RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED:

I. Due Process of Law Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan Facts: Petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding assails the validity of the Presidential Decree creating the Sandiganbayan, He was accused before such respondent Court of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. HELD: Dismissed. The above formulation is a reiteration of what was decided by the American Supreme Court in a case of Philippi 54 ne origin, Ong Chang Wing v. United States decided during the period of American rule, 1910 to be precise. Th us: "This court has had frequent occasion to consider the requirements of due process of law as applied to crimin al procedure, and, generally speaking, it may be said that if an accused has been heard in a court of competent j urisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and invest igation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a 55 constitutional law, then he has had due process of law." II. To be Presumed Innocent: Lejano vs. People (Vizconde Massacre) HELD: WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated December 15, 2005 and Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336 and ACQUITS accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the crimes of which they were charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless they are confined for another lawful cause. If the Court were to subscribe to this extremely skeptical view, it might as well tear the rules of evidence out of the law books and regard suspicions, surmises, or speculations as reasons for impeaching evidence. It is not that official records, which carry the presumption of truth of what they state, are immune to attack. They are not. That presumption can be overcome by evidence. Here, however, the prosecution did not bother to present evidence to impeach the entries in Webbs passport and the certifications of the Philippine and U.S. immigration services regarding his travel to the U.S. and back. The prosecutions rebuttal evidence is the fear of the unknown that it planted in the lower courts minds. In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court entertains doubts about the innocence of the accused since an open mind is willing to explore all possibilities, but whether it entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it would be a serious mistake to send an innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt hangs on to ones inner being, like a piece of meat lodged immovable between teeth.

Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on the testimony of an NBI asset who proposed to her handlers that she take the role of the witness to the Vizconde massacre that she could not produce?

People vs. Mingoa Facts: Found short in his accounts as officer-in-charge of the office of the municipal treasurer of Despujols, Romblon, and unable to produce the missing fund amounting to P3,938 upon demand by the provincial auditor, Aquino Mingoa was prosecuted for the crime of malversation of public funds in the Court of First Instance of Romblon. Mingoa explained to the examining officer that some days before he had, by mistake, put the money in a large envelope which he took with him to a show and that he forgot it on his seat and it was not there anymore when he returned. But he did not testify in court and presented no evidence in his favor. Having been found guilty as charged and sentenced to the corresponding penalty, he appealed to the Court of Appeals. But that court certified the case to the Supreme Court on the ground that it involved a constitutional question. Issue: Whether Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use" violates the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved cannot be sustained

HELD: AFFIRMED. In many event, the validity of statutes establishing presumptions in criminal cases is now settled matter, Cooley, in his work on constitutional limitations, 8th ed., Vo. I, pp. 639-641says that "there is no constitutional objection to the passage of law providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by contrary presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence." In line with this view, it is generally held in the United States that the legislature may enact that when certain facts have been proven they shall be prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of the accused and shift the burden of proof provided there be rational connection between that facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed so that the inference of the one from proof of the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in common experience. (See annotation on constitutionality of statutes or ordinances making one fact presumptive or prima facie evidence of another, 162 A.L.R. 495-535; also, State vs. Brown, 182 S.E., 838, with reference to embezzlement.) The same view has been adopted here as may be seen from the decisions of this court in the U.S. vs. Tria, 17 Phil., 303; U.S. vs. Luling, 34 Phil., 725; and People vs. Merilo, G.R. No. L-3489, promulgated June 28, 1951. The statute in the present case creates a presumption of guilt once certain facts are proved. It makes the failure of public officer to have duly forthcoming, upon proper demand, any public funds or property with which he is chargeable prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use . The ultimate fact presumed is that officer has malversed the funds or property entrusted to his custody, and the presumption is made to arise from proof that he has received them and yet he has failed to have them forthcoming upon proper demand. Clearly, the fact presumed is but a natural inference from the fact proved, so that it cannot be said that there is no rational connection between the two. Furthermore, the statute establishes only a prima

faciepresumption, thus giving the accused an opportunity to present evidence to rebut it. The presumption is reasonable and will stand the test of validity laid down in the above citations. Corpus vs. People HELD. Affirmed with the Modification. Many times, this Court has already ruled that a buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which has repeatedly [14] been accepted to be a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. The elements necessary f or the prosecution of the illegal sale of drugs are as follows: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, a [15] nd the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is essential in a prosecution for the illegal sale of prohibited drugs is proof that the transaction or sale actuall [16] y took place and the presentation in court of the corpus delicti, which has two elements: (1) proof of the occurren [17] ce of a certain event and (2) a person's criminal responsibility for the act. Further, in a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, a case becomes a contest of credibility of witne sses and their testimonies. In such a situation, this Court generally relies upon the assessment by the trial court, whi [18 ch had the distinct advantage of observing the conduct or demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying. ] Hence, its factual findings are accorded respect -- even finality -- absent any showing that certain facts of weight a [19] nd substance bearing on the elements of the crime have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied. We fi [20] nd no reason to deviate from this rule in the case before us. People vs. Sendaydiego HELD. It is to me clearly obvious that the dismiss of an appeal due to death of the appellant, from a judgment of conviction by a trial court does not result in the affirmance of such conviction contrary to the general rule when an appeal in a case is dismissed but, on the contrary, it amounts to an acquittal of the appellant based on the constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence in his favor that can be overcome only by a finding of guilt, something that his death prevents the court from making. The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and be made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification. This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so closely connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the forgery. (U.S. vs. Castillo, 6 Phil., 453; People vs. De Lara, 45 Phil. 754; People vs. Domingo, 49 Phil. 28; People vs. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338 People vs. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253).

People vs Calma FACTS: A person raped a 12 yr old girl. But the trial court erred in recommending death penalty to the accused. This is because the trial court imposed death penalty upon the accused when it should just be reclusion perpetua. It should just be reclusion perpetua because the prosecution failed to prove the relationship between accusedappellant and his victim. Proving the relationship between the accused and the victim is necessary in order for the accused to be imposed the punishment of death penalty due to the R.A. No. 7659. This law provides for the

penalty of death when the rape victim is under eighteen years old and the offender is a relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree. The trial court was not able to establish this fact as basis of assessing the degree of punishment to be imposed upon the accused because the judge erroneously informed the accused that by pleading guilty, the accused forfeited his right to testify and to adduce evidence in his defense. DOCTRINE: Reasonable doubt can be established through evidences presented in court. Also even if the accused pleads guilty, it is still the duty of the court to assess evidences and testimonies in order to know the degree of punishment to be imposed upon the accused.

Dizon-Pamintuan vs People FACTS: a robbery occurred at the house of Teodoro Encarnacion upon his arrival from the airport. He reported the incident to the police and the police instructed Encarnacion to list the items that was lost during the robbery incident. Upon knowing the items that was lost, the police told Encarnacion that the some of the lost items were seen in Chinatown. The police then made an entrapment operation on Dizon Pamintuan for she owned the stall on which the lost items were seen and the Encarnacion spouses posed as buyers. Then on the basis of the testimonies made by Teodoro Encarnacion and some other police officers, Dizon Pamintuan was held guilty beyond reasonable doubt DOCTRINE: the constitutional presumption of innocence will not apply as long as there is "some rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be purely arbitrary mandate"

People vs Holgado FACTS: Frisco Holgado was charged with slight illegal detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty. On the day set for the trial, Holgado pleaded guilty without the benefit of a lawyer. The court did not perform the duties if a defendant appears without counsel. Two days later, the trial court rendered judgment finding Holgado guilty. Holgado appealed.

DOCTRINE: In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel - The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel -Under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio if he so desires and he is poor grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own. Four important duties of the court if the defendant appears without counsel: 1 - inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned

2 - After giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney 3 - If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him 4 - If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a reasonable time therefore.

( wala pa ka Erica na assignment kay Black Out sa ilang place,.., ako lang gi.assignan ni Erica na mag disseminate sa na.collate na assignments., tnx) (c Abby, wala pa pud sa iyang assignment,.., pero ako lang ni g.send ninyo kay basin ani na pud sa area namu mag black out.. )

PEOPLE vs. RELOVA

Members of the Batangas City Police together with personnel of the Batangas Electric Light System, searched and examined the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and operated by the private respondent Manuel Opulencia. The police discovered that electric wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed, without the necessary authority from the city government. These electric devices and contraptions were, in the allegation of the petitioner "designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the electric meter of the said electric [ice and cold storage] plant." An Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the City Court of Batangas City an information against Manuel Opulencia for violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974, Batangas City (unauthorized installations of electric wirings and devices to lower or decrease the consumption of electric fluid). The information was dismissed on the ground of prescription, having been filed more than two months after the discovery of the offense. The Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch 11, another information against Manuel Opulencia, this time for theft of electric power under Article 308 in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code. Before he could be arraigned thereon, Manuel Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the offense charged in the second information and that the filing thereof was violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. By Order dated 16 August 1976, the respondent Judge granted the accused's Motion to Quash and ordered the case dismissed.

PRINCIPLE The petitioner concludes that: (1) the unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of Batangas City] is not the same as theft of electricity [under the Revised Penal Code]; (2) the offense is not an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof and that the second offense is not necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information. The above arguments made by the petitioner are of course correct. This is clear both from the express terms of the constitutional provision involved, which reads as follows:

 No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act (Article IV (22), 1973 Constitution) and from our case law on this point. The basic difficulty with the petitioner's position is that it must be examined, not under the terms of the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather under the second sentence of the same section. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. Where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charge: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an Identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute. The question may be raised why one rule should exist where two offenses under two different sections of the same statute or under different statutes are charged, and another rule for the situation where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance and another offense under a national statute. If the second sentence of the double jeopardy provision had not been written into the Constitution, conviction or acquittal under a municipal ordinance would never constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act under a national statute. An offense penalized by municipal ordinance is, by definition, different from an offense under a statute. The two offenses would never constitute the same offense having been promulgated by different rule-making authorities, though one be subordinate to the other, and the plea of double jeopardy would never lie.

MELO vs. PEOPLE

Petitioner Conrado Melo was charged with frustrated homicide, for having allegedly inflicted upon Benjamin Obillo, several serious wounds on different parts of the body, requiring medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days, and incapacitating him from performing his habitual labor for the same period of time. December 29, 1949, at eight o'clock in the morning, the accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged, and at 10:15 in the evening of the same day Benjamin Obillo died from his wounds. Evidence of death was available to the prosecution only on January 3, 1950, and on the following day, January 4, 1950, an amended information was filed charging the accused with consummated homicide. The accused filed a motion to quash the amended information alleging double jeopardy, motion that was denied by the respondent court. The protection of the Constitution inhibition is against a second jeopardy for the same offense, the only exception being, as stated in the same Constitution, that "if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." The phrase same offense, under the general rule, has always been construed to mean not only the second offense charged is exactly the same as the one alleged in the first information, but also that the two

offenses are identical. There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other. This rule of identity does not apply, however when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy.

PEOPLE vs. QUIJADA

Accused-appellant Daniel Quijada was convicted of the two offenses separately charged in two informations, viz., murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated from under P.D. No. 1866. The Supreme Court confirmed and applied the doctrine laid down in the case of People v. Tac-an, stating that these are separate offenses, with the first punished under the Revised Penal Code and the second under a special law; hence, the constitutional bar against double jeopardy will not apply. It is elementary that the constitutional right against double jeopardy protects one against a second or later prosecution for the same offense, and that when the subsequent information charges another and different offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts, there is no prohibited double jeopardy. It would appear self-evident that these two (2) offenses in themselves are quite different one from the other, such that in principle, the subsequent filing of the second criminal case is not to be regarded as having placed appellant in a prohibited second jeopardy.

CUISON vs. C.A.

Accused Eduardo Cuison was found guilty of the crime of double homicide and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment from 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum for each offense. He was also ordered to pay indemnity to the heirs of the victims for P30,000.00 each. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the said decision was affirmed with the modification that the civil indemnity was increased to P50,000.00. The accused elevated the decision before the Supreme Court which denied the said petition. The case was remanded to the Regional Trial Court for promulgation of the decision. However, respondent Judge promulgated the decision of [the Court of Appeals] only with respect to the modified civil liability of the accused but did not commit the accused to jail to commence service of his sentence. The CA clarified the ambiguity in the dispositive portion through its Resolution dated August 17, 1995 which categorically stated that the court affirmed the decision of the respondent court with respect to the penalty of imprisonment imposed upon the accused. Petitioner submits that the trial court's promulgation of the CA Decision "cannot be set aside and a second promulgation be ordered" because to do so would contravene the prohibition against double jeopardy. To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the following must be proven: (1) first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated;

(3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof. And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused Since the criminal cases have not yet been terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Hence, double jeopardy cannot prosper as a defense. The constitutional proscription of double jeopardy is not violated by a Court of Appeals order requiring the trial court to promulgate a decision sentencing the accused to imprisonment even if, earlier, the same decision has been promulgated in regard only to the payment of the modified civil indemnity arising from the same criminal act. The promulgation of only one part of the decision, i.e., the liability for civil indemnity, is not a bar to the subsequent promulgation of the other part, the imposition of the criminal accountability.

ESMEA vs POGOY

Petitioners Generoso Esmea , et. al were charged with grave coercion in the city court of Cebu City for having allegedly forced Reverend Father Tomas Tibudan of the Jaro Cathedral, Iloilo City to withdraw the sum of five thousand pesos from the bank and to give that amount to the accused because the priest lost it in a game of cards. The two, of the accused pleaded not guilty at their arraignment. However, no trial was held after the arraignment because complainant Father Tibudan requested the transfer of the hearing to another date. In the meantime, the fiscal lost his record of the case. So, the hearing scheduled on another day and was cancelled at his instance. Then the respondent judge issued again another order setting the trial "for the last time on August 16, 1979, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning." When the case was called on that date, the fiscal informed the court that the private prosecutor received from complainant Father Tibudan a telegram stating that he was sick. The counsel for petitioners Esmea and Alba opposed the cancellation of the hearing. They invoked the right of the accused to have a speedy trial. Respondent judge provisionally dismissed the case as to the four accused who were present because it "has been dragging all along and the accused are ready for the hearing" but the fiscal was not ready with his witness. The fiscal filed a motion for the revival of the case, which was granted by the judge. Esmea and Alba filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of double jeopardy. The rule on double jeopardy (non bis in Idem or not twice for the same) is found in section 22, Article IV Bill of Rights) of the Constitution which provides that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." This is complemented by Rule 117 of the Rules of Court which provides as follows: SEC. 9. Former conviction or acquittal or former jeopardy. When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and after the

defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. In order that legal jeopardy may exist, there should be (a) a valid complaint or information (b) before a court of competent jurisdiction and (c) the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or information. Respondent judge on his own volition provisionally dismissed the case. The petitioners did not expressly manifest their conformity to the provisional dismissal. Hence, the dismissal placed them in jeopardy. The provisional dismissal would not have place the petitioners in jeopardy if respondent judge had taken the precaution of making sure that the dismissal was with their consent. In this case, it is not very clear that the petitioners consented to the dismissal of the case. It is the practice of some judges before issuing an order of provisional dismissal in a case wherein the accused had already been arraigned to require the accused and his counsel to sign the minutes of the session or any available part of the record to show the conformity of the accused or his lack of objection to the provisional dismissal. The judge specifies in the order of provisional dismissal that the accused and his counsel signified their assent thereto. That procedure leaves no room for doubt as to the consent of the accused and precludes jeopardy from attaching to the dismissal.

PEOPLE vs. BALADJAY

Four criminal cases were filed against Sergio Baladjay and others in the municipal court of Ozamiz City, for illegal possession of instruments for committing counterfeiting or falsification, 2 counts of estafa, and for theft. The judge dismissed the case for failure of the prosecution to finish the presentation of its evidence and on the basis of accused right to speedy trial. The case had been pending for more than eleven years. We hold that the four dismissal orders, although provisional in character, which were issued upon motion of the accused and on the basis of his right to a speedy trial placed him in jeopardy. The dismissal was equivalent to an acquittal. The reinstatement of the cases would place him in double jeopardy. The rule that the dismissal of a criminal case upon defendant's motion will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense as said dismissal is not without the express consent of the defendant, has no application to a case where the dismissal is predicated on the right of a defendant to a speedy trial. The "provisional" dismissal of a criminal case for failure to prosecute ... is not truly a dismissal but an acquittal because the prosecution failed to prove the case when the time therefor came. A judgment of acquittal becomes final immediately after promulgation and cannot thus be recalled thereafter for correction or amendment

i.

Allied Right: RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY Clearly, jeopardy attaches only :

Upon valid indictment Before a competent court After arraignment When a valid plea has been entered

When the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the expressed consent of the accused (Almario v. CA, 355 SCRA 1) Generally, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion will not place the accused on double jeopardy. However, the rule admits two exceptions namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of right to speedy trial. (Almario v. CA, 355 SCRA 1) Issue: Whether the dismissal of a criminal case made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of double jeopardy.(People vs. Sandiganbayan) Once the court grants the demurrer, such order amounts to an acquittal; and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. This constitutes an exception to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of double jeopardy. (People vs. Sandiganbayan) (same with pp v. Laguio)

Double jeopardy in continued or continuous crimes Continued crime is a single crime consisting of series of acts but all arising from one criminal resolution The petitioner having already been convicted of the complex crime of estafa stands to reason that she can no longer be held liable for the same crime in this case. (Mallari v. People) Appeal of civil aspect When the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, the issue was about the civil aspect of the criminal case. Thus, there could be no double jeopardy. The judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to establish any fact there determined, even though both actions involve the same act or omission. (Manantan vs. Court of Appeals, 350 SCRA 387 (2001))