Free Culture by Lawrence Lessig

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ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG 28
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The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons 30
in a Connected World 31
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Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace R33
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THE PENGUIN PRESS
30 NEW YORK
31 2004
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FREE CULTURE 24
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HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND 27
LAW
THE TO
LAW LOCK
TO LOCKDOWN
DOWN CULTURE
CULTURE AND CONTROL 28
AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 29
CREATIVITY
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LAWRENCE LESSIG 31
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1
2 THE P ENGUIN PRESS
a member of
3
Penguin Group (USA) Inc.
4 375 Hudson Street
5 New York, New York 10014
6 Copyright © Lawrence Lessig, 2004

7 All rights reserved
8 Excerpt from an editorial titled “The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,”

9 The New York Times, January 16, 2003. Copyright © 2003 by The New York Times Co.
Reprinted with permission.
10
Cartoon by Paul Conrad on page 159. Copyright Tribune Media Services, Inc.
11 All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
12 Diagram on page 164 courtesy of the office of FCC Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
13 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

14
Lessig, Lawrence.
15 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
16 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
p. cm.
17 Includes index.
18 ISBN 1-59420-006-8 (hardcover)
1. Intellectual property—United States. 2. Mass media—United States.
19
3. Technological innovations—United States. 4. Art—United States. I. Title.
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KF2979.L47 2004
21
343.7309'9—dc22 2003063276
22
23 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
24 Printed in the United States of America

25 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2
26 Designed by Marysarah Quinn

27 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this publication may
28 be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or
29 by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise), without the
prior written permission of both the copyright owner and the above publisher of this book.
30
31 The scanning, uploading, and distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other
means without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by law. Please pur-
32S
chase only authorized electronic editions and do not participate in or encourage electronic
33R piracy of copyrighted materials. Your support of the author’s rights is appreciated.
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To Eric Eldred—whose work first drew me 15
to this cause, and for whom 16
it continues still. Co17
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CONTENTS
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In16
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PREFACE xiii
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INTRODUCTION 1
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“PIRACY” 15
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CHAPTER ONE: Creators 21
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CHAPTER TWO: “Mere Copyists” 31
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CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs 48
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CHAPTER FOUR: “Pirates” 53
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Film 53
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Recorded Music 55
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Radio 58
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Cable TV 59
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CHAPTER FIVE: “Piracy” 62
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Piracy I 63
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Piracy II 66
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<http://free-culture.org/get-it>
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1 “PROPERTY” 81
2 CHAPTER SIX: Founders 85
3 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders 95
4 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers 100
5 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors 108
6 CHAPTER TEN: “Property” 116
7 Why Hollywood Is Right 124
8 Beginnings 130
9 Law: Duration 133
10 Law: Scope 136
11 Law and Architecture: Reach 139
12 Architecture and Law: Force 147
13 Market: Concentration 161
14 Together 168
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16 PUZZLES 175
17 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera 177
18 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms 183
19 Constraining Creators 184
20 Constraining Innovators 188
21 Corrupting Citizens 199
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23 BALANCES 209
24 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred 213
25 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II 248
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27 CONCLUSION 257
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29 AFTERWORD 273
30 Us, Now 276
31 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed:
32S Examples 277
33R Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea 282
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Them, Soon 287 1

1. More Formalities 287 2
Registration and Renewal 289 3
Marking 290 4
2. Shorter Terms 292 5
3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use 294 6
4. Liberate the Music—Again 296 7
5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304 8
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NOTES 307 10
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 331 11
INDEX 333 12
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PREFACE
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At the end of his review of my first book, Code: And Other Laws of In16
Cyberspace, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless 17
technical and computer-related texts, wrote this: 18
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Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It 20
doesn’t affect people who aren’t online (and only a tiny minority 21
of the world population is). And if you don’t like the Internet’s 22
system, you can always flip off the modem.1 23
24
Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book—that soft- 25
ware, or “code,” functioned as a kind of law—and his review suggested 26
the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we could always 27
“drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome”-like simply flip a switch and be back 28
home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and any troubles 29
that exist in that space wouldn’t “affect” us anymore. 30
Pogue might have been right in 1999—I’m skeptical, but maybe. 31
But even if he was right then, the point is not right now: Free Culture S32
is about the troubles the Internet causes even after the modem is turned R33
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1 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
2 on-line have fundamentally affected “people who aren’t online.” There
3 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet’s effect.
4 But unlike Code, the argument here is not much about the Internet
5 itself. It is instead about the consequence of the Internet to a part of
6 our tradition that is much more fundamental, and, as hard as this is for
7 a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more important.
8 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
9 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of “free culture”—not
10 “free” as in “free beer” (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the free-
11 software movement 2), but “free” as in “free speech,” “free markets,” “free
12 trade,” “free enterprise,” “free will,” and “free elections.” A free culture
13 supports and protects creators and innovators. It does this directly by
14 granting intellectual property rights. But it does so indirectly by limit-
15 ing the reach of those rights, to guarantee that follow-on creators and
16 innovators remain as free as possible from the control of the past. A free
17 culture is not a culture without property, just as a free market is not a
18 market in which everything is free. The opposite of a free culture is a
19 “permission culture”—a culture in which creators get to create only
20 with the permission of the powerful, or of creators from the past.
21 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not “we”
22 on the Left or “you” on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
23 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
24 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense dis-
25 interested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the changes I
26 describe affect values that both sides of our political culture deem fun-
27 damental.
28 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
29 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
30 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
31 generated more than 700,000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
32S As William Safire described marching “uncomfortably alongside
33R CodePink Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, be-
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tween liberal Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens,” he for- 1

mulated perhaps most simply just what was at stake: the concentration 2
of power. And as he asked, 3
4
Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration 5
of power—political, corporate, media, cultural—should be anath- 6
ema to conservatives. The diffusion of power through local con- 7
trol, thereby encouraging individual participation, is the essence 8
of federalism and the greatest expression of democracy.3 9
10
This idea is an element of the argument of Free Culture, though my 11
focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by concentra- 12
tions in ownership, but more importantly, if because less visibly, on the 13
concentration of power produced by a radical change in the effective 14
scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is altering the way our 15
culture gets made; that change should worry you—whether or not you 16
care about the Internet, and whether you’re on Safire’s left or on his right. 17
18
19
The inspiration for the title and for much of the argument of 20
this book comes from the work of Richard Stallman and the Free Soft- 21
ware Foundation. Indeed, as I reread Stallman’s own work, especially 22
the essays in Free Software, Free Society, I realize that all of the theoret- 23
ical insights I develop here are insights Stallman described decades 24
ago. One could thus well argue that this work is “merely” derivative. 25
I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a 26
lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this book 27
than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been its own. 28
Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of values. Like 29
Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And like Stallman, 30
I believe those are values of our past that will need to be defended in 31
our future. A free culture has been our past, but it will only be our fu- S32
ture if we change the path we are on right now. R33
PREFACE xv
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1 Like Stallman’s arguments for free software, an argument for free

2 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
3 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
4 a culture in which artists don’t get paid. A culture without property, or
5 in which creators can’t get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
6 what I advance here.
7 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance be-
8 tween anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is filled
9 with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract that get
10 enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted if its prop-
11 erty becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered by extremism
12 in the property rights that define it. That is what I fear about our cul-
13 ture today. It is against that extremism that this book is written.
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INTRODUCTION
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On December 17, 1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just In16
shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a 17
heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was elec- 18
tric and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there 19
was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned 20
flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it. 21
At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American 22
law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the sur- 23
face of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth, 24
and all the space above, to “an indefinite extent, upwards.”1 For many 25
years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that 26
rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the 27
stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass? 28
Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of Amer- 29
ican law—deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowl- 30
edged by the most important legal thinkers of our past—mattered. If 31
my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over S32
my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I al- R33
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1 lowed to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we

2 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
3 In 1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Car-
4 olina farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
5 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens appar-
6 ently flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit say-
7 ing that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
8 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys’ land. But if, as
9 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to “an indefi-
10 nite extent, upwards,” then the government was trespassing on their
11 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
12 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys’ case. Congress had
13 declared the airways public, but if one’s property really extended to the
14 heavens, then Congress’s declaration could well have been an unconsti-
15 tutional “taking” of property without compensation. The Court ac-
16 knowledged that “it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
17 the land extended to the periphery of the universe.” But Justice Douglas
18 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
19 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
20
21 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
22 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
23 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to count-
24 less trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
25 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways, se-
26 riously interfere with their control and development in the public
27 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
28 the public has a just claim.2
29
30 “Common sense revolts at the idea.”
31 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or impa-
32S tiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas’s style not to
33R dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
2 FREE CULTURE
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conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: “Common sense revolts 1

at the idea.” But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special 2
genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the 3
technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were 4
as solid as rock in one age crumble in another. 5
Or at least, this is how things happen when there’s no one powerful 6
on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And 7
though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the 8
growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew 9
themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very 10
hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright 11
brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the 12
technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken 13
coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by “what 14
seemed reasonable” given the technology that the Wrights had pro- 15
duced. They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and 16
shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted. 17
They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the 18
end, the force of what seems “obvious” to everyone else—the power of 19
“common sense”—would prevail. Their “private interest” would not be 20
allowed to defeat an obvious public gain. 21
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Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America’s forgotten inventor 24
geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the 25
titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in 26
the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any 27
single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated 28
than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder’s apprentice had discov- 29
ered electric induction in 1831. But he had the same intuition about 30
how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions, Arm- 31
strong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our S32
understanding of radio. R33
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1 On the day after Christmas, 1933, four patents were issued to Arm-
2 strong for his most significant invention—FM radio. Until then, con-
3 sumer radio had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
4 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
5 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
6 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
7 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
8 much less transmitter power and static.
9 On November 5, 1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meet-
10 ing of the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in
11 New York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
12 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from seven-
13 teen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and then with a
14 clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an electrical de-
15 vice, it produced the sound of an announcer’s voice: “This is amateur
16 station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on frequency modu-
17 lation at two and a half meters.”
18 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
19
20 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
21 sounded like a glass of water being poured. . . . A paper was
22 crumpled and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling
23 forest fire. . . . Sousa marches were played from records and a pi-
24 ano solo and guitar number were performed. . . . The music was
25 projected with a live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio
26 “music box.”3
27
28 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a
29 vastly superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Arm-
30 strong was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the
31 then dominant AM radio market. By 1935, there were a thousand radio
32S stations across the United States, but the stations in large cities were all
33R owned by a handful of networks.
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RCA’s president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong’s, was eager 1

that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So 2
Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device 3
that removed static from “radio.” But when Armstrong demonstrated 4
his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased. 5
6
I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove 7
static from our AM radio. I didn’t think he’d start a revolution— 8
start up a whole damn new industry to compete with RCA.4 9
10
Armstrong’s invention threatened RCA’s AM empire, so the com- 11
pany launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have 12
been a superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one au- 13
thor described, 14
15
The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the 16
weight of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices 17
to subdue this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to 18
develop unrestrained, posed . . . a complete reordering of radio 19
power . . . and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted 20
AM system on which RCA had grown to power.5 21
22
RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further 23
tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew 24
impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall 25
FM radio’s deployment generally. In 1936, RCA hired the former head 26
of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign 27
spectrum in a way that would castrate FM—principally by moving FM 28
radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But 29
when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II, 30
RCA’s work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the 31
FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM S32
radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it, R33
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1 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
2 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
3 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and devi-
4 ousness.6
5
6 To make room in the spectrum for RCA’s latest gamble, television,
7 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
8 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
9 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
10 (This change was strongly supported by AT&T, because the loss of
11 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
12 wired links from AT&T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
13 least temporarily.
14 Armstrong resisted RCA’s efforts. In response, RCA resisted Arm-
15 strong’s patents. After incorporating FM technology into the emerging
16 standard for television, RCA declared the patents invalid—baselessly,
17 and almost fifteen years after they were issued. It thus refused to pay
18 him royalties. For six years, Armstrong fought an expensive war of lit-
19 igation to defend the patents. Finally, just as the patents expired, RCA
20 offered a settlement so low that it would not even cover Armstrong’s
21 lawyers’ fees. Defeated, broken, and now broke, in 1954 Armstrong
22 wrote a short note to his wife and then stepped out of a thirteenth-
23 story window to his death.
24 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
25 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From the
26 beginning, government and government agencies have been subject
27 to capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
28 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful interest
29 too often exerts its influence within the government to get the govern-
30 ment to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of course always
31 public spirited; the reality is something different. Ideas that were as
32S solid as rock in one age, but that, left to themselves, would crumble in
33R
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another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political 1

process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the ef- 2
fect of technological change. 3
4
5
There’s no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good 6
date upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Inter- 7
net has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew 8
Internet and American Life Project, 58 percent of Americans had ac- 9
cess to the Internet in 2002, up from 49 percent two years before.7 10
That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end 11
of 2004. 12
As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has 13
changed things. Some of these changes are technical—the Internet has 14
made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data, 15
and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They 16
are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of 17
thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off. 18
They don’t affect people who don’t use the Internet, or at least they 19
don’t affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about 20
the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet. 21
Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the In- 22
ternet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that the 23
Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that 24
process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as old as 25
the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change, would reject 26
it. Yet most don’t even see the change that the Internet has introduced. 27
We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between 28
commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law’s reg- 29
ulation of each. By “commercial culture” I mean that part of our culture 30
that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By “noncommercial 31
culture” I mean all the rest. When old men sat around parks or on S32
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1 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
2 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his “Reader,”
3 or Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
4 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
5 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
6 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the peace,
7 then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly concerned
8 with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it left this cul-
9 ture “free.” The ordinary ways in which ordinary individuals shared and
10 transformed their culture—telling stories, reenacting scenes from plays
11 or TV, participating in fan clubs, sharing music, making tapes—were
12 left alone by the law.
13 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
14 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
15 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
16 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial marketplace.8 This is also, of
17 course, an important part of creativity and culture, and it has become
18 an increasingly important part in America. But in no sense was it dom-
19 inant within our tradition. It was instead just one part, a controlled
20 part, balanced with the free.
21 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
22 been erased.9 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and,
23 pushed by big media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in
24 our tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
25 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has ex-
26 panded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and crea-
27 tivity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved the
28 balance of our history—between uses of our culture that were free and
29 uses of our culture that were only upon permission—has been undone.
30 The consequence is that we are less and less a free culture, more and
31 more a permission culture.
32S This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial cre-
33R
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ativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its motivation. But the 1

protectionism that justifies the changes that I will describe below is not 2
the limited and balanced sort that has defined the law in the past. This 3
is not a protectionism to protect artists. It is instead a protectionism 4
to protect certain forms of business. Corporations threatened by the 5
potential of the Internet to change the way both commercial and 6
noncommercial culture are made and shared have united to induce 7
lawmakers to use the law to protect them. It is the story of RCA and 8
Armstrong; it is the dream of the Causbys. 9
For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many 10
to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture that 11
reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the mar- 12
ketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that change 13
in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet is thus to 14
the industries that built and distributed content in the twentieth cen- 15
tury what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was to the 16
railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of the end, 17
or at least a substantial transformation. Digital technologies, tied to the 18
Internet, could produce a vastly more competitive and vibrant market 19
for building and cultivating culture; that market could include a much 20
wider and more diverse range of creators; those creators could produce 21
and distribute a much more vibrant range of creativity; and depending 22
upon a few important factors, those creators could earn more on average 23
from this system than creators do today—all so long as the RCAs of our 24
day don’t use the law to protect themselves against this competition. 25
Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is hap- 26
pening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the early 27
twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are using their 28
power to get the law to protect them against this new, more efficient, 29
more vibrant technology for building culture. They are succeeding in 30
their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet remakes them. 31
It doesn’t seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the S32
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1 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
2 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions—whether “piracy” will
3 be permitted, and whether “property” will be protected. The “war” that
4 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet—what Mo-
5 tion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
6 calls his “own terrorist war”10—has been framed as a battle about the
7 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
8 war, most think that we need only decide whether we’re for property or
9 against it.
10 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
11 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and espe-
12 cially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls “creative prop-
13 erty.” I believe that “piracy” is wrong, and that the law, properly tuned,
14 should punish “piracy,” whether on or off the Internet.
15 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
16 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
17 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet “pirates” will also rid our
18 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
19 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first 180 years of
20 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
21 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
22 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
23 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,11 copyright law, prop-
24 erly balanced, protected creators against private control. Our tradition
25 was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of patrons. It instead carved out
26 a wide berth within which creators could cultivate and extend our culture.
27 Yet the law’s response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
28 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the effective
29 regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or critique the cul-
30 ture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist–like, for permission first.
31 Permission is, of course, often granted—but it is not often granted to
32S the critical or the independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobil-
33R
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ity; those within the noble class live easily; those outside it don’t. But it 1
is nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition. 2
The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the “central- 3
ity of technology” to ordinary life. I don’t believe in gods, digital or 4
otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual or group, for 5
neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or otherwise. It is not a moral- 6
ity tale. Nor is it a call to jihad against an industry. 7
It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war in- 8
spired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond its 9
code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map peace. 10
There is no good reason for the current struggle around Internet tech- 11
nologies to continue. There will be great harm to our tradition and 12
culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must come to un- 13
derstand the source of this war. We must resolve it soon. 14
15
16
Like the Causbys’ battle, this war is, in part, about “property.” 17
The property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys’, and no 18
innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding this 19
“property” are as obvious to most as the Causbys’ claim about the sa- 20
credness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us 21
take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners of 22
“intellectual property” now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys, treat 23
these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object when 24
a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to us as it 25
was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are “trespassing” 26
upon legitimate claims of “property.” It is as plain to us as it was to 27
them that the law should intervene to stop this trespass. 28
And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or 29
Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic. Com- 30
mon sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky Causbys, 31
common sense is on the side of the property owners in this war. Unlike S32
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1 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
2 on its side.
3 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become in-
4 creasingly amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property
5 and, more importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy
6 makers and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when
7 more of our “culture” was as “owned” as it is now. And yet there has
8 never been a time when the concentration of power to control the uses
9 of culture has been as unquestioningly accepted as it is now.
10 The puzzle is, Why?
11 Is it because we have come to understand a truth about the value
12 and importance of absolute property over ideas and culture? Is it be-
13 cause we have discovered that our tradition of rejecting such an ab-
14 solute claim was wrong?
15 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
16 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
17 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
18 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
19 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
20 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
21 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
22 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because
23 common sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common
24 sense stand silent in the face of these extremes because, as with Arm-
25 strong versus RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the
26 more powerful view?
27 I don’t mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe
28 it was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
29 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt against
30 the extreme claims made today on behalf of “intellectual property.”
31 What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a sheriff arrest-
32S ing an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of this silliness will
33R be much more profound.
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1
2
The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: “piracy” and 3
“property.” My aim in this book’s next two parts is to explore these two 4
ideas. 5
My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don’t want to 6
plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to ob- 7
scure French theorists—however natural that is for the weird sort we 8
academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a collection 9
of stories that set a context within which these apparently simple ideas 10
can be more fully understood. 11
The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the 12
Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our gov- 13
ernment, pushed by big media to respond to this “something new,” is 14
destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes 15
the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let “common 16
sense” resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most threat- 17
ened by the changes to use their power to change the law—and more 18
importantly, to use their power to change something fundamental about 19
who we have always been. 20
We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because 21
most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the in- 22
terests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our 23
depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the 24
story of one more consequence of this form of corruption—a conse- 25
quence to which most of us remain oblivious. 26
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“PIRACY” S32
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Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there Po17
has been a war against “piracy.” The precise contours of this concept, 18
“piracy,” are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to cap- 19
ture. As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of 20
English copyright law to include sheet music, 21
22
A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to 23
rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing 24
of them for his own use.1 25
26
Today we are in the middle of another “war” against “piracy.” The 27
Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the effi- 28
cient spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among the 29
most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet enables. Using 30
distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the easy spread of con- 31
tent in a way unimagined a generation ago. S32
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1 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.

2 The network doesn’t discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
3 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of shar-
4 ing of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the war, as
5 copyright owners fear the sharing will “rob the author of the profit.”
6 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and in-
7 creasingly to technology to defend their “property” against this “piracy.”
8 A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being raised to be-
9 lieve that “property” should be “free.” Forget tattoos, never mind body
10 piercing—our kids are becoming thieves!
11 There’s no doubt that “piracy” is wrong, and that pirates should be
12 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
13 notion of “piracy” in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
14 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
15 The idea goes something like this:
16
17 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
18 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
19 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
20 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
21 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
22 piracy.
23
24 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
25 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the “if value, then right” the-
26 ory of creative property 2—if there is value, then someone must have a
27 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers’ rights or-
28 ganization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
29 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.3 There was “value”
30 (the songs) so there must have been a “right”—even against the Girl
31 Scouts.
32S This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
33R property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
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of law protecting creative property. But the “if value, then right” theory 1
of creative property has never been America’s theory of creative prop- 2
erty. It has never taken hold within our law. 3
Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It 4
sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains sub- 5
servient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this turned 6
around. We have become so concerned with protecting the instrument 7
that we are losing sight of the value. 8
The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer 9
takes care to draw—the distinction between republishing someone’s 10
work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on 11
the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern; 12
copyright law today regulates both. 13
Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn’t mat- 14
ter all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that 15
meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial 16
entities could bear the burden of the law—even the burden of the 17
Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one 18
more expense of doing business. 19
But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of 20
the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of 21
commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that ex- 22
pansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only “copy- 23
ing,” when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does, the 24
extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly outweighs 25
any original benefit—certainly as it affects noncommercial creativity, 26
and increasingly as it affects commercial creativity as well. Thus, as 27
we’ll see more clearly in the chapters below, the law’s role is less and 28
less to support creativity, and more and more to protect certain indus- 29
tries against competition. Just at the time digital technology could 30
unleash an extraordinary range of commercial and noncommercial 31
creativity, the law burdens this creativity with insanely complex and S32
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1 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the “Rise of the Creative Class.”4

2 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
3 this creative class.
4 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
5 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
6 context the current battles about behavior labeled “piracy.”
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CHAPTER ONE: Creators 15
16
In 1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse Co17
made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called Plane Crazy. 18
In November, in New York City’s Colony Theater, in the first widely 19
distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, Steamboat Willie brought 20
to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse. 21
Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in 22
the movie The Jazz Singer. That success led Walt Disney to copy the 23
technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it 24
would work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But 25
when Disney ran a test in the summer of 1928, the results were unam- 26
biguous. As Disney describes that first experiment, 27
28
A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play 29
a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see 30
the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where 31
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1 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After

2 several false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The
3 mouth organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound de-
4 partment bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat.
5 The synchronization was pretty close.
6 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than elec-
7 tric. They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound
8 and motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in
9 the audience and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was
10 wonderful! And it was something new!1
11
12 Disney’s then partner, and one of animation’s most extraordinary
13 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: “I have never been so thrilled
14 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it.”
15 Disney had created something very new, based upon something rel-
16 atively new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity
17 that had rarely—except in Disney’s hands—been anything more than
18 filler for other films. Throughout animation’s early history, it was Dis-
19 ney’s invention that set the standard that others struggled to match.
20 And quite often, Disney’s great genius, his spark of creativity, was built
21 upon the work of others.
22 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that 1928 also
23 marks another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed
24 to cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
25 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was Steamboat Bill, Jr.
26 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in 1895. In the era of
27 silent film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to
28 spark uncontrollable laughter from his audience. Steamboat Bill, Jr. was
29 a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its incredible stunts.
30 The film was classic Keaton—wildly popular and among the best of its
31 genre.
32S Steamboat Bill, Jr. appeared before Disney’s cartoon Steamboat Willie.
33R The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a di-
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rect cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,2 and both are built upon a com- 1
mon song as a source. It is not just from the invention of synchronized 2
sound in The Jazz Singer that we get Steamboat Willie. It is also from 3
Buster Keaton’s invention of Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the 4
song “Steamboat Bill,” that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from 5
Steamboat Willie, Mickey Mouse. 6
This “borrowing” was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the 7
industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream 8
films of his day.3 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with 9
knockoffs—slight variations on winning themes; retellings of ancient 10
stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the differences. With 11
Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its spark. Later, it was the 12
quality of his work relative to the production-line cartoons with which 13
he competed. Yet these additions were built upon a base that was bor- 14
rowed. Disney added to the work of others before him, creating some- 15
thing new out of something just barely old. 16
Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant. 17
Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you’re as oblivi- 18
ous as I was, you’re likely to think that these tales are happy, sweet sto- 19
ries, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the Grimm fairy tales 20
are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps overly ambitious parent 21
who would dare to read these bloody, moralistic stories to his or her 22
child, at bedtime or anytime. 23
Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried 24
them into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and 25
light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he 26
made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compas- 27
sion where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the 28
Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon 29
the work of others is astonishing when set together: Snow White 30
(1937), Fantasia (1940), Pinocchio (1940), Dumbo (1941), Bambi 31
(1942), Song of the South (1946), Cinderella (1950), Alice in Wonderland S32
(1951), Robin Hood (1952), Peter Pan (1953), Lady and the Tramp R33
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1 (1955), Mulan (1998), Sleeping Beauty (1959), 101 Dalmatians (1961),

2 The Sword in the Stone (1963), and The Jungle Book (1967)—not to
3 mention a recent example that we should perhaps quickly forget, Trea-
4 sure Planet (2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney, Inc.) ripped
5 creativity from the culture around him, mixed that creativity with his
6 own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix into the soul of his
7 culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
8 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should remem-
9 ber and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no cre-
10 ativity except this kind. We don’t need to go that far to recognize its
11 importance. We could call this “Disney creativity,” though that would
12 be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, “Walt Disney creativity”—a
13 form of expression and genius that builds upon the culture around us
14 and makes it something different.
15 In 1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was rela-
16 tively fresh. The public domain in 1928 was not very old and was
17 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
18 thirty years—for that minority of creative work that was in fact copy-
19 righted.4 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
20 copyright holders of a creative work had an “exclusive right” to control
21 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
22 required the permission of the copyright owner.
23 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public do-
24 main. No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
25 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a “lawyer-free
26 zone.” Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
27 for Disney to use and build upon in 1928. It was free for anyone—
28 whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether approved or
29 not—to use and build upon.
30 This is the ways things always were—until quite recently. For most
31 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From 1790
32S until 1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
33R years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
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free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else. 1
Today’s equivalent would be for creative work from the 1960s and 2
1970s to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without 3
permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for con- 4
tent from before the Great Depression. 5
6
7
Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on “Walt Disney cre- 8
ativity.” Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, 9
and except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite 10
universal. 11
Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to 12
many Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: 13
manga, or comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some 40 14
percent of publications are comics, and 30 percent of publication rev- 15
enue derives from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at 16
every magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on 17
Japan’s extraordinary system of public transportation. 18
Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That’s an 19
unattractive characteristic of ours. We’re likely to misunderstand much 20
about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to the 21
stories that these “graphic novels” tell. For the Japanese, manga cover 22
every aspect of social life. For us, comics are “men in tights.” And any- 23
way, it’s not as if the New York subways are filled with readers of Joyce 24
or even Hemingway. People of different cultures distract themselves in 25
different ways, the Japanese in this interestingly different way. 26
But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a 27
variant on manga that from a lawyer’s perspective is quite odd, but 28
from a Disney perspective is quite familiar. 29
This is the phenomenon of doujinshi. Doujinshi are also comics, but 30
they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of 31
doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is just a copy; the artist must make a S32
contribution to the art he copies, by transforming it either subtly or R33
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1 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and

2 develop it differently—with a different story line. Or the comic can
3 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
4 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently “different.” But they
5 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
6 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
7 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
8 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They
9 are huge. More than 33,000 “circles” of creators from across Japan pro-
10 duce these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than 450,000 Japanese
11 come together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the coun-
12 try, to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
13 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
14 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
15 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi mar-
16 ket down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
17 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those
18 trained in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
19 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors Amer-
20 ican copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal one. Doujinshi are
21 plainly “derivative works.” There is no general practice by doujinshi
22 artists of securing the permission of the manga creators. Instead, the
23 practice is simply to take and modify the creations of others, as Walt
24 Disney did with Steamboat Bill, Jr. Under both Japanese and American
25 law, that “taking” without the permission of the original copyright
26 owner is illegal. It is an infringement of the original copyright to make
27 a copy or a derivative work without the original copyright owner’s
28 permission.
29 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
30 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
31 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, “The
32S early days of comics in America are very much like what’s going on
33R in Japan now. . . . American comics were born out of copying each
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other. . . . That’s how [the artists] learn to draw—by going into comic 1
books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them” 2
and building from them.5 3
American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part 4
because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are 5
allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, “there are these rules 6
and you have to stick to them.” There are things Superman “cannot” 7
do. “As a creator, it’s frustrating having to stick to some parameters 8
which are fifty years old.” 9
The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is pre- 10
cisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that explains 11
the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra, for ex- 12
ample, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these technical 13
violations because they spur the manga market to be more wealthy and 14
productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were banned, so 15
the law does not ban doujinshi.6 16
The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowl- 17
edges, is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not 18
clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if doujin- 19
shi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn’t explain why in- 20
dividual copyright owners don’t sue nonetheless. If the law has no 21
general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases individual 22
manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not a more gen- 23
eral pattern of blocking this “free taking” by the doujinshi culture? 24
I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question 25
as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by 26
a friend from a major Japanese law firm. “We don’t have enough 27
lawyers,” he told me one afternoon. There “just aren’t enough resources 28
to prosecute cases like this.” 29
This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a 30
function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those 31
words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is S32
begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga R33
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1 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the

2 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
3 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
4 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
5 their clients or hurt them?
6
7
8 Let’s pause for a moment.
9 If you’re like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
10 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
11 be puzzled about something you hadn’t thought through before.
12 We live in a world that celebrates “property.” I am one of those cel-
13 ebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also believe
14 in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call “intellec-
15 tual property.”7 A large, diverse society cannot survive without prop-
16 erty; a large, diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without
17 intellectual property.
18 But it takes just a second’s reflection to realize that there is plenty of
19 value out there that “property” doesn’t capture. I don’t mean “money
20 can’t buy you love,” but rather, value that is plainly part of a process of
21 production, including commercial as well as noncommercial produc-
22 tion. If Disney animators had stolen a set of pencils to draw Steamboat
23 Willie, we’d have no hesitation in condemning that taking as wrong—
24 even though trivial, even if unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at
25 least under the law of the day, with Disney’s taking from Buster Keaton
26 or from the Brothers Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the tak-
27 ing from Keaton because Disney’s use would have been considered
28 “fair.” There was nothing wrong with the taking from the Grimms be-
29 cause the Grimms’ work was in the public domain.
30 Thus, even though the things that Disney took—or more generally,
31 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity—are
32S valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
33R
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things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that free- 1
dom is good. 2
The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into 3
a publisher’s office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest 4
work—or even one copy—without paying, we’d have no hesitation in 5
saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would 6
have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever 7
form, whether large or small. 8
Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to 9
say that the copycat comic artists are “stealing.” This form of Walt Dis- 10
ney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in particular find 11
it hard to say why. 12
It’s the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once 13
you begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists 14
without asking or paying for the privilege. (“Excuse me, Professor Ein- 15
stein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity to show 16
that you were wrong about quantum physics?”) Acting companies per- 17
form adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing per- 18
mission from anyone. (Does anyone believe Shakespeare would be 19
better spread within our culture if there were a central Shakespeare 20
rights clearinghouse that all productions of Shakespeare must appeal 21
to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles with a certain kind of 22
movie: five asteroid films in the late 1990s; two volcano disaster films 23
in 1997. 24
Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building 25
upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now. 26
That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without 27
permission and without compensating the original creator. No society, 28
free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that 29
permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead, 30
every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking—free 31
societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree. S32
R33
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1 The hard question is therefore not whether a culture is free. All cul-
2 tures are free to some degree. The hard question instead is “How free is
3 this culture?” How much, and how broadly, is the culture free for oth-
4 ers to take and build upon? Is that freedom limited to party members?
5 To members of the royal family? To the top ten corporations on the
6 New York Stock Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To
7 artists generally, whether affiliated with the Met or not? To musicians
8 generally, whether white or not? To filmmakers generally, whether af-
9 filiated with a studio or not?
10 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
11 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
12 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32S
33R
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
CHAPTER TWO: “Mere Copyists” 15
16
In 1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for Co17
producing what we would call “photographs.” Appropriately enough, 18
they were called “daguerreotypes.” The process was complicated and 19
expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few 20
zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre 21
Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such associa- 22
tions, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.) 23
Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong. 24
This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make “au- 25
tomatic pictures.” William Talbot soon discovered a process for mak- 26
ing “negatives.” But because the negatives were glass, and had to be 27
kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In the 28
1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the tak- 29
ing of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of glass, and 30
thus it was still not a process within reach of most amateurs. 31
The technological change that made mass photography possible S32
didn’t happen until 1888, and was the creation of a single man. George R33
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1 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the

2 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
3 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible, it
4 could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to a de-
5 veloper, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By lower-
6 ing the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
7 population of photographers.
8 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
9 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was mar-
10 keted on the basis of its simplicity. “You press the button and we do the
11 rest.”1 As he described in The Kodak Primer:
12
13 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work
14 that any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph,
15 from the work that only an expert can do. . . . We furnish any-
16 body, man, woman or child, who has sufficient intelligence to
17 point a box straight and press a button, with an instrument which
18 altogether removes from the practice of photography the neces-
19 sity for exceptional facilities or, in fact, any special knowledge of
20 the art. It can be employed without preliminary study, without a
21 darkroom and without chemicals.2
22
23 For $25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
24 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
25 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
26 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
27 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
28 popular photography. Eastman’s camera first went on sale in 1888; one
29 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
30 From 1888 through 1909, while industrial production was rising by 4.7
31 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by 11
32S percent.3 Eastman Kodak’s sales during the same period experienced
33R an average annual increase of over 17 percent.4
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The real significance of Eastman’s invention, however, was not 1

economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a 2
glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photogra- 3
phy gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had 4
never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, “For the first 5
time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a per- 6
manent record of his family and its activities. . . . For the first time in 7
history there exists an authentic visual record of the appearance and ac- 8
tivities of the common man made without [literary] interpretation 9
or bias.”5 10
In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of ex- 11
pression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of expression, 12
of course. But it took years of training before they could be deployed by 13
amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the Kodak, expression 14
was possible much sooner and more simply. The barrier to expression 15
was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its “quality”; professionals would 16
discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study how best to frame a 17
picture and you get a sense of the experience of creativity that the Ko- 18
dak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary people a way to express 19
themselves more easily than any tools could have before. 20
What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously, 21
Eastman’s genius was an important part. But also important was the le- 22
gal environment within which Eastman’s invention grew. For early in 23
the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions that 24
could well have changed the course of photography substantially. 25
Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional, 26
required permission before he could capture and print whatever image 27
he wanted. Their answer was no.6 28
The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surpris- 29
ingly familiar. The photographer was “taking” something from the per- 30
son or building whose photograph he shot—pirating something of 31
value. Some even thought he was taking the target’s soul. Just as Dis- S32
ney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to draw R33
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1 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
2 that they thought valuable.
3 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
4 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
5 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
6 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
7 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.7) It may be
8 that this means that the photographer gets something for nothing. Just
9 as Disney could take inspiration from Steamboat Bill, Jr. or the Broth-
10 ers Grimm, the photographer should be free to capture an image with-
11 out compensating the source.
12 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
13 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no permission
14 would be required before an image could be captured and shared with
15 others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the default.
16 (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous people: com-
17 mercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people for com-
18 mercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of us. But in the
19 ordinary case, the image can be captured without clearing the rights to
20 do the capturing.8)
21 We can only speculate about how photography would have devel-
22 oped had the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been
23 against the photographer, then the photographer would have had to
24 demonstrate permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to
25 demonstrate permission, too, before it developed the film upon which
26 images were captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then
27 Eastman Kodak would be benefiting from the “theft” committed by
28 the photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright in-
29 fringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
30 from the “image-right” infringement of its photographers. We could
31 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
32S demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine
33R a system developing to demonstrate that permission.
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But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would 1

be very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if 2
the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that gov- 3
ern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in im- 4
portance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the 5
technology as they did—since professionals could have more easily borne 6
the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of photography 7
to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like that growth 8
would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that growth in a 9
democratic technology of expression would have been realized. 10
11
12
If you drive through San Francisco’s Presidio, you might see two 13
gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and striking im- 14
ages, and the logo “Just Think!” in place of the name of a school. But 15
there’s little that’s “just” cerebral in the projects that these busses en- 16
able. These buses are filled with technologies that teach kids to tinker 17
with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the film of your VCR. 18
Rather the “film” of digital cameras. Just Think! is a project that en- 19
ables kids to make films, as a way to understand and critique the filmed 20
culture that they find all around them. Each year, these busses travel to 21
more than thirty schools and enable three hundred to five hundred 22
children to learn something about media by doing something with me- 23
dia. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they learn. 24
These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is increas- 25
ingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has fallen dra- 26
matically. As one analyst puts it, “Five years ago, a good real-time 27
digital video editing system cost $25,000. Today you can get profes- 28
sional quality for $595.”9 These buses are filled with technology that 29
would have cost hundreds of thousands just ten years ago. And it is 30
now feasible to imagine not just buses like this, but classrooms across 31
the country where kids are learning more and more of something S32
teachers call “media literacy.” R33
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1 “Media literacy,” as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just

2 Think!, puts it, “is the ability . . . to understand, analyze, and decon-
3 struct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the way
4 media works, the way it’s constructed, the way it’s delivered, and the
5 way people access it.”
6 This may seem like an odd way to think about “literacy.” For most
7 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
8 and noticing split infinitives are the things that “literate” people know
9 about.
10 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average 390 hours of
11 television commercials per year, or between 20,000 and 45,000 com-
12 mercials generally,10 it is increasingly important to understand the
13 “grammar” of media. For just as there is a grammar for the written
14 word, so, too, is there one for media. And just as kids learn how to write
15 by writing lots of terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by con-
16 structing lots of (at least at first) terrible media.
17 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
18 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who has
19 written understands how difficult writing is—how difficult it is to se-
20 quence the story, to keep a reader’s attention, to craft language to be
21 understandable—few of us have any real sense of how difficult media
22 is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense of how media works,
23 how it holds an audience or leads it through a story, how it triggers
24 emotion or builds suspense.
25 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
26 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
27 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
28 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
29 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
30 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
31 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just
32S film, as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of South-
33R ern California’s Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
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USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was 1

about “the placement of objects, color, . . . rhythm, pacing, and tex- 2
ture.”11 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is 3
“played” as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple 4
control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Au- 5
thor Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction. 6
But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his 7
works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through 8
a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even 9
to a wildly successful author.12 10
This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley de- 11
scribes, “people are very surprised about how they are led through a 12
film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you 13
have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were 14
led.” If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed. 15
Yet the push for an expanded literacy—one that goes beyond text to 16
include audio and visual elements—is not about making better film di- 17
rectors. The aim is not to improve the profession of filmmaking at all. 18
Instead, as Daley explained, 19
20
From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide 21
is not access to a box. It’s the ability to be empowered with the 22
language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people 23
can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to 24
being read-only. 25
26
“Read-only.” Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere. 27
Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the 28
twentieth century. 29
The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial point: 30
It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better under- 31
standing the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding the S32
tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any literacy, R33
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1 and this literacy in particular, is to “empower people to choose the appro-

2 priate language for what they need to create or express.”13 It is to enable
3 students “to communicate in the language of the twenty-first century.”14
4 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some
5 than to others. It doesn’t necessarily come more easily to those who ex-
6 cel in written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the In-
7 stitute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe one
8 particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high school.
9 The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles school. In all
10 the traditional measures of success, this school was a failure. But Daley
11 and Barish ran a program that gave kids an opportunity to use film
12 to express meaning about something the students know something
13 about—gun violence.
14 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
15 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
16 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
17 away. The “kids were showing up at 6 A.M. and leaving at 5 at night,”
18 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
19 what education should be about—learning how to express themselves.
20 Using whatever “free web stuff they could find,” and relatively sim-
21 ple tools to enable the kids to mix “image, sound, and text,” Barish said
22 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
23 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
24 close to the lives of these students. The project “gave them a tool and
25 empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about it,”
26 Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating expression—far more
27 successfully and powerfully than could have been created using only
28 text. “If you had said to these students, ‘you have to do it in text,’ they
29 would’ve just thrown their hands up and gone and done something
30 else,” Barish described, in part, no doubt, because expressing them-
31 selves in text is not something these students can do well. Yet neither
32S is text a form in which these ideas can be expressed well. The power of
33R this message depended upon its connection to this form of expression.
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“But isn’t education about teaching kids to write?” I asked. In part, 1

of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education, Da- 2
ley explained, is about giving students a way of “constructing mean- 3
ing.” To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching writing 4
is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one part—and increas- 5
ingly, not the most powerful part—of constructing meaning. As Daley 6
explained in the most moving part of our interview, 7
8
What you want is to give these students ways of constructing 9
meaning. If all you give them is text, they’re not going to do it. 10
Because they can’t. You know, you’ve got Johnny who can look at 11
a video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your 12
walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other 13
things. He just can’t read your text. So Johnny comes to school 14
and you say, “Johnny, you’re illiterate. Nothing you can do mat- 15
ters.” Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or 16
he [can] dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he’s going to 17
dismiss you. [But i]nstead, if you say, “Well, with all these things 18
that you can do, let’s talk about this issue. Play for me music that 19
you think reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect 20
that, or draw for me something that reflects that.” Not by giving 21
a kid a video camera and . . . saying, “Let’s go have fun with the 22
video camera and make a little movie.” But instead, really help 23
you take these elements that you understand, that are your lan- 24
guage, and construct meaning about the topic. . . . 25
That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of 26
course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they 27
bump up against the fact, “I need to explain this and I really need 28
to write something.” And as one of the teachers told Stephanie, 29
they would rewrite a paragraph 5, 6, 7, 8 times, till they got it right. 30
Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They 31
needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through S32
your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they R33
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1 didn’t speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2 had a lot of power with this language.”
3
4 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into
5 the Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around
6 the world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
7 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media gener-
8 ally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The telling was
9 a retelling, because we had seen the events that were described. The ge-
10 nius of this awful act of terrorism was that the delayed second attack was
11 perfectly timed to assure that the whole world would be watching.
12 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
13 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across the
14 screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was “balance,” and
15 seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have increas-
16 ingly come to expect it, “news as entertainment,” even if the entertain-
17 ment is tragedy.
18 But in addition to this produced news about the “tragedy of Sep-
19 tember 11,” those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
20 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
21 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
22 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
23 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
24 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
25 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an ex-
26 traordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
27 the term in his book Cyber Rights, around a news event that had cap-
28 tured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
29 was also the Internet.
30 I don’t mean simply to praise the Internet—though I do think the
31 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
32S instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a Ko-
33R dak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a movie
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by a student on the “Just Think!” bus, the visual images could be mixed 1
with sound or text. 2
But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Inter- 3
net allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of 4
people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our tradi- 5
tion—not just that culture can be captured mechanically, and obviously 6
not just that events are commented upon critically, but that this mix of 7
captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely spread practi- 8
cally instantaneously. 9
September 11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around 10
the same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically 11
was just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or 12
blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures, such 13
as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those cultures, it 14
records private facts in a public way—it’s a kind of electronic Jerry 15
Springer, available anywhere in the world. 16
But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different char- 17
acter. There are some who use the space simply to talk about their pri- 18
vate life. But there are many who use the space to engage in public 19
discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing others who 20
are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about the decisions 21
they make, offering solutions to problems we all see: blogs create the 22
sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which we don’t all hope to 23
be there at the same time and in which conversations are not necessar- 24
ily linked. The best of the blog entries are relatively short; they point 25
directly to words used by others, criticizing with or adding to them. 26
They are arguably the most important form of unchoreographed pub- 27
lic discourse that we have. 28
That’s a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy 29
as it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most difficult 30
for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy has atro- 31
phied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the courts al- S32
low those elections to count. A relatively small number of people vote R33
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1 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally pro-
2 fessionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
3 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
4 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
5 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned dis-
6 course. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis de
7 Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
8 most important account of early “Democracy in America.” It wasn’t
9 popular elections that fascinated him—it was the jury, an institution
10 that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or death for other cit-
11 izens. And most fascinating for him was that the jury didn’t just vote
12 about the outcome they would impose. They deliberated. Members ar-
13 gued about the “right” result; they tried to persuade each other of the
14 “right” result, and in criminal cases at least, they had to agree upon a
15 unanimous result for the process to come to an end.15
16 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
17 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
18 are pushing to create just such an institution.16 And in some towns in
19 New England, something close to deliberation remains. But for most
20 of us for most of the time, there is no time or place for “democratic de-
21 liberation” to occur.
22 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to oc-
23 cur. We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
24 strong norm against talking about politics. It’s fine to talk about poli-
25 tics with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about politics
26 with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes isolated,
27 and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.17 We say what our
28 friends want to hear, and hear very little beyond what our friends say.
29 Enter the blog. The blog’s very architecture solves one part of this
30 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when
31 they want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time. Tech-
32S nologies that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
33R increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
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discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public 1

place. 2
But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of 3
norms. There’s no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics. 4
Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and 5
the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian, 6
but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not 7
political cover political issues when the occasion merits. 8
The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The 9
name Howard Dean may well have faded from the 2004 presidential 10
race but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the read- 11
ing is having an effect. 12
One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the 13
mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott 14
“misspoke” at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially prais- 15
ing Thurmond’s segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this 16
story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight 17
hours. It did. But he didn’t calculate its life cycle in blog space. The 18
bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and more in- 19
stances of the same “misspeaking” emerged. Finally, the story broke 20
back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to resign 21
as senate majority leader.18 22
This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pres- 23
sures don’t exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and 24
newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention. 25
If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move on. 26
But bloggers don’t have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they 27
can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a particu- 28
larly interesting story, more and more people link to that story. And as 29
the number of links to a particular story increases, it rises in the ranks 30
of stories. People read what is popular; what is popular has been se- 31
lected by a very democratic process of peer-generated rankings. S32
There’s a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle R33
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1 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
3 difference is the absence of a financial “conflict of interest.” “I think you
4 have to take the conflict of interest” out of journalism, Winer told me.
5 “An amateur journalist simply doesn’t have a conflict of interest, or the
6 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
7 get it out of the way.”
8 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
9 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide
10 more from the public than an unconcentrated media can—as CNN
11 admitted it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the conse-
12 quences to its own employees.19 It also needs to sustain a more coher-
13 ent account. (In the middle of the Iraq war, I read a post on the
14 Internet from someone who was at that time listening to a satellite up-
15 link with a reporter in Iraq. The New York headquarters was telling the
16 reporter over and over that her account of the war was too bleak: She
17 needed to offer a more optimistic story. When she told New York that
18 wasn’t warranted, they told her that they were writing “the story.”)
19 Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the debate—“amateur” not
20 in the sense of inexperienced, but in the sense of an Olympic athlete,
21 meaning not paid by anyone to give their reports. It allows for a much
22 broader range of input into a story, as reporting on the Columbia dis-
23 aster revealed, when hundreds from across the southwest United States
24 turned to the Internet to retell what they had seen.20 And it drives
25 readers to read across the range of accounts and “triangulate,” as Winer
26 puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are “communicating directly with
27 our constituency, and the middle man is out of it”—with all the bene-
28 fits, and costs, that might entail.
29 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected with
30 blogs. “It’s going to become an essential skill,” Winer predicts, for pub-
31 lic figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It’s not clear that
32S “journalism” is happy about this—some journalists have been told to
33R curtail their blogging.21 But it is clear that we are still in transition. “A
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lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises,” Winer told me. 1
There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect. 2
And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use 3
of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, “we will 4
be the last thing that gets shut down.” 5
This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because 6
“you don’t have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a gate- 7
keeper.” That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well. 8
As more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in 9
writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It is 10
easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the 11
product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a rare 12
human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But it 13
is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong. 14
The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy. 15
Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing 16
happens. When there are ten million, there will be something extraor- 17
dinary to report. 18
19
20
John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation. 21
His work, as his Web site describes it, is “human learning and . . . the 22
creation of knowledge ecologies for creating . . . innovation.” 23
Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit dif- 24
ferently from the perspectives I’ve sketched so far. I’m sure he would be 25
excited about any technology that might improve democracy. But his 26
real excitement comes from how these technologies affect learning. 27
As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When “a lot of us grew 28
up,” he explains, that tinkering was done “on motorcycle engines, lawn- 29
mower engines, automobiles, radios, and so on.” But digital technolo- 30
gies enable a different kind of tinkering—with abstract ideas though 31
in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how S32
a commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can R33
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1 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage, or
3 “free collage,” as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform the
4 tinkering of many others.
5 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
6 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
7 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes
8 a FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit
9 of FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
10 This opportunity creates a “completely new kind of learning plat-
11 form,” as Brown describes. “As soon as you start doing that, you . . .
12 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can start
13 looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing if they can
14 improve it.” Each effort is a kind of apprenticeship. “Open source be-
15 comes a major apprenticeship platform.”
16 In this process, “the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
17 They are code.” Kids are “shifting to the ability to tinker in the ab-
18 stract, and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that you’re do-
19 ing in your garage. You are tinkering with a community platform. . . .
20 You are tinkering with other people’s stuff. The more you tinker the
21 more you improve.” The more you improve, the more you learn.
22 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the
23 same collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As
24 Brown puts it, “the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors multi-
25 ple forms of intelligence.” Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter
26 or word processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much
27 more than text. “The Web . . . says if you are musical, if you are artis-
28 tic, if you are visual, if you are interested in film . . . [then] there is a lot
29 you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
30 these multiple forms of intelligence.”
31 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish,
32S and Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
33R
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as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different kind 1

of recognition. 2
Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed. In- 3
deed, as we’ll see through the course of this book, that freedom is in- 4
creasingly highly contested. While there’s no doubt that your father 5
had the right to tinker with the car engine, there’s great doubt that your 6
child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all around. 7
The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a freedom that 8
technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure. 9
These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and schol- 10
ars. Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we’ll see more of in chap- 11
ter 10) has developed a powerful argument in favor of the “right to 12
tinker” as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in general.22 13
But Brown’s concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is 14
about the learning that kids can do, or can’t do, because of the law. 15
“This is where education in the twenty-first century is going,” 16
Brown explains. We need to “understand how kids who grow up digi- 17
tal think and want to learn.” 18
“Yet,” as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will 19
evince, “we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the 20
natural tendencies of today’s digital kids. . . . We’re building an archi- 21
tecture that unleashes 60 percent of the brain [and] a legal system that 22
closes down that part of the brain.” 23
We’re building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes 24
moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an 25
opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we’re building 26
the law to close down that technology. 27
“No way to run a culture,” as Brewster Kahle, whom we’ll meet in 28
chapter 9, quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence. 29
30
31
S32
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
16
17Co In the fall of 2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled
18 as a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
19 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a pro-
20 grammer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search en-
21 gine technology that was available on the RPI network.
22 RPI is one of America’s foremost technological research institu-
23 tions. It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engi-
24 neering to information sciences. More than 65 percent of its five
25 thousand undergraduates finished in the top 10 percent of their high
26 school class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience
27 to imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
28 RPI’s computer network links students, faculty, and administration
29 to one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything avail-
30 able on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the network
31 is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet, as well as
32S more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
33R Search engines are a measure of a network’s intimacy. Google
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brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically improving 1

the quality of search on the network. Specialty search engines can do 2
this even better. The idea of “intranet” search engines, search engines 3
that search within the network of a particular institution, is to provide 4
users of that institution with better access to material from that insti- 5
tution. Businesses do this all the time, enabling employees to have ac- 6
cess to material that people outside the business can’t get. Universities 7
do it as well. 8
These engines are enabled by the network technology itself. Mi- 9
crosoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very easy 10
for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for infor- 11
mation about the publicly (within that network) available content. 12
Jesse’s search engine was built to take advantage of this technology. It 13
used Microsoft’s network file system to build an index of all the files 14
available within the RPI network. 15
Jesse’s wasn’t the first search engine built for the RPI network. In- 16
deed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others had 17
built. His single most important improvement over those engines was 18
to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could cause a 19
user’s computer to crash. With the engines that existed before, if you 20
tried to access a file through a Windows browser that was on a com- 21
puter that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse modified the 22
system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that a user could 23
click to see if the machine holding the file was still on-line. 24
Jesse’s engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six 25
months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By 26
March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one 27
million files in his directory, including every type of content that might 28
be on users’ computers. 29
Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures, 30
which students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes 31
or research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that stu- S32
dents might have created; university brochures—basically anything that R33
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1 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their

2 computer.
3 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
4 files that Jesse’s search engine listed were music files. But that means,
5 of course, that three quarters were not, and—so that this point is ab-
6 solutely clear—Jesse did nothing to induce people to put music files in
7 their public folders. He did nothing to target the search engine to these
8 files. He was a kid tinkering with a Google-like technology at a uni-
9 versity where he was studying information science, and hence, tinker-
10 ing was the aim. Unlike Google, or Microsoft, for that matter, he made
11 no money from this tinkering; he was not connected to any business
12 that would make any money from this experiment. He was a kid tin-
13 kering with technology in an environment where tinkering with tech-
14 nology was precisely what he was supposed to do.
15 On April 3, 2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
16 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
17 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
18 other students whom he didn’t even know, two of them at other uni-
19 versities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from the suit.
20 As he read these papers and watched the news reports about them, he
21 was increasingly astonished.
22 “It was absurd,” he told me. “I don’t think I did anything wrong. . . .
23 I don’t think there’s anything wrong with the search engine that I ran
24 or . . . what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn’t modified it in any way
25 that promoted or enhanced the work of pirates. I just modified the
26 search engine in a way that would make it easier to use”—again, a
27 search engine, which Jesse had not himself built, using the Windows file-
28 sharing system, which Jesse had not himself built, to enable members
29 of the RPI community to get access to content, which Jesse had not
30 himself created or posted, and the vast majority of which had nothing
31 to do with music.
32S But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
33R network and had therefore “willfully” violated copyright laws. They de-
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manded that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of 1
“willful infringement,” the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers 2
call “statutory damages.” These damages permit a copyright owner to 3
claim $150,000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one 4
hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded 5
that Jesse pay them at least $15,000,000. 6
Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one 7
other student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at 8
Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse’s. Though each case 9
was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same: 10
huge demands for “damages” that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to. 11
If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in 12
the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $100 billion—six 13
times the total profit of the film industry in 2001.1 14
Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened. 15
An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They 16
demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved 17
$12,000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded 18
$12,000 to dismiss the case. 19
The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He 20
refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would essen- 21
tially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of technology 22
for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him understand that this 23
process of being sued was not going to be pleasant. (As Jesse’s father 24
recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the case, Matt Oppenheimer, told 25
Jesse, “You don’t want to pay another visit to a dentist like me.”) And 26
throughout, the RIAA insisted it would not settle the case until it took 27
every penny Jesse had saved. 28
Jesse’s family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight. 29
But Jesse’s uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the 30
American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even 31
win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be S32
at least $250,000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he R33
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1 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
3 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $250,000 and a chance at win-
4 ning, or $12,000 and a settlement.
5 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
6 Let’s put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
7 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
8 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
9 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $1 million a year.
10 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
11 artist makes $45,900.2 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
12 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a stu-
13 dent for running a search engine?3
14 On June 23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
15 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
16 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $15 million lawsuit became an
17 activist:
18
19 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
20 an activist. . . . [But] I’ve been pushed into this. In no way did I
21 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it’s just completely ab-
22 surd what the RIAA has done.
23
24 Jesse’s parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
25 his father told me, Jesse “considers himself very conservative, and so do
26 I. . . . He’s not a tree hugger. . . . I think it’s bizarre that they would
27 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they’re sending the
28 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record.”
29
30
31
32S
33R
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
CHAPTER FOUR: “Pirates” 15
16
If “piracy” means using the creative property of others without Co17
their permission—if “if value, then right” is true—then the history of 18
the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of 19
“big media” today—film, records, radio, and cable TV—was born of a 20
kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation’s 21
pirates join this generation’s country club—until now. 22
23
24
Film 25
26
The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.1 Creators 27
and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in the early 28
twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents granted the 29
inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were exer- 30
cised through a monopoly “trust,” the Motion Pictures Patents Com- 31
pany, and were based on Thomas Edison’s creative property—patents. S32
Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights this creative property R33
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1 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
3
4 A January 1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
5 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
6 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
7 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
8 summer of 1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
9 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
10 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
11 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the
12 number of nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the in-
13 dependent movement by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known
14 as the General Film Company to block the entry of non-licensed
15 independents. With coercive tactics that have become legendary,
16 General Film confiscated unlicensed equipment, discontinued
17 product supply to theaters which showed unlicensed films, and
18 effectively monopolized distribution with the acquisition of all
19 U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by the independent
20 William Fox who defied the Trust even after his license was re-
21 voked.2
22
23 The Napsters of those days, the “independents,” were companies like
24 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously re-
25 sisted. “Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and ‘accidents’
26 resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and sometimes life
27 and limb frequently occurred.”3 That led the independents to flee the
28 East Coast. California was remote enough from Edison’s reach that film-
29 makers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the law. And the
30 leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently, did just that.
31 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
32S of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
33R patent holder a truly “limited” monopoly (just seventeen years at that
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time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had 1
expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of Edi- 2
son’s creative property. 3
4
5
Recorded Music 6
7
The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see 8
how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music. 9
At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines 10
for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player 11
piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of 12
their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of 13
their music. In other words, in 1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel’s 14
1899 hit “Happy Mose,” the law said I would have to pay for the right 15
to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the 16
right to perform it publicly. 17
But what if I wanted to record “Happy Mose,” using Edison’s 18
phonograph or Fourneaux’s player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was 19
clear enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that 20
I performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I 21
would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was record- 22
ing. But it wasn’t totally clear that I would have to pay for a “public per- 23
formance” if I recorded the song in my own house (even today, you don’t 24
owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in the shower), or if I 25
recorded the song from memory (copies in your brain are not—yet— 26
regulated by copyright law). So if I simply sang the song into a record- 27
ing device in the privacy of my own home, it wasn’t clear that I owed the 28
composer anything. And more importantly, it wasn’t clear whether I 29
owed the composer anything if I then made copies of those recordings. 30
Because of this gap in the law, then, I could effectively pirate someone 31
else’s song without paying its composer anything. S32
The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about R33
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1 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge

2 put it,
3
4 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
5 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
6 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and compa-
7 nies who cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain
8 of the composer and publisher without any regard for [their] rights.4
9
10 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
11 people’s works were “sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
12 genius of American composers,”5 and the “music publishing industry”
13 was thereby “at the complete mercy of this one pirate.”6 As John Philip
14 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, “When they make money
15 out of my pieces, I want a share of it.”7
16 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So,
17 too, do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who devel-
18 oped the player piano argued that “it is perfectly demonstrable that the
19 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any com-
20 poser of anything he had before their introduction.” Rather, the ma-
21 chines increased the sales of sheet music.8 In any case, the innovators
22 argued, the job of Congress was “to consider first the interest of [the
23 public], whom they represent, and whose servants they are.” “All talk
24 about ‘theft,’” the general counsel of the American Graphophone
25 Company wrote, “is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in
26 ideas musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by statute.”9
27 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer and
28 the recording artist. Congress amended the law to make sure that
29 composers would be paid for the “mechanical reproductions” of their
30 music. But rather than simply granting the composer complete con-
31 trol over the right to make mechanical reproductions, Congress gave
32S recording artists a right to record the music, at a price set by Congress,
33R once the composer allowed it to be recorded once. This is the part of
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copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer au- 1
thorizes a recording of his song, others are free to record the same 2
song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law. 3
American law ordinarily calls this a “compulsory license,” but I will 4
refer to it as a “statutory license.” A statutory license is a license whose 5
key terms are set by law. After Congress’s amendment of the Copyright 6
Act in 1909, record companies were free to distribute copies of record- 7
ings so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder) the fee set 8
by the statute. 9
This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham 10
writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if Grisham 11
gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to charge what- 12
ever he wants for that permission. The price to publish Grisham is 13
thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you have no 14
permission to use Grisham’s work except with permission of Grisham. 15
But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And 16
thus, in effect, the law subsidizes the recording industry through a kind 17
of piracy—by giving recording artists a weaker right than it otherwise 18
gives creative authors. The Beatles have less control over their creative 19
work than Grisham does. And the beneficiaries of this less control are 20
the recording industry and the public. The recording industry gets 21
something of value for less than it otherwise would pay; the public gets 22
access to a much wider range of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress 23
was quite explicit about its reasons for granting this right. Its fear was 24
the monopoly power of rights holders, and that that power would sti- 25
fle follow-on creativity.10 26
While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently, 27
historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for 28
records. As a 1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary 29
relates, 30
31
the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory S32
license system must be retained. They asserted that the record in- R33
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1 dustry is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic impor-

2 tance in the United States and throughout the world; records
3 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this
4 creates special problems, since performers need unhampered ac-
5 cess to musical material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically,
6 the record producers pointed out, there were no recording rights
7 before 1909 and the 1909 statute adopted the compulsory license
8 as a deliberate anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these
9 rights. They argue that the result has been an outpouring of
10 recorded music, with the public being given lower prices, im-
11 proved quality, and a greater choice.11
12
13 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their cre-
14 ative work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
15
16
17 Radio
18
19 Radio was also born of piracy.
20 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
21 “public performance” of the composer’s work.12 As I described above,
22 the law gives the composer (or copyright holder) an exclusive right to
23 public performances of his work. The radio station thus owes the com-
24 poser money for that performance.
25 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing
26 a copy of the composer’s work. The radio station is also performing a
27 copy of the recording artist’s work. It’s one thing to have “Happy Birth-
28 day” sung on the radio by the local children’s choir; it’s quite another to
29 have it sung by the Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist
30 is adding to the value of the composition performed on the radio sta-
31 tion. And if the law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would
32S have to pay the recording artist for his work, just as it pays the com-
33R poser of the music for his work.
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But it doesn’t. Under the law governing radio performances, the ra- 1
dio station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station 2
need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of some- 3
thing for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist’s work for 4
free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege of 5
playing the song. 6
This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of mu- 7
sic. Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize 8
public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your 9
song in public, she has to get your permission. 10
Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She 11
then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top 12
hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you get 13
some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on 14
the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a 15
“protected” right. The radio station thus gets to pirate the value of 16
Madonna’s work without paying her anything. 17
No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists 18
benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the 19
performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law ordi- 20
narily gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making the 21
choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right to take 22
something for nothing. 23
24
25
Cable TV 26
27
Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy. 28
When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with 29
cable television in 1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the con- 30
tent that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable compa- 31
nies started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay S32
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1 casters’ content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever did—
2 Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to give away.
3 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
4 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
5 “unfair and potentially destructive competition.”13 There may have
6 been a “public interest” in spreading the reach of cable TV, but as Doug-
7 las Anello, general counsel to the National Association of Broadcast-
8 ers, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, “Does public
9 interest dictate that you use somebody else’s property?”14 As another
10 broadcaster put it,
11
12 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
13 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
14 paid for.15
15
16 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable
17 enough:
18
19 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
20 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
21 piracy and I don’t think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
22 think there are harsher words which would fit it.16
23
24 These were “free-ride[rs],” Screen Actor’s Guild president Charl-
25 ton Heston said, who were “depriving actors of compensation.”17
26 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant At-
27 torney General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
28
29 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have
30 any copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copy-
31 right holders who are already compensated, who already have a
32S monopoly, should be permitted to extend that monopoly. . . . The
33R
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question here is how much compensation they should have and 1

how far back they should carry their right to compensation.18 2
3
Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the 4
Supreme Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright 5
owners nothing. 6
It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question 7
of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they “pirated.” 8
In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it re- 9
solved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes, cable 10
companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast; but 11
the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright owner. 12
The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn’t exercise veto 13
power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable companies thus 14
built their empire in part upon a “piracy” of the value created by broad- 15
casters’ content. 16
17
18
These separate stories sing a common theme. If “piracy” 19
means using value from someone else’s creative property without per- 20
mission from that creator—as it is increasingly described today19— 21
then every industry affected by copyright today is the product and 22
beneficiary of a certain kind of piracy. Film, records, radio, cable 23
TV. . . . The list is long and could well be expanded. Every generation 24
welcomes the pirates from the last. Every generation—until now. 25
26
27
28
29
30
31
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15 CHAPTER FIVE: “Piracy”
16
17Co There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy
18 comes in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
19 unauthorized taking of other people’s content within a commercial
20 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its defense,
21 this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law should
22 stop it.
23 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of “taking”
24 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
25 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
26 taking “piracy,” however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
27 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than out-
28 right copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it has
29 so often done in the past.
30
31
32S
33R
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Piracy I 1
2
All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there 3
are businesses that do nothing but take others people’s copyrighted 4
content, copy it, and sell it—all without the permission of a copyright 5
owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $4.6 billion 6
every year to physical piracy1 (that works out to one in three CDs sold 7
worldwide). The MPAA estimates that it loses $3 billion annually 8
worldwide to piracy. 9
This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this 10
book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about 11
the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point: 12
This piracy is wrong. 13
Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn’t be made 14
for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one 15
hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor for- 16
eign copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might 17
therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other devel- 18
oping nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years of our 19
existence, treated as right. 20
That excuse isn’t terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban 21
the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American 22
works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works 23
without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule. 24
The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian law 25
does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops vio- 26
late that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not just a 27
moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally legal 28
wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well. 29
True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these 30
countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose 31
not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a pi- S32
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1 rate nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a similar
2 childhood.
3 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
4 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
5 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
6 of intellectual property law.2 In my view, more developing nations
7 should take advantage of that opportunity, but when they don’t, then
8 their laws should be respected. And under the laws of these nations,
9 this piracy is wrong.
10 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
11 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
12 to American CDs at 50 cents a copy are not people who would have
13 bought those American CDs at $15 a copy. So no one really has any
14 less money than they otherwise would have had.3
15 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
16 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
17 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
18 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
19 “You wouldn’t go into Barnes & Noble and take a book off of the shelf
20 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?”
21 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes &
22 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
23 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
24 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
25 piracy of the tangible.
26 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
27 property right of a very special sort, it is a property right. Like all prop-
28 erty rights, the copyright gives the owner the right to decide the terms
29 under which content is shared. If the copyright owner doesn’t want to
30 sell, she doesn’t have to. There are exceptions: important statutory li-
31 censes that apply to copyrighted content regardless of the wish of the
32S copyright owner. Those licenses give people the right to “take” copy-
33R righted content whether or not the copyright owner wants to sell. But
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where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is 1
wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have 2
a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the technol- 3
ogy of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the permission 4
of a property owner. That is exactly what “property” means. 5
Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that 6
the piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese 7
“steal” Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft. 8
Microsoft loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains 9
users who are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the na- 10
tion grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software 11
rather than steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will ben- 12
efit Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating 13
Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating 14
system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying Mi- 15
crosoft. Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose. 16
This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a 17
good one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law 18
students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal 19
databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will be- 20
come so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the 21
other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees). 22
Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don’t give the al- 23
coholic a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that will 24
make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we ordi- 25
narily allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best to give 26
their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of GNU/Linux, 27
then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for example, with 28
Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right means giv- 29
ing the property owner the right to say who gets access to what—at 30
least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the rights of the copy- 31
right owner with the rights of access, then violating the law is still S32
wrong. R33
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1 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,

2 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3 at justifying commercial piracy simply don’t cut it. This kind of piracy
4 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn’t transform the content it
5 steals; it doesn’t transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
6 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
7 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
8 is flat out wrong.
9 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this
10 part suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all “piracy” is. Or
11 at least, not all “piracy” is wrong if that term is understood in the way
12 it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of “piracy” are useful and pro-
13 ductive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing business.
14 Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all “piracy” in
15 that sense of the term.
16 This doesn’t mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
17 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
18 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
19 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
20 For (1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
21 controlling industry; and (2) like the original recording industry, it
22 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (3) unlike cable
23 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
24 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
25 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this shar-
26 ing to survive.
27
28
29 Piracy II
30
31 The key to the “piracy” that the law aims to quash is a use that “rob[s]
32S the author of [his] profit.”4 This means we must determine whether
33R and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
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law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the 1

author of his profit. 2
Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors 3
of the Napster technology had not made any major technological inno- 4
vations. Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet (and, ar- 5
guably, off the Internet as well5), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply 6
put together components that had been developed independently. 7
The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July 1999, 8
Napster amassed over 10 million users within nine months. After 9
eighteen months, there were close to 80 million registered users of the 10
system.6 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged 11
to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It 12
boasts over 100 million members.) These services’ systems are different 13
architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables 14
users to make content available to any number of other users. With a 15
p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend— 16
or your 20,000 best friends. 17
According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of Ameri- 18
cans have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in 19
September 2002 estimated that 60 million Americans had downloaded 20
music—28 percent of Americans older than 12.7 A survey by the NPD 21
group quoted in The New York Times estimated that 43 million citizens 22
used file-sharing networks to exchange content in May 2003.8 The vast 23
majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a massive 24
quantity of content is being “taken” on these networks. The ease and 25
inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired millions to en- 26
joy music in a way that they hadn’t before. 27
Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it 28
does not. And even among the part that is technically copyright in- 29
fringement, calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more 30
complicated than one might think. So consider—a bit more carefully 31
than the polarized voices around this debate usually do—the kinds of S32
sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds of harm it entails. R33
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1 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these

2 different kinds into four types.
3
4 A. There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for pur-
5 chasing content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released,
6 rather than buying the CD, these users simply take it. We might
7 quibble about whether everyone who takes it would actually
8 have bought it if sharing didn’t make it available for free. Most
9 probably wouldn’t have, but clearly there are some who would.
10 The latter are the target of category A: users who download in-
11 stead of purchasing.
12 B. There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
13 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an
14 artist he’s not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that
15 artist. This is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to suc-
16 ceed. If the friend recommending the album gains nothing from
17 a bad recommendation, then one could expect that the recom-
18 mendations will actually be quite good. The net effect of this
19 sharing could increase the quantity of music purchased.
20 C. There are many who use sharing networks to get access to copy-
21 righted content that is no longer sold or that they would not
22 have purchased because the transaction costs off the Net are too
23 high. This use of sharing networks is among the most reward-
24 ing for many. Songs that were part of your childhood but have
25 long vanished from the marketplace magically appear again on
26 the network. (One friend told me that when she discovered
27 Napster, she spent a solid weekend “recalling” old songs. She
28 was astonished at the range and mix of content that was avail-
29 able.) For content not sold, this is still technically a violation of
30 copyright, though because the copyright owner is not selling the
31 content anymore, the economic harm is zero—the same harm
32S that occurs when I sell my collection of 1960s 45-rpm records to
33R a local collector.
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D. Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access 1
to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner 2
wants to give away. 3
4
How do these different types of sharing balance out? 5
Let’s start with some simple but important points. From the per- 6
spective of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the 7
perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly harmful.9 8
Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is ille- 9
gal, yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good) and 10
harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise available). So 11
how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to answer—and cer- 12
tainly much more difficult than the current rhetoric around the issue 13
suggests. 14
Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on 15
how harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about Hol- 16
lywood, composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists 17
complained about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV, 18
the music industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of “theft” 19
that is “devastating” the industry. 20
While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how harm- 21
ful is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry’s prac- 22
tice to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of cassette 23
recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst & 24
Young put it, “Rather than exploiting this new, popular technology, the 25
labels fought it.”10 The labels claimed that every album taped was an 26
album unsold, and when record sales fell by 11.4 percent in 1981, the 27
industry claimed that its point was proved. Technology was the prob- 28
lem, and banning or regulating technology was the answer. 29
Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity 30
to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record 31
turnaround. “In the end,” Cap Gemini concludes, “the ‘crisis’ . . . was S32
not the fault of the tapers—who did not [stop after MTV came into R33
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1 being]—but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical

2 innovation at the major labels.”11
3 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
4 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
5 the industry in particular, and society in general—or at least the soci-
6 ety that inherits the tradition that gave us the film industry, the record
7 industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the VCR—the question is
8 not simply whether type A sharing is harmful. The question is also how
9 harmful type A sharing is, and how beneficial the other types of shar-
10 ing are.
11 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from
12 the standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
13 The “net harm” to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
14 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
15 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
16 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They
17 would therefore have little static reason to resist them.
18 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining be-
19 cause of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD
20 sales actually suggest it might be close.
21 In 2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by 8.9 per-
22 cent, from 882 million to 803 million units; revenues fell 6.7 percent.12
23 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames In-
24 ternet piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
25 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
26 than 20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since 1999. That
27 no doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
28 account for at least some of the loss. “From 1999 to 2001, the average
29 price of a CD rose 7.2 percent, from $13.04 to $14.19.”13 Competition
30 from other forms of media could also account for some of the decline.
31 As Jane Black of BusinessWeek notes, “The soundtrack to the film High
32S Fidelity has a list price of $18.98. You could get the whole movie [on
33R DVD] for $19.99.”14
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But let’s assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD 1
sales is because of Internet sharing. Here’s the rub: In the same period 2
that the RIAA estimates that 803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA 3
estimates that 2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus, al- 4
though 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for 5
free, sales revenue fell by just 6.7 percent. 6
There are too many different things happening at the same time to 7
explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable: 8
The recording industry constantly asks, “What’s the difference be- 9
tween downloading a song and stealing a CD?”—but their own num- 10
bers reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to 11
sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the 12
RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of 13
downloads. If every download were a lost sale—if every use of Kazaa 14
“rob[bed] the author of [his] profit”—then the industry would have 15
suffered a 100 percent drop in sales last year, not a 7 percent drop. If 2.6 16
times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for free, and yet sales 17
revenue dropped by just 6.7 percent, then there is a huge difference be- 18
tween “downloading a song and stealing a CD.” 19
These are the harms—alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let’s as- 20
sume, real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on the 21
recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to these 22
costs? 23
One benefit is type C sharing—making available content that is 24
technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially avail- 25
able. This is not a small category of content. There are millions of 26
tracks that are no longer commercially available.15 And while it’s con- 27
ceivable that some of this content is not available because the artist 28
producing the content doesn’t want it to be made available, the vast 29
majority of it is unavailable solely because the publisher or the distrib- 30
utor has decided it no longer makes economic sense to the company to 31
make it available. S32
In real space—long before the Internet—the market had a simple R33
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1 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are thou-
2 sands of used book and used record stores in America today.16 These
3 stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they buy. And
4 under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this content,
5 even if the content is still under copyright, the copyright owner doesn’t get
6 a dime. Used book and record stores are commercial entities; their
7 owners make money from the content they sell; but as with cable com-
8 panies before statutory licensing, they don’t have to pay the copyright
9 owner for the content they sell.
10 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
11 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making the
12 content available isn’t making money from making the content avail-
13 able. It is also different, of course, because in real space, when I sell a
14 record, I don’t have it anymore, while in cyberspace, when someone
15 shares my 1949 recording of Bernstein’s “Two Love Songs,” I still have
16 it. That difference would matter economically if the owner of the 1949
17 copyright were selling the record in competition to my sharing. But
18 we’re talking about the class of content that is not currently commer-
19 cially available. The Internet is making it available, through coopera-
20 tive sharing, without competing with the market.
21 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
22 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
23 well be better, it doesn’t follow that it would be good to ban used book
24 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
25 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
26 shut as well?
27 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
28 type D sharing to occur—the sharing of content that copyright owners
29 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
30 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
31 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, Down and Out in
32S the Magic Kingdom, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
33R
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day. His (and his publisher’s) thinking was that the on-line distribution 1
would be a great advertisement for the “real” book. People would read 2
part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If 3
they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow’s content is 4
type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then 5
both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a 6
great book!) 7
Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits soci- 8
ety with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem 9
of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we 10
lose something important in order to protect type A content. 11
The point throughout is this: While the recording industry under- 12
standably says, “This is how much we’ve lost,” we must also ask, “How 13
much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the efficiencies? 14
What is the content that otherwise would be unavailable?” 15
For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this chapter, 16
much of the “piracy” that file sharing enables is plainly legal and good. 17
And like the piracy I described in chapter 4, much of this piracy is mo- 18
tivated by a new way of spreading content caused by changes in the 19
technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the tradition that 20
gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and cable TV, the 21
question we should be asking about file sharing is how best to preserve 22
its benefits while minimizing (to the extent possible) the wrongful harm 23
it causes artists. The question is one of balance. The law should seek 24
that balance, and that balance will be found only with time. 25
“But isn’t the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn’t the target 26
just what you call type A sharing?” 27
You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The ef- 28
fect of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far 29
beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the Nap- 30
ster case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had devel- 31
oped a technology to block the transfer of 99.4 percent of identified S32
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1 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster 99.4
2 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
3 “down to zero.”17
4 If 99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
5 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
6 assure that a p2p system is used 100 percent of the time in compliance
7 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that 100 percent of
8 VCRs or 100 percent of Xerox machines or 100 percent of handguns
9 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
10 The court’s ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
11 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
12 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
13 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
14 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
15 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way con-
16 tent was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new tech-
17 nology. In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights
18 of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes this has meant
19 more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
20 So, as we’ve seen, when “mechanical reproduction” threatened the
21 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
22 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to com-
23 posers, but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be paid, but
24 at a price set by Congress. But when radio started broadcasting the
25 recordings made by these recording artists, and they complained to
26 Congress that their “creative property” was not being respected (since
27 the radio station did not have to pay them for the creativity it broad-
28 cast), Congress rejected their claim. An indirect benefit was enough.
29 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
30 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
31 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
32S compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable com-
33R panies the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory price.
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This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player 1

pianos, served two important goals—indeed, the two central goals of 2
any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new innovators 3
would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver content. Sec- 4
ond, the law assured that copyright holders would be paid for the con- 5
tent that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress simply 6
required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they demanded 7
for their content, then copyright holders associated with broadcasters 8
would use their power to stifle this new technology, cable. But if Con- 9
gress had permitted cable to use broadcasters’ content for free, then it 10
would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus Congress chose a path that 11
would assure compensation without giving the past (broadcasters) con- 12
trol over the future (cable). 13
In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major pro- 14
ducers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against another 15
technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to them today, 16
VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney’s and Universal’s 17
claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a device, Dis- 18
ney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage in copy- 19
right infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a “record” 20
button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies and 21
shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright infringement 22
of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and Universal claimed, be 23
partially liable for that infringement. 24
There was something to Disney’s and Universal’s claim. Sony did 25
decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television 26
shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct 27
copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the 28
machine to copy only if there were a special “copy me” signal on the 29
line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not 30
grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no 31
doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And S32
in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its sys- R33
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1 tem to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did

2 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
3 for the architecture it chose.
4 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios’ most vocal
5 champion. Valenti called VCRs “tapeworms.” He warned, “When
6 there are 20, 30, 40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be in-
7 vaded by millions of ‘tapeworms,’ eating away at the very heart and
8 essence of the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his copy-
9 right.”18 “One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing
10 and creative judgment,” he told Congress, “to understand the devasta-
11 tion on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of mil-
12 lions of tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
13 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
14 and plain common sense.”19 Indeed, as surveys would later show, 45
15 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more20—a
16 use the Court would later hold was not “fair.” By “allowing VCR own-
17 ers to copy freely by the means of an exemption from copyright in-
18 fringement without creating a mechanism to compensate copyright
19 owners,” Valenti testified, Congress would “take from the owners the
20 very essence of their property: the exclusive right to control who may
21 use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby profit from its re-
22 production.”21
23 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
24 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which in-
25 cludes Hollywood in its jurisdiction—leading Judge Alex Kozinski,
26 who sits on that court, refers to it as the “Hollywood Circuit”—held
27 that Sony would be liable for the copyright infringement made possi-
28 ble by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit’s rule, this totally famil-
29 iar technology—which Jack Valenti had called “the Boston Strangler
30 of the American film industry” (worse yet, it was a Japanese Boston
31 Strangler of the American film industry)—was an illegal technology.22
32S But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
33R
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And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of 1

when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the 2
Court wrote, 3
4
Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference 5
to Congress when major technological innovations alter the mar- 6
ket for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional au- 7
thority and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the 8
varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably im- 9
plicated by such new technology.23 10
11
Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court’s decision. 12
But as with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts, Con- 13
gress ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film 14
got enough, this “taking” notwithstanding. 15
If we put these cases together, a pattern is clear: 16
17
CASE WHOSE VALUE RESPONSE OF RESPONSE OF CONGRESS 18
WAS “PIRATED” THE COURTS
Recordings Composers No protection Statutory license

19
Radio Recording artists N/A Nothing 20
Cable TV Broadcasters No protection Statutory license 21
VCR Film creators No protection Nothing 22
23
In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the 24
way content was distributed.24 In each case, throughout our history, 25
that change meant that someone got a “free ride” on someone else’s 26
work. 27
In none of these cases did either the courts or Congress eliminate all 28
free riding. In none of these cases did the courts or Congress insist that 29
the law should assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his 30
copyright created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of 31
“piracy.” In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the legiti- S32
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1 macy in the behavior of the “pirates.” In each case, Congress allowed

2 some new technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced
3 the interests at stake.
4 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
5 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
6 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
7 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
8 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better reg-
9 ulated? Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
10 to $15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
11 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
12 permission to record a song?
13 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
14 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
15 copyright “has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
16 over all possible uses of his work.”25 Instead, the particular uses that the
17 law regulates have been defined by balancing the good that comes from
18 granting an exclusive right against the burdens such an exclusive right
19 creates. And this balancing has historically been done after a technol-
20 ogy has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that facilitate
21 the distribution of content.
22 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
23 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
24 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
25 should not become a tool for “stealing” from artists. But neither should
26 the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which artists
27 (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in some detail
28 in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing income to artists
29 while we allow the market to secure the most efficient way to promote
30 and distribute content. This will require changes in the law, at least
31 in the interim. These changes should be designed to balance the pro-
32S tection of the law against the strong public interest that innovation
33R continue.
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This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly su- 1

perior mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies 2
can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse net- 3
work. Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more effi- 4
cient. Yet these “potential public benefits,” as John Schwartz writes in 5
The New York Times, “could be delayed in the P2P fight.”26 6
7
8
Yet when anyone begins to talk about “balance,” the copyright war- 9
riors raise a different argument. “All this hand waving about balance 10
and incentives,” they say, “misses a fundamental point. Our content,” 11
the warriors insist, “is our property. Why should we wait for Congress 12
to ‘rebalance’ our property rights? Do you have to wait before calling 13
the police when your car has been stolen? And why should Congress 14
deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask whether the 15
car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?” 16
“It is our property,” the warriors insist. “And it should be protected 17
just as any other property is protected.” 18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
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1
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The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of Po17
property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its 18
theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he 19
wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine 20
the price she can get. 21
But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a “property” right is a 22
bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of property. 23
Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any expression is very 24
odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the picnic table you 25
put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic table, and after I 26
take it, you don’t have it. But what am I taking when I take the good 27
idea you had to put a picnic table in the backyard—by, for example, go- 28
ing to Sears, buying a table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the 29
thing I am taking then? 30
The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus 31
ideas, though that’s an important difference. The point instead is that S32
in the ordinary case—indeed, in practically every case except for a nar- R33
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1 row range of exceptions—ideas released to the world are free. I don’t

2 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress—though I
3 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
5 when I copy the way someone else dresses), “He who receives an idea
6 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
7 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.”1
8 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
9 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
10 I won’t discuss here. Here the law says you can’t take my idea or ex-
11 pression without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
12 property.
13 But how, and to what extent, and in what form—the details, in
14 other words—matter. To get a good sense of how this practice of turn-
15 ing the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this “prop-
16 erty” in its proper context.2
17 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the pre-
18 ceding part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of “copyright ma-
19 terial is property” in context. Where did the idea come from? What are
20 its limits? How does it function in practice? After these stories, the
21 significance of this true statement—“copyright material is property”—
22 will be a bit more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite
23 different from the implications that the copyright warriors would have
24 us draw.
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CHAPTER SIX: Founders 15
16
William Shakespeare wrote Romeo and Juliet in 1595. The play Co17
was first published in 1597. It was the eleventh major play that Shake- 18
speare had written. He would continue to write plays through 1613, 19
and the plays that he wrote have continued to define Anglo-American 20
culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a sixteenth-century writer 21
seeped into our culture that we often don’t even recognize their source. 22
I once overheard someone commenting on Kenneth Branagh’s adapta- 23
tion of Henry V: “I liked it, but Shakespeare is so full of clichés.” 24
In 1774, almost 180 years after Romeo and Juliet was written, the 25
“copy-right” for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive 26
right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.1 Tonson was the 27
most prominent of a small group of publishers called the Conger 2 who 28
controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth century. The 29
Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the “copy” of books that 30
they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant that no 31
one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the copy- S32
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1 right. Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to pro-
2 duce better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
3 Now, there’s something puzzling about the year 1774 to anyone who
4 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the history
5 of copyright is 1710, the year that the British Parliament adopted the
6 first “copyright” act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the act stated that
7 all published works would get a copyright term of fourteen years, re-
8 newable once if the author was alive, and that all works already pub-
9 lished by 1710 would get a single term of twenty-one additional years.3
10 Under this law, Romeo and Juliet should have been free in 1731. So why
11 was there any issue about it still being under Tonson’s control in 1774?
12 The reason is that the English hadn’t yet agreed on what a “copy-
13 right” was—indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
14 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
15 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of 1662, had ex-
16 pired in 1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing, as
17 a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was published.
18 But after it expired, there was no positive law that said that the pub-
19 lishers, or “Stationers,” had an exclusive right to print books.
20 There was no positive law, but that didn’t mean that there was no
21 law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to both the words of
22 legislatures and the words of judges to know the rules that are to gov-
23 ern how people are to behave. We call the words from legislatures “pos-
24 itive law.” We call the words from judges “common law.” The common
25 law sets the background against which legislatures legislate; the legis-
26 lature, ordinarily, can trump that background only if it passes a law to
27 displace it. And so the real question after the licensing statutes had ex-
28 pired was whether the common law protected a copyright, indepen-
29 dent of any positive law.
30 This question was important to the publishers, or “booksellers,” as
31 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
32S publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
33R and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
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of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law 1

to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand ul- 2
timately resulted in the Statute of Anne. 3
The Statute of Anne granted the author or “proprietor” of a book 4
an exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation, how- 5
ever, and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the bookseller 6
that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the copyright “ex- 7
pired,” and the work would then be free and could be published by 8
anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have believed. 9
Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would 10
Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to the 11
particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right at all? 12
For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a 13
very strong claim. Take Romeo and Juliet as an example: That play was 14
written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the 15
world. He didn’t take anybody’s property when he created this play 16
(that’s a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating this 17
play, he didn’t make it any harder for others to craft a play. So why is it 18
that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and take 19
Shakespeare’s play without his, or his estate’s, permission? What rea- 20
son is there to allow someone else to “steal” Shakespeare’s work? 21
The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something spe- 22
cial about the notion of “copyright” that existed at the time of the 23
Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about 24
“booksellers.” 25
First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have 26
come to apply the concept of “copyright” ever more broadly. But in 27
1710, it wasn’t so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The 28
copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade oth- 29
ers from reprinting a book. In 1710, the “copy-right” was a right to use 30
a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not go be- 31
yond that very narrow right. It did not control any more generally how S32
a work could be used. Today the right includes a large collection of re- R33
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1 strictions on the freedom of others: It grants the author the exclusive

2 right to copy, the exclusive right to distribute, the exclusive right to
3 perform, and so on.
4 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare’s works were
5 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
6 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare’s work without the per-
7 mission of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled any-
8 thing, for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
9 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
10 allowed to make his films. The “copy-right” was only an exclusive right
11 to print—no less, of course, but also no more.
12 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
13 They had had a long and ugly experience with “exclusive rights,” espe-
14 cially “exclusive rights” granted by the Crown. The English had fought
15 a civil war in part about the Crown’s practice of handing out monopo-
16 lies—especially monopolies for works that already existed. King Henry
17 VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a monopoly to Darcy to
18 print playing cards. The English Parliament began to fight back
19 against this power of the Crown. In 1656, it passed the Statute of Mo-
20 nopolies, limiting monopolies to patents for new inventions. And by
21 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing monopoly in
22 publishing.
23 Thus the “copy-right,” when viewed as a monopoly right, was nat-
24 urally viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing
25 the claim that “it’s my property, and I should have it forever,” try
26 sounding convincing when uttering, “It’s my monopoly, and I should
27 have it forever.”) The state would protect the exclusive right, but only
28 so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from special-
29 interest favors; they passed a law to stop them.
30 Second, about booksellers. It wasn’t just that the copyright was a
31 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
32S Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
33R as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
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were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst kind—tools of the 1

Crown’s repression, selling the liberty of England to guarantee them- 2
selves a monopoly profit. The attacks against these monopolists were 3
harsh: Milton described them as “old patentees and monopolizers in 4
the trade of book-selling”; they were “men who do not therefore labour 5
in an honest profession to which learning is indetted.”4 6
Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread 7
of knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the Enlighten- 8
ment was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread 9
generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of the 10
time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering with 11
that idea. 12
To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition 13
among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the 14
wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of 15
copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become 16
open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting 17
of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a compro- 18
mise to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was 19
an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the 20
construction and spread of culture. 21
When 1731 (1710 + 21) came along, however, the booksellers were 22
getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and 23
like every competitor, they didn’t like them. At first booksellers simply 24
ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right 25
to control publication. But in 1735 and 1737, they tried to persuade 26
Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough, 27
they said; they needed more time. 28
Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in 29
words that echo today, 30
31
I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not S32
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1 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be es-
2 tablishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in
3 the Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discour-
4 agement to Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general
5 Tax on the Publick; and all this only to increase the private Gain
6 of the Booksellers.5
7
8 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in
9 a series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
10 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
11 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
12 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
13 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person’s cre-
14 ative “property” and use it without his permission. The Statute of Anne,
15 the booksellers argued, didn’t change that. Therefore, just because the
16 protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn’t mean the pro-
17 tections of the common law expired: Under the common law they had
18 the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its Statute of Anne
19 copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only way to protect
20 authors.
21 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some
22 of the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary chutz-
23 pah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it, “The
24 publishers . . . had as much concern for authors as a cattle rancher has
25 for cattle.”6 The bookseller didn’t care squat for the rights of the au-
26 thor. His concern was the monopoly profit that the author’s work gave.
27 The booksellers’ argument was not accepted without a fight.
28 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
29 Donaldson.7
30 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
31 career in Edinburgh in 1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
32S reprints “of standard works whose copyright term had expired,” at least
33R under the Statute of Anne.8 Donaldson’s publishing house prospered
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and became “something of a center for literary Scotsmen.” “[A]mong 1

them,” Professor Mark Rose writes, was “the young James Boswell 2
who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology 3
of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson.”9 4
When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson’s 5
shop in Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where 6
he sold inexpensive editions “of the most popular English books, in de- 7
fiance of the supposed common law right of Literary Property.”10 His 8
books undercut the Conger prices by 30 to 50 percent, and he rested 9
his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of Anne, 10
the works he was selling had passed out of protection. 11
The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block “piracy” like 12
Donaldson’s. A number of actions were successful against the “pirates,” 13
the most important early victory being Millar v. Taylor. 14
Millar was a bookseller who in 1729 had purchased the rights to 15
James Thomson’s poem “The Seasons.” Millar complied with the re- 16
quirements of the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full pro- 17
tection of the statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor 18
began printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual 19
common law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.11 20
Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in En- 21
glish history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever 22
protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held, 23
extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the 24
common law would protect the author against subsequent “pirates.” 25
Mansfield’s answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from 26
reprinting Thomson’s poem without Millar’s permission. That com- 27
mon law rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to 28
control the publication of any book assigned to them. 29
Considered as a matter of abstract justice—reasoning as if justice 30
were just a matter of logical deduction from first principles—Mansfield’s 31
conclusion might make some sense. But what it ignored was the larger S32
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1 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament’s strategy was to offer a

2 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in 1710, but
3 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament be-
5 lieved, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
6 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
7 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
8 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
9 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
10 estate sold Thomson’s poems to a syndicate of printers that included
11 Thomas Beckett.12 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
12 of Thomson’s works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in Millar,
13 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
14 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
15 Court. In February of 1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
16 meaning of Parliament’s limits from sixty years before.
17 As few legal cases ever do, Donaldson v. Beckett drew an enormous
18 amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson’s lawyers argued
19 that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the Statute
20 of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute of Anne,
21 the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control publication
22 came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term specified in
23 the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been protected by the
24 statute were no longer protected.
25 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
26 presented to the House and voted upon first by the “law lords,” mem-
27 bers of special legal distinction who functioned much like the Justices
28 in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the House of
29 Lords generally voted.
30 The reports about the law lords’ votes are mixed. On some counts,
31 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
32S about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one ma-
33R
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jority (22 to 11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights. 1
Whatever one’s understanding of the common law, now a copyright 2
was fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copy- 3
right passed into the public domain. 4
“The public domain.” Before the case of Donaldson v. Beckett, there 5
was no clear idea of a public domain in England. Before 1774, there 6
was a strong argument that common law copyrights were perpetual. 7
After 1774, the public domain was born. For the first time in Anglo- 8
American history, the legal control over creative works expired, and the 9
greatest works in English history—including those of Shakespeare, 10
Bacon, Milton, Johnson, and Bunyan—were free of legal restraint. 11
It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords 12
fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland, 13
where most of the “pirate publishers” did their work, people celebrated 14
the decision in the streets. As the Edinburgh Advertiser reported, “No 15
private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the public, and 16
none has been tried before the House of Lords in the decision of 17
which so many individuals were interested.” “Great rejoicing in Edin- 18
burgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires and illumina- 19
tions.”13 20
In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was 21
equally strong in the opposite direction. The Morning Chronicle re- 22
ported: 23
24
By the above decision . . . near 200,000 pounds worth of what 25
was honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday 26
thought property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of 27
London and Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses 28
to purchase Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who 29
after many years industry thought they had acquired a compe- 30
tency to provide for their families now find themselves without a 31
shilling to devise to their successors. 14 S32
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1 “Ruined” is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to

2 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
3 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in En-
4 gland would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter free.
5 Not in the sense that copyrights would not be respected, for of course,
6 for a limited time after a work was published, the bookseller had an ex-
7 clusive right to control the publication of that book. And not in the
8 sense that books could be stolen, for even after a copyright expired, you
9 still had to buy the book from someone. But free in the sense that the
10 culture and its growth would no longer be controlled by a small group
11 of publishers. As every free market does, this free market of free culture
12 would grow as the consumers and producers chose. English culture
13 would develop as the many English readers chose to let it develop—
14 chose in the books they bought and wrote; chose in the memes they
15 repeated and endorsed. Chose in a competitive context, not a context
16 in which the choices about what culture is available to people and
17 how they get access to it are made by the few despite the wishes of
18 the many.
19 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is anti-
20 monopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a world
21 where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less pro-
22 tected.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders 15
16
Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and Co17
has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and 18
as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students 19
feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party. 20
He was their god.) 21
Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break, 22
he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America 23
today. 24
In 1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner’s Ring 25
Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera. Stage- 26
hands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera. Dur- 27
ing a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips’ lounge and in 28
the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the stage. 29
During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stage- 30
hands playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set. 31
Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers and S32
the opera company played Wagner, was The Simpsons. As Else judged R33
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1 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
2 about the scene.
3 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of The Simpsons.
5 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
6 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
7 unless “fair use” or some other privilege applies.
8 Else called Simpsons creator Matt Groening’s office to get permis-
9 sion. Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-half-
10 second image on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How
11 could it hurt? Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told
12 Else to contact Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
13 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
14 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie’s parent company.
15 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
16 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
17 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
18 Then, as Else told me, “two things happened. First we discov-
19 ered . . . that Matt Groening doesn’t own his own creation—or at least
20 that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn’t own his own creation.” And
21 second, Fox “wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us to use
22 this four-point-five seconds of . . . entirely unsolicited Simpsons which
23 was in the corner of the shot.”
24 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to
25 someone he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Her-
26 rera. He explained to her, “There must be some mistake here. . . .
27 We’re asking for your educational rate on this.” That was the educa-
28 tional rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
29 confirm what he had been told.
30 “I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight,” he told me. “Yes,
31 you have your facts straight,” she said. It would cost $10,000 to use the
32S clip of The Simpsons in the corner of a shot in a documentary film about
33R
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Wagner’s Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, “And 1
if you quote me, I’ll turn you over to our attorneys.” As an assistant to 2
Herrera told Else later on, “They don’t give a shit. They just want the 3
money.” 4
Else didn’t have the money to buy the right to replay what was play- 5
ing on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce 6
this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker’s budget. At the very 7
last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally replaced the 8
shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on, The Day After 9
Trinity, from ten years before. 10
11
12
There’s no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, 13
owns the copyright to The Simpsons. That copyright is their property. 14
To use that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permis- 15
sion of the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the 16
Simpsons copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he 17
would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he 18
could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner of 19
the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law says the 20
owner gets to control. 21
For example, “public performance” is a use of The Simpsons that 22
the copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite 23
episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see “My 24
Favorite Simpsons,” then you need to get permission from the copy- 25
right owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge 26
whatever she wants—$10 or $1,000,000. That’s her right, as set by 27
the law. 28
But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first 29
thought is “fair use.”1 Else’s use of just 4.5 seconds of an indirect shot 30
of a Simpsons episode is clearly a fair use of The Simpsons—and fair use 31
does not require the permission of anyone. S32
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1 So I asked Else why he didn’t just rely upon “fair use.” Here’s his reply:
2
3 The Simpsons fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf be-
4 tween what lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and
5 what is crushingly relevant in practice to those of us actually
6 trying to make and broadcast documentaries. I never had any
7 doubt that it was “clearly fair use” in an absolute legal sense. But
8 I couldn’t rely on the concept in any concrete way. Here’s why:
9
10 1. Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires
11 that we buy Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers re-
12 quire a detailed “visual cue sheet” listing the source and licens-
13 ing status of each shot in the film. They take a dim view of
14 “fair use,” and a claim of “fair use” can grind the application
15 process to a halt.
16
17 2. I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the
18 first place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a
19 history of tracking down and stopping unlicensed Simpsons
20 usage, just as George Lucas had a very high profile litigating
21 Star Wars usage. So I decided to play by the book, thinking
22 that we would be granted free or cheap license to four seconds
23 of Simpsons. As a documentary producer working to exhaus-
24 tion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk legal
25 trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
26 principle.
27
28 3. I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford
29 Law School . . . who confirmed that it was fair use. He also
30 confirmed that Fox would “depose and litigate you to within
31 an inch of your life,” regardless of the merits of my claim. He
32S made clear that it would boil down to who had the bigger le-
33R gal department and the deeper pockets, me or them.
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4. The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the 1

project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of 2
money. 3
4
In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory there- 5
fore supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. 6
But in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of 7
the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed, means 8
that the effective fair use for many types of creators is slight. The law 9
has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim. 10
This practice shows just how far the law has come from its 11
eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect pub- 12
lishers’ profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has matured 13
into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or not. 14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
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1
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10
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12
13
14
15 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
16
17Co In 1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Star-
18 wave was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder
19 Paul Allen to develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet
20 became popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for de-
21 livering entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
22 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
23 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology—not to distribute
24 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very difficult.
25 In 1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to build retro-
26 spectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor chosen was
27 Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of East-
28 wood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures important
29 to his career.
30 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor
31 and as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with East-
32S wood, asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
33R interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
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That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so 1

Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood’s career: 2
posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood 3
made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was 4
relatively easy to get permission for that content. 5
Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. “Our 6
goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of East- 7
wood’s films,” Alben told me. It was here that the problem arose. “No 8
one had ever really done this before,” Alben explained. “No one had 9
ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an actor’s 10
career.” 11
Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave. 12
Slade asked, “Well, what will it take?” 13
Alben replied, “Well, we’re going to have to clear rights from 14
everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything 15
else that we want to use in these film clips.” Slade said, “Great! Go 16
for it.”1 17
The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what 18
clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films 19
could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD- 20
ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there 21
was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do. 22
I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious 23
pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his 24
tale, Alben recounted just what they did: 25
26
So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. 27
We made some artistic decisions about what film clips to in- 28
clude—of course we were going to use the “Make my day” clip 29
from Dirty Harry. But you then need to get the guy on the ground 30
who’s wiggling under the gun and you need to get his permis- 31
sion. And then you have to decide what you are going to pay S32
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1 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the day-

2 player rate for the right to reuse that performance. We’re talking
3 about a clip of less than a minute, but to reuse that performance
4 in the CD-ROM the rate at the time was about $600.
5 So we had to identify the people—some of them were hard to
6 identify because in Eastwood movies you can’t tell who’s the guy
7 crashing through the glass—is it the actor or is it the stuntman?
8 And then we just, we put together a team, my assistant and some
9 others, and we just started calling people.
10
11 Some actors were glad to help—Donald Sutherland, for example,
12 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
13 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
14 “Hey, can I pay you $600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
15 know, $1,200?” And they would say, “Are you for real? Hey, I’d love
16 to get $1,200.” And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
17 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
18 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood’s
19 career.
20 It was one year later—“and even then we weren’t sure whether we
21 were totally in the clear.”
22 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
23 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
24 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
25
26 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up
27 their hands and said, “Oh, my gosh, a film, it’s so many copy-
28 rights, there’s the music, there’s the screenplay, there’s the director,
29 there’s the actors.” But we just broke it down. We just put it into
30 its constituent parts and said, “Okay, there’s this many actors, this
31 many directors, . . . this many musicians,” and we just went at it
32S very systematically and cleared the rights.
33R
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And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood 1

loved it, and it sold very well. 2
But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to 3
take a year’s work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done this 4
efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, “There is noth- 5
ing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done at 6
all.”2 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work 7
has to be made? 8
For, as he acknowledged, “very few . . . have the time and resources, 9
and the will to do this,” and thus, very few such works would ever be 10
made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what 11
anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that 12
you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips? 13
14
I don’t think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie, 15
he or she gets paid very well. . . . And then when 30 seconds of 16
that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective 17
of somebody’s career, I don’t think that that person . . . should be 18
compensated for that. 19
20
Or at least, is this how the artist should be compensated? Would it 21
make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind of statutory license that 22
someone could pay and be free to make derivative use of clips like this? 23
Did it really make sense that a follow-on creator would have to track 24
down every artist, actor, director, musician, and get explicit permission 25
from each? Wouldn’t a lot more be created if the legal part of the cre- 26
ative process could be made to be more clean? 27
28
Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing mecha- 29
nism—where you weren’t subject to hold-ups and you weren’t 30
subject to estranged former spouses—you’d see a lot more of this 31
work, because it wouldn’t be so daunting to try to put together a S32
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1 retrospective of someone’s career and meaningfully illustrate it

2 with lots of media from that person’s career. You’d build in a cost
3 as the producer of one of these things. You’d build in a cost of pay-
4 ing X dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a
5 known cost. That’s the thing that trips everybody up and makes
6 this kind of product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have
7 a hundred minutes of film in this product and it’s going to cost me
8 X, then you build your budget around it, and you can get invest-
9 ments and everything else that you need to produce it. But if you
10 say, “Oh, I want a hundred minutes of something and I have no
11 idea what it’s going to cost me, and a certain number of people are
12 going to hold me up for money,” then it becomes difficult to put
13 one of these things together.
14
15 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some
16 of the richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and
17 access that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him
18 a year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity
19 is never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
20 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a Re-
21 publican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
22 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
23 how much it’s going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea
24 that land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing fly-
25 through rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
26 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
27 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained, regulation-
28 minimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask, “Does this
29 still make sense?”
30 I’ve seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
31 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
32S The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
33R was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
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from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a 1
friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced. 2
The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the 3
twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a 60 Minutes episode. 4
The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The 5
judges loved every minute of it. 6
When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David 7
Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the 8
nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the 9
room of over 250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he 10
began his talk with a question: “Do you know how many federal laws 11
were just violated in this room?” 12
For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this 13
film hadn’t done what Alben did. They hadn’t spent a year clearing the 14
rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the law. 15
Of course, it wasn’t as if they or anyone were going to be prosecuted for 16
this violation (the presence of 250 judges and a gaggle of federal mar- 17
shals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an important point: 18
A year before anyone would have heard of the word Napster, and two 19
years before another member of our panel, David Boies, would defend 20
Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Nimmer was try- 21
ing to get the judges to see that the law would not be friendly to the 22
capacities that this technology would enable. Technology means you 23
can now do amazing things easily; but you couldn’t easily do them 24
legally. 25
26
27
We live in a “cut and paste” culture enabled by technology. Anyone 28
building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut 29
and paste architecture of the Internet created—in a second you can 30
find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it 31
planted in your presentation. S32
But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and R33
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1 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound never
2 before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of clips on
3 computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden takes
4 images of politicians and blends them with music to create biting po-
5 litical commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced some of
6 the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is through
7 the mixing of Flash! and music.
8 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
9 wanted to be “legal,” the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
10 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
11 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn’t follow the
12 clearance rules, it doesn’t get released.
13 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let’s alter the mix of
14 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add or
15 mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without necessar-
16 ily requiring that the “free” use be free as in “free beer.” Instead, the sys-
17 tem could simply make it easy for follow-on creators to compensate
18 artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come along: a rule, for
19 example, that says “the royalty owed the copyright owner of an unreg-
20 istered work for the derivative reuse of his work will be a flat 1 percent
21 of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the copyright owner.” Under
22 this rule, the copyright owner could benefit from some royalty, but he
23 would not have the benefit of a full property right (meaning the right
24 to name his own price) unless he registers the work.
25 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
26 for objecting? We’re talking about work that is not now being made;
27 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
28 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
29
30
31 In February 2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agree-
32S ment with Mike Myers, the comic genius of Saturday Night Live and
33R Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-
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Works would work together to form a “unique filmmaking pact.” Under 1

the agreement, DreamWorks “will acquire the rights to existing motion 2
picture hits and classics, write new storylines and—with the use of state- 3
of-the-art digital technology—insert Myers and other actors into the 4
film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of entertainment.” 5
The announcement called this “film sampling.” As Myers ex- 6
plained, “Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on 7
existing films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap 8
artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able 9
to take that same concept and apply it to film.” Steven Spielberg is 10
quoted as saying, “If anyone can create a way to bring old films to new 11
audiences, it is Mike.” 12
Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if 13
you don’t think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point 14
about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage re- 15
mains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks an- 16
nouncement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is 17
free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of 18
our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a 19
privilege reserved for the funny and famous—and presumably rich. 20
This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first 21
continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of “fair use.” 22
Much of “sampling” should be considered “fair use.” But few would 23
rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason 24
that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the 25
legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high. 26
These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to 27
defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions 28
so you don’t have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative 29
process is a process of paying lawyers—again a privilege, or perhaps a 30
curse, reserved for the few. 31
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1
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9
10
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12
13
14
15 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
16
17Co In April 1996, millions of “bots”—computer codes designed to
18 “spider,” or automatically search the Internet and copy content—began
19 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
20 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
21 Francisco’s Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
22 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
23 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
24 By October 2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
25 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the archive
26 that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to the
27 world. Using a technology called “the Way Back Machine,” you could
28 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to 1996, as well
29 as when those pages changed.
30 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have appre-
31 ciated. In the dystopia described in 1984, old newspapers were con-
32S stantly updated to assure that the current view of the world, approved
33R of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news reports.
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Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was 1

no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the 2
story that was printed on the date published on the paper. 3
It’s the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today, 4
there’s no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is 5
the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same, 6
but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell’s li- 7
brary—constantly updated, without any reliable memory. 8
Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Ma- 9
chine, and the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the 10
Internet was. You have the power to see what you remember. More 11
importantly, perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don’t 12
remember and what others might prefer you forget.1 13
14
15
We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remem- 16
ber reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reac- 17
tion of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in 1965, 18
or to Bull Connor’s water cannon in 1963, you could go to your public 19
library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on 20
microfiche. If you’re lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you 21
are free, using a library, to go back and remember—not just what it is 22
convenient to remember, but remember something close to the truth. 23
It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to re- 24
peat it. That’s not quite correct. We all forget history. The key is whether 25
we have a way to go back to rediscover what we forget. More directly, the 26
key is whether an objective past can keep us honest. Libraries help do 27
that, by collecting content and keeping it, for schoolchildren, for re- 28
searchers, for grandma. A free society presumes this knowedge. 29
The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the In- 30
ternet Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the 31
quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more im- S32
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1 portant to maintain in some historical form. It’s just bizarre to think that
2 we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns around the
3 world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet—the one kept by the In-
4 ternet Archive.
5 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
6 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer re-
7 searcher. In the 1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business suc-
8 cess. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he launched
9 a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The Inter-
10 net Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew Carnegie
11 of the Internet. By December of 2002, the archive had over 10 billion
12 pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
13 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge
14 in human history. At the end of 2002, it held “two hundred and thirty
15 terabytes of material”—and was “ten times larger than the Library of
16 Congress.” And this was just the first of the archives that Kahle set
17 out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has been con-
18 structing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is even more
19 ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century culture
20 was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of that cul-
21 ture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news are re-
22 corded each evening by Vanderbilt University—thanks to a specific
23 exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and is available
24 to scholars for a very low fee. “But other than that, [television] is almost
25 unavailable,” Kahle told me. “If you were Barbara Walters you could get
26 access to [the archives], but if you are just a graduate student?” As Kahle
27 put it,
28
29 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Mur-
30 phy Brown? Remember that back and forth surreal experience of
31 a politician interacting with a fictional television character? If you
32S were a graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to
33R get those original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
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60 Minutes episode that came out after it . . . it would be almost 1

impossible. . . . Those materials are almost unfindable. . . . 2
3
Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded 4
in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is 5
recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we’ve created a world 6
where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on nineteenth- 7
century America will have an easier time than researchers trying to un- 8
derstand the effect of media on twentieth-century America? 9
In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law, 10
copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in li- 11
braries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread of 12
knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around once 13
the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the work. 14
These rules applied to film as well. But in 1915, the Library of Con- 15
gress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so long 16
as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to 17
borrow back the deposits—for an unlimited time at no cost. In 1915 18
alone, there were more than 5,475 films deposited and “borrowed back.” 19
Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy held by any 20
library. The copy exists—if it exists at all—in the library archive of the 21
film company.2 22
The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts 23
were originally not copyrighted—there was no way to capture the 24
broadcasts, so there was no fear of “theft.” But as technology enabled 25
capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law re- 26
quired they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be “copy- 27
righted.” But those copies were simply kept by the broadcasters. No 28
library had any right to them; the government didn’t demand them. 29
The content of this part of American culture is practically invisible to 30
anyone who would look. 31
Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September 11, 2001, he and S32
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1 tions from around the world and hit the Record button. After Septem-
2 ber 11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty stations
3 from around the world and, beginning October 11, 2001, made their
4 coverage during the week of September 11 available free on-line. Any-
5 one could see how news reports from around the world covered the
6 events of that day.
7 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger,
8 whose archive of film includes close to 45,000 “ephemeral films”
9 (meaning films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never
10 copyrighted), Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle
11 digitize 1,300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet
12 to be downloaded for free. Prelinger’s is a for-profit company. It sells
13 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
14 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock footage
15 sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the material they
16 wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made films on
17 their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to be made.
18 Either way, the archive enabled access to this important part of our cul-
19 ture. Want to see a copy of the “Duck and Cover” film that instructed
20 children how to save themselves in the middle of nuclear attack? Go to
21 archive.org, and you can download the film in a few minutes—for free.
22 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that
23 we otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of what
24 defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The law
25 doesn’t require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be deposited in
26 an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way to find them.
27 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access to
28 this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to it. His
29 aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part of our cul-
30 ture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative property, but dur-
31 ing a second life that all creative property has—a noncommercial life.
32S For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
33R of creative property goes through different “lives.” In its first life, if the
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creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial mar- 1
ket is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative property 2
doesn’t enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that content, 3
commercial life is extremely important. Without this commercial mar- 4
ket, there would be, many argue, much less creativity. 5
After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our tradi- 6
tion has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper delivers 7
the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next day, it is 8
used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to build an archive 9
of knowledge about our history. In this second life, the content can 10
continue to inform even if that information is no longer sold. 11
The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of 12
print very quickly (the average today is after about a year 3). After it is 13
out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the copyright 14
owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many get to read 15
the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries are thus the sec- 16
ond life of a book. That second life is extremely important to the 17
spread and stability of culture. 18
Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for cre- 19
ative property does not hold true with the most important components 20
of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. For 21
these—television, movies, music, radio, the Internet—there is no guar- 22
antee of a second life. For these sorts of culture, it is as if we’ve replaced 23
libraries with Barnes & Noble superstores. With this culture, what’s 24
accessible is nothing but what a certain limited market demands. Be- 25
yond that, culture disappears. 26
27
28
For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this 29
so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make accessi- 30
ble all television and film and music: The cost of analog copies is ex- 31
traordinarily high. So even though the law in principle would have S32
restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture generally, the R33
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1 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly difficult

2 to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had little practi-
3 cal effect.
4 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution
5 is that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is feasible to
6 imagine constructing archives that hold all culture produced or distrib-
7 uted publicly. Technology makes it possible to imagine an archive of all
8 books published, and increasingly makes it possible to imagine an
9 archive of all moving images and sound.
10 The scale of this potential archive is something we’ve never imag-
11 ined before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it;
12 but we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
13 Kahle describes,
14
15 It looks like there’s about two to three million recordings of mu-
16 sic. Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases
17 of movies, . . . and about one to two million movies [distributed]
18 during the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million
19 different titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that
20 would fit in this room and be able to be afforded by a small com-
21 pany. So we’re at a turning point in our history. Universal access is
22 the goal. And the opportunity of leading a different life, based on
23 this, is . . . thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind
24 would be most proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria,
25 putting a man on the moon, and the invention of the printing
26 press.
27
28 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
29 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
30 libraries or archives could be. When the commercial life of creative
31 property ends, I don’t know. But it does. And whenever it does, Kahle
32S and his archive hint at a world where this knowledge, and culture, re-
33R mains perpetually available. Some will draw upon it to understand it;
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some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to re-create 1
the past for the future. These technologies promise something that had 2
become unimaginable for much of our past—a future for our past. The 3
technology of digital arts could make the dream of the Library of 4
Alexandria real again. 5
Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building 6
such an archive. But lawyers’ costs remain. For as much as we might 7
like to call these “archives,” as warm as the idea of a “library” might 8
seem, the “content” that is collected in these digital spaces is also some- 9
one’s “property.” And the law of property restricts the freedoms that 10
Kahle and others would exercise. 11
12
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15 CHAPTER TEN: “Property”
16
17Co Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Asso-
18 ciation of America since 1966. He first came to Washington, D.C.,
19 with Lyndon Johnson’s administration—literally. The famous picture
20 of Johnson’s swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
21 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
22 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
23 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
24 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion
25 Picture Association. It was formed in 1922 as a trade association whose
26 goal was to defend American movies against increasing domestic crit-
27 icism. The organization now represents not only filmmakers but pro-
28 ducers and distributors of entertainment for television, video, and
29 cable. Its board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven
30 major producers and distributors of motion picture and television pro-
31 grams in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertain-
32S ment, MGM, Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal
33R Studios, and Warner Brothers.
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Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president 1

before him has had as much influence over that organization, or over 2
Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most impor- 3
tant political skill of a Southerner—the ability to appear simple and 4
slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti plays 5
the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four 6
books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more 7
than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When 8
Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially 9
Washingtonian way. 10
In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our cul- 11
ture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting 12
the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of 13
speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization’s 14
mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is 15
the organization’s effort, epitomized in Valenti’s every act, to redefine 16
the meaning of “creative property.” 17
In 1982, Valenti’s testimony to Congress captured the strategy per- 18
fectly: 19
20
No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges 21
and the counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, 22
reasonable men and women will keep returning to the fundamen- 23
tal issue, the central theme which animates this entire debate: Cre- 24
ative property owners must be accorded the same rights and protection 25
resident in all other property owners in the nation. That is the issue. 26
That is the question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire 27
hearing and the debates to follow must rest.1 28
29
The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti’s 30
rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The “cen- 31
tral theme” to which “reasonable men and women” will return is this: S32
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1 tections resident in all other property owners in the nation.” There are
2 no second-class citizens, Valenti might have continued. There should
3 be no second-class property owners.
4 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
6 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more extreme a
7 claim made by anyone who is serious in this debate than this claim of
8 Valenti’s. Jack Valenti, however sweet and however brilliant, is perhaps
9 the nation’s foremost extremist when it comes to the nature and scope
10 of “creative property.” His views have no reasonable connection to our
11 actual legal tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has
12 slowly redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
13 While “creative property” is certainly “property” in a nerdy and pre-
14 cise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,2 it has never been the
15 case, nor should it be, that “creative property owners” have been “ac-
16 corded the same rights and protection resident in all other property
17 owners.” Indeed, if creative property owners were given the same rights
18 as all other property owners, that would effect a radical, and radically
19 undesirable, change in our tradition.
20 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat
21 for our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
22 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British over-
23 turned in 1710. In the world that Valenti’s changes would create, a
24 powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
25 culture would develop.
26 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
27 that, historically, Valenti’s claim is absolutely wrong. The second is to
28 convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our his-
29 tory. We have always treated rights in creative property differently
30 from the rights resident in all other property owners. They have never
31 been the same. And they should never be the same, because, however
32S counterintuitive this may seem, to make them the same would be to
33R
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fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create. Cre- 1

ativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than perfect 2
control. 3
Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most 4
powerful of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric notwith- 5
standing, in assuring that the new can displace them. No organization 6
does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.) But what’s 7
good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A society that 8
defends the ideals of free culture must preserve precisely the opportu- 9
nity for new creativity to threaten the old. 10
11
12
To get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in 13
Valenti’s argument, we need look no further than the United States 14
Constitution itself. 15
The framers of our Constitution loved “property.” Indeed, so 16
strongly did they love property that they built into the Constitution an 17
important requirement. If the government takes your property—if it 18
condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your farm—it is 19
required, under the Fifth Amendment’s “Takings Clause,” to pay you 20
“just compensation” for that taking. The Constitution thus guarantees 21
that property is, in a certain sense, sacred. It cannot ever be taken from 22
the property owner unless the government pays for the privilege. 23
Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what 24
Valenti calls “creative property.” In the clause granting Congress the 25
power to create “creative property,” the Constitution requires that after 26
a “limited time,” Congress take back the rights that it has granted and 27
set the “creative property” free to the public domain. Yet when Con- 28
gress does this, when the expiration of a copyright term “takes” your 29
copyright and turns it over to the public domain, Congress does not 30
have any obligation to pay “just compensation” for this “taking.” In- 31
stead, the same Constitution that requires compensation for your land S32
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1 requires that you lose your “creative property” right without any com-
2 pensation at all.
3 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
4 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to be
5 treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a change in
6 our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners should be
7 accorded the same rights as every other property-right owner. He is ef-
8 fectively arguing for a change in our Constitution itself.
9 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
10 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
11 The Constitution of 1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be ap-
12 pointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral college
13 to produce a tie between the president and his own vice president (as it
14 did in 1800). The framers were no doubt extraordinary, but I would be
15 the first to admit that they made big mistakes. We have since rejected
16 some of those mistakes; no doubt there could be others that we should
17 reject as well. So my argument is not simply that because Jefferson did
18 it, we should, too.
19 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
20 least try to understand why. Why did the framers, fanatical property
21 types that they were, reject the claim that creative property be given the
22 same rights as all other property? Why did they require that for cre-
23 ative property there must be a public domain?
24 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the his-
25 tory of these “creative property” rights, and the control that they en-
26 abled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
27 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that should
28 be at the core of this war: Not whether creative property should be pro-
29 tected, but how. Not whether we will enforce the rights the law gives to
30 creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights ought to
31 be. Not whether artists should be paid, but whether institutions designed
32S to assure that artists get paid need also control how culture develops.
33R
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To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk 1

about how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more gen- 2
eral way than the narrow language of the law allows. In Code and Other 3
Laws of Cyberspace, I used a simple model to capture this more general 4
perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks how 5
four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken 6
the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram: 7
8
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22
At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or 23
group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In each 24
case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as a right. 25
For simplicity’s sake, I will speak only of regulations.) The ovals repre- 26
sent four ways in which the individual or group might be regulated— 27
either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law is the most obvious 28
constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains by threatening punish- 29
ments after the fact if the rules set in advance are violated. So if, for ex- 30
ample, you willfully infringe Madonna’s copyright by copying a song 31
from her latest CD and posting it on the Web, you can be punished S32
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1 with a $150,000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating

2 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
3 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an indi-
4 vidual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is imposed by
5 a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be no law
6 against spitting, but that doesn’t mean you won’t be punished if you
7 spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The punishment
8 might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it could
9 easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
10 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but the
11 source of the enforcement.
12 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
13 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you’ll be paid M if
14 you do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
15 norms—it is property law that defines what must be bought if it is to be
16 taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately sold. But given a
17 set of norms, and a background of property and contract law, the mar-
18 ket imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an individual or group
19 might behave.
20 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously, “archi-
21 tecture”—the physical world as one finds it—is a constraint on be-
22 havior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability to get across a
23 river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of a community to
24 integrate its social life. As with the market, architecture does not ef-
25 fect its constraint through ex post punishments. Instead, also as with
26 the market, architecture effects its constraint through simultaneous
27 conditions. These conditions are imposed not by courts enforcing con-
28 tracts, or by police punishing theft, but by nature, by “architecture.”
29 If a 500-pound boulder blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that
30 enforces this constraint. If a $500 airplane ticket stands between
31 you and a flight to New York, it is the market that enforces this con-
32S straint.
33R
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So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is obvi- 1

ous: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be reinforced 2
by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be undermined by 3
another. 4
The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the 5
effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any partic- 6
ular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities interact. 7
Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well be; my 8
claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the most 9
significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing) must 10
consider how these four in particular interact. 11
So, for example, consider the “freedom” to drive a car at a high 12
speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that say 13
how fast you can drive in particular places at particular times. It is in 14
part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for example, slow most ra- 15
tional drivers; governors in buses, as another example, set the maxi- 16
mum rate at which the driver can drive. The freedom is in part restricted 17
by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as speed increases, thus the price of 18
gasoline indirectly constrains speed. And finally, the norms of a com- 19
munity may or may not constrain the freedom to speed. Drive at 50 20
mph by a school in your own neighborhood and you’re likely to be 21
punished by the neighbors. The same norm wouldn’t be as effective in 22
a different town, or at night. 23
The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear: 24
While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a 25
special role in affecting the three.3 The law, in other words, sometimes 26
operates to increase or decrease the constraint of a particular modality. 27
Thus, the law might be used to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to in- 28
crease the incentives to drive more slowly. The law might be used to 29
mandate more speed bumps, so as to increase the difficulty of driving 30
rapidly. The law might be used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless 31
driving. Or the law might be used to require that other laws be more S32
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17 strict—a federal requirement that states decrease the speed limit, for
18 example—so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast driving.
19 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
20 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of property
21 at any particular moment, we must track these changes over time. A re-
22 striction imposed by one modality might be erased by another. A free-
23 dom enabled by one modality might be displaced by another.4
24
25
26 Why Hollywood Is Right
27
28 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
29 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
30 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
31 rallying makes sense.
32S Let’s say this is the picture of copyright’s regulation before the In-
33R ternet:
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There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The 15
law limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties 16
on those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by 17
technologies that make it hard to copy and share content (architecture) 18
and expensive to copy and share content (market). Finally, those penal- 19
ties are mitigated by norms we all recognize—kids, for example, taping 20
other kids’ records. These uses of copyrighted material may well be in- 21
fringement, but the norms of our society (before the Internet, at least) 22
had no problem with this form of infringement. 23
Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s 24
and p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramati- 25
cally, as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and 26
architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The 27
happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet be- 28
comes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet. 29
Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors’ response. Tech- 30
nology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this change, 31
when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance of pro- S32
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15 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
16 looting that results.
17 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
18 warriors. Indeed, in a “White Paper” prepared by the Commerce De-
19 partment (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in 1995,
20 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
21 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the In-
22 ternet had effected, the White Paper argued (1) Congress should
23 strengthen intellectual property law, (2) businesses should adopt inno-
24 vative marketing techniques, (3) technologists should push to develop
25 code to protect copyrighted material, and (4) educators should educate
26 kids to better protect copyright.
27 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed—if it was to pre-
28 serve the particular balance that existed before the change induced by
29 the Internet. And it’s just what we should expect the content industry
30 to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the happy life
31 you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to protect it if some-
32S thing comes along to change that happy life. Homeowners living in a
33R
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flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild 1

(and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their prop- 2
erty (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government to 3
bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their crop. Unions 4
have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail them out when 5
imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry. 6
Thus, there’s nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry’s 7
campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a techno- 8
logical innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that the 9
changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect on the 10
content industry’s way of doing business, or as John Seely Brown de- 11
scribes it, its “architecture of revenue.” 12
But just because a particular interest asks for government support, 13
it doesn’t follow that support should be granted. And just because tech- 14
nology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn’t fol- 15
low that the government should intervene to support that old way of 16
doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as 20 17
percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies 18
of digital cameras.5 Does anyone believe the government should ban 19
digital cameras just to support Kodak? Highways have weakened the 20
freight business for railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks 21
from roads for the purpose of protecting the railroads? Closer to the sub- 22
ject of this book, remote channel changers have weakened the “sticki- 23
ness” of television advertising (if a boring commercial comes on the 24
TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it may well be that this 25
change has weakened the television advertising market. But does any- 26
one believe we should regulate remotes to reinforce commercial televi- 27
sion? (Maybe by limiting them to function only once a second, or to 28
switch to only ten channels within an hour?) 29
The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no. 30
In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and 31
free trade, the government’s role is not to support one way of doing S32
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1 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
2 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
3 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
4 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, “established companies
5 have an interest in excluding future competitors.”6 And relative to a
6 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
7 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
8 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
9 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
10 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
11 Brezhnev.
12 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
13 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the gov-
14 ernment for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to guar-
15 antee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It is the
16 duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the changes they
17 create, in response to the request of those hurt by changing technology,
18 are changes that preserve the incentives and opportunities for innova-
19 tion and change.
20 In the context of laws regulating speech—which include, obviously,
21 copyright law—that duty is even stronger. When the industry com-
22 plaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to respond in
23 a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers should be es-
24 pecially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for the government
25 to get into the business of regulating speech markets. The risks and
26 dangers of that game are precisely why our framers created the First
27 Amendment to our Constitution: “Congress shall make no law . . .
28 abridging the freedom of speech.” So when Congress is being asked to
29 pass laws that would “abridge” the freedom of speech, it should ask—
30 carefully—whether such regulation is justified.
31 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
32S the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are “justi-
33R
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fied.” My argument is about their effect. For before we get to the ques- 1
tion of justification, a hard question that depends a great deal upon 2
your values, we should first ask whether we understand the effect of the 3
changes the content industry wants. 4
Here’s the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow. 5
In 1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In 1948, Swiss 6
chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work 7
demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the 1950s, the 8
insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying 9
pests. It was also used to increase farm production. 10
No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop 11
production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was 12
important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions. 13
But in 1962, Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, which argued 14
that DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended 15
environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to repro- 16
duce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed. 17
No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly 18
did not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of prob- 19
lems produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse 20
than the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, 21
the problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at 22
least when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways 23
to solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve. 24
It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James 25
Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an “environmentalism” for 26
culture.7 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of 27
this chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that au- 28
thors should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given 29
away “for free.” The point is that some of the ways in which we might 30
protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural en- 31
vironment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just S32
R33
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1 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on

2 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations protect-
3 ing copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on authors.
4 It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we should be aware
5 of our actions’ effects on the environment.
6 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
7 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
8 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
9 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
10 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
11 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
12 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
13 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
14 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
15 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
16 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
17 be lost.
18
19
20 Beginnings
21
22 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and im-
23 proved English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of
24 “creative property” rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the En-
25 glish aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
26 The power to establish “creative property” rights is granted to Con-
27 gress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very odd. Article I,
28 section 8, clause 8 of our Constitution states that:
29
30 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
31 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
32S the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
33R
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We can call this the “Progress Clause,” for notice what this clause does 1
not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant “creative prop- 2
erty rights.” It says that Congress has the power to promote progress. The 3
grant of power is its purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the 4
purpose of enriching publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of re- 5
warding authors. 6
The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we 7
saw in chapter 6, the English limited the term of copyright so as to as- 8
sure that a few would not exercise disproportionate control over culture 9
by exercising disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume 10
the framers followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike 11
the English, the framers reinforced that objective, by requiring that 12
copyrights extend “to Authors” only. 13
The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the 14
Constitution’s design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers built 15
structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they built 16
a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept them 17
short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned the 18
federal government from establishing a church. To prevent concentrat- 19
ing power in the federal government, they built structures to reinforce 20
the power of the states—including the Senate, whose members were 21
at the time selected by the states, and an electoral college, also selected 22
by the states, to select the president. In each case, a structure built 23
checks and balances into the constitutional frame, structured to pre- 24
vent otherwise inevitable concentrations of power. 25
I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call “copy- 26
right” today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they 27
ever considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put 28
our “copyright” in context: We need to see how it has changed in the 29
210 years since they first struck its design. 30
Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes 31
in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a S32
R33
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1 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we

2 started here:
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18 We will end here:
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32S
33R Let me explain how.
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Law: Duration 1
2
When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it 3
faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that 4
the English had confronted in 1774. Many states had passed laws pro- 5
tecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply 6
supplemented common law rights that already protected creative au- 7
thorship.8 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in 8
the United States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the com- 9
mon law, then there was no simple way to know whether a work pub- 10
lished in the United States was controlled or free. Just as in England, 11
this lingering uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely 12
upon a public domain to reprint and distribute works. 13
That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting 14
copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law, federal 15
protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law protections. 16
Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant that the copy- 17
rights for all English works expired, a federal statute meant that any 18
state copyrights expired as well. 19
In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a fed- 20
eral copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If the au- 21
thor was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could opt to 22
renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not renew the 23
copyright, his work passed into the public domain. 24
While there were many works created in the United States in the 25
first ten years of the Republic, only 5 percent of the works were actu- 26
ally registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work cre- 27
ated in the United States both before 1790 and from 1790 through 28
1800, 95 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the bal- 29
ance would pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at 30
most, and more likely within fourteen years.9 31
This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system S32
of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be R33
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1 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
2 of fourteen years, if it wasn’t worth it to an author to renew his copy-
3 right, then it wasn’t worth it to society to insist on the copyright, either.
4 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
5 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small mi-
6 nority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the bal-
7 ance allowed their work to pass into the public domain.10
8 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
9 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
10 out of print after one year.11 When that happens, the used books are
11 traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are no longer effec-
12 tively controlled by copyright. The only practical commercial use of the
13 books at that time is to sell the books as used books; that use—because
14 it does not involve publication—is effectively free.
15 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright
16 was changed once. In 1831, the term was increased from a maximum
17 of 28 years to a maximum of 42 by increasing the initial term of copy-
18 right from 14 years to 28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
19 the term increased once again. In 1909, Congress extended the renewal
20 term of 14 years to 28 years, setting a maximum term of 56 years.
21 Then, beginning in 1962, Congress started a practice that has de-
22 fined copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
23 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
24 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
25 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
26 In 1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
27 And in 1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
28 Congress extended the term of existing and future copyrights by
29 twenty years.
30 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
31 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
32S public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
33R years, or 70 percent of the time since 1962. Thus, in the twenty years
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after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the 1
public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue 2
of the expiration of a copyright term. 3
The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another, 4
little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the 5
framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright 6
owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of 7
renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection 8
would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining 9
under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial 10
value. 11
The United States abandoned this sensible system in 1976. For 12
all works created after 1978, there was only one copyright term—the 13
maximum term. For “natural” authors, that term was life plus fifty 14
years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in 1992, 15
Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created 16
before 1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the 17
maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term 18
was ninety-five years. 19
This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic 20
way to assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the 21
public domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether 22
it is even possible to put works into the public domain. The public do- 23
main is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the re- 24
quirement that terms be “limited,” we have no evidence that anything 25
will limit them. 26
The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is 27
dramatic. In 1973, more than 85 percent of copyright owners failed to 28
renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright 29
in 1973 was just 32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal 30
requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term. 31
In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from 32.2 years to 95 S32
years.12 R33
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1 Law: Scope
2
3 The “scope” of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
4 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
5 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6 of the changes if we’re to keep this debate in context.
7 In 1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only “maps,
8 charts, and books.” That means it didn’t cover, for example, music or
9 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
10 the author the exclusive right to “publish” copyrighted works. That
11 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
12 work without the copyright owner’s permission. Finally, the right granted
13 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
14 did not extend to what lawyers call “derivative works.” It would not,
15 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
16 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
17 (such as a drama based on a published book).
18 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copy-
19 right today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
20 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a tangible
21 form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well as computer
22 programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative work not only
23 the exclusive right to “publish” the work, but also the exclusive right of
24 control over any “copies” of that work. And most significant for our
25 purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner control over not
26 only his or her particular work, but also any “derivative work” that might
27 grow out of the original work. In this way, the right covers more cre-
28 ative work, protects the creative work more broadly, and protects works
29 that are based in a significant way on the initial creative work.
30 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, proce-
31 dural limitations on the right have been relaxed. I’ve already described
32S the complete removal of the renewal requirement in 1992. In addition
33R to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American copy-
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right law, there was a requirement that a work be registered before it 1

could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also a require- 2
ment that any copyrighted work be marked either with that famous © 3
or the word copyright. And for most of the history of American copy- 4
right law, there was a requirement that works be deposited with the 5
government before a copyright could be secured. 6
The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible under- 7
standing that for most works, no copyright was required. Again, in the 8
first ten years of the Republic, 95 percent of works eligible for copy- 9
right were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the norm: Most 10
works apparently didn’t need copyright, so registration narrowed the 11
regulation of the law to the few that did. The same reasoning justified 12
the requirement that a work be marked as copyrighted—that way it 13
was easy to know whether a copyright was being claimed. The require- 14
ment that works be deposited was to assure that after the copyright ex- 15
pired, there would be a copy of the work somewhere so that it could be 16
copied by others without locating the original author. 17
All of these “formalities” were abolished in the American system 18
when we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no re- 19
quirement that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright 20
now is automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your 21
work with a ©; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually 22
make a copy available for others to copy. 23
Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these dif- 24
ferences. 25
If, in 1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the 5 percent who 26
actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you 27
against another publisher’s taking your book and republishing it with- 28
out your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers so 29
as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In 1790, there were 174 30
publishers in the United States.13 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny 31
regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in S32
the United States—publishers. R33
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1 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your

2 poem by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my
3 act was totally unregulated by the 1790 act. If I took your novel and
4 made a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
5 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These cre-
6 ative activities remained free, while the activities of publishers were re-
7 strained.
8 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
9 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
10 every note to your spouse, every doodle, every creative act that’s re-
11 duced to a tangible form—all of this is automatically copyrighted.
12 There is no need to register or mark your work. The protection follows
13 the creation, not the steps you take to protect it.
14 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
15 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
16 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
17 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would con-
18 trol competing publishing. But there’s a second part to the copyright of
19 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of “derivative
20 rights.” If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
21 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
22 CliffsNotes can’t make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
23 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
24 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an ex-
25 clusive right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
26 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
27 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
28 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this ex-
29 pansion was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower copy-
30 right. If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
31 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
32S joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
33R those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
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In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power within 1

a free culture—at least, it’s astonishing when you understand that the 2
law applies not just to the commercial publisher but to anyone with a 3
computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating and selling someone 4
else’s work. But whatever that wrong is, transforming someone else’s 5
work is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at 6
all—they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should not pro- 7
tect derivative rights at all.14 Whether or not you go that far, it seems 8
plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from 9
the wrong of direct piracy. 10
Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same 11
way. I can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my 12
book. I can go to court and get an injunction against your transforma- 13
tive use of my book.15 These two different uses of my creative work are 14
treated the same. 15
This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why 16
should you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes 17
money from it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney cre- 18
ates a creature called “Mickey Mouse,” why should you be able to make 19
Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney 20
originally created? 21
These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the 22
derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower: sim- 23
ply to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the 24
rights originally granted. 25
26
27
Law and Architecture: Reach 28
29
Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in 30
copyright’s scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users, 31
and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making S32
copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.16 R33
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1 “Copies.” That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for copyright
2 law to regulate. But as with Jack Valenti’s argument at the start of this
3 chapter, that “creative property” deserves the “same rights” as all other
4 property, it is the obvious that we need to be most careful about. For
5 while it may be obvious that in the world before the Internet, copies
6 were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon reflection, it should be
7 obvious that in the world with the Internet, copies should not be the
8 trigger for copyright law. More precisely, they should not always be the
9 trigger for copyright law.
10 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
11 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
12 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
13 the law of copyright automatically applies,17 because it is clear that the
14 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
15 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
16 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
17 empty circle.
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32S
33R
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Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to repre- 1
sent all its potential uses. Most of these uses are unregulated by copyright 2
law, because the uses don’t create a copy. If you read a book, that act is not 3
regulated by copyright law. If you give someone the book, that act is 4
not regulated by copyright law. If you resell a book, that act is not reg- 5
ulated (copyright law expressly states that after the first sale of a book, 6
the copyright owner can impose no further conditions on the disposi- 7
tion of the book). If you sleep on the book or use it to hold up a lamp or 8
let your puppy chew it up, those acts are not regulated by copyright law, 9
because those acts do not make a copy. 10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated 26
by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It 27
is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands 28
at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the 29
paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first 30
diagram on next page). 31
Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses S32
that remain unregulated because the law considers these “fair uses.” R33
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats
15 as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain unreg-
16 ulated. You are free to quote from this book, even in a review that
17 is quite negative, without my permission, even though that quoting
18 makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright owner the
19 exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not, but the law
20 denies the owner any exclusive right over such “fair uses” for public
21 policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32S
33R
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three 15
sorts: (1) unregulated uses, (2) regulated uses, and (3) regulated uses that 16
are nonetheless deemed “fair” regardless of the copyright owner’s views. 17
Enter the Internet—a distributed, digital network where every use 18
of a copyrighted work produces a copy.18 And because of this single, 19
arbitrary feature of the design of a digital network, the scope of cate- 20
gory 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were presumptively un- 21
regulated are now presumptively regulated. No longer is there a set of 22
presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom associated with a 23
copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the copyright, 24
because each use also makes a copy—category 1 gets sucked into cate- 25
gory 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of copy- 26
righted work must look exclusively to category 3, fair uses, to bear the 27
burden of this shift. 28
So let’s be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the 29
Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would be 30
no plausible copyright-related argument that the copyright owner could 31
make to control that use of her book. Copyright law would have noth- S32
ing to say about whether you read the book once, ten times, or every R33
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1 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of use—reading—

2 could be regulated by copyright law because none of those uses pro-
3 duced a copy.
4 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a differ-
5 ent set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
6 only once or only once a month, then copyright law would aid the copy-
7 right owner in exercising this degree of control, because of the acci-
8 dental feature of copyright law that triggers its application upon there
9 being a copy. Now if you read the book ten times and the license says
10 you may read it only five times, then whenever you read the book (or
11 any portion of it) beyond the fifth time, you are making a copy of the
12 book contrary to the copyright owner’s wish.
13 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
14 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
15 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
16 points also become clear:
17 First, making category 1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
18 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the pre-
19 sumptively unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no evi-
20 dence at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they allowed
21 our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important part of
22 free culture before the Internet.
23 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of transfor-
24 mative uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand the wrong
25 in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate any trans-
26 formation you make of creative work using a machine. “Copy and paste”
27 and “cut and paste” become crimes. Tinkering with a story and releas-
28 ing it to others exposes the tinkerer to at least a requirement of justifi-
29 cation. However troubling the expansion with respect to copying a
30 particular work, it is extraordinarily troubling with respect to transfor-
31 mative uses of creative work.
32S Third, this shift from category 1 to category 2 puts an extraordinary
33R
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burden on category 3 (“fair use”) that fair use never before had to bear. 1
If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read 2
a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a 3
violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation 4
about whether I have a fair use right to read, because before the Inter- 5
net, reading did not trigger the application of copyright law and hence 6
the need for a fair use defense. The right to read was effectively pro- 7
tected before because reading was not regulated. 8
This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for 9
free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights de- 10
pend upon fair use—never even addressing the earlier question about 11
the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection grounded in 12
fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are unregulated. But 13
when everything becomes presumptively regulated, then the protec- 14
tions of fair use are not enough. 15
The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was 16
in the business of making “trailer” advertisements for movies available 17
to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell 18
videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put 19
the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores. 20
The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in 1997, it be- 21
gan to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these pre- 22
views. The idea was to expand their “selling by sampling” technique by 23
giving on-line stores the same ability to enable “browsing.” Just as in a 24
bookstore you can read a few pages of a book before you buy the book, 25
so, too, you would be able to sample a bit from the movie on-line be- 26
fore you bought it. 27
In 1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film distribu- 28
tors that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet 29
(rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two 30
years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video 31
Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter—he had built a busi- S32
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1 ness on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney films; he

2 had customers who depended upon his delivering this content. Disney
3 would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the distribution im-
4 mediately. Video Pipeline thought it was within their “fair use” rights
5 to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a lawsuit to ask the
6 court to declare that these rights were in fact their rights.
7 Disney countersued—for $100 million in damages. Those damages
8 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had “willfully in-
9 fringed” on Disney’s copyright. When a court makes a finding of will-
10 ful infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the actual
11 harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the
12 statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of
13 Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those movies,
14 Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $100 million.
15 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
16 stores that were selling Disney’s films also had some sort of right to be
17 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney’s claim
18 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
19 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
20 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
21 Disney’s permission.
22 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts would
23 consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change that gives
24 Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn’t really control
25 how people got access to their content. Once a video was in the market-
26 place, the “first-sale doctrine” would free the seller to use the video as he
27 wished, including showing portions of it in order to engender sales of the
28 entire movie video. But with the Internet, it becomes possible for Disney
29 to centralize control over access to this content. Because each use of the
30 Internet produces a copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the
31 copyright owner’s control. The technology expands the scope of effective
32S control, because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
33R No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for con-
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trol is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes & Noble has the right to say 1
you can’t touch a book in their store; property law gives them that right. 2
But the market effectively protects against that abuse. If Barnes & No- 3
ble banned browsing, then consumers would choose other bookstores. 4
Competition protects against the extremes. And it may well be (my argu- 5
ment so far does not even question this) that competition would prevent 6
any similar danger when it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers exercis- 7
ing the rights that authors have assigned to them might try to regulate 8
how many times you read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book 9
with anyone. But in a competitive market such as the book market, the 10
dangers of this happening are quite slight. 11
Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed 12
architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of 13
copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by 14
balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private own- 15
ers choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But in some 16
contexts it is a recipe for disaster. 17
18
19
Architecture and Law: Force 20
21
The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a 22
second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its 23
significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright 24
regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced. 25
In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that 26
controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law. 27
The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human, 28
trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that 29
tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict 30
your freedom. 31
There’s a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers S32
and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of R33
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1 Casablanca. Warner Brothers objected. They wrote a nasty letter to the

2 Marxes, warning them that there would be serious legal consequences
3 if they went forward with their plan.19
4 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
5 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers “were brothers long before
6 you were.”20 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word brothers,
7 and if Warner Brothers insisted on trying to control Casablanca, then
8 the Marx Brothers would insist on control over brothers.
9 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
10 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
11 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
12 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
13 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because
14 on the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by
15 a machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
16 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers copy-
17 righted content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the problem
18 with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no shame. Code
19 would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The consequence of
20 that is not at all funny.
21 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
22 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook
23 is not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
24 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the tech-
25 nology, and the publisher delivers the content by using the technology.
26 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
27 Reader.
28 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
29 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
30 public domain: Middlemarch, for example, is in the public domain.
31 Some of them reproduce content that is not in the public domain: My
32S own book The Future of Ideas is not yet within the public domain.
33R Consider Middlemarch first. If you click on my e-book copy of
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
Middlemarch, you’ll see a fancy cover, and then a button at the bottom 19
called Permissions. 20
If you click on the Permissions button, you’ll see a list of the per- 21
missions that the publisher purports to grant with this book. 22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
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1 According to my eBook
2 Reader, I have the permission
3 to copy to the clipboard of the
4 computer ten text selections
5 every ten days. (So far, I’ve
6 copied no text to the clipboard.)
7 I also have the permission to
8 print ten pages from the book
9 every ten days. Lastly, I have
10 the permission to use the Read
11 Aloud button to hear Middle-
12 march read aloud through the
13 computer.
14 Here’s the e-book for another
15 work in the public domain (in-
16 cluding the translation): Aristo-
17 tle’s Politics.
18 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
19 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
20 the book.
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32S Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
33R original e-book version of my last book, The Future of Ideas:
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
No copying, no printing, and don’t you dare try to listen to this book! 10
Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls “permissions”— 11
as if the publisher has the power to control how you use these works. 12
For works under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have 13
the power—up to the limits of the copyright law. But for work not un- 14
der copyright, there is no such copyright power.21 When my e-book of 15
Middlemarch says I have the permission to copy only ten text selections 16
into the memory every ten days, what that really means is that the 17
eBook Reader has enabled the publisher to control how I use the book 18
on my computer, far beyond the control that the law would enable. 19
The control comes instead from the code—from the technology 20
within which the e-book “lives.” Though the e-book says that these are 21
permissions, they are not the sort of “permissions” that most of us deal 22
with. When a teenager gets “permission” to stay out till midnight, she 23
knows (unless she’s Cinderella) that she can stay out till 2 A.M., but 24
will suffer a punishment if she’s caught. But when the Adobe eBook 25
Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies of the text into 26
the computer’s memory, that means that after I’ve made ten copies, the 27
computer will not make any more. The same with the printing restric- 28
tions: After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not print any more pages. 29
It’s the same with the silly restriction that says that you can’t use the 30
Read Aloud button to read my book aloud—it’s not that the company 31
will sue you if you do; instead, if you push the Read Aloud button with S32
my book, the machine simply won’t read aloud. R33
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1 These are controls, not permissions. Imagine a world where the

2 Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when you tried to
3 type “Warner Brothers,” erased “Brothers” from the sentence.
4 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright law as
5 copyright code. The controls over access to content will not be controls
6 that are ratified by courts; the controls over access to content will be
7 controls that are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that
8 are built into the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls
9 that are built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
10 How significant is this? Isn’t it always possible to get around the
11 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with tech-
12 nologies that limited the ability of users to copy the software, but those
13 were trivial protections to defeat. Why won’t it be trivial to defeat these
14 protections as well?
15 We’ve only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
16 eBook Reader.
17 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a pub-
18 lic relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for
19 free on the Adobe site was a copy of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland.
20 This wonderful book is in the public domain. Yet when you clicked on
21 Permissions for that book, you got the following report:
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32S
33R
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Here was a public domain children’s book that you were not al- 1
lowed to copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the “per- 2
missions” indicated, not allowed to “read aloud”! 3
The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission. 4
For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read 5
Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book 6
aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the 7
right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which 8
seemed, to say the least, absurd. 9
Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was try- 10
ing to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only re- 11
stricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book read 12
aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would Adobe 13
thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack around the 14
restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company (call it 15
Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological protec- 16
tion built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say, could use a 17
computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that such a use of 18
an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn’t answer because the answer, 19
however absurd it might seem, is no. 20
The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most 21
innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to 22
content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe’s tech- 23
nology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this con- 24
trol. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is often crazy. 25
To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite 26
story of mine that makes the same point. 27
Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named “Aibo.” The Aibo 28
learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity 29
and that doesn’t leave that much of a mess (at least in your house). 30
The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world 31
have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web S32
site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set R33
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1 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),

2 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
3 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
4 “Teach” here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
5 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it differ-
6 ently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about how to
7 teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com was giv-
8 ing information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack their com-
9 puter “dog” to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
10 If you’re not a programmer or don’t know many programmers, the
11 word hack has a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers
12 hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even
13 worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them, hack is a much
14 more positive term. Hack just means code that enables the program to
15 do something it wasn’t originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy
16 a new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer
17 doesn’t run, or “drive,” the printer. If you discovered that, you’d later be
18 happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a
19 driver to enable the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
20 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
21 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
22 difficult tasks. There’s a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
23 well. There’s a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
24 ethically.
25 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the pro-
26 gram and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo
27 to dance jazz. The dog wasn’t programmed to dance jazz. It was a
28 clever bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
29 than Sony had built.
30 I’ve told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
31 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
32S is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We for-
33R get that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of the
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world. So let’s just be clear before we continue: It’s not a crime any- 1
where (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog to 2
dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don’t have a lot to go 3
on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a com- 4
pletely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com 5
thought, What possible problem could there be with teaching a robot dog to 6
dance? 7
Let’s put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show— 8
not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic 9
named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic 10
is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the 11
Microsoft case to test Microsoft’s claims about what could and could 12
not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his 13
brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft 14
lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied 15
into being silent about something he knew very well. 16
But Felten’s bravery was really tested in April 2001.22 He and a 17
group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted at con- 18
ference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an encryp- 19
tion system being developed by the Secure Digital Music Initiative as 20
a technique to control the distribution of music. 21
The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content 22
owners to exercise much better control over their content than the In- 23
ternet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI 24
hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say 25
“this music cannot be copied,” and have a computer respect that com- 26
mand. The technology was to be part of a “trusted system” of control 27
that would get content owners to trust the system of the Internet much 28
more. 29
When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a compe- 30
tition. In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an 31
SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it S32
and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium. R33
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1 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He
2 and the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryp-
3 tion systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
4 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
5 Let’s review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
6 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great idea. A
8 strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to encourage a wide
9 range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in turn, to improve the sys-
10 tems or people or ideas criticized.
11 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
12 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
13 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
14 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
15 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
16 constituted, succeed.
17 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
18 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
19 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
20 wrote:
21
22 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
23 AIBO-ware’s copy protection protocol constituting a violation of
24 the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copy-
25 right Act.
26
27 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
28 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
29 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
30
31 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
32S Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permit-
33R
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ted by the Agreement and could subject you and your research 1
team to actions under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 2
(“DMCA”). 3
4
In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the 5
spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made 6
spreading such information an offense. 7
The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners’ first fear 8
about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively 9
dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate. 10
These new technologies would be copyright protection technologies— 11
technologies to control the replication and distribution of copyrighted 12
material. They were designed as code to modify the original code of the 13
Internet, to reestablish some protection for copyright owners. 14
The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of 15
this code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could 16
say, legal code intended to buttress software code which itself was in- 17
tended to support the legal code of copyright. 18
But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted 19
works to the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that 20
is, did not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regu- 21
lated devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection 22
measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use 23
of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention 24
would have been a copyright violation. 25
Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circum- 26
vented a copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the 27
dog to dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copy- 28
righted material. But as aibopet.com’s site was noncommercial, and the 29
use did not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there’s no doubt 30
that aibopet.com’s hack was fair use of Sony’s copyrighted material. Yet 31
fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the S32
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1 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question

2 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
3 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
4 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a copy-
5 right protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer sug-
6 gested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone’s copyright,
8 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others’ copyright.
9 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn
10 in 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held
11 that the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
12 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
13 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
14 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka “Mr. Rogers,” for example, had testi-
15 fied in that case that he wanted people to feel free to tape Mr. Rogers’
16 Neighborhood.
17
18 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
19 “Neighborhood” at hours when some children cannot use it. I
20 think that it’s a real service to families to be able to record such
21 programs and show them at appropriate times. I have always felt
22 that with the advent of all of this new technology that allows
23 people to tape the “Neighborhood” off-the-air, and I’m speak-
24 ing for the “Neighborhood” because that’s what I produce,
25 that they then become much more active in the programming of
26 their family’s television life. Very frankly, I am opposed to people
27 being programmed by others. My whole approach in broadcast-
28 ing has always been “You are an important person just the way
29 you are. You can make healthy decisions.” Maybe I’m going on
30 too long, but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be
31 more active in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
32S important.23
33R
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Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were 1
some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing 2
the VCR responsible. 3
This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to 4
the DMCA. 5
No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close. 6
The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright 7
circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used 8
for different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive pi- 9
rating of copyrighted material—a bad end. Or they can be used to en- 10
able the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that would be 11
considered fair use—a good end. 12
A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most 13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
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1 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
2 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
3 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
4 and bad uses.
5 The obvious point of Conrad’s cartoon is the weirdness of a world
6 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: No one ever died from
8 copyright circumvention. Yet the law bans circumvention technologies
9 absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some good, but
10 permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
11 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners
12 are changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copy-
13 right owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who
14 would attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose
15 through code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be
16 erased; the law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
17 This is how code becomes law. The controls built into the technology
18 of copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
19 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the law—increasing its
20 regulation, even if the subject it regulates (activities that would otherwise
21 plainly constitute fair use) is beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes
22 law; code extends the law; code thus extends the control that copyright
23 owners effect—at least for those copyright holders with the lawyers
24 who can write the nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
25 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture
26 and law that contributes to the force of copyright’s regulation. This is
27 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
28 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
29 Internet, no one knows you’re a dog, increasingly, given changing tech-
30 nologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who com-
31 mitted a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
32S snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at track-
33R ing down the identity of those who violate the rules.
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For example, imagine you were part of a Star Trek fan club. You 1
gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan 2
fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Cap- 3
tain Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, 4
then simply continue it.24 5
Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated activ- 6
ity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would never 7
be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in that space 8
to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were allowed to 9
build on it as you wished without fear of legal control. 10
But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally 11
available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots scour- 12
ing the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would quickly 13
find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon the owner- 14
ship of the series that you’re depicting, could well inspire a lawyer’s 15
threat. And ignoring the lawyer’s threat would be extremely costly in- 16
deed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The penalties are se- 17
vere, and the process is quick. 18
This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change 19
in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts 20
the law’s balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at 21
which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just 22
one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you 23
transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here. 24
25
26
Market: Concentration 27
28
So copyright’s duration has increased dramatically—tripled in the past 29
thirty years. And copyright’s scope has increased as well—from regu- 30
lating only publishers to now regulating just about everyone. And 31
copyright’s reach has changed, as every action becomes a copy and S32
hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists find better ways R33
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1 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly enforced

2 through technology, copyright’s force changes, too. Misuse is easier to
3 find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative process, which
4 began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the market for cre-
5 ative work, has become the single most important regulator of creativ-
6 ity there is. It is a massive expansion in the scope of the government’s
7 control over innovation and creativity; it would be totally unrecogniz-
8 able to those who gave birth to copyright’s control.
9 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
10 weren’t for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
11 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
12 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
13 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
14 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
15 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
16 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the me-
17 dia. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
18 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
19 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the
20 FCC announced in June 2003, most expect that within a few years, we
21 will live in a world where just three companies control more than 85
22 percent of the media.
23 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
24 nature.
25 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
26 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC’s review of media
27 ownership, “five companies control 85 percent of our media sources.”25
28 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Mu-
29 sic Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control 84.8 per-
30 cent of the U.S. music market.26 The “five largest cable companies pipe
31 programming to 74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide.”27
32S The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
33R the nation’s largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
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seventy-five stations. Today one company owns more than 1,200 stations. 1
During that period of consolidation, the total number of radio owners 2
dropped by 34 percent. Today, in most markets, the two largest broad- 3
casters control 74 percent of that market’s revenues. Overall, just four 4
companies control 90 percent of the nation’s radio advertising revenues. 5
Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. To- 6
day, there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States 7
than there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the 8
nation’s circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in 9
the United States. The top ten film studios receive 99 percent of all 10
film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for 85 percent of 11
all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the framers 12
sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well protected— 13
by the market. 14
Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious 15
change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows 16
put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch, 17
18
Murdoch’s companies now constitute a production system un- 19
matched in its integration. They supply content—Fox movies . . . 20
Fox TV shows . . . Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus newspa- 21
pers and books. They sell the content to the public and to adver- 22
tisers—in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the cable 23
channels. And they operate the physical distribution system 24
through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch’s 25
satellite systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe 26
and Asia; if Murdoch becomes DirecTV’s largest single owner, 27
that system will serve the same function in the United States.28 28
29
The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not 30
just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies 31
owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this S32
pattern better than a thousand words could do: R33
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
17 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
18 distribute content?
19 My view was that concentration wouldn’t matter. I thought it was
20 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
21 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
22 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
23 Here’s a representative story that begins to suggest how this inte-
24 gration may matter.
25 In 1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for All in the Family. He took
26 the pilot to ABC. The network didn’t like it. It was too edgy, they told
27 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
28 first. ABC was exasperated. You’re missing the point, they told Lear.
29 We wanted less edgy, not more.
30 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
31 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
32S The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
33R control.29
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The network did not control those copyrights because the law for- 1
bade the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The 2
law required a separation between the networks and the content pro- 3
ducers; that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as 4
1992, because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time televi- 5
sion—75 percent of it—was “independent” of the networks. 6
In 1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this inde- 7
pendence. After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. 8
In 1985, there were twenty-five independent television production stu- 9
dios; in 2002, only five independent television studios remained. “In 10
1992, only 15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a 11
company it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by 12
controlled companies more than quintupled to 77 percent.” “In 1992, 13
16 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control, 14
last year there was one.”30 In 2002, 75 percent of prime time television 15
was owned by the networks that ran it. “In the ten-year period between 16
1992 and 2002, the number of prime time television hours per week 17
produced by network studios increased over 200%, whereas the num- 18
ber of prime time television hours per week produced by independent 19
studios decreased 63%.”31 20
Today, another Norman Lear with another All in the Family would 21
find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be 22
fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly 23
owned by the network. 24
While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the own- 25
ership of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller 26
few. As Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers, 27
28
Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on 29
their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes 30
through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is 31
fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We S32
u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent produc- R33
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1 tion companies producing television programs. Now you have less

2 than a handful.32
3
4 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of
5 such large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous. In-
6 creasingly safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows from
7 networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the network
8 wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from the in-
9 side, it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can question
10 without risk of consequence—not necessarily banishment to Siberia,
11 but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical, different views are
12 quashed. This is not the environment for a democracy.
13 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
14 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the “Innovator’s
15 Dilemma”: the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
16 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
17 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
18 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.33 Lum-
19 bering giants not only don’t, but should not, sprint. Yet if the field is
20 only open to the giants, there will be far too little sprinting.
21 I don’t think we know enough about the economics of the media
22 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
23 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
24 measure.
25 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
26 suggest the concern.
27 In addition to the copyright wars, we’re in the middle of the drug
28 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
29 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
30 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
31 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
32S mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
33R
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wrecked by drugs—though the drugs that wrecked my family were all 1

quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the collat- 2
eral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war insane. 3
When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice system, the 4
desperation of generations of kids whose only real economic opportu- 5
nities are as drug warriors, the queering of constitutional protections be- 6
cause of the constant surveillance this war requires, and, most profoundly, 7
the total destruction of the legal systems of many South American na- 8
tions because of the power of the local drug cartels, I find it impossible 9
to believe that the marginal benefit in reduced drug consumption by 10
Americans could possibly outweigh these costs. 11
You may not be convinced. That’s fine. We live in a democracy, and 12
it is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we de- 13
pend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about 14
these issues. 15
Beginning in 1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy 16
launched a media campaign as part of the “war on drugs.” The cam- 17
paign produced scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal 18
drugs. In one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, 19
discussing the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the 20
collateral damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of 21
drug legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way 22
against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes his 23
mind (hey, it’s television). The plug at the end is a damning attack on 24
the pro-legalization campaign. 25
Fair enough. It’s a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its 26
message well. It’s a fair and reasonable message. 27
But let’s say you think it is a wrong message, and you’d like to run a 28
countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to 29
demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the 30
drug war. Can you do it? 31
Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the S32
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1 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in

2 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your mes-
3 sage will be heard then?
4 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoid-
5 ing “controversial” ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
6 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are controversial.
7 This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with the First Amend-
8 ment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have the right to
9 choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of commercial media
10 will refuse one side of a crucial debate the opportunity to present its case.
11 And the courts will defend the rights of the stations to be this biased.34
12 I’d be happy to defend the networks’ rights, as well—if we lived in
13 a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the media
14 throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies control ac-
15 cess to the media, and that handful of companies gets to decide which
16 political positions it will allow to be promoted on its channels, then in
17 an obvious and important way, concentration matters. You might like
18 the positions the handful of companies selects. But you should not like
19 a world in which a mere few get to decide which issues the rest of us
20 get to know about.
21
22
23 Together
24
25 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the copy-
26 right warriors that the government should “protect my property.” In
27 the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally harmless. No
28 sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
29 But when we see how dramatically this “property” has changed—
30 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology
31 and markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to cul-
32S tivate our culture is dramatically different—the claim begins to seem
33R
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less innocent and obvious. Given (1) the power of technology to sup- 1
plement the law’s control, and (2) the power of concentrated markets 2
to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing the mas- 3
sively expanded “property” rights granted by copyright fundamentally 4
changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and build upon our 5
past, then we have to ask whether this property should be redefined. 6
Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish 7
copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total 8
mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within 9
our culture today. 10
But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture notwith- 11
standing. And these massive shifts in the effective power of copyright 12
regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content industry and 13
resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly enable control 14
over the use of culture, should drive us to consider whether another ad- 15
justment is called for. Not an adjustment that increases copyright’s 16
power. Not an adjustment that increases its term. Rather, an adjust- 17
ment to restore the balance that has traditionally defined copyright’s 18
regulation—a weakening of that regulation, to strengthen creativity. 19
Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It’s not a set of con- 20
stant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and 21
geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a 22
short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation 23
have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by copy- 24
right holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in technol- 25
ogy suggest that we may well need similar changes in the future. And 26
these changes have to be reductions in the scope of copyright, in re- 27
sponse to the extraordinary increase in control that technology and the 28
market enable. 29
For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that 30
we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add 31
together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and chang- S32
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1 ing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:

2 Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control more of the de-
3 velopment of our culture than now.
4 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
5 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when only
6 publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much more
7 diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for even
8 then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers were in-
9 dependent of the networks. Never has copyright protected such a wide
10 range of rights, against as broad a range of actors, for a term that was
11 remotely as long. This form of regulation—a tiny regulation of a tiny
12 part of the creative energy of a nation at the founding—is now a mas-
13 sive regulation of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus
14 the market now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into
15 the most significant regulation of culture that our free society has
16 known.35
17
18
19 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
20 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
21 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have distin-
22 guished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
23 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
24 that copyright law has undergone.
25 In 1790, the law looked like this:
26
27 PUBLISH TRANSFORM
28 Commercial © Free
29 Noncommercial Free Free
30
31 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
32S copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
33R copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
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to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of 1

noncommercial work was also free. 2
By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this: 3
4
PUBLISH TRANSFORM 5
Commercial © © 6
Noncommercial Free Free
7
8
Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law—if pub- 9
lished, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time, 10
means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and 11
transformation were still essentially free. 12
In 1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and af- 13
ter this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the 14
technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law ex- 15
panded. Thus by 1975, as photocopying machines became more com- 16
mon, we could say the law began to look like this: 17
18
COPY TRANSFORM
19
Commercial © ©
Noncommercial ©/Free Free
20
21
22
The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through,
23
say, copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the commer-
24
cial market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of
25
digital technologies, especially in the context of a digital network,
26
means that the law now looks like this:
27
28
COPY TRANSFORM
Commercial © ©
29
Noncommercial © © 30
31
Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most cre- S32
ativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of creativity— R33
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1 commercial or not, transformative or not—with the same rules designed

2 to regulate commercial publishers.
3 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
4 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
5 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
6 these domains actually does any good.
7 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
9 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and, espe-
10 cially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the rea-
11 sons sketched especially in chapters 7 and 8, one might well wonder
12 whether it does more harm than good for commercial transformation.
13 More commercial transformative work would be created if derivative
14 rights were more sharply restricted.
15 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
16 course copyright is a kind of “property,” and of course, as with any
17 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions notwith-
18 standing, historically, this property right (as with all property rights36)
19 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
20 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
21 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new tech-
22 nologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the “copyright” did not
23 control at all the freedom of others to build upon or transform a creative
24 work. American culture was born free, and for almost 180 years our
25 country consistently protected a vibrant and rich free culture.
26 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
27 limits on the scope of the interests protected by “property.” The very
28 birth of “copyright” as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
29 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the story
30 of chapter 6). The tradition of “fair use” is animated by a similar con-
31 cern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of exercising any fair
32S use right become unavoidably high (the story of chapter 7). Adding
33R statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another famil-
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iar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter 8). And grant- 1
ing archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect, claims of property 2
notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing the soul of a culture 3
(chapter 9). Free cultures, like free markets, are built with property. But 4
the nature of the property that builds a free culture is very different 5
from the extremist vision that dominates the debate today. 6
Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In re- 7
sponse to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the technologies of the 8
Internet present to twentieth-century business models for producing 9
and distributing culture, the law and technology are being transformed 10
in a way that will undermine our tradition of free culture. The property 11
right that is copyright is no longer the balanced right that it was, or 12
was intended to be. The property right that is copyright has become 13
unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The opportunity to create and 14
transform becomes weakened in a world in which creation requires 15
permission and creativity must check with a lawyer. 16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
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PUZZLES S32
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❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚ ❙❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❘ ❙❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚ ❙❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚

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14
CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera 15
16
In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber Co17
named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and 18
isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.1 The valley is extraordinarily 19
beautiful, with “sweet water, pasture, an even climate, slopes of rich 20
brown soil with tangles of a shrub that bore an excellent fruit.” But the 21
villagers are all blind. Nunez takes this as an opportunity. “In the 22
Country of the Blind,” he tells himself, “the One-Eyed Man is King.” 23
So he resolves to live with the villagers to explore life as a king. 24
Things don’t go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of 25
sight to the villagers. They don’t understand. He tells them they are 26
“blind.” They don’t have the word blind. They think he’s just thick. In- 27
deed, as they increasingly notice the things he can’t do (hear the sound 28
of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try to control 29
him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. “‘You don’t under- 30
stand,’ he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and resolute, and 31
which broke. ‘You are blind and I can see. Leave me alone!’” S32
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1 The villagers don’t leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak)
2 the virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his af-
3 fection, a young woman who to him seems “the most beautiful thing in
4 the whole of creation,” understands the beauty of sight. Nunez’s de-
5 scription of what he sees “seemed to her the most poetical of fancies,
6 and she listened to his description of the stars and the mountains and
7 her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty indulgence.”
8 “She did not believe,” Wells tells us, and “she could only half under-
9 stand, but she was mysteriously delighted.”
10 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his “mysteriously de-
11 lighted” love, the father and the village object. “You see, my dear,” her
12 father instructs, “he’s an idiot. He has delusions. He can’t do anything
13 right.” They take Nunez to the village doctor.
14 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. “His brain
15 is affected,” he reports.
16 “What affects it?” the father asks.
17 “Those queer things that are called the eyes . . . are diseased . . . in
18 such a way as to affect his brain.”
19 The doctor continues: “I think I may say with reasonable certainty
20 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a simple
21 and easy surgical operation—namely, to remove these irritant bodies
22 [the eyes].”
23 “Thank Heaven for science!” says the father to the doctor. They in-
24 form Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
25 (You’ll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I be-
26 lieve in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
27
28
29 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother’s
30 womb. That fusion produces a “chimera.” A chimera is a single creature
31 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
32S different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
33R
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plot for murder mysteries. “But the DNA shows with 100 percent cer- 1
tainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the scene. . . .” 2
Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were im- 3
possible. A single person can’t have two sets of DNA. The very idea of 4
DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only can two 5
individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but one person 6
can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our understanding of 7
a “person” should reflect this reality. 8
The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright 9
and culture, which I’ve sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not 10
unfairly enough, “the copyright wars,” the more I think we’re dealing 11
with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question “What is 12
p2p file sharing?” both sides have it right, and both sides have it wrong. 13
One side says, “File sharing is just like two kids taping each others’ 14
records—the sort of thing we’ve been doing for the last thirty years 15
without any question at all.” That’s true, at least in part. When I tell my 16
best friend to try out a new CD that I’ve bought, but rather than just 17
send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that is, in all relevant re- 18
spects, just like what every executive in every recording company no 19
doubt did as a kid: sharing music. 20
But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is 21
on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, 22
then sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of 23
“friends” beyond recognition to say “my ten thousand best friends” can 24
get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is 25
what “we have always been allowed to do,” we have not always been al- 26
lowed to share music with “our ten thousand best friends.” 27
Likewise, when the other side says, “File sharing is just like walking 28
into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out 29
with it,” that’s true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett (finally) re- 30
leases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa and find a free 31
copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy from Tower. S32
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1 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
2 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take
3 a CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and some-
4 thing to show on my shelves. (And, while we’re at it, we could also note
5 that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine that
6 might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is $1,000. Ac-
7 cording to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song CD, I’m li-
8 able for $1,500,000 in damages.)
9 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is that
10 it is both—both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa describes it. It
11 is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the other side as-
12 serts, we need to begin to think about how we should respond to this
13 chimera. What rules should govern it?
14 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
15 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be a
16 felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in damages
17 just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And we can get
18 universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure that no com-
19 puter is used to commit this crime. These responses might be extreme,
20 but each of them has either been proposed or actually implemented.2
21 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids
22 act as though we’ve responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there
23 be no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making copy-
24 righted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like gossip: reg-
25 ulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
26 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
27 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
28 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
29 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next chapter
30 is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the zero-tolerance
31 extreme. I believe either extreme would be worse than a reasonable al-
32S ternative. But I believe the zero-tolerance solution would be the worse
33R of the two extremes.
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Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government’s policy. In the 1

middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary land 2
grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to give con- 3
tent holders a kind of control over our culture that they have never had 4
before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new inno- 5
vation and new creativity will be lost. 6
I’m not talking about the opportunities for kids to “steal” music. My 7
focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war 8
will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so 9
broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the innova- 10
tion that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already seen the 11
passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to distribute 12
content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the vice president 13
for global public policy at one of these new innovators, eMusic.com, 14
put it when criticizing the DMCA’s added protection for copyrighted 15
material, 16
17
eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted 18
material, and we want to protect those rights. 19
But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of 20
the major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright 21
interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to an- 22
swer that question. Market forces operating naturally may very 23
well produce a totally different industry model. 24
This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make 25
with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the 26
market for digital media and the manner in which digital media 27
are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options 28
that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with 29
which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment 30
that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the 31
game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone’s S32
interests.3 R33
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1 In April 2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,

2 one of “the major labels.” Its position on these matters has now
3 changed.
4 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
5 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture, and will
6 kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32S
33R
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms 15
16
To fight “piracy,” to protect “property,” the content industry has Co17
launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have 18
now brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one 19
will have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of prohi- 20
bition, these damages will be suffered most by our own people. 21
My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in 22
particular, the consequences for “free culture.” But my aim now is to ex- 23
tend this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war jus- 24
tified? 25
In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the 26
first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the 27
power of the property called “intellectual property” is at its greatest in 28
our history. 29
Yet “common sense” does not see it this way. Common sense is still 30
on the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme 31
claims of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical S32
rejection of “piracy” still has play. R33
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1 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to

2 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
3 confident the third is unintended. I’m less sure about the first two. The
4 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
5 the wings to fight today’s monopolists of culture.
6
7
8 Constraining Creators
9
10 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital technologies.
11 These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture and share
12 content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what humans have
13 done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and communicate. But
14 capturing and sharing through digital technology is different. The fi-
15 delity and power are different. You could send an e-mail telling some-
16 one about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you could send the
17 clip. You could write an essay about the inconsistencies in the argu-
18 ments of the politician you most love to hate, or you could make a short
19 film that puts statement against statement. You could write a poem to
20 express your love, or you could weave together a string—a mash-up—
21 of songs from your favorite artists in a collage and make it available on
22 the Net.
23 This digital “capturing and sharing” is in part an extension of the
24 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture, and
25 in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but it ex-
26 plodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology of
27 digital “capturing and sharing” promises a world of extraordinarily di-
28 verse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that cre-
29 ativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of citizens
30 to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to the culture
31 all around.
32S Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
33R culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
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isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a col- 1
lection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same story- 2
telling extended across the globe. 3
Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In 4
the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for 5
a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web 6
sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites 7
that catalog cartoons from the 1960s; sites that mix images and sound 8
to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles 9
on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative 10
work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this 11
work is presumptively illegal. 12
That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the examples 13
of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to proliferate. It 14
is impossible to get a clear sense of what’s allowed and what’s not, and at 15
the same time, the penalties for crossing the line are astonishingly harsh. 16
The four students who were threatened by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of 17
chapter 3 was just one) were threatened with a $98 billion lawsuit for 18
building search engines that permitted songs to be copied. Yet World- 19
Com—which defrauded investors of $11 billion, resulting in a loss to in- 20
vestors in market capitalization of over $200 billion—received a fine of a 21
mere $750 million.1 And under legislation being pushed in Congress 22
right now, a doctor who negligently removes the wrong leg in an opera- 23
tion would be liable for no more than $250,000 in damages for pain and 24
suffering.2 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where 25
the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more 26
than the fine for a doctor’s negligently butchering a patient? 27
The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely 28
high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either 29
never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive this cre- 30
ative process underground by branding the modern-day Walt Disneys 31
“pirates.” We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a public S32
domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are designed to R33
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1 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right to cre-
2 ate, and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As was the
3 case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons, we will be-
4 gin to see a world of underground art—not because the message is nec-
5 essarily political, or because the subject is controversial, but because the
6 very act of creating the art is legally fraught. Already, exhibits of “ille-
7 gal art” tour the United States.3 In what does their “illegality” consist?
8 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
9 critical or reflective.
10 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the chang-
11 ing law. I described that change in detail in chapter 10. But an even
12 bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which infractions
13 can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems discovered in 2002, it
14 is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get courts to order Internet
15 service providers to reveal who has what content. It is as if your cassette
16 tape player transmitted a list of the songs that you played in the privacy
17 of your own home that anyone could tune into for whatever reason
18 they chose.
19 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
20 his painting infringed on someone else’s work; but the modern-day
21 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
22 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
23 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
24 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
25 market in pencils; we needn’t worry about its effect on creativity. But
26 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
27 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
28 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
29 described in chapter 7, in response to the story about documentary
30 filmmaker Jon Else, I have been lectured again and again by lawyers
31 who insist Else’s use was fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the
32S law regulates such a use.
33R
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But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to 1
defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system 2
for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad—in practically 3
every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it delivers too 4
slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection to the justice un- 5
derlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable for the very rich. 6
For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a tradition that prides it- 7
self on the rule of law. 8
Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides ade- 9
quate “breathing room” between regulation by the law and the access 10
the law should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal 11
system has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that 12
publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors impose 13
upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon journalists— 14
these are the real laws governing creativity. And these rules have little 15
relationship to the “law” with which judges comfort themselves. 16
For in a world that threatens $150,000 for a single willful infringe- 17
ment of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of dollars to 18
even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and which would 19
never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything of the costs 20
she suffered to defend her right to speak—in that world, the astonish- 21
ingly broad regulations that pass under the name “copyright” silence 22
speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes a studied blindness for 23
people to continue to believe they live in a culture that is free. 24
As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said 25
to me, 26
27
We’re losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative 28
people are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are 29
not being expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, 30
it still won’t get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made . . . you’re 31
not going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless S32
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1 you’ve got a little note from a lawyer saying, “This has been
2 cleared.” You’re not even going to get it on PBS without that kind
3 of permission. That’s the point at which they control it.
4
5
6 Constraining Innovators
7
8 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty story—creativity
9 quashed, artists who can’t speak, yada yada yada. Maybe that doesn’t
10 get you going. Maybe you think there’s enough weird art out there, and
11 enough expression that is critical of what seems to be just about every-
12 thing. And if you think that, you might think there’s little in this story
13 to worry you.
14 But there’s an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense. In-
15 deed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme pro-
16 market ideologue. And if you’re one of these sorts (and a special one at
17 that, 188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this other aspect
18 by substituting “free market” every place I’ve spoken of “free culture.”
19 The point is the same, even if the interests affecting culture are more
20 fundamental.
21 The charge I’ve been making about the regulation of culture is the
22 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone,
23 of course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary—at a
24 minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to en-
25 force both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that at
26 least some framework of copyright is also required. But both perspec-
27 tives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is good, it
28 doesn’t follow that more regulation is better. And both perspectives are
29 constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation simply enables the
30 powerful industries of today to protect themselves against the com-
31 petitors of tomorrow.
32S This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
33R strategy that I described in chapter 10. The consequence of this mas-
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sive threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright law is 1

that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely innovate 2
only if they have the sign-off from last generation’s dominant indus- 3
tries. That lesson has been taught through a series of cases that were 4
designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a lesson. That les- 5
son—what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a “nuclear pall” that 6
has fallen over the Valley—has been learned. 7
Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning 8
I told in The Future of Ideas and which has progressed in a way that 9
even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted. 10
In 1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. 11
MP3.com was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not 12
just to facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also 13
to facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels, 14
MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity, with- 15
out demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators. 16
To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable 17
way to recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative 18
was to leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recom- 19
mend new artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you’re likely to enjoy Bonnie 20
Raitt. And so on. 21
This idea required a simple way to gather data about user prefer- 22
ences. MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather 23
this preference data. In January 2000, the company launched a service 24
called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would 25
sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The soft- 26
ware would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that con- 27
tent. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then 28
wherever you were—at work or at home—you could get access to that 29
music once you signed into your account. The system was therefore a 30
kind of music-lockbox. 31
No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But S32
that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the R33
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1 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
2 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
3 the kind of content the users liked.
4 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy
5 50,000 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
6 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time, and
7 would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It therefore
8 purchased 50,000 CDs from a store, and started the process of making
9 copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content from those
10 copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they had a copy
11 of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was 50,000 copies, it
12 was 50,000 copies directed at giving customers something they had al-
13 ready bought.
14 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
15 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com
16 settled with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
17 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
18 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
19 MP3.com of $118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
20 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $54 million. Vivendi pur-
21 chased MP3.com just about a year later.
22 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
23 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and
24 filed a malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that
25 they had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would
26 be considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
27 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior ille-
28 gal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had dared
29 to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels demanded.
30 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an unspec-
31 ified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in the press)
32S was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising clients in this
33R space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content indus-
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try directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of you who be- 1
lieve the law should be less restrictive should realize that such a view of 2
the law will cost you and your firm dearly. 3
This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April 2003, 4
Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the 5
venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of 6
its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner 7
(Hank Barry).4 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have 8
recognized the right of the content industry to control how the indus- 9
try should develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a 10
company whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again, 11
the aim of the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if 12
you fund a company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs, 13
you are at risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well. 14
Your investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit. 15
So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers 16
are afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in Business 17
2.0, Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW: 18
19
I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in 20
the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW 21
engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via 22
the car’s built-in sound system, but that the company’s marketing 23
and legal departments weren’t comfortable with pushing this for- 24
ward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the 25
United States with bona fide MP3 players. . . . 5 26
27
This is the world of the mafia—filled with “your money or your 28
life” offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats that the 29
law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system that will ob- 30
viously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard enough to start 31
a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is constantly threat- S32
ened by litigation. R33
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1 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
2 enterprises. The point is the definition of “illegal.” The law is a mess of
3 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
4 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and
5 by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law im-
6 poses, that uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more conserv-
7 ative than is right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking
8 tickets, we’d not only have fewer parking tickets, we’d also have much
9 less driving. The same principle applies to innovation. If innovation is
10 constantly checked by this uncertain and unlimited liability, we will
11 have much less vibrant innovation and much less creativity.
12 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
13 use. Whatever the “real” law is, realism about the effect of law in both
14 contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation will sys-
15 tematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect some indus-
16 tries and some creators, but it will harm industry and creativity
17 generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant competi-
18 tion. Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this kind of competi-
19 tion. The effect is to produce an overregulated culture, just as the effect
20 of too much control in the market is to produce an overregulated-
21 regulated market.
22 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
23 the first important way in which the changes I have described will bur-
24 den innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer’s culture—a cul-
25 ture in which the ability to create requires a call to your lawyer. Again,
26 I am not antilawyer, at least when they’re kept in their proper place. I
27 am certainly not antilaw. But our profession has lost the sense of its
28 limits. And leaders in our profession have lost an appreciation of the
29 high costs that our profession imposes upon others. The inefficiency of
30 the law is an embarrassment to our tradition. And while I believe our
31 profession should therefore do everything it can to make the law more
32S efficient, it should at least do everything it can to limit the reach of the
33R
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law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried 1
within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of creativ- 2
ity. Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that result. 3
4
5
The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There is 6
a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by many 7
in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the technol- 8
ogy of the Internet so that it better protects their content. 9
The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables 10
the efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the Inter- 11
net’s design. But from the perspective of the content industry, this fea- 12
ture is a “bug.” The efficient spread of content means that content 13
distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution of content. 14
One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make the Internet 15
less efficient. If the Internet enables “piracy,” then, this response says, 16
we should break the kneecaps of the Internet. 17
The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of 18
the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that 19
would require computers to determine whether the content they access 20
is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.6 Con- 21
gress has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory “broad- 22
cast flag” that would be required on any device capable of transmitting 23
digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable the copying of 24
any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other members of 25
Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from liability 26
for technology they might deploy that would hunt down copyright vi- 27
olators and disable their machines.7 28
In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the 29
code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any regu- 30
lation of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular 31
technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on S32
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1 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly

2 those requirements.
3 In March 2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
4 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
5 impose.8 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not
6 be protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
7 harm than good.
8
9
10 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed in-
11 novation—again, a story that will be quite familiar to the free market
12 crowd.
13 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
14 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
15 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
16 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
17 As I described in chapter 10, despite this feature of copyright as
18 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica
19 Litman in her book Digital Copyright,9 overall this history of copyright
20 is not bad. As chapter 10 details, when new technologies have come
21 along, Congress has struck a balance to assure that the new is protected
22 from the old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses have been one part of
23 that strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR) has been another.
24 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
25 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
26 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
27 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
28 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
29 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.10 It has been
30 mirrored in the responses threatened and actually implemented by
31 Congress. I won’t catalog all of those responses here.11 But there is one
32S example that captures the flavor of them all. This is the story of the de-
33R mise of Internet radio.
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As I described in chapter 4, when a radio station plays a song, the 1

recording artist doesn’t get paid for that “radio performance” unless he 2
or she is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had 3
recorded a version of “Happy Birthday”—to memorialize her famous 4
performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden— 5
then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current copy- 6
right owners of “Happy Birthday” would get some money, whereas 7
Marilyn Monroe would not. 8
The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some 9
sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The 10
recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the radio 11
station was making it more likely that her records would be purchased. 12
Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only indirectly. Prob- 13
ably this reasoning had less to do with the result than with the power 14
of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good at stopping any ef- 15
forts to get Congress to require compensation to the recording artists. 16
Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a technol- 17
ogy to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The broadcast 18
travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio spectrum. 19
Thus, I can “tune in” to an Internet radio station in Berlin while sitting 20
in San Francisco, even though there’s no way for me to tune in to a reg- 21
ular radio station much beyond the San Francisco metropolitan area. 22
This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there 23
are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user could 24
tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing architecture 25
for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the number of broad- 26
casters and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio could therefore 27
be more competitive than regular radio; it could provide a wider range 28
of selections. And because the potential audience for Internet radio is 29
the whole world, niche stations could easily develop and market their 30
content to a relatively large number of users worldwide. According to 31
some estimates, more than eighty million users worldwide have tuned S32
in to this new form of radio. R33
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1 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an im-

2 provement potentially vastly more significant than the FM improve-
3 ment over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too, is the
4 competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the fight to es-
5 tablish FM radio and the fight to protect Internet radio. As one author
6 describes Howard Armstrong’s struggle to enable FM radio,
7
8 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on ra-
10 dio in the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the
11 number of stations would be limited only by economics and com-
12 petition rather than by technical restrictions. . . . Armstrong
13 likened the situation that had grown up in radio to that following
14 the invention of the printing press, when governments and ruling
15 interests attempted to control this new instrument of mass com-
16 munications by imposing restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny
17 was broken only when it became possible for men freely to ac-
18 quire printing presses and freely to run them. FM in this sense
19 was as great an invention as the printing presses, for it gave radio
20 the opportunity to strike off its shackles.12
21
22 This potential for FM radio was never realized—not because Arm-
23 strong was wrong about the technology, but because he underestimated
24 the power of “vested interests, habits, customs and legislation”13 to re-
25 tard the growth of this competing technology.
26 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
27 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
28 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
29 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
30 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
31 radio?
32S But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
33R new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
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powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the phe- 1
nomenon of Internet radio in 1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress 2
to adopt a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to 3
terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our hypo- 4
thetical Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording of 5
“Happy Birthday” on the air, Internet radio does. Not only is the law not 6
neutral toward Internet radio—the law actually burdens Internet radio 7
more than it burdens terrestrial radio. 8
This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor 9
William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed ad- 10
free popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four 11
hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be 12
over $1 million a year.14 A regular radio station broadcasting the same 13
content would pay no equivalent fee. 14
The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were 15
proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio station) 16
would have to collect the following data from every listening transaction: 17
18
1. name of the service; 19
2. channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID); 20
3. type of program (archived/looped/live); 21
4. date of transmission; 22
5. time of transmission; 23
6. time zone of origination of transmission; 24
7. numeric designation of the place of the sound recording 25
within the program; 26
8. duration of transmission (to nearest second); 27
9. sound recording title; 28
10. ISRC code of the recording; 29
11. release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case 30
of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- 31
right date of the track; S32
12. featured recording artist; R33
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1 13. retail album title;

2 14. recording label;
3 15. UPC code of the retail album;
4 16. catalog number;
5 17. copyright owner information;
6 18. musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
7 19. name of the service or entity;
8 20. channel or program;
9 21. date and time that the user logged in (in the user’s time zone);
10 22. date and time that the user logged out (in the user’s time zone);
11 23. time zone where the signal was received (user);
12 24. Unique User identifier;
13 25. the country in which the user received the transmissions.
14
15 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
16 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
17 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
18 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
19 Internet radio has to pay a type of copyright fee that terrestrial radio
20 does not.
21 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
22 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
23 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
24 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed ob-
25 vious to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
26 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
27
28 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
29 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
30 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
31 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
32S the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
33R webcasters asked the RIAA, . . . “How do you come up with a
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rate that’s so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio? Be- 1
cause here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who 2
want to pay, and that should establish the market rate, and if you 3
set the rate so high, you’re going to drive the small webcasters out 4
of business. . . .” 5
And the RIAA experts said, “Well, we don’t really model this 6
as an industry with thousands of webcasters, we think it should be 7
an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a 8
high rate and it’s a stable, predictable market.” (Emphasis added.) 9
10
Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so 11
that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would 12
cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not 13
cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right 14
or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is 15
practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything 16
effective to prevent it. 17
18
19
Corrupting Citizens 20
21
Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives di- 22
nosaurs a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity 23
for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables. 24
In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was 25
important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation 26
corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law. 27
The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with 28
every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very 29
large number of citizens. According to The New York Times, 43 million 30
Americans downloaded music in May 2002.15 According to the RIAA, 31
the behavior of those 43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a S32
set of rules that transform 20 percent of America into criminals. As the R33
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1 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
2 the world, but against students building search engines, and increas-
3 ingly against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
4 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
5 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more ex-
6 treme response by the other.
7 The content industry’s tactics exploit the failings of the American
8 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
10 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
11 ($15,000,000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
12 paying all the money in the world in damages ($250,000 in legal fees)
13 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
14 ($12,000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
15 RIAA’s suits against individual users. In September 2003, the RIAA
16 sued 261 individuals—including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
17 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
18 was.16 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to de-
19 fend against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
20 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $2,000
21 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
22 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
23 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
24 they oppose.
25 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
26 something more extreme than anything we’ve seen before. We experi-
27 mented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita con-
28 sumption of alcohol was 1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war against
29 drinking initially reduced that consumption to just 30 percent of its
30 preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition, consumption was
31 up to 70 percent of the preprohibition level. Americans were drinking
32S just about as much, but now, a vast number were criminals.17 We have
33R
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launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regu- 1

lated narcotics that 7 percent (or 16 million) Americans now use.18 2
That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in 1979 of 14 percent of the 3
population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast ma- 4
jority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex 5
tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly cheat.19 We 6
pride ourselves on our “free society,” but an endless array of ordinary 7
behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a huge pro- 8
portion of Americans regularly violate at least some law. 9
This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly 10
salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law students 11
about the importance of “ethics.” As my colleague Charlie Nesson told 12
a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands of students 13
who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed alcohol and 14
sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes, illegally driven 15
cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is increasingly the 16
norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to teach them how 17
to behave ethically—how to say no to bribes, or keep client funds sep- 18
arate, or honor a demand to disclose a document that will mean that 19
your case is over. Generations of Americans—more significantly in 20
some parts of America than in others, but still, everywhere in America 21
today—can’t live their lives both normally and legally, since “normally” 22
entails a certain degree of illegality. 23
The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law 24
more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn how 25
to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense de- 26
pends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both in- 27
tended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended and 28
collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be changed. 29
Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much greater than 30
the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason to consider the 31
alternative. S32
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1 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
2 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
3 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
4 that wouldn’t make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
5 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
6 My point is instead one that democracies understood for gen-
7 erations, but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law
8 depends upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more re-
9 peatedly, we as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect
10 the law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
11 respect for the law. I don’t care whether the rapist respects the law or
12 not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care whether
13 my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law sow in-
14 creasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they impose.
15 Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet intro-
16 duced this different idea of “sharing.” We need to be able to call these
17 twenty million Americans “citizens,” not “felons.”
18 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from
19 the Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
20 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be ask-
21 ing is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should be
22 whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to achieve
23 the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another way to
24 assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three million
25 Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other ways to
26 assure that artists get paid without transforming America into a nation
27 of felons?
28 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
29 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These
30 pieces of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought.
31 The law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a copy-
32S right infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a used
33R
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record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That “use” of the 1
recordings is free. 2
But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of 3
phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings 4
were made without copy-protection technologies, I am “free” to copy, 5
or “rip,” music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed, 6
Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that “freedom” was a right: 7
In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the “Rip, Mix, Burn” ca- 8
pacities of digital technologies. 9
This “use” of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large 10
process at home of ripping all of my and my wife’s CDs, and storing 11
them in one archive. Then, using Apple’s iTunes, or a wonderful pro- 12
gram called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our music: 13
Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant Others—the 14
potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of mixing play lists, 15
these technologies help build a creativity with play lists that is itself in- 16
dependently valuable. Compilations of songs are creative and mean- 17
ingful in their own right. 18
This use is enabled by unprotected media—either CDs or records. 19
But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens 20
(or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn a fair 21
return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to experi- 22
ment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These tech- 23
nologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be ripped. Or 24
they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content on people’s 25
machines. 26
If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of 27
your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in 28
hacker circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that pro- 29
tect the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that 30
doesn’t bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people, 31
these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving S32
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1 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
2 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
3 plastic or were part of a massively complex “digital rights manage-
4 ment” system.
5 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
6 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to inter-
7 fere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But what
8 if there were another way to assure that artists are paid, without lock-
9 ing down any content? What if, in other words, a different system
10 could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the freedom
11 to move content easily?
12 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I of-
13 fer a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
14 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different system
15 achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing copyright sys-
16 tem achieved, but left consumers and creators much more free, then
17 we’d have a very good reason to pursue this alternative—namely, free-
18 dom. The choice, in other words, would not be between property and
19 piracy; the choice would be between different property systems and the
20 freedoms each allowed.
21 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without turn-
22 ing forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient feature
23 of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different market for
24 producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few, who today
25 control the vast majority of the distribution of content in the world,
26 would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather, they would go
27 the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
28 Except that this generation’s buggy manufacturers have already
29 saddled Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against
30 this new form of competition. For them the choice is between forty-
31 three million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
32S It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not under-
33R standable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
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Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a tra- 1

dition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture. 2
3
4
There’s one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly im- 5
portant to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of prohibi- 6
tion. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von Lohmann 7
describes, this is the “collateral damage” that “arises whenever you turn 8
a very large percentage of the population into criminals.” This is the 9
collateral damage to civil liberties generally. 10
“If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker,” von Lohmann 11
explains, 12
13
then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections evapo- 14
rate to one degree or another. . . . If you’re a copyright infringer, 15
how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you’re a copyright 16
infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of your 17
computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet 18
access? . . . Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, “Oh, 19
well, but that person’s a criminal, a lawbreaker.” Well, what this 20
campaign against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable per- 21
centage of the American Internet-using population into “law- 22
breakers.” 23
24
And the consequence of this transformation of the American public 25
into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to 26
effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume. 27
Users of the Internet began to see this generally in 2003 as the 28
RIAA launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn 29
over the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating 30
copyright law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple re- 31
quest to a judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the S32
identity of an Internet user is revealed. R33
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1 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general

2 strategy to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
3 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we’ve
4 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a fam-
5 ily’s computer is used to download a single CD’s worth of music, the
6 family could be liable for $2 million in damages. That didn’t stop the
7 RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
8 Jesse Jordan.20
9 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
10 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
11 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.21 Using a sophisticated
12 hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in effect a fingerprint of
13 every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of one of those MP3s will
14 have the same “fingerprint.”
15 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
16 friend gives a CD to your daughter—a collection of songs just like the
17 cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don’t know, and neither does
18 your daughter, where these songs came from. But she copies these
19 songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to college and
20 connects it to a college network, and if the college network is “cooper-
21 ating” with the RIAA’s espionage, and she hasn’t properly protected
22 her content from the network (do you know how to do that yourself ?),
23 then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter as a “criminal.”
24 And under the rules that universities are beginning to deploy,22 your
25 daughter can lose the right to use the university’s computer network.
26 She can, in some cases, be expelled.
27 Now, of course, she’ll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
28 a lawyer for her (at $300 per hour, if you’re lucky), and she can plead
29 that she didn’t know anything about the source of the songs or that
30 they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university believes
31 her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat this “con-
32S traband” as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of college students
33R
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have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in 1

the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different. 2
Says von Lohmann, 3
4
So when we’re talking about numbers like forty to sixty million 5
Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a 6
situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in 7
peril in a general matter. [I don’t] think [there is any] analog 8
where you could randomly choose any person off the street and be 9
confident that they were committing an unlawful act that could 10
put them on the hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of 11
millions of dollars of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but 12
speeding isn’t the kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit 13
civil liberties. Some people use drugs, and I think that’s the clos- 14
est analog, [but] many have noted that the war against drugs has 15
eroded all of our civil liberties because it’s treated so many Amer- 16
icans as criminals. Well, I think it’s fair to say that file sharing 17
is an order of magnitude larger number of Americans than drug 18
use. . . . If forty to sixty million Americans have become law- 19
breakers, then we’re really on a slippery slope to lose a lot of civil 20
liberties for all forty to sixty million of them. 21
22
When forty to sixty million Americans are considered “criminals” 23
under the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective— 24
securing rights to authors—without these millions being considered 25
“criminals,” who is the villain? Americans or the law? Which is Amer- 26
ican, a constant war on our own people or a concerted effort through 27
our democracy to change our law? 28
29
30
31
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2
3
4
5
6
7
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9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
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30
31
BALANCES S32
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So here’s the picture: You’re standing at the side of the road. Your Po17
car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start 18
the fire. Now you don’t know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket, 19
filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won’t put the fire out. 20
As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she 21
grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to stop—or be- 22
fore she understands just why she should stop—the bucket is in the air. 23
The gasoline is about to hit the blazing car. And the fire that gasoline 24
will ignite is about to ignite everything around. 25
26
27
A war about copyright rages all around—and we’re all focusing on the 28
wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing busi- 29
nesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies change. 30
The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use technology 31
to protect themselves against the current threats of the Internet. This S32
is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out. R33
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1 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
2 with plenty of lobbyists’ money, they are keen to intervene to eliminate
3 the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is not the real
4 threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small fire in the cor-
5 ner, there is a massive change in the way culture is made that is hap-
6 pening all around.
7 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more im-
8 portant and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to
9 avoid pouring gasoline onto this fire.
10 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a sim-
11 pler, binary view. However much many people push to frame this de-
12 bate more broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We
13 rubberneck to look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on
14 the road.
15 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
16 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small brace
17 of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this debate. We must
18 understand these failures if we’re to understand what success will re-
19 quire.
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32S
33R
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred 15
16
In 1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn’t seem to like Co17
Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at least 18
one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer program- 19
mer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the 20
Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and 21
explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author’s work 22
come alive. 23
It didn’t work—at least for his daughters. They didn’t find Haw- 24
thorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred’s experiment gave 25
birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build a 26
library of public domain works by scanning these works and making 27
them available for free. 28
Eldred’s library was not simply a copy of certain public domain 29
works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people 30
across the world who can’t get access to printed versions of these 31
works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these S32
public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more R33
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1 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne,

2 and many others, into a form more accessible—technically accessi-
3 ble—today.
4 Eldred’s freedom to do this with Hawthorne’s work grew from the
5 same source as Disney’s. Hawthorne’s Scarlet Letter had passed into the
6 public domain in 1907. It was free for anyone to take without the per-
7 mission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
8 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
9 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
11 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (Cinderella), sometimes not
12 (The Hunchback of Notre Dame, Treasure Planet). These are all commer-
13 cial publications of public domain works.
14 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications
15 of public domain works. Eldred’s is just one example. There are liter-
16 ally thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world
17 have discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share
18 works that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we
19 might call the “noncommercial publishing industry,” which before the
20 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or so-
21 cial causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of individu-
22 als and groups dedicated to spreading culture generally.1
23 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In 1998, Robert Frost’s
24 collection of poems New Hampshire was slated to pass into the public
25 domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in his free public library.
26 But Congress got in the way. As I described in chapter 10, in 1998, for
27 the eleventh time in forty years, Congress extended the terms of exist-
28 ing copyrights—this time by twenty years. Eldred would not be free to
29 add any works more recent than 1923 to his collection until 2019. In-
30 deed, no copyrighted work would pass into the public domain until
31 that year (and not even then, if Congress extends the term again). By
32S contrast, in the same period, more than 1 million patents will pass into
33R the public domain.
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This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act 1

(CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician 2
Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that “copy- 3
rights should be forever.”2 4
Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through 5
civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he 6
would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a 7
second law passed in 1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act 8
of publishing would make Eldred a felon—whether or not anyone 9
complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer 10
to undertake. 11
It was here that I became involved in Eldred’s battle. I was a con- 12
stitutional scholar whose first passion was constitutional interpreta- 13
tion. And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the 14
Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as impor- 15
tantly different. As you know, the Constitution says, 16
17
Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science . . . 18
by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . exclusive Right to 19
their . . . Writings. . . . 20
21
As I’ve described, this clause is unique within the power-granting 22
clause of Article I, section 8 of our Constitution. Every other clause 23
granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do 24
something—for example, to regulate “commerce among the several 25
states” or “declare War.” But here, the “something” is something quite spe- 26
cific—to “promote . . . Progress”—through means that are also specific— 27
by “securing” “exclusive Rights” (i.e., copyrights) “for limited Times.” 28
In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of ex- 29
tending existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me 30
about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, 31
then the Constitution’s requirement that terms be “limited” will have S32
no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire, Con- R33
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1 gress has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve what
2 the Constitution plainly forbids—perpetual terms “on the installment
3 plan,” as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
4 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
5 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious con-
6 sideration of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress’s
7 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
8 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that the
9 practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
11 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to
12 keep this gravy train going.
13 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
14 government. “Corruption” not in the sense that representatives are bribed.
15 Rather, “corruption” in the sense that the system induces the benefici-
16 aries of Congress’s acts to raise and give money to Congress to induce
17 it to act. There’s only so much time; there’s only so much Congress can
18 do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must do—and those
19 things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
20 If that’s not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you’re one
21 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
22 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
23 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in 1963. His poetry contin-
24 ues to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate bene-
25 fits greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher would
26 pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be published
27 by anyone for free.
28 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $100,000 a year from
29 three of Frost’s poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
30 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
31 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
32S report:
33R “Next year,” the adviser announces, “our copyrights in works A, B,
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and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be 1
receiving the annual royalty check of $100,000 from the publishers of 2
those works. 3
“There’s a proposal in Congress, however,” she continues, “that 4
could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the 5
terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily 6
valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes.” 7
“Hope?” a fellow board member says. “Can’t we be doing something 8
about it?” 9
“Well, obviously, yes,” the adviser responds. “We could contribute 10
to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that 11
they support the bill.” 12
You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want 13
to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. “How much 14
would we get if this extension were passed?” you ask the adviser. “How 15
much is it worth?” 16
“Well,” the adviser says, “if you’re confident that you will continue 17
to get at least $100,000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the 18
‘discount rate’ that we use to evaluate estate investments (6 percent), 19
then this law would be worth $1,146,000 to the estate.” 20
You’re a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the 21
correct conclusion: 22
“So you’re saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than 23
$1,000,000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those con- 24
tributions would assure that the bill was passed?” 25
“Absolutely,” the adviser responds. “It is worth it to you to con- 26
tribute up to the ‘present value’ of the income you expect from these 27
copyrights. Which for us means over $1,000,000.” 28
You quickly get the point—you as the member of the board and, I 29
trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every 30
beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same 31
choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights, S32
they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time copy- R33
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1 rights are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get

2 the copyright term extended.
3 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as legisla-
4 tion can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
5 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
6 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono Copy-
7 right Term Extension Act, this “theory” about incentives was proved
8 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
9 received the maximum contribution from Disney’s political action
10 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received contri-
11 butions.3 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
12 $1.5 million lobbying in the 1998 election cycle. They paid out more
13 than $200,000 in campaign contributions.4 Disney is estimated to have
14 contributed more than $800,000 to reelection campaigns in the 1998
15 cycle.5
16
17
18 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
19 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred’s complaint, this re-
20 ality about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
21 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
22 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
23 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
24 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be “lim-
25 ited.” If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
26 and again.
27 It was also my judgment that this Supreme Court would not allow
28 Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to the Supreme
29 Court’s work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted the power
30 of Congress when it has viewed Congress’s actions as exceeding the
31 power granted to it by the Constitution. Among constitutional schol-
32S ars, the most famous example of this trend was the Supreme Court’s
33R
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decision in 1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of 1

guns near schools. 2
Since 1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress’s granted 3
powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the 4
power to regulate only “commerce among the several states” (aka “in- 5
terstate commerce”), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to 6
include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected inter- 7
state commerce. 8
As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there 9
was no limit to Congress’s power to regulate, since just about every ac- 10
tivity, when considered on a national scale, affects interstate commerce. 11
A Constitution designed to limit Congress’s power was instead inter- 12
preted to impose no limit. 13
The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist’s command, 14
changed that in United States v. Lopez. The government had argued 15
that possessing guns near schools affected interstate commerce. Guns 16
near schools increase crime, crime lowers property values, and so on. In 17
the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the government whether 18
there was any activity that would not affect interstate commerce under 19
the reasoning the government advanced. The government said there 20
was not; if Congress says an activity affects interstate commerce, then 21
that activity affects interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, the gov- 22
ernment said, was not in the position to second-guess Congress. 23
“We pause to consider the implications of the government’s argu- 24
ments,” the Chief Justice wrote.6 If anything Congress says is interstate 25
commerce must therefore be considered interstate commerce, then 26
there would be no limit to Congress’s power. The decision in Lopez was 27
reaffirmed five years later in United States v. Morrison.7 28
If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress 29
Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.8 And if it is applied to the 30
Progress Clause, the principle should yield the conclusion that Con- 31
gress can’t extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an exist- S32
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1 ing term, then there would be no “stopping point” to Congress’s power

2 over terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such
3 a limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant copy-
4 rights should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the term of
5 existing copyrights.
6 If, that is, the principle announced in Lopez stood for a principle.
7 Many believed the decision in Lopez stood for politics—a conservative
8 Supreme Court, which believed in states’ rights, using its power over
9 Congress to advance its own personal political preferences. But I re-
10 jected that view of the Supreme Court’s decision. Indeed, shortly after
11 the decision, I wrote an article demonstrating the “fidelity” in such an
12 interpretation of the Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court
13 decides cases based upon its politics struck me as extraordinarily bor-
14 ing. I was not going to devote my life to teaching constitutional law if
15 these nine Justices were going to be petty politicians.
16
17
18 Now let’s pause for a moment to make sure we understand what
19 the argument in Eldred was not about. By insisting on the Constitu-
20 tion’s limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing piracy.
21 Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of piracy—piracy of
22 the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his work and when Walt
23 Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright term was just
24 fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and Disney had al-
25 ready enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their work. They had
26 gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution envisions: In
27 exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years, they created new
28 work. But now these entities were using their power—expressed
29 through the power of lobbyists’ money—to get another twenty-year
30 dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop would be taken from the
31 public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a piracy that affects us all.
32S Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
33R
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before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association 1

wrote that the public domain is nothing more than “legal piracy.”9 But 2
it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional system, 3
our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution’s requirements, 4
but that doesn’t make the Constitution a pirate’s charter. 5
As we’ve seen, our constitutional system requires limits on copy- 6
right as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily influ- 7
ence the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric 8
Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright 9
terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We 10
have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have 11
not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be 12
bought to extend them again. 13
14
15
It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being ex- 16
tended. Mickey Mouse and “Rhapsody in Blue.” These works are too 17
valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our soci- 18
ety from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains Dis- 19
ney’s. Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works 20
from the 1920s and 1930s that have continuing commercial value. The 21
real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The 22
real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially ex- 23
ploited, and no longer available as a result. 24
If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (1923 to 25
1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 26
2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the 27
copyright holders for that 2 percent who pushed the CTEA through. 28
But the law and its effect were not limited to that 2 percent. The law 29
extended the terms of copyright generally.10 30
Think practically about the consequence of this extension—practi- 31
cally, as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal S32
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1 work. In 1930, 10,047 books were published. In 2000, 174 of those

2 books were still in print. Let’s say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
3 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the re-
4 maining 9,873. What would you have to do?
5 Well, first, you’d have to determine which of the 9,873 books were
6 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
7 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
8 titles and authors of the 9,873 books with the copyright registration
9 and renewal records for works published in 1930. That will produce a
10 list of books still under copyright.
11 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
12 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
13 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright own-
14 ers somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
15 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
16 being at least a list?
17 But there is no list. There may be a name from 1930, and then in
18 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think prac-
19 tically about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down thou-
20 sands of such records—especially since the person who registered is
21 not necessarily the current owner. And we’re just talking about 1930!
22 “But there isn’t a list of who owns property generally,” the apolo-
23 gists for the system respond. “Why should there be a list of copyright
24 owners?”
25 Well, actually, if you think about it, there are plenty of lists of who
26 owns what property. Think about deeds on houses, or titles to cars.
27 And where there isn’t a list, the code of real space is pretty good at sug-
28 gesting who the owner of a bit of property is. (A swing set in your
29 backyard is probably yours.) So formally or informally, we have a pretty
30 good way to know who owns what tangible property.
31 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
32S owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
33R a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
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car. If you see a bunch of children’s toys sitting on the front lawn of a 1
house, it’s fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you hap- 2
pen to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look 3
around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don’t see any 4
kids, then okay: Here’s a bit of property whose owner we can’t easily 5
determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily 6
know quite well who owns what property. 7
Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library. 8
The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I’ve al- 9
ready described, there’s no list of copyright owners. There are authors’ 10
names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or 11
passed down in an estate like Grandma’s old jewelry. To know who 12
owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom 13
line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in 14
which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner’s 15
permission, the property isn’t going to be used. 16
The consequence with respect to old books is that they won’t be 17
digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the conse- 18
quence for other creative works is much more dire. 19
Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Stu- 20
dios, which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee 21
is a direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films 22
were made between 1921 and 1951. Only one of these films, The Lucky 23
Dog, is currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after 24
1923 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee 25
controls the exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great 26
deal of money. According to one estimate, “Roach has sold about 27
60,000 videocassettes and 50,000 DVDs of the duo’s silent films.”11 28
Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare 29
virtue in this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the 30
Supreme Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act 31
will, if left standing, destroy a whole generation of American film. S32
His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has R33
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1 any continuing commercial value. The rest—to the extent it survives at

2 all—sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that some of this work not
3 now commercially valuable will be deemed to be valuable by the own-
4 ers of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the commercial benefit
5 from the work must exceed the costs of making the work available for
6 distribution.
7 We can’t know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
8 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
9 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10 it cost more than $10,000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
11 film in 1993, it can now cost as little as $100 to digitize one hour of 8
12 mm film.12
13 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most impor-
14 tant. Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
15 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
16 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
17 locate the copyright owner.
18 Or more accurately, owners. As we’ve seen, there isn’t only a single
19 copyright associated with a film; there are many. There isn’t a single
20 person whom you can contact about those copyrights; there are as
21 many as can hold the rights, which turns out to be an extremely large
22 number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights to these films is excep-
23 tionally high.
24 “But can’t you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
25 copyright owner when she shows up?” Sure, if you want to commit a
26 felony. And even if you’re not worried about committing a felony, when
27 she does show up, she’ll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
28 have made. So, if you’re successful, you can be fairly confident you’ll be
29 getting a call from someone’s lawyer. And if you’re not successful, you
30 won’t make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
31 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
32S to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won’t make any money.
33R For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
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these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the ben- 1
efit would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old 2
films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until 3
the copyright expires. 4
But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will 5
have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and 6
nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal can- 7
isters in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more 8
than dust. 9
10
11
Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny 12
fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the 13
copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction, 14
the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the cre- 15
ative work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an “engine of 16
free expression.” 17
But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the 18
creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I’ve indi- 19
cated, most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of 20
music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving. 21
And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial dis- 22
tributors, the commercial life ends. 23
Yet that doesn’t mean the life of the creative work ends. We don’t 24
keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes & Noble, and 25
we don’t have archives of films because we expect people to choose be- 26
tween spending Friday night watching new movies and spending Fri- 27
day night watching a 1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life 28
of culture is important and valuable—for entertainment but also, and 29
more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and 30
where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we 31
have, we need to have access to this history. S32
Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression. R33
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1 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in

2 this context do no good.
3 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
4 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
5 copyright-related use that would be inhibited by an exclusive right.
6 When a book went out of print, you could not buy it from a publisher.
7 But you could still buy it from a used book store, and when a used book
8 store sells it, in America, at least, there is no need to pay the copyright
9 owner anything. Thus, the ordinary use of a book after its commercial
10 life ended was a use that was independent of copyright law.
11 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
12 a film—the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs—were so high, it
13 was never at all feasible to preserve or restore film. Like the remains of
14 a great dinner, when it’s over, it’s over. Once a film passed out of its
15 commercial life, it may have been archived for a bit, but that was the
16 end of its life so long as the market didn’t have more to offer.
17 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
18 of our history, long copyrights wouldn’t have mattered for the works
19 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
20 would not have interfered with anything.
21 But this situation has now changed.
22 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
23 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
24 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
25 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
26 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone, forever. Once
27 a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it and make it avail-
28 able to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give new life to copy-
29 righted material after it passes out of its commercial life. It is now
30 possible to preserve and assure universal access to this knowledge and
31 culture, whereas before it was not.
32S And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of produc-
33R
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ing this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right of 1
copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires permis- 2
sion of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any other 3
aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make these 4
things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who just want 5
to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were written for a rad- 6
ically different context. 7
Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: 8
Now that technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, 9
the law gets in the way. And it doesn’t get in the way for any useful 10
copyright purpose, for the purpose of copyright is to enable the com- 11
mercial market that spreads culture. No, we are talking about culture 12
after it has lived its commercial life. In this context, copyright is serv- 13
ing no purpose at all related to the spread of knowledge. In this con- 14
text, copyright is not an engine of free expression. Copyright is a brake. 15
You may well ask, “But if digital technologies lower the costs for 16
Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too. 17
So won’t Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading 18
culture widely?” 19
Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest 20
that publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes & Noble 21
offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that elimi- 22
nate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role of a li- 23
brary is to serve what “the market” would demand. But if you think the 24
role of a library is bigger than this—if you think its role is to archive 25
culture, whether there’s a demand for any particular bit of that culture 26
or not—then we can’t count on the commercial market to do our li- 27
brary work for us. 28
I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We 29
should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable 30
culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the 31
market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the S32
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1 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American cul-
2 ture, 94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between 1923
3 and 1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
4 commercial market, if access is a value, then 6 percent is a failure to
5 provide that value.13
6
7
8 In January 1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred’s behalf in fed-
9 eral district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
10 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
11 central claims that we made were (1) that extending existing terms vio-
12 lated the Constitution’s “limited Times” requirement, and (2) that ex-
13 tending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
14 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an ar-
15 gument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also dis-
16 missed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
17 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
18 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
19 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
20 copyrights be for “limited Times” only. His argument was as elegant as
21 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
22 “stopping point” to Congress’s power under the Copyright Clause. The
23 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
24 terms that are “limited.” Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had to
25 interpret the term “limited Times” to give it meaning. And the best in-
26 terpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
27 power to extend existing terms.
28 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
29 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
30 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
31 whole, where the court will sit “en banc” to hear the case.
32S The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
33R This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
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D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the 1
most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had over- 2
stepped its bounds. 3
It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the 4
Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It 5
hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand 6
appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a 7
statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute. 8
But in February 2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by 9
granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument 10
was set for October of 2002. The summer would be spent writing 11
briefs and preparing for argument. 12
13
14
It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still astonishingly 15
hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you know that we 16
lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just the mini- 17
mum, you probably think there was no way this case could have been 18
won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives by 19
well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of 20
this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more sig- 21
nificant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred. 22
But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have 23
been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to 24
retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own 25
mistake lost it. 26
27
28
The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the 29
very end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an ex- 30
traordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had moved 31
to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of heat S32
from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They ig- R33
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1 nored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
2 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
3 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
4 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
5 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
6 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
7 told me, if we could make the issue seem “important” to the Supreme
8 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
9 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against “the
10 most powerful media companies in the world.”
11 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
12 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
13 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
14 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
15 “right” as in “true,” I thought, but it is “wrong” as in “it just shouldn’t be
16 that way.” As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
17 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
18 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful in-
19 terpretation of what the First Amendment means would yield the
20 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is uncon-
21 stitutional, I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
22 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
23 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the Constitu-
24 tion, so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress’s
25 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
26 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
27 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
28 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
29 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
30 weren’t convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
31 didn’t need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
32S why it was unconstitutional.
33R There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
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and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced 1

that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were 2
just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was 3
not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed that 4
this field of review was simply the preference of a small political minor- 5
ity. Although my focus in the case was not to demonstrate how bad the 6
Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it was unconstitutional, 7
my hope was to make this argument against a background of briefs that 8
covered the full range of political views. To show that this claim against 9
the CTEA was grounded in law and not politics, then, we tried to 10
gather the widest range of credible critics—credible not because they 11
were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated 12
that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one’s politics. 13
The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly’s organization, 14
Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the very be- 15
ginning. Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by Congress. In 16
November 1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking the Repub- 17
lican Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote, “Do you 18
sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to narrow 19
special interests slide easily through the intricate legislative process, 20
while bills that benefit the general public seem to get bogged down?” 21
The answer, as the editorial documented, was the power of money. 22
Schlafly enumerated Disney’s contributions to the key players on the 23
committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey Mouse twenty 24
more years in Disney’s control, Schlafly argued. 25
In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief sup- 26
porting our position. Their brief made the argument that became the 27
core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of 28
existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress’s power to set terms. 29
That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong conservative 30
judge, Judge Sentelle. 31
In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse S32
as it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free R33
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1 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/

2 Linux possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of un-
3 certainty by Intel. There were two law professors’ briefs, one by copy-
4 right scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
5 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world’s experts in the his-
6 tory of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief by
7 Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
8 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
9 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
10 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
12 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the ar-
13 gument I’ve already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued that
14 unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film would
15 disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely clear.
16 This economists’ brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
17 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
18 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The econo-
19 mists, as the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
20 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
21 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do anything
22 to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were nothing more
23 than “rent-seeking”—the fancy term economists use to describe
24 special-interest legislation gone wild.
25 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gath-
26 ered to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been
27 with us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court,
28 we added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court:
29 Alan Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group
30 that had made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories
31 in the Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and
32S dean, Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
33R
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who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and fi- 1
nally, former solicitor general Charles Fried. 2
Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor 3
general was hired by the other side to defend Congress’s power to give 4
media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried 5
was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand 6
up for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan’s chief 7
lawyer in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that 8
limited Congress’s power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And 9
while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I per- 10
sonally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of confidence in 11
our argument. 12
The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of 13
friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these “friends” included 14
historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were 15
written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and 16
copyright holders. 17
The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to 18
gain from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either—they 19
were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of contribu- 20
tions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising that the 21
copyright holders would defend the idea that they should continue to 22
have the right to control who did what with content they wanted to 23
control. 24
Dr. Seuss’s representatives, for example, argued that it was better for 25
the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to Dr. Seuss’s work— 26
better than allowing it to fall into the public domain—because if this 27
creativity were in the public domain, then people could use it to “glo- 28
rify drugs or to create pornography.”14 That was also the motive of 29
the Gershwin estate, which defended its “protection” of the work of 30
George Gershwin. They refuse, for example, to license Porgy and Bess 31
to anyone who refuses to use African Americans in the cast.15 That’s S32
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1 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,

2 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
3 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this de-
4 bate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing copy-
5 rights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will favor.
6 Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin estate
7 and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, “Give us twenty years to con-
8 trol the speech about these icons of American culture. We’ll do better
9 with them than anyone else.” Congress of course likes to reward the
10 popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when Con-
11 gress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way, that’s just
12 what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
13 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the
14 CTEA mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
15 copyrights—extensions that would further concentrate the market; it
16 would also mean that there was no limit to Congress’s power to play fa-
17 vorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
18
19
20 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond
21 preparing for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
22 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One
23 camp we called “the Conservatives.” The other we called “the Rest.”
24 The Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor,
25 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
26 been the most consistent in limiting Congress’s power. They were the
27 five who had supported the Lopez/Morrison line of cases that said that
28 an enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress’s
29 powers had limits.
30 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
31 Congress’s power. These four—Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, Justice
32S Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer—had repeatedly argued that the Consti-
33R tution gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to imple-
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ment its powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the 1
Court’s role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four 2
justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed 3
with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get. 4
In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg’s. In addition to 5
her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of 6
gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the con- 7
text of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an ex- 8
cellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from 9
the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with 10
the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this con- 11
text to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little sense. 12
Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also 13
viewed as unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter 14
strongly favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both 15
were also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly be- 16
lieved, there was a very important free speech argument against these 17
retrospective extensions. 18
The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice 19
Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest 20
judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just 21
means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he 22
had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property 23
generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here. 24
This analysis of “the Rest” showed most clearly where our focus 25
had to be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open 26
these five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single over- 27
riding argument that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives’ 28
most important jurisprudential innovation—the argument that Judge 29
Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress’s power 30
must be interpreted so that its enumerated powers have limits. 31
This then was the core of our strategy—a strategy for which I am S32
responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the Lopez R33
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1 case, under the government’s argument here, Congress would always

2 have unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain
3 about Congress’s power under the Progress Clause, it was that this
4 power was supposed to be “limited.” Our aim would be to get the
5 Court to reconcile Eldred with Lopez: If Congress’s power to regulate
6 commerce was limited, then so, too, must Congress’s power to regulate
7 copyright be limited.
8
9
10 The argument on the government’s side came down to this: Con-
11 gress has done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The gov-
12 ernment claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been
13 extending the term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued,
14 the Court should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
15 There was some truth to the government’s claim, but not much. We
16 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in 1831
17 and in 1909. And of course, in 1962, Congress began extending exist-
18 ing terms regularly—eleven times in forty years.
19 But this “consistency” should be kept in perspective. Congress ex-
20 tended existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
21 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
22 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending ex-
23 isting terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that re-
24 straint was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
25 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not hes-
26 itated to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
27 There was no reason it couldn’t intervene here.
28
29
30 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I ar-
31 rived in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
32S weeks, I was repeatedly “mooted” by lawyers who had volunteered to
33R
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help in the case. Such “moots” are basically practice rounds, where 1
wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners. 2
I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a 3
single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to 4
the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that 5
terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give Con- 6
gress a clear line to follow: Don’t extend existing terms. The moots 7
were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to 8
this central idea. 9
One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the 10
skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with So- 11
licitor General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the 12
Supreme Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern 13
speak: 14
“I’m just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won’t be 15
willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a con- 16
sistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see the 17
harm—passionately get them to see the harm. For if they don’t see 18
that, then we haven’t any chance of winning.” 19
He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but 20
he didn’t understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the 21
right thing—not because of politics but because it was right. As a law 22
professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court 23
does the right thing—not because of politics but because it is right. As 24
I listened to Ayer’s plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood 25
his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough. 26
Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good. 27
28
29
The night before the argument, a line of people began to form 30
in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the 31
press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line S32
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1 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
2 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
3 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
4 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia’s chambers for seats for
5 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
6 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and con-
7 gressmen have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
8 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
9 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
10 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
12 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
13 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
14 family of the Justices.
15 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
16 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress’s
17 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
18 those enumerated powers had any limit.
19 Justice O’Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
20 The history was bothering her.
21
22 justice o’connor: Congress has extended the term so often
23 through the years, and if you are right, don’t we run the risk of
24 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
25 practice that began with the very first act.
26
27 She was quite willing to concede “that this flies directly in the face
28 of what the framers had in mind.” But my response again and again
29 was to emphasize limits on Congress’s power.
30
31 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
32S mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
33R
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words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer 1
is yes. 2
3
There were two points in this argument when I should have seen 4
where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice 5
Kennedy, who observed, 6
7
justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that 8
the ’76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we 9
might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these 10
years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts. 11
I just don’t see any empirical evidence for that. 12
13
Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a stu- 14
dent, I answered, 15
16
mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all. 17
Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical 18
assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a 19
structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an effec- 20
tively perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws. 21
22
That was a correct answer, but it wasn’t the right answer. The right 23
answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any 24
number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And 25
here was the place Don Ayer’s advice should have mattered. This was a 26
softball; my answer was a swing and a miss. 27
The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had 28
been crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the Lopez ruling, and we 29
hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin. 30
It was clear a second into his question that he wasn’t at all sympa- 31
thetic. To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked: S32
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1 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
2 right to copy verbatim other people’s books, don’t you?
3
4 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
5 should be in the public domain and would be in the public do-
6 main but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
7 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
8 into the Copyright Clause.
9
10 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
12 asked Solicitor General Olson,
13
14 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an un-
15 limited time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that’s
16 precisely the argument that’s being made by petitioners here, that
17 a limited time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of
18 an unlimited time.
19
20 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
21 Olson’s flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
22 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
23 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress’s Copyright
24 and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the advocate, I
25 closed by pointing out the long history of the Court imposing limits on
26 Congress’s power in the name of the Copyright and Patent Clause—
27 indeed, the very first case striking a law of Congress as exceeding a spe-
28 cific enumerated power was based upon the Copyright and Patent
29 Clause. All true. But it wasn’t going to move the Court to my side.
30
31
32S As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
33R wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
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answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me 1
optimistic. 2
The government had been asked over and over again, what is the 3
limit? Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This 4
was precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not 5
imagine how the Court could understand that the government be- 6
lieved Congress’s power was unlimited under the terms of the Copy- 7
right Clause, and sustain the government’s argument. The solicitor 8
general had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried, 9
I could not understand how the Court could find that Congress’s 10
power under the Commerce Clause was limited, but under the Copy- 11
right Clause, unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself be- 12
lieve that we may have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court—in 13
particular, the Conservatives—would feel itself constrained by the rule 14
of law that it had established elsewhere. 15
16
17
The morning of January 15, 2003, I was five minutes late to the office 18
and missed the 7:00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to 19
the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The 20
Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven 21
justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents. 22
A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the 23
phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat 24
down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning. 25
My reasoning. Here was a case that pitted all the money in the 26
world against reasoning. And here was the last naïve law professor, 27
scouring the pages, looking for reasoning. 28
I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would dis- 29
tinguish the principle in this case from the principle in Lopez. The ar- 30
gument was nowhere to be found. The case was not even cited. The 31
argument that was the core argument of our case did not even appear S32
in the Court’s opinion. R33
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1 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.

2 Consistent with her view that Congress’s power was not limited gener-
3 ally, she had found Congress’s power not limited here.
4 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable—for her, and for Justice
5 Souter. Neither believes in Lopez. It would be too much to expect them
6 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
7 they had worked so hard to defeat.
8 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn’t quite believe what I
9 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
10 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with
11 the Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
12 reconcile the two simply by not addressing the argument. There was no
13 inconsistency because they would not talk about the two together.
14 There was therefore no principle that followed from the Lopez case: In
15 that context, Congress’s power would be limited, but in this context it
16 would not.
17 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers’ val-
18 ues they would respect? By what right did they—the silent five—get to
19 select the part of the Constitution they would enforce based on the val-
20 ues they thought important? We were right back to the argument that
21 I said I hated at the start: I had failed to convince them that the issue
22 here was important, and I had failed to recognize that however much I
23 might hate a system in which the Court gets to pick the constitutional
24 values that it will respect, that is the system we have.
25 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens’s
26 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition of
27 intellectual property law should not support this unjustified extension
28 of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that had gov-
29 erned in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of the Court
30 discounted the parallel—without explaining how the very same words
31 in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally different things de-
32S pending upon whether the words were about patents or copyrights.
33R The Court let Justice Stevens’s charge go unanswered.
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Justice Breyer’s opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever writ- 1
ten, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of copy- 2
rights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had said 3
that under the current term, a copyright gave an author 99.8 percent of 4
the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong, that the ac- 5
tual number was 99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either way, the 6
point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be “limited,” and 7
the existing term was so long as to be effectively unlimited, then it was 8
unconstitutional. 9
These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But 10
because neither believed in the Lopez case, neither was willing to push 11
it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without 12
anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge 13
Sentelle. It was Hamlet without the Prince. 14
15
16
Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when 17
depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn’t cure 18
the depression. This anger was of two sorts. 19
It was first anger with the five “Conservatives.” It would have been 20
one thing for them to have explained why the principle of Lopez didn’t 21
apply in this case. That wouldn’t have been a very convincing argu- 22
ment, I don’t believe, having read it made by others, and having tried 23
to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of integrity. 24
These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the proper mode 25
of interpreting the Constitution is “originalism”—to first understand 26
the framers’ text, interpreted in their context, in light of the structure 27
of the Constitution. That method had produced Lopez and many other 28
“originalist” rulings. Where was their “originalism” now? 29
Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain 30
what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they 31
did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the S32
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1 power. And they joined an opinion that didn’t even try to explain why
2 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
3 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not ap-
4 ply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
5 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that they
6 liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their own
7 principles.
8 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with my-
9 self. For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
10 the law as it is.
11 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for ide-
12 alism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
13 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that
14 this case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices
15 that the framers’ values were important, I fought the idea, because I
16 didn’t want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted on
17 arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of principles.
18 I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn’t need to waste my
19 time showing it should also follow in popularity.
20 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
21 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the con-
22 versation in different directions, where the truth about the harm that
23 this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to this
24 Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I, idiotically,
25 corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith wanted to be shown
26 the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher, reframed the ques-
27 tion to make the logical point. I had shown them how they could strike
28 this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a hundred places
29 where I could have helped them want to, yet my stubbornness, my re-
30 fusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before hundreds of audiences
31 trying to persuade; I have used passion in that effort to persuade; but I
32S refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the pas-
33R
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sion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court should 1
decide the issue. 2
Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it 3
have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or 4
Kathleen Sullivan? 5
My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court 6
was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It 7
would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were 8
right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court. 9
Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in 10
doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have 11
little reason to resist doing right. I can’t help but think that if I had 12
stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could 13
have persuaded. 14
And even if I couldn’t, then that doesn’t excuse what happened in 15
January. For at the start of this case, one of America’s leading intellec- 16
tual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this case was 17
a mistake. “The Court is not ready,” Peter Jaszi said; this issue should 18
not be raised until it is. 19
After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and 20
publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have 21
been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that’s needed to know that 22
here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in 23
a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case 24
in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring 25
this case—a decision I had made four years before—was wrong. 26
27
28
While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost 29
unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court’s decision was mixed. 30
No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of 31
copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where S32
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1 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been skep-
2 tical of the Court’s activism in other cases. Deference was a good thing,
3 even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision was attacked,
4 it was attacked because it left standing a silly and harmful law. The New
5 York Times wrote in its editorial,
6
7 In effect, the Supreme Court’s decision makes it likely that we are
8 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
9 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand exper-
10 iment, one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw
11 freely on the entire creative output of humanity is one of the rea-
12 sons we live in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
13
14 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of hi-
15 larious images—of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from my view
16 of the case, was Ruben Bolling’s, reproduced on the next page. The
17 “powerful and wealthy” line is a bit unfair. But the punch in the face felt
18 exactly like that.
19 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
20 quote from The New York Times. That “grand experiment” we call the
21 “public domain” is over? When I can make light of it, I think, “Honey,
22 I shrunk the Constitution.” But I can rarely make light of it. We had in
23 our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I fa-
24 thered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
25 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
26
27
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30
31
32S
33R
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15 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
16
17Co The day Eldred was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
18 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in Eldred was de-
19 nied—meaning the case was really finally over—fate would have it that
20 I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.) This was a
21 particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The drive into the city
22 from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I opened up my com-
23 puter and wrote an op-ed piece.
24 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
25 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
26 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
27 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
28 Justice Kennedy: “For all these years the act has impeded progress in
29 science and the useful arts. I just don’t see any empirical evidence for
30 that.” And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
31 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
32S The New York Times published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
33R fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
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would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid 1
the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not, 2
the work passed into the public domain. 3
We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name. 4
Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as 5
he said early on, it won’t get passed unless it has another name. 6
Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this 7
is either the “Public Domain Enhancement Act” or the “Copyright 8
Term Deregulation Act.” Either way, the essence of the idea is clear 9
and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except 10
blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as 11
Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $1. But for 12
everything else, let the content go. 13
The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes en- 14
dorsed it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters 15
expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity, people 16
can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good Republican 17
might say, here government regulation is simply getting in the way of 18
innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might say, here the 19
government is blocking access and the spread of knowledge for no 20
good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference between Democrats 21
and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize the stupid harm 22
of the present system. 23
Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration re- 24
quirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system for 25
people who want to license content is that there is no obvious place to 26
look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is not re- 27
quired, since marking content is not required, since no formality at all 28
is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate copyright owners to ask 29
permission to use or license their work. This system would lower these 30
costs, by establishing at least one registry where copyright owners 31
could be identified. S32
As I described in chapter 10, formalities in copyright law were re- R33
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1 moved in 1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandon-

2 ing any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.1 The Euro-
3 peans are said to view copyright as a “natural right.” Natural rights
4 don’t need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American tradi-
5 tion that required copyright owners to follow form if their rights were
6 to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly respect the
7 dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my creativity, not
8 upon the special favor of the government.
9 That’s great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is ab-
10 surd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because a
11 world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
12 “Walt Disney creativity” is destroyed when there is no simple way to
13 know what’s protected and what’s not.
14 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in Berlin
15 in 1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne Conven-
16 tion in 1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty years, as well as
17 the abolition of copyright formalities. The formalities were hated be-
18 cause the stories of inadvertent loss were increasingly common. It was
19 as if a Charles Dickens character ran all copyright offices, and the fail-
20 ure to dot an i or cross a t resulted in the loss of widows’ only income.
21 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
22 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law should
23 always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no reason
24 copyright law couldn’t, as well. Rather than abandoning formalities to-
25 tally, the response in Berlin should have been to embrace a more equi-
26 table system of registration.
27 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
28 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
29 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
30 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory bur-
31 den imposed upon creators.
32S In addition to the practical complaint of authors in 1908, there was
33R a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
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should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a table, 1

his rights over the table don’t depend upon filing a form with the gov- 2
ernment. He has a property right over the table “naturally,” and he can 3
assert that right against anyone who would steal the table, whether or 4
not he has informed the government of his ownership of the table. 5
This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For 6
the argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative 7
property being second-class property. The argument in favor of for- 8
malities turns upon the special problems that creative property pres- 9
ents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of creative 10
property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly spread. 11
No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just 12
because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land is 13
to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property just 14
because you must register the car with the state and tag it with a li- 15
cense. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an important 16
reason to secure registration—both because it makes the markets more 17
efficient and because it better secures the rights of the owner. Without 18
a registration system for land, landowners would perpetually have to 19
guard their property. With registration, they can simply point the po- 20
lice to a deed. Without a registration system for cars, auto theft would 21
be much easier. With a registration system, the thief has a high burden 22
to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is placed on the property owner, but 23
those burdens produce a much better system of protection for property 24
generally. 25
It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in 26
copyright law. Unlike a carpenter’s table, there’s nothing in nature that 27
makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative 28
property. A recording of Lyle Lovett’s latest album can exist in a billion 29
places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular 30
owner. And like a car, there’s no way to buy and sell creative property 31
with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is S32
the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in R33
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1 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive, lawyer transactions

2 take their place.
3 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
4 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
5 didn’t “get.” Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
6 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
7 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, “short,” then this
8 wouldn’t matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers’ system, a
9 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
10 be presumptively uncontrolled.
11 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the in-
12 ability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes a
13 huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a li-
14 brary can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
15 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the copyright
16 system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been seen before
17 because there are no formalities.
18 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
19 it is worth $1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
20 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
21 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
22 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
23 If it isn’t worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
24 term, then it shouldn’t be worth it for the government to defend your
25 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
26 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
27 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $1 to you.
28 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won’t the burden of reg-
29 istering the work mean that the $1 is really misleading? Isn’t the hassle
30 worth more than $1? Isn’t that the real problem with registration?
31 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
32S completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
33R doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
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registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must ad- 1

dress the real problem of governments standing at the core of any sys- 2
tem of formalities. In this book, I offer such a solution. That solution 3
essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For now, assume it was 4
Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it was one-click reg- 5
istration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple, one-click registra- 6
tion fifty years after a work was published. Based upon historical data, 7
that system would move up to 98 percent of commercial work, com- 8
mercial work that no longer had a commercial life, into the public do- 9
main within fifty years. What do you think? 10
11
12
When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began 13
to pay attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representa- 14
tives who might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few 15
who directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step. 16
One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get 17
the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international law. It 18
imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners possible. In 19
May 2003, it looked as if the bill would be introduced. On May 16, I 20
posted on the Eldred Act blog, “we are close.” There was a general reac- 21
tion in the blog community that something good might happen here. 22
But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and 23
the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman’s office to 24
give the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, 25
Valenti informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose 26
the Eldred Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, 27
their thinness shows something clear about what this debate is re- 28
ally about. 29
The MPAA argued first that Congress had “firmly rejected the cen- 30
tral concept in the proposed bill”—that copyrights be renewed. That 31
was true, but irrelevant, as Congress’s “firm rejection” had occurred S32
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1 ond, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright own-
2 ers—apparently those who could not afford the $1 fee. Third, they ar-
3 gued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright term
4 would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small per-
5 centage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
6 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut off
7 the extended term unless the $1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
8 argued that the bill would impose “enormous” costs, since a registration
9 system is not free. True enough, but those costs are certainly less than
10 the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright whose owner is not
11 known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the copyright to a story
12 underlying a film were to pass into the public domain. But what risk is
13 that? If it is in the public domain, then the film is a valid derivative use.
14 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright
15 owners to do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
16 thousands of copyright owners who don’t even know they have a copy-
17 right to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright or
18 not—a controversial claim in any case—unless they know about a
19 copyright, they’re not likely to.
20
21
22 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law re-
23 acting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
24 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the
25 two stories was the power of the opposition—the power of the side that
26 fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology threat-
27 ened old interests. But in only one case did those interest’s have the
28 power to protect themselves against this new competitive threat.
29 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
30 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
31 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
32S sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
33R sense?
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When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the copyright 1
owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and harmful, 2
and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is p2p shar- 3
ing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners still: Much 4
of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When the issue is 5
copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is possible still 6
to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people don’t rec- 7
ognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus still possible 8
to see good faith within the resistance. 9
But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the El- 10
dred Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked self- 11
interest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary range of 12
content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn’t interfere with any copy- 13
right owner’s desire to exercise continued control over his content. It 14
would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the “Dark Content” that 15
fills archives around the world. So when the warriors oppose a change 16
like this, we should ask one simple question: 17
What does this industry really want? 18
With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So 19
the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about 20
protecting their content. The effort to block the Eldred Act is an effort 21
to assure that nothing more passes into the public domain. It is another 22
step to assure that the public domain will never compete, that there 23
will be no use of content that is not commercially controlled, and that 24
there will be no commercial use of content that doesn’t require their 25
permission first. 26
The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other 27
side is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has 28
as its aim not the protection of “property” but the rejection of a tradi- 29
tion. Their aim is not simply to protect what is theirs. Their aim is to as- 30
sure that all there is is what is theirs. 31
It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not S32
hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public R33
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1 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA

2 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
3 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
4 and to share its own creation.
5 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
6 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
7 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
8 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
9 block the progress of others.
10 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of
11 the “property” in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and
12 so long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
13 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing “permission soci-
14 ety.” The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the owner and
15 gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be controlled
16 by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32S
33R
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
CONCLUSION 15
16
There are more than 35 million people with the AIDS virus Co17
worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa. 18
Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans 19
is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More 20
importantly, it is seventeen million Africans. 21
There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its progres- 22
sion. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental, but they have 23
already had a dramatic effect. In the United States, AIDS patients who 24
regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase their life expectancy 25
by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make the disease almost 26
invisible. 27
These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the 28
United States, they cost between $10,000 and $15,000 per person per 29
year. Today, some cost $25,000 per year. At these prices, of course, no 30
African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its popula- 31
tion: $15,000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of S32
Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.1 R33
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1 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
2 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
3 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes en-
4 joy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use that
5 monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
6 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
7 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
8 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be sup-
9 ported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case where
10 patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some assurance
11 that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a disease, it will
12 be able to earn back its investment and more. This is socially an ex-
13 tremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who would argue that
14 the law should abolish it, at least without other changes.
15 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is an-
16 other thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as African
17 leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was bringing,
18 they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at costs signif-
19 icantly below the market price.
20 In 1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
21 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
22 another nation’s market with the consent of the patent owner. For ex-
23 ample, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into Africa
24 from India. This is called “parallel importation,” and it is generally per-
25 mitted under international trade law and is specifically permitted
26 within the European Union.2
27 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed,
28 more than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property Associ-
29 ation characterized it, “The U.S. government pressured South Africa . . .
30 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel imports.”3 Through the
31 Office of the United States Trade Representative, the government
32S asked South Africa to change the law—and to add pressure to that re-
33R quest, in 1998, the USTR listed South Africa for possible trade sanc-
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tions. That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies be- 1
gan proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the govern- 2
ment’s actions. The United States was then joined by other governments 3
from the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical compa- 4
nies, was that South Africa was violating its obligations under inter- 5
national law by discriminating against a particular kind of patent— 6
pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments, with the 7
United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect these patents 8
as it respects any other patent, regardless of any effect on the treatment 9
of AIDS within South Africa.4 10
We should place the intervention by the United States in context. 11
No doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans 12
don’t have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective 13
health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the 14
most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on their 15
demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or mar- 16
ginal, there was an effect from our government’s intervention to stop 17
the flow of medications into Africa. 18
By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United 19
States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens. 20
This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can’t); instead, the flow that the 21
United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge: 22
information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and 23
turn those chemicals into drugs that would save 15 to 30 million lives. 24
Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the 25
profits of United States drug companies—at least, not substantially. It 26
was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for 27
the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are 28
wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the 29
parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales 30
by U.S. companies. 31
Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of informa- S32
tion, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an argument R33
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1 about the sanctity of property.5 It was because “intellectual property”

2 would be violated that these drugs should not flow into Africa. It was
3 a principle about the importance of “intellectual property” that led
4 these government actors to intervene against the South African re-
5 sponse to AIDS.
6 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
7 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
8 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose di-
9 rect cost would be to speed the death of 15 to 30 million Africans, and
10 whose only real benefit would be to uphold the “sanctity” of an idea?
11 What possible justification could there ever be for a policy that results
12 in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that would allow so
13 many to die for such an abstraction?
14 Some blame the drug companies. I don’t. They are corporations.
15 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
16 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
17 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
18 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system—
19 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
20 The corruption is our own politicians’ failure of integrity. For the
21 drug companies would love—they say, and I believe them—to sell their
22 drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and elsewhere.
23 There are issues they’d have to resolve to make sure the drugs didn’t get
24 back into the United States, but those are mere problems of technol-
25 ogy. They could be overcome.
26 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
27 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
28 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, “How
29 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $1 a pill, but the same
30 drug would cost an American $1,500?” Because there is no “sound
31 bite” answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
32S of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
33R avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
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sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the 1

unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational 2
strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal—the sanctity of an 3
idea called “intellectual property.” 4
So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will 5
you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts 6
against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done? 7
What is the argument? 8
A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the 9
patent system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly 10
the same way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and 11
strongly support a copyright system without having to regulate the 12
spread of culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could 13
endorse and strongly support a patent system without having to block 14
the spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market 15
prices in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced 16
policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies were 17
balanced in just this sense. 18
But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the 19
critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and extrem- 20
ism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to our 21
tradition, now reigns in this culture—bizarrely, and with consequences 22
more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost any other 23
single policy decision that we as a democracy will make. 24
25
26
A simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much 27
happens that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically 28
do we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don’t even notice 29
how monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without 30
them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture that 31
we don’t even question when the control of that property removes our S32
ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness be- R33
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1 comes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
2 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make this
3 common sense open its eyes.
4 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
5 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
6 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
7 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
8 to fight “piracy,” and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
9 the idea of “creative property,” while transforming real creators into
10 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
11 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
13 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
14 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
15 produce the “perfect storm” for free culture.
16
17
18 In August 2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
19 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
20 meeting.6 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had de-
21 cided to hold a meeting to discuss “open and collaborative projects to
22 create public goods.” These are projects that have been successful in
23 producing public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary
24 use of intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the
25 World Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of pro-
26 tocols in the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support
27 open academic journals, including the Public Library of Science proj-
28 ect that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
29 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
30 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project com-
31 prised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
32S technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
33R
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Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche, Glaxo- 1

SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It included 2
the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free in the 3
early 1980s. And it included “open source and free software.” 4
The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects 5
from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon 6
intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual 7
property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose 8
limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used. 9
From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.7 10
The projects within its scope included both commercial and noncom- 11
mercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many per- 12
spectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since 13
WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual 14
property issues. 15
Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact 16
about WIPO. In February 2003, I delivered a keynote address to a 17
preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information So- 18
ciety (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked 19
what I would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the 20
importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of 21
an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly in- 22
terrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question 23
about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those 24
questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had 25
prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property rela- 26
tively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made intellectual 27
property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to talk about an 28
“Information Society” unless one also talked about the range of infor- 29
mation and culture that would be free. My talk did not make my im- 30
moderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct that the 31
scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the stuff of S32
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1 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn’t be too much of a conversation

2 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
3 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
4 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual prop-
5 erty, I had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and
6 should. And thus the meeting about “open and collaborative projects to
7 create public goods” seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO
8 agenda.
9 But there is one project within that list that is highly controversial,
10 at least among lobbyists. That project is “open source and free soft-
11 ware.” Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of the subject. From
12 its perspective, a conference to discuss open source and free software
13 would be like a conference to discuss Apple’s operating system. Both
14 open source and free software compete with Microsoft’s software. And
15 internationally, many governments have begun to explore requirements
16 that they use open source or free software, rather than “proprietary
17 software,” for their own internal uses.
18 I don’t mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to make
19 clear that the distinction is not between commercial and noncommer-
20 cial software. There are many important companies that depend fun-
21 damentally upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
22 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
23 operating system, the most famous bit of “free software”—and IBM is
24 emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support “open source and
25 free software” is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead, to
26 support a mode of software development that is different from Mi-
27 crosoft’s.8
28 More important for our purposes, to support “open source and free
29 software” is not to oppose copyright. “Open source and free soft-
30 ware” is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft’s
31 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
32S quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected by
33R
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adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license are 1
no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software license. 2
Free software licensed under the General Public License (GPL), for 3
example, requires that the source code for the software be made avail- 4
able by anyone who modifies and redistributes the software. But that 5
requirement is effective only if copyright governs software. If copyright 6
did not govern software, then free software could not impose the same 7
kind of requirements on its adopters. It thus depends upon copyright 8
law just as Microsoft does. 9
It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software devel- 10
oper, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and understand- 11
able that it would use its lobbyists to get the United States government 12
to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what was reported to have 13
happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the Washington Post, Mi- 14
crosoft’s lobbyists succeeded in getting the United States government 15
to veto the meeting.9 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was can- 16
celed. 17
I don’t blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own in- 18
terests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is plainly 19
consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about its lobby- 20
ing here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most powerful soft- 21
ware producer in the United States having succeeded in its lobbying 22
efforts. 23
What was surprising was the United States government’s reason for 24
opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting 25
director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark 26
Office, explained that “open-source software runs counter to the mis- 27
sion of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights.” She 28
is quoted as saying, “To hold a meeting which has as its purpose to dis- 29
claim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the goals of 30
WIPO.” 31
These statements are astonishing on a number of levels. S32
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1 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
2 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property right
3 called “copyright.” Without it, restrictions imposed by those licenses
4 wouldn’t work. Thus, to say it “runs counter” to the mission of promot-
5 ing intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap in under-
6 standing—the sort of mistake that is excusable in a first-year law
7 student, but an embarrassment from a high government official deal-
8 ing with intellectual property issues.
9 Second, who ever said that WIPO’s exclusive aim was to “promote”
10 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the prepara-
11 tory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best to
12 protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of intellec-
13 tual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the hard ques-
14 tion in intellectual property law is to find that balance. But that there
15 should be limits is, I had thought, uncontested. One wants to ask Ms.
16 Boland, are generic drugs (drugs based on drugs whose patent has
17 expired) contrary to the WIPO mission? Does the public domain
18 weaken intellectual property? Would it have been better if the proto-
19 cols of the Internet had been patented?
20 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to max-
21 imize intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
22 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
23 what to do with those rights because, again, they are their rights. If they
24 want to “waive” or “disclaim” their rights, that is, within our tradition,
25 totally appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than $20 billion
26 to do good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the objectives of
27 the property system. That is, on the contrary, just what a property sys-
28 tem is supposed to be about: giving individuals the right to decide what
29 to do with their property.
30 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meet-
31 ing “which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights,” she’s
32S saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
33R
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the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow, 1

WIPO’s objective should be to stop an individual from “waiving” or “dis- 2
claiming” an intellectual property right. That the interest of WIPO is 3
not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but that they also 4
should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive way possible. 5
There is a history of just such a property system that is well known 6
in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called “feudalism.” Under feu- 7
dalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of in- 8
dividuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with that 9
property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a strong 10
interest in assuring that property holders within that system not 11
weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their control 12
to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control and 13
concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with that 14
control. 15
As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the 16
choice we are now making about intellectual property.10 We will have 17
an information society. That much is certain. Our only choice now is 18
whether that information society will be free or feudal. The trend is to- 19
ward the feudal. 20
When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the 21
comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who 22
tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one com- 23
ment that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster 24
wrote, 25
26
George, you misunderstand Lessig: He’s only talking about the 27
world as it should be (“the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any 28
government, should be to promote the right balance of intellectual- 29
property rights, not simply to promote intellectual property 30
rights”), not as it is. If we were talking about the world as it is, 31
then of course Boland didn’t say anything wrong. But in the world S32
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1 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay atten-
2 tion to the distinction between Lessig’s world and ours.
3
4 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
5 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
6 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
7 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
8 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student’s
9 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
10 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
11 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
12 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. In-
13 stead, the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
14 “goal” of a government should be “to promote the right balance” of in-
15 tellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it obviously
16 betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. “Typical for an aca-
17 demic,” the poster might well have continued.
18 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism
19 is silly, too, and I’d be the first to poke fun at the absurdly unrealistic
20 ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in our own coun-
21 try’s history).
22 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our gov-
23 ernment should be to “seek balance,” then count me with the silly, for
24 that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should be
25 obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
26 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
27 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
28 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
29 not lies is just naïve, then who have we, the most powerful democracy
30 in the world, become?
31 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
32S the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
33R something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
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It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has 1

been part of our tradition for most of our history—free culture. 2
If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. 3
4
5
There are moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that 6
surprise. When the FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, 7
which would thereby further increase the concentration in media own- 8
ership, an extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this 9
change. For perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the 10
NRA, the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and 11
CodePink Women for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC 12
policy. An astonishing 700,000 letters were sent to the FCC, demand- 13
ing more hearings and a different result. 14
This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coali- 15
tion in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hear- 16
ings leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement 17
had become. There was no substantial support for the FCC’s decision, 18
and there was broad and sustained support for fighting further concen- 19
tration in the media. 20
But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle. 21
Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because 22
some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big play- 23
ers. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not mean 24
that you can’t get a good hamburger from somewhere else. 25
The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentra- 26
tion, but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the 27
change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few power- 28
ful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the media. It 29
is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated range of 30
rights—property rights of a historically extreme form—that makes 31
their bigness bad. S32
It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand com- R33
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1 petition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood as being

2 about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We Americans have a
3 long history of fighting “big,” wisely or not. That we could be moti-
4 vated to fight “big” again is not something new.
5 It would be something new, and something very important, if an
6 equal number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built
7 within the idea of “intellectual property.” Not because balance is alien
8 to our tradition; indeed, as I’ve argued, balance is our tradition. But be-
9 cause the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything called
10 “property” is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
11 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
12 of our tragedy.
13
14
15 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
16 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.11 Em-
17 inem has just been sued for “sampling” someone else’s music.12 The
18 story about Bob Dylan “stealing” from a Japanese author has just fin-
19 ished making the rounds.13 An insider from Hollywood—who insists
20 he must remain anonymous—reports “an amazing conversation with
21 these studio guys. They’ve got extraordinary [old] content that they’d
22 love to use but can’t because they can’t begin to clear the rights. They’ve
23 got scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but
24 it would take scores of lawyers to clean it first.” Congressmen are talk-
25 ing about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers thought
26 to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for kids who
27 use a computer to share content.
28 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
29 that it will build a “Creative Archive,” from which British citizens can
30 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.14 And in Brazil, the
31 culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero of Brazilian music,
32S has joined with Creative Commons to release content and free licenses
33R in that Latin American country.15
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I’ve told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has 1
given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this 2
freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the 3
twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of 4
digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and 5
more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our 6
day into the Causbys. 7
Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this 8
potential is ever to be realized. 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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30
31
S32
R33
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31
AFTERWORD S32
R33
❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚ ❙❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❘ ❙❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚ ❙❚❘ ❙ ❚❘ ❙ ❚

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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
At least some who have read this far will agree with me that some- Po17
thing must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of 18
this book maps what might be done. 19
I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now, 20
and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson 21
that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that 22
it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue. 23
That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must re- 24
cruit a significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators, au- 25
thors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists—all to tell this story in their 26
own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle is so important. 27
Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of 28
having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people 29
think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands 30
opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I 31
sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture. S32
R33
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15 US, NOW
16
17Co Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so
18 far has been framed at the extremes—as a grand either/or: either prop-
19 erty or anarchy, either total control or artists won’t be paid. If that re-
20 ally is the choice, then the warriors should win.
21 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are ex-
22 tremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there is. There
23 are those who believe in maximal copyright—“All Rights Reserved”—
24 and those who reject copyright—“No Rights Reserved.” The “All
25 Rights Reserved” sorts believe that you should ask permission before
26 you “use” a copyrighted work in any way. The “No Rights Reserved”
27 sorts believe you should be able to do with content as you wish, re-
28 gardless of whether you have permission or not.
29 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
30 tilted in the “no rights reserved” direction. Content could be copied
31 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus, re-
32S gardless of anyone’s desire, the effective regime of copyright under the
33R
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original design of the Internet was “no rights reserved.” Content was 1
“taken” regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively unpro- 2
tected. 3
This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite 4
equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this 5
book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network’s 6
design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential char- 7
acter of the environment of the original Internet. If the original archi- 8
tecture made the effective default “no rights reserved,” the future 9
architecture will make the effective default “all rights reserved.” The ar- 10
chitecture and law that surround the Internet’s design will increasingly 11
produce an environment where all use of content requires permission. 12
The “cut and paste” world that defines the Internet today will become 13
a “get permission to cut and paste” world that is a creator’s nightmare. 14
What’s needed is a way to say something in the middle—neither “all 15
rights reserved” nor “no rights reserved” but “some rights reserved”— 16
and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable creators to free content 17
as they see fit. In other words, we need a way to restore a set of free- 18
doms that we could just take for granted before. 19
20
21
Rebuilding Freedoms Previously 22
Presumed: Examples 23
24
If you step back from the battle I’ve been describing here, you will rec- 25
ognize this problem from other contexts. Think about privacy. Before 26
the Internet, most of us didn’t have to worry much about data about 27
our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you walked into a bookstore 28
and browsed through some of the works of Karl Marx, you didn’t need 29
to worry about explaining your browsing habits to your neighbors or 30
boss. The “privacy” of your browsing habits was assured. 31
What made it assured? S32
R33
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1 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter

2 10, your privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture for
3 gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
4 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North Ko-
5 rea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be assured.
6 But that’s because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable enough to
7 spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of us (again,
8 we can hope), spying doesn’t pay. The highly inefficient architecture of
9 real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount of privacy. That
10 privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law (there is no law pro-
11 tecting “privacy” in public places), and in many places, not by norms
12 (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead, by the costs that fric-
13 tion imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
14 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particu-
15 lar has become quite tiny. If you’re a customer at Amazon, then as you
16 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you’ve looked
17 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there’s a list of “re-
18 cently viewed” pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net and
19 the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the data than
20 not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any “privacy” protected by
21 the friction disappears, too.
22 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to
23 worry about libraries. If you’re one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
24 people should have the “right” to browse in a library without the gov-
25 ernment knowing which books you look at (I’m one of those lefties,
26 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
27 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in electronic
28 spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday disappears.
29 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define “privacy”
30 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
31 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what fric-
32S tion did.1 And whether you’re in favor of those laws or not, it is the pat-
33R tern that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
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kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in tech- 1

nology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively act 2
where, before, privacy was given by default. 3
A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software 4
movement. When computers with software were first made available 5
commercially, the software—both the source code and the binaries— 6
was free. You couldn’t run a program written for a Data General ma- 7
chine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn’t care much 8
about controlling their software. 9
That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he 10
was a researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that devel- 11
oped when one was free to explore and tinker with the software that 12
ran on machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented program- 13
mer, Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify 14
other people’s work. 15
In an academic setting, at least, that’s not a terribly radical idea. In 16
a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a proof that 17
someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to prove a theo- 18
rem, you could take what someone else did and change it. In a classics 19
department, if you believed a colleague’s translation of a recently dis- 20
covered text was flawed, you were free to improve it. Thus, to Stallman, 21
it seemed obvious that you should be free to tinker with and improve 22
the code that ran a machine. This, too, was knowledge. Why shouldn’t 23
it be open for criticism like anything else? 24
No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue 25
for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs 26
from one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least 27
in the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as com- 28
panies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I could just 29
take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make it easier for 30
me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you. 31
Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the S32
early 1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code. R33
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1 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the eco-
2 nomics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about it,
3 then the freedom to change and share software would be fundamen-
4 tally weakened.
5 Therefore, in 1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operat-
6 ing system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
7 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds’s “Linux”
8 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
9 Stallman’s technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
10 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free Soft-
11 ware Foundation’s GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless the
12 source code for that software is made available as well. Thus, anyone
13 building upon GPL’d software would have to make their buildings free
14 as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of code
15 would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His funda-
16 mental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a byproduct.
17 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
18 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
19 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
20 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
21 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
22 what before had been passively guaranteed.
23 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
24 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
25 scientific journals are produced.
26 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many
27 that printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending
28 them to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
29 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
30 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic journals
31 through password-protected sites. Something similar to this has been
32S happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw have had
33R electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers to their ser-
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vice. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not copyrighted, and any- 1

one is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis and Westlaw are also free 2
to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme 3
Court opinion through their respective services. 4
There’s nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability 5
to charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive 6
for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge. 7
The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been al- 8
lowed to flourish. And if there’s nothing wrong with selling the public 9
domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling 10
access to material that is not in the public domain. 11
But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data 12
was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to 13
browse this data except by paying for a subscription? 14
As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with 15
scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper form, 16
libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had access to 17
the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer experts be- 18
cause the library gave them access. Or patients trying to understand 19
the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks by reading all 20
available articles about that treatment. This freedom was therefore a 21
function of the institution of libraries (norms) and the technology of 22
paper journals (architecture)—namely, that it was very hard to control 23
access to a paper journal. 24
As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demand- 25
ing that libraries not give the general public access to the journals. This 26
means that the freedoms provided by print journals in public libraries 27
begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with software, a changing 28
technology and market shrink a freedom taken for granted before. 29
This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to 30
restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science 31
(PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making S32
scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors R33
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1 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.

2 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is then
3 deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently avail-
4 able for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but the copy-
5 right for the print journal does not inhibit the right of anyone to
6 redistribute the work for free.
7 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
8 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and mar-
9 kets. There’s no doubt that this alternative competes with the tradi-
10 tional publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
11 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is presump-
12 tively a good—especially when it helps spread knowledge and science.
13
14
15 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
16
17 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the in-
18 creasing control effected through law and technology.
19 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a non-
20 profit corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
21 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of reasonable copyright
22 on top of the extremes that now reign. It does this by making it easy for
23 people to build upon other people’s work, by making it simple for cre-
24 ators to express the freedom for others to take and build upon their
25 work. Simple tags, tied to human-readable descriptions, tied to bullet-
26 proof licenses, make this possible.
27 Simple—which means without a middleman, or without a lawyer.
28 By developing a free set of licenses that people can attach to their
29 content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of content that
30 can easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are then linked to
31 machine-readable versions of the license that enable computers auto-
32S matically to identify content that can easily be shared. These three ex-
33R
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pressions together—a legal license, a human-readable description, and 1

machine-readable tags—constitute a Creative Commons license. A 2
Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone 3
who accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the 4
ideal that the person associated with the license believes in something 5
different than the “All” or “No” extremes. Content is marked with the 6
CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that cer- 7
tain freedoms are given. 8
These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their 9
precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The cre- 10
ator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as attribution is 11
given. She can choose a license that permits only noncommercial use. 12
She can choose a license that permits any use so long as the same free- 13
doms are given to other uses (“share and share alike”). Or any use so 14
long as no derivative use is made. Or any use at all within developing 15
nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full copies are not made. Or 16
lastly, any educational use. 17
These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default 18
of copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional 19
fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way 20
that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a 21
lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content, gov- 22
erned by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build 23
upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this con- 24
tent available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild a pub- 25
lic domain. 26
This is just one project among many within the Creative Com- 27
mons. And of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization 28
pursuing such freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative 29
Commons from many is that we are not interested only in talking 30
about a public domain or in getting legislators to help build a public 31
domain. Our aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers S32
R33
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1 of content (“content conducers,” as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)

2 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
3 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
4 The aim is not to fight the “All Rights Reserved” sorts. The aim is
5 to complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a cul-
6 ture are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws
7 written centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could
8 have imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a back-
9 ground of technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense
10 against the background of digital technologies. New rules—with dif-
11 ferent freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can
12 use them—are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effec-
13 tively to begin to build those rules.
14 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
15 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for example,
16 is a science fiction author. His first novel, Down and Out in the Magic
17 Kingdom, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative Com-
18 mons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
19 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
20 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (1) those
21 who will buy Cory’s book whether or not it’s on the Internet, and (2)
22 those who may never hear of Cory’s book, if it isn’t made available for
23 free on the Internet. Some part of (1) will download Cory’s book in-
24 stead of buying it. Call them bad-(1)s. Some part of (2) will download
25 Cory’s book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call them (2)-goods.
26 If there are more (2)-goods than bad-(1)s, the strategy of releasing
27 Cory’s book free on-line will probably increase sales of Cory’s book.
28 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that con-
29 clusion. The book’s first printing was exhausted months before the
30 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author was
31 a total success.
32S The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree con-
33R tent was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
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who wrote a book about the free software movement titled Free for All, 1
made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative 2
Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored 3
used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of 4
downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as 5
well. 6
These are examples of using the Commons to better spread propri- 7
etary content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the 8
Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for 9
other reasons. Many who use the “sampling license” do so because any- 10
thing else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that others 11
are free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample content 12
from the licensed work; they are just not free to make full copies of the 13
licensed work available to others. This is consistent with their own 14
art—they, too, sample from others. Because the legal costs of sampling 15
are so high (Walter Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy, 16
which was born sampling the music of others, has stated that he does 17
not “allow” Public Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs 18
are so high2), these artists release into the creative environment content 19
that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow. 20
Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative 21
Commons license just because they want to express to others the im- 22
portance of balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system 23
as it is, you are effectively saying you believe in the “All Rights Reserved” 24
model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however ap- 25
propriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an appropriate 26
description of how most creators view the rights associated with their 27
content. The Creative Commons license expresses this notion of “Some 28
Rights Reserved,” and gives many the chance to say it to others. 29
In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over 30
1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next 31
step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them S32
build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content R33
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1 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
2 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
3 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
4 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
5 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
6 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
7 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
8 steps are possible.
9 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by indi-
10 viduals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern the
11 creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it comple-
12 ments it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to make it
13 easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more flexibly and
14 cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable creativity to spread
15 more easily.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32S
33R
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
THEM, SOON 15
16
We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will Co17
also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before 18
the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms. 19
But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the 20
changes that we need. 21
In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general, 22
and one that’s specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each 23
is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way 24
to our end. 25
26
27
1. More Formalities 28
29
If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land 30
upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed. 31
If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an S32
airplane ticket, it has your name on it. R33
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1 These are all formalities associated with property. They are require-
2 ments that we all must bear if we want our property to be protected.
3 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
4 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
5 don’t have to register. You don’t even have to mark your content. The
6 default is control, and “formalities” are banished.
7 Why?
8 As I suggested in chapter 10, the motivation to abolish formalities
9 was a good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
10 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
11 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
12 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those for-
13 malities were getting in the way.
14 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
15 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that bur-
16 dens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns what,
17 or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the cre-
18 ative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to trace—
19 there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet given the
20 massive increase in the scope of copyright’s rule, getting permission is
21 a necessary step for any work that builds upon our past. And thus, the
22 lack of formalities forces many into silence where they otherwise could
23 speak.
24 The law should therefore change this requirement1—but it should
25 not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We should re-
26 quire formalities, but we should establish a system that will create the
27 incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
28 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work, reg-
29 istering copyrights, and renewing the claim to copyright. Traditionally,
30 the first of these three was something the copyright owner did; the sec-
31 ond two were something the government did. But a revised system of
32S formalities would banish the government from the process, except for
33R the sole purpose of approving standards developed by others.
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REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL 1

Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration with 2
the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When filing that 3
registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most government 4
agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to minimize the 5
burden of registration; it also had little incentive to minimize the fee. 6
And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of government policy- 7
making, the office has historically been terribly underfunded. Thus, 8
when people who know something about the process hear this idea 9
about formalities, their first reaction is panic—nothing could be worse 10
than forcing people to deal with the mess that is the Copyright Office. 11
Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradi- 12
tion of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer 13
think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed. 14
Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it doesn’t 15
follow that the government must actually administer the role. Instead, 16
we should be creating incentives for private parties to serve the public, 17
subject to standards that the government sets. 18
In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet. 19
There are at least 32 million Web sites registered around the world. 20
Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their 21
registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net), 22
there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however, per- 23
formed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the cost 24
of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease with which 25
registration occurs up. 26
We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of 27
copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central registry, 28
but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it should estab- 29
lish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It should approve 30
registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars would then compete 31
with one another to deliver the cheapest and simplest systems for reg- S32
istering and renewing copyrights. That competition would substan- R33
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1 tially lower the burden of this formality—while producing a database

2 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
3
4
5 MARKING
6 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a creative
7 work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh punish-
8 ment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule—akin to imposing
9 the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of creative rights.
10 Here again, there is no reason that a marking requirement needs to be
11 enforced in this way. And more importantly, there is no reason a mark-
12 ing requirement needs to be enforced uniformly across all media.
13 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is copy-
14 righted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark also
15 makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to use
16 the work.
17 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
18 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn’t
19 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
20 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
21 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
22 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
23 signal from the failure to mark—not the loss of the copyright, but the
24 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
25 Let’s start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
26 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
27 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
28 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the copy-
29 right owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
30 doesn’t give permission.2 The meaning of an unmarked work would
31 therefore be “use unless someone complains.” If someone does com-
32S plain, then the obligation would be to stop using the work in any new
33R
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work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses. 1
This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark 2
their work. 3
That in turn raises the question about how work should best be 4
marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies 5
evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the 6
Copyright Office’s role to that of approving standards for marking 7
content that have been crafted elsewhere. 8
For example, if a recording industry association devises a method 9
for marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The 10
Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could 11
be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it 12
judged preferable, and it would base that choice solely upon the consid- 13
eration of which method could best be integrated into the registration 14
and renewal system. We would not count on the government to inno- 15
vate; but we would count on the government to keep the product of in- 16
novation in line with its other important functions. 17
Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration re- 18
quirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there 19
would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for ex- 20
ample, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick step. The 21
aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the system itself 22
should be kept as simple as possible. 23
The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing 24
system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to 25
make things unclear. 26
If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most 27
difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed. 28
It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it 29
would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular 30
kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew 31
that assertion at the appropriate time. S32
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1 2. Shorter Terms
2
3 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
4 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
5 natural authors.
6 In The Future of Ideas, I proposed a seventy-five-year term, granted
7 in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every five years.
8 That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost Eldred v.
9 Ashcroft, the proposals became even more radical. The Economist en-
10 dorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year copyright term.3 Others have
11 proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
12 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in copy-
13 right’s term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there are four
14 principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright terms.
15
16 (1) Keep it short: The term should be as long as necessary to
17 give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied to very
18 strong protections for authors (so authors were able to reclaim
19 rights from publishers), rights to the same work (not deriva-
20 tive works) might be extended further. The key is not to tie the
21 work up with legal regulations when it no longer benefits an
22 author.
23
24 (2) Keep it simple: The line between the public domain and
25 protected content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the fuzzi-
26 ness of “fair use,” and the distinction between “ideas” and “ex-
27 pression.” That kind of law gives them lots of work. But our
28 framers had a simpler idea in mind: protected versus unpro-
29 tected. The value of short terms is that there is little need to
30 build exceptions into copyright when the term itself is kept
31 short. A clear and active “lawyer-free zone” makes the com-
32S plexities of “fair use” and “idea/expression” less necessary to
33R navigate.
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(3) Keep it alive: Copyright should have to be renewed. Espe- 1

cially if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner 2
should be required to signal periodically that he wants the 3
protection continued. This need not be an onerous burden, 4
but there is no reason this monopoly protection has to be 5
granted for free. On average, it takes ninety minutes for a vet- 6
eran to apply for a pension.4 If we make veterans suffer that 7
burden, I don’t see why we couldn’t require authors to spend 8
ten minutes every fifty years to file a single form. 9
10
(4) Keep it prospective: Whatever the term of copyright should 11
be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that a term 12
once given should not be extended. It might have been a mis- 13
take in 1923 for the law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year 14
term. I don’t think so, but it’s possible. If it was a mistake, then 15
the consequence was that we got fewer authors to create in 16
1923 than we otherwise would have. But we can’t correct that 17
mistake today by increasing the term. No matter what we do 18
today, we will not increase the number of authors who wrote 19
in 1923. Of course, we can increase the reward that those who 20
write now get (or alternatively, increase the copyright burden 21
that smothers many works that are today invisible). But in- 22
creasing their reward will not increase their creativity in 1923. 23
What’s not done is not done, and there’s nothing we can do 24
about that now. 25
26
These changes together should produce an average copyright term 27
that is much shorter than the current term. Until 1976, the average 28
term was just 32.2 years. We should be aiming for the same. 29
No doubt the extremists will call these ideas “radical.” (After all, I 30
call them “extremists.”) But again, the term I recommended was longer 31
than the term under Richard Nixon. How “radical” can it be to ask for S32
a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over? R33
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1 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use

2
3 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
4 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
5 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
6 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional challenge.
7 It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given the emer-
8 gence of that new technology.
9 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors “exclu-
10 sive right” to “their writings.” Congress has given authors an exclusive
11 right to “their writings” plus any derivative writings (made by others) that
12 are sufficiently close to the author’s original work. Thus, if I write a book,
13 and you base a movie on that book, I have the power to deny you the
14 right to release that movie, even though that movie is not “my writing.”
15 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in 1870, when it ex-
16 panded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to control
17 translations and dramatizations of a work.5 The courts have expanded
18 it slowly through judicial interpretation ever since. This expansion has
19 been commented upon by one of the law’s greatest judges, Judge Ben-
20 jamin Kaplan.
21
22 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
23 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
24 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
25 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.6
26
27 I think it’s time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
28 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
29 sense. More precisely, they don’t make sense for the period of time that
30 a copyright runs. And they don’t make sense as an amorphous grant.
31 Consider each limitation in turn.
32S Term: If Congress wants to grant a derivative right, then that right
33R should be for a much shorter term. It makes sense to protect John
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Grisham’s right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least 1
I’m willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right 2
to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative 3
right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long 4
after the creative work is done. 5
Scope: Likewise should the scope of derivative rights be narrowed. 6
Again, there are some cases in which derivative rights are important. 7
Those should be specified. But the law should draw clear lines around 8
regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted material. When all 9
“reuse” of creative material was within the control of businesses, per- 10
haps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate the lines. It no longer 11
makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the lines. Think about all the cre- 12
ative possibilities that digital technologies enable; now imagine pour- 13
ing molasses into the machines. That’s what this general requirement 14
of permission does to the creative process. Smothers it. 15
This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of 16
the Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation 17
for foreseeable derivative rights—turning a book into a movie, or a 18
poem into a musical score—it doesn’t make sense to require negotia- 19
tion for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make much 20
more sense. 21
In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are pro- 22
tected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not pro- 23
tected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague Paul 24
Goldstein.7 His view is that the law should be written so that expanded 25
protections follow expanded uses. 26
Goldstein’s analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the le- 27
gal system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of 28
the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the in- 29
centives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with a 30
strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation. 31
The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection S32
beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon cer- R33
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1 tain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free a great
2 deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory rights
3 regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
4
5
6 4. Liberate the Music—Again
7
8 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it wouldn’t
9 be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that is, to most
10 people, most pressing—music. There is no other policy issue that bet-
11 ter teaches the lessons of this book than the battles around the sharing
12 of music.
13 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the Inter-
14 net’s growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more power-
15 fully than any other single application. It was the Internet’s killer
16 app—possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was the applica-
17 tion that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the application
18 that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill innovation on
19 the network.
20 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music
21 in particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed, per-
22 formed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
23 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
24 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
25 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the
26 spread of content for which the performer has not been paid. But of
27 course, that’s not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in
28 chapter 5, they enable four different kinds of sharing:
29
30 A. There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
31 for purchasing CDs.
32S B. There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
33R on the way to purchasing CDs.
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C. There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get ac- 1
cess to content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright 2
or that would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net. 3
D. There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get ac- 4
cess to content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the 5
copyright owner plainly endorses. 6
7
Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It 8
must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The 9
eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover, 10
should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net 11
effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is 12
significantly weakened. 13
As I said in chapter 5, the actual harm caused by sharing is contro- 14
versial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume the harm is 15
real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is significantly 16
greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing networks. 17
Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological 18
context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law 19
should respond. 20
Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won’t be. It is addictive 21
today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a broad range of con- 22
tent. It won’t be the easiest way to get access to a broad range of content 23
in ten years. Today, access to the Internet is cumbersome and slow—we 24
in the United States are lucky to have broadband service at 1.5 MBs, and 25
very rarely do we get service at that speed both up and down. Although 26
wireless access is growing, most of us still get access across wires. Most 27
only gain access through a machine with a keyboard. The idea of the al- 28
ways on, always connected Internet is mainly just an idea. 29
But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to 30
the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should 31
not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should S32
make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The ques- R33
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1 tion should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this world?
2 The question should be, what law will we require when the network
3 becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is one in
4 which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net; where
5 everywhere you are—except maybe the desert or the Rockies—you can
6 instantaneously be connected to the Internet. Imagine the Internet as
7 ubiquitous as the best cell-phone service, where with the flip of a de-
8 vice, you are connected.
9 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that
10 give you access to content on the fly—such as Internet radio, content
11 that is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here, then, is the
12 critical point: When it is extremely easy to connect to services that give
13 access to content, it will be easier to connect to services that give you
14 access to content than it will be to download and store content on the
15 many devices you will have for playing content. It will be easier, in other
16 words, to subscribe than it will be to be a database manager, as every-
17 one in the download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies es-
18 sentially is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if
19 the services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
20 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over cell
21 phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are pay-
22 ing for this content even though “free” content is available in the form
23 of MP3s across the Web.8
24 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
25 present: It is emphatically temporary. The “problem” with file shar-
26 ing—to the extent there is a real problem—is a problem that will in-
27 creasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to the Internet.
28 And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy makers today to be
29 “solving” this problem in light of a technology that will be gone to-
30 morrow. The question should not be how to regulate the Internet to
31 eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve that problem away). The
32S question instead should be how to assure that artists get paid, during
33R
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this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business 1

and twenty-first-century technologies. 2
The answer begins with recognizing that there are different “prob- 3
lems” here to solve. Let’s start with type D content—uncopyrighted 4
content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The “prob- 5
lem” with this content is to make sure that the technology that would 6
enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can think of it 7
this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands, no doubt. 8
But there are many who need to use pay phones who have nothing to 9
do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in order to 10
eliminate kidnapping. 11
Type C content raises a different “problem.” This is content that was, 12
at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be unavailable 13
because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the record label he 14
signed with to carry his work. Or it may be unavailable because the work 15
is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the law should be to facilitate the ac- 16
cess to this content, ideally in a way that returns something to the artist. 17
Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out 18
of print, it may still be available in libraries and used book stores. But 19
libraries and used book stores don’t pay the copyright owner when 20
someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes total sense, of 21
course, since any other system would be so burdensome as to eliminate 22
the possibility of used book stores’ existing. But from the author’s per- 23
spective, this “sharing” of his content without his being compensated is 24
less than ideal. 25
The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply 26
deem out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make 27
copies of the music available for sale, then commercial and noncom- 28
mercial providers would be free, under this rule, to “share” that content, 29
even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would 30
be incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing 31
has ended, trading music should be as free as trading books. S32
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1 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would en-
2 sure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For exam-
3 ple, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial sharing of
4 content that was not offered for sale by a commercial publisher, and if
5 that rate were automatically transferred to a trust for the benefit of the
6 artist, then businesses could develop around the idea of trading this
7 content, and artists would benefit from this trade.
8 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
9 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
10 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
11 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
12 work commercially available. But if they don’t keep it available, and in-
13 stead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it alive,
14 then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than the
15 amount owed a commercial publisher.
16 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
17 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
18 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law’s solu-
19 tion should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that we are
20 in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for deliver-
21 ing and accessing content.
22 So here’s a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
23 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
24 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
25 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
26 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
27 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
28 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
29 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
30 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
31 harmed the interests of the content industry.
32S I love the Internet, and so I don’t like likening it to tobacco or as-
33R
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bestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the law. 1
And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy the In- 2
ternet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming content 3
providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple way to 4
compensate those who are harmed. 5
The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been 6
floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.9 Fisher suggests a 7
very clever way around the current impasse of the Internet. Under his 8
plan, all content capable of digital transmission would (1) be marked 9
with a digital watermark (don’t worry about how easy it is to evade 10
these marks; as you’ll see, there’s no incentive to evade them). Once the 11
content is marked, then entrepreneurs would develop (2) systems to 12
monitor how many items of each content were distributed. On the ba- 13
sis of those numbers, then (3) artists would be compensated. The com- 14
pensation would be paid for by (4) an appropriate tax. 15
Fisher’s proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million 16
questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book, 17
Promises to Keep. The modification that I would make is relatively sim- 18
ple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright sys- 19
tem. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of the 20
proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that harm 21
could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at fa- 22
cilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require renewal 23
after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to facilitate free ex- 24
change of content, supported through a taxation system, then it can be 25
continued. If this form of protection is no longer necessary, then the 26
system could lapse into the old system of controlling access. 27
Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His 28
aim is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that the 29
system supports the widest range of “semiotic democracy” possible. But 30
the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the other changes 31
I described were accomplished—in particular, the limits on derivative S32
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1 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
2 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was al-
3 lowed to do with the content itself.
4 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
5 “harm” to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
6 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
7 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere
8 with innovative proposals such as Apple’s MusicStore. As experts pre-
9 dicted when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat “free” by be-
10 ing easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
11 of songs at even the very high price of 99 cents a song. (At 99 cents, the
12 cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels have
13 none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple’s move was countered by Real
14 Networks, offering music at just 79 cents a song. And no doubt there
15 will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music on-line.
16 This competition has already occurred against the background of
17 “free” music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have
18 known for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more
19 than that, there is nothing impossible at all about “competing with
20 free.” Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to of-
21 fer new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive
22 market was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant,
23 movie theaters are often luxurious—with “first class” seats, and meals
24 served while you watch a movie—as they struggle and succeed in find-
25 ing ways to compete with “free.”
26 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
27 don’t lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the delivery of
28 content. That competition would continue to shrink type A sharing. It
29 would inspire an extraordinary range of new innovators—ones who
30 would have a right to the content, and would no longer fear the uncer-
31 tain and barbarically severe punishments of the law.
32S In summary, then, my proposal is this:
33R
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The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a tech- 1

nology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize the 2
harm to interests affected by this technological change, while enabling, 3
and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can create. 4
We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to inno- 5
vation by 6
7
1. guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing; 8
2. permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability, 9
and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by 10
statute; 11
3. while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A 12
sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated. 13
14
But what if “piracy” doesn’t disappear? What if there is a competi- 15
tive market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of 16
consumers continue to “take” content for nothing? Should the law do 17
something then? 18
Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the 19
facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But 20
the real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. 21
The real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a tech- 22
nology that is 95 percent secure and produces a market of size x, or 23
(b) to have a technology that is 50 percent secure but produces a mar- 24
ket of five times x? Less secure might produce more unauthorized 25
sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in au- 26
thorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists’ com- 27
pensation without breaking the Internet. Once that’s assured, then it 28
may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty pirates. 29
But we’re a long way away from whittling the problem down to this 30
subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we’re there should not be 31
on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we’re there S32
R33
AFTERWORD 303
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1 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting the
2 space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
3
4
5 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers
6
7 I’m a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
8 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
9 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
10 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
11 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
12 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it is
13 my view that our profession has become too attuned to the client. And
14 in a world where the rich clients have one strong view, the unwilling-
15 ness of the profession to question or counter that one strong view queers
16 the law.
17 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I’m attacked as a “rad-
18 ical” by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am advo-
19 cating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate and
20 significant figures in the history of this branch of the law. Many, for ex-
21 ample, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to the Copyright
22 Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the dominant scholar
23 and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville Nimmer, thought it
24 obvious.10
25 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
26 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
27 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
28 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and bene-
29 fits. But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the
30 legal system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction
31 costs of the legal system are slight.11 They see a system that has been
32S around for hundreds of years, and they assume it works the way their
33R elementary school civics class taught them it works.
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But the legal system doesn’t work. Or more accurately, it doesn’t 1

work for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the 2
system is corrupt. I don’t think our legal system (at the federal level, at 3
least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of our legal sys- 4
tem are so astonishingly high that justice can practically never be done. 5
These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer’s time is 6
billed at the largest firms at more than $400 per hour. How much time 7
should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching ob- 8
scure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality: very lit- 9
tle. The law depended upon the careful articulation and development 10
of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development of legal doc- 11
trine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work costs too much, 12
except in the most high-profile and costly cases. 13
The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock 14
our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it 15
their duty to change the way the law works—or better, to change the 16
law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the 17
top 1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient, 18
and inexpensive, and hence radically more just. 19
But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the 20
law away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is pre- 21
cisely what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left 22
to its review. 23
Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with 24
digital technology—the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or 25
think about the amazing things your community could facilitate with 26
digital technology—a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change some- 27
thing. Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold 28
molasses poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that re- 29
quires permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev’s 30
Russia. 31
The law should regulate in certain areas of culture—but it should S32
regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers R33
AFTERWORD 305
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1 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this simple
2 pragmatic question: “Will it do good?” When challenged about the ex-
3 panding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, “Why not?”
4 We should ask, “Why?” Show me why your regulation of culture is
5 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
6 keep your lawyers away.
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32S
33R
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
NOTES
13
14
15
Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide Web. As In16
anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be highly unstable. I 17
have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting readers to the original source
through the Web site associated with this book. For each link below, you can go to 18
http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by clicking on the 19
number after the # sign. If the original link remains alive, you will be redirected to 20
that link. If the original link has disappeared, you will be redirected to an appro-
priate reference for the material.
21
22
PREFACE 23
1. David Pogue, “Don’t Just Chat, Do Something,” New York Times, 30 Janu- 24
ary 2000.
25
2. Richard M. Stallman, Free Software, Free Societies 57 ( Joshua Gay, ed.
2002). 26
3. William Safire, “The Great Media Gulp,” New York Times, 22 May 2003. 27
28
INTRODUCTION
1. St. George Tucker, Blackstone’s Commentaries 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.: 29
Rothman Reprints, 1969), 18. 30
2. United States v. Causby, U.S. 328 (1946): 256, 261. The Court did find that 31
there could be a “taking” if the government’s use of its land effectively de-
stroyed the value of the Causbys’ land. This example was suggested to me S32
by Keith Aoki’s wonderful piece, “(Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: R33
307
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1 Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship,” Stanford Law Re-

view 48 (1996): 1293, 1333. See also Paul Goldstein, Real Property (Mi-
2
neola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1984), 1112–13.
3 3. Lawrence Lessing, Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
4 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company, 1956), 209.
4. See “Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the Electronic Era,” First Elec-
5
tronic Church of America, at www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
6 link #1.
7 5. Lessing, 226.
8 6. Lessing, 256.
7. Amanda Lenhart, “The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look
9 at Internet Access and the Digital Divide,” Pew Internet and American
10 Life Project, 15 April 2003: 6, available at link #2.
11 8. This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
12 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
13 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
14 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
15 D. Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193,
16 198–200.
17 9. See Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (New York: Prometheus Books,
2001), ch. 13.
18 10. Amy Harmon, “Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
19 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club,” New York
20 Times, 17 January 2002.
11. Neil W. Netanel, “Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society,” Yale Law
21
Journal 106 (1996): 283.
22
23 “PIRACY”
1. Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777) (Mansfield).
24
2. See Rochelle Dreyfuss, “Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
25 in the Pepsi Generation,” Notre Dame Law Review 65 (1990): 397.
26 3. Lisa Bannon, “The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can’t Unless They Pay
Up,” Wall Street Journal, 21 August 1996, available at link #3; Jonathan
27
Zittrain, “Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
28 Speech, No One Wins,” Boston Globe, 24 November 2002.
29 4. In The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: Basic Books, 2002), Richard
30 Florida documents a shift in the nature of labor toward a labor of creativ-
ity. His work, however, doesn’t directly address the legal conditions under
31 which that creativity is enabled or stifled. I certainly agree with him about
32S the importance and significance of this change, but I also believe the con-
33R ditions under which it will be enabled are much more tenuous.
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CHAPTER ONE: CREATORS 1

1. Leonard Maltin, Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated Car-
2
toons (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 34–35.
2. I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at link #4. 3
According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to 4
use the music for five songs in Steamboat Willie: “Steamboat Bill,” “The 5
Simpleton” (Delille), “Mischief Makers” (Carbonara), “Joyful Hurry No. 1”
(Baron), and “Gawky Rube” (Lakay). A sixth song, “The Turkey in the 6
Straw,” was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to 7
Harry Surden, 10 July 2003, on file with author. 8
3. He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, “The Mouse
that Ate the Public Domain,” Findlaw, 5 March 2002, at link #5. 9
4. Until 1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an 10
initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the “average” term by de- 11
termining the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
and the proportion renewing. Thus, if 100 copyrights are registered in year 12
1, and only 15 are renewed, and the renewal term is 28 years, then the aver- 13
age term is 32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the 14
Web site associated with this book, available at link #6.
5. For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, Reinventing Comics (New
15
York: Perennial, 2000). 16
6. See Salil K. Mehra, “Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain 17
Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?” Rutgers Law
Review 55 (2002): 155, 182. “[T]here might be a collective economic ra-
18
tionality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing legal 19
actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga artists may be 20
better off collectively if they set aside their individual self-interest and de-
21
cide not to press their legal rights. This is essentially a prisoner’s dilemma
solved.” 22
7. The term intellectual property is of relatively recent origin. See Siva Vaid- 23
hyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 11 (New York: New York Univer-
24
sity Press, 2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas (New York:
Random House, 2001), 293 n. 26. The term accurately describes a set of 25
“property” rights—copyright, patents, trademark, and trade-secret—but the 26
nature of those rights is very different. 27
CHAPTER TWO: “MERE COPYISTS” 28
1. Reese V. Jenkins, Images and Enterprise (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univer- 29
sity Press, 1975), 112. 30
2. Brian Coe, The Birth of Photography (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1977), 53. 31
3. Jenkins, 177. S32
4. Based on a chart in Jenkins, p. 178. R33
NOTES 309
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1 5. Coe, 58.
6. For illustrative cases, see, for example, Pavesich v. N.E. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E.
2
68 (Ga. 1905); Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 123090 S.W. 364, 366 (Ky.
3 1909); Corliss v. Walker, 64 F. 280 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1894).
4 7. Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” Har-
vard Law Review 4 (1890): 193.
5
8. See Melville B. Nimmer, “The Right of Publicity,” Law and Contemporary
6 Problems 19 (1954): 203; William L. Prosser, “Privacy,” California Law Re-
7 view 48 (1960) 398–407; White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.
8 2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993).
9. H. Edward Goldberg, “Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and Soft-
9 ware You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations,” cadalyst, 1
10 February 2002, available at link #7.
11 10. Judith Van Evra, Television and Child Development (Hillsdale, N.J.:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990); “Findings on Family and TV
12 Study,” Denver Post, 25 May 1997, B6.
13 11. Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish, 13 December
14 2002.
12. See Scott Steinberg, “Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs,” E!online, 4 No-
15 vember 2000, available at link #8; “Timeline,” 22 November 2000, avail-
16 able at link #9.
17 13. Interview with Daley and Barish.
14. Ibid.
18 15. See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, bk. 1, trans.
19 Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books, 2000), ch. 16.
20 16. Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, “Deliberation Day,” Journal of Politi-
cal Philosophy 10 (2) (2002): 129.
21
17. Cass Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001),
22 65–80, 175, 182, 183, 192.
23 18. Noah Shachtman, “With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot,” New
York Times, 16 January 2003, G5.
24
19. Telephone interview with David Winer, 16 April 2003.
25 20. John Schwartz, “Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of Informa-
26 tion Online,” New York Times, 2 February 2003, A28; Staci D. Kramer,
“Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,” Online Journal-
27
ism Review, 2 February 2003, available at link #10.
28 21. See Michael Falcone, “Does an Editor’s Pencil Ruin a Web Log?” New
29 York Times, 29 September 2003, C4. (“Not all news organizations have
30 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN correspon-
dent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the war on March 9,
31 stopped posting 12 days later at his bosses’ request. Last year Steve Olaf-
32S son, a Houston Chronicle reporter, was fired for keeping a personal Web log,
33R
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published under a pseudonym, that dealt with some of the issues and 1
people he was covering.”)
2
22. See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, “Technological Ac-
cess Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship,” Communications 3
of the Association for Computer Machinery 43 (2000): 9. 4
5
CHAPTER THREE: CATALOGS
1. Tim Goral, “Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-2-P Networks: 6
Suit Alleges $97.8 Billion in Damages,” Professional Media Group LCC 6 7
(2003): 5, available at 2003 WL 55179443. 8
2. Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (2001)
(27–2042—Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for 9
the Arts, More Than One in a Blue Moon (2000). 10
3. Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in “KaZaA and Punishment,” 11
Wall Street Journal, 10 September 2003, A24.
12
CHAPTER FOUR: “PIRATES” 13
1. I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary his- 14
tory. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 87–93,
which details Edison’s “adventures” with copyright and patent.
15
2. J. A. Aberdeen, Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion 16
Picture Producers (Cobblestone Entertainment, 2000) and expanded texts 17
posted at “The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
18
Company vs. the Independent Outlaws,” available at link #11. For a dis-
cussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the limits 19
imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, “From Edison 20
to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Prop-
21
ertization of Copyright” (September 2002), University of Chicago Law
School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper 22
No. 159. 23
3. Marc Wanamaker, “The First Studios,” The Silents Majority, archived at
24
link #12.
4. To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on 25
S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents, 59th 26
Cong. 59, 1st sess. (1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge, of 27
South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in Legislative History of the 1909
Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hack- 28
ensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976). 29
5. To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 223 (state- 30
ment of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
6. To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 226 (state- 31
ment of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association). S32
R33
NOTES 311
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1 7. To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 23 (state-

ment of John Philip Sousa, composer).
2
8. To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 283–84
3 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music Perforat-
4 ing Company of New York).
9. To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 376 (pre-
5
pared memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the Amer-
6 ican Graphophone Company Association).
7 10. Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2499, S. 2900, H.R. 243, and
8 H.R. 11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents, 60th Cong., 1st
sess., 217 (1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
9 in Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and
10 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
11 11. Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R. 2512, House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st sess., House Document no. 83, 66
12 (8 March 1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention
13 to this report.
14 12. See 17 United States Code, sections 106 and 110. At the beginning, record
companies printed “Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast” and other mes-
15 sages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a radio station.
16 Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a warning attached to a
17 record might restrict the rights of the radio station. See RCA Manufactur-
ing Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F. 2d 86 (2nd Cir. 1940). See also Randal C.
18 Picker, “From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and
19 Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright,” University of Chicago Law
20 Review 70 (2003): 281.
13. Copyright Law Revision—CATV: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the Sub-
21
committee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Com-
22 mittee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 78 (1966) (statement of
23 Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications Commission).
14. Copyright Law Revision—CATV, 116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
24
general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
25 15. Copyright Law Revision—CATV, 126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
26 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
16. Copyright Law Revision—CATV, 169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
27
Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
28 United Artists Television, Inc.).
29 17. Copyright Law Revision—CATV, 209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
30 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
18. Copyright Law Revision—CATV, 216 (statement of Edwin M. Zimmer-
31 man, acting assistant attorney general).
32S 19. See, for example, National Music Publisher’s Association, The Engine of Free
33R Expression: Copyright on the Internet—The Myth of Free Information, avail-
312 NOTES
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able at link #13. “The threat of piracy—the use of someone else’s creative 1
work without permission or compensation—has grown with the Internet.”
2
CHAPTER FIVE: “PIRACY” 3
1. See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), The 4
Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report 2003, July 2003, available at 5
link #14. See also Ben Hunt, “Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,”
Financial Times, 14 February 2003, 11. 6
2. See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who Owns 7
the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2003), 10–13, 209. 8
The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agree-
ment obligates member nations to create administrative and enforcement 9
mechanisms for intellectual property rights, a costly proposition for devel- 10
oping countries. Additionally, patent rights may lead to higher prices for 11
staple industries such as agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the dispar-
ity between burdens imposed upon developing countries and benefits con- 12
ferred to industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use 13
patents for public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent 14
holder’s permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to gain the
benefits of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a promising strategy for
15
developing nations within the TRIPS framework. 16
3. For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan 17
Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy (New York: Amacom, 2002),
18
144–90. “In some instances . . . the impact of piracy on the copyright holder’s
ability to appropriate the value of the work will be negligible. One obvious in- 19
stance is the case where the individual engaging in pirating would not have 20
purchased an original even if pirating were not an option.” Ibid., 149.
21
4. Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777).
5. See Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma: The Revolutionary 22
National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business (New York: 23
HarperBusiness, 2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
24
that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to come
up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own products. 25
This job usually falls to outside innovators, who reassemble existing tech- 26
nology in inventive ways. For a discussion of Christensen’s ideas, see 27
Lawrence Lessig, Future, 89–92, 139.
6. See Carolyn Lochhead, “Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,” 28
San Francisco Chronicle, 24 September 2002, A1; “Rock ’n’ Roll Suicide,” 29
New Scientist, 6 July 2002, 42; Benny Evangelista, “Napster Names CEO, 30
Secures New Financing,” San Francisco Chronicle, 23 May 2003, C1; “Nap-
ster’s Wake-Up Call,” Economist, 24 June 2000, 23; John Naughton, “Hol- 31
lywood at War with the Internet” (London) Times, 26 July 2002, 18. S32
7. See Ipsos-Insight, TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution R33
NOTES 313
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1 (September 2002), reporting that 28 percent of Americans aged twelve

and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and 30 percent have
2
listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3 8. Amy Harmon, “Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight,” New
4 York Times, 6 June 2003, A1.
9. See Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy,148–49.
5
10. See Cap Gemini Ernst & Young, Technology Evolution and the Music In-
6 dustry’s Business Model Crisis (2003), 3. This report describes the music in-
7 dustry’s effort to stigmatize the budding practice of cassette taping in the
8 1970s, including an advertising campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull
and the caption “Home taping is killing music.”
9 At the time digital audio tape became a threat, the Office of Technical
10 Assessment conducted a survey of consumer behavior. In 1988, 40 percent
11 of consumers older than ten had taped music to a cassette format. U.S.
Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Copyright and Home Copying:
12 Technology Challenges the Law, OTA-CIT-422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
13 Government Printing Office, October 1989), 145–56.
14 11. U.S. Congress, Copyright and Home Copying, 4.
12. See Recording Industry Association of America, 2002 Yearend Statistics,
15 available at link #15. A later report indicates even greater losses. See
16 Recording Industry Association of America, Some Facts About Music Piracy,
17 25 June 2003, available at link #16: “In the past four years, unit shipments
of recorded music have fallen by 26 percent from 1.16 billion units in 1999
18 to 860 million units in 2002 in the United States (based on units shipped).
19 In terms of sales, revenues are down 14 percent, from $14.6 billion in 1999
20 to $12.6 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The mu-
sic industry worldwide has gone from a $39 billion industry in 2000 down
21
to a $32 billion industry in 2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments).”
22 13. Jane Black, “Big Music’s Broken Record,” BusinessWeek online, 13 Feb-
23 ruary 2003, available at link #17.
14. Ibid.
24
15. By one estimate, 75 percent of the music released by the major labels is no
25 longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright Law—Coming
26 Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the Senate Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st sess. (3 April 2001) (prepared state-
27
ment of the Future of Music Coalition), available at link #18.
28 16. While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
29 existence, in 2002, there were 7,198 used book dealers in the United States,
30 an increase of 20 percent since 1993. See Book Hunter Press, The Quiet
Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market (2002), available at link
31 #19. Used records accounted for $260 million in sales in 2002. See Na-
32S tional Association of Recording Merchandisers, “2002 Annual Survey Re-
33R sults,” available at link #20.
314 NOTES
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17. See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at 34- 1

35 (N.D. Cal., 11 July 2001), nos. MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 99-5183
2
MHP, available at link #21. For an account of the litigation and its toll on
Napster, see Joseph Menn, All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn Fan- 3
ning’s Napster (New York: Crown Business, 2003), 269–82. 4
18. Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on 5
S. 1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
and 2nd sess., 459 (1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion 6
Picture Association of America, Inc.). 7
19. Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 475. 8
20. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 438
(C.D. Cal., 1979). 9
21. Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 485 (testimony 10
of Jack Valenti). 11
22. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir.
1981). 12
23. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984). 13
24. These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other 14
cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
15
Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and 16
controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of 17
1992 (Title 17 of the United States Code), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat.
18
4237, codified at 17 U.S.C. §1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I’ve described. See 19
Lessig, Future, 71. See also Picker, “From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,” 20
University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 293–96.
21
25. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432
(1984). 22
26. John Schwartz, “New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software 23
Echoes Past Efforts,” New York Times, 22 September 2003, C3.
24
“PROPERTY” 25
1. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (13 August 1813) in 26
The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert 27
Ellery Bergh, eds., 1903), 330, 333–34.
2. As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are intangi- 28
ble. A property right is simply a right that an individual has against the 29
world to do or not do certain things that may or may not attach to a phys- 30
ical object. The right itself is intangible, even if the object to which it is
(metaphorically) attached is tangible. See Adam Mossoff, “What Is Prop- 31
erty? Putting the Pieces Back Together,” Arizona Law Review 45 (2003): S32
373, 429 n. 241. R33
NOTES 315
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1 CHAPTER SIX: FOUNDERS

2 1. Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
3 handsome “definitive editions” of classic works. In addition to Romeo and
4 Juliet, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
5 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, “Jacob Tonson,
6 Bookseller,” American Scholar 61:3 (1992): 424–31.
7 2. Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville: Van-
8 derbilt University Press, 1968), 151–52.
3. As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a “copy-
9 right law.” See Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 40.
10 4. Philip Wittenberg, The Protection and Marketing of Literary Property (New
11 York: J. Messner, Inc., 1937), 31.
5. A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
12
in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
13 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the En-
14 couragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the
Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein men-
15
tioned (London, 1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et al., 8,
16 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
17 6. Lyman Ray Patterson, “Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use,” Vanderbilt
18 Law Review 40 (1987): 28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
Vaidhyanathan, 37–48.
19 7. For a compelling account, see David Saunders, Authorship and Copyright
20 (London: Routledge, 1992), 62–69.
21 8. Mark Rose, Authors and Owners (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1993), 92.
22 9. Ibid., 93.
23 10. Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective, 167 (quoting
24 Borwell).
11. Howard B. Abrams, “The Historic Foundation of American Copyright
25 Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright,” Wayne Law Re-
26 view 29 (1983): 1152.
27 12. Ibid., 1156.
13. Rose, 97.
28 14. Ibid.
29
30 CHAPTER SEVEN: RECORDERS
1. For an excellent argument that such use is “fair use,” but that lawyers don’t
31 permit recognition that it is “fair use,” see Richard A. Posner with William
32S F. Patry, “Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred ” (draft on
33R file with author), University of Chicago Law School, 5 August 2003.
316 NOTES
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CHAPTER EIGHT: TRANSFORMERS 1

1. Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of public- 2
ity—rights an artist has to control the commercial exploitation of his im-
age. But these rights, too, burden “Rip, Mix, Burn” creativity, as this chapter
3
evinces. 4
2. U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, Seven 5
Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition, available at link #22.
6
CHAPTER NINE: COLLECTORS 7
1. The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White 8
House changes its own press releases without notice. A May 13, 2003, press
9
release stated, “Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended.” That was later
changed, without notice, to “Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended.” 10
E-mail from Brewster Kahle, 1 December 2003. 11
2. Doug Herrick, “Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at the
12
Library of Congress,” Film Library Quarterly 13 nos. 2–3 (1980): 5; An-
thony Slide, Nitrate Won’t Wait: A History of Film Preservation in the United 13
States ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., 1992), 36. 14
3. Dave Barns, “Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord, 15
Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business,” Chicago Tribune,
5 September 1997, at Metro Lake 1L. Of books published between 1927 16
and 1946, only 2.2 percent were in print in 2002. R. Anthony Reese, “The 17
First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks,” Boston College Law Re- 18
view 44 (2003): 593 n. 51.
19
CHAPTER TEN: “PROPERTY” 20
1. Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R. 21
4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the Sub-
committee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of 22
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 97th 23
Cong., 2nd sess. (1982): 65 (testimony of Jack Valenti). 24
2. Lawyers speak of “property” not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle of
rights that are sometimes associated with a particular object. Thus, my
25
“property right” to my car gives me the right to exclusive use, but not the 26
right to drive at 150 miles an hour. For the best effort to connect the ordi- 27
nary meaning of “property” to “lawyer talk,” see Bruce Ackerman, Private
Property and the Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977),
28
26–27. 29
3. By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don’t mean 30
to suggest that the other three don’t affect law. Obviously, they do. Law’s
31
only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a right self-consciously to
change the other three. The right of the other three is more timidly ex- S32
pressed. See Lawrence Lessig, Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace (New R33
NOTES 317
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1 York: Basic Books, 1999): 90–95; Lawrence Lessig, “The New Chicago
School,” Journal of Legal Studies, June 1998.
2
4. Some people object to this way of talking about “liberty.” They object be-
3 cause their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any partic-
4 ular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the government. For
instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people think it is meaningless
5
to say that one’s liberty has been restrained. A bridge has washed out, and
6 it’s harder to get from one place to another. To talk about this as a loss of
7 freedom, they say, is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of or-
8 dinary life.
I don’t mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which depends
9 upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue against any
10 insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view of liberty. As I
11 argued in Code, we come from a long tradition of political thought with a
broader focus than the narrow question of what the government did when.
12 John Stuart Mill defended freedom of speech, for example, from the
13 tyranny of narrow minds, not from the fear of government prosecution;
14 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co., 1978), 19.
John R. Commons famously defended the economic freedom of labor
15 from constraints imposed by the market; John R. Commons, “The Right
16 to Work,” in Malcom Rutherford and Warren J. Samuels, eds., John R.
17 Commons: Selected Essays (London: Routledge: 1997), 62. The Americans
with Disabilities Act increases the liberty of people with physical disabili-
18 ties by changing the architecture of certain public places, thereby making
19 access to those places easier; 42 United States Code, section 12101 (2000).
20 Each of these interventions to change existing conditions changes the
liberty of a particular group. The effect of those interventions should be
21
accounted for in order to understand the effective liberty that each of these
22 groups might face.
23 5. See Geoffrey Smith, “Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?” Busi-
nessWeek online, 2 August 1999, available at link #23. For a more recent
24
analysis of Kodak’s place in the market, see Chana R. Schoenberger, “Can
25 Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?” Forbes.com, 6 October 2003, avail-
26 able at link #24.
6. Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars (New York: Wiley, 1994), 170–71.
27
7. See, for example, James Boyle, “A Politics of Intellectual Property: Envi-
28 ronmentalism for the Net?” Duke Law Journal 47 (1997): 87.
29 8. William W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the
30 United States (London: Cambridge University Press, 1953), vol. 1, 485–86:
“extinguish[ing], by plain implication of ‘the supreme Law of the Land,’
31 the perpetual rights which authors had, or were supposed by some to have, under
32S the Common Law” (emphasis added).
33R 9. Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790 to
318 NOTES
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1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, A History of 1
Book Publishing in the United States, vol. 1, The Creation of an Industry,
2
1630–1865 (New York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000 imprints
recorded before 1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the 1790 act; 3
William J. Maher, Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension and the Copy- 4
right Law of 1790 in Historical Context, 7–10 (2002), available at link #25. 5
Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell immediately into the pub-
lic domain. Even those works that were copyrighted fell into the public 6
domain quickly, because the term of copyright was short. The initial term 7
of copyright was fourteen years, with the option of renewal for an addi- 8
tional fourteen years. Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124.
10. Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For instance, 9
of the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were renewed in 10
1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal rates, see Barbara 11
A. Ringer, “Study No. 31: Renewal of Copyright,” Studies on Copyright,
vol. 1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute, 1963), 618. For a more recent 12
and comprehensive analysis, see William M. Landes and Richard A. Pos- 13
ner, “Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,” University of Chicago Law Re- 14
view 70 (2003): 471, 498–501, and accompanying figures.
11. See Ringer, ch. 9, n. 2.
15
12. These statistics are understated. Between the years 1910 and 1962 (the 16
first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never 17
more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
18
Posner, “Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,” loc. cit.
13. See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, “Poets, Pirates, and the Cre- 19
ation of American Literature,” 29 New York University Journal of Interna- 20
tional Law and Politics 255 (1997), and James Gilraeth, ed., Federal
21
Copyright Records, 1790–1800 (U.S. G.P.O., 1987).
14. Jonathan Zittrain, “The Copyright Cage,” Legal Affairs, July/August 22
2003, available at link #26. 23
15. Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
24
about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the perspective
of the First Amendment) between mere “copies” and derivative works. See 25
Jed Rubenfeld, “The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitution- 26
ality,” Yale Law Journal 112 (2002): 1–60 (see especially pp. 53–59). 27
16. This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law certainly
regulates more than “copies”—a public performance of a copyrighted 28
song, for example, is regulated even though performance per se doesn’t 29
make a copy; 17 United States Code, section 106(4). And it certainly some- 30
times doesn’t regulate a “copy”; 17 United States Code, section 112(a). But
the presumption under the existing law (which regulates “copies;” 17 31
United States Code, section 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right. S32
17. Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends, R33
NOTES 319
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1 we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for
its extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the ba-
2
sis of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
3 18. I don’t mean “nature” in the sense that it couldn’t be different, but rather that
4 its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not make
copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be designed to
5
delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies remain.
6 19. See David Lange, “Recognizing the Public Domain,” Law and Contempo-
7 rary Problems 44 (1981): 172–73.
8 20. Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 1–3.
21. In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might, for
9 example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I will read
10 it only three times, or that I promise to read it three times. But that obli-
11 gation (and the limits for creating that obligation) would come from the
contract, not from copyright law, and the obligations of contract would
12 not necessarily pass to anyone who subsequently acquired the book.
13 22. See Pamela Samuelson, “Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,”
14 Science 293 (2001): 2028; Brendan I. Koerner, “Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks,” American Prospect, 1
15 January 2002; “Court Dismisses Computer Scientists’ Challenge to
16 DMCA,” Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter, 11 December 2001; Bill
17 Holland, “Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns,” Billboard, 26
May 2001; Janelle Brown, “Is the RIAA Running Scared?” Salon.com, 26
18 April 2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, “Frequently Asked Ques-
19 tions about Felten and USENIX v. RIAA Legal Case,” available at link #27.
20 23. Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
455 fn. 27 (1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
21
James Lardner, Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
22 the VCR (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 270–71.
23 24. For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, “Legal Fictions,
Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law,” Loyola of Los Angeles
24
Entertainment Law Journal 17 (1997): 651.
25 25. FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
26 Transportation Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (22 May 2003) (state-
ment of Senator John McCain).
27
26. Lynette Holloway, “Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
28 Slide,” New York Times, 23 December 2002.
29 27. Molly Ivins, “Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped,” Charleston Gazette,
30 31 May 2003.
28. James Fallows, “The Age of Murdoch,” Atlantic Monthly (September
31 2003): 89.
32S 29. Leonard Hill, “The Axis of Access,” remarks before Weidenbaum Center
33R Forum, “Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry,” St. Louis, Mis-
320 NOTES
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souri, 3 April 2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at link #28; 1

for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see link #29).
2
30. NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on
Media Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 108th 3
Cong., 1st sess. (2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Con- 4
sumers Union and the Consumer Federation of America), available at link 5
#30. Kimmelman quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of
America, West, in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, 6
Virginia, 27 February 2003. 7
31. Ibid. 8
32. “Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation,” Now with Bill Moyers, Bill
Moyers, 25 April 2003, edited transcript available at link #31. 9
33. Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma: The Revolutionary Na- 10
tional Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business (Cambridge: Harvard 11
Business School Press, 1997). Christensen acknowledges that the idea was
first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See Kim B. Clark, “The Interaction of 12
Design Hierarchies and Market Concepts in Technological Evolution,” 13
Research Policy 14 (1985): 235–51. For a more recent study, see Richard 14
Foster and Sarah Kaplan, Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are
Built to Last Underperform the Market—and How to Successfully Transform
15
Them (New York: Currency/Doubleday, 2001). 16
34. The Marijuana Policy Project, in February 2003, sought to place ads that 17
directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within the
18
Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as “against [their] pol-
icy.” The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads without reviewing 19
them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally agreed to run the ads and 20
accepted payment to do so, but later decided not to run the ads and re-
21
turned the collected fees. Interview with Neal Levine, 15 October 2003.
These restrictions are, of course, not limited to drug policy. See, for ex- 22
ample, Nat Ives, “On the Issue of an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with 23
Rejection from TV Networks,” New York Times, 13 March 2003, C4. Out-
24
side of election-related air time there is very little that the FCC or the
courts are willing to do to even the playing field. For a general overview, 25
see Rhonda Brown, “Ad Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Adver- 26
tising on Television and Radio,” Yale Law and Policy Review 6 (1988): 27
449–79, and for a more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the
courts, see Radio-Television News Directors Association v. FCC, 184 F. 3d 28
872 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as 29
the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San Francisco 30
transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni diesel buses. Phillip
Matier and Andrew Ross, “Antidiesel Group Fuming After Muni Rejects 31
Ad,” SFGate.com, 16 June 2003, available at link #32. The ground was S32
that the criticism was “too controversial.” R33
NOTES 321
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1 35. Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his “four surrenders” of

copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan, 159–60.
2
36. It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist move-
3 ment to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to balance
4 public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, “The Disintegration of
Property,” in Nomos XXII: Property, J. Roland Pennock and John W.
5
Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University Press, 1980).
6
7 CHAPTER ELEVEN: CHIMERA
8 1. H. G. Wells, “The Country of the Blind” (1904, 1911). See H. G. Wells,
The Country of the Blind and Other Stories, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
9 York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
10 2. For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
11 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School, “Copy-
right and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,” 27 June 2003, available
12 at link #33. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
13 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized on-line
14 copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high as five years
imprisonment; see Jon Healey, “House Bill Aims to Up Stakes on Piracy,”
15 Los Angeles Times, 17 July 2003, available at link #34. Civil penalties are
16 currently set at $150,000 per copied song. For a recent (and unsuccessful)
17 legal challenge to the RIAA’s demand that an ISP reveal the identity of a
user accused of sharing more than 600 songs through a family computer,
18 see RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services (In re. Verizon Internet Services), 240 F.
19 Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as
20 high as $90 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a
powerful arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging
21
from $12,000 to $17,500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
22 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $98 bil-
23 lion the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See Eliza-
beth Young, “Downloading Could Lead to Fines,” redandblack.com, 26
24
August 2003, available at link #35. For an example of the RIAA’s target-
25 ing of student file sharing, and of the subpoenas issued to universities to
26 reveal student file-sharer identities, see James Collins, “RIAA Steps Up
Bid to Force BC, MIT to Name Students,” Boston Globe, 8 August 2003,
27
D3, available at link #36.
28 3. WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to
29 Digital Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before
30 the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protec-
tion, House Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong. 29 (1999) (statement
31 of Peter Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards, EMu-
32S sic.com), available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House Con-
33R gressional Testimony File.
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CHAPTER TWELVE: HARMS 1

1. See Lynne W. Jeter, Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom (Hobo-
2
ken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2003), 176, 204; for details of the settle-
ment, see MCI press release, “MCI Wins U.S. District Court Approval for 3
SEC Settlement” (7 July 2003), available at link #37. 4
2. The bill, modeled after California’s tort reform model, was passed in the 5
House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July 2003. For
an overview, see Tanya Albert, “Measure Stalls in Senate: ‘We’ll Be Back,’ 6
Say Tort Reformers,” amednews.com, 28 July 2003, available at link #38, 7
and “Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps,” CBSNews.com, 9 July 2003, 8
available at link #39. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
recent months. 9
3. See Danit Lidor, “Artists Just Wanna Be Free,” Wired, 7 July 2003, avail- 10
able at link #40. For an overview of the exhibition, see link #41. 11
4. See Joseph Menn, “Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor,” Los Angeles
Times, 23 April 2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on innova- 12
tion in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, “The Music Revolu- 13
tion Will Not Be Digitized,” Salon.com, 1 June 2001, available at link #42. 14
See also Jon Healey, “Online Music Services Besieged,” Los Angeles
Times, 28 May 2001.
15
5. Rafe Needleman, “Driving in Cars with MP3s,” Business 2.0, 16 June 16
2003, available at link #43. I am grateful to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli 17
for this example.
6. “Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,” GartnerG2 and
18
the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School 19
(2003), 33–35, available at link #44. 20
7. GartnerG2, 26–27.
21
8. See David McGuire, “Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy,” Newsbytes, 28
February 2002 (Entertainment). 22
9. Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 23
2001).
24
10. The only circuit court exception is found in Recording Industry Association
of America (RIAA) v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, 180 F. 3d 1072 (9th 25
Cir. 1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that 26
makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for contributory copy- 27
right infringement for a device that is unable to record or redistribute mu-
sic (a device whose only copying function is to render portable a music file 28
already stored on a user’s hard drive). 29
At the district court level, the only exception is found in Metro- 30
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D.
Cal., 2003), where the court found the link between the distributor and 31
any given user’s conduct too attenuated to make the distributor liable for S32
contributory or vicarious infringement liability. R33
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1 11. For example, in July 2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R. 5211), which would immunize
2
copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
3 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In Au-
4 gust 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate that
technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films broadcast on
5
TV (i.e., computers) respect a “broadcast flag” that would disable copying
6 of that content. And in March of the same year, Senator Fritz Hollings
7 introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion
8 Act, which mandated copyright protection technology in all digital media
devices. See GartnerG2, “Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster
9 World,” 27 June 2003, 33–34, available at link #44.
10 12. Lessing, 239.
11 13. Ibid., 229.
14. This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright Arbitra-
12 tion Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an example
13 offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings, iLaw
14 (Stanford), 3 July 2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher and Zittrain
submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was ultimately rejected.
15 See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings
16 and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9, CARP DTRA 1 and 2,
17 available at link #45.
For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal C. Picker,
18 “Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution,” Antitrust
19 Bulletin (Summer/Fall 2002): 461: “This was not confusion, these are just
20 old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog radio stations are protected from dig-
ital entrants, reducing entry in radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the
21
name of getting royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of pow-
22 erful interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way.”
23 15. Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, “The Music Downloading Deluge,” Pew
Internet and American Life Project (24 April 2001), available at link #46.
24
The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that 37 million
25 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early 2001.
26 16. Alex Pham, “The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case,” Los
Angeles Times, 10 September 2003, Business.
27
17. Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, “Alcohol Consumption During Pro-
28 hibition,” American Economic Review 81, no. 2 (1991): 242.
29 18. National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
30 Reform Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (5 March 2003) (statement of
John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
31 19. See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, “Tax Compli-
32S ance,” Journal of Economic Literature 36 (1998): 818 (survey of compliance
33R literature).
324 NOTES
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20. See Frank Ahrens, “RIAA’s Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single 1
Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,” Wash-
2
ington Post, 10 September 2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, “Worried Parents Pull
Plug on File ‘Stealing’; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on File 3
Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid Being 4
Sued,” Orlando Sentinel Tribune, 30 August 2003, C1; Jefferson Graham, 5
“Recording Industry Sues Parents,” USA Today, 15 September 2003, 4D;
John Schwartz, “She Says She’s No Music Pirate. No Snoop Fan, Either,” 6
New York Times, 25 September 2003, C1; Margo Varadi, “Is Brianna a 7
Criminal?” Toronto Star, 18 September 2003, P7. 8
21. See “Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Dis-
closes Some Methods Used,” CNN.com, available at link #47. 9
22. See Jeff Adler, “Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,” Boston 10
Globe, 18 May 2003, City Weekly, 1; Frank Ahrens, “Four Students Sued 11
over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at Colleges,” Wash-
ington Post, 4 April 2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong, “Students ‘Rip, Mix, 12
Burn’ at Their Own Risk,” Christian Science Monitor, 2 September 2003, 13
20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, “Music Pirate Hunt Turns to Loy- 14
ola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over; Lawsuit Possible,” Chicago
Tribune, 16 July 2003, 1C; Beth Cox, “RIAA Trains Antipiracy Guns on
15
Universities,” Internet News, 30 January 2003, available at link #48; Benny 16
Evangelista, “Download Warning 101: Freshman Orientation This Fall to 17
Include Record Industry Warnings Against File Sharing,” San Francisco
18
Chronicle, 11 August 2003, E11; “Raid, Letters Are Weapons at Universi-
ties,” USA Today, 26 September 2000, 3D. 19
20
CHAPTER THIRTEEN: ELDRED
21
1. There’s a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to describe, but
it’s a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet created was a world 22
of noncommercial pornographers—people who were distributing porn 23
but were not making money directly or indirectly from that distribution.
24
Such a class didn’t exist before the Internet came into being because the
costs of distributing porn were so high. Yet this new class of distributors 25
got special attention in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down 26
the Communications Decency Act of 1996. It was partly because of the 27
burden on noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed
Congress’s power. The same point could have been made about noncom- 28
mercial publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the 29
world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it at 30
least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to protect non-
commercial pornographers. 31
2. The full text is: “Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright protection to S32
last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change would violate the R33
NOTES 325
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1 Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to strengthen our copy-

right laws in all of the ways available to us. As you know, there is also Jack
2
Valenti’s proposal for a term to last forever less one day. Perhaps the Com-
3 mittee may look at that next Congress,” 144 Cong. Rec. H9946, 9951-2
4 (October 7, 1998).
3. Associated Press, “Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
5
Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators 20 More Years,”
6 Chicago Tribune, 17 October 1998, 22.
7 4. See Nick Brown, “Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
8 Age,” available at link #49.
5. Alan K. Ota, “Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,” Congres-
9 sional Quarterly This Week, 8 August 1990, available at link #50.
10 6. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
11 7. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
8. If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle carries
12 from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in the con-
13 text of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered by the
14 government would allow the government unending power to regulate
commerce—the limitation to interstate commerce notwithstanding. The
15 same point is true in the context of the Copyright Clause. Here, too, the
16 government’s interpretation would allow the government unending power
17 to regulate copyrights—the limitation to “limited times” notwithstanding.
9. Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
18 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), n.10, available at link #51.
19 10. The figure of 2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the Congres-
20 sional Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 7, available at link #52.
21
11. See David G. Savage, “High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright
22 Law,” Los Angeles Times, 6 October 2002; David Streitfeld, “Classic
23 Movies, Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today
on Striking Down Copyright Extension,” Orlando Sentinel Tribune, 9 Oc-
24
tober 2002.
25 12. Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae Sup-
26 porting the Petitoners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-
618), 12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of Petitioners by
27
the Internet Archive, Eldred v. Ashcroft, available at link #53.
28 13. Jason Schultz, “The Myth of the 1976 Copyright ‘Chaos’ Theory,” 20 De-
29 cember 2002, available at link #54.
30 14. Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186
(2003) (No. 01-618), 19.
31 15. Dinitia Smith, “Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
32S Mouse Joins the Fray,” New York Times, 28 March 1998, B7.
33R
326 NOTES
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN: ELDRED II 1

1. Until the 1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
2
legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with for-
malities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of the au- 3
thor’s claim of copyright. However, starting with the 1908 act, every text 4
of the Convention has provided that “the enjoyment and the exercise” of 5
rights guaranteed by the Convention “shall not be subject to any formal-
ity.” The prohibition against formalities is presently embodied in Article 6
5(2) of the Paris Text of the Berne Convention. Many countries continue 7
to impose some form of deposit or registration requirement, albeit not as 8
a condition of copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of
copies of works in national repositories, principally the National Museum. 9
Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in 10
the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar 11
of Authors where the author’s true name can be filed in the case of anony-
mous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, International Intellectual 12
Property Law, Cases and Materials (New York: Foundation Press, 2001), 13
153–54. 14
CONCLUSION
15
1. Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, “Final Report: Integrating 16
Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy” (London, 2002), 17
available at link #55. According to a World Health Organization press re-
lease issued 9 July 2002, only 230,000 of the 6 million who need drugs in
18
the developing world receive them—and half of them are in Brazil. 19
2. See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who 20
Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2003), 37.
21
3. International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report Pre- 22
pared for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C., 23
2000), 14, available at link #56. For a firsthand account of the struggle over
24
South Africa, see Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House Committee on Government 25
Reform, H. Rep., 1st sess., Ser. No. 106-126 (22 July 1999), 150–57 26
(statement of James Love). 27
4. International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report Pre- 28
pared for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C., 29
2000), 15. 30
5. See Sabin Russell, “New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa’s
Needs at Odds with Firms’ Profit Motive,” San Francisco Chronicle, 24 31
May 1999, A1, available at link #57 (“compulsory licenses and gray mar- S32
R33
NOTES 327
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1 kets pose a threat to the entire system of intellectual property protection”);

Robert Weissman, “AIDS and Developing Countries: Democratizing Ac-
2
cess to Essential Medicines,” Foreign Policy in Focus 4:23 (August 1999),
3 available at link #58 (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, “TRIPS,
4 Pharmaceutical Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper
Balance Between Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a Synop-
5
sis,” Widener Law Symposium Journal (Spring 2001): 175.
6 6. Jonathan Krim, “The Quiet War over Open-Source,” Washington Post, 21
7 August 2003, E1, available at link #59; William New, “Global Group’s
8 Shift on ‘Open Source’ Meeting Spurs Stir,” National Journal’s Technology
Daily, 19 August 2003, available at link #60; William New, “U.S. Official
9 Opposes ‘Open Source’ Talks at WIPO,” National Journal’s Technology
10 Daily, 19 August 2003, available at link #61.
11 7. I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
meeting.
12 8. Microsoft’s position about free and open source software is more sophisti-
13 cated. As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with “open source”
14 software or software in the public domain. Microsoft’s principal opposi-
tion is to “free software” licensed under a “copyleft” license, meaning a li-
15 cense that requires the licensee to adopt the same terms on any derivative
16 work. See Bradford L. Smith, “The Future of Software: Enabling the Mar-
17 ketplace to Decide,” Government Policy Toward Open Source Software
(Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies,
18 American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 2002), 69,
19 available at link #62. See also Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice presi-
20 dent, The Commercial Software Model, discussion at New York University
Stern School of Business (3 May 2001), available at link #63.
21
9. Krim, “The Quiet War over Open-Source,” available at link #64.
22 10. See Drahos with Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, 210–20.
23 11. John Borland, “RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers,” CNET News.com, 8
September 2003, available at link #65; Paul R. La Monica, “Music Indus-
24
try Sues Swappers,” CNN/Money, 8 September 2003, available at link
25 #66; Soni Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, “Sued for a
26 Song, N.Y.C. 12-Yr-Old Among 261 Cited as Sharers,” New York Daily
News, 9 September 2003, 3; Frank Ahrens, “RIAA’s Lawsuits Meet Sur-
27
prised Targets; Single Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
28 Defendants,” Washington Post, 10 September 2003, E1; Katie Dean,
29 “Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA,” Wired News, 10 September 2003, avail-
30 able at link #67.
12. Jon Wiederhorn, “Eminem Gets Sued . . . by a Little Old Lady,” mtv.com,
31 17 September 2003, available at link #68.
32S 13. Kenji Hall, Associated Press, “Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for Dy-
33R lan Songs,” Kansascity.com, 9 July 2003, available at link #69.
328 NOTES
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14. “BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public,” BBC press release, 1
24 August 2003, available at link #70.
2
15. “Creative Commons and Brazil,” Creative Commons Weblog, 6 August
2003, available at link #71. 3
4
US, NOW 5
1. See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, “Fair Information Practices and the Ar-
chitecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn’t Get),” Stanford Technology Law 6
Review 1 (2001): par. 6–18, available at link #72 (describing examples in 7
which technology defines privacy policy). See also Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked 8
Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom in an Anxious Age (New York: Ran-
dom House, 2004) (mapping tradeoffs between technology and privacy). 9
2. Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real Culture Wars 10
(2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg Hittelman, a Fiat Lu- 11
cre production, available at link #72.
12
THEM, SOON 13
1. The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only. 14
Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be adopted
by other countries as well.
15
2. There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not 16
solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated 17
system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
18
3. “A Radical Rethink,” Economist, 366:8308 (25 January 2003): 15, available
at link #74. 19
4. Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran’s Application for Compensation 20
and/or Pension, VA Form 21-526 (OMB Approved No. 2900-0001),
21
available at link #75.
5. Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (New York: Columbia 22
University Press, 1967), 32. 23
6. Ibid., 56.
24
7. Paul Goldstein, Copyright’s Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial Juke-
box (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 187–216. 25
8. See, for example, “Music Media Watch,” The J@pan Inc. Newsletter, 26
3 April 2002, available at link #76. 27
9. William Fisher, Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities (last revised:
10 October 2000), available at link #77; William Fisher, Promises to Keep: 28
Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment (forthcoming) (Stanford: 29
Stanford University Press, 2004), ch. 6, available at link #78. Professor Ne- 30
tanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial shar-
ing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation to 31
artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, “Impose a Non- S32
commercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing,” available at link R33
NOTES 329
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1 #79. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, “Who’s Holding Back
Broadband?” Washington Post, 8 January 2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
2
behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
3 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 26 February 2002,
4 available at link #80; Serguei Osokine, A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
Use Fee (IPUF), 3 March 2002, available at link #81; Jefferson Graham,
5
“Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly,” USA Today, 13 May
6 2002, available at link #82; Steven M. Cherry, “Getting Copyright Right,”
7 IEEE Spectrum Online, 1 July 2002, available at link #83; Declan Mc-
8 Cullagh, “Verizon’s Copyright Campaign,” CNET News.com, 27 August
2002, available at link #84.
9 Fisher’s proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman’s proposal for
10 DAT. Unlike Fisher’s, Stallman’s proposal would not pay artists directly
11 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current de-
12 bate by about a decade. See link #85.
13 10. Lawrence Lessig, “Copyright’s First Amendment” (Melville B. Nimmer
14 Memorial Lecture), UCLA Law Review 48 (2001): 1057, 1069–70.
11. A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is to
15 be commended for his careful review of data about infringement, leading
16 him to question his own publicly stated position—twice. He initially pre-
17 dicted that downloading would substantially harm the industry. He then
revised his view in light of the data, and he has since revised his view again.
18 Compare Stan J. Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy: The True
19 Forces That Drive the Digital Marketplace (New York: Amacom, 2002), 173
20 (reviewing his original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J.
Liebowitz, “Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?” working paper,
21
June 2003, available at link #86.
22 Liebowitz’s careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the ef-
23 fect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he underestimates the
costs of the legal system. See, for example, Rethinking, 174–76.
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32S
33R
330 NOTES
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
13
14
15
This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
In16
began when I read of Eric Eldred’s war to keep books free. Eldred’s
17
work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
18
to him that this book is dedicated.
19
I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
20
including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard
21
Posner, Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction
22
and guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School
23
and Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden,
24
James P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hall-
25
man, Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum,
26
Alina Ng, and Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine
27
Crump and Harry Surden, who helped direct their research, and to
28
Laura Lynch, who brilliantly managed the army that they assembled,
29
and provided her own critical eye on much of this.
30
Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
31
its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
S32
me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
R33
Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
331
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1 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,

2 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
3 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
4 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
5 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly
6 draw upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible
7 to receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
8 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice
9 to requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli,
10 David Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who
11 had specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
12 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob
13 Devine, Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy
14 Hunsinger, Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lin-
15 denschmidt, K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey
16 McHugh, Evan McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D.
17 Rezende, Shabbir Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack,
18 Kragen Sitaker, Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina,
19 Sean Walsh, Matt Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, “Wink,” Roger
20 Wood, “Ximmbo da Jazz,” and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have
21 missed anyone; with computers come glitches, and a crash of my
22 e-mail system meant I lost a bunch of great replies.)
23 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book
24 in draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
25 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the regula-
26 tion of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an embarrassingly large
27 number of errors. While my work is in part inspired by Stallman’s, he
28 does not agree with me in important places throughout this book.
29 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always in-
30 sisted that there would be unending happiness away from these battles,
31 and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever, grateful for
32S her perpetual patience and love.
33R
332 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
INDEX
13
14
15
ABC, 164, 321n Anello, Douglas, 60 In16
academic journals, 262, 280–82 animated cartoons, 21–24
17
Adobe eBook Reader, 148–53 antiretroviral drugs, 257–61
advertising, 36, 45–46, 127, 145–46, 167– Apple Corporation, 203, 264, 302 18
68, 321n architecture, constraint effected through, 19
Africa, medications for HIV patients in, 122, 123, 124, 318n
257–61 archive.org, 112 20
Agee, Michael, 223–24, 225 see also Internet Archive 21
agricultural patents, 313n archives, digital, 108–15, 173, 222, 226–27
Aibo robotic dog, 153–55, 156, 157, 160 Aristotle, 150 22
AIDS medications, 257–60 Armstrong, Edwin Howard, 3–6, 184, 196 23
air traffic, land ownership vs., 1–3 Arrow, Kenneth, 232
Akerlof, George, 232 art, underground, 186 24
Alben, Alex, 100–104, 105, 198–99, 295, artists: 25
317n publicity rights on images of, 317n
alcohol prohibition, 200 recording industry payments to, 52,
26
Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (Carroll), 58–59, 74, 195, 196–97, 199, 301, 27
152–53 329n–30n
28
Allen, Paul, 100 retrospective compilations on, 100–104
All in the Family, 164, 165 ASCAP, 18 29
Amazon, 278 Asia, commercial piracy in, 63, 64, 65, 302 30
American Association of Law Libraries, 232 AT&T, 6
American Graphophone Company, 56 Ayer, Don, 230, 237, 239, 244, 248 31
Americans with Disabilities Act (1990), S32
318n Bacon, Francis, 93
Andromeda, 203 Barish, Stephanie, 38, 39, 46 R33
333
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1 Barlow, Joel, 8 Bunyan, John, 93

Barnes & Noble, 147 Burdick, Quentin, 60
2 Barry, Hank, 189, 191 Bush, George W., 323n
3 BBC, 270
Beatles, 57 cable television, 59–61, 74–75, 162, 163, 302
4 Beckett, Thomas, 92 camera technology, 32–33, 34, 35, 127
5 Bell, Alexander Graham, 3 Camp Chaos, 106
Berlin Act (1908), 327n CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty
6 Berman, Howard L., 322n, 324n Panel), 324n
7 Berne Convention (1908), 250, 327n cars, MP3 sound systems in, 191
8 Bernstein, Leonard, 72 Carson, Rachel, 129
Betamax, 75–76 cartoon films, 21–25
9 biomedical research, 262–63 Casablanca, 148
10 Black, Jane, 70 cassette recording, 69–70, 314n
blogs (Web-logs), 41, 42–45, 310n-11n VCRs, 75–76, 77, 158–60, 194, 297, 320n
11 BMG, 162 Causby, Thomas Lee, 2, 3, 7, 11, 12, 256,
12 BMW, 191 307n
Boies, David, 105 Causby, Tinie, 2, 3, 7, 11, 12, 256, 307n
13 Boland, Lois, 265, 266–68 CBS, 164
14 Bolling, Ruben, 246, 247 CD-ROMs, film clips used in, 100–104
Bono, Mary, 215, 326n CDs:
15 Bono, Sonny, 215, 325n copyright marking of, 291
16 books: foreign piracy of, 63, 64
English copyright law developed for, mix technology and, 203–4
17
85–94 preference data on, 189–90
18 free on-line releases of, 72–73, 284–85 prices of, 70, 302
19 on Internet, 143, 144, 148–53 sales levels of, 70–71, 314n
out of print, 72, 113, 134, 299, 317n cell phones, music streamed over, 298
20 resales of, 72, 134, 299, 314n chimeras, 178–79
21 three types of uses of, 141–43 Christensen, Clayton M., 166, 313n, 321n
total number of, 114 circumvention technologies, 156, 157–60
22 booksellers, English, 88–94, 316n civil liberties, 205–7
23 Boswell, James, 91 Clark, Kim B., 321n
bots, 108, 161 CNN, 44
24 Boyle, James, 129 Coase, Ronald, 232
25 Braithwaite, John, 267 Code (Lessig), xiii, xiv, 121, 318n
Branagh, Kenneth, 85, 88 CodePink Women for Peace, xiv, 269
26 Brandeis, Louis, 34 Coe, Brian, 33
27 Brazil, free culture in, 270 Comcast, 321n
28 Breyer, Stephen, 234, 235, 242, 243 comics, Japanese, 25–26, 27–28, 29, 309n
Brezhnev, Leonid, 128 commerce, interstate, 219, 236, 326n
29 British Parliament, 86, 87, 89–90, 91–92, Commerce, U.S. Department of, 126
30 94 commercials, 36, 45–46, 127, 167–68, 321n
broadcast flag, 193, 324n common law, 86, 90, 91, 92
31 Bromberg, Dan, 230 Commons, John R., 318n
32S Brown, John Seely, 45, 46, 47, 127 Communications Decency Act (1996), 325n
browsing, 145, 147, 277–78 composers, copyright protections of,
33R Buchanan, James, 232 55–59, 74
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compulsory license, 57–58 Creative Commons licenses for material 1

computer games, 37 in, 282–86
Conger, 85, 87, 88–89, 90, 91 duration of, 24–25, 86, 89–94, 130, 131, 2
Congress, U.S.: 133–35, 172, 214–18, 220, 221–22, 3
on cable television, 61, 74–75 292–93, 294–95, 309n, 319n
challenge of CTEA legislation of, four regulatory modalities on, 124–26,
4
228–48 132 5
constitutional powers of, 215–16, infringement lawsuits on, see copyright
6
219–20, 233, 234–35, 238–39, 240 infringement lawsuits
in constitutional Progress Clause, marking of, 137, 288, 290–91 7
130–31, 236 as narrow monopoly right, 87–94 8
on copyright laws, 56–57, 61, 74–75, 76, of natural authors vs. corporations, 135
77–78, 133, 134–35, 193, 194, 196, no registration of works, 222–23, 249 9
197, 294, 324n in perpetuity, 89–90, 91, 92–93, 170, 10
copyright terms extended by, 134–35, 215, 243, 246, 318n, 325n–26n
214–18, 219–21, 228, 236 as property, 83–84, 172 11
on derivative rights, 294 renewability of, 86, 133–34, 135, 289–90, 12
on digital audio tape, 315n 293, 309n, 319n
lobbying of, 217–18 scope of, 136–39, 140, 169–72, 295, 320n
13
on radio, 196, 197 usage restrictions attached to, 87–88, 14
on recording industry, 56–57, 74, 196 143–44, 146, 320n
Supreme Court restraint on, 218–19, voluntary reform efforts on, 275, 277–86
15
220, 234 see also copyright law 16
on VCR technology, 76, 77 Copyright Act (1790), 133, 137–38, 319n 17
Conrad, Paul, 158, 159, 160 Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel
Constitution, U.S.: (CARP), 324n 18
Commerce Clause of, 219, 233, 244, copyright infringement lawsuits: 19
326n distribution technology targeted in,
copyright purpose established in, 130–31, 75–77, 190, 191, 323n 20
220, 221, 308n, 326n exaggerated claims of, 51, 180, 185, 187, 21
on creative property, 119–20, 130 190, 206, 322n
Fifth Amendment to, 119 individual defendants intimidated by, 22
First Amendment to, 10, 128, 142, 168, 51–52, 185, 187, 200, 270 23
228, 230, 234, 244, 319n in recording industry, 50–52, 180, 185,
originalist interpretation of, 243 190, 200, 270, 322n, 323n
24
Progress Clause of, 130–31, 215, 218, statutory damages of, 51 25
232, 236, 243–44 against student file sharing, 50–52, 180,
26
structural checks and balances of, 131 322n
Takings Clause of, 119 willful infringement findings in, 146 27
Consumer Broadband and Digital zero tolerance in, 73–74, 180–81 28
Television Promotion Act, 324n copyright law:
contracts, 320n authors vs. composers in, 56–57 29
Conyers, John, Jr., 322n on cable television rebroadcasting, 30
cookies, Internet, 278 59–61, 74–75
“copyleft” licenses, 328n circumvention technology banned by, 31
copyright: 156, 157–60 S32
constitutional purpose of, 130–31, 220, commercial creativity as primary pur-
221, 308n, 326n pose of, 8, 204, 308n
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1 copyright law (cont.) Copyright Office, 252–53, 289, 291

copies as core issue of, 139–40, 141–44, corporations:
2 146, 171, 319n, 320n copyright terms for, 135
3 creativity impeded by, 19, 184–88, 308n in pharmaceutical industry, 260
development of, 85–94, 316n “Country of the Blind, The” (Wells),
4 English, 17, 85–94, 316n 177–78
5 European, 137, 250, 327n Court of Appeals:
as ex post regulation modality, 121–22 D.C. Circuit, 228–29, 231, 235
6 fair use and, 95–99, 107, 141–42, 143, Ninth Circuit, 76, 105, 323n
7 145, 146, 157, 160, 172, 186–87, 283, cover songs, 57
8 292, 316n Creative Commons, 270, 282–86
felony punishment for infringement of, creative property:
9 180, 215, 223, 322n of authors vs. composers, 56–57
10 formalities reinstated in, 287–91, 329n common law protections of, 133
government reforms proposed on, constitutional tradition on, 118–20,
11 287–306 130–31
12 history of American, 132–38, 170–71 “if value, then right” theory of, 18–19,
illegal behavior as broad response to, 53
13 199–207 noncommercial second life of, 112–13,
14 innovation hampered by, 188–99 114–15
innovative freedom balanced with fair other property rights vs., 117–24, 140
15 compensation in, 75, 77–79, 120, see also intellectual property rights
16 129–30, 172–73 creativity:
international compliance with, 63–64, labor shift to, 308n
17
313n legal restrictions on, 19, 184–88, 308n
18 Japanese, 26, 27–28 by transforming previous works,
19 lawyers as detriment to, 292, 304–6 22–24, 25–29
malpractice lawsuits against lawyers see also innovation
20 advising on, 190–91 Crichton, Michael, 37
21 on music recordings, 55–58, 74, 181, criminal justice system, 167
195, 291 Crosskey, William W., 318n
22 privacy interests in, 308n CTEA, see Sonny Bono Copyright Term
23 as protection of creators, 10, 131, 204 Extension Act
registration requirement of, 137, 170–71, culture:
24 248–54, 288, 289–90, 291, 327n archives of, 108–15, 173, 226–27
25 on republishing vs. transformation of commerical vs. noncommercial, 7–8,
original work, 19, 136, 138–39, 170–72, 225
26 144–45, 170–72, 294–96, 319n see also free culture
27 royalty proposal on derivative reuse in, 106 Cyber Rights (Godwin), 40
28 statutory licenses in, 56–58, 64, 74, 194,
295–96, 300 Daguerre, Louis, 31
29 Supreme Court case on term extension Daley, Elizabeth, 36–37, 38, 39–40, 46
30 of, 218, 228–48 DAT (digital audio tape), 315n, 330n
technology as automatic enforcer of, 147, Data General, 279
31 148–61, 181, 186, 203, 320n, 324n Day After Trinity, The, 97
32S term extensions in, 134–35, 214–18, D.C. Court of Appeals, 228–29, 231, 235
219–21, 228–48 DDT, 129–30
33R two central goals of, 75 Dean, Howard, 43
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democracy: DreamWorks, 106–7 1

digital sharing within, 184 Dreyfuss, Rochelle, 18
media concentration and, 166 driving speed, constraints on, 123–24, 207 2
public discourse in, 42, 45 Drucker, Peter, 103 3
semiotic, 301–2 drugs:
in technologies of expression, 33, 35, illegal, 166–67, 201, 207, 321n
4
41–42, 43, 44–45 pharmaceutical, 257–61, 266, 327n, 5
Democratic Party, 249 328n
6
derivative works, 329n Dryden, John, 316n
fair use vs., 145 “Duck and Cover” film, 112 7
First Amendment and, 319n DVDs: 8
historical shift in copyright coverage of, piracy of, 64
136, 170–72 price of, 70 9
piracy vs., 22–24, 25–29, 138–39, 141 Dylan, Bob, 270 10
reform of copyright term and scope on,
294–96 Eagle Forum, 231, 232 11
royalty system proposed for, 106 Eastman, George, 31–34 12
technological developments and, 144, 171 Eastwood, Clint, 100–103, 295
developing countries, foreign patent costs e-books, 144, 148–53
13
in, 63, 257–61, 313n Edison, Thomas, 3, 53–54, 55, 69, 78 14
Diamond Multimedia Systems, 323n education:
digital audio tape (DAT), 315n, 330n in media literacy, 35–40
15
digital cameras, 35, 127 tinkering as means of, 45–47, 50 16
Digital Copyright (Litman), 194 Eldred, Eric, 213–15, 218, 220, 221, 229, 17
Digital Millennium Copyright Act 249, 325n
(DMCA), 156, 157, 159, 160, 181 Eldred Act, 249–54, 255 18
Diller, Barry, 165–66 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 220, 228–48, 292 19
DirecTV, 163 elections, 41–42, 43
Dirty Harry, 101 electoral college, 120, 131 20
Disney, Inc., 23–24, 116, 145–46, 218, 231 Electronic Frontier Foundation, 205 21
Sony Betamax technology opposed by, Else, Jon, 95–99, 186
75–76 e-mail, 42 22
Disney, Walt, 21–24, 25, 26, 28–29, 33–34, EMI, 162, 191 23
78, 115, 139, 213, 220, 309n Eminem, 270
DMCA (Digital Millennium Copyright eMusic.com, 181–82
24
Act), 156, 157, 159, 160, 181 encryption systems, 155–56 25
Doctorow, Cory, 72–73, 284 England, copyright laws developed in,
26
doctors, malpractice claims against, 185, 85–94
323n Enlightenment, 89 27
documentary film, 95–99 environmentalism, 129–30 28
domain names, 289 ephemeral films, 112
Donaldson, Alexander, 90–91, 92 Errors and Omissions insurance, 98 29
Donaldson v. Beckett, 92–94 Erskine, Andrew, 91 30
Douglas, William O., 2–3 ethics, 201
doujinshi comics, 25–26, 27–28, 29 expression, technologies of: 31
Down and Out in the Magic Kingdom democratic, 33, 35, 41–42, 43, S32
(Doctorow), 72–73, 284 44–45
Drahos, Peter, 267 media literacy and, 35–40
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1 Fairbank, Robert, 105 First Amendment, 10, 128, 142, 168, 319n
fair use, 141–43 copyright extension as violation of, 228,
2 circumvention technology ban and, 230, 234, 244
3 157–58 first-sale doctrine, 146
Creative Commons license vs., 283 Fisher, William, 197, 301, 324n, 330n
4 in documentary film, 95–99, 316n Florida, Richard, 20, 308n
5 fuzziness of, 292 FM radio, 4–6, 128, 196, 256
Internet burdens on, 143, 145 Forbes, Steve, 249, 253
6 legal intimidation tactics against, 98–99, formalities, 137, 287–91
7 146, 172, 186–87 Fourneaux, Henri, 55
8 in sampling works, 107 Fox, William, 54
technological restriction of, 160 Fox (film company), 96, 97, 98, 163
9 Fallows, James, 163–64 free culture:
10 Fanning, Shawn, 67 Creative Commons licenses for
Faraday, Michael, 3 recreation of, 282–86
11 farming, 127, 129 defined, xvi
12 FCC: derivative works based on, 29–30
on FM radio, 5–6 English legal establishment of, 94
13 on media bias, 321n four modalities of constraint on, 121–26,
14 media ownership regulated by, xiv–xv, 317n, 318n
162, 269 permission culture vs., xiv, 8, 173
15 on television production studios, 165 restoration efforts on previous aspects of,
16 Felton, Ed, 47, 155–57, 158, 160 277–82
feudal system, 267 Free for All (Wayner), 285
17
Fifth Amendment, 119 free market, technological changes in, 127–28
18 film industry: Free Software Foundation, xv, 231–32, 280
19 consolidation of, 163 free software/open-source software (FS/
luxury theaters vs. video piracy in, 302 OSS), 45, 65, 264–66, 279–80, 328n
20 patent piracy at inception of, 53–55 French copyright law, 327n
21 rating system of, 117 Fried, Charles, 233, 237
trade association of, 116–17, 119, 218, Friedman, Milton, 232
22 253–54, 256 Frost, Robert, 214, 216–17, 220
23 trailer advertisements of, 145–46 Future of Ideas, The (Lessig), 148, 150, 189,
VCR taping facility opposed by, 292
24 75–76
25 films: Garlick, Mia, 284
animated, 21–24 Gates, Bill, 128, 266
26 archive of, 111, 112 General Film Company, 54
27 clips and collages of, 100–107 General Public License (GPL), 265, 280
28 digital copies of, 324n generic drugs, 266
fair use of copyrighted material in, German copyright law, 327n
29 95–99 Gershwin, George, 233, 234
30 multiple copyrights associated with, 95, Gil, Gilberto, 270
101–3, 224 Ginsburg, Ruth Bader, 234, 235, 242
31 in public domain, 223–25, 254 Girl Scouts, 18
32S restoration of, 224, 226 Global Positioning System, 263
total number of, 114 GNU/Linux operating system, 65, 232,
33R film sampling, 107 264, 280
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Godwin, Mike, 40 of drug patents, 260–61, 328n 1

Goldstein, Paul, 295 international organization on issues of,
Google, 48–49, 50 262–64, 265–67, 328n 2
GPL (General Public License), 265, 280 U.S. Patent Office on private control of, 3
Gracie Films, 96 266–69
Grimm fairy tales, 23, 28, 213–14 international law, 63–64, 258–59, 313n
4
Grisham, John, 57, 294–95 Internet: 5
Groening, Matt, 96, 97, 98 blogs on, 41, 42–45, 310n–11n
6
Grokster, Ltd., 323n books on, 72–73, 143–44, 148–53,
guns, 159–60, 219 284–85 7
copyright applicability altered by 8
hacks, 154 technology of, 141–44
Hal Roach Studios, 223, 232 copyright enforced through, 149–57, 9
Hand, Learned, 312n 161 10
handguns, 159–60 copyright regulatory balance lost with,
Hawthorne, Nathaniel, 213, 214 125–26 11
Henry V, 85 creative Web sites on, 185 12
Henry VIII, King of England, 88 cultural process transformed by, 7–8
Herrera, Rebecca, 96, 97 development of, 7, 262, 276–77
13
Heston, Charlton, 60 domain name registration on, 289 14
history, records of, 109 efficient content distribution on, 17–18,
HIV/AIDS therapies, 257–61 193–94
15
Hollings, Fritz, 324n encryption systems designed for, 155–56 16
Hollywood film industry, 53–55 initial free character of, 276–77 17
see also film industry music files downloaded from, 67, 180–82,
Horovitz, Jed, 187–88 199, 313n, 323n, 324n 18
House of Lords, 92–93, 94 news events on, 40–41, 43 19
Hummer, John, 191 peer-generated rankings on, 43
Hummer Winblad, 191 peer-to-peer file sharing on, see peer-to- 20
Hyde, Rosel, 60 peer (p2p) file sharing 21
pornography on, 325n
IBM, 264, 279 privacy protection on, 278–79 22
“if value, then right” theory, 18–19, 53 public discourse conducted on, 41–45 23
images, ownership of, 34, 186 radio on, 194–99, 324n
innovation, 67, 313n search engines used on, 48–50
24
copyright profit balanced with, 75, 77–79 speed of access to, 297–98 25
industry establishment opposed to, 75–76, user identities released by service
26
188–99 providers of, 186, 205–6, 322n
media conglomeration as disincentive Internet Archive, 108–10, 112, 114, 222, 232 27
for, 164–66 Internet Explorer, 65 28
see also creativity interstate commerce, 219, 236, 326n
Innovator’s Dilemma, The (Christensen), Iraq war, 44, 310n, 317n 29
166, 321n ISPs (Internet service providers), user iden- 30
insecticide, environmental consequences of, tities revealed by, 186, 205–6, 322n
129–30 Iwerks, Ub, 22 31
Intel, 194, 232 S32
intellectual property rights, 11–12 Japanese comics, 25–26, 27–28, 29, 309n
components of, 309n Jaszi, Peter, 216, 245
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1 Jefferson, Thomas, 84, 120, 284 Lessig, Lawrence, xiii, xiv, 121, 148, 150,
Johnson, Lyndon, 116 189, 292, 318n
2 Johnson, Samuel, 93 Eldred case involvement of, 215, 216,
3 Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue ( Jones Day), 218, 228–48
229–30, 232, 237 in international debate on intellectual
4 Jonson, Ben, 316n property, 263–64, 267–68, 328n
5 Jordan, Jesse, 48, 49–52, 185, 200, 206 Lessing, Lawrence, 5–6
journalism, 44 Lexis and Westlaw, 280–81
6 jury system, 42 libraries:
7 Just Think!, 35–36, 41, 45–46 archival function of, 109, 111, 113, 114,
8 173, 227
Kahle, Brewster, 47, 110–15, 222, 226–27, journals in, 280, 281
9 317n privacy rights in use of, 278
10 Kaplan, Benjamin, 294 of public-domain literature, 213–14
Kazaa, 67, 71, 179, 180 Library of Congress, 110, 111, 198
11 Keaton, Buster, 22, 23, 28 Licensing Act (1662), 86
12 Kelly, Kevin, 255 Liebowitz, Stan, 313n, 330n
Kennedy, Anthony, 234, 239, 244, 248 Linux operating system, 65, 232, 264, 280
13 Kennedy, John F., 116, 195 Litman, Jessica, 194
14 Kittredge, Alfred, 56 Lofgren, Zoe, 253
knowledge, freedom of, 89 Lott, Trent, 43
15 Kodak cameras, 32–33, 34, 127, 184 Lovett, Lyle, 179, 189
16 Kodak Primer, The (Eastman), 32 Lucas, George, 98
Kozinski, Alex, 76 Lucky Dog, The, 223
17
Krim, Jonathan, 265
18 McCain, John, 162
19 labor, 308n, 318n Madonna, 59, 121
land ownership, air traffic and, 1–3, 294 manga, 25–26, 27–28, 29, 309n
20 Laurel and Hardy films, 223 Mansfield, William Murray, Lord, 17, 91
21 law: Marijuana Policy Project, 321n
citizen respect for, 199–207 market competition, 128, 147
22 common vs. positive, 86, 90 market constraints, 122, 123, 125, 188, 192,
23 as constraint modality, 121–22, 123–24, 318n
125, 317n Marx Brothers, 147–48, 152
24 on copyrights, see copyright law media:
25 databases of case reports in, 65, blog pressure on, 43
280–81 commercial imperatives of, 43, 44
26 federal vs. state, 133 ownership concentration in, xiv–xv, 4–6,
27 law schools, 201 44, 162–68, 269–70
28 lawyers: media literacy, 35–40
copyright cultural balance impeded by, Mehra, Salil, 27, 309n
29 292, 304–6 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.
30 malpractice suits against, 190–91 Grokster, Ltd., 323n
Leaphart, Walter, 285 MGM, 116
31 Lear, Norman, 164, 165 Michigan Technical University, 51
32S legal realist movement, 322 Mickey Mouse, 21–22, 139, 220, 221, 231
legal system, attorney costs in, 51–52, 185, Microsoft, 100
33R 186–87, 304–6 competitive strategies of, 65
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on free software, 264, 265, 328n Needleman, Rafe, 191 1

government case against, 155 Nesson, Charlie, 201
international software piracy of, 65 NET (No Electronic Theft) Act (1998), 2
network file system of, 49 215 3
Windows operating system of, 65 Netanel, Neil Weinstock, 10, 329n
WIPO meeting opposed by, 265 Netscape, 65
4
Middlemarch (Eliot), 148–50, 151 New Hampshire (Frost), 214 5
Mill, John Stuart, 318n News Corp., 163
6
Millar v. Taylor, 91, 92 news coverage, 40–41, 43, 44, 110–12
Milton, John, 89, 93, 316n newspapers: 7
monopoly, copyright as, 88–94 archives of, 109, 110 8
Monroe, Marilyn, 195 ownership consolidation of, 163
Morrison, Alan, 232 Nick and Norm anti-drug campaign, 167, 9
Motion Picture Association of America 321n 10
(MPAA), 116–17, 119, 218, 253–54, Nimmer, David, 105
256 Nimmer, Melville, 304 11
Motion Pictures Patents Company 1984 (Orwell), 108–9 12
(MPPC), 53–54, 63 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 76, 105,
Movie Archive, 112 323n
13
Moyers, Bill, 165 Nixon, Richard, 293 14
MP3.com, 189–90 No Electronic Theft (NET) Act (1998),
MP3 players, 191 215
15
MP3s, 125 norms, regulatory influence of, 122, 123, 16
see also peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing 125 17
Mr. Rogers’ Neighborhood, 158
MTV, 69–70 O’Connor, Sandra Day, 234, 238 18
Müller, Paul Hermann, 129 Olafson, Steve, 310n–11n 19
Murdoch, Rupert, 163 Olson, Theodore B., 240
music publishing, 17, 55–56 open-source software, see free software/ 20
music recordings: open-source software 21
total number of, 114 Oppenheimer, Matt, 51
see peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing; originalism, 243 22
recording industry Orwell, George, 108–9 23
MusicStore, 302
Myers, Mike, 106–7 parallel importation, 258
24
my.mp3.com, 189–90 Paramount Pictures, 116 25
Patent and Trademark Office, U.S., 265–69
26
Napster, 34, 60, 105 patents:
infringing material blocked by, 73–74 duration of, 54–55, 242, 292 27
number of registrations on, 67 on film technology, 53–55 28
range of content on, 68 on pharmaceuticals, 258–61, 266, 328n
recording industry tracking of users of, in public domain, 135, 214 29
206 Patterson, Raymond, 90 30
replacement of, 67 peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing:
venture capital for, 191 benefits of, 71–73, 79 31
Nashville Songwriters Association, 221 of books, 72–73 S32
National Writers Union, 232 efficiency of, 17–18
NBC, 321n felony punishments for, 180, 215, 322n
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1 peer-to-peer file sharing (cont.) power, concentration of, xv, 12

four types of, 68–69, 296–97 Prelinger, Rick, 112
2 infringement protections in, 73–74, Princeton University, 51
3 181–82 privacy rights, 205, 277–79
participation levels of, 67, 313n Progress Clause, 130–31, 215, 218, 232,
4 piracy vs., 66–79 236, 243–44
5 reform proposals of copyright restraints prohibition, citizen rebellion against,
on, 296–304 199–207
6 regulatory balance lost in, 125, 206–7 Promises to Keep (Fisher), 301
7 shoplifting vs., 179–80 property rights:
8 total legalization of, 180 air traffic vs., 1–3, 294
zero-tolerance of, 180–82 as balance of public good vs. private
9 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act, interests, 172–73, 322n
10 324n copyright vs., 83–84, 172–73
permission culture: feudal system of, 267
11 free culture vs., xiv, 8, 173 formalities associated with, 287–88
12 transaction burdens of, 192–93 intangibility of, 84, 315n
permissions: Takings Clause on, 119
13 coded controls vs., 149–53 see also copyright; creative property;
14 photography exempted from, 33–35 intellectual property rights
for use of film clips, 100–107 proprietary code, 279–80
15 see also copyright protectionism, of artists vs. business
16 pharmaceutical patents, 258–61, 328n interests, 9
phonograph, 55 p2p file sharing, see peer-to-peer (p2p) file
17
photocopying machines, 171 sharing
18 photography, 31–35 Public Citizen, 232
19 Picker, Randal C., 324n public domain:
piracy: access fees for material in, 281
20 in Asia, 63, 64, 65, 302 balance of U.S. content in, 133, 170–72,
21 commercial, 62–66, 313n 318n–19n
derivative work vs., 22–24, 25–29, content industry opposition to, 253–56
22 138–39, 141 defined, 24
23 in development of content industry, e-book restrictions on, 148–50, 152–53
53–61, 312n English legal establishment of, 93
24 of intangible property, 64, 71, 179–80 films in, 223–25, 254
25 international, 63–64 future patents vs. future copyrights in,
profit reduction as criterion of, 66–71, 73 134–35, 214
26 p2p file sharing vs., 66–79 legal murkiness on, 185–86
27 uncritical rejection of, 183–84 library of works derived from, 213–14
28 player pianos, 55, 56, 75 license system for rebuilding of, 281–86
PLoS (Public Library of Science), 262, protection of, 220–21
29 281–82 p2p sharing of work in, 73
30 Pogue, David, xiii public projects in, 262–63
political discourse, 41, 42–45 traditional term for conversion to,
31 Politics (Aristotle), 150 24–25
32S Porgy and Bess, 233 Public Enemy, 285
pornography, 233, 325n Public Library of Science (PloS), 262,
33R positive law, 86, 90 281–82
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Quayle, Dan, 110 Recording Industry Association of America v. 1

Verizon Internet Services, 322n
radio: regulation: 2
FM spectrum of, 3–6, 128, 196, 256 as establishment protectionism, 126–28, 3
on Internet, 194–99 188–99
music recordings played on, 58–59, 74, four modalities of, 121–26, 317n, 318n
4
195, 312n outsize penalties of, 190, 192 5
ownership consolidation in, 162–63 rule of law degraded by excess of,
6
railroad industry, 127 199–207
rap music, 107 Rehnquist, William H., 219, 234, 239–40 7
RCA, 4–5, 6, 7, 128, 184, 256, 275 remote channel changers, 127 8
Reagan, Ronald, 233, 237, 263 Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI), 48
Real Networks, 302 computer network search engine of, 9
recording industry: 49–51 10
artist remuneration in, 52, 58–59, 74, Republican Party, 104, 249
195, 196–97, 199, 301, 329n–30n “Rhapsody in Blue” (Gershwin), 221 11
CD sales levels in, 70–71, 314n RIAA, see Recording Industry Association 12
composers’ rights vs. producers’ rights in, of America
56–58, 74 “Rip, Mix, Burn” technologies, 203
13
copyright infringement lawsuits of, Rise of the Creative Class, The (Florida), 20, 14
50–52, 180, 185, 190, 200, 270, 322n, 308n
323n Roberts, Michael, 189
15
copyright protections in, 55–58, 74, 181, robotic dog, 153–55, 156, 157, 160 16
195, 291 Rogers, Fred, 158, 320n 17
international piracy in, 63 Romeo and Juliet (Shakespeare), 85–86, 87,
Internet radio hampered by, 196–99, 316n 18
324n Rose, Mark, 91 19
new recording technology opposed by, RPI, see Rensselaer Polytechnic
69–70, 314n Institute 20
out-of-print music of, 68, 71–72, 314n Rubenfeld, Jed, 319n 21
ownership concentration in, 162 Russel, Phil, 55
piracy in, 55–58 22
radio broadcast and, 58–59, 74, 196, 312n Saferstein, Harvey, 104–5 23
statutory license system in, 56–58 Safire, William, xiv–xv, 269
Recording Industry Association of America San Francisco Muni, 321n
24
(RIAA): San Francisco Opera, 95, 97 25
on CD sales decline, 70, 71 Sarnoff, David, 5
26
on circumvention technology, 158, 160 Saturday Night Live, 106
copyright infringement lawsuits filed by, Scalia, Antonin, 234, 238, 240, 247 27
50–52, 180, 185, 190, 200, 270, 322n Scarlet Letter, The (Hawthorne), 214 28
on encryption system critique, 156–57 Schlafly, Phyllis, 231
on Internet radio fees, 197, 198–99 schools, gun possession near, 219 29
intimidation tactics of, 51–52, 200, 206 Schwartz, John, 79 30
ISP user identities sought by, 205–6, 322n scientific journals, 280, 281–82
lobbying power of, 52, 197, 218 Scottish publishers, 86, 90–91, 93 31
Recording Industry Association of America Screen Actors Guild, 60 S32
(RIAA) v. Diamond Multimedia search engines, 48–50
Systems, 323n “Seasons, The” (Thomson), 91
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1 Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI), Stanford University, 282

155–56 Star Wars, 98
2 semiotic democracy, 301–2 Starwave, 100–101
3 Senate, U.S., 120, 131 Statute of Anne (1710), 86, 87, 89, 90, 91,
FCC media ownership rules reversed by, 92, 133
4 269 Statute of Monopolies (1656), 88
5 see also Congress, U.S. statutory damages, 51
Sentelle, David, 228–29, 231, 235, 243 statutory licenses, 57–58, 64, 74, 194,
6 September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks of, 40, 295–96, 300
7 41, 111–12 Steamboat Bill, Jr., 22–23, 26, 34
8 Seuss, Dr., 233, 234 Steamboat Willie, 21–23, 309n
Shakespeare, William, 29, 85, 87, 88, 93, 316n steel industry, 127
9 sheet music, 17, 56 Stevens, John Paul, 234, 235, 242
10 Silent Spring (Carson), 129 Stevens, Ted, xv
Simpsons, The, 95–98 Stewart, Gordon, 229, 230
11 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), Story, Joseph, 252
12 262–63 Sullivan, Kathleen, 232–33
Sites, Kevin, 310n–11n Superman comics, 27
13 60 Minutes, 105, 111 Supreme Court, U.S.:
14 Slade, Michael, 101 access to opinions of, 281
slavery, 120 on airspace vs. land rights, 2–3, 307n
15 Smith, David, 309n annual docket of, 229
16 Snowe, Olympia, xv on balance of interests in copyright law,
software, open-source, see free software/ 77, 78
17
open-source software on cable television, 61
18 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension congressional actions restrained by,
19 Act (CTEA) (1998), 134, 135, 215, 218–19, 220, 234
218, 221, 223 on copyright term extensions, 218, 228–48
20 Supreme Court challenge of, 228, 230, factions of, 234–35
21 231, 234–48, 252, 304 House of Lords vs., 92
Sony: on Internet pornography restrictions, 325n
22 Aibo robotic dog produced by, 153–55, on television advertising bans, 168
23 156, 157 on VCR technology, 76–77
Betamax technology developed by, 75–76 Sutherland, Donald, 102
24 Sony Music Entertainment, 162
25 Sony Pictures Entertainment, 116 Takings Clause, 119
Sousa, John Philip, 56 Talbot, William, 31
26 Souter, David, 234, 235, 242, 244 Tatel, David, 229
27 South Africa, Republic of, pharmaceutical Tauzin, Billy, 324n
28 imports by, 258–59 tax system, 201
speech, freedom of, 318n Taylor, Robert, 91
29 constitutional guarantee of, 128 technology:
30 film-rating system vs., 117 archival opportunity afforded through,
useful criticism fostered by, 156 113–14, 115
31 speeding, constraints on, 123–24, 207 of circumvention, 156, 157–60
32S spider, 108 of copying, 171
Spielberg, Steven, 107 copyright enforcement controlled by, 147,
33R Stallman, Richard, xv–xvi, 279–80, 330n 148–61, 181, 186, 203–4, 320n, 324n
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copyright intent altered by, 141–44 on creative property rights, 10, 117–20, 1
cut-and-paste culture enabled by, 105–6, 140
203 Eldred Act opposed by, 253 2
of digital capturing and sharing, 184–85 perpetual copyright term proposed by, 3
established industries threatened by 326n
changes in, 69–70, 126–28 on VCR technology, 76
4
innovative improvements in, 67, 313n Vanderbilt University, 110 5
legal murkiness on, 192 VCRs, 75–76, 77, 158–60, 194, 297,
6
television, 6 320n
advertising on, 36, 127, 167–68, 321n venture capitalists, 189, 191 7
cable vs. broadcast, 59–61, 74–75, 302 Verizon Internet Services, 205, 322n 8
controversy avoided by, 168, 321n veterans’ pensions, 293
independent production for, 164–66 Video Pipeline, 145–46, 187 9
industry trade association of, 116 Vivendi Universal, 182, 190 10
ownership consolidation in, 162, 163 von Lohmann, Fred, 205, 207
VCR taping of, 75–76, 158–60 11
Television Archive, 110, 111–12 Wagner, Richard, 95, 97 12
Thomas, Clarence, 234 Warner Brothers, 101, 116, 147–48, 152
Thomson, James, 91, 92 Warner Music Group, 162
13
Thurmond, Strom, 43 Way Back Machine, 108, 109, 110 14
Tocqueville, Alexis de, 42 Wayner, Peter, 284
Tonson, Jacob, 85, 86, 316n Web-logs (blogs), 41, 42–45, 310n–11n
15
tort reform, 323n Web sites, domain name registration of, 16
Torvalds, Linus, 280 289 17
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop- Webster, Noah, 8
erty Rights (TRIPS) agreement, 313n Wellcome Trust, 262 18
Turner, Ted, 269 Wells, H. G., 177–78 19
Twentieth Century Fox, 116 White House press releases, 317n
twins, as chimera, 178–79 willful infringement, 146 20
Windows, 65 21
United Kingdom: Winer, Dave, 44–45
copyright requirements in, 327n Winick, Judd, 26–27 22
history of copyright law in, 85–94 WJOA, 321n 23
public creative archive in, 270 WorldCom, 185
United States Trade Representative World Intellectual Property Organiza-
24
(USTR), 258–59 tion (WIPO), 262–64, 265–67, 25
United States v. Lopez, 219, 220, 234, 328n
26
235–36, 239, 241, 242, 243 World Summit on the Information Society
United States v. Morrison, 219, 234 (WSIS), 263–64, 266 27
Universal Music Group, 162, 191 World Trade Center, 40 28
Universal Pictures, 75–76, 116 World Wide Web, 262
university computer networks, p2p sharing WRC, 321n 29
on, 48–51, 180, 206–7, 270, 322n Wright brothers, 1, 3, 11–12 30
used record sales, 72, 314n
Yanofsky, Dave, 36 31
Vaidhyanathan, Siva, 316n, 322n S32
Valenti, Jack, 205, 238 Zimmerman, Edwin, 60–61
background of, 116, 117 Zittrain, Jonathan, 324n
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
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LAWRENCE LESSIG (http://www.lessig.org), professor of law and a John A. In16
Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar at Stanford Law School, is founder of the 17
Stanford Center for Internet and Society and is chairman of the Creative Com-
mons (http://creativecommons.org). The author of The Future of Ideas (Random
18
House, 2001) and Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), Lessig 19
is a member of the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier 20
Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free Software
21
Foundation’s Award for the Advancement of Free Software, twice listed in Busi-
nessWeek’s “e.biz 25,” and named one of Scientific American’s “50 visionaries.” A 22
graduate of the University of Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law 23
School, Lessig clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court
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of Appeals.
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6 Copyright © Lawrence Lessig, 2004

8 Excerpt from an editorial titled “The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,”

13 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

24 Printed in the United States of America

26 Designed by Marysarah Quinn

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Them, Soon 287 1

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tween liberal Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens,” he for- 1

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1 Like Stallman’s arguments for free software, an argument for free

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1 lowed to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we

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conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: “Common sense revolts 1

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RCA’s president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong’s, was eager 1

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another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political 1

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ativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its motivation. But the 1

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1 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.

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1 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the “Rise of the Creative Class.”4

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1 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After

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1 (1955), Mulan (1998), Sleeping Beauty (1959), 101 Dalmatians (1961),

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1 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and

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