The Comfort of Civilization

Author(s): Franco Moretti

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Representations, No. 12 (Autumn, 1985), pp. 115-139
Published by: University of California Press
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FRANCO

MORETTI

The Comfortof Civilization

BILDUNGSROMAN.

A CERTAIN

MAGNETISM

hovers around the

term.It standsoutas themostobviousofthe(few)reference

pointsavailablefor
thatirregularexpansewe call the"novel."It occupiesa centralrolein thephilosophicalinvestigations
ofthenovel,fromHegel'sAesthetics
toDiltheytoLukatcs's
Theory
oftheNovel.Foundin thebroadhistorical
frameworks
of MikhailBakhtin
and ErichAuerbach,it is evendiscerniblein themodelsof narrativeplotconstructedby YuriLotman.It reappearsundervariousheadings("novelof formation;'"ofinitiation;'
"ofeducation")inallofthemajorliterary
traditions.
Even
thosenovelsthatclearlyare notBildungsromans
or novelsof formation
are perceivedbyus onlyagainstthisconceptualhorizon;so we speakof a "failedinitiation"or ofa "problematic
formation."
ofdubioususefulness,
Expressions
as are
all negativedefinitions;
nonethelesstheybear witnessto thehold of thisimage
on our modesof analysis.
Such semantichypertrophy
is not by chance.Even thoughthe conceptof
theBildungsroman
has becomeevermoreapproximatewithtime,it is stillclear
thatweseekwithittoindicateone ofthemostharmonious
solutionseveroffered
to a consubstantial
dilemmaof modernbourgeoiscivilization:
theconflict
between
theideal of "self-determination"
and thejust as imperiousdemandsof "socialization."Fortwocenturiesnow,Western
societieshaverecognizedtheindividual's
rightto choose one's own ethicsand one's own idea of "happiness:'to freely
imagineand designone'spersonaldestiny-rights
declaredinproclamations
and
setdowninconstitutions
butthatare not,as a result,universally
realizable,since
theyobviouslygiverise to contrasting
And if a liberal-democratic
aspirations.
and capitalist
a doubtone thatcan best"livewith"conflict,
itis
societyis without
of socialand politicalrelationships,
equallytruethat,as a system
it too tendsto
settleitselfintoan operationalmodethatis predictable,
regular,"normal."Like
all systems,
itdemandsagreement,
consensus.
homogeneity,
How can the tensiontowardindividuality,
whichis the necessaryfruitof a
be madetocoexistwiththeopposingtensiontoward
cultureofself-determination,
the offspring,
of the mechanismof socialization?
normality,
equallyinevitable,
This is thefirstaspectof theproblem,complicated
and made morefascinating
stillbyanothercharacteristic
of our civilization,
which,havingalwaysbeen pervadedbythedoctrinesof naturallaw,cannotconcedethatsocialization
is based
on a merecompliancetoauthority.
It isnotenoughthatthesocialorderis"legal";

REPRESENTATIONS

12 * Fall 1985 ? THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY

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OF CALIFORNIA

115

It must draw its inspirationfromvalues

it must also appear culturally
legitimate.
recognized by societyas fundamental,reflectthem and encourage them. Or it
mustat least seem to do so.
Thus it is not sufficientfor modern bourgeois societythat the drives which
oppose the successiveprevailingstandards of "normality"merelyare subdued.
It is also necessarythat,as a "free individual,"not as a fearfulsubject but as a
convincedcitizen,one perceive the social normsas onesown.One mustinternalize
themand fuse externalcompulsion and internalimpulses into a new unityuntil
the formeris no longer distinguishablefromthe latter.This fusion is what we
appears to us still
usually call "consensus"or "legitimation."If theBildungsroman
todayas an essential,pivotalpoint of our history,thisis because it has succeeded
in representingthis fusion witha force of convictionand optimisticclaritythat
will never be equaled again. We will see in fact that here there is no conflict
and
betweenindividualityand socialization,autonomyand normality,interiority
without
One's formationas an individualinandforoneselfcoincides
objectification.
riftswithone's social integrationas a simplepartofa whole.These are two trajectories that nourish one another and in which the painful perceptionof socialization as Entsagung,"renunciation"(fromwhich will emerge the immense psychologicaland narrativeproblematicsof the nineteenthand twentiethcenturies)
is stillinconceivable.The "comfortof civilization":perhaps the Bildungsroman's
historicalmeaning can best be summarizedin these words.

"All peasants and craftsmen might be

elevated into artists. . "
The characters in WilhelmMeisterare not idlers. If they make this
impressionon Wernerit is because, as a proper merchant,he cannot conceive of
workthatdoes notbringwithitrenunciationand ascesis,sacrifice.But theimmense
bet of theTowerSociety,previouslyannounced byWilhelmin theletterto Werner
on the differencesbetweenthe noble and the bourgeois (WM 5.3), is thata kind
of work can be created that would enhance not "having"but rather"being."A
workthatproduces not commodities,objects thathave value onlyin thatmarket
exchange which distances them foreverfrom their producer,but, as Wilhelm
hints,"harmonious objects:'1objects that"return"to theircreator,therebypermittingthe entire"reappropriation"of one's own activity.
Workin thiswayis fundamentalin Meister-as noncapitalistic
work,as reproduction of a "closed circle.' It is an unequaled instrumentof social cohesion,
producing not commoditiesbut rather "harmonious objects:' "connections."It
gives a homeland to the individual. It reinforcesthe links between man and
work.It does
nature,man and other men, man and himself.2It is alwaysconcrete
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not require a producer who is "average,""abstract,"denatured, but is addressed

to a specificindividualand to the end of exaltinghis peculiarities.
Workin Meister,in both its "harmonious" resultsand in its manner of presentingitselfto the one who works,seems to have as its end theformation
ofthe
in
its
individual.It is,
essence, pedagogy.This is the true occupation, much more
so than itslanded enterprises,of the Tower Society,which,afterall, has itsorigin
in a pedagogical experiment.Producing men-this is the true vocation of the
masons in Meister:
Freeyourmind,whereitis possible,fromall suspicionand all anxiety!Therecomesthe
towardshimuntilyoulearnstillmorehowmuchgratitude
Abbe.Be friendly
youowe
him.The rogue!therehe goesbetweenNataliaand Theresa.I wouldbethe is thinking
something
out.As he aboveall likestoplaya littlethepartofDestiny,
so he does notoften
leta marriagebe madefromlove-making.
(WM8.5)
The Abbe and Jarno,who pronounces these words,are preciselythose who
have worked at educating Wilhelm.They have writtenhis YearsofApprenticeship
and willalso decide, overcominghis resistance,whichwoman he should marry.
These are all double-edged particulars.On the one hand, theyare reminiscent
of what Schillerenvisioned in his Letterson theAesthetic
EducationofMan: a situation in whichthe "goal" of societyis man. On the other hand, the premisesand
consequences of thisutopia cannot but appear disturbing.If in factthe end of
societyis man, then it goes withoutsayingthatthose who hold social power have
the rightor duty to chart the progress of their "product" even in its minimal
details-man, in turn ("be friendlytowardshim"),is also required to show gratitude toward them. Here organicismand liberty,organicismand criticalintelligence, are antithetical-for an organic systemis withouta doubt an inviting
homeland, but in everyorganism,as will graduallybecome more clear,there is
room foronly one brain.
The "harmony"thatcharacterizesworkin Meisteris due to the factthatwork
does not obey solelyan economic logic in the strictsense, one thatis necessarily
indifferentto the subjectiveaspirationsof the individualworker.Instead of forcand an interiority
iblysunderingan "alienated"objectification
incapable of being
creates a continuitybetweenexternal and
expressed, work in the Bildungsroman
internal,betweenthe "best and most intimate"part of the soul and the "public"
aspect of existence.Once again we have the congruence of formationand socialization,but thereis more. For a workdefinedin thiswayis in factindistinguishable from what a large part of the German culture of the time called "art."
Humboldt:
Everything
towardswhichmandirectshisattention,
whetheritis limitedto thedirector
of external
indirectsatisfaction
of his merelyphysicalwants,or to theaccomplishment
relationwithhisinternalsensaobjectsin general,presentsitselfin a closelyinterwoven
tions.Sometimes,
thereco-existswiththisexternalpurpose,some impulse
moreover,
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fromhisinnerbeing;and often,even,thislastis thesole

proceedingmoreimmediately
theformerbeingonlyimpliedin it,necessarily
or incidentally...
springof hisactivity,
A man,therefore,
whosecharacter
peculiarly
interests,
althoughhislifedoes notlosethis
or howeverengaged,onlyattainsthe mostmaturedand
charmin any circumstances
ofhisactivity,
whenhiswayoflifeis in harmonious
gracefulconsummation
keepingwith
hischaracter.
it seemsas if all peasantsand craftsmen
In viewof thisconsideration,
mightbe
elevatedintoartists;thatis,intomenwholovetheirlabourforitsownsake,improveit
cultivate
theirintellect,
ennoble
bytheirownplasticgeniusand inventive
skill,and thereby
And so humanity
wouldbe entheircharacter,
and exaltand refinetheirenjoyments.
in themselves,
so oftengo to denobledbytheverythingswhichnow,thoughbeautiful
grade it.3

In this currentof thought,which will continue up to Ferdinand Tonnies's

work can assume two opposing forms. The first-capiand Society,
Community
talisticwork-"degrades" humanity.It serves not man but rather (say Schiller
and the Abbe in Meister)the god of "profit";in so doing itbetraystheveryessence
of work,what it is "in and for itself."Beautiful. Nobilitating.Formative.If only
thissecond typeof workcan be substitutedfor the first....
Indeed. What would happen then? Or to put it in other words,fromwhat
is this"aesthetic"and humanizingworksuperior to one thatis instrustandpoint
mentaland alienated? Certainlynot foritsproductivecapacities.Schiller,in fact,
in his On theAesthetic
EducationofMan, postulatesan inverselyproportionalrelationshipbetween the "wealthof nations" and the "aestheticeducation of man."
To the "superiorityof the species" that characterizesthe modern period from
classicalGreece mustbe opposed the "inferiority
of theindividual"(letter6). This
is whatthe harmonyof workas art (or as "play")mustremedy-cost whatitmay:
in theexerciseof powers,it is true,inevitably
leads theindividualintoerror,
Partiality
thewholeenergyof our spiritin one single
buttherace to truth.Onlybyconcentrating
our wholebeingintoone singlepower,do we attachwings,
focus,and drawingtogether
so to say,to thisindividualpowerand lead itartificially
beyondtheboundswhichNature
seemsto haveimposedupon it....
Thus, howevermuchmaybe gainedfortheworldas a wholebythisfragmentary
of humanpowers,itis undeniablethattheindividuals
cultivation
whomitaffects
suffer
underthe curseof thisuniversalaim.... The exertionof individualtalentscertainly
producesextraordinary
makesfulland happymen.4
men,butonlytheireventempering
The reversalundertakenby Schillerin the second of these paragraphs is one
of the keys for penetratingthe universe of values of the Bildungsroman.
The
does not bother with "extraordinarymen," "universal aims,"or
Bildungsroman
what "maybe gained for the world as a whole."Its purpose is to create "fulland
happy men"-full and happy because "tempered:' not "partial" or unilateral.
Free fromthat disharmonious specializationthat,in the eyes of Wilhelm,constitutesthe particularcurse of the "bourgeois":
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He is to cultivate
individualcapabilities
so as to becomeuseful,and itis alreadypresupposed thatthereis no harmonyin hismannerof existencenorcan therebe, becausehe
is obligedtomakehimself
usefulinone direction
and must,therefore,
neglecteverything
else.(WM5.3)
Only if the individual renounces the bourgeois who dwells withinhim will
he be able to become an harmonious entity,be "fulland happy."Only then will
he feel that he again "belongs" to his world, and only then will the strifethat
pervades the modern age be at an end. For the aestheticutopia is a socialutopia:
and Reasonimplantsocialprinciples
in him,
Thoughneed maydriveMan intosociety,
intosociety,
Beautyalonecanconferon hima socialcharacter.
Tastealonebringsharmony
becauseitestablishes
dividea
harmonyin theindividual.All otherformsof perception
part
man,becausetheyare exclusively
basedeitheron thesensuousor on theintellectual
ofhisbeing;onlytheperception
oftheBeautifulmakessomething
wholeofhim,because
bothhisnaturesmustaccordwithit.5
Schiller is wishinghere for the advent of a "social" society,spontaneously
cohesive,devoid of lacerationsand strife.It is for thisend that "beauty,""play,"
and "art" are necessary.And yet,it is clear,these cannot reallymodifythe functioningof the great, alienated social mechanisms: the "mechanical" state,proaesthetic
ductionforprofit.To bringharmony"to the individualand to society,"
education followsa more indirectand elusive strategy.Instead of directlyconfrontingthe great powers of social life, it creates a new realm of existence in
which those abstractand deformingforces penetrate less violentlyand can be
reconstitutedin syntonywith the individual aspiration toward harmony.This
realm is organized accordingto thedictatesof "beauty"and "play"; it is pervaded
with the "happiness" of the individual; and the Bildungsroman
is its narrative
explication.Fine. As always,however,when one is dealing withutopias,the question arises: whereexactlyis the realm of aestheticharmony to be located? Furthermore,whichaspectsof modern lifehas iteffectively
involvedand organized?
The Art of Living
A fairlysimple and reasonable answercan be offeredfor these questions.Schiller'saesthetic"sociableness,"likeHumboldt'sartistic"work;'represents
in fact the precapitalistcommunityand its craftsmanship;just as typicallyprebourgeois is the idea-dealt withat lengthby WernerSombart-that man is "the
meteyard of all things."6The notorious "Deutsche misere" corroborates this
hypothesis,whichcontainswithouta doubt much of the truth.The allure of On
Meisterwould thereforebe born, in
theAesthetic
EducationofMan or of Wilhelm
large measure, of the regretfor a lost harmony.As likelyas thisseems, I would
like to propose here a differenttype of historicalinterpretation:that aesthetic
organicity,and the happiness that comes withit, belong not only to a past that
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precedes capitalistproductionand the "mechanical"statebut endure in modern

times as well. But now they are shifted"to the side of,"so to speak, the new
collectiveinstitutions,
which theyengage in a silentand unending border war.
Followingthe lead of various recent studies, I will call this "parallel world"
the sphere of "everydaylife."Henri Lefebvre:
Everyday
lifeis definedas totality.
and technicalization,
Consideredin theirspecialization
void"filledin byeveryday
life.
thehigheractivities
leaveamongthemselves
a "technical
inan extensive
and encompasses
themtogether
The latterengagesall activities
relationship
itconstitutes
theirmeetinggroundsand their
withtheirdifferences
and theirconflicts;
commonlink.7
Lefebvre is halfright.That there are no limitsto what can be incorporated
by everydaylifeseems,to me, to be true. But it is also true that,ifwe mustdefine
a sphere of life,and declare thatit is withoutlimits,then we have not come very
far. A new element must be inserted; we must specifythat what characterizes
everydaylife (as well as Schiller'saestheticeducation, for thatmatter)is not the
nature or the number of its pursuitsbut their "treatment."That is to say,the
directionthattheyassume, the end to whichtheyare subordinated.Karel Kosik:
The everyday
appears... as theworldof familiarity....The everyday
is a worldwhose
and
dimensions
and potentialities
an individual
can controland calculatewithhisabilities
resources.In theeveryday,
can realizehisinteneverything
is 'at hand'and an individual
tions.... In theeveryday,
on [the]basisofhisownexpetheindividual
developsrelations
rience,hisownpossibilities,
hisownactivity,
and therefore
considerstheeveryday
reality
to be hisownworld.8
We may thus speak of everydaylife whenever the individual subordinates
any activitywhatsoeverto the constructionof "his own world."We are at the
antipodes of Protestantethics,of the ascetic and imperious Weberianvocation.
In everydaylife,it is the activity-anyactivity,
at least potentially-that mustbe
submittedto the service of the individual. It mustbecome proportionalto "his
abilitiesand resources."If the enterprisesucceeds, "an individualcan realize his
It
intentions,"and the world acquires the comfortingdimensionsof familiarity.
is no longer the world of hardshipand duty.It is a world where man trulyis the
meteyardof all things.
We have more or less retraced the picture hypothesizedin On theAesthetic
EducationofMan. Furtherproof of thisaffinity
betweenaestheticeducation and
everydaylife is to be found in Agnes Heller's work, who, followingLukacs,
defines Kosik's "individual"as a "particularity"that "tends toward self-preservation, to which it subordinates everything."9Heller, reappropriatingHegel's
notion of the "world-historical
individual;"thus opposes "particularity"to what
she definesas "individuality":
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It is theindividualities-particularly
thosemostdevelopedindividualities
... towhomwe
shallreferas representative
individuals-who
theevolutionary
individually
incorporate
generic
apex ofa givensociety.'0
These greatmen, Hegel had written,seem to followonlytheirpassions,their
freewill,but what theywant is the universal,and thisis theirpathos."
Consequently:
It wasnotunhappinesstheychosebutexertion,
and laborin theserviceoftheir
conflict,
end. Andevenwhentheyreachedtheirgoal,peacefulenjoyment
and happinesswasnot
theirlot.Their actionsare theirentirebeing.... Whentheirend is attained,theyfall
asidelikeemptyhusks.Theymayhaveundergonegreatdifficulties
inordertoaccomplish
theirpurpose,butas soon as theyhavedone so, theydie earlylikeAlexander,
are murdered likeCaesar,or deportedlikeNapoleon.... The fearfulconsolation[is] thatthe
12
greatmenof history
did notenjoywhatis calledhappiness.
To use once again Schiller'sterminology:these individualsmay be "advantageous to the species" but theyare not "fulland happy" men. They are "representatives,"
for Heller, "of the evolutionarygenericapex of a given society,"
of
its major historicalturningsand acquisitions.But preciselyfor thisreason they
are notrepresentativesof those times"of ordinaryadministration"that,we will
see, constitutethe privilegedhistoricalbackdrop of the novel, especiallyof the
13 Here the "representativeindividual"does not want "exertion,
Bildungsroman.
conflict,and labor in the serviceof theirend": thesestruggleswilltakeplace (and
in an extremelyproblematicway) only in Stendhal, whose heroes, not without
reason, are takenin by the "world-historical"
model of Napoleon; theythus give
life to a narrativeplot whose typicalevent is a clash withthe existingorder. But
the hero of theBildungsroman,
like Heller's "particular,""wantsa lifefreeofconflict,
wants to feel at ease in the world as it is."14 His compass is personal happiness,
and the plot that will permit him to realize it will follow the model of organic
integration:
the polar opposite of the conflictualplot.
Although theyare differentin many ways,the studies of Lefebvre,Kosik,
and Heller neverthelessall converge toward a single goal, the formulationof a
critiqueof everydaylife. They want to "disalienate"it,reveal itswretchednessor
transience,unmask the "happiness" itpromisesas somethingmean or imaginary.
In doing this,all threeoppose it,more or less echoing Hegel, withthe great and
revolutionarymarchof universalhistory,and therecan be no doubt that,against
such a backdrop, thishappiness seems a trulypoor and fragileentity.
Furtheralong,in discussingthe stanceof theBildungsroman
towardthe French
revolution,we too will finda particularlylucid example of the alteritybetween
the two spheres of life.A difficulty
remains,however:the viewpointof universal
history,on whichthe critiqueof everydayliferests,is certainlynot the only one
possible,and above all it is nottheone assumedbynovelistic
form.Not blind to the
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progress of universal history,novelisticform nevertheless"reshapes" it as it is

perceivedfromthe viewpointof everydaylife.Furthermore,the novel "funnels"
universalhistoryinto thismode of existencein order to amplifyand enrich the
lifeof the "particularity."
the "significanceof history"does not
In other words, in the Bildungsroman
have its reference point in the "futureof the species." Historical significance
instead must be revealed withinthe more narrow confinesof a circumscribed
and relativelycommon individual life. What is involved here is an a prioriconditionof the "symbolicform";whetherwe like it or not, thisis how thingsstand.
It therebyfollowsthatthe novel existsnot as a critiquebut as a cultureofeveryday
life.Far fromdevaluing it, the novel organizes and "refines"this form of existence,makingitever more aliveand interesting-or,withBalzac, even fascinating.
betweenaestheticeducation and everydaylife,one of the
Given the affinity
tasksof the Bildungsroman
willbe to show how pleasing lifein "our small world"
can be. Once again, Agnes Heller:
in everydaylifeconsistsof twoingredients:
thepleasingand theuseful....
Satisfaction
in everydaylife.Withit we simplyimplya
The pleasingis of consequenceexclusively
positivefeelingthataccompaniesthephysicalor psychicstate.'5
The pleasing: the comfortor ease of being in the world. And it is precisely
this satisfiedequilibriumthat renders such comfortdeaf-exactly in the same
way as the "aestheticeducation"-to the proud harshnessof modern, "autonomous" art. "Great worksof art,"Heller continues,"eitherare notpleasing,or are
morethan pleasing."16 In both cases it is art itselfthatmakes impossiblethe "full
and happy" temperanceof Schiller'sproject.Is thereno waythento fuseart with
life?Not exactly,but there is a solution thathas appeared preciselyin the most
recentdecades. Kitsch:
Kitschislinkedtoan artofliving,
anditisduetothisworldthatithasfounditsauthenticity,
forit is difficult
to liveintimately
withartisticmasterpieces
toutcourt,
whetherthoseof
woman's
fashion
orthoseofMichelangelo's
vault.Kitsch,
isofhuman
instead,
proportions....
Kitschis acceptableart,thatwhichdoes nottransform
our spiritviaa transcendence
ifitmust
beyondtheboundsofeveryday
life,viaa forcesuperiortoourselves-especially
makeus overcome
ourselves.
Kitsch
hashumanproportions,
whereasartisbeyondthese....
In theadaptationofthetonality
oftheenvironment
to thatoftheindividual
wefind
a recipe
Kitschis theartofhappiness,and each exaltation
ofthemessagesof
ofhappiness.
happinessis at the same timean exaltationof Kitsch.Hence itsuniversality...Kitsch
coincideswiththematerialenvironment
of everyday
life.It is difficult
to conceiveof it
without
someconcreteprop.'7
From "happiness"as an insertionintoan organicwhole to itsminiaturization
in the aesthetic harmony of the individual-and from here to kitschand to
everydaylife.Kitschliterally"domesticates"aestheticexperience. It bringsitinto
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the home,where most of everydaylife takes place. Moreover,it raids all sortsof
aesthetic material to constructwhat will be the typicalhousehold of modern
times.In Meisterthe"harmoniousobjects"par excellence,
thosethatmake theworld
an inviting"homeland,"are preciselyhomes, and thisis even more true forPride
and Prejudice.The crucial episode, here, is Elizabeth Bennett'svisitto Pemberley,
Darcy'scountryresidence. Pemberleyis open to the public: it is a monumentof
"beauty"fortheadmirationof outsiders.But thereis nothingmuseum-likeabout
it,and the reactionit arouses in Elizabeth certainlyis not "aesthetic."On seeing
Pemberley,she instead thinksof Darcy for the firsttimeas a possible husbandnot because of ambitionor avarice,but because Pemberleyrevealsthatthe everyday-domestic-life ofa man likeDarcycan preciselybe somethingvery"beautiful"
Beautiful?Not exactly.Jane Austen, who chose her words with legendary
precision,attributesthe adjective beautifulonly to the "natural" beauty of the
estate. The house, the rooms, and the furnitureare not "beautiful"-they are
"handsome."A termthatindicatesa "decorous" and "balanced" beauty,"without
harshness,""comfortable"(as the etymologyitselfsuggests).A beauty,in a word,
of human proportions.Repeated threetimesin a page to indicateobjects,handsomereappears a page later-four timesin ten lines!-to designate Darcy.
"Handsome": a beauty that is not in the least threateningor disconcerting,
not in the least autonomous. It envelops the ideal of a golden mean, of a clear
and reciprocal translatability
between the individual and his context. It is the
miracle of eighteenth-century
"taste"-of the "artisticperiod" that literaryhistoriographysees as ending withGoethe'sdeath. An "artistic"period not because
markedby a matchlessaestheticproduction,but because art stillseems withinit
to form a whole with "life."With the life of the social elite, of course, which
becomes ever more broad and rich,while artisticproduction (especially architecture and painting but also music), which has not yet installed itselfin the
"marketplace,"remains in good part within the bounds and rhythmsof that
existence. The two spheres thus achieve a "natural" fusion,withoutsuffering
any resultingdisgrace or deformation.
It is the miracle,we have said, of eighteenth-century
taste.To associate such
a fusionwithbad tastemightseem a gratuitousslap in the face: in the end, when
a musicalcigarettecase playsMozart'sserenade,somethinghas changed.Grantedbut the pointis thatthe kitschthatwillengulfthe followingcentury-and which
is already leering in the castle episode in Meisteror in the Rosing chapters of
Pride and Prejudice-is not distinguishedfrom neoclassical tastebecause it has
betrayeditsaspirationsbut because ithas remained faithfulto themin a historical
contextthathas by now changed too radically.And what has especiallychanged
is the position and self-knowledgeof the aestheticsphere: "My dear Fraulein,"
observesthe musicianKlesmerin George Eliot'sDaniel Deronda,"you have develcould still
of the salon."This Standpunkt
oped yourqualities fromthe Standpunkt
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be relevantto Darcy and Elizabeth,whose path Gwendolen Harlethwould in fact

like to follow.Halfwaythroughthe nineteenthcentury,however,art leaves the
salons. Thus, Klesmer coldlyconcludes, "you mustunlearn all that."
Aestheticeducation mustbe unlearned because it has no more worth. It is
neithertrue aestheticsnor true education. In "givinga meaning" to the lives of
Eliot's heroes, we witnessits replacementwitha much more demanding "vocation": a much more rigid and "depersonalizing,"and also, as we will see, more
painful or self-damaging,ideal. And this explains why it has been so difficult,
for Westernculture,to finda true substitutefor the harmonious "dilettantism"
Will
celebrated in Meister(Eliot herselfwill pay tributeto it withMiddlemarch's
Ladislaw). The aestheticfullnessof everydaylife in fact ensured a "humanization" of the social universe that will be, in the future,difficultto imagine. We
should not thereforebe surprisedifithas continuedfora long time,in countless
metamorphoses,to enhance the existenceof the modern individual.'8
Personality
The balanced harmonythatstrikesElizabeth at Pemberleyis not only
an architecturalstylebut also the visiblemanifestationof a pedagogical ideal. An
ideal of the greatestimportance,in an age in which the formationof the individual had become saddled withnew problems.Philippe Aries:
Our modernspiritisuneasy(whenfacedwiththenatureofmedievalassociations)
because
it refusesto admitthe intimatemixingof waysof beingthattodayare sharplydistinor friendship;
theprivatemodeoflife:diverguished-theintimate
modeoflife:family
sionand distraction;
thereligiousmodeof life:devoteeand cultactivity;
thecorporative
modeof life:thegathering
of thosewhoexercisethesameprofession
withthepurpose
oflearningit,orofgainingprofit
fromitor protecting
it.Modernmanisdividedbetween
a professional
lifeand a domesticlifethatoftenclash.... Modernlifeis characterized
by
theseparationof elementsthatwereat one timeintertwined.'9
If by individualwe mean somethingfundamentallyunitary,then the human
being described in these lines is no longer so-or not yetso. The varietyof his
fieldsof activityhas certainlyenriched him, but it has also deprived him of all
cohesion. The modern individualis marked frombirthby thisheterogeneityof
occupations, by a perennial disequilibriumof his symbolicand emotive investments.To become an "individual"in the full sense of the word, he will have to
learn how to master this multiplicityand how to keep it from turning into a
wearisomedisharmony.
How can thisbe done? Richard Sennett'sTheFall ofPublicMan is one of the
most intelligentreconstructionsof thiseffort.20For Sennett,the conflictcan be
reduced to the two extremepoles of "public" lifeand "intimate"life.During the
last two centuries,the meaning of existence, for the Westernindividual, has
moved ever more decisivelyintothe intimatesphere,resulting,therefore,in "the
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fall of public man." When faced witheach situationor collectiveinstitution,this

individualhas turnedmore and more to a magicaland almostobsessivephrase"what does this mean for me?"-which reflectsthe transferof the "meaning of
life" and celebrates the triumph of the sociopsychologicalattitude known as
"narcissism.9
Amazinglyrich in intuitionand thought across the most divergentfields,
Sennett'sreconstructionhas perhaps only one weak point. It is not necessarily
life.
true thatthe narcissistic"forme" has alwaysdwelled in the sphere of intimate
Heedless of the "objective"significanceof what surrounds him, the narcissistic
"I" is in fact basicallyirresponsible.However, intimatelife during the last two
centuries-the realm of maritaland familialrelationshipsin the narrowsensehas been in fact dominated too much by ideals of responsibility,
self-sacrifice,
and considerationof the other.The origin of narcissismshould not be looked
for here. The intimateis a realm that is too "strong"emotionally,too full of
symbolicand legal obligationsto allow forthe evasion of responsibilities.We must
look for a world of less rigid and demanding relationships.One thatleaves the
individual a wider range for the centripedal and narcissisticmanipulation of
externalreality.
This more pliable realm is in factthe sphere of everydaylife.Agnes Heller
Here all relationhas called it the sphere of the "fatteningof the particularity."
ships, intimateas well as public, only have worth in their contributionto the
rounding out of the individual personality."Personality":elusive catchwordof
our times,its semanticcontentchanges preciselyin those decades between the
senses.
eighteenthand nineteenthcenturies,as it settlesdown intotwointertwined
Firstof all, personalityis a distinctivetrait.It designates what renders an
individualunique and different
fromothers.But thisdistinction-andhere comes
into play the second aspect of the term-never applies to a single activityor to
a single characteristic.The modern individual feels that no occupation, be it
work or familylife or whatever,ever permitsone to "fullyexpress" one's perunsatisfied
sonality.Multilateraland prismatic,personalityremainsa consistently
idol. It would prefernever to have to bend for anything,never to be the means
toward an end, whateverthat end mightbe. It would instead preferthat each
activitylose its autonomyand objective consistencyin order to become a mere
instrumentof its own development.
For all these reasons, modern personalitylodges at the center of everyday
life,and it is under itslead thatthe latteris reunitedwiththe cultureof Bildung
and withthe theoryof the novel itself.Georg Simmel:
at thispointfollows
Here we see the sourceof theconceptof culture,which,however,
onlyour linguistic
feeling.We are not yetcultivated
by havingdevelopedthisor that
individual
bitof knowledgeor skill;we becomecultivated
onlywhenall of themservea
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psychic
unitywhichdependson butdoesnotcoincidewiththem.Ourconsciousendeavors
aim towardsparticularinterests
and potentialities.
The development
of everyhuman
being,whenitis examinedin termsof identifiable
items,appearsas a bundleof develdirections
and quitedifferent
opmentallineswhichexpandindifferent
lengths.Butman
butonlyinsofaras theyhelp
himself
doesnotcultivate
throughtheirisolatedperfections,
to develophis indefinable
personalunity.In otherwords:cultureis thewaythatleads
to theunfoldedunity.
fromtheclosedunitythroughtheunfoldedmultiplicity
towardssomething
This can referonlyto a development
prearrangedin the gersketched
out withinitself,
as a kindof idealplan.2'
minating
forcesof personality,
During the same yearsin whichSimmel was recapitulatingthisideal of individual culture-aware, likewise,that the development of capitalismand of the
metropoli had rendered it by then unattainable (and it is not by chance that
Lukacs was following
neitherplaya deciding role in theBildungsroman)-Gyorgy
an analogous path. The TheoryoftheNovel:
whichcomprehends
The contentofsuchmaturity
isan idealoffreehumanity
and affirms
thestructures
ofsociallifeas necessary
formsofhumancommunity,
yet,atthesametime,
onlyseesthemas an occasionfortheactiveexpressionof theessentiallifesubstance-in
notin theirrigidpoliticaland
otherwords,whichtakespossessionof thesestructures,
butas thenecessary
instruments
ofaimswhichgo farbeyond
legalbeing-for-themselves,
them....
be shownas a worldofconvention,
The socialworldmusttherefore
whichis partially
open to penetration
bylivingmeaning.
A new principleof heterogeneity
is therebyintroducedintothe outsideworld:a
hierarchy
ofthevariousstructures
and layersofstructures
accordingtotheirpenetrability
is irrationaland incapableof beingrationalised;
and the
by meaning.This hierarchy
to thepossibility
of a
meaning,in thisparticular
case,is notobjectivebutis tantamount
itselfin action.22
personality
fulfilling
There is one point on whichLukaicsand Simmel seem particularlyto agree:
formodern "personality"to reach itsgoal in a professional
thatitis fairlydifficult
occupation alone, thatis to say,in work.Workhas become too fragmentedin its
nature and also too "objective:"too imperviousto "livingmeaning."Those who
devote themselvesto a modern professionmust give up theirown personality:
thus Max Weber,writingin the same years as Simmel and Lukaics.And in his
letteron the antithesisbetweenthe nobilityand thebourgeoisie,WilhelmMeister
likewisestates:
A bourgeoismayacquiremeritand withgreattroublecultivate
hismind,buthispersonhe maydo. (WM 5.3)
alityis lost,whatever
That this not happen, Meistersuggests that one turn to occupations at the
same timemore pliable and more integral:the "pedagogic" vocation,"aesthetic"
enjoyment-we willsee otherexamples shortly.But Meisteralso suggeststhatwe
willfindthe keyto modern personality,and to its sphere of everydayoperation,
not so much in specific"activities"but in a peculiar disposition
of thesoul. This
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infiltrates
littleby littleinto each occupation, ruminateson it, appraises it, and
assails it if it mustin its effortsto render it consonant withthe developmentof
the individual as an "unfolded unity."In this way we can trulysay withJean
Baudrillard thateverydaylife is a system
ofinterpretation;
the same holds true for
personality.Both are waysof "reshaping"the world,of perceivingand judging
it,accordingto human proportions.In the wordsof Lukacs quoted above, external realityacquires value according to the "possibilityof a personalityfulfilling
itselfin [it]."Whateverlies beyondthiscircleand cannotbe translatedinto"experience"becomes, conversely,"insignificant":
it does not attractthe eye,the novel
has no desire to tellit. It is,to paraphrase Sennett,"thefallof public perception":
an ethical-intellectual
nearsightednessthatblurs our image of the modern individual. Withoutit, however,everythingleads one to believe that the individual
would be difficultto imagine.
Trial, Opportunity,Episode
If we read Meister,or even betterPride and Prejudice,with a dose of
healthycriticalingenuity,sooner or later arises the inevitablequestion of what
preciselythe main charactersare "doing."Wernergives a response upon seeing
Wilhelmanew: "Look at him, how he stands! How it all suits and fitstogether!
How idlingmakesone flourish!"(WM 8.1). Yes,in the end Wilhelmand Elizabeth
but rather
engage in "idling."But this,we have seen, does not mean doing nothing
means not entrustingthe definitionof one's personalityto any one activity.
We have here a furtherconvergencebetweenthe particularitiesof everyday
lifeand the categoriesof the theoryof the novel. By not defininghimselfin only
one sphere of life,the novelisticprotagonistceases to be definableas a "role"the "merchant"Werner,the "minister"Collins, the "mother" of the Bennett
sisters.He becomes instead,to echo Philippe Hamon, a "polyparadigmaticcharacter."That is to say,he becomes an entitydefined by various, heterogeneous
traitsthatmay even contradictone another.23
To explain the genesis of this"polyparadigmaticity,"
narrativetheoryusually
makes use of some conception of "realism."Somewhere along the line we learn
to representexistencein a more "faithful"way.If thisis true, however,how do
we explain whysuch a multiplicity
of traitsalwaysapplies to a verysmall number
in
Another
of characters a novel?
explanation is needed. Perhaps by puttinga
polyparadigmaticcharacterat the center of a story,every event becomes autoEach eventdrawsitsmeaningthrough
maticallyattractedintotheorbitof'personality.
its reflectionat the other levels of Wilhelmand Elizabeth'sexistence,fromthe
internalharmonythatit helps to bind or crack.
It is thereforenot a question of representingthingsor people in a more
truthful
waybut of deciding thata certain aspect of existenceis more meaningful
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than others and can consequentlyhave a special functionin the story'sorganization-a "central"functionthatputs the narrationinto perspectivewhereinthe
plot has its center,in fact,in the multilateraldevelopment of the protagonist.
This "focused" perceptionof a structureis preciselythe image of social relationthatis the point of departure and
ships mostconsonantwiththe anthropocentrism
arrivalof everydaylife.
But plot is still,nevertheless,a diachronicsuccession of events. How do we
reconcile our spatial metaphors of "centrality"and "focus;"which transmitan
idea of equilibriumand harmony,witha temporaldimensionthatimplieschange
and instability?In other words: how do we reconcile a novelistic
plot, which is
uncertainand gripping,withthe familiarand pleasing rhythmof everydaylife?
Withthe rhythmof "ordinaryadministration"?
Perhaps we can start by observing that the "ordinary"course of modern
everydaylife does not coincide, as at firstsightwould appear inevitable,with
banality,inertia,and repetition.Lefebvre,who initiallyheld this position,had
later to writea few hundred pages to refuteit.24More concisely,Karel Kosik:
The everyday
has itsexperienceand wisdom,itssophistication,
itsforecasting.
It has its
butalso itsspecialoccasions,itsroutinebutalso itsfestivity.
replicability
The everyday
is
to theunusual,thefestive,
thespecial,or to History:hyposthusnotmeantas a contrast
as a routineoverHistory,
as theexceptional,
theeveryday
is itselftheresult
of a
tatizing
certainmystification.25
Kosik is right.Modern everydaylife is no longer reducible to a mere repetitionof prescribed,"uneventful,"narrativelyinsignificant
eventsthat therefore
do not meritbeing related.The interventionof personalityhas brokendown the
rigid barrierbetween"workday"monotonyand "holiday"exception:
One dayin winter,
as I camehome,mymother,
seeingthatI wascold,offeredme some
take.I declinedatfirst,
and then,forno particular
tea,a thingI did notordinarily
reason,
changedmymind.She sentout forone of thoseshort,plumplittlecakescalled'petites
madeleines'. . .
In thisall too familiarexample fromProust,the graynessof modern everyday life is seen to preserve withinitselfthe "Sunday mornings"of childhood
("and all the flowersin our garden and in M. Swann's park, and the water-lilies
on the Vivonne and the good folkof the villageand theirlittledwellingsand the
parishchurchand the whole of Combray"),onlyto returnthemto us at the most
insignificant
moments,fromthe depths "of mycup of tea."And the spark of the
entire process is preciselythe work,voluntaryor not, of personality,which the
novel uses to bringto lifea sortof temporalthirddimension,withever-expanding confines,in whichnothingcan be declared a priorias entirelywithoutsignificance,and nothingas absolutelysignificant.Nothingis mere repetition;nothing
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is sheer novelty.The typicalnovelistic"episode;" as we shall shortlysee, always

containswithinitselfsomethingof Proust'sMadeleine,some type of experiment
withtime.
The two stances toward time that dominate The Theoryof theNovel-hope
and, above all, memory-refer only in appearance to the dimension of the past
or to that of the future. In reality,they confer on novelistictime a particular
focusing,a curvaturethatcontinuallyhas past and futureconvergeon thepresent.
On a presentthatis "individualized"and is the constantworkof reorganization
of what has taken place as well as a projectionof what is to come. It is an elastic,
elusive present,the exact opposite of the definitive"here and now" of tragedy.
Not only of tragedy,however,for it is in such a representationof temporality
that one witnessesthe absolute incompatibility
between the Bildungsroman,
and
modern formation-socialization,
and that "initiation"with which it is so often
confused. Not just the initiationof primitiveritualbut, even more so, that of a
work which preceded Meisterby only a few years and which Goethe admired
enough to sketcha continuationof it: Mozart and Schickaneder'sTheMagicFlute.
The "trial"in TheMagic Fluteis the typicalexceptionalevent. It breaks Tamino's lifeinto two parts thathave nothingin common. Before the testTamino is
a boy,"einJfingling"-after,he is a man, "ein Mann."Before,he is in facta prince
in exile-after, the true heir of his fatherthe king. Before, a wandering and
solitaryindividual-after, the member of a powerful community.Before, the
torturedadmirerof Pamina-after, her legitimatespouse.
Before, after... and duringthe trial?During the trial,and thisis the point,
Tamino is nothing.He is pure potentiality.
He can be what he ends up being,or
he can be knockedback down to whathe was. But in thecourse of thePriifungszeit
he is on hold, at zero degree,just as timein factis on hold. The "trial"of initiation
consistspreciselyin acceptingthattimestop and thatone's own identitydissipate.
It consistsin being willingtodie in order to have the possibilitytobe reborn.The
onlyvirtueput to trialis courage in the sense of "patience;"the virtueof exceptionalcircumstances,virtuein the face of death. It does not measure thecapacity
to live,whichdoes not seem to concern it at all, but onlythe abilityto endure the
stark alternative(there exists no gray area between the Night Realm and the
Court of Sarastro) of death and rebirth.
The opposite is true in Meister.
Justlike Tamino, Wilhelmis accepted into a
secretsociety,but withoutever being put to a recognizable"trial."Justas in space
thereexistsno line thatseparates the world of the initiatesfromthe outside one
(there is no symbolicdoor on whichto "knockthreetimes"as in TheMagicFlute,
the beat of which is heard from the very "Overture"),26so in time there is no
irreversiblemomentin whicheverything,in one fellswoop, is decided. Wilhelm's
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Bildung consistsalso in his realization of such a state of affairsand in his no

longer searching for the decisive act, the event from which his destinyshines
forth.The Wilhelmof Theatrical
Mission,stilla prisonerof thisvision,27willnever
vice versa,willsucceed
finishhis quest. The Wilhelmof the YearsofApprenticeship,
preciselybecause he has adopted a flexibleattitudetoward the passage of time.
There is a warning of the Tower Society that constantlyaccompanies him-it
almost tormentshim: "Remember to live!" Not to live in one way or the next,
but simplyto live. What is importantis not to establisha goal and concentrate
all of one's forcesfor the momentin whichit is neared, the momentof the test.
What is importantis to be able to dispose of one's energies at everymoment
and
to employ them for the numerous occasions or opportunitiesthat life,littleby
little,takes upon itselfto offer.
"Seize the opportunities."If we project thisphrase onto the diachronicaxis
of plot we get the contoursof the novelistic"episode'" Unlike what occurs in the
shortstoryor in tragedy,the novelisticepisode does not referback to an objective
necessitybut to a subjectivepossibility.It is thateventwhich,in the strongsense
of the word, couldalso nothave takenplace. Every novel is in effectan unending
combinativematrixof events that are potentiallycrucial but frustrated,and of
others that, apparently of littleconsequence, acquire instead an unexpected
the "conversations"in Prideand Prejudice:
importance.The "meetings"in Meister,
theyare on everypage, but not all become equally meaningful.
They becomemeaningful:that is the point. The novelisticepisode is almost
never meaningfulin itself.It becomes so because someone-in theBildungsroman
usually the protagonist-givesit meaning.He prolongs the encounter,he probes
into the conversation,he recallsit,he puts his hopes in it.... The novelisticplot
which dispenses meaning and
is marked by this curvature toward interiority,
therebycreates events."Rememberto live": rememberthatall you run into can
be used for the building of your life; it can all be made meaningful.
This is the uneven glimmerof "experience."Anothercatchwordof the culture we are examining,experience
too changes in meaning in the second half of
the eighteenthcentury.Experience(not as in the famous aphorism "Experience
consistsin experiencingsomethingthat we would have preferrednot to experience") no longer indicates somethingthat is essentiallydispleasing: the experience of pain, baroque disillusionment,the loss of an original innocence. By
now it refersto an acquisitivetendency.It is growth,the expansion of self,and
it is also a typeof "experiment"performedwithone's self.An experiment,and
thus provisional: the episode becomes an experience if the individualmanages
to give it a meaning thatexpands and strengthenshis personality....

... but also manages to impose limitsbefore it becomes unilaterallyand

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and thus again is differentfromthe short storyor tragedy-that one does not
get in too "deep," for if no episode in itselfis immune to meaning, no episode,
on the otherhand, can containthe entiremeaning of existence.No characterwill
ever entirelyreveal his essence in a single gestureor encounter.(Elizabeth Bennett,by forcingin thisway her interpretationof Darcy,therebyrisksdestroying
her "novel.")28
mustovercome consists
The "trial"thatthe protagonistof theBildungsroman
thus in accepting the defermentof the ultimatemeaning of his existence. It is
thenew pedagogical ideal of theeighteenthcentury,whichsubstitutesadmiration
forprecocitywiththe image of a gradual growth,a fewsteps at a time.29For this
to happen-and Rousseau returnsconstantlyto this point in Emile-one must
firstof all learn to controlthe imagination,whichis at the originof thetwoerrors
thatcan lead us astrayfromthe path toward"maturity."
Restlessness,firstof all,
the "ramblingthoughts"of Robinson Crusoe, makes man too much of a wanderer,too detached fromhis environment,therebypreventinghim fromextracting all the potentialmeaningitcontains.But even more thanrestlessness,intensity
compels him to see an excessof meaning in those thingsaround him and to bind
himselfto them too thoroughlyand too quickly.Prematurely:in ways that are
not those of an "adult."
The middle road of the hero of the Bildungsroman
is lined withcharacters
who err in the opposite directions.Restless characters,such as Lydia Bennett,
who are preyto futility;and intensecharacters,theirpatheticinnocence driving
them to a tragicend: Mariane, Aurelie, the Harpist. And, of course, Mignon.
The episode that decides her death-one of the most disagreeablycruel in all
of world literature-embodies withouthalf-tonesthe eighteenth-century
repudiation of premature and passionate desire (the episode takes the form of a
mysteryin 5.12 and is explained in 8.3). Mignon,one night,secretlyentersinto
Wilhelm'sbedroom, spurred on by a desire that she cannot yetwell define. She
hides and waitsforWilhelmto arrive,but Philine arrivesinstead,slips into bed,
as does Wilhelm,halfdrunk,momentslater.From her hidingplace, Mignon will
be the silentwitnessto the nightof love betweenthe two.
Not much can be said about the meaning of thisscene: it is such a veryclear
and banal "everythinghas its time and place." But it is a savage banality:when
Goethe shows us his philistineside he does absolutelynothingto appear affable.
In an episode like this we see the convex side of everydaylife: that part of it
whichfaces not the elect individualbut ratherthe outside world. Its conventions
seem so flexibleand inoffensive,almost withoutconfines-but only as long as
one remainswithinthem,and withina spiritualdispositionconsonantwiththem.
If one givesin to the flightof imagination,however,one thendiscoversthatthose
confinesdo indeed exist, and with a cuttingedge: but then it is too late. The
limbsthatare severed fromthe organism,in Meister,
can neverbe rejoined. That
most fervidand alive interiority,
because it is not yetobjectified,and perhaps is
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not objectifiable,that new and closed dimension of the spiritmarked by strife,

which will dominate the great nineteenth-century
novels, is, in the relentlessly
"industrious"and "objectified"environmentof theBildungsroman,
a symptomof
illness. It is a betrayalof life, its opposite. This explains the frequency,most
uncommon for novels of the period, withwhich Goethe kills his charactersor
deprives them of reason. Beyond the organism there is not loneliness but-as
and later in ElectiveAffinities-nightmares,
already in Werther,
insanity,or death.
A death, it is understood, by which the imminentand radiant conclusion
mustnotbe upset. Thus the repugnantmiseensceneof Mignon'sburial-embalmings and choirs of angels conceal the realityof the corpse and transformeven
the funeralinto an "episode" thatmeritsbeing lived. The gaze mustbe removed
in otherwordsimmediately,
at the firstopportunity,
fromthe spot thatwillremain
empty.One must immediatelymove on to new tales, to new connections.It is
that "immediately"that makes one shudder, cruel as only Goethe, in his wellknownabhorrenceof death, managed to be. Everyvoid mustbe filled.Moreover,
itcan be filledwithoutreal losses.There is no doubt thatwe can easilyreformulate
"Remember to live!" as "Forget the dead!" Mourning does not contributeto
Bildung.
Conversation
Trial in TheMagic Fluteis an obstacle. To enter into one's own role as
an adult an external barrier mustbe overcome-the four elementsin revoltof
the finaltest.It is an archaicmechanismthatmakesone thinkof VladimirPropp's
models of narrativeplot; linear sequences of thrustsand counterthrusts,with
is instead an
corresponding allies and adversaries. Trial in the Bildungsroman
opportunity:not an obstacle to be overcome while remaining"intact,"but someforonlyby stringingtogether"experiences"does
thingthatmustbe incorporated,
one build a personality.If Tamino ceases to existduringhisPriifungszeit,
Wilhelm
existsonlyin the course of his "yearsof apprenticeship."
This antithesisbetweeninitiationand formationis seen withexemplaryclarityin the differentfunctionsthat language is called upon to perform in these
works.In TheMagic FluteTamino mustabove all remain silent.That maturityis
confirmedwithsilenceilluminateshow terrible,how essentiallyviolent,the ritual
of initiationcan be: to be silentmeans, firstof all, not to scream frompain (or,
in the less bloody world of TheMagic Flute,fromfear). It also means that,in the
climacticmomentof his existence,the individualagrees to deprive himselfof his
mostelementaryright:the rightto talk,to reason, to "have his say."It is a logical
privation,in any case, since he is introducedto a role that has existed for him
unchanging,and before which his argumentsmustremain mute.
There is more,however.In the course of the finaltestTamino is permitteda detail thatdoes not reallyfitin withthe logic of the plot,and is forthisreason
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all the more interesting-to use the flutegivento himby the Queen of the Night.
Uneasy surrogatesforwords,more "potent"than thembut tremendouslymore
enigmatic,the notes of the flutetell us that the crucial point in Tamino's trial
rests not so much on not emittingany sound, but on not emittingany sound
endowedwithmeaning.Either all language is renounced, or one is used thatis by
definitionasemantic.No "meaning" is given,or can be given,to the trial.It lies
beyond the realm of the verbal sphere and wants to remain outside of it. Conversely,language becomes "twaddle": it suits Papageno, not Tamino, and it will
never be an essentialstage in thejourney of formation.30
Those who are familiarwithMeisterand Prideand Prejudiceknow well that,
in these works,the paradigm is reversed. Here, if anything,one talkstoo much.
One talkstoo much: the formationof the individual,once seen withineveryday
life,involveslanguage primarilyas a tool of conversation.
A decisiveturningpoint
in Wilhelm'sBildungis when he abandons the "theatrical"rhetoricof impassioned
monologue forthe much more prosaic art of dialogue. Elizabeth and Darcy,for
theirpart, mustliterallylearn to talk to one another: only thus willtheybe able
to overcome those "embarrassingmomentsof silence" that mark and frustrate
theireveryencounter.
"To learn to talkto one another,"to talkto one another"sincerely."
These are
circumlocutionsto say that one must trustin language. In the magic circle of
everydaylife language in fact appears-as does work-as a sociablesocial institution. If one abandons oneself to it withoutreserve, the double operation of
"expressingoneself" and of "understandingothers"thenbecomes possible. One
willbe able, in otherwords,to reach an agreement:as everyconversationbeyond
a mere exchange of civilities(or of insults) presupposes the willingnessof the
participantsto abandon their own viewpointin order to embrace that of the
other.3'It is a secretinclination-just as strongin Goethe as in Jane Austen-to
separate conversationfrom that violent,noisy,and partial discussion that had
accompanied the formationof eighteenth-century
public opinion, a discussion
thattookplace in strictly
publicplaces-cafes, inns,postalcenters-and excluded
on principleall interestin and referenceto the privateconditionof the participants: each spoke only as a member of the public.32In comparison with this
historicalprecedent,conversationbringsthe linguisticexchange back to a more
domestic and "familiar"space. It is reserved for persons who know each other
well; one is not only not unaware of the personal import of one's words but
actuallystrivesto understandand giveworthto thatelement.Conversationseems,
more so than the "rational public debate" that Jurgen Habermas sees at the
foundation of public opinion, to lead back to the less demanding language of
"worldliness"-"se rendre agreable dans la societe"'-examined by Peter Brooks
in The Novel of Worldliness.33
It is as if the term conversation
were stillfaithfulto
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therebyindicating-beyond and more thana verbalrelationshipitsetymology,

a concretehabitat,a serene and varied wayof occupying
an everydayfamiliarity,
one's niche in the world.
Conversationjust likeeverydaylife,is born of theattemptto assimilateevery
sort of experience. It presentsitselfas that rhetoricalformwhich permitsone
to talk "about everything."To talk about everything,however,is not easy, or,
betterput, is a type of rhetoric,a systemof rules that must be observed. But
conversationhas become forus by now so habitual,havingread so many novels
and having engaged in so many conversations,that it is hard for us to see it as
somethingartificial,as only one of many possible modes of discourse-with its
advantages and its limits,its words and its silences. Limitsand silences that do
not referto the subjectsof conversation:obviouslyevery era provides for permissibleand forbiddenones. The essentialsilenceinsteadinvolvesconversation's
form,and it consistsof avoiding in a systematicway the purityof reasoning. For
in the modern world one can trulytalk "about everything"only if one forgets
about a break, and a trulyirreversibleone, in the historyof thought.Agnes
Heller:
thoughtcould refermoreor lessto theexperienceof
In antiquity
anytypeof scientific
occurlife.. . . In thePlatonicdialoguesSocratesalwaysbeginswithan everyday
everyday
theoryexperiencepresent
thought.... He "raises"to philosophical
rence,witheveryday
whether
he is dealingwiththeoriesrelatingto "naturalsciences,'
in everyday
thinking,
or politics.34
to gnoseology,
ethics,aesthetics,
metaphysics,
is broken:knowledgeslowly
From the Renaissanceon, however,thiscontinuity
loses its anthropomorphictraitsand becomes incommensuratewith everyday
experience. Moreover,it as a rule begins to challenge common sense, to demonstratethatfromit no cognitive"growth"is any longer possible. "Familiarity,"
Kosik succinctlysummarizes,"is an obstacle to knowledge."35
theexact opposite takesplace. Here thought'sgreatYet,in theBildungsroman,
"Ideas" mustnever drifttoo farfrom"life."Goethe:
est riskis to become abstract.
freeat themomentwhenhe couldbe at unitywithhimself.... He
Wilhelmsawhimself
fornoticingthathe was lackingin experienceand therefore
opportunity
had sufficient
whichwithconviction
he laidan excessivevalueon theexperienceofothersand theresults
he camestillmoredeeplyintoerror.Whathe lacked
theydeducedfromit,and thereby
he thoughthe couldjust acquireifhe undertookto collectand keepall thememorable
wrote
He therefore
thingswhichhe shouldcome acrossin booksand in conversation.
which
downhisownand otherpeople'sopinionsand ideas,indeedwholeconversations
he keptthefalseas wellas thetrue,stayed
him.In thisway,unfortunately,
interested
muchtoo long on one idea-one mightsayon a simplemaxim.... No one had been
whichcould forma
moredangerousto himthanJarno.This man had a clearintellect

correct and severe decision about present things,but with this he had the mistakeof
whereas the verdictsof
expressingthese individualdecisions witha kind of universality,

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if
theintellect
haveforceonlyonceand thatin thedefinite
case,and wouldbe incorrect
one appliedthemto others.(WM5.1)
Here again is the anthropocentricvocationof everydaylifethat,withthe art
of conversation,subjugatesthe manifestationsof thoughtand draws fromthem
a plasticand pliable language, a refinedand inedited rhetoricof the "concrete."
The language and rhetoric,ifone thinksabout it,of the novel:the firstand only
literarygenre thatnot onlyhas chosen not to accentuateitsirreducibility
to what
we call "ordinarylanguage" but has even contributed,as littleelse has, to the
diffusionand nobilitationof the idea itselfof linguistic"normality"and to the
of thatmode of discoursewhichaims at continuallyconverting
makingmeaningful
the concrete into the abstractand vice versa. Once again it is that eighteenthcenturytastefor includingand harmonizing:the comfortof equilibrium.
If all this is contained in the conversationalform,what remains outside of
it? Or to put the problem in historicalterms,"against"what formof the manifestation
of thoughtdo Goetheand Austenconjureup theirmagnificent
dialogues?
The beginningsof an answercan be found in a memorable chapterof L'AncienRegimeetla Revolution:"How, towardsthe middle of the Eighteenthcentury,
men of lettershave become the mostimportantpoliticalmen in the country,and
of the consequences whichhave resulted."In these pages, Tocqueville reflectson
the peculiaritiesof the Enlightenmentintellectualin France: neither "mixed
up in everydayaffairsor administration,as in England, nor "as in Germany,
totallyextraneousto politics,confinedto the world of pure philosophyor of the
belleslettres."
The fact is that there emerges in France a new and explosive form of the
manifestationof thought. It is at once fundamentallyand stubbornlypolitical
("French intellectualscontinuallyare concerned withproblems connected with
the activitiesof government")and withoutrestrictionabstract
("All believe thatit
is good to substitutewith simple and elementaryrules, based on reason and
natural law, those complex customs sanctioned by traditionwhich govern our
society").
Given this,I would not exclude the notion thatthe relaxed and sturdylanguage of novelisticconversationhas its opposite not in silence but in the revolutionarypamphlet or oration. This is an antithesisthat brings with it many
others: the "curbing" earthiness of concretenessagainst the cold and daring
of the "I" in "you" against
universalismof principles;the dialogic convertibility
the rigid demarcation between orator and audience; the attentiontoward the
patient weaving of a plot against the urge to tear, the passion for "beginning
anew."Irreconcilable contraststhat tell us a common truth-everyday life and
revolutionare incompatible-and a littleless common truth: that this incomThe ComfortofCivilization 135

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patibilityalso existsbetween revolutionaryepochs and the narrativestructures

of the novel.
Yes, the novel, even though it is born declaring thatit can and wantsto talk
about everything,prefersas a rule to pass over in silence revolutionaryfractures.36Because theyare fractures,upheavals in the narrativecontinuumthat
are too abrupt and radical,of course. But also because theyaffectthatparticular
sphere of action-the centralizedpower of the state-in relation to which the
cultureof the novel, in antithesisto thatof tragedy,is the victimof an unmistakable and veryreal taboo.
-Translated by AlbertSbragia

Notes
The followingpages are taken fromthe firstchapter of my TheProseoftheWorld,to
be published by Verso (London) in 1986. The book undertakes a reconstructionof
fromGoethe to Flaubert and George Eliot, seen as the
the European Bildungsroman,
mostsignificant
attempt,on the part of Westernculture,to come symbolically
to terms
withmodernity.An effortis made in the workto bringto lightconnectionsbetween
fieldsof research and spheres of life that are usually considered distantfrom one
another: narrativetheory,aestheticideology,nineteenth-century
philosophyof history,sociologyof everydaylife,historyof youth,the world of the metropolisand of
the capitalistmarketplace....
Concerningtheinternaldynamicsof the study:in the firstchapterthearchetypal
is examined in its "aesthetic"foundation,as formulated
model of the Bildungsroman
byGoethe and Jane Austen. In thesecond chaptertheworksof Stendhaland Pushkin
of politics,novelisticrhetoric,and
are discussed,especiallyregardingtheintertwining
aesthetic realism. The third chapter deals with the works of Balzac and Flaubert,
interpretedin thelightof ambiguous tensionsthatlinktheformationof theindividual
withcapitalistdevelopment. In the fourthchapter an effortis made to trace a particularlyEnglish traditionof the Bildungsroman-fromFielding to Scott, Charlotte
Bronte,and Dickens-concluding withthe revivaland exhaustionof Goethian problematicsin the worksof George Eliot.
1. "We are moved by the storyof a good deed and by the sightof every harmonious
object; we thenfeel thatwe are not quite in a strangecountry;we fondlyimagine that
we are nearer a home, towards which what is best and most inward withinus is
striving";Johann Wolfgangvon Goethe, Wilhelm
Meister,
trans.R. 0. Moon (London,
1947), book 7, chap. 1. All furtherreferencesto WilhelmMeister(hereafterWM)
appear in the text.
the madness of the Harpist:
2. It is throughworkthatone can cure, at least temporarily,
"I find the means of curing insanityvery simple. They are the same by which you
preventhealthypeople frombecominginsane. Their activityhas to be aroused, accustom them to order.... An active life bringswithit so many incidentsthat he must
feel how true it is thateverykind of doubt can be removed by activity"(WM 5.16).

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3. Wilhelmvon Humboldt,TheSphereand DutiesofGovernment,

trans.J. Coulthard (London, 1854), 27-28.
4. FriedrichSchiller,On theAesthetic
EducationofMan, trans.R. Snell (New Haven, 1954),
letter6, 44-45.
5. Ibid., letter27, 138.
6. WernerSombart,TheQuintessence
trans.H. Fertig(New York,1967), 13.
ofCapitalism,
7. Henri Lefebvre, Criticadelta vita quotidiana,Italian trans. (Bari, 1977), 1:113-14;
originallypublished as Critiquede la vie quotidienne
(Paris, 1958).
8. Karel Kosik, "Metaphysics of Everyday Life," in Dialecticsof the Concrete,trans.
K. Kovanda and J. Schmidt (Dordrecht, 1976), 43; originallypublished in Czech
(Prague, 1963).
9. Agnes Heller, Sociologiadeltavitaquotidiana,Italian trans.,57; originallypublished in
Hungarian (Budapest, 1970). An abridged versionof thisworkhas recentlyappeared
in English as Everyday
Life,trans.G. L. Campbell (London, 1984).
10. Ibid., 52.
11. Georg Hegel, "Introduction:Reason in History,"in Lectureson thePhilosophy
ofWorld
History,
trans.H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge, 1975), 85.

12. Ibid.

13. "Our comparison of novel and drama shows that the novel's manner of portrayalis
closerto life,or ratherto the normal appearance of life,than thatof drama"; Gyorgy
Lukacs, The HistoricalNovel, trans. H. and S. Mitchell (London, 1962), 138. That
thisaffirmation
refersto the historical
novel rendersit,in myopinion, more meaningful still.
14. Heller,Sociologia,66.
15. Ibid., 407-8.
16. Ibid., 408.
17. Abraham Moles, Il Kitsch:L'artedeltafelicitd,Italian trans. (Rome, 1979), 42-43, 46,
47, 53; originallypublished as Le Kitsch:L'Artdu bonheur(Paris, 1971).
18. I have discussed the ups and downs of the aestheticdimension in twentieth-century
life in "From the Waste Land to the ArtificialParadise," in Signs Takenfor Wonders
(London, 1983).
19. Philippe Aries,Padriefiglinell'Europamedievalee moderna,Italian trans. (Bari, 1976),
trans.R. Baldick (New York,
282-83; published in English as Centuries
ofChildhood,
1962).
20. Richard Sennett,TheFall ofPublicMan (New York, 1977).
21. Georg Simmel, "On the Concept and Tragedy of Culture,"in The Conflict
in Modern
Cultureand OtherEssays,trans.K. P. Etzkorn(New York, 1968), 27-46, esp. 28 - 29.
22. GyorgyLukdcs, The TheoryoftheNovel,trans.A. Bostock (Cambridge, Mass., 1971),
133-34, 137-38.
23. The novelisticprotagonistcan no longer be presented as the hero of the classical
epic-shrewd Odysseus,fleet-footed
Achilles,wise Nestor.One's Christianname must
be, and is, enough-"Wilhelm," "Elizabeth."Such a mannerof namingdenotes a great
and thus suggestsa complete and almost "natural"knowledgeof the perfamiliarity
son in question,but it above all gives to our knowledge,as it were,the utmostliberty,
neither constrainingit, leading it in a precise direction nor binding it to a clearly
defined subject. It is a "knowledge" that combines a maximum of certaintywith a
minimumof commitment.It is so open and inexhaustiblethatit can never trulybe
put to a test.What happens withnovelisticheroes is what happens withour friends
and relatives:we know them,while we do not know who theyare.

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24. "One of the more recentformsof the critiqueof everydaylifehas been the critique
of the real via the surreal.Surrealism,in departing from the everydaytoward the
extraordinaryand the surprising. . . rendered the prosaic unsupportable."Furthermore: "Under the sign of the Supernatural,the literatureof the nineteenthcentury
launched an attackagainst everydaylife thathas not lost any of its force"; Lefebvre,
Critica,34 and 122.
25. Kosik, "Metaphysicsof EverydayLife,"43.
26. "A complete scheme of ritesof passage theoreticallyincludespreliminal
rites(ritesof
rites(ritesof incorporaseparation),liminalrites(ritesof transition),and postliminal
tion)"; thusArnold Van Gennep in his classicanalysisof primitiveinitiation,TheRites
ofPassage, trans. M. Vizedom and G. Caffee (Chicago, 1960), 11. The "transition"
space, oftenassociated withyouth,is seen to be verynarrow,severelyregulated,and
merelyfunctionalto the passage fromthe infantileaggregationto theadult one. Once
thispassage is complete,the "transition"space loses all value. The patternis stillfully
valid forTheMagicFlute,but itshierarchyis unequivocallyoverturnedin Meister.
Here
the "transition"of youthis vastlyexpanded; one lives in it in complete liberty,and,
above all, it is transformedinto the mostmeaningful
part of one's existence,precisely
thatone which"meritsbeing told."We findan analogous overturningin the relationship betweenthose typicalperiods of transitionknownas courtship,engagement,and
marriage. In archaic societies courtship and engagement chronologicallyprecede
marrigebut,froma logical standpoint,are a consequence of it: one mustget married,
and thereforeone mustfirstget engaged, but the value of courtshipand engagement
ends here; theyare purelyinstrumental.In the modern world,and in the novel, the
opposite is true. Marriage is the consequence of a satisfyingcourtshipand engageendswithmarriages,itneverthelessnarrates
ment,and ifthereforetheBildungsroman
courtships.The emotiveand intellectualcenterof gravityhas decidedlychanged.
27. Thus Wilhelmto the "gentlemanfromC." who is about to leave for war (Theatrical
Mission,4.1 1): "Oh how fortunateyou are to be lead by destinyto where a true man
can call upon his best powers, where all that he has become in life,all that he has
learned is changed in a moment'stimeintoactionand appears in itsutmostsplendor!"
Needless to say,the gentlemanfromC. sees itin a totallydifferentway,and his answer
chillsWilhelm'sepic enthusiasms.
28. This dialecticof meaning and episode is the basis of the novelisticchapterAn extraorof a text,the chaptersetsup a balance between
dinarymechanismof self-segmentation
our satisfactionwithwhat we have learned (the meaning thathas been attributedto
an event) and our curiosityfor what we stilldo not know (that meaning is as a rule
alwaysincomplete).We can thus continueour reading (givingin to our curiosity)or
interruptit (declaring ourselves satisfied).The narrativestructureauthorizesboth
choices and therebyrenders symbolicallyplausible the irregularrhythmof interruptionsand resumptionsto whichthereader is in anycase constrainedbythedimensions
themselvesof a novel.
Thanks to thistruemiracleof self-regulation
thatis thechapter,thenovel imparts
to literaryenjoymenta totallyunique character,which Poe in his Philosophy
of Com"If any work is too long to be read at one sitting,we
positionfound self-destructive:
mustbe contentto dispense withthe immenselyimportanteffectderivablefromunity
of impression-for, if two sittingsbe required,the affairsof the world interfere,and
eveythinglike totalityis at once destroyed";in SelectedWritings
ofEdgar AllanPoe, ed.
David Galloway(Harmondsworth,Eng., 1967), 482. What Poe did not manage to see
is that the novel quite simplywantsthe affairsof the world to interfere.Unlike the

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29.
30.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

shortstory,or the lyricpoem, itdoes not see in everydaylifeanythingdisparate from

its own conventions; rather it sees there its chosen object, with which it must also
"materially"mix itself-via the patient rhythmof a reading of interruptionsand
resumptions-in order to give it a formand a meaning.
We have here the two major paths-one diurnal and domestic,the other lunar
and estranging-of modern literature.And not only of literature:if many cinematographicaleffectsfind a surprisinganticipationin Poe's theoreticalwritings,radio
and television,on the contrary,pursue withother means the colonializationof everyday existencebegun by the novelisticgenre. (It is a parallel thatcould go on forever:
to enjoy cinema one mustleave the home-radio and televisionbringthe world into
our bedroom.... At the movies a three-minutedelay is a tragedy-we move constantlyto and fromthe televisionwithutterpeace of mind.... At the moviesall must
be dark except the screen-we watchtelevisionwithat least one lighton, almostas if
we wished to remind ourselves at all costs of the domestic context in which it is
found. .. .) As long as we are on the subject: the principalnoveltyof Wim Wenders's
filmsconsistspreciselyin his having"weakened"the cinematographicepisode and the
narrativeconcatenationof plot, therebybringingboth of these closer to the manner
of novelisticcomposition.Coincidence or not,Wenders'ssecond filmwas a remakeof
Meister,
See once again Aries, Centuries
ofChildhood,
especiallythe second part.
"During most of the ceremonies which have been discussed, and especially during
the transitionperiods, a special language is employed which in some cases includes
an entire vocabulary unknown or unusual in the societyas a whole, and in others
consistssimplyof a prohibitionagainstusing certainwords in the common tongue";
it is instead
Van Gennep, RitesofPassage, 169. We will see how in the Bildungsroman
the obligation
to use the common language thatseems to hold.
Conversationis thus a totallydifferentthingthan Bakhtin's"heteroglossia."The Bilof the pluralityof social
dungsroman's
socializingvocation bringswithit the reduction
languagesto a "middleof theroad" conventionwithwhichtheymayall easilyparticipate.
Regarding thispoint see the fourthchapter of Sennett,Fall ofPublicMan, and espederOffentlichkeit
ciallyJurgen Habermas, Strukturwandel
(Neuwied, Germ., 1962).
Peter Brooks, TheNovel ofWorldliness
(Princeton,1969).
Heller,Sociologia,106. On the implicationsof everydaylife,anthropomorphicthought,
and artisticproduction,see also the firstchaptersof Lukdcs'sAesthetics.
Kosik, "Metaphysicsof EverydayLife,"46.
Ever since Defoe's RobinsonCrusoe,whose protagonist,"born in the cityof Yorkin the
year 1632,"remainsin England until 1650. But on the civilwar that,afterall, permits
him to be a merchantin peace and quiet, there is not a word.

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