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;/
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From: KABUL -GR -C4R

Sent: August 27, 2007 9: 15 AM
To: BUCK Kerry -FTAG -DFD -C4
Cc: TERMORSHUIZEN Cindy -FTAG -C4; GIBBINS Christopher -FTAG -C4; Anderson, Cory-
DFA -FTAG -C5; Nolke, Sabine -JLHA -C5; HUTCHISON David -IDR -C4; NDHQ OTT D
NATO POL -C4; KANDH -C4R; KANDH -KAF -C4R; KABUL -KAF -HOM -C4R; KABUL -GR-
C4R; EXTOn -DMA -C4; GOLBERG Elissa -IRH-GHA -C4; ALEXANDER Vera -OGD -
PCO/BCP -C4R; SWORDS Colleen -IFM -C4; NDHQ +CEFCOM J9 -C4R; NDHQ OTT ADM
(POL) -C4; SINCLAIR Jill -PCO/BCP -C4R
Subject: KBGR0321 -- RC South Brainstorming on Detainees

Summary: The_ast week convened a brainstonning session on detainees, bringing together Regional
Command -South stakeholders to share . and ideas. P acknowledged the
importance of the detainee issue and There was
considerable interest in Canada's experience. Participants endorsed the two initiatives underway with the
National Directorate f Security (NDS): the UK's prisoner tracking network, and a joint RC-S letter on access
to NDS facilities. however that ISAF nations could do more.

was very
the 2 attendees. The purpose of the ~hare
expenences, ,provide an update on current initiatives and -- a c l e a r _ brainstonn
ideas for tackling the challenges identified during the meeting.

4. Tour de table. There was considerable interest in Canada's experience. We gave an update on the steps we
have taken in recent months, noting in particular the inclusion of provisions in our revised MoO for monitoring
by Canadian officials, in addition to the ICRC and Afghan fudependent Human Commission (AlliRC).
The UK discussed the network it is to install

[Comment: Canada has since submitted modest final comments,

20091114
Document Number / Numlh-o dn document- D- \10 - 0 82 1 of 3

Receipt Date I DJte ~:Ie_'.....;'...:;b:;;.---...:l~I_-o.;;.-O'-=--__ Redactf'd by AG

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20091114 82 2of3
 15. Participants stressed the need to move fOIWard together and to take steps to address both short-term and
long-term imperatives. All emphasized the importance of winning Afghan support for whatever eventual
course of action is adopted.

16. To close this helpful and lively meeting, the "creative

brainstonning" for practical ideas, both short- long-term, to underlymg problems that continue
to bedevil the detainee issue. They asked key RC-S partners, including Canada, to submit ideas to their

Drafted: Townson, Colvin

Consulted: Bloodworth
Approved: Hoffmann

20091114 82 30f3
 To: David Mulroney
Cc: Kerry Buck
From: Richard Colvin
SUbject : End-of-posting observations
Date: 24 October, 2007

After completing 18 months in Afghanistan, I have decided to record some personal observations and
recommendations in this end-of-assignment memo. I have limited these coil1tl1ents to three key issues:
detainees, governance, and management by DFAIT of the Afghanistan file . Although there is no formal
"dissent channel" in the Canadian foreign service, this memo is put forvvard in a spirit of constructive criticism
of Canadais engagement in what remains officially our # i foreign-policy priority.

To avoid suggestions that my recommendations are not sufficiently substantiated, I have taken the time in this
memo to set out in some detail the grounds for the conclusions.

Detainees

my Vlew stop HW1Ulll!S

• • • If we do continue to transfer detainees to NDS, we should do
reasonably assured that Canadian officials can monitor them effectively
_ _ _ Hbwever, a Iliuch better solution would be tb transfer
~ther the Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Justice.

counterpart at
~as similarly unable to fmd any colleague at
~potato.

At around the same time,~to the PRT an Afghan woman with three young children. Her
husband, a taxi driver, ha~ra1 months earlier. However, because the information we were
taking was inadequate, I was unable to confIrm to her whether or not Canadian forces had detained her
husband.

Although these problems were eventually addressed (a new form was introduced that asked for the names of
the and notiftcation to the ICRC was accelerated, although delays persisted
well into 2007), they were indicative of the low priority afforded · Canada to detainee management This
was also evident in Kabul, where it was clear during meetings colleagues that
their 20vernments were focusin2 a great deal of attention to the detamee issue, regular, hands-on
monitoring of detairtees. The contrast with Canada was sharp. At that time, the embassy did not even have a

Document Number I Numero du document- D--no -() Lf J.- H <I.' d .iH~ It'd h y ;\ G

Receipt Date I G.lte ~:le:_..:.\..;:b~-~(_l_-_O_Dt__

20091114 83 1 of 5
 poV mil officer while reporting by the embassy
on detainee issues

Even after the detainee scandal broke into the open, in April 2007, with the publication by the Globe and Mail

••".I
of an in-depth investigation into detainee abuse in Kandahar, a new policy was formulated in Ottawa without
even the formality of consultation with the embassy. In March 2007, I had happened to attend one of these
interdepartmental discussions on detainees in Ottawa and had been struck by the participants' collective lack
of understanding, as well as the Defence Department's reluctance to acknowledge ~._!II.~
~ •• ~.IIIi ••• unsurpriSingly, the new, unconsulted policy did not reflect Afghan realities and
thus promised to perpetuate the existing problems. As charge d'affaires. I decided to register our concerns
with this policy, adding three constructive suggestions for tackling the problem. The terse, dismissive reply
from HQ made very dear that input f'rom the field was not at all welcome, even though our key
recommendations (e.g. the need for a new MOU, and for Canada to take responsibility for its own detainees
given the well-entrenched practices of the NDS) were ultimately adopted.

AS the detainee crisis escalated, the Canadian response became mote seriouS but still tended to lag beh.ind
needs, A new MOU was hurriedly signed, granting Canada the right to monitor its own detainees, However,
there was at first resistance to assignjng a dedicated DF AIT human-rights officer to actually carry out the
monitoring. As of October 2007, that officer had still not arrived, obliging both the PRT and embassy to use
already overstretched officers, untrained in human-rights monitoring, or short-term secondees from HQ. A
dedicated poV mil officer was eventually assigned to the embassy. However, given new, secretive
information protocols, he is not privy to internal reporting on detainees and thus is unable to make an effective
contribution. The same is now true for the head of the political section.

have personally seen physical evidence of scars on

abuse by all three of the detainees we interviewed in Kabul who were willing to discuss the issue.

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 •

my view the only way to ensure that

Canadian detainees are treated in accordance norms is to a) transfer detainees to one of the
'open' NDS facilities in Kabul (not Kandahar), with regular detainee monitoring by Canadian officials, or b)
transfer detainees to an Afghan organization other than NDS - either the Ministry of Defence or Ministry of
Unlike NDS facilities in Kandahar Mol· · accessible to monitors and

However, as before, there seems to be a continued reluctance to acknowledge the scope or severity of the
detainee problem, instead claiming that the "alleged" abuse is a Taliban fabricatio~ or stressing fictitious
'Afghan investigations.' Our systemic failure to operationalize our human-rights rhetoric runs contrary to
Canadian values and interests, and has needlessly damaged public support for the Afghan deployment.

Rather than tackle this

acknowledged that we

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 Management of Afghanistan by DF AIT

Canada's engagement in Afghanistan has been undercut by a continued reluctance by DFAIT to commit the
resources, or to create the organizational environment, necessary for success.
~\;(';?
Until late summer 2007, there were exactly three DFAIT ~fficers in Afghanistan working for DF AIT - two in
Kabul and one at the PRT (The Polad at KAF was working for the Canadian forces commander. I have
excluded the ambassador, who is supposed to represent the entire Canadian government, not just one
department.) The Kabul embassy's political section was the same size as that of the Canadian Representative
Office to the Palestinian Authority - a minor mission. At the same time, there was a severe structural
dysfunctionality at HQ, with responsibility for Kabul completely separate from responsibility for Kandahar.
During the two months I spent in Kandahar, I did not receive a single instruction or piece of policy guidance
from HQ, even though this was a critical period, with the Taliban massing west of Kandahar city, and most
Kandaharis believing that the city would soon fall to the enemy.

By early summer 2007, the two 'halves' of Afghanistan had organizationally been united, and HQ had agreed
to the addition of a third political officer to the embassy. After further petitioning, this was subsequently
increased again, to four. Although this represents a doubling of D FAIT effort, it is still much less than
required.

By the standards of Canadian missions around the world., four is not a large .ifilOant number.
less than the DF AIT effort in Moscow, which has ten officers in total. It also
of effort made allies in Kabul. For eX(Ullt)ie.
one ,or
\'-dl.Jl:1U.ldll embassy has exactly one-third of a person

is one of the most important issues in the south.

At the same time as Canada has created only a modest staff in Kabul, it has greatly
This trend., once again, is the opposite of the approach taken by our principal allies.
~ave created a very large presence in Kabul, with considerable responsibility devolved to the field:
This reflects the importance, the complexity and the nature of the challenge facing the international
community in Afghanistan. As the international presence is propping up - and often substituting for - . _
u glli:1Jlu'::;laLIl requires time-coosuming, hands-on management of issues by the

rl.J../Su<uu.:.l<UJ is a hyper-centralized state and all the key decisions ~ including on

Kandahar - are taken in the capital. Moreover, as this is a strongly multinational effort, much time is needed
to coordinate with our partners in the UK, US, Netherlands, UN, European Union and NATOI ISAF.

Canada, by contrast, has created a weak field presence. The result of this chronic under-resourcing is that the}
embassy is able passively to track issues (and then incompletely), but not to hope properly to influence them.
For example, what credibility can the embassy bring to bear on counter-narcotics when we do not even have a
single dedicated officer? Because of under-staffmg, we are unable to process the very heavy flow of
information and intelligence, resulting in critical information gaps about key issues and personalities. We had
nobody looking at development in Kandahar, CIDA officers managing CIDA's own projects.
Unlike our colleagues in have no offlCer with either functionalDari or
Pashtu. By contrast, every given a year's language training prior to
being posted.

20091114 83 4 of 5
 Canada consequently continues to punch below its weight in Kabul - and is seen by our allies to punch below
its weight

Canada did substantially increase the number of DF AIT staff at the PRT. The initial decision was for three
more officers in Kandahar, but only one more in Kabul . As charge d'affaires, I tried to [md out the basis for
this decision but was unable, in March 2007, to find anyone at HQ willing to take responsibility for that
decision, or to explain on what basis it had been taken. One senior official suggested only that there was no
space at the embassy, which was simply not true. In order to make the case for additional staff, I was even
obliged to spend a day drawing up floor plans to prove that plenty of space existed,

At the same time, it has dramatically expanded the number of officials managing the process from Ottawa -
including a very significant public-affairs contingent. This suggests that, for Canada, Afghaillstan is being
treated primarily as a domestic issue, with improving the situation on the ground a much lesser priority,

The expansion in Ottawa has been accompanied by a greater emphasis on information control. Whereas, prior
to April 2007, it was possible at post to report honestly about even the most sensitive issue, after April this
was not always possible. Thave mentioned earlier abetlt the fierce lack of interest in Ottawa about our views
on detainees, even though we had been tracking the issue closely for a year and were the best-informed part of
the government. Discussion of detainee issues has since been restricted to a very small group of people,
which does not include essential embassy staff (i.e. the head of the political section, the poVmil officer),
Reporting on detainees from the post is now virtually impossible - HQ has made clear that it wants nothing in
writing. This hyper-secrecy is conducive to information control but not to effective management of this
critical issue.

More recently, after I submitted a quick summary of the security situation, in response to a last-minute HQ
request, it was made very clear that the assessment (things are getting worse) was 'wrong.' Even my
professionalism was impugned, The next day, the point was unambiguously made to the whole embassy that
henceforth the official embassy view is that things are getting better. This is completely contradicted by the
available data, as well as by the careful assessments .iII~ .........Ii•••••••••••
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 have never before in my IS-year career been tol at,
lllU;llli:WY, we must message was delivered when it was recommended that we be
"very careful" about what we put into our next human-rights report. This all adds up, in my opinion, to a very
troubling politicization of reporting,

Conclusion

In Afghanistan, Canada was presented with an extraordinary challenge. We found ourselves in one of the
most dangerous, important provinces of the country, in an environment of rapidly deteriorating security, We
also found ourselves with a very important role in the collective effort to fix one of the gravest foreign-policy
challenges facing the international community today . This is indeed Canada's "#1 foreign-policy priority.·

Unfortunately, DFAIT's response to this challenge has been timid, inadequate and ineffectual, There are some
very good people working on Afghanistan but, at least in Kabul, there are not nearly enough of them,
Important issues are ignored, or left to fester, until they explode into crisis - in other words, when they are
picked up by the media, When a crisis does develop, the Canadian response seems to emphasize messaging
over substance, and process over policy. As someone who believes in the Afghanistan mission, and has spent
18 months in the field, I have been deeply disappointed in our failure to live up to our rhetoric, We could do
so much better.

If there is interest, I would be pleased to follow up on any of the points raised in this memo ,

20091114 83 5 of 5