Livestock Marketing in Kenya and Ethiopia:

A Review of Policies and Practice

Yacob Aklilu
October 2008
Suggested citation:
Aklilu, Y. (2008). Livestock Marketing in Kenya and Ethiopia: A Review of Policies and
Practice. Feinstein International Center, Addis Ababa.

This report is a product of the Pastoral Areas Coordination, Analysis and Policy Support
(PACAPS) project of the Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, funded by USAID
East Africa.
Table of Contents

1. Introduction 1

2. General Policy Outlines 3

3. Animal Health 8
3.1 Marketing and Animal Health in Kenya 8
3.2 Marketing and Animal Health in Ethiopia 13
3.3 Inadequacy of Resource Allocations 17

4. Infrastructure 17

5. Meat Exports 19
5.1 Issues in Kenya 19
5.2 Issues in Ethiopia 22

6. Live Animal Exports 23

7. Market Stratification 24

8. Commercial Production and Breeding Issues 29

9. Provision of Financial Services to Pastoral Areas 31

10. Cross Border Trade 35

11. Conclusions 36

References 38
Acronyms

ADB African Development Bank

ADC Agricultural Development Corporation
ALLPRO ASAL Based Livestock and Rural Livelihoods Support Project
ALRMP Arid Lands Resource Management Programme (Kenya)
APHRD Animal and Plant Health Regulatory Department (Ethiopia)
ASAL Arid and Semi Arid Lands
CAADP Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
CAHW Community based Animal Health Workers
CBO Community Based Organisation
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
DFZ Disease Free Zone
DVS Department of Veterinary Services
EU European Union
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation
FMD Foot and mouth disease
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HACCP Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points
IBAR Interafrican Bureau for Animal Resources
IGAD Inter Governmental Authority for Development
KLMC Kenya Livestock Marketing Council
KMC Kenya Meat Commission
LMA Livestock Marketing Authority (Ethiopia)
MoARD Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (Ethiopia)
MoFED Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (Ethiopia)
MoLFD Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Development (Kenya)
MT Metric Tonne
NAHDIC National Animal Health Diagnostic and Investigation Center
NGO Non Governmental Organization
OIE Office international des epizootics
PACAPS Pastoral Coordination, Analysis and Policy Support (Project)
PLI Pastoral Livelihood Initiative (Ethiopia)
PPG Pastoral Producer Groups
RELPA Regional Enhanced Livelihood for Pastoral Areas
RVF Rift Valley fever
SAT South African Type
SPS LMM Sanitary and Phyto Sanitary – Livestock and Meat Marketing (Project)
TAD Transboundary Animal Disease
USAID United States Agency for International Development
VOCA Voluntary Organization of Cooperatives in America
1. INTRODUCTION

The last few years have witnessed a renewed interest in the export of live
animals and meat from Kenya and Ethiopia. In both cases, the private sector
has taken the lead in initiating or advocating for the revival of the export
business, prompting the respective governments to pay attention to the
potentials of livestock trade.

In Kenya, this move was enhanced by the formation of a new Ministry for
Livestock and Fisheries. This has led to the re operationalization of the Kenya
Meat Commission (KMC), new plans to set up satellite abattoirs in strategic
locations along the northern corridor, innovative approaches to improve
dilapidated market infrastructure and a continued interest in addressing
sanitary requirements related to livestock and meat trade. Kenya has also
incorporated a livestock marketing policy in the national livestock policy
document (still in draft). Prior to this, interested groups such as the Kenya
Livestock Marketing Council (KLMC), initially supported by Arid Land
Resource Management Project (ALRMP), had set up various district based
livestock marketing groups and played a major role in raising awareness and
establishing linkages between producers and potential importers.

During the last ten years in Ethiopia, the private sector has been active in
setting up export abattoirs and also in the exporting of live animals.
Government support to this sector was provided through the Livestock
Marketing Authority (LMA)1, under the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development (MoARD) at the time, forming exporter’s associations,
identifying potential export markets, facilitating export procedures and so on.
Bilateral programs specifically designed to address sanitary issues are also on
the fore.

An increasing number of donors (USAID and EU in particular), FAO and

NGOs are also engaged in supporting livestock marketing from pastoral areas
either through national, regional, cross border or area based programs. Some
of these programs have been or are being implemented through regional
organizations such as the Africa Union/Interafrican Bureau for Animal
Resources (AU/IBAR), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA) and the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD),
and some through national based institutions or as stand alone projects.
Many of the NGOs operate at the local level with a few exceptions that
operate at the national level.
1
The LMA was dissolved some three years ago. Livestock marketing issues are now handled by the
State Minister for agricultural inputs and marketing. Livestock is now considered as one of the various
agricultural commodities which the Ministry handles.

1
Considering the size of the human population that depends on livestock
production in both countries, the development of domestic and export
markets is critical to alleviating poverty, raising revenues and continuing the
trend towards more market orientation. In realization of this potential, both
governments are taking some encouraging measures towards promoting the
marketing of livestock, specifically from pastoral areas. However, livestock
and meat marketing, especially exports, is a complex process. The subsistence
production systems in Ethiopia and Kenya cannot compete with commercial
producers in Brazil or Australia. International trade barriers (SPS, tariff and
non tariff) impose huge limitations on both countries. Export marketing and
promotional strategies in destination countries are almost non existent. There
is no economy of scale to offset costs. In short, the livestock and meat
marketing systems are not as efficient nor as streamlined as those of their
competitors.

Yet, these problems are not insurmountable in the long term. Some require
substantial investments, for example, in animal health and SPS systems,
infrastructure and processing facilities. Others may require a combination of
investment and attitudinal changes such as shifting the mode of production to
meet what the market demands. Competing in the international market
entails acquiring and practicing savvy marketing strategies along with
availing the right product on time. Obviously, a public and private sector
partnership is crucial to achieving long term objectives. More importantly, an
appropriate policy framework is the pre requisite for providing an enabling
environment for all actors. This paper will look into some policy and
operational issues.

Objective

The objective of this paper is to provide insights on livestock marketing policy

issues for the COMESA Secretariat under the PACAPS/RELPA programme.
The paper constitutes part of the in house capacity building program on
pastoral policy issues for the Secretariat in conjunction with the training
courses provided by PACAPS to COMESA staff and CAADP country focal
points. It is anticipated that the overall capacity building effort will translate
into the pro active engagement of the pastoral sector in the CAADP process.

Structure

The paper reviews selected livestock marketing policy and some operational
issues in both Kenya and Ethiopia. It is structured to provide some details on
nine pertinent issues that are critical for the development of pastoral livestock
markets in order that COMESA may focus on priority areas. Issues discussed

2
will focus on general policy outlines, animal health services and
infrastructure; the status of meat and live animal exports, market stratification
and feeds, commercial production and the provision of financial services. The
discussion on each topic incorporates analysis and suggestions for
improvement.

Methodology

Relevant documents were reviewed in both countries; these include policy

drafts/documents, sessional papers, commissioned or non commissioned
specific studies, project appraisals, mid term or terminal evaluations, progress
reports and various articles in journals and newspapers. The findings from
these reviews were further refined through interviews held with various key
informants in the Department of Veterinary Services (DVS) in each country,
other relevant government and private financial institutions, meat and live
animal exporters and specialized groups such as livestock marketing
cooperatives and the KLMC.

2. GENERAL POLICY OUTLINES

Ethiopia ranks first in livestock resources in Africa with the potential to

export substantial numbers of live animals and meat products. However,
various constraints continue to hinder international trade to destinations of
choice turning the country into a major supplier of live cattle, camels and
shoats to its neighboring countries at a level unparalleled elsewhere in
Africa. Kenya, theoretically, is a meat deficit country, but its shortfall is
covered through cross border imports from Tanzania, Ethiopia and Somalia
and, to some extent, from South Sudan. Kenya’s export potential emanates
primarily from such cross border live animal imports, although significant
livestock resources exist in its North eastern and Northern provinces as well
as in some of the commercial ranches.

Both countries are keen to promote the export of live animals and meat with a
growing interest in value addition by maximizing export revenues, creating
jobs and offsetting the limitations arising from SPS requirements for live
animal exports. In recent years, the respective governments have taken some
encouraging initiatives to facilitate and promote livestock trade. By and large,
these include establishing relevant government departments/ministries,
policy initiatives to promote agricultural development, poverty reduction,
accelerated economic growth policy frameworks and the setting up of
bilateral or multilateral programs focusing specifically on livestock or pastoral
development. Some of these programs incorporate livestock and meat
marketing components, albeit with very mixed impacts.

3
In Kenya, the importance of livestock marketing and value addition is
highlighted in the MoLFD ‘s sessional paper on livestock policy (in draft, at
the timing of writing this report). The draft policy paper acknowledges that
the marketing of livestock and livestock products should be a major economic
enterprise, handled largely by the private sector, ‘with the government only
offering regulatory and facilitation services’. It concedes that its access to
European and Middle East markets2 has been hampered due to the country’s
inability to meet SPS standards and that the distribution system of livestock
products has been poorly developed in the country.

Future policy directions include the institutionalization of emergency

livestock off take (from pastoral areas) as a drought mitigation measure by
setting up a robust drought early warning and response system; rehabilitation
of dilapidated infrastructure (roads, holding grounds and stock routes) along
with protecting holding grounds from acquisition by private developers. One
interesting development, in this regard, is the idea to plough back some of the
cess revenue collected by local councils towards the development and
maintenance of market infrastructure. Due importance is also given to setting
up an efficient market information system to minimize distortions and
enhance choices for both producers and buyers. In recognition of the adverse
impacts of insecurity on livestock marketing (particularly in pastoral areas),
the policy paper aims to promote peace in collaboration with the pastoral
communities which might then, for example, allow the trekking (rather than
the more expensive trucking) of trade herds.

Emphasis is also placed on promoting the processing and consumption of

camel products, including camel milk3, in local and export markets, and
fostering an enabling environment for the marketing of ‘emerging livestock’
products (mainly of wildlife resources) by harmonizing existing laws (e.g. the
Wildlife Act) that otherwise contradict such initiatives. Furthermore, Kenya
aims to improve the standards of meat and milk products to ensure ‘the
competitiveness of local products by installing the necessary mechanisms that
are acceptable to regional and international markets’; this policy includes
honey products as well.

Value addition is recommended for milk, meat, hides, skins, wool, honey,
bones, blood, feathers, hooves and horns because of their current low value
chain that results in low earnings. The policy envisages a role for the MoLFD
in developing incentives for value addition enterprises involving cottage and

2
Although this is stated in the draft policy document, Kenya is now accessing the Middle East market.
3
Packed camel milk is now available in Kenyan supermarkets through a private initiative

4
large scale value adding industries. To overcome limitations of technological
advancement, skills development is incorporated as an integral part of the
value addition process. To buttress the value addition chain, the Ministry
plans to set up an in house agri business and value addition office to
coordinate activities.

The MoLFD acknowledges that over the past decade the livestock sector has
been allocated only a small proportion of the annual national budget. While
the Ministry envisions a corresponding budgetary increase to execute its new
mandate, it is also advocating for increased credit provision for small or large
scale producers, traders and the like in the sector.

In a bid to revamp the livestock sector development, MoLFD has developed a

number of policies and bills incorporating dairy, livestock feed, animal
breeding, poultry and apiculture. These have been approved by cabinet and
forwarded to parliament for approval.

The ALRMP policy document for arid and semi arid areas of Kenya is aimed
at fostering sustainable development for pastoral and agro pastoral
communities in which livestock marketing features as one of the priority
areas. Basically, the document canvasses a wide range of issues affecting
pastoral and agro pastoral communities (land, water, education, health,
youth, governance, mining, alternative livelihoods, tourism etc.), but it also
acknowledges the critical role livestock marketing can play in enhancing the
livelihoods of pastoralists and agro pastoralists. The existing bottlenecks
affecting livestock marketing listed in the ALRMP policy document and the
visions for the future are similar to those of MoLFD. The 10 year policy
document (2017 2016) envisages the construction of road networks, the setting
up of market information systems, the establishment of DFZs and abattoirs in
key strategic sites, investment in appropriate disease control and surveillance,
the promotion of camel production and the enhancement of the market for
agricultural products. Two key components of the policy document include
widening and deepening financial services in ASAL areas (for small scale
traders, co operatives, associations, small producers, etc) and reducing
transaction costs for cross border operations through infrastructure
development.

Despite having the largest livestock resources in Africa and unlike Sudan,
Kenya or Tanzania, Ethiopia does not have a separate central ministry for the
livestock sector. The MoARD, which oversees livestock related activities and
policies, is itself divided into four State ministries—natural resources,
agricultural inputs and marketing, crop and animal husbandry, and the early
warning and response sector. Thus, while animal production and the DVS fall

5
under one State Ministry, livestock and meat marketing activities fall under
another, although both state ministries report to MoARD. Furthermore, the
federal structure of the government allows a significant level of autonomy to
regional governments empowering the latter to formulate regional policies on
issues of a wide ranging nature including livestock marketing, taxation,
budgetary allocations etc. Those regions with significant pastoralist and agro
pastoralist populations also have their own pastoral
departments/commissions and a pastoral unit in the Ministry of Federal
4

Affairs, at federal level, assumes a similar role to the ALRMP in Kenya. In

addition, a Pastoral Coordination Unit was recently set up within the Deputy
Prime Minister’s office in a bid to provide additional support to ‘emerging
regions’ mainly consisting of pastoral areas.

In effect, there is no specific livestock marketing policy at the central level in

Ethiopia. This is partly because meat and live animal trade constitutes only
one of the many agricultural products the specific State Ministry responsible
for the marketing of agricultural produces and inputs handles. Priority is also
given to products that currently generate more substantial export revenues
than meat and live animals (coffee and horticultural crops, for example).
Even if the specific state ministry is intent on developing a livestock
marketing policy, this may not be comprehensive as veterinary services and
animal production are each housed in a different state ministry. As a result,
policies related to livestock marketing and animal health are scattered in
various policy documents such as in the investment policy, the Ministry of
Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) 2005/06 to 2009/10 Plan for
Accelerated and Sustained Development Plan to End Poverty (PASDEP), trade
policy and specific programs related to livestock marketing (such as the SPS
LMM project). The relevance of such policies to livestock marketing applies in
the general sense whereas they could be specific in the case of animal health
services5 and other designated programmes.

For example, the general investment policy allows investors in the livestock
sector to enjoy the following privileges:
• income tax holiday from two to six years and up to eight years for
special circumstances;
• exemption from any export tax and other taxes levied on exports; full
exemption from payment of import custom duties and other taxes
levied on imports for the investment;

4
For example, Afar, Oromia, Somali and Southern Nations have set up pastoral departments or
commissions.
5
In the absence of a comprehensive policy document, specific national, bilateral and multi-lateral
livestock/pastoral related programs serve as proxy indicators of policies on livestock marketing, animal
health and other related sectors.

6
 • guarantee to foreign investors to remit in convertible currency the
profits and dividends accruing from the investment as well as principal
and interest on external loans.

Additional policy incentives since June 2005 include support for the creation
of industry associations to provide a consultation forum between the private
sector and the government. This has resulted in the formation of two
associations related to meat and livestock trade viz. the Ethiopian Meat
Exporters Association and Ethiopian Live Animal Exporters Association;
deregulation of domestic prices; liberalization of foreign trade; institutional
support for the export sector; promulgation of a liberal investment law and
issuance of a new labor law.

The MoFED five year all sector economic development plan is short on
background analysis having made the assumption that the relevant analytical
components are already documented with the relevant ministries. Policies
and strategies for the livestock sub sector focus on genetic improvement for
sheep and cattle (local and exotic breeds) and improving animal feed
production (forage feed production/forage banks, natural pasture
improvement, maximizing crop residue feed etc.). The livestock and meat
marketing component of the document envisage the construction of about a
dozen new export abattoirs, the establishment of new and the upgrading of
existing cold storage and packing facilities, and importation of Thermo king
trucks for transportation. In contrast to Kenya, the MoFED five year plan and
policy document gives emphasis to identifying and penetrating export
markets (through trade missions or in depth studies of foreign markets) and
marketable commodities transfer studies. Promotional activities include trade
fairs, documentary films and the development of websites on profiles of
private organizations and cooperatives for facilitating the export market.

Of the three major pastoral regions of Ethiopia, the Oromia Region has taken
the lead in setting up a separate Livestock Resources Development and
marketing Agency following a study tour to Sudan organized by the PLI
programme. This move would enable the Agency to focus primarily on
livestock related issues in contrast to other Regions where priority is given to
crops. There is also hope that this precedence would prompt the other two
major pastoral Regions, Somali and Afar, to follow suit.

7
3. ANIMAL HEALTH

Poor animal health services coupled with the sporadic outbreak of

economically important diseases (RVF, FMD etc.) remain major constraints
for the marketing of livestock and meat from the Horn in general. Over the
last thirty years, available evidence indicates that the allocation of resources
for the livestock sub sector (and principally for the DVS) has been decreasing
both in absolute and proportional terms (Tambi and Maina, 2002). The need
to strengthen veterinary services (through public and private goods) is
becoming more apparent in light of the recurring bans being imposed by
importing countries despite initiatives to revive livestock and meat exports
from Ethiopia and Kenya. In reality, both countries have a long way to go to
bring the status of their veterinary services to internationally acceptable
standards given the ever increasing stringent rules and regulations being
formulated by actors such as the OIE and EU. At this stage, both countries are
formulating policy initiatives to address the issue using different approaches.
Interestingly, these policy initiatives are not buttressed by proportional
increases in resource allocation and instead, rely on bilateral and multilateral
funding6. Tambi and Maina (2002) suggest that some governments even
reduce allocated resources when donor funding becomes available. The
commitment of both governments to improving veterinary services remains
an issue of concern until their intent can be proven through resource
allocation.

3.1 Marketing and Animal Health in Kenya

Various legal statutes empower the DVS in Kenya to control animal diseases
and pests – such as the Animal Diseases Act, Cattle Cleansing Act, Rabies
Control Act, Branding Act, the Crop and Livestock Production Act,
Veterinary and Surgeons Act, Meat Control Act, Livestock Movement Act, etc.
These acts are legally binding – although some of them may be outdated7 and
their enforcement is questionable8. In recognition of these facts, the Kenyan
Veterinary Board is pushing for changes and is currently reviewing some of
these acts including the drafting of new ones involving avian flu and DFZs.
Policy review is a lengthy process in Kenya since it has to pass first through
cabinet and then through parliament for approval. Therefore, it may take up

6
ADB in Kenya and USAID in Ethiopia
7
For example, the provision governing the inspection of livestock for 100 days (for three CBPP tests)
prior to exports could be unrealistic in today’s highly competitive world market.
8
The issuance of ‘movement permits’ is the most widely practiced aspect of this Act and without
which livestock are not permitted to travel from high-risk areas to the terminal markets. The application
of other aspects of the Act is subject to the available means.

8
to two to three years for the review process to materialize. Nevertheless, the
initiative has been set in motion.

Meanwhile, despite the training of thousands of CAHWs, the key role they
played in eradicating/controlling rinderpest and their undisputed position as
the main providers of animal health services to the pastoral population, the
DVS does not officially recognize CAHWs except as ‘the devil they have to
work with’9. Whatever the case was in the past, the exclusion of CAHWs
from recognition in the review process will be another missed opportunity for
the livestock sector in Kenya. In fact, the existing Animal Diseases Act (CAP
364) gives too much weight and power to veterinarians, and one only hopes
that the review process will lead to more appropriate support to the full range
of veterinary para professionals (diplomates, technicians and CAHWs). In
the past, the contracting out of some public services to the private sector was
not endorsed in government circles, although OIE rules stipulate that certain
activities (some types of surveillance, testing, manning, etc) can be performed
by the private sector. Reversing this concept, the draft policy document
proposes a stronger private sector partnership by facilitating and encouraging
‘self employment and deployment of professionals and technically qualified
personnel to sustainably serve the sub sector’. This move will obviously bring
in a host of advantages if the policy gains approval. It will ease the financial
burden on the government, introduce payments for performance based
services, improve quality control through competition and pave the way for
efficiency and imagination.

Perhaps, the single most prominent but questionable measure under

consideration in Kenya is the establishment of DFZs for increased exports of
live animals and beef. In this connection, a Ministerial Committee has
proposed the following three areas for establishment of DFZs: North Rift;
Laikipia/Timau/Kieni and the Galana Kilifi Kwale Taita Taveta Ranches
(Coast region). Of these, some activities have been initiated through ADB
financing for the Coast region DFZ 10. Apparently, the DFZs have been
planned to serve as the last holding points for cattle that have been vaccinated
and quarantined en route. The DFZs will be equipped with dips, water and
feeding facilities and will be fully fenced. In addition, financial support has
been provided through the ADB project for rehabilitating two quarantine
centers at Mirtini and Bachuma. The DFZs are intended to serve cattle coming
from the North and North Eastern provinces of Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia.

9
Personal communication (name withheld).
10
DFZ is conspicuously not mentioned in the MoLFD draft policy document, although the MoLFD
implements the ADB funded project covering 22 ASAL districts. Apparently, the DVS has some
reservations that others are getting the money in the name of activities that belong to the DVS. The
DVS advice in this regard is to focus on exporting meat rather than live animals.

9
There are a number of issues that need to be considered when determining if
DFZs are the right solution to problems that are inherent in the system.
Historically, Southern African nations (Namibia, Botswana and South
Africa)11 have been exporting beef on the basis of zones free from FMD
without vaccination. According to Dr. Gavin Thompson12 of SADC, obtaining
recognition of zones free from FMD is ‘logistically difficult, very expensive13
and socially disruptive with displacement and exclusion of local populations
and livestock’. The practicalities and technical constraints are frequently
underestimated by Sub Saharan countries. However, 70 to 80 percent of the
national livestock populations owned by smallholders in Namibia and
Botswana are excluded from the DFZs in those countries, with no access to
international markets for the excluded farmers. In other words, the DFZs in
both countries are meant for white owned ranches (with a few black elite
groups). Dr. Thomson adds, ‘Although freedom from FMD with vaccination
is possible, this approach is so far not used in Sub Saharan Africa but applied
in South America. However, technical difficulties related to the purity of SAT
strains in the region and the sensitivity of diagnostic tests for SAT type
viruses may make the effort difficult.’ Even in the absence of a DFZ, Kenya
has simply demonstrated that it can export healthy live animals to Mauritius.
What is required is to strengthen this system by setting up appropriate
quarantine facilities without the need to invest in a DFZ that may not even be
recognized by international authorities. The recurrence of RVF also poses a
specific challenge as mosquitoes cannot be controlled by fencing an area.14

The relatively new concept of compartmentalization as a complement or an

alternative to the DFZ concept is based on integrated bio security systems
which are likely to benefit vertically integrated (sophisticated) business
enterprises preferentially. However, the OIE’s Scientific Commission decision
that compartmentalization should not be applicable in the case of FMD makes
the effort daunting, at least in the short run.

11
Zimbabwe is no longer in that category
12
A world expert on FMD and former Chairman of the OIE FMD and Other Epizootics Commission
13
For example, between 1992 and 2005 Namibia invested N$134 million for infrastructure and
additional N$2 million p.a. for cattle registration while Botswana invested P166 million between 2000-
2004 for the introduction of LITS and an additional P15 million p.a for maintenance/upgrading to
comply with EU standards.
14
In theory, a DFZ could be established in areas where RVF outbreaks may not likely occur. However,
the fact that RVF outbreaks occur within the country’s borders by itself poses a serious challenge for
international authorities to recognize the DFZ.

10
 Compartmentalization
Country Y

Feed Abattoir & meat

production processing plant

Feed-lots
Animal supp.

Compartmentalized, i.e. bio-secure,

beef production chain

Source: Gavin Thompson

If the intention to create DFZs in Kenya15 is solely for the export of more live
animals (mainly cattle), one is tempted to ask if the market justifies the
investment. The volume of live animal export to Mauritius is not that
significant, and promises made by Egypt can be reversed at any time (as
happened with Ethiopia). As agreed by those in the industry, Kenya can
benefit more through value addition and by exporting meat products16.
However, attempts to export meat to high end markets (such as Europe) by
reviving the Kenyan quota from the previous Lome Convention may not be
possible due to complications arising from the replacement of the latter by the
EU Economic Partnership Agreement. This agreement may not include Kenya
for meat commodities. Kenya would be well advised to focus on exporting
meat or live animals to Mauritius, Egypt, the Middle East, Malaysia and other
less demanding destinations where a movement control system following
vaccination and quarantine might suffice.

In terms of commitment to DFZs, Kenya will need to consider factors such as:
• social exclusion displacements and exclusion of the local population
• economic conflicts the tourist industry, wildlife and in particular buffalo

15
In fact, at the time of writing this paper, it was announced that the GoK has allocated KSh. 3B
(US$37,500,000) for the development of the first two DFZs. The first 2 will be Samburu/Laikipia/Isilo
Complex and the Coastal Complex (Galana and other organized commercial ranches).
16
Including, the MoLFD policy document which strongly argues for value addition.

11
• epidemiological factors – related to wildlife and tourism e.g. buffalo acting
as a natural reservoir for FMD,
• financial and logistical difficulties – which are various and inherent in the
proposed DFZ system
• supply issues – such as an inconsistent supply of livestock and
dependence on external supply sources, which could potentially dry up at
any time17

This combination of complex factors indicates that the creation of DFZs is not
warranted in the short to medium term. Traceability could also be a challenge
for animals originating from neighboring countries. The alternative to this
would be in upgrading and strengthening veterinary services and animal
disease surveillance, reporting and control key elements. These need to be
addressed in the short to medium term with a view to perhaps establishing
DFZs in the long run18. A recent study by GTZ on DFZs (Aiello–Gout, et al,
2007), commissioned by AU/IBAR, also concurs with this conclusion.

According to the Kenya DVS, ‘Effective control of livestock movement is the

key to finding disease free animals19’. On the other hand, the on going
campaigns for a Commodity Based Certification System and freedom from
FMD through compartmentalization are gathering momentum. Taking into
account shortages in meat supply forecasts in the world market (Delgado,
2000), it may not be too long before countries are able to export meat products
through a robust veterinary system that need not necessarily include DFZs.

The ADB funded ALLPRO project in Kenya supports various livestock

marketing related activities:
• rehabilitation of quarantine stations;
• installment of mobile laboratories including equipment and
consumables;
• procurement of vaccines;
• stakeholders workshops on disease control and disease surveillance in
districts;
• training of meat inspectors and CAHWs;
• rehabilitation of meat training institutes;

17
There is a commonly-accepted misperception in Kenya that it attracts livestock supplies from
Ethiopia because of price differentials. The reality is meat prices are twice as high in Ethiopia
compared to Kenya. The domestic market in Ethiopia is supplied largely by highland cattle, due to
proximity, to the exclusion of the pastoral areas - the main reason for the flow of trade herds from
pastoral areas of Ethiopia to Kenya. However, this trend can change at any time, when and if Ethiopia
starts exporting beef, as was the case with shoats. Also note that there are more cattle in the highland
areas of Ethiopia than in the pastoral areas
18
The mid-term review of the ADB-financed ALLPRO project states that, ‘The creation of a coastal
DFZ is a major challenge and well outside the budgetary scope of ALLPRO’.
19
Personal communication with Dr Peter Ithodenka, head of the DVS in Kenya, 25/02/2008

12
 • building the capacity of diagnostic staff.

While these initiatives are commendable, it should be noted that the system
can only work in the long run through the commitment of the government
and all stakeholders in the post project phase. For example, the sustainability
of the mobile labs is already in doubt. A strategy has to be put in place to
sustain the system in the post project phase through full cost recovery and/or
cost sharing.

Other pertinent issues contained in the Kenya MoLFD draft policy document
include the following:
• establishing the necessary mechanisms to deal with emerging diseases
(e.g. avian flu) plus fires, floods and drought;
• enlisting the private sector and community participation in disease and
pest control and surveillance;
• promoting and facilitating community and private sector participation
in environmentally safe vector and vector borne disease control
programmes;
• devising necessary strategies and initiating programmes to eradicate
tsetse flies;
• measuring disease control measures for other livestock species in
addition to cattle by harnessing public and private resources;
• separating the management and control of veterinary drugs from that
of human drugs for control and regulation by MoLFD; enforcing
existing regulations to effectively control the movement of livestock
and livestock products20;
• upgrading the infrastructure of the existing laboratories (two national,
six regional labs) and enhancing their capacity building to international
standards.

3.2 Animal Health and Marketing in Ethiopia

In Ethiopia, a new Animal and Plant Health Regulatory Directorate

(APHRD)21, under the MoARD, has been mandated to regulate, monitor and
control SPS standards for plants, animals and their derivatives at the federal
level. The new Directorate will have two separate divisions/departments to
handle animals and plants. The organizational structure of the Directorate is
currently under formation. Whether this structure will be replicated at
regional levels is not known yet. Regardless, owing to the federal structure of
the government, the regional veterinary departments remain autonomous,
20
On the other hand, the ALRMP policy document calls for a review of the livestock movement
control rather than reinforcing it.
21
Modeled on the USA system.

13
with their own budget allocations from the respective regional governments.
The federal APHRD mandate extends only to TADs, SPS certifications and
meat inspections as well as coordinating vaccination campaigns in times of
disaster. The regional veterinary departments do not necessarily report on
their activities to APHRD with the exception of disease reporting for
monitoring purposes and on other issues as and when requested. The loose
working relationship between the federal and the regional structures could be
an impediment to setting up a credible SPS structure. However, there is hope
that APHRD will come up with new Acts and Regulations that bind the
federal and regional veterinary systems to a common vertical structure
regarding SPS standards, disease surveillance, monitoring and reporting and
disease control systems.

Meanwhile, the MoFED five year plan on policies, strategies and programmes
envisages an ambitious goal regarding the development of veterinary services
in the country. These include:
• strengthening field veterinary services by doubling the number of
veterinary clinics to 3,600 along with mobile service delivery units;
• improving the supply and quality of 16 types of vaccines through
significant expansion;
• controlling and preventing five economically important TADS;
• establishing a livestock early warning system;
• Expanding basic animal health service training from the current level
of 5% to 50%;
• producing significant doses for seven types of vaccines that are not
produced in the country currently;
• investigating and controlling newly emerging diseases (such as avian
flu);
• establishing three DFZs;
• investigating and controlling the new camel disease.

Other planned interventions include strengthening the quarantine and

inspection service with plans to build eight new quarantine stations and
increasing the number of domestic abattoirs from the current 140 to 321. There
is a plan to build one quality control laboratory for animal products and an
additional five animal health posts to enforce control on animal product
standards. In addition, the plan envisages strengthening diagnostic and
surveillance capacity of laboratories by increasing the number of diseases
surveyed to six with a substantial increase in the number of samples tested
per annum. Coverage of disease reporting rate is to be increased to 80 percent.

Regarding human resource development, the five year plan foresees

increasing the number of animal health professionals as follows: animal

14
health assistants to 6,000; meat inspectors to 684; assistant meat inspectors to
519; and graduate veterinarians to 50022.

The plan provides limited information on public–private partnerships and or

the sustainability of all these activities over the long run. There are also
doubts if adequate resources have been allocated (except for manpower
development) to undertake the tasks outlined in the five year plan. It is
unrealistic to think that the proposed DFZs will be implemented within the
planned five years, as there are no initiatives to date indicating commitment.
Whether there is a need for DFZs and, if so, their eventual materialization is
highly doubtful. A pragmatic approach involving a two phase quarantine
system (at purchase sites and feedlots) proposed by the USAID funded SPS
LMM program appears to be more appropriate for the present status of the
country. This system could be put in practice once the cost elements are
known through a test run23.

The planned increase in vaccine production (for both new and old types) can
only be achieved through substantial upgrading of the vaccine production
center at Debre Zeit. Joint venturing could be necessary for capital
investment, technology transfer and marketing purposes. Some initiatives
were undertaken through the USAID funded SPS LMM program for possible
joint venturing with foreign pharmaceutical companies. The results are
mixed, but not yet finalized.

There is one national referral laboratory and thirteen regional laboratories in

Ethiopia. A baseline survey carried out on the status of these laboratories by
SPS LMM found the labs to be reasonably equipped. However, their
operational capacity is constrained by a lack of resources resulting in an
irregular supply of consumables, limited field activities and high staff
turnover. A lack of technical skills has also rendered some equipment idle.
Certain tests are not being carried out due to capacity constraints. In addition,
the assessment identified weak functional linkages between the regional
laboratories and the National Animal Health Diagnostic and Investigation
Center. Through the SPS LMM program, support was provided to decision
makers to redirect the mandate of NAHDIC to lead/assist the regional labs in
the provision of diagnostic services, the investigation of disease outbreaks
and the instigation of systematic surveillance in an effort to improve the
national diagnostic capacity levels. Essential lab consumables were supplied
to regional labs through NAHDIC. Training was provided to federal staff on

22
Six universities in the country run veterinary faculties and a number of colleges train animal health
assistants and meat inspectors.
23
ILRI’s cost-benefit analysis of this system suggests that the system may not be financially feasible
(Rich, et al, 2007). But, a test-run is necessary to confirm/reject the findings.

15
Molecular Diagnostic Tests and on HACCP and SPS requirements for
MoARD meat inspectors and exporters. Support was also provided to
NAHDIC staff for developing a Quality Systems Manual. However, a system
has to be put in place to sustain these activities in the post project phase.

The existing quarantine stations in Ethiopia are small in size and without
adequate facilities and some of these are inappropriately located for live
animal exports except for meat processing. There is also a plan to set up two
new quarantine stations of international standard to bypass the Djibouti
facility that is increasingly charging exorbitant fees to a level that makes live
animal exports almost impossible. The certification of animals in Djibouti by
veterinarians hired by the owner of the quarantine facility also contravenes
the international norm.

The Djibouti quarantine facility, built with USAID funding and originally
planned to be owned by the regional livestock traders’ association, now
belongs to a private company called Abu Yaser International. The company
has lobbied for all animals from Ethiopia to pass through the facility but it’s
creation, to some extent, has put Ethiopian live animal exporters at a
disadvantage as it costs them an average of $50 per head to keep cattle in the
facility. Ethiopia’s determination to build its own international quarantine
center is, therefore, justifiable from a number of points. This move will
hopefully resolve the predicament of live animal exporters.

Compared to Kenya, Ethiopia’s Animal Disease Control Proclamation No

267/2002 is limited to a few sections incorporating provisions (legal
terminologies), Prevention and Control of Animal Diseases, Movement of
Animals24, Animal Products and by Products and Registration of Animal
Health Professionals and Delivery of Services. The proclamation does not
cover other pertinent issues such as breeding, a branding/cattle identification
system, the movement of livestock to terminal markets etc. No amount of
effort will come to fruition in the absence of such crucial Acts and Bills and
more importantly without a mechanism to enforce the Acts and Bills.
APHRD, therefore, should focus on working with other stakeholders (with
Ethiopian Veterinary Association/ or the emerging Veterinary Board,
Ethiopian Society of Animal Production, etc.) to originate Acts that are crucial
for enhancing veterinary services, livestock and meat trade25.

24
In times of disease outbreak only
25
In realization of these short comings, guidelines and acts covering some of these pertinent issues, but
not all, have been drafted by MoARD and sent to parliament for approval.

16
3.3 Inadequacy of Resource Allocations

In Kenya, the livestock sector contributes about 10% of the entire GDP and
about 42% of the agricultural GDP. It accounts for about 30% of marketed
agricultural products. Yet, the total agricultural sector used to receive 10% of
the total government budget in the 1960s, was reduced to 7.5% in the 1980s
and to a trifling 3% in the 1990s. In 2002/03, livestock accounted for only 1% of
the proportion (or 0.25% of the national GDP). In Ethiopia, the livestock
sector contributes about 20% of the total GDP. It is not possible to tally the
total resource allocation in Ethiopia as the sub sector resource allocation for
the regions is determined by the respective regional governments. However,
circumstantial evidence indicates that the resource allocation may not be
better than in Kenya (Tambi and Maina, 2002). The failure of both
governments in allocating proportionally adequate resources for such a vital
sub sector remains puzzling. What is more worrisome is that both Ethiopia
and Kenya rely on external funding (loans or grants) for revamping or
upgrading their veterinary services despite the respective governments’ wish
to export more live animals and meat in order to collect export revenues.
While the need for external technical assistance is apparent, running the
veterinary service delivery systems through short term financial grants or
loans is a questionable approach. Dependence on external funding emanates
partly from the age old adherence to running everything through the public
sector and, at the same time, from the non committal attitude of the respective
governments due to ‘other’ priorities. Public private partnership is critical not
only to relieve the financial burden on governments but also to bring in
efficiency and quality service into the system. At the same time, governments
should know better than to try to collect local taxes and export revenues from
the sector without investing in it.

4. INFRASTRUCTURE

Inadequate infrastructure has been cited in many papers and presentations as

contributing to the inefficiency of livestock marketing. In fact, some form of
infrastructure did exist in both countries in the past (holding grounds, stock
routes, water points, quarantine stations etc.) mainly due to World Bank and
ADB loans. But, most of the infrastructure is dilapidated or non existent
because no system was put in place to make them self financing for
maintenance or upgrading. In some cases, their demise was caused by
regional instability (the Ethio Somali war of 1977, for example) or was due to
internal ethnic conflicts or communities that did not see any benefit in caring
for them.

17
Once again, both the MoLFD and ALRMP policy papers in Kenya consider
the development of infrastructure (roads, stock routes, holding grounds,
communications) as one of the priority areas. Obviously, surfaced roads could
increase efficiency while decreasing transportation costs. Communication
facilities could simplify and facilitate transactions. Livestock market yards
could grade stock, monitor volume of trade, price, etc. although they could
also simplify things for council tax collectors, bringing an unintended burden
to pastoralists. Holding grounds and stock routes are critical for the
movement of livestock to their final destinations and for tracking purposes. In
Kenya, the ALLPRO project infrastructural activities include the rehabilitation
of ten rural markets and stock routes, renovation of the leather tannery at
Kabete, construction of four slaughterhouses, rehabilitation of quarantine
stations and the Meat Training Institute. These activities are under various
stages of implementation with slight changes in some of their activities
following the mid term review. However useful these are for livestock
development and marketing efficiency, a system should be devised to operate
them profitably or at least on a cost recovery basis in order to sustain the
services they provide. In fact, the MoLFD policy document recommends that
part of the cess26 collected by local councils from rural markets should be set
aside for maintenance and upgrading purposes. This approach should be
extended to quarantine stations, holding grounds, mobile laboratories and
other service providing infrastructure facilities.

Infrastructure development in Ethiopia is planned and executed by the

relevant federal and regional authorities (roads, telecommunications, water
etc). Such activities take place as part of the national development plan and
are not specifically tied to livestock development although the sub sector
benefits from the whole development process. The MoFED five year plan on
infrastructure related activities for the livestock sub sector envisages
increasing quarantine posts from three to eight27, check posts from three to 12
and domestic abattoirs from 140 to 321. One hopes that this infrastructure will
operate profitably or at least on a cost recovery basis.

Another development that took place during the last three years was the
construction of 25 market yards in pastoral areas through the USAID funded
PLI program. Although the market yards include some facilities such as
loading ramps and watering points, they lack some crucial attributes such as
holding grounds for purchased animals. It seems possible that building fewer
market yards with complete facilities in vibrant secondary markets might
have been more effective than building to the same standard in less
26
Local council tax.
27
In view of the decision taken to build two international quarantine centers, the original plan of
building three to eight quarantine centers in different locations of the country could be put on hold.

18
important, and in some cases, non functional markets. More importantly,
insufficient thought went into planning the management of the market yards.
This effectively placed them under the ownership of the local councils,
without provision to use some of the revenue for maintaining and/or
upgrading the yards. This casts doubt about the functionality of the yards
over a long period of time unless this status is revised by the concerned
stakeholders.

The privately owned Djibouti quarantine center remains a challenge to

Ethiopia and Somalia. Owned by Abu Yaser International, it proclaims itself
to be a regional quarantine center covering such countries as Ethiopia,
Somalia and even Kenya, and lobbies actively to persuade major importing
countries and international agencies that it is the only quarantine center of
acceptable standard in the region. More positively, the facility may have
triggered the setting up of similar quarantine facilities by two competing
Saudi companies in Bosaso and Berbera. This move has in turn prompted
Somali livestock exporters to put their own quarantine facilities in both ports
to counteract the threat posed by the Saudi companies to monopolize the
export trade. With Ethiopia planning to build two new quarantine centers
within its borders, the region is heading for a fierce competition in persuading
importers that one establishment fulfills the requirements better than another,
and that the private Djibouti facility does not represent the region. Perhaps,
one unintended effect of the Djibouti quarantine center has been to persuade
Ethiopia, Somaliland and Puntland to set up their own quarantine centers
which should have been in place a long time ago. However, setting up the
quarantine center in Djibouti in the first place, against the wishes of the
principal stakeholder countries (Ethiopia and Somalia), remains the cause of
much of the controversy that followed. Its likely impact, in view of the new
initiatives in Ethiopia, Puntland and Somaliland, remains to be seen.

5. MEAT EXPORTS

5.1 Issues in Kenya

There are three export standard abattoirs in Kenya (KMC, Farmers Choice
and Hurlingham), and there are plans to build four more through the
ALLPRO project, of which two have been tendered for Garissa and Isiolo. The
recently refurbished KMC, the oldest and the largest abattoir in Kenya, has
the capacity to throughput 1,000 head of cattle and some 2,000 shoats a day.
KMC’s supply sources include the Northeastern and Northern provinces, the
same source areas being targeted by the planned abattoirs in Garisa and
Isiolo.

19
KMC faces four major problems in running its operation:
• erratic or seasonally bound supplies (even before the Garissa and Isiolo
abattoirs become operational), particularly between August and December
when there is enough pasture in pastoral areas;
• the supply problem is exacerbated by security problems, including recent
post election conflicts;
• a pricing policy based on grades, putting KMC at a disadvantage
compared to other local abattoirs;
• financial limitations due to excessive focus on rehabilitating the plant at
Athi and its subsidiary in Mombasa, without providing for operational
costs.

At the time of the author’s visit in March 2008, KMC was slaughtering only
200 head of cattle per day and about 400 goats every two days i.e. it was
running at only around 20% capacity.

KMC uses five types of grades for cattle with a fixed price ceiling for each
grade:
• prime grade (15 mm fat) and not more than 3 years of age at 165 KSh/Kg
(USD $ 2.05) carcass weight;
• choice grade (20 mm fat) at 155 KSh/Kg (USD $ 1.94) carcass weight
• fair average quality, no age limit, with good fat cover at 142.56KSh/carcass
weight (USD $ 1.78);
• standard grade at 135 Ksh/Kg (USD $ 1.68) carcass weight (mainly from
pastoral areas);
• commercial grade or cull cows at 95 KSh/Kg (USD $ 1.19) carcass weight;
some 25% of the livestock coming from pastoral areas of Wajir and Moyale
fall into this group.

KMC effects payments five days after purchase. Each trader is required to
bring a minimum of five animals; individuals bring a minimum of 22 animals;
and farmers or ranchers a minimum of 40 head. Most ranchers (such as those
in Lakipia) do not sell to KMC because of the low price. Other ranches close to
Athi occasionally sell cattle to KMC at a price of 70 85 KSh/Kg (USD $ 0.87 –
1.05) live weight.

KMC’s major competitors are privately owned abattoirs supplying the

supermarkets and the big hotels. Many of these privately owned abattoirs pay
immediately to traders whereas KMC has to follow a process. KMC states that
the pricing policy must change and that the Grade Act needs to be revised as
it is not easy for ordinary Kenyans to attain the grade under the Act.
Unfortunately, the Board does not meet to make timely decisions as
frequently as the market dynamics change. Most animals coming from the

20
Northeast and Moyale also suffer from the poor conditions of the road and
arrive at the plant in bad shape. Traders also complain of high transport costs
and roadblocks en route to the Athi plant. The meat from such areas is
rejected in some cases. Nonetheless, KMC states that it is contributing to the
welfare of pastoralists.

KMC’s main market is Nairobi. It has licensed four franchises in Nairobi

although they don’t stock the franchises on a regular basis due to erratic
supplies. This has constrained them from opening similar franchises in other
big cities. KMC produces corned beef for the Kenyan army in a 300 gm can
(due to shortages of the standard 340 gm can) at a price of 115 KSh (USD $
1.43) per can and also supplies the Ugandan Army with 190–200 gm corned
beef. KMC plans to produce burgers, sausages and ox tongue for the local
market.

KMC exports whole carcasses to Dubai at a price of 165KSh/Kg (USD $2.0628.

They have also exported some beef to South Sudan. Negotiations have started
with Egypt, and Malaysia has agreed to import meat by air. KMC also plans
to export goat carcasses to Dubai although the type of goat carcasses required
in Dubai (small ones) are not available in bulk.

Supply problems and world meat market prices (unless they go up sharply
due to the global food shortage) will affect the performance of KMC. The two
abattoirs at Isiolo and Garissa are likely to affect the supply of cattle (however
seasonal) to KMC from Moyale and the Northeastern province leaving KMC
to rely on Taita, the Tanzanian border, and some ranches along the Mombasa
road, usually rented by Somalis. Coupled with this is the little or no margin
KMC is obtaining from its exports to Dubai. An FOB price of KSh 165/Kg
(USD $2.06) to Dubai is equivalent to what KMC pays for prime grade cattle
locally, and this is without adding the overhead costs at the plant. KMC
should look into the feasibility of making a profit by exporting meat cuts
rather than whole carcasses and should also investigate the possibility of
exporting meat to Mauritius. As a parastatal agency, KMC is besieged by
financial and management problems.

The private company Farmers Choice is mainly involved in pork processing

(a non pastoral product) for the local market with limited exports to the
Middle East and Mauritius. The main market for Hurlingham butcheries is
also the local market. There are rumors that Farmers Choice and Alpha Fine
Foods plan to build their own abattoirs (the latter is thinking instead of

28
This is less than the meat price in Nairobi.

21
renting the new abattoirs in Garissa and Isiolo)29. Whatever the case, the
companies should take stock of the supply situation, the local and world meat
market prices (unless they get premium prices for ranch animals around
Lakipia) before investing in a new abattoir. Obviously, renting out the Garissa
and Isiolo abattoirs would be the better option rather than running them as
government entities.

5.2 Issues in Ethiopia

There are some nine privately owned export abattoirs in Ethiopia30. Five of
these have been operating for the last six or seven years, exporting a weekly
average of 150 MT of goat and sheep carcasses to the Middle East. These
abattoirs are small in size with a daily throughput capacity of between 1,500
and 2000 shoats. One or two of them also have some capacity for slaughtering
cattle and occasionally they export beef to some African countries by air.
These abattoirs also face seasonal supply shortages. High transport costs and
inaccessibility to some surplus areas in the country also contribute to
shortages of supplies.

There are three new abattoirs under construction (one is near completion)
with capacities to slaughter both cattle and shoats, and they include facilities
for vacuum packaging. One of these anticipates exporting beef to Dubai
shortly. It will take a year or two for the other two abattoirs to start operation.

Whether these abattoirs will be competitive to export beef carcasses remains

to be seen given the ever escalating price of meat in the local market. In
Addis, the price of meat varies between $4/kg and $6/kg, which is far above
the world market price and is likely to impact the performance of these
abattoirs. Whether this price hike is due to supply shortages or is the result of
a cartel type control needs to be assessed in view of the abundant livestock
resources in the country. Meanwhile, the abattoirs may benefit by switching
to sea freight (for vacuum packed meat) given they meet the stringent
logistical requirements. On the other hand, the currently operational abattoirs
(plus the ones under construction) are capable of catering for the current
volume of livestock supplies except in the Eastern parts of the country, where
an abattoir in Jigjiga could provide a market for supplies from the Somali
region.

29
Personal communication with Alpha Fine Foods manager.
30
Excluding the old government-owned four industrial abattoirs sold to the Midroc Group, which are
more or less obsolete.

22
 Carcasses for export from one of the private abattoirs in Ethiopia

6. LIVE ANIMAL EXPORTS

Kenya exported live animals to the Middle East in the 1980s31. However,
beginning in the 1990’s, its live animal export business declined significantly.
About five or six years ago, some camels were exported to Egypt and recent
trends include an irregular export of small numbers of cattle (uncastrated) to
Mauritius32. Mauritius also imports beef and lamb carcasses from other
sources, and this provides an opportunity for Kenya to diversify into that
meat market as well.

In relative terms, Ethiopia has been exporting large numbers of animals

(about 150,000 per annum) consisting of camels, cattle and shoats to Yemen,
Jordan, Egypt and other destinations through Djibouti. The official export
figure is insignificant compared to the volume of informal exports that take
place through cross border trade to Sudan, Kenya, Somalia and Djibouti.33

In any case, the potential to increase live animal exports from Ethiopia or
Kenya is constrained by a number of internal weaknesses varying from poor
infrastructure to SPS standards and the recurrent ban imposed by the
importing countries of the Middle East. On the other hand, both countries
need to realize that, for a number of reasons, their future potential lies in
expanding meat exports. First, live animal trade is by and large limited to one
species – sheep (during the Haj season, which is time bound), and the market
potential for other species (cattle, camel, goats) is limited. Second, the

31
Largely due to the effort of one exporter, Idrisii.
32
About 8,000 head of cattle in 2006/7.
33
The cross-border trade deprives Ethiopia from accessing export revenues – the reason why Ethiopian
authorities are not keen on cross-border trade.

23
increasingly stringent SPS requirements for live animal exports go way
beyond the prevailing standards in Ethiopia and Kenya to access lucrative
markets. Third, less stringent meat export requirements can be met easily
with the added benefits of value adding and employment creation. There is
also a remote possibility of entering into lucrative export markets as and
when the ‘commodity based certification system’ is ratified by the OIE
sometime in the future. The bottom line is that although the export of live
animals can be continued as the situation permits, the strategic focus should
be on expanding meat exports, notwithstanding the prevailing logistical
difficulties and SPS standards, for better economic and financial returns.

Kenyan bulls in a feedlot in Mauritius, mainly fed on baggas

7. MARKET STRATIFICATION

Kenya’s market stratification system is largely ranch based. According to the

Range Management Division of the MoARD, there were 454 ranches in Kenya
as of December 2000. Of these:
• 321 were group ranches;
• 84 were private company ranches;
• 27 were district agricultural company ranches;
• 17 were cooperative ranches;
• while three and two were Agricultural Development Corporation
(ADC) and Public Company ranches respectively.

Of the above, in 2000:

• 77 were dormant;
• 84 were operational;
• 2 were newly proposed;
• 106 were sub divided;
• 109 were to be sub divided;

24
 • 76 were of unidentified status.

Most of the sub divided ranches belong to the category of group ranches. A
good proportion of company and cooperative ranches are still functional
albeit with varying degrees of success. Many of the company and some of the
cooperative ranches have diversified into eco tourism as well. Company
ranches use, own or purchase stocks from pastoral areas for value adding and
usually sell the animals to high end local markets (high class butcheries, big
hotels etc.). Cooperative ranches usually rent out the ranches to livestock
traders (mainly Somalis) who move in immature male animals at 120–150 kg
live weight and finish them at about 300 to 320 Kg live weight in a period of
some six months. These traders graze their animals on free range in the
ranches while company ranches and dairy farmers rely on concentrates and
other feed formulae. Feedlot operations are rare in Kenya.

By contrast, market stratification in Ethiopia is largely feedlot based. There

are some 200 feedlots scattered within a radius of 250 km of Addis which
manage between 100 and 500 head of cattle at a given time. Feedlot operators
source cattle mainly from pastoral areas and feed them on concentrate and
roughage for a period of three to four months, recording an average weight
gain of 1 Kg or more per day. Finished animals are sold largely to live animal
exporters and in some cases to high end local markets. Quite recently, feedlot
operators became involved in commercial de stocking in times of drought in
pastoral areas, attracted by the high profit margins that can be made in a
relatively short time by feeding drought stricken animals. PLI played a
pivotal role in initiating this approach which is now endorsed by the
government (Abebe et al., 2008). Unlike Kenya, Ethiopia has fewer ranches
that remain dormant. Some of these are sub divided for other uses.

Escalating feed costs, in view of rising fuel and grain prices, remain major
impediments to value adding for livestock. In Ethiopia, the average cost of
feed (fattening ration) has risen from Birr 8 to Birr 20/day (USD $0.93 – 2.08)
per head in the feedlots, and transport costs from Central Ethiopia to Moyale
have recently exceeded actual feed costs by some 45%. A study on livestock
feed also shows that 80% of the traditional feed provided to cattle at the
smallholder level (in farming communities) is used for body maintenance
only (Tolera, 2007). In Kenya, the MoARD estimates that between 60% and
80% of the costs associated with animal production go to the purchase of
feeds.

Most of the processed feed types in Kenya and Ethiopia depend largely on
food crop grains and residues that are primarily produced for human
consumption, thereby resulting in increases in feed prices as food prices rise.

25
The absence of large scale fodder production, despite the potential in both
countries (through irrigation schemes, for example), has contributed to the
perpetual dependency on food crops for livestock use. In addition, the export
of oil crops (particularly from Ethiopia) and the use of crop residues for other
purposes (for construction of huts, fences etc) hinders the full exploitation of
available resources at hand. The problem is compounded by shrinkage of
communal grazing areas in mixed farming systems and the lack of tradition
by smallholders to grow fodder alongside food crops.

Under the current mode of production, livestock cannot easily be fattened

pastoral areas, at least to a level required by some high end markets.
However, riverine areas along the Tana, Dawa, Ganale, Shebelle, Awash and
Omo Rivers are capable of supporting irrigated fodder production not only to
enhance feed availability but also to encourage a more extensive shift towards
market orientation. Because supplementary or alternative types of feed
(except natural pasture) are not available in pastoral areas, NGOs have
increasingly begun to transport feed (hay bales, concentrates, pellets etc) to
pastoral areas to save core breeding herds in times of drought. Such
interventions have, inadvertently, exposed pastoralists to alternative types of
feeds other than natural pasture and many have been noted as willing to buy
such feeds— at least in times of drought (Bekele and Tsehay, 2008). This
exposure may ultimately lead them to providing supplementary feeds to their
livestock even in normal times creating the possibility that they may, in time,
switch to a more market driven mode of production.

Given the current status of feed availability, value adding may not be that
feasible in pastoral areas in the short term. However, there is a great
opportunity for stratification wherein immatures or young steers from
pastoral areas could be finished by small farmers in high potential areas. This
could be done through stall feeding/zero grazing only or in combination with
natural grazing where the situation permits34. Small farmers in both the
highlands of Hararghe and Wolayta in Ethiopia and in the Central highlands
of Kenya are used to this practice. Financial constraints limit the number of
immatures and/or the amount of supplementary feed that they can buy.
Therefore, they operate under limited capacity, in most cases handling one
head of cattle at a time. Complementing the income of small farmers through
livestock value adding while providing market opportunities for pastoralists
(through the purchase of steers) could contribute immensely to poverty
alleviation goals. Many small farmers in Ethiopia were beneficiaries of such a
scheme under the Third Livestock Development Project where steers

34
Potential feed sources in smallholder areas include grain stalks, cane tops, sweet potato and other
root crop vines, vegetables, alfalfa and fodder beet (if cultivated) in addition to supplementary feed.

26
purchased from lowland areas were distributed on loan to highland farmers
for finishing. The loan and the interest were repaid to the project upon selling
the finished animals35. Unfortunately, the programme was phased out with
the project despite the success of the scheme.

Farmer taking stall fed bulls to market in Western Ethiopia

The significance of developing the feeds industry can not be over emphasized
in light of the recent drive to maximize returns from the livestock sector
through export revenues and/or domestic marketing. Given the genetic make
up of the livestock species found in both countries, noted for enduring
hardship but not for productivity, competing in international markets without
adequate feed and health provisions is not likely to pay off. Not surprisingly,
the authorities in both countries understand the limitations imposed on
livestock productivity arising from feed shortages and rising costs.

The Kenyan policy document goes into some detail in assessing the situation
of feed quality, availability and affordability in the country. It states that ‘the
greatest proportion of diet for ruminants is roughages that includes grass and
browse…with minimal supplementation of concentrates and minerals in low
rainfall areas, where extensive livestock keeping is practiced, whereas
concentrates make a significant proportion of the livestock diet in high rainfall
areas.’ It acknowledges that feed quality and quantity is affected by the
‘seasonality of raw material supplies (maize, wheat, barley, millet, legumes
etc.) coupled with an inconsistent supply of imported ingredients such as
oilseed cakes, meals and minerals plus sub standard processing, handling and

35
The ‘stalker-feeder’ programme, as it was known then, provided steers on loan to thousands of small
farmers in the then Sidamo, Bale and Hararghe provinces for finishing. Farmers were insured for cattle
deaths occurring due to causes beyond their control, which had to be substantiated.

27
storage of mixed feeds’. The high cost of ingredients, lack of standardization
and poor training of feed manufacturers also contributes to the low quality of
feed. It is reported that ‘Napier grass, the fodder crop of choice in high and
medium potential areas, is threatened with Napier Smut and Napier
stunting’.

The MoLFD policy document aims at improving feed quality, quantity and
availability through a series of measures. These include:
• diversification of the feed base through the use of alternative sources of
both energy and protein requirements;
• encouraging cooperatives and similar societies to establish feed mills;
• taking the necessary measures to standardize feed ingredients and
feeds for all classes of livestock;
• putting in place the necessary institutional framework to ensure the
production and marketing of quality feeds through a review of the
existing Fertilizer and Animal Foodstuffs Act to allow for a separate
Animal Foodstuffs Act;
• establishing an Animal Feed Inspectorate Service to ensure that
standards are met and to safeguard consumers from hazardous/poor
quality feeds;
• identifying a wide range of forage types for various agro ecological
zones; and,
• fodder and pasture conservation in the rangelands including
promoting sound range management practices with ASAL
communities.

The Ethiopian five year plan foresees increased forage production through
the distribution of seeds, forage plants and cuts, improvement of natural
pasture through bush clearing, construction of molasses depots in strategic
locations and the establishment of forage banks. As a five year plan, the
document does not give a detailed assessment of the current shortcomings
affecting feed quality, availability and affordability. More importantly, it does
not address issues related to institutional framework as regards
standardization, quality control and inspections, perhaps, this being the
mandate of MoARD.

However, a comprehensive assessment was made by the Texas SPS LMM

program regarding feed quality, quantity and availability in Ethiopia (Tolera,
2007). The assessment findings are similar to those of Kenya – such as the
seasonality of supplies, high cost of raw materials, the use of natural pasture
in traditional production systems and more use of concentrates in feedlots
and high potential areas. Specific factors contributing to feed supply
shortages in Ethiopia include the export of oil crops (without value adding –

28
reducing a huge potential to produce oil seed cakes) and livestock feed (which
has been recently banned). Meanwhile, the SPS LMM program has
formulated a cost effective ration system for feedlots. On the other hand,
Ethiopia needs to learn from Kenya when setting up the institutional
framework that promotes, guides and regulates the feed industry. In
conclusion, both countries need to attract and support potential investors in
feed production and processing while providing support to small holders to
produce quality feed.

8. COMMERCIAL PRODUCTION AND BREEDING ISSUES

Both countries rely largely on surplus pastoral areas for meat and live animal
exports despite the inherent low productivity of livestock breeds found in
such areas. For example, it usually takes five to seven years to reach a live
weight of 300–350 kg (even for the much coveted Boran bull) if fed on natural
pasture under normal conditions. If it were not for the pastoral production
system that does not necessarily take into account the production costs of
labor, pasture and water, the competitiveness (profitability) of such animals
(or their products) in international markets would become questionable.
Basically, both countries aim to compete in international markets against
sophisticated commercial producers (of Brazil, Argentina and the like) while
relying on a subsistent production system and cattle breeds that are not so
productive. This is not to understate the specific merits of drought and
disease tolerance inherent in such breeds. It is rather to suggest the
possibilities of combining such merits with productivity. The ‘improved
Boran’ bull, bred in Kenyan ranches, is not common in the pastoral areas of
Kenya or Ethiopia whereas it is common in Australian and Texas ranches. The
‘Beef Master’ breed introduced from Texas to Southern Africa close to a
hundred years ago is already indigenized and capable of reaching a live
weight of 700 800 Kg in a space of four years on natural pasture alone36. This
breed performs well even under the harshest conditions in Botswana and
Namibia and provides most of the meat exported to Europe. If it performs
well in a relatively shorter time in Botswana and Namibia under less
favourable conditions than Kenya or Ethiopia, then the introduction of such
breeds is worth considering. For that matter, the Baggara cattle and Saharawi
sheep of Western Sudan are much more productive, even under extreme
conditions, compared to their equivalents in the Horn.

Basically, the concern for genetic conservation is understandable, but it makes

sense if the conservation process is aimed at keeping the desired
characteristics/traits of indigenous animals while increasing their

36
Interview with Botswana ranchers.

29
productivity. Genetic preservation for the sake of preservation alone may be
important for maintaining biodiversity but does not necessarily guarantee
profitability. Regardless, the preservation process can be maintained in situ
with the collaboration of government and communities. However, this should
not preclude the importation of improved breeds even for the pastoral
production system if they are capable of performing under the prevailing
local situations. Such breeds can be managed in isolation to preserve local
genetic resources. Competing in international markets necessitates improving
outputs per whatever unit of measurement for cost effectiveness. Lessons
should be drawn from Botswana and Namibia.

Of note, export abattoirs are facing supply shortages (especially of shoats)

from time to time. This is understandable, given the current pastoral mode of
production where the motive for selling livestock is prompted by immediate
cash needs rather than profit, and where the flow of livestock to terminal
abattoirs is constrained by the lengthy process of purchasing, collecting and
assembling livestock from individuals. Besides market inefficiency and the
reluctance of herders to sell marketable animals in one go, supply levels are
affected by a high level of abortion and mortality rates in the pastoral
production system. Bekele’s (2006) findings in the Dolo area (close to the
Mandera border on the Ethiopian side) establishes an abortion rate of 12.5%
for camels, 8.5% for cattle, 27% for goats and 9% for sheep. Mortality rates for
the same area were found to be 12% for camels, 14.5% for cattle, 10% for goats
and 20% for sheep. Coupled with supply anomalies caused by drought,
floods, RVF, FMD and the like under the existing production system, it is
perhaps time to consider ways of increasing productivity per livestock unit
through the importation of appropriate and adaptable breeds. However,
given the lower disease resistance of such breeds, there is the need for
simultaneous strengthening of preventive and clinical services. After all, this
has been achieved, through public and private veterinary service providers,
for the vibrant dairy industry in Kenya, consisting of some 3 million dairy
animals. Extending similar services to pastoral areas should therefore be
possible with a little extra effort.

The Kenyan policy document puts emphasis on preserving genetic resources

while recognizing the fact that valuable genes contained in local breeds have
neither been identified nor have their characteristics been documented. The
document cites past efforts in which the focus has been on up grading
indigenous animals towards exotic western breeds resulting in the loss of
original genetic material, particularly in the poultry sector. As a result, the
policy objective states that it is necessary to formulate superior breeding
programs for indigenous animals. The MoLFD believes in the necessity of a
regulatory framework for a centrally managed and coordinated breeding

30
strategy. At the moment, decisions on ‘what animals are to parent future
animals’ are taken by many actors (farmers, pastoralists, CBOs, NGOs, Breed
Associations and the government). This regulatory framework will allow a
‘central organization to formulate appropriate policy and legal framework,
encourage others to invest in breeding services, support the Kenya livestock
breeders associations, encourage farmers in progeny testing and serve as the
national focal point to co ordinate animal genetic resources’. However, this
stance on preserving domestic genetic resources understates the immense
benefits Kenya gained as a major producer of surplus milk in the region
through the cross breeding of dairy herds. A balance has to be kept between
preserving genetic resources and making economic gains through the
introduction of productive breeds. Ethiopia’s breeding program is limited to
dairy herds and poultry and the preservation of Boran breeds. There are no
indications with regard to improving beef breeds either from local sources or
through imports from abroad.

9. PROVISION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES TO PASTORAL AREAS

Poor financial services, including the provision of credit, are commonly

regarded as a major impediment both to the development of pastoral areas in
general and livestock marketing in particular. This assertion is usually made
on the assumption that pastoral communities have no access to credit or other
forms of financial services. While this remains a fact, it is unlikely that
pastoral communities (i.e. full time herders) are keen to access such services.
To begin with, pastoralists operate on a moving capital base (livestock) and
returns from livestock reproduction are far greater than bank interest rates
(except in drought and other hazardous times). Put simply, it does not make
sense for a pastoral household to save cash in a bank and less so to take a loan
with interest attached. The fact that full time herders rely entirely on brokers
(kinsmen in towns) even in simple transactions involving the sale of animals
indicates that they are not yet ready to use the complicated services of
financial institutions. The mode of their production system, which relies on
mobility away from major settlement centers, also does not make them
accessible to use such services for most parts of the year.

This is not to say that credit provision is not at all necessary in pastoral areas.
There are those who can benefit from the provision of such services, but they
are not necessarily full time herders. Making a distinction between the two
groups is necessary before devising an appropriate strategy. Those who have
moved out of pastoralism, and now reside in major settlements or who
require alternative or complementary livelihoods, may require cash
provisions to set up petty trades involving service provisions, commodity
trade, value adding or other income generating activities. Women headed

31
households, unemployed youth and other specific groups residing in or close
to major settlements may require this type of support. Even in such cases, the
apparent differences within and between different pastoral areas and groups
in terms of business opportunities and local business acumen should be taken
into account. For example, the prospect of setting up viable and diversified
small businesses is better in Somali inhabited areas than, for example, in
Turkana or Afar.

So far, credit provisions in the ASAL areas of both countries have been
limited to savings and credit groups mainly through NGOs and micro credit
institutions such as K REP (which pulled out recently from Northern Kenya).
Apparently, there exist limited opportunities for setting up diversified small
scale businesses in pastoral areas because of low purchasing power, limited
‘wants’ of the pastoral population that adheres to a simple way of life and the
general lack of development. As a result, NGOs involved in micro credit
programs disburse loans for too many groups engaged in the same kind of
business activities within the same locality or market shed. For example, too
many livestock marketing groups or cooperatives were formed in the same
market shed in Southern Ethiopia resulting in diminished profit levels and
causing many of these groups to move out of livestock marketing business
altogether. Part of the problem stems from the NGO staff having no business
skills themselves to guide such groups and partly from too many NGOs
jumping on the band wagon with little or no cooperation between them.
Businesses can only be viable if they reach a volume of transaction that
enables them to generate profits, regardless of their market share. Where the
business volume is high, firms can stay in business even with smaller market
shares. Where the volume is low, as in pastoral areas, a firm needs to capture
a higher market share to stay in business. Too many firms providing similar
services to a limited number of clientele will not survive. Where business
opportunities are limited for diversification, lending institutions or NGOs
should limit their support to fewer groups to enable them to stay in business.
In the end, it is the number of viable businesses that should count rather than
the number of loanees or business entities to whom loans have been
disbursed.

Within pastoral areas, the group that seeks relatively significant loan
provision is live animal (and other major commodity) traders. With few
exceptions, small and big scale live animal traders operate generally without
access to credit provisions. The trust based livestock transaction system,
common in the ASAL regions of both countries, in which immediate cash
payment is deferred until animals are sold in terminal markets, stems mainly
from the shortage of working capital although the savvy nature of livestock
traders in passing the risk to the primary producer or the middleman can’t be

32
ruled out. In such a system, it is the herder who finances the big trader
through intermediaries where no interest is charged for delayed payments.
More importantly, there are times when primary producers and the
middlemen in the chain fail to receive payments because the big traders have
gone bankrupt or defaulted for any number of reasons.

Conventional banks do not regard livestock as equitable assets. This

necessitates a non conventional banking system for pastoral areas with a
proviso for accommodation to those requiring relatively larger amounts of
loans (such as livestock traders, feedlot operators, ranchers etc). In Sudan, the
‘Livestock Resources Bank’ caters specifically to livestock traders and
exporters by providing them with short term working capital loans on a
‘profit sharing’ basis – a system that has not been tried in Kenya or Ethiopia
but which can be explored.

Perhaps, the biggest obstacle for expanding credit provisions in pastoral areas
is the lack of collateral. The lifestyle of the population residing or trading in
pastoral systems does not provide the kind of conventional collateral (such as
properties) lending institutions are used to (save for few exceptions in major
settlement areas). However, this does not mean that all trade, and in
particular livestock trade, is transacted on strictly cash terms. Most livestock
transactions take place in a clan or kinship based trust system. As is the case
with conventional banks, defaults also occur in the ‘trust lending’ system for
various reasons. Despite such occasional hiccups, however, the system is
routinely practiced which implies that the system functions more or less well
since the kinship or clan based guarantee serves as collateral. A proper
understanding of this system is critical when designing a kinship or clan
based banking system for pastoral areas as an option to the conventional
system.

Alternatively, financial institutions that insist on conventional collateral could

employ the ‘reverse value chain approach’. This approach entails providing
loans to operators at the higher end of the value chain – such as live animal
and meat exporters, processors, ranchers, feedlot operators, wholesalers etc.,
who would in turn disburse the loans to their suppliers in pastoral areas. The
advantage in this system is that borrowers at this level of the value chain are
capable of providing the required collateral for the banks and are responsible
for the loans they disburse to their suppliers (whether on kinship or purely
business relationships). The disadvantages lie in the control that high value
operators could exert on small scale suppliers and the possibility of diverting
loans to businesses not related to pastoral areas. This may necessitate having a
proper control mechanism in place. Regardless, this option is worth
considering as an alternative to the current impasse.

33
The CARE–Equity Bank partnership in Kenya, in this regard, is an attempt to
provide a non conventional banking service for pastoral areas following
which the latter has set up a branch office in Garissa. The Bank provides three
kinds of services:
• a savings component in which no minimum balance is required to
open an account, no limit is placed on withdrawals and no overhead
costs and ledger fees are applied in order to encourage the culture of
saving among the pastoral population;
• a credit component, for pastoral producer groups (PPGs) engaged in
livestock fattening or in an export business provides loans to a
maximum amount of 5 million (USD $62,500) at a 1% commission per
month (the term commission is used to comply with Sharia Law),
repayable within a year. The bank is also exploring a combination of
non conventional collateral in which local Sheiks and community
leaders could serve as guarantors, using the trade herd as collateral
and evaluating the customer’s reputation through word of mouth and
other means. KMC’s invoices will also enable PPGs to get loans from
the Bank;
• the third component of the service is aimed at improving and
strengthening the value chain, in which CARE, as a partner, will play a
role in identifying Pastoral Producers Groups (PPGs), training them in
financial management and animal husbandry and linking the PPGs to
the KMC and other exporters through the KLMC.

The Bank’s seemingly risky venture is cushioned by the guarantee provided

by CARE to counter any losses incurred. Regardless, this initiative could
serve as a ‘lesson learning’ experience to refine methodologies in the future,
not only in Kenya but also in Ethiopia. The Bank should also explore the
possibility of operating on a ‘profit sharing’ basis as Muslim communities do
not endorse interest on loans (even with the euphemism ‘commission’). One
hopes that the credit scheme also covers livestock traders in addition to PPGs.

No similar scheme exists in Ethiopia for pastoral areas. Agencies like VOCA
have been forming pastoral livestock marketing groups in some areas but
without the proviso to support them financially through credit provision,
assuming that such cooperatives should qualify for loans from mainstream
banks. The few banks that operate in pastoral areas apply conventional
conditions of lending and, therefore, are not in a position to provide financial
services to pastoral marketing groups. Efforts in the past include the
provision of grants to pastoral livestock marketing groups by other agencies
(AU IBAR, PARIMA) and linking these groups with exporters – an initiative
that prompted meat exporters to open purchasing offices in pastoral areas.

34
The initial success of the pastoral marketing groups was later compromised
by the formation of additional marketing cooperatives by other agencies in
the same market sheds.

10. CROSS BORDER TRADE

The flow of livestock through cross border trade between the two countries is
one dimensional i.e. from Ethiopia to Kenya, although small shoats (weighing
less than 30 kgs) are traded in the reverse direction in limited cases. Many
expect this trade to flourish on the basis of better price offers in Kenya.
Although this could have been the case in the past, livestock and meat prices
have been substantially higher in Ethiopia during the last three years, and yet
the cross border trade continues to favor Kenya. This happens because most
of the domestic beef demand in Ethiopia is met with supplies from the
highlands; therefore, due to the absence of large scale beef exports from the
country, pastoral livestock are sold across the border. Of note, full time
herders do not choose between markets on the basis of better price offers.
What influences their decision is market proximity and the reliance on
brokers they know (due to kinship). Similarly, the availability of essential
commodities, including grain, also leverages decisions concerning where to
sell animals. For example, a recent study shows that the cross border
importation of maize for the first time from Kenya to Southern Ethiopia has
increased the level of livestock flow towards Kenya37. The choice of markets
on the basis of price is done by livestock traders and, to some extent, at the
broker level (those operating across borders).

Apparently, the governments of Kenya and Ethiopia have differing views

regarding the cross border livestock trade. Kenya views it as an essential
trade for obvious reasons: it helps meet the local meat demand, allows the
importation of animals with no foreign exchange payments, and generates
local revenue and possibly foreign exchange as well through exports.
Ethiopia’s differing position comes from the loss of local and foreign
exchange revenues given the fact that all imports from Kenya are transacted
through hard currency. This stance has prompted border officials, on rare
occasions, to control the flow of trade herds across the border but not on the
scale exaggerated by some advocacy groups and NGOs (of continuous
harassment of pastoralists). That the trade is going on smoothly for most of
the year indicates that the border control measures are temporary in nature.
Yet, livestock traders are even more harassed in Kenya when obtaining

37
Bekele and Aklilu (2007) Participatory Impact Assessment of New Livestock Markets in Oromia,
Somali and Afar Regions, Feinstein International Center (draft).

35
essential movement permits and at numerous police manned checkpoints en
route to terminal markets.

So far, the cross border trade has been functioning without major
interruption. In view of the parallel stance, however, a formal agreement
between the two countries is necessary to ensure its continuity and eliminate
potential disruptions in the future. Such an agreement is also necessary for
collaboration on animal health related issues, for instance, in terms of
conducting joint vaccination operations across the border, without which,
efforts taken by only one country may not materialize. One case, in this
regard, is Kenya’s decision to vaccinate against RVF whereas Ethiopia
engages in active surveillance. Such differing positions in a porous common
border area are incompatible and undermine unilateral efforts. This is also
true for the disease Peste des petis ruminants, as vaccination campaigns in
both countries take place without any coordination and at different times.
Having a long common border necessitates tackling cross border issues
through joint efforts and in this regard COMESA, IGAD or AU/IBAR could
play a significant coordinating role. Alternatively, either Ethiopia or Kenya
could take the initiative to expand the mandate of the Ethio Kenya Border
Commission to incorporate such pertinent livelihood issues.

11. CONCLUSIONS

Compared to the 1990s both Governments are increasingly realizing the

potentials of pastoral livestock resources. To some extent, this is reflected in
new allocations of resources (e.g. DFZs in Kenya and quarantine stations in
Ethiopia) and in the restructuring of relevant government institutions as each
country sees fit (e.g. MoLFD in Kenya and APHRD in Ethiopia). Initiatives for
new (or amendment of existing) Acts and Guidelines also indicate the
growing interest in livestock marketing. Private investments in feedlots,
ranches, abattoirs and live animal trade signify the confidence of investors in
the sector.

The strategies designed to achieve set objectives are more or less similar in
both countries, although there are apparent differences owing to variations in
natural and physical resources, value adding modalities, priority setting, etc.
The ultimate goal of both countries, however, remains in increasing value
added exports (mainly meat products) rather than live animals. This is an
appropriate direction that should ultimately result in the strengthening of the
livestock sector in both countries.

The tasks required to achieve the ultimate objective are varied but could be
summarized into two main categories. The first involves establishing and

36
maintaining a credible SPS system through robust veterinary systems
consisting of both public and private service providers. However, setting up
such a system not only requires additional resources but also the enabling
policy environment for the practical application of all rules and regulations
that need to be observed. It should be noted that neither can work in isolation.
The second category involves streamlining the efficiency of the marketing
system from production to consumption and / or export levels. The tasks to be
carried out in this category are numerous: market oriented production;
infrastructure and communications; finance provision; market information
and intelligence; availing appropriate products in a timely fashion; packaging,
labeling; market promotion, and so on. Obviously, all these tasks can not be
met in one go but rather through phases and/or stages. This should, however,
begin with an understanding of what the market demands and working in the
‘reverse value chain’ order to improve efficiency through a top down
approach. Of note, this strategy is the precursor for economy of scale.

On the surface, it may appear that the two countries are competing against
each other. To an extent, this could be true given the similarity of products in
question, target export destinations, and the sourcing of livestock from a
common porous border. In reality, both countries have not yet scratched the
surface of their potential capacities. In any case, the volume of the meat
demand in the Middle East and Africa is adequate to accommodate more than
the combined exports of both countries. At this particular stage they have
stronger commonalities when it comes to controlling transboundary diseases,
streamlining cross border livestock trade, and preventing cattle theft and
banditry. This fact underlines the need for collaborative efforts for solving the
common problems along the border areas of the two countries.

37
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Institutes visited for interviews (various dates): DVS (Kenya and Ethiopia); Equity Bank;
KLMC; KMC; KMC Board; LIPFund, CARE; Live Animals Exporters Association; Meat
Exporters Association; MoLFD; other export abattoirs.

38