PNB V.

DE JESUS
411 SCRA 557

FACTS:
It would appear that on 10 June 1995, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court of Occidental Mindoro for recovery of ownership and possession, with damages, over the questioned
property. In his complaint, respondent stated that he had acquired a parcel of land situated in Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro, with an area of 1,144 square meters covered by TCT No. T-17197, and that on 26 March 1993, he had
caused a verification survey of the property and discovered that the northern portion of the lot was being encroached
upon by a building of petitioner to the extent of 124 square meters. Despite two letters of demand sent by
respondent, petitioner failed and refused to vacate the area.
Petitioner, in its answer, asserted that when it acquired the lot and the building sometime in 1981 from then
Mayor Bienvenido Ignacio, the encroachment already was in existence and to remedy the situation, Mayor Ignacio
offered to sell the area in question (which then also belonged to Ignacio) to petitioner at P100.00 per square meter
which offer the latter claimed to have accepted. The sale, however, did not materialize when, without the knowledge
and consent of petitioner, Mayor Ignacio later mortgaged the lot to the Development Bank of the Philippines. He also
contends that he is a builder in good faith.

ISSUE:
Whether or not being a builder in good faith matters under article 448.

HELD:
Article 448, of the Civil Code refers to a piece of land whose ownership is claimed by two or more parties,
one of whom has built some works (or sown or planted something) and not to a case where the owner of the land is
the builder, sower, or planter who then later loses ownership of the land by sale or otherwise for, elsewise stated,
where the true owner himself is the builder of works on his own land, the issue of good faith or bad faith is entirely
irrelevant.



Macasaet vs Macasaet G.R. 154391 92 September 30, 2004

Facts:
1. Petitioners Ismael and Teresita Macasaet and Respondents Vicente and Rosario
Macasaet are first-degree relatives. Ismael is the son of respondents, and Teresita is his
wife.
2. The parents alleged that they were the owners of two (2) parcels of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-78521 and T-103141, situated in Banay-banay,
Lipa City; that by way of a verbal lease agreement, their son and his wife occupied these
lots in March 1992 and used them as their residence and the situs of their construction
business.
3. Ismael and Teresita denied the existence of any verbal lease agreement. They claimed
that their parents had invited them to construct their residence and business on the
subject lots. They added that it was the policy of their parents to allot the the land
owned as an advance grant of inheritance in favor of their children. Thus, they
contended that the lot covered by TCT no. T-103141 had been allotted to Ismael as
advance inheritance. On the other hand, the lot covered by TCT-78521 was allegedly
given to petitioners as payment for construction materials used in the renovation of
their parents house.
4. On December 10, 1997, the parents filed with the MTCC of Lipa City an ejectment suit
against their children for failure to pay the agreed rental despite repeated demands.
5. The MTCC ruled in favor of the parents and ordered the children to vacate the
premises. It opined that the children had occupied the lots, not by virtue of a verbal
lease agreement but by tolerance of the parents. As their stay was by mere tolerance,
the children were necessarily bound by an implied promise to vacate the lots upon
demand. The MTCC dismissed their contention that one lot had been allotted as an
advance inheritance, on the ground that succcesional rights were inchoate. It
disbelieved that the other parcel had been given as payment for construction material.
6. On appeal, the RTC upheld the findings of the MTCC. RTC allowed the parents to
appropriate the building and other improvements introduced by the children, after
payment by indemnity provided for bt Article 448 in relation to Article 546 and 548 of
the Civil Code.
7. On an appeal by both parties to the CA which were consolidated, the CA sustained the
finding of the lower courts that the children had been occupying the subject lots only by
the tolerance of their parent. Thus, possession of the subject lots by the children
became illegal upon their receipt of letter to vacate it. The CA modified the RTC Decision
by declaring that Article 448 of the Civil Code was inapplicable. The CA opined that
under Article 1678 of the same Code, the children had the right to be reimbursed for
one half of the value of the improvements made.
8. Not satisfied with the CAs ruling, the children brought the case to the Supreme Court.

Issues:
1. WON the children can be ejected

a. Based on the parents love reasons for gratuitously allowing the children to use the
lots, it can be safely concluded that the agreement subsisted as long as the parents
and the children benefitted from the arrangement. Effectively, there is a resolutory
condition existing between the parties occurs like a change of ownership,
necessity, death of either party or unresolved conflict or animosity the agreement
maybe deemed terminated. When persistent conflict and animosity overtook the
love and solidarity between the parents and the children, the purpose of the
agreement ceased. The children had any cause for continued possession of the lots.
Their right to use became untenable. It ceased upon their receipt of the notice to
vacate. And because they refused to heed the demand, ejectment was the proper
remedy against them.
b. The children had no right to retain possession. The right of the children to inherit
from their parents is merely inchoate and is vested only upon the latters demise.
Rights of succession are transmitted only from the moment of death of the
decedent. Assuming that there was an allotment of inheritance, ownership
nonetheless remained with the parents.
c. The childrens allegation that the indebtness of their parent to them has been paid
through dation cannot be given credence as there were no sufficient proof of a
settlement or contract of dation to settle the alleged debt, and is inconsistent of the
separate action by the children to recover the same debt.
d. As a rule, the right of ownership carries with it the right of possession.

2. Rights of a Builder in Good faith
a. As applied to the present case, accession refers to the right of owner to everything
that is incorporated or attached to the property. Accession industrial building,
planting and sowing on an immovable is governed by Articles 445 to 456 of the
Civil Code.
b. As the court found that the children possession of the two lots was not by mere
tolerance, the applicable rule would be Article 448. This article has been applied to
cases wherein a builder had constructed improvements with the consent of the
owner.










FACTS:

On June 25, 1959, Claro L. Laureta filed in the Court of First Instance of Davao an action for nullity,
recovery of ownership and/or reconveyance with damages and attorney's fees against Marcos Mata,
Codidi Mata, Fermin Z. Caram Jr. and the Register of Deeds of Davao City.

On June 10, 1945, Marcos Mata conveyed a large tract of agricultural land covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 3019 in favor of Claro Laureta, plaintiff, the respondent herein. The deed of
absolute sale in favor of the plaintiff was not registered because it was not acknowledged before a
notary public or any other authorized officer. At the time the sale was executed, there was no
authorized officer before whom the sale could be acknowledged inasmuch as the civil government in
Tagum, Davao was not as yet organized. However, the defendant Marcos Mata delivered to Laureta the
peaceful and lawful possession of the premises of the land together with the pertinent papers thereof
such as the Owner's Duplicate Original Certificate of Title No. 3019, sketch plan, tax declaration, tax
receipts and other papers related thereto. Since June 10, 1945, the plaintiff Laureta had been and is still
in continuous, adverse and notorious occupation of said land, without being molested, disturbed or
stopped by any of the defendants or their representatives. In fact, Laureta had been paying realty taxes
due thereon and had introduced improvements worth not less than P20,000.00 at the time of the filing
of the complaint.

However, the said property was sold to Fermin Caram, Jr., the petitioner, by Marcos Mata on May 5,
1947. And was able to declare the ODOCT in the possession of Laureta null and void, after Mata filed for
an issuance of new ODOCT before the RD of Davao on the ground of loss of the said title.

The Trial Court ruled infavor of Laureta, stating that Caram, Jr. was not a purchaser in good faith, and
the Court of Appeals thenafter affirmed the decision of the lower court.

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:

The petitioner assails the finding of the trial court that the second sale of the property was made
through his representatives, Pedro Irespe and Atty. Abelardo Aportadera. He argues that Pedro Irespe
was acting merely as broker or intermediary with the specific task and duty to pay Marcos Mata the sum
FERMIN Z. CARAM, JR. V. CLARO L. LAURETA
G.R. No. L-28740. February 24, 1981
of P1,000.00 for the latter's property and to see to it that the requisite deed of sale covering the
purchase was properly executed by Marcos Mata; that the identity of the property to be bought and the
price of the purchase had already been agreed upon by the parties; and that the other alleged
representative, Atty. Aportadera, merely acted as a notary public in the execution of the deed of sale.

ISSUES:

Whether petitioner have acted in bad faith through his agents action.

RULING:

In the case at bar, the court found that the Attorneys Irespe and Aportadera had knowledge of the
circumstances, and knew that Mata's certificate of title together with other papers pertaining to the
land was taken by soldiers under the command of Col. Claro L. Laureta. Added to this is the fact that at
the time of the second sale Laureta was already in possession of the land. Irespe and Aportadera should
have investigated the nature of Laureta's possession. If they failed to exercise the ordinary care
expected of a buyer of real estate they must suffer the consequences. The rule of caveat emptor
requires the purchaser to be aware of the supposed title of the vendor and one who buys without
checking the vendor's title takes all the risks and losses consequent to such failure.

The principle that a person dealing with the owner of the registered land is not bound to go behind the
certificate and inquire into transactions the existence of which is not there intimated 18 should not
apply in this case. It was of common knowledge that at the time the soldiers of Laureta took the
documents from Mata, the civil government of Tagum was not yet established and that there were no
officials to ratify contracts of sale and make them registrable. Obviously, Aportadera and Irespe knew
that even if Mata previously had sold the disputed property such sale could not have been
registered.cdrep

There is no doubt then that Irespe and Aportadera, acting as agents of Caram, purchased the property
of Mata in bad faith. Applying the principle of agency, Caram, as principal, should also be deemed to
have acted in bad faith.

Article 1544 of the New Civil Code provides that:

"Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.

"Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good
faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.

"Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in
the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there
is good faith. (1973)".

Since Caram was a registrant in bad faith, the situation is as if there was no registration at all.
MANOTOK REALTY, INC. V COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. L-45038, April 30, 1987
TOPIC: Administration of exclusive property

FACTS:
Felipe Madlangawa, respondent claims that he has been occupying a parcel of land in the Clara de
Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision since 1949 upon permission being obtained from Andres
Ladores, then an overseer of the subdivision, with the understanding that the respondent would
eventually buy the lot.
April 2, 1950
o The owner of the lot, Clara Tambunting, died and her entire estate, including her paraphernal
properties covering the lot occupied by the respondent were placed under custodia legis.
April 22, 1950
o Vicente Legarda, husband of Tambunting received the deposit of respondent amounting to
P1,500 for the lot
o Respondent had a remaining balance of P5,700 which he did not pay or was unable to pay
because the heirs of Tambunting could not settle their differences.
April 28, 1950
o Don Vicente Legarda was appointed as a special administrator of the estate and the respondent
remained in possession of the lot in question.
March 13 and 20, 1959
o Petitioner Manotok Realty, Inc. became the successful and vendee of the Tambunting de
Legarda Subdivision pursuant to the deeds of sale executed in its favor by the Philippine Trust
Company, as administrator of the Testate Estate of Clara Tambunting de Legarda. The lot in
dispute was one of those covered by the sale. The Deed of Sale provided for terms and
conditions.
Petitioner caused the publication of several notices in the Manila Times and the Taliba advising the
occupants to vacate their respective premises, otherwise, court action with damages would follow.
This includes respondent among others who refused to vacate the lots
Trial Court dismissed the petitioner's action. CA ruled that the only right remaining to the petitioner
is to enforce the collection of the balance because accordingly, it stepped into the shoes of its
predecessor (Don Vicente Legarda).
ISSUE: Whether Don Vicente Legarda could validly dispose of the paraphernal property?
DECISION: NO. Decision of CA is reversed and set aside
RATIO:
The record does not show that Don Vicente Legarda was the administrator of the paraphernal
properties of Dona Clara Tambunting during the lifetime of the latter. Thus, it cannot be said that the
sale which was entered into by the private respondent and Don Vicente Legarda had its inception
before the death of Clara Tambunting and was entered into by the Don Vicente on behalf of Clara
Tambunting but was only consummated after her death.
Don Vicente Legarda, therefore, could not have validly disposed of the lot in dispute as a continuing
administrator of the paraphernal properties of Dona Clara Tambunting.
Art. 136 NCC. The wife retains the ownership of the paraphernal property.
Art. 137 NCC. The wife shall have the administration of the paraphernal property, unless she
delivers the same to the husband by means of a public instrument empowering him to administer it.
In this case, the public instrument shall be recorded in the Registry of Property. As for the movables,
the husband shall give adequate security.
The Court concluded that the sale between Don Vicente Legarda and the private respondent is void ab
initio, the former being neither an owner nor administrator of the subject property. Such being the
case, the sale cannot be the subject of the ratification by the Philippine Trust Company or the probate
court.
After the appointment of Don Vicente Legarda as administrator of the estate of Dona Clara
Tambunting, he should have applied before the probate court for authority to sell the disputed
property in favor of the private respondent. If the probate court approved the request, then Don
Vicente Legarda would have been able to execute a valid deed of sale in favor of the respondent. But
Don Vicente Legarda had no effort to comply with the above-quoted rule of procedure nor on that of
the respondent to protect his interests or to pay the balance of the installments to the court appointed
administrator.