Regino Vs Pangasinan Colleges
Regino Vs Pangasinan Colleges
Regino Vs Pangasinan Colleges
Whether or not the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) has exclusive original jurisdiction over
actions for damages based upon violation of the Civil Code provisions on human relations filed by a
student against the school.[9]
All of the foregoing point to one issue -- whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
is applicable. The Court, however, sees a second issue which, though not expressly raised by petitioner,
was impliedly contained in her Petition: whether the Complaint stated sufficient cause(s) of action.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Respondents anchored their Motion to Dismiss on petitioners alleged failure to exhaust administrative
remedies before resorting to the RTC. According to them, the determination of the controversy hinge on
the validity, the wisdom and the propriety of PCSTs academic policy. Thus, the Complaint should have
been lodged in the CHED, the administrative body tasked under Republic Act No. 7722 to implement the
state policy to protect, foster and promote the right of all citizens to affordable quality education at all
levels and to take appropriate steps to ensure that education is accessible to all. [10]
Petitioner counters that the doctrine finds no relevance to the present case since she is praying for
damages, a remedy beyond the domain of the CHED and well within the jurisdiction of the courts. [11]
Petitioner is correct. First, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has no bearing on the
present case. In Factoran Jr. v. CA,[12] the Court had occasion to elucidate on the rationale behind this
doctrine:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of
law, comity, and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative
remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given the
appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the
administrative forum. x x x.[13]
Petitioner is not asking for the reversal of the policies of PCST. Neither is she demanding it to allow her
to take her final examinations; she was already enrolled in another educational institution. A reversal of
the acts complained of would not adequately redress her grievances; under the circumstances, the
consequences of respondents acts could no longer be undone or rectified.
Second, exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence on the part of
the administrative body to act upon the matter complained of. [14] Administrative agencies are not courts;
they are neither part of the judicial system, nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. [15] Specifically, the
CHED does not have the power to award damages. [16]Hence, petitioner could not have commenced her
case before the Commission.
Third, the exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions, one of which arises when the issue is purely legal
and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court. [17] Petitioners action for damages inevitably calls for the
application and the interpretation of the Civil Code, a function that falls within the jurisdiction of the courts.
[18]
Second Issue:
Cause of Action
Sufficient Causes of Action Stated
in the Allegations in the Complaint
As a rule, every complaint must sufficiently allege a cause of action; failure to do so warrants its
dismissal.[19] A complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on
its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for. Assuming the facts that are
alleged to be true, the court should be able to render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the
complaint.[20]
A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the alleged
facts. In their Motion to Dismiss, respondents did not dispute any of petitioners allegations, and they
admitted that x x x the crux of plaintiffs cause of action is the determination of whether or not the
assessment of P100 per ticket is excessive or oppressive. [21] They thereby premised their prayer for
dismissal on the Complaints alleged failure to state a cause of action. Thus, a reexamination of the
Complaint is in order.
The Complaint contains the following factual allegations:
10.
In the second week of February 2002, defendant Rachelle A. Gamurot, in connivance
with PCST, forced plaintiff and her classmates to buy or take two tickets each, x x x;
11.
Plaintiff and many of her classmates objected to the forced distribution and selling of
tickets to them but the said defendant warned them that if they refused [to] take or pay
the price of the two tickets they would not be allowed at all to take the final
examinations;
12.
As if to add insult to injury, defendant Rachelle A. Gamurot bribed students with
additional fifty points or so in their test score in her subject just to unjustly influence and
compel them into taking the tickets;
13.
Despite the students refusal, they were forced to take the tickets because [of]
defendant Rachelle A. Gamurots coercion and act of intimidation, but still many of them
including the plaintiff did not attend the dance party imposed upon them by defendants
PCST and Rachelle A. Gamurot;
14.
Plaintiff was not able to pay the price of her own two tickets because aside form the
fact that she could not afford to pay them it is also against her religious practice as a
The amount was refundable after the student graduated or left the school. After noting that the
imposition of the fee was made only after prior consultation and approval by the parents of the students,
the Court held that the school committed no actionable wrong in refusing to admit the children of the
petitioners therein for their failure to pay the land purchase deposit and the 2.5 percent monthly
surcharge thereon.
In the present case, PCST imposed the assailed revenue-raising measure belatedly, in the middle of
the semester. It exacted the dance party fee as a condition for the students taking the final examinations,
and ultimately for its recognition of their ability to finish a course. The fee, however, was not part of the
school-student contract entered into at the start of the school year. Hence, it could not be unilaterally
imposed to the prejudice of the enrollees.
Such contract is by no means an ordinary one. In Non, we stressed that the school-student contract
is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the
grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions. [32] Sections 5 (1)
and (3) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution provide:
The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at
all levels and shall take appropriate steps to make such declaration accessible to all.
Every student has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements.
The same state policy resonates in Section 9(2) of BP 232, otherwise known as the Education Act of
1982:
Section 9. Rights of Students in School. In addition to other rights, and subject to
the limitations prescribed by law and regulations, students and pupils in all schools shall
enjoy the following rights:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(2) The right to freely choose their field of study subject to existing
curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation, except in
cases of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations.
Liability for Tort
In her Complaint, petitioner also charged that private respondents inhumanly punish students x x x
by reason only of their poverty, religious practice or lowly station in life, which inculcated upon [petitioner]
the feelings of guilt, disgrace and unworthiness;[33] as a result of such punishment, she was allegedly
unable to finish any of her subjects for the second semester of that school year and had to lag behind in
her studies by a full year. The acts of respondents supposedly caused her extreme humiliation, mental
agony and demoralization of unimaginable proportions in violation of Articles 19, 21 and 26 of the Civil
Code. These provisions of the law state thus:
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall
produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his beliefs, lowly station in life, place of
birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.
Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not otherwise bound by a contract. An
academic institution, however, may be held liable for tort even if it has an existing contract with its
students, since the act that violated the contract may also be a tort. We ruled thus in PSBA vs. CA,[34] from
which we quote:
x x x A perusal of Article 2176 [of the Civil Code] shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts
or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound
by contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court
from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. In Air France v.
Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the private respondent was awarded damages for his unwarranted
expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner airline. It is noted, however, that the Court
referred to the petitioner-airlines liability as one arising from tort, not one arising form a contract of
carriage. In effect, Air France is authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there
is a contract, for the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. x x x This view was not all that
revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this Court was already of a similar mind. In Cangco v.
Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated thus: x x x. When such a contractual
relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which
constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual
obligation had no contract existed between the parties.
Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, particularly
Article 21 x x x.[35]
Academic Freedom
In their Memorandum, respondents harp on their right to academic freedom. We are not impressed.
According to present jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the independence of an academic
institution to determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4)
who may be admitted to study.[36] In Garcia v. the Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology,
[37]
the Court upheld the respondent therein when it denied a female students admission to theological
studies in a seminary for prospective priests. The Court defined the freedom of an academic institution
thus: to decide for itself aims and objectives and how best to attain them x x x free from outside coercion
or interference save possibly when overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. [38]
In Tangonan v. Pao,[39] the Court upheld, in the name of academic freedom, the right of the school to
refuse readmission of a nursing student who had been enrolled on probation, and who had failed her
nursing subjects. These instances notwithstanding, the Court has emphasized that once a school has, in
the name of academic freedom, set its standards, these should be meticulously observed and should not
be used to discriminate against certain students. [40] After accepting them upon enrollment, the school
cannot renege on its contractual obligation on grounds other than those made known to, and accepted by,
students at the start of the school year.
In sum, the Court holds that the Complaint alleges sufficient causes of action against respondents, and
that it should not have been summarily dismissed. Needless to say, the Court is not holding respondents
liable for the acts complained of. That will have to be ruled upon in due course by the court a quo.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed Orders REVERSED. The trial court is
DIRECTED to reinstate the Complaint and, with all deliberate speed, to continue the proceedings in Civil
Case No. U-7541. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on leave.
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