51-1 Judicial Defendants' Answering Brief

Case: 14-56140, 12/19/2014, ID: 9356705, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 1 of 76
Appeal No. 14-56140

IN THE
UNITED STATESCOURT OFAPPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CALIFORNIA COALITION FOR FAMILIESAND CHILDREN, PBC
a Delaware public benefit corporation, COLBERN C. STUART, III,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
SAN DIEGO COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION, et. al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California
Case No. 13-CV-1944-CAB-BLM
The Honorable CathyAnn Bencivengo
JOINT ANSWERING BRIEFOFJUDICIAL DEFENDANTSAPPELLEES
James B. Gilpin,Bar No. 151466

Matthew L. Green,Bar No. 227904
BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP
655W est Broadway,15th Floor
San Diego,California 92101
Telephone:(619) 525-1300
Facsimile: (619) 233-6118
Attorneys for Judicial DefendantsAppellees SUPERIOR COURT OF

CALIFORNIA,COUNTY OFSAN
DIEGO,et. al.
TABLE OFCONTENTS
Page
I.
INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................1
II.
STATEMENT OFISSUES..........................................................................4
III.
STATEMENT OFFACTS..........................................................................5
IV.
A.
The Stuart Dissolution .......................................................................5
B.
Stuarts Criminal ProceedingPeople v. Stuart ................................6
C.
The April 15,2010Bar Association Event.........................................8
D.
The FilingOf This Action And The Inclusion Of Judicial

OfficersHome Addresses In the Complaint......................................9
PROCEDURALHISTORY.......................................................................11
A.
The Motions to Dismiss the Complaint ............................................11
B.
The First Amended Complaint And Omnibus Motion To

Dismiss ............................................................................................14
C.
The Dismissal of the Action.............................................................16
V.
STANDARD OFREVIEW .......................................................................16
VI.
SUMMARY OFARGUMENT .................................................................17
VII. ARGUMENT ............................................................................................20

A.
THEDISTRICT COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS

DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THEACTION FOR
FAILURETO COMPLY W ITH FEDERAL RULEOFCIVIL
PROCEDURE8..............................................................................20
1.
AppellantsFailure To ComplyW ith Rule 8W as One Of

Several Enumerated Grounds In Support Of The
Omnibus Motion To Dismiss .................................................22
2.
The District Court CorrectlyConcluded That The FAC

Failed To SatisfyRule 8.........................................................22
3.
The District Court Did Consider And ProperlyApply

The Relevant Factors For Dismissal Under Rule 41(b) ..........25
-i-
TABLE OFCONTENTS
(continued)
Page
4.
B.
C.
The InvoluntaryDismissal W as Supported W ith Or

W ithout The District Courts Prior Order On The
Original Complaint ................................................................28
JUDICIALIMMUNITY BARSALLCLAIMSARISING OUT

OFSTUARTSDISSOLUTION AND CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS..............................................................................29
1.
Ashelman and Sparkman Are BindingPrecedent In This

Circuit....................................................................................31
2.
The District Court CorrectlyApplied Circuit Precedent.........34
3.
The Recycled Claims In The FAC ConcerningStuarts

Dissolution Proceeding,As W ell As The New Claims
RelatingTo People v. Stuart,Are Also Barred By
Judicial Immunity..................................................................35
4.
No Historical Analysis Of Judicial ImmunityW as

Necessary...............................................................................36
5.
FamilyLaw Judges Are Also Afforded Judicial

Immunity...............................................................................37
THEDISTRICT COURTSJUDGMENT MAY BE

AFFIRMED ON NUMEROUSOTHER GROUNDS......................38
1.
The Claims Against The Judicial Defendants In Counts 1

And 2,W hich Arise From The So-Called Stuart
Assault,
Are Time-Barred ....................................................39
2.
Counts 1 And 2 Also Fail To State Facts Sufficient To

State A Claim Against AnyJudicial Defendants ....................40
3.
The Claims Against Judicial Defendants In Count 3,

W hich Relate To People v. Stuart,Also Fail To State
Sufficient Facts ......................................................................41
4.
The Claims In Count 3 Against Judge Groch Are Also

Barred ByThe Rooker-Feldman Doctrine..............................41
-ii-
TABLE OFCONTENTS
(continued)
Page
5.
Count 4,W hich Arises From AppellantsInclusion Of

Judicial OfficersHome Addresses In Their Original
Complaint,Fails To State Sufficient Facts .............................42
6.
The Claims For SupervisoryLiabilityIn Count 6Are

Devoid Of Sufficient Facts.....................................................44
7.
The Claims Against The Superior Court,Judicial

Council,and AOC In Count 7Are Barred ByEleventh
Amendment Immunity...........................................................46
8.
Counts 9And 10Fail To State Facts Sufficient To State

A Claim For Violation Of Sections 1985and 1986................47
9.
The Claims Against Judicial Defendants In Count 11 Are

Barred ByThe Rooker-Feldman Doctrine..............................50
10.
Counts 12 and 13 Fail To State Facts Sufficient To State

A Claim Against AnyJudicial Defendant ..............................51
11.
Count 15Does Not And Cannot State Facts Sufficient To

State A Claim Against The Judicial Defendants For False
AdvertisingUnder The Lanham Act ......................................51
12.
The FAC Does Not Allege Facts Sufficient To State A

Civil RICO Claim Against The Judicial Defendants ..............53
13.
The Claims For Prospective Relief Are Barred For Lack

Of StandingAnd Under Principles Of Abstention..................56
D.
NONE OFTHEDISTRICT COURTSCOMMENTS

SUPPORT APPELLANTSPARTIALITY CHALLENGE.............57
E.
THEDISTRICT COURT PROPERLY APPLIED ITS

DISCRETION IN DENYING STUARTSMOTION FOR
COUNTER-SANCTIONS............................................................58
VIII. CONCLUSION .........................................................................................61
-iii-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Federal Cases
Alan Neuman Prods., Inc. v. Albright,
862 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1988)............................................................. 55
Arnold v. Bostick,
339 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1964)............................................................... 37
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009)............................................................................. 25
Ashelman v. Pope,
793 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1986) .................................................... passim
Awabdy v. City of Adelanto,
368 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2004)............................................................. 41
B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist.,
192 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1999)............................................................. 56
Barrus v. Sylvania,
55 F.3d 468 (9th Cir. 1995)................................................................. 52
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007)............................................................................. 25
Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam,
334 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2003)............................................................... 42
Blake v. Dierdorff,
856 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1988)............................................................. 55
Bradley v. Fisher,
80 U.S. (13 Wall) 335 (1872)....................................................... passim
Bretz v. Kelman,
773 F.2d 1026 (9th Cir. 1985)............................................................. 48
-iv-
Estate of Brooks v. U.S.,

197 F.3d 1245 (9th Cir. 1999)............................................................. 40
Ipcon Collections LLC v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,
698 F.3d 58 (2nd Cir. 2012) ................................................................ 59
Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys.,
637 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2011)................................................. 17, 23, 25
Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,
404 U.S. 508 (1972)............................................................................. 43
Canlis v. San Joaquin Sheriffs Posse Comitatus,
641 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1981)......................................................... 48, 49
In re Century 21-Re/Max,
882 F. Supp. 915 (C.D. Cal. 1994) ...................................................... 53
Cerrato v. San Francisco Cmty. Coll. Dist.,
26 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 1994)................................................................. 48
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,
461 U.S. 95 (1983)............................................................................... 56
Delew v. Wagner,
143 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1998)............................................................. 43
Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462 (1983)............................................................................. 41
Doe & Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano,
252 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2001)............................................................. 42
Duvall v. County of Kitsap,
260 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2001)............................................................. 37
E.T. v. Cantil-Sakauye,
682 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) ...................................................... 46, 57
Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York,
762 F.2d 243 (2nd Cir. 1985) .............................................................. 59
-v-
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,

544 U.S. 280 (2005)............................................................................. 41
Farm Credit Servs. v. Am. State Bank,
339 F.3d 764 (8th Cir. 2003)............................................................... 25
Forrett v. Richardson,
112 F.3d 416 (9th Cir. 1997)............................................................... 45
Forsyth v. Humana, Inc.,
114 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1997)............................................................. 42
Franceschi v. Schwartz,
57 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 1995)................................................................. 46
Greater Los Angeles Council of Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin,
812 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1987)....................................................... 46, 47
Griffin v. Breckenridge,
403 U.S. 88 (1971)......................................................................... 49, 50
Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. City of Morgan Hill,
353 F.3d 651 (9th Cir. 2003)............................................................... 39
Hansen v. Black,
885 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1989)............................................................... 44
Hart v. Massanari,
266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001)............................................................. 32
Hearns v. San Bernardino Police Dept.,
530 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2008)....................................................... 21, 28
Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477 (1994)............................................................................. 41
Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept.,
839 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1988)............................................................... 48
Kush v. Rutledge,
460 U.S. 719 (1983)............................................................................. 48
-vi -
Lacey v. Maricopa County,

693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012) ........................................................ 28, 42
Lancaster Community Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist.,
940 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1991)............................................................... 55
Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp.,
464 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2006)......................................................... 26, 28
Liteky v. United States,
510 U.S. 540 (1994)....................................................................... 57, 58
Long v. County of Los Angeles,
442 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2006)............................................................. 40
Margolis v. Ryan,
140 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 1998)............................................................... 40
McHenry v. Renne,
84 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2003)......................................................... 16, 22
Meek v. County of Riverside,
183 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 1999)............................................................... 17
Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc.,
540 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2008)....................................................... 16, 17
Mireles v. Waco,
502 U.S. 9 (1991) .................................................................... 29, 30, 36
Moore v. Brewster,
96 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 1996)............................................................... 29
Moore v. Kayport Package Exp., Inc.,
885 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1989)............................................................... 55
Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co.,
651 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1981)................................................... 21, 22, 28
Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp.,
378 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2004)............................................................. 52
-vii -
OShea v. Littleton,
414 U.S. 488 (1974)............................................................. 4, 19, 39, 57
Occupational-Urgent Health Sys., Inc. v. Sutro & Co.,
711 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. Cal. 1989) .................................................... 54
Odom v. Microsoft Corp.,
486 F.3d 541 (9th Cir. 2007)............................................................... 54
Orin v. Barclay,
272 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2001)............................................................. 50
Parke v. Raley,
506 U.S. 20 (1992)............................................................................... 16
Parker v. Google, Inc.,
422 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2006)................................................... 53
Pesnell v. Arsenault,
543 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2008)............................................................. 58
Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. 547 (1967)....................................................................... 33, 36
PlayMakers LLC v. ESPN, Inc.,
376 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2004)............................................................... 34
Portman v. County of Santa Clara,
995 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1993)............................................................... 49
Reves v. Ernst & Young,
507 U.S. 170 (1993)............................................................................. 54
RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle,
307 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2002)............................................................. 49
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413 (1923)............................................................................. 41
San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco,
145 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 1998)............................................................. 57
-viii -
Schmidt v. Herrmann,
614 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1980)....................................................... 22, 26
Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court,
318 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2003)....................................................... 46, 47
Skydive Arizona, Inc. v. Quattrocchi,
673 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2012)............................................................. 52
Stump v. Sparkman,
435 U.S. 349 (1978)..................................................................... passim
Tan v. Univ. of S. Cal.,
252 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2001)............................................................. 38
U.S. v. Bosch,
951 F.2d 1546 (9th Cir. 1991)....................................................... 17, 58
U.S. v. Lockheed-Martin Corp.,
328 F.3d 374 (7th Cir. 2003)......................................................... 21, 25
U.S. v. Odachyan,
749 F.3d 798 (9th Cir. 2014)............................................................... 58
Usher v. City of Los Angeles,
828 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1987)............................................................... 39
Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police,
491 U.S. 58 (1989)............................................................................... 47
Winterrowd v. Am. Gen. Annuity Ins. Co.,
556 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 1999)............................................................... 17
Wolfe v. Strankman,
392 F.3d 358 (9th Cir. 2004)............................................................... 47
Woodrum v. Woodward County,
866 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1989)............................................................. 40
Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971)....................................................................... passim
-ix-
Yourish v. California Amplifier,

191 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 1999)............................................................... 26
State Cases
Olsen v. Harbison,
119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 460 (Ct. App. 2010) ................................................ 43
Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Superior Court,
238 P. 687 (Cal. 1925) ......................................................................... 46
Federal Statutes
15 U.S.C. 1125 ..................................................................................... 52
18 U.S.C. 1961 ...................................................................................... 54
18 U.S.C. 1962 ................................................................................ 53, 54
28 U.S.C. 1391 ...................................................................................... 44
42 U.S.C. 1983 .............................................................................. passim
42 U.S.C. 1985 ...................................................................... 9, 14, 47, 50
42 U.S.C. 1986 ...................................................................... 9, 14, 47, 50
State Statutes
Cal. Civ. Code 47 .................................................................................. 43
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 335.1 .................................................................... 39
Cal. Fam. Code 200............................................................................... 38
Cal. Gov. Code 6254.21................................................................... 10, 43
Cal. Gov. Code 70301-70404............................................................... 47
Cal. Gov. Code 77003............................................................................ 46
Cal. Gov. Code 77200............................................................................. 46
Cal. Penal Code 646.9............................................................................. 6
-x-
Cal. Penal Code 653m......................................................................... 6, 7

Rules
Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 10.81 .................................................................... 46
Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 10.810 .................................................................. 47
Fed. R. App. P. 28.................................................................................... 25
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8............................................................................... passim
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9....................................................................................... 55
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 ............................................................................. passim
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 ............................................................................... 24, 28
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 ............................................................................. passim
Constitutional Provisions
Eleventh Amendment ..................................................................... passim
Cal. Const. Article VI, 1.................................................................. 46, 53
Cal. Const. Article VI, 5........................................................................ 46
-xi -
I.
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is an appeal from the dismissal of a lawsuit brought bya
disgruntled family court litigant,Colbern C. Stuart (Stuart),against nearly 60
defendants identified as San Diegos familylaw community. Stuart generally
claims that anyone involved with his divorce proceeding,which includes the
family court j
udges that presided over the matter and their supervisors,state
judicial branch entities,familylaw attorneys and firms,and forensic psychologists,
conspired together to deprive Stuart of his federal familyrights.1
Stuart also alleges San Diegos familylaw communityretaliated against
him as a result of complaints regarding the family law systemthat he lodged
with various governmental agencies,elected officials,and media outlets. Namely,
The j
udicial defendants named in this action consist of the (1) Superior
Court of California,Countyof San Diego (Superior Court),(2) Hon. Robert J.
Trentacosta,Judge of the Superior Court,(3) Michael M. Roddy,Executive Officer
of the Superior Court,(4) Judicial Council of California (Judicial Council),(5)
Hon. Steven Jahr,Administrative Director of the Courts,(6) Administrative Office
of the Courts (AOC),(7) Hon. Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye,Chief Justice of
California,(8) Hon. Lisa Schall,Judge of the Superior Court,(9) Hon. Lorna A.
Alksne,Judge of the Superior Court,(10) Hon. Christine K. Goldsmith,Judge of
the Superior Court (Ret.),(11) Hon. Jeannie Lowe,Commissioner of the Superior
Court (Ret.),(12) Hon. W illiam H. McAdam,Jr.,Judge of the Superior Court
(Ret.),(13) Hon. Edlene C. McKenzie,Commissioner of the Superior Court,(14)
Hon. Joel R. W ohlfeil,Judge of the Superior Court,(15) Hon. Michael S. Groch,
Judge of the Superior Court,and (16) Kristine P. Nesthus,the Director of Legal
Services and General Counsel for the Superior Court (collectively,Judicial
Defendants).
1
-1-
Stuart asserts that the familylaw communityconspired together to bringabout

the filing of criminal harassment and stalking charges against him by the San
Diego CityAttorneys Office for conduct directed at his ex-spouse,for which he
was convicted,and Stuarts purported assault in April 2010 at a San Diego
CountyBar Association (Bar Association) familylaw seminar.
As implausible as Stuarts conspiracytheoryis,Stuart filed the instant action
pro se in August 2013. The original complaint purported to assert approximately
36claims in a complaint roughly175pages in length,and more than 1,
300pages
with exhibits.
Aside from the sparse factual averments buried in pages of
generalized grievances about the family courts,

as the district court found,the
complaint was confusing,redundant,[and] conclusory,
fail[ed] to clearly
identify each separate claim for relief,
and fail[ed]to connect [the]factual
allegations to the numerous causes of action identified,
amongother deficiencies.
(ER 46-47.)
The district court dismissed the complaint with leave to amend for failure to
comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8,which requires pleadings to
contain a short and plain statement of the claim and that each allegation be
simple,concise,and direct[.]Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2),(d)(1). The district court
also dismissed with prej
udice Stuarts damages claims against the defendant j
udges
under the doctrine of judicial immunity,which bars claims arisingout of j
udicial
-2-
acts within the jurisdiction of their courts. Stump v. Sparkman,435U.S. 349,356

(1978);Ashelman v. Pope,793 F.2d 1072,1075(9th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
Rather than attempt to correct the pleading deficiencies identified by the
district court,Stuart filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC),which asserted
more than 100claims and grew in size to 251 pages,and nearly1,
550pages with
exhibits. Given the amended pleading was even longer than the original and
remain[ed]
unmanageable, argumentative, confusing, and
frequently
incomprehensible,
(ER 10),the district court again found that Stuart failed to
complywith Rule 8and the district courts prior order.
Based on the substantial harm to the defendants,the district court,and
litigants in other matters pending before the district court,coupled with Stuarts
inability,or unwillingness,to file a Rule 8-compliant pleading,the district court
properlydismissed the action with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(b),which permits dismissals for failure to complywith Rule 8or a court order.
For the reasons explained in this brief,the Court should affirm the district courts
dismissal of the action for failure to complywith Rule 8. W hile Rule 8alone is
sufficient to affirm the dismissal of the action,ample other grounds also support
the district courts j
udgment.
-3-
II.
STATEMENT OFISSUES
The issues presented in this appeal are:
(1)
whether the district court abused its discretion in dismissingthe action
for failure to complywith Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8;

(2)
whether the district court properly dismissed the claims against the
judicial officers who presided over Stuarts dissolution and criminal proceedings
under the doctrine of judicial immunity;
(3)
whether the district courts dismissal is supported by other grounds
beyond Rule 8and j

udicial immunity,includingthe statute of limitations,failure to
state facts sufficient to state a claim,the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,Eleventh
Amendment immunity,lackof standing,and abstention under Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37(1971) and OShea v. Littleton,414U.S. 488(1974);
(4)
whether anyremarks of the district j

udge,which merelyreflected her
general frustration with Stuart,amounted to deprivation of an impartial tribunal;

and
(5)
whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Stuart
counter-sanctionsagainst certain Judicial Defendants based on their successful

motion to dismiss the original complaint.
-4-
III.
STATEMENT OFFACTS
As outlined bythe district court,the allegations in this action generallyrelate
to four incidents: (1) Stuarts dissolution proceeding; (2) Stuarts criminal
prosecution and conviction;(3) Stuarts so-called assaultat the Bar Association
event;and (4) Stuarts inclusion of judicial officershome addresses in the original
complaint. (ER 7:
13-16.)
A.
The Stuart Dissolution
The genesis of this action,particularlyStuarts grievances with the family

law system,
appears to begin with Stuarts dissolution proceedingwith his former
spouse,Lynn Stuart (Stuart Dissolution). According to Stuart,who was an
attorney admitted to practice in California,Arizona,and Nevada at the time,the
Honorable Joel R. W ohlfeil,Judge of the Superior Court,recommended that Dr.
Stephen Doyne mediate custody issues in the Stuart Dissolution in April 2008.
(ER 111,3;ER 265,809.) Stuart thereafter hired Dr. Doyne in September
2008,and Judge W ohlfeil is alleged to have had oversight responsibilities in
connection with the mediation. (ER 265,812;ER 270-71,833,835,836-37.)
In December 2008,the Stuart Dissolution was reassigned to another Superior
Court judge,the Honorable Lisa Schall,who allegedly maintained the same
oversight responsibilities until November 2009. (ER 271,837;ER 276,876.)
-5-
Stuart avers that Dr. Doyne caused Stuart to lose shared custodyof his son
and for sole custody to be awarded to Ms. Stuart. (ER 265,817(F).) Stuart
makes numerous other accusations against Dr. Doyne and alleges that Judges
W ohlfeil and Schall did not properly discharge their oversight responsibilities.
(ER 266-71,816-17,821,822-30,838.) Based on the same purported conduct,
Stuart also alleges supervisoryfailuresbythe Honorable Lorna A. Alksne,the
SupervisingFamilyCourt j
udge at the time,the Honorable Robert J. Trentacosta,
the former PresidingJudge of the Superior Court,Michael Roddy,the Executive
Officer of the Superior Court,and the Superior Court itself. (ER 111-12,9-10;
ER 113,19;ER 276,873.)
B.
Stuarts Criminal Proceeding People v. Stuart
This action also stems from the criminal prosecution of Stuart in the matter
of People of the State of California v. Stuart,Superior Court of California,County
of San Diego,Case No. M104094DV (People v. Stuart). In March 2010,Stuart
was charged with multiple violations of California Penal Code section 653m(a) and
2
(b),
as well as one count of stalkingunder California Penal Code section 646.9(a),
based on conduct directed at Ms. Stuart. (ER 181, 373.) Citing to Stuarts
Subdivision (a) generallyprohibits the harassment of others bytelephone or

e-mail with obscene language or threats to inflict inj
ury,while subdivision (b)
generallyprohibits a person from harassingothers with repeated telephone calls or
e-mails.
2
-6-
ongoingobscene and threateningmessages,

an arrest warrant was requested by
the San Diego CityAttorneys Office,which was granted on April 14,2010. (SER
68,70.)
Accordingto Stuart,the Assistant CityAttorneyprosecutingthe case,Emily
Garson,conspiredwith her boss,San Diego CityAttorneyJan Goldsmith,and
his spouse,the Honorable Christine K. Goldsmith,Judge of the Superior Court
(Ret.),in initiating criminal proceedings and obtaining the arrest warrant against
Stuart. (ER 181,373;ER 183,381;ER 204,486-89.) Stuart also claims
that Judge Goldsmiths purported involvement with People v. Stuart,byvirtue of
her marriage to Jan Goldsmith,was with the knowledge and supportof Judges
Schall and W ohlfeil. (ER 183,382.)
The Honorable Michael S. Groch,also a Superior Court j
udge,was assigned
as the trial j
udge in People v. Stuart. (ER 187,402.) Stuart was ultimately
convicted of multiple violations of California Penal Code section 653m and
sentenced by Judge Groch in March 2011. (ER 190,416-17.) After serving
approximately 90 days in jail,Stuart was conditionally released from custodyin
May 2011.
(ER 191, 421-22.)
As a result of violating the terms of his
suspended sentence,however,Stuart was arrested in April 2012,and returned to

jail until May 2013. (ER 194-95,433,439.) Stuart also alleges that Judge
Groch issued multiple domestic violence restrainingorders prohibitinganycontact
-7-
with Ms. Stuart. (See ER 191,422-23;ER 196,444;ER 199,462.) Stuarts

conviction in People v. Stuart also led to his disbarment in California,Arizona,and
Nevada. (ER 192-93,426-32;SER 74-75,77-82,84,86,88-91.)
C.
The April 15, 2010 Bar Association Event
This matter also arises out of a familylaw seminar hosted bythe San Diego
CountyBar Association on April 15,2010,which Stuart identifies as the central
subject of this litigation. (Compl. 114-15;ER 135-36,109.) Stuart alleges
that Judges Goldsmith, W ohlfeil and W illiam H. McAdam, Jr. (Ret.), and
Commissioners Jeannie Lowe (Ret.) and Edlene C. McKenzie were organizers
and panel members in connection with the seminar. (ER 113-14, 21-25.)
Stuart also avers that Judge Alksne served as a panel member at the seminar. (ER
136,110;ER 139,125.)
Stuart attended the seminar for the purpose of gainingknowledge in order
to advance [his]PUBLIC BENEFIT ACTIVITY. (ER 138,121.) Accordingto
Stuart,duringher introductoryremarks,Judge Alksne announced an abrupt break,
apologizingthat she needed a breakso we can straighten somethingout. (ER
139,125.) Judge Alksne is alleged to have conferred with Sheriffs deputies,
security guards,and other individuals regarding Stuart. (ER 139, 126-27.)
Sheriffs deputies and private security officers thereafter asked Stuart multiple
times to accompanythem in leavingthe seminar. (ER 139,128.) Stuart refused
-8-
to leave and was ultimatelyhandcuffed and removed from the seminar. (ER 140,
132.) Stuart was released once outside of the seminar and told not to return. (ER
140,133.)
D.
The Filing Of This Action And The Inclusion Of Judicial Officers

Home Addresses In the Complaint
On August 20,2013,Stuart and the California Coalition for Families and

Children,PBC (California Coalition) (collectively,Appellants),a Delaware
corporation formed by Stuart the day before he filed this action,and whose
membership allegedly consists of other aggrieved family court participants,filed
this action against dozens of defendants generallyreferred to as the FamilyLaw
Community.3 (Compl.;ER 111,3-4;ER 121,63;SER 72.) Appellants
complaint totaled roughly175pages,plus 1,
156pages of exhibits,and contained
numerous acronyms of [Appellants]invention. (Compl.;ER 42:
14-15.) The
complaint purported to assert approximately36claims arisingunder 42 U.S.C.
1983,1985,and 1986,the Lanham Act,the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO),the Declaratory Judgment Act,and California state
law. (Compl.)
Stuarts former law corporation,Lexevia,P.C.,was also a plaintiff in the

original complaint,but was omitted from the First Amended Complaint and is not
a partyto this appeal. (See Compl. 3,107-08;ER 1:
22-35;ER 7n.1.)
3
-9-
For no ostensible purpose other than intimidation,the complaint also

included the residential addresses of Judges Trentacosta,Schall,Alksne,and
W ohlfeil,and the Chief Justice of California,the Honorable Tani G. CantilSakauye.4 (Compl. 11,17,22,23,29.) After viewing the complaint on the
Internet,Kristine Nesthus,the Superior Courts Director of Legal Services and
General Counsel,delivered a letter to Appellants on August 25,2013,demanding
that the residential addresses be removed from the Internet and that steps be taken
to remove the information from PACER under California Government Code
section 6254.21.5 (See ER 208-10,510-26.) Ms. Nesthus,who allegedlyacted
in collaboration with and under the direction of Mr. Roddy and Judge
Trentacosta,also attempted to contact Stuart directly by e-mail and through his
attorneyservice bytelephone to demand that the home addresses be removed from
the Internet. (ER 209,518;ER 210,524;ER 214,538.)
Rather than comply with Ms. Nesthuss requests,Appellants applied ex
parte to the district court on August 26,2013,for an order excusing their
The home address of Lawrence J. Simi,Chairperson for the Commission on

Judicial Performance,was also included in the complaint. (Compl. 19.)
4
California Government Code section 6254.21 prohibits any person from

displayingon the Internet the home address of anyelected or appointed official,
which includes j
udges and court commissioners,if that official has demanded in
writing that the person remove his or her home address. Cal. Gov. Code
6254.21(c)(1),(f)(3).
5
-10-
compliance with the requests. (SER 5:24-6:

1;SER 15:
9-26.) Plaintiffsexparte
application acknowledged that as of the prior day,the VERIFIED COMPLAINT
containingthe residential addresses of several Defendants ha[d]been viewed over
119,
296 times [on an Internet blog],and this number is progressing at a rate of
about 20,
000views per day. (SER 6:18-7:5.)
Recognizing that the complaint contains confidential information,
particularly the home addresses of judicial officers,the district court issued a
minute order on August 26,2013,directingthat the complaint be sealed. (SER 25,
26.) Appellants nevertheless allege that Ms. Nesthus,along with Mr. Roddy,
Judges Trentacosta,Alksne,W ohlfeil,Schall,Goldsmith,McAdam,and Groch,
and Commissioners Lowe and McKenzie,obstructed j
ustice. (ER 208,509;
ER 214-16,540,542,544,546,548.)
IV.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A.
The Motions to Dismiss the Complaint
On September 30,2013,the Judicial Defendants who had been served at the

time,which were collectively identified as the Superior Court Defendants,
6
moved to dismiss the complaint on numerous grounds,including,but not limited
The Superior Court Defendantsconsisted of the Superior Court,Judges
Trentacosta,Schall,Alksne,Goldsmith,McAdam,and W ohlfeil,Commissioners
Lowe and McKenzie,and Mr. Roddy. (SER 28:5-15.)
6
-11-
to,the California Coalitions failure to obtain counsel,non-compliance with

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8,j
udicial immunity,and the statute of limitations.
(SER 28:1-19;SER 2:
20;SER 41:
5-42:4.) Several other defendants also filed
motions to dismiss the complaint on similar or related grounds,which included the
Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP) and its officials,Brad Battson and
Lawrence J. Simi. (SER 95.)
The Superior Court also moved for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 based on the frivolous nature of the claims and the inclusion of
judicial officershome addresses in the complaint. (SER 97.) In response,Stuart
filed his own motion for Rule 11 sanctions on the ground that the Superior Court
Defendantsmotion to dismiss the complaint was frivolous. (SER 104;ER 37:
1115.)
The district court heard the Superior Court Defendantsand the CJPparties
motions to dismiss on December 19,2013,and thereafter issued its order on
December 23,2013. (ER 41:17-21.) The district court dismissed the California
Coalitions claims without prej
udice due to its failure to obtain counsel. (ER 45:827.)
As to Stuarts claims,the district court dismissed them without prejudice for
failure to comply with Rule 8(a)(2). (ER 46:2-4.) The district court found that
Stuarts individual claims could not be distinguished from those of the California
-12-
Coalition,that each claim for relief was not clearlyand separatelyidentified,and

that the complaint was confusing,redundant,conclusory,and buries its factual
allegations in pages of generalized grievances about the familycourts. (ER 46:647:
25.) The district court also dismissed with prej
udice Stuarts claims against
the defendant j
udges for damages arisingout of judicial acts within the j
urisdiction
of their courts. (ER 48:
2-4.)
Although Stuart requested that the dismissal of the complaint on Rule 8
grounds be with prej
udice in order to expedite his filingof an appeal,(ER 63:
2023),the district courts dismissal was nevertheless without prejudice,(ER 48:2426). In amendingthe complaint,the district court cautioned Stuart to be waryof
the immunityand statute-of-limitation issues . (ER 48:
28.)
The district court denied the Superior Courts sanctions motion,but warned
that sanctions against Appellants would be considered if the amended complaint
does not provide justifiable reasonsas to why each defendant is named in the
action,does not take judicial immunityinto account,and names judicial defendants
just to harass them. (ER 59:21-60:1.) The district court also advised Stuart that
[he was]lucky [he wasnt]sanctioned for filing a complaint representing a
corporation where [he]knew,as a disbarred lawyer,[he]had no right to do that.
(ER 38:
4-7.)
Given the Superior Court Defendants motion to dismiss was
-13-
granted,the district court found that the motion was not frivolous and denied
Stuarts sanctions motion. (ER 16:16-17:
9.)
B.
The First Amended Complaint And Omnibus Motion To Dismiss
On January 9,2014,the California Coalition,after retaining counsel,and

Stuart filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC). (ER 109.) Rather than set forth
a short plain statement as directed by the district court,the FAC increased the
length of the original complaint to 251 pages,plus 1,
297pages of exhibits,added
7
roughly eleven new defendants to the case,
and continued to utilize countless,
lengthy,concocted acronyms. (ER 7:12-13;ER 8:

6-9:
7.)
The FAC included over 1,
200numbered paragraphs and was divided into 28
counts. (ER 143-356,149-1203.) The first 15counts were subdivided into 75
claims generally arising under 42 U.S.C. 1983,1985,and 1986,the Lanham
Act,and California state law. (ER 143-292,149-914;ER 25-27.) The FAC
also contained an additional eleven RICO counts and two counts for prospective
relief. (ER 316-49,1001-1180;ER 351-54,1192-1203.)
In order to promote efficiency, the district court scheduled a case
management conference for February 26,2014.
(SER 155.)
At the case
management conference,the district court expressed its preference to have the

The new defendants named in the FAC included the Honorable Steven Jahr,
Administrative Director of the Courts,Judge Groch,and Ms. Nesthus. (ER 112,
12;ER 115-16,26,31.)
7
-14-
defendants file one j

oint motion,rather than receive separate motions from the
multitude of defendants. (ER 25:3-15.) The district court added that it would like
to see one motion that addresses the issues the Court previouslyraised regarding
Rule 8,regardingthe statute of limitations,and regardingthe immunityissues on
the broad perspective that most of the defendants mayhave immunity . (ER
27:
13-17.) Following the case management conference,the district court set a
briefingschedule,which was to commence with the filingof an omnibus motion
to dismissbythe Bar Association and be followed bythe filingof j
oinders and
supplemental motions to dismissbyother defendants. (SER 157.)
Pursuant to the district courts briefingschedule,the Bar Association filed
the omnibus motion to dismiss the FAC on March 28,2014. (SER 159.) Among
other grounds,the omnibus motion sought dismissal based on Appellantsfailure
to complywith Rules 8and 9of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (SER 159.)
On April 10,2014,the Judicial Defendants filed their notice of j
oinder in the
omnibus motion to dismiss,as well as their supplemental memorandum of points
and authorities,the stated purpose of which was to advance those additional
grounds supporting dismissal of the action as against the Judicial Defendants.
(SER 222:
8-10,SER 232-34.) On May13,2014,the Superior Court and the AOC
also filed a motion for Rule 11 sanctions based on the continuingfrivolous nature
of Appellantslawsuit and failure to comply with the district courts directives.
-15-
(SER 236-39.) After all briefingconcluded,the district court tookthe matter under
submission. (SER 265.)
C.
The Dismissal of the Action
On July8,2014,the district court issued an order dismissingthe case with

prejudice for failure to comply with Rule 8.
(ER 6-12.)
The district court
appropriatelyreasoned that that the FAC remains unmanageable,argumentative,

confusing,and frequentlyincomprehensible. (ER 10:22-26.) The district court
further observed that Appellantsnon-compliance with Rule 8 prej
udiced the
defendants and harmed litigants in other pending matters.
(ER 10:
27-11:
10.)
Although recognizingthat the amended submission is even more unmanageable

than the original ,
the district court nevertheless declined to impose sanctions.
(ER 11:21-12:
3.) Judgment in favor of the defendants was entered on July9,2014,
and the instant appeal ensued. (ER 1-5.)
V.
STANDARD OFREVIEW
The decision of a district court is generallypresumed to be correct. Parke v.
Raley,506 U.S. 20,29 (1992). A dismissal for failure to satisfy the pleading
standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
McHenry v. Renne,84 F.3d 1172,1177(9th Cir. 2003). The denial of leave to
amend a complaint is also reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Metzler Inv.
-16-
GMBH v. Corinthian Colleges,Inc.,540F.3d 1049,1072 (9th Cir. 2008). [T]he

district courts discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where
plaintiff has previously amended the complaint. Id.;see also Cafasso v. Gen.
Dynamics C4 Sys.,637F.3d 1047,1058(9th Cir. 2011).
The district courts dismissal based on judicial immunityis a question of law
reviewed de novo. Meek v. County of Riverside,183 F.3d 962,965 (9th Cir.
1999). The district courts denial of Rule 11 sanctions is also reviewed for abuse
of discretion. Winterrowd v. Am. Gen. Annuity Ins. Co.,556F.3d 815,819(9th
Cir. 1999). Finally,anyclaim for reversal based on j
udicial bias is reviewed for
plain error when raised for the first time on appeal. U.S. v. Bosch,951 F.2d 1546,
1548(9th Cir. 1991).
VI.
SUMMARY OFARGUMENT
As properly determined by the district court,the pleading at issue in this
action is argumentative,prolix,confusing,redundant,almost entirelyconclusory,
nearlyimpossible to determine what claims are beingasserted and against whom,
and contains incomprehensible rambling,all of which are grounds on which this
Court has consistentlyaffirmed dismissals for failure to complywith Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 8. There was therefore no abuse of discretion by the district
court in its dismissal of the action with prejudice for failure to complywith Rule 8.
-17-
Although Rule 8alone supports affirmance of the district courts dismissal

of the action,the j
udgment against Appellants is warranted on numerous other
grounds. W ith regard to those claims against the j
udicial officers that presided
over Stuarts Dissolution Proceeding and People v. Stuart,the district court
correctlyrecognized that judicial officers enj
oyabsolute immunityfrom claims for
damages arising out of j
udicial acts within the jurisdiction of their courts. The
claims relatingto the dissolution and criminal proceedings are also barred bythe
Rooker-Feldman doctrine,which precludes federal courts from hearing de facto
appeals of state court judgments.
Stuarts criminal conviction also bars any
malicious prosecution claim in connection with People v. Stuart.

As to those claims relatingto the Bar Association incident,which occurred
more than three years before this action was filed,theyare barred bythe two-year
statute of limitations for civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983,and theydo
not otherwise state facts sufficient to state a claim.
Appellantsnonsensical obstruction of justiceclaim based on the demands
that the j
udgeshome addresses be removed from the original complaint also fails
as a matter of law,as the inclusion of such information violates a general order of
the district court and California state law and is entirelyimmaterial to the outcome
of this action.
-18-
Eleventh Amendment immunity also bars the claims against the Superior
Court,Judicial Council,and AOC,as it is well-established that such State agencies
are immune from suit. The state court judicial officers and employees named as
defendants in this action are also protected byEleventh Amendment immunityas
to those claims against them in their official capacities.
The dismissal of Appellantsconspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. 1985
and 1986was also proper due to the absence of anyfactual allegations establishing
a conspiracy,that Stuart is a federal officer,or that anyJudicial Defendant acted
with a discriminatory animus.
Appellants false advertising claim under the
Lanham Act also does not and cannot state facts sufficient to state a claim,as the
Judicial Defendants do not advertise or sell services,or compete commercially
with anyone.
The FAC also does not and cannot satisfythe elements needed to assert a
viable civil RICO claim. There are no factual allegations regardinganyJudicial
Defendants participation in a purported enterprise,
or conduct that constitutes a
criminal act,let alone a patternof crime. Appellants also lackstandingto obtain
prospective relief because there are no allegations establishinga real or immediate
threat of beingharmed again in the future. The grantingof such relief would also
run afoul of principles of abstention under Younger and OShea,which generally
-19-
preclude federal courts from interferingwith ongoingstate proceedings,as well as

the administration of Californias j
udicial system.
Appellantsremaininggrounds for appeal relate to the alleged partialityof
the district court and the denial of counter-sanctions in connection with the
Superior Court Defendantsmotion to dismiss the original complaint.
As to the
former,the comments made bythe district judge about which Appellants complain
reflect nothingmore than the district j
udges frustration with Appellants,which is
insufficient to establish judicial bias as a matter of law,let alone that the district
court was incapable of making a fair judgment. W ith regard to the latter,the
district court clearlydid not abuse its discretion in denyinga motion for countersanctionsrelatingto a motion to dismiss that was granted. For these reasons,and
as set forth more fullybelow,the Court should affirm the district courts judgment.
VII.
ARGUMENT
A.
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS

DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE ACTION FOR FAILURE
TO COMPLY WITH FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 8
In order to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8,a complaint must

contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Each allegation in a complaint also
must be simple,concise,and direct. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Rule 8requires
-20-
parties to make their pleadings straightforward,so that judges and adverse parties
need not tryto fish a gold coin from a bucket of mud. U.S. v. Lockheed-Martin
Corp.,328F.3d 374,378(7th Cir. 2003).
A complaint which fails to comply with Rule 8 may be dismissed with
prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Hearns v. San Bernardino
Police Dept.,530F.3d 1124,1129(9th Cir. 2008);Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins.
Co.,651 F.2d 671,673 (9th Cir. 1981). Under Rule 41(b),a defendant maymove
for dismissal of an action where the plaintiff fails to complywith the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure or a court order.
On appeal,Appellants argue the district courts dismissal of the FAC for
failure to complywith Rule 8was error on the grounds that (1) the district court
sua sponte considered Rule 8without notice and an opportunityfor Appellants to
be heard on the issue;(2) the district court misapplied Rule 8;(3) the district court
did not consider the pertinent factors for an involuntary dismissal under Rule
41(b),and (4) the district courts order dismissingthe original complaint with leave
to amend was improvidentand thus the violation thereof cannot support a Rule
41(b) dismissal. (AOB 21-30.) Each argument is without merit.
-21-
1.
AppellantsFailure To Comply W ith Rule 8 W as One Of Several

Enumerated Grounds In Support Of The Omnibus Motion To
Dismiss.
Appellants first assert that the district court sua sponte dismissed the action
under Rule 8without providingAppellants notice and opportunityto be heard.
(AOB 21-22.) Contraryto Appellantsassertion,the district courts consideration
of Rule 8was not sua sponte. Not onlydid the Bar Associations notice expressly
state that the motion was beingmade under Rule 41(b) for failure to complywith
Rule 8,but its memorandum of points and authorities devoted six pages to
Appellantsnon-compliance with Rule 8. (SER 160:
2-4;SER 168-74.)
The
allegedlysua sponte nature of the district courts Rule 8dismissal,and Appellants

purported lack of notice and opportunity be heard,is also belied by Appellants
joint opposition to the omnibus motion to dismiss,which devoted approximately
18pages to discussingRule 8. (SER 244-62.)
2.
The District Court Correctly Concluded That The FAC Failed To

SatisfyRule 8.
As noted bythe district court,[this Court]has affirmed dismissal on Rule 8

grounds where the complaint is argumentative,prolix,replete with redundancy,
and largelyirrelevant,
McHenry v. Renne,84F.3d 1172,1177-80(9th Cir. 1996),
verbose,confusingand [almost entirely]conclusory,
Nevijel v. North Coast Life
Ins. Co.,651 F.2d 671,674(9th Cir. 1981),or where it is impossible to designate
the cause or causes of action attempted to be alleged in the complaint,
Schmidt v.
-22-
Herrmann,614F.2d 1221,1223 (9th Cir. 1980). (ER 5:

8-14);see also Cafasso,
637F.3d at 1059(Rule 8(a) has been held to be violated bya pleadingthat was
needlessly long,or a complaint that was highly repetitious,or confused,or
consisted of incomprehensible rambling.).
The rationale for such dismissals has been explained by this Court as
follows:
Prolix,confusing complaints impose unfair burdens
on litigants and j
udges. As a practical matter,the j
udge
and opposing counsel, in order to perform their
responsibilities,cannot use [the]complaint and must
prepare outlines to determine who is beingsued for what.
Defendants are then put at risk that their outline differs
from the judges,that plaintiffs will surprise them with
something new at trial which they reasonably did not
understand to be in the case at all,and that res j
udicata
effects of settlement or j
udgment will be different from
what theyreasonablyexpected.
The judge wastes half a day in chambers preparing the
short and plain statement which Rule 8 obligated
plaintiffs to submit. He then must manage the litigation
without knowing what claims are made against whom.
This leads to discovery disputes and lengthy trials,
prejudicing litigants in other case who follow the rules,
as well as defendants in the case in which the prolix
pleadingis filed. McHenry,84F.3d at 1179-80.
Moreover,[t]he propriety of dismissal for failure to comply with Rule 8
does not depend on whether the complaint is wholly without merit. Rule
8[(d)(1)],requiringeach averment of a pleadingto be simple,concise,and direct,
-23-
applies to good claims as well as bad,and is a basis for dismissal independent of

Rule 12(b)(6). [Citations]. Id. at 1179.
The operative pleadingin this action contains anythingbut a short and plain
statementof each claim,or simple,concise,and directallegations. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2),(d)(1). The FAC totals 251 pages in length,and roughly1,
550
pages with all of its voluminous exhibits,and sets forth in excess of 1,
200
numbered allegations.
W hile verbosity alone is ordinarily not a basis for
dismissing an action under Rule 8,like the pleadings at issue in the authorities
referenced above,the FAC is unquestionablyargumentative,confusing,and almost
entirelyconclusory.
The general charge in the FAC is that nearly 60 defendants,consisting of
judicial officers and state judicial branch entities,the Bar Association,the San
Diego County Sheriff,the County,the City,the District Attorney,health care
professionals,and family law attorneys and firms,all conspired against Stuart to
deprive him of his fundamental rights. Yet,it is impossible to determine from the
FAC what each defendants role was in this alleged conspiracy,the manner in
which each defendant participated in the conspiracy,and what claims Appellants
assert arise from each defendants conduct.
Because the FAC requires the defendants and the district court to penetrate
a tome approaching the magnitude of War and Peace to discern [the]plaintiffs
-24-
claims and allegations[,

] Cafasso,637F.3d at 1058,and to try to fish a gold
coin from a bucket of mud[,
]Lockheed-Martin,328F.3d at 378,the district court
properlyexercised its discretion in dismissingthe action on Rule 8grounds.8
3.
The District Court Did Consider And Properly Apply The Relevant
Factors For Dismissal Under Rule 41(b).
Appellants also argue that the district court erred byfailingto consider the
requisite factors for an involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b). (AOB 20-21.)
Appellants reason that because the district court did not specificallyreference Rule
41(b),the district court therefore did not analyze the relevant factors for its
application. (AOB 20.) Not onlydid the district court address such factors,but the
findings relatingthereto are correct.
A district courts dismissal under Rule 41(b) should not be disturbed unless
there is a definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error
of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighingof the relevant factors.
Appellants also assert that Rule 8 was satisfied because the FAC contains
sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausibleon its face.
(AOB 21-30);Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,550U.S. 544,555(2007). Simply
put,a conspiracybyand between the entire FamilyLaw Communityto deprive
Stuart of his fundamental rights is implausible. Indeed,the district court found
certain of Appellantsallegations to be so implausible as to be offensive. (ER
8:1.) Moreover,the assertion of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual
allegations,as is the case here,is insufficient to establish a plausible claim.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,556U.S. 662,678(2009);Farm Credit Servs. v. Am. State Bank,
339 F.3d 764,767 (8th Cir. 2003);(see also Doc. 45 at 14-17,adopted by
reference under Fed. R. App. P. 28(i).)
8
-25-
Schmidt,614F.2d at 1224(internal quotation marks omitted);see also Leon v. IDX

Sys. Corp.,464 F.3d 951,961 (9th Cir. 2006). Such factors consist of (1) the
publics interest in expeditious resolution of litigation;(2) the courts need to
manage its docket;(3) the riskof prejudice to the defendants;(4) the public policy
favoringdisposition of cases on their merits;and (5) the availabilityof less drastic
alternatives. (Yourish v. California Amplifier,191 F.3d 983,990(9th Cir. 1999).
A dismissal should be affirmed where at least four factors support
dismissal, or where at least three factors strongly support dismissal. Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Although it is preferred,it is not required that
the district court make explicit findings in order to show that it has considered
these factors and [this Court]mayreview the record independentlyto determine if
the district court abused its discretion. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court correctlyfound that at least four of the foregoingfactors
favors dismissal of the action with prejudice. (ER 10-11.) The district courts
order first addressed the risk of prej
udice to the defendants,noting that the
defendants face the onerous task of combing through [plaintiffs lengthy
complaint]just to prepare an answer that admits or denies such allegations and to
determine what claims and allegations must be defended or otherwise litigated.
(ER 10:27-11:
3 (quoting Cafasso,637F.3d at 1059).)
-26-
The district court next found that plaintiffsnoncompliance [with Rule 8]

harms litigants in other matters pendingbefore the court[,
] which corresponds to
the public interest and docket management factors. (ER 11:
3-4.) The district court
aptlynoted that [f]ederal j
udges have better things to do [than tryto fish a gold
coin from a bucket of mud],and the substantial subsidyof litigation (court costs do
not begin to cover the expense of the judiciary) should be targeted on those
litigants who take the preliminary steps to assemble a comprehensible claim.
(ER 11:4-10 (quoting Lockheed-Martin Corp.,328 F.3d at 378).) The district
court also appropriately observed that [d]istrict judges are busy,and therefore
have a right to dismiss a complaint that is so longthat it imposes an undue burden
on the judge to the prejudice of other litigants seekingthe judges attention. (ER
11 n.6(quotingKadamovas v. Stevens,706F.3d 843,844(7th Cir. 2013)).)
Lastly,the district court addressed the issue of whether further leave to
amend should be granted, which relates to the availability of less drastic
alternatives. (ER 11:
12-20.) Because Appellants were previouslygranted leave to
amend,and their amended submission [was]even more unmanageable than the
original,
the district court found that Appellants demonstrated an inability or
unwillingness to file a Rule 8-compliant pleadingand thus denied leave to amend.
(ER 11.) Based on the foregoing,four of the five factors weigh in favor of
-27-
dismissal of the action with prejudice.9 The Court therefore should affirm the
district courts dismissal of the action with prejudice under Rule 41(b).
4.
The Involuntary Dismissal W as Supported W ith Or W ithout The

District Courts Prior Order On The Original Complaint.
Appellants also take aim at the district courts order dismissingthe original
complaint and contend the violation thereof cannot support an involuntary
dismissal under Rule 41(b). (AOB 19-20.) According to Appellants,instead of
moving to dismiss the original complaint,the Superior Court Defendants should
have moved for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e). (AOB 29.) W hile
such a motion mayhave been available,a motion to dismiss for failure to comply
with Rule 8was also appropriate. Hearns,530F.3d a 1129;Nevijel,651 F.2d at
673.
Although Appellants maydisagree with the district courts conclusion that
the original complaint did not complywith Rule 8,the district court specifically
identified the pleadings deficiencies and provided Appellants leave to amend.
(ER 41-49.) Given Appellants elected to amend their complaint and included
everyclaim from their original complaint in the FAC,Appellants cannot now be
heard to complain about the district courts order on the original complaint. Lacey
The lone factor arguably weighing against dismissal is the general policy
favoringdisposition of cases on their merits. This factor,byitself,however,is
not sufficient to outweigh the other four factors. Leon,464 F.3d at 961-62
(internal quotation marks omitted).
9
-28-
v. Maricopa County,693 F.3d 896,927(9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (recognizingthe

general rule that an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint and
renders it without legal effect).
Appellantsargument concerningthe proprietyof an involuntary dismissal
based on the district courts December 23,2013 order also ignores the express
language of Rule 41(b). Under Rule 41(b),dismissal is warranted for failure to
comply with a court order or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Thus,
notwithstanding their failure to adhere to the district courts original dismissal

order,Appellantsnon-compliance with Rule 8 alone warranted the involuntary
dismissal of the action under Rule 41(b).
B.
JUDICIAL IMMUNITY BARS ALL CLAIMS ARISING OUT

OF
STUARTS
DISSOLUTION
AND
CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS
A long line of [the Supreme Courts] precedents acknowledge that,

generally,a judge is immune from a suit for moneydamages.10 Mireles v. Waco,
502 U.S. 9,11 (1991) (per curiam). Judicial immunityapplies even where a j
udge
is accused of actingin bad faith,maliciously,corruptly,or erroneously. Mireles,
502 U.S. at 11;Stump,435U.S. at 356. As earlyas 1872,the [Supreme]Court
recognized that it was a general principle of the highest importance to the proper
Ninth Circuit j
urisprudence has also recognized that j
udicial immunity
extends to actions for declaratory,inj
unctive and other equitable relief. Moore v.
Brewster,96F.3d 1240,1243 (9th Cir. 1996).
10
-29-
administration of justice that a judicial officer,in exercisingthe authorityvested in

him,[should]be free to act upon his own convictions,without apprehension of
personal consequences to himself.11 Stump,435U.S. at 356(quotingBradley v.
Fisher,80U.S. (13 W all) 335,351 (1872)).
The onlytwo instances in which immunityis overcome is where the j
udge
acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction,[citation],or performs an act that is not
judicialin nature. Ashelman,793 F.2d at 1075(internal quotation marks and
citations omitted);see also Mireles,502 U.S. at 11-12. The factors relevant in
determining whether an act is judicial relate to the nature of the act itself,i.e.,
whether it is a function normallyperformed bya j
udge,and to the expectations of
the parties,i.e.,whether they dealt with the j
udge in his judicial capacity.
Ashelman,793 F.2d at 1075(quotingStump,435U.S. at 362);see also Mireles,
502 U.S. at 11.
In connection with the original complaint,the district court dismissed with
prejudice Stuarts claims against the defendant j
udges for damages arisingout of
judicial acts within the j
urisdiction of their courts. (ER 48:2-4(citingAshelman,
The Supreme Court further recognized: Liability to answer to everyone

who might feel himself aggrieved bythe action of the judge,would be inconsistent
with the possession of this freedom,and would destroythat independence without
which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful. As observed by a
distinguished English judge,it would establish the weakness of judicial authority
in a degradingresponsibility. Bradley,80U.S. at 347.
11
-30-
793 F.2d at 1075).) Although Appellants effectively ignored the district courts
ruling and asserted the same claims in their FAC,as well as additional claims
against judicial officers arisingout of allegedlynon-immune acts,
(see ER 17778, 350;ER 270-71, 831-838),Appellants criticize the district courts
dismissal of claims based on j
udicial immunity. (AOB 34-48.)
Appellants argue that (1) Ashelman,which was cited by the district court,
and Sparkman were both wrongly decided,(AOB 46-51,53-58,62-63);(2) the
district court improperly expanded the immunity recognized in Ashelman,(AOB
52-53);(3) the district court failed to perform a historical analysis to determine
whether there is anyfederal common law immunityfor j
udges,(AOB 43-46);and
(4) that family law judges,in particular,have no common law immunity,(AOB
58-62). Each of Appellantsassertions is without merit.
1.
Ashelman and Sparkman Are BindingPrecedent In This Circuit.
In Ashelman,the issue before an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit was

whether a judge and prosecutor are immune from damages in a civil rights action
charging them with conspiracy to predetermine the outcome of the judicial
proceedings. 793 F.2d at 1074. In light of policy considerations favor[ing]a
liberal application of immunity[,
]the en banc panel held that [a]s long as the
judges ultimate acts are judicial actions taken within the courts subj
ect matter
jurisdiction,immunityapplies. Id. at 1078. W hile clearlyimproper,
the Court
-31-
concluded that a conspiracybetween a j

udge and prosecutor to predetermine the
outcome of a judicial proceeding does not pierce the immunity extended to
judges and prosecutors. Id.
Appellants accuse the en banc panel in Ashelman of misapplying and
expanding Sparkman,(AOB 36-40,41-45),and go so far as to claim that the
Supreme Court overstepped the limits of Article IIIj
urisdictionin Sparkman by
findingthe doctrine of judicial immunityapplicable to section 1983 actions,(AOB
39-40). In other words,Appellants askthat this Court reconsider the wisdom of
the en banc panels decision in Ashelman and the Supreme Courts ruling in
Sparkman.
W hile Appellants may disagree with the holdings in Ashelman and
Sparkman,it is well-settled that published Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court
decisions are bindingprecedent in this circuit. Hart v. Massanari,266F.3d 1155,
1171 (9th Cir. 2001). Once a panel resolves an issue in a precedential opinion,
the matter is deemed resolved,unless overruled bythe court itself sittingen banc,
or by the Supreme Court. Id. Given Ashelman is the law in this circuit,and
Sparkman the law of the land,Appellantsrequest that this Court ignore such
precedent,revive earlier case law expressly abrogated in Ashelman,and invoke
case law from other circuits,is misplaced.
-32-
Notwithstanding the precedential value of Ashelman and Sparkman,the

grounds for Appellantsattack on these decisions are equally devoid of merit.
According to Appellants, Ashelmans consideration of the precise act to
determine whether j
udicial immunity applies was rej
ected by Sparkman. (AOB
45-46.)
Nothing in Sparkman rejected consideration of the precise act or
ultimate actfor purposes of applying j

udicial immunity. To the contrary,the
first factor identified bythe Supreme Court relate[s]to the nature of the act itself,
i.e.,whether it is a function normally performed by a j
udge[.] Sparkman,435
U.S. at 362 (emphasis added) (applying judicial immunity to j
udges ex parte
approval of a minors sterilization).
Appellantscriticism of Sparkman and Ashelman on Article IIIgrounds is
also unavailing. (See AOB 40,49.) Appellants effectivelyassert that the scope of
judicial immunityrecognized in Sparkman and Ashelman did not exist in federal
common law and was therefore abolished byCongress with the adoption of section
1983.
In Pierson v. Ray,386U.S. 547(1967),the Supreme Court expresslyheld
that the doctrine of j
udicial immunityis applicable to section 1983 actions. 386
U.S. at 555,overruled on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald,457 U.S. 800
(1982);Sparkman,435U.S. at 355-56;Ashelman,793 F.2d at 1075. Indeed,in
1872,the Supreme Court held that j
udicial immunityapplies however erroneous
-33-
the act may have been,and however inj

urious in its consequences it may have
proved to the plaintiff. Bradley,80 U.S. at 347. The only requirements for
judicial immunityreflected in Bradley,and repeated in Sparkman and Ashelman,is
that the character of the act be j
udicial,and that the act was within the j
urisdiction
of the j
udicial officer. 80 U.S. at 347,351. Appellantsattack on well-settled
Supreme Court authorities is therefore not well taken and should be rej
ected.
2.
The District Court CorrectlyApplied Circuit Precedent.
In its December 23,2013 order,the district court dismissed with prej

udice
those claims for damages against the defendant judges arisingout of j
udicial acts
within the j
urisdiction of their courts. (ER 48:2-4.) W hile Appellants may
disagree with the law,this is a correct recitation of the doctrine of judicial
immunityunder Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent.
Appellants seem to fault the district court for not identifyinganyparticular
claims that are barred by j
udicial immunity.12 (AOB 34.) Although the district
courts order does not cite to the specific claims to which judicial immunity
Appellants also attackthe scope of judicial immunityoutlined bythe district

court at the hearingon the Superior Court Defendantsoriginal motion to dismiss.
(AOB 34-35.) W here the record includes both oral and written rulings on the
same matter,[the Court]review[s]the written opinion and not the oral statements.
PlayMakers LLC v. ESPN,Inc.,376F.3d 894,896(9th Cir. 2004). Appellants
apparent request for review of the district courts oral remarks is therefore
misplaced.
12
-34-
13
applies,
the district courts order identifies the two events on which the original
complaint was based the so-called assaultat the Bar Association seminar and
Stuarts Dissolution Proceeding.
(ER 42:
18-44:25.)
The Superior Court
Defendantsmotion papers also show that j

udicial immunitywas beingraised as to
any claims challenging allegedly unlawful rulings and decisions in the
Dissolution Proceeding. (SER 50:25-51:
5;SER 144,n.4.) Because the defendant
judges are clearlyimmune from such claims,the Court should affirm the district
courts dismissal of such claims with prejudice.
3.
The Recycled Claims In The FAC Concerning Stuarts Dissolution

Proceeding,As W ell As The New Claims Relating To People v.
Stuart,Are Also Barred ByJudicial Immunity.
Despite the district courts dismissal of the claims arisingout of the j

udicial
decisions in Stuarts Dissolution Proceeding,Count 11 of the FAC continues to
assert claims against Judges W ohlfeil and Schall relatingto their conduct in that
matter. (ER 270-71,831-838.) Count 3 of the FAC also adds new claims
arising out of allegedly non-immune acts against Judge Groch,who presided
over the trial in People v. Stuart. (ER 177-78,350;ER 205-06,491-97.)
In both cases,the FAC fails to identifyanyacts outside the scope of judicial
immunity.
The allegations that these judicial officers acted in bad faith,
Given Appellantsutter failure to comply with Rule 8,particularly their

failure to connect their scant factual allegations to causes of action, it is
understandable whythe district court did not do so.
13
-35-
maliciously,corruptly,or erroneously,or the legal conclusion that their acts were

not j
udicial,has no impact on the application of judicial immunity. Mireles,502
U.S. at 11;Stump,435 U.S. at 356. Given the acts about which Appellants
complain occurred during Stuarts encounter with Judges W ohlfeil,Schall,and
Groch solelyin their judicial capacities,j
udicial immunitysupports the dismissal
of the claims relatingto Stuarts divorce and criminal proceedings.
4.
No Historical Analysis Of Judicial ImmunityW as Necessary.
Appellants next suggest that the district court erred because the Superior
Court Defendants proffered,and the district court undertook,no historical analysis
of whether judicial defendants asserting immunities were performing functions
immune at common law in 1871 both merelycitingto Ashelman. (AOB 35-36.)
Once again,Appellants ignore the precedential effect of prior decisions of this
circuit and the Supreme Court. After performinga historical analysis,the Supreme
Court,as recognized in Ashelman,has alreadyheld that j
udicial immunityexisted
under federal common law and was not abolished in 1871 by42 U.S.C. 1983.
Sparkman,435U.S. at 355-56;Pierson,386U.S. at 555;Bradley,80U.S. at 347;
Ashelman,793 F.2d at 1075. Appellantshistorical analysis argument is therefore
without merit.
-36-
5.
FamilyLaw Judges Are Also Afforded Judicial Immunity.
Finally,Appellants contend that family court j

udges are not entitled to
judicial immunityon the ground that courts did not have j
urisdiction over divorces
and child custody matters in 1871. (AOB 46-48.) Appellants also assert any
immunity granted to such j
udgments does not apply to j
udicial acts performed
maliciouslyor corruptlybecause of the inferiorstatus of familycourts. (AOB
48.) Neither assertion has anymerit.
It is well-established that j
udicial immunity applies to judges in divorce
proceedings. Duvall v. County of Kitsap,260F.3d 1124,(9th Cir. 2001) (finding
superior court j
udge absolutely immune in action under the American with
Disabilities Act arisingout of judges failure to accommodate plaintiffs hearing
impairment duringdissolution proceeding);Arnold v. Bostick,339F.2d 879,88081 (9th Cir. 1964) (affirming dismissal of section 1983 action against superior
court judge based on court order excluding plaintiff from the family home);see
also Meyers v. Contra Costa County Dept. of Soc. Servs.,812 F.2d 1154,1158-59
(9th Cir. 1986) (applyingquasi-j
udicial immunityto familycourt employees that
mediate custodyand visitation disputes).
In Bradley,the Supreme Court held that judges of courts of superior or
general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts,even when
such acts are in excess of their j
urisdiction,and are alleged to have been done
-37-
maliciously or corruptly. 80 U.S. at 351.
Bradley did not recognize any
exception for malicious or corrupt acts of judges of limited and inferior

authority. (See AOB 48.) To the contrary,the Supreme Court held that anysuch
limitation was not a a correct statement of the law. 80U.S. at 351. Indeed,[i]t
is essential in all courts that the judges who are appointed to administer the law
should be permitted to administer it under the protection of the law,independently
and freely,without favor and without fear. Id. at 349 n.16 (internal quotation
marks omitted). An exception to j
udicial immunity for malicious or corrupt
motiveswould subj
ect judges to the same vexatious litigationthat the doctrine
was designed to prevent. Id. at 354. Judges presidingover familylaw matters are
therefore entitled to the same protections granted under the doctrine of judicial
immunity.14
C.
THE DISTRICT COURTS JUDGMENT MAY BE AFFIRMED

ON NUMEROUSOTHER GROUNDS
In addition to Rule 8and j

udicial immunity,the Judicial Defendants moved
to dismiss the FAC on several other grounds,all of which support affirmance of
the district courts judgment against Appellants. See Tan v. Univ. of S. Cal.,252
Even if a narrower form of immunityexisted for inferior courts,

which it
does not,the named j
udicial officers that presided over Stuarts Dissolution
Proceeding,Judges W ohlfeil and Schall,are superior court judges. (See ER 113,
18;ER 114-15,25.) It is the Superior Court that is vested with jurisdiction in
proceedings under the California FamilyCode. Cal. Fam. Code 200.
14
-38-
F.3d 1059,1062 (9th Cir. 2001) ([O]ur review is not limited to a consideration of
the grounds upon which the district court decided the issues;we can affirm the
district court on anygrounds supported bythe record.). As detailed below,the
claims against the Judicial Defendants are also barred bythe statute of limitations,
failure to state facts sufficient to state a claim,the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
Eleventh Amendment immunity,lack of standing,and abstention under Younger
and OShea.
1.
The Claims Against The Judicial Defendants In Counts 1 And 2,

W hich Arise From The So-Called Stuart Assault,
Are Time-Barred.
Counts 1 and 2 of the FAC purport to assert claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983
against various Judicial Defendants relating to Stuarts removal from the family
law seminar on April 15,2010,which Appellants describe as the central subject
of this litigation. (Compl. 114-15;ER 135,109.) Claims brought under
section 1983 must be filed within the time specified bythe forum states statute of
limitations for personal injurytorts,which is two years in California. Cal. Code
Civ. Proc. 335.1;Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. City of Morgan Hill,353
F.3d 651,655n.2 (9th Cir. 2003);Usher v. City of Los Angeles,828F.2d 556,558
(9th Cir. 1987). Because Appellants did not file their civil rights action until
August 20,2013,more than three years after the so-called Stuart Assault,
the
claims against the Judicial Defendants in Counts 1 and 2 are untimely.
-39-
2.
Counts 1 And 2 Also Fail To State Facts Sufficient To State A Claim

Against AnyJudicial Defendants.
To succeed on a section 1983 claim,a plaintiff must show that a right

secured bythe Constitution or the laws of the United States was violated[.] Long
v. County of Los Angeles,442 F.3d 1178,1185(9th Cir. 2006). Causation is,of
course,a required element of a 1983 claim. Estate of Brooks v. U.S.,197F.3d
1245,1248(9th Cir. 1999).
Counts 1 and 2 of the FAC appear to assert section 1983 claims against
judicial officers who served as panel members at the familylaw seminar (Judges
Goldsmith, W ohlfeil McAdam, and Alksne, and Commissioners Lowe and
McKenzie),as well as Judge Schall,who presided over Stuarts Dissolution
Proceeding.
The blanket allegation against the j

udicial officers is that they
conspired with San Diegos family law community in connection with his
removal from the seminar. (See ER 167-70,286-99.) Not onlyis this allegation
implausible and conclusory,but the FAC does not allege specific facts establishing
an agreement involvinganyJudicial Defendant that amounts to a conspiracy. See
Margolis v. Ryan,140 F.3d 850,853 (9th Cir. 1998) (conspiracy claim under
1983 must allege facts with sufficient particularity to show an agreement or a
meeting of the minds to violate plaintiffs constitutional rights);Woodrum v.
Woodward County,866F.2d 1121,1126(9th Cir. 1989). Dismissal of Counts 1
and 2 as against the Judicial Defendants was therefore proper.
-40-
3.
The Claims Against Judicial Defendants In Count 3,W hich Relate To

People v. Stuart,Also Fail To State Sufficient Facts.
Count 3 of the FAC includes claims against Judicial Defendants,particularly

Judges Groch and Goldsmith,under section 1983 for malicious prosecution in
connection with People v. Stuart. The Supreme Court has recognized that [o]ne
element that must be alleged and proved in a malicious prosecution action is
termination of the prior criminal proceeding in favor of the accused. Heckv.
Humphrey,512 U.S. 477,484(1994);see also Awabdy v. City of Adelanto,368
F.3d 1062,1068 (9th Cir. 2004). Given Stuart was convicted in his criminal
proceeding,(ER 181-82,373-74;ER 190,415-17;SER 198,200),the FAC
does not and cannot satisfythe innocence element for a 1983 claim for malicious
prosecution.
4.
The Claims In Count 3 Against Judge Groch Are Also Barred ByThe
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine.
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,a federal district court lacks subject

matter j
urisdiction to hear an appeal from a state court judgment. Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,544U.S. 280,283-84(2005);see also Dist. of
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,460 U.S. 462,476 (1983);Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co.,263 U.S. 413,415 (1923). Rooker-Feldman is a powerful
doctrine that prevents federal courts from second-guessingstate court decisions by
barring the lower federal courts from hearing de facto appeals from state-court
-41-
judgments[.] Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam,334F.3d 895,898(9th Cir. 2003);see also

Doe & Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano,252 F.3d 1026,1030 (9th Cir. 2001)
(Rooker-Feldman also applies to interlocutoryorders). Because the claims against
Judge Groch in Count 3 take direct aim at orders and rulings made in People v.
Stuart,the district court lacked j
urisdiction to hear such claims.15
5.
Count 4, W hich Arises From Appellants Inclusion Of Judicial

OfficersHome Addresses In Their Original Complaint,Fails To State
Sufficient Facts.
Count 4 of the FAC arises out of Appellants inclusion of residential

addresses of judicial officers in the original complaint,Appellantspostingof the
same on the Internet,and Ms. Nesthusrequests that such information be removed
from the Internet and that steps be taken to remove the information from PACER.
(ER 208-10, 510-26.)
Although identified as a count for obstruction of
justice,
a claim for which there is no private right of action,Forsyth v. Humana,
Inc.,114F.3d 1467,1482 (9th Cir. 1997),overruled on other grounds by Lacey v.
Maricopa County,693 F.3d 896,925-28(9th Cir. 2010) (en banc),Appellants have
described Count 4 as one for interference with Plaintiffs and their members
rights to access j
ustice in this courthouse after this Action was filed. (SER
263:28-264:5.)
As set forth supra,the claims against Judge Groch are also barred under the
doctrine of judicial immunity.
15
-42-
W hile the Constitution protects the right of meaningful access to the courts,
Delew v. Wagner,143 F.3d 1219,1222 (9th Cir. 1998),this right must be within
the limits,of course,of [the courts]prescribed procedures[.] Cal. Motor Transp.
Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,404U.S. 508,515(1972). Pursuant to Section 1(h)(5)
of the district courts General Order 550,parties must refrain from includinghome
addresses in all pleadings and documents filed with the district court.16 Given that
the right to access the courts does not encompass the right to include judicial
officershome addresses,Count 4fails as a matter of law.17
Notwithstandingthe absence of anyright to include j
udgeshome addresses
in court pleadings,the FAC also fails to allege facts establishingthat Appellants
were denied full access to the courts as a result of the conduct of any Judicial
Defendant. Absent from the FAC are anyfacts showinghow Ms. Nesthusactions
As previously noted,California Government Code section 6254.21 also

prohibits any person from displaying on the Internet a j
udicial officers home
address where the j
udicial officer demands in writingthat the person remove his or
her address from the Internet. Cal. Gov. Code 6254.21(c)(1),(f)(3).
16
Insofar as Count 4 goes beyond a federal civil rights claim under section
1983 and includes state law claims,such claims are barred by Californias
litigation privilege,which applies to anycommunication (1) made in judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings;(2) bylitigants or other participants authorized bylaw;
(3) to achieve the objects of the litigation;and (4) that [has]some connection or
logical relation to the action. Olsen v. Harbison,119Cal. Rptr. 3d 460,466-67
(Ct. App. 2010);Cal. Civ. Code 47.
17
-43-
and the removal of the home addresses impacted Appellantsaccess to the courts,
or the outcome of this case.
The onlyj
ustification for includingjudgeshome addresses ever offered by
Appellants is that the addresses were necessaryto establish venue under 28U.S.C.
1391(b). (See SER 145:
5-8;SER 146:
11-13.) Not onlydid the complaint only
include the home addresses of certain judicial officers,as well as the CJPs
Chairperson,(Compl. 11,17,19,22-23,29),but all that need be alleged to
establish venue based on the residencyof a defendant is that the defendant resides
in a particular j
udicial district. 28 U.S.C. 1391(b)(1). The district courts
dismissal of Count 4was therefore appropriate.18
6.
The Claims For Supervisory Liability In Count 6 Are Devoid Of

Sufficient Facts.
Count 6 of the FAC asserts section 1983 claims under the theory of
supervisor liability against Judges Trentacosta,Alksne,and Jahr,Chief Justice
Cantil-Sakauye,and Mr. Roddy. (ER 237-41,666-84;ER 242-45,690-712.)
A supervisor is not liable under section 1983 unless he or she was personally
involved in the constitutional deprivation,or his or her conduct caused the
constitutional violation. Hansen v. Black,885F.2d 642,645-46(9th Cir. 1989).
For the same reasons,the district courts denial of Stuarts ex parte

application for leave to file and/or supplement motion for harassment restraining
orderwas proper. (ER 67-68,358-77;AOB 51.)
18
-44-
There is also no liabilityfor the supervisor where his or her subordinate committed
no constitutional violation. Forrett v. Richardson,112 F.3d 416,421 (9th Cir.
1997).
To support the section 1983 claims for supervisor liability,the FAC alleges
that Judges Trentacosta,Alksne,and Jahr,Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye,and Mr.
Roddyeach had various supervisoryduties and that [o]n information and belief,
they each CULPABLY and UNREASONABLY failed to perform [his or her]

own PROFESSIONAL DUTIES and one or more SUPERVISORY DUTY over
his or her subordinates,setting in motion the subordinates acts as elsewhere
alleged,depriving Plaintiffs of rights as elsewhere alleged,causing injury in a
nature and amount to be proven at trial. (ER 239,674;ER 241,684;ER 243,
697,702;ER 245,712.) Such allegations are insufficient because theydo not
establish anypersonal involvement in purported constitutional deprivations and do
not set forth any facts showing a causal connection between the actions of any
supervisoryJudicial Defendant and the alleged deprivations. Appellantsfailure to
allege facts demonstrating a constitutional violation by any subordinates also
forecloses Count 6of the FAC.
-45-
7.
The Claims Against The Superior Court,Judicial Council,and AOC

In Count 7Are Barred ByEleventh Amendment Immunity.
In Count 7of the FAC,Appellants seekto impose section 1983 municipal

liabilityagainst the Superior Court,Judicial Council,and AOC.19 (ER 246-250,
719-742.) The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for damages,injunctive relief,
and declaratoryrelief against a state,an arm of the state,
its instrumentalities,or
its agencies. Franceschi v. Schwartz,57F.3d 828,831 (9th Cir. 1995);Greater
Los Angeles Council of Deafness,Inc. v. Zolin,812 F.2d 1103,1110 (9th Cir.
1987).
It is well-settled that California superior courts are considered a state agency
and therefore enj
oy Eleventh Amendment immunity. Simmons v. Sacramento
County Superior Court,318F.3d 1156,1161 (9th Cir. 2003);Zolin,812 F.2d at
1110;see also Cal. Const. art. VI1,5;Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage
Dist. v. Superior Court,238P. 687,694(Cal. 1925)).20 This Court has also found
As previouslyexplained bythis Court,[t]he Judicial Council oversees the

statewide administration of j
ustice in the states courts[,
]while the AOC referred
to the staff agency of the Council responsible for a variety of programs and
services to improve access to a fair and impartial j
udicial system. E.T. v. CantilSakauye,682 F.3d 1121,1123 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam),cert. denied,133 S.Ct.
476(2012);see also Cal. Rules of Ct.,rule 10.81. On July29,2014,however,the
Judicial Council discontinued use of the AOC when referring to the Judicial
Councils staff and accordinglyamended the California Rules of Court to reflect
the same. (Cal. Rules of Ct.,rule 10.81(b).)
19
Even before the State of California assumed responsibilityfor the fundingof

all state trial court operations on July 1,1997,see Cal. Gov. Code 77003,
20
-46-
that the Judicial Council is clearlya state agencyand immune from suit under
the Eleventh Amendment. Wolfe v. Strankman,392 F.3d 358,364(9th Cir. 2004).
Eleventh Amendment immunity therefore also supports the district courts
dismissal of the claims against the Superior Court,Judicial Council,and AOC with
prejudice in Count 7of the FAC.21
8.
Counts 9And 10Fail To State Facts Sufficient To State A Claim For

Violation Of Sections 1985and 1986.
In Counts 9 and 10 of the FAC,Appellants purport to assert conspiracy

claims under 42 U.S.C. 1985(1)-(3) and 1986against a group labeled the Color
of Law Defendants[,
]which appear to arise out of the Bar Association incident,
Stuarts prosecution in People v. Stuart,and Appellantsinclusion of j
udicial
77200,et seq.;Cal. Rules of Ct.,rule 10.810,function 10(b),rule 10.201,rule,
10.202,and before all 532 superior court facilities were transferred from the
counties to the State byDecember 31,2009,Cal. Gov. Code 70301-70404,this
Court recognized that suits against superior courts are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. Zolin,812 F.2d at 1110. The Court reasoned:The official name of
the court is the Superior Court of the State of California;its geographical location
within anyparticular countycannot change the fact that the court derives its power
from the State and is ultimatelyregulated bythe State. Judges are appointed by
Californias governor,and their salaries are established and paid bythe State. Id.
Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to claims against state court
judges and employees in their official capacities,as theyare also considered arms
of the state. Simmons,318F.3d at 1161;see also Will v. Michigan Dept. of State
Police,491 U.S. 58,71 (1989) (neither a State nor its officials acting in their
official capacities are personsunder 1983). Appellantsclaims against Chief
Justice Cantil-Sakauye, Judges Trentacosta, Jahr, Schall, Alksne, Goldsmith,
McAdam,W ohlfeil,and Groch,Commissioners Lowe and McKenzie,Mr. Roddy,
and Ms. Nesthus,in their official capacities are therefore also barred by the
Eleventh Amendment and were properlydismissed bythe district court.
21
-47-
officershome addresses in the original complaint. (ER 254-64,764-801.) The

fundamental flaw in these claims is that the FAC does not allege facts with
sufficient particularity showing a conspiracy involving any Judicial Defendant.
Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept.,839F.2d 621,626(9th Cir. 1988).
Section 1985(1) prohibits conspiracies to prevent a United States officer
from performing his or her duties.
Canlis v. San Joaquin Sheriffs Posse
Comitatus,641 F.2d 711,717(9th Cir. 1981);see also Bretzv. Kelman,773 F.2d

1026,1027 n.3 (9th Cir. 1985).
Section 1985(2) prohibits conspiracies to
intimidate parties,witnesses,or j
urors in federal courts and interfere with the
administration of justice in state courts. Kush v. Rutledge,460U.S. 719,724-25
(1983);Bretz,773 F.2d at 1027 n.3. Section 1985(3) prohibits conspiracies to
deprive a person of the equal protection of the laws,to hinder state authorities from
securingequal protection of the laws,or to interfere with federal elections. Kush,
460 U.S. at 720-25; Bretz,773 F.2d at 1027 n.3. Section 1986 authorizes a
remedy against state actors who have negligently failed to prevent a conspiracy
that would be actionable under 1985. Cerrato v. San Francisco Cmty. Coll.
Dist.,26F.3d 968,971 n.7(9th Cir. 1994).
At a minimum,a claim under section 1985must allege that the defendants
conspired together and set forth a factual basis for the allegation of conspiracy;a
mere allegation of conspiracy,without factual support,is insufficient. Karim-48-
Panahi,839F.2d at 626. To state a claim under section 1985(2) and (3),the acts
of the alleged conspirators also must be motivated by some racial,or perhaps
class-based,invidiouslydiscriminatoryanimus . Griffin v. Breckenridge,403
U.S. 88,102 (1971);RK Ventures,Inc. v. City of Seattle,307F.3d 1045,1056(9th
Cir. 2002);Portman v. County of Santa Clara,995F.2d 898,909(9th Cir. 1993).
Aside from the insufficient,conclusory allegations that the Color of Law
Defendantsunreasonablyand culpablyconspiredtogether,(see ER 256-57,
772;ER 260-61,788;ER 262,792;ER 263,799;ER 264,803),the FAC
fails to allege any facts showing a conspiracy involving any Judicial Defendant.
The absence of such factual allegations,byitself,supports the dismissal of Counts
9and 10of the FAC.
The specific allegations required to state a claim under section 1985(1),(2),
and (3) are also absent from the FAC. [Section 1985(1)s]protections extend
exclusivelyto the benefit of federal officers. Canlis,641 F.2d at 717. The FACs
allegation that Stuart is an officer of the federal courtsdoes not render Stuart a
federal officer for purposes of section 1985(1). Given the FAC does not and
cannot allege Stuart is an employee of the federal government,or that he is
authorized to perform any official federal duties,the section 1985(1) claim was
properlydismissed.
-49-
As to the claims under sections 1985(2) and (3),the FAC must allege facts
showing that the Judicial Defendants deprived Appellants of another right with
invidiously discriminatory animus based on their membership in a protected
class. Griffin,403 U.S. at 102;see also Orin v. Barclay,272 F.3d 1207,1217n.4
(9th Cir. 2001) (protected class extends beyond race only when the class in
question can show that there has been a governmental determination that its
members require and warrant special federal assistance in protecting their civil
rights). Aside from alleging membership in certain alleged equal protection
classes,
(ER 257,777),the FAC offers no factual allegations showingthat any
Judicial Defendants acted with a discriminatory animus.
The district courts
dismissal of the section 1985and 1986claims was therefore appropriate.

9.
The Claims Against Judicial Defendants In Count 11 Are Barred By

The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine.
Count 11 of the FAC alleges section 1983 claims against Judges W ohlfeil
and Schall arising out of their j
udicial acts in Stuarts Dissolution Proceeding,
namely their alleged recommendation to use Dr. Doyne as the mediator and
oversight of the same. (ER 265-79,808-88.) In addition to judicial immunity,
which is addressed above,the claims against Judges W ohlfeil and Schall in Count
11 are also barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Because such claims
constitute a de facto appeal of decisions made byJudges W ohlfeil and Schall in
-50-
Stuarts dissolution proceeding,the district court lacked j

urisdiction to hear such
claims.
10.
Counts 12 and 13 Fail To State Facts Sufficient To State A Claim

Against AnyJudicial Defendant.
In Counts 12 and 13,the FAC appears to assert substantive due process and
trespass claims under section 1983 against the Color of Law Defendantsand all
defendants,respectively. (ER 279-83,889-900.) W ith regard to the Judicial
Defendants,Count 12 alleges that they breached their [d]uties to ensure due
process and protect rights of all those within their j
urisdiction[,
][and]all duties in
Canons and
related
codes of judicial ethics[,

] by CULPABLE or
UNREASONABLEconduct as elsewhere alleged . (ER 279,890(c);ER 282,

894.) Count 13 avers that each defendant committed a trespassbyexceeding
the limits of their authority as elsewhere alleged in each Count and Claim
herein[.] (ER 283,900.) Given the absence of anyfactual allegations in Counts
12 and 13,as well as Appellants failure to allege facts sufficient to state
substantive due process and trespass claims elsewhere in the FAC,Counts 12 and
13 were also properlydismissed bythe district court.
11.
Count 15 Does Not And Cannot State Facts Sufficient To State A

Claim Against The Judicial Defendants For False AdvertisingUnder
The Lanham Act.
Count 15of the FAC asserts a claim for false advertisingunder the Lanham
Act against All Defendants. (ER 284-92, 904-14.)
-51-
The crux of the
allegations against the Judicial Defendants,particularlythe Judicial Council,AOC,

and Superior Court,is that theyhave made misrepresentations regardingthe legal
authority of family court staff and j
udicial officers,the legality of domestic
violence forms and orders,and the rights of family court litigants. (ER 284,
907(e).)
Among other elements,a false advertising claim under the Lanham Act
requires a false statement of fact bythe defendant in a commercial advertisement
about its own or anothers product. 15U.S.C. 1125(a)(1)(B);Skydive Arizona,
Inc. v. Quattrocchi,673 F.3d 1105,1110(9th Cir. 2012). The plaintiff in a false
advertisingaction must allege commercial inj
urybased upon a misrepresentation
about a product,and also that the inj
ury was competitive,
i.e.,harmful to the
plaintiffs abilityto compete with the defendant. Barrus v. Sylvania,55F.3d 468,
470(9th Cir. 1995);15U.S.C. 1125(a)(1)(B).
Appellantsfalse advertisingclaim fails on multiple grounds. Although the
FAC labels all of the defendantsalleged misrepresentations as COMMERCIAL
SPEECH,
the FAC does not and cannot aver that the Judicial Defendants engage
in commercial activities,let alone the commercial advertisement of anyproducts or
services. See Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp.,378F.3d 1002,1017
(9th Cir. 2004) (commercial speech requires statements that propose a commercial
transaction). Moreover,the judicial power of the State of California is vested only
-52-
in the Supreme Court,courts of appeal,and superior courts. Cal. Const. art. VI,
1. The FAC therefore does not and cannot aver that the Judicial Defendants
compete with anyone in the operation of the courts,let alone Appellants.
The Judicial Defendants anticipate that Appellants may argue that the
Judicial Defendants are nevertheless liable for the alleged misrepresentations of
others under the theory of joint tortfeasor liability. Joint tortfeasor liability is
available only when the defendant has knowingly participated in the creation,
development,and propagation of the false advertising campaign . In re
Century 21-Re/Max,882 F. Supp. 915,925 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
Personal
liabilityextends onlyto those persons who activelyparticipate as a movingforce in

the decision to engage in the infringingacts or otherwise cause the infringement as
a whole to occur. Parker v. Google,Inc.,422 F. Supp. 2d 492,503 (E.D. Pa.
2006) (no aider and abetterliabilityunder the Lanham Act). Because the FAC
does not and cannot allege anyfacts establishingthe requisite participation for any
Judicial Defendant,anyreliance on joint tortfeasor liabilityis misplaced.
12.
The FAC Does Not Allege Facts Sufficient To State A Civil RICO
Claim Against The Judicial Defendants.
Although anything but clear,various Judicial Defendants appear to be

named as defendants in certain claims included within 11 of the 12 Racketeering
Counts of the FAC. (ER 316-49, 1001-1180.) AppellantsRICO claims
purport to be based on 18U.S.C. 1962(c),which provides in relevant part:
-53-
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or

associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the
activities of which affect,interstate or foreign commerce,
to conduct or participate,directly or indirectly,in the
conduct of such enterprises affairs through a pattern of
racketeeringactivityor collection of unlawful debt.22
To state a claim for violation of section 1962(c),a RICO plaintiff must
allege,amongother elements,the existence of a RICO enterprise,
and a pattern
of racketeeringactivity. Odom v. Microsoft Corp.,486F.3d 541,552 (9th Cir.
2007);Occupational-Urgent Health Sys.,Inc. v. Sutro & Co.,711 F. Supp. 1016,
1021 (E.D. Cal. 1989). One is not liable under section 1962(c) unless one has
participated in the operation or management of the enterprise itself. Reves v.
Ernst & Young,507 U.S. 170,183 (1993).
[T]o participate,directly or
indirectly,in the conduct of such enterprises affairs,

one must have some part in
directingthose affairs. Id. at 179. Racketeeringactivityis anyact indictable
under several provisions of Title 18of the United States Code,and also includes
anyact or threat involvingmurder,kidnapping,gambling,arson,robbery,bribery,
extortion,dealingin obscene matter,or dealingin a controlled substance ,which
is chargeable under State law and punishable byimprisonment for more than one
year. 18U.S.C. 1961(1).
The FAC also cites 18 U.S.C. 1962(d),which makes it unlawful to

conspire to violate section 1962(c).
22
-54-
A RICO plaintiff must allege facts supportingeach element with specificity

and identify the individual actions of each defendant sufficient to constitute a
pattern of racketeeringactivity. Blake v. Dierdorff,856F.2d 1365,1370(9th Cir.
1988). The Ninth Circuit has applied Rule 9(b)s particularity requirements to
RICO claims under section 1962. Moore v. Kayport Package Exp.,Inc.,885F.2d
531,541 (9th Cir. 1989);see also Alan Neuman Prods.,Inc. v. Albright,862 F.2d
1388,1392-93 (9th Cir. 1988) (dismissing RICO claim where the allegations of
predicate acts in the complaint were entirelygeneral,
and no specifics of time,
place,or nature of the alleged communications are pleaded).
To satisfy the enterpriseelement,the FAC alleges the existence of five
RICO enterprises. (See ER 296-302,929-45.) For the racketeeringactivity
element,the FAC lists numerous crimes under Title 18,includingenticement into
slavery,sale into involuntary servitude,transportation of slaves,and service on
vessels in slave trade. (ER 315,1000(A)-(Z).) Absent from the FAC are any
allegations concerning any Judicial Defendants participation in the purported
enterprises,
or any facts specifying conduct that amounts to a criminal act,let
alone a patternof crime. The RICO claims against the Superior Court,Judicial
Council,and AOC also fail because government entities are incapable of forming
a malicious intent. Lancaster Community Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist.,
940F.2d 397,404(9th Cir. 1991) (rejectingRICO claim against hospital district).
-55-
AppellantsRICO claims against the Judicial Defendants were therefore properly

dismissed bythe district court.
13.
The Claims For Prospective Relief Are Barred For LackOf Standing
And Under Principles Of Abstention.
The FAC also asserts counts for prospective relief,which generallyaskthat

all defendants be enj
oined from further violatingAppellantsrights. (ER 351-54,
1192-1203.) To have standingto obtain prospective relief,there must exist a
sufficient likelihood that [plaintiff]will again be wronged in a similar way. City
of Los Angeles v. Lyons,461 U.S. 95,111 (1983);B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch.
Dist.,192 F.3d 1260,1264 (9th Cir. 1999).
Absent from the FAC are any
allegations that Appellants are likelyto be wronged in the future byanyJudicial

Defendant.
Insofar as the prospective relief counts are based on hypothetical orders that
maybe issued in the future in Stuarts Dissolution Proceeding,(see,e.g.,ER 355,
1203 (requestinginj
unction against enforcement of anyDVILS order now or at
anytime in effect relatingto STUART)),there is no real or immediate threat that
such orders may be entered,and it is unknown what orders may or may not be
issued. An attack on such orders order would also be subj
ect to the RookerFeldman doctrine and Younger abstention.23
Under Younger abstention,federal courts must abstain and allow the state
court to adj
udicate all claims,state and federal,if the state proceedings are (1)
23
-56-
Finally,anyendeavor byAppellants to use this action to interfere with the

administration of Californias state j
udicial system would run afoul of OShea.
Under OShea,[f]ederal courts maynot entertain actions that seekto impose an
ongoingfederal audit of state proceedings. E.T.,682 F.3d at 1123 (quoting
OShea,414 U.S. at 500). The Ninth Circuit has expressed great reluctance in
grant[ing]relief that would entail heavy federal interference in such sensitive
state activities as administration of the judicial system. Id. (affirmingabstention
under OShea in action challenging juvenile dependency court system based on
caseloads of court and court-appointed attorneys). Such grounds therefore also
support the district courts dismissal of the prospective relief claims.
D.
NONE OF THE DISTRICT COURTSCOMMENTS SUPPORT

APPELLANTSPARTIALITY CHALLENGE
Appellants also assert that theywere deprived of an impartial tribunal based

on allegedly hostile comments made by the district court. (AOB 50-51.) The
Supreme Court has held that [j
]udicial remarks duringthe course of a trial that are
critical or disapprovingof,or even hostile to,counsel,the parties,or their cases,
ordinarilydo not support a bias or partialitychallenge. Liteky v. United States,
ongoing,(2) implicate important state interests,and (3) provide the plaintiff with
an adequate opportunityto litigate federal claims. Younger,401 U.S. at 49-53;San
Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco,145F.3d 1095,1103 (9th Cir.
1998).
-57-
510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).
[O]nly in the most extreme of cases would
disqualification on this basis be constitutionallyrequired. U.S. v. Odachyan,749

F.3d 798,802 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). [E]xpressions
of impatience,dissatisfaction,annoyance,and even angerare not grounds for
establishing bias or impartiality, nor are a j
udges efforts at courtroom
administration. Pesnell v. Arsenault,543 F.3d 1038,1044 (9th Cir. 2008)
(quotingLiteky,510U.S. at 555-56);see also Odachyan,749F.3d at 803;Bosch,
951 F.2d at 1549.
None of the comments made bythe district j
udge in this action,all of which
were entirely warranted,amount to anything more than mere frustration with
Appellants. Because none of the districts judges remarks reveal such a high
degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible[,
]Liteky,
510U.S. at 555-56,theydo not support Appellantspartialitychallenge.
E.
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY APPLIED ITS

DISCRETION IN DENYING STUARTS MOTION FOR
COUNTER-SANCTIONS
In addition to movingto dismiss the original complaint,the Superior Court

moved for Rule 11 sanctions. (SER 97-100.) The sanctions motion was primarily
based on the ground that Appellantsclaims have absolutelyno chance of success
under the existingprecedents,and []no reasonable argument can be advanced to
extend,modify or reverse the law as it stands[,
] and the motion accordingly
-58-
relied on the same grounds raised in the Superior Court Defendantsdismissal

motion. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York,762 F.2d 243,254(2nd Cir.
1985),abrogated on other grounds by Ipcon Collections LLC v. Costco Wholesale
Corp.,698F.3d 58,63 (2nd Cir. 2012);Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2). The Superior
Court also sought sanctions on the ground that the complaint was presented for an
improper purpose,namelyto harass the Superior Court Defendants,as evidenced
bythe inclusion of the residential addresses of judicial officers in the complaint.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1).
In response to the Superior Courts sanctions motion,Stuart filed his own
motion for Rule 11 sanctions on the ground that the Superior Court Defendants
motion to dismiss the complaint was frivolous. (SER 104-05;ER 37:11-15.)
Given the Superior Court Defendantsmotion was granted,the district court
ostensiblyfound that the motion was not frivolous and accordinglydenied Stuarts
sanctions motion. (ER 16:
16-18:9.)
Remarkably,Appellants argue on appeal that the district court abused its
discretion in denyingcounter-sanctionson the grounds that the Superior Court
Defendants effectivelylosttheir motion to dismiss the complaint and that many
groundsraised in the first motion to dismiss were withdrawnand abandoned
-59-
in connection with the omnibus motion to dismiss the FAC.24
(AOB 52.)
Appellantsformer assertion is puzzling because the district court granted the

Superior Court Defendantsmotion to dismiss the complaint. (ER 41-49.) That
the district court did not rule on everyground raised in the motion to dismiss does
not equate to losingthe motion. Indeed,the district courts Rule 8 dismissal
effectivelyrendered all remaininggrounds for dismissal moot.
Appellants latter contention regarding the Judicial Defendants alleged
omission of many grounds from the second motion to dismiss is equally
perplexing. W ith the exception of the corporate capacity grounds that were no
longer at issue,the omnibus motion to dismiss the FAC,with which the Judicial
Defendants joined,and the Judicial Defendantssupplemental memorandum of
points and authorities in support of the omnibus motion relied on the same grounds
advanced in support of the Judicial Defendantsprior motion to dismiss. (SER
28:
19-29:
20;SER 160:
2-8;SER 221:
10-222:
10;SER 222:13-230:4;SER 232-34.)
Appellants challenge of the district courts denial of counter-sanctions is
therefore entirelydevoid of merit.
Appellants also assert that counter-sanctionsshould have been awarded
based on the Superior Courts frivolous sanction motion practice. (AOB 52.)
Not onlydid the district court advise Stuart that he was luckynot to have been
sanctioned in connection with the original complaint,(ER 38:
4-8),but the alleged
frivolityof the Superior Courts sanctions motion is not properlybefore this Court,
as the sole basis of Stuarts sanctions motion was the Superior Courts MTD
(i.e.,motion to dismiss). (SER 104.)
24
-60-
VIII.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above,the Court should affirm the district courts
dismissal of the action for failure to complywith Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8. Although Appellantsnon-compliance with Rule 8,by itself,is sufficient to
affirm the dismissal of the action,the district courts j
udgment maybe affirmed on
numerous,alternative grounds.
Dated:December 19,2014
Respectfullysubmitted,
/s/Matthew L. Green
Best Best & Krieger LLP
Attorneys for Judicial Defendants-Appellees
SUPERIOR COURT OFCALIFORNIA,
COUNTY OFSAN DIEGO,et. al.
-61-
STATEMENT OFRELATED CASES

PURSUANT TO CIRCUIT RULE 28-2.6
The Judicial Defendants-Appellees are not aware of anyrelated cases.
/s/Matthew L. Green
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,
-62-
CERTIFICATE OFCOMPLIANCE PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32(a)(7)(C) AND NINTH CIRCUIT RULE 32-1
In accordance with Rule 32(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
and Ninth Circuit Rule 32-1, I certify that this Joint Answering Brief is
proportionally spaced 14-point Times New Roman font; that the brief was
produced on a computer usinga word processingprogram;and that the program
calculated that the brief contains 12,
856words.
/s/Matthew L. Green
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,
-63-
CERTIFICATE OFSERVICE
Iherebycertifythat Ielectronicallyfiled the foregoingwith the Clerkof the
Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit by using the
appellate CM/
ECFsystem on December 19,2014
On the date stated below,Iserved the documents via CM/
ECF described
above on the designated recipients through electronic transmission of said
documents;a certified receipt is issued to filing party acknowledging receipt by
CM/
ECFs system. Once CM/EFC has served all designated recipients,proof of
electronic service is returned to the filingparty.
/
s/Matthew L. Green
Matthew L. Green
25508.00086\
9445275.2
-64-

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Case: 14-56140, 12/19/2014, ID: 9356705, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 1 of 76

Appeal No. 14-56140

Appeal from the United States District Court

JOINT ANSWERING BRIEFOFJUDICIAL DEFENDANTSAPPELLEES

James B. Gilpin,Bar No. 151466

Attorneys for Judicial DefendantsAppellees SUPERIOR COURT OF

Case: 14-56140, 12/19/2014, ID: 9356705, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 2 of 76

The Stuart Dissolution .......................................................................5

Stuarts Criminal ProceedingPeople v. Stuart ................................6

The April 15,2010Bar Association Event.........................................8

The FilingOf This Action And The Inclusion Of Judicial

The Motions to Dismiss the Complaint ............................................11

The First Amended Complaint And Omnibus Motion To

The Dismissal of the Action.............................................................16

STANDARD OFREVIEW .......................................................................16

SUMMARY OFARGUMENT .................................................................17

VII. ARGUMENT ............................................................................................20

THEDISTRICT COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS

AppellantsFailure To ComplyW ith Rule 8W as One Of

The District Court CorrectlyConcluded That The FAC

The District Court Did Consider And ProperlyApply

Case: 14-56140, 12/19/2014, ID: 9356705, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 3 of 76

The InvoluntaryDismissal W as Supported W ith Or

JUDICIALIMMUNITY BARSALLCLAIMSARISING OUT

Ashelman and Sparkman Are BindingPrecedent In This

The District Court CorrectlyApplied Circuit Precedent.........34

The Recycled Claims In The FAC ConcerningStuarts

No Historical Analysis Of Judicial ImmunityW as

FamilyLaw Judges Are Also Afforded Judicial

THEDISTRICT COURTSJUDGMENT MAY BE

The Claims Against The Judicial Defendants In Counts 1

Counts 1 And 2 Also Fail To State Facts Sufficient To

The Claims Against Judicial Defendants In Count 3,

The Claims In Count 3 Against Judge Groch Are Also

Case: 14-56140, 12/19/2014, ID: 9356705, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 4 of 76

Count 4,W hich Arises From AppellantsInclusion Of

The Claims For SupervisoryLiabilityIn Count 6Are

The Claims Against The Superior Court,Judicial

Counts 9And 10Fail To State Facts Sufficient To State

The Claims Against Judicial Defendants In Count 11 Are

Counts 12 and 13 Fail To State Facts Sufficient To State

Count 15Does Not And Cannot State Facts Sufficient To

The FAC Does Not Allege Facts Sufficient To State A

The Claims For Prospective Relief Are Barred For Lack

NONE OFTHEDISTRICT COURTSCOMMENTS

THEDISTRICT COURT PROPERLY APPLIED ITS

VIII. CONCLUSION .........................................................................................61

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Case: 14-56140, 12/19/2014, ID: 9356705, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 6 of 76

Estate of Brooks v. U.S.,

Case: 14-56140, 12/19/2014, ID: 9356705, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 7 of 76

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,

Case: 14-56140, 12/19/2014, ID: 9356705, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 8 of 76

Lacey v. Maricopa County,

Case: 14-56140, 12/19/2014, ID: 9356705, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 9 of 76

Case: 14-56140, 12/19/2014, ID: 9356705, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 10 of 76

Case: 14-56140, 12/19/2014, ID: 9356705, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 11 of 76

Yourish v. California Amplifier,

Case: 14-56140, 12/19/2014, ID: 9356705, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 12 of 76

Cal. Penal Code 653m......................................................................... 6, 7