General Defence of Inevitable Accident

MEANING AND DEFINITION

An inevitable accident or unavoidable accident is that which could not be possibly prevented by the exercise of ordinary care, caution and skill. It does not apply to anything which either party might have avoided. Inevitable accident was defined by Sir rederick !ollock as an accident not avoidable by any such precautions as a reasonable man, doing such an act then there, could be expected to take. It does not mean a catastrophe which could not have been avoided by any precaution whatever, but such as could not have been avoided by a reasonable man at the moment at which it occurred, and it is common knowledge that a reasonable man is not credited by the law with perfection of "udgment. As observed by #reene $.%., an accident isone out of the ordinary course of things, something so unusual as not to be looked for by a person of ordinary prudence. All causes of inevitable accident may be divided into & classes' (hose which are occasioned by the elementary forces of nature unconnected with the agency of man or other cause (hose which have their origin either in the whole or in part in the agency of man, whether in acts of commission or omission, nonfeasance, or in any other causes independent of the agency of natural forces. (he term Act of #od is applicable to the former class.

or example, in Stanley vs Powell 18 1, the plaintiff and the defendant were members of a shooting party. (he defendant shot a bird but the bulled ricocheted off a tree and hit the plaintiff. (he defendant was not held liable because it was an accident and the defendant did not intent it and could neither have prevented it.

O!IGIN AND "ISTO!I#A$ E%O$&TION OF INE%ITA'$E A##IDENT

In the pre nineteenth century cases, the defence of inevitable accident used to be essentially relevant in actions for trespass when the old rule was that even a faultless trespassery contact was actionable, unless the defendant could show that the accident was inevitable. It was for long thought that the burden of proof in trespass upon the person rested with the defendant and that trespass, therefore, offered scope to the defence of inevitable accident, but it has now been held that here too the burden is with the claimant. In trespass as well as in negligence, therefore, inevitable accident has no place. In these cases inevitable accident is irrelevant because the burden is on the claimant to establish the defendant)s negligence, but it does not follow that that it is any more relevant if the claimant has no such burden. (he emerging conception of inevitability can be seen most clearly in *hitelock v. *herwell +,- .mory /.0. 121, !g 345678, the bolting horse case from 5-9:. (he complaint in *hitelock was unusual because the plaintiff, rather than "ust reciting that the defendant had hit him with force and arms, also alleged that the defendant had ;controlled the horse so negligently and improvidently; that it knocked him down. (he defendant conceded that the horse had knocked down the plaintiff, but pleaded that the plaintiff<s fall was ;against the will; of the defendant. (he defendant went on to explain that he had hired the horse without notice of its bad habits, that it ran

away with him as soon as he mounted it, and that he ;could in no way stop the horse; although he ;used all his strength and power to control; it. It was a plea of inevitable accident in a case of latent defect 3the horse is a ;bolter;7. (he collision may have been inevitable, but it had become inevitable by virtue of the defendant<s negligence, and was thus not held to be an accident. (he first explicit statement that a defendant can escape liability in trespass if the accident was inevitable occurs in *eaver v.*ard, decided in 5454. (he category ;inevitable accident; was understood, in its inception as distinguished from the defence of ;accident,; or ;mischance,; which was available in felony but not in trespass, and which was a true no=negligence defence. (he defendant in *eaver inadvertently shot the plaintiff when his musket discharged while their company of soldiers was skirmishing with another band. (he defendant pleaded that he ;accidentally and by misfortune and against his will, in discharging his musket, in"ured and wounded the plaintiff> which wounding is the same trespass of which the plaintiff complains.; Substantively, this was a plea of accident. (he plaintiff demurred, and the court held the defendant<s plea bad. In trespass, the plaintiff needed only to allege that the defendant had done harm with force and arms, rather than done harm negligently. In actions on the case, however, allegations of negligence seem always to have been necessary. In property damage cases involving heavy weather, where there was typically a presumption of fault against the moving vessel, and the vessel owner<s efforts to rebut liability take the inevitable accident form. (he inevitable accident defence was typically invoked when a vessel, caught in the full force of a storm, has been driven against another vessel or vessels, or against a fixed structure. !roperty damage cases also involved destruction by fire. In (ucker v. Smith 35-197, the defendant said simply that his house ;caught fire by mischance and was burned down so that the fire there from being blown by the wind to +plaintiff<s8 house; burned it ;by mischance.; It can be ?uite as impractical to

stop an ordinary wind from spreading fire as a tempest. (he plaintiff therefore elected to "oin issue on how the fire started rather than how it spread. @is special traverse claimed that the defendants burned the house ;of their own wrong and by their fault; and denied that it ;was burned down by mischance.; In .llis v. Angwy 35-967, the defendant pleaded that unknown to him and ;against his will, a fire suddenly arose by mischance; in his house, and was spread by ;a great gust of wind; to the plaintiff<s houses. (he plea says nothing about what the defendant did to prevent the fire from arising or spreading. (he act of #od was thus incorporated 3though not by that name7 in a plea of accident to show that the harm was inevitable. (he last pre=nineteenth century case that directly deals with how inevitable accident should be pleaded is #ibbons v. !epper+5-8. (he defendant pleaded that his horse became frightened and ;ran away with him so that he could not stop the horse,; that the plaintiff ignored his warning ;to take care,; and that the horse thus ran over the plaintiff ;against the will of the defendant.; In substance, this was a plea of inevitable accident. #ibbons thus holds that inevitable accident should be raised by pleading the general issue when the substantive nature of the plea amounts to a complete denial of causal responsibility. (he #ibbons court put the ;runaway horse; on a par with the hypothetical case of A using A<s hand to strike B, and treated both as denials. In $itchell v. Allestry 354247, the plaintiff was run over by two untamed horses the defendants were breaking in a public s?uare. (he plaintiff initially brought an action claiming that the defendants ;did negligently permit; the horses to run over her. Aut at the first trial ;the evidence as to the negligence; went against the plaintiff, and she was non=suited. She then brought a second suit, in which, as counsel for the defendant said, her ;own declaration excused; the defendants of that ;negligence,; because it said ;that on account of their ferocity they could not govern them, but that they did run upon her.; (he first suit failed because

the evidence=given that the plaintiff did not challenge the defendants< antecedent decision to break horses in a public s?uare=showed that the harm was both accidental and inevitable. (he court 3@ale, B.A.7 pointed out, however, that the plaintiff could sue again on a different theory. (his accordingly illustrates the way in which some decisions about precautions were governed only by accident, while others were also governed by inevitability. In the Citro #lycerine case, the defendants, a firm of carriers, received a wooden case to be carried to its destination and its contents were not communicated. It was found that the contents were leaking. (he case was taken to the defendants) office, which they had rented from the plaintiff and the defendants proceeded to open the case for examination but the nitro glycerine which was present had already exploded. All present were killed and the building was badly damaged. (he defendants were held not liable in the absence of reasonable ground of suspicion, the contents of the package offered them for carriage and that, they were without such knowledge in fact and without negligence. In the case of @olmes v. $ather, the defendant)s horses while being driven by his servant on a public highway ran away from a barking dog and became unmanageable that the servant could not stop them, but could, to some extent guide them. *hile trying to turn a corner safely, they knocked down and in"ured the plaintiff on the highway. It was held that the action was not maintainable since the servant had done his best under the circumstances. In the case of ardon v.@arcourt=%ivington the defendant parked his saloon motor car in a street and left his dog inside. (he dog has always been ?uiet and docile. As the plaintiff was walking past the car, the dog started "umping about in the car, smashed a glass panel, and a splinter entered into the plaintiff)s left eye which had to be removed. Sir rederick !ollock said' !eople must guard against reasonable probabilities but they are not bound to guard against fantastic possibilities+5:8 In the absence of negligence, the plaintiff could not recover

damages. In the case of Arown v. Dendal, the plaintiff)s and defendants dogs were fighting. (he defendant was hitting the dogs to stop them from fighting while the plaintiff was standing at a distance watching them. Accidentally, the stick hit and hurt the plaintiff)s eye. In an action for damages it was held that the defendant would not be liable since the damage was the result of a pure accident and not the negligence of the defendant.

(he use of inevitable accident in early actions interpreted inevitability as impracticality. In the present scenario, to speak of inevitable accident as a defence, therefore, is to say that there are cases in which the defendant will escape liability if he succeeds in proving that the accident occurred despite the use of reasonable care on his part, but is also to say that there are cases in which the burden of proving this is placed upon him. In an ordinary action for negligence, for example, it is for the claimant to prove the defendant)s lack of care, not for the defendant to disprove it, and the defence of inevitable accident is accordingly irrelevant and it is e?ually irrelevant in any other class of case in which the burden of proving the defendant)s negligence is imposed upon the claimant. Cor is the position different in a case of res ipsa loquitor, for that merely raises a prima facie case.

!%.S.C( EAF !GSI(IGC G (@. E. .CS.

(he very term Inevitable accident is used for incidents where accidents occur by chance, in the absence of any form of negligence or human error. $eanwhile, His $a"or specifically restricts itself to severe and unforeseen acts of nature leading to a particular damage. Gne similarity in both these defences is

that these grounds stand nullified if negligence of the defendant is proved. An inevitable accident is an event which happens not only without the concurrence of the will of the man, but in spite of all efforts on his part to prevent it. It means, an accident physically unavoidable something which cannot be prevented by human skill or foresight. (his can be observed in the Indian case of A Drishna !atra v. Grissa State .lectricity Aoard where it was held that Inevitable Accident is not a valid defence in a case of accidental death due to electrocution. Since transmission of electricity was a dangerous activity, the principle of strict liability was applied in this case. (he Bourt further observed' ......*e are of the view that an enterprise which is engaged in a haIardous or inherently dangerous industry which poses a potential threat to the health and safety of the persons working in the factory and residing in the surrounding areas owes an absolute and non=delegable duty to the community to; ensure that no harm results to anyone on account of haIardous or inherently dangerous nature of the activity which it has undertaken......; And ;...... *e would therefore hold that where an enterprise is engaged in a haIardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm results to anyone on account of an accident in the operation of such haIardous or inherently dangerous activity resulting, for example, in escape of toxic gas the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate all those who are affected by the accident and such liability is not sub"ect to any of the exceptions which operate vis=a=vis the tortious principles of strict liability under the rule in %ylands v. letcher. (hus, the plea of inevitable accident has, in cases of this type, practically lost all its utility. (he ambit of Inevitable Accident as a defence has shrunk ma"orly. (he plea of inevitable accident has now substantially lost its utility. Since the principle of strict liability applies even in the absence of negligence on the part

of the defendant, inevitable accident in the absence of a natural catastrophe does not hold any scope as a defence. *ith growth of scientific knowledge, the number of accidents that can be termed inevitable is fast dismissing. @owever, things are a little different for those Inevitable Accidents that involve nature)s intervention.