ciphers uses its
own key. All encryption keys are mutually independent (note that header keys are independent too, even
though they are derived from a single password – see the section Header Key Derivation, Salt, and
Iteration Count). See above for information on the individual cascaded ciphers.

Twofish-Serpent
Two ciphers in a cascade [15, 16] operating in XTS mode (see the section Modes of Operation). Each 128-
bit block is first encrypted with Serpent (256-bit key) in XTS mode and then with Twofish (256-bit key) in
XTS mode. Each of the cascaded ciphers uses its own key. All encryption keys are mutually independent
(note that header keys are independent too, even though they are derived from a single password – see the
section Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count). See above for information on the individual
cascaded ciphers.
 Hash Algorithms
In the Volume Creation Wizard, in the password change dialog window, and in the Keyfile Generator
dialog window, you can select a hash algorithm. A user-selected hash algorithm is used by the TrueCrypt
Random Number Generator as a pseudorandom "mixing" function, and by the header key derivation
function (HMAC based on a hash function, as specified in PKCS #5 v2.0) as a pseudorandom function.
When creating a new volume, the Random Number Generator generates the master key, secondary key
(XTS mode), and salt. For more information, please see the section Random Number Generator and
section Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count.
TrueCrypt currently supports the following hash algorithms:
• RIPEMD-160
• SHA-512
• Whirlpool

RIPEMD-160
RIPEMD-160, published in 1996, is a hash algorithm designed by Hans Dobbertin, Antoon Bosselaers,
and Bart Preneel in an open academic community. The size of the output of RIPEMD-160 is 160 bits.
RIPEMD-160 is a strengthened version of the RIPEMD hash algorithm that was developed in the
framework of the European Union's project RIPE (RACE Integrity Primitives Evaluation), 1988-1992.
RIPEMD-160 was adopted by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the IEC in the
ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004 international standard [21].

SHA-512
SHA-512 is a hash algorithm designed by the NSA and published by NIST in FIPS PUB 180-2 [14] in
2002 (the first draft was published in 2001). The size of the output of this algorithm is 512 bits.

Whirlpool
The Whirlpool hash algorithm was designed by Vincent Rijmen (co-designer of the AES encryption
algorithm) and Paulo S. L. M. Barreto. The size of the output of this algorithm is 512 bits. The first
version of Whirlpool, now called Whirlpool-0, was published in November 2000. The second version,
now called Whirlpool-T, was selected for the NESSIE (New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity
and Encryption) portfolio of cryptographic primitives (a project organized by the European Union, similar
to the AES competition). TrueCrypt uses the third (final) version of Whirlpool, which was adopted by the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the IEC in the ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004
international standard [21].
 Technical Details
Notation

C Cipher text block

DK() Decryption algorithm using encryption/decryption key K
EK() Encryption algorithm using encryption/decryption key K
H() Hash function
i Block index for n-bit blocks; n is context-dependent
K Cryptographic key
P Plaintext block
^ Bitwise exclusive-OR operation (XOR)
Modulo 2n addition, where n is the bit size of the left-most operand and of the
resultant value (e.g., if the left operand is a 1-bit value, and the right operand is a 2-bit
value, then: 1 0 = 1; 1 1 = 0; 1 2 = 1; 1 3 = 0; 0 0 = 0; 0 1 = 1; 0
2 = 0; 0 3 = 1)
Modular multiplication of two polynomials over the binary field GF(2), modulo
x128+x7+x2+x+1 (GF stands for Galois Field)
|| Concatenation

Encryption Scheme
When mounting a TrueCrypt volume (assume there are no cached passwords/keyfiles) or when
performing pre-boot authentication, the following steps are performed:
1. The first 512 bytes of the volume (i.e., the standard volume header) are read into RAM, out of
which the first 64 bytes are the salt (see TrueCrypt Volume Format Specification). For system
encryption (see the chapter System Encryption), the last 512 bytes of the first logical drive track
are read into RAM (the TrueCrypt Boot Loader is stored in the first track of the system drive
and/or on the TrueCrypt Rescue Disk).
2. Bytes 65536–66047 of the volume are read into RAM (see the section TrueCrypt Volume Format
Specification). For system encryption, bytes 65536–66047 of the first partition located behind the
boot partition are read into RAM (see the section Hidden Operating System). If there is a hidden
volume within this volume (or within the partition behind the boot partition), we have read its
header at this point; otherwise, we have just read random data (whether or not there is a hidden
volume within it has to be determined by attempting to decrypt this data; for more information see
the section Hidden Volume).
3. Now TrueCrypt attempts to decrypt the standard volume header read in (1). All data used and
generated in the course of the process of decryption are kept in RAM (TrueCrypt never saves them
to disk). The following parameters are unknown* and have to be determined through the process of
trial and error (i.e., by testing all possible combinations of the following):
a. PRF used by the header key derivation function (as specified in PKCS #5 v2.0; see the
 section Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count), which can be one of the
following:

HMAC-SHA-512, HMAC-RIPEMD-160, HMAC-Whirlpool.

A password entered by the user (to which one or more keyfiles may have been applied – see
the section Keyfiles) and the salt read in (1) are passed to the header key derivation
function, which produces a sequence of values (see the section Header Key Derivation,
Salt, and Iteration Count) from which the header encryption key and secondary header key
(XTS mode) are formed. (These keys are used to decrypt the volume header.)
b. Encryption algorithm: AES-256, Serpent, Twofish, AES-Serpent, AES-Twofish-Serpent,
etc.
c. Mode of operation: XTS, LRW (deprecated/legacy), CBC (deprecated/legacy)
d. Key size(s)
4. Decryption is considered successful if the first 4 bytes of the decrypted data contain the ASCII
string "TRUE", and if the CRC-32 checksum of the last 256 bytes of the decrypted data (volume
header) matches the value located at byte #8 of the decrypted data (this value is unknown to an
adversary because it is encrypted – see the section Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration
Count). If these conditions are not met, the process continues from (3) again, but this time, instead
of the data read in (1), the data read in (2) are used (i.e., possible hidden volume header). If the
conditions are not met again, mounting is terminated (wrong password, corrupted volume, or not a
TrueCrypt volume).
5. Now we know (or assume with very high probability) that we have the correct password, the
correct encryption algorithm, mode, key size, and the correct header key derivation algorithm. If
we successfully decrypted the data read in (2), we also know that we are mounting a hidden
volume and its size is retrieved from data read in (2) decrypted in (3).
6. The encryption routine is reinitialized with the primary master key** and the secondary key (XTS
mode), which are retrieved from the decrypted volume header (see the section TrueCrypt Volume
Format Specification). These keys can be used to decrypt any sector of the volume, except the
volume header area (or the key data area, for system encryption), which has been encrypted using
the header keys. The volume is mounted.

See also the section Modes of Operation and the section Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count.

• These parameters are kept secret not in order to increase the complexity of an attack, but primarily
to make TrueCrypt volumes unidentifiable (indistinguishable from random data), which would be
difficult to achieve if these parameters were stored unencrypted within the volume header. Also
note that if a non-cascaded encryption algorithm is used for system encryption, the algorithm is
known (it can be determined by analyzing the contents of the unencrypted TrueCrypt Boot Loader
stored in the first logical drive track or on the TrueCrypt Rescue Disk).
** The master keys were generated during the volume creation and cannot be changed later.
Volume password change is accomplished by re-encrypting the volume header using a new header
key (derived from a new password).
 Modes of Operation
The mode of operation used by TrueCrypt for encrypted partitions, drives, and virtual volumes is XTS.

XTS mode is in fact XEX mode [12], which was designed by Phillip Rogaway in 2003, with a minor
modification (XEX mode uses a single key for two different purposes, whereas XTS mode uses two
independent keys). XTS mode was approved as the IEEE 1619 standard for cryptographic protection of
data on block-oriented storage devices in December 2007.

Description of XTS mode:

Ci = EK1(Pi ^ (EK2(n) ai)) ^ (EK2(n) ai)
Where:

denotes multiplication of two polynomials over the binary field GF(2) modulo
x128+x7+x2+x+1

K1 is the encryption key (256-bit for each supported cipher; i.e, AES, Serpent, and Twofish)

K2 is the secondary key (256-bit for each supported cipher; i.e, AES, Serpent, and Twofish)

i is the cipher block index within a data unit; for the first cipher block within a data unit, i
=0

n is the data unit index within the scope of K1; for the first data unit, n = 0

a is a primitive element of Galois Field (2128) that corresponds to polynomial x (i.e., 2)

The size of each data unit is always 512 bytes (regardless of the sector size).
For further information pertaining to XTS mode, see e.g. [12].

Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count

Header key is used to encrypt and decrypt the encrypted area of the TrueCrypt volume header, which
contains the master key and other data (see the sections Encryption Scheme and TrueCrypt Volume
Format Specification). The method that TrueCrypt uses to generate the header key and the secondary
header key (XTS mode) is PBKDF2, specified in PKCS #5 v2.0; see [7] (the document specifying
PBKDF2 is also available courtesy of RSA Laboratories at: http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/pkcs5v2-0.pdf).
512-bit salt is used, which means there are 2512 keys for each password. This decreases vulnerability to
'off-line' dictionary attacks (pre-computing all the keys for a dictionary of passwords is very difficult when
a salt is used) [7]. The salt consists of random values generated by the TrueCrypt random number
generator during the volume creation process. The header key derivation function is based on HMAC-
SHA-512, HMAC-RIPEMD-160, or HMAC-Whirlpool (see [8, 9, 20, 22]) – the user selects which. The
length of the derived key does not depend on the size of the output of the underlying hash function. For
example, a header key for the AES-256 cipher is always 256 bits long even if HMAC-RIPEMD-160 is
used (in XTS mode, an additional 256-bit secondary header key is used; hence, two 256-bit keys are used
for AES-256 in total). For more information, refer to [7]. 1000 iterations (or 2000 iterations when HMAC-
RIPEMD-160 is used as the underlying hash function) of the key derivation function have to be performed
to derive a header key, which increases the time necessary to perform an exhaustive search for passwords
(i.e., brute force attack) [7].
Header keys used by ciphers in a cascade are mutually independent, even though they are derived from a
single password (to which keyfiles may have been applied). For example, for the AES-Twofish-Serpent
cascade, the header key derivation function is instructed to derive a 768-bit encryption key from a given
password (and, for XTS mode, in addition, a 768-bit secondary header key from the given password). The
generated 768-bit header key is then split into three 256-bit keys (for XTS mode, the secondary header
key is split into three 256-bit keys too, so the cascade actually uses six 256-bit keys in total), out of which
the first key is used by Serpent, the second key is used by Twofish, and the third by AES (in addition, for
XTS mode, the first secondary key is used by Serpent, the second secondary key is used by Twofish, and
the third secondary key by AES). Hence, even when an adversary has one of the keys, he cannot use it to
derive the other keys, as there is no feasible method to determine the password from which the key was
derived (except for brute force attack mounted on a weak password).

Random Number Generator

The random number generator (RNG) is used to generate the master encryption key, the secondary key
(XTS mode), salt, and keyfiles. It creates a pool of random values in RAM (memory). The pool, which is
640 bytes long, is filled with data from the following sources:
• Mouse movements
• Keystrokes
• Mac OS X and Linux: Values generated by the built-in RNG (both /dev/random and /dev/urandom)
• MS Windows only: MS Windows CryptoAPI (collected regularly at 500-ms interval)
• MS Windows only: Network interface statistics (NETAPI32)
• MS Windows only: Various Win32 handles, time variables, and counters (collected regularly at
500-ms interval)
Before a value obtained from any of the above-mentioned sources is written to the pool, it is divided into
individual bytes (e.g., a 32-bit number is divided into four bytes). These bytes are then individually
written to the pool with the modulo 28 addition operation (not by replacing the old values in the pool) at
the position of the pool cursor. After a byte is written, the pool cursor position is advanced by one byte.
When the cursor reaches the end of the pool, its position is set to the beginning of the pool. After every
16th byte written to the pool, the pool mixing function is applied to the entire pool (see below).

Pool Mixing Function

The purpose of this function is to perform diffusion [2]. Diffusion spreads the influence of individual
"raw" input bits over as much of the pool state as possible, which also hides statistical relationships. After
every 16th byte written to the pool, this function is applied to the entire pool.
Description of the pool mixing function:
 1. Let R be the randomness pool
2. Let H be the hash function selected by the user (SHA-512, RIPEMD-160, or Whirlpool)
3. l = byte size of the output of the hash function H (i.e., if H is RIPEMD-160, then l = 20; if H is
SHA-512, l = 64)
4. z = byte size of the randomness pool R (640 bytes)
5. q = z / l – 1 (e.g., if H is Whirlpool, then q = 4)
6. R is divided into l-byte blocks B0...Bq.
For 0 < i < q (i.e., for each block B) the following steps are performed:
a. M = H (B0 || B1 || ... || Bq) [i.e., the randomness pool is hashed using the hash function H,
which produces a hash M]
b. Bi = Bi ^ M
7. R = B0 || B1 || ... || Bq
For example, if q = 1, the randomness pool would be mixed as follows:
1. (B0 || B1) = R
2. B0 = B0 ^ H(B0 || B1)
3. B1 = B1 ^ H(B0 || B1)
4. R = B0 || B1

The design and implementation of the random number generator are based on the following works:
• Software Generation of Practically Strong Random Numbers by Peter Gutmann [10]
• Cryptographic Random Numbers by Carl Ellison [11]

Keyfiles
TrueCrypt keyfile is a file whose content is combined with a password. The user can use any kind of file
as a TrueCrypt keyfile. The user can also generate a keyfile using the built-in keyfile generator, which
utilizes the TrueCrypt RNG to generate a file with random content (for more information, see the section
Random Number Generator).
The maximum size of a keyfile is not limited; however, only its first 1,048,576 bytes (1 MB) are
processed (all remaining bytes are ignored due to performance issues connected with processing
extremely large files). The user can supply one or more keyfiles (the number of keyfiles is not limited).
Keyfiles can be stored on PKCS-11-compliant [23] security tokens and smart cards protected by multiple
PIN codes (which can be entered either using a hardware PIN pad or via the TrueCrypt GUI).
Keyfiles are processed and applied to a password using the following method:
1. Let P be a TrueCrypt volume password supplied by user (may be empty)
2. Let KP be the keyfile pool
3. Let kpl be the size of the keyfile pool KP, in bytes (64, i.e., 512 bits);
 kpl must be a multiple of the output size of a hash function H
4. Let pl be the length of the password P, in bytes (in the current version: 0 < pl < 64)
5. if kpl > pl, append (kpl – pl) zero bytes to the password P (thus pl = kpl)
6. Fill the keyfile pool KP with kpl zero bytes.
7. For each keyfile perform the following steps:
a. Set the position of the keyfile pool cursor to the beginning of the pool
b. Initialize the hash function H
c. Load all bytes of the keyfile one by one, and for each loaded byte perform the following
steps:
i. Hash the loaded byte using the hash function H without initializing the hash, to
obtain an intermediate hash (state) M. Do not finalize the hash (the state is retained
for next round).
ii. Divide the state M into individual bytes.
For example, if the hash output size is 4 bytes, (T0 || T1 || T2 || T3) = M
iii.Write these bytes (obtained in step 7.c.ii) individually to the keyfile pool with the
modulo 28 addition operation (not by replacing the old values in the pool) at the
position of the pool cursor. After a byte is written, the pool cursor position is
advanced by one byte. When the cursor reaches the end of the pool, its position is
set to the beginning of the pool.
8. Apply the content of the keyfile pool to the password P using the following method:
a. Divide the password P into individual bytes B0...Bpl-1.
Note that if the password was shorter than the keyfile pool, then the password was padded
with zero bytes to the length of the pool in Step 5 (hence, at this point the length of the
password is always greater than or equal to the length of the keyfile pool).
b. Divide the keyfile pool KP into individual bytes G0...Gkpl-1
c. For 0 < i < kpl perform: Bi = Bi Gi
d. P = B0 || B1 || ... || Bpl-2 || Bpl-1
9. The password P (after the keyfile pool content has been applied to it) is now passed to the header
key derivation function PBKDF2 (PKCS #5 v2), which processes it (along with salt and other
data) using a cryptographically secure hash algorithm selected by the user (e.g., SHA-512). See the
section Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count for more information.
The role of the hash function H is merely to perform diffusion [2]. CRC-32 is used as the hash function H.
Note that the output of CRC-32 is subsequently processed using a cryptographically secure hash
algorithm: The keyfile pool content (in addition to being hashed using CRC-32) is applied to the
password, which is then passed to the header key derivation function PBKDF2 (PKCS #5 v2), which
processes it (along with salt and other data) using a cryptographically secure hash algorithm selected by
the user (e.g., SHA-512). The resultant values are used to form the header key and the secondary header
key (XTS mode).
 TrueCrypt Volume Format Specification
Note that this specification applies to volumes created by TrueCrypt 6.0 or later. The format of file-hosted
volumes is identical to the format of partition/device-hosted volumes (however, the "volume header", or
key data, for a system partition/drive is stored in the last 512 bytes of the first logical drive track).
TrueCrypt volumes have no "signature" or ID strings. Until decrypted, they appear to consist solely of
random data.
Free space on each TrueCrypt volume is filled with random data when the volume is created.* The
random data is generated as follows: Right before TrueCrypt volume formatting begins, a temporary
encryption key and a temporary secondary key (XTS mode) are generated by the random number
generator (see the section Random Number Generator). The encryption algorithm that the user selected is
initialised with the temporary keys. The encryption algorithm is then used to encrypt plaintext blocks
generated by the random number generator. The encryption algorithm operates in XTS mode (see the
section Hidden Volume). The resulting ciphertext blocks are used to fill (overwrite) the free space on the
volume. The temporary keys are stored in RAM and are securely erased after formatting finishes.

TrueCrypt Volume Format Specification:

Size
Offset Encryption
(bytes Description
(bytes) Status†
)

Unencrypted
0 64 Salt
§

64 4 Encrypted ASCII string "TRUE"

68 2 Encrypted Volume header format version

70 2 Encrypted Minimum program version required to open the volume

72 4 Encrypted CRC-32 checksum of the (decrypted) bytes 256-511

76 16 Encrypted Reserved (set to zero)

Size of hidden volume (for normal/outer volumes, set to

92 8 Encrypted
zero)

100 8 Encrypted Size of volume

108 8 Encrypted Byte offset of the start of the master key scope

116 8 Encrypted Size of the encrypted area within the master key scope
 Flag bits (bit 0 set: system encryption; bit 1 set: non-
124 4 Encrypted
system
in-place-encrypted volume; bits 2–31 are reserved)

128 124 Encrypted Reserved (set to zero)

252 4 Encrypted CRC-32 checksum of the (decrypted) bytes 64-251

256 Var. Encrypted Concatenated primary and secondary master keys**

512 65024 Encrypted Reserved (for system encryption, this item is omitted‡‡)

Area for hidden volume header (if there is no hidden

65536 65536 Encrypted /
volume
Unencrypted
within the volume, this area contains random data††). For
§
system encryption, this item is omitted.‡‡ See bytes 0–
65535.

Data area (master key scope). For system encryption,

131072 Var. Encrypted
offset
may be different (depending on offset of system partition).

Backup header (encrypted with a different header key

S-131072‡ 65536 Encrypted /
derived
Unencrypted
using a different salt). For system encryption, this item is
§
omitted.‡‡ See bytes 0–65535.

Backup header for hidden volume (encrypted with a

S-65536‡ 65536 Encrypted /
different
Unencrypted header key derived using a different salt). If there is no
§ hidden
volume within the volume, this area contains random
data.††
For system encryption, this item is omitted.‡‡ See bytes
0–65535.

The fields located at the byte #0 (salt) and #256 (master keys) contain random values generated by the
random number generator (see the section Random Number Generator) during the volume creation
process.
If a TrueCrypt volume hosts a hidden volume (within its free space), the header of the hidden volume is
located at the byte #65536 of the host volume (the header of the host/outer volume is located at the byte
#0 of the host volume – see the section Hidden Volume). If there is no hidden volume within a TrueCrypt
volume, the bytes 65536–131071 of the volume (i.e., the area where the header of a hidden volume can
reside) contain random data (see above for information on the method used to fill free volume space with
random data when the volume is created). The layout of the header of a hidden volume is the same as the
one of a standard volume (bytes 0–65535).
The maximum possible TrueCrypt volume size is 263 bytes (8,589,934,592 GB). However, due to security
reasons (with respect to the 128-bit block size and the mode of operation), the maximum allowed volume
size is 1 PB (1,048,576 GB).

Embedded Backup Headers

Each TrueCrypt volume created by TrueCrypt 6.0 or later contains an embedded backup header, located at
the end of the volume (see above). The header backup is not a copy of the volume header because it is
encrypted with a different header key derived using a different salt (see the section Header Key
Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count).
When the volume password and/or keyfiles are changed, or when the header is restored from the
embedded (or an external) header backup, both the volume header and the backup header (embedded in
the volume) are re-encrypted with different header keys (derived using newly generated salts – the salt for
the volume header is different from the salt for the backup header). Each salt is generated by the
TrueCrypt random number generator (see the section Random Number Generator).
For more information about header backups, see the subsection Tools > Restore Volume Header in the
chapter Main Program Window.

• Provided that the options Quick Format and Dynamic are disabled and provided that the volume
does not contain a filesystem that has been encrypted in place (note that TrueCrypt does not allow
the user to create a hidden volume within such a volume).
† The encrypted areas of the volume header are encrypted with the header key (and the secondary
header key in XTS mode). For more information, see the section Encryption Scheme and the
section Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count.
‡ S denotes the size of the volume (in bytes).
§ Note that the salt does not need to be encrypted, as it does not have to be kept secret [7] (salt is a
sequence of random values).
** Multiple concatenated master keys are stored here when the volume is encrypted using a
cascade of ciphers (secondary master keys are used for XTS mode).
†† See above in this section for information on the method used to fill free volume space with
random data when the volume is created.
‡‡ Here, the meaning of "system encryption" does not include a hidden volume containing a
hidden operating system.
 Compliance with Standards and Specifications
TrueCrypt complies with the following standards, specifications, and recommendations:
• PKCS #5 v2.0 [7]
• PKCS #11 v2.20 [23]
• FIPS 197 [3]
• FIPS 198 [22]
• FIPS 180-2 [14]
• ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004 [21]

The correctness of the implementations of the encryption algorithms can be verified using test vectors
(select Tools > Test Vectors) or by examining the source code of TrueCrypt.

Source Code
TrueCrypt is open-source and free software. The complete source code of TrueCrypt (written in C, C++,
and assembly) is freely available for peer review at:

http://www.truecrypt.org/
 TrueCrypt Volume
There are two types of TrueCrypt volumes:
• File-hosted (container)
• Partition/device-hosted
Note: In addition to creating the above types of virtual volumes, TrueCrypt can encrypt a physical
partition/drive where Windows is installed (for more information, see the chapter System Encryption).
A TrueCrypt file-hosted volume is a normal file, which can reside on any type of storage device. It
contains (hosts) a completely independent encrypted virtual disk device.
A TrueCrypt partition is a hard disk partition encrypted using TrueCrypt. You can also encrypt entire hard
disks, USB hard disks, floppy disks, USB memory sticks, and other types of storage devices.

Creating a New TrueCrypt Volume

To create a new TrueCrypt file-hosted volume or to encrypt a partition/device (requires administrator
privileges), click on 'Create Volume' in the main program window. TrueCrypt Volume Creation Wizard
should appear. As soon as the Wizard appears, it starts collecting data that will be used in generating the
master key, secondary key (XTS mode), and salt, for the new volume. The collected data, which should be
as random as possible, include your mouse movements, key presses, and other values obtained from the
system (for more information, please see the section Random Number Generator). The Wizard provides
help and information necessary to successfully create a new TrueCrypt volume. However, several items
deserve further explanation:

Hash Algorithm
Allows you to select which hash algorithm TrueCrypt will use. The selected hash algorithm is used by the
random number generator (as a pseudorandom mixing function), which generates the master key,
secondary key (XTS mode), and salt (for more information, please see the section Random Number
Generator). It is also used in deriving the new volume header key and secondary header key (see the
section Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count).
For information about the implemented hash algorithms, see the chapter Hash Algorithms.
Note that the output of a hash function is never used directly as an encryption key. For more information,
please refer to the chapter Technical Details.

Encryption Algorithm
This allows you to select the encryption algorithm with which your new volume will be encrypted. Note
that the encryption algorithm cannot be changed after the volume is created. For more information, please
see the chapter Encryption Algorithms.
 Quick Format
If unchecked, each sector of the new volume will be formatted. This means that the new volume will be
entirely filled with random data. Quick format is much faster but may be less secure because until the
whole volume has been filled with files, it may be possible to tell how much data it contains (if the space
was not filled with random data beforehand). If you are not sure whether to enable or disable Quick
Format, we recommend that you leave this option unchecked. Note that Quick Format can only be enabled
when encrypting partitions/devices.
Important: When encrypting a partition/device within which you intend to create a hidden volume
afterwards, leave this option unchecked.

Dynamic
Dynamic TrueCrypt container is a pre-allocated NTFS sparse file whose physical size (actual disk space
used) grows as new data is added to it. Note that the physical size of the container (actual disk space that
the container uses) will not decrease when files are deleted on the TrueCrypt volume. The physical size of
the container can only increase up to the maximum value that is specified by the user during the volume
creation process. After the maximum specified size is reached, the physical size of the container will
remain constant.
Note that sparse files can only be created in the NTFS file system. If you are creating a container in the
FAT file system, the option Dynamic will be disabled ("greyed out").
Note that the size of a dynamic (sparse-file-hosted) TrueCrypt volume reported by Windows and by
TrueCrypt will always be equal to its maximum size (which you specify when creating the volume). To
find out current physical size of the container (actual disk space it uses), right-click the container file (in a
Windows Explorer window, not in TrueCrypt), then select Properties and see the Size on disk value.
WARNING: Performance of dynamic (sparse-file-hosted) TrueCrypt volumes is significantly worse than
performance of regular volumes. Dynamic (sparse-file-hosted) TrueCrypt volumes are also less secure,
because it is possible to tell which volume sectors are unused. Furthermore, if data is written to a
dynamic volume when there is not enough free space in its host file system, the encrypted file system may
get corrupted.

Cluster Size
Cluster is an allocation unit. For example, one cluster is allocated on a FAT file system for a one-byte file.
When the file grows beyond the cluster boundary, another cluster is allocated. Theoretically, this means
that the bigger the cluster size, the more disk space is wasted; however, the better the performance. If you
do not know which value to use, use the default.

TrueCrypt Volumes on CDs and DVDs

If you want a TrueCrypt volume to be stored on a CD or a DVD, first create a file-hosted TrueCrypt
container on a hard drive and then burn it onto a CD/DVD using any CD/DVD burning software (or,
under Windows XP or later, using the CD burning tool provided with the operating system).
Remember that if you need to mount a TrueCrypt volume that is stored on a read-only medium (such as a
CD/DVD) under Windows 2000, you must format the TrueCrypt volume as FAT. The reason is that
Windows 2000 cannot mount NTFS file system on read-only media (Windows XP and later versions of
Windows can).

Hardware/Software RAID, Windows Dynamic Volumes

Windows Vista or later: Dynamic volumes are displayed in the ‘Select Device’ dialog window as \Device\
HarddiskVolumeN.

Windows XP/2000/2003: TrueCrypt supports hardware/software RAID as well as Windows dynamic

volumes. If you intend to format a Windows dynamic volume as a TrueCrypt volume, keep in mind that
after you create the Windows dynamic volume (using the Windows Disk Management tool), you must
restart the operating system in order for the volume to be available/displayed in the 'Select Device' dialog
window of the TrueCrypt Volume Creation Wizard. Also note that, in the 'Select Device' dialog window, a
Windows dynamic volume is not displayed as a single device (item). Instead, all volumes that the
Windows dynamic volume consists of are displayed and you can select any of them in order to format the
entire Windows dynamic volume.

Additional Notes on Volume Creation

After you click the 'Format' button in the Volume Creation Wizard window (the last step), there will be a
short delay while your system is being polled for additional random data. Afterwards, the master key,
header key, secondary key (XTS mode), and salt, for the new volume will be generated, and the master
key and header key contents will be displayed.
For extra security, the randomness pool, master key, and header key contents can be prevented from being
displayed by unchecking the checkbox in the upper right corner of the corresponding field:

Note that only the first 128 bits of the pool/keys are displayed (not the entire contents).

You can create FAT (whether it will be FAT12, FAT16, or FAT32, is automatically determined from the
number of clusters) or NTFS volumes (however, NTFS volumes can only be created by users with
administrator privileges). Mounted TrueCrypt volumes can be reformatted as FAT12, FAT16, FAT32, or
NTFS anytime. They behave as standard disk devices so you can right-click the drive letter of the
mounted TrueCrypt volume (for example in the 'Computer' or 'My Computer' list) and select 'Format'.
For more information about creating TrueCrypt volumes, see also the section Hidden Volume.
 Main Program Window

Select File
Allows you to select a file-hosted TrueCrypt volume. After you select it, you can perform various
operations on it (e.g., mount it by clicking 'Mount'). It is also possible to select a volume by dragging its
icon to the 'TrueCrypt.exe' icon (TrueCrypt will be automatically launched then) or to the main program
window.

Select Device
Allows you to select a TrueCrypt partition or a storage device (such as floppy disk or USB memory stick).
After it is selected, you can perform various operations with it (e.g., mount it by clicking 'Mount').
Note: There is a more comfortable way of mounting TrueCrypt partitions/devices – see the section Auto-
Mount Devices below for more information.

Mount
After you click 'Mount', TrueCrypt will try to mount the selected volume using cached passwords (if there
are any) and if none of them works, it prompts you for a password. If you enter the correct password (and/
or provide correct keyfiles), the volume will be mounted.
Important: Note that when you exit the TrueCrypt application, the TrueCrypt driver continues working
and no TrueCrypt volume is dismounted.

Auto-Mount Devices
This function allows you to mount TrueCrypt partitions/devices without having to select them manually
(by clicking 'Select Device'). TrueCrypt scans headers of all available partitions/devices on your system
(except DVD drives and similar devices) one by one and tries to mount each of them as a TrueCrypt
volume. Note that a TrueCrypt partition/device cannot be identified, nor the cipher it has been encrypted
with. Therefore, the program cannot directly "find" TrueCrypt partitions. Instead, it has to try mounting
each (even unencrypted) partition/device using all encryption algorithms and all cached passwords (if
there are any). Therefore, be prepared that this process may take a long time on slow computers.
If the password you enter is wrong, mounting is attempted using cached passwords (if there are any). If
you enter an empty password and if Use keyfiles is unchecked, only the cached passwords will be used
when attempting to auto-mount partitions/devices. If you do not need to set mount options, you can bypass
the password prompt by holding down the Shift key when clicking Auto-Mount Devices (only cached
passwords will be used, if there are any).
Drive letters will be assigned starting from the one that is selected in the drive list in the main window.
 Dismount
To dismount a TrueCrypt volume means to close it and make it impossible to read/write from/to the
volume.

Dismount All
To dismount a TrueCrypt volume means to close it and make it impossible to read/write from/to the
volume. This function dismount all currently mounted TrueCrypt volumes.

Wipe Cache
Clears all passwords (which may also contain processed keyfile contents) cached in driver memory. When
there are no passwords in the cache, this button is disabled. For information on password cache, see the
subsection Cache Password in Driver Memory in the section Mounting TrueCrypt Volumes.

Never Save History

If this option disabled, the file names and/or paths of the last twenty files/devices that were attempted to
be mounted as TrueCrypt volumes will be saved in the History file (whose content can be displayed by
clicking on the Volume combo-box in the main window). When this option is enabled, TrueCrypt clears
the registry entries created by the Windows file selector for TrueCrypt, and sets the "current directory" to
the user's home directory (in traveler mode, to the directory from which TrueCrypt was launched)
whenever a container or keyfile is selected via the Windows file selector. Therefore, the Windows file
selector will not remember the path of the last mounted container (or the last selected keyfile).
Furthermore, if this option is enabled, the volume path input field in the main TrueCrypt window is
cleared whenever you hide TrueCrypt.

Note: You can clear the volume history by selecting Tools -> Clear Volume History.

Exit
Terminates the TrueCrypt application. The driver continues working and no TrueCrypt volumes are
dismounted. When running in 'traveler' mode, the TrueCrypt driver is unloaded when it is no longer
needed (e.g., when all instances of the main application and/or of the Volume Creation Wizard are closed
and no TrueCrypt volumes are mounted). However, if you force dismount on a TrueCrypt volume when
TrueCrypt runs in ‘traveler’ mode, the TrueCrypt driver will not be unloaded when you exit TrueCrypt (it
will be unloaded only when you shut down or restart the system). This prevents various problems caused
by a bug in Windows (for instance, it would be impossible to start TrueCrypt again as long as there are
applications using the dismounted volume).

Volume Tools
Change Volume Password
See the item Volumes -> Change Volume Password in the section Program Menu.
Set Header Key Derivation Algorithm
See the item Volumes -> Set Header Key Derivation Algorithm in the section Program Menu.
Backup Volume Header
See the item Tools -> Backup Volume Header in the section Program Menu.
Restore Volume Header
See the item Tools -> Change Volume Password in the section Program Menu.

Program Menu
Note: To save space, only the menu items that are not self-explanatory are described in this
documentation.

Volumes -> Auto-Mount All Device-Hosted Volumes

See the section Auto-Mount Devices in the chapter Main Program Window.

Volumes -> Save Currently Mounted Volumes as Favorite

This function is useful if you often work with more than one TrueCrypt volume at a time and you need
each of them to be always mounted to a particular drive letter.
A list of all currently mounted volumes (and the drive letters they are mounted as) is saved to a file called
Favorite Volumes.xml in the folder where application data are saved on your system (for example, in
C:\Documents and Settings\YourUserName\Application Data\TrueCrypt). In traveler mode, the file is
saved to the folder from which you run the file TrueCrypt.exe (in which TrueCrypt.exe resides).
Note that when you use this function, all dismounted volumes that were previously saved as "Favorite"
will be deleted from the list of favorite volumes.
To mount volumes saved as "Favorite", select Volumes > Mount Favorite Volumes.
To delete the list of favorite volumes, dismount all TrueCrypt volumes, and select Volumes > Save
Currently Mounted Volumes as Favorite.

Volumes -> Mount Favorite Volumes

This function mounts volumes you previously saved as "Favorite". For more information, see the section
Volumes > Save Currently Mounted Volumes as Favorite above.
 Volumes -> Set Header Key Derivation Algorithm
This function allows you to re-encrypt a volume header with a header key derived using a different PRF
function (for example, instead of HMAC-RIPEMD-160 you could use HMAC-SHA-512). Note that the
volume header contains the master encryption key with which the volume is encrypted. Therefore, the data
stored on the volume will not be lost after you use this function. For more information, see the section
Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count.

Note: When TrueCrypt re-encrypts a volume header, the original volume header is first overwritten 100
times with random data to prevent adversaries from using techniques such as magnetic force microscopy
or magnetic force scanning tunneling microscopy [17] to recover the overwritten header (however, see
also the chapter Security Precautions).

Volumes -> Change Volume Password

Allows changing the password of the currently selected TrueCrypt volume (no matter whether the volume
is hidden or standard). Only the header key and the secondary header key (XTS mode) are changed – the
master key remains unchanged. This function re-encrypts the volume header using a header encryption
key derived from a new password. Note that the volume header contains the master encryption key with
which the volume is encrypted. Therefore, the data stored on the volume will not be lost after you use this
function (password change will only take a few seconds).

To change a TrueCrypt volume password, click on Select File or Select Device, then select the volume,
and from the Volumes menu select Change Volume Password.

Note: For information on how to change a password used for pre-boot authentication, please see the
section System > Change Password.
PKCS-5 PRF

In this field you can select the algorithm that will be used in deriving new volume header keys
(for more information, see the section Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count) and
in generating the new salt (for more information, see the section Random Number Generator).

Note: When TrueCrypt re-encrypts a volume header, the original volume header is first
overwritten 100 times with random data to prevent adversaries from using techniques such as
magnetic force microscopy or magnetic force scanning tunneling microscopy [17] to recover
the overwritten header (however, see also the chapter Security Precautions).

See also the chapter Security Precautions.

System -> Change Password

Changes the password used for pre-boot authentication (see the chapter System Encryption).
WARNING: Your TrueCrypt Rescue Disk allows you to restore key data if it is damaged. By doing so,
you also restore the password that was valid when the TrueCrypt Rescue Disk was created. Therefore,
whenever you change the password, you should destroy your TrueCrypt Rescue Disk and create a new one
(select System > Create Rescue Disk). Otherwise, an attacker could decrypt your system partition/drive
using the old password (if he finds the old TrueCrypt Rescue Disk and uses it to restore the key data). See
also the chapter Security Precautions.
For more information on changing a password, please see the section Volumes > Change Volume
Password above.

System -> Mount Without Pre-Boot Authentication

Check this option, if you need to mount a partition that is within the key scope of system encryption
without pre-boot authentication. For example, if you need to mount a partition located on the encrypted
system drive of another operating system that is not running. This can be useful e.g. when you need to
back up or repair an operating system encrypted by TrueCrypt (from within another operating system).

Note: If you need to mount multiple partitions at once, click 'Auto-Mount Devices', then click 'Mount
Options' and enable the option 'Mount partition using system encryption without pre-boot authentication'.
Please note you cannot use this function to mount extended (logical) partitions that are located on an
entirely encrypted system drive.

Tools -> Clear Volume History

Clears the list containing the file names (if file-hosted) and paths of the last twenty successfully mounted
volumes.

Tools -> Traveler Disk Setup

See the chapter Traveler Mode.

Tools -> Keyfile Generator

See the section Keyfiles > Generate Random Keyfile in the chapter Keyfiles.

Tools -> Backup Volume Header

Tools -> Restore Volume Header

If the header of a TrueCrypt volume is damaged, the volume is, in most cases, impossible to mount.
Therefore, each volume created by TrueCrypt 6.0 or later contains an embedded backup header, located at
the end of the volume. For extra safety, you can also create external volume header backup files. To do so,
click Select Device or Select File, select the volume, select Tools > Backup Volume Header, and then
follow the instructions.
Note: A backup header (embedded or external) is not a copy of the original volume header because it is
encrypted with a different header key derived using a different salt (see the section Header Key
Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count). When the volume password and/or keyfiles are changed, or when
the header is restored from the embedded (or an external) header backup, both the volume header and the
backup header (embedded in the volume) are re-encrypted with header keys derived using newly
generated salts (the salt for the volume header is different from the salt for the backup header). Each salt is
generated by the TrueCrypt random number generator (see the section Random Number Generator).
Both types of header backups (embedded and external) can be used to repair a damaged volume header.
To do so, click Select Device or Select File, select the volume, select Tools > Restore Volume Header, and
then follow the instructions.
WARNING: Restoring a volume header also restores the volume password that was valid when the
backup was created. Moreover, if keyfile(s) are/is necessary to mount a volume when the backup is
created, the same keyfile(s) will be necessary to mount the volume again after the volume header is
restored. For more information, see the section Encryption Scheme.
After you create a volume header backup, you might need to create a new one only when you change the
volume password and/or keyfiles. Otherwise, the volume header remains unmodified so the volume
header backup remains up-to-date.
Note: Apart from salt (which is a sequence of random numbers), external header backup files do not
contain any unencrypted information and they cannot be decrypted without knowing the correct password
and/or supplying the correct keyfile(s). For more information, see the chapter Technical Details.
When you create an external header backup, both the standard volume header and the area where a hidden
volume header can be stored is backed up, even if there is no hidden volume within the volume (to
preserve plausible deniability of hidden volumes). If there is no hidden volume within the volume, the
area reserved for the hidden volume header in the backup file will be filled with random data (to preserve
plausible deniability).
When restoring a volume header, you need to choose the type of volume whose header you wish to restore
(a standard or hidden volume). Only one volume header can be restored at a time. To restore both headers,
you need to use the function twice (Tools > Restore Volume Header). You will need to enter the correct
password (and/or to supply the correct keyfiles) that was/were valid when the volume header backup was
created. The password (and/or keyfiles) will also automatically determine the type of the volume header to
restore, i.e. standard or hidden (note that TrueCrypt determines the type through the process of trial and
error).
Note: If the user fails to supply the correct password (and/or keyfiles) twice in a row when trying to mount
a volume, TrueCrypt will automatically try to mount the volume using the embedded backup header (in
addition to trying to mount it using the primary header) each subsequent time that the user attempts to
mount the volume (until he or she clicks Cancel). If TrueCrypt fails to decrypt the primary header but it
successfully decrypts the embedded backup header at the same time, the volume is mounted and the user
is warned that the volume header is damaged (and informed as to how to repair it).
Note that these features can be used in a corporate environment to reset volume passwords in case a user
forgets it (or when he/she loses his/her keyfile). After you create a volume, backup its header (select Tools
> Backup Volume Header) before you allow a non-admin user to use the volume. Note that the volume
header (which is encrypted with a header key derived from a password/keyfile) contains the master key
with which the volume is encrypted. Then ask the user to choose a password, and set it for him/her
(Volumes > Change Volume Password); or generate a user keyfile for him/her. Then you can allow the user
to use the volume and to change the password/keyfiles without your assistance/permission. In case he/she
forgets his/her password or loses his/her keyfile, you can "reset" the volume password/keyfiles to your
original admin password/keyfiles by restoring the volume header backup (Tools > Restore Volume
Header).

Settings -> Preferences

Invokes the Preferences dialog window, where you can change, among others, the following options:
Wipe cached passwords on exit

If enabled, passwords (which may also contain processed keyfile contents) cached in driver
memory will be cleared when TrueCrypt exits.

Cache passwords in driver memory

When checked, passwords and/or p rocessed keyfile contents for up to last four successfully
mounted TrueCrypt volumes are cached. This allows mounting volumes without having to
type their passwords (and selecting keyfiles) repeatedly. TrueCrypt never saves any password
to a disk (however, see the chapter Security Precautions). Password caching can be
enabled/disabled in the Preferences (Settings > Preferences) and in the password prompt
window.

Open Explorer window for successfully mounted volume

If this option is checked, then after a TrueCrypt volume has been successfully mounted, an
Explorer window showing the root directory of the volume (e.g., T:\) will be automatically
opened.

Close all Explorer windows of volume being dismounted

Sometimes, dismounting a TrueCrypt volume is not possible because some files or folders
located on the volume are in use or "locked". This also applies to Explorer windows
displaying directories located on TrueCrypt volumes. When this option is checked, all such
windows will be automatically closed before dismounting, so that the user does not have to
close them manually.

TrueCrypt Background Task – Enabled

See the chapter TrueCrypt Background Task.

TrueCrypt Background Task – Exit when there are no mounted volumes

If this option is checked, the TrueCrypt background task automatically and silently exits as
soon as there are no mounted TrueCrypt volumes. For more information, see the chapter
TrueCrypt Background Task. Note that this option cannot be disabled when TrueCrypt runs in
traveler mode.

Auto-dismount volume after no data has been read/written to it for

After no data has been written/read to/from a TrueCrypt volume for n minutes, the volume is
 automatically dismounted.

Force auto-dismount even if volume contains open files or directories

This option applies only to auto-dismount (not to regular dismount). It forces dismount
(without prompting) on the volume being auto-dismounted in case it contains open files or
directories (i.e., file/directories that are in use by the system or applications).

Mounting TrueCrypt Volumes

If you have not done so yet, please read the sections 'Mount' and 'Auto-Mount Devices' in the chapter Main
Program Window.

Cache Password in Driver Memory

This option can be set in the password entry dialog so that it will apply only to that particular mount
attempt. It can also be set as default in the Preferences. For more information, please see the subsection
Settings -> Preferences, item Cache passwords in driver memory in the section Program Menu.

Mount Options
Mount options affect the parameters of the volume being mounted. The Mount Options dialog can be
opened by clicking on the Mount Options button in the password entry dialog. When a correct password is
cached, volumes are automatically mounted after you click Mount. If you need to change mount options
for a volume being mounted using a cached password, hold down the Control (Ctrl) key while clicking
Mount, or select Mount with Options from the Volumes menu.
Default mount options can be configured in the main program preferences (Settings -> Preferences).

Mount volume as read-only

When checked, it will not be possible to write any data to the mounted volume. Note that Windows 2000
do not allow NTFS volumes to be mounted as read-only.
Mount volume as removable medium

Check this option, for example, if you need to prevent Windows from automatically creating the 'Recycled'
and/or 'System Volume Information' folders on the volume (these folders are used by the Recycle Bin and
System Restore facilities).
Use backup header embedded in volume if available

All volumes created by TrueCrypt 6.0 or later contain an embedded backup header (located at the end of
the volume). If you check this option, TrueCrypt will attempt to mount the volume using the backup
header. Note that if the volume header is damaged, you do not have to use this option to mount the
volume. Instead, you can repair the header by selecting Tools > Restore Volume Header.
Mount partition using system encryption without pre-boot authentication

Check this option, if you need to mount a partition that is within the key scope of system encryption
without pre-boot authentication. For example, if you need to mount a partition located on the encrypted
system drive of another operating system that is not running. This can be useful e.g. when you need to
back up or repair an operating system encrypted by TrueCrypt (from within another operating system).
Note that this option can be enabled also when using the 'Auto-Mount Devices' or 'Auto-Mount All Device-
Hosted Volumes' functions.
Hidden Volume Protection

Please see the section Protection of Hidden Volumes Against Damage.

 Keyfiles
Keyfile is a file whose content is combined with a password (for information on the method used to
combine a keyfile with password, see the section Keyfiles in the chapter Technical Details). Until the
correct keyfile is provided, no volume that uses the keyfile can be mounted.
You do not have to use keyfiles. However, using keyfiles has some advantages:
• Provides protection against keystroke loggers (even if an adversary captures your password using a
keystroke logger, he will not be able to mount the volume without your keyfile).
• May improve protection against brute force attacks (significant particularly if the volume password
is weak).
• Allows managing multi-user shared access (all keyfile holders must present their keyfiles before a
volume can be mounted).
Any kind of file (for example, .txt, .exe, mp3**, .avi) may be used as a TrueCrypt keyfile (however, we
recommend that you prefer compressed files, such as .mp3, .jpg, .zip, etc).

Note that TrueCrypt never modifies the keyfile contents. Therefore, it is possible to use, for example, five
files in your large mp3 collection as TrueCrypt keyfiles (and inspection of the files will not reveal that
they are used as keyfiles).

You can select more than one keyfile; the order does not matter. You can also let TrueCrypt generate a file
with random content and use it as a keyfile. To do so, select Keyfiles -> Generate Random Keyfile.
IMPORTANT: To make brute force attacks on a keyfile infeasible, the size of the keyfile should be at
least 30 bytes. If a volume uses multiple keyfiles, then at least one of the keyfiles should be 30 bytes in
size or larger. Note that the 30-byte limit assumes a large amount of entropy in the keyfile. If the first 1024
kilobytes of a file contain only a small amount of entropy, it should not be used as a keyfile (regardless of
the file size). If you are not sure what entropy means, we recommend that you let TrueCrypt generate a
file with random content and that you use it as a keyfile (select Keyfiles -> Generate Random Keyfile).
WARNING: If you lose a keyfile or if any bit of its first 1024 kilobytes changes, it will be impossible to
mount volumes that use the keyfile!
WARNING: If password caching is enabled, the password cache also contains the processed contents
of keyfiles used to successfully mount a volume. Then it is possible to remount the volume even if the
keyfile is not available/accessible. To prevent this, click 'Wipe Cache' or disable password caching (for
more information, please see the subsection 'Settings -> Preferences', item 'Cache passwords in driver
memory' in the section Program Menu).

Keyfiles Dialog Window

If you want to use keyfiles (i.e. "apply" them) when creating or mounting volumes, or changing
passwords, look for the 'Use keyfiles' option and the Keyfiles button below a password input field.
These control elements appear in various dialog windows and always have the same functions. Check the
Use keyfiles option and click Keyfiles. The keyfile dialog window should appear where you can specify
keyfiles (to do so, click Add Files or Add Token Files) or keyfile search paths (click Add Path).

Security Tokens and Smart Cards

TrueCrypt can directly use keyfiles stored on a security token or smart card that complies with the
PKCS #11 (2.0 or later) standard [23] and that allows the user to store a file (data object) on the
token/card. To use such files as TrueCrypt keyfiles, click Add Token Files (in the keyfile dialog window).
Access to a keyfile stored on a security token or smart card is typically protected by PIN codes, which can
be entered either using a hardware PIN pad or via the TrueCrypt GUI. It can also be protected by other
means, such as fingerprint readers.
In order to allow TrueCrypt to access a security token or smart card, you need to install a PKCS #11 (2.0
or later) software library for the token or smart card first. Such a library may be supplied with the device
or it may be available for download from the website of the vendor or other third parties.
If your security token or smart card does not contain any file (data object) that you could use as a
TrueCrypt keyfile, you can use TrueCrypt to import any file to the token or smart card (if it is supported
by the device). To do so, follow these steps:
1. In the keyfile dialog window, click Add Token Files.
2. If the token or smart card is protected by a PIN, password, or other means (such as a fingerprint
reader), authenticate yourself (for example, by entering the PIN using a hardware PIN pad).
3. The 'Security Token Keyfile' dialog window should appear. In it, click Import Keyfile to Token and
then select the file you want to import to the token or smart card.
Note that you can import for example 512-bit keyfiles with random content generated by TrueCrypt (see
Keyfiles -> Generate Random Keyfile below).
To close all opened security token sessions, either select Keyfiles > Close All Security Token Sessions or
define and use a hotkey combination (Settings > Hot Keys > Close All Security Token Sessions).

Keyfile Search Path

By adding a folder in the keyfile dialog window (click Add Path), you specify a keyfile search path. All
files found in the keyfile search path* will be used as keyfiles.
Important: Note that folders (and files they contain) found in keyfile search paths are ignored.
Keyfile search paths are especially useful if you, for example, store keyfiles on a USB memory stick that
you carry with you. You can set the drive letter of the USB memory stick as a default keyfile search path.
To do so, select Keyfiles -> Set Default Keyfiles/Paths. Then click
Add Path, browse to the drive letter assigned to the USB memory stick, and click OK. Now each time you
mount a volume (and if the option Use keyfiles is checked in the password dialog window), TrueCrypt will
scan the path and use all files that it finds on the USB memory stick as keyfiles.
WARNING: When you add a folder (as opposed to a file) to the list of keyfiles, only the path is
remembered, not the filenames! This means e.g. that if you create a new file in the folder or if you copy
an additional file to the folder, then all volumes that used keyfiles from the folder will be impossible to
mount (until you remove the newly added file from the folder).

Empty Password & Keyfile

When a keyfile is used, the password may be empty, so the keyfile may become the only item necessary to
mount the volume (which we do not recommend). If default keyfiles are set and enabled when mounting a
volume, then before prompting for a password, TrueCrypt first automatically attempts to mount using an
empty password plus default keyfiles. If you need to set Mount Options (e.g., mount as read-only, protect
hidden volume etc.) for a volume being mounted this way, hold down the Control (Ctrl) key while
clicking Mount (or select Mount with Options from the Volumes menu). This will open the Mount Options
dialog.

Quick Selection
Keyfiles and keyfile search paths can be quickly selected in the following ways:
• Right-click the Keyfiles button in the password entry dialog window and select one of the menu
items.
• Drag the corresponding file/folder icons to the keyfile dialog window or to the password entry
dialog.

Keyfiles -> Add/Remove Keyfiles to/from Volume

This function allows you to re-encrypt a volume header with a header encryption key derived from any
number of keyfiles (with or without a password), or no keyfiles at all. Thus, a volume which is possible to
mount using only a password can be converted to a volume that require keyfiles (in addition to the
password) in order to be possible to mount. Note that the volume header contains the master encryption
key with which the volume is encrypted. Therefore, the data stored on the volume will not be lost after
you use this function.
This function can also be used to change/set volume keyfiles (i.e., to remove some or all keyfiles, and to
apply new ones).
Remark: This function is internally equal to the Password Change function.

When TrueCrypt re-encrypts a volume header, the original volume header is first overwritten 100 times
with random data to prevent adversaries from using techniques such as magnetic force microscopy or
magnetic force scanning tunneling microscopy [17] to recover the overwritten header (however, see also
the chapter Security Precautions).
 Keyfiles -> Remove All Keyfiles from Volume
This function allows you to re-encrypt a volume header with a header encryption key derived from a
password and no keyfiles (so that it can be mounted using only a password, without any keyfiles). Note
that the volume header contains the master encryption key with which the volume is encrypted. Therefore,
the data stored on the volume will not be lost after you use this function.
Remark: This function is internally equal to the Password Change function.

When TrueCrypt re-encrypts a volume header, the original volume header is first overwritten 100 times
with random data to prevent adversaries from using techniques such as magnetic force microscopy or
magnetic force scanning tunneling microscopy [17] to recover the overwritten header (however, see also
the chapter Security Precautions).

Keyfiles -> Generate Random Keyfile

You can use this function to generate a file with random content, which you can use as a keyfile
(recommended). This function uses the TrueCrypt Random Number Generator. Note that the resulting file
size is always 64 bytes (i.e., 512 bits), which is also the maximum possible TrueCrypt password length.

Keyfiles -> Set Default Keyfile/Paths

Use this function to set default keyfiles and/or default keyfile search paths. This function is particularly
useful if you, for example, store keyfiles on a USB memory stick that you carry with you. You can add its
drive letter to the default keyfile configuration. To do so, click Add Path, browse to the drive letter
assigned to the USB memory stick, and click OK. Now each time you mount a volume (and if Use
keyfiles is checked in the password dialog), TrueCrypt will scan the path and use all files that it finds there
as keyfiles.

WARNING: When you add a folder (as opposed to a file) to your default keyfile list, only the path is
remembered, not the filenames! This means e.g. that if you create a new file in the folder or if you copy
an additional file to the folder, then all volumes that used keyfiles from the folder will be impossible to
mount (until you remove the newly added file from the folder).

IMPORTANT: Note that when you set default keyfiles and/or default keyfile search paths, the filenames
and paths are saved unencrypted in the file Default Keyfiles.xml. For more information, please see the
chapter TrueCrypt System Files & Application Data.

• Found at the time when you are mounting the volume, changing its password, or performing any
other operation that involves re-encryption of the volume header.
** However, if you use an MP3 file as a keyfile, you must ensure that no program modifies the
ID3 tags within the MP3 file (e.g. song title, name of artist, etc.). Otherwise, it will be impossible
to mount volumes that use the keyfile.
 Security Tokens & Smart Cards
TrueCrypt supports security (or cryptographic) tokens and smart cards that can be accessed using the
PKCS #11 (2.0 or later) protocol [23]. For more information, please see the section Security Tokens and
Smart Cards in the chapter Keyfiles.

Traveler Mode
TrueCrypt can run in so-called traveler (portable) mode, which means that it does not have to be installed
on the operating system under which it is run. However, there are two things to keep in mind:
• You need administrator privileges in order to able to run TrueCrypt in traveler mode (for reasons,
see the chapter Using TrueCrypt Without Administrator Privileges).
• After examining the registry file, it may be possible to tell that TrueCrypt was run (and that a
TrueCrypt volume was mounted) on a Windows system even if it was run in traveler mode (for
more information, see the section Windows Registry).
If you need to solve these problems, we recommend using BartPE for this purpose. For further
information on BartPE, see the question "Is it possible to use TrueCrypt without leaving any 'traces' on
Windows?" in the section Frequently Asked Questions.

There are two ways to run TrueCrypt in traveler mode:

• After you unpack the binary distribution archive, you can directly run TrueCrypt.exe.
• You can use the Traveler Disk Setup facility to prepare a special traveler disk and launch TrueCrypt
from there.
The second option has several advantages, which are described in the following sections in this chapter.

Note: When running in traveler mode, the TrueCrypt driver is unloaded when it is no longer needed (e.g.,
when all instances of the main application and/or of the Volume Creation Wizard are closed and no
TrueCrypt volumes are mounted). However, if you force dismount on a TrueCrypt volume when
TrueCrypt runs in traveler mode, the TrueCrypt driver will not be unloaded when you exit TrueCrypt (it
will be unloaded only when you shut down or restart the system). This prevents various problems caused
by a bug in Windows (for instance, it would be impossible to start TrueCrypt again as long as there are
applications using the dismounted volume).

Tools -> Traveler Disk Setup

You can use this facility to prepare a special traveler disk and launch TrueCrypt from there. Note that
TrueCrypt 'traveler disk' is not a TrueCrypt volume but an unencrypted volume. A 'traveler disk' contains
TrueCrypt executable files and optionally the 'autorun.inf' script (see the section AutoRun Configuration
below). After you select Tools -> Traveler Disk Setup, the Traveler Disk Setup dialog box should appear.
Some of the parameters that can be set within the dialog deserve further explanation:
Include TrueCrypt Volume Creation Wizard
Check this option, if you need to create new TrueCrypt volumes using TrueCrypt run from the traveler
disk you will create. Unchecking this option saves space on the traveler disk.
AutoRun Configuration (autorun.inf)
In this section, you can configure the 'traveler disk' to automatically start TrueCrypt or mount a specified
TrueCrypt volume when the 'traveler disk' is inserted. This is accomplished by creating a special script file
called 'autorun.inf' on the traveler disk. This file is automatically executed by the operating system each
time the 'traveler disk' is inserted.

Note, however, that this feature only works for removable storage devices such as CD/DVD (Windows XP
SP2, Windows Vista, or a later version of Windows is required for this feature to work on USB memory
sticks) and only when it is enabled in the operating system. Depending on the operating system
configuration, these auto-run and auto-mount features may work only when the traveler disk files are
created on a non-writable CD/DVD-like medium (which is not a bug in TrueCrypt but a limitation of
Windows).

Also note that the 'autorun.inf' file must be in the root directory (i.e., for example G:\, X:\, or Y:\ etc.) of an
unencrypted disk in order for this feature to work.

Using TrueCrypt Without Administrator

Privileges
In Windows, a user who does not have administrator privileges can use TrueCrypt, but only after a system
administrator installs TrueCrypt on the system. The reason for that is that TrueCrypt needs a device driver
to provide transparent on-the-fly encryption/decryption, and users without administrator privileges cannot
install/start device drivers in Windows.

After a system administrator installs TrueCrypt on the system, users without administrator privileges will
be able to run TrueCrypt, mount/dismount any type of TrueCrypt volume, load/save data from/to it, and
create file-hosted TrueCrypt volumes on the system. However, users without administrator privileges
cannot encrypt/format partitions, cannot create NTFS volumes, cannot install/uninstall TrueCrypt, cannot
change passwords/keyfiles for TrueCrypt partitions/devices, cannot backup/restore headers of TrueCrypt
partitions/devices, and they cannot run TrueCrypt in 'traveler' mode.

TrueCrypt Background Task

When the main TrueCrypt window is closed, the TrueCrypt Background Task takes care of the following
tasks/functions:
1) Hot keys
2) Auto-dismount (e.g., upon log off, inadvertent host device removal, time-out, etc.)
3) Notifications (e.g., when damage to hidden volume is prevented)
4) Tray icon
WARNING: If neither the TrueCrypt Background Task nor TrueCrypt is running, the above-mentioned
tasks/functions are disabled.
The TrueCrypt Background Task is actually the TrueCrypt.exe application, which continues running in the
background after you close the main TrueCrypt window. Whether it is running or not can be determined
by looking at the system tray area. If you can see the TrueCrypt icon there, then the TrueCrypt
Background Task is running. You can click the icon to open the main TrueCrypt window. Right-click on
the icon opens a popup menu with various TrueCrypt-related functions.
You can shut down the Background Task at any time by right-clicking the TrueCrypt tray icon and
selecting Exit. If you need to disable the TrueCrypt Background Task completely and permanently, select
Settings -> Preferences and uncheck the option Enabled in the TrueCrypt Background Task area of the
Preferences dialog window.

Advertisements / Sponsored Links:

Language Packs
Language packs contain third-party translations of the TrueCrypt user interface texts. Some language
packs also contain translated TrueCrypt User Guide. Note that language packs are currently supported
only by the Windows version of TrueCrypt.

Installation
To install a language pack, follow these steps:
1. Download a language pack from: http://www.truecrypt.org/localizations
2. Exit TrueCrypt (if it is running).
3. Extract the language pack to the folder to which you installed TrueCrypt, i.e. the folder in which
the file 'TrueCrypt.exe' resides; for example, 'C:\Program Files\TrueCrypt' or 'C:\Program Files
(x86)\TrueCrypt', etc.
4. Run TrueCrypt.
5. The language pack should be automatically detected, loaded, and set as the default language pack.
(You can select a language at any time by clicking Settings -> Language).
To revert to English, select Settings -> Language. Then select English and click OK.

Hot Keys
To set system-wide TrueCrypt hot keys, click Settings -> Hot Keys. Note that hot keys work only when
TrueCrypt or the TrueCrypt Background Task is running.

Supported Operating Systems

TrueCrypt currently supports the following operating systems:
• Windows Vista
• Windows Vista x64 (64-bit) Edition
• Windows XP
• Windows XP x64 (64-bit) Edition
• Windows Server 2008
• Windows Server 2008 x64 (64-bit)
• Windows Server 2003
• Windows Server 2003 x64 (64-bit)
• Windows 2000 SP4
• Mac OS X 10.5 Leopard
• Mac OS X 10.4 Tiger
• Linux (kernel 2.4, 2.6 or compatible)
 Security Precautions
The sections in this chapter, along with the chapters Known Issues & Limitations and Security
Precautions Pertaining to Hidden Volumes, give information about things that adversely affect or limit
the ability of TrueCrypt to secure data on a computer. Please note that it is impossible to list all known
security risks here. There are, unfortunately, too many of them and it would require thousands of pages to
describe them.

Paging File
Note: The issue described below does not affect you if the system partition or system drive is encrypted
(for more information, see the chapter System Encryption) and if all paging files are located on one or
more of the partitions within the key scope of system encryption, for example, on the partition where
Windows is installed (for more information, see the subsection 'Solution' below).
Also called 'swap file'; Windows uses this file (usually stored on a hard drive) to hold parts of programs
and data files that do not fit in memory. This means that sensitive data, which you believe are only stored
in RAM, can actually be written unencrypted to a hard drive by Windows without you knowing.

TrueCrypt always attempts to lock the memory areas in which cached passwords, encryption keys, and
other sensitive data are stored, in order to prevent such data from being leaked to paging files. However,
note that Windows may reject or fail to lock memory for various (documented and undocumented)
reasons. Furthermore, TrueCrypt cannot prevent the contents of sensitive files that are opened in RAM
from being saved unencrypted to a paging file (note that when you open a file stored on a TrueCrypt
volume, for example, in a text editor, then the content of the file is stored unencrypted in RAM).
Solution: Encrypt the system partition/drive (for information on how to do so, see the chapter System
Encryption) and make sure that all paging files are located on one or more of the partitions within the key
scope of system encryption (for example, on the partition where Windows is installed). Note that the last
condition is typically met on Windows XP by default. However, Windows Vista and later versions of
Windows are configured by default to create paging files on any suitable volume. Therefore, before, you
start using TrueCrypt, you must follow these steps: Right-click the 'Computer' (or 'My Computer') icon on
the desktop or in the Start Menu, and then select Properties > (on Windows Vista or later: > Advanced
System Settings >) Advanced tab > section Performance > Settings > Advanced tab > section Virtual
memory > Change. On Windows Vista or later, disable 'Automatically manage paging file size for all
drives'. Then make sure that the list of volumes available for paging file creation contains only volumes
within the intended key scope of system encryption (for example, the volume where Windows is
installed). To disable paging file creation on a particular volume, select it, then select 'No paging file' and
click Set. When done, click OK and restart the computer.

Note: You may also want to consider creating a hidden operating system (for more information, see the
section Hidden Operating System).
 Hibernation File
Note: The issue described below does not affect you if the system partition or system drive is encrypted*
(for more information, see the chapter System Encryption) and if the hibernation file is located on any of
the partitions within the key scope of system encryption (which it typically is, by default), for example, on
the partition where Windows is installed. When the computer hibernates, data are encrypted on the fly
before they are written to the hibernation file.
When a computer hibernates (or enters a power-saving mode), the content of its system memory is written
to a so-called hibernation file on the hard drive. You can configure TrueCrypt (Settings > Preferences >
Dismount all when: Entering power saving mode) to automatically dismount all mounted TrueCrypt
volumes, erase their master keys stored in RAM, and cached passwords (stored in RAM), if there are any,
before a computer hibernates (or enters a power-saving mode). However, keep in mind, that if you do not
use system encryption (see the chapter System Encryption), TrueCrypt still cannot reliably prevent the
contents of sensitive files opened in RAM from being saved unencrypted to a hibernation file. Note that
when you open a file stored on a TrueCrypt volume, for example, in a text editor, then the content of the
file is stored unencrypted in RAM (and it may remain unencrypted in RAM until the computer is turned
off).
Solution 1: Encrypt the system partition/drive (for information on how to do so, see the chapter System
Encryption) and make sure that the hibernation file is located on one the partitions within the key scope of
system encryption (which it typically is, by default), for example, on the partition where Windows is
installed. When the computer hibernates, data will be encrypted on the fly before they are written to the
hibernation file.
Note: You may also want to consider creating a hidden operating system (for more information, see the
section Hidden Operating System).
Solution 2: If you do not use system encryption, disable or prevent hibernation on your computer at least
for each session during which you work with any sensitive data and during which you mount a TrueCrypt
volume.

• Disclaimer: As Microsoft does not provide any API for handling hibernation, non-Microsoft
developers of disk encryption software are forced to modify undocumented components of
Windows in order to allow users to encrypt hibernation files. Therefore, no disk encryption
software (except for Microsoft's BitLocker) can currently guarantee that hibernation files will
always be encrypted. At anytime, Microsoft can arbitrarily modify components of Windows (using
the Auto Update feature of Windows) that are not publicly documented or accessible via a public
API. Any such change, or the use of an untypical or custom storage device driver, may cause any
non-Microsoft disk encryption software to fail to encrypt the hibernation file. Note: We plan to file
a complaint with Microsoft (and if rejected, with the European Commission) about this issue, also
due to the fact that Microsoft's disk encryption software, BitLocker, is not disadvantaged by this.

[Update 2008-04-02: Although we have not filed any complaint with Microsoft yet, we were
contacted (on March 27) by Scott Field, a lead Architect in the Windows Client Operating System
Division at Microsoft, who stated that he would like to investigate our requirements and look at
possible solutions. We responded on March 31 providing details of the issues and suggested
solutions.]
 [Update 2009-05-10: Since April 2008, we have been working with Microsoft to explore possible
ways to solve this issue. We have private access to a draft version of a document specifying the
future API, which should allow us to solve the issue on Windows Vista and later versions of
Windows. Note: We have been asked not to disclose the content of the document to any third
parties, so please do not ask us to send you a copy of the document.]

Memory Dump Files

Note: The issue described below does not affect you if the system partition or system drive is encrypted
(for more information, see the chapter System Encryption) and if the system is configured to write memory
dump files to the system drive (which it typically is, by default).
Most operating systems, including Windows, can be configured to write debugging information and
contents of the system memory to so-called memory dump files when an error occurs (system crash, "blue
screen," bug check). Therefore, memory dump files may contain sensitive data. TrueCrypt cannot prevent
cached passwords, encryption keys, and the contents of sensitive files opened in RAM from being saved
unencrypted to memory dump files. Note that when you open a file stored on a TrueCrypt volume, for
example, in a text editor, then the content of the file is stored unencrypted in RAM (and it may remain
unencrypted in RAM until the computer is turned off). Also note that when a TrueCrypt volume is
mounted, its master key is stored unencrypted in RAM. Therefore, we strongly recommend that you
disable memory dump file generation on your computer at least for each session during which you work
with any sensitive data and during which you mount a TrueCrypt volume. To do so in Windows XP or
later, right-click the 'Computer' (or 'My Computer') icon on the desktop or in the Start Menu, and then
select Properties > (on Windows Vista or later: > Advanced System Settings >) Advanced tab > section
Startup and Recovery > Settings > section Write debugging information > select (none) > OK.
Note: If the system partition/drive is encrypted by TrueCrypt and if the system is configured to write
memory dump files to the system drive, the TrueCrypt driver automatically prevents Windows from
writing any data to memory dump files (for information on how to encrypt the system partition/drive, see
the chapter System Encryption).

Multi-User Environment
Keep in mind, that the content of a mounted TrueCrypt volume is visible (accessible) to all logged on
users (NTFS file permissions can be configured to prevent this). Moreover, on Windows, the password
cache is shared by all logged on users.
Also note that switching users in Windows XP or later (Fast User Switching functionality) does not
dismount a successfully mounted TrueCrypt volume (unlike system restart, which dismounts all mounted
TrueCrypt volumes).
On Windows 2000, the container file permissions are ignored when a file-hosted TrueCrypt volume is to
be mounted. On all supported versions of Windows, users without administrator privileges can mount any
partition/device-hosted TrueCrypt volume (provided that they supply the correct password and/or
keyfiles). However, a user without administrator privileges can dismount only volumes that he or she
mounted.
 Unencrypted Data in RAM
It is important to note that TrueCrypt is disk encryption software, which encrypts only disks, not RAM
(memory).
Keep in mind that most programs do not clear the memory area (buffers) in which they store unencrypted
(portions of) files they load from a TrueCrypt volume. This means that after you exit such a program,
unencrypted data it worked with may remain in memory (RAM) until the computer is turned off (and,
according to some researchers, even for some time after the power is turned off*). Also note that if you
open a file stored on a TrueCrypt volume, for example, in a text editor and then force dismount on the
TrueCrypt volume, then the file will remain unencrypted in the area of memory (RAM) used by (allocated
to) the text editor. This applies to forced auto-dismount too.
Inherently, unencrypted master keys have to be stored in RAM too. When a non-system TrueCrypt volume
is dismounted, TrueCrypt erases its master keys (stored in RAM). When the computer is cleanly restarted
(or cleanly shut down) or hibernates, all non-system TrueCrypt volumes are automatically dismounted (by
default) and, thus, all master keys stored in RAM are erased by the TrueCrypt driver (except master keys
for system partitions/drives — see below). However, when power supply is abruptly interrupted, when the
computer is reset (not cleanly restarted), or when the system crashes, TrueCrypt naturally stops running
and therefore cannot erase any keys or any other sensitive data. Furthermore, as Microsoft does not
provide any appropriate API for handling hibernation and shutdown, master keys used for system
encryption cannot be reliably (and are not) erased from RAM when a computer hibernates, is shut down or
restarted.**

To summarize, TrueCrypt cannot and does not ensure that RAM contains no sensitive data
(e.g. passwords, master keys, or decrypted data). Therefore, after each session in which you
work with a TrueCrypt volume or in which an encrypted operating system is running, you
must shut down (or, if the hibernation file is encrypted, hibernate) the computer and then leave
it powered off for several minutes before turning it on again. This is required to clear the
RAM.

• Allegedly, for 1.5-35 seconds under normal operating temperatures (26-44 °C) and up to several
hours when the memory modules are cooled (when the computer is running) to very low
temperatures (e.g. -50 °C). New types of memory modules allegedly exhibit a much shorter decay
time than older types (e.g. 1.5-2.5 seconds).
** Before a key can be erased from RAM, the corresponding TrueCrypt volume must be
dismounted. For non-system volumes, this does not cause any problems. However, as Microsoft
currently does not provide any appropriate API for handling the final phase of the system
shutdown process, paging files located on encrypted system volumes that are dismounted during
the system shutdown process may still contain valid swapped-out memory pages (including
portions of Windows system files). This could cause 'blue screen' errors. Therefore, to prevent
'blue screen' errors, TrueCrypt does not dismount encrypted system volumes and consequently
cannot clear the master keys of the system volumes when the system is shut down or restarted.
 Physical Security
If an attacker can physically access the computer hardware and you use it after the attacker has physically
accessed it, then TrueCrypt may become unable to secure data on the computer. This is because the
attacker may modify the hardware or attach a malicious hardware component to it (such as a hardware
keystroke logger) that will capture the password or encryption key (e.g. when you mount a TrueCrypt
volume) or otherwise compromise the security of the computer. Note: Additional information pertaining to
hardware attacks where the attacker has direct physical access may be found in the section Unencrypted
Data in RAM.
Furthermore, even if the attacker cannot physically access the computer hardware directly, he or she may
be able to breach the physical security of the computer by remotely intercepting and analyzing emanations
from the computer hardware (including the monitor and cables). For example, intercepted emanations
from the cable connecting the keyboard with the computer can reveal passwords you type. It is beyond the
scope of this document to list all of the kinds of such attacks (sometimes called TEMPEST attacks) and all
known ways to prevent them (such as shielding or radio jamming). It is your responsibility to prevent such
attacks. If you do not, TrueCrypt may become unable to secure data on the computer.

Malware
The term 'malware' refers to all types of malicious software, such as computer viruses, Trojan horses, or
spyware. Some kinds of malware are designed e.g. to log keystrokes, including typed passwords (such
captured passwords are then either sent to the attacker over the Internet or saved to an unencrypted local
drive from which the attacker might be able to read it later, when he or she gains physical access to the
computer). If you are working with a TrueCrypt volume (or using an encrypted operating system) while
this or any other kind of malware is running on the computer, TrueCrypt may become unable to secure
data on the computer.
It is important to note that TrueCrypt is encryption software, not anti-malware software. It is your
responsibility to prevent malware from running on the computer. If you do not, TrueCrypt may become
unable to secure data on the computer.
There are many rules that you should follow to help prevent malware from running on your computer.
Among the most important rules are the following: Keep your operating system, Internet browser, and
other critical software, up-to-date. In Windows XP or later, turn on DEP for all programs.* Do not open
suspicious email attachments, especially executable files, even if they appear to have been sent by your
relatives or friends (their computers may be infected with malware sending malicious emails from their
computers/accounts without their knowledge). Do not follow suspicious links contained in emails or on
websites (even if the email/website appears to be harmless or trustworthy). Do not visit any suspicious
websites. Do not download or install any suspicious software. Consider using good, trustworthy, anti-
malware software.

• DEP stands for Data Execution Prevention. For more information about DEP, please visit
http://support.microsoft.com/kb/875352, http://go.microsoft.com/FWLink/?LinkId=84124, and
http://windowshelp.microsoft.com/Windows/en-US/help/80062dee-6203-42f8-b898-
cfb79bde98891033.mspx.
 Changing Passwords and Keyfiles
Note that the volume header (which is encrypted with a header key derived from a password/keyfile)
contains the master key with which the volume is encrypted. If an adversary is allowed to make a copy of
your volume before you change the volume password and/or keyfile(s), he may be able to use his copy or
fragment (the old header) of the TrueCrypt volume to mount your volume using a compromised password
(for example, captured by a keystroke logger) and/or compromised keyfiles that were necessary to mount
the volume before you changed the volume password and/or keyfile(s).

If you are not sure whether an adversary knows your password (or has your keyfiles) and whether he has a
copy of your volume when you need to change its password and/or keyfiles, it is strongly recommended
that you create a new TrueCrypt volume and move files from the old volume to the new volume (the new
volume will have a different master key).

Also note that if an adversary knows your password (or has your keyfiles) and has access to your volume,
he may be able to retrieve and keep its master key. If he does, he may be able to decrypt your volume even
after you change its password and/or keyfile(s) (because the master key does not change when you change
the volume password and/or keyfiles). In such a case, create a new TrueCrypt volume and move all files
from the old volume to this new one.
Note: The following sections of this chapter contain additional information pertaining to possible security
issues connected with changing passwords and/or keyfiles:
• Wear-Leveling
• Journaling File Systems
• Defragmenting
• Reallocated Sectors

Data Leaks
Note: The issues described below do not affect you if the system partition or system drive is encrypted (for
more information, see the chapter System Encryption) and if no unencrypted filesystems (or volumes) are
accessible during a session in which a TrueCrypt volume is mounted or in which an encrypted operating
system is running.
When a TrueCrypt volume is mounted, the operating system and third-party applications may write to
unencrypted volumes (typically, to the unencrypted system volume) unencrypted information about the
data stored in the TrueCrypt volume (e.g. filenames and locations of recently accessed files, databases
created by file indexing tools, etc.), or the data itself in an unencrypted form (temporary files, etc.), or
unencrypted information about the filesystem residing in the TrueCrypt volume. Note that Windows
automatically records large amounts of potentially sensitive data, such as the names and locations of files
you open, applications you run, etc.
Solution: Encrypt the system partition/drive (for information on how to do so, see the chapter System
Encryption) and make sure that only encrypted filesystems are mounted during a session in which you
work with sensitive data (unencrypted filesystems/volumes should not be mounted/accessible during a
session in which a TrueCrypt volume is mounted or an encrypted operating system is running).
Note: You may also want to consider creating a hidden operating system (for more information, see the
section Hidden Operating System).
 Windows Registry
It is important to note that TrueCrypt provides plausible deniability only in the sense that it is impossible
to prove that a file or a partition is a TrueCrypt volume and that a hidden TrueCrypt volume exists.
Windows stores various data in the registry file, which TrueCrypt cannot securely and reliably erase. After
examining the registry file, the attacker may be able to tell that TrueCrypt was run on the system, that a
TrueCrypt volume was mounted (but he cannot tell/determine what the location/filename/size/type* of the
volume was) and which drive letters have been used for TrueCrypt volume(s) (but he cannot determine the
locations/filenames/sizes/types of the volumes).
Note: You can encrypt the registry file by encrypting the system partition/drive (for information on how to
do so, see the chapter System Encryption). You may also want to consider creating a hidden operating
system (for more information, see the section Hidden Operating System).

• 'Type of volume' refers to whether it is a hidden or standard volume.

Wear-Leveling
Some storage devices (e.g., some USB flash drives) and some file systems utilize so-called wear-leveling
mechanisms to extend the lifetime of the storage device or medium. These mechanisms ensure that even if
an application repeatedly writes data to the same logical sector, the data is distributed evenly across the
medium (logical sectors are remapped to different physical sectors). Therefore, multiple "versions" of a
single sector may be available to an attacker. This may have various security implications. For instance,
when you change a volume password/keyfile(s), the volume header is, under normal conditions,
overwritten with a re-encrypted version of the header. However, when the volume resides on a device that
utilizes a wear-leveling mechanism, TrueCrypt cannot ensure that the older header is really overwritten. If
an adversary found the old volume header (which was to be overwritten) on the device, he could use it to
mount the volume using an old compromised password (and/or using compromised keyfiles that were
necessary to mount the volume before the volume header was re-encrypted). Due to security reasons, we
recommend that TrueCrypt volumes are not created on devices (or in file systems) that utilize a wear-
leveling mechanism. If you decide not to follow this recommendation and you intend to use system
encryption when the system drive utilizes wear-leveling mechanisms, make sure the system partition/drive
does not contain any sensitive data before you fully encrypt it (TrueCrypt cannot reliably perform secure
in-place encryption of existing data on such a drive; however, after the system partition/drive has been
fully encrypted, any new data that will be saved to it will be reliably encrypted on the fly). To find out
whether a device utilizes a wear-leveling mechanism, please refer to documentation supplied with the
device or contact the vendor/manufacturer.

Reallocated Sectors
Some storage devices, such as hard drives, internally reallocate/remap bad sectors. Whenever the device
detects a sector to which data cannot be written, it marks the sector as bad and remaps it to a sector in a
hidden reserved area on the drive. Any subsequent read/write operations from/to the bad sector are
redirected to the sector in the reserved area. This means that any existing data in the bad sector remains on
the drive and it cannot be erased (overwritten with other data). This may have various security
implications. For instance, data that is to be encrypted in place may remain unencrypted in the bad sector.
Likewise, data to be erased (for example, during the process of creation of a hidden operating system)
may remain in the bad sector. Additional examples of possible security implications are listed in the
section Wear-Leveling. Please note that this list is not exhaustive (these are just examples). Also note that
TrueCrypt cannot prevent any security issues related to or caused by reallocated sectors. To find out the
number of reallocated sectors on a hard drive, you can use e.g. a third-party software tool for reading so-
called S.M.A.R.T. data.

Defragmenting
When you defragment the file system in which you store a file-hosted TrueCrypt container, a copy of the
TrueCrypt container (or of its fragment) may remain in the free space on the host volume (in the
defragmented file system). This may have various security implications. For example, if you change the
volume password/keyfile(s) afterwards, and an adversary finds the old copy or fragment (the old header)
of the TrueCrypt volume, he might use it to mount the volume using an old compromised password
(and/or using compromised keyfiles that were necessary to mount the volume before the volume header
was re-encrypted). To prevent this, do one of the following:
• Use a partition/device-hosted TrueCrypt volume instead of file-hosted.
• Securely erase free space on the host volume (in the defragmented file system) after
defragmenting.
• Do not defragment file systems in which you store TrueCrypt volumes.

Journaling File Systems

When a file-hosted TrueCrypt container is stored in a journaling file system (such as NTFS), a copy of the
TrueCrypt container (or of its fragment) may remain in the free space on the host volume. This may have
various security implications. For example, if you change the volume password/keyfile(s) and an
adversary finds the old copy or fragment (the old header) of the TrueCrypt volume, he might use it to
mount the volume using an old compromised password (and/or using compromised keyfiles that were
necessary to mount the volume before the volume header was re-encrypted). Some journaling file systems
also internally record file access times and other potentially sensitive information. To prevent possible
security issues related to journaling file systems, do one the following:
• Use a partition/device-hosted TrueCrypt volume instead of file-hosted.
• Store the container in a non-journaling file system (for example, FAT32).

See also the subsection Security Precautions Pertaining to Hidden Volumes.

 Command Line Usage
Note that this section applies to the Windows version of TrueCrypt. For information on command line
usage applying to the Linux and Mac OS X versions, please run: truecrypt –h
/help or /? Display command line help.

/volume or /v File and path name of a TrueCrypt volume to mount (do not use when
dismounting). To mount a hard disk partition, use, for example, /
v \Device\Harddisk1\Partition3 (to determine the path to a partition, run
TrueCrypt and click Select Device). Note that device paths are case-
sensitive.

/letter or /l Driver letter to mount the volume as. When /l is omitted and when /a is used,
the first free drive letter is used.

/explore or /e Open an Explorer window after a volume has been mounted.

/beep or /b Beep after a volume has been successfully mounted or dismounted.

/auto or /a If no parameter is specified, automatically mount the volume. If devices is

specified as the parameter (e.g., /a devices), auto-mount all currently
accessible device/partition-hosted TrueCrypt volumes. If favorites is
specified as the parameter, auto-mount favorite volumes. Note that /auto is
implicit if /quit and /volume are specified.

/dismount or /d Dismount volume specified by drive letter (e.g., /d x). When no drive letter
is specified, dismounts all currently mounted TrueCrypt volumes.

/force or /f Forces dismount (if the volume to be dismounted contains files being used
by the system or an application) and forces mounting in shared mode (i.e.,
without exclusive access).

/keyfile or /k Specifies a keyfile or a keyfile search path. For multiple keyfiles, specify
e.g.:
/k c:\keyfile1.dat /k d:\KeyfileFolder /k c:\kf2
To specify a keyfile stored on a security token or smart card, use the
following syntax: token://slot/SLOT_NUMBER/file/FILE_NAME

/tokenlib Use the specified PKCS #11 library for security tokens and smart cards.

/cache or /c y or no parameter: enable password cache; n: disable password cache (e.g., /

c n). Note that turning the password cache off will not clear it (use /w to
clear the password cache).

/history or /h y or no parameter: enables saving history of mounted volumes; n: disables

saving history of mounted volumes (e.g., /h n).

/wipecache or /w Wipes any passwords cached in the driver memory.

/password or /p The volume password. If the password contains spaces, it must be enclosed
in quotation marks (e.g., /p "My Password"). Use /p "" to specify an empty
password. Warning: This method of entering a volume password may be
insecure, for example, when an unencrypted command prompt history log is
being saved to unencrypted disk.

/quit or /q Automatically perform requested actions and exit (main TrueCrypt window
will not be displayed). If preferences is specified as the parameter (e.g.,
/q preferences), then program settings are loaded/saved and they override
settings specified on the command line.
/q background launches the TrueCrypt Background Task (tray icon) unless it
is disabled in the Preferences.

/silent or /s If /q is specified, suppresses interaction with the user (prompts, error

messages, warnings, etc.). If /q is not specified, this option has no effect.

/mountoption or /m ro or readonly: Mount volume as read-only.

rm or removable: Mount volume as removable medium.

ts or timestamp: Do not preserve container timestamps

sm or system: Without pre-boot authentication, mount a partition that is

within the key scope of system encryption (for example, a partition located
on the encrypted system drive of another operating system that is not
running). Useful e.g. for backup or repair operations.
Note: If you supply a password as a parameter of /p, make sure that the
password has been typed using the standard US keyboard layout (in contrast,
the GUI ensures this automatically).

bk or headerbak: Mount volume using embedded backup header.

Note: All volumes created by TrueCrypt 6.0 or later contain an embedded
backup header (located at the end of the volume).

recovery: Do not verify any checksums stored in the volume header. This
option should be used only when the volume header is damaged and the
volume cannot be mounted even with the mount option headerbak.

Example: /m ro. To specify multiple mount options, use e.g.: /m rm /m ts

TrueCrypt Format.exe (TrueCrypt Volume Creation Wizard):

/noisocheck or /n Do not verify that TrueCrypt Rescue Disks are correctly burned. This can be
useful e.g. in corporate environments where it may be more convenient to
maintain a central repository of ISO images rather than a repository of CDs
 or DVDs. WARNING: Never attempt to use this option to facilitate the
reuse of a previously created TrueCrypt Rescue Disk. Note that every time
you encrypt a system partition/drive, you must create a new TrueCrypt
Rescue Disk even if you use the same password. A previously created
TrueCrypt Rescue Disk cannot be reused because it was created for a
different master key.

Syntax
TrueCrypt.exe [/a [devices|favorites]] [/b] [/c [y|n]] [/d [drive letter]] [/e] [/f] [/h [y|n]] [/k keyfile or
search path] [/l drive letter] [/m {rm|ro|sm|ts}] [/p password] [/q [background|preferences]] [/s] [/v
volume] [/w]
"TrueCrypt Format.exe" [/n]
Note that the order in which options are specified does not matter.

Examples
Mount the volume d:\ myvolume as the first free drive letter, using the password prompt (the main
program window will not be displayed):
truecrypt /q /v d:\myvolume

Dismount a volume mounted as the drive letter X (the main program window will not be displayed):
truecrypt /q /dx

Mount a volume called myvolume.tc using the password MyPassword, as the drive letter X. TrueCrypt will
open an explorer window and beep; mounting will be automatic:
truecrypt /v myvolume.tc /lx /a /p MyPassword /e /b
 Sharing over Network
If there is a need to access a single TrueCrypt volume simultaneously from multiple operating systems,
there are two options:
1. A TrueCrypt volume is mounted only on a single computer (for example, on a server) and only the
content of the mounted TrueCrypt volume (i.e., the file system within the TrueCrypt volume) is
shared over a network. Users on other computers or systems will not mount the volume (it is
already mounted on the server).

Advantages: All users can write data to the TrueCrypt volume. The shared volume may be both
file-hosted and partition/device-hosted.

Disadvantage: Data sent over the network will not be encrypted. However, it is still possible to
encrypt them using e.g. SSL, TLS, VPN, or other technologies.
2. A dismounted TrueCrypt file container is stored on a single computer (for example, on a server).
This encrypted file is shared over a network. Users on other computers or systems will locally
mount the shared file. Thus, the volume will be mounted simultaneously under multiple operating
systems.

Advantage: Data sent over the network will be encrypted (however, it is still recommended to
encrypt them using e.g. SSL, TLS, VPN, or other appropriate technologies to make traffic analysis
more difficult and to preserve the integrity of the data).

Disadvantages: The shared volume may be only file-hosted (not partition/device-hosted). The
volume must be mounted in read-only mode under each of the systems (see the section Mount
Options for information on how to mount a volume in read-only mode). Note that this requirement
applies to unencrypted volumes too. One of the reasons is, for example, the fact that data read from
a conventional file system under one OS while the file system is being modified by another OS
might be inconsistent (which could result in data corruption).
 How to Back Up Securely
Due to hardware or software errors/malfunctions, files stored on a TrueCrypt volume may become
corrupted. Therefore, we strongly recommend that you backup all your important files regularly (this, of
course, applies to any important data, not just to encrypted data stored on TrueCrypt volumes).

Non-System Volumes
To back up a non-system TrueCrypt volume securely, it is recommended to follow these steps:
1. Create a new TrueCrypt volume using the TrueCrypt Volume Creation Wizard (do not enable the
Quick Format option or the Dynamic option). It will be your backup volume so its size should
match (or be greater than) the size of your main volume.

If the main volume is a hidden TrueCrypt volume, the backup volume must be a hidden TrueCrypt
volume too. Before you create the hidden backup volume, you must create a new host (outer)
volume for it without enabling the Quick Format option. In addition, especially if the backup
volume is file-hosted, the hidden backup volume should occupy only a very small portion of the
container and the outer volume should be almost completely filled with files (otherwise, the
plausible deniability of the hidden volume might be adversely affected).
2. Mount the newly created backup volume.
3. Mount the main volume.
4. Copy all files from the mounted main volume directly to the mounted backup volume.
IMPORTANT: If you store the backup volume in any location that an adversary can repeatedly
access (for example, on a device kept in a bank's safe deposit box), you should repeat all of the above
steps (including the step 1) each time you want to back up the volume (see below).
If you follow the above steps, you will help prevent adversaries from finding out:
• Which sectors of the volumes are changing (because you always follow step 1). This is particularly
important, for example, if you store the backup volume on a device kept in a bank's safe deposit
box (or in any other location that an adversary can repeatedly access) and the volume contains a
hidden volume (for more information, see the subsection Security Precautions Pertaining to
Hidden Volumes in the chapter Plausible Deniability).
• That one of the volumes is a backup of the other.

System Partitions
Note: In addition to backing up files, we recommend that you also back up your TrueCrypt Rescue Disk
(select System > Create Rescue Disk).
To back up an encrypted system partition securely and safely, it is recommended to follow these steps:
1. If you have multiple operating systems installed on your computer, boot the one that does not
require pre-boot authentication.
 If you do not have multiple operating systems installed on your computer, you can boot a WinPE
or BartPE CD/DVD (i.e. 'live' Windows entirely stored on and booted from a CD/DVD; for more
information, search the TrueCrypt FAQ for the keyword 'BartPE').

If none of the above is possible, connect your system drive as a secondary drive to another
computer and then boot the operating system installed on the computer.

Note: For security reasons, if the operating system that you want to back up resides in a hidden
TrueCrypt volume (see the section Hidden Operating System), then the operating system that you
boot in this step must be either another hidden operating system or a "live-CD" operating system
(see above). For more information, see the subsection Security Precautions Pertaining to Hidden
Volumes in the chapter Plausible Deniability.
2. Create a new non-system TrueCrypt volume using the TrueCrypt Volume Creation Wizard (do not
enable the Quick Format option or the Dynamic option). It will be your backup volume so its size
should match (or be greater than) the size of the system partition that you want to back up.

If the operating system that you want to back up resides in a hidden TrueCrypt volume (see the
section Hidden Operating System), the backup volume must be a hidden TrueCrypt volume too.
Before you create the hidden backup volume, you must create a new host (outer) volume for it
without enabling the Quick Format option. In addition, especially if the backup volume is file-
hosted, the hidden backup volume should occupy only a very small portion of the container and the
outer volume should be almost completely filled with files (otherwise, the plausible deniability of
the hidden volume might be adversely affected).
3. Mount the newly created backup volume.
4. Mount the system partition that you want to back up by following these steps:
a. Click Select Device and then select the system partition that you want to back up (in case of
a hidden operating system, select the partition containing the hidden volume in which the
operating system is installed).
b. Click OK.
c. Select System > Mount Without Pre-Boot Authentication.
d. Enter your pre-boot authentication password and click OK.
5. Mount the backup volume and then copy all files from the system partition (mounted as a regular
TrueCrypt volume since the previous step) directly to the mounted backup volume.
IMPORTANT: If you store the backup volume in any location that an adversary can repeatedly
access (for example, on a device kept in a bank's safe deposit box), you should repeat all of the above
steps (including the step 2) each time you want to back up the volume (see below).
If you follow the above steps, you will help prevent adversaries from finding out:
• Which sectors of the volumes are changing (because you always follow step 2). This is particularly
important, for example, if you store the backup volume on a device kept in a bank's safe deposit
box (or in any other location that an adversary can repeatedly access) and the volume contains a
hidden volume (for more information, see the subsection Security Precautions Pertaining to
Hidden Volumes in the chapter Plausible Deniability).
• That one of the volumes is a backup of the other.
 General Notes
If you store the backup volume in any location where an adversary can make a copy of the volume,
consider encrypting the volume with a cascade of ciphers. Otherwise, if the volume is encrypted only with
a single encryption algorithm and the algorithm is later broken (for example, due to advances in
cryptanalysis), the attacker might be able to decrypt his copies of the volume. The probability that three
distinct encryption algorithms will be broken is significantly lower than the probability that only one of
them will be broken (each of the ciphers in a cascade uses its own key).
 Troubleshooting
This section presents possible solutions to common problems that you may run into when using
TrueCrypt. If your problem is not listed here, it might be listed in one of the following sections:
Incompatibilities
Known Issues & Limitations
Frequently Asked Questions

Problem:
Writing/reading to/from volume is very slow even though, according to the benchmark, the speed of the
cipher that I'm using is higher than the speed of the hard drive.
Probable Cause:
This is probably caused by an interfering application.
Possible Solution:
First, make sure that your TrueCrypt container does not have a file extension that is reserved for
executable files (for example, .exe, .sys, or .dll). If it does, Windows and antivirus software may interfere
with the container and adversely affect the performance of the volume.
Second, disable or uninstall any application that might be interfering, which usually is antivirus software
or automatic disk defragmentation tool, etc. In case of antivirus software, it often helps to turn off real-
time (on-access) scanning in the preferences of the antivirus software. If it does not help, try temporarily
disabling the virus protection software. If this does not help either, try uninstalling it completely and
restarting your computer subsequently.

Problem:
After successfully mounting a volume, Windows reports "This device does not contain a valid file system"
or a similar error.
Probable Cause:
The file system on the TrueCrypt volume may be corrupted (or the volume is unformatted).
Possible Solution:
You can use filesystem repair tools supplied with your operating system to attempt to repair the filesystem
on the TrueCrypt volume. In Windows, it is the 'chkdsk' tool. TrueCrypt provides an easy way to use this
tool on a TrueCrypt volume: First, make a backup copy of the TrueCrypt volume (because the 'chkdsk' tool
might damage the filesystem even more) and then mount it. Right-click the mounted volume in the main
TrueCrypt window (in the drive list) and from the context menu select 'Repair Filesystem'.

Problem:
When trying to create a hidden volume, its maximum possible size is unexpectedly small (there is much
more free space than this on the outer volume).
Probable Cause:
Fragmentation
OR
Too small cluster size + too many files/folders in the root directory of the outer volume.
Possible Solution:
Note: The following solution applies only to hidden volumes created within FAT volumes.
Defragment the outer volume (mount it, right-click its drive letter in the 'Computer' or 'My Computer'
window, click Properties, select the Tools tab, and click 'Defragment Now'). After the volume is
defragmented, exit Disk Defragmenter and try to create the hidden volume again.

If this does not help, delete all files and folders on the outer volume by pressing Shift+Delete, not by
formatting, (do not forget to disable the Recycle Bin and System Restore for this drive beforehand) and try
creating the hidden volume on this completely empty outer volume again (for testing purposes only). If the
maximum possible size of the hidden volume does not change even now, the cause of the problem is very
likely an extended root directory. If you did not use the 'Default' cluster size (the last step in the Wizard),
reformat the outer volume and this time leave the cluster size at 'Default'.
If it does not help, reformat the outer volume again and copy less files/folders to its root folder than you
did last time. If it does not help, keep reformatting and decreasing the number of files/folders in the root
folder. If this is unacceptable or if it does not help, reformat the outer volume and select a larger cluster
size. If it does not help, keep reformatting and increasing the cluster size, until the problem is solved.
Alternatively, try creating a hidden volume within an NTFS volume.

Problem:
I cannot encrypt a partition/device because TrueCrypt Volume Creation Wizard says it is in use.
Possible Solution:
Close, disable, or uninstall all programs that might be using the partition/device in any way (for example
an anti-virus utility). If it does not help, right-click the 'Computer' (or 'My Computer') icon on your
desktop and select Manage -> Storage -> Disk Management. Then right-click the partition that you want
to encrypt, and click Change Drive Letter and Paths. Then click Remove and OK. Restart the operating
system.

Problem:
When creating a hidden volume, the Wizard reports that the outer volume cannot be locked.
Probable Cause:
The outer volume contains files being used by one or more applications.
Possible Solution:
Close all applications that are using files on the outer volume. If it does not help, try disabling or
uninstalling any anti-virus utility you use and restarting the system subsequently.
Problem:
One of the following problems occurs:
1. A TrueCrypt volume cannot be mounted.
2. NTFS TrueCrypt volumes cannot be created
In addition, the following error may be reported: "The process cannot access the file because it is being
used by another process."
Probable Cause:
This is probably caused by an interfering application. Note that this is not a bug in TrueCrypt. The
operating system reports to TrueCrypt that the device is locked for an exclusive access by an application
(so TrueCrypt is not allowed to access it).
Possible Solution:
It usually helps to disable or uninstall the interfering application, which is usually an anti-virus utility, a
disk management application, etc.

Problem:
When accessing a file-hosted container shared over a network, you receive one or both of the following
error messages:
"Not enough server storage is available to process this command." and/or,
"Not enough memory to complete transaction."
Probable Cause:
IRPStackSize in the Windows registry may have been set to a too small value.
Possible Solution:
Locate the IRPStackSize key in the Windows registry and set it to a higher value. Then restart the system.
If the key does not exist in your Windows registry, create it at
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\Parameters and set its
value to 16 or higher. Then restart the system. For more information, see: http://support.microsoft.com/kb/
285089/
and http://support.microsoft.com/kb/177078/
 Incompatibilities
Activation of Adobe Photoshop® and Other Products Using FLEXnet Publisher® /
SafeCast
Note: The issue described below does not affect you if you use TrueCrypt 5.1 or later and a non-cascade
encryption algorithm (i.e., AES, Serpent, or Twofish).* The issue also does not affect you if you do not use
system encryption (pre-boot authentication).
Acresso FLEXnet Publisher activation software, formerly Macrovision SafeCast, (used for activation of
third-party software, such as Adobe Photoshop) writes data to the first drive track. If this happens when
your system partition/drive is encrypted by TrueCrypt, a portion of the TrueCrypt Boot Loader will be
damaged and you will not be able to start Windows. In that case, please use your TrueCrypt Rescue Disk
to regain access to your system. There are two ways to do so:
1. You may keep the third-party software activated but you will need to boot your system from the
TrueCrypt Rescue Disk CD/DVD every time. Just insert your Rescue Disk into your CD/DVD
drive and then enter your password in the Rescue Disk screen.
2. If you do not want to boot your system from the TrueCrypt Rescue Disk CD/DVD every time, you
can restore the TrueCrypt Boot Loader on the system drive. To do so, in the Rescue Disk screen,
select Repair Options > Restore TrueCrypt Boot Loader. However, note that this will deactivate the
third-party software.
For information on how to use your TrueCrypt Rescue Disk, please see the chapter TrueCrypt Rescue
Disk.
Possible permanent solution: Upgrade to TrueCrypt 5.1 or later, decrypt the system partition/drive, and
then re-encrypt it using a non-cascade encryption algorithm (i.e., AES, Serpent, or Twofish).*
Please note that this not a bug in TrueCrypt (the issue is caused by inappropriate design of the third-party
activation software).

• The reason is that the TrueCrypt Boot Loader is smaller than the one used for cascades of ciphers
and, therefore, there is enough space in the first drive track for a backup of the TrueCrypt Boot
Loader. Hence, whenever the TrueCrypt Boot Loader is damaged, its backup copy is run
automatically instead.
 Known Issues & Limitations
Last Updated May 13, 2009

Known Issues
• (There are currently no confirmed issues.)

Limitations
• [Note: This limitation does not apply to users of Windows Vista and later versions of Windows.] On
Windows XP/2003, TrueCrypt does not support encrypting an entire system drive that contains
extended (logical) partitions. You can encrypt an entire system drive provided that it contains only
primary partitions. Extended (logical) partitions must not be created on any system drive that is
partially or fully encrypted (only primary partitions may be created on it). Note: If you need to
encrypt an entire drive containing extended partitions, you can encrypt the system partition and, in
addition, create partition-hosted TrueCrypt volumes within any non-system partitions on the drive.
Alternatively, you may want to consider upgrading to Windows Vista or a later version of
Windows.
• TrueCrypt currently does not support encrypting a system drive that has been converted to a
dynamic disk.
• TrueCrypt volume passwords must consist only of printable ASCII characters. Non-ASCII
characters in passwords are not supported and may cause various problems (e.g., inability to mount
a volume).
• To work around a Windows XP issue, the TrueCrypt boot loader is always automatically
configured for the version of the operating system under which it is installed. When the version of
the system changes (for example, the TrueCrypt boot loader is installed when Windows Vista is
running but it is later used to boot Windows XP) you may encounter various known and unknown
issues (for example, on some notebooks, Windows XP may fail to display the log-on screen). Note
that this affects multi-boot configurations, TrueCrypt Rescue Disks, and decoy/hidden operating
systems (therefore, if the hidden system is e.g. Windows XP, the decoy system should be Windows
XP too).
• The ability to mount a partition that is within the key scope of system encryption without pre-boot
authentication (for example, a partition located on the encrypted system drive of another operating
system that is not running), which can be done e.g. by selecting System > Mount Without Pre-Boot
Authentication, is limited to primary partitions (extended/logical partitions cannot be mounted this
way).
• Due to a Windows 2000 issue, TrueCrypt does not support the Windows Mount Manager under
Windows 2000. Therefore, some Windows 2000 built-in tools, such as Disk Defragmenter, do not
work on TrueCrypt volumes. Furthermore, it is not possible to use the Mount Manager services
under Windows 2000, e.g., assign a mount point to a TrueCrypt volume (i.e., attach a TrueCrypt
 volume to a folder).
• The Windows Volume Shadow Copy Service is currently supported only for partitions within the
key scope of system encryption (for example, a system partition encrypted by TrueCrypt or a non-
system partition located on a system drive encrypted by TrueCrypt). Note: For other types of
volumes, the Volume Shadow Copy Service is not supported because the documentation for the
necessary API is available from Microsoft only under a non-disclosure agreement (which is
impossible to comply with because TrueCrypt is open source).
• Encrypted partitions cannot be resized except partitions on an entirely encrypted system drive that
are resized while the encrypted operating system is running.
• When the system partition/drive is encrypted, the system cannot be upgraded (for example, from
Windows XP to Windows Vista) or repaired from within the pre-boot environment (using a
Windows setup CD/DVD). In such cases, the system partition/drive must be decrypted first. Note:
A running operating system can be updated (security patches, service packs, etc.) without any
problems even when the system partition/drive is encrypted.
• When the notebook battery power is low, Windows may omit sending the appropriate messages to
running applications when the computer is entering power saving mode. Therefore, TrueCrypt may
fail to auto-dismount volumes in such cases.
• Special software (e.g., a low-level disk editor) that writes data to a disk drive in a way that
circumvents drivers in the driver stack of the class 'DiskDrive' (GUID of the class is 4D36E967-
E325-11CE-BFC1-08002BE10318) can write unencrypted data to a non-system drive hosting a
mounted TrueCrypt volume ('Partition0') and to encrypted partitions/drives that are within the key
scope of active system encryption (TrueCrypt does not encrypt such data written that way).
Similarly, software that writes data to a disk drive circumventing drivers in the driver stack of the
class 'Storage Volume' (GUID of the class is 71A27CDD-812A-11D0-BEC7-08002BE2092F) can
write unencrypted data to TrueCrypt partition-hosted volumes (even if they are mounted).
• For security reasons, when a hidden operating system is running, TrueCrypt ensures that all local
unencrypted filesystems and non-hidden TrueCrypt volumes are read-only. However, this does not
apply to filesystems on CD/DVD-like media and on custom, atypical, or non-standard
devices/media (for example, any devices/media whose class is other than the Windows device class
'Storage Volume' or that do not meet the requirements of this class (GUID of the class is
71A27CDD-812A-11D0-BEC7-08002BE2092F)).
• TrueCrypt-encrypted floppy disks: When a floppy disk is ejected and another one is inserted, data
read/written from/to the disk will be corrupted. Note that this affects only raw floppy disk volumes
(not file-hosted TrueCrypt containers stored on floppy disks).
 How to Remove Encryption
Please note that TrueCrypt can in-place decrypt only system partitions and system drives (select System
> Permanently Decrypt System Partition/Drive). If you need to remove encryption (e.g., if you no longer
need encryption) from a non-system volume, please follow these steps:
1. Mount your TrueCrypt volume.
2. Move all files from the TrueCrypt volume to any location outside the TrueCrypt volume (note that
the files will be decrypted on the fly).
3. Dismount the TrueCrypt volume.
4. If the TrueCrypt volume is file-hosted, delete it (the container) just like you delete any other file.

If the volume is partition-hosted (applies also to USB flash drives), in addition to the steps 1-3,
do the following:
a. Right-click the 'Computer' (or 'My Computer') icon on your desktop, or in the Start Menu,
and select Manage. The 'Computer Management' window should appear.
b. In the Computer Management window, from the list on the left, select 'Disk Management'
(within the Storage sub-tree).
c. Right-click the partition you want to decrypt and select 'Change Drive Letter and Paths'.
d. The 'Change Drive Letter and Paths' window should appear. If no drive letter is displayed
in the window, click Add. Otherwise, click Cancel.
If you clicked Add, then in the 'Add Drive Letter or Path' (which should have appeared),
select a drive letter you want to assign to the partition and click OK.
e. In the Computer Management window, right-click the partition you want to decrypt again
and select Format. The Format window should appear.
f. In the Format window, click OK. After the partition is formatted, it will no longer be
required to mount it with TrueCrypt to be able to save or load files to/from the partition.

If the volume is device-hosted (i.e., there are no partitions on the device, and the device is entirely
encrypted), in addition to the steps 1-3, do the following:
g. Right-click the 'Computer' (or 'My Computer') icon on your desktop, or in the Start Menu,
and select Manage. The 'Computer Management' window should appear.
h. In the Computer Management window, from the list on the left, select 'Disk Management'
(within the Storage sub-tree).
i. Right-click the area representing the storage space of the encrypted device and select 'New
Partition' or 'New Simple Volume'.
j. WARNING: Before you continue, make sure you have selected the correct device, as all
files stored on it will be lost. The 'New Partition Wizard' or 'New Simple Volume Wizard'
window should appear now; follow its instructions to create a new partition on the device.
After the partition is created, it will no longer be required to mount the device with
TrueCrypt to be able to save or load files to/from the device.
 Uninstalling TrueCrypt
To uninstall TrueCrypt on Windows XP, select Start menu > Settings > Control Panel > Add or Remove
Programs > TrueCrypt > Change/Remove. To uninstall TrueCrypt on Windows Vista or later, select Start
menu > Control Panel > Programs - Uninstall a program > TrueCrypt > Change/Remove.
No TrueCrypt volume will be removed when you uninstall TrueCrypt. You will be able to mount your
TrueCrypt volume(s) again after you install TrueCrypt or when you run it in 'traveler' mode.

TrueCrypt System Files & Application Data

Note: %windir% is the main Windows installation path (e.g., C:\WINDOWS)

TrueCrypt Driver

%windir%\SYSTEM32\DRIVERS\truecrypt.sys (32-bit Windows)

or:
%windir%\SysWOW64\drivers\truecrypt.sys (64-bit Windows)

Note: This files are not present when TrueCrypt is run in 'traveler' mode.

TrueCrypt Settings & Application Data

The following files are saved in the folder where application data are normally saved on your system (for
example, in C:\Documents and Settings\UserName\Application Data\TrueCrypt\, where UserName is your
Windows user name). In traveler mode, these files are saved to the folder from which you run the file
TrueCrypt.exe (i.e., the folder in which TrueCrypt.exe resides). WARNING: Note that TrueCrypt does
not encrypt those files (unless TrueCrypt encrypts the system partition/drive).

Configuration.xml (the main configuration file).

Original System Loader (a backup of the original content of the first drive track made before the
TrueCrypt Boot Loader was written to it).
Note: This file is absent if the system partition/drive has not been encrypted.
System Encryption.xml (temporary configuration file used during the initial process of in-place
encryption/decryption of the system partition/drive).
Default Keyfiles.xml
Note: This file may be absent if the corresponding TrueCrypt feature is not used.
Favorite Volumes.xml
Note: This file may be absent if the corresponding TrueCrypt feature is not used.
History.xml (the list of last twenty files/devices attempted to be mounted as TrueCrypt volumes or
attempted to be used as hosts for TrueCrypt volumes; this feature can be disabled – for more information,
see the subsection Never Save History in the chapter Main Program Window).
Note: This file may be absent if the corresponding TrueCrypt feature is not used.
In-Place Encryption
In-Place Encryption Wipe Algo
(temporary configuration files used during the initial process of in-place encryption/decryption of a non-
system volume).
Post-Install Task - Tutorial
Post-Install Task - Release Notes
(temporary configuration files used during the process of installation or upgrade of TrueCrypt).

References
[1] U.S. Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS), National Policy on the Use of the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to Protect National Security Systems and National
Security Information, CNSS Policy No. 15, Fact Sheet No. 1, June 2003, available at
http://www.cnss.gov/Assets/pdf/cnssp_15_fs.pdf and also at
http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/CNSS15FS.pdf.

[2] C. E. Shannon, Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems, Bell System Technical Journal, v.
28, n. 4, 1949

[3] NIST, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication 197, November 26, 2001, available at
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf.

[4] J. Nechvatal, E. Barker, L. Bassham, W. Burr, M. Dworkin, J. Foti, E. Roback, NIST, Report
on the Development of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), October 2, 2000, available
at http://nvl.nist.gov/pub/nistpubs/jres/106/3/j63nec.pdf.

[5] B. Schneier, J. Kelsey, D. Whiting, D. Wagner, C. Hall, N. Ferguson, T. Kohno, M. Stay, The
Twofish Team's Final Comments on AES Selection, May 15, 2000, available at
http://csrc.nist.gov/CryptoToolkit/aes/round2/comments/20000515-bschneier.pdf.

[6] M. Bellare, New Proofs for NMAC and HMAC: Security without Collision-Resistance,
Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2006/043, February 6, 2006, available at
http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/043.

[7] RSA Laboratories, PKCS #5 v2.0: Password-Based Cryptography Standard, RSA Data
Security, Inc. Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS), March 25, 1999, available at
 ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-5v2/pkcs5v2-0.pdf
and also courtesy of RSA Laboratories at: http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/pkcs5v2-0.pdf.

[8] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti, HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication,

RFC 2104, February 1997, available at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2104.txt.

[9] M. Nystrom, RSA Security, Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-
256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512, RFC 4231, December 2005, available at http://
www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4231.txt.

[10] Peter Gutmann, Software Generation of Practically Strong Random Numbers, presented at
the 1998 Usenix Security Symposium, available at
http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/usenix98.pdf.

[11] Carl Ellison, Cryptographic Random Numbers, originally an appendix to the P1363 standard,
available at http://world.std.com/~cme/P1363/ranno.html.

[12] P. Rogaway, Efficient Instantiations of Tweakable Blockciphers and Refinements to Modes

OCB and PMAC, Asiacrypt 2004. LNCS vol. 3329. Springer, 2004. Also available at: http://
www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/offsets.pdf.

[13] J. Kelsey, Twofish Technical Report #7: Key Separation in Twofish, AES Round 2 public
comment, April 7, 2000

[14] NIST, Secure Hash Standard, FIPS 180-2, August 1, 2002, available at
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/fips180-2.pdf.

[15] U. Maurer, J. Massey, Cascade Ciphers: The Importance of Being First, Journal of
Cryptology, v. 6, n. 1, 1993

[16] Bruce Schneier, Applied Cryptography, Second Edition, John Wiley & Sons, 1996

[17] Peter Gutmann, Secure Deletion of Data from Magnetic and Solid-State Memory, first
published in the Sixth USENIX Security Symposium Proceedings, San Jose, California, July
22-25, 1996, available at http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/secure_del.html.

[18] Serpent home page: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/serpent.html.

[19] M. E. Smid, AES Issues, AES Round 2 Comments, May 22, 2000, available at
http://csrc.nist.gov/CryptoToolkit/aes/round2/comments/20000523-msmid-2.pdf.

[20] A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot, S. Vanstone, Handbook of Applied Cryptography, CRC Press,
October 1996

[21] International Organization for Standardization (ISO), Information technology – Security

techniques – Hash-functions – Part 3: Dedicated hash-functions, ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004,
February 24, 2004

[22] NIST, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), Federal Information
Processing Standards Publication 198, March 6, 2002, available at
 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198/fips-198a.pdf.

[23] RSA Laboratories, PKCS #11 v2.20: Password-Based Cryptography Standard, RSA Security,
Inc. Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS), June 28, 2004, available at
ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-11/v2-20/pkcs-11v2-20.pdf