Republic of the Philippines

Cebu City, 6000

People of the Philippines, Petitioner
vs
Josh Peyton, Respondent

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS

Respondent Atty. Josh Peyton was involved in the Kidnapping incident of a six-year-old girl
named Caitlyn Faulkner. He is charged as an accessory of the crime because of his participation as a
runner for the ransom money and the escape of Client X.

Subsequent to the kidnapping incident, Client X approached Atty. Peyton in his office to seek for
help. Client X confessed to Atty. Peyton that he kidnapped a little girl. Client X negotiated with Atty.
Peyton to play the role of a runner for the two (2) million dollars ransom money from the parents. Atty.
Peyton indeed affirmed during the cross examination of the prosecution during the trial, and we quote,
I made the deal. I would go to the parents, get the money and cash. He would bring the girl to me, and
which time, I would give him the cash. He succeeded in getting hold of the ransom money, however,
after giving it to Client X, Atty. Peyton did not immediately return Caitlyn to her parents upon custody.
Caitlyn is scared knowing that the man who took her is still there. Further narrated, I stayed at his
office, at that night, he called my parents. Why aren`t you calling the police? He`s getting away. He had
assured first that Client X could get a full day to escape from the country. Furthermore, despite his
custody of the girl, he did not call the police.


ISSUES

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED IS AN ACCESSORY TO THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING
FOR RANSOM.

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED CAN BE HELD CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR VIOLATING
PD 1829 OR AN ACT PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION AND
PRESECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS

III. WHETHER OR NOT ATTY. PEYTON CAN INVOKE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE UNDER
CANON 15 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

ARGUMENTS

I. YES. The accused is an accessory to the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom.

II. YES. The accused can be held criminally responsible for violating PD 1829 sec. 1
paragraph (c).

III. YES. The accused is guilty as an accessory for withholding identity of the perpetrator.

DISCUSSION

I. Under the Revised Penal Code, Article 19 defines an Accessory as those who, having
knowledge in the commission of the crime, and without having participated therein,
either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of
the following manners:

i. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender profit by the
effects of the crime;
ii. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime or the effects or
instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery;
iii. By harboring, concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal of the
crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or
whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder,
or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be
habitually guilty of some other crime.

In the case of People of the Philippines vs Maluenda
1
, the Supreme Court had the
occasion to discuss who may be held liable as accessories to the crime, to wit:

Thus, having knowledge of the kidnapping for ransom and without
having directly participated therein, he took part in the crime subsequent to its
commission by profiting from its effects. He may not be the devil with the face of
an angel that the trial court described, but he is definitely not a saint. He is
criminally liable as an accessory to the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Under
Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, accessories are defined as those who (1)
have knowledge of the commission of the crime, (2) did not take part in its
commission as principal or accomplice, but (3) took part in it subsequent to its
commission by any of the three modes enumerated in this article, one of which is
by profiting or by assisting the offender to profit from the effects of the crime.

In the case cited above, the accused Legarto was criminally liable as an accessory to the
crime of kidnapping for ransom for violating Art. 19 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, where he,
having knowledge of the crime without directly participating therein, took part subsequent to
the commission of the crime, by profiting from the effects of the crime. This case has
substantially the same facts compared with the case at bar except for the fact that the accused
Peyton, assisted the offender to profit from the effects of the crime unlike Legarto who profited
for himself. Both cases, however, are violations of the same provision in the Revised Penal

1
See G.R. No. 115351, March 27, 1998
Code, particularly paragraph 1 of Art. 19. Corollary thereto, it is clear as daylight that Peyton is
an accessory to the crime of kidnapping for ransom by playing the role of a middleman to
obtain the ransom money, thereby assisting the kidnapper to profit from the effects of the
crime.

While it is true that in the case of People of the Philippines vs Maluenda, accused
Legarto was held as an accessory by profiting for himself from the effects of the crime, the
accused in the case at bar can still be considered an accessory because his act clearly falls
within the scope of paragraph 1, Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code. To buttress this
argument, it bears stressing that the word or is used in the first paragraph of the above-cited
article of the Revised Penal Code. In Statutory Construction, the use of the disjunctive word
or between two phrases connotes that either phrase serves as qualifying phrase
2
. Thus, it is
clear as daylight that the act of Peyton qualifies him as an accessory to the said crime.

In the case of People of the Philippines vs. Leonilo Cui et. al.,
3
, the Supreme Court reiterated
the elements of becoming an accessory, to wit:

Conviction of an accused as an accessory requires the following elements: (1)
that he has knowledge of the commission of the crime; and (2) that he took part in it
subsequent to its commission by any of the three modes enumerated in Article 19 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.

2
Agpalo, Statutory Construction, sixth edition, 2009, p299
3
See G.R. No. 121982, September 10, 1999

As discussed above, Peyton has knowledge of the crime and took part in it subsequent
to its commission by assisting the offender to profit from the effects of the crime which is one
of the three modes enumerated in Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code. All the elements are
present, thus Peyton has to be considered an accessory to the crime.

In another case, People of the Philippines vs Magsino
4
, the Supreme Court held that
those who acted as runners or couriers in obtaining the ransom money assisted the offenders
to profit by the effects of the crime.

In the case at bar, Client X, after having committed the crime of kidnapping, went to
Peyton to ask for some help from the latter. Client X confessed to Atty. Peyton that he had
kidnapped a minor and was asking Atty. Peyton to be the runner for the ransom money. Atty.
Peyton agreed. Atty. Peyton succeeded in collecting the two million U.S dollars ransom money
from the parents of the minor and giving the said sum of money to the kidnapper, Client X.

By successfully collecting the two million U.S dollar ransom money and giving this
money to the Kidnapper, Atty. Peyton had assisted the offender to profit from the effects of the
crime.
Hence, Atty. Peyton, having knowledge of the commission of the kidnapping for ransom
by Client X without having directly participated therein, took part in the subsequent to its

4
See G.R. No. L-3649, January 29, 1954)
commission by being a Runner or Courier in obtaining the ransom money. By agreeing to be a
runner for the ransom money, Atty. Peyton has assisted the Kidnapper to profit from the crime,
making all the elements of an accessory under paragraph 1 of Article 19 present and making
Atty. Peyton an accessory to the crime of kidnapping with ransom.

II. Those who assist the principal to escape may be prosecuted under P.D. 1829 on
obstruction of justice not as accessory but as a principal
5


Presidential Decree No. 1829 Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and
Prosecution of Criminal Offenders penalizes any person who knowingly or willfully
obstructs, impedes, frustrates, or delays the apprehension of suspects and the
investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing the acts specified therein,
one of which under paragraph (c), to wit:

c. Harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of any person he
knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed any
offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and
conviction;

The Revised Penal Code penalizes, as accessories, those who, having knowledge of the
commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals or

5
Boado, Notes and Cases on the Revised Penal Code, 2008 edition, p196
accomplices, take part, subsequent to its commission, by three acts: 1) profiting or to assisting
the offender to profit by the effects of the crime, 2) concealing or destroying the body of the
crime or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery and 3) harboring,
concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal of the crime, provided the accessory acts
with abuse of his public functions, or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason,
parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be
habitually guilty of some other crime.
Under the Revised Penal Code, there are two classes of accessories contemplated under
the third type of accessory:
1. Public officers who harbor, conceal or assist in the escape of
the principal of any crime (not light felony) with abuse of his
public functions; and
2. Private persons who harbor, conceal or assist in the escape
of the author of the crime guilty of treason, parricide,
murder, or an attempt against the life of the President, or who
is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.

Thus, the Revised Penal Code does not penalize a person who harbors, conceals or
assists in the escape of an author of a crime other than those specifically enumerated therein
treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt on the life of the President. Various crimes such as
kidnap for ransom, destructive arson, qualified rape, and crimes related to prohibited drugs,
are of the same gravity with the crimes listed under Art. 19 of the Code. But the Code does not
penalize private persons who harbor, conceal or assist in the escape of the author of crimes
such as kidnap for ransom.

However, PD 1829 penalizes under the present subsection the act of harboring or
concealing, or facilitating the escape of any person he knows or has reasonable ground to
believe or suspect, has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his
arrest, prosecution and conviction. Here, there is no specification of the crime to be committed
by the offender for criminal liability to be incurred for harboring, concealing, or facilitating the
escape of the offender. Thus, although the subject acts may not bring about criminal liability
under the Revised Penal Code, it may still be punishable under this particular subsection of PD
1829. Such an offender if violating Presidential Decree No. 1829 is no longer an accessory. He
is simply an offender without regard to the crime committed by the person assisted to escape,
and he is penalized as a principal.
6


In the instant case, accused Peyton committed another violation by facilitating the
escape of the offender. Before he returned the kidnapped child to her parents, he had to assure
that the kidnapper could get a full day to escape. He did not report the matter to the police
who could have apprehended the kidnapper, but instead, he kept the child for full day as
requested by the kidnapper. The accused may have acted that way in order to insure the girls
safety. However, a violation of this law is malum prohibitum and thus intent is immaterial, it

6
See Allan Verman Y. Ong, http://www.angelfire.com/ks/cybertarget/SPLpaper.htm
being a special penal law. In acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated
7
?
The act prohibited by PD 1829, which is facilitating the escape of a person who committed any
offense, is evidently committed by the accused. So long as this act has been perpetrated, he
shall be liable under such law.

III. Sec. 15 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility prescribes how far a lawyer may
go in supporting a client's cause? It says:

Nothing operates more certainly to create or to foster popular prejudice
against lawyers as a class, and to deprive the profession of that full measure of
public esteem and confidence which belongs to the proper discharge of its duties
than does the false claim. Often set up by the unscrupulous for the defense of
questionable transactions, that it is the duty of the lawyer to do whatever may
enable him to succeed in winning his client's cause. It is improper for a lawyer to
assert in argument his personal belief in his client's innocence or in the justice of
his cause. The lawyer owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability," to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him,
save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public
popularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty. In the judicial
forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense

7
Reyes, The Revised Penal Code. 15
th
edition, 2001, p56
that is authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert
every such remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the
great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds
of the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of
him for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicanery, he must
obey his own conscience and not that of his client.

A lawyer has all his right to ascertain that the good of his clients person. However, it is
not to the point of doing or performing unlawful acts to achieve such.

In Geneto vs. Silapan
8
, the Court ruled:
It must be stressed, however, that the privilege against disclosure of
confidential communications or information is limited only to communications
which are legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful employment of
a lawyer. It does not extend to those made in contemplation of a crime or a
perpetration of a fraud. If the lawful purpose is avowed x x x the communication
is not covered by the privilege as the client does not consult the lawyer
professionally. It is not within the profession of a lawyer to advise a client as to
how he may commit a crime x x x Thus, the attorney-client privilege lawyer does
not attach, there being no professional employment in the strict sense.


8
See A.C. No. 4078, July 14, 2003
A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act
of disclosure between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as
the client is aware, discloses the information to no third person other than one
reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information of the accomplishment of
the purpose for which it was given.
Our jurisprudence on this matter rests on quiescent ground. Thereby the act of
Atty. Peyton being a runner for the commission of the crime is not within the scope of
his professional duty, are not privilege communications where the element of
confidentiality is not present.

In addition, the protection of the attorney-client privilege has reference to
communications which are legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful
employment and does not extend to those made in contemplation of a crime or
perpetuation of a fraud. The privilege cannot be used as a weapon of offense to enable
a person to carry out a contemplated crime against society. A person who is committing
a crime or is about to commit a wrong can have no privilege witness. The law does not
make a law office a nest of vipers in which to hatch crimes or frauds.

Wherefore by deliberately using the attorney-client privilege which in itself not
applicable to the case at hand does not justify the act of promoting injustice and
defending a criminal act assisted by the accused. The Prosecution is firm that Atty.
Peyton has interest to the prosecution of his client being the only link to the identity of
the perpetrator. Thus, we hold that he is guilty as an accessory to the crime of kidnap
for ransom.

PRAYER
Wherefore, Applicants respectfully pray and submit that Josh Peyton, who failed to
inform the authority of the kidnapping incident, whereby acted himself as a middle-man, has
been proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged against him. The
Prosecution requests this Honorable Court to adjudge and declare that Josh Peyton is guilty and
bears the criminal responsibility on all charges.
Cebu City, 3
rd
of October, 2013.
APPLICANTS

Kristine Jean Bacala Den Krystian Basadre


Francis Ken Cogue Apple Joy Collados


Frances Lourraine de Gracia Ma. Kristina
Diamante


Allan Dave Diaz Berlito Edradan Jr.


Roela Faye Felicia Gretchin Flores


Leizyl Mae Galia Blanche Althea Hamoy


Erika Jumalon Beverly Largosa


Sashin Mae Lim Mikhaela Frances Maldo


Meg Anthony Miralles Frances Bea Pea


Rutchiel Rabor Philip James Tidoso

Teodoro Jon Velez