CONDITIONALITY AND

SANCTIONS
REPORT TO THE SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR WORK AND
PENSIONS
NEIL COULING

Contents
Page

Introduction

Background

Findings

Recommendations and
Conclusions

Annexes
Letter from District for Manager
East London (14 August 2012)

12

Copy of Adviser Manager e-mail

published in the Guardian

14

Papers from the PCS Union,

issues raised with me directly by
Jobcentre staff and other issues
raised in the Guardian together
with a management commentary

16

Introduction
1.1 On 22 March 2013 the Guardian newspaper reported that it had
documentary evidence that a secret regime of targets existed within Jobcentre
Plus which was causing claimants to be inappropriately sanctioned. They
cited a copy of an e-mail from one of the Adviser Managers in Walthamstow
Jobcentre.
1.2 In April 2011 the Government removed the system of targets through
benchmarks which had existed since 1996, and was strengthened in 2006.
As Government policy has not changed since then you asked me to
investigate the matter urgently.
1.3 Subsequent to that further material emerged via the Guardian and on
Maundy Thursday afternoon the PCS shared information they had been
collecting, mostly the material that had been appearing in the Guardian.
Whilst this report first focuses on Walthamstow I have looked into these other
allegations as they are of a generic nature.

Background
2.1 Sanctions have been a feature of the system of unemployment benefits
since 1911. They were introduced in their present form following the
introduction of Jobseekers Allowance (JSA) in 1996. Their use has waxed
and waned over the years and they have sometimes been used more
assertively than others, notably at times of rising unemployment. For example
the system of internal targets, through benchmarks, which was set at an
overall level of 6% of live load, was enhanced in 2006 and then further
tightened in 2009 to make sure that 1% of referrals came via the actively
seeking and refusal of employment elements. Benchmarks remained in place
until their abolition in April 2011.
2.2 The rationale for sanctions is two fold. First, you cant get a job unless
you are looking for one, so sanctions can be used to get claimants to search
for work. Second, unemployment benefits have always been conditional, paid
to support people who have no work and therefore no income on the grounds
that they seek that work. For conditionality to be enforced some form of
penalties are required.
2.3 Sanctions have consistently been proven effective in sustaining
conditionality within an active regime, and are widely recognised in effective
back-to-work regimes from around the World. The introduction of Jobseekers
Allowance in 1996 and its supporting regime has been reckoned to reduce the
numbers of people claiming unemployment benefit by 200,000. With the
effect of increasing the number of people in work and saving some 700m per
annum not including Housing Benefits.
2.4 The Coalition Government reformed the system of sanctions and
conditionality through the Welfare Reform Act 2012. The new system for JSA
was introduced on 20 October 2012 and Employment Support Allowance
(ESA) on 5 December 2012.
2.5 Whilst sanctions and conditionality have been a feature of the system of
unemployment benefits since inception they are not without controversy. The
Coalition Government was concerned about the deep-rooted system of
targets that existed inside of Jobcentre Plus. As part of the preparations for
their reforms the pre-existing system of personal benchmarks for applying
sanctions was removed from April 2011 to both help make the culture of
Jobcentre Plus less about applying processes and more focussed on
outcomes but also to ensure that sanctions would be applied properly. Strong
and very clear communications were issued at the time from my Predecessor
Ruth Owen and the Regional and local District Managers as part of this
programme of cultural change. For example see the letter sent by the District
Manager for East London on 14 August 2012 (attached at Annex A).
2.6 Management information is collected on referral rates and decision
outcomes. This is used to assure Managers that conditionality referrals are
being done appropriately. Where an outlier is identified, whether that is high or
low, Managers collect evidence to explain these figures and where justified,
no further action is taken. Should there be any issue of inappropriate use or
non-compliance with the conditionality and sanctions legislation; staff should

be supported to correctly impose conditionality with the use of Personal

Improvement Plan (PIP) and Line Manager support.
2.7 Jobcentre Advisers do not, as widely assumed in the reporting of these
issues, apply sanctions directly. What advisers do is raise a doubt as to
conditionality and they refer the case with associated evidence to a Decision
Maker (DM) independent of the process. The DM then reaches a decision,
and writes to the claimant. If a sanction is applied, a so called adverse
decision (as seen from the claimants perspective), is imposed, together with
a right of appeal to an Independent Appeal Tribunal.
2.8 By separating the referral from the decision the system helps ensure that
inappropriate sanctioning is much less likely to occur. Indeed if a rogue
manager did demand that all cases should be sent for a sanction this system
provides a natural fail safe because the DM would refuse to implement a
sanction decision where there was insufficient evidence. This tried and tested
mechanism has been in place since JSA was introduced in 1996 and has not
been changed in 2011 or through the 2012 changes.

Findings
3.1 On 6 February 2013 an Adviser Manager in Walthamstow Jobcentre sent
an e-mail to the advisers. A copy of that (annotated) was leaked to the
Guardian at some point after and published on 22 March (attached at Annex
B).
3.2 I asked the Work Services Director for London and the Home Counties
John-Paul Marks to interview the Adviser Manager and the management
chain.
3.3 In his interview with the Adviser Manager who wrote the email, who this
month completed her 28th year of public service, Mr Marks saw nothing
inappropriate in her attitude. She said her email was an attempt to translate
improvement messages into tangible outcomes for her advisors to
understand.
3.4 It is apparent that the Adviser Manager, suspecting that sanctions were
not being applied appropriately, was trying to address low levels of adviser
activity when she wrote the email to her team, and the manager now
recognises that the language was inappropriate and wrong. Walthamstows
rate of sanctions was 2.4%, below the level of the other Jobcentres in the
District which must be understood in the context of the improvement activity
the local team had put in place since the start of that new operational year.
The site, and District, had been struggling previously to match the
performance of other Jobcentres to help people back to work and the team
had been working hard to turn this around.
3.5 Looking at the data from London and the Homes Counties and across the
UK it would appear that the response to the removal of sanctions benchmarks
in 2011 was a marked reduction in sanctioning activity which upon
investigation suggested that conditionality was no longer being enforced
appropriately by some individuals. As part of the Race for Jobs, a regionally
inspired effort to reduce unemployment in London, the proper application of
the rules was stepped up successfully in most locations across the region.
The Race for Jobs has seen unemployment fall across the group and
Londons employment rate now stands at 70.3%, 0.6% higher than the
previous quarter and the highest rate for over three years. Even so by the
end of 2012 Walthamstow had the lowest rates of referral among comparable
sites in the East London District. So I am satisfied that explains the
management focus and motivation for the local response.
DMA - JSA CONDITIONALITY (Previously SBR)
Conditionality Referrals (previously SBR) as % of Live Load
National Total
Central England
LHC
NE England
NW England
Scotland
Southern England
Wales

Jul-11 Aug-11 Sep-11 Oct-11 Nov-11 Dec-11 Jan-12 Feb-12 Mar-12 Apr-12 May-12 Jun-12 Jul-12 Aug-12 Sep-12 Oct-12 Nov-12 Dec-12 Jan-13
2.5%
2.4%
2.3%
2.5%
2.7%
2.1%
2.5%
2.7%
2.9%
2.6%
3.2%
2.9%
3.6%
3.6%
3.3%
4.2%
4.2%
3.4%
4.5%
2.8%
2.9%
2.8%
2.8%
3.5%
2.6%
3.0%
3.1%
3.1%
2.5%
3.4%
3.1%
3.6%
3.6%
3.4%
4.5%
5.1%
3.7%
5.2%
2.2%
2.0%
2.0%
2.3%
2.6%
2.2%
2.9%
3.0%
3.5%
3.5%
4.0%
3.6%
4.3%
4.3%
3.9%
4.9%
4.6%
4.1%
5.4%
2.5%
2.5%
2.2%
2.4%
2.4%
1.7%
1.8%
2.0%
2.1%
1.7%
2.0%
1.9%
2.3%
2.6%
2.7%
3.2%
3.0%
2.4%
3.1%
2.7%
2.5%
2.4%
2.6%
2.6%
1.9%
2.4%
2.4%
2.7%
2.3%
3.0%
2.5%
2.9%
2.9%
2.7%
3.2%
3.4%
2.9%
4.1%
2.0%
2.1%
2.0%
2.1%
2.5%
1.7%
2.0%
2.2%
2.7%
2.3%
2.6%
2.4%
3.1%
3.6%
3.2%
4.3%
4.0%
2.9%
4.2%
3.2%
3.0%
2.9%
3.2%
2.6%
2.1%
2.5%
3.1%
2.9%
3.0%
3.6%
3.5%
5.4%
5.1%
4.4%
5.3%
5.1%
4.0%
4.7%
2.0%
1.8%
1.8%
2.0%
2.1%
1.7%
1.9%
2.9%
2.8%
2.3%
2.7%
2.6%
2.7%
2.8%
2.1%
3.6%
4.1%
2.7%
3.3%

Beds & Herts

East London
Essex
Kent
North London
South London
West London

Jul-11 Aug-11 Sep-11 Oct-11 Nov-11 Dec-11 Jan-12 Feb-12 Mar-12 Apr-12 May-12 Jun-12 Jul-12 Aug-12 Sep-12 Oct-12 Nov-12 Dec-12 Jan-13
3.5%
3.4%
3.1%
3.1%
3.2%
3.4%
3.7%
4.0%
3.9%
3.7%
3.7%
2.4%
4.0%
3.6%
3.8%
4.5%
4.7%
3.1%
3.4%
2.0%
1.8%
1.8%
2.3%
2.6%
2.2%
2.5%
2.7%
3.9%
4.8%
5.3%
4.9%
4.4%
4.0%
4.0%
5.5%
4.7%
4.9%
7.0%
2.0%
1.5%
1.6%
1.7%
1.6%
1.4%
1.9%
1.7%
2.9%
3.0%
4.3%
4.1%
5.5%
5.4%
4.5%
5.1%
5.7%
4.6%
6.3%
1.5%
1.5%
1.5%
1.9%
3.4%
2.9%
3.9%
3.6%
3.5%
3.1%
3.9%
3.6%
4.3%
5.2%
4.6%
7.1%
6.5%
5.5%
8.0%
2.1%
1.7%
1.8%
2.0%
1.9%
1.6%
2.2%
2.5%
3.1%
3.1%
3.4%
2.6%
3.4%
3.5%
3.0%
3.6%
3.3%
3.5%
3.9%
1.7%
1.7%
1.8%
1.7%
1.9%
1.6%
2.6%
2.6%
2.8%
2.7%
3.4%
3.4%
4.3%
4.3%
4.2%
5.0%
4.5%
4.2%
5.2%
3.0%
2.4%
2.5%
3.3%
4.1%
2.8%
4.3%
4.0%
4.5%
3.9%
4.2%
3.4%
4.2%
4.5%
3.3%
3.8%
3.4%
2.8%
3.5%

Conditionality Adverse Decisions (previously SBR) as a % of total Decisions

National Total
Central England
LHC
NE England
NW England
Scotland
Southern England
Wales

Jul-11
69.8%
72.9%
76.8%
70.9%
71.2%
52.8%
62.3%
73.4%

Aug-11
71.9%
73.8%
78.0%
72.6%
74.0%
56.6%
65.7%
78.5%

Sep-11
72.8%
73.7%
80.9%
74.4%
73.1%
54.9%
68.5%
77.2%

Oct-11
71.2%
74.4%
78.8%
73.6%
72.4%
57.3%
59.4%
77.3%

Nov-11
72.7%
77.7%
80.8%
72.2%
71.4%
57.6%
59.2%
76.7%

Dec-11
71.9%
75.8%
80.0%
71.8%
72.1%
57.6%
58.2%
77.1%

Jan-12
76.5%
78.2%
84.6%
77.4%
73.9%
68.5%
64.1%
80.4%

Feb-12
74.8%
75.9%
83.7%
75.2%
75.4%
71.6%
57.9%
79.0%

Mar-12
74.7%
74.7%
82.6%
74.4%
74.4%
73.5%
60.8%
77.2%

Apr-12
76.0%
74.4%
84.1%
77.8%
75.0%
77.1%
58.9%
78.3%

May-12
76.8%
75.6%
84.0%
76.3%
77.2%
77.6%
63.5%
75.6%

Jun-12
78.5%
77.5%
83.4%
83.0%
77.4%
79.6%
65.4%
83.4%

Jul-12
77.0%
77.1%
85.7%
82.3%
76.2%
75.0%
59.7%
86.5%

Aug-12
74.7%
75.0%
82.3%
79.7%
76.3%
77.2%
57.0%
82.7%

Sep-12
76.8%
75.4%
84.0%
81.2%
74.9%
80.1%
62.7%
83.1%

Oct-12
76.7%
74.4%
83.0%
80.7%
75.8%
73.0%
66.9%
85.2%

Nov-12
77.4%
77.8%
82.9%
81.2%
73.0%
77.0%
64.6%
84.7%

Dec-12
80.7%
80.4%
85.2%
84.6%
73.5%
81.6%
75.1%
82.3%

Jan-13
83.1%
82.8%
87.5%
86.1%
77.4%
84.1%
77.2%
84.4%

Beds & Herts

East London
Essex
Kent
North London
South London
West London

Jul-11
70.2%
80.0%
63.8%
76.3%
80.2%
76.8%
82.6%

Aug-11
75.0%
81.1%
68.9%
73.7%
77.3%
81.4%
81.5%

Sep-11
75.0%
81.2%
78.2%
80.0%
80.6%
85.8%
82.7%

Oct-11
77.9%
82.5%
78.4%
78.3%
74.9%
78.6%
78.8%

Nov-11
81.4%
82.6%
78.8%
83.9%
78.8%
81.5%
78.5%

Dec-11
84.3%
82.0%
70.2%
80.7%
81.4%
80.7%
76.3%

Jan-12
81.6%
86.4%
82.2%
81.2%
86.1%
86.1%
85.6%

Feb-12
86.7%
86.3%
68.7%
81.8%
84.9%
82.4%
85.8%

Mar-12
85.4%
87.1%
76.1%
81.4%
82.0%
81.8%
80.8%

Apr-12
88.9%
87.7%
72.6%
82.3%
85.2%
84.4%
82.4%

May-12
88.9%
87.8%
74.5%
82.6%
84.7%
84.6%
82.0%

Jun-12
89.3%
86.9%
73.6%
82.0%
82.5%
86.4%
81.6%

Jul-12
88.5%
87.5%
79.2%
81.4%
86.0%
87.7%
87.0%

Aug-12
84.1%
84.4%
73.7%
76.8%
86.1%
85.8%
84.4%

Sep-12
90.0%
87.4%
71.4%
76.8%
86.8%
88.3%
84.3%

Oct-12
88.2%
86.0%
73.0%
78.0%
82.2%
87.2%
82.6%

Nov-12
87.7%
87.9%
74.3%
77.3%
83.5%
85.4%
82.0%

Dec-12
88.0%
89.3%
77.2%
84.5%
84.1%
87.7%
79.1%

Jan-13
92.7%
90.2%
80.1%
87.1%
85.1%
90.0%
85.9%

Beds & Herts. sites range from 1.6% in Hertford to 6.9% in Luton
East London ranges from 2.6% in Walthamstow to 10.8% in Canning
Town
Essex sites range from 1.7% in Witham to 12.0% in Rayleigh
Kent sites range from 2.8% in Herne Bay (inc Whit) to 7.7% in
Gravesend
North London sites range from 1.4% in both Edmonton and
Westminster to 5.5% in Hendon
South London sites range from 2.6% in Purley to 6.2% in Croydon
West London sites range from 1.6% in Kingston to 5.8% in Harrow.

3.6 Two mistakes were made in Walthamstow. The language, tone and
contents of the e-mail were simply wrong and an inappropriate communication
channel was used. The particular reference to a local DMA target of 5% was
neither necessary nor accurate and appropriate. Concerns about Advisers
performance should have been picked up with them individually in a face to
face conversation rather than through a group e-mail to the whole team. Our
wider review of the evidence suggests a limited number of other locations
where errors of this type were also made. These were dealt with when
brought to light.
3.7 Cultural change does not happen overnight and eradicating the legacy
target-culture in JCP built up over decades is not easy. Targets, including for
sanctions and conditionality, were administered in JCP for many years, and
we have been trying to change that pervasive culture by reducing the number
of targets to a minimum.
3.8 Given this legacy of targets, I do not think anyone should be surprised that
there are, and will from time to time for a while yet, be isolated examples of
the kind highlighted in the Guardian report. That shouldnt be taken as a sign
of complacency or resignation that this cant be changed but a recognition that

an organisation of 40,000 people with a long history of targets isnt going to

change uniformly and at an even pace.
3.9 One issue raised subsequently in the Guardian and from the PCS is the
use of Personal Improvement Plans (PIPs) for individual advisers.
PIPs
seeking the proper applications of sanctions and conditionality are allowed
and are being applied as per the guidance, and follow coaching, support and
L&D.
3.10 PCS have presented me with a small handful of examples of objectives
or PIPs which contain metrics and they have all been investigated. I have
been clear, most notably in my letter of 22 March (ironically also leaked to the
Guardian), no metrics can be used in PIPs for conditionality and sanctions
and my District Managers have confirmed they understand that direction.
There is an important difference though in setting an individual target, which is
not acceptable and giving an individual an idea about what might be expected
in their local labour market and for their size of caseload as an aid to judging
whether the law is being properly applied. PIPs that make these references
will be appropriate and do not constitute a local target or benchmark. That is
a subtle difference that I suspect some advisers and some Managers may
struggle with.
3.11 There is no doubt that applying conditionality and sanctions is not easy.
And there will be some advisers who do not want to or do not see the merit of
their application. The PCS has a long history of opposing sanctions as a point
of principle and regularly campaign on this issue. For civil servants though
the application of the law cannot be a matter of pick n mix with regard to the
bits that are easiest to deal with. So, where appropriate, Managers must take
action to deal with failures of that sort or find ourselves not administering the
law as intended by Parliament.
3.12 We have been accused of having league tables to drive activity. I found
no evidence of national league tables in operation, nor is there a regional one
for London. As I told the Public Accounts Committee when I gave evidence
on 11 March 2013 1 we do keep management information. This is widely
available internally (indeed it was in turn leaked to the Guardian on 28 March).
It would be technically possible to configure this into a league table (a simple
manipulation of excel) but as the leak showed it is not in a league table
format.
3.13 I explained, and my managers have subsequently confirmed, the
information is used to look for outliers and explain to sites where we have
doubts about whether sanctions and conditionality are being properly applied.
3.14 One unintended consequence of the publicity about these issues has
been to raise some additional health and safety questions in jobcentres. The
application of sanctions and conditionality already generates a significant
number of incidents and there is a strong likelihood that this media attention
and comment in Parliament will serve to exacerbate these risks. I will monitor
the situation closely and, if the volume of incidents increase, will consider
what additional steps we can take to make our offices as safe as possible.
1

see uncorrected evidence answer to Question 86 and following exchanges

Conclusions and Recommendations

4.1 We found no evidence of a secret national regime of targets or
widespread secret imposition of local regimes to that effect. There is no
national use of league tables. We found no evidence people are being
wrongly sanctioned as a consequence. Indeed the accusation itself is
founded on a misapprehension that advisers in jobcentres sanction people.
As this report explained earlier advisers merely raise a doubt about
conditionality. Independent Decision-Makers make the sanction decision and
claimants have a right to an independent appeal with Her Majestys Courts
and Tribunal Service if they are unhappy with the decision.
4.2 After an extensive trawl through of the material provided to us or leaked to
the press we have found a limited number of instances where a local manager
has misinterpreted the instructions or has fallen back on target methodology
in an effort to exercise their responsibilities to ensure the law is being properly
applied. I believe that is happening because the cultural change underpinning
the move away from a target-based approach to sanctions and conditionality
is incomplete. We need to be vigilant and consistent to ensure junior
managers continue to move away from legacy habits as we focus on building
the freedom and flexibility approach. We are using these incidents and the
recent press coverage to redouble our efforts. For the individual Managers
concerned we are supporting them in tackling these issues with coaching and
guidance. Where, despite these efforts, managers fall short of the standard
required, disciplinary action will be considered.
4.3 The removal of the targets in 2011 was received by a minority of our
advisers who dont like applying sanctions as a sign that they no longer
needed to apply sanctions. (That in itself is a sign of how deeply the targetregime has become ingrained. If there isnt a target; it cant be required was
the logic used). Indeed a small minority of our advisers are not yet convinced
of the merits of applying sanctions and conditionality. That is not acceptable;
civil servants cannot adopt a pick n mix attitude to applying the rules.
Sanctions, where appropriate, should be applied and are not a matter for
individual discretion. So we will continue to work with them and their trade
union representatives to help them understand that sanctions and
conditionality are an important way we can help people back to work. Where
PIPs prove necessary they should not contain numerical values to be hit but
may contain a reference to what level might on average be expected. PIPs
should be very clear about the consequences of an individual not fulfilling their
personal responsibilities as a civil servant to administer the system in full.
4.5 There is more work for all of us to do in explaining externally the case for
sanctions and conditionality. Whilst we know the public as a whole is strongly
behind the reforms, there are those who remain to be convinced. Some of
those commenting have not been to see a jobcentre work for a number of
years. So we intend to renew our invitation to MPs to come and see us, and
shadow advisers as they carry out this difficult task, to improve their
understanding and allay any remaining fears.

4.6 Whilst there is already a regular National Statistics publication of data

there is a time-lag in the series to allow for validation. Additionally this
publication does not break down the data to site level. But given the level of
public interest we should seek to publish in the next available statistical
release in May a breakdown to Jobcentre level. Not only will this respond to
the high level of interest from the public generated by the press stories but will
minimise the costs of Freedom of Information requests and Parliamentary
Questions.
4.7 Given the public interest in this issue I recommend we publish in full this
report at the earliest opportunity. We should share copies with Liam Byrne,
Stephen Timms, Stella Creasy and the Chairs of the Work and Pensions and
Public Accounts Committees.

10

ANNEXES TO THE REPORT

Annex A DM Letter to East London District
Annex B Copy of leaked e-mail
Annex C Investigation into specific allegations

11

Annex A
East London District Manager
@JCP EastLondonDM

To: East London Managers

14 August 2012

Dear colleagues
Personal Improvement Plans (PIPs) and DMA Targets
Background
At the recent TU informal, our TU colleagues raised the subject of DMA targets
and the appropriateness of Personal Improvement Plans (PIPs) in relation to
achieving DMA targets. Following much discussion, where I restated the East
London position, I agreed to write out to all managers to ensure we all have a
clear understanding of the current position and we are applying it consistently
across the District.
DMA SBR activity
You will all be aware of our Race for Jobs campaign, launched in January across
the whole of LHC. One key element of the campaign includes ensuring our
advisers are consistently applying the JSA conditionality regime. We deal with
every case fairly on its own merits. Referrals for sanctions are all subject to
independent decision-making, reconsideration and a formal appeal process.
Im sure you all understand DMA is not a numbers game and that, as of April
2011, there have been no targets for you or your staff to meet. Simply put: as
managers, you need to be assured that advisers are making the right judgments
about whether a doubt arises or referral for sanction is appropriate, and that
these judgments are being applied equally and fairly and in line with the
legislation.
Our welfare system is based on a clear two-way contract. We will do everything
we can to help people find work but equally we expect customers to be doing
everything they can to find work as well. The sanctions regime is only to be used
when people are failing to live up to their responsibilities and will be applied with
discretion and commonsense. For example, it is unacceptable for customers to
regularly fail to attend provision we have sent them to, unless there are very
exceptional circumstances.
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Use of PIPs
I would ask you to make clear to all of your people that the absence of a target
does not mean that this area of our responsibilities is unimportant. Every office
and every adviser should be ensuring that we fulfil the legislation where
claimants do not meet their agreed responsibilities in their JSAg or dont
undertake mandatory activity. We know that, at times, this means engaging in
some difficult conversations with customers.
Where you are not getting the assurance that action is being taken equally and
fairly, for example where levels of referral for DMA are below national or local
averages, it is a legitimate discussion to have with staff to question why this is. If
offices or advisers are wilfully choosing not to enact that legislation or are failing
their customers by not making sure they attend mandatory provision designed to
improve their prospects of finding work, then it may be appropriate for a PIP plan
to be agreed and monitored. This is in line with DWP policy.
I appreciate that it is not always an easy discussion with the customer but it is
important to remember that we have a role in ensuring fairness for the tax payer
by ensuring people are fulfilling their obligations for the receipt of benefit. And
ultimately, fulfilling their JSAg or attending our mandatory provision does help
our customers better prepare themselves for the world of work, and in the long
run will help them and their families be better off.
Summary
I hope that this letter sets out clearly the position regarding DMA targets and
supports you in the discussions you may have with your staff. If you are still
unclear about any aspect of this note, please get in touch with me, or your
respective DOM, if you would like to have a conversation about this wed be
happy to talk it through.

Best regards
East London District Manager

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Annex B
Sent: 06 February 2013 16:13
Subject: DMA - SBR

Dear All,
SBR raises its ugly head again!
I attach the latest SBR figures. As you can see, Walthamstow are 95th in the
league table - out of only 109.
Obviously our District Manager is not pleased; James Corbett is not pleased
and neither is John. Because John is under pressure to improve our (Office)
output and move up the league he has to apply some pressure downwards that's us ATM's.
So, the bottom lineI have until the 15th Feb - along with the other ATM's to
show an improvement. Then its a PIP for me. Obviously if I am on a PIP to
improve my Team's SBR referral rate I will not have a choice but to consider
implementing PIPs for those individuals who are clearly not delivering SBR
within the Team.
The fact we are delivering in other areas will not stand up as an excuse for not
delivering in this area of work as SBR is a separate measure of achievement
from Off Flow for the Office.
I refer you back to my e-mail from last week about the process for
implementing a PIP and remind you that initially a PIP is not a formal action
but a plan to highlight where improvements can be made and what action
needs to be taken to support those.
John is looking for about 25 referrals per week.
We made 6 last week and so far this week have made 4. There is a shortfall
here!
We talked about this yesterday and I really don't want to do this to death
butit is the only area we need to make a significant improvement in as a
Team and as an Office. You should consider every doubt - if you are unsure
then please conference with me.
ASE - do not accept the same jobsearch every week
do not accept "I dropped off my CV" to shops like ASDA or Sainsbury's
- they need to download! Ask for proof of registration to
websites and
agencies. Ask customers to show you what websites they use and bring them
up on screen.
do not accept the same old excuses from people who we have worked
with or given FSF to help remove barriers.

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what are speakers of other languages doing to find work within their
community - who is helping them, are we asking them to
bring in an
interpreter or using the big word?
Avail and Restricted Avail - listen for tell-tale phrases - "I pick up the kids", "I
look after my neighbours children/my grandchildren" or just "I am busy" all of
which suggest that the customer may not be fully available for work. Even
cases where a parent shares custody can be considered if the arrangement is
informal - not that I am suggesting you go there but you need to consider
each case individually.
Is the customer placing restrictions on their availability - wants retail but can't
work on Saturday or cant consider working in the west end or travelling to
Stratford to work at Westfield? Are they studying and not willing to give up the
course? Are they available for every day of the week - "I can't work on
Monday's as I like to do my shopping and visit my Mum".
If someone FTA's you must consider their availability as well as the FTA. They
are always late - is there an availability issue? Are they working as wellFRF
action may also be required. For example, "I was late because I had to take
the dog to the vet"; I didn't come in yesterday because my husband was ill"; "I
can't come in on Saturday because my girlfriend is visiting me" - these are all
availability doubts and should be raised. If someone is going away from home
but is not willing to return to take up employment - availability; not willing to
leave details of how they can be contacted should a job become available availability; not looking for work whilst away - possible availability or ASE or
both!!!!
RE - "I don't want to work in Stratford so I am not applying for that job"; I don't
want to work in that Garage, I don't like the people there"! These are cases of
RE. As are cases where the customer is trained and qualified for a particular
job but refuses to consider or apply for a job in that field because of where the
job is; the journey; the pay etc.
An easy win is a JSD. Set one, if the customer does not comply then action
the direction!
Guys, we really need to up the game here. The 5% target is one thing, the
fact we are seeing over 300 people a week and only submitting 6 of them for
possible doubts is simply not quite credible.
Happy to discuss.

15

Annex C
PCS Allegations of Sanctions Targets
Summary
In reviewing the evidence provided by PCS, individual colleagues from within
the Directorate and the Guardian I have found no evidence to suggest that
there is a systemic target regime being delivered throughout Work Services or
indeed within any District. Some of these examples do not provide any
evidence of wrong doing on our part, whereas others are historical examples
which have already been addressed. There are however a small number of
examples of where targets have been set by individual managers with local
office colleagues and where this is the case, steps have now been taken to
ensure that this is rectified.
The evidence suggests that these examples represent a failure on the part of
individuals to correctly apply our policy with regard to ensuring that
conditionality is applied appropriately and not symptomatic of a wider target
regime.
Findings
1. My examination of each case is set out below in the order in which PCS
presented them:
1.1 Example one was a zip file of the national management information (MI)
scorecards produced by our performance reporting teams. This lists the
sanction rates against several benefits and regimes down to District level. An
example of which was also leaked to the Guardian. These reports are sorted
geographically and are not ranked nor do they state any target, overtly or
implied. As such I do not believe that our keeping this data or the way it is
presented constitutes a league table or targets and is rather in keeping with
my explanation of our MI to the PAC. I have taken no further action on this
example.
1.2 Example two is a copy of minutes from a local communication and
performance meeting held in an office in Thames Valley in which minimum
expected levels are listed for sanctions referrals. This was also detailed by the
Guardian. This contravenes our policy however the minutes were raised
locally by PCS on 23 January 2013 and a response was issued on 12
February reaffirming the correct position and describing action taken to
correct the situation. Upon reviewing the evidence, I feel that this was an error
in communication by local managers which has now been resolved.
Furthermore this case illustrates the ongoing benefit of good local TU
relations in highlighting and resolving these issues quickly.
1.3 Example three is a photograph taken of a poster in a Derbyshire site
which states numerically a minimum level of referrals which the office should
be looking to make. This was also detailed by the Guardian. Upon
investigation, this chart was intended by local management to ensure
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consistency both across their Adviser teams and with other sites with similar
labour markets. The poster was removed in January 2013. There is no
evidence of any formal target setting here but there was clearly an
expectation set based on numerical averages which is against policy. Again,
this issue was raised locally by PCS and resolved at the time. Local
management have been reminded of the sensitivities herein and how to
correctly ensure that conditionality is applied appropriately.
1.4 Example four is a copy of the Malvern Newsletter which was also passed
to the Guardian. The newsletter makes reference to the site being one of the
worst performing sites in the District and that should this not improve, special
measures may be invoked. PCS have drawn particular reference to a
statement that colleagues may be put on Performance Improvement Plans
(PIPs). Upon investigation, this newsletter was compiled by a nonmanagement colleague following a verbal discussion with the office manager.
The office manager is clear that no targets are, nor have been, in place and
that this discussion centred on ensuring colleagues were applying sanctions
correctly and wherever appropriate. The interpretation by the colleague writing
this newsletter suggests that, though no targets were set, pressure to improve
referral rates was inferred. As such the communication explaining this could
have been better. Local management have been reminded of how to correctly
ensure that conditionality is applied appropriately.
1.5 Example five is an account from a local PCS Representative of how
sanctions activity is being driven in a Birmingham Jobcentre. The account
claims that an expectation of referring 8.7% of the sites live load was given to
Advisers but also states that when challenged on this by PCS that
management have reiterated that there are no DMA targets. This account is
itself third hand conjecture and I have not been able to secure any further
evidence to confirm it. The District management team maintain that no targets
are in place but to ensure compliance, again, local management have been
reminded of how to correctly ensure that conditionality is applied
appropriately.
There is a second issue with this example where the account states that a
manager issuing PIPs has been pressured to do so by her own line manager.
There is no reference to targets being mentioned. Without specific details of
the colleagues in question it is not possible to ascertain exactly what has
transpired however it is right and in keeping with DWP policy that
countersigning officers should have a view on the performance of colleagues
within their line management chain. Where continued poor performance is
identified and is not being tackled by a manger, it is again right that their
manager should in turn tackle them on what is a failure to carry out their own
obligations.
1.6 Example six is an account from a local PCS representative of two PIPs
issued in July 2012 in East London. The account claims that numerical figures
were set for improvement action in line with the office profile. There are two
separate issues here, the imposition of numerical improvement targets, which
was also reported in the Guardian, and the mention of an office profile. Of the
former, there has been much debate over the issue of numerical targets on

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PIPs and at the time of this account the policy on this issue was not clear.
There was an argument that to evidence clear improvement which would
stand up to external scrutiny (at employment tribunal for example), typical
volumes for the site/team should be applied. We have since amended this
with a clear steer that numerical values should not be included in PIPs to
avoid the potential for encouraging perverse behaviour. This example then
does highlight a historical issue however steps have already been taken to
resolve this.
On the latter issue, no evidence has been found to suggest that Dagenham
was operating a target regime. The office profile referred to was an example
figure which local managers came to by comparing site sanction rates against
historic performance. As part of the extensive work which East London District
are taking forward in light of the wider sanctions issue, all managers at
Dagenham have been reminded of how to correctly ensure conditionality is
applied appropriately.
1.7 Example seven consists of excerpts from three e-mails sent by local office
managers in Cumbria and Lancashire District in May 2012, the case was one
of those raised by PCS with Ruth Owen last year. These e-mails do refer to
benchmarks being applied but are also specific in that referrals should only be
made where appropriate. Indeed the covering letter from the colleague raising
these concerns is explicit in that targets have not been set. The content of the
e-mails, in part, does not reflect the current policy and is therefore
unacceptable however the matter was raised locally by PCS in May 2012 and
corrective action was taken by the District Manager at the time. I have found
no evidence to suggest that this issue persists and have taken no further
action.
1.8 Example eight consists of copies of PIPs issued to two colleagues for not
applying conditionality appropriately; and copies of letters inviting them to
formal performance management meetings. PCS have stated many times that
they feel our applying PIPs is evidence of target setting however I found
nothing in the content of this PIP which could be construed as such. No
targets were set or minimum expectation referenced; only that the colleagues
referral rate was low and that they are expected to test conditionality at every
interview. The invitation letters were in keeping with DWP policy and do not
mention sanction referral rates, only work performance. As such this example
does not support the assertion that it constitutes a target.
1.9 Example nine is of an account given by a colleague of how he came to be
issued with a PIP and a copy of this. The account suggests that inappropriate
explanations were given for why this colleague was placed on a PIP and that
it was more to match volumes of PIPs issued in other Districts. I have asked
the District manager to take this up with the manager concerned. This is a
separate capability issue though. The District has provided assurance that this
is not a policy they endorse and nothing in the account suggests that targets
are in place.
In reviewing the detail of the PIP, no numerical improvement target has been
set or implied. The PIP does state that current activity is zero referrals made
for the last month but this is an objective review of what has previously been

18

delivered and although it could be better put, it is not indicative of a target

regime.
1.10 Example 10 is an excerpt from an e-mail sent by a cluster manager in
which flight-paths and targets are mentioned. This was also detailed by the
Guardian. The detail and tone of the e-mail clearly contravenes our policy.
This has been raised with the District Manager who agrees that the wording of
the e-mail was inappropriate and has taken action with the individual to
remedy this. He has also reminded the wider District management team of
how the policy should be managed. He is clear though, that this was the
interpretation of how to ensure appropriate conditionality testing by an
individual manager and that there are no District imposed targets for sanction
referrals.
1.11 Example 11 consists of copies of three PIPs which were issued to
colleagues in February and March 2012. Though these PIPs seek to secure
general performance improvements, they do include specific targets for DMA
activity. The details of the colleagues concerned have been omitted in the
evidence provided to us and without them it is not possible to track down the
offices and investigate further however these PIPs again pre-date our clear
steer on removing these figures from such agreements. Of greater concern is
that these volumes have been arrived at by breaking down a percentage of
live load which could suggest that a typical referral rate is being used as an
expectation.
1.12 Example 12 is a copy of a letter issued by the Derbyshire District
Manager to his staff. PCS have highlighted that it references PIPs being used
to address performance issues. The letter concerns a drive within Derbyshire
to improve their performance in moving claimants in to work. At no point is
DMA mentioned in the letter and so it does not support the assertion that
there are targets being applied for sanctions referrals.
1.13 Example 13 is an e-mail from an Employer and Partnership Manager
which states that from 14.01.13, anyone {claimant} claiming to have found no
jobs when job searching should be referred for ASE. This does not reflect
current policy and is wrong. Though this is an inappropriate steer for
colleagues in making referrals it does not in itself constitute the setting of
targets, nor have I found any evidence to suggest that this steer was
implemented simply to increase referral rates. The matter has been raised
with the District and the colleague reminded of correct protocol.
2. In addition to the evidence provided by PCS we have also received other
examples direct from colleagues within the Directorate where they have
concerns about how Adviser obligations on conditionality are enforced.
2.1 We received evidence that targets were in place at a Jobcentre in the
North West. Upon investigation it transpired that the site manager had agreed
upon a 6% referral target in colleagues Key Work Objectives (KWOs) for the
2012/13 performance year. This matter has been raised with the manager
concerned as well as the District management team who took steps to

19

remove these targets immediately as well as reiterate the correct protocol for
managing the application of conditionality. No evidence has been found to
suggest that this issue extends beyond this one site.
2.2 Two colleagues from a site in East London wrote to me suggesting that
numerical expectations were in place for sanction referrals. This site was
covered by the investigation which London and the Home Counties carried
out and I also visited this site personally. Though no evidence of target setting
was uncovered by either event, managers on site have been reminded of the
need to correctly communicate their appropriate challenge of colleagues
application of conditionality.
3. Finally there was one further allegation made by the Guardian of sites
opening on weekends to apply botherability to claimants. In investigating this
allegation it came to pass that the incidents in question were in
Gloucestershire, West of England District. Neither reference to botherability
nor anything which might imply it has been found. The weekend opening was
authorised by the District Manager to increase the time available to Advisers
in delivering a wide range of services to claimants in helping them to find
employment and was necessary to manage seasonal peak workloads.

May 2013

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