EAST ASIAN REVIEW

Vol.12, No.4, Winter 2000, pp. 3-36

The Sunshine Policy and the Korean Summit:

Assessments and Prospects

Moon Chung-in

INTRODUCTION

he Korean peninsula has long been considered the last relic of the
Cold War era where protracted military tension has outweighed
prospects for peace and stability. Defying the global trend of progress
toward post-Cold War order, both Koreas have engaged in a vicious
circle of suspicion, distrust, and mutual negation, often flaring up in
military clashes. As recently as June 1999, a perilous naval clash
heightened the potential for a major escalation. Indeed, peace has
been distant, while conflict has remained close by. Perpetual
insecurity and fear of war have haunted the Korean people.
A major breakthrough came in June 2000 in the wake of the
Korean summit, which was held in Pyongyang. Technically
speaking, North and South Korea are in a state of war, so it would be
virtually unthinkable for the South Korean leader to pay a visit to the
heart of enemy territory. In fact, the South Korea military was placed
The original version of this paper was presented at the Korea Symposium and
Workshop of the Rafto Foundation, Bergen, Norway, November 2-3, 2000.
East Asian Review, 12(4), Winter 2000, pp.3-36
2000 by The Institute for East Asian Studies
Published by the IEAS, 508-143 Jungrung 2-Dong Songbuk-Ku Seoul 136-851 KOREA

EAST ASIAN REVIEW WINTER 2000

under the highest state of alert during President Kim Dae-jungs

visit to Pyongyang. At the first historic North-South Korean summit,
President Kim and Chairman Kim Jong-il produced the June 15 Joint
Declaration which will serve as the basic document guiding peaceful
co-existence and national unification on the Korean peninsula.
No doubt, the summit meeting and the June 15 Joint
Declaration are a product partly of the Kim Dae-jung
governments sunshine policy. Were it not for the patient and
consistent pursuit of the sunshine policy, such new
developments would be quite inconceivable. The sunshine policy
has aimed at paving the way to peaceful co-existence and
national unification through the dismantling of the Cold War
structure that has dictated the geopolitical fate of the Korean
peninsula since the end of the second world war. Although
actual implementation is yet to be seen, the summit meeting
represents a decisive moment in the extrication of the Korean
peninsula from the trap of the Cold War and the start of the
process toward a new peace system.
Against this backdrop, the article is designed to not only
understand the evolutionary dynamics of the sunshine policy, but
also look into the summit meeting and its impacts. The first section reexamines the evolving nature of the sunshine policy and its
ramifications, while the second looks into ideals and practices of the
sunshine policy since its inception. Third, the article presents a
comprehensive analysis of the summit meeting and the June 15
Declaration. Finally, the prospects for inter-Korean relations in the
post-summit period are being explored.

THE KIM DAE-JUNG GOVERNMENT AND THE SUNSHINE POLICY:

A RE-EXAMINATION1)

The Korean summit was truly unexpected. Despite its pledge to

THE SUNSHINE POLICY AND THE SUMMIT

resume official talks with North Korea following its inauguration,

the Kim Dae-jung government had failed to deliver. Up until six
months ago, even vice ministerial-level talks did not go well. Judged
on this, the summit talk was an extraordinary development. While
several factors contributed to the making of this historic event, it can
be seemed as a product of sunshine policy.2) The sunshine policy is
not an instant policy initiative, but dates back to as early as 1997. On
September 30, 1994, Kim Dae-jung, who was then a defeated
presidential candidate, delivered an interesting speech at the
Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C. While highly praising
Jimmy Carters visit to Pyongyang and the subsequent defusing of
the Norths nuclear crisis through negotiations with Kim Il-sung,
Kim noted that America must patiently adhere to the sunshine
policy which had proved to be the only effective way to deal with
isolated countries such as North Korea. 3) Citing a well-known
Aesops fable about wind and sunshine, Kim argued that sunshine
1) This section draws partly from Moon Chung-in, Understanding DJ Doctrine: The
Sunshine Policy and the Korean Peninsula, in Moon Chung-in and David
Steinberg (ed.), Kim Dae-jung Government and Sunshine Policy (Seoul: Yonsei
University Press, 1999), pp. 36-40.
2) The term engagement (poyong) fails to reflect the comprehensive picture of
Kim s North Korean policy, since poyong literally refers to accommodation or
embracement, not engagement. The term sunshine comprises broader semantic
implications such as engagement, embracement, and even harsh punishment. It
was also relabeled the DJ doctrine elsewhere. See my chapter in Moon and
Steinberg (eds.), op. cit., Nevertheless, in this article, terms sunshine policy and
terms engagement policy are used interchangeably. For an overview of the
sunshine policy, see Moon Chung-in and David Steinberg (eds.), The Kim Daejung Government and Sunshine Policy: Promises and Challenges (Seoul and
Washington, D.C.: Yonsei University Press and Georgetown University, 1999);
The Society for Northeast Asian Peace Studies (ed.), The Sunshine Policy (Seoul:
Millennium Books, 1999).
3) Kim Dae-jung Dont Take the Sunshine Away in Korea and Asia: A Collection of
Essays, Speeches, and Discussions (Seoul: The Kim Dae-jung Peace Foundation,
1994), p. 33.

EAST ASIAN REVIEW WINTER 2000

would be more effective than strong wind in inducing North Korea

to come out of isolation and abandon its confrontational stance.
Kim Dae-jung initially used the analogy of sunshine in order to
persuade the American government to pursue a soft-landing policy
in dealing with North Korea. But when he was elected President, the
sunshine policy became the official North Korean policy of the South
Korean government. In a speech delivered at the School of Oriental
and African Studies, London University, on April 4, 1998, Kim
described the sunshine policy as follows: Backed by firm public
support, the Republic is now able to confidently promote a North
Korean policy. I have been steadfast in advocating what I call a
sunshine policy which seeks to lead North Korea down a path
toward peace, reform and openness through reconciliation,
interaction and cooperation with the South. As President, I will carry
out such ideas step by step.4)
The sunshine policy can be seen as a proactive policy to induce
incremental and voluntary changes in North Korea for peace,
opening, and reform through the patient pursuit of reconciliation,
exchanges, and cooperation. In the forthcoming discussion, however,
the sunshine policy goes beyond simple engagement. It comprises
several components such as military deterrence, international
collaboration, and domestic consensus. Nevertheless, its objective is
crystal clear: to lay the foundation for peaceful Korean unification by
breaking the vicious cycle of negative, hostile actions and reactions
through peaceful coexistence and peaceful exchanges and
cooperation.5)
The sunshine policy is based on three fundamental principles as
outlined in President Kims inaugural speech. The first principle is
non-tolerance of military threat or armed provocation by North
Korea. The second is the official abandonment of the idea of
4) Office of the President, The Republic of Korea, Government of the People-Collected
Speeches of President Kim Dae-jung (Seoul: ROK Government, 1999), pp. 63.-64.

THE SUNSHINE POLICY AND THE SUMMIT

unification by absorption and the negation of any other measures to

undermine or threaten North Korea, and the third is the promotion
of exchanges and cooperation through resumption of the 1991
Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and
Cooperation.6)
A close examination of the sunshine policy reveals at least five
major operating principles. The most distinct component is strategic
offensive. The sunshine policy has often been accused of being a fragile
appeasement policy or a policy for the weak. In actuality, however, it is
an extremely offensive and proactive policy. In the past, Seouls policy
on North Korea was mostly reactive, often resulting in inconsistencies,
even incoherence. In fact, it could even be said that policy was dictated
by the North. The Kim Dae-jung government wants to overhaul this
passive and reactive policy by taking its own initiative. It is dedicated to
the pursuit of engagement through exchanges and cooperation despite
North Koreas initial negative responses. Such a policy might sound like
appeasement, but as the analogy of sunshine implies, it is penetrating
and comprehensive. No clouds can perpetually block the penetration of
sunshine since the latter is constant, while the former is temporal. With
a little more patience and endurance, the Kim government believes,
active engagement will eventually thaw the frozen mind of the North
Korean leadership, yielding to peaceful coexistence as well as economic
opening and reforms.
The second operating principle is flexible dualism, which is
predicated on major changes in the sequential order of inter-Korean
5) See Hong Soon-young, The Wing Koreas Cold War: The Path to Peace on the
Korean Peninsula, Foreign Affairs, May June (1999), pp.8-12, which reappeared in
this volume: Lim Dong-won, The Government of People s North Korean
Policy, a speech delivered for senior officials of the Ministry of Unification,
February 9, 1999 (in Korean, mimeo); Ministry of Unification, Policy Towards North
Korea for Peace, Reconciliation and Cooperation (Seoul: The Ministry of Unification,
1999.
6) Government of the People, op. cit., p. 12 and pp. 64-65.

EAST ASIAN REVIEW WINTER 2000

interactions. New terms of engagement with the North under the Kim
government can be summarized as the following (1) Easy tasks first,
and difficult tasks later; (2) Economy first, politics later; (3) Nongovernmental organizations first, government later; (4) Give first,
and take later.7) It represents a profound paradigm shift in managing
inter-Korean relations. Past governments failed to overcome the interKorean stalemate precisely because of their rigid adherence to the
principles of government first, civil society later, political-economic
linkage, and the primacy of mechanical reciprocity. Thus, the
sunshine policy can be characterized as being incremental, pragmatic,
and functionalist in dealing with the North.
The core of flexible dualism can be found in the separation of
politics and economy. Previous governments were preoccupied with the
primacy of politics and its linkage to the economy. However, that
attitude entailed structural barriers to the promotion of inter-Korean
exchanges and cooperation, not only because of the compartmentalized
decision-making structure in the North that separates politics from the
economy, but also because of the negative backlash associated with it.
Temporary improvements in inter-Korean relations through socioeconomic exchanges were instantly wiped out by new political
bottlenecks or by sporadic military provocations by the North,
producing an amplified feedback loop of distrust and hostility. But the
Kim government is attempting to sever the chain of negative reenforcement between the two, pledging itself to the promotion of
economic exchanges and cooperation even if the North engages in
military and political provocation. As a matter of fact, infiltration of
North Korean submarines in the South, resumption of a negative
propaganda campaign by the North, and the naval clash in the West Sea
have not blocked the continued pursuit of economic exchanges and
7) See Lim Dong-won, North Korean Policy under the Kim Dae-jung Government,
speech delivered at a breakfast meeting with the National Reconciliation Council,
March 11, 1999, p. 3.

THE SUNSHINE POLICY AND THE SUMMIT

cooperation. It is this functional flexibility that differentiates the

sunshine policy from the North Korean policy of previous governments.
The third operating principle is the simultaneous pursuit of
engagement and security in which credible military deterrence is
emphasized. This is the most delicate aspect of the sunshine policy. The
Kim Dae-jung government is keenly aware of the acute military threat
from the North and is more than willing to deter it through strengthened
security posture. It believes that an effective engagement policy is
plausible only when South Korea remains strong and is well prepared
for military deterrence. The credible deterrence is based on two concepts.
One is the principle of specific reciprocity. Although North Koreas
armed provocation will not be automatically linked to the suspension of
economic and social exchanges and cooperation, it will not be tolerated
either. Such behavior will be immediately balanced out or reciprocated
through punitive measures in kind. South Koreas forceful retaliation on
North Koreas recent intrusion into the West Sea exemplifies the
implementation of the principle of specific reciprocity. The other is to
secure a position of strength through the continuation of the ROK-U.S.
alliance. The Kim government perceives that ROK-U.S. combined forces
will be sufficient to deter any military aggression from the North.8) In
light of this, the sunshine policy does not presuppose any departure
from the old policy of military deterrence and alliance management.
Instead, there are elements of continuity.
A renewed emphasis on international collaboration constitutes
another important dimension. Although the Korean conflict and
unification should be resolved by and for Koreans themselves, the
Kim government recognizes the importance of international
collaboration with major actors in the region. Maximization of
international collaboration is critical, not only because it can facilitate
conflict management on the Korean peninsula, but also because it
can help North Korea manage to land softly. For the management of
8) See the breakfast speech by Lim Dong-won.

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EAST ASIAN REVIEW WINTER 2000

the Korean conflict, the Kim government has stressed the

continuation of the Four Party Talks. It has also proposed the two
plus four formula and the establishment of a Northeast Asian
security cooperation regime in order to shape a new security
environment conducive to tension reduction as well as peace and
security building on Korean peninsula. For the soft-landing of North
Korea, the Kim government has been calling for two practical steps
to be taken: North Koreas diplomatic normalization with the United
States and Japan on the one hand, and the creation of an
international milieu favorable to North Koreas economic opening
and reform on the other. The second measure could be achieved
through lifting existing sanctions on the North and facilitating North
Korean access to international capital through membership in
multilateral lending institutions (i.e., the IMF, the World Bank, and
the Asia Development Bank) as well as fostering the inflow of
private foreign investments into the North.9)
The final component is the centrality of domestic consensus.
Seouls traditional North Korean policy has been guided by two
implicit operating rationales. One is the clandestine management of
inter-Korean relations and the other is its domestic political
utilization. A breakthrough in inter-Korean relations through Park
Chung-hees July 4, 1972 the South-North Joint Communique, Chun
Doo-hwans near success in achieving a summit meeting with Kim
Il-sung, and Roh Tai-woos Nordpolitik and inter-Korean
rapprochement were all engineered through clandestine operations.
Such high-level maneuvers, charactered by a lack of transparency,
eventually undermined the legitimacy of the previous governments
policy initiatives. Moreover, the inseparable linkage between
domestic politics and inter-Korean relations exacerbates this effect.
As the Northwind scandal aptly illustrates, ruling regimes in the
9) President Kim Dae-jung reaffirmed this position through his interview with CNN.
See Dong-A Ilbo, May 7, 1999.

THE SUNSHINE POLICY AND THE SUMMIT

11

past contrived military tensions with the North during presidential

or general elections, and took advantage of the ensuing insecurity to
win conservative votes.10) Political abuse and misuse of inter-Korean
relations considerably weakened the foundation of domestic
consensus and marginalized its North Korean policy. Himself a
victim of such political maneuvering, President Kim officially
declared his governments intentions not to politicize inter-Korean
relations, but to base North Korean policy solely on transparency
and domestic consensus.
Thus, the sunshine policy reveals both continuity and
discontinuity from previous governments. Emphasis on the
resumption of the Basic Agreement underscores an adherence to old
soft-line policies of the July 4, 1972 the South-North Joint
Communique under Park Chung-hee, the Nordpolitik and the July 7,
1988 Declaration of Roh Tai-woo, and even engagement policy
promoted during the early period of the Kim Young-sam
administration. And as previously stated, the Kim Dae-jung
government has made it clear that it would not compromise national
security in the pursuit of engagement. The top priority is a strong
security posture in the sunshine policy, along with the cardinal
importance of the South Korean-U.S. alliance, both of which express
elements of historical continuity. Yet, there are also pronounced
discontinuities in the sunshine policy. The most salient difference
comes from changes in structural parameters. While previous
policies were bound by the Cold War template of confrontation and
containment, the new policy is predicated the dissolution of that
model in terms of ideology, institution, and the external milieu. There
is also divergence in the operational mode. Kim Dae-jungs policy is
10) The Northwind (bukpung) scandal refers to the South Korea intelligence
agencys covert operations designed to undermine Kim Dae-jungs image by
fabricating reports about his ties with the North. Such operations were allegedly
undertaken in cooperation with North Korean intelligence organizations.

12

EAST ASIAN REVIEW WINTER 2000

much more proactive, offensive, and strategic, while previous

policies were reactive, defensive, and tactical. Its scope is far more
comprehensive than previous policies, favoring unrestrained
interaction with the North. The time frame is also substantively
different. While previous governments had opted for immediate
gains, the Kim Dae-jung government aims at achieving medium- and
long-term gains that require patience and endurance. Finally, the
sunshine policy rejects the instrumental use of inter-Korean relations
for domestic political purposes, in contrast to previous policies that
were mird in domestic political manipulation.

IDEALS AND PRACTICE OF THE SUNSHINE POLICY:

AN INTERIM ASSESSMENT11)

All policies, public or foreign, are instruments for achieving

certain national goals. Ideals of goals, thus, serve as the basic
foundation on which policies are formulated and navigated. What
then are the ideals of the sunshine policy? Five major ones can be
considered.12)
The first ideal is the resolute rejection of war or major military
conflicts on the Korean peninsula. President Kim has repeatedly
argued that nothing can justify war and that it should be prevented
at any cost. Likewise, he has consistently called for the removal of
weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear and bio-chemical.
Such a war can destroy all that has been we have achieved. And
while it might bring about national unification, a link achieved
11) This section draws partly on Between Ideals and Reality: An Interim Assessment
of the Sunshine Policy, Pyonghwa Ronchong, Vol. 4, no.1 (2000), pp. 46-58.
12) These five ideals were compiled from a collection of President Kims speeches. See
office of the President. The Republic of Korea, Government of the People: Selected
Speeches of President Kim Dae-jung, Vol. 1 and 2 (Seoul: ROK Govement, 1999).

THE SUNSHINE POLICY AND THE SUMMIT

13

through violent means is likely to breed hatred as well as the seeds

of another national division. The primacy of peace over war is well
documented in the three principles of peace that were long
championed by President Kim Dae-jung even before he was elected
president. They are peaceful co-existence (peace-building through
the termination of hostile relations, arms reduction, and mutual
surveillance as well as through the establishment of a multilateral
security cooperation regime); peaceful exchange (restoration of
common national identity through political, economic, social,
cultural, and humanitarian interactions and expansion of common
interests through increased economic exchanges); and peaceful
unification (incremental unification and the rejection of unification
by absorption, military power or manipulation).13) The sunshine
policy can be seen as a reflection of these three principles of peace.
Kim is not an idealist, however. While believing in the virtue of
peace, he is equally aware of the vulnerability of peacemaking and
peacekeeping. Emphasis on security emanates from his prudent
understanding that a weak security posture can precipitate an
adversarys hostile action, jeopardizing peace per se. Thus, his
sunshine policy is deeply anchored in the traditional wisdom that
those who wish to achieve peace must prepare for war. It is with this
understanding that the Kim Dae-jung government has undertaken
an engagement policy based on a strong security posture. While it
might sound paradoxical, this paradox is the very essence of the
Korean conflict in which peace and war constantly overlap. North
and South Korea are striving toward national unification, at the same
time perceiving each other as a major enemy. The ambivalent nature
of the Korean problem has led to the adoption of a dualistic policy of
peaceful co-existence and strong security. Likewise, the first ideal of
the sunshine policy can be characterized as a mixture of peace and
13) Kim Dae-jung, The Korean Problem: Nuclear Crisis, Democracy and Reunification
(Seoul: The Kim Dae-jung Peace Foundation, 1994), pp. 223-224.

14

EAST ASIAN REVIEW WINTER 2000

security where peacemaking through engagement and reconciliation

and peacekeeping through strong security and war prevention are
simultaneously pursued.
The second ideal is related to the concept of quasi- or de facto
unification. The sunshine policy assumes that de jure unification
through mutual consensus and national referendum could take much
longer. Cognizant of the reality, the Kim Dae-jung government aims at
creating a de facto or quasi-unification in which exchanges of personnel
as well as goods and services are fully activated, and confidencebuilding and arms control can be materialized. The quasi-unification
thesis is justified by both its feasibility and for immediate humanitarian
concerns. More importantly, de jure unification may not be attainable
without first learning how to co-exist peacefully through exchanges
and cooperation between the two Koreas.14)
However, de facto or quasi-unification should not be interpreted as the perpetual state of national division and peaceful coexistence. As President Kims three-stage approach to unification
demonstrates, it represents only the first stage of unification,
involving a gradual preparation for unification through the
formation of a confederation of republics (or states) in which both
parties retain their sovereignties. Kim hopes that during the first
stage (lasting ten years), the North Korean system would undergo
dramatic changes, both to an open market system and to an
improved political system based on a multi-party system and free
elections. He argues that the first stage of forming a confederation
needs to be approved by the people through a national
referendum. The second stage would involve unification in the
form of a federal system that is composed of one federation and
two local governments. At this stage, both republics would
relinquish their sovereignties, and the newly-formed federation

14) A speech by Lim Dong-won at the Ministry of Unification, op. cit. p. 24.

THE SUNSHINE POLICY AND THE SUMMIT

15

would determine foreign and national defense policy, even

intervening in important domestic affairs. The final stage would be
complete unification based on one nation, one state, and one
government. Kim envisages that the newly-unified Korea will be
founded on the basis of a democracy and an open-market
economy. 15) In sum, the sunshine policy assumes a very much
open-ended and long-term process toward realizing national
unification on the Korean peninsula, distinguishing itself from
previous quick-fix approaches.
The third ideal is an anticipation that his policy of engagement
and accommodation can bring about changes in North Korea and
that its transformation into a normal state can offer decisive
momentum for peaceful co-existence on the Korean peninsula. What
kinds of changes does his policy anticipate? There can be changes on
several levels: people, policy, government, regime, system, and state
sovereignty.16) What the sunshine policy attempts to achieve is rather
modest: changes in policy as well as in popular attitude. As the Basic
Agreement stipulates, the Kim Dae-jung government does not intend
to change or undermine the North Korean government, the Kim
Jong-il regime, the Juche system, or the Democratic Peoples Republic
of Korea. Any attempt to do so would be tantamount to interfering
in the internal matters of North Korea, an outright violation of the
Basic Agreement. The sunshine policy simply presupposes that an
increasing frequency in exchanges and cooperation can
spontaneously foster North Korean reforms, and ultimately,
peaceful co-existence.
This line of reasoning stems from an alternative way of
15) Kim Dae-jung, 1994, op. cit., pp. 224-226.
16) Moon Chung-in and Rhyu Kil-jeh, Regime Changes in North Korea and
Political- Economic Conditions for Economic Cooperation with the North, in
Yoo Han-soo and Lee Young-sun (eds.), Corporate Strategies for North Korean
Ventures (Seoul: Orum, 1997), pp. 33-116.

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understanding North Korea. The sunshine policy does not anticipate

that the Kim Jong-il regime or North Korea will collapse soon. In
fact, it believes that the thesis of imminent collapse of North Korea is
premature and even misleading. Indeed, the German unification, the
dismantling of the Soviet Union and the communist bloc, and the
death of Kim Il-sung did not signal the imminent demise of the
North Korean regime or its state sovereignty. On the contrary,
despite this development, North Korean regime has shown
extraordinary durability. Its intensifying campaign to build
Kangsungdaekuk (strong and prosperous nation) underscores the
fallacy of the imminent collapse thesis par excellence.17) Being keenly
aware of this reality, the Kim Dae-jung government has set up a goal
to change North Korea incrementally. Fostering the collapse of the
North Korean regime and system could backfire, ultimately
undermining peace ad stability on the Korean peninsula. Even
incremental changes can jeopardize regime security in the North. But
equating incremental changes with total collapse seems to be a faulty
reasoning. Depending on the choice of the current leadership,
incremental changes can be either liabilities or assets. Thus, the endgame is entirely up to North Korea.
The fourth ideal is the centrality of South Korea in managing the
Korean problem and the external security environment. The sunshine
policy recognizes the importance of the four major powers
surrounding the Korean peninsula, but refutes the traditional balance
of power determinism. While they might constrain South Koreas
behavior, they cannot dictate its destiny. Although national division
and the Korean conflict are products of Cold War bipolarity, it is the
mandate of Koreans to demolish the trappings of the Cold War and to
bring peace and stability on the Korean peninsula through their own
17) For the most recent work on the collapse thesis, see Nicholas Eberstadt, The End
of North Korea (Washington, D.C.: AEI, 1999); For a survey of opposing views,
see Moon and Rhyu, op. cit., and The Sunshine Policy, op. cit.

THE SUNSHINE POLICY AND THE SUMMIT

17

initiative. The Kim Dae-jung government believes that it can alter the
behavior of the four major powers, including the United States. Such
a belief is most clearly evidenced in Kim Dae-jungs efforts to
dismantle the structure of the Cold War on the basis of five elements:
improvement of inter-Korean relations, normalization of North
Korea-U.S. relations, normalization of North Korea-Japan relations,
encouragement of North Koreas participation in the international
community, prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and acceleration of arms control, and replacement of the
armistice agreement with a South-North Korean peace treaty.18) The
efforts reveal that South Korea is more than willing to play a role as
facilitator or mediator in North Koreas diplomatic normalization
with Japan and the United States and in promoting the inflow of
foreign capital into North Korea.
The dismantling of the Cold War structure is conducive to peace
and stability on the Korean peninsula precisely because it can alter
North Koreas behavior. The sunshine policy assumes that North
Korean behavior can be tamed if proper external incentives are
granted. North Korea slid into its role as an aggressive rogue state
not simply because of the regimes structure and ideology, but also
because of international isolation and containment. Improved
external environment can transform North Korea into a normal state.
Lifting of sanctions and international recognition (e.g., diplomatic
normalization with Japan and the United States) can induce North
Korea to behave as a rational actor as well as a constructive member
of the international community.19) Thus, The sunshine policy aims at
realigning the international environment in such a way as to
18) The Ministry of Unification, Two Years of the Government of the People:
Achievements and Assessments of North Korean Policy, (mimeo), pp. 29-31.
19) See Leon Segal, Disarming Strangers (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996)
and his chapter, Think-tanks and the Development of Options, in Moon and
Steinberg, op. cit., pp. 153-171.

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EAST ASIAN REVIEW WINTER 2000

transform North Korea into a normal state, which is an essential

prerequisite for improved inter-Korean relations and peace on the
Korean peninsula.
Finally, the Kim Dae-jung government is attempting to achieve
domestic consensus and bipartisan political support in the process of
implementing the sunshine policy. It might seem utopian to
anticipate voluntary changes in North Korea, since under a
democratic polity, it is rarely possible to forge bipartisan political
support for foreign or public policies. However, Kim believes that as
far as policy on North Korea and national unification is concerned,
forming domestic consensus and winning bipartisan support is not
impossible. Policies of previous governments failed to win public
support largely because of their domestic political abuse and misuse.
But de-politicization, coupled with appropriate education and
persuasion, may well mitigate domestic opposition, ultimately
leading to national consensus and bipartisan political support.
People will realize that the sunshine policy is the only feasible and
desirable option for dealing with North Korea and that there are no
other alternatives. And if there were any opposition, it would have
to be the result of ignorance and misunderstanding of the sunshine
policy, not of genuine disagreement.20) Thus, the utopian logic of
harmony of interests strongly prevails in the reasoning of the
sunshine policy.
Despite its realistic ideals, the practice of the sunshine policy has
mixed results. The pacifist ideal had been tainted with several
negative developments. For the past two years, there have been no
major breakthroughs in tension reduction, confidence-building
measures, or peace-making. On the contrary, both Koreas were on
the brink of a major escalation in June 1999 in the wake of the naval
clash on the West Sea. Along with this, the sunshine policy was

20) See President Kims August 15, 1999 National Liberation Day speech.

THE SUNSHINE POLICY AND THE SUMMIT

19

greeted by the infiltration of North Korean spy submarines,

Pyongyangs intensified denunciations of the South Korean
government, and the launch of the Daepodong I long-range missile.
Old patterns of military confrontation still remained, undercutting
the performance of the sunshine policy.
The idea of de facto unification fared better. Although interKorean governmental contacts remained minimal, social, economic,
and cultural exchanges proliferated. Since the Hyundai Group
signed the concession agreement on tourist development of Mt.
Kumkang with the North in November 1998, more than 200,000
South Koreans have visited Mt. Kumkang. The engagement policy
has also accelerated inter-Korean personnel exchanges. In the ten
years between 1989 and 1997, 2,408 South Koreans visited North
Korea for economic, social, and personal reasons. But since the
implementation of the sunshine policy, there has been a phenomenal
growth in the number of visitors to the North. In less than two years,
between February 1998 and November 1999, 8,509 South Koreans
visited the North for various purposes. Frequency of reunions of
separated families also rose exponentially, even though the reunions
took place in China. The economic crisis in 1997 slowed economic
exchanges and cooperation. However, as the South Korean economy
began to recover, the volume of inter-Korean trade has risen rapidly.
And as of December 1999, more than 130 South Korean firms had set
up off-shore production sites in the North. Such remarkable progress
in inter-Korean exchanges notwithstanding, however, de facto
unification is far from a reality.
The objective to transform North Korea into a normal state also
saw mixed results. The Kim Dae-jung government worked hard in this
regard. It was not only instrumental in softening Americas hard-line
policy on North Korea by persuading the United States to adopt the
Perry Process, but was also active in facilitating North Koreas
diplomatic normalization with Japan and other countries.21) At the
same time, it strongly advocated North Koreas admission to the

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EAST ASIAN REVIEW WINTER 2000

World Bank, the Asia Development Bank, and the Asian Regional
Forum. Yet despite these efforts, North Koreas unruly behavior
continued. The surprising launch of the Daepodong I missile on
August 31, 1998 alarmed the entire world, heightening its fear of
North Koreas erratic behavior. In addition, continuing suspicion over
nuclear facilities in Kumchangri and elsewhere led some conservative
critics in South Korea, Japan, and the United States to brand North
Korea as a rogue state, undermining South Koreas efforts.
The Kim Dae-jung governments pledge to resolve the Korean
question through self-initiative also remained unfulfilled. South Korea
could not resume direct channels of communication with the North,
and the United States continued to play a mediating role. While the
United States was operating multiple channels with the North
involving nuclear and missile negotiations, the Kim government could
not engage in direct talks with the North. Such salient issues as the
status of the armistice treaty, confidence-building measures, and
peace-building on the Korean peninsula were left to negotiations
within the framework of the Four Party Talks. South Korea was able to
hold vice ministerial-level talks with the North twice in 1998 and 1999
over the issue of fertilizer assistance, but both meetings failed without
producing any tangible outcomes. North Korea also turned down the
South Korean proposal to exchange special envoys. Likewise, the
centrality of South Korea in resolving the Korean question did not
work out primarily because of lack of cooperation by the North.
Also worrisome, the foundation of domestic consensus became
fragile. In contrast to earlier overwhelming endorsement by a
majority of South Koreans, the sunshine policy began to lose its
popular support base. Several factors contributed to the declining
popular support. First, a lack of reciprocity from the North critically
21) See Moon Chung-in, Masao Okonogi and Mitchell Reiss (eds.), The Perry Report,
the Missile Quagmire, and the North Korean Question (Seoul: Yonsei University
Press, 2000).

THE SUNSHINE POLICY AND THE SUMMIT

21

undermined the efficacy of the sunshine policy. Some critics even

portrayed the sunshine policy as a one-sided love affair. Second,
national fatigue became all the more visible. The Kim Dae-jung
government capitalized on the sunshine policy, yet failed to yield
convincing results, thereby amplifying fatigue effects on the people.
Finally, deepening ideological polarization blurred the focus of the
engagement policy. Conservative forces began to accuse it of being a
policy of appeasement that could ultimately endanger South Koreas
national security posture. Sagging performance, along with North
Koreas cynical negation, severely eroded domestic support bases
and jeopardized its survival.
Judged on the above, the sunshine policy did not fare well. While
it proved to be useful in promoting exchanges and cooperation on
the private sector level, fostering the process of limited de facto
unification, the sunshine policy was not able to produce concrete
results in other areas. Peace remained elusive, and potential for
conflict escalation was high. Whereas North Korea and the United
States were shaping the geopolitical destiny of the Korean peninsula,
South Korea was playing a rather passive role in the Korean drama.
Moreover, still obsessed with the ideology of Juche and building a
strong and prosperous nation, North Korea did not show any signs
of voluntary changes. Such developments undercut the thrust of the
sunshine policy, deteriorating the foundation of domestic consensus.
However, a major turning point came in April 2000. Four days before
the general election on April 13, 2000, the Kim Dae-jung government
made a shocking announcement that both Koreas had agreed to hold
a summit meeting in Pyongyang between June 12-14. The faltering
sunshine policy was vindicated. At last, President Kim Dae-jung
delivered on his inaugural pledge to hold a summit meeting with
Chairman Kim Jong-il during his term of office.

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EAST ASIAN REVIEW WINTER 2000

THE KOREAN SUMMIT AND THE JUNE 15 DECLARATION:

AN ANALYSIS

Observing the North-South Korean summit was like watching a

surrealist movie.22) Reception of the President Kim by the Chairman
at the Sunan Airport, the ceremonial inspection of the North Korean
military guard, the two leaders motorcade ride to the Paekhwawon
state guest house without the usual entourage, and the overall
ambiance of the summit meeting contrasted with the old image of
military animosity between the two Koreas. The summit meeting
was like a large family gathering. Absent were vestiges of suspicion,
distrust, animosity, and hostility, that had long governed the
psyches of all classes, and in both Koreas. War was forgotten, and
peace seemed imminent. The climax of the summit meeting came
during the farewell luncheon hosted by chairman Kim Jong-il. Before
the official luncheon started, Vice Marshal Cho Myong-rok, the first
vice-chairman of the National Defense Commission and the third
man in North Koreas power hierarchy, and Lim Dong-won, director
of the National Intelligence Service of South Korea, in charge of
covert espionage warfare on the North, exchanged brief speeches
pledging their support for the summit meeting and the June 15 Joint
Declaration.
The most significant result of the summit meeting was the
adoption of the June 15 Joint Declaration.23) It is composed of five
items. The first item states that the North and the South have agreed
to resolve the question of reunification independently and through
the joint efforts of the Korean people, who are the masters of the
country. While the statement appears to reaffirm North Koreas
traditional position which emphasizes the principle of independence
22) See Moon Chung-in, Two Days on the Other Side, Time, June 26, 2000.
23) http://www.kois.go.kr/government/president/2000/s_n/focus/analysis.html.

THE SUNSHINE POLICY AND THE SUMMIT

23

and autonomy, a close examination reveals that there is a striking

contrast with previous North Korean positions set forth in the July 4
Joint Communique. Specifically, there is no mention of exclusion of
foreign influence and interference as a precondition for improved
inter-Korean relations. Obviously, exclusion of foreign interference
referred to the status of American forces in the South and the ROKU.S. military alliance. For the North, it would be virtually
inconceivable to resolve the Korean question, including reunification,
without first withdrawing American forces from the South and
terminating the South Korean-United States Military alliance.
The June 15 Joint Declaration, however, does not include such
wording, thereby leaving room for international cooperation with
the four major powers, including the United States. Thus, the
statement can be re-read as follows: the question of Korean
reunification should be resolved through the self-initiated joint
efforts of the two Koreas, who are the principal parties to the Korean
problem.24) The fact that both leaders recognized the importance of
cooperative initiative (hyopryokjok jajoo) over exclusive one (baetajok
jajoo) in resolving the Korean question represents a major paradigm
shift in discourses on Korean unification. It is so precisely because
they admitted the complexity of the Korean problem which is
entangled with regional security environment. This issue can be
further corroborated by chairman Kim Jong-ils statements on the
status of American forces in the South. Chairman Kim is known to
concur with President Kims view of American forces in the South.
President Kim justified the continuing presence of American forces
on three accounts: a credible deterrent to war on the Korean
peninsula, a stabilizing element in prevailing regional strategic
instability, and ultimately a peacemaker or peace-insurer even after
24) The official text of the Joint Declaration translates jajoo as independence, but this
translation is quite misleading. Self-determination or self-initiative seems more
appropriate (Doklip is the exact translation of independence).

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EAST ASIAN REVIEW WINTER 2000

Korean unification. Chairman Kim recognized the instrumental

value of American forces by quipping that: American forces can
prevent you from invading the North.25)
The second item in the Joint Declaration touches on a more
sensitive issue, namely, modes for Korean unification. It states that
Acknowledging that there is a common element in the Souths
proposal for a confederation and the Norths proposal for a loose
form of federation as the formulae for achieving unification, the
South and the North have agreed to promote reunification in that
direction. This item was most hotly debated. It is known that
Chairman Kim took the initiative on the issue of national unification,
urging President Kim to adopt the North Korean proposal of the
Koryo Confederal Democratic Republic (namely federation model) as
a gift to the entire Korean nation. As a matter of fact, North Korea
has persistently adhered to the Koryo confederate model since late
Kim Il-sung proposed it on October 10, 1980 on the occasion of the
Sixth Plenary Session of the Korean Workers Party. 26) The North
Korean proposal of confederation is much closer to federation than
to confederation in the strict sense. It is predicated on the notion of
one nation, one unified state, two local governments, and two
systems where diplomatic sovereignty and rights over military
command and control are assumed to belong to one central
government, while other functions are delegated to the jurisdiction
of two local governments. In his 1991 New Years message, Kim Ilsung proposed a loose form of confederation by stating that in order
to achieve a national consensus on the Koryo Confederal Democratic
Republic more easily, we are willing to discuss a loose form of
confederation with the South which would temporarily bestow
greater power and autonomy to local governments and gradually
25) The Joongang Ilbo, June 20, 2000.
26) Yonhap News Agency, Bukhan 50 nyon (Seoul: Yonhap News Agency, 1995), pp.
483-487.

THE SUNSHINE POLICY AND THE SUMMIT

25

enhance functions of the central government over time in the

future. 27) For all the minor amendments to the original version,
North Korean government officials have consistently held that the
confederate model is the only way to national unification.28)
President Kim countered that it is virtually impossible to make a
transition from a state of national division and conflict to a complete
stage of (con-)federation at once. Merging diplomatic sovereignty and
integrating military command and control are not easy tasks. He cited
the Yemeni example in which hasty military integration within the
framework of a federation derailed the entire process of unification.
According to him, the stage of federation (yonbang) cannot be reached
without first going through the stage of confederation (union of states,
or yonhap). His version of confederation is predicated on one nation,
two states, two governments, and two systems, which is similar to
the case of the European Union or the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS). In fact, two schemes of the confederation model have
been considered in the South. One is the union of republics
(gonghwakuk yonhap) which President Kim suggested as the first stage
of his three-stage approach to national unification, and the other is the
union of South and North (nambuk yonhap) which former president,
Roh Tae-woo, proposed as the interim stage of his commonwealth
model of Korean unification.29) Kims union of republics presupposes
reasonable political confidence-building, a free market system, and a
pluralist political system as preconditions for confederation. Then,
27) Bukhanyonguso, Bukhanshinnyonsa Bunsok 1945-1995 (Seoul: Bukhanyonguso,
1996), pp. 220-228.
28) Literal transition of yonbang is federation. But North Koreans have translated
yonbang as confederation, creating confusion between yonbang and yonhap
(confederation or union states). In a sense, the Joint Declaration clarified the
semantic confusion.
29) On Kims proposal, see Kim Dae-jung, Three-stages approach to Unification (Seoul: The
Kim Dae-jung Foundation), in Korean. On Roh,s proposal, see National Unification
Board, Theoretical Foundation and Policy Directions of the Commonwealth Model of
Unification (Seoul: National Unification Board, 1990).

26

EAST ASIAN REVIEW WINTER 2000

once confederation is established, it would be easier to reach the

stage of federation and ultimately a unified state. On the other hand,
Rohs commonwealth model posits reconciliation, exchanges, and
cooperation as the first stage through which the North-South union
and ultimately one unified nation-state can evolve. While Kims
model includes federation as an interim stage, Rohs model skips the
stage of federation and assumes a direct transition from the interim
stage of South-North union into a unified state.
Interestingly, President Kim proposed Rohs interim stage (i.e.,
South-North union) as an alternative to North Koreas federation
scheme. The interim stage comprises four distinct elements: (1)
peaceful management of national division and military conflict
through tension reduction, confidence-building measures, arms
control and reduction, and inter-Korean peace treaty; (2) promotion
of exchanges and cooperation to foster national unification; (3)
institutional realignments to promote inter-Korean social integration
through which hostile institutions are removed, friendly institutions
re-enforced, and a framework for reunification is formulated; (4)
institutionalization of a confederation or a union of North and South
Korea through summit meetings, ministerial meetings,
parliamentary meetings, and ultimately an umbrella consultative
body between the two. The North Korean leader was receptive to the
proposal, and indeed, both leaders have agreed on at least two
points: one is that Korean reunification can be achieved through
incremental and functionalist approaches, and the other is that the
last stage of confederation (South Korean proposal), namely
formalization of the summit, ministerial, and parliamentary
meetings, converges with the loose form of federation (North Korean
proposal). The convergence of the two discourses on unification
formulae, which used to compete in a parallel mode, can be seen as
one of the most significant achievements in the summit talk.
The third item deals with reunion of separated families by
stating that the South and the North have agreed to promptly

THE SUNSHINE POLICY AND THE SUMMIT

27

resolve humanitarian issues such as exchange visits by separated

family members and relatives on the occasion of National Liberation
Day in August, and the question of unrepentant Communists who
had served long prison sentences in the South. From his arrival in
Pyongyang, President Kim persistently sought the resolution of the
issue pertaining to reunion of separated families. Chairman Kim
willingly accepted the South Korean proposal, at the same time
making a counter-proposal: He wanted the return of those North
Korean spies and sympathizers who had been released after serving
long-term sentences, but had refused to be law-abiding South Korean
citizens for ideological reasons. The South accepted the offer within
the broad framework of humanitarianism. Such a move might have
been motivated to resolve other pending issues, such as the return of
South Korean fishermen and prisoners of the Korean war who are
still detained in the North.
The Joint Declaration also made a major breakthrough in
economic, social, and cultural exchanges. The fourth item stipulates
that The South and the North have agreed to consolidate mutual trust
by promoting balanced development of the national economy through
economic cooperation and by stimulating cooperation and exchanges
in civic, cultural, sports, public health, environmental and all other
fields. This agreement was also very much anticipated before the
summit meeting. But there are several noticeable developments. One
is related to economic cooperation. In previous agreements with the
North such as the July 4 Joint Communique and Basic Agreement on
Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchange and Cooperation,
economic exchanges and cooperation were regarded as goals per se.
But the June 15 Joint Declaration treats them as a means to promote
balanced development of the national economy. The use of the term,
national economy, is also refreshing since it assumes an integration
of North and South Korean economies. Balanced development also
appears to have a new semantic nuance. It could imply that the South
is ready to assist the North in boosting up the latters economy and

28

EAST ASIAN REVIEW WINTER 2000

that the South will neither exploit the North through market
mechanisms nor extend unilateral concessions to the North. Apart
from traditional emphasis on social and cultural exchanges and
cooperation, the Joint Declaration specifically highlights public health
and environmental issues, reflecting North Koreas preference.
The fifth item states that The South and the North have agreed
to hold dialogues between relevant authorities in the near future to
implement the above agreements expeditiously. In order to
implement the above agreements, it follows that Koreas will activate
official channels of dialogue and negotiation. In light of past
experiences, however, this provision also reveals a fundamental
departure. North Korea has always refused to take part in official
dialogues with the South. Instead, it attempted to expand contacts
with civic organizations and business firms by circumventing the
South Korean government. As it was reluctant to recognize the
legitimacy of the South Korean government, it instead projected
itself as the sole legitimate government on the Korean peninsula. But
with the summit talks, the North has changed its previous position,
recognizing the South as a legitimate counterpart for dialogue and
negotiation. As a result, channels of dialogues between the North
and the South have shifted from non-governmental to intergovernmental.
Finally, President Kim succeeded in winning Chairman Kims
agreement on a return visit to Seoul. Chairman Kim initially opposed
including his return visit to Seoul in written form, but he was
persuaded to do so by President Kim. Formalization of Kims return
visit in the declaration is imperative since it signals the continuation
of inter-Korean summit talks.
All in all, the summit meeting and the June 15 Joint Declaration
present a historic turning point in inter-Korean relations. Both
leaders were able to build mutual trust, and they agreed that neither
unification by absorption (the previous South Korean intention) nor
unification by force (the previous North Korean position) will be

THE SUNSHINE POLICY AND THE SUMMIT

29

acceptable. The newly-formed bond of trust between the two leaders

proved to be crucial for tension-reduction and confidence-building
between two Koreas. More importantly, they initiated the interKorean summit meeting without the help of third party
intermediaries. This represents a radical departure from the past,
since the North had refused to have any official and direct contacts
with the South Korean government. At the present moment, it is not
clear whether the North Korean move is tactical or strategic, but it
has become all the more clear that it is willing to change, at least as
far as inter-Korean relations. The North Korean attitude is so far
sincere and forthcoming, with most of the agreements embodied in
the Joint Declaration being implemented. A completely different
political landscape is on the horizon. Indeed, unimaginable
objectives are being realized at an amazing speed.

PROSPECTS FOR KOREAN REUNIFICATION:

NEWLY-EMERGING OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS

The summit and subsequent developments signify revolutionary

changes in inter-Korean relations. Judging from the protracted,
vicious circle of mutual distrust, negation, and military
confrontation, which has governed Korea for the past fifty years,
recent changes reflect a truly profound breakthrough. However, the
summit talk and the adoption of the June 15 Joint Declaration is not
the end of the Korean question, but merely the beginning of a long
and precarious journey toward peaceful co-existence and Korean
reunification. Despite remarkable progress in inter-Korean relations,
an array of new and tough agenda for future inter-Korean
negotiations await. Some of important agenda can be summarized in
the following:
- Military issues: tension reduction, military confidence-building,

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EAST ASIAN REVIEW WINTER 2000

arms control and reduction, and replacement of the armistice

treaty by a new inter-Korean peace treaty;
- Weapons of mass destruction and missile issues including
implementation of the Joint Declaration of de-nuclearization of
the Korean peninsula;
- Return of kidnapped South Koreans, including fishermen and
prisoners of the Korean war, who are still detained in the North,
as a reciprocal measure for the return of unconverted North
Korean spies and pro-North Korean sympathizers;
- Increased frequency and expanded size and scope of reunions for
separated families, including location of missing families and
exchanges of letters;
- Terms of economic exchanges and cooperation including
institutional changes in the direction of opening and reform.
None of these agenda are likely to be easy or smooth, not only
because of their backlash effects on vital interests of the North
Korean regime, but also because of inherent differences between the
two Koreas in their priorities. For example, South Korea has always
wanted to include tension reduction and military confidencebuilding measures in the agenda of inter-ministerial talks, but the
North has wished to avoid these issues. Although the second
ministerial talk was able to produce a joint statement urging tension
reduction and activation of inter-Korean military talks, the North has
been rather reluctant to discuss these issues. The situation will be
even more complicated if North and South Korea begin deliberating
on arms control, limitation, and reduction. It is not easy to realign
and reduce the combined forces of nearly 1.8 million soldiers and
their related weapons systems, since such moves can severely
undercut institutional interests of the military in both North and
South Korea.30) Moreover, even though Chairman Kim recognizes
American forces in the South as a fait accompli, actual inter-Korean
arms control negotiations are bound to affect their status.

THE SUNSHINE POLICY AND THE SUMMIT

31

Transforming the armistice treaty into an inter-Korean peace

treaty system will pose more complex and daunting challenges.
South Korea is not a legal party to the armistice treaty since it
refused to sign it in 1953. Only North Korea, the United States, and
China are de jure parties to the treaty, with the United States merely
representing the United Nations Command.31) Thus, dismantling the
armistice treaty involves complex legal processes which would be
difficult for North and South Korea to resolve through the principle
of self-determination. As President Kim Dae-jung suggested in his
recent meeting with Jiang Zemin at the United Nations, the
transformation of the inter-Korean peace treaty should be resolved in
a forum other than bilateral negotiations. The Four Party Talks
would be a more desirable venue in this regard where inter-Korean
peace treaty can be guaranteed by China and the United States.
However, such efforts could hinder North Koreas intention to sign a
bilateral peace treaty directly with the United States ahead of the
dismantling of the armistice treaty. 32) Hence, inter-Korean peacebuilding is a much more complicated task than commonly thought.
Inter-Korean negotiations are not likely to adopt agenda
involving weapons of mass destruction and missiles. Indeed, the
United States will remain the principal partner for dialogue and
negotiation over these issues, while retaining the close unilateral
policy coordination with Japan and South Korea. However, South
Korea will be placed in a difficult position if the North again plays
the nuclear and missile cards in its game of brinkmanship diplomacy.
In order to avoid such a contingency, South Korea is obliged to
engage in negotiations with the North over the issue of nuclear and
30) Moon Chung-in Arms Control..., ch. 6.
31) Je Sung-ho, Building a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula, Kukga Jonryak
(National Strategy), 2:1(1996), pp. 77-78 (in Korean).
32) Moon Chung-in, The Kim Dae-jung Government and Peace-building on the
Korean Peninsula, Kukga Jonryak (National Strategy), 5:2(1999), pp. 139-170. (in
Korean).

32

EAST ASIAN REVIEW WINTER 2000

missiles. Given Chairman Kims responses during the summit talk,

however, it will be quite difficult for the South to persuade the North
to comply with both the Joint Declaration on de-nuclearization of the
Korean peninsula and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
Current progress alludes that social exchanges and cooperation
can be expedited, leading to de facto unification as the Kim Dae-jung
government anticipates. Even in this area, however, major obstacles
can emerge. The return of kidnapped South Koreans and prisoners of
war has become a major political issue in the South, and the Kim
Dae-jung government is under heavy political and social pressures.
But the North has been relatively insensitive to these issues since it
believes that they are not a legitimate agenda for negotiations. For
the North, there are no kidnapped South Koreans, rather stayed in
the North of their own free will. And according to the North, the
issue of prisoners of war was addressed already, through official
exchanges in 1953. Increased frequency and expansion of reunion of
separated families might not be easy either. Since increased
personnel exchanges can pose major threats to regime security in the
North, it will try to impose maximum control over the size and the
modes of reunion of separated families. Thus, this issue cannot be
easily resolved either.
Contrary to public expectations, reaching viable agreements on
modes and nature of economic cooperation and exchanges might be
as difficult as military issues. The June 15 Joint Declaration has set
the lofty goal of achieving balanced development of the national
economy through economic exchanges and cooperation, but this goal
cannot be realized unless North Korea undergoes far-reaching
reforms in its economic structure. Tactical and cosmetic changes, as
seen in the example of the Rajin-Sonbong free trade zone, cannot
induce private investments from the South. In the brave new world
of the post-IMF crisis, private firms, including the chaebols, cannot
commit themselves to North Korea without considering corresponding profit. Hyundai is the exception rather than the rule. South

THE SUNSHINE POLICY AND THE SUMMIT

33

Korean officials must thus persuade North Korean counterparts to

undertake major institutions reforms. Prevention of double-taxation,
investment guarantees, formalization of payment clearance, and
mechanisms for dispute resolution are important, but they alone
cannot attract private money from abroad including South Korea.
There should be deeper and wider reforms in the direction of the
market economy with a firm institutional guarantee of private
property rights. Otherwise, the South Korean government cannot
persuade its firms to invest in the North. Lack of opening and
reforms in the North could also easily place the South Korean
government in a difficult position, for public opinion will oppose the
governments economic cooperation with the North under such
circumstances.
Apart from institutional changes, the size and terms of economic
cooperation with the North will turn out to be another major
problem. Given overall signals from the North, it appears that the
North anticipates major support from the South. But the existing
fiscal burden, new fiscal demands associated with corporate as well
as banking and financial reforms and productive welfare initiatives,
plus the conservative opposition to massive economic cooperation
with the North will make it difficult for the South to engage in mega
projects with the North.
Likewise, a rocky road is ahead of inter-Korean relations. What
then are opportunities and constraints underlying inter-Korean
relations? The most important variable is the North Korean factor.
Chairman Kims continuing commitment to improving inter-Korean
relations and consolidation of his political power over the party, the
military, the state, and civil society are the most essential
prerequisites for smooth inter-Korean relations. Failure to tame
military grievances as well as to control party cadres and state
bureaucrats can derail the entire enterprise of inter-Korean relations,
which will eventually endanger his own regime. Although there is
no doubt as to Kim Jong-ils paramount leadership, unpredictable

34

EAST ASIAN REVIEW WINTER 2000

events embedded in the institutional structure of North Korean

society can ruin the process of inter-Korean improvements.
South Korea is not without its own drawbacks. Despite the
remarkable success, public reactions to the June 15 Joint Declaration
have been somewhat mixed. Conservative critics have raised several
issues. First, the declaration failed to address issues on tension
reduction and peace building on the Korean peninsula. Second, the
item on agents of Korean unification and the following item on
modes of unification reflect North Koreas agenda, not the Souths.
According to conservatives, President Kim accommodated North
Korean demands imprudently. That accommodation has created a
new confusion where discourses on unification have overwhelmed
those on tension reduction and peace building. Third, unconditional
return of North Korean sympathizers who refused to accept South
Korean authority is a too generous concession. They should be
linked to the return of kidnapped South Korean fishermen and
prisoners of war during the Korean War who are still retained in the
North. Fourth, the other items are nothing new. Previous
agreements, such as the July 4 Joint Communique and the Joint
Declaration, have already addressed those issues. Finally the summit
meeting and the Joint Declaration went too far and too fast by
precipitating ideological chaos and jeopardizing national security in
the South. Triumphant mood followed by the summit pacified
domestic opposition for the time-being, forging a rather contrived
national consensus. As the moment of enthusiasm recedes, however,
the sound and the fury begin to rise. While the opposing Grand
National Party is acutely critical of Kim Dae-jungs venture with the
North, conservatives have begun to strike back with cynicism.
Despite an overall high approval rate of the summit meeting,
popular support has been divided along regional lines. More
critically, leading mass medias criticism of Kim Dae-jungs
engagement policy has begun to undercut political dividends
garnered from the summit. If inter-Korean arms control talks are

THE SUNSHINE POLICY AND THE SUMMIT

35

realized, the military could emerge as another factor that can

critically influence the process of inter-Korean negotiations. Then,
the crumbling foundation of national consensus can easily dampen
prospects for inter-Korean relations.
Finally, external factors can also influence the process and
outcome of inter-Korean negotiations. Of four major actors in the
region, China has everything to gain from inter-Korean
rapprochement. While Russia has become a rather residual actor,
Japan has been rather passive by coupling its interests within the
Japan-U.S.-South Korea trilateral policy coordination. But if the
United States abandons the Perry line and shifts to a hard-line
position, parameters governing inter-Korean relations can be
radically reshaped. Containing the North and playing with the
Theater Missile Defense (TMD) card are likely to undermine interKorean relations significantly.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The summit marks a stunning breakthrough in inter-Korean

relations. Two Koreas have now entered a new era of reconciliation,
exchanges, and cooperation. Although de jure unification is still far
away, peaceful co-existence and de facto unification appear to be near.
By all accounts, the summit talk was a dazzling success. It has shown
that North Korea is not an eccentric rogue state to be constrained,
but should a normal, calculating state that deserves political space
for dialogue and negotiation.
As noted in the above, however, there are numerous obstacles to
peaceful co-existence and Korean reunification. Leadership in both
Koreas should not only avoid the politicization of inter-Korean
issues for domestic political purposes, but sould also overcome
domestic division and opposition. Improved inter-Korean relations
cannot be envisaged without pacifying domestic forces and forging a

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EAST ASIAN REVIEW WINTER 2000

viable national consensus. The international community should also

give its blessing and lend unprecedented support for tension
reduction and peace-building on the Korean peninsula. By
abandoning the structure of balance-of-power determinism, the four
major powers can also play a constructive role in facilitating peaceful
co-existence and reunification. But it should be remembered that
reunification cannot be achieved without first achieving peace. Once
peace is realized, the door to reunification will open. Keeping this in
mind, both Koreas should make every effort to turn spectres of war
into rays of peace and to transform division into reunification with
patience, prudence, and inter-subjective understanding.