RP 30-7

INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL

DESIGN PHILOSOPHY FOR FIRE AND
GAS DETECTION AND CONTROL
SYSTEMS
February 1994

Copyright The British Petroleum Company p.l.c.

Copyright The British Petroleum Company p.l.c.

All rights reserved. The information contained in this document is subject to the
terms and conditions of the agreement or contract under which the document was
supplied to the recipient's organisation. None of the information contained in this
document shall be disclosed outside the recipient's own organisation without the
prior written permission of Manager, Standards, BP International Limited, unless
the terms of such agreement or contract expressly allow.

BP GROUP RECOMMENDED PRACTICES AND SPECIFICATIONS FOR ENGINEERING

Issue Date
Doc. No.

RP 30-7

February 1994

Latest Amendment Date

Document Title

INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL

DESIGN PHILOSOPHY FOR FIRE AND
GAS DETECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS
APPLICABILITY
Regional Applicability: International
SCOPE AND PURPOSE
This document provides guidance on the design philosophy required for fire and gas detection
systems and how this should be integrated into a facilities overall protection arrangement.

AMENDMENTS
Amd
Date
Page(s)
Description
___________________________________________________________________

CUSTODIAN (See Quarterly Status List for Contact)

Control & Electrical Systems

Issued by:-

Engineering Practices Group, BP International Limited, Research & Engineering Centre

Chertsey Road, Sunbury-on-Thames, Middlesex, TW16 7LN, UNITED KINGDOM
Tel: +44 1932 76 4067
Fax: +44 1932 76 4077
Telex: 296041

CONTENTS
Section

Page

FOREWORD.......................................................................................................................iii
1. INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................1
2. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS......................................................................................1
3. HAZARD DETECTION REQUIREMENTS ................................................................3
3.1 Steps 1-1 / 1-7 - Fire/Gas Hazard.........................................................................3
3.2 Step 1-2 - Automatic Executive Response (Fire) ..................................................3
3.3 Steps 1-3 / 1-4 / 1-5 - Operator View (Fire).........................................................3
3.4 Steps 1-8 / 1-9 - Plant Ventilation (Gas)................................................................4
3.5 Step 1-10 - Effective Detection (Gas)...................................................................4
4. HAZARD MITIGATION/PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS ...................................4
4.1 General.................................................................................................................4
4.2 Step 2-1 - Manning...............................................................................................5
4.3 Step 2-2 - Means of Escape .................................................................................5
4.4 Steps 2-3/2-4 - Personnel/Asset Protection...........................................................5
4.5 Step 2-5 - Access/Escape Routes .........................................................................6
4.6 Step 2-6 - Hazard Escalation................................................................................6
4.7 Steps 2-7 - Mobile/Portable Appliances................................................................6
4.8 Step 2-8 - Manual Protection Initiation..................................................................7
4.9 Steps 2-9/2-10 - Automatic Protection Initiation....................................................7
5. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS .........................................................................................7
5.1 General.................................................................................................................7
5.2 Step 3-1 - Manning...............................................................................................8
5.3 Step 3-2 - Fire Watch...........................................................................................8
5.4 Step 3-3 - Asset Protection...................................................................................8
5.5 Step 3-4 - Maintenance Response.........................................................................8
5.6 Step 3-5 - Spares Availability................................................................................9
5.7 Step 3-8 - Cost Benefit Analysis ...........................................................................9
6. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION...........................................................................9
FIGURE 1 ............................................................................................................................11
HAZARD DETECTION REQUIREMENTS .............................................................11
FIGURE 2 ............................................................................................................................12
HAZARD MITIGATION/CONTROL REQUIREMENTS ........................................12
FIGURE 3 ............................................................................................................................13

RP 30-7
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL
DESIGN PHILOSOPHY FOR FIRE AND GAS
DETECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

PAGE i

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS.....................................................................................13
APPENDIX A.......................................................................................................................14
DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS.................................................................14
APPENDIX B.......................................................................................................................15
LIST OF REFERENCED DOCUMENTS .................................................................15
APPENDIX C.......................................................................................................................16
LEGISLATION AND STANDARDS.......................................................................16

RP 30-7
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL
DESIGN PHILOSOPHY FOR FIRE AND GAS
DETECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

PAGE ii

FOREWORD
Introduction to BP Group Recommended Practices and Specifications for Engineering
The Introductory Volume contains a series of documents that provide an introduction to the BP
Group Recommended Practices and Specifications for Engineering (RPSEs). In particular, the
'General Foreword' sets out the philosophy of the RPSEs. Other documents in the Introductory
Volume provide general guidance on using the RPSEs and background information to Engineering
Standards in BP. There are also recommendations for specific definitions and requirements.
Value of this Recommended Practice
(i)

There are not yet any industry or international codes or standards in existence to cover this
area.

(ii)

The requirements for Fire & Gas detection and control systems need to be appropriate to
the risks inherent in an installation. This guidance gives an approach to ensure that the
design considers the risk factors and avoids the provision of overly complex systems.

Application
Text in italics is Commentary. Commentary provides background information which supports the
requirements of the Recommended Practice, and may discuss alternative options.
This document may refer to certain local, national or international regulations but the responsibility to
ensure compliance with legislation and any other statutory requirements lies with the user. The user
should adapt or supplement this document to ensure compliance for the specific application.
Principal Changes from Previous Edition
This is a first issue of the Recommended Practice. Readers should be aware that the document may
be subject to change resulting from rationalisation with other associated Recommended Practices
and Standards within the BP Group.
Feedback and Further Information
Users are invited to feed back any comments and to detail experiences in the application of BP
RPSE's, to assist in the process of their continuous improvement.
For feedback and further information, please contact Standards Group, BP International or the
Custodian. See Quarterly Status List for contacts.

RP 30-7
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL
DESIGN PHILOSOPHY FOR FIRE AND GAS
DETECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

PAGE iii

1.

INTRODUCTION
1.1

This document provides guidance on the design philosophy required for Fire
and Gas system design and how this should be integrated into overall
protection systems. Gas detection includes both flammable and toxic
considerations. The guidance is applicable to onshore and offshore plant
and installations (herein after referred to as installations for oil, chemicals
and production facilities.

1.2

The requirements for detection devices and logic systems are not covered
and reference should be made to BP Group RP 30-5, Section 4, 'Fire &
Gas Detection and Control Systems' for applicable recommendations.
These cover issues such as hardwired and relay systems versus logic based
systems.
Further Recommended Practices will follow outlining other areas where guidance
is required on defining performance in the field, e.g. combustible and toxic gas
detection.

1.3

2.

The requirements for fire protection facilities are detailed in BP Group RP

24-1 'Fire Protection - Onshore' and BP Group RP 24-2 'Fire Protection Offshore'. Outline detail is included within this Recommended Practice for
clarity, but cross reference should be made, where detailed, for specific
requirements.

GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
2.1

The requirements for fire and gas systems has to be considered as part of
the overall health, safety and environmental protection facilities for
installations. The aim will be to ensure the inherent risks involved are
reduced to an acceptable limit, as agreed with the Business Unit responsible
for the installation, and as required by any applicable Local or National
Regulatory Authority. The risks that the safety facilities will be mitigating will
include but not necessarily be limited to:-

Loss of life or serious injury

Maintaining safe means of escape and refuge.
Prevention of escalation of an incident
Prevention of 'major' commercial loss
Minimisation of environmental pollution

There may also be other risk criteria involved due to the market place where the
facility is installed or where the 'product' is being supplied. Risks such as Company
standing within the local community or image with customers may have an
influence on the specific installation.

RP 30-7
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL
DESIGN PHILOSOPHY FOR FIRE AND GAS
DETECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

PAGE 1

It needs to be stressed that setting very onerous targets for acceptable risk can
result in the requirement for complex and expensive fire and gas systems and the
whole of life costs for maintenance and test of these systems should not be under
estimated. Such targets need to be realistic and supportable.

2.2

The first step in designing protection facilities will therefore be the

identification of the overall risks involved for the installation. The business
unit responsible, will then need to set the criteria that are to be deemed
acceptable risk.
Reference should be made to BP Group RP 24-1 'Fire Protection - Onshore' and BP
Group RP 24-2 'Fire Protection - Offshore' which detail methods for front end fire
hazard assessment.
These may be qualitative or quantitative criteria and may be governed by local or
national regulation or practice. In general, criteria associated with serious risk to
life can be of a quantitative nature whereas a less rigorous approach may be
accepted for areas related to commercial or less sensitive aspects.
Having established overall risk criteria, a more detailed study can be made of the
installation to establish what contributing factors there may be from individual risk
sources which could impact on the overall risk limitation requirement. The level of
detail assessment will need to be commensurate with the stage of the design
completion at that time, however, the validity of the assessment would need review
as detail is developed.
Individual risk sources will be considered down to the primary level which could
result in release such as flanges, pump seals, vents etc.

2.3

An assessment then needs to be made to establish whether the provision of

any fire and gas detection or protection will give benefit in making a
significant contribution to reducing the risk involved. The benefits of using
alternative measures also needs to be assessed to ensure the optimum
arrangement is provided. Included within this assessment should be
consideration of any facilities that need to be provided to meet Regulatory/
Inspection Authority specific requirements.
The use of fire and gas detection and control systems can be very expensive to
engineer install and subsequently maintain during the life of an installation. There
may well be benefits, therefore in considering redesign of plant, layout or using
alternative measures such as passive protection. The use of Quantified Risk and
Cost Benefit Analyses may also be considered, however this will depend on
project/installation philosophy. The cost, time and resources required for such
analysis can be considerable should not be under estimated when deciding on this
route.

2.4

Having detailed the areas where fire and gas detection or protection control
systems could give a significant risk reduction, it is also necessary to
establish the effectiveness of any facilities that may be identified as required.

RP 30-7
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL
DESIGN PHILOSOPHY FOR FIRE AND GAS
DETECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

PAGE 2

The configuration of the system required to meet the anticipated risk

prevention contribution, will also need to be defined.
2.5

3.

The design process, once risks have been identified, is summarised on flow
diagrams, Figures 1 to 3 and the steps involved are allocated numbers
which can be cross referred to in the following sections.

HAZARD DETECTION REQUIREMENTS

(Refer Figure 1)
3.1

Steps 1-1 / 1-7 - Fire/Gas Hazard

The first step is to determine whether any area of risk of gas release and/or
fire introduces a significant hazard in the immediate area or due to
accumulation in other areas. If not, the provision of detection should not be
necessary. For gas detection, both combustible and toxic gases have to be
considered.

3.2

Step 1-2 - Automatic Executive Response (Fire)

Consideration needs to be given as to whether automatic executive
response to detection of fire is essential. In order to achieve this there is no
alternative to the provision of fire detection to initiate the response. The
applications where automatic executive response may be considered
essential could be where rapid escalation of an incident may occur or where
there is no operator presence at the control point who could initiate hazard
mitigating actions.

3.3

Steps 1-3 / 1-4 / 1-5 - Operator View (Fire)

If automatic executive response on detection of fire is not required, it should
be established whether the operator has free vision to fully monitor all areas
where there is a significant risk of a fire situation or if this can be provided
by other means such as remote CCTV facilities. It would be essential,
however that it is possible to readily identify the fact that there is a fire and
that the operational philosophy is such that an operator is always at the
point where such viewing is possible and will be in a position to be able to
take corrective action in time to avoid escalation of an incident. If viewing is
considered a practical approach, the provision of fire detection should not
be necessary. If considered not practical, or not of adequate reliability, fire
detection should be provided.
Having established the need for fire detection , it is necessary to determine how the
fire detection will be applied. The preferred method is to develop the fire hazards
into a 'grading' approach depending on fire, effective power and associated
performance requirements for alarm/control actions and effective response times.
No formal BP Group RPSE exists for this at present, however, internal guideline
documents are available which outline an approach for offshore installations. This

RP 30-7
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL
DESIGN PHILOSOPHY FOR FIRE AND GAS
DETECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

PAGE 3

could be applied to onshore applications, however, it should be noted that the

requirement for detection is generally much less.

3.4

Steps 1-8 / 1-9 - Plant Ventilation (Gas)

Having assessed that a source of potential gas release could create a
significant hazard (this could be from a view point of flammable
concentration, toxicity or environmental concerns) the ventilation of the area
needs to be considered to decide whether any resultant concentrations
remaining will be hazardous. If there are high levels of ventilation, the release
may be diluted to a level where the resultant concentrations are so low that
they do not constitute a risk due to the toxic nature or potential for ignition
of the release. Under these circumstances, gas detection should not be
required, however, consideration will need to be given to any protection
measures necessary in the event that the ventilation can be inhibited.
Even where free flow or forced ventilation is provided, there may be areas where air
is virtually stagnant and gas accumulation is possible. The type of release, release
rate and effectiveness of the ventilation must also be considered. Detail review will
be necessary and consideration given to redesign to avoid these stagnant areas.
Where this is not possible, or practical, the provision of gas detection may be
necessary.

3.5

Step 1-10 - Effective Detection (Gas)

Even where concentrations of gas remain, they may not be of sufficient
strength to be detected, in which case a gas detection system would not be
effective. Under these circumstances, different methods of providing
detection of release should be considered. If not available, alternative
approaches need to be considered which may include operating
procedures, warning signs, barriers and breathing apparatus.
Gas is necessary in selection of high detector sensitivity to ensure that spurious
alarms do not result due to detection of non-hazardous background concentrations
that may occur during routine operation.

4.

HAZARD MITIGATION/PROTECTION REQUIREM ENTS

(Refer Figure 2)
4.1

General
Where it has been identified that there is significant benefit in providing
hazard protection, it is necessary to consider the type to be provided. For
fire protection, reference should be made to BP Group RP 24-1, 'Fire
Protection-Onshore', and BP Group RP 24-2, 'Fire Protection-Offshore'.
The following should then be considered before confirming the requirement:-

RP 30-7
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL
DESIGN PHILOSOPHY FOR FIRE AND GAS
DETECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

PAGE 4

Hazard protection may be provided by means of manual or automatic executive

actions and may include in one or more of the following depending on the risk,
potential hazard and site:-

4.2

Initiating audible/visual alarms

Emergency shutdown of equipment
Blow down and depressurisation
Stopping fans and closing dampers via the HVAC system.
Extinguishant release via the Fire Protection system.
Isolating non-certified electrical equipment in potentially hazard areas

Step 2-1 - Manning

The requirements for dealing with an incident will depend on the operating
philosophy for the installation. This would normally be considered as
manned, where the operation is controlled, or monitored, from a control
point with ready access to the installation. The alternative of not normally
manned will apply where the operation is controlled, or monitored from a
remote location and is normally only manned short term for
breakdown/scheduled maintenance requirements.
Not normally manned installations will require visits for planned operation and
maintenance and unscheduled repairs and emergencies, so may still require a Fire
& Gas system. It may also be necessary for detection of problems before approach to
the installation is attempted.
The installation of fire and gas systems on not normally manned installations may
also be defined as required in local or national regulations.

4.3

Step 2-2 - Means of Escape

Where an installation is deemed to be not normally manned, the periods
when it is periodically manned need to be considered. Under these
circumstances, if there is potential risk to these personnel, it will be
necessary to assess whether there is adequate means of escape from the
hazard. Provided escape from the hazard source is possible, the provision
of auto hazard protection may not be necessary. For offshore applications,
reference should be made to BP Group RP 44-9 'Design Guide for
Offshore Evacuation and Escape'.
Escape routes require careful consideration to ensure a rapid and safe exit from the
area. On offshore platforms this may involve enclosed and segregated routes
monitored by fire and gas detection.

4.4

Steps 2-3/2-4 - Personnel/Asset Protection

It will be necessary for the Business unit involved with the installation to
establish the philosophy as to what will be deemed as acceptable risk of
serious injury/loss of life or 'major' commercial loss, refer to section 2.1. If
asset protection is not critical, reliance can be put on mobile protection
services.

RP 30-7
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL
DESIGN PHILOSOPHY FOR FIRE AND GAS
DETECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

PAGE 5

Where personnel protection is not the prime consideration of a Fire & Gas
detection system, such as for not normally manned installations, protection of
property and the environment may become the overriding factors.

4.5

Step 2-5 - Access/Escape Routes

Throughout the installation, routes need to be available to permit escape by
personnel from hazard areas. In addition, consideration should be given to
what access is available as necessary for deployment of mobile hazard
fighting appliances and personnel. For gas detection, consideration also
needs to be given to the practicality of escape to ensure hazard to personnel
in an area is not created. This may require automatic response to minimise
hazard.
For offshore applications reference should be made to BP Group RP 44-9
' Design Guide for Offshore Evacuation and Escape'.
The consideration of escape from gas release will be of particular concern
where toxic gases are involved or where high gas concentrations are
possible.

4.6

Step 2-6 - Hazard Escalation

Each source of hazard that is identified needs to be reviewed to establish
whether that hazard can cause problems in other areas thus causing
escalation of the event.
This will require due consideration of the type of release, the form of any fire that
may result and what protection exists for adjacent equipment. The outcome of this
review may be that additional alternative protection methods are required (e.g.
passive protection). If the event can be contained within an area and escalation
should not occur, manned installations should be able to rely on mobile hazard
protection.
The following have to be taken into consideration:-

4.7

(a)

How probable is ignition and what would be the consequence.

(b)

How probable is the spread of fire to adjoining areas.

(c)

How valuable are the contents of the area, and adjoining areas if a fire is
likely to spread.

Steps 2-7 - Mobile/Portable Appliances

If an incident could escalate, the practicality of being able to deploy
mobile/portable hazard fighting appliances should be considered. If this is
possible in time to prevent escalation of the event (effective response time),
then it should be acceptable to rely on such facilities rather than auto/manual
fixed protection systems.

RP 30-7
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL
DESIGN PHILOSOPHY FOR FIRE AND GAS
DETECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

PAGE 6

The effective response time (ERT) in hydrocarbon areas, is the time taken from
receipt of an initial fire or gas detection alarm to the completion of achieving the
activation of the necessary protection systems.
The level of experience and training of fire fighting teams and their ability to deal
with major incidents needs to be taken into a ccount.

4.8

Step 2-8 - Manual Protection Initiation

The installation and protection arrangement being proposed needs to be
reviewed to establish whether manual initiation will be effective. This would
necessitate that the incident is alarmed to an operator who will be available
to take effective action within the effective response time. The inherent delay
which may result from the operator becoming aware of the incident needs to
be included and it would need to be ensured that alarms will not be delayed
due to other plant activities. The preference should be for manual initiation,
to minimise the possibility of spurious operation, unless this is determined to
be ineffective.
Where manual initiation is accepted, local and remote initiation should also
be considered to ensure a fast protection response where necessary.

4.9

Steps 2-9/2-10 - Automatic Protection Initiation

Automatic initiation of protection systems must be carefully considered to
ensure that such initiation does not result in greater problems than the initial
event. Examples could include initiation of deluge on hot equipment, release
of carbon dioxide extinguishant into normally manned rooms, or where
automatic operation of the protection system may inhibit access for
subsequent manual intervention if required.
The review should also consider the impact of spurious initiation of the
protection systems. If the consequence of spurious alarm and control
actions can result in creation of a hazard or major operational problems,
then manual only systems should be provided. Alternatively additional
design features should be considered to improve the system reliability if
manual initiation is demonstrated to be unacceptable.

5.

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
(Refer Figure 3)
5.1

General
Having established that detection or protection is required, it is necessary to
determine the appropriate configuration of the system to meet the required
performance.

RP 30-7
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL
DESIGN PHILOSOPHY FOR FIRE AND GAS
DETECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

PAGE 7

5.2

Step 3-1 - Manning

A fundamental design requirement is knowing whether the installation is
manned or not normally manned. With manning it may be possible for
manned intervention for initiation of protection measures or back up in the
event of failure of the fire and gas system.
Fire & Gas systems on not normally manned installations are primarily installed to
protect capital investment and the environment or to give warning prior to
approach to the facility. The system availability, however, may need to be high as
personnel intervention can no longer be relied on. Automatic executive actions may
well be the only secure means of protection even if remote initiation capability is
also provided.

5.3

Step 3-2 - Fire Watch

The alternative approaches for maintaining safety in the event of failure of
the fire and gas system need to be considered. On manned installations it
may be considered practical to utilise fire/gas 'watch' for a limited period of
time whilst repairs to the fire and gas system are being made. Where a
fire/gas watch is considered to be a practical approach, it will be necessary
to patrol the installation at regular intervals to ascertain any existing or likely
hazardous situations. For gas watch, portable manual gas detection facilities
would be necessary. The fire/gas watch would need the facility to
communicate with the operator to inform him of any situations requiring
remote action.

5.4

Step 3-3 - Asset Protection

Refer to section 4.4 with regard to 'critical' asset protection only.

5.5

Step 3-4 - Maintenance Response

Where maintenance response cannot be mobilised rapidly, a duplex system
should be considered with full diagnostics to maintain the required
availability of the system. The maintenance diagnostics reports should be
readily available at the location where maintenance effort will be called on.
This allows maintenance personnel to prepare the required spares so that
they can be carried to the equipment requiring repair. An alternative
approach, can be to carry out a cost benefit analysis, refer 5.7.
The 'duplex' system can relate to detectors, interface cards, logic systems and output
devices. The extent to which the elements should be duplicated depends on the
degree of redundancy already provided by area coverage and what alternative
means are available in the event that an element failure occurs. In general,
detector and interface card redundancy will be provided by detector voting and/or
secondary detection. Duplex logic systems and output devices will be required
unless secondary alarming of hazard detection is provided which independently
initiates the protection facilities.

RP 30-7
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL
DESIGN PHILOSOPHY FOR FIRE AND GAS
DETECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

PAGE 8

5.6

Step 3-5 - Spares Availability

If maintenance response can be rapidly mobilised, and spares are readily
available to carry out the repairs, then a simplex system should be adequate
for the installation provided temporary fire watch has been accepted. If
spares will not be readily available the operating fire and gas system panels
should include 'hot spares' so that rapid changeout can be done at the work
site.
During the initial design phase it will be necessary to agree operating and
maintenance philosophy with the operator, and to determine the required on-line
and off-line maintenance procedures for field devices and panel equipment.

5.7

Step 3-8 - Cost Benefit Analysis

Having established that the reliability of the fire and gas system is of
concern, due to asset protection requirements or the inability to effectively
'fire/gas watch', the system type needs consideration. A high level of
reliability can be achieved by use of a full duplex system, however this can
introduce undesirable levels of complexity and costs. An alternative
approach is to make an assessment to determine whether the additional
complexity and cost of provision of the duplex system, will give benefit in
reduction of potential operational down time if shutdown is deemed
necessary whilst repairs are being completed. If benefit is not demonstrable,
then simplex systems should be considered.

6.

DESIGN AND IMPLEM ENTATION

6.1

With the minimum system requirements established, the method of

implementation then can be considered. This may be by stand alone
independent system or by use of the installation control or shutdown system.
The decision would be governed by how essential the system is to meet the
overall safety risk criteria set for the installation.
For most installations the fire and gas system may well be considered as non
essential to meet the safety risk criteria but required for asset protection purposes.
Provided that it is determined that the system is non essential for safety, the system
could be incorporated into the control system, however, the ease of implementation
within those systems and cost benefit, would need to be considered.
If the fire and gas system is designated as essential to meet the safety risk criteria, it
could be incorporated into the shutdown system, but if this system was
programmable, due regard would need to be given to relating failure modes of such
systems and issues of requirements for diverse hardware and software.
It should be noted that, if the control or shutdown system is used there may well be
the need to provide interface facilities which could effect the cost benefit decision.

6.2

The assessment of detection, protection and system requirements should be

fully documented to enable demonstration of the safety case for the plant.

RP 30-7
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL
DESIGN PHILOSOPHY FOR FIRE AND GAS
DETECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

PAGE 9

This documentation should be considered a live document for the life of the
installation and the basis for design reviewed whenever there is a significant
change in circumstances for the plant such as design modification or change
of operating conditions. After any such changes the safety basis should be
examined, to confirm validity or to identify any modifications necessary to
the fire and gas system.

RP 30-7
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL
DESIGN PHILOSOPHY FOR FIRE AND GAS
DETECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

PAGE 10

IS FIRE A
SIGNIFICANT
HAZARD
( NOTE 1 )

IS POTENTIAL
GAS RELEASE A
SIGNIFICANT
HAZARD ( NOTE 1)

NO

NO

1-1

1-7
YES

YES

IS
AUTOMATIC
RESPONSE TO
DECTECTION
ESSENTIAL

YES
1-2

NO

IS PLANT
SUFFICIENTLY
VENTILLATED

1-8
YES
NO

CAN THE
PLANT BE
READILY
VIEWED BY THE
OPERATOR

1-3

NO

WILL
RESULTANT
CONCENTRATION
BE HAZRADOUS

NO
1-9

YES

YES
1-4

CAN
REMOTE CCTV
FACILITIES BE
PROVIDED

YES

NO

1-5

WILL VISUAL
MONITORING
REVEAL
ALL SIGNIFICANT
RISKS

YES

NO
NO
1-10

IS RELEASE
LIKELY TO BE SUCH
THAT DECTECTION
IS EFFECTIVE

YES

PROVIDE
FIRE
DECTECTION

1-11

1/12

1-6
NO FIRE / GAS
DECTECTION
REQUIRED

PROVIDE
GAS
DECTECTION

FIGURE 1
HAZARD DETECTION REQUIREMENTS
(To be read in conjunction with paras. 3.1 to 3.7)

RP 30-7
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL
DESIGN PHILOSOPHY FOR FIRE AND GAS
DETECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

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IS FACILITY
NORMALLY MANNED

2-1

NO

YES
NO

WHEN MANNED
IS MEANS OF ESCAPE
AVAILABLE
( NOTE 2 )

2-2

YES

2-3

NO

IS PERSONNEL
PROTECTECTION
CRITICAL
(NOTE 1)

YES

ASSET
PROTECTION
CRITICAL
( NOTE 1 )

YES

2-4

2-8

NO
2-9

CAN MANUAL
INITATION OF
HAZARD
PROTECTION BE
EFFECTIVE

YES

NO

IS ACCESS /
ESCAPE READILY
AVAILABLE AND
PRACTICAL
( NOTE 2 )

2-5

NO

YES

CAN AUTO
PROTECTION
CAUSE
MORE PROBLEMS
THAN
IT SOLVES

IS HAZARD
LIKELY TO
ESCALATE
( NOTE 1 )

2-6

YES

YES
2-10

NO

NO

YES

CAN AUTO
HAZARD
PROTECTION
BE IMPROVED

NO

CAN MOBILE
HAZARD FIGHTING
APPLIANCES BE READILY
DEPLOYED
( NOTE 1 )

2-7
YES

2-11
PROVIDE AUTO
HAZARD PROTECTION

2-12
PROVIDE MANUAL ONLY
HAZARD PROTECTION

2-13
RELY ON MOBILE
HAZARD PROTECTION

FIGURE 2
HAZARD MITIGATION/CONTROL REQUIREMENTS
(To be read in conjunction with paras. 4.1 to 4.9)

RP 30-7
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL
DESIGN PHILOSOPHY FOR FIRE AND GAS
DETECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

PAGE 12

YES

IS
FACILITY NORMALLY
MANNED

NO

3-1

WILL RISK
PERMIT FIRE / GAS
WATCH

YES

NO

3-2

IS ASSET
PROTECTION
CIRITCAL

3-3
YES
NO

CAN RAPID
MAINTENANCE
REPONSE
BE MOBILISED

3-4

NO

YES

ARE SPARES
READILY
AVAILABLE

YES

3-5
NO

YES

IS COST
BENEFIT ANALYSIS
TO BE DONE

3-8
NO
3-7

3-9

PROVIDE SIMPLEX
SYSTEM WITH HOT
SPARES

PROVIDE DUPLEX
SYSTEM WITH DIAGNOSTIC
CAPABILITY FROM
MAINTENANCE BASE

3-6
PROVIDE SIMPLEX
SYSTEM

3-10
PROVIDE SYSTEM
AS DETERMINED BY
COST BENIFIT
ANALYSIS

FIGURE 3
SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
(To be read in conjunction with paras. 5.1 to 5.4)

RP 30-7
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL
DESIGN PHILOSOPHY FOR FIRE AND GAS
DETECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

PAGE 13

APPENDIX A
DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Definitions
Standardised definitions may be found in the BP Group RPSEs Introductory Volume.
Abbreviations
CCTV

Closed Circuit Television

ERT
HVAC

Effective Response Time

Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning

RP 30-7
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL
DESIGN PHILOSOPHY FOR FIRE AND GAS
DETECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

PAGE 14

APPENDIX B
LIST OF REFERENCED DOCUMENTS
A reference invokes the latest published issue or amendment unless stated otherwise.
Referenced standards may be replaced by equivalent standards that are internationally or otherwise
recognised provided that it can be shown to the satisfaction of the purchaser's professional engineer
that they meet or exceed the requirements of the referenced standards.
BP Group Documents
BP Group RP 24-1

Fire Protection - Onshore

(replaces BP CP 15)

BP Group RP 24-2

Fire Protection - Offshore

(replaces BP CP 16)

BP Group RP 30-5

Section 4 - Fire and Gas Detection and Control Systems

(replaces BP CP 18 Part 5 Section 4)

BP Group RP 44-9

Design Guide for Offshore Evacuation and Escape

RP 30-7
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL
DESIGN PHILOSOPHY FOR FIRE AND GAS
DETECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

PAGE 15

APPENDIX C
LEGISLATION AND STANDARDS
The following legislation and Standards are applicable to the UK. In other Countries where local or
national equivalents exist for the area of application, these must be used. Where none exist,
however, the Standards should be applied subject to agreement with the business unit responsible
for the installation.

GENERAL
Legislation
Offices, Shops and Railway Premises Act 1963
Fire Precautions Act 1971
Standards
BS 5839

Fire Detection and Alarm Systems in Buildings.

BS 6266

Code of Practice for Fire Protection for Electronic Data

Processing Installations.

Health and Safety Executive

Occupational Exposure Limits

Guidance Note EH 40

NFPA 72E

Automatic Fire Detectors

OFFSHORE UK
Legislation
UK Statutory Instrument

No. 611
No. 1218

The Offshore Installations Regulations (Fire Fighting

Equipment)
The Merchant Shipping Regulations (Fire Protection)

Standards
SOLAS

1974 Solas Convention

1978 Solas Protocol
1981 and 1983 Solas Amendment

RP 30-7
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL
DESIGN PHILOSOPHY FOR FIRE AND GAS
DETECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

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