Applied Crypto Hardening

Draft revision: 3f5ad4f (2014-06-21 16:38:47 +0200) Pepi Zawodsky

Applied Crypto Hardening
Wolfgang Breyha, David Durvaux, Tobias Dussa, L. Aaron Kaplan, Florian Mendel,
Christian Mock, Manuel Koschuch, Adi Kriegisch, Ulrich Pschl, Ramin Sabet, Berg
San, Ralf Schlatterbeck, Thomas Schreck, Alexander Wrstlein, Aaron Zauner, Pepi
Zawodsky
(University of Vienna, CERT.be, KIT-CERT, CERT.at, A-SIT/IAIK, coretec.at, FH Campus Wien, VRVis,
MilCERT Austria, A-Trust, Runtux.com, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg,
azet.org, maclemon.at)
June 21, 2014
Do not talk unencrypted
Applied Crypto Hardening Draft revision: 3f5ad4f (2014-06-21 16:38:47 +0200) Pepi Zawodsky page 2 of 95
Acknowledgements
We would like to express our thanks to the following reviewers and people who have generously
oered their time and interest (in alphabetical order):
Brown, Scott
Brulebois, Cyril
Dirksen-Thedens, Mathis
Dulaunoy, Alexandre
Ghring Philipp
Grigg, Ian
Horenbeck, Maarten
Huebl, Axel
Kovacic, Daniel
Lenzhofer, Stefan
Lornser, Thomas
Millauer, Tobias
Mirbach, Andreas
OBrien, Hugh
Pacher, Christoph
Palfrader, Peter
Pape, Tobias (layout)
Petukhova, Anna (Logo)
Pichler, Patrick
Riebesel, Nicolas
Roeckx, Kurt
Rublik, Martin
Seidl, Eva (PDF layout)
Wagner, Sebastian (sebix)
Zangerl, Alexander
The reviewers did review parts of the document in their area of expertise; all remaining errors in
this document are the sole responsibility of the primary authors.
Abstract
Unfortunately, the computer security and cryptology
communities have drifted apart over the last 25 years.
Security people dont always understand the available
crypto tools, and crypto people dont always understand
the real-world problems.
Ross Anderson in [And08]
This guide arose out of the need for system administrators to have an updated, solid, well re-
searched and thought-through guide for conguring SSL, PGP, SSH and other cryptographic tools
in the post-Snowden age. Triggered by the NSA leaks in the summer of 2013, many system admin-
istrators and IT security ocers saw the need to strengthen their encryption settings. This guide is
specically written for these system administrators.
As Schneier noted in [Sch13a], it seems that intelligence agencies and adversaries on the Internet
are not breaking so much the mathematics of encryption per se, but rather use software and
hardware weaknesses, subvert standardization processes, plant backdoors, rig random number
generators and most of all exploit careless settings in server congurations and encryption systems
to listen in on private communications. Worst of all, most communication on the internet is not
encrypted at all by default (for SMTP, opportunistic TLS would be a solution).
This guide can only address one aspect of securing our information systems: getting the crypto
settings right to the best of the authors current knowledge. Other attacks, as the above mentioned,
require dierent protection schemes which are not covered in this guide. This guide is not an
introduction to cryptography. For background information on cryptography and cryptoanalysis we
would like to refer the reader to the references in appendix B and C at the end of this document.
The focus of this guide is merely to give current best practices for conguring complex cipher suites
and related parameters in a copy & paste-able manner. The guide tries to stay as concise as is pos-
sible for such a complex topic as cryptography. Naturally, it can not be complete. There are many
excellent guides [IS12, fSidIB13, ENI13] and best practice documents available when it comes to
cryptography. However none of themfocuses specically on what an average systemadministrator
needs for hardening his or her systems crypto settings.
This guide tries to ll this gap.
Contents
1. Introduction 7
1.1. Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2. Related publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3. How to read this guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4. Disclaimer and scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.5. Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2. Practical recommendations 11
2.1. Webservers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1.1. Apache . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1.2. lighttpd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1.3. nginx . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.1.4. MS IIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.1.5. Supporting older clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2. SSH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2.1. OpenSSH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2.2. Cisco ASA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2.3. Cisco IOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3. Mail Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3.1. SMTP in general . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3.2. Dovecot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3.3. cyrus-imapd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3.4. Postx . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3.5. Exim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4. VPNs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.4.1. IPsec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.4.2. Check Point FireWall-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.4.3. OpenVPN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.4.4. PPTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.4.5. Cisco ASA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.4.6. Openswan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.4.7. tinc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.5. PGP/GPG - Pretty Good Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.6. IPMI, ILO and other lights out management solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.7. Instant Messaging Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.7.1. General server conguration recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.7.2. ejabberd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.7.3. Chat privacy - O-the-Record Messaging (OTR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.7.4. Charybdis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.7.5. SILC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.8. Database Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.8.1. Oracle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.8.2. MySQL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.8.3. DB2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Contents Contents
2.8.4. PostgreSQL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.9. Intercepting proxy solutions and reverse proxies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.9.1. Bluecoat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.9.2. Pound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.10.Kerberos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.10.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.10.2. Implementations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3. Theory 59
3.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.2. Cipher suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.2.1. Architectural overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.2.2. Forward Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.2.3. Recommended cipher suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.2.4. Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.3. Random Number Generators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.3.1. When random number generators fail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.3.2. Linux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.3.3. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.4. Keylengths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.5. A note on Elliptic Curve Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.6. A note on SHA-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.7. A note on Die Hellman Key Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.8. Public Key Infrastructures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.8.1. Certicate Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.8.2. Hardening PKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.9. TLS and its support mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.9.1. HTTP Strict Transport Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
A. Tools 77
A.1. SSL & TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
A.2. Key length . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
A.3. RNGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
A.4. Guides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
B. Links 79
C. Suggested Reading 80
D. Cipher Suite Name Cross-Reference 81
E. Further research 90
Index 95
1. Introduction
1.1. Audience
Sysadmins. Sysadmins. Sysadmins. They are a force-multiplier.
1.2. Related publications
Ecrypt II [IS12], ENISAs report on Algorithms, key sizes and parameters [ENI13] and BSIs Technische
Richtlinie TR-02102 [fSidIB13] are great publications which are more in depth than this guide.
However, this guide has a dierent approach: it focuses on copy & paste-able settings for system
administrators, eectively breaking down the complexity in the above mentioned reports to an
easy to use format for the intended target audience.
1.3. How to read this guide
This guide tries to accommodate two needs: rst of all, having a handy reference on how to
congure the most common services crypto settings and second of all, explain a bit of background
on cryptography. This background is essential if the reader wants to chose his or her own cipher
string settings.
System administrators who want to copy & paste recommendations quickly without spending a
lot of time on background reading on cryptography or cryptanalysis can do so, by simply searching
for the corresponding section in chapter 2 (Practical recommendations).
It is important to know that in this guide the authors arrived at two recommendations: Cipher string
A and Cipher string B. While the former is a hardened recommendation the latter is a weaker one
but provides wider compatibility. Cipher strings A and B are described in 3.2.3.
However, for the quick copy & paste approach it is important to know that this guide assumes
users are happy with Cipher string B.
While chapter 2 is intended to serve as a copy & paste reference, chapter 3 (Theory) explains the
reasoning behind cipher string B. In particular, section 3.2 explains how to choose individual cipher
strings. We advise the reader to actually read this section and challenge our reasoning in choosing
Cipher string B and to come up with a better or localized solution.
1.4. Disclaimer and scope 1.4. Disclaimer and scope
Start Introduction
No time, I just want
to copy & paste
read Practical recommendations
To understand why we chose
certain settings, read Theory rst
re-read Practical recommendations
Appendix: references, links
yes
no
1.4. Disclaimer and scope
A chain is no stronger than its weakest link, and life is after
all a chain
William James
Encryption works. Properly implemented strong crypto
systems are one of the few things that you can rely on.
Unfortunately, endpoint security is so terrically weak that
NSA can frequently nd ways around it.
Edward Snowden, answering questions live on the
Guardians website [Gle13]
This guide specically does not address physical security, protecting software and hardware against
exploits, basic IT security housekeeping, information assurance techniques, trac analysis attacks,
issues with key-roll over and key management, securing client PCs and mobile devices (theft,
loss), proper Operations Security
1
, social engineering attacks, protection against tempest [Wik13c]
attack techniques, thwarting dierent side-channel attacks (timing, cache timing, dierential fault
analysis, dierential power analysis or power monitoring attacks), downgrade attacks, jamming
the encrypted channel or other similar attacks which are typically employed to circumvent strong
encryption. The authors can not overstate the importance of these other techniques. Interested
1
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operations_security
1.4. Disclaimer and scope 1.4. Disclaimer and scope
readers are advised to read about these attacks in detail since they give a lot of insight into other
parts of cryptography engineering which need to be dealt with.
2
This guide does not talk much about the well-known insecurities of trusting a public-key infrastruc-
ture (PKI)
3
. Nor does this text fully explain how to run your own Certicate Authority (CA).
Most of this zoo of information security issues are addressed in the very comprehensive book
Security Engineering by Ross Anderson [And08].
For some experts in cryptography this text might seemtoo informal. However, we strive to keep the
language as non-technical as possible and tting for our target audience: system administrators
who can collectively improve the security level for all of their users.
Security is a process, not a product.
Bruce Schneier
This guide can only describe what the authors currently believe to be the best settings based
on their personal experience and after intensive cross checking with literature and experts. For a
complete list of people who reviewed this paper, see the Acknowledgements. Even though multiple
specialists reviewed the guide, the authors can give no guarantee whatsoever that they made the
right recommendations. Keep in mind that tomorrow there might be new attacks on some ciphers
and many of the recommendations in this guide might turn out to be wrong. Security is a process.
We therefore recommend that system administrators keep up to date with recent topics in IT
security and cryptography.
In this sense, this guide is very focused on getting the cipher strings done right even though there
is much more to do in order to make a system more secure. We the authors, need this document
as much as the reader needs it.
Scope
In this guide, we restricted ourselves to:
Internet-facing services
Commonly used services
Devices which are used in business environments (this specically excludes XBoxes, Playsta-
tions and similar consumer devices)
OpenSSL
We explicitly excluded:
Specialized systems (such as medical devices, most embedded systems, industrial control
systems, etc.)
2
An easy to read yet very insightful recent example is the "FLUSH+RELOAD" technique [YF13] for leaking cryptographic
keys from one virtual machine to another via L3 cache timing attacks.
3
Interested readers are referred to https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=647959 or http://www.h-online.com/
security/news/item/Honest-Achmed-asks-for-trust-1231314.html which brings the problem of trusting PKIs right to the
point
1.5. Methods 1.5. Methods
Wireless Access Points
Smart-cards/chip cards
1.5. Methods
C.O.S.H.E.R - completely open source, headers, engineering
and research
A. Kaplans mail signature for many years
For writing this guide, we chose to collect the most well researched facts about cryptography
settings and let as many trusted specialists as possible review those settings. The review process
is completely open and done on a public mailing list. The document is available (read-only) to
the public Internet on the web page and the source code of this document is on a public git
server, mirrored on GitHub.com and open for public scrutiny. However, write permissions to the
document are only granted to vetted people. The list of reviewers can be found in the section
Acknowledgements. Every write operation to the document is logged via the git version control
system and can thus be traced back to a specic author. We accept git pull requests on the github
mirror
4
for this paper.
Public peer-review and multiple eyes checking of our guide is the best strategy we can imagine at
the present moment
5
.
We invite the gentle reader to participate in this public review process.
4
https://github.com/BetterCrypto/Applied-Crypto-Hardening
5
http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/how-to-design-and-defend-against-the-perfect-backdoor/
2. Practical recommendations
2.1. Webservers
2.1.1. Apache
Note that any cipher suite starting with EECDH can be omitted, if in doubt. (Compared to the theory
section, EECDH in Apache and ECDHE in OpenSSL are synonyms
1
)
Tested with Versions
Apache 2.2.22 linked against OpenSSL 1.0.1e, Debian Wheezy
Apache 2.4.6 linked against OpenSSL 1.0.1e, Debian Jessie
Settings
Enabled modules SSL and Headers are required.
SSLProtocol All -SSLv2 -SSLv3
SSLHonorCipherOrder On
SSLCompression off
# Add six earth month HSTS header for all users...
Header add Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=15768000"
# If you want to protect all subdomains, use the following header
# ALL subdomains HAVE TO support HTTPS if you use this!
# Strict-Transport-Security: "max-age=15768000 ; includeSubDomains"
SSLCipherSuite 'EDH+CAMELLIA:EDH+aRSA:EECDH+aRSA+AESGCM:EECDH+aRSA+SHA384:EECDH+\
\aRSA+SHA256:EECDH:+CAMELLIA256:+AES256:+CAMELLIA128:+AES128:+SSLv3:!aNULL:!\
\eNULL:!LOW:!3DES:!MD5:!EXP:!PSK:!DSS:!RC4:!SEED:!ECDSA:CAMELLIA256-SHA:AES256\
\-SHA:CAMELLIA128-SHA:AES128-SHA'
Listing 2.1: SSL conguration for an Apache vhost
[configuration/Webservers/Apache/default-ssl]
1
https://www.mail-archive.com/openssl-dev@openssl.org/msg33405.html
2.1. Webservers 2.1.2. lighttpd
Additional settings
You might want to redirect everything to https:// if possible. In Apache you can do this with the
following setting inside of a VirtualHost environment:
<VirtualHost *:80>
RewriteEngine On
RewriteRule ^.*$ https://%{SERVER_NAME}%{REQUEST_URI} [L,R=permanent]
</VirtualHost>
Listing 2.2: https auto-redirect vhost
[configuration/Webservers/Apache/hsts-vhost]
References
Apache2 Docs on SSL and TLS: https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/ssl/
How to test
See appendix A
2.1.2. lighttpd
lighttpd/1.4.31-4 with OpenSSL 1.0.1e on Debian Wheezy
lighttpd/1.4.33 with OpenSSL 0.9.8o on Debian Squeeze (note that TLSv1.2 does not work in
openssl 0.9.8 thus not all ciphers actually work)
lighttpd/1.4.28-2 with OpenSSL 0.9.8o on Debian Squeeze (note that TLSv1.2 does not work
in openssl 0.9.8 thus not all ciphers actually work)
Settings
$SERVER["socket"] == "0.0.0.0:443" {
ssl.engine = "enable"
ssl.use-sslv2 = "disable"
ssl.use-sslv3 = "disable"
ssl.pemfile = "/etc/lighttpd/server.pem"
ssl.cipher-list = "EDH+CAMELLIA:EDH+aRSA:EECDH+aRSA+AESGCM:EECDH+aRSA+SHA384:\
\EECDH+aRSA+SHA256:EECDH:+CAMELLIA256:+AES256:+CAMELLIA128:+AES128:+SSLv3:!\
\aNULL!eNULL:!LOW:!3DES:!MD5:!EXP:!PSK:!DSS:!RC4:!SEED:!ECDSA:CAMELLIA256-SHA:\
\AES256-SHA:CAMELLIA128-SHA:AES128-SHA"
ssl.honor-cipher-order = "enable"
2.1. Webservers 2.1.2. lighttpd
setenv.add-response-header = ( "Strict-Transport-Security" => "max-age\
\=15768000") # six months
# use this only if all subdomains support HTTPS!
# setenv.add-response-header = ( "Strict-Transport-Security" => "max-age\
\=15768000; includeSubDomains")
}
Listing 2.3: SSL conguration for lighttpd
[configuration/Webservers/lighttpd/10-ssl.conf]
Starting with lighttpd version 1.4.29 Die-Hellman and Elliptic-Curve Die-Hellman key agreement
protocols are supported. By default, elliptic curve "prime256v1" (also "secp256r1") will be used, if
no other is given. To select special curves, it is possible to set them using the conguration options
ssl.dh-file and ssl.ec-curve.
ssl.dh-file = "/etc/lighttpd/ssl/dh2048.pem"
ssl.ec-curve = "secp521r1"
Listing 2.4: SSL EC/DH conguration for lighttpd
[configuration/Webservers/lighttpd/10-ssl-dh.conf]
Please read section 3.7 for more information on Die Hellman key exchange and elliptic curves.
Additional settings
As for any other webserver, you might want to automatically redirect http:// trac toward https://.
It is also recommended to set the environment variable HTTPS, so the PHP applications run by the
webserver can easily detect that HTTPS is in use.
$HTTP["scheme"] == "http" {
# capture vhost name with regex condition -> %0 in redirect pattern
# must be the most inner block to the redirect rule
$HTTP["host"] =~ ".*" {
url.redirect = (".*" => "https://%0$0")
}
# Set the environment variable properly
setenv.add-environment = (
"HTTPS" => "on"
)
}
Listing 2.5: https auto-redirect conguration
[configuration/Webservers/lighttpd/11-hsts.conf]
Additional information
The cong option honor-cipher-order is available since 1.4.30, the supported ciphers depend on
the used OpenSSL-version (at runtime). ECDHE has to be available in OpenSSL at compile-time,
2.1. Webservers 2.1.3. nginx
which should be default. SSL compression should by deactivated by default at compile-time (if not,
its active).
Support for other SSL-libraries like GnuTLS will be available in the upcoming 2.x branch, which is
currently under development.
References
HTTPS redirection: http://redmine.lighttpd.net/projects/1/wiki/HowToRedirectHttpToHttps
Lighttpd Docs SSL: http://redmine.lighttpd.net/projects/lighttpd/wiki/Docs_SSL
Release 1.4.30 (How to mitigate BEAST attack) http://redmine.lighttpd.net/projects/lighttpd/
wiki/Release-1_4_30
SSL Compression disabled by default: http://redmine.lighttpd.net/issues/2445
How to test
See appendix A
2.1.3. nginx
Tested with Version
1.4.4 with OpenSSL 1.0.1e on OS X Server 10.8.5
1.2.1-2.2+wheezy2 with OpenSSL 1.0.1e on Debian Wheezy
1.4.4 with OpenSSL 1.0.1e on Debian Wheezy
1.2.1-2.2 bpo60+2 with OpenSSL 0.9.8o on Debian Squeeze (note that TLSv1.2 does not work
in openssl 0.9.8 thus not all ciphers actually work)
Settings
ssl_prefer_server_ciphers on;
ssl_protocols TLSv1 TLSv1.1 TLSv1.2; # not possible to do exclusive
ssl_ciphers 'EDH+CAMELLIA:EDH+aRSA:EECDH+aRSA+AESGCM:EECDH+aRSA+SHA384:EECDH+\
\eNULL:!LOW:!3DES:!MD5:!EXP:!PSK:!DSS:!RC4:!SEED:!ECDSA:CAMELLIA256-SHA:AES256\
\-SHA:CAMELLIA128-SHA:AES128-SHA';
add_header Strict-Transport-Security max-age=15768000; # six months
# use this only if all subdomains support HTTPS!
# add_header Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=15768000; includeSubDomains";
Listing 2.6: SSL settings for nginx
[configuration/Webservers/nginx/default]
If you absolutely want to specify your own DH parameters, you can specify them via
2.1. Webservers 2.1.4. MS IIS
ssl_dhparam file;
However, we advise you to read section 3.7 and stay with the standard IKE/IETF parameters (as
long as they are >1024 bits).
Additional settings
If you decide to trust NISTs ECC curve recommendation, you can add the following line to nginxs
conguration le to select special curves:
ssl_ecdh_curve secp384r1;
Listing 2.7: SSL EC/DH settings for nginx
[configuration/Webservers/nginx/default-ec]
You might want to redirect everything to https:// if possible. In Nginx you can do this with the
following setting:
rewrite ^ https://$server_name$request_uri? permanent;
Listing 2.8: https auto-redirect in nginx
[configuration/Webservers/nginx/default-hsts]
References
http://nginx.org/en/docs/http/ngx_http_ssl_module.html
http://wiki.nginx.org/HttpSslModule
How to test
See appendix A
2.1.4. MS IIS
To congure SSL/TLS on Windows Server IIS Crypto can be used.
2
Simply start the Programm, no
installation required. The tool changes the registry keys described below. A restart ist required for
the changes to take eect.
Instead of using the IIS Crypto Tool the conguration can be set using the Windows Registry. The
following Registry keys apply to the newer Versions of Windows (Windows 7, Windows Server
2
https://www.nartac.com/Products/IISCrypto/
2008, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 and Windows Server 2012 R2). For detailed
information about the older versions see the Microsoft knowledgebase article.
3
[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\Schannel]
[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\Schannel\\
\Ciphers]
\CipherSuites]
\Hashes]
\KeyExchangeAlgorithms]
\Protocols]
Tested with Version
Windows Server 2008
Windows Server 2008 R2
Windows Server 2012
Windows Server 2012 R2
Windows Vista and Internet Explorer 7 and upwards
Windows 7 and Internet Explorer 8 and upwards
Windows 8 and Internet Explorer 10 and upwards
Windows 8.1 and Internet Explorer 11
Settings
When trying to avoid RC4 (RC4 biases) as well as CBC (BEAST-Attack) by using GCM and to support
perfect forward secrecy, Microsoft SChannel (SSL/TLS, Auth,.. Stack) supports ECDSA but lacks
support for RSA signatures (see ECC suite B doubts
4
).
Since one is stuck with ECDSA, an elliptic curve certicate needs to be used.
The conguration of cipher suites MS IIS will use, can be congured in one of the following ways:
1. Group Policy
5
2. Registry
6
3. IIS Crypto
7
3
http://support.microsoft.com/kb/245030/en-us
4
http://safecurves.cr.yp.to/rigid.html
5
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/bb870930(v=vs.85).aspx
6
http://support.microsoft.com/kb/245030
7
https://www.nartac.com/Products/IISCrypto/
Table 2.1.: Client support
Cipher Suite Client
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 only IE 10,11, OpenSSL 1.0.1e
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 Chrome 30, Opera 17, Safari 6+
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA FF 10-24, IE 8+, Safari 5, Java 7
4. Powershell
Table 2.1 shows the process of turning on one algorithm after another and the eect on the
supported clients tested using https://www.ssllabs.com.
SSL 3.0, SSL 2.0 and MD5 are turned o. TLS 1.0 and TLS 2.0 are turned on.
Table 2.1 shows the algorithms from strongest to weakest and why they need to be added in this
order. For example insisting on SHA-2 algorithms (only rst two lines) would eliminate all versions
of Firefox, so the last line is needed to support this browser, but should be placed at the bottom,
so capable browsers will choose the stronger SHA-2 algorithms.
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA or equivalent should also be added if MS Terminal Server Connection
is used (make sure to use this only in a trusted environment). This suite will not be used for SSL,
since we do not use a RSA Key.
Clients not supported:
1. Java 6
2. WinXP
3. Bing
Additional settings
Its recommended to use Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=15768000 for detailed information
visit the
8
Microsoft knowledgebase.
You might want to redirect everything to https:// if possible. In IIS you can do this with the following
setting by Powershell:
Set-WebConfiguration -Location "$WebSiteName/$WebApplicationName"
-Filter 'system.webserver/security/access'
-Value "SslRequireCert"
8
http://www.iis.net/congreference/system.webserver/httpprotocol/customheaders
2.1. Webservers 2.1.5. Supporting older clients
Justication for special settings (if needed)
References
How to test
See appendix A
2.1.5. Supporting older clients
Older clients like Internet Explorer on Windows XP (actually the Windows XP crypto stack), Java 6
and Java 7 arent supported by the recommended Variant B cipher string. To catch most of those
old clients you might use their inability to understand SNI to create a catchall page with a default
SSL server. On the default page you should provide information about upgrading their browser to
the user. This will not work with Java 7 because Java 7 understands SNI.
Apache
Create a default SSL server:
NameVirtualHost *:443
Listen 443
Listing 2.9: SNI for SSL on Apache
[configuration/Webservers-legacy/Apache/ports.conf]
# this setting is needed to allow non SNI aware clients to connect too
SSLStrictSNIVHostCheck off
# This needs to be the first virtual host entry; on Debian systems put this
# in /etc/apache2/sites-enabled/000-default-ssl
<VirtualHost *:443>
DocumentRoot /var/www/bad-ssl
SSLEngine on
SSLProtocol All
SSLCipherSuite ALL:!ADH:!NULL:!EXPORT:+HIGH:+MEDIUM:+LOW:+SSLv3
SSLCertificateFile /etc/ssl/certs/ssl-cert-snakeoil.pem
SSLCertificateKeyFile /etc/ssl/private/ssl-cert-snakeoil.key
</VirtualHost>
Listing 2.10: SNI catchall on Apache
[configuration/Webservers-legacy/Apache/000-default-ssl]
2.2. SSH 2.2. SSH
The catchall virtual server needs to be the rst server in the cong. You also should not use snakeoil
certicates (as in the snipplet above) but the very same certicate as you use for the real service.
In case you provide several virtual servers via SNI, the certicate for the catchall page needs to
include all their names.
nginx
Create a default SSL server:
# HTTPS default server
server {
listen 443 default;
listen [::]:443 default ipv6only=on;
root /var/www/bad-ssl;
index index.html
ssl on;
ssl_certificate /etc/ssl/certs/ssl-cert-snakeoil.pem;
ssl_certificate_key /etc/ssl/private/ssl-cert-snakeoil.key;
ssl_session_timeout 5m;
ssl_protocols SSLv3 TLSv1 TLSv1.1 TLSv1.2;
ssl_ciphers ALL:!ADH:!NULL:!EXPORT:+HIGH:+MEDIUM:+LOW:+SSLv3;
}
Listing 2.11: SNI catchall on nginx
[configuration/Webservers-legacy/nginx/default]
The real service then needs to be in its own server denition omitting the default keyword in the
listen directive. You should not use snakeoil certicates (as in the snipplet above) but the very
same certicate as you use for the real service. In case you provide several virtual servers via SNI,
the certicate for the catchall page needs to include all their names.
2.2. SSH
Please be advised that any change in the SSH-Settings of your server might cause problems
connecting to the server or starting/reloading the SSH-Daemon itself. So every time you cong-
ure your SSH-Settings on a remote server via SSH itself, ensure that you have a second open
connection to the server, which you can use to reset or adapt your changes!
2.2. SSH 2.2.1. OpenSSH
2.2.1. OpenSSH
Tested with Version
OpenSSH 6.6p1 (Gentoo)
Settings
Protocol 2
# HostKeys for protocol version 2
HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
PermitRootLogin no # or 'without-password' to allow SSH key based login
StrictModes yes
PermitEmptyPasswords no
Ciphers chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,aes128-gcm@openssh.\
\com,aes256-ctr,aes128-ctr
MACs hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-\
\etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256,hmac-ripemd160
KexAlgorithms curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,\
\diffie-hellman-group14-sha1,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1
Listing 2.12: Important OpenSSH 6.6 security settings
[configuration/SSH/OpenSSH/6.6/sshd_config]
Note: OpenSSH 6.6p1 now supports Curve25519
Tested with Version
OpenSSH 6.5 (Debian Jessie)
Settings
Protocol 2
HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
StrictModes yes
Ciphers aes256-gcm@openssh.com,aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-ctr,aes128-ctr
2.2. SSH 2.2.1. OpenSSH
MACs hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-\
\etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256,hmac-ripemd160
KexAlgorithms diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1,\
\diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1
Tested with Version
OpenSSH 6.0p1 (Debian wheezy)
Settings
Protocol 2
StrictModes yes
Ciphers aes256-ctr,aes128-ctr
MACs hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256,hmac-ripemd160
KexAlgorithms diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1,\
\diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1
Note: Older Linux systems wont support SHA2. PuTTY (Windows) does not support RIPE-MD160.
Curve25519, AES-GCM and UMAC are only available upstream (OpenSSH 6.6p1). DSA host keys
have been removed on purpose, the DSS standard does not support for DSA keys stronger than
1024bit
9
which is far below current standards (see section 3.4). Legacy systems can use this
conguration and simply omit unsupported ciphers, key exchange algorithms and MACs.
References
The OpenSSH sshd_cong man page is the best reference: http://www.openssh.org/cgi-bin/man.
cgi?query=sshd_cong
9
https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1647
2.2. SSH 2.2.2. Cisco ASA
How to test
Connect a client with verbose logging enabled to the SSH server
$ ssh -vvv myserver.com
and observe the key exchange in the output.
2.2.2. Cisco ASA
9.1(3)
Settings
crypto key generate rsa modulus 2048
ssh version 2
ssh key-exchange group dh-group14-sha1
Note: When the ASA is congured for SSH, by default both SSH versions 1 and 2 are allowed. In
addition to that, only a group1 DH-key-exchange is used. This should be changed to allow only SSH
version 2 and to use a key-exchange with group14. The generated RSA key should be 2048 bit (the
actual supported maximum). A non-cryptographic best practice is to recongure the lines to only
allow SSH-logins.
References
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/security/asa/asa91/conguration/general/admin_management.
html
How to test
2.3. Mail Servers 2.2.3. Cisco IOS
2.2.3. Cisco IOS
15.0, 15.1, 15.2
Settings
crypto key generate rsa modulus 4096 label SSH-KEYS
ip ssh rsa keypair-name SSH-KEYS
ip ssh version 2
ip ssh dh min size 2048
line vty 0 15
transport input ssh
Note: Same as with the ASA, also on IOS by default both SSH versions 1 and 2 are allowed and the
DH-key-exchange only use a DH-group of 768 Bit. In IOS, a dedicated Key-pair can be bound to SSH
to reduce the usage of individual keys-pairs. From IOS Version 15.0 onwards, 4096 Bit rsa keys are
supported and should be used according to the paradigm "use longest supported key". Also, do
not forget to disable telnet vty access.
References
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/sec_user_services/conguration/guide/sec_cfg_secure_
shell.html
How to test
2.3. Mail Servers
This section documents the most common mail (SMTP) and IMAPs/POPs servers. Another option
to secure IMAPs/POPs servers is to place them behind an stunnel server.
2.3. Mail Servers 2.3.1. SMTP in general
2.3.1. SMTP in general
SMTP usually makes use of opportunistic TLS. This means that an MTA will accept TLS connections
when asked for it during handshake but will not require it. One should always support incoming
opportunistic TLS and always try TLS handshake outgoing.
Furthermore a mailserver can operate in three modes:
As MSA (Mail Submission Agent) your mailserver receives mail from your clients MUAs (Mail
User Agent).
As receiving MTA (Mail Transmission Agent, MX)
As sending MTA (SMTP client)
We recommend the following basic setup for all modes:
correctly setup MX, A and PTR RRs without using CNAMEs at all.
enable encryption (opportunistic TLS)
do not use self signed certicates
For SMTP client mode we additionally recommend:
the hostname used as HELO must match the PTR RR
setup a client certicate (most server certicates are client certicates as well)
either the common name or at least an alternate subject name of your certicate must
match the PTR RR
do not modify the cipher suite for client mode
For MSA operation we recommend:
listen on submission port 587
enforce SMTP AUTH even for local networks
do not allow SMTP AUTH on unencrypted connections
optionally use the recommended cipher suites if (and only if) all your connecting MUAs
support them
We strongly recommend to allow all cipher suites for anything but MSA mode, because the alter-
native is plain text transmission.
2.3.2. Dovecot
Tested with Version
Dovecot 2.1.7, Debian Wheezy (without ssl_prefer_server_ciphers setting)
Dovecot 2.2.9, Debian Jessie
2.0.19apple1 on OS X Server 10.8.5 (without ssl_prefer_server_ciphers setting)
Settings
2.3. Mail Servers 2.3.3. cyrus-imapd
# SSL ciphers to use
ssl_cipher_list = EDH+CAMELLIA:EDH+aRSA:EECDH+aRSA+AESGCM:EECDH+aRSA+SHA384:EECDH\
\+aRSA+SHA256:EECDH:+CAMELLIA256:+AES256:+CAMELLIA128:+AES128:+SSLv3:!aNULL:!\
\eNULL:!LOW:!3DES:!MD5:!EXP:!PSK:!DSS:!RC4:!SEED:!ECDSA:CAMELLIA256-SHA:AES256-\
\SHA:CAMELLIA128-SHA:AES128-SHA
# Prefer the server's order of ciphers over client's.
ssl_prefer_server_ciphers = yes
Listing 2.15: Dovecot SSL conguration
[configuration/MailServers/Dovecot/10-ssl.conf]
Additional info
Dovecot 2.0, 2.1: Almost as good as dovecot 2.2. Dovecot does not ignore unknown conguration
parameters. Does not support ssl_prefer_server_ciphers
Limitations
Dovecot currently does not support disabling TLS compression. Furthermore, DH parameters
greater than 1024bit are not supported. The most recent version 2.2.7 of Dovecot implements
congurable DH parameter length
10
.
References
http://wiki2.dovecot.org/SSL
How to test
openssl s_client -crlf -connect SERVER.TLD:993
2.3.3. cyrus-imapd
2.4.17
10
http://hg.dovecot.org/dovecot-2.2/rev/43ab5abeb8f0
2.3. Mail Servers 2.3.3. cyrus-imapd
Settings
To activate SSL/TLS congure your certicate with
tls_cert_file: /etc/ssl/certs/ssl-cert-snakeoil.pem
tls_key_file: /etc/ssl/private/ssl-cert-snakeoil.key
Listing 2.16: Activating TLS in cyrus
[configuration/MailServers/cyrus-imapd/imapd.conf]
Do not forget to add necessary intermediate certicates to the .pem le.
Limiting the ciphers provided may force (especially older) clients to connect without encryption at
all! Sticking to the defaults is recommended.
If you still want to force strong encryption use
tls_cipher_list: EDH+CAMELLIA:EDH+aRSA:EECDH+aRSA+AESGCM:EECDH+aRSA+SHA384:EECDH+\
\SHA:CAMELLIA128-SHA:AES128-SHA
Listing 2.17: TLS cipher selection in cyrus
cyrus-imapd loads hardcoded 1024 bit DH parameters using get_rfc2409_prime_1024() by default.
If you want to load your own DH parameters add them PEM encoded to the certicate le given in
tls_cert_le. Do not forget to re-add them after updating your certicate.
To prevent unencrypted connections on the STARTTLS ports you can set
allowplaintext: no
Listing 2.18: Force encrypted connections in cyrus
This way MUAs can only authenticate with plain text authentication schemes after issuing the
STARTTLS command. Providing CRAM-MD5 or DIGEST-MD5 methods is not recommended.
To support POP3/IMAP on ports 110/143 with STARTTLS and POP3S/IMAPS on ports 995/993 check
the SERVICES section in cyrus.conf
SERVICES {
imap cmd="imapd -U 30" listen="imap" prefork=0 maxchild=100
imaps cmd="imapd -s -U 30" listen="imaps" prefork=0 maxchild=100
pop3 cmd="pop3d -U 30" listen="pop3" prefork=0 maxchild=50
pop3s cmd="pop3d -s -U 30" listen="pop3s" prefork=0 maxchild=50
}
Listing 2.19: STARTTLS for POP3/IMAP and POP3S/IMAPS in cyrus
[configuration/MailServers/cyrus-imapd/cyrus.conf]
2.3. Mail Servers 2.3.4. Postx
Limitations
cyrus-imapd currently (2.4.17, trunk) does not support elliptic curve cryptography. Hence, ECDHE
will not work even if dened in your cipher list.
Currently there is no way to prefer server ciphers or to disable compression.
There is a working patch for all three features: https://bugzilla.cyrusimap.org/show_bug.cgi?id=
3823
How to test
openssl s_client -crlf -connect SERVER.TLD:993
2.3.4. Postx
Postx 2.9.6, Debian Wheezy
Settings
MX and SMTP client conguration: As discussed in section 2.3.1, because of opportunistic encryp-
tion we do not restrict the list of ciphers. There are still some steps needed to enable TLS, all in
main.cf:
# TLS parameters
smtpd_tls_cert_file=/etc/ssl/certs/ssl-cert-snakeoil.pem
smtpd_tls_key_file=/etc/ssl/private/ssl-cert-snakeoil.key
# use 0 for Postfix >= 2.9, and 1 for earlier versions
smtpd_tls_loglevel = 0
# enable opportunistic TLS support in the SMTP server and client
smtpd_tls_security_level = may
smtp_tls_security_level = may
smtp_tls_loglevel = 1
# if you have authentication enabled, only offer it after STARTTLS
smtpd_tls_auth_only = yes
tls_ssl_options = NO_COMPRESSION
Listing 2.20: Opportunistic TLS in Postx
[configuration/MailServers/Postfix/main.cf]
2.3. Mail Servers 2.3.4. Postx
MSA: For the MSA smtpd process, we rst dene the ciphers that are acceptable for the manda-
tory security level, again in main.cf:
smtpd_tls_mandatory_protocols = !SSLv2, !SSLv3
smtpd_tls_mandatory_ciphers=high
tls_high_cipherlist=EDH+CAMELLIA:EDH+aRSA:EECDH+aRSA+AESGCM:EECDH+aRSA+SHA384:\
\EECDH+aRSA+SHA256:EECDH:+CAMELLIA256:+AES256:+CAMELLIA128:+AES128:+SSLv3:!aNULL\
\:!eNULL:!LOW:!3DES:!MD5:!EXP:!PSK:!DSS:!RC4:!SEED:!ECDSA:CAMELLIA256-SHA:AES256\
\-SHA:CAMELLIA128-SHA:AES128-SHA
Listing 2.21: MSA TLS conguration in Postx
Then, we congure the MSA smtpd in master.cf with two additional options that are only used for
this instance of smtpd:
submission inet n - - - - smtpd
-o smtpd_tls_security_level=encrypt
-o tls_preempt_cipherlist=yes
Listing 2.22: MSA smtpd service conguration in Postx
[configuration/MailServers/Postfix/master.cf]
For those users who want to use EECDH key exchange, it is possible to customize this via:
smtpd_tls_eecdh_grade=ultra
Listing 2.23: EECDH customization in Postx
The default value since Postx 2.8 is strong.
Limitations
tls_ssl_options is supported from Postx 2.11 onwards. You can leave the statement in the cong-
uration for older versions, it will be ignored.
tls_preempt_cipherlist is supported from Postx 2.8 onwards. Again, you can leave the statement
in for older versions.
References
Refer to http://www.postx.org/TLS_README.html for an in-depth discussion.
Additional settings
Postx has two sets of built-in DHparameters that can be overridden with the smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file
and smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file options. The dh512 parameters are used for export ciphers,
while the dh1024 ones are used for all other ciphers.
2.3. Mail Servers 2.3.5. Exim
The bit length in those parameter names is just a name, so one could use stronger parameter
sets; it should be possible to e.g. use the IKE Group14 parameters (see section 3.7) without much
interoperability risk, but we have not tested this yet.
How to test
You can check the eect of the settings with the following command:
$ zegrep "TLS connection established from.*with cipher" /var/log/mail.log | awk \
\'{printf("%s %s %s %s\n", $12, $13, $14, $15)}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -n
1 SSLv3 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
23 TLSv1.2 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
60 TLSv1 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
270 TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
335 TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -crlf -connect SERVER.TLD:25
2.3.5. Exim
Exim 4.82, Debian Jessie
It is highly recommended to read http://exim.org/exim-html-current/doc/html/spec_html/ch-encrypted_
smtp_connections_using_tlsssl.html rst.
MSA mode (submission): In the main cong section of Exim add:
tls_certificate = /etc/ssl/exim.crt
tls_privatekey = /etc/ssl/exim.pem
Listing 2.24: Certicate selection in Exim (MSA)
[configuration/MailServers/Exim/configure.msa]
Dont forget to add intermediate certicates to the .pem le if needed.
Tell Exim to advertise STARTTLS in the EHLO answer to everyone:
tls_advertise_hosts = *
Listing 2.25: TLS advertise in Exim (MSA)
If you want to support legacy SMTPS on port 465, and STARTTLS on smtp(25)/submission(587)
ports set
daemon_smtp_ports = smtp : smtps : submission
tls_on_connect_ports = 465
Listing 2.26: STARTTLS and SMTPS in Exim (MSA)
It is highly recommended to limit SMTP AUTH to SSL connections only. To do so add
server_advertise_condition = ${if eq{$tls_cipher}{}{no}{yes}}
Listing 2.27: SSL-only authentication in Exim (MSA)
to every authenticator dened.
Add the following rules on top of your acl_smtp_mail:
acl_smtp_mail = acl_check_mail
acl_check_mail:
warn hosts = *
control = submission/sender_retain
accept
Listing 2.28: Submission mode in Exim (MSA)
This switches Exim to submission mode and allows addition of missing Message-ID and Date
headers.
It is not advisable to restrict the default cipher list for MSA mode if you dont know all connecting
MUAs. If you still want to dene one please consult the Exim documentation or ask on the exim-
users mailinglist.
The cipher used is written to the logles by default. You may want to add
log_selector = <whatever your log_selector already contains> +\
\tls_certificate_verified +tls_peerdn +tls_sni
to get even more TLS information logged.
Server mode (incoming): In the main cong section of Exim add:
Listing 2.29: Certicate selection in Exim (Server)
[configuration/MailServers/Exim/configure.server]
dont forget to add intermediate certicates to the .pem le if needed.
Tell Exim to advertise STARTTLS in the EHLO answer to everyone:
tls_advertise_hosts = *
Listing 2.30: TLS advertise in Exim (Server)
Listen on smtp(25) port only
daemon_smtp_ports = smtp
Listing 2.31: STARTTLS on SMTP in Exim (Server)
It is not advisable to restrict the default cipher list for opportunistic encryption as used by SMTP.
Do not use cipher lists recommended for HTTPS! If you still want to dene one please consult the
Exim documentation or ask on the exim-users mailinglist.
If you want to request and verify client certicates from sending hosts set
tls_verify_certificates = /etc/pki/tls/certs/ca-bundle.crt
tls_try_verify_hosts = *
Listing 2.32: TLS certicate veriaction in Exim (Server)
tls_try_verify_hosts only reports the result to your logle. If you want to disconnect such clients
you have to use
tls_verify_hosts = *
The cipher used is written to the logles by default. You may want to add
log_selector = <whatever your log_selector already contains> +\
\tls_certificate_verified +tls_peerdn +tls_sni
to get even more TLS information logged.
Client mode (outgoing): Exim uses opportunistic encryption in the SMTP transport by default.
Client mode settings have to be done in the conguration section of the smtp transport (driver =
smtp).
If you want to use a client certicate (most server certicates can be used as client certicate, too)
set
Listing 2.33: Certicate selection in Exim (Client)
[configuration/MailServers/Exim/configure.client]
This is recommended for MTA-MTA trac.
Do not limit ciphers without a very good reason. In the worst case you end up without encryption
at all instead of some weak encryption. Please consult the Exim documentation if you really need
to dene ciphers.
OpenSSL: Exim already disables SSLv2 by default. We recommend to add
openssl_options = +all +no_sslv2 +no_compression +cipher_server_preference
to the main conguration.
Note: +all is misleading here since OpenSSL only activates the most common workarounds. But
thats how SSL_OP_ALL is dened.
You do not need to set dh_parameters. Exim with OpenSSL by default uses parameter initialization
with the "2048-bit MODP Group with 224-bit Prime Order Subgroup" dened in section 2.2 of RFC
5114 [LK08] (ike23). If you want to set your own DHparameters please read the TLS documentation
of exim.
GnuTLS: GnuTLS is dierent in only some respects to OpenSSL:
tls_require_ciphers needs a GnuTLS priority string instead of a cipher list. It is recommended
to use the defaults by not dening this option. It highly depends on the version of GnuTLS
used. Therefore it is not advisable to change the defaults.
There is no option like openssl_options
Exim string expansion: Note that most of the options accept expansion strings. This way you can
e.g. set cipher lists or STARTTLS advertisement conditionally. Please follow the link to the ocial
Exim documentation to get more information.
Limitations: Exim currently (4.82) does not support elliptic curves with OpenSSL. This means that
ECDHE is not used even if dened in your cipher list. There already is a working patch to provide
support: http://bugs.exim.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1397
How to test
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -crlf -connect SERVER.TLD:25
2.4. VPNs 2.4. VPNs
2.4. VPNs
2.4.1. IPsec
Settings
Assumptions: We assume the use of IKE (v1 or v2) and ESP for this document.
Authentication: IPSEC authentication should optimally be performed via RSA signatures, with
a key size of 2048 bits or more. Conguring only the trusted CA that issued the peer certicate
provides for additional protection against fake certicates.
If you need to use Pre-Shared Key authentication:
1. Choose a random, long enough PSK (see below)
2. Use a separate PSK for any IPSEC connection
3. Change the PSKs regularly
The size of the PSK should not be shorter than the output size of the hash algorithm used in
IKE
11
.
For a key composed of upper- and lowercase letters, numbers, and two additional symbols
12
,
table 2.2 gives the minimum lengths in characters.
Table 2.2.: PSK lengths
IKE Hash PSK length (chars)
SHA256 43
SHA384 64
SHA512 86
Cryptographic Suites: IPSEC Cryptographic Suites are pre-dened settings for all the items of a
conguration; they try to provide a balanced security level and make setting up VPNs easier.
13
When using any of those suites, make sure to enable Perfect Forward Secrecy for Phase 2, as this
is not specied in the suites. The equivalents to the recommended ciphers suites in section 3.2.3
are shown in table 2.3.
11
It is used in a HMAC, see RFC2104 [KBC97] and the discussion starting in http://www.vpnc.org/ietf-ipsec/02.ipsec/
msg00268.html.
12
64 possible values = 6 bits
13
RFC6379 [LS11], RFC4308 [Hof05]
2.4. VPNs 2.4.1. IPsec
Table 2.3.: IPSEC Cryptographic Suites
Conguration A Conguration B Notes
Suite-B-GCM-256 Suite-B-GCM-128
VPN-B
All Suite-B variants use NIST elliptic curves
Table 2.4.: IPSEC Phase 1 parameters
Conguration A Conguration B
Mode Main Mode Main Mode
Encryption AES-256 AES, CAMELLIA (-256 or -128)
Hash SHA2-* SHA2-*, SHA1
DH Group Group 14-18 Group 14-18
Table 2.5.: IPSEC Phase 2 parameters
Conguration A Conguration B
Perfect Forward Secrecy
Encryption AES-GCM-16, AES-CTR,
AES-CCM-16, AES-256
AES-GCM-16, AES-CTR, AES-CCM-16,
AES-256, CAMELLIA-256, AES-128,
CAMELLIA-128
Hash SHA2-* (or none for AEAD) SHA2-*, SHA1 (or none for AEAD)
DH Group Same as Phase 1 Same as Phase 1
Phase 1: Alternatively to the pre-dened cipher suites, you can dene your own, as described in
this and the next section.
Phase 1 is the mutual authentication and key exchange phase; table 2.4 shows the parameters.
Use only main mode, as aggressive mode has known security vulnerabilities
14
.
Phase 2: Phase 2 is where the parameters that protect the actual data are negotiated; recom-
mended parameters are shown in table 2.5.
References
A Cryptographic Evaluation of IPsec, Niels Ferguson and Bruce Schneier: https://www.
schneier.com/paper-ipsec.pdf
14
http://ikecrack.sourceforge.net/
2.4. VPNs 2.4.2. Check Point FireWall-1
2.4.2. Check Point FireWall-1
R77 (should work with any currently supported version)
Settings
Please see section 2.4.1 for guidance on parameter choice. In this section, we will congure a
strong setup according to Conguration A.
This is based on the concept of a VPN Community, which has all the settings for the gateways
that are included in that community. Communities can be found in the IPSEC VPN tab of Smart-
Dashboard.
Either chose one of the encryption suites in the properties dialog (gure 2.2), or proceed to Custom
Encryption..., where you can set encryption and hash for Phase 1 and 2 (gure 2.3).
The Die-Hellman groups and Perfect Forward Secrecy Settings can be found under Advanced
Settings / Advanced VPN Properties (gure 2.4).
Additional settings
For remote Dynamic IP Gateways, the settings are not taken from the community, but set in the
Global Properties dialog under Remote Access / VPN Authentication and Encryption. Via the
Edit... button, you can congure sets of algorithms that all gateways support (gure 2.5).
Please note that these settings restrict the available algorithms for all gateways, and also inuence
the VPN client connections.
References
Check Point VPN R77 Administration Guide (may require a UserCenter account to access)
2.4.3. OpenVPN
OpenVPN 2.3.2 from Debian wheezy-backports linked against openssl (libssl.so.1.0.0)
OpenVPN 2.2.1 from Debian Wheezy linked against openssl (libssl.so.1.0.0)
OpenVPN 2.3.2 for Windows
2.4. VPNs 2.4.3. OpenVPN
Figure 2.1.: IIS Crypto Tool
Figure 2.2.: VPN Community encryption properties
Figure 2.3.: Custom Encryption Suite Properties
Figure 2.4.: Advanced VPN Properties
Settings
General We describe a conguration with certicate-based authentication; see below for details
on the easyrsa tool to help you with that.
OpenVPN uses TLS only for authentication and key exchange. The bulk trac is then encrypted
and authenticated with the OpenVPN protocol using those keys.
Note that while the tls-cipher option takes a list of ciphers that is then negotiated as usual with
TLS, the cipher and auth options both take a single argument that must match on client and
server.
Server Conguration
tls-cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-\
\SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA\
\-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:CAMELLIA256-SHA:AES256-SHA:CAMELLIA128-SHA:\
\AES128-SHA
cipher AES-256-CBC
auth SHA384
Listing 2.34: Cipher conguration for OpenVPN (Server)
[configuration/VPNs/OpenVPN/server.conf]
Client Conguration Client and server have to use compatible congurations, otherwise they
cant communicate. The cipher and auth directives have to be identical.
tls-remote server.example.com
# Attention: it must fit in 256 bytes, so not the infamous CipherStringB!
tls-cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-\
\SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA\
\-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:CAMELLIA256-SHA:AES256-SHA:CAMELLIA128-SHA:\
\AES128-SHA
cipher AES-256-CBC
auth SHA384
# https://openvpn.net/index.php/open-source/documentation/howto.html#mitm
remote-cert-tls server
Listing 2.35: Cipher and TLS conguration for OpenVPN (Server)
[configuration/VPNs/OpenVPN/client.conf]
Justication for special settings
OpenVPN 2.3.1 changed the values that the tls-cipher option expects from OpenSSL to IANA ci-
pher names. That means from that version on you will get Deprecated TLS cipher name warnings
for the congurations above. You cannot use the selection strings from section 3.2.3 directly from
2.3.1 on, which is why we give an explicit cipher list here.
In addition, there is a 256 character limit on conguration le line lengths; that limits the size of
cipher suites, so we dropped all ECDHE suites.
The conguration shown above is compatible with all tested versions.
References
OpenVPN Documentation: Security Overview https://openvpn.net/index.php/open-source/
documentation/security-overview.html
Additional settings
Key renegotiation interval The default for renegotiation of encryption keys is one hour (reneg-
sec 3600). If you transfer huge amounts of data over your tunnel, you might consider conguring
a shorter interval, or switch to a byte- or packet-based interval (reneg-bytes or reneg-pkts).
Fixing easy-rsa When installing an OpenVPN server instance, you are probably using easy-rsa to
generate keys and certicates. The le vars in the easyrsa installation directory has a number of
settings that should be changed to secure values:
export KEY_SIZE=4096
export CA_EXPIRE=1826
export KEY_EXPIRE=365
Listing 2.36: Sane default values for OpenVPN (easy-rsa)
[configuration/VPNs/OpenVPN/vars]
This will enhance the security of the key generation by using RSA keys with a length of 4096 bits,
and set a lifetime of one year for the server/client certicates and ve years for the CA certicate.
NOTE: 4096 bits is only an example of how to do this with easy-rsa. See also section 3.4 for a
discussion on keylengths.
In addition, edit the pkitool script and replace all occurrences of sha1 with sha256, to sign the
certicates with SHA256.
Limitations
Note that the ciphersuites shown by openvpn --show-tls are known, but not necessarily supported
15
.
15
https://community.openvpn.net/openvpn/ticket/304
2.4. VPNs 2.4.4. PPTP
Which cipher suite is actually used can be seen in the logs:
Control Channel: TLSv1, cipher TLSv1/SSLv3 DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA, 2048 bit RSA
2.4.4. PPTP
PPTP is considered insecure, Microsoft recommends to use a more secure VPN tunnel
16
.
There is a cloud service that cracks the underlying MS-CHAPv2 authentication protocol for the price
of USD 200
17
, and given the resulting MD4 hash, all PPTP trac for a user can be decrypted.
2.4.5. Cisco ASA
The following settings reect our recommendations as best as possible on the Cisco ASA platform.
These are - of course - just settings regarding SSL/TLS (i.e. Cisco AnyConnect) and IPsec. For further
security settings regarding this platform the appropriate Cisco guides should be followed.
9.1(3) - X-series model
Settings
crypto ipsec ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES-Fallback
protocol esp encryption aes-256 aes-192 aes
protocol esp integrity sha-512 sha-384 sha-256
crypto ipsec ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES-GCM-Fallback
protocol esp encryption aes-gcm-256 aes-gcm-192 aes-gcm
protocol esp integrity sha-512 sha-384 sha-256
crypto ipsec ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES128-GCM
protocol esp encryption aes-gcm
protocol esp integrity sha-512
protocol esp encryption aes-gcm-192
protocol esp encryption aes-gcm-256
crypto ipsec ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES
protocol esp encryption aes
protocol esp integrity sha-1 md5
16
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/advisory/2743314
17
https://www.cloudcracker.com/blog/2012/07/29/cracking-ms-chap-v2/
2.4. VPNs 2.4.5. Cisco ASA
crypto ipsec ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES192
protocol esp encryption aes-192
crypto ipsec ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES256
protocol esp encryption aes-256
crypto ipsec ikev2 sa-strength-enforcement
crypto ipsec security-association pmtu-aging infinite
crypto dynamic-map SYSTEM_DEFAULT_CRYPTO_MAP 65535 set pfs group14
crypto dynamic-map SYSTEM_DEFAULT_CRYPTO_MAP 65535 set ikev2 ipsec-proposal \
\AES256-GCM AES192-GCM AES128-GCM AES-GCM-Fallback AES-Fallback
crypto map Outside-DMZ_map 65535 ipsec-isakmp dynamic SYSTEM_DEFAULT_CRYPTO_MAP
crypto map Outside-DMZ_map interface Outside-DMZ
crypto ikev2 policy 1
encryption aes-gcm-256
integrity null
group 14
prf sha512 sha384 sha256 sha
lifetime seconds 86400
encryption aes-gcm-256 aes-gcm-192 aes-gcm
integrity null
group 14
encryption aes-256 aes-192 aes
integrity sha512 sha384 sha256
group 14
encryption aes-256 aes-192 aes
integrity sha512 sha384 sha256 sha
group 14
crypto ikev2 enable Outside-DMZ client-services port 443
crypto ikev2 remote-access trustpoint ASDM_TrustPoint0
ssl server-version tlsv1-only
ssl client-version tlsv1-only
ssl encryption dhe-aes256-sha1 dhe-aes128-sha1 aes256-sha1 aes128-sha1
ssl trust-point ASDM_TrustPoint0 Outside-DMZ
Justication for special settings
New IPsec policies have been dened which do not make use of ciphers that may be cause for
concern. Policies have a "Fallback" option to support legacy devices.
2.4. VPNs 2.4.6. Openswan
3DES has been completely disabled as such Windows XP AnyConnect Clients will no longer be able
to connect.
The Cisco ASA platform does not currently support RSA Keys above 2048bits.
Legacy ASA models (e.g. 5505, 5510, 5520, 5540, 5550) do not oer the possibility to congure for
SHA256/SHA384/SHA512 nor AES-GCM for IKEv2 proposals.
References
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/security/asa/roadmap/asaroadmap.html
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/nextgen_crypto.html
2.4.6. Openswan
Tested with Version
Openswan 2.6.39 (Gentoo)
Settings
Note: the available algorithms depend on your kernel conguration (when using protostack=netkey)
and/or build-time options.
To list the supported algorithms
$ ipsec auto --status | less
and look for algorithm ESP/IKE at the beginning.
aggrmode=no
# ike format: cipher-hash;dhgroup
# recommended ciphers:
# - aes
# recommended hashes:
# - sha2_256 with at least 43 byte PSK
# - sha2_512 with at least 86 byte PSK
# recommended dhgroups:
# - modp2048 = DH14
# - modp3072 = DH15
# - modp4096 = DH16
# - modp6144 = DH17
# - modp8192 = DH18
ike=aes-sha2_256;modp2048
type=tunnel
phase2=esp
# esp format: cipher-hash;dhgroup
2.4. VPNs 2.4.7. tinc
# recommended ciphers configuration A:
# - aes_gcm_c-256 = AES_GCM_16
# - aes_ctr-256
# - aes_ccm_c-256 = AES_CCM_16
# - aes-256
# additional ciphers configuration B:
# - camellia-256
# - aes-128
# - camellia-128
# recommended hashes configuration A:
# - sha2-256
# - sha2-384
# - sha2-512
# - null (only with GCM/CCM ciphers)
# additional hashes configuration B:
# - sha1
# recommended dhgroups: same as above
phase2alg=aes_gcm_c-256-sha2_256;modp2048
salifetime=8h
pfs=yes
auto=ignore
How to test
Start the vpn and using
$ ipsec auto --status | less
and look for IKE algorithms wanted/found and ESP algorithms wanted/loaded.
References
https://www.openswan.org/
2.4.7. tinc
Tested with Version
tinc 1.0.23 from Gentoo linked against OpenSSL 1.0.1e
tinc 1.0.23 from Sabayon linked against OpenSSL 1.0.1e
Defaults
tinc uses 2048 bit RSA keys, Blowsh-CBC, and SHA1 as default settings and suggests the usage of
CBC mode ciphers. Any key length up to 8196 is supported and it does not need to be a power of
two. OpenSSL Ciphers and Digests are supported by tinc.
2.5. PGP/GPG - Pretty Good Privacy 2.5. PGP/GPG - Pretty Good Privacy
Settings
Generate keys with
tincd -n NETNAME -K8196
Old keys will not be deleted (but disabled), you have to delete them manually. Add the following
lines to your tinc.conf on all machines
Cipher = aes-256-cbc
Digest = SHA512
Listing 2.37: Cipher and digest selection in tinc
[configuration/VPNs/tinc/tinc.conf]
References
tincd(8) man page
tinc.conf(5) man page
tinc mailinglist: http://www.tinc-vpn.org/pipermail/tinc/2014-January/003538.html
2.5. PGP/GPG - Pretty Good Privacy
The OpenPGP protocol
18
uses asymmetric encryption to protect a session key which is used to
encrypt a message. Additionally, it signs messages via asymmetric encryption and hash functions.
Research on SHA-1 conducted back in 2005
19
has made clear that collision attacks are a real threat
to the security of the SHA-1 hash function. PGP settings should be adapted to avoid using SHA-1.
When using PGP, there are a couple of things to take care of:
keylengths (see section 3.4)
randomness (see section 3.3)
preference of symmetric encryption algorithm (see section 3.2)
preference of hash function (see section 3.2)
Properly dealing with key material, passphrases and the web-of-trust is outside of the scope of
this document. The GnuPG website
20
has a good tutorial on PGP.
This Debian How-to
21
is a great resource on upgrading your old PGP key as well as on safe default
settings. This section is built based on the Debian How-to.
18
https://tools.ietf.org/search/rfc4880
19
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/02/sha1_broken.html
20
http://www.gnupg.org/
21
https://www.debian-administration.org/users/dkg/weblog/48
2.7. Instant Messaging Systems 2.6. IPMI, ILO and other lights out management solutions
Hashing
Avoid SHA-1 in GnuPG. Edit $HOME/.gnupg/gpg.conf:
personal-digest-preferences SHA256
cert-digest-algo SHA256
default-preference-list SHA512 SHA384 SHA256 SHA224 AES256 AES192 AES CAST5 ZLIB \
\BZIP2 ZIP Uncompressed
Listing 2.38: Digest selection in GnuPG
[configuration/GPG/GnuPG/gpg.conf]
Before you generate a new PGP key, make sure there is enough entropy available (see subsection
3.3.2).
2.6. IPMI, ILO and other lights out management solutions
We strongly recommend that any remote management system for servers such as ILO, iDRAC, IPMI
based solutions and similar systems never be connected to the public internet. Consider creating
an unrouted management VLAN and access that only via VPN.
2.7. Instant Messaging Systems
2.7.1. General server conguration recommendations
For servers, we mostly recommend to apply whats proposed by the Peters manifesto
22
.
In short:
require the use of TLS for both client-to-server and server-to-server connections
prefer or require TLS cipher suites that enable forward secrecy
deploy certicates issued by well-known and widely-deployed certication authorities (CAs)
The last point being out-of-scope for this section, we will only cover the rst two points.
2.7.2. ejabberd
Debian Wheezy 2.1.10-4+deb7u1
22
https://github.com/stpeter/manifesto
2.7. Instant Messaging Systems 2.7.2. ejabberd
Settings
ejabberd is one of the popular Jabber server. In order to be compliant with the manifesto, you
should adapt your conguration
23
:
{listen,
[
{5222, ejabberd_c2s, [
{access, c2s},
{shaper, c2s_shaper},
{max_stanza_size, 65536},
starttls,
starttls_required,
{certfile, "/etc/ejabberd/ejabberd.pem"}
]},
]}.
{s2s_use_starttls, required_trusted}.
{s2s_certfile, "/etc/ejabberd/ejabberd.pem"}.
Listing 2.39: TLS setup for ejabberd
[configuration/IM/ejabberd/ejabberd.cfg]
Additional settings
Older Versions of ejabberd (< 2.0.0) need to be patched
24
to be able to parse all of the certicates
in the CA chain.
Newer versions of ejabberd now support specifying the cipher string in the cong le. See the com-
mit message: https://github.com/processone/ejabberd/commit/1dd94ac0d06822daa8c394ea2da20d91c8209124.
However, this change did not yet make it into the stable release at the time of this writing.
References
TODO: ADD references!!
How to test
https://xmpp.net is a practical website to test Jabber server congurations.
23
http://www.process-one.net/docs/ejabberd/guide_en.html
24
http://hyperstruct.net/2007/06/20/installing-the-startcom-ssl-certicate-in-ejabberd/
2.7. Instant Messaging Systems 2.7.3. Chat privacy - O-the-Record Messaging (OTR)
2.7.3. Chat privacy - O-the-Record Messaging (OTR)
The OTR protocol works on top of the Jabber protocol
25
. It adds to popular chat clients (Adium,
Pidgin...) the following properties for encrypted chats:
Authentication
Integrity
Condentiality
Forward secrecy
It basically uses Die-Hellman, AES and SHA1. Communicating over an insecure instant messaging
network, OTR can be used for end to end encryption.
There are no specic congurations required but the protocol itself is worth to be mentioned.
2.7.4. Charybdis
There are numerous implementations of IRC servers. In this section, we choose Charybdis which
serves as basis for ircd-seven
26
, developed and used by freenode. Freenode is actually the biggest
IRC network
27
. Charybdis is part of the Debian & Ubuntu distributions.
/* Extensions */
#loadmodule "extensions/chm_sslonly_compat.so";
loadmodule "extensions/extb_ssl.so";
serverinfo {
ssl_private_key = "etc/test.key";
ssl_cert = "etc/test.cert";
ssl_dh_params = "etc/dh.pem";
# set ssld_count as number of cores - 1
ssld_count = 1;
};
listen {
sslport = 6697;
};
Listing 2.40: SSL relevant conguration for Charybdis/ircd-seven
[configuration/IM/Charybdis/ircd.conf]
2.7.5. SILC
SILC
28
is instant messaging protocol publicly released in 2000. SILC is a per-default secure chat
protocol thanks to a generalized usage of symmetric encryption. Keys are generated by the server
meaning that if compromised, communication could be compromised.
25
https://otr.cypherpunks.ca/Protocol-v3-4.0.0.html
26
https://dev.freenode.net/redmine/projects/ircd-seven
27
http://irc.netsplit.de/networks/top10.php
28
http://www.silcnet.org/ and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SILC_(protocol)
2.8. Database Systems 2.8. Database Systems
The protocol is not really popular anymore.
2.8. Database Systems
2.8.1. Oracle
We do not test this here, since we only reference other papers for Oracle so far.
References
Technical safety requirements by Deutsche Telekom AG (German). Please read section 17.12
or pages 129 and following (Req 396 and Req 397) about SSL and ciphersuites http://www.
telekom.com/static/-/155996/7/technische-sicherheitsanforderungen-si
2.8.2. MySQL
Debian Wheezy and MySQL 5.5
Settings
[mysqld]
ssl
ssl-ca=/etc/mysql/cacert.pem
ssl-cert=/etc/mysql/server-cert.pem
ssl-key=/etc/mysql/server-key.pem
# needs OpennSSL build
ssl-cipher=DH+CAMELLIA:EDH+aRSA:EECDH+aRSA+AESGCM:EECDH+aRSA+SHA384:EECDH+aRSA+\
\SHA256:EECDH:+CAMELLIA256:+AES256:+CAMELLIA128:+AES128:+SSLv3:!aNULL:!eNULL:!\
\LOW:!3DES:!MD5:!EXP:!PSK:!DSS:!RC4:!SEED:!ECDSA:CAMELLIA256-SHA:AES256-SHA:\
\CAMELLIA128-SHA:AES128-SHA
Listing 2.41: SSL conguration fo MySQL
[configuration/DBs/MySQL/my.cnf]
References
MySQL Documentation on SSL Connections.
https://dev.mysql.com/doc/refman/5.5/en/ssl-connections.html
2.8. Database Systems 2.8.3. DB2
How to test
After restarting the server run the following query to see if the ssl settings are correct:
show variables like '%ssl%';
2.8.3. DB2
Tested with Version
We do not test this here, since we only reference other papers for DB2 so far.
Settings
ssl_cipherspecs: In the link above the whole SSL-conguration is described in-depth. The following
command shows only how to set the recommended ciphersuites.
# recommended and supported ciphersuites
db2 update dbm cfg using SSL_CIPHERSPECS
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
References
IBM Db2 Documentation on Supported cipher suites.
http://pic.dhe.ibm.com/infocenter/db2luw/v9r7/index.jsp?topic=%2Fcom.ibm.db2.luw.admin.
sec.doc%2Fdoc%2Fc0053544.html
2.8. Database Systems 2.8.4. PostgreSQL
2.8.4. PostgreSQL
Debian Wheezy and PostgreSQL 9.1
Linux Mint 14 nadia / Ubuntu 12.10 quantal with PostgreSQL 9.1+136 and OpenSSL 1.0.1c
Settings
ssl = on # (change requires restart)
ssl_ciphers = 'EDH+CAMELLIA:EDH+aRSA:EECDH+aRSA+AESGCM:EECDH+aRSA+SHA384:EECDH+\
\SHA:CAMELLIA128-SHA:AES128-SHA' # allowed SSL ciphers
Listing 2.42: Enabling SSL in PostgreSQL
[configuration/DBs/PostgreSQL/9.1/postgresql.conf]
To start in SSL mode the server.crt and server.key must exist in the servers data directory $PG-
DATA.
Starting with version 9.2, you have the possibility to set the path manually.
ssl_cert_file = 'server.crt' # (change requires restart)
ssl_key_file = 'server.key' # (change requires restart)
ssl_ca_file = 'root.crt' # (change requires restart)
Listing 2.43: Certicate locations in PostgreSQL 9.2
[configuration/DBs/PostgreSQL/9.3/postgresql.conf]
References
Its recommended to read Security and Authentication in the manual
29
.
PostgreSQL Documentation on Secure TCP/IP Connections with SSL: http://www.postgresql.
org/docs/9.1/static/ssl-tcp.html
PostgreSQL Documentation on host-based authentication: http://www.postgresql.org/docs/
current/static/auth-pg-hba-conf.html
How to test
To test your ssl settings, run psql with the sslmode parameter:
psql "sslmode=require host=postgres-server dbname=database" your-username
29
http://www.postgresql.org/docs/9.1/interactive/runtime-cong-connection.html
2.9. Intercepting proxy solutions and reverse proxies 2.9. Intercepting proxy solutions and reverse proxies
2.9. Intercepting proxy solutions and reverse proxies
Within enterprise networks and corporations with increased levels of paranoia or at least some
dened security requirements it is common not to allowdirect connections to the public internet.
For this reason proxy solutions are deployed on corporate networks to intercept and scan the
trac for potential threats within sessions.
For encrypted trac there are four options:
Block the connection because it cannot be scanned for threats.
Bypass the threat-mitigation and pass the encrypted session to the client, which results in a
situation where malicious content is transferred directly to the client without visibility to the
security system.
Intercept (i.e. terminate) the session at the proxy, scan there and re-encrypt the session
towards the client (eectively MITM).
Deploy special Certicate Authorities to enable Deep Packet Inspection on the wire.
While the latest solution might be the most "up to date", it arises a new front in the context
of this paper, because the most secure part of a clients connection could only be within the
corporate network, if the proxy-server handles the connection to the destination server in an
insecure manner.
Conclusion: Dont forget to check your proxy solutions SSL-capabilities. Also do so for your reverse
proxies!
2.9.1. Bluecoat
SGOS 6.5.x
BlueCoat Proxy SG Appliances can be used as forward and reverse proxies. The reverse proxy
feature is rather under-developed, and while it is possible and supported, there only seems to be
limited use of this feature "in the wild" - nonetheless there are a few cipher suites to choose from,
when enabling SSL features.
Only allow TLS 1.0,1.1 and 1.2 protocols:
$conf t
$(config)ssl
$(config ssl)edit ssl-device-profile default
$(config device-profile default)protocol tlsv1 tlsv1.1 tlsv1.2
ok
2.9. Intercepting proxy solutions and reverse proxies 2.9.2. Pound
Select your accepted cipher-suites:
$conf t
Enter configuration commands, one per line. End with CTRL-Z.
$(config)proxy-services
$(config proxy-services)edit ReverseProxyHighCipher
$(config ReverseProxyHighCipher)attribute cipher-suite
Cipher# Use Description Strength
------- --- ----------------------- --------
1 yes AES128-SHA256 High
2 yes AES256-SHA256 High
3 yes AES128-SHA Medium
4 yes AES256-SHA High
5 yes DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA High
6 yes DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA High
[...]
13 yes EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5 Export
Select cipher numbers to use, separated by commas: 2,5,6
ok
The same protocols are available for forward proxy settings and should be adjusted accordingly:
In your local policy le add the following section:
<ssl>
DENY server.connection.negotiated_ssl_version=(SSLV2, SSLV3)
Disabling protocols and ciphers in a forward proxy environment could lead to unexpected results
on certain (miscongured?) webservers (i.e. ones accepting only SSLv2/3 protocol connections)
2.9.2. Pound
Pound 2.6
Settings
# HTTP Listener, redirects to HTTPS
ListenHTTP
Address 10.10.0.10
Port 80
Service
Redirect "https://some.site.tld"
End
End
## HTTPS Listener
ListenHTTPS
2.10. Kerberos 2.10. Kerberos
Address 10.10.0.10
Port 443
AddHeader "Front-End-Https: on"
Cert "/path/to/your/cert.pem"
## See 'man ciphers'.
Ciphers "TLSv1.2:TLSv1.1:!SSLv3:!SSLv2:EDH+CAMELLIA:EDH+aRSA:EECDH+aRSA+AESGCM\
\:EECDH+aRSA+SHA384:EECDH+aRSA+SHA256:EECDH:+CAMELLIA256:+AES256:+CAMELLIA128\
\:+AES128:+SSLv3:!aNULL:!eNULL:!LOW:!3DES:!MD5:!EXP:!PSK:!DSS:!RC4:!SEED:!\
\ECDSA:CAMELLIA256-SHA:AES256-SHA:CAMELLIA128-SHA:AES128-SHA"
Service
BackEnd
Address 10.20.0.10
Port 80
End
End
End
Listing 2.44: HTTPS Listener in Pound
[configuration/Proxies/Pound/pound.cfg]
2.10. Kerberos
This section discusses various implementations of the Kerberos 5 authentication protocol on Unix
and Unix-like systems as well as on Microsoft Windows.
2.10.1. Overview
Kerberos provides mutual authentication of two communicating parties, e.g. a user using a net-
work service. The authentication process is mediated by a trusted third party, the Kerberos key
distribution centre (KDC). Kerberos implements secure single-sign-on across a large number of
network protocols and operating systems. Optionally, Kerberos can be used to create encrypted
communications channels between the user and service.
Recommended reading An understanding of the Kerberos protocol is necessary for properly
implementing a Kerberos setup. Also, in the following section some knowledge about the inner
workings of Kerberos is assumed. Therefore we strongly recommend reading this excellent intro-
duction rst: http://gost.isi.edu/publications/kerberos-neuman-tso.html. No further overview over
Kerberos terminology and functions will be provided, for a discussion and a selection of relevant
papers refer to http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/papers.html.
The Kerberos protocol over time has been extended with a variety of extensions and Kerberos
implementations provide additional services in addition to the aforementioned KDC. All discussed
implementations provide support for trust relations between multiple realms, an administrative
network service (kerberos-adm, kadmind) as well as a password changing service (kpasswd). Some-
times, alternative database backends for ticket storage, X.509 and SmartCard authentication are
provided. Of those, only administrative and password changing services will be discussed.
2.10. Kerberos 2.10.1. Overview
Only the Kerberos 5 protocol and implementation will be discussed. Kerberos 4 is obsolete, inse-
cure and its use is strongly discouraged.
Providing a suitable Setup for secure Kerberos Operations
The aim of Kerberos is to unify authentication across a wide range of services, for many dierent
users and use cases and on many computer platforms. The resulting complexity and attack surface
make it necessary to carefully plan and continuously evaluate the security of the overall ecosystem
in which Kerberos is deployed. Several assumptions are made on which the security of a Kerberos
infrastructure relies:
Every KDC in a realmneeds to be trustworthy. The KDCs principal database must not become
known to or changed by an attacker. The contents of the principal database enables the
attacker to impersonate any user or service in the realm.
Synchronisation between KDCs must be secure, reliable and frequent. An attacker that is
able to intercept or inuence synchronisation messages obtains or inuences parts of the
principal database, enabling impersonation of aected principals. Unreliable or infrequent
synchronisation enlarges the window of vulnerability after disabling principals or changing
passwords that have been compromised or lost.
KDCs must be available. An attacker is able to inhibit authentication for services and users
by cutting o their access to a KDC.
Users passwords must be secure. Since Kerberos is a single-sign-on mechanism, a single
password may enable an attacker to access a large number of services.
Service keytabs need to be secured against unauthorized access similarly to SSL/TLS server
certicates. Obtaining a service keytab enables an attacker to impersonate a service.
DNS infrastructure must be secure and reliable. Hosts that provide services need consistent
forward and reverse DNS entries. The identity of a service is tied to its DNS name, similarly
the realm a client belongs to as well as the KDC, kpasswd and kerberos-adm servers may
be specied in DNS TXT and SRV records. Spoofed DNS entries will cause denial-of-service
situations and might endanger[MIT13, HA00] the security of a Kerberos realm.
Clients and servers in Kerberos realms need to have synchronized clocks. Tickets in Kerberos
are created with a limited, strictly enforced lifetime. This limits an attackers window of
opportunity for various attacks such as the decryption of tickets in snied network trac or
the use of tickets read from a client computers memory. Kerberos will refuse tickets with
old timestamps or timestamps in the future. This would enable an attacker with access to a
systems clock to deny access to a service or all users logging in from a specic host.
Therefore we suggest:
Secure all KDCs at least as strongly as the most secure service in the realm.
Dedicate physical (i.e. non-VM) machines to be KDCs. Do not run any services on those
machines beyond the necessary KDC, kerberos-adm, kpasswd and kprop services.
2.10. Kerberos 2.10.2. Implementations
Restrict physical and administrative access to the KDCs as severely as possible. E.g. ssh
access should be limited to responsible adminstrators and trusted networks.
Encrypt and secure the KDCs backups.
Replicate your primary KDC to at least one secondary KDC.
Prefer easy-to-secure replication (propagation in Kerberos terms) methods.Especially avoid
LDAP replication and database backends. LDAP enlarges the attack surface of your KDC and
facilitates unauthorized access to the principal database e.g. by ACL misconguration.
Use DNSSEC. If that is not possible, at least ensure that all servers and clients in a realm use
a trustworthy DNS server contacted via secure network links.
Use NTP on a trustworthy server via secure network links.
Avoid services that require the user to enter a password which is then checked against
Kerberos. Prefer services that are able to use authentication via service tickets, usually not
requiring the user to enter a password except for the initial computer login to obtain a
ticket-granting-ticket (TGT). This limits the ability of attackers to spy out passwords through
compromised services.
2.10.2. Implementations
Cryptographic Algorithms in Kerberos Implementations The encryption algorithms (commonly
abbreviated etypes or enctypes) in Kerberos exchanges are subject to negotiation between both
sides of an exchange. Similarly, a ticket granting ticket (TGT), which is usually obtained on initial
login, can only be issued if the principal contains a version of the password encrypted with an
etype that is available both on the KDC and on the client where the login happens. Therefore, to
ensure interoperability among components using dierent implementations as shown in table
??, a selection of available etypes is necessary. However, the negotiation process may be subject
to downgrade attacks[EHS10] and weak hashing algorithms endanger integrity protection and
password security. This means that the des3-cbc-sha1-kd or rc4-hmac algorithms should not be
used, except if there is a concrete and unavoidable need to do so. Other des3-*, des-* and rc4-
hmac-exp algorithms should never be used.
Along the lines of cipher string B, the following etypes are recommended: aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96
camellia256-cts-cmac aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 camellia128-cts-cmac.
Existing installations The conguration samples below assume new installations without preex-
isting principals.
For existing installations:
Be aware that for existing setups, the master_key_type can not be changed easily since it
requires a manual conversion of the database. When in doubt, leave it as it is.
When changing the list of supported_enctypes, principals where all enctypes are no longer
supported will cease to work.
Table 2.6.: Commonly supported Kerberos encryption types by implementation. Algorithm names ac-
cording to RFC3961, except where aliases can be used or the algorithm is named dierently altogether
as stated [Rae05a, Hud12, Rae05b, NYHR05, NYHR05, krb10, Jav, Shi].
ID Algorithm MIT Heimdal GNU Shishi MS ActiveDirectory
1 des-cbc-crc
2 des-cbc-md4
3 des-cbc-md5
6 des3-cbc-none
7 des3-cbc-sha1
a

16 des3-cbc-sha1-kd
b

c

17 aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96
d
18 aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96
e
23 rc4-hmac
24 rc4-hmac-exp
25 camellia128-cts-cmac
f

26 camellia256-cts-cmac
f

a
named old-des3-cbc-sha1
b
alias des3-cbc-sha1, des3-hmac-sha1
c
named des3-cbc-sha1
d
since Vista,
Server 2008
e
since 7, Server 2008R2
f
since 1.9
Be aware that Kerberos 4 is obsolete and should not be used.
Principals with weak enctypes pose an increased risk for password bruteforce attacks if an
attacker gains access to the database.
To get rid of principals with unsupported or weak enctypes, a password change is usually the
easiest way. Service principals can simply be recreated.
MIT krb5
KDC conguration In /etc/krb5kdc/kdc.conf set the following in your realms conguration:
supported_enctypes = aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:normal camellia256-cts-cmac:\
\normal aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:normal camellia128-cts-cmac:normal
default_principal_flags = +preauth
Listing 2.45: Encryption ags for MIT krb5 KDC
[configuration/Kerberos/krb5/kdc.conf]
In /etc/krb5.conf set in the [libdefaults] section:
[libdefaults]
allow_weak_crypto = false
permitted_enctypes= aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 camellia256-cts-cmac aes128-cts-hmac\
\-sha1-96 camellia128-cts-cmac
default_tkt_enctypes= aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 camellia256-cts-cmac aes128-cts-\
\hmac-sha1-96 camellia128-cts-cmac
default_tgs_enctypes= aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 camellia256-cts-cmac aes128-cts-\
\hmac-sha1-96 camellia128-cts-cmac
Listing 2.46: Encryption ags for MIT krb5 client
[configuration/Kerberos/krb5/krb5.conf]
Figure 2.5.: Remote Access Encryption Properties
3. Theory
3.1. Overview
The balance between freedom and security is a delicate
one.
Mark Udall, american politician
This chapter provides the necessary background information on why chapter 2 recommended
cipher string B.
We start o by explaining the structure of cipher strings in section 3.2.1 (architecture) and dene
perfect forward secrecy (PF S) in 3.2.2. Next we present Cipher String A and Cipher String B in section
3.2.3. This concludes the section on cipher strings. In theory, the reader should now be able to
construct his or her own cipher string. However, the question why certain settings were chosen still
remains. To answer this part, we need to look at recommended keylengths, problems in specic
algorithms and hash functions and other cryptographic parameters. As mentioned initially in
section 1.2, the ENISA [ENI13], ECRYPT 2 [IS12] and BSI [fSidIB13] reports go much more into these
topics and should be consulted in addition.
We try to answer the questions by explaining issues with random number generators (section 3.3),
keylengths (section 3.4), current issues in ECC (section 3.5), a note of warning on SHA-1 (section
3.6) and some comments on Die Hellman key exchanges (section 3.7). All of this is important in
understanding why certain choices were made for Cipher String A and B. However, for most system
administrators, the question of compatibility is one of the most pressing ones. Having the freedom
to be compatible with any client (even running on outdated operating systems) of course, reduces
the security of our cipher strings. We address these topics in section 3.2.4. All these sections will
allow a system administrator to balance his or her needs for strong encryption with usability and
compatibility.
Last but not least, we nish this chapter by talking about issues in PKIs (section 3.8), Certicate
Authorities and on hardening a PKI. Note that these last few topics deserve a book on their own.
Hence this guide can only mention a few current topics in this area.
3.2. Cipher suites
3.2.1. Architectural overview
This section denes some terms which will be used throughout this guide.
3.2. Cipher suites 3.2.1. Architectural overview
A cipher suite is a standardized collection of key exchange algorithms, encryption algorithms (ci-
phers) and Message authentication codes (MAC) algorithm that provides authenticated encryption
schemes. It consists of the following components:
Key exchange protocol: An (interactive) key exchange protocol is a method whereby parties who
do not share any secret information can generate a shared, secret key by communicating over
a public channel. The main property guaranteed here is that an eavesdropping adversary
who sees all the messages sent over the communication line does not learn anything about
the resulting secret key. [KL08]
Example: DHE
Authentication: The client authenticates the server by its certicate. Optionally the server may
authenticate the client certicate.
Example: RSA
Cipher: The cipher is used to encrypt the message stream. It also contains the key size and mode
used by the suite.
Example: AES256
Message authentication code (MAC): A MAC ensures that the message has not been tampered
with (integrity).
Examples: SHA256
Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD): AEAD is a class of authenticated encryp-
tion block-cipher modes which take care of encryption as well as authentication (e.g. GCM,
CCM mode).
Example: AES256-GCM
DHE RSA AES256 SHA256
Figure 3.1.: Composition of a typical cipher string
A note on nomenclature: there are two common naming schemes for cipher strings IANA names
(see appendix B) and the more well known OpenSSL names. In this document we will always use
OpenSSL names unless a specic service uses IANA names.
3.2. Cipher suites 3.2.2. Forward Secrecy
3.2.2. Forward Secrecy
Forward Secrecy or Perfect Forward Secrecy is a property of a cipher suite that ensures conden-
tiality even if the server key has been compromised. Thus if trac has been recorded it can not be
decrypted even if an adversary has got hold of the server key
1 2 3
.
3.2.3. Recommended cipher suites
In principle system administrators who want to improve their communication security have to
make a dicult decision between eectively locking out some users and keeping high cipher
suite security while supporting as many users as possible. The website https://www.ssllabs.com/
gives administrators and security engineers a tool to test their setup and compare compatibility
with clients. The authors made use of ssllabs.com to arrive at a set of cipher suites which we will
recommend throughout this document.
Conguration A: Strong ciphers, fewer clients
At the time of writing, our recommendation is to use the following set of strong cipher suites
which may be useful in an environment where one does not depend on many, dierent clients
and where compatibility is not a big issue. An example of such an environment might be machine-
to-machine communication or corporate deployments where software that is to be used can be
dened without restrictions.
We arrived at this set of cipher suites by selecting:
TLS 1.2
Perfect forward secrecy / ephemeral Die Hellman
strong MACs (SHA-2) or
GCM as Authenticated Encryption scheme
This results in the OpenSSL string:
EDH+aRSA+AES256:EECDH+aRSA+AES256:!SSLv3
Compatibility: At the time of this writing only Win 7 and Win 8.1 crypto stack, OpenSSL 1.0.1e,
Safari 6 / iOS 6.0.1 and Safar 7 / OS X 10.9 are covered by that cipher string.
1
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy
2
https://www.e.org/deeplinks/2013/08/pushing-perfect-forward-secrecy-important-web-privacy-protection
3
http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2013/06/25/ssl-intercepted-today-decrypted-tomorrow.html
3.2. Cipher suites 3.2.3. Recommended cipher suites
Table 3.1.: Conguration A ciphers
ID OpenSSL Name Version KeyEx Auth Cipher MAC
0x009F DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 DH RSA AESGCM(256) AEAD
0x006B DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256 TLSv1.2 DH RSA AES(256) (CBC) SHA256
0xC030 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 ECDH RSA AESGCM(256) AEAD
0xC028 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 ECDH RSA AES(256) (CBC) SHA384
Conguration B: Weaker ciphers but better compatibility
In this section we propose a slightly weaker set of cipher suites. For example, there are known
weaknesses for the SHA-1 hash function that is included in this set. The advantage of this set of
cipher suites is not only better compatibility with a broad range of clients, but also less computa-
tional workload on the provisioning hardware.
All examples in this publication use Conguration B.
We arrived at this set of cipher suites by selecting:
TLS 1.2, TLS 1.1, TLS 1.0
allowing SHA-1 (see the comments on SHA-1 in section 3.6)
This results in the OpenSSL string:
EDH+CAMELLIA:EDH+aRSA:EECDH+aRSA+AESGCM:EECDH+aRSA+SHA384:EECDH+aRSA+SHA256:EECDH:
+CAMELLIA256:+AES256:+CAMELLIA128:+AES128:+SSLv3:!aNULL:!eNULL:!LOW:!3DES:!MD5:!EX
P:!PSK:!DSS:!RC4:!SEED:!IDEA:!ECDSA:kEDH:CAMELLIA256-SHA:AES256-SHA:CAMELLIA128-SH
A:AES128-SHA
TODO: make a column for cipher chaining mode
Compatibility: Note that these cipher suites will not work with Windows XPs crypto stack (e.g.
IE, Outlook), We could not verify yet if installing JCE also xes the Java 7 DH-parameter length
limitation (1024 bit). TODO: do that!
Explanation: For a detailed explanation of the cipher suites chosen, please see ??. In short,
nding a single perfect cipher string is practically impossible and there must be a tradeo between
compatibility and security. On the one hand there are mandatory and optional ciphers dened
in a few RFCs, on the other hand there are clients and servers only implementing subsets of the
specication.
3.2. Cipher suites 3.2.4. Compatibility
Table 3.2.: Conguration B ciphers
ID OpenSSL Name Version KeyEx Auth Cipher MAC
0x009F DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 DH RSA AESGCM(256) AEAD
0x006B DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256 TLSv1.2 DH RSA AES(256) SHA256
0xC030 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 ECDH RSA AESGCM(256) AEAD
0xC028 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 ECDH RSA AES(256) SHA384
0x009E DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 DH RSA AESGCM(128) AEAD
0x0067 DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 DH RSA AES(128) SHA256
0xC02F ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 ECDH RSA AESGCM(128) AEAD
0xC027 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 ECDH RSA AES(128) SHA256
0x0088 DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA SSLv3 DH RSA Camellia(256) SHA1
0x0039 DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 DH RSA AES(256) SHA1
0xC014 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 ECDH RSA AES(256) SHA1
0x0045 DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA SSLv3 DH RSA Camellia(128) SHA1
0x0033 DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 DH RSA AES(128) SHA1
0xC013 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 ECDH RSA AES(128) SHA1
0x0084 CAMELLIA256-SHA SSLv3 RSA RSA Camellia(256) SHA1
0x0035 AES256-SHA SSLv3 RSA RSA AES(256) SHA1
0x0041 CAMELLIA128-SHA SSLv3 RSA RSA Camellia(128) SHA1
0x002F AES128-SHA SSLv3 RSA RSA AES(128) SHA1
Straight forward, the authors wanted strong ciphers, forward secrecy
4
and the best client com-
patibility possible while still ensuring a cipher string that can be used on legacy installations (e.g.
OpenSSL 0.9.8).
Our recommended cipher strings are meant to be used via copy and paste and need to work "out
of the box".
TLSv1.2 is preferred over TLSv1.0 (while still providing a useable cipher string for TLSv1.0
servers).
AES256 and CAMELLIA256 count as very strong ciphers at the moment.
AES128 and CAMELLIA128 count as strong ciphers at the moment
DHE or ECDHE for forward secrecy
RSA as this will t most of todays setups
AES256-SHA as a last resort: with this cipher at the end, even server systems with very
old OpenSSL versions will work out of the box (version 0.9.8 for example does not provide
support for ECC and TLSv1.1 or above).
Note however that this cipher suite will not provide forward secrecy. It is meant to provide
the same client coverage (eg. support Microsoft crypto libraries) on legacy setups.
3.2.4. Compatibility
4
http://nmav.gnutls.org/2011/12/price-to-pay-for-perfect-forward.html
3.3. Random Number Generators 3.3. Random Number Generators
TODO: write this section. The idea here is to rst document which server (and openssl) version
we assumed. Once these parameters are xed, we then list all clients which are supported for
Variant A) and B). Therefore we can document compatibilities to some extent. The sysadmin can
then choose roughly what he looses or gains by omitting certain cipher suites.
3.3. Random Number Generators
The generation of random numbers is too important to be
left to chance.
Robert R. Coveyou
Figure 3.2.: xkcd, source: https://imgs.xkcd.com/comics/random_number.png, license: CC-BY-NC
A good source of random numbers is essential for many crypto operations. The key feature of a
good random number generator is the non-predictability of the generated numbers. This means
that hardware support for generating entropy is essential.
Hardware random number generators in operating systems or standalone components collect
entropy from various random events mostly by using the (low bits of the) time an event occurs
as an entropy source. The entropy is merged into an entropy pool and in some implementations
there is some bookkeeping about the number of random bits available.
3.3.1. When random number generators fail
Random number generators can fail returning predictable non-random numbers if not enough
entropy is available when random numbers should be generated.
This typically occurs for embedded devices and virtual machines. Embedded devices lack some
entropy sources other devices have, e.g.:
No persistent clock, so boot-time is not contributing to the initial RNG state
No hard-disk: No entropy from hard-disk timing, no way to store entropy between reboots
Virtual machines emulate some hardware components so that the generated entropy is over-
estimated. The most critical component that has been shown to return wrong results in an emu-
lated environment is the timing source [Eng11, POL11].
Typically the most vulnerable time where low-entropy situations occur is shortly after a reboot.
Unfortunately many operating system installers create cryptographic keys shortly after a re-
boot [HDWH12].
3.3. Random Number Generators 3.3.2. Linux
Another problem is that OpenSSL seeds its internal random generator only seldomly from the
hardware random number generator of the operating system. This can lead to situations where a
daemon that is started at a time when entropy is low keeps this low-entropy situation for hours
leading to predictable session keys [HDWH12].
3.3.2. Linux
On Linux there are two devices that return random bytes when read; the /dev/random can block
until sucient entropy has been collected while /dev/urandom will not block and return whatever
(possibly insucient) entropy has been collected so far.
Unfortunately most crypto implementations are using /dev/urandom and can produce predictable
random numbers if not enough entropy has been collected [HDWH12].
Linux supports the injection of additional entropy into the entropy pool via the device /dev/random.
On the one hand this is used for keeping entropy across reboots by storing output of /dev/random
into a le before shutdown and re-injecting the contents during the boot process. On the other
hand this can be used for running a secondary entropy collector to inject entropy into the kernel
entropy pool.
On Linux you can check how much entropy is available with the command:
$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail
3.3.3. Recommendations
To avoid situations where a newly deployed server doesnt have enough entropy it is recommended
to generate keys (e.g. for SSL or SSH) on a system with a sucient amount of entropy available and
transfer the generated keys to the server. This is especially advisable for small embedded devices
or virtual machines.
For embedded devices and virtual machines deploying additional userspace software that gen-
erates entropy and feeds this to kernel entropy pool (e.g. by writing to /dev/random on Linux)
is recommended. Note that only a process with root rights can update the entropy counters in
the kernel; non-root or user processes can still feed entropy to the pool but cannot update the
counters [Wik13a].
For Linux the haveged implementation [HAV13a] based on the HAVEGE [SS03] strong random
number generator currently looks like the best choice. It can feed its generated entropy into the
kernel entropy pool and recently has grown a mechanism to monitor the quality of generated
random numbers [HAV13b]. The memory footprint may be too high for small embedded devices,
though.
For systems where during the lifetime of the keys it is expected that low-entropy situations
occur, RSA keys should be preferred over DSA keys: For DSA, if there is ever insucient entropy
at the time keys are used for signing this may lead to repeated ephemeral keys. An attacker who
can guess an ephemeral private key used in such a signature can compromise the DSA secret
3.4. Keylengths 3.4. Keylengths
key. For RSA this can lead to discovery of encrypted plaintext or forged signatures but not to the
compromise of the secret key [HDWH12].
3.4. Keylengths
On the choice between AES256 and AES128: I would never
consider using AES256, just like I dont wear a helmet when
I sit inside my car. Its too much bother for the epsilon
improvement in security.
Vincent Rijmen in a personal mail exchange Dec 2013
Recommendations on keylengths need to be adapted regularly. Since this document rst of all is
static and second of all, does not consider itself to be authoritative on keylengths, we would rather
refer to existing publications and websites. Recommending a safe key length is a hit-and-miss
issue.
Furthermore, when choosing an encryption algorithm and key length, the designer/sysadmin
always needs to consider the value of the information and how long it must be protected. In other
words: consider the number of years the data needs to stay condential.
The ECRYPT II publication [IS12] gives a fascinating overview of strengths of symmetric keys in
chapter 5 and chapter 7. Summarizing ECRYPT II, we recommend 128 bit of key strength for
symmetric keys. In ECRYPT II, this is considered safe for security level 7, long term protection.
In the same ECRYPT II publication you can nd a practical comparison of key size equivalence
between symmetric key sizes and RSA, discrete log (DLOG) and EC keylengths. ECRYPT II arrives at
the interesting conclusion that for an equivalence of 128 bit symmetric size, you will need to use
an 3248 bit RSA key [IS12, chapter 7, page 30].
There are a couple of other studies comparing keylengths and their respective strengths. The
website http://www.keylength.com/ compares these papers and oers a good overview of ap-
proximations for key lengths based on recommendations by dierent standardization bodies and
academic publications. Figure 3.3 shows a typical comparison of keylengths on this web site.
Summary
For asymmetric public-key cryptography we consider any key length below 3248 bits to be
deprecated at the time of this writing (for long term protection).
For elliptic curve cryptography we consider key lengths below 256 bits to be inadequate for
long term protection.
For symmetric algorithms we consider anything below 128 bits to be inadequate for long
term protection.
3.5. A note on Elliptic Curve Cryptography 3.5. A note on Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Figure 3.3.: Screenshot of http://www.keylength.com for 128 bit symmetric key size equivalents
Special remark on 3DES: We want to note that 3DES theoretically has 168 bits of security, however
based on the NIST Special Publication 800-57
5
, it is clear that 3DES can only be considered to
provide for 80 bits / 112 bits security.
3.5. A note on Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Everyone knows what a curve is, until he has studied
enough mathematics to become confused through the
countless number of possible exceptions.
Felix Klein
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (simply called ECC from now on) is a branch of cryptography that
emerged in the mid-1980s. The security of the RSA algorithm is based on the assumption that
factoring large numbers is infeasible. Likewise, the security of ECC, DH and DSA is based on the
discrete logarithm problem [Wik13b, McC90, Wol13]. Finding the discrete logarithm of an elliptic
curve from its public base point is thought to be infeasible. This is known as the Elliptic Curve
Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). ECC and the underlying mathematical foundation are not
5
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html#800-57-part1, pages 63 and 64
3.7. A note on Die Hellman Key Exchanges 3.6. A note on SHA-1
easy to understand - luckily, there have been some great introductions on the topic lately
6 7 8
. ECC
provides for much stronger security with less computationally expensive operations in comparison
to traditional asymmetric algorithms (See the Section 3.4). The security of ECC relies on the elliptic
curves and curve points chosen as parameters for the algorithm in question. Well before the NSA-
leak scandal there has been a lot of discussion regarding these parameters and their potential
subversion. A part of the discussion involved recommended sets of curves and curve points chosen
by dierent standardization bodies such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST)
9
which were later widely implemented in most common crypto libraries. Those parameters
came under question repeatedly from cryptographers [BL13, Sch13b, W.13]. At the time of writing,
there is ongoing research as to the security of various ECC parameters [DJB13]. Most software
congured to rely on ECC (be it client or server) is not able to promote or black-list certain curves.
It is the hope of the authors that such functionality will be deployed widely soon. The authors of
this paper include congurations and recommendations with and without ECC - the reader may
choose to adopt those settings as he nds best suited to his environment. The authors will not
make this decision for the reader.
A word of warning: One should get familiar with ECC, dierent curves and parameters if one
chooses to adopt ECC congurations. Since there is much discussion on the security of ECC, awed
settings might very well compromise the security of the entire system!
3.6. A note on SHA-1
In the last years several weaknesses have been shown for SHA-1. In particular, collisions on SHA-1
can be found using 2
63
operations, and recent results even indicate a lower complexity. Therefore,
ECRYPT II and NIST recommend against using SHA-1 for generating digital signatures and for other
applications that require collision resistance. The use of SHA-1 in message authentication, e.g.
HMAC, is not immediately threatened.
We recommend using SHA-2 whenever available. Since SHA-2 is not supported by older versions
of TLS, SHA-1 can be used for message authentication if a higher compatibility with a more diverse
set of clients is needed.
Our congurations A and B reect this. While conguration A does not include SHA-1, conguration
B does and thus is more compatible with a wider range of clients.
3.7. A note on Die Hellman Key Exchanges
A common question is which Die Hellman (DH) Parameters should be used for Die Hellman
key exchanges
10
. We follow the recommendations in ECRYPT II [IS12, chapter 16]
6
http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/10/a-relatively-easy-to-understand-primer-on-elliptic-curve-cryptography
7
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2010/12/04/ecc.html
8
http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~sdg/ecc.html
9
http://www.nist.gov
10
http://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/1963/how-large-should-a-die-hellman-p-be
3.8. Public Key Infrastructures 3.8. Public Key Infrastructures
Where congurable, we recommend using the Die Hellman groups dened for IKE, specically
groups 14-18 (20488192 bit MODP [KK03]). These groups have been checked by many eyes and
can be assumed to be secure.
For convenience, we provide these parameters as PEM les on our webserver
11
.
3.8. Public Key Infrastructures
Public-Key Infrastructures try to solve the problem of verifying whether a public key belongs to a
given entity, so as to prevent Man In The Middle attacks.
There are two approaches to achieve that: Certicate Authorities and the Web of Trust.
Certicate Authorities (CAs) sign end-entities certicates, thereby associating some kind of identity
(e.g. a domain name or an email address) with a public key. CAs are used with TLS and S/MIME
certicates, and the CA system has a big list of possible and real problems which are summarized
in section 3.8.2 and [DKBH13].
The Web of Trust is a decentralized system where people sign each others keys, so that there is a
high chance that there is a trust path from one key to another. This is used with PGP keys, and
while it avoids most of the problems of the CA system, it is more cumbersome.
As alternatives to these public systems, there are two more choices: running a private CA, and
manually trusting keys (as it is used with SSH keys or manually trusted keys in web browsers).
The rst part of this section addresses how to obtain a certicate in the CA system. The second
part oers recommendations on how to improve the security of your PKI.
3.8.1. Certicate Authorities
In order to get a certicate, you can nd an external CA willing to issue a certicate for you, run
your own CA, or use self-signed certicates. As always, there are advantages and disadvantages
for every one of these options; a balance of security versus usability needs to be found.
Certicates From an External Certicate Authority
There is a fairly large number of commercial CAs that will issue certicates for money. Some
of the most ubiquitous commercial CAs are Verisign, GoDaddy, and Teletrust. However, there
are also CAs that oer certicates for free. The most notable examples are StartSSL, which is a
company that oers some types of certicates for free, and CAcert, which is a non-prot volunteer-
based organization that does not charge at all for issuing certicates. Finally, in the research and
11
https://www.bettercrypto.org/static/dhparams/
3.8. Public Key Infrastructures 3.8.1. Certicate Authorities
education eld, a number of CAs exist that are generally well-known and well-accepted within the
higher-education community.
A large number of CAs is pre-installed in client softwares or operating systemstrust stores;
depending on your application, you have to select your CA according to this, or have a mechanism
to distribute the chosen CAs root certicate to the clients.
When requesting a certicate from a CA, it is vital that you generate the key pair yourself. In
particular, the private key should never be known to the CA. If a CA oers to generate the key pair
for you, you should not trust that CA.
Generating a key pair and a certicate request can be done with a number of tools. On Unix-like
systems, it is likely that the OpenSSL suite is available to you. In this case, you can generate a
private key and a corresponding certicate request as follows:
% openssl req -new -nodes -keyout <servername>.key -out <servername>.csr -newkey \
\rsa:<keysize>
Country Name (2 letter code) [AU]:DE
State or Province Name (full name) [Some-State]:Bavaria
Locality Name (eg, city) []:Munich
Organization Name (eg, company) [Internet Widgits Pty Ltd]:Example
Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) []:Example Section
Common Name (e.g. server FQDN or YOUR name) []:example.com
Email Address []:admin@example.com
Please enter the following 'extra' attributes
to be sent with your certificate request
A challenge password []:
An optional company name []:
Setting Up Your Own Certicate Authority
In some situations it is advisable to run your own certicate authority. Whether this is a good idea
depends on the exact circumstances. Generally speaking, the more centralized the control of the
systems in your environment, the fewer pains you will have to go through to deploy your own CA.
On the other hand, running your own CA maximizes the trust level that you can achieve because it
minimizes external trust dependencies.
Again using OpenSSL as an example, you can set up your own CA with the following commands on
a Debian system:
% cd /usr/lib/ssl/misc
% sudo ./CA.pl -newca
Answer the questions according to your setup. Now that you have congured your basic settings
and issued a new root certicate, you can issue new certicates as follows:
% cd /usr/lib/ssl/misc
% sudo ./CA.pl -newreq
3.9. TLS and its support mechanisms 3.8.2. Hardening PKI
Alternatively, software such as TinyCA [Wik13d] that acts as a wrapper around OpenSSL and tries
to make life easier is available.
Creating a Self-Signed Certicate
If the desired trust level is very high and the number of systems involved is limited, the easiest way
to set up a secure environment may be to use self-signed certicates. A self-signed certicate is
not issued by any CA at all, but is signed by the entity that it is issued to. Thus, the organizational
overhead of running a CA is eliminated at the expense of having to establish all trust relationships
between entities manually.
With OpenSSL, you can self-sign a previously created certicate with this command:
% openssl req -new -x509 -key privkey.pem -out cacert.pem -days 1095
You can also create a self-signed certicate in just one command:
openssl req -new -x509 -keyout privkey.pem -out cacert.pem -days 1095 -nodes -\
\newkey rsa:<keysize>
The resulting certicate will by default not be trusted by anyone at all, so in order to be useful, the
certicate will have to be made known a priori to all parties that may encounter it.
3.8.2. Hardening PKI
In recent years several CAs were compromised by attackers in order to get a hold of trusted
certicates for malicious activities. In 2011 the Dutch CA Diginotar was hacked and all certicates
were revoked [Eli11]. Recently Google found certicates issued to them, which were not used by
the company [Dam11]. The concept of PKIs heavily depends on the security of CAs. If they get
compromised the whole PKI system will fail. Some CAs tend to incorrectly issue certicates that
were designated to do a dierent job than what they were intended to by the CA [Ada13b].
Therefore several security enhancements were introduced by dierent organizations and ven-
dors [H. 13]. Currently two methods are used, DANE [HS12] and Certicate Pinning [C. 13]. Google
recently proposed a new system to detect malicious CAs and certicates called Certicate Trans-
parency [Ada13a].
3.9. TLS and its support mechanisms
TODO: Add a short intro
3.9. TLS and its support mechanisms 3.9.1. HTTP Strict Transport Security
3.9.1. HTTP Strict Transport Security
HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) is a web security policy mechanism. HSTS is realized through
HTTP header by which a web server declares that complying user agents (web browsers) should
interact with it by using only secure HTTPS connections
12
.
HSTS header is bound to a DNS name or domain by which the server was accessed. For example if
server serves content for two domains and it is HTTPS enabled only for one domain, the browser
wont enforce HSTS for the latter.
HSTS reduces the risk of active man-in-the-middle attacks such as SSL stripping, and impersonation
attacks with untrusted certicate. HSTS also helps to avoid unintentional mistakes such as insecure
links to a secure web site (missing HTTPS links
13
), and mistyped HTTPS URLs.
After the web browser receives a HSTS header in a correctly
14
prepared SSL session it will automat-
ically use secure HTTPS links for accessing the server. This prevents unencrypted HTTP access (SSL
striping, mistyped HTTPS URLs, etc.) when the server is accessed later by the client.
When a server (that previously emitted a HSTS header) starts using untrusted certicate, complying
user agent must show an error message and block the server connection. Thus impersonation MITM
attack with untrusted certicate cannot occur.
For the initial setup HSTS header needs a trusted secure connection over HTTPS. This limitation
can be addressed by compiling a list of STS enabled sites directly into a browser
15
.
HSTS Header Directives
HSTS header can be parametrized by two directives:
max-age=<number-of-seconds>
includeSubdomains
max-age is a required directive. This directive indicates the number of seconds during which the
user agent should enforce the HSTS policy (after the reception of the STS header eld from a
server).
includeSubdomains is an optional directive. This directive indicates that the HSTS Policy applies to
this HSTS Host as well as any subdomains of the hosts domain name.
12
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security
13
Thus, it might be useful for xing HTTPS mixed-content related errors, see https://community.qualys.com/blogs/
securitylabs/2014/03/19/https-mixed-content-still-the-easiest-way-to-break-ssl.
14
Website must load without SSL/TLS browser warnings (certicate is issued by a trusted CA, contains correct DNS name, it
is time valid, etc.)
15
List of the preloaded sites can be found at http://dev.chromium.org/sts. This list is managed by Google/Chrome but it is
also used by Firefox https://wiki.mozilla.org/Privacy/Features/HSTS_Preload_List
HSTS Client Support
HSTS is supported
16
by these web browsers:
Firefox version >= v4.0
Chrome version >= 4.0
Android Browser >=4.4
Opera version >= 12.0
Opera mobile >= 16.0
Safari >= 7.0
Microsoft should add HSTS support in Internet Explorer 12
17
.
HSTS Considerations
Before enabling HSTS it is recommended to consider following:
Is it required to serve content or services over HTTP?
Enabling includeSubdomains and SSL certicate management.
Proper value of max-age.
It is recommended to serve all content using HTTPS, but there are exceptions to this rule as
well. Consider running a private PKI
18
. CRLs and OCSP responses are published typically by HTTP
protocol. If HSTS is enabled on the site where OCSP and CRLs are published the browser might fail
fetching CRL or validating OCSP response.
Similar reasoning goes for includeSubdomains. One needs to be sure that HTTPS can be enforced
for all subdomains. Moreover the administrators are advised to watch for expiration of the SSL
certicate and handle the renewal process with caution. If a SSL certicate is renewed after expira-
tion or misses a (HSTS enabled) domain name, the connection to site will break (without providing
override mechanism to the end user).
Finally HSTS should be tested with lower max-age values and deployed with higher max-age val-
ues.
Testing HSTS
HSTS can be tested either using locally or through the Internet.
For local testing it is possible to utilize Chrome Web browser UI by typing chrome://net-internals/
#hsts
19
in the address bar.
16
http://caniuse.com/stricttransportsecurity
17
http://status.modern.ie/httpstricttransportsecurityhsts
18
see Public Key Infrastructures
19
see http://blog.chromium.org/2011/06/new-chromium-security-features-june.html
Testing over the Internet can be conducted by Qualys SSL Labs test https://www.ssllabs.com/
ssltest/. Strict Transport Security (HSTS) information is located in the Protocol Details section.
References
Websites Must Use HSTS in Order to Be Secure https://www.e.org/deeplinks/2014/02/
websites-hsts
OWASP: HTTP Strict Transport Security: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/HTTP_Strict_Transport_
Security
HSTS Browser Compatibility List: http://caniuse.com/stricttransportsecurity
RFC 6797:HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) - Examples: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6797#
section-6.2
Listings
2.1. SSL conguration for an Apache vhost
configuration/Webservers/Apache/default-ssl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2. https auto-redirect vhost
configuration/Webservers/Apache/hsts-vhost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3. SSL conguration for lighttpd
configuration/Webservers/lighttpd/10-ssl.conf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4. SSL EC/DH conguration for lighttpd
configuration/Webservers/lighttpd/10-ssl-dh.conf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5. https auto-redirect conguration
configuration/Webservers/lighttpd/11-hsts.conf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.6. SSL settings for nginx
configuration/Webservers/nginx/default . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.7. SSL EC/DH settings for nginx
configuration/Webservers/nginx/default-ec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.8. https auto-redirect in nginx
configuration/Webservers/nginx/default-hsts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.9. SNI for SSL on Apache
configuration/Webservers-legacy/Apache/ports.conf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.10.SNI catchall on Apache
configuration/Webservers-legacy/Apache/000-default-ssl . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.11.SNI catchall on nginx
configuration/Webservers-legacy/nginx/default . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.12.Important OpenSSH 6.6 security settings
configuration/SSH/OpenSSH/6.6/sshd_config . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.15.Dovecot SSL conguration
configuration/MailServers/Dovecot/10-ssl.conf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.16.Activating TLS in cyrus
configuration/MailServers/cyrus-imapd/imapd.conf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.17.TLS cipher selection in cyrus
2.18.Force encrypted connections in cyrus
2.19.STARTTLS for POP3/IMAP and POP3S/IMAPS in cyrus
configuration/MailServers/cyrus-imapd/cyrus.conf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.20.Opportunistic TLS in Postx
configuration/MailServers/Postfix/main.cf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.21.MSA TLS conguration in Postx
2.22.MSA smtpd service conguration in Postx
configuration/MailServers/Postfix/master.cf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Listings Listings
2.23.EECDH customization in Postx
2.24.Certicate selection in Exim (MSA)
configuration/MailServers/Exim/configure.msa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.25.TLS advertise in Exim (MSA)
2.26.STARTTLS and SMTPS in Exim (MSA)
2.27.SSL-only authentication in Exim (MSA)
2.28.Submission mode in Exim (MSA)
2.29.Certicate selection in Exim (Server)
configuration/MailServers/Exim/configure.server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.30.TLS advertise in Exim (Server)
2.31.STARTTLS on SMTP in Exim (Server)
2.32.TLS certicate veriaction in Exim (Server)
2.33.Certicate selection in Exim (Client)
configuration/MailServers/Exim/configure.client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.34.Cipher conguration for OpenVPN (Server)
configuration/VPNs/OpenVPN/server.conf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.35.Cipher and TLS conguration for OpenVPN (Server)
configuration/VPNs/OpenVPN/client.conf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.36.Sane default values for OpenVPN (easy-rsa)
configuration/VPNs/OpenVPN/vars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.37.Cipher and digest selection in tinc
configuration/VPNs/tinc/tinc.conf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.38.Digest selection in GnuPG
configuration/GPG/GnuPG/gpg.conf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.39.TLS setup for ejabberd
configuration/IM/ejabberd/ejabberd.cfg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.40.SSL relevant conguration for Charybdis/ircd-seven
configuration/IM/Charybdis/ircd.conf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.41.SSL conguration fo MySQL
configuration/DBs/MySQL/my.cnf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.42.Enabling SSL in PostgreSQL
configuration/DBs/PostgreSQL/9.1/postgresql.conf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.43.Certicate locations in PostgreSQL 9.2
configuration/DBs/PostgreSQL/9.3/postgresql.conf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.44.HTTPS Listener in Pound
configuration/Proxies/Pound/pound.cfg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.45.Encryption ags for MIT krb5 KDC
configuration/Kerberos/krb5/kdc.conf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.46.Encryption ags for MIT krb5 client
configuration/Kerberos/krb5/krb5.conf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
A. Tools
This section lists tools for checking the security settings.
A.1. SSL & TLS
Server checks via the web
ssllabs.com oers a great way to check your webserver for miscongurations. See https://
www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/. Furthermore, ssllabs.com has a good best practices tutorial, which
focuses on avoiding the most common mistakes in SSL.
SSL Server certicate installation issues https://www.sslshopper.com/ssl-checker.html
Check SPDY protocol support and basic TLS setup http://spdycheck.org/
XMPP/Jabber Server check (Client-to-Server and Server-to-Server) https://xmpp.net/
Luxsci SMTP TLS Checker https://luxsci.com/extranet/tlschecker.html
Does your mail server support StartTLS? https://starttls.info/
http://checktls.com is a tool for testing arbitrary TLS services.
TLS and SSH key check https://factorable.net/keycheck.html
http://tls.secg.org is a tool for testing interoperability of HTTPS implementations for ECC
cipher suites.
http://www.whynopadlock.com/ Testing for mixed SSL parts loaded via http that can totally
lever your HTTPS.
Browser checks
Check your browsers SSL capabilities: https://cc.dcsec.uni-hannover.de/ and https://www.
ssllabs.com/ssltest/viewMyClient.html.
Check Browsers SSL/TLS support and vulnerability to attacks: https://www.howsmyssl.com
Command line tools
https://sourceforge.net/projects/sslscan connects to a given SSL service and shows the cipher
suites that are oered.
http://www.bolet.org/TestSSLServer/ tests for BEAST and CRIME vulnerabilities.
https://github.com/iSECPartners/sslyze Fast and full-featured SSL scanner
http://nmap.org/ nmap security scanner
http://www.openssl.net OpenSSL s_client
A.4. Guides A.2. Key length
A.2. Key length
http://www.keylength.com comprehensive online resource for comparison of key lengths
according to common recommendations and standards in cryptography.
A.3. RNGs
ENT is a pseudo random number generator sequence tester.
HaveGE is a tool which increases the Entropy of the Linux random number generator devices.
It is based on the HAVEGE algorithm. http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=945516
Dieharder a random number generator testing tool.
CAcert Random another random number generator testing service.
A.4. Guides
See: https://www.ssllabs.com/downloads/SSL_TLS_Deployment_Best_Practices_1.3.pdf.
B. Links
IANA ocial list of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Parameters: https://www.iana.org/assignments/
tls-parameters/tls-parameters.txt
SSL cipher settings: http://www.skytale.net/blog/archives/22-SSL-cipher-setting.html
Elliptic curves and their implementation (04 Dec 2010): https://www.imperialviolet.org/2010/
12/04/ecc.html
A (relatively easy to understand) primer on elliptic curve cryptography: http://arstechnica.
com/security/2013/10/a-relatively-easy-to-understand-primer-on-elliptic-curve-cryptography
Duraconf, A collection of hardened conguration les for SSL/TLS services (Jacob Appel-
baums github): https://github.com/ioerror/duraconf
Attacks on SSL a comprehensive study of BEAST, CRIME, TIME, BREACH, LUCKY 13 & RC4
Biases: https://www.isecpartners.com/media/106031/ssl_attacks_survey.pdf
EFF How to deploy HTTPS correctly: https://www.e.org/https-everywhere/deploying-https
Bruce Almighty: Schneier preaches security to Linux faithful (on not recommending to use
Blowsh anymore in favor of Twosh): https://www.computerworld.com.au/article/46254/
bruce_almighty_schneier_preaches_security_linux_faithful/?pp=3
Implement FIPS 183-3 for DSA keys (1024bit constraint): https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_
bug.cgi?id=1647
Elliptic Curve Cryptography in Practice: http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/734.pdf
Factoring as a Service: http://crypto.2013.rump.cr.yp.to/981774ce07e51813fd4466612a78601b.
pdf
Black Ops of TCP/IP 2012: http://dankaminsky.com/2012/08/06/bo2012/
SSL and the Future of Authenticity, Moxie Marlinspike - Black Hat USA 2011: https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=Z7Wl2FW2TcA
ENISA - Algorithms, Key Sizes and Parameters Report (Oct.13) http://www.enisa.europa.eu/
activities/identity-and-trust/library/deliverables/algorithms-key-sizes-and-parameters-report
Die-Hellman Groups http://ibm.co/18lslZf
Die-Hellman Groups standardized in RFC3526 [KK03] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc3526/
ECC-enabled GnuPG per RFC6637 [Jiv12] https://code.google.com/p/gnupg-ecc
TLS Security (Survey + Lucky13 + RC4 Attack) by Kenny Paterson https://www.cosic.esat.
kuleuven.be/ecc2013/les/kenny.pdf
Ensuring High-Quality Randomness in Cryptographic Key Generation http://arxiv.org/abs/
1309.7366v1
Wikipedia: Ciphertext Stealing https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ciphertext_stealing
Wikipedia: Malleability (Cryptography) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malleability_(cryptography)
Ritters Crypto Glossary and Dictionary of Technical Cryptography http://www.ciphersbyritter.
com/GLOSSARY.HTM
C. Suggested Reading
This section contains suggested reading material.
Cryptography Engineering: Design Principles and Practical Applications, Ferguson, N. and
Schneier, B. and Kohno, T. (ISBN-13: 978-0470474242)
Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems, Anderson, R.J.
(ISBN-13: 978-0470068526)
Applied cryptography: protocols, algorithms, and source code in C, Schneier, B. (ISBN-13:
978-0471117094)
Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Hankerson, D. and Vanstone, S. and Menezes, A.J. (ISBN-
13: 978-0387952734)
A Introduction To The Theory of Numbers, Godfrey Harold Hardy, E. M. Wrigh (ISBN-13:
978-0199219865)
Malicious Cryptography: Exposing Cryptovirology, Young A., Yung, M. (ISBN-13: 978-0764549755)
D. Cipher Suite Name Cross-Reference
This table shows the cipher suite names as IANA dened them, the names OpenSSL uses, and the
respective codes.
The list of IANA cipher suite names was retrieved fromhttps://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/
tls-parameters-4.csv on Tue Jun 3 22:36:58 2014.
The list of OpenSSL Ciphers was generated with OpenSSL 1.0.1e 11 Feb 2013.
Code IANA Name OpenSSL Name
0x00,0x00 TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL
0x00,0x01 TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 NULL-MD5
0x00,0x02 TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA NULL-SHA
0x00,0x03 TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 EXP-RC4-MD5
0x00,0x04 TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 RC4-MD5
0x00,0x05 TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA RC4-SHA
0x00,0x06 TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5
0x00,0x07 TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x08 TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-DES-CBC-SHA
0x00,0x09 TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA DES-CBC-SHA
0x00,0x0A TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA DES-CBC3-SHA
0x00,0x0B TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x0C TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x0D TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x0E TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x0F TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x10 TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x11 TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA
0x00,0x12 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA
0x00,0x13 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA
0x00,0x14 TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA
0x00,0x15 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA
0x00,0x16 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
0x00,0x17 TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 EXP-ADH-RC4-MD5
0x00,0x18 TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 ADH-RC4-MD5
0x00,0x19 TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-ADH-DES-CBC-SHA
0x00,0x1A TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA ADH-DES-CBC-SHA
A.4. Guides A.4. Guides
0x00,0x1B TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA
0x00,0x1E TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x1F TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x20 TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
0x00,0x21 TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x22 TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_MD5
0x00,0x23 TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_MD5
0x00,0x24 TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_MD5
0x00,0x25 TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_MD5
0x00,0x26 TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_SHA
0x00,0x27 TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_SHA
0x00,0x28 TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_SHA
0x00,0x29 TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_MD5
0x00,0x2A TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5
0x00,0x2B TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5
0x00,0x2C TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA
0x00,0x2D TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA
0x00,0x2E TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA
0x00,0x2F TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA AES128-SHA
0x00,0x30 TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x31 TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x32 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA
0x00,0x33 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA
0x00,0x34 TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ADH-AES128-SHA
0x00,0x35 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA AES256-SHA
0x00,0x36 TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x37 TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x38 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA
0x00,0x39 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
0x00,0x3A TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ADH-AES256-SHA
0x00,0x3B TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 NULL-SHA256
0x00,0x3C TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 AES128-SHA256
0x00,0x3D TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 AES256-SHA256
0x00,0x3E TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0x3F TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0x40 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256
0x00,0x41 TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA CAMELLIA128-SHA
0x00,0x42 TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x43 TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x44 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA
0x00,0x45 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA
0x00,0x46 TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA
0x00,0x67 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256
0x00,0x68 TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0x69 TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0x6A TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256
0x00,0x6B TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256
0x00,0x6C TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ADH-AES128-SHA256
0x00,0x6D TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 ADH-AES256-SHA256
0x00,0x84 TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA CAMELLIA256-SHA
0x00,0x85 TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x86 TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x87 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA
0x00,0x88 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA
0x00,0x89 TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA
0x00,0x8A TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA PSK-RC4-SHA
0x00,0x8B TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA
0x00,0x8C TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA
0x00,0x8D TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA
0x00,0x8E TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
0x00,0x8F TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x90 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x91 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x92 TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
0x00,0x93 TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x94 TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x95 TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x96 TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA SEED-SHA
0x00,0x97 TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x98 TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x99 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA
0x00,0x9A TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA
0x00,0x9B TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA ADH-SEED-SHA
0x00,0x9C TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 AES128-GCM-SHA256
0x00,0x9D TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 AES256-GCM-SHA384
0x00,0x9E TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
0x00,0x9F TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
0x00,0xA0 TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
0x00,0xA1 TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
0x00,0xA2 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256
0x00,0xA3 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384
0x00,0xA4 TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
0x00,0xA5 TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
0x00,0xA6 TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ADH-AES128-GCM-SHA256
0x00,0xA7 TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384
0x00,0xA8 TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
0x00,0xA9 TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
0x00,0xAA TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
0x00,0xAB TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
0x00,0xAC TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
0x00,0xAD TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
0x00,0xAE TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0xAF TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
0x00,0xB0 TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256
0x00,0xB1 TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384
0x00,0xB2 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0xB3 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
0x00,0xB4 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256
0x00,0xB5 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384
0x00,0xB6 TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0xB7 TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
0x00,0xB8 TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256
0x00,0xB9 TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384
0x00,0xBA TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0xBB TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0xBC TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0xBD TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0xBE TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0xBF TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0xC0 TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0xC1 TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0xC2 TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0xC3 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0xC4 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0xC5 TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0xFF TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV
0xC0,0x01 TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA ECDH-ECDSA-NULL-SHA
0xC0,0x02 TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA ECDH-ECDSA-RC4-SHA
0xC0,0x03 TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
0xC0,0x04 TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA
0xC0,0x05 TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA
0xC0,0x06 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA ECDHE-ECDSA-NULL-SHA
0xC0,0x07 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA ECDHE-ECDSA-RC4-SHA
0xC0,0x08 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
0xC0,0x09 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA
0xC0,0x0A TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA
0xC0,0x0B TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA ECDH-RSA-NULL-SHA
0xC0,0x0C TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA ECDH-RSA-RC4-SHA
0xC0,0x0D TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
0xC0,0x0E TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA
0xC0,0x0F TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA
0xC0,0x10 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA ECDHE-RSA-NULL-SHA
0xC0,0x11 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA
0xC0,0x12 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
0xC0,0x13 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA
0xC0,0x14 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
0xC0,0x15 TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA AECDH-NULL-SHA
0xC0,0x16 TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA AECDH-RC4-SHA
0xC0,0x17 TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA AECDH-DES-CBC3-SHA
0xC0,0x18 TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA AECDH-AES128-SHA
0xC0,0x19 TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA AECDH-AES256-SHA
0xC0,0x1A TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA SRP-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA
0xC0,0x1B TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA SRP-RSA-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA
0xC0,0x1C TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA SRP-DSS-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA
0xC0,0x1D TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA SRP-AES-128-CBC-SHA
0xC0,0x1E TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA SRP-RSA-AES-128-CBC-SHA
0xC0,0x1F TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA SRP-DSS-AES-128-CBC-SHA
0xC0,0x20 TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA SRP-AES-256-CBC-SHA
0xC0,0x21 TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA SRP-RSA-AES-256-CBC-SHA
0xC0,0x22 TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA SRP-DSS-AES-256-CBC-SHA
0xC0,0x23 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256
0xC0,0x24 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384
0xC0,0x25 TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256
0xC0,0x26 TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384
0xC0,0x27 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256
0xC0,0x28 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384
0xC0,0x29 TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA256
0xC0,0x2A TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384
0xC0,0x2B TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
0xC0,0x2C TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
0xC0,0x2D TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
0xC0,0x2E TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
0xC0,0x2F TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
0xC0,0x30 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
0xC0,0x31 TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
0xC0,0x32 TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ECDH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
0xC0,0x33 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
0xC0,0x34 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
0xC0,0x35 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
0xC0,0x36 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
0xC0,0x37 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x38 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x39 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA
0xC0,0x3A TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256
0xC0,0x3B TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384
0xC0,0x3C TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x3D TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x3E TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x3F TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x40 TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x41 TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x42 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x43 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x44 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x45 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x46 TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x47 TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x48 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x49 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x4A TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x4B TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x4C TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x4D TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x4E TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x4F TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x50 TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x51 TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x52 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x53 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x54 TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x55 TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x56 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x57 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x58 TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x59 TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x5A TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x5B TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x5C TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x5D TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x5E TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x5F TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x60 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x61 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x62 TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x63 TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x64 TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x65 TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x66 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x67 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x68 TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x69 TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x6A TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x6B TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x6C TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x6D TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x6E TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x6F TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x70 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x71 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x72 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x73 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x74 TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x75 TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x76 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x77 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x78 TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x79 TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x7A TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x7B TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x7C TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x7D TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x7E TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x7F TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x80 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x81 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x82 TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x83 TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x84 TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x85 TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x86 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x87 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x88 TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x89 TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x8A TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x8B TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x8C TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x8D TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x8E TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x8F TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x90 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x91 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x92 TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x93 TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x94 TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x95 TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x96 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x97 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x98 TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x99 TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x9A TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x9B TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x9C TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM
0xC0,0x9D TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
0xC0,0x9E TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM
0xC0,0x9F TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
0xC0,0xA0 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8
0xC0,0xA1 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8
0xC0,0xA2 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8
0xC0,0xA3 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8
0xC0,0xA4 TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM
0xC0,0xA5 TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM
0xC0,0xA6 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM
0xC0,0xA7 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM
0xC0,0xA8 TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8
0xC0,0xA9 TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8
0xC0,0xAA TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8
0xC0,0xAB TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8
0xC0,0xAC TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM
0xC0,0xAD TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
0xC0,0xAE TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8
0xC0,0xAF TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8
E. Further research
The following is a list of services, software packages, hardware devices or protocols that we consid-
ered documenting but either did not manage to document yet or might be able to document later.
We encourage input from the Internet community.
whatsapp (might be prob-
lematic since a user/ad-
min cant change any-
thing)
Lync
Skype (might be problem-
atic since a user/admin
cant change anything)
Wi-Fi APs, 802.1X
Tomcat
SIP
SRTP
DNSSec (mention BCPs)
DANE
TOR
S/Mime (check are there
any BCPs? )
TrueCrypt, LUKS, File-
Vault
AFS
Kerberos
NNTP
NTPs tlsdate
BGP / OSPF
SILC
LDAP
seclayer-tcp
Commerical network
equipment vendors
RADIUS
Moxa , APC, und co... ICS .
Ethernet to serial
telnet (only sensible rec-
ommendation: DONt!!)
rsyslog
v6 spoong (look at work
by Ferndo Gont, Marc
Heuse, et. al.)
tinc
racoon
l2tp
rsync
telnets
ftps
webmin (probably the
same recommendations
as with Apache apply, but
where does that need to
be congured?)
plesk (same as webmin)
phpmyadmin (same as
webmin)
DSL modems (where to
start?)
UPnP, natPmp
SAML federated auth
providers
1
Microsoft SQL Server
1
e.g., all the REFEDS folks (https://refeds.org/)), including InCommon (http://www.incommon.org/federation/metadata.
html https://wiki.shibboleth.net/conuence/display/SHIB2/TrustManagement
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Index
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