Intuition as a Philosophical Method in India

Author(s): P. T. Raju
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Oct., 1952), pp. 187-207
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press
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P. T. RAJU

Intuition

Method

Philosophical

in

India

Intuition as a philosophical method is an

intricate and intriguing problem, because philosophers are not agreed as to
precisely what intuition and philosophical method are. The same problem
with reference to classical Indian philosophies is further complicated by
certainpreconceivednotions about Indian philosophies among some Western
students of the subject. During some of the lectures which the writer gave
in the West, questions like "At what age do you begin to give a child training in intuition?"and "If I go to India, how long will it take to get complete
training in intuition?" were put to him. Such questions reveal, in the minds
of the questioner, the feeling that intuition is a mysterious faculty with the
help of which almost every Indian is able to see God or ultimate reality.
Indeed, they show also, so far as philosophy of life is concerned, a sense of
frustration and disappointment with the pure logicalism of most of the
contemporaryphilosophical trends of the West. But in this attitude toward
philosophy there is the danger that a complete divorce between intellect
and intuition may be assumed, and the academic philosopher might say,
with Professor Cunningham,1 that, if reason and intellect are not to be
trusted, his place cannot be in a university, which implies that philosophies
based upon intuition (and not on reason) have no place in universities,
since universities are centers of critical thinking, and the validity of many
intuitions is not beyond doubt and any criterion to test their validity will
have to be logical.
There is another wrong conclusion which philosophers tend to draw,
namely, that thinkers belonging to cultures the philosophies of which are
supposed to be intuitive are inherently incapable of standing the strain of
logical and scientific thinking. This conclusion makes many assumptions
which it is not possible to discuss here. For instance, it assumes that there
are two kinds of cultures and philosophies, the intellectual and the intuitive,
1G. Watts Cunningham,"How Far to the Landof Yoga? An Experimentin Understanding,"
The PhilosophicalReview, LVII (November, 1948).
187

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P. T. RAJU

and that people belonging to the one are by nature psychologically different
from those belonging to the other. But one might retort by saying that the
true difference is that between the progressive and the backward,and that
it is one of degree but not of kind. The backward,therefore, do not insist
that their cultural and philosophical achievements,obtained by fits and starts,
should continue to be improved by only the same intuitive methods and by
fits and starts.
There is a further misunderstandingabout Indian philosophy, namely,
that it is a single school or system of thought. It is almost as correctto speak
of Western philosophy as a single philosophy as to speakof Indianphilosophy
as one. If one important school holds strong views on the dependabilityor
otherwise of intellect, the same is wrongly attributedto all the others. Again,
the term Indian philosophy is made to refer to the ancient systems alone,
as if Indian philosophy were something ancient like Greek philosophy. It is
true that India is better known for her ancient philosophies than for any
new systems, but many contemporaryphilosophers in India have not been
satisfied with everything of ancient thought and have shown inclinations
toward new ideas. And none of the new philosophers has made intuition
his philosophical method, though almost every one has admitted the truth
of intuition and the shortcomings of intellect.
II
Before proceeding with the discussion,the meaning of the word intuition
needs to be clarified. Intuition means immediate or unmediatedknowledge.
Etymologically, it means "looking into," that is, it is knowledge obtained
not by looking outside one's self-whatever the word self means, and its
meaning may not be discussedfor the present-but by looking inside one's
self.
Now, is looking into one's self necessarily unmediated? This is a controversial question; and the answer depends on how the process of "looking
into" and the nature of the self are understood. If the "looking into" also
needs an instrument (karana), then the process is mediated, and knowledge
so obtained is not immediate knowledge. First, even if some instrumentality
is needed, if the self is understoodto be identical with the mind (manas)as it is in Western philosophy and psychology in general-then it is its
own instrument,and the resulting knowledge may be regardedas unmediated
in the sense of being not mediated by something other than the agent of
that cognition. However, even in Western psychology, there has been a
growing feeling that there is a core to be called the self in our experience,

INTUITION AS A PHILOSOPHICALMETHOD IN INDIA

189

which is not exhausted by the mental processes.2 This distinction was more
clearly made by the ancient Indian philosophers.3 Even when this distinction is accepted, the self may be regarded as being capable of looking into
itself in some way, without the help of the mind; and as the instrument
and the agent would here be identical, the resulting knowledge can be said
to be unmediated and therefore intuitive. The present case, which is the
second, is the self's knowledge of itself, when it is different from the mind,
while the previous case is one in which the self is regardedas identical with
the mind. We may next have a third situation, in which the self is considered to be different from the mind and yet, through the instrumentality
(karanatva) of the mind, that is, through introspection, it cognizes such
mental processes as emotions, feelings, and sentiments. In this case, as the
instrument is different from the self, the agent, knowledge cannot be said
to be unmediated. Then we have a fourth situation: Some cognitions
need not only the instrumentalityof the mind, but also that of the senses
(indriyas), for instance, the perceptual cognition of the tree in front of me.
And whether the self, as agent, is regarded as identical with the mind or
not, perceptual cognition is mediated and not unmediated. Quite often
Western philosophers treat perception as direct and immediate knowledge.
Even the Sanskrit word aparoksam (not beyond senses) implies that view.
But if we are to be thorough in our application of the idea of immediacy,
we have to say that even sense perception is mediated. But, in all the
cases mentioned so far, mediation is not voluntary: it is spontaneous
like the workings of our involuntary nervous system. And for the reason
that knowledge is not deliberately mediated, we say that perception in all
the above cases is direct. But in the fifth situation, namely, that of inference,
the resulting cognition is voluntarily mediated and is accepted by all as
mediated knowledge.
III
In Indian philosophy, the words used for mediate and immediate knowledge are paroksajinan and aparoksajina. As indicated above, the words
literally mean "knowledge beyond senses" and "knowledge not beyond
senses." But later, the second word came to mean both sense perception and
the highest intuition, which is that of the Brahman, the Absolute, and
largely corresponds to the intellectual intuition of Kant, particularly as
2
See Leon Litwinski, "Towards a Reinstatement of the Concept of Self," The British Journal
of Psychology, General Section, August, 1951 .
3Self (atman) does not mean the same as soul (jiva) for any Indian philosophers except the
Jainas.

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P. T. RAJU

interpretedby Caird. The second word still retained,however, the meaning

of mediated cognition such as syllogistic inference (anumana) and analogy
(upamana).
It will be asked, perhaps, whether Kant's conception of intellectual intuition, as interpreted even by Caird, has anything to do with the highest
intuition in Indian philosophy, particularly as understood by the Advaita
of Safikara;for intellectual intuition contains mediation as a moment, but
the highest intuition, according to the Advaita, has no such moment and
is pure immediacy. But the objector has behind his objection the feeling
that immediacy can be only sensuous immediacy. What the Advaita refers
to here is the immediacyof, and to, consciousness. Indeed, the Advaitin does
not call it the immediacy of, and to, the intellect, which the first position
in Section II involves. At that level of immediacy,senses and mind (manas
and buddhi, intellect, included) are transformedinto self (dtman) or disappear in it. Indeed, even according to Kant, if God possessed intellectual
intuition, his intellect would be intuitive and his intuition intellectual; and
we have to say that both intellect and intuition in their ordinarysense must
have been transformedin his experience.
Again, not all schools of Indian philosophy accept the Advaita view of
the highest intuition (aparoksanubhiti). The Advaita of Saiikara is nondualistic. There are two other important Vedantic schools, the qualified
non-dualismof Raminuja and the dualism of Madhva. These philosophical
differences are found among both the Vaisnavas and the gaivas. There
are other schools occupying intermediatepositions between the three. According to the Advaita, the Brahman is the same in essence as the Atman
(Self) and is of the nature of consciousness (jnina).4 In other words, the
very substance of the Brahman is consciousness. But as the Brahman has
no other to itself, as consciousness it knows itself only. Here knowledge,
its subject, and its object are one and the same. This knowledge is a form
of experience (anubhuti) and is intuition in the highest sense. But Ramanuja
and Madhva, though they accept the view that knowledge is self-revealing,
do not believe in the absence of distinctions.
But there are schools that do not hold that knowledge (jfLna) is selfrevealing.5 Kumarila, a follower of the Purva-Mimramsa,maintains that
knowledge is not self-revealing,but that its existence is known only through
inference. Prabhikara, another follower of the same school, however, conThe essence of the Brahmanand the Atman is said to be not only consciousness(cit) but
also existence (sat) and bliss (nannda).
'The intricatelogical argumentsfor and against the position may be seen in Madhusudana,
Advaitasiddhi(Bombay:NirnayasagarPress,1917), pp. 768-784.

INTUITION AS A PHILOSOPHICALMETHOD IN INDIA

191

tends that knowledge is self-revealing. But, while for Kumarila atman is

of the nature of consciousness,for Prabhakarait is not. The Siakhya and
Yoga schools accept Kumarila's position, and so the highest intuition we
are speaking of is possible according to them. Ordinary cognition is not
self-revealing but revealed by atman, for ordinary cognition is a modification of buddhi (reason understood in a substantive sense), a product of
prakrti (matter, nature), which is unconscious. According to the Nyaya and
the Vaisesika, atman is by nature unconscious, and cognition arises when it
comes into contact with mind. No cognition is self-revealing but is revealed
by another cognition (adhyavasaya). The Jainas believe that knowledge is
self-revealing and, therefore, also in the possibility of the highest intuition.
The Buddhists, particularly of the Mahayana, accept a kind of experience
(anubhuti) above discursive reasoning; and though they do not accept an
eternal atman, the Vijfinnavadinsamong them contend that the highest stage
of nirvana is consciousness (vijinna).6
These few details are given only to show the wide variety of views held
concerning the highest realization. For some, it is an experience (anubhuti);
for others (the Nyaya and the Vaisesika), it is not, as there can be no
experience at all at that level. For some, again, knowledge is self-revealing,
and so this intuition is involved in all kinds of experience. The Advaitins
would particularly insist on this point. For others, knowledge is not selfrevealing, though a few of these, again, accept the view that the highest
intuition is true and is a distinct experience,not necessarilyinvolved in other
kinds of experience. For these, intuition is a mysteriousfaculty, not rationally
understandable. There are differences of view as to whether this intuition
is a faculty of the mind as distinct from the self. On the whole, Sahkara
holds the doctrine of the self-luminosity of consciousnessconsistently to the
end and establishes his doctrine of unmediated knowledge (aparoksanubhuti) of the Brahman; Ramanuja takes a middle course, for, while he accepts knowledge as self-revealing, he insists on the distinctions between the
knower, the known, and knowledge even at the highest level. Others take
a more extreme course. Among the non-Vedanticschools, including Jainism
and Buddhism, a similar variety of views is to be found.

IV
The above points refer mainly to intuition as the direct and unmediated
knowledge of the Brahman, Atman, and Nirvana. But the word intuition
is used also in the sense of the knowledge of physical objects and other
6See Mahayana-sutralankara
I. 12, SylvainLevi, ed. (Paris: LibrarieHonore Champion,1907).

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P. T. RAJU

minds, unmediatedby the senses. This is a mysteriouspower obtained

through yogic discipline. It correspondsto telepathy, clairvoyance,and other
kinds of extra-sensoryperception. According to Patafijali, the author of
the Yoga-sitras, this ability is a power acquired through certain types of
yogic practices. The Nyiya calls it an extraordinaryperception (alaukika).
According to this school, it is of two kinds, complete and incomplete (yukta
and yunjana). In the former, one knows all things at all times; in the
latter, one knows an object only when one makes an effort.
V
Can the above types of intuition be made methods of philosophy? Indeed,
no school in India makes use of intuition alone as a philosophical method.
The Nyiya school, for instance, while discussing the two forms of yogic
perception, says only that they are propounded by the Vedas and Purinas
(Epics), and at no place appeals to intuition to establish its doctrines.7 All
the schools, except the Carvaka,give a high place to this type of intuition,
for it is a great achievement for the yogin, though they warn him not to be
attractedand tempted by it. It is an extraordinaryperceptionat the empirical
level, though it is not the highest type of intuition, namely, the intuition
of God or the Brahman or Nirv.na. This higher type of intuition is also
accepted by all except the Cirvikas. Both types are cognition without the
usual instruments and media of knowledge. And though both types are
acceptedas truthful and attainable,neither is made use of as a philosophical
method, only because it cannot be so used.
VI
For, what is philosophical method? Classical Indian philosophy did not
know of any distinction between the methods of the special sciences, on
the one hand, and that or those of philosophy, on the other. And so, the
question as to whether the philosophical method was or was not the same
as the scientificwas not mooted by the philosophers of the time. For them,
philosophy was knowledge in the widest sense; the words used by them are
darfana (perception, view), mata (opinion, doctrine), siddhanta (theory,
doctrine), etc. Quite often, since the word darsanais used to mean a system
or school, it is contended that philosophy meant for the Indian philosophers
the perception of reality, which, for many of the Vedintins at least, means
perception of the Brahman. Their view is often identified with the whole
of Indian philosophy, but it is to be repeatedthat the view of this one school
7Karikavaliwith the commentary,Muktavali,etc. (Benares: JaikrishnadasHaridas Gupta,
1951), p. 209.

INTUITION AS A PHILOSOPHICALMETHOD IN INDIA

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is not the whole of Indian philosophy. According to the Nyaya and the
Vaisesika schools, perception of the Brahman or Isvara (God) is not the
same as perception of reality, for these two schools accept the eternality
of atoms, space, time, and atman (self), which are therefore separate from
the Brahman or Isvara and are as real as it or he. But the more important
point is that, at the stage of liberation (mukti), at which atman regains its
pure state, it does not perceive anything, since it is by nature unconscious.
Thus, there is no scope for any darsana (perception), even if by dariana
is meant the unpolluted perception of the original reality. So, the word
dariana has to be understood as is the word view, which means not only
the view I have of the street or scenery before me but also the view I hold
of the nature of mind, matter, etc. Such an interpretationis necessitatedby
the synonyms of the word darsanain the sense of philosophy, such as mata
(opinion, doctrine) and siddhanta (doctrine, theory). For instance, the
Saiva philosophy is called not only SaivadarSanabut also Saivasiddhanta.
Another reason given for the opinion that the method of Indian philosophy is intuitive is that philosophy in India is also called moksasastra,the
science of salvation or liberation. Indian philosophy aims, it is said, at
pointing out the path to liberation; and, as the state of liberation, which
is the original pure state of one's self, is known only through intuition
and not through intellect, it is thought that the method of Indian philosophy
must be intuitive and not logical. Almost all the Indian systems speak of
moksa (liberation) as the aim of philosophical activity. Therefore, they
must discuss the nature of moksa, the method or way (marga) of attaining
moksa, and the nature of reality, both phenomenal and noumenal, with
reference to which moksa has to be explained. But, it must be pointed out,
none of the problems connected with these topics can be solved by means
of intuition alone. Neither human nature nor the nature of the physical
world can be explained merely through intuition. Indeed, reason cannot
work in a vacuum and with mere assumptionsor axioms arbitrarilyaccepted,
if it is to explain any existent fact. Therefore, it is based upon intuition
in the widest sense of direct experience, whether sensuous or non-sensuous.
The truths of intuition are integrated into a system by reason.8 The nature
of moksa cannot be explained, therefore, without the help of reason, and
philosophy consists of this explanation. Hence, even for those systems for
which moksa is the ultimate aim of philosophy, philosophical method consists not merely in intuition but also in rationally integrating the intuited
8 In this sense, even human beings are accredited with intuitive understanding by some Western
thinkers, while Kant thought that God alone might possess it. See W. H. Walsh, Reason and
Experience (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1947), pp. 57 ff.

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truths. Furthermore,it should not be forgotten that for those schools for
which the original pure state of self (atman) is not conscious, that is, the
Nyaya and the Vaisesika, there can be no intuition of moksa. Its nature is
only inferred with the help of reason. Again, for those schools for which
the Brahman is not the only reality, intuition of the Brahman does not
explain the nature of the other realities. Explanation of these realities and
their mutual interrelationshipsis the work of reason and not merely of
intuition. For instance, the existence of atoms is logically proved by the
Vaisesikas, and most of the followers of this school do not claim to have
experienced them intuitively; and this intuition, they say, is heard of in the
and the Yoga, though they say that
Vedas and the Puranas. The Samhkhya
atman is by nature conscious, treat it as different from prakrti (nature);
and so, intuition of the former does not explain the nature of the latter.
The Sramkhyaproves the plurality of selves and their differencefrom nature
with the help of reason. Further, most schools do not accept moksa
(liberation) and the state of the individual during liberation merely on the
basis of intuition. They prove the truth of both with the help of logic,
with phenomenal experience as the starting point.
Another important reason for the view that Indian philosophy depends
on intuition as its method may be the reliance by many schools on scripture
(sruti). The sruti consists of a number of utterancesabout the experiences
of several discoverers of inner truths, which are therefore intuitions. But
though the Vedic seers may be said to have based their statementson intuitions, their followers and commentatorswho expounded their views did not
use intuition for their argument. In the discussionsamong themselves, they
depended upon grammar and etymology for the interpretation of verbal
statements,and upon perceptionand inference for the interpretationof ideas.
Again, not all the Indian schools accept the fruti as authority. The Buddhists
and the Jainas, in their controversieswith the followers of the Vedic tradition, depended exclusively upon perception and inference for establishing
their conclusions, as did also the Vedic followers in their controversieswith
the Buddhists and the Jainas. Yet, all these schools accepted intuition in
the sense of suprarational,non-discursiveknowledge, which is direct experience (aparoksanubhiti) of the ultimate reality,whatever that be. Indeed,
intuition in the sense of direct perception or sensation is accepted by all
schools, though many of them are aware of the defects of perception as a
form of knowledge. Some of the later CQrvakas,e.g., Jayarasi,the author of
Tattvopaplavasimha;Buddhistslike Nagarjuna, the author of Madhyamikakarikas; and Advaitins like Sriharsa,the author of Khandana-khandtakhdya,

INTUITION AS A PHILOSOPHICALMETHOD IN INDIA

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point out the shortcomings not only of inference but also of perception.
Again, most of the Indian philosophers accept two kinds of perception, the
determinate and the indeterminate. Indeterminateperception is pure sense
awareness;but discursionenters determinateperception, which is relational.
It is knowledge in which the distinction between subject and predicate is a
moment. It is always of the form, "That is an X." Some schools, e.g., the
Nyaya, do not accept indeterminate perception as knowledge at all, for
knowledge is either true or false, and the question of truth and falsity is not
relevant to indeterminateperception. Others, however, e.g., the Buddhists,
treat indeterminateperceptionas a form of knowledge. But now, for schools
like the Nyaya, intuition, in the sense of non-discursiveknowledge, cannot
be a philosophical method at all, for the simple reason that it can be neither
true nor false. But philosophy has to be either true or false.
Another important doctrine to be referred to in this connection is that
of pr,amanya,the nature of truth. Very interesting controversieshave been
carriedon by the several schools about the question as to whether a cognition
is true by itself or made true by another cognition. This is not the same
question as whether cognition is self-revelatory or not. For the highest
intuition, namely, the intuition of the Brahman, if one has it, there can be
no other cognition either to prove or disprove it. In the case of my perception of the book in front of me, I may know that I know the book, but
this knowledge that I know the book does not make my knowledge of the
book either true or false. So, even if we accept the self-revelatorycharacter
of knowledge at the empirical level, the self-revelatorycharacterof knowledge is not the same as the truth of that cognition. Now, the Naiyayikas
(followers of the Nyaya) maintain that no cognition by itself is either true
or false, but is made so by another cognition.9 If every cognition has to
refer beyond itself to another cognition in order to be true or false, then
non-discursiveknowledge cannot be true; and in order to be true knowledge
must be discursive. So, accordingto the epistemology of the Nyaya, intuition
as immediate non-discursiveknowledge can be neither true nor false.
According to some Buddhists,every cognition is false by itself, but is made
true by another cognition, the second cognition here being the cognition that
the object cognized serves the purpose for which it is meant. This is a
pragmatic conception of truth. But it means that, so far as the empirical
world is concerned,pure intuition by itself, even as indeterminateperception
(nirvikalpakapratyaksa), cannot be true, unless made so by another cognition. Hence, knowledge at the empirical level must be discursive.
9This
interpretationis given to the doctrinesof the otherschoolsalso. See the author'sThought
and Reality (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1937), Part III, chap. VIII.

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According to the Mimamrsaand the Advaita of Sankara,every cognition

is true by itself, but may be renderedfalse by another cognition. Sometimes
this theory is interpreted' as meaning that the truth of a cognition is selfrevealed, whereas the falsity of a cognition is revealed by another cognition.
Only the upholders of this doctrine accept intuition as a philosophical
method. But the admission that falsity is revealed by another cognition and
that the possibility of an empirical cognition's being false is always present
makes discursive knowledge a necessary complement to the intuitive until
this possibility is removed; and it is removed only at the highest level of
intuition, where the distinctions between subject and object and subject and
predicatevanish.
A significant point to be noted is that the truth of the higher intuition
itself needs proof, since it is not commonly possessedby all men. As already
mentioned, the Nyaya and the Vaisesika accept it as an instrument of valid
cognition on the authority of the Vedas and the Puranas. The Nyaya, for
instance, accepts four sources of valid cognition: perception, inference,
analogy, and the sruti. Intuition in the sense of telepathy and other extraordinary forms of perception is included in perception. And this school
makes very little use of scripture in establishing its conclusions. In fact,
neither the Nyaya nor the Vaisesika could furnish a commentary on the
Vedanta-siitras(or Brahma-s&tras)of Badarayana,which attempted to systematize the Upanisadic statements. The Vaisesika, again, did not treat
scriptureas a distinct source of knowledge, but said that it could be included
in perceptionor inference. The Siamkhyaand Yoga schools acceptedperception, inference, and scripture as valid sources of knowledge, but accepted
scriptureonly to support their conclusions independently arrived at through
the other means of cognition. In fact, they say that only those entities which
cannot be established through the ordinarysources of knowledge should be
establishedthrough scripture.10That the doctrinesof the above four schools
were establishedindependentlyof scriptureis supportedby the fact that they
could not furnish a commentaryon the Vedanta-stras. Vijfianabhiksuwrote
a commentary from the Sfmnkhyapoint of view only during the fifteenth
century,long after the doctrineswere propoundedand criticizedby the rival
schools. The name of Kapila, the founder of the Sarhkhyasystem, occurs
in the SvetMivataraUpanisad, which belongs to the pre-Christian era."
According to Indian tradition, a school is considered to be orthodox and a
' See
Iswarakrishna, Samkhyakirikas VI.
"It is difficult to fix the date of the Upanisads. See S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy
(London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1948), Vol. I, p. 141. Also S. K. Belvalkar and R. D.
Ranade, The Creative Period (Poona: Bilvakunja Publishing House, 1927), p. 89.

INTUITION AS A PHILOSOPHICALMETHOD IN INDIA

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follower of the Vedic tradition only if it has been able to furnish a commentary on the Veddnta-sutras.This shows that neither the Nyaya and the
Vaisesika nor the Sahkhya and the Yoga started their philosophical activity
as elaborations and interpretationsof the Upanisadic intuitive statements.
To be sure, they acceptedthe possibility of intuiting empirical and noumenal
realities, but they did not use intuition either in expounding their doctrines
or in controverting those of their rivals.
It is only the Vedantic schools that startedas expounders,interpreters,and
systematizersof the Upanisadic statements. The Vedanta-s&trascomposed
by Badarayanafor systematizing the Upanisadic statements and removing
contradictionswere later found inadequatefor the purpose. As controversies
arose among the Vedantic followers themselves and between the Vedantins
and their rivals, need was felt for further clarificationand development of
the ideas. And so, commentaries and commentaries upon commentaries
had to be written, and this kind of work continued with more or less vigor
until about the fifteenth century. Besides the Vedas, there were other kinds
of scriptures,such as the Agamas of the Saivas and the Vaisnavas, which
also were regardedby some as of equal authority. And in order to remove
conflict between them and the Upanisads, commentaries reinterpretingthe
Vedanta-sutrasand the Upaniads were written. Thus, clear-cut differences
developed among the Vedantic schools.
The activity of writing commentariesupon commentarieswill perhaps be
interpretedas being based upon intuition as a philosophical method. It may
be contended that there was an original intuition and the rest was merely
its elaboration. Even if the contention were true, elaborationand interpretation were not intuitively done. It was with the help of logic and reason
that the whole superstructureof a system was raised on an idea accepted
on the authority of some scripture. And the scripture was nothing more
than a revelation to one or more seekers of truth, and was later accepted as
truth by his or their followers on authority.
Now, does this acceptanceof an original intuition justify us in saying that,
for Indian philosophy, the philosophical method is intuition? First, many
schools did not follow the method of writing commentaries upon commentaries on the intuitive wisdom of the Upanisads and the Vedanta-sitras
for developing and expounding their systems. Second, different schools and
sub-schools of the Vedanta understood and interpreted these original intuitions in quite different ways, and in order to justify their understandingand
interpretationthey used logic and reason. Their method was to show that
rival interpretationswere illogical and contrary to fact. Anyone who goes
through the commentariesof Saikara and Ramanujaon the Vedanta-sutras

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P. T. RAJU

cansee how theytriedto refuterivaldoctrines.Also, acceptanceof scriptural

authoritydoes not constitutethe use of intuitionas a philosophicalmethod,
unless the personwho acceptsit uses intuitionat everystep and says that
it confirmsor contradictsthe doctrinein question.
Furthermore,the developmentof Indian philosophyhas had its own
peculiarity.Up to the present,it has beena philosophyof life, inquiringinto
the natureand aims of humanlife. It was wont, therefore,to probe into
the deepertruthsof our inner being and adopteda markedlyinwardattitude. The significanttruthsit discoveredwerediscoveredthroughmeditative
contemplationand disciplinedintrospection.Even so, there were varieties
of expressionand of opinionwhich resultedin conflictsand controversies.
within
It was foundnecessary,therefore,not only to removecontradictions
a singletraditionbut also to defendthattraditionfromthe attacksof others.
Here is the sphereof reasonand logic. Moreover,not only was it necessary
that theseinnertruthsbe madeconsistentwith eachotherbut also that they
be madeconsistentwith the truthsof the outerworld. Now, thereare two
ways of accomplishingthis task: the approachmay be made from the
inner to the outer, and the outer truthsso interpretedas to appearconsistentwith the inner;or the approachmay be madefrom the outerto the
inner, and the inner truthsso interpretedas to appearconsistentwith the
outer. That the inner and the outermust be consistentwith each other is
but eachassumesa differentpattern,andoften
acceptedby both approaches,
the inner or the outertruths,as
or overemphasizes
eitherunderemphasizes
of
the case may be. Some sub-schools the Vedanta,particularlyof the Advaita, are so engrossedwith the inner that they do not give due attention
to the outertruths. They would acceptany theoryof the outerworld,providedit did not denythe innertruths. Hence,theircosmologiesare meager
and weak, and some of them do not even care to develop such doctrines
at all. The Nyaya and the Vaisesikaare, indeed,exceptions;but, comparatively, their philosophiesof the inner life are meager. However,because
of the general emphasison the importanceof the inner life in Indian
philosophy,there is the belief that it dependson intuitionmainly as its
philosophicalmethod.
But just as logic cannot work without some data intuitively accepted

(modernlogic would substituteassumptionsfor intuitivetruths) aboutthe

outer world, so, with regardto the truthsof the inner world also, logic
must startwith intuitivelyobtainedtruths. They are the datato startwith.
Logic steps in when we attemptto clarifyand interrelatethem. Only to
those who are not interestedin the realm of inner truths or who come

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suddenly to realize, as if it were strange, that there is such a realm, would

the inner truths appear to be merely intuitive and a philosophy concerning
them to be using only intuition as its method. There can be no philosophy
without the use of intellect, just as there can be no logic without data
obtained intuitively in the widest sense of the term. If philosophy is to be
philosophy of experience, both intuition and intellect are equally necessary
for its development.
Still another aspectof philosophicaldevelopment in India should be noted.
Indian philosophy started with primary emphasis on, and interest in, inner
truths and began its interpretation of the outward in consonance with its
understanding of the inner. But this aspect belongs only to the Vedantic
schools, and not to the Nyaya, Vaisesika, Samnkhya,and Yoga among the
orthodox or to the heterodox schools of Jainism, Buddhism, and Carvaka,
with which all the orthodox schools had to contend. In these controversies,
the Vedantic schools had not only to reformulatetheir doctrinesabout outer
truths in accordancewith facts, but also to prove the reality of inner truths
themselves. The Carvakas,who were materialistsand neither acknowledged
the authority of scripture nor accepted the reality of the self (itman),
to say nothing of God, acted as a check upon any tendency to accept truths
upon the authorityof scripture. The necessityof even inner truths expounded
by the Upanisads, with which the orthodox schools started, had later to be
proved with the help of the method of postulation (arthapatti). Some of
the orthodox schools did not accept postulation as a distinct means of
cognition, but turned it into a form of syllogism. In any case, they had to
prove the inner truths besides accepting them on scripturalauthority,which
latter method may be identified with intuition. In fact, as the Carvakas
did not at first accept the validity of inference and later even that of perception, the other schools had to prove the validity of both. Thus, the forms
which the systems finally took have the appearanceof logically formulated
systems rather than collated intuitive truths, though the Vedantic schools in
the form of commentaries on commentaries on the Vedanta-sutras,which
are themselves systematizationsof the Upanisadictruths, appearto be reconciliations and systematizationsof the Upanisadic intuitions.

VII
Provided we do not forget that Indian philosophy has been primarily
concerned with the inner life of man and with the place of man in the
universe and his destiny, we may say that it is neither more intuitive nor
less intellectual in its methods than Western philosophy. Taking into further

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considerationthe fact that Indian philosophy has had no significantdevelopment since about the fifteenth century and therefore cannot show as many
ramificationsand as much progress as modern and contemporaryWestern
philosophy can, we may say with justificationthat, up to the fifteenth century, Indian philosophy showed as vigorous a development of logic as could
be expected. The elaboratedefinitions,the methods of definition,and logical
analysis of concepts which the Neo-Nyiya gave us and the practiceof which
was later adopted by the other schools would leave no doubt in the minds
of any serious student about the intellectualism of the methods of the
philosophers of that time. But if we consider philosophy as interpretation
of experienceand experienceas both inner and outer, and as primarilydirect,
we have to accept also the view that no philosophy can dispense with intuition. Quite often, the Middle Ages of Europe are referred to as the Dark
Ages, and the medieval period of European philosophy as having no philosophy but only theology; and it is also said that the period tolerated no
freedom of inquiry and put arbitrarylimits on reason. But Whitehead says
that it was a period of reason.l2 The Schoolmen argued and argued, even
about the number of angels that could dance on the point of a needle. It is
the modern period, he says, that turned its attention to history, fact, and
experience. It is an accepted method now to start from experience, argue
about it, and test our arguments again by experience. That is, we use both
intuition and intellect. When it is said that the Middle Ages were opposed
to the free use of reason, it is meant that they were opposed to that freedom
of inquiry which is not merely arguing but also discovery. And discovery
includes direct experience. Intellect cannot work without intuition, and intuition needs intellect for its development and as a check.
So much is admitted even by Western philosophers. ProfessorMontague
writes that the "theory that truth can be attained by a supra-rationaland
supersensuousfaculty of intuition is mysticism."13He says further: "Intuition
might be defined not only as imagination touched with conviction, but also
as the outcome of sub-consciousinduction or deduction."14 And intuition
touched with conviction is the same whether it occurs in the scientist or the
poet.5l This imagination is that function of mind which forms hypotheses.
Logically it is the function of forming hypotheses, and psychologically it is
imagination. Again, ProfessorMontague writes: "It is the latter business of
comparing the newly born hypotheses of imagination with the established
1 A. N. Whitehead,Scienceand the Modern World (New York: The New AmericanLibrary
of World Literature,Inc., 1949), p. 39. Certaintendenciesin contemporarylogical positivism
may be called tendenciesof "unbridledrationalism."
"W. P. Montague,Waysof Knowing (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1948), p. 55.
1 Ibid., p. 66.
Ibid., p. 64.

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community of older principles which constitutes the work of reason."'l But

is not the forming of hypotheses the work of reason also? That is, at this
point it is difficult clearly to demarcate reason from imagination, for the
framing of hypotheses is a function of reason as well. Thus, we have facts
directly experienced,and reason interrelatingthem by positing relations and
new facts and principles. Without intuition in the sense of direct experience,
reason cannot work, and what we call the intuition of the mystics is experience at a level at which reason ceases to function. And, when the mystics
say that reason cannot grasp their highest reality, they mean that at that
level there is no scope for the work of reason, as there are no differencesor
distinctions to be interrelated.
As Professor Montague complains, some of the mystics adopt a negative
relation to the world and maintain that the world is not real. As the world
of plurality is not real, as the highest reality is the only real, and as the work
of reason or intellect is confined to the realm of plurality, they say that
reason or intellect cannot grasp reality. But even these mystics do not use
intuition as a philosophical method. Philosophy is always discursiveknowledge, logical understanding of the nature of the universe. What these
mystics generally do is to disprove, with the help of reason, all the positive
conclusions about the world arrived at by the same reason in rival philosophies. Their philosophies generally appear to be destructive (vitandivadas), not constructive. Their positive contribution to philosophy lies in
their contention that there is a kind of knowledge which is intuitive but not
discursive and that through it alone can reality be known. But intuition
itself gives them no philosophy, for there is nothing to think about and
thought as such ceases to exist in that intuition.
One important point which these negativistic philosophers seem to overlook is that, if the truth of intuition and of their reality is based on, and
derived from, considerationsof empirical fact, either through inference or
postulation, the latter must also be regarded as true if the former are true.
This objection was raised, in fact, by the realistic Vedintins in India, for,
they said, if the data are false, the conclusion cannot be true. The importance
of this objection was noticed by the later followers of the extremist subschools of even the Advaita of Safikara,who said, therefore, that the world
is neither unreal nor real. The truth of the world is a relative truth; only
the truth of the Absolute is absolutely true. And the distinction between
the relative and absolute truths turns out to be the distinction between what
is true to the human intellect and what is true to the highest intuition. Some,
Ibid., p. 65.

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like the followers of Sankara,say that what is true from one point of view
and false from another can be neither true nor false. Others say that it is
both true and false. But all this elaborationof the ideas of truth and falsity
is the work of intellect, not of intuition.
Taking Bergson, for instance, should we say that he used intuition as a
philosophical method? In spite of all his strictures against intellect and
logic, it was only with their help that he attempted to show their shortcomings. All that he succeeded in proving was that there is such a form
of cognition as intuition and that it is with its help that we can cognize
time or duration. But is the experience of space the same as the concept
of space? The experience of space is as much an intuition as the experience
of time. Kant said as much, before Bergson, in calling space and time
forms of intuition; even as forms of intuition, they are as much intuited.
If successionis not time, simultaneityis not space. We need not here discuss
the question of whether time or space is or is not spiritual. But there are
many things in the world which we know through intuition in the sense
of direct experience. And so long as we are preparedto leave them unrelated
and unco-ordinatedwith each other, reason does not enter the scene. But
when we attempt to co-ordinateand relate them and disprove false intuitions
and confirm the true, we need the work of reason. Bergson, for example,
had to use reason for relating time with space and other objects of experience
and in developing principles of this interrelating.
Bradleyalso admittedthe necessityof intuition, when he said that, without
the "This" in immediate experience, thought cannot work; otherwise, the
workings of thought would be a consistent fairy tale without relevance to
actuality.17Mr. Walsh says that Bradley admits somewhat tacitly the truth
of intellectual intuition in our experience,which Kant thought belongs only
to God's experience.'8 Thought cannot incorporatethe immediacy of feeling and sense and therefore remains until the end "an unearthly ballet of
bloodless categories"and a "spectralwoof of impalpable abstractions." In
order to succeed in its work and attain its objective, thought must pass into
something other and higher. And this higher, which is to retain the mediacy
of thought and the immediacy of feeling and sense, can be nothing other
than intellectual intuition, which creates sensations according to its conceptions.
17F. H. Bradley, The Principles of Logic (London: Oxford University Press, 1922), Vol. II,
p. 660. See also Rudolf Carnap, Meaning and Necessity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
n.d.), p. 12. Just as Bradley says that reason cannot determine whether a proposition is factually
true or not without immediate experience, Carnap admits that semantics cannot determine the
same without direct observation.
'8 Reason and Experience, p. 62.

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VIII

It may be interestingand useful for comparativepurposesto know some

of the meaningsin whichthe phraseintellectualintuitionis usedin Western
philosophy.Walsh,in his bookReasonandExperience,givesfourimportant
meanings. First,intellectualintuitionin the full Kantiansense is a hypotheticalcognitivefaculty,attributedto God,whichsimultaneously
intuitsthe
and
thinks
them.19
intellectual
intuition
is
the
Second,
particulars
apprehensionof self-evidenttruths. "Intuitionof the self-evident. . . lies at the
basisof all knowledge. We have only to supplementthis with the theory
of Descartesthat inferenceitself reducesat its best to intuitionto reachthe
rationalistdoctrineof scientificknowledgein its strongestform."20In the
third place, intellectualintuition is the intuitionof universals. Aristotle
believedthat the universalsare perceivedin the particularsand exist in the
particulars,in re. So, they are directlyperceived.But they are not sensed
or intuitedwith the help of the senses. Therefore,they mustbe intuitedby
thoughtor intellect.Thus,all formsareintellectuallyintuited.In the fourth
place,everyinferencehas an elementof intuition.Murewrites:"HadKant
paid more attentionto the natureof inferencehe might have found it less
easy to deny to thought its native moment of intuition. The discursive
factorin thoughtis revealednot only in the dispersionof an identicalconcept througha multiplicityof sensuousintuitionswhich instantiateit, but
also in the movementof inferencefrom premisesto conclusion;and in the
factorof intellectualintuitionis
graspingof a conclusiona complementary
not
as
act
from
discursion
butas the re-immediation
manifest,
plainly
separate
of the discursive mediatory movement."2l Dr. Ewing identifies the insight

that the premisesnecessitatethe conclusionwith intellectualintuition.Here

we are remindedof Bradley'sview that in inferencewe synthesizethe data
and intuit the conclusionin an integratedwhole.22
Now, withoutgoing into detailedexplanationand criticismof these dock9Some
interpreters equate intuiting the particulars with creating the sensations that accord with
the categories.
20Here we are reminded of the view of the Mimamrsakas,namely, that among the grades of the
universals all universals except the highest and the lowest are both universal and particular,
because each universal, as different from the others of the same grade, is a particular coming
under a higher universal, and, as comprehending the species coming under itself, is a universal.
The lowest in the gradation must be a pure particular and the highest a pure universal. Now,
at least those universals that are particulars must be intuited also, besides being conceived. Again,
as individual entities, all universals must be intuited. Thus, not only sense but also intellect must
have the power to intuit; which means cognition as such must be an intuition as well.
1 G. R. G.
Mure, An Introduction to Hegel, p. 96, quoted by Walsh in Reason and Experience,
pp. 56-57.
"Bradley, The Principles of Logic, Vol. I, p. 258: "We first do a certain work on our data;
and this work is the construction. We then by inspection discover and select a new relation,
and this intuition is the conclusion."

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trines, we may say that in Western philosophy, too, the presence of intuition
is admitted not only at the level of sensation and perception, but also at
that of intellect or thought. Intuition is the grasping of an object as a solid
unity or integrality. It is present, therefore, not only when pure qualities
like colors and smells are grasped but also when individual objects like
pens and pencils, universals like humanity and redness,and the Absolute or
Brahman at the suprarationallevel are cognized. When I perceive a pen
as a pen and not merely as a combination of qualities like colors and touch,
I have an intuition. That the pen is perceived as a pen and not always as
a group of qualities is shown when, in the erroneous perception of a pencil
as a pen, we make the contradicting judgment, "It is a pencil and not a
pen." We do not say that we did not really perceive this or that quality, but
that we did not perceive this or that object. The knowledge that we did
not really perceive this or that quality is a result of later analysis of our
experience. And even when we perceive a color like red, we have intuition,
because the object is seen as a solid unity. A quality is a quality only when
it is seen in relation to its substance.
Regarding the cognition of universals, there are two views: accordingto
Plato, they are only remembered but not perceived, whereas, according to
Aristotle, they are perceived in the particulars. But Aristotle says that they
are only intellectually intuited and not sensuously. Among the Indian philosophers, the Naiyiyikas say that universals are sensuously intuited. Now,
even taking Plato's doctrine,when we rememberan object, do we remember
it as a solid unity or as a group or combination of interrelated elements?
In rememberingan object as a solid unity, there is an element of intuition,
whether the object is a physical object or a universal. And Plato treats the
Ideas as substances, which shows that the universals are solid unities and
not mere groupings of elements. So, if we accept the view that the cognition
of any solid unity involves intuition, then there must be intuition at the level
of thought also.
One may now ask: If thought, like perception, involves intuition, what
is the differencebetween the two? Is not thought said to be discursiveand
perception non-discursive?In answer, it may be asked: If the perception of
a book is of the form "It is a book" and not merely of the form "book,"is
not perception also discursive? Perception itself becomes relational knowledge with the relation between "It" and "book." We may hold that there
is a stage in perception at which cognition is of the simple form "book."
But when I wish to communicatemy knowledge or bring it to the level of
communicabilityor even to that level at which I can relate it to other bits
of my own knowledge, it would be of the form "It is a book" and would

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be relational.For all these stages,philosophershave usedthe wordperception. Even if we believe that perceptionis originallyof the form "book"
and is intuitive,it is potentiallyrelationaland discursive,becauseit later
assumesthe form "It is a book." "It"and "book"then becomeelementsof
the originalperception"book." But the elementsnow remainintuitions;
and againthe awarenessof the whole,thoughdiscursive,retainsan intuitive
background.
At the level of thinking,we pass beyonddemonstrativereference.But
even when we make a judgmentlike "Manis mortal,"we have two solid
formal unities,"man"and "mortal,"distinctlyentertainedby thoughtand
relatedby it. These solid unitiesare intuitions.If so, even at the level of
we have intuition.
thought or understanding,
The above discussionshows that, except at the highest (that is, of the
Absolute and of the mystic) and the lowest levels of cognition, thought
cannot work without intuitions and intuitions cannot be understoodwithout

thought,and that the distinctionbetweenthoughtand intuitioncannotbe

clear-cut. If thought is relational and relations need terms to relate, then,

in the sameprocessof cognition,the cognitionof the termsis intuitiveand

the act of relatingis discursive.This meansthat thoughtis permeatedby
intuition. And even in perception,particularlyat that level at which it is
communicable,intuitionis permeatedby thought. If philosophyis a communicablesystemof knowledge,intuitionby itself cannotbe its method. If
a communicablesystemof knowledgeis one basedon intuitions,then intuition must be one of the methodsof philosophy,whetherin the Eastor the
West.

Kant contrastedintuitionand concepts,sayingthat intuitions(percepts)

withoutconceptsare blind and conceptswithoutintuitionsare empty. He
used the word intuitionin the meaningof sensationonly. But later,even
wereregardedas intuitions.
categories,as unitaryformsof the understanding,
They are intuitively used and intuitively known, and confer unitary form

on the manifoldof sensations.If intuitionis the awarenessof solid unities,

then it applies as much to categoriesas to sensations.We have already
referredto Bradley'sview, accordingto which we inspect or intuit the
conclusionin a synthesizedwhole comprisingthe data. His view is justified
only if intuitingthe conclusionmeansthe perception(not a sensuousperception,of course) of the formalunity of the whole. So, wheneverthere
is perceptionof a unity, whether formal or material,we have intuition.
And the self-sameprocessof cognitionis discursivealso if it is awareof
the relationalaspect, too. This awarenessmay be of three kinds: sub-

conscious and voluntary, subconsciousand involuntary (spontaneous), and

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consciousand voluntary. The subconsciousand voluntary type may be found

in those cases in which we draw conclusions without knowing that we are
doing so; in the use of categories, our awareness is subconscious and involuntary; only in explicit inference is the awareness of relational activity
conscious and voluntary.
This latter considerationshows that the opposition between intuition and
concepts is not the same as the opposition between intuition and discursive
thought. If to perceive a sensation is not regardedas discursive,then simply
to cognize a universal is also not discursive. Discursive knowledge comes
in when we begin to be aware of relations. If it is said that no concept
can be cognized without cognizing its relations with the particulars and
that cognition of a concept is therefore always relational, as much can be
said about the cognition of even a color like red, for even here cognition
is of the form "It is red" and therefore involves a relation between "It" and
"red." If it is said that there must have been a cognitive stage at which
the distinction between "It" and "red"is not drawn, we may say that there
must have been a stage at which every concept without relation to its particulars is grasped. Indeed, neither stage can be demonstratedand fixed, but
only postulated. From the standpoint of communicable knowledge or of
every kind of knowledge that can be used and related, pure sensation and
concepts are equally hypotheses.
IX
The above discussion might have warned us that, in order to answer the
question whether Indian philosophy as a whole, or one or more of its
systems, uses intuition, either solely or conjointly with reason, as a philosophical method, one must be careful about the meaning of the word intuition and about the object with reference to which intuition is claimed to
be the proper method of cognition. Intuition may be ordinary or extraordinary. Clairvoyance,telepathy, etc., and the intuition of the mystics are
extraordinary. All of us may possess these powers but to such a degree
as to be negligible. But intuition in the ordinary sense of direct awareness
of solid unities or unitaryforms is used by all of us, and we are either aware
of its use or acknowledge it if it is subconscious or spontaneous. Both
Western philosophy and Indian philosophy use it as one of their methods.
But intuition alone can never be a philosophical method and is not so used
even by Indian philosophers.
The real differencebetween Indian and Western philosophies does not lie
in their use or avoidance of intuition as a philosophical method, but in the

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spheresof theirprimaryinterestand their attitudes.Indianphilosophyhas

been interesteduntil now more in the inner life of man and has adopted
a more inwardattitude,while Westernphilosophyhas been interestedin
generalmorein the outerlife of man andhas adoptedan outwardattitude.23
Becauseof this difference,it is wronglythoughtthat Indianphilosophyhas
used intuition alone as its method, while Western philosophyhas used
reason. The formeralso has used reasonas its method,but primarilyfor
the clarificationand elaborationof inner truths.
We may concludeby sayingthat (1) manyclassicalIndianphilosophers
maintainedthat experienceof the highestreality,the Brahman(Absolute),
Atman (Self), or Purusa(Self), is possibleonly throughunmediatedknowledgeor intuition;(2) somemaintainedthateven at thatlevel ourexperience
cannotbe unmediated;(3) even the formergroup,in its controversies
with
its rivals, had to prove, with the help of reason,not only the realityof
the Brahmanor the Atman but also the validityand even the possibility
of the highestintuitionas unmediatedcognitiveexperience;(4) almostall
of them acceptedthe extraordinaryforms of empiricalknowledge like
andtelepathy;(5) mostof themheld thatall empiricalknowlclairvoyance
truth is discursive;and (6) all of them used reasonto
claims
that
edge
interrelatenot only the differentforms of valid knowledgebut also the
differentformsor levels of realitywhich they accepted.
a2We should not use the terms subjective attitude and objective attitude to denote this difference,
for we may adopt an objective attitude even in the study of our inner life and a subjective
attitude in the study of the outer.