De Knecht v CA

G.R. No. 108015. May 20, 1998

FACTS: Cristina de Knecht and Rene Knecht- owners of a land in which they
constructed 8houses: 7 leased out , 1 occupied by them.
1979 RP initiated a civil case for expropriation of their property for the
purpose of using it to complete the Manila Flood Control and Drainage
Project and the extension of the EDSA towards Roxas Boulevard. CFI of
Pasay issued a writ of possession but was annulled for an arbitrary choice
for EDSAs extension.
1982 City Treasurer sold the property at public auction for failure of
petitioners to pay real estate taxes on the property from 1980 to 1982.
Spouses Babieras and Spouses Sangalangs were the highest bidders.
1985 they sold the property to Salem Investment Corporation. The
property was part of those expropriated under B.P. Blg. 340 authorizing
the national government to expropriate certain properties in Pasay City for
the EDSA Extension, passed on 1983.
1990 RP filed Civil Case 7327 for determination of just compensation for
expropriated properties. Writ of possession was issued by the trial court. 7
of the 8 houses built on the property were demolished. The Knechts
refused to leave their house so Salem filed a case against them for
unlawful detainer. Court ordered Knechts ejectment.
1991 the Knechts filed for a Motion to Intervene and to Implead Additional
Parties after the trial court issued an order fixing the compensation of all
the lands sought to be expropriated by the govt. The trial court denied the
motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision after finding that
petitioners had no legal interest over the property.
ISSUE: WON petitioners are entitled to just compensation.
HELD: NO. Since B.P. Blg. 340 did not, by itself, lay down the procedure
for expropriation, reference must be made to the provisions on eminent
domain in the Revised Rules of Court.

Section 1. The complaint.-- The right of eminent domain shall be exercised

by the filing of a complaint which shall state with certainty the right and
purpose of condemnation, describe the real or personal property sought to
be condemned, and join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to
own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest therein, showing, so far as
practicable, the interest of each defendant separately.
The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of
the property condemned.
"Owner" when employed in statutes relating to eminent domain to
designate the persons who are to be made parties to the proceeding,
refers, as is the rule in respect of those entitled to compensation, to all
those who have lawful interest in the property to be condemned. If a
person claiming an interest in the land sought to be condemned is not
made a party, he is given the right to intervene and lay claim to the
compensation.
The Knechts insisted that although they were no longer the registered
owners of the property at the time Civil Case No. 7327 was filed, they still
occupied the property and therefore should have been joined as
defendants in the expropriation proceedings and entitled to a share in the
just compensation.
4 months prior filing of Civil Case No. 7327, a case for reconveyance was
dismissed with finality which resulted to the Knechts loss of whatever
right or colorable title they had to the property. The fact that the Knechts
remained in physical possession was based on their claim of ownership,
not on any juridical title such as a lessee, mortgagee, or vendee. Since the
issue of ownership was put to rest in the civil case of reconveyance, they
had no legal interest in the property by the time the expropriation
proceedings were instituted. They had no right to intervene and the trial
court did not err in denying their "Motion for Intervention and to Implead
Additional Parties.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. KER AND COMPANY

LIMITED, respondent. G.R. No. 136171. July 2, 2002
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J
Facts: Petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City a
petition for expropriation of portions of two parcels of land owned by
respondent. Petitioner needed the parcels of land for the widening of the
road component of J.P. Laurel-Buhangin Interchange in Davao City. The
Regional trial court rendered decision of a fair just compensation for
defendant Ker Corporation. However, it was challenged by Petitioner
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Public
Works and Highways alleging that just compensation for site must be
reduced. Petitioner alleged that when the petition for expropriation was
filed, the tax declaration of the property indicated its assessed value at a
lower price.

Issue: 1. Whether or not the two adjacent sites warrant different

valuations
2. Whether or not respondent Ker Company was given a fair just
compensation.

Held:
1. The court held that there are no substantial distinctions between the lot
in Site I and the lot in Site II to warrant different valuations.
2. The Supreme Court held that the valuation for Site I was excessive and
unreasonable. Just compensation cannot be measured by the assessed
value of the property as stated in the tax declaration and schedule of
market values. For the purpose of appraisal, the fair market value of the
property is taken into account and such value refers to the highest price in
terms of money which a property will bring if exposed for sale in the public
market.
In computing just compensation for expropriation proceedings, it is the
value of the land at the time of the taking or at the time of the filing of the
complaint which should be taken into consideration. Section 4, Rule 67 of

the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that just compensation is to be

determined as of the date of the taking or the filing of the complaint
whichever came first. On this matter, the appellate court is correct in
disregarding petitioner's claim.
Manosca v Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 106440
FACTS:
Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada,
MM, which was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birthsite of Felix
Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo. NHI, passed Resolution No. 1,
Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of PD 260, declaring the land to be a
national historical landmark.
Petitioners argued that the intended appropriation was not for a public
purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of
public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia
Ni Cristo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not taking of a private property to be used for historical
landmark is under the scope of eminent domain.
HELD:
Affirmed the decision of the lower courts.
Public use, not having been otherwise defined by the Constitution, must
be considered in its general concept of meeting a public need or a public
exigency. It is one which confers some benefit or advantage to the public;
it is not confined to actual use by public. It is measured in terms of right of
public to use proposed facilities for which the condemnation is sought and,
as long as public has right of use, whether exercised by one or many
members of public, a public advantage or public benefit accrues
sufficient to constitute a public use.

GR L-14355
The City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila, et al.

Facts:
- Dec. 11, 1916: Petitioner presented a petition in its CFI, praying that
certain lands (within Block 83 of the district of Binondo) be expropriated
for the purpose of constructing a public improvement (extension of Rizal
Avenue).

- Answer of defendant:
1. It is a corporation under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines,
having for its purpose the benefit and general welfare of the Chinese
community of the City of Manila
2. It owns of two parcels of lands petitioned for expropriation (it had a
Torrens title for the land which was used for cemetery purposes)
3. Denied necessity or expediency of the expropriation
4. The expropriation would disturb the resting place of the dead and
require a great deal of expenditure for the removal and transfer of the
bodies

In this case*, YES.

- The power of expropriation is not an inherent power of the City of Manila
because it is a municipal corporation. Thus, the judiciary may review
whether:

(a) it was given authority to exercise such power

> Sec. 2429, Act No. 2711 (Charter of the city of Manila) states that:
"the city (Manila)... may condemn PRIVATE PROPERTY for PUBLIC USE.
Hence, petitioner was given authority to exercise the power.

(b) its exercise of the power is in accordance with law

> The land involved was PUBLIC LAND. It was established under Spanish
governmental authority for the indigent Chinese. At the time of the
petition, the land was being used by the general community (not just by a
particular family).
> There is NO NECESSITY for the exprorpriation given the public
purpose because adjoining and adjacent lands were being offered for free.

* The answer would be no if the expropriation was ordered by law.

- Answer of Tambunting (defendant): Offered and still offers to grant a
right of way over other land without cost to the plaintiff

- Plaintiff appealed from the decision rendered by the Honorable Simplicio

del Rosario (who said there was no necessity for the expropriation)

Issue:
May the courts inquire into and hear upon the the NECESSITY of an
expropriation?

Held:

People vs. Fajardo, et al.

PONENTE: BENGZON, J.
Facts: Juan F. Fajardo, former mayor,and his son-in-law, Pedro Babilonia,
violated Ordinance No. 7 Series of 1950, of the Municipality of Baao,
Camarines Sur, for having constructed without permit from the municipal
mayor a building that destroys the view of the public plaza.
Sec. 1 Any person or persons who will construct or repair a building should,
before constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the
Municipal Mayor.
Sec. 3 x x x If said building destorys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies
any public property, it shall be removed at the expense of the owner of the
building or house.
Fajardo and Babilonia sought to construct a building adjacent to their
gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located

along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek.
They filed a written request, but the same was denied. However, they
proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because
they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having
been destroyed by a typhoon and they had been living on leased property.
Issue: Whether or not the ordinance is one of police power or eminent
domain. Whether or not the issuance of such ordinance was within the
province of the issuing authority.
Held: The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive in that it operates to
permanently deprive the persons affected of the right to use their own
property; it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking
of appellants property without just compensation. The state may not,
under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the
beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to
preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. To do so
would let the lands of the persons affected by the ordinance to remain
idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited. To
legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just
compensation and an opportunity to be heard.
The power of the municipal council to require the issuance of building
permits rests upon its first establishing fire limits in populous parts of the
town and prescribing the kinds of buildings that may be constructed or
repaired within them. As there is absolutely no showing in this case that
the municipal council had either established fire limits or set standards for
the kind of buildings to be constructed or repaired within them before it
passed the ordinance in question, it is clear that said ordinance was not
promulgated under the sec 2243 of the revised administrative code, and
hence the issuance was beyond the authority of the municipality to enact.
Said ordinance is NULL AND VOID.
G.R. No. L-59603
April 29, 1987
EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY v HON. CEFERINO E. DULAY (CFI
Judge of Cebu ) & SAN ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

FACTS:
San Antonio Development Corporation owns 4 parcels of land in the City of
Lapu-lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu. Upon the issuance of Proclamation No.
1811, EPZA offered to purchase this property from the respondent for the
establishment of an export processing zone. The petitioner filed for the
expropriation of the respondents property to the Court of First Instance of
Cebu. The respondent judge resolved this petition by ordering the
condemnation of the land in favor of the petitioner and appointed certain
persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated. Thereafter,
the 3 commissioners recommended the amount of P15/sq meter as the
fair and reasonable value for the just compensation of the said land.
However, the petitioner contended that PD 1533 has already superseded
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court (appointment of commissioners who will
assess the appropriate value) and that the compensation must not exceed
the maximum amount set by PD 1533. The trial court denied his petition.
ISSUE:
WON the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining the just
compensation in PD 1533, is valid and constitutional.
HELD:
The Supreme Court dismissed this petition and declared that PD 1533 (and
that of PD 96,464 and 794*) on just compensation, as unconstitutional and
void. The method of ascertaining just compensation on the Presidential
Decree cited renders the Court inutile. It impairs the courts independence
in ascertaining as to what is just and fair. Even a grade school pupil could
substitute a judge in the determination of just compensation. The trial
court correctly stated that the decree may serve as a guiding principle, but
cannot substitute to the courts judgment as to what amount should be
awarded.
Just Compensation means the value of the property at the time of the
taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the
facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its
improvements and capabilities should be well considered.

In the present case, the tax declarations presented by the petitioner as the
basis for just compensation were made, long before martial law when the
assessed values of the properties constitute a fraction of their true market
value. The private respondent was not even the owner of the said property
at that time. To keep the value of the lots on the basis of the documents
which are out of date and at prices below the acquisition cost would be
arbitrary and confiscatory. Tax values can serve as a guide but can never be
absolute substitute for just compensation. It is violative of the due process,
to deny the owner, the opportunity to prove that the valuation of the tax is
wrong. It is contrary to the basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow
the haphazard work of a clerk to prevail over the judgment of the court
only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property, after
evidence and arguments were presented and after all the factors and
considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been
judiciously evaluated.
*the basis for payment of just compensation shall be, the lower value
between the current and fair market value declared by the owner or
administrator; and that of the market value determined by the Assessor
(they basically have same content-PD 96,464 & 794)
AMIGABLE VS. CUENCA 43 SCRA 360
G.R. No. L-26400
Feb 29, 1972
Facts: Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the
back of her Transfer Certificate of Title (1924), there was no annotation in
favor of the government of any right or interest in the property. Without
prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of
the lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On 1958,
Amigables counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting
payment of the portion of the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor
General in his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner then filed in the court a quo a
complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his
capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of
ownership and possession of the lot. According to the defendants, the
action was premature because it was not filed first at the Office of the
Auditor General. According to them, the right of action for the recovery of

any amount had already prescribed, that the Government had not given its
consent to be sued, and that plaintiff had no cause of action against the
defendants.

Issue: Whether or Not, under the facts of the case, appellant may properly
sue the government.

Held: In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held
that when the government takes away property from a private landowner
for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or
negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against
the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity
from suit without its consent. In the case at bar, since no annotation in
favor of the government appears at the back of the certificate of title and
plaintiff has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot
to the government, then she remains the owner of the lot. She could then
bring an action to recover possession of the land anytime, because
possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since such
action is not feasible at this time since the lot has been used for other
purposes, the only relief left is for the government to make due
compensationprice or value of the lot at the time of the taking.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON
CITY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO,
INC., respondents.
FACTS: Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled ORDINANCE
REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF
PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE
JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE
VIOLATION THEREOF The ordinance provides that at least six (6) percent
of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for
charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been
residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be

determined by competent City Authorities. The Quezon City Engineer

notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of
Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced
Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and
reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public
use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers.
The respondent points out that if an owner is deprived of his property
outright under the State's police power, the property is generally not taken
for public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed in order to promote
the general welfare.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid
exercise of police power.
HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is
no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent
of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of
deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety,
or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking
without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit
paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building
or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the
burden to private cemeteries. Expropriation, requires payment of just
compensation.
Moreover, the questioned ordinance was passed after Himlayang Pilipino,
Inc. had incorporated. received necessary licenses and permits and
commenced operating. The sequestration of six percent of the cemetery
cannot even be considered as having been impliedly acknowledged by the
private respondent when it accepted the permits to commence
operations.
The petition is hereby DISMISSED.

REPUBLIC v. PLDT
Jan. 27, 1969
FACTS:
The plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines set up its own Government
Telephone System through the Bureau of Telecommunications, which was
created (under EO 94, July 1,1947) pursuant to a state policy reorganizing
the government offices to meet the exigencies attendant and for
promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in its operation. This was
done by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting
trunk lines of the defendant PLDT to enable government offices to call
private parties. The application for the use of trunk lines was in the usual
form, containing a statement that the Bureau will abide by the rules and
regulations of the PLDT (on file with the Public Service Commission), one
was that it prohibits the public use of the service furnished the telephone
subscriber for his private use. The Bureau has extended its services to the
general public since 1948. On Mar. 5, 1958, the plaintiff, through the
Director of Telecommunications, entered into an agreement with RCA
Communications Inc. (not a party to the case, an american corporation
authorized to transact business in the country and is engaged in reception
and transmission of long distance wireless messages as well as
broadcasting, radio-telephone and radio-telegraphic communications
services) for joint overseas telephone service. PLDT sent a notice to the
Bureau complaining for violating its conditions because the latter had used
the trunk lines not only for government offices but also served private
persons or general public, which makes it in competition with its business.
As the defendant received no reply, it disconnected the rented trunk lines
which resulted to the isolation of the country from the rest of the world
except U.S. Then the Bureau proposed that they enter into an
interconnecting agreement in which PLDT was willing to enter provided
that the former would submit to the jurisdiction and regulations of the
Public Service Commission. It was not accepted by either party.
ISSUE: W/N the Bureau has the right to demand interconnection between
the Government Telephone System and that of the PLDT, in order for
the former to utilize its lines and facilities.
HELD:

The parties cannot be coerced to enter into a contract without agreement

as to its principal terms and conditions. However, while the Republic may
not compel PLDT to enter into a contract, in the exercise of its sovereign
power of eminent domain, it may require PLDT to permit interconnection
of the Government Telephone System and that of the PLDT, as the needs
of the governement service may require, subject to the payment of just
compensation to be determined by the court. Said power can be availed of
even without loss of title, imposing only a burden upon the property
owner. Under Art. XIII sec.6, the State may, in the interest of the national
welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just
compensation. The condemnation would be for public use as its
beneficiaries would be the users of both telephone systems. Moreover,the
theses of PLDT that Bureau's commercial services constituted unfair
competition and was guilty of fraud and abuse are untenable because they
were merely hypothetical and PLDT'S acceptance of the payment of rentals
implies assent to its extended public use. The main reason for PLDT'S
objection was the fact that the Bureau's telephone system expanded
rapidly and to uphold its contention would be to make the needs of the
general public subordinate to its right to derive profit from futrure
expansion.
Decision appealed is affirmed but the petition to compel PLDT is dismissed.
Reyes vs. National Housing Authority
GR 147511
Jan 20, 2003
Puno, J:
Facts: in 1977, NHA filed complaints for the expropriation of former
sugarcane lands (namely Lots 6450, 6448-E, 6198-A and 6199) belonging to
petitioners in the CFI of Cavite, the stated public purpose of which is to
relocate squatters from Metro Manila. Trial court rendered judgment in
favor of expropriation and ordered respondent to pay just compensation,
with the expropriation court issuing an Order in Feb 24, 1989 instructing
the Register of Deeds of Cavite to transfer in NHA's name the lots
mentioned, ordering respondent to pay just compensation and ordering
the defendants to pay capital gains tax on the properties. In 1992,
petitioners filed a case for forfeiture of rights before the RTC of QC alleging
that NHA had not relocated squatters from Metro Manila on the
expropriated lots in violation of the stated public purpose of the
expropriation and that they failed to pay just compensation. They are
praying that the rights vested upon the NHA be forfeited in favor of the

condemnees and that NHA should be enjoined from disposing said lands.
NHA answered, stating that expropriation cannot prosper on account of
the defendant's failure to pay capital gains tax and other fees and
expenses for the transfer of title to NHA and that they have spent large
sums paying just compensation.Trial court dismissed the complaint in Sept.
29, 1995. On appeal, the CA also dismissed the complaint in Sept 29, 2000.
Hence the case at bar.
Issues: WON CA has erred in ruling that as expropriation court did not
include a condition that should property be not used for intended purpose,
it reverts to condemnee, as action to declare the forfeiture of rights under
expropriation jufgement cannot occur.
WON CA erred when it ruled that non-payment of just compensation is not
a ground for forfeiture.
WON CA erred in ruling against forfeiture in light of the usage of the
property for a different purpose than that stipulated.
Held: The court is not impressed with merit. The concept of "public use" is
not limited to clear cases of use by the public, as public use is now
synonymous with "public interest", "public benefit" and "public
welfare". Expropriation of private lands for slum clearance and urban
develpment is for a public purpose even if said lands are sold to private
entities and is considered a furtherance of "public use", not a deviation
therefrom. Also, the Constitution allows the state to undertake "A
continuing program of urban land reform and housing" for the nation's
needy in furtherance of the social justice provision under Sec. 1, Art XIII.
Court also ruled that when land has been acquired for public use
unconditionally in exchange for just compensation, former owners retain
no rights therein and non-payment of compensation cannot lead to a case
of recovery in favor of former owners. This is so as the lands are still
appropriated for public use despite non-payment. As long as the purpose
of taking is for public use, eminent domain comes into play. However, as
the expropriation judgment states that paying of JC is not subject to any
condition, the court found the CA erring in not awarding interest
computed from the time property is acquired to when compensation is
fully paid.The court ordered NHA to pay the unpaid balance of
P1,218,574.35 with interest of 12%/ annum computed from the time of
taking in 1977 untl fully paid, as well as the petitioners to pay CGT and to
surrender the dup;icate certificates of title for the expropriated lands.