Concave Programming
Concave Programming
Concave Programming
Concave programming
1 Introduction
Concave programming is another special case of the general constrained optimization problem
max (x)
x
subject to g(x) 0
in which the objective function is concave and the constraint functions
are convex. For such problems, an alternative derivation of the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions is possible, providing yet another perspective on the Lagrangean
method.
2 Derivation
Consider the family of optimization problems
max (x)
x
subject to g(x) c
where the parameter c measures the available resources. The value function
(c) = max{ (x) : (x) c }
x
(c)
(2)
(x, ) = (x)
(x)
where (x) measures the resources used and the (x) the total benet attained. If is concave and convex, the Lagrangean is concave, and the
Kuhn-Tucker conditions identify those policies which maximize the net benet. This is the fundamental economic insight of the Lagrangean method.
Example An electricity company operates generating plants. At each
plant , it costs ( ) to produce units of electricity. If the company aims
to meet electricity demand at minimum cost, its optimization problem is
min
( ) subject to
=
x
=1
=1
The Lagrangean is
(, ) =
=1
( )
=1
(
( ) +
=1
(3)
=1
Suppose that the company has the option of purchasing electricity from outside suppliers at a price . Then, the Lagrangean (3) represents the sum of
the costs of producing electricity at its own plants and purchasing electricity
from outside. For any arbitrary price , the company will choose an optimal
mix of its own production and outside purchase to minimize the total costs.
The rst-order conditions for a minimum of (3) are
= = 0
(4)
Optimality requires that the company utilize each plant to the level at which
its marginal cost is equal to the alternative price . As the price increases, the
proportion of demand which it satises from its own resources will increase.
At some price , the company will be induced to ll total demand from
its own production. This is the shadow price which arises from the solution
of (4) together with the constraint
=1
and is the marginal cost of producing the total demand from its own
plants.
3
Sucient
x0
Unconstrained
= 0
0, x = 0
pseudoconcave
Equality constraints
= 0
0, x = 0
pseudoconcave
g(x) = 0
Inequality constraints
g(x) 0
Concave programming
quasiconvex
= 0
0, x = 0
pseudoconcave
0, g(x ) = 0
0, g(x ) = 0
quasiconvex
max
max
concave
convex
5 Homework
1. In general, the equation of the separating hyperplane in (1) is
c =
Show that 0 and 0. [Hint: Consider the point (0, +1) .
]
2. The constraints g satises the Slater constraint qualication condition
with (
if there exist x
x) < 0. Show that this implies that > 0.
Therefore, without loss of generality, we can set = 1 as in (1) (see
Remark 5.8).
3. Show how the shadow price can be used to decentralize the running of
the power company, leaving the production level at each plant to be
determined locally.
4. (Pareto optimality) Suppose that there are agents each of which has
preferences over a set . The preferences of agent can be presented
by the concave function : . A choice is Pareto
optimal if it impossible to make any agent better o without making
another agent worse o. Show that is Pareto optimal if and only
()
arg max
=1
+ 0
(, ) =
=1
=1
( ( ) ) 0
(5)
= 1, 2, . . . ,
Solutions 6
1 The point (0, + 1) belongs to , and therefore
( + 1) 0 = 0
which implies that 0. Similarly, let { e1 , e2 , . . . , e } denote the standard
basis for (Example 1.79). For any = 1, 2, . . . , , the point (0 e , )
(which corresponds to decreasing resource by one unit) belongs to and
therefore (from (75))
(0 e ) = + 0 =
which implies that 0.
2 Let
c = g(
x) < 0 and = (
x)
c 0
and therefore = 0 implies
(
( ) +
=1
(2)
=1
can be rewritten as
(x, ) =
)
( ) +
(3)
=1
The th term in the sum is the net prot of plant if its output is valued at
. Therefore, if the company undertakes to buy electricity from its plants at
the price and instructs each plant manager to produce so as to maximize
the plants net prot, each manager will be induced to choose an output
1
level which maximizes the prot of the company as a whole. This is the
case whether the price is the market price at which the company can buy
electricity from external suppliers or the shadow price determined by the
need to satisfy the total demand . In this way, the shadow price can be
used to decentralize the production decision.
4 is Pareto optimal if and only if it solves the problem
max 1 ()
subject to () ( )
= 2, 3, . . . ,
subject to () = ( ) () 0
= 2, 3, . . . ,
Since is concave, is convex for every . Assuming the qualication condition is satised (see below), the problem satises the conditions of the concave programming theorem (Theorem 5.6). Therefore, is Pareto optimal
if and only if there
exist multipliers 2 , 3 , . . . , such that the Lagrangean
(, ) = () =2 () is maximized on , that is
(
(
)
)
( , ) = 1 ( )
( ) ( ) 1()
( ) () = (, )
=2
=2
1 ( ) +
( ) 1 () +
=2
() for every
=2
subject to () ( )
2
= 2, 3, . . . ,
subject to () = ( ) () 0
= 2, 3, . . . ,
(
(
)
)
( , ) = 1 ( )
( ) ( ) 1()
( ) () = (, )
=2
=2
1 ( ) +
( ) 1 () +
=2
() for every
=2
Letting 1 = 1 and = 0 for every > gives the desired result, namely
arg max
()
(4)
=1
() >
=1
=1
contradicting (4).
( )
max (, ) =
( ( ) ) 0
, 0
=1
subject to (y, ) = 0
= 1, 2, . . . ,
0 0
1 0 . . .
0
2 . . . 0 0
=
0
. . . 0
0
...
0 0
is nonpositive denite (Exercise 3.96). The constraints are linear and hence
convex. Moreover, there exists a point (0, 1) such that for every = 1, 2, . . . ,
(0, 1) = 0 1 < 0
Therefore the problem satises the conditions of Theorem 5.6. The optimal
solution (y , ) satises the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, that is there exist
multipliers 1 , 2 , . . . , such that for every period = 1, 2, . . . ,
= ( ) 0
0
0
( ( ) ) = 0
( ) = 0
(5)
(
0
=1
=0
(6)
=1
(, , ) =
=1
( ( ) ) 0
( )
=1
= 0
=1
=1
Peak
=
=
O-peak
=0
= 0
=1
( )
=1
=
=
=
=1
=1
( + )
+
=1
+ 0 = (, )
=1
Under the optimal pricing policy, revenue equals cost and the utility breaks
even.