Santiago vs.

Republic Ildefonso
Santiago, represented
by his Attorney-in-Fact,
Alfredo T. Santiago,
petitioner, vs.
TheGovernment of the
Republic of the
Philippines,
represented by
Director, Bureau of
Plant Industry, andthe
Regional Director,
Region IX, Zamboanga
City,
repondent.December
19, 1978Fernando, J:
Facts:
Petitioner Ildefonso
Santiago donated a
parcel of land to the
Bureau of Plant
Industry on theterms
that the Bureau should
construct a building
and install lighting
facilities on the said lot.
When time passed and
there were still no
improvements on the
lot, Santiago filed a
casepleading for the
revocation of such
contract of donation
but the trial court
dismissed thepetition
claiming that it is a suit
against the
government and should
not prosper without
theconsent of the
government.
Issue:

Whether or not the

respondent
government has
waived its immunity
from suit.

Victor Amigable,
respondents.

Held:

Facts:

Yes.

On 1924, the
government took
private respondent
Victor Amigable's land
for road-right-of-way
purpose.

Ratio:
The government's
waiver of immunity was
implied by virtue of the
terms provided in the
deed of donation. The
government is a
beneficiary of the
terms of the donation
but it did not comply
with such terms. Thus,
the donor Santiago has
the right to be heard in
the court. Also, to not
allow the donor to be
heard would be
unethical and contrary
to equity which the
government so
advances. The Court of
First Instance is hereby
directed to proceed
with the case.

Commissioner of
Public Highways vs.
Burgos
Commissioner of Public
Highways, petitioner,
vs. Hon. Francisco P.
Burgos, in his capacity
as Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu
City, Branch II, and

March 31, 1980

De Castro, J:

On 1959, Amigable
filed in the Court of
First Instance a
complaint to recover
the ownership and
possession of the land
and for damages for
the alleged illegal
occupation of the land
by the government
(entitled Victor
Amigable vs. Nicolas
Cuenco, in his capacity
as Commissioner of
Public Highways and
Republic of the
Philippines).
Amigable's complaint
was dismissed on the
grounds that the land
was either donated or
sold by its owners to
enhance its value, and
that in any case, the
right of the owner to
recover the value of
said property was
already barred by
estoppel and the
statute of limitations.
Also, the non-suability

of the government was

invoked.
In the hearing, the
government proved
that the price of the
property at the time of
taking was P2.37 per
square meter.
Amigable, on the other
hand, presented a
newspaper showing
that the price was
P6.775.
The public respondent
Judge ruled in favor of
Amigable and directed
the Republic of the
Philippines to pay
Amigable the value of
the property taken with
interest at 6% and the
attorney's fees.

Issue:
Whether or not the
provision of Article
1250 of the New Civil
Code is applicable in
determining the
amount of
compensation to be
paid to private
respondent Amigable
for the property taken.
Held:
Not applicable.
Ratio:
Article 1250 of the NCC
provides that the value
of currency at the time

of the establishment of
the obligation shall be
the basis of payment
which would be the
value of peso at the
time of taking of the
property when the
obligation of the
government to pay
arises. It is only when
there is an agreement
that the inflation will
make the value of
currency at the time of
payment, not at the
time of the
establishment, the
basis for payment.
The correct amount of
compensation would be
P14,615.79 at P2.37
per square meter, not
P49,459.34, and the
interest in the sum of
P145,410.44 at the rate
of 6% from 1924 up to
the time respondent
court rendered its
decision as was
awarded by the said
court should
accordingly be
reduced.

Froilan vs. Pan

Oriental Shipping
Co.September 30,
1954103 PHIL.
473PARAS, J.: Nature of
the Case: Appeal from
an Order of the CFI of
Manila.
FACTS:

Defendant Pan Oriental

took possession of the
vesselin question after
it had been
repossessed by the
ShippingAdministration
and title thereto
reacquired by
thegovernment,
following the original
purchaser,
FernandoFroilans,
default in his payment
of the unpaid
balanceand insurance
premiums for the said
vessel. Pan Oriental
chartered said vessel
and operated the same
after it hadrepaired the
vessel and paid the
stipulated initial
payment, thereby
exercising its option to
purchase, pursuant to a
bareboat charter
contract entered
between said company
and the Shipping
Corporation. The
Cabinet resolved to
restore Froilan to his
right under the original
contract of sale on
condition that he shall
pay a sum of money
upon delivery of the
vessel to him, that he
shall continue paying
the remaining
installments due, and
that he shall assume
the expenses incurred
for the repair and by
docking of the vessel.
Pan Oriental protested
to this restoration of

Froilans rightsunder
the contract of sale, for
the reason that when
the vessel was
delivered to it, the
Shipping
Administration had
authority to dispose of
said authority to the
property, Froilan having
already relinquished
whatever rights he may
have thereon. Froilan
paid the required cash
of P10,000.00 and as
Pan Oriental refused to
surrender possession
of the vessel, he filed
an action for in the
CFIof Manila to recover
possession thereof and
have himdeclared the
rightful owner of said
property.The Republic
of the Philippines was
allowed tointervene in
said civil case praying
for the possession of
the in order that the
chattel mortgage
constituted
thereonmay be
foreclosed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the
governments motion
to dismiss Pan Oriental
counterclaims may
prosper.HELD:Under
the circumstances
already ad voted to,
PanOriental cannot be
considered a possessor
in bad faithuntil after
the institution of the

instant case.
However,since it is not
disputed that said
appellant is entitled
tothe refund of such
expenses with the right
to retain thevessel until
he has been
reimbursed therefore.
As it is by the corrected
acts of defendant and
intervenor Republic of
the Philippines that the
appellant ha a lien far
hisexpenses, appellees
Froilan, Compania
Maratma, and
theRepublic of the
Philippines are declared
liable for
thereimbursement to
appellant of its
legitimate expenses,
asallowed by law, with
legal interest from the
time of disbursement.

Commissioner of
Public Highways v.
San Diego, 31 SCRA
616
Facts:
Before WWII, the
Philippine Government
filed an action for the
expropriation of a
parcel of land owned
by Hashim for the
construction of a public
road. Government took
possession over the
property after the
deposit of the amount
of 23, 413.64. Records

of the case were

destroyed during the
WWII. After the war,
Hashim filed an action
for money claims
before the CFI against
Bureau of Public
Highways.
The parties entered
into a compromise
agreement wherein the
Bureau shall pay
almost half of the
amount claimed. The
bureau failed to pay so
Hashim filed a motion
for the issuance of a
writ of execution.
Respondent judge
granted the motion.
The sheriff served the
writ with a Notice of
Garnishment to PNB
against the Bureau's
funds. Hashim further
filed a motion for
issuance of an order
ordering the release of
the amount. It was
granted. PNB released
the amount. Petitioner
filed this petition for
certiorari with
mandatory injunction
to reimburse the
amount released.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the
State may invoke its
immunity from suit
2. Whether or not the
State may impugn the

validity of the
compromise agreement
3. Whether or not the
orders were valid
Ruling:
In expropriation
proceedings, the State
submits to the court's
jurisdiction and asks
the court to affirm its
right to take the
property sought to be
expropriated. State
immunity does not
apply.
Only the principal can
question the authority
of the counsel to enter
into a compromise
agreement. The state
cannot raise it.

The assailed orders are

void. Government
funds are not subject to
garnishment.

Estrada v Desierto
GR Nos. 146710-15,
March 2, 2001
Ponente :Puno, J.
Facts :
1. In 1998, Joseph
Estrada was elected
President of
thePhilippines, while
Gloria Macapagal-

Arroyo was elected

Vice-President. The
president was accused
with
corruption,culminating
in Ilocos Sur Governor
ChavitSingsons
accusations that the
president received
millions of pesos from
jueteng lords.
2. The Senate and the
House of
Representatives began
early investigations
regarding the
accusation, while key
socio-political figures
like Cardinal Sin,
former Presidents
Aquino and Ramos, the
vice president, senior
advisers and cabinet
members called on the
president to resign, and
resigned from their
cabinet posts
themselves.
3. The impeachment
trial began on 7
December 2000, with
21senator-judges
presided over by Chief
Justice Hilario Davide.
At a point when 11
senator-judges ruled
against opening a
second
envelope of evidence
showing the presidents
P3.3 billion bank
account under the
name Jose Velarde,
the public prosecutors

resigned and a mass

demonstration at EDSA
began.
4. CJ Davide granted
Senator Raul Rocos
motion to postpone the
impeachment trial until
the House of
Representatives
resolved the lack of
public prosecutors.
5. With the defection of
more officials and of
the army and police
from the Estrada
administration, the
president attempted to
appease public
sentiment by
announcing a snap
election and by
allowing the second
envelope to be opened.
The measures failed,
and the calls for
resignation
strengthened.6. On 20
January 2001, the
president negotiated
with representatives of
the vice-president.
News broke out that
Chief Justice
HilarioDavide would
administer the oath of
presidency to the vice
president at EDSA
Shrine. Estrada issued
two statementsone stating
reservations on the
constitutionality of
Arroyos

presidency, and
another stating that he
is incapable of
dispensinghis
responsibilities as
president, thus allowing
Arroyo to be theacting
president.7. The Arroyo
administration was met
with acceptance by
thedifferent branches
of government, by
majority of the public,
andby the international
community. The
impeachment trial
wasclosed, despite
sentiments such as
those of Senator
Defensor-Santiago that
the impeachment court
had failed to resolve
the
case, leaving open
questions regarding
Estradas qualifications
to
run for other elected
posts.8. The Office of
the Ombudsman
proceeded to file a
series of cases
regarding the
corruption of Estrada.
Estrada filed a motion
compelling the
Ombudsman to refrain
from further
proceedings until his
term as president was
over. He also filed a
petition to be
confirmed as the lawful
and incumbent
president, temporarily

unable to fulfill his

duties, thus making
Arroyo an acting
president only.9. The
Supreme Court ruled a)
to inform the parties
that they didnot
declare the Office of
the President vacant on
20 January 2001,b) to
prohibit either party
from discussing
inpublic the merits of
the case while in its
pendency, c) to
enjointhe Ombudsman
from resolving pending
criminal cases against
Estrada for 30
days.Issues:I. Whether
the petitions present a
justiciable
controversy.II.
Assuming that the
petitions present a
justiciable
controversy,whether
petitioner Estrada is a
President on leave
while respondent
Arroyo is an Acting
President.III. Whether
conviction in the
impeachment
proceedings is
acondition precedent
for the criminal
prosecution of
petitionerEstrada. In
the negative and on
the assumption that
petitioner isstill
president, whether he
is immune from
criminal prosecution.IV.
Whether the
prosecution of

petitioner Estrada
should beenjoined on
the ground of
prejudicial publicity
Ruling:
I. The petitions present
a justiciable
controversy because
thecases at bar pose
legal, and not political,
questions. Hence,
thecases are within the
jurisdiction of the Court
to decide.
Definition of political
questions: ...those
questions which, under
the Constitution, are to
bedecided by the
people in their
sovereign capacity, or
inregard to which full
discretionary authority
has beendelegated to
the legislative or
executive branch of
government.
--Former CJ Roberto
Concepcion
Arroyos government is
NOT revolutionary in
character, since her
oath was taken under
the 1987Constitution.
EDSA II is an exercise
of people power of
freedom of speech and
the right to assembly. It
is intraconstitutional in
this regard (within the
scope of
theConstitution). The

resignation of Estrada
that it causedand the
subsequent succession
of of Arroyo are subject
to judicial review.
II. Estrada is NOT a
President onleave while
Arroyo is Acting
President. Under
Section 11 Article VII,
Estrada saysthat only
Congress has the
ultimate
authority todetermine
whether the President
is incapable of
performing his
functions in the manner
provided bysaid
provision. Hence,
Arroyo has no power to
judge
Estradas inability to do
his job as President.
However, both houses
of Congress expressed
their recognition and
support of Arroyo as
the new President, and
it is implicitly clear in
this recognitionthat
Estradas inability is no
longer temporary.
Thus,Congress has
rejected Estradas
claim of inability.
Furthermore, Court
cannot exercise its
judicial power to revise
decision of Congress in
recognizing Arroyo. To
do so would be to
transgress.

SHIGENORI KURODA,
petitioner, vs. Major
General RAFAEL
JALANDONI
Doctrine:
Rules and regulations
of the Hague and
Geneva conventions
form part of and are
wholly based on the
generally accepted
principals of
international law.
Theyform part of the
law of our nation even
if the Philippines was
not a signatory to
theconventions
embodying them, for
our Constitution has
been deliberately
generaland extensive
in its scope and is not
confined to the
recognition of rules
andprinciples of
international law as
contained in treaties to
which our government
mayhave been or shall
be a signatory.
Facts:
- A Military commission
was empaneled under
the authority of
Executive Order 68 of
the President of the
Philippines, which was
issued on July 29, 1947.
This is an
actestablishing a
national war crimes
office and prescribing

rules and
regulationgoverning
the trial of accused war
criminals.- Shigenori
Kuroda, formerly a
Lieutenant-General of
the Japanese Imperial
Army and Commanding
General of the
Japanese Imperial
Forces in The
Philippines from19431944, is charged before
a military commission
convened by the Chief
of Staff of the Armed
forces of the Philippines
with having unlawfully
disregarded and
failed"to discharge his
duties as such
command, permitting
them to commit
brutalatrocities and
other high crimes
against noncombatant
civilians and prisoners
of theImperial Japanese
Forces in violation of
the laws and customs
of war".- Melville
Hussey and Robert
Port, American lawyers,
were appointed
prosecutors inbehalf of
USA.- Kuroda
challenges the legality
of the EO No. 68 and
the personality as
prosecutorsof Hussey
and Port.- Kurodas
arguments were: (1)EO
No. is illegal on the
gound that ut wiolates
notonly the provisions
of our constitutional
law but also our local

laws; (2)
MilitaryCommission has
no Jurisdiction to try
him for acts committed
in violation of
theHague Convention
and the Geneva
Convention because
the Philippines is not
asignatory to the first
and signed the second
only in 1947 and,
therefore, he ischarged
with crime not based
on law, national or
international; and (3)
Husseyand Port have
no personality as
prosecutors in this case
because they are
notqualified to practice
law in Philippines in
accordance with our
Rules of court and
theappointment of said
attorneys as
prosecutors is violative
of our
nationalsovereignty.
Issues/Held:
(1) WON EO No. 68 is
valid and
constitutional? [Yes it is
a validbecause it is
based on the generally
accepted principles of
international law
whichform part of our
laws.](2) WON rules
and regulations of the
Hague and Geneva
Conventions form part
of the law of the nation
even if Philippines was
not a signatory to the

conventionsembodying
them? [Yes, they form
part of our laws.](3)
WON the American
lawyers could
participate in the
prosecution of this
case?[Yes, they can.]

ICHONG VS.
HERNANDEZ
101 PHIL 155
Facts:
The Congress of the
Philippines enacted the
act which nationalizes
theretail trade
business, Republic Act
No. 1180 entitled An
Act to Regulate
theRetail Business,
prohibiting aliens in
general to engage in
retail trade in
ourcountry.Petitioner,
for and in his own
behalf and on behalf of
other alien
residents,corporations
and partnerships
adversely affected by
the provisions of RA
No.1180, brought this
action to obtain a
judicial declaration that
said Act
isunconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether Congress in
enacting R.A. No. 1180
violated the UN
Charter, theUN

Declaration of Human
Rights and the
Philippine-Chinese
Treaty of Amity.

Held:
The UN Charter
imposes no strict or
legal obligations
regarding the rightsand
freedom of their
subjects, and the
Declaration of Human
Rights containsnothing
more than a mere
recommendation, or a
common standard of
achievement for all
peoples and all nations.
The Treaty of Amity
between the Republic
of the Philippines and
the Republic of China
guarantees equality of
treatment to the
Chinese nationals
upon the sameterms
as the nationals of any
other country. But the
nationals of China are
notdiscriminated
against because
nationals of all other
countries, except those
of the United States,
who are granted
special rights by the
Constitution, are
allprohibited from
engaging in the retail
trade.But even
supposing that the law
infringes upon the said
treaty, the treaty
isalways subject to

qualification or
amendment by a
subsequent law, and
the samemay never
curtail or restrict the
scope of the police
power of the State.

Calalang vs.
Williams
Facts:
Maximo Calalang in his
capacity as a private
citizen and a taxpayer
of Manila filed apetition
for a writ of prohibition
against the
respondents.It is
alleged in the petition
that the National Traffic
Commission, in its
resolution of July 17,
1940, resolved to
recommend to the
Director of the Public
Works and to the
Secretary of Public
Works and
Communications that
animal-drawn vehicles
be prohibited from
passingalong Rosario
Street extending from
Plaza Calderon de la
Barca to Dasmarias
Street from 7:30Am to
12:30 pm and from
1:30 pm to 530 pm;
and along Rizal Avenue

extending from
therailroad crossing at
Antipolo Street to
Echague Street from 7
am to 11pm for a
period of one yearfrom
the date of the opening
of the Colgante Bridge
to traffic.The Chairman
of the National Traffic
Commission on July 18,
1940 recommended to
theDirector of Public
Works with the
approval of the
Secretary of Public
Works the adoption of
themeasure proposed
in the resolution
aforementioned in
pursuance of the
provisions of
theCommonwealth Act
No. 548 which
authorizes said Director
with the approval from
theSecretary of the
Public Works and
Communication to
promulgate rules and
regulations toregulate
and control the use of
and traffic on national
roads.On August 2,
1940, the Director
recommended to the
Secretary the approval
of therecommendations
made by the Chairman
of the National Traffic
Commission
withmodifications. The
Secretary of Public
Works approved the
recommendations on
August 10,1940.The
Mayor of Manila and

the Acting Chief of

Police of Manila have
enforced and causedto
be enforced the rules
and regulation. As a
consequence, all
animal-drawn vehicles
are not allowed to pass
and pick up passengers
in the places above
mentioned to the
detriment not only of
their owners but of the
riding public as well.
Issue:
1.
Whether the rules and
regulations
promulgated by the
respondents pursuant
to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act NO.
548 constitute an
unlawful inference with
legitimate business or
trade and abridged the
right to personal liberty
and freedom of
locomotion?2. Whether
the rules and
regulations complained
of infringe upon the
constitutional precept
regarding the
promotion of social
justice to insure the
well-being and
economic security of all
the people?
Held:
1.
No. The promulgation
of the Act aims to

promote safe transit

upon and
avoidobstructions on
national roads in the
interest and
convenience of the
public. Inenacting said
law, the National
Assembly was
prompted by
considerations of public
convenience and
welfare. It was inspired
by the desire to
relievecongestion of
traffic, which is a
menace to the public
safety.
Public welfare liesat the
bottom of the
promulgation of the
said law and the state
inorder to promote the
general welfare may
interfere with
personalliberty, with
property, and with
business and
occupations
. Persons andproperty
may be subject to all
kinds of restraints and
burdens in order to
securethe general
comfort, health, and
prosperity of the State.
To this
fundamentalaims of
the government, the

rights of the individual

are subordinated.
Liberty isa blessing
which should not be
made to prevail over
authority because
society will fall into
anarchy. Neither should
authority be made to
prevail over liberty
because then the
individual will fall into
slavery.
The paradox lies in the
factthat the apparent
curtailment of liberty is
precisely the very
means of insuring its
preserving.
2.
No. Social justice
means the promotion
of the welfare of all the
people, theadoption by
the Government of
measures calculated to
insure economic
stability of all the
competent elements of
society, through the
maintenance of a
propereconomic and
social equilibrium in
the interrelations of the
members of
thecommunity,
constitutionally,

through the adoption of

measures legally
justifiable,or extraconstitutionally,
through the exercise of
powers underlying the
existenceof all
governments on the
time-honored principles
of
salus populi
estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be
founded on the
recognition of the
necessity of
interdependence
among divers and
diverse units of a
society and of
theprotection that
should be equally and
evenly extended to all
groups as acombined
force in our social and
economic life,
consistent with the
fundamentaland
paramount objective of
the state of promoting
health, comfort and
quiet of all persons,
and of bringing about
the greatest good to
the greatest number.
THE PETITION IS
DENIED WITH COSTS
AGAINST THE
PETITIONER.