Bedri Peci

Role of the Legislature in the Budget Procedure: The Case of Kosovo
Assembly
Abstract
Frequent olitical!legal changes as "ell as the form of
organi#ation of the government in Kosovo from $%%% until
the second art of &''( have been re)ected in the
budget rocedure* Budget rocedure in Kosovo under the
administration of +nited ,ations -issions in Kosovo
.+,-/K0 "as a sui generis case ali1e +,-/K
administration itself2 "here role of the Kosovo Assembly
"as nothing more than symbolic* 3ith declaration of the
indeendence on $4
th
February &''( and romulgation of
the Constitution on (
th
Aril &''( de 5ure2 the role of the
Assembly in the budget rocedure has been emo"ered*
6o"ever2 regardless imrovements in the constitutional
osition of the Assembly2 a survey of the Assembly of
Kosovo revealed many shortcomings that are necessary
to be addressed in order to increase the role of the
Assembly in the budget rocedure* /n this direction "e
shall emhasi#e increasing of the role of the Assembly in
accordance "ith constitutional authori#ations in the
budget rocedure2 increasing of the technical caacities
of the Assembly to conduct research and analysis of the
budget and underta1ing stes on facilitation the
communication bet"een -7F!8overnment!Assembly!the
Budget and Finance Committee*
Keywords: Legislature .Assembly02 budget2 budget
rocedure2 Budget and Finance Committee.
1. Introduction
Research and analyses on budgetary powers of
legislatures are conducted from many authors in many
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Iliria International Review 2013/1
FelixVerlag, Holzkirchen, er!an" an# Iliria $ollege, %ri&tina, 'o&ovo
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Role of the Legislature in the Budget
Procedure: The Case of Kosovo Asseml!
Bedri Peci
9r*sc* Bedri P7C/
states. They note that budgetary powers of legislature are diferent
from country to country. Several factors infuence these difering
score among them; (! the type of political system (that is"
presidential" parliamentary" or hybrid!; (#! the type of electoral
system through which representatives are elected ( that is" plurality$
ma%ority" propotional" and semipropotional!; (&! the legislature's
formal powers (in this case" the e(tent of its powers to amend the
e(ecutive budget!; ()! the combination of the political environment
within which the legislature functions" and the political will of
legislators to e(ert parliament's powers; and (*! the technical
capacity of the parliament. (+ohnson and
,a-amura ..." /ienert #00*" 1ehner" #00):&2" +ohnson #00*!.
3bove mentioned factors infuence the budget theory to provide a
simple classi4cation of legislative roles in the budget process"
identifying three types of legislatures:
a0 Budget ma1ing legislatures. These legislatures have the ability"
possibilities and capacities to amend and refuse draft budget
proposed by the government as well as ability to compile additional
draft budget in accordance with its own choice. 5n this group we have
the legislatures of the following states; 6S3" 78ech Republic"
9enmar-" :ungary and ;inland.
b0 Budget in)uencing legislatures. These legislatures have the
ability and capacity to change or refuse approval of the draft budget
of the government" however they lac- ability to prepare additional
draft budget in accordance with their own choice. 5n this group we
have the legislatures of these states: 3ustria" <ermany" 5sland" 5taly"
=orea" >e(ico" ;rance" ,orway" ,etherlands" ?oland" ?ortugal" Spain"
Sweden" Swit8erland" and Tur-ey.
c0 Budget aroving legislatures* These legislatures lac- the
capacity to change or refuse draft budget of the government as well
as the ability to prepare additional draft budget in accordance with
their own choice. The power of these legislatures is limited only to the
approval of the government proposal. 5n this group 4rst of all we have
legislatures of the type of 1estminster" in which presentation of the
amendments in the draft budget is implied as loss of trust towards
the e(ecutive branch of the government" thus speeding up the
resignation of the government. 5n this group we have legislatures of
these states: 3ustralia" 7anada" 5reland" ,ew @eeland" Angland and
two states that do not belong to the 1estminsterBs type C +apan and
<reece (DA79" #00#a; 1ehner" #00):&&!.
3lmost two decades after beginning of the social$economic reforms
in the South$Aastern Aurope" the role of legislatures and development
of parliamentary system has been consistently increased and through
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this budget and budgetary procedure developed. 5ncreasing the role
of legislatures in these states is result of democracy and
constitutional changes C processes which enabled increasing the role
of the legislatures in their political systems that have earlier on been
closed. Sometime in the states with central planning system there
has not been even a budget oEce (?remchand and <aranival4"
..#:)$&#!. 5n this direction a lot has been done in creation of a
suitable legal environment" cooperation between main budget
institutions C e(ecutive bodies and legislatures.
Though the 3ssembly of =osovo is the main institution responsible
for the budgetary procedures" still no research is done on the role of
the 3ssembly on budgetary procedures. The role of any 3ssembly on
budgetary procedures depends on several factors. The aim of this
paper is to ma-e an analy8e on the =osovo 3ssembly role in
budgetary procedure" also develop and interpret the established
concept based on hypothesis and common variables which ma-e the
comparative analy8es of =osovo case easier.
3n analysis of the =osovo case is made in reference to /ienerBs
method of analy8ing (F1ho 7ontrols the GudgetH The /egislature or
the A(ecutiveHI 5>;" #00*!" in e(amining the ne(us between the
separation of powers and the legislatureBs budgetary authority and
also in analy8ing the main factors from which the budget power of the
parliament in =osovo case depends on. ;or this purpose two inde(es
of /iener are being used. 1e thought to use these inde(es as
framewor- to calculate a score for the 3ssembly of =osovo which
would also infuence a comparative perspective for the discussion.
/ienert established a strong lin- between political and budgetary
powers of legislatures and the degree of separation of the legislative
and e(ecutive branches of government. 3nyway he notices that
diferences between countries with the same form of government can
be at least as great as the diferences across diferent forms of
governments because country speci4c factors" rather than form of
government are predominant in determining the budgetary powers of
the legislatures.
Research methodology has been supported on the secondary
sources" and analy8ing of all legal documents based on which
budgetary procedure is developed as well as reports of the >inistry of
;inance" laws and constitution of =osovo. Ta-ing into account the fact
that until now in =osovo no such analyses have been conducted" we
have also relied our research in interviews (public and anonymous!
with members of the Gudget and ;inance 7ommittee" deputies and
oEcials of the >inistry of ;inance (>;!. 5nterviewees have given a
great contribution in enlightening the role of 3ssembly and Gudget
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and ;inance 7ommittee during legislative phase of the budgetary
procedure.
A(cept introduction paper is laid out as follows. ?art 55 reviews
relevant literature. ?art 555 belongs to overview of =osovo budget
process.. ?art 5J is presents an assessment of the =osovo legislative
budget procedure after independence according to /iener inde(es.
;irst we have applied the 5nde( on separation of political powers of
the e(ecutive and the legislature in =osovo (?art 3 of 3nne( ! and
4ve factors of control of e(ecutive by the legislature are described
(?art G of 3nne( !. 3lso" on the basis of 4ve particularly important
criteria based on /ienert inde( we have represented the budgetary
power of the =osovo assembly (3nne( #!. 3t the end conclusions are
given.

2. Literature review and framework for analysis
5n the beginning of year ..0" when the economical transition in
post communistic countries started" the economical sciences did not
recogni8e in full such practices that would help to developers of
economical policies. 1ith time passing and by being introduced to the
e(perience of some countries that faced this transition before"
diferent scientists went into analy8ing economical transition process.
(Gird" Abel and 1allich ..K: 2)L$L0&" ,ord #000" Tan8i ..&!.Though
there were many diferent analyses made by many diferent author
for the economical transit" analyses on budgetary procedures started
latter. ;irst discursions about the role of parliament and e(ecutive
organs on budgetary procedure came out from the studies of
institutional measures treatment in controlling budgetary de4cit and
public debts. (e.g. von :agen"..#!. Than the analy8e focusing the
role of parliament in budgetary procedure followed. Dn this setting
analysis of the role of the parliament on budgetary procedure were
more freMuent in individual countries than comparative analyses.
7aiden (..&! treats the comparative aspect of the budgetary
procedure in 78ech and Slova- Republic by saying the budgetary
procedures in transitory countries are becoming always more ali-e to
those of developed" democratic countries.
Straussman (..2! in his comparative analy8e pointed out the
measurements to be underta-en in strengthening the >inistry of
;inance" widening the income bases and their classi4cation.
/e/oup (#00)! analyses in comparative aspect the establishment
and development of the budgetary national system in Slovenia and
:ungary after political changes in these countries" a special accent he
as given to the role of the parliament in the budgetary procedure in
this countries.
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+ohnson and Stapenhurst (#00K! treat the international e(perience
of the roles and functions of legislative budget oEces in four regions
of the globe.
1ehner (#002! and /ienert (#00*! developed inde(es of the
legislature's budgetary power which would also enable a comparative
perspective for the discussion.
Schic-Bs analy8e (#00#! amongst else represents the role of the
congress in budgetary procedure in 6S3.
1ehnerBs analy8e (#00! shows the role of <erman parliament in
budgetary procedure.
>i-sellBs analy8e (..*! tells about the resistance in budgetary
reforms in 6-raine.
Straussman and ;abianBs analy8e (..)! treats the problems of
4nancing local power in :ungary that have to do with changes in the
central budged of the state.
3lesina" >are" and ?erottiBs analy8e (..*! treats the 5talian budget
procedure.
Gratic (#00)! has made an analyses of 7roatian parliament (sabor!
role in budgetary procedures showing the wee- power of the
parliament in this procedure and giving recommendations about this.
3s we said at the beginning the analyses of =osovo 3ssembly role
in budgetary procedure is made by referring to /ienerBs way of
analy8e and 5nde(es.

. !verview of t"e Kosovo bud#et $rocess
3s of the day >inistry of ;inance ta-es the initiative for preparation
of the budget until the phase of 4nal calculations" many institutions
and state organs underta-e a multitude of legal$procedural actions. 5n
one word all these activities are called budget procedure. Gudget
procedure represents a system of main rules (formal and non$formal!
which enable e(ecutive branch of the <overnment to ta-e decisions
on budget preparation" presentation of the budget in front of the
legislature and its e(ecution (Dtt" #000:&.!.
The budget process in =osovo is still to be developed. Though
many -ey elements already e(ist" not all of them wor- well and not all
of the necessary roles and responsibilities for an efective budgetary
procedure are eEciently ful4lled.
Gudgetary procedure in =osovo has three basic phases C the phase
of preparation of the draft budget" the phase of approval in the
parliament and phase of budget e(ecution. Aach of these phases
consists of some sub$phases" which from the time point of view of the
time include two and half years.
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>ain sta-eholders in the budgetary procedure are the >inistry of
;inance" 3ssembly" DEce of the <eneral 3uditor and ta(payers.
Gefore declaration of independence these sta-eholders have only
been formal entities. This was the case due to the fact that until
declaration of the independence on L
th
;ebruary #00K main
sta-eholders have been Special Representative of the Secretary
<eneral (SRS<!" with the power to ma-e 4nal approval of the budget
and Aconomic and ;iscal 7ouncil as an advisory body to the SRS
Budget formulation (GAP; 5)
$: Aril: >inistry of ;inance prepares the >edium Term A(penditure
;ramewor- for the ne(t three years.
;' Aril: The last deadline when the >inistry of ;inance sends the
budget circulars to budget organi8ations
$: <une: The last deadline when budget organi8ations send their
proposals for budget" based on >inistry guidelines" e(penditure
priorities and budget ceilings
$: <une = ;$ >ctober: >inistry of ;inance consults proposals from
budget from budget organi8ations and organi8es public hearings with
budget organi8ations. This process is usually conducted during +uly$
3ugust. ,ot later than & Dctober" the >inistry of ;inance sends a
proposed budget appropriation to each budget organi8ation and
together with the >edium Term A(penditure ;ramewor- sends it to
the <overnment for approval.
;$ >ctober: The <overnment adopts the proposed budget and sends
it to the 3ssembly. The 3ssembly organi8es sessions where the
budget is presented by >inistry of ;inance.
;$ 9ecember: The last deadline when the 3ssembly adopts the
=osovo budget.

.1. %"e $"ase of $re$aration of t"e draft bud#et
Gudget preparation starts with pro%ection of the 4scal policy for
the coming year by the >inistry of ;inance. Gudget procedure with
regard to budget preparation begins with sending of the Gudget
7ircular by >; to the budget organi8ations.
Gudget calendar for preparation of the draft budget doesnBt have
constant timetable each year. Gudget calendar was not de4ned in
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detail in none of the budget steps neither by any 3dministrative
5nstruction and neither by /aw until year #00K. A.g. 4rst Gudget
7ircular for budget planning for the year #00K was sent on .
th
3pril
#00L (>; Gudget 7ircular #00.N0!" while the 4rst Gudget 7ircular for
budget planning for the year #00. has been sent on &
th
+une #00K
(>; Gudget 7ircular #00KN0!. This should have been e(actly
regulated by the /aw on ?ublic ;inancial >anagement and
3ccountability. ;rom #*
th
until &
st
of Dctober 4nal approval of the
draft budget shall be made in the <overnment.
.2. &"ase of a$$roval of t"e bud#et in t"e Assembly
3fter its approval by the <overnment" draft budget and reasoning
is submitted to the Spea-er of the 3ssembly not later than &
st
Dctober. 3fterwards draft budget is reviewed in detail by the Gudget
and ;inance 7ommittee. Joting and approval of the budget is done
after 4rst and second review rounds in the 3ssembly; after
promulgation budget e(ecution phase commences. 6ntil declaration
of the independence after approval by the 3ssembly" the budget had
to be sent to the SRS< as a 4nal authority for promulgation; this was
done by signing it. Dnly after promulgation by the SRS< the budget
could have entered into force. This was the case due to the fact that
according to 6,S7 Resolution #)) and 7onstitutional ;ramewor-"
SRS< had the power not to promulgate the law and instead return it
to the 3ssembly for additional review or even amend it. 3fter
promulgation by the SRS<" >inistry of Aconomy and ;inance informed
ministries and other budget organi8ations on their budget allocations.
.. 'ud#et e(ecution $"ase
3t this phase revenues are collected and spent in accordance with
budget planning. Gudget e(ecution starts on
st
+anuary. 5n speci4c
time intervals" regulated by the /aw on ?ublic ;inancial >anagement
and 3ccountability (/?;>3!" audit and control of budget e(ecution is
conducted. The Treasury as part of the >inistry of ;inance is
responsible for cash and debt management and is the main contact
point between the Gudget 9epartment and budget users.
'o( . %"e bud#et e(ecution $rocess
. The approval of =osovo 7onsolidated Gudget by =osovo
assembly;
#. 3fter the promulgation of the budget based on the law for
budgetary divisions from the 3ssembly" the >inister of Aconomy
and ;inance enters these budgetary divisions on the appropriate
software for public funds management;
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&. 3t the beginning of each year" budgetary organi8ations
(>inistries and >unicipalities!" are obliged to submit the plan of
money fow to the Treasure 9epartment;
). Treasure 9epartment considering the money fow plan made by
budgetary organi8ations ma-es the allocation of founds. 6sually
funds allocation is made for a period of three months" e(cept for
wages and salaries fund allocation of which is done each month;
*. 1hen budgetary organi8ations receive the funds allocated to
them " they may proceed by ma-ing use of this money
approved by the Treasure;
Though ways of managing public funds are not satisfactory" =osovo
has got a very good system of budget e(ecution characteri8ed by
integrated control" authori8ations" payments" and the accounting
system managed by the Treasure. 7entrali8ing the ma%ority of money
available from the government on a single account of the Treasure"
but with a number of sub$accounts and the presence of a centrali8ed
accounting system at Treasure 9epartment helps a lot on the eMuality
of governmental accounts and ban- operations. This is further
supported by good ban- operations and income accounts. Ouarterly
and yearly reports are based on the 5nternational Standards for ?ublic
Sector 3ccount of available money represented in a variety of
dimensions and are much more informative than budget documents.
.). Internal control
5n #000 the 9epartment of 5nternal 3udit (953! in the >inistry of
;inance was established. 5ts duty is distributing internal audits in
Gudgetary Drgani8ations (GD!. /aw on ?ublic ;inancial >anagement
and 3ccountability (/?;>3! is the legal base of internal audit.
Regarding internal audits /?;>3 is highly based on 5nternational
Standards for ?rofessional ?ractices in 5nternal 3udit (5S??53!. 3ll GDs
have their own yearly audit plan" but none of them communicates
this to the >inistry of ;inance while some of them do report to the
DEce of <eneral 3udit (D<3!.
.*. +(ternal control
6,>5= Regulation #00#NK" later changed with Regulation #00*N&&"
established the DEce of <eneral 3udit (D<3! with standard and
general authority and responsibility. 3ccording to article & of /aw ,o.
0&N/$0L* on the establishment of the oEce of the 3uditor <eneral of
=osovo and the D4cee 3udit in =osovo ,The 3uditor$<eneral shall
annually conduct a Regularity 3udit of the =osovo 7onsolidated
Gudget" budget organi8ations" including but not limited to the
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3ssembly of the Republic of =osovo" the DEce of the ?resident of the
Republic of =osovo" each >inistry and e(ecutive agency"
municipalities" independent bodies" the 7entral Gan- of the Republic
of =osovo (7G=!" and other entities that are either more than *0 P
publicly owned or receive funding from" or provide dividends or other
non ta( revenue to" the =osovo 7onsolidated ;und including but not
limited the =osovo 7ustoms Service" the =osovo ?rivati8ation 3gency
and the DmbudspersonI. 3ctually D<3 has a staf of around )0.
). Assessment of t"e le#islative bud#et $rocedure
Gudgetary procedure connects e(ecutive and legislative branches
of the government in an integral procedure (Tan8i" #000:*#!.
9evelopment of the budget procedure only in the line of e(ecutive
organs negatively infuences in many aspects (1ehner" #00):#K!; 4rst
of all" the basic principle of democracy" implying the rights of
legislature to e(ercise the power over the purse is not being reali8ed"
respectively legislature fails to ensure citi8ens that revenues and
e(penditures provided in the budget are reasonable and best respond
to their needs and that are spent in accordance with forecasts;
second" no eEcient control of the budget and balance between
legislative and e(ecutive organs" as a main precondition of the Fgood
public administrationI may be reali8ed. Gesides this" budget practice
of states in various phases has shown that bigger the infuence of the
parliament in the budgetary procedure the bigger the budget
transparency or vice versa (3lesima

and ?erotti" ...:#*" 7hrystal"
.K:&#$*." Tan8i" #000:*" /a8ere" #00#:$#&!.
;rom budgetary theory and practice we notice that the budgetary
process of the parliament difers from one country to the other. Since
on the 4rst treatment of this problem diferent authors set out the
Muestion of Fwhy are these diferences on budget power of
parliaments of diferent countriesIH The answer to this Muestion
depends on some variables whose overall action de4nes the ability of
a parliament in dealing with budgetary issues.
Same as /ienert inde( the degree of separation of legislature from
e(ecutive for =osovo case are presented in part 3 of 3nne( " while
factors of controls of the e(ecutive by legislature are described in ?art
G of 3nne( . /egislative power on budget can be e(pressed on this
phases: a! e( ante" b! during budget e(ecution and as" c! e( posed
budgetary authority. 3n important Muestion that can be done in e(
ante phase is Fdoes the legislature formally approve a binding
medium$ term budget framewor- that guides the e(ecutive in
preparing each year's annual budgetFH 5f so" does it concern in total
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revenue" total e(penditure" level of debt or is including in allocation of
spendingH
3 second very important Muestion is F7an =osovo 3ssembly
amends the budget without restrictionsIH
3 third very important Muestion for e( ante budgetary powers is
F9oes =osovo 3ssembly has enough time to e(amine the budget and
propose changesIH
9uring budget e(ecution phase the important Muestion is Fdoes the
3ssembly oblige the government to implement its e(penditure
programme e(actly as adoptedIH 5f not" what are the restrictionsH
The most important Muestion in e( post phase is Fdoes =osovo
3ssembly have such a strong power to follow up vis$Q$vis e(ecutive
audit recommendations and desirable changes in public 4nance
managementIH
3ccording to /ienert inde( =osovo legislative power over
budget based on 4ve particularly criteria is presented in 3nne( #.
3fter you will see in detail traits of 4ve factors on which budget power
of =osovo 3ssembly is based.
).1. -edium %erm +($enditure .ramework /-%+.0
3ny efective government should wor- on an all inclusive frame
where long and midterm policies and priorities are de4ned" and where
resources are divided according to such policies and priorities in order
to insure a better future for the citi8ens. 9espite some diferent
attempts =osovo has not yet a long term strategy of economical
development and this is an obstacle for long and midterm budgetary
planning. Some attempts for creating the =osovo long term economic
development strategy are made; a draft document is drown but is not
yet approved by the government" so it serves only as an information
document.
6ntil now a fundamental wea-ness on the system of =osovoBs
public funds management is the lac- of long term orientation. 3s long
as the /aw on ?ublic ;inancial >anagement and 3ccountability of
each year has foreseen a three year budgetary perspective" de fact
the 4scal perspective until #00K was a yearly one. ;irst attempt was
presenting >TA; on donorBs conference in 9ecember #00* and was
revised in #002. This was -nown by the government as Fwor- in
continuityI and was not included in the budget formulation process
until year #00..5n the absence of this" midterm budgetary plan lays
on >id Term A(penditure ;ramewor- (>TA;! and ?ublic 5nvestments
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?rogram (?5?!. So" though =osovo since years is on the process of
developing a long$lived access on the budget the 4rst >TA; was
introduced in the budget formulation process for #00. and covered
the period #00.$. 3 parallel process to >TA; is even the
development of ?ublic 5nvestment ?rogram (?5?! which is going on
since years. ?5? is a multi$annual plan of budgetary process with
focus in identi4cation of needs and 4nding of funds for capital articles
that could attract investments and help in building the economy or
decrease unemployment or help in any other way for reaching the
main aims of the country. The idea is that through ?5? we can as-
budgetary organi8ations to prepare investment pro%ects which would
be funded by governments own income or =osovo foreign partners.
;inally" in #00K =osovo government presented an enhanced >id
Term A(penditure ;ramewor- for #00.$#0 (>TA;! which sets policy
priorities" including economic growth and good governance. The
introduction of the medium$term e(penditure framewor- (>TA;! was
the driving force of the reform in budget management and
e(penditure policy.
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9r*sc* Bedri P7C/
'o( ). -edium %erm +($enditure .ramework
The >TA; shall contain2
a! >acroeconomic and 4scal forecasts for the >TA; Gudget ?eriod"
inclu$ding main economic indicators such as infation" <9? and
e(change rates;
b! 3n analysis of tendencies in allocation of 4nancial resources and
an analysis of budget e(penditures by main economic category;
c! ;orecasts of domestic debt for the >TA; Gudget ?eriod;
d! Astimated resources reMuired to service internal and e(ternal
debt during the >TA; Gudget ?eriod;
e! 3n analysis of capital investment tendencies 4nanced from the
budget and an assessment of their volume for the >TA; Gudget
?eriod;
f! 3 review of salary policy for the >TA; Gudget ?eriod;
g! 3n analysis of the tendencies in the employment and wage bill in
the budget sector and an assessment of the impact of any wage
reform policy;
h! 3 proposal for ad%usting wage bill policy to the general macro$
4scal framewor- set in the >TA; for the purpose of assuring
corresponding 4nancial support;
i! Astimated e(penditure ceilings for each budget organi8ation that
is not a municipality or an independent agency with dedicated
revenue;
%! Astimated grant levels for each municipality calculated in
accordance with the formulae established in the /aw on /ocal
<overnment" ;inance" and
f! 3ny other information the >inistry may desire to include.
The >TA; aims to ensure targeted spending of scarce state
resources in line with government priorities" and to strengthen the
lin- between policies and e(penditure estimates over a period of
three years. 5n spite of some shortcomings in the 4rst year of
application" the introduction of the >TA; in the =osovo budget
process is a ma%or step forwards. 5t brings the consideration of
policies and e(penditures together in a multi$annual perspective. The
>inister of ;inances should submit >TA; to the 3ssembly each year
until &0 3pril. The legislative is only informed of the governmentBs
medium$term strategy" but not as-ed for its approval. The 3ssembly
approves only the law on budgetary divisions of each year by means
of which budget is approved as foreseen on general forecasts of >TA;
in case of formulation by the e(ecutive.
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).2. Le#islature &ower to amend t"e annual bud#et.
3ccording to the 7onstitution" 3ssembly has to approve the
budget" which has the legal character of a draft law or bill. ;or that
purpose 3ssembly must receive the budget bill at least two months
prior to the beginning of the 4scal year. /?;>3 states that the 4scal
year is the calendar year" so the budget must be submitted latest on
& of Dctober.
=osovo 3ssembly power to amend the annual budget under 6,>5=
administration has been more 4ctional than realistic. Gudget
procedure in =osovo under the 6,N6,>5= administration has been sui
generis case" same as the 6,>5= administration itself. Gudget
procedure in =osovo has been e(clusively e(ecutive" fragmented and
with no infuence by the 3ssembly.
Gesides the fact 7onstitutional ;ramewor- established the
institution of 3ssembly" 4nal authori8ations to set 4nancial and
political parameters and approve Gudget of =osovo remain
competence of the SRS<.
Aven though 7onstitutional ;ramewor- provided that =osovo
3ssembly had the right to adopt laws" this was still limited by the
right of SRS< to promulgate laws adopted by the 3ssembly. Gased on
the mandate deriving from the Resolution #))" SRS< could use the
right to veto and not sign laws adopted by the 3ssembly of =osovo
any time he deemed that they are in contradiction with Resolution
#)). This was the case with the law on >anagement of ?ublic
;inance; this law was in principle adopted by the 3ssembly; however
SRS< refused to sign it" respectively to render it efective. This law
was adopted by the SRS< only after it was amended.
/egislature with no powers to approve the budget doesnBt deserve
to be called legislature at all. 3ssembly of =osovo had the right to
only formally review and stamp a budget" which 4nally could of
couldnBt be signed by the SRS<. This control over legislative branch
of the government" which we donBt encounter in none of the
parliamentary state" made that role of the 3ssembly in approval of
the budget is more 4ctional than realistic.
Regardless legal and social$political changes" =osovo is still in a
group of countries where reMuirements for a budget procedure with
active role of the legislature are not ful4lled not even closely. This is
largely due to the fact that in practice e(ecutive organs dominate
through budget procedure. The 3ssembly had proved its e(istence
only technically without bringing any fundamental amendment that
would efect in improving of the <overnmentBs budget policy. 6ntil
today" the number of amendments presented from the 3ssembly
never e(ceeded *L. A.g." for #0& the number of amendments
_____________________________
19
9r*sc* Bedri P7C/
presented by the 3ssembly was )." for #0# was *L" while for #0
was #L (Reports with recommendations related to 9raft /aw on
Gudget of Republic of =osovo for #0&" #0# and #0!.
>oreover" these amendments were more technical in character
than substantial. Time for draft$budget review was limited because of
chain holdups that in years had characteri8ed the budgetary
procedure in =osovo.
9evelopment of the budget procedure only in the line of e(ecutive
organs cased negative efects on many directions" but above all it
made that Gudget of =osovo is not transparent. /et us remember that
very important factor which impacted the need to increase the role of
legislatures in budget procedure in all South$Aastern countries"
respectively increasing of the budget transparency in these countries
is the need of countries in development and those in transition to
have access to international 4nancial institutions in order decrease
poverty. Receiving 4nancial assistance from international 4nancial
institutions is conditioned with certain obligations for the developing
and countries in transition" out of which most important is having a
Mualitative and transparent budget procedure (1ehner" #00):#L!.
1ith declaration of independence the legal basis for more active role
of the 3ssembly in budget procedure has been created. 3fter the
9eclaration of 5ndependence and the 7onstitution the role of the
3ssembly in budget procedure de 5ure has improved a lot. 1hile de
facto its role is still small and symbolic. The assessment of =osovo
3ssembly role in budget procedure" presented in /inerBs inde(" is
made relying more on %uridical and constitutional dispositions that
refer to the lin- between the division of power and roles of the
parliament on budget and budget procedure. Though from the
%uridical and constitutional point of view the 3ssembly has the
unlimited right to ma-e the budged amendment" de fact the situation
stands fare more diferent and the 3ssembly has a very wee- role on
it. Ta-ing into account the new system of governance and
authori8ations provided by the 7onstitution" the 3ssembly has the
right to amend the draft budget presented by the <overnment" while
the e(tent of these amendments depends from the development and
empowered role of the factors presented below C which in =osovo
case are very wee-.
Thus" the =osovo 3ssembly power to amend the annual budget
e(cept with constitutional and legal provisions as well is sub%ected to;
! The 3ssemblyBs ability to access important budget related
documents" #! The role of 3ssembly 7ommittees in the budget
control" &! 9ynamics of political parties" )! The 3ssemblyBs technical
capacity to conduct budget research and analysis. 5n accordance with
_____________________________
20
Assembly
/ienert 5nde( alignment (3nne( 55! technical capacity of parliament to
conduct research and analysis is treated such a fourth factor
(subsection ).)!.
).2.1. Ability of t"e Le#islature to access im$ortant bud#et
related documents.
?resent$day legislatures pay a particular regard to the information
on the e(penditure fows granted by the e(ecutive bodies that
implement the budget and" also from the audit authorities. DA79 has
evolved so$called the best practices for budget transparency (DA79
b" #00#:L$)! (Gest ?ractices for Gudget Transparency! that render
the issues of comprehensive budget information" publication of the
speci4c budget reMuirements as well as the integrity and the liability
of the central budget institutions. :ereinto" DA79 recommends the
conclusion of these budgetary documents and their publication
designed for the ful4llment of the best practices for budget
transparency;

'o( 1. 'ud#etary documents t"at insure 'ud#et
%rans$arency
Comrehensive Budget; includes the stateBs entire incomes and
e(penditures by providing data on the current situation and mid$
term pro%ects.
Preliminary Budget Reort; points out the long$term targets of the
4scal and economic policies" such are 4scal and economic mid$term
oversights.
-onthly Reort; reveals the improvements on the budget e(ecution
by including the e(planation on the diference between the real and
presumptive sum of the budget.
?emiannual Reort; enables comprehensive and accurate data on
the budget e(penditures including mid$term oversights on the
budget e(ecution.
Annual Reort; shall be revised by the revision body and published
within the si( months after the end of a 4scal year.
Pre!election Reort@ tells overall public 4nancial situation prior to the
elections.
9eliberation of the parliamentarian decisions over the budget in
=osovo sustains in information and budgetary documents that are
way far from the standards stipulated from DA79 for e(act and
comprehensive information provided from the e(ecutive branch and
revision authorities according to /?;>3.
_____________________________
21
9r*sc* Bedri P7C/
The amount of supplementary documentation following$up the
draft$budget in the 3ssembly is e(ceedingly formal and inconsonant
with the de4cient cognition of budgetary issues by the most of the
members of the 3ssembly. 3nyhow" this presents a nuisance for the
members of the 3ssembly for understanding budgetary policies on
which the budget rests. >oreover" the budgetary information is not
presented clearly and understandably.
,umber and the format of presentation in the 3ssembly by the
e(ecutive body are regulated under /?;>3 (3rticle )* and )2 of /aw
,r. 0&N/$0)K!. 3ccording to this /aw >inistry of ;inance is responsible
for preparation of Muarter reports reviewed by the <overnment. These
reports shall be presented to the 3ssembly within thirty$days after
each Muarter. Ouarter report includes: report on the receivables"
e(penditures" records on the investments and liabilities" and a
Statement from the >inister on the (in! suEciency of the current
4nancial harvest for budget share$outs as de4ned in the law for
budget allotments. Gudget ;inal Report shall be prepared not later
than >arch &
st
of each calendar year. >; shall complete and submit
to the <overnment for approval and further presentation to the
3ssembly a ;inal Summary Report on the departed 4scal year and
two other past 4scal years. This report includes statements on
incomes and e(penses" and presents comparative records on the
years presented for review over the real incomes and e(penditures"
budget suEce and de4cit" method of 4nancing the de4cit or the
investments of the suEce.
(table &! Reporting 9eadlines
Type of
Report
Reporting period
9ates of reporting
to the <overnment
and 3ssembly
3uditor <eneral
Report
Ouarter
reports
+anuary $ & >arch 3pril C &0 3pril
Semi$annual
reports
+anuary C &+une +uly C &0 +uly
Three$
Muarter
reports
+anuary C &
September
Dctober C &0
Dctober
3nnual
reports
+anuary C &
9ecember
+anuary C &
>arch
,ot later than
+uly &
st
(for
previous 4scal
year!
Source: 3rticle )* and )2 of /aw ,r. 0&N/$0)K ?ublic ;inancial >anagement and
3ccountability
_____________________________
22
Assembly
This is presented de %ure while de facto e(ecutiveBs reports often
were delayed and fail to be submitted within the reMuired deadlines
as overseen by law.
).2.2. 3ole of t"e Assembly committees on bud#et control
5t is often thought that the e(istence of a strong system for the
3ssembly operational committees is a guarantee for an increase of
/egislatureBs role on the decision$ta-ing (/eloup" #00):*#!.
Dperational committees of the 3ssembly of =osovo for 4rst time were
established under the provisions ...#2.f of the 7onstitutional
;ramewor- (6,>5= Regulation #00N.! and according to Regulation
).) of the Rules of ?rocedure of the 3ssembly. Gudget and ;inance
7ommittee consists of members appointed proportionally by the
parties and coalitions represented in the 3ssembly (3rticle ... of
6,>5= Regulation #00N.!. The selection principle of the members of
the Gudget and ;inance 7ommittee very often is in demur with
professional reMuirements that one member of the Gudget and
;inance 7ommittee should meet. 3ccording to budget theory it is very
well -nown that the responsibilities of the budget committees are
diferent in every country. 5n some countries they have general
responsibilities for budget approval. :owever" in diferent countries
committees have the responsibility only on reviewing the draft$
budget while in some countries committees on budget and 4nances
only wor- on resemblance of section committees on proposals of
budget users. ?ursuant to article * of the Rules of ?rocedure of the
3ssembly the structure of the responsibilities of the Gudget and
;inance 7ommittee of the 3ssembly of =osovo is consisted on the:
review of diferent budgetary and 4nancial issues; review of annual
budget; review of budgetary implications for the current year and the
coming years that follow the draft$budget and thus to ma-e
recommendations to the respective committee or the 3ssembly.
The Gudget and ;inance 7ommittee has also the responsibility for
supervision of annual reports and revised 4nancial statements of the
=osovo Gudget. This is presented according to the right" however
throughout all legislations from '.. and present" the activity of the
Gudget and ;inance 7ommittee was more technical than
fundamental. Role of the budget committees includes also informing
the parliaments for budget revenues and e(penditures. 5n one$party
governments budget committees are wea-er in scope of informing
the parliament and budget e(ploiters" while in multi$party
governments their role is much greater in this direction (/upia and
>c7ubbins" ..):&2$&K)!. 5n =osovo" although the government is
build upon bi$partisan coalition" the role of Gudget and ;inance
_____________________________
2
9r*sc* Bedri P7C/
7ommittee in informing the 3ssembly and the citi8ens on the budget
issues remains minor because of the committeeBs inability to have
timely and constant access on the records on budget e(ecutions.
).2.. 4ynamics of t"e $olitical $arties
Gudgetary theory and practice leads us to understand that if one
parliament is constituted of several political parties and none of them
have the ma%ority of seats than the e(ecutive power (government!
has to put a lot of eforts on granting the ma%ority for approval of the
draft$budget (1ehner" #00):&K!. 5n such cases the debate over the
budget is overwhelming and in scope of critical scrutiny of the draft$
budget C coverage which indirectly contributes to budget
transparency. ?arty discipline in countries with fragile democracies is
the main cause that leads house representatives to build up their
opinions on budget issues and this has a negative efect on the
budget transparency. 6nfortunately" in such cases the representatives
Fare more loyal to party setting than their callingI (Sil-" .KL:#!.3t
this picture" budgetary procedure in =osovo is a classic e(pression of
the political proportion that does ta-e account in. Shortage of open"
detailed and transparent review in the 3ssembly remained and still is
indirectly preconditioned by the de4ciency of the dynamic of the
political parties on the budget issues during process over budget.
5n principle ma%ority in the parliament is a prime indicator for the
voting results on the budget. 9uring all mandates" the budget
endorsement was ta-en in absentia of the political parties dynamics"
represented in the 3ssembly. Aach of the governments being
safeguarded with the ma%ority in the 3ssembly had no doubt for the
budget approval. 5n the other side" the opposition shrun- from the
awareness with the power of the government's ma%ority in the
3ssembly thus the draft$budget would be approved through the
voting machine.
Those colorless debates did not ta-e place for improvements in the
budget proposals but only for instant political calculations. ;ormation
of such practices steers not only towards absence of Muali4ed and
vital debate on the budget during its oversight and approval" but also
in cases of the control of the budget e(ecution.
).2.). %ime allowed for discussion of annual bud#et
The budgetary theory and practice teach us that amongst all the
legislature's strength is determined by suEcient time limit for the
budget review.
The time span for budget review in the 3ssembly of =osovo by the
Gudget and ;inance 7ommittee has often been limited because of
_____________________________
2)
Assembly
chain delays and legal$politic events that have portrayed during years
the budgetary policy and budgetary procedure in =osovo from ...
until independence; afecting the Gudget and ;inance 7ommittee not
having time neither for its review of the draft$budget" not even
attempting on infuencing on its amendment. 3ccording to /?;>3" the
budget draft should be submitted to legislative at least two month
before the beginning of the new 4scal year. 3fter its approval by the
<overnment" draft budget and reasoning is submitted to the Spea-er
of the 3ssembly not later than &
st
Dctober.
The time for the 3ssembly to discus budget draft is very short
considering even delays and diEculties that characteri8e =osovo
budget procedure (for e(ample in #002 the Gudget draft was
submitted with three wee-s of delay to the 3ssembly and ?SS? and
with two wee-s of delay in #00L!. The situation is further aggravated
because Gudget and ;inance 7ommittee has no funds with which it
would 4nance the e(ternal e(perts and partners for advise"
suggestions or wording the amendments. Gudget and ;inance
7ommittee in the focus of this e(pertise throughout years had only
e(ternal professional assistance on the budget issues provided from
international institutions such are 6S359" DS7A" ,95" etc.
4.4. %ec"nical ca$acity and ca$ability of Kosovo Assembly to
conduct researc" and analysis of t"e bud#et
3s for the performing an important role on the budgetary
procedure members of the parliaments should understand the
fundamentals of the draft$budget.
Gudgetary practices teach us that the 3ssemblies with active input
on budget procedures posses own research capacities. 7ongressional
Gudget DEce of the 6.S. 7ongress with its #)* employees
academically degreed in the 4eld of budget heads on the chart list.
The ?hilippineBs the ?lanning and Gudget 9epartment employs
around *0 people. Some other 3ssemblies have smaller speciali8ed
units for budgetary issues such is e.g. ?oland. 5n other countries" such
as <erman Gundestag" there are <eneral Research 6nits that bring
studies and research over the budget (+ohnson and Stapenhurst
#00K:)$*L!. Dther countries have no speciali8ed employees for
supporting the Gudget and ;inance 7ommittee while the above$
mentioned houses of representatives have employed hundreds of
chefs (1ehner #00):&.!.
3fter the scrutiny of the circumstances in the 3ssembly of =osovo
and comparing it with the parliamentsB capacities over the world
regarding the budgetary issues the following emerges: that the
=osovo's 3ssembly does not have any oEce for budget studies or
_____________________________
2*
9r*sc* Bedri P7C/
domestic permanent e(pert for professional e(pertise on the budget.
,or the 3ssembly nor the Gudget and ;inance 7ommittee were
funded by the budget for trainings in the budget 4eld of e(pertise.
A(ternal professional assistance was given solely from 6S359" DS7A"
,95" etc. The absence of technical power directly impacted and
continues to hinder the representatives on their Muality performance
of their %ob as the representatives in the 3ssembly and in their
responsibility towards their body of voters.
).*. 3estrictions durin# bud#et e(ecutions.
3 general restriction is the fact that in conformity with provisions of
the /?;>3 the budget may only be amended by the 3ssembly of the
Republic of =osovo. 9espite this /?;>3 de4nes the cases when the
A(ecutive may reallocateNtransfer funds" sub%ect to certain limits"
without 3ssembly approval" as is presented below:
3 budget organi8ation may" without obtaining the approval of the
>inister" transfer up to 4ve percent (*P! of one appropriation of that
budget organi8ation to another appropriation of that budget
organi8ation during any 4scal year; provided" however" that no such
transfer may be made into the wages and salaries appropriation
without the approval of the >inister and" if applicable" the
<overnment or 3ssembly.
The >inister may" if provided with a valid %usti4cation by the head
of a budget organi8ation" authori8e the transfer of part of one
appropriation of that budget organi8ation to another appropriation of
that budget organi8ation; provided" however" that the part so
transferred shall not e(ceed 4fteen percent (*P! of the negatively
afected appropriation.
5f the head of the budget organi8ation reMuests the >inister to
authori8e the transfer of an amount greater than 4fteen percent
(*P! but less than twenty$4ve percent (#*P! of the negatively
afected appropriation" the >inister may authori8e such a transfer
only after 4rst obtaining the written approval of the <overnment.
5f the head of the budget organi8ation reMuests the >inister to
authori8e the transfer of an amount eMual to twenty$4ve percent
(#*P! or more of the negatively afected appropriation" the >inister
may authori8e such a transfer only after 4rst obtaining the approval
of the 3ssembly.
*. 4iscussion and conclusion
Gudget procedure in =osovo under the administration of 6,N6,>5=
(phase ...$#00K! was a sui generis case ali-e 6,>5= administration
itself. 5n such composition of power the budgetary procedure was
_____________________________
21
Assembly
entirely e(ecutive and way to far from the balance between the
3ssembly and e(ecutive$governmental bodies and the >inistry of
Aconomy and ;inance. Gesides the fact that the institution of the
3ssembly is founded by the 7onstitutional ;ramewor-" 4nal power for
determining 4nancial and political parameters on the approval of the
Gudget of =osovo remained under SRS<.
/awma-ing capacity bounded with the SRS<'s right to promulgate
laws approved by the 3ssembly. Gased on the mandate deriving from
the Resolution #))" SRS< could e(ercise the right of veto and re%ect
signing the laws brought by the 3ssembly anytime it was considered
those were in ob%ection with the Resolution #)). 3fter the
declaration of independence a legal ground for larger role of the
3ssembly on the budgetary procedure came into shape.
;rom the results abstained by the analy8es maid according to
/inerBs inde( to =osovo 3ssembly role in budgetary procedure after
the independence we obtained a strong lin- between the political and
budgetary powers of =osovo 3ssembly and the degree of separation
of the legislative and e(ecutive branches of government. The result
would have been so if we would have ta-en in account only
constitutional and legal dimensions of =osovo 3ssembly powers after
independence in #00K.
:owever" aside of the improvement of the constitutional and legal
status of the 3ssembly on the budget procedures" =osovo 3ssembly
belongs to the group of C budget approving legislatures. This is
because =osovo 3ssembly languishes from many defects" were the
most important are; a! promulgation of assembly decisions on the
budget is built on the budgetary information and documents that are
far away from the standards determined from DA79 regarding the
accurate and comprehensive records on the blueprint and e(ecution
by the e(ecutive power and audit bodies; b! Gudget and ;inance
7ommittee is more technical rather than deep$seated; c! the lac- of
technical and 4nancial capacities do ta-e away its portion. 9e4cit of
technical capacities of the =osovo 3ssembly for larger part in the
budgeting procedures for the fact that there is no oEce established
for budget studies" no permanent internal e(pert for professional
e(pertise on the budget. The 3ssembly nor the Gudget and ;inance
7ommittee have ever been funded from the budget for trainings
related to the budget issues; d! the absence of normal
communication between 7ommittee$<overnment$>A;" etc.
3lthough the education bac-ground of the members of the
3ssembly is well composed there is a shortage of the e(pertise on the
4nance and budget 4elds since only few of them are economists and
%urists. 3lthough" according to professional e(pertise" the economists
_____________________________
27
9r*sc* Bedri P7C/
and the %urists are e(pected to give inputs on the budgetary issues.
A(ternal professional assistance was given solely from 6S359" DS7A"
,95" etc. 9uring all mandates the budget approval was ta-en in the
absent of the political partiesB dynamics. Those colorless debates did
not occur for enhancement in the budget proposals but only for
instant political calculations.
3s for the increase of the role of the 3ssembly on budgetary
procedures these measures should be underta-en:
! 5ncrease of the 3ssemblyBs technical and 4nancial capacities for
producing vaster outcome in budgetary procedure" speci4cally: a!
establishment of an oEce for the budget analysis would be in hand to
providing professional e(pertise for the members of the assembly on
budgetary issues" b! budget funding for the Gudget and ;inance
7ommittee for engagement of e(perts and parallel to that" widen the
%ob responsibilities of the Gudget and ;inance 7ommittee" c! funding
the training for representatives in the 4eld of budget and budgetary
procedures and publication of diferent guidance regarding the
budget.
&! 6nderta-ing steps on facilitation the communication between
>;$<overnment$3ssembly$the Gudget and ;inance 7ommittee. The
Gudget and ;inance 7ommittee should be informed on the fow of the
budgetary procedure prior to presenting the draft$budget to the
3ssembly for approval. This would be in hand for the most Mualitative
performance of the Gudget and ;inance 7ommittee on informing
representatives with the preparation of the draft$budget.
3t the end we would summari8e that the increase of =osovo
3ssembly's part on budget procedures is a necessity and there is
suEcient headway and opportunity" and that should only be
e(ercised. :erein" amongst all" 5 have in mind the best practices of
updated budgetary procedures in other countries.
_____________________________
28
Assembly
A55+6 I
Indices on t"e 7e$aration of &owers and t"e 8ontrol by t"e
Le#islature in Kosovo after inde$endence
This anne( describes the overall inde( on the separation of powers"
based on twelve indicators of the separation of political powers and
the control of the e(ecutive by the legislature. Gased on forms of
government" Muantitative values
are assigned" as follows:

Lienert Inde( of t"e 7e$aration of &owers and t"e
Le#islature9s &olitical 8ontrol : Kosovo case after
inde$endence
4escri$tion of variable ;uanti<cation
&art A. 7e$aration of &owers
. 5s the head State directly in
elections separate from elections for
the legislatureH
R Ses
0= 5o
#. 5s the head of e(ecutive (or
government! elected independentlyH
#R Ses" citi8ens elect himNher
directly
1= 5o> "e?s"e is a$$ointed by
t"e "ead of 7tate> u$on
recommendation of t"e
le#islature
0R ,o" heNshe is automatically
the head of government" but
virtue of hisNher leadership of
party with the most votes in the
legislature
&. 5s the head of the State also a
constituent part of the legislatureH
1= 5o
0R Ses
). 7an the head of government be
drawn from outside the legislatureH
#R Ses" citi8ens elect himNher
directly 1= @es> by
a$$ointment of t"e "ead of
7tate
0R ,o" a heNshe must necessarily
be an elected member of the
legislature
*.5s it impossible to hold
simultaneously positions in both the
legislature and in the government
(e(ecutive!
1= @es
R ,o
2. 7an the head of State call elections
of the legislatureH
R ,o
0 = @es
L. 7an the legislature vote Fno R ,o
1
Ouantitative values for =osovo case are emphasi8ed in bold.
_____________________________
29
9r*sc* Bedri P7C/
con4denceI in the government
(e(ecutive!
0= @es
&art '. Limitations on +(ecutive &ower by t"e Le#islature
K. 7an the government (e(ecutive!
determine the timing of sessions of
the legislatureH
1= 5o
0R Ses
.. 7an the head of the State or
government veto bills modi4ed (and
possibly approved! by the legislatureH
0= @es
R Ses" provided the veto is not
re%ected by superma%ority in the
legislature
#R ,o" not under any
circumstances
0. 7an the e(ecutive adopt
secondary laws with the same force as
primary lawsH
1= 5o
0R Ses" some secondary laws are
not reviewed by the legislature
. 9o nearly all draft laws originate
in the e(ecutiveH
1= 5o
0R Ses
#. 7an the legislature bloc- the
appointment of political appointees
that are nominated by e(ecutiveH
R Ses 0= 5o
_____________________________
0
Assembly
A55+6 I

Dn the basis of the numeric values associated with each Muestion"
the following results were obtained:
Anne( %able 1. Indices of 7e$aration of &owers and 8ontrol
of t"e +(ecutive by t"e Le#islature : Kosovo case /indices
under style no. four0
_____________________________
?
a
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m
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s
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r
A. 7e$aration of t"e Le#islature
from t"e +(ecutive
.Alection of head of State 0 0 0 0
#.Alection of head of the e(ecutive # 0
.Aead of 7tate se$arate from
le#islature
0
).Selection of head of government # 0
*.,on$compatibility of legislature
and e(ecutive
0.* 0.* 0.* 0
2.Alection call by head of State 0 0 0 0 0
L.F,o con4denceI vote 0 0 0 0 0
%otal 9 .* .* ) .* 0
'. 8ontrol of t"e +(ecutive by
t"e Le#islature
K.Timing of legislature sessions 0
..Jeto power of head of State or
government
0 0 0 0
0.3doption of secondary laws by
e(ecutive
0 0
.Drigin of draft laws 0 0.* 0 0
#./egislative power over political
appointees
0 0 0 0 0
%otal * 2.* 2 0
!verall Inde( of 7e$aration of
&olitical &owers (total possible
score R)!
1) 7.* 1 7 *.* 0
1
9r*sc* Bedri P7C/
Source: 3nalyses of =osovo case is conducted by author according to /ienerBs
inde( (F1ho 7ontrols the GudgetH The /egislature or the A(ecutiveHI 5>;" #00*!
based on laws and constitution of =osovo.
_____________________________
2
Assembly
3,,AT 55
Lienert Inde( of Kosovo Assembly 'ud#etary &owers after
inde$endence
The legislatureBs power over the budget are mainly at the e( ante
stage $ before the annual budget law is approved. ;our Muestions are
particularly pertinent (see below!. 9uring budget e(ecution" the main
Muestion concerns whether or not the e(ecutive branch can modify
the budget without returning to the legislature and see- its approval.
3n inde( was constructed on the basis of the following 4ve Muestions:

Le#islature9s 'ud#etary &owers
4escri$tion of variable ;uanti<cation
2
. Astablishment of the
medium$term budget strategy.
9oes the legislature approve each
year" an updated budget strategy
covering at least & years (including
the new budget year!H
2 = @es> t"e le#islature ado$ts a
law eac" year
R Ses" the legislature adopts a
resolution each year
0 R ,o" at the best" the legislature is
only informed of the governmentBs
medium term strategy
#. ?ower to amend the annual

budget. 9oes the legislature have
unlimited powers to amend the
draft budget proposed by the
e(ecutiveH 5f there are any
restrictions" how severe are theseH
= no restrictions to c"an#e
balance and com$osition
# R budget de4cit may only be
increased if ofsetting measures
R budget de4cit may not be
amended" but composition of
e(penditures may change
0 R neither budget balance nor
composition may change e(cept in
very minor ways. /egislature must" in
efect" accept or re%ect entire budget
&. Time allowed for discussion of
annual bud$get. :ow many months
does the legislature receive the
draft budget from the e(ecutiveH
# R >ore than four months
1 = .rom one to four mont"s
)

0 R /ess than one month or after the
beginning of the 4scal year
). Technical support in the
legislature. 9oes the legislature
have speciali8ed budget
advisoryNresearch organi8ation
attached to provide budgetary
analyses independent of the
# R Ses" but with a substantial
number of staf (more than #*!
R Ses" but with a limited number of
staf
0 = 5o
2
Ouanti4cations for =osovo are emphasi8ed in bold.
3
The 3ssembly is only informed of the governmentBs >edium Term Strategy because
no approval reMuired from 3ssembly.
(
& of Dctober is deadline for submission draft budget in 3ssembly" whereas
3ssembly must approve it until & 9ecember.
_____________________________
9r*sc* Bedri P7C/

e(ecutiveH
*. Restrictions during budget
e(ecution. 9oes the legislature
oblige the government to
implement its e(penditure programs
e(actly as adoptedH 5f not" what
restrictions are there on the
governments powers to modify the
budget during implementationH
# R A(ecutive may neither withhold
nor reallocate funds without
legislative approval.
1 = +(ecutive may wit""old or
reallocate funds> subBect to
certain limits.
0 R A(ecutive has unlimited powers
to limit e(penditures in order to
achieve overall budget ob%ectives.

A55+6 II
Table #. 5ndices for the /egislatureBs Gudget 3uthority in #K 7ountries
and =osovo 7ase
%y$e of
#overnment
1
.

-
e
d
i
u
m
C
t
e
r
m

f
r
a
m
e
w
o
r
k
2
.

A
m
e
n
d
m
e
n
t

$
o
w
e
r
s
.

%
i
m
e

f
o
r

s
c
r
u
t
i
n
y

o
f

b
u
d
#
e
t
)
.

%
e
c
"
n
i
c
a
l

s
u
$
$
o
r
t

t
o

l
e
#
i
s
l
a
t
u
r
e
*
.

3
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
i
o
n
s

d
u
r
i
n
#

e
(
e
c
u
t
i
o
n
T
o
t
a
l

i
n
d
e
(
Kosovo ?arlia. Republic 2
*
1 0 1 7
Ar#entina ?residential 0 # 0 )
Australia 1estminister 0 0 0 0 1
Austria Semipresidential 0 & 0 # 1
'el#ium ?arlia. >onarchy 0 & 0 0 )
'olivia ?residential 0 & 0 *
8anada 1estminister 0 0 0 0 1
4enmark ?arlia. >onarchy 0 & 0 *
.inland Semipresidential 0 & 0 # 1
)
5ndices # is assigned because the /aw on Gudgetary 9ivisions is approved each
year from the 3ssembly and is applied during >id $Term Strategy of A(penditure.
>id$ Term Strategy of A(penditure is needed to be submitted to the 3ssembly until
&0 3pril of the year before $ %ust for information without as-ing for its approval.
_____________________________
)
Assembly
.rance Semipresidential 0 # 0 )
Dermany ?arliam. Republic 0 & 0 0 )
Dreece Semipresidential 0 0 0 0 0 0
Aun#ary Semipresidential 0 & 0 # 1
Iceland ?arliam. Republic 0 & 0 # 1
Indonesia ?residential 0 # # 1
Ireland Semipresidential 0 0 0 0 0 0
Italy ?arliam. Republic # & 0 7
Ea$an ?arliam.
>onarchy
0 & # 7
Korea Semipresidential 0 0 # )
-e(ico ?residential 0 0 # 0
5et"erland ?arlia. >onarchy 0 & 1
5ew Fealand 1estminister 0 0 0 0 0 0
5orway ?arlia. >onarchy 0 & 0 # 1
&ortu#al Semipresidential & 0 0 *
7$ain ?arlia. >onarchy 0 0
7weden ?arlia. >onarchy & # 9
%urkey ?arlia. >onarchy 0 0
Gnited
Kin#dom
1estminister 0 0 0 0 1
Gnited 7tates ?residential & # # # 10
_____________________________
*
9r*sc* Bedri P7C/
3+.+3+58+7
Alesina> A. and &erotti 3.> 1999. FGudget 9e4cits and Gudget
5nstitutionsI ed. by ?oterba" +. and Jon :agen" +. ;iscal 5nstitutions and
;iscal ?erformance. 7hicago and /ondon: 6niversity of 7hicago ?ress" & C
&L.
Alesina> A.> -. -are> 3. &erotti> 199*.I The 5talian budget procedures:
3nalysis and proposalsI" 7olumbia 6niversity 1or-ing ?aper ,o. L**.
'ratic>H.> 200).I 6loga parlamenta u proraUuns-om procesu: prim%er
:rvats-og saboraI (online! ;inanci%s-a teori%a i pra-sa #K (! str. L$
#&(#00)! http:NNwww.i%f.hrN;T?N#00)NNbratic.pdf
8aiden> 5.> 199. FThe Roads to Transformation: Gudgeting 5ssues in the
78ech and Slova- ;ederal RepublicI. ?ublic Gudgeting and ;inance"
&(1inter!" *L$L.
8"rystal> A.> 1981. FAlectoral 7ycle" budget controls" and public
e(penditureI" +ournal of ?ublic ?olicy" :&#$*..
8onstitution of the Republic of =osovo approved on 0K.0).#00K.
DA&> =osovo Gudget C transparency and forms of budget reporting" #0&.
Eo"nson> Eo"n K.> and 3obert 5akamura. 1999. F3 7oncept paper on
/egislatures and <ood <overnance.I 6nited ,ations 9evelopment
?rogramme" >anagement 9evelopment and <overnance 9ivision" ,ew
Sor-.
Eo"nson> E. K. And 3. 7ta$en"urst 2008. V The /egislative Gudget
DEces: 5nternational A(perience F5n: /egislative Dversight and Gudgeting:
3 1orld ?erspective. R. Stapenhurst" R. ?eli88o" 9.>. Dlson and /. Jon
Trapp. 1ashington" 9.7." 1orld Gan-: )$*K.
Eo"nson> Eo"n K. 200*. FThe Role of ?arliament in <overnment.I1orld
Gan- 5nstitute" 1ashington" 97.
Lienert> Ian> 200*. V1ho 7ontrols The GudgetH The /egislature or the
A(ecutiveH F5>; 1?N0*N*.Lu$ia. A> and -c8ubbins> -.4.> 199).
F1ho 7ontrolsH 5nformation and the structure of the /egislative 9ecision
>a-ingI" online: 7omparative /egislative Research 7enter"
http:NNwww.%stor.orgNstableN))0" Jol. ." ,o. &" pp. &2$&K).
LaJere> +.> 2002. F5mproving the transparency of the 97 budgetI
1ashington: 9istrict of 7olumbia" ;iscal ?olicy 5nstitute.
Lu$ia> Art"ur> -at"ew 4. -c8ubbins" 1ho 7ontrolsH 5nformation and
the structure of the /egislative 9ecision >a-ing : SO #" ..).
LeLou$> %>L.> 200). I6loga parlamenata u odreWivan%u proraUuna u
>aWars-o% i Sloveni%iI (online! ;inanci%s-a teori%a i pra-sa #K (! str. ).$L#
(#00)!. 3vailable from h ttp:NNwww.i%f.hrN;T?N#00)NNleloup.pdf
-ediumC%erm +($enditure .ramework #00K$#0" >A; #00K.
-ikesell> E.> 199*. F9oing ?ublic ;inance on the ;rontier of Aconomic
Transition: Dbservations from a 4scal 3dvisor in 6-raineI. ?ublic
Gudgeting and ;inance * (Summer!" $#.
5ord> 3.> 2000. F7entral and Aastern Aurope and the ,ew ;inancial
3rchitectureI" ;inance and 9evelopment" #000" Jol. &L" ,o.&" $2.
_____________________________
1
Assembly
!tt> K.> 2000. ?roraUuns-i vodic 8a gradane" @agreb: 5nstitut 8a +avne
;inanci%e.
!+84> 2002a. FThe DA79 Gudgeting 9atabaseI. DA79 +ournal on
Gudgeting" (&!**$L.
!+84> 2002b. FDA79 Gest ?ractices for Gudget TransparencyI. DA79
+ournal on Gudgeting" (&!" L$).
&remc"and A.> L. Daranival<.> 1992. F<overnment Gudget and
3ccounting SystemsI in ;iscal ?olicies in Aconomies in Transition"
1ashington: 5>;" )$&#.
3ic"ard -. 'ird> 3obert 4. +bel d"e 8"ristine I. Kallic"> 1998. ;iscal
9ecentrali$8ation ;rom 7ommand to >ar-et" in; 1allace A. Dates" p. 2)L$
L0& (The Aconomics of ;iscal ;ederalism and /ocal ;inance"
>assachusetts!. 3e#ulation on ?rocedure of the 3ssembly of =osovo"
?ristine #0 >ay #00*" amended on +une #002.
3a$ort with amendments to draft law no. 0)N/$2* on the Gudget of the
Republic of =osovo for #0&.
3e$ort with recommendations on the 9raft /aw of the Republic of =osovo
Gudget for #0#.
3e$ort with recommendations on the 9raft /aw of the Republic of =osovo
Gudget for #0.
7ilk> &aul. 1987. 6o" Parliament 3or1s. /ondon" ,ew Sor-: /ongman.
7traussman> E.4.> 1991. V 5deals and Reality in the Avolution of ;iscal
Reform in 7entral and Aastern AuropeF. ?ublic Gudgeting and ;inance )
(Summer!" L.$.*.
7traussman> E.4. and .abian> K.> 199). V/ocal <overnment ;inance in
:ungary: D-un RevisitedF. ?ublic Gudgeting and ;inance ) (1inter!" L$
K&.
%anJi> H>. 199bI;inancial >ar-ets and ?ublic ;inance in the Transformation
?rocessI ed. by Tan8i" J." p. $& (Studies in ;iscal Reform. 1ashington:
5>;!.
%anJi> H.> and 7c"uknec"t L.> 2000. ;iscal rules and 5nstitutions" p. *$
2."in ?ublic Spending in the #0
th
7entury: 7ambridge 6niversity ?ress.
Hon Aa#en> Eur#en> 1992. VGudgeting ?rocedures and ;iscal ?erformance
in the Auropean 7ommunity"F Aconomics ?apers .2 (Grussels: Auropean
7ommission!.
Ke"ner> Eoac"im> 2001 FReconciling 3ccountability and ;iscal ?rudence: 3
7ase study of the Gudgetary Role and 5mpact of the <erman ?arliament"I
+ournal of /egislative Studies" Jol. L" ,o. #.
Ke"ner> Eoac"im> 2001 F3ssessing the ?ower of the ?urse: 3n 5nde( of
/egislative Gudget 5nstitutionsI" ?olitical studies" Jol. *)" L2L$LK*.
Ke"ner> E.> 200) I?ovrata- s margineH Rede4nisan%e doprinosa parlamenta
proraUuns$-om ci-lusuI (online! ;inanci%s-a Teori%a i ?ra-sa #K (! str. L$
#&. 3vailable from http:NNwww.i%f.hrN;T?N#00)NNwehner.pdfc
Korld 'ank2 Report no. &#2#)$T=" Review of ?ublic A(penditure and
5nstitutions in =osovo" ## +une #00*.
Law ,o. 0&N/$0)K on ?ublic ;inancial >anagement and 3ccountability.
Law 5o. 200?2 on ?ublic ;inancial >anagement and 3ccountability
announced with Regulation nr. #00& NL on the promulgation of a law
_____________________________
7
9r*sc* Bedri P7C/
adopted by the assembly of =osovo on public 4nancial management and
accountability.
Law no. 0&N/$## for amendment of /aw no. 0&N/$0)K for the management
of public 4nances.
_____________________________
8

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Role of the Legislature in the Budget Procedure: The Case of Kosovo

are assigned" as follows:

#. ?ower to amend the annual

9rsc Bedri P7C/

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