San Beda College of Law

Mendiola, Manila

CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

POLICE POWER
Philippine Association of Service Exporters vs. Drilon [G.R. No. L-81958, June
30, 1988]
CONCEPT OF POLICE POWER. The concept of police power is well-established in this
jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare."
As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2)
in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has
been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive
embrace.
"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate
the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and
flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest
benefits."
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its
origin to the Charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn
in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of
government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance.
Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, refers to it succinctly as the
plenary power of the State "to govern its citizens."
"The police power of the State . . . is a power coextensive with self-protection, and
it is not inaptly termed the 'law of overwhelming necessity.' It may be said to be
that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society."
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is
"rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to
enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the
enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure communal peace, safety,
good order, and welfare." Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not purport to
be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the
greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will."
It
is subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater
number.
Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations.
For all its awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or
unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is
exercised, that is, to advance the public good. Thus, when the power is used to
further private interests at the expense of the citizenry, there is a clear misuse of
the power.

Ichong vs. Hernandez [G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957]

POLICE POWER; NATURE AND SCOPE. Police power is far-reaching in scope, and
it is almost impossible to limit its sweep. It derives its existence from the very
existence of the State itself, and does not need to be expressed or defined in its
scope. It is said to be co-extensive with self - protection and survival, and as such
it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential,
insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework
where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost
unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost
boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become
almost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight.
The conflict between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and
the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence, or the
indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic
society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercises it, for that would be
tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and
anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty or property, provided
there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups,
provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as
always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public
interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and
means. And if distinction or classification has been made, there must be a
reasonable basis for said distinction.
Lozano vs. Martinez [G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986]
CONCEPT OF POLICE POWER. It may be constitutionally impermissible for the
legislature to penalize a person for non-payment of a debt ex contractu. But
certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts
deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only
acts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as
inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but because of the harm that it inflicts
on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum
prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power.
The police power of the state has been described as "the most essential, insistent
and illimitable of powers" which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society.
It is a power not emanating from or
conferred by the constitution, but inherent in the state, plenary, suitably vague and
far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man in organizing the state
and imposing upon the government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did
not intend thereby to enable individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures to ensure communal peace,
safety, good order and welfare."
The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of
public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed a public
nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.
It is not for us to question the wisdom or impolicy of the statute. It is sufficient that
a reasonable nexus exists between means and end. Considering the factual and
legal antecedents that led to the adoption of the statute, it is not difficult to
understand the public concern which prompted its enactment. It had been reported
that the approximate value of bouncing checks per day was close to 200 million
pesos, and thereafter when overdrafts were banned by the Central Bank, it
averaged between 50 million to 80 million pesos a day.
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Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. San Diego[G.R. No. 89572,
December 21, 1989]
TESTS OF VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER. There is no need to redefine here
the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the power is validly exercised
if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed
are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of
a lawful subject and a lawful method.
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police
power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the
medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may
unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose
of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to
insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the
intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a
constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the
public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's
ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to
see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These
resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common good
while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction.
A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If
one who wants to be a lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he should be so
advised and adviced. Of course, he may not be forced to be a plumber, but on the
other hand he may not force his entry into the bar. By the same token, a student
who has demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to take a
course in nursing, however appropriate this career may be for others.
The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute.
The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a
profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission
and academic requirements."
The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those
better prepared. Where even those who have qualified may still not be
accommodated in our already crowded medical schools, there is all the more reason
to bar those who, like him, have been tested and found wanting.
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987]
LAWFUL MEANS AS A TEST OF VALIDITY OF EXERCISE. A similar prohibition was
challenged in United States v. Toribio,
where a law regulating the registration,
branding and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property
without due process of law. The defendant had been convicted thereunder for
having slaughtered his own carabao without the required permit, and he appealed
to the Supreme Court. The conviction was affirmed. The law was sustained as a
valid police measure to prevent the indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were
then badly needed by farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of these animals and
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the reduction of their number had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural

output, which in turn had caused an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the
scarcity of the animals and the consequent increase in their price, cattle-rustling
had spread alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures for the registration
and branding of these animals. The Court held that the questioned statute was a
valid exercise of the police power and declared in part as follows:
"To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the
public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally,
as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such
interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. . . .
"From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of
the provisions of the statute under consideration was required by `the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class' and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos
for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for
agricultural work or draft purposes was a `reasonably necessary'
limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the
loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident
owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to
enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive
power of the community may be measurably and dangerously
affected."
In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the
carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public
welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen
in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be
achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the abovecited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals
except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if
female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be
conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident
depletion.
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as
the original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies
with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to
strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute
ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no
carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef
shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition
escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the
purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
We do not see how the prohibition of the interprovincial transport of carabaos can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed
anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously,
retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any
more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there.
As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says
executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal.
Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of
preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no
reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant, dead meat.

Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed,
we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for
violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or
carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually
the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty
prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and
conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial
is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the
police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
Lutz vs. Araneta [G.R. No. L-7859, December 22, 1955]
POWER OF TAXATION MAY BE USED AS AN IMPLEMENT OF POLICE POWER. The
basic defect in the plaintiff's position is his assumption that the tax provided for in
Commonwealth Act No. 567 is a pure exercise of the taxing power. Analysis of the
Act, and particularly of section 6 (heretofore quoted in full), will show that the tax is
levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and
stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. In other words, the act is primarily
an exercise of the police power.
This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that sugar production is one of the
great industries of our nation, sugar occupying a leading position among its export
products; that it gives employment to thousands of laborers in fields and factories;
that it is a great source of the state's wealth, is one of the important sources of
foreign exchange needed by our government, and is thus pivotal in the plans of a
regime committed to a policy of currency stability. Its promotion, protection and
advancement, therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare. Hence it was
competent for the legislature to find that the general welfare demanded that the
sugar industry should be stabilized in turn; and in the wide field of its police power,
the law-making body could provide that the distribution of benefits therefrom be
readjusted among its components to enable it to resist the added strain of the
increase in taxes that it had to sustain.
As stated in Johnson vs. State ex rel. Marey, with reference to the citrus industry in
Florida
"The protection of a large industry constituting one of the great
sources of the state's wealth and therefore directly or indirectly
affecting the welfare of so great a portion of the population of the
State is affected to such an extent by public interests as to be within
the police power of the sovereign." (128 So. 857)
Once it is conceded, as it must, that the protection and promotion of the sugar
industry is a matter of public concern, it follows that the Legislature may determine
within reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection and expedient for its
promotion. Here, the legislative discretion must be allowed full play, subject only to
the test of reasonableness; and it is not contended that the means provided in
section 6 of the law (above quoted) bear no relation to the objective pursued or are
oppressive in character. If objective and methods are alike constitutionally valid, no
reason is seen why the state may not be levy taxes to raise funds for their
prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be made the implement of the state's
police power
Association of Small Landowners vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform [G.R. No.
78742, July 14, 1989]
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN MAY BE USED AS AN IMPLEMENT OF POLICE POWER.
There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of
eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same
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time on the same subject. In the case of City of Baguio v. NAWASA, for example,
where a law required the transfer of all municipal waterworks systems to the
NAWASA in exchange for its assets of equivalent value, the Court held that the
power being exercised was eminent domain because the property involved was
wholesome and intended for a public use. Property condemned under the police
power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge
of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials,
which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such
property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of
expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.
In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, Justice Holmes laid down the limits
of the police power in a famous aphorism: "The general rule at least is that while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking." The regulation that went "too far" was a law prohibiting
mining which might cause the subsidence of structures for human habitation
constructed on the land surface. This was resisted by a coal company which had
earlier granted a deed to the land over its mine but reserved all mining rights
thereunder, with the grantee assuming all risks and waiving any damage claim. The
Court held the law could not be sustained without compensating the grantor.
Justice Brandeis filed a lone dissent in which he argued that there was a valid
exercise of the police power. He said:
Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of
the police power deprives the owner of some right theretofore
enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the State of rights in
property without making compensation. But restriction imposed to
protect the public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is
not a taking. The restriction here in question is merely the prohibition
of a noxious use. The property so restricted remains in the possession
of its owner. The state does not appropriate it or make any use of it.
The state merely prevents the owner from making a use which
interferes with paramount rights of the public. Whenever the use
prohibited ceases to be noxious as it may because of further
changes in local or social conditions the restriction will have to be
removed and the owner will again be free to enjoy his property as
heretofore.
Recent trends, however, would indicate not a polarization but a mingling of the
police power and the power of eminent domain, with the latter being used as an
implement of the former like the power of taxation. The employment of the taxing
power to achieve a police purpose has long been accepted. As for the power of
expropriation, Prof. John J. Costonis of the University of Illinois College of Law
(referring to the earlier case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365, which
sustained a zoning law under the police power) makes the following significant
remarks:
Euclid, moreover, was decided in an era when judges located the
police and eminent domain powers on different planets. Generally
speaking, they viewed eminent domain as encompassing public
acquisition of private property for improvements that would be
available for "public use," literally construed. To the police power, on
the other hand, they assigned the less intrusive task of preventing
harmful externalities, a point reflected in the Euclid opinion's reliance
on an analogy to nuisance law to bolster its support of zoning. So long
as suppression of a privately authored harm bore a plausible relation
to some legitimate "public purpose," the pertinent measure need have
afforded no compensation whatever. With the progressive growth of
government's involvement in land use, the distance between the two
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powers has contracted considerably. Today government often employs

eminent domain interchangeably with or as a useful complement to
the police power a trend expressly approved in the Supreme Court's
1954 decision in Berman v. Parker, which broadened the reach of
eminent domain's "public use" test to match that of the police power's
standard of "public purpose."
The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of
compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge
merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police
power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution.
But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such
owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed,
there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment
of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere
limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and
the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the
owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the
police power but of the power of eminent domain.
City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta [G.R. No. L-34915, June 24, 1983]
We find the stand of the private respondent as well as the decision of the
respondent Judge to be well-founded. We quote with approval the lower court's
ruling which declared null and void Section 9 of the questioned city ordinance:
"The issue is: Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise
of the police power?
"An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 5371),
does not reveal any provision that would justify the ordinance in
question except the provision granting police power to the City.
Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City
to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other business, trades,
and occupation as may be established or practiced in the City.' (Subsections 'C', Sec. 12, R.A. 537).
"The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit (People
vs. Esguerra, 81 Phil. 33, Vega vs. Municipal Board of Iloilo, L-6765,
May 12, 1954; 39 N.J. Law, 70, Mich. 396). A fortiori, the power to
regulate does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in
question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a
memorial park cemetery, because under Section 13 of said ordinance,
'Violation of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or
imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate
and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled.' The
confiscatory clause and the penal provision in effect deter one from
operating a memorial park cemetery. Neither can the ordinance in
question be justified under sub-section 't', Section 12 of Republic Act
537 which authorizes the City Council to
"'prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the
city and provide for their burial in such proper place and in such
manner as the council may determine, subject to the provisions of the
general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries and governing
funerals and disposal of the dead.'(Sub-sec. (t), Sec. 12, Rep. Act No.
537).

There is nothing in the above provision which authorizes confiscation

or as euphemistically termed by the respondents, 'donation.'
We now come to the question whether or not Section 9 of the
ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police power. The police
power of Quezon City is defined in sub-section 00, Sec. 12, Rep. Act
537 which reads as follows:
"(00) To make such further ordinance and regulations not repugnant
to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the
powers and duties conferred by this act and such as it shall deem
necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote,
the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and
convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the
protection of property therein; and enforce obedience thereto with
such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe under
the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section.'
"We start the discussion with a restatement of certain basic principles.
Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the provision which
states that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law' (Art. III, Section 1 subparagraph 1,
Constitution).
"On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by
which the state interferes with the property rights, namely (1) police
power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist
independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of
sovereignty.
"Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the
public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property' (Quoted in Political Law by Taada and Carreon, V-II, p. 50).
It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment
of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is
not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the
general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover from the
government for injury sustained in consequence thereof. (12 C.J.
623). It has been said that police power is the most essential of
government powers, at times the most insistent, and always one of
the least limitable of the powers of government (Ruby vs. Provincial
Board, 39 Phil. 660; Ichong vs. Hernandez, L-7995, May 31, 1957).
This power embraces the whole system of public regulation (U.S. vs.
Linsuya Fan, 10 Phil. 104). The Supreme Court has said that police
power is so far-reaching in scope that it has almost become impossible
to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of
the state itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its
scope. Being coextensive with self-preservation and survival itself, it is
the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most
essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially it is so under the modern
democratic framework where the demands of society and nations have
multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions. The field and scope of
police power have become almost boundless, just as the fields of
public interest and public welfare have become almost all embracing
and have transcended human foresight. Since the Courts cannot
foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare, they
cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of the police power by
which and through which the state seeks to attain or achieve public
interest and welfare. (Ichong vs. Hernandez, L-7995, May 31, 1957).
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"The police power being the most active power of the government and
the due process clause being the broadest limitation on governmental
power, the conflict between this power of government and the due
process clause of the Constitution is oftentimes inevitable.
"It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is
usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the
use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It
does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the
exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate
private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the
peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance,
the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and
firearms.
"It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of
1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright
confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due
process of law, nay, even without compensation."
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila [G.R. No. 14355, October 31, 1919]
NECESSITY OF EXPROPRIATION IS A JUSTICEABLE QUESTION WHEN THE POWER
IS EXERCISED BY A DELEGATE. It is contended on the part of the plaintiff that the
phrase in said section, "and if the court shall find that the right to expropriate
exists," means simply that, if the court finds that there is some law authorizing the
plaintiff to expropriate, then the courts have no other function than to authorize the
expropriation and to proceed to ascertain the value of the land involved; that the
necessity for the expropriation is a legislative and not a judicial question.
Upon the question whether expropriation is a legislative function exclusively, and
that the courts cannot intervene except for the purpose of determining the value of
the land in question, there is much legal literature. Much has been written upon
both sides of that question. A careful examination of the discussions pro and con
will disclose the fact that the decisions depend largely upon particular constitutional
or statutory provisions. It cannot be denied, if the legislature under proper
authority should grant the expropriation of a certain or particular parcel of land for
some specified public purpose, the courts would be without jurisdiction to inquire
into the purpose of that legislation.
If, upon the other hand, however, the Legislature should grant general authority to
a municipal corporation to expropriate private land for public purposes, we think
the courts have ample authority in this jurisdiction, under the provisions above
quoted, to make inquiry and to hear proof, upon an issue properly presented,
concerning whether or not the lands were private and whether the purpose was, in
fact, public. In other words, have not the courts in this jurisdiction the right,
inasmuch as the questions relating to expropriation must be referred to them (sec.
241, Act No. 190) for final decision, to ask whether or not the law has been
complied with? Suppose, in a particular case, it should be denied that the property
is not private property but public, may not the courts hear proof upon that
question? Or, suppose the defense is, that the purpose of the expropriation is not
public but private, or that there exists no public purpose at all, may not the courts
make inquiry and hear proof upon that question?
We are of the opinion that the power of the court is not limited to that question.
The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and
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before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it.
When the courts come to determine the question, they must not only find (a) that a
law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also
that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. In the
present case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the
City of Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be
public. If the court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or that
either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right is being
exercised in accordance with law
Whether the purpose for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is public, is a
question of fact. Whether the land is public or private is also a question of fact;
and, in our opinion, when the legislature conferred upon the courts of the Philippine
Islands the right to ascertain upon trial whether the right exists for the exercise of
eminent domain, it intended that the courts should inquire into, and hear proof
upon, those questions. Is it possible that the owner of valuable land in this
jurisdiction is compelled to stand mute while his land is being expropriated for a use
not public, with the right simply to beg the city of Manila to pay him the value of his
land? Does the law in this jurisdiction permit municipalities to expropriate lands,
without question, simply for the purpose of satisfying the aesthetic sense of those
who happen for the time being to be in authority? Expropriation of lands usually
calls for public expense. The taxpayers are called upon to pay the costs. Cannot the
owners of land question the public use or the public necessity?
"The legislature, in providing for the exercise of the power of eminent domain, may
directly determine the necessity for appropriating private property for a particular
improvement for public use, and it may select the exact location of the
improvement. In such a case, it is well settled that the utility of the proposed
improvement, the extent of the public necessity for its construction, the expediency
of constructing it, the suitableness of the location selected and the consequent
necessity of taking the land selected for its site, are all questions exclusively for the
legislature to determine and the courts have no power to interfere, or to substitute
their own views for those of the representatives of the people."
"But when the statute does not designate the property to be taken nor how much
may be taken, then the necessity of taking particular property is a question for the
courts. Where the application to condemn or appropriate is made directly to the
court, the question (of necessity) should be raised and decided in limine."
There is a wide distinction between a legislative declaration that a municipality is
given authority to exercise the right of eminent domain, and a decision by the
municipality that there exists a necessity for the exercise of that right in a particular
case. The first is a declaration simply that there exist reasons why the right should
be conferred upon municipal corporation, while the second is the application of the
right to a particular case. Certainly, the legislative declaration relating to the
advisability of granting the power cannot be converted into a declaration that a
necessity exists for its exercise in a particular case, and especially so when,
perhaps, the land in question was not within the territorial jurisdiction of the
municipality at the time the legislative authority was granted.
The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its
authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that
case is that the authority must be strictly construed. No species of property is held
by individuals with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution and
laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the
legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates
the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should
not be enlarged by doubtly interpretation. (Bensley vs. Mountain lake Water Co., 13
Cal., 306 and cases cited [73 Am. Dec., 576].)
10

The statutory power of taking property from the owner without his consent is one of
the most delicate exercise of governmental authority. It is to be watched with
jealous scrutiny. Important as the power may be to the government, the inviolable
sanctity which all free constitutions attach to the right of property of the citizens,
constrains the strict observance of the substantial provisions of the law which are
prescribed as modes of the exercise of the power, and to protect it from abuse. Not
only must the authority of municipal corporations to take property be expressly
conferred and the use for which it is taken specified, but the power, with all
constitutional limitation and directions for its exercise, must be strictly pursued.
(Dillon on Municipal Corporations [5th Ed.], sec. 1040, and cases cited; Tenorio vs.
Manila Railroad Co., 22 Phil., 411.)
It can scarcely be contended that a municipality would be permitted to take
property for some public use unless some public necessity existed therefor. The
right to take private property for public use originates in the necessity, and the
taking must be limited by such necessity. The appellant contends that inasmuch as
the legislature has given it general authority to take private property for public use,
that the legislature has, therefore, settled the question of the necessity in every
case and that the courts are closed to the owners of the property upon that
question. Can it be imagined, when the legislature adopted section 2429 of Act No.
2711, that it thereby declared that it was necessary to appropriate the property of
Juan de la Cruz, whose property, perhaps, was not within the city limits at the time
the law was adopted? The legislature, then, not having declared the necessity, can
it be contemplated that it intended that a municipality should be the sole judge of
the necessity in every case, and that the courts, in the face of the provision that "if
upon trial they shall find that a right exists," cannot in that trial inquire into and
hear proof upon the necessity for the appropriation in a particular case?
The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused
with the right to exercise it in a particular case. The power of the legislature to
confer, upon municipal corporations and other entities within the State, general
authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be questioned by the
courts, but that general authority of municipalities or entities must not be confused
with the right to exercise it in particular instances. The moment the municipal
corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply
with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the
authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is
admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal
corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions
imposed by the general authority, is a question which the courts have the right to
inquire into.
PROPERTY DEVOTED TO PUBLIC USE MAY BE EXPROPRIATED. - Where a cemetery
is open to the public, it is a public use and no part of the ground can be taken for
other public uses under a general authority. And this immunity extends to the
unimproved and unoccupied parts which are held in good faith for future use.
(Lewis on Eminent Domain, sec. 434, and cases cited.)
The cemetery in question seems to have been established under governmental
authority. The Spanish Governor-General, in an order creating the same, used the
following language:
"The cemetery and general hospital for indigent Chinese having been
founded and maintained by the spontaneous and fraternal contribution
of their protector, merchants and industrials, benefactors of mankind,
in consideration of their services to the Government of the Islands its
internal administration, government and regime must necessarily be
adjusted to the taste and traditional practices of those born and
11

educated in China in order that the sentiments which animated the

founders may be perpetually effectuated."
It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by the
general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the
definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public
property. If that is true, then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff must be denied,
for the reason that the city of Manila has no authority or right under the law to
expropriate public property.
But, whether or not the cemetery is public or private property, its appropriation for
the uses of a public street, especially during the lifetime of those specially
interested in its maintenance as a cemetery, should be a question of great concern,
and its appropriation should not be made for such purposes until it is fully
established that the greatest necessity exists therefor.
Republic vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. [G.R. No. L-18841,
January 27, 1969]
PERSONS AND ENTITIES MAY NOT BE COMPELLED TO ENTER INTO A CONTRCT
WITH THE GOVERNMENT, BUT THE LATTER MAY EXERCISE THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN TO IMPOSE BURDEN ON A PROPERTY WITHOUT ACTUAL
TAKING. We agree with the court below that parties can not be coerced to enter
into a contract where no agreement is had between them as to the principal terms
and conditions of the contract. Freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions is of
the essence of our contractual system, and by express provision of the statute, a
contract may be annulled if tainted by violence, intimidation or undue influence
(Articles 1306, 1336, 1337, Civil Code of the Philippines). But the court a quo has
apparently overlooked that while the Republic may not compel the PLDT to
celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign
power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit interconnection
of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the
government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to
be determined by the court. Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain
results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated
property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of
to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of
title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through
expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way. The use of the PLDT's
lines and services to allow interservice connection between both telephone systems
is not much different. In either case private property is subjected to a burden for
public use and benefit. If under Section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State
may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon
payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the State may not require a
public utility to render services in the general interest, provided just compensation
is paid therefor. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be
the users of both telephone systems, so that the condemnation would be for public
use.
The Bureau of Telecommunications, under Section 78(b) of Executive Order No. 94,
may operate and maintain wire telephone or radio telephone communications
throughout the Philippines by utilizing existing facilities in cities, towns, and
provinces under such terms and conditions or arrangement with present owners or
operators as may be agreed upon to the satisfaction of all concerned; but there is
nothing in this Section that would exclude resort to condemnation proceedings
where unreasonable or unjust terms and conditions are exacted, to the extent of
crippling or seriously hampering the operations of said Bureau.

12

People vs. Fajardo [G.R. No. L-12172, August 29, 1958]

REGULATION OF PROPERTY WHICH FOREVER DEPRIVES THE OWNER OF THE
BENEFICIAL USE THEREOF CANNOT BE SUSTAINED UNDER THE EXERCISE OF
POLICE POWER. It is contended, on the other hand, that the mayor can refuse a
permit solely in case that the proposed building "destroys the view of the public
plaza or occupies any public property" (as stated in its section 3); and in fact, the
refusal of the Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit to the appellant was
predicated on the ground that the proposed building would "destroy the view of the
public plaza" by preventing its being seen from the public highway. Even thus
interpreted, the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to
permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it
oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants
property without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency
is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and
happiness of residents. But while property may be regulated in the interest of the
general welfare, and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures offensive to
the sight (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580), the State may not, under
the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their
property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic
appearance of the community. As the case now stands, every structure that may be
erected on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under
the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view of the public
plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their
land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited,
being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give
appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.
"An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be
used for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be
recognized as a taking of the property. The only substantial difference, in such
case, between restriction and actual taking, is that the restriction leaves the owner
subject to the burden of payment of taxation, while outright confiscation would
relieve him of that burden." (Arverne Bay Constr. Co. vs. Thatcher (N.Y.) 117 ALR.
1110, 1116).
'A regulation which substantially deprives an owner of all beneficial use of his
property is confiscation and is a deprivation within the meaning of the 14th
Amendment." (Sundlum vs. Zoning Bd., 145 Atl. 451; also Eaton vs. Sweeny, 177
NE 412; Taylor vs. Jacksonville, 133 So. 114).
"Zoning which admittedly limits property to a use which can not reasonably be
made of it cannot be said to set aside such property to a use but constitutes the
taking of such property without just compensation. Use of property is an element of
ownership therein. Regardless of the opinion of zealots that property may properly,
by zoning, be utterly destroyed without compensation, such principle finds no
support in the genius of our government nor in the principles of justice as we
known them. Such a doctrine shocks the sense of justice. If it be of public benefit
that property remain open and unused, then certainly the public, and not the
private individuals, should bear the cost of reasonable compensation for such
property under the rules of law governing the condemnation of private property for
public use. (Tews vs. Woolhiser (1933) 352 111. 212, 185 N.E. 827) (Emphasis
supplied.)
Republic vs. Vda. De Castellvi [G.R. No. L-20620, August 15, 1974]
ELEMENTS OF TAKING IN EMINENT DOMAIN. First, the expropriator must enter a
private property. This circumstance is present in the instant case, when by virtue of

13

the lease agreement the Republic, through the AFP, took possession of the property
of Castellvi.
Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary
period. "Momentary" means, "lasting but a moment; of but a moment's duration"
(The Oxford English Dictionary, Volume VI, page 596); "lasting a very short time;
transitory; having a very brief life; operative or recurring at every moment"
(Webster's Third International Dictionary, 1963 edition.) The word "momentary"
when applied to possession or occupancy of (real) property should be construed to
mean "a limited period" not indefinite or permanent. The aforecited lease
contract was for a period of one year, renewable from year to year. The entry on
the property, under the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory. The fact
that the Republic, through the AFP, constructed some installations of a permanent
nature does not alter the fact that the entry into the land was transitory, or
intended to last a year, although renewable from year to year by consent of the
owner of the land. By express provision of the lease agreement the Republic, as
lessee, undertook to return the premises in substantially the same condition as at
the time the property was first occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that the intention
of the lessee was to occupy the land permanently, as may be inferred from the
construction of permanent improvements. But this "intention" cannot prevail over
the clear and express terms of the lease contract. Intent is to be deduced from the
language employed by the parties, and the terms of the contract, when
unambiguous, as in the instant case, are conclusive in the absence of averment and
proof of mistake or fraud the question being not what the intention was, but
what is expressed in the language used. (City of Manila v. Rizal Park Co., Inc., 53
Phil. 515, 525); Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Myrick, 71 Phil. 344, 348). Moreover, in
order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and
subsequent acts shall be principally considered (Art. 1371, Civil Code). If the
intention of the lessee (Republic) in 1947 was really to occupy permanently
Castellvi's property, why was the contract of lease entered into on year to year
basis? Why was the lease agreement renewed from year to year? Why did not the
Republic expropriate this land of Castellvi in 1949 when, according to the Republic
itself, it expropriated the other parcels of land that it occupied at the same time as
the Castellvi land, for the purpose of converting them into a jet air base?" It might
really have been the intention of the Republic to expropriate the lands in question
at some future time, but certainly mere notice much less an implied notice of
such intention on the part of the Republic to expropriate the lands in the future did
not, and could not, bind the landowner, nor bind the land itself. The expropriation
must be actually commenced in court (Republic vs. Baylosis, et al., 96 Phil. 461,
484).
Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal
authority. This circumstance in the "taking" may be considered as present in the
instant case, because the Republic entered the Castellvi property as lessee.
Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected. It may be conceded that the circumstance of
the property being devoted to public use is present because the property was used
by the air force of the AFP.
Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust
the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. In the
instant case, the entry of the Republic into the property and its utilization of the
same for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property. Castellvi remained as owner, and was continuously
recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown by the renewal of the lease contract
from year to year, and by the provision in the lease contract whereby the Republic
undertook to return the property to Castellvi when the lease was terminated.
Neither was Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property,
14

because the Republic was bound to pay, and had been paying, Castellvi the agreed
monthly rentals until the time when it filed the complaint for eminent domain on
June 26, 1959.
JUST COMPENSATION IS DETERMINED FROM THE TIME OF FILING THE
COMPLAINT. We hold, therefore, that the "taking' of the Castellvi property should
not be reckoned as of the year 1947 when the Republic first occupied the same
pursuant to the contract of lease, and that the just compensation to be paid for the
Castellvi property should not be determined on the basis of the value of the
property as of that year. The lower court did not commit an error when it held that
the "taking" of the property under expropriation commenced with the filing of the
complaint in this case.
Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the "just compensation" is to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. This Court has ruled that
when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the
filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. (Republic vs. Philippine
National Bank, L-14158, April 12, 1961, 1 SCRA 957, 961-962). In the instant case,
it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castellvi property,
by authority of the court, on August 10, 1959. The "taking" of the Castellvi property
for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore,
be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed.
In expropriation proceedings, therefore, the owner of the land has the right to its
value for the use for which it would bring the most in the market. The owner may
thus show every advantage that his property possesses, present and prospective, in
order that the price it could be sold for in the market may be satisfactorily
determined. The owner may also show that the property is suitable for division into
village or town lots.
Philippine Press Institute vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 119694, May 22, 1995]
TAKING IN EMINENT DOMAIN. - To compel print media companies to donate
"Comelec space" of the dimensions specified in Section 2 of resolution No. 2772
(not less than one-half Page), amounts to "taking" of private personal property for
public use or purposes. Section 2 failed to specify the intended frequency of such
compulsory "donation:" only once during the period from 6 March 1995 (or 21
March 1995) until 12 May 1995? or everyday or once a week? or has often as
Comelec may direct during the same period? the extent of the taking or deprivation
is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or
restraint upon the use of private property. The monetary value of the compulsory
"donation," measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper
publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be very substantial indeed.
The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be appraised under
the public of expropriation of private personal property for public use. The threshold
requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use need to be examined
here: one is the necessity for the taking; another is the legal authority to effect the
taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by respondent
Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell
print space at their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the
unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the
problem. Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone demonstrated, that
Comelec has been granted the power of imminent domain either by the Constitution
or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and
the enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it
is not casually to be assumed.
15

That the taking is designed to subserve "public use" is not contested by petitioner
PPI. We note only that, under Section 3 of Resolution No. 2772, the free "Comelec
space" sought by the respondent Commission would be used not only for informing
the public about the identities, qualifications and programs of government of
candidates for elective office but also for "dissemination of vital election
information" (including, presumably, circulars, regulations, notices, directives, etc.
issued by Comelec). It seems to the Court a matter of judicial notice that
government offices and agencies (including the Supreme Court) simply purchase
print space, in the ordinary course of events, when their rules and regulations,
circulars, notices and so forth need officially to be brought to the attention of the
general public.
The taking of private property for public use it, of course, authorized by the
Constitution, but not without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section
9). And apparently the necessity of paying compensation for "Comelec space" is
precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission, whether Section
2 of resolution No. 2772 is read as petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of
authority to require newspaper publishers to "donate" free print space for Comelec
purpose, or as an exhortion, or perhaps an appeal, to publishers to donate free
print space, as Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772-A attempts to suggest. There is
nothing at all to prevent newspaper and magazine publishers from voluntarily
giving free print space to Comelec for the purposes contemplated in Resolution No.
2772. Section 2 of resolution No. 2772 does not, however, provide a constitutional
basis for compelling publishers, against their will, in the kind of factual context here
present, to provide free print space for Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not
constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.
Sumulong vs. Guerrero [G.R. No. L-48685, September 30, 1987]
CONCEPT OF PUBLIC USE IN EMINENT DOMAIN. Petitioners contend that "socialized
housing" as defined in Pres. Decree No. 1224, as amended, for the purpose of
condemnation proceedings is not "public use" since it will benefit only "a handful of
people, bereft of public character."
"Socialized housing" is defined as, "the
construction of dwelling units for the middle and lower class members of our
society, including the construction of the supporting infrastructure and other
facilities" (Pres. Decree No. 1224, par. 1).
The "public use" requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is
a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. In this
jurisdiction, the statutory and judicial trend has been summarized as follows:
The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it
was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a
requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to
enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is
not allowable. It is not anymore. As long as the purpose of the taking
is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just
noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt,
determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be
subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is
in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and
other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then
that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general
welfare satisfies the requirement of public use [Heirs of Juancho
Ardona v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 60549, 60553-60555, October 26, 1983,
125 SCRA 220 (1983) at 234-5 quoting E. FERNANDO, THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES 523-4, (2nd e., 1977) Emphasis
supplied]
16

The term "public use" has acquired a more comprehensive coverage. To the literal
import of the term signifying strict use or employment by the public has been
added the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. As discussed in
the above cited case of Heirs of Juancho Ardona:
The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation
which circumscribes the scope of government activities and public
concerns and which possesses big and correctly located public lands
that obviate the need to take private property for public purposes.
Neither circumstance applies to the Philippines. We have never been a
laissez faire State. And the necessities which impel the exertion of
sovereign power are an too often found in areas of scarce public land
or limited government resources. (p. 231)
Specifically, urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low-cost
housing is recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the expanded
concept of public use but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution. The
1973 Constitution made it incumbent upon the State to establish, maintain and
ensure adequate social services including housing [Art. II, sec. 7]. The 1987
Constitution goes even further by providing that:
The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will
ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the
people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social
services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living and an
improved quality of life for all. [Art. II, sec. 9]
The state shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in
cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of urban
land reform and housing which will make available at affordable cost
decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless
citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. It shall also promote
adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In the
implementation of such program the State shall respect the rights of
small property owners. (Art. XIII, sec. 9, Emphasis supplied)
Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern
since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and
in sum, the general welfare. The public character of housing measures does not
change because units in housing projects cannot be occupied by all but only by
those who satisfy prescribed qualifications. A beginning has to be made, for it is not
possible to provide housing for all who need it, all at once.
SIZE OF THE PROPERTY IS NOT DETERMINATIVE OF THE PROPER EXERCISE OF
EMINENT DOMAIN.
Petitioners further contend that Pres. Decree 1224, as
amended, would allow the taking of "any private land" regardless of the size and no
matter how small the area of the land to be expropriated. Petitioners claim that
"there are vast areas of lands in Mayamot, Cupang, and San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal
hundred of hectares of which are owned by a few landowners only. It is surprising
[therefore] why respondent National Housing Authority [would] include [their] two
small lots . . ."
In J.M. Tuason Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, [G.R. No. L-21064,
February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413 (1970, at 428] this Court earlier ruled that
expropriation is not confined to landed estates. This Court, quoting the dissenting
opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Republic v. Baylosis, [96 Phil. 461 (1955)], held
that:

17

The propriety of exercising the power of eminent domain under Article XIII, section
4 of our Constitution cannot be determined on a purely quantitative or area basis.
Not only does the constitutional provision speak of lands instead of landed estates,
but I see no cogent reason why the government, in its quest for social justice and
peace, should exclusively devote attention to conflicts of large proportions,
involving a considerable number of individuals, and eschew small controversies and
wait until they grow into a major problem before taking remedial action.
The said case of J.M. Tuason Co., Inc. departed from the ruling in Guido v. Rural
Progress Administration [84 Phil. 847 (1949)] which held that the test to be applied
for a valid expropriation of private lands was the area of the land and not the
number of people who stood to be benefited. Since then "there has evolved a clear
pattern of adherence to the `number of people to be benefited test'" [Mataas na
Lupa Tenants Association, Inc. v. Dimayuga, G.R. No. 32049, June 25, 1984, 130
SCRA 30 (1984) at 39]. Thus, in Pulido v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 57625, May 3,
1983, 122 SCRA 63 (1983) at 73], this Court stated that, "[i]t is unfortunate that
the petitioner would be deprived of his landholdings, but his interest and that of his
family should not stand in the way of progress and the benefit of the greater
majority of the inhabitants of the country."
The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the
particular property/properties to be taken for socialized housing purposes and how
much thereof may be expropriated. Absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith, or
gross abuse of discretion, which petitioners herein failed to demonstrate, the Court
will give due weight to and leave undisturbed the NHA's choice and the size of the
site for the project. The property owner may not interpose objections merely
because in their judgment some other property would have been more suitable, or
just as suitable, for the purpose. The right to the use, enjoyment and disposal of
private property is tempered by and has to yield to the demands of the common
good. The Constitutional provisions on the subject are clear:
The state shall promote social justice in all phases of national
development. (Art. II, sec. 10)
The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect
and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic,
and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing
wealth and political power for the common good. To this end, the State shall
regulate the acquisition, ownership, use and disposition of property and its
increments. (Art. XIII, sec. 1)
JUST COMPENSATION. Just compensation means the value of the property at the
time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the
facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and
capabilities, should be considered.
Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific properties singled out
for expropriation. The values given by provincial assessors are usually uniform for
very wide areas covering several barrios or even an entire town with the exception
of the poblacion. Individual differences are never taken into account. The value of
land is based on such generalities as its possible cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts,
or other crops. Very often land described as "cogonal" has been cultivated for
generations. Buildings are described in terms of only two or three classes of
building materials and estimates of areas are more often inaccurate than correct.
Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just
compensation.
To say that the owners are estopped to question the valuations made by assessors
since they had the opportunity to protest is illusory. The overwhelming mass of
18

landowners accept unquestioningly what is found in the tax declarations prepared

by local assessors or municipal clerks for them. They do not even look at, much less
analyze, the statements. The idea of expropriation simply never occurs until a
demand is made or a case filed by an agency authorized to do so. (pp. 12-3)
Manosca vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 106440. January 29, 1996.]
PUBLIC USE IN EMINENT DOMAIN. The term "public use," not having been
otherwise defined by the constitution, must be considered in its general concept of
meeting a public need or a public exigency. Black summarizes the characterization
given by various courts to the term: thus:
"Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and statutory basis for
taking property by eminent domain. For condemnation purposes,
'public use' is one which confers some benefit or advantage to the
public; it is not confined to actual use by public. It is measured in
terms of right of public to use proposed facilities for which
condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of use,
whether exercised by one or many members of public, a 'public
advantage' or 'public benefit' accrues sufficient to constitute a public
use. Montana Power Co. vs. Bokma, Mont. 457 P.2d 769, 772, 773.
"Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the exercise of the
right to take private property in virtue of eminent domain, means a
use concerning the whole community as distinguished from particular
individuals. But each and every member of society need not be equally
interested in such use, or be personally and directly affected by it; if
the object is to satisfy a great public want or exigency, that is
sufficient. Rindge Co. vs. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700, 43 S.Ct.
689, 692, 67 L.Ed. 1186. The term may be said to mean public
usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general
benefit. It may be limited to the inhabitants of a small or restricted
locality, but must be in common, and not for a particular individual.
The use must be a needful one for the public, which cannot be
surrendered without obvious general loss and inconvenience. A 'public
use' for which land may be taken defies absolute definition for it
changes with varying conditions of society, new appliances in the
sciences, changing conceptions of scope and functions of government,
and other differing circumstances brought about by an increase in
population and new modes of communication and transportation. Katz
v. Brandon, 156 Conn., 521, 245 A.2d 579,586."
Petitioners ask: But "(w)hat is the so-called unusual interest that the expropriation
of (Felix Manalo's) birthplace become so vital as to be a public use appropriate for
the exercise of the power of eminent domain" when only members of the Iglesia ni
Cristo would benefit? This attempt to give some religious perspective to the case
deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is the principal objective
of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power.
The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive
contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to
commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo.
The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia
ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still
remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few
would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily
diminish the essence and character of public use.

19

EPZA vs. Dulay [G.R. No. L-59603, April 29, 1987]

DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION IS A POWER THAT BELONGS TO THE
COURT. The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a
judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial
determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of
Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just
compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be
precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.
The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees
constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render
this Court initial in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final
determination. Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically
would still have the power to determine the just compensation for the property,
following the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the
lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. As a
necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court to appoint commissioners
under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process
clause in the taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said
that a judicial proceeding was not had before the actual taking. However, the strict
application of the decrees during the proceedings would be nothing short of a mere
formality or charade as the court has only to choose between the valuation of the
owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower of the
two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what
is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could substitute for the judge insofar as the
determination of constitutional just compensation is concerned.
We are convinced and so rule that the trial court correctly stated that the valuation
in the decree may only serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in
determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment
as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. A return
to the earlier well-established doctrine, to our mind, is more in keeping with the
principle that the judiciary should live up to its mission "by vitalizing and not
denigrating constitutional rights." (See Salonga v. Cruz Pao, 134 SCRA 438, 462;
citing Mercado v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, 116 SCRA 93.) The doctrine we
enunciated in National Housing Authority v. Reyes, supra, therefore, must
necessarily be abandoned if we are to uphold this Court's role as the guardian of
the fundamental rights guaranteed by the due process and equal protection clauses
and as the final arbiter over transgressions committed against constitutional rights.
Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It
means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the
condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities,
should be considered. In this particular case, the tax declarations presented by the
petitioner as basis for just compensation were made by the Lapu-Lapu municipal,
later city assessor long before martial law, when land was not only much cheaper
but when assessed values of properties were stated in figures constituting only a
fraction of their true market value. The private respondent was not even the owner
of the properties at the time. It purchased the lots for development purposes. To
peg the value of the lots on the basis of documents which are out of date and at
prices below the acquisition cost of present owners would be arbitrary and
confiscatory.

20

Amigable vs. Cuenca [G.R. No. L-26400, February 29, 1972]

THE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT CANNOT BE USED TO EVADE PAYMENT OF JUST
COMPENSATION. - In the case of Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu,
involving a claim for payment of the value of a portion of land used for the widening
of the Gorordo Avenue in Cebu City, this Court, through Mr. Justice Enrique M.
Fernando, held that where the government takes away property from a private
landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or
negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the
government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from
suit without its consent. We there said:
". . . If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for
property taken for public use were to be respected, as it should, then a
suit of this character should not be summarily dismissed. The doctrine
of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed
the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint
would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the
compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party
entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it have the right to
enter in and upon the land so condemned, to appropriate the same to
the public use defined in the judgment.' If there were an observance of
procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they
are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a
failure to abide by what the law requires, the government would stand
to benefit. It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity
to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be
maintained. It is not too much to say that when the government takes
any property for public use, which is conditioned upon the payment of
just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that
it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that
the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately
invoked."
Municipality of Paraaque vs. V.M. Realty Corp. [G.R. No. 127820, July 20, 1998]
CONDITIONS FOR THE VALID EXERCISE OF EMINENT DOMAIN BY LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNITS. Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the
municipal council for the purpose of initiating an expropriation case "substantially
complies with the requirements of the law" because the terms "ordinance" and
"resolution" are synonymous for "the purpose of bestowing authority [on] the local
government unit through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation
proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of eminent domain." Petitioner
seeks to bolster this contention by citing Article 36, Rule VI of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, which provides: "If the LGU
fails to acquire a private property for public use, purpose, or welfare through
purchase, the LGU may expropriate said property through a resolution of the
Sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to initiate expropriation proceedings."
The Court disagrees. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative
branch of government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other
public entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to
expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the
latter's control and restraints imposed "through the law conferring the power or in
other legislations." In this case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs
the power of eminent domain, also lays down the parameters for its exercise. It
provides as follows:

21

"Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may,

through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,
exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or
welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of
just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and
pertinent laws. Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain
may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted:
Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately
take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation
proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at
least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property
based on the current tax declaration of the property to be
expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the
expropriated .property shall be determined by the proper court, based
on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property."
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the
power of eminent domain:
1.

2.
3.
4.

An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the

local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of
eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular
private property.
The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or
welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9,
Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

Rule 67, Revised Rules of Court

POWER OF TAXATION
Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works [G.R. No. L-10405, December 29, 1960]
PUBLIC MONEY MAY ONLY BE APPROPRIATED FOR PUBLIC PURPOSE. As regards
the legal feasibility of appropriating public funds for a private purpose the principle
according to Ruling Case Law, is this:
"It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate
public revenue for anything but a public purpose. . . . It is the
essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which must
determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the
interests to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage
of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately
benefited by their promotion. Incidental advantage to the public or to
the state, which results from the promotion of private interests and
the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify their
aid by the use of public money." (25 R.L.C. pp. 398-400; Italics
supplied.)
The rule is set forth in Corpus Juris Secundum in the following language:
"In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised
for public purposes only, discussed supra sec. 14, money raised by
taxation can be expanded only for public purposes and not for the

22

advantage of private individuals." (85 C.J.S. pp. 645-646; italics

supplied.)
Explaining the reason underlying said rule, Corpus Juris Secundum states:
"Generally, under the express or implied provisions of the constitution,
public funds may be used for a public purpose. The right of the
legislature to appropriate funds is correlative with its right to tax,
under constitutional provisions against taxation except for public
purposes and prohibiting the collection of a tax for one purpose and
the devotion thereof to another purpose, no appropriation of state
funds can be made for other than a public purpose. . .
"The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public
funds is whether the statute is designed to promote the public
interests, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of
individuals, although each advantage to individuals might incidentally
serve the public. . . ." (81 C.J.S. p. 1147; italics supplied.)
Needless to say, this Court is fully in accord with the foregoing views which, apart
from being patently sound, are a necessary corollary to our democratic system of
government, which, as such, exists primarily for the promotion of the general
welfare. Besides, reflecting as they do, the established jurisprudence in the United
States, after whose constitutional system ours has been patterned, said views and
jurisprudence are, likewise, part and parcel of our own constitutional law.
THE VALIDITY OF THE APPROPRIATION IS DETERMINED UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES PREVAILING AT THE TIME OF APPROPRIATION AND NOT ON
SUBSEQUENT EVENTS. The validity of a statute depends upon the powers of
Congress at the time of its passage or approval, not upon events occupying, or acts
performed, subsequently thereto, unless the latter consist of an amendment of the
organic law, removing, with retrospective operation, the constitutional limitation
infringed by said statute. Referring to the P85,000.00 appropriation for the
projected feeder roads in question, the legality thereof depended upon whether said
roads were public or private property when the bill, which, later on, became
Republic Act No. 920, was passed by Congress, or when said bill was approved by
the President and the disbursement of said sum became effective, or on June 20,
1953 (see section 13 of said Act). Inasmuch as the land on which the projected
feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to respondent Zulueta, the
result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and
void. The donation to the Government, over five (5) months after the approval and
effectivity of said Act, made according to the petition, for the purpose of giving a
"semblance of legality", or legalizing, the appropriation in question, did not cure its
aforementioned basic defect. Consequently, a judicial nullification of said donation
need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of said appropriation.
Punsalan vs. Municipal Board of Manila [G.R. No. L-4817, May 26, 1954]
DOUBLE TAXATION IS NOT PROHIBITED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION UNLESS IT IS
UNDULY OPPRESSIVE AND VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. The argument
against double taxation may not be invoked where one tax is imposed by the state
and the other is imposed by the city (1 Cooley on Taxation, 4th ed., p. 492), it
being widely recognized that there is nothing inherently obnoxious in the
requirement that license fees or taxes be exacted with respect to the same
occupation, calling or activity by both the state and the political subdivisions
thereof. (51 Am. Jur., 341.)

23

Lladoc vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue [G.R. No. L-19201, June 16, 1965]
THE TAX EXEMPTION UNDER SECTION 28 (3), ARTICLE VI, APPLIES ONLY TO REAL
PROPERTY TAX AND NOT TO EXCISE TAXES. Section 22(3), Art. VI of the
Constitution of the Philippines, exempts from taxation cemeteries, churches and
personages or convents, appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements used exclusively for religious purposes. The exemption is only from
the payment of taxes assessed on such properties enumerated, as property taxes,
as contra-distinguished from excise taxes. In the present case, what the Collector
assessed was a donee's gift tax; the assessment was not on the properties
themselves. It did not rest upon general ownership; it was an excise upon the use
made of the properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving the
properties (Phipps vs. Com. of Int. Rev., 91 F [2d] 627.) Manifestly, gift tax is not
within the exempting provisions of the section just mentioned. A gift tax is not a
property tax, but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift
inter vivos, the imposition of which on property used exclusively for religious
purposes, do not constitute an impairment of the Constitution. As well observed by
the learned respondent Court, the phrase "exempt from taxation," as employed in
the Constitution supra should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds
of taxes. And there being no clear, positive or express grant of such privilege by
law, in favor of the petitioner, the exemption herein must be denied.
Abra Valley College vs. Aquino [G.R. No. L-39086, June 15, 1988]
EXEMPTION EXTENDS TO USES WHICH ARE INCIDENTAL TO THE MAIN PURPOSES.
As early as 1916 in YMCA of Manila vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 33 Phil. 217
[1916], this Court ruled that while it may be true that the YMCA keeps a lodging
and a boarding house and maintains a restaurant for its members, still these do not
constitute business in the ordinary acceptance of the word, but an institution used
exclusively for religious, charitable and educational purposes, and as such, it is
entitled to be exempted from taxation.
In the case of Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Provincial Board of Ilocos Norte, 51 Phil.
352 [1972], this Court included in the exemption a vegetable garden in an adjacent
lot and another lot formerly used as a cemetery. It was clarified that the term "used
exclusively" considers incidental use also. Thus, the exemption from payment of
land tax in favor of the convent includes, not only the land actually occupied by the
building but also the adjacent garden devoted to the incidental use of the parish
priest. The lot which is not used for commercial purposes but serves solely as a sort
of lodging place, also qualifies for exemption because this constitutes incidental use
in religious functions.
The phrase "exclusively used for educational purposes" was further clarified by this
Court in the cases of Herrera vs. Quezon City Board of Assessment Appeals, 3 SCRA
186 [1961] and Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Bishop of the Missionary
District, 14 SCRA 991 [1965], thus
"Moreover, the exemption in favor of property used exclusively for
charitable or educational purposes is 'not limited to property actually
indispensable' therefor (Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 2, p. 1430), but
extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of said purposes, such as in the case of
hospitals, 'a school for training nurses, a nurses' home, property use
to provide housing facilities for interns, resident doctors,
superintendents, and other members of the hospital staff, and
recreational facilities for student nurses, interns, and residents' (84
CJS 6621), such as 'Athletic fields' including 'a firm used for the
inmates of the institution.'" (Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 2, p. 1430).

24

The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes
mentioned in the Constitution (Apostolic Prefect v. City Treasurer of Baguio, 71 Phil.
547 [1941]).
It must be stressed however, that while this Court allows a more liberal and nonrestrictive interpretation of the phrase "exclusively used for educational purposes"
as provided for in Article VI, Section 22, paragraph 3 of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution, reasonable emphasis has always been made that exemption extends
to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the main purposes. Otherwise stated, the use of the school
building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by
jurisprudence. Thus, while the use of the second floor of the main building in the
case at bar for residential purposes of the Director and his family, may find
justification under the concept of incidental use, which is complimentary to the
main or primary purpose educational, the lease of the first floor thereof to the
Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be
considered incidental to the purpose of education.
ARTICLE III THE BILL OF RIGHTS
Section 1
Due Process of Law
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987]
THE CONCEPT OF DUE PROCESS WAS NOT GIVEN EXACT DEFINITION FOR
RESILIENCY. It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the
charter be cast in precise and unmistakable language to avoid controversies that
might arise on their correct interpretation. That is the ideal. In the case of the due
process clause, however, this rule was deliberately not followed and the wording
was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly was
submitted in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by Delegate
Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, who forcefully
argued against it. He was sustained by the body.
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also
conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some
provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and
immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best
virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to
make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as
the changing times and circumstances may require.
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description
of due process lest they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive
them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the clause
whenever indicated. Instead, they have preferred to leave the import of the
protection open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually ascertained by the process of
inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as they arise." Thus,
Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go no
farther than to define due process - and in so doing sums it all up as nothing
more and nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play."
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS. The closed mind has no place in the
open society. It is part of the sporting idea of fair play to hear "the other side"
before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment.
Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question; the other half must also be
considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed
25

appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides

complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling
after examination of the problem not from one or the other perspective only but in
its totality. A judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a
hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or
ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of power.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally
speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard
against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system
that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as
proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have
consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State,
is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two
hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, as "the law which hears
before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after
trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the
reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the
due process clause into a worn and empty catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be
sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for
example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is
based on human experience or there is a rational connection between the fact
proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. There are instances when the
need for expeditious action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the
summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may
be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives
of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are
inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person
sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his
return to the country he has fled. Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked
in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals.
In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due
process in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to
protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.
Ichong vs. Hernandez [G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957]
BALANCING OF INTERESTS IN DUE PROCESS. The conflict between police power
and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws is more
apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to
coexist. The balancing is the essence, or the indispensable means for the
attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no
absolute power, whoever exercises it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can
neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State
can deprive persons of life, liberty or property, provided there is due process of
law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is
given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason.
The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare,
and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if
distinction or classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for
said distinction.
Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corp. vs. Torres [G.R. No. 98050, March 17, 1994]
THE RIGHT TO HEARING AS AN ELEMENT OF DUE PROCESS DOES NOT CALL FOR A
TRIAL TYPE HEARING. We do not see it the way PHILPHOS does here. The essence
of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
26

proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a

reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
Where, as in the instant
case, petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter
and to consider the case submitted for decision on the basis of the position papers
filed by the parties, there was sufficient compliance with the requirement of due
process, as petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to present its side.
Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so desired, insisted on a hearing to confront
and examine the witnesses of the other party. But it did not;
instead, it opted to
submit its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the
opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its appeal to the Secretary of Labor.
Philippine Communications Satellite Corp. vs. Alcuaz [G.R. No. 84818,
December 18, 1989]
RATE FIXING POWER EXERCISED IN A QUASI-JUDICIAL MANNER REQUIRES PRIOR
NOTICE AND HEARING. While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final
determination of the application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary
though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of
notice and hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness. Assuming that
such power is vested in NTC, it may not exercise the same in an arbitrary and
confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an order as temporary in nature does not
perforce entail the applicability of a different rule of statutory procedure than would
otherwise be applied to any other order on the same matter unless otherwise
provided by the applicable law. In the case at bar, the applicable statutory provision
is Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act which provides: "Section 16. Proceedings
of the Commission, upon notice and hearing. The Commission shall have power,
upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this
Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to
the contrary: (c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, . . . which shall be
imposed, observed and followed thereafter by any public service; . . . ."
"Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates
when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind
throughout the Philippines may partake of a legislative character, such is not the
nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the same applies exclusively to
petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact based
upon a report submitted by the General Auditing Office that petitioner is making
a profit of more than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by petitioner.
Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to
introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or complement
the same, as well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by the respondent.
In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed a function
partaking of a quasi-judicial character, the valid exercise of which demands
previous notice and hearing." This rule was further explained in the subsequent
case of The Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Cloribel, et al. to wit: "It is also clear
from the authorities that where the function of the administrative body is
legislative, notice of hearing is not required by due process of law (See
Oppenheiner, Administrative Law, 2 Md. L.R. 185, 204, supra, where it is said: If
the nature of the administrative agency is essentially legislative, the requirements
of notice and hearing are not necessary. The validity of a rule of future action which
affects a group, if vested rights of liberty or property are not involved, is not
determined according to the same rules which apply in the case of the direct
application of a policy to a specific individual) . . . It is said in 73 C.J.S. Public
Administrative Bodies and Procedure, sec. 130, pages 452 and 453: Aside from
statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative proceeding
depends on the character of the proceeding and the circumstances involved. In so
far as generalization is possible in view of the great variety of administrative
proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and hearing are not
essential to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body acts
27

in the exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where a

public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are
particular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the person whose
rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing.
Alonte vs. Savellano [G.R. No. 131652, March 9, 1998]
INDISPENSABLE ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS. It does seem to the
Court that there has been undue precipitancy in the conduct of the proceedings.
Perhaps the problem could have well been avoided had not the basic procedures
been, to the Court's perception taken lightly. And in this shortcoming, looking at
the records of the case, the trial court certainly is not alone to blame.
Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution provides the
fundamentals.
"(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law.
"(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable."
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular,
require (a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial
power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully
acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is given an
opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful
hearing.
The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and
deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and
indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in
the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be met
without a "law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and
renders judgment only after trial."
Aniag vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 104961, October 7, 1994]
THE RIGHT TO PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, ALTHOUGH DOES NOT EMANATE
FROM THE CONSTITUTION IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF CRIMINAL DUE
PROCESS. Moreover, the manner by which COMELEC proceeded against petitioner
runs counter to the due process clause of the Constitution. The facts show that
petitioner was not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus
Election Code. Nor was he subjected by the City Prosecutor to a preliminary
investigation for such offense. The non-disclosure by the City Prosecutor to the
petitioner that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation is violative of
due process which requires that the procedure established by law should be
obeyed.
COMELEC argues that petitioner was given the chance to be heard because he was
invited to enlighten the City Prosecutor regarding the circumstances leading to the
arrest of his driver, and that petitioner in fact submitted a sworn letter of
28

explanation regarding the incident. This does not satisfy the requirement of due
process the essence of which is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
submit any evidence one may have in support of his defense. Due process
guarantees the observance of both substantive and procedural rights, whatever the
source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
In Go v. Court of Appeals, we held that
While the right to preliminary investigation is statutory rather than
constitutional in its fundamental, since it has in fact been established
by statute, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice.
The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being
bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of
incarceration or some other penalty is not a mere formal or technical
right; it is a substantive right . . . . [T]he right to an opportunity to
avoid a process painful to anyone save, perhaps, to hardened criminals
is a valuable right. To deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary
investigation would be to deprive him of the full measure of his right to
due process.
Apparently, petitioner was merely invited during the preliminary investigation of
Arellano to corroborate the latter's explanation. Petitioner then was made to believe
that he was not a party respondent in the case, so that his written explanation on
the incident was only intended to exculpate Arellano, not petitioner himself. Hence,
it cannot be seriously contended that petitioner was fully given the opportunity to
meet the accusation against him as he was not apprised that he was himself a
respondent when he appeared before the City Prosecutor.
Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations [G.R. No. 46496, February 27, 1940]
CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS.
There are
cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this
character. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right
of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in
support thereof. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his
case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but
the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate
does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision.
Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the
evidence must be substantial. The decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore,
must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controvercial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know
the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
Ateneo de Manila vs. Capulong [G.R. No. 99327, May 27, 1993]
MINIMUM STANDARD TO BE SATISFIED IN IMPOSING DISCIPLINARY SANCTION BY
AN ACADEMIC INSTITUTION. Corollary to respondent students' contention of
denial of due process is their argument that it is the Ang Tibay case [69 Phil. 635
(1940)] and not the Guzman case [142 SCRA 699], which is applicable in the case
at bar. Though both cases essentially deal with the requirements of due process,
the Guzman case is more apropos to the instant case, since the latter deals
specifically with the minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein,
29

thus: "(1)
the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of
any accusation against them; (2) that they shall have the right to answer the
charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be
informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce
evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and
decide the case."
THE RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINATION IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE GUARANTEE OF
DUE PROCESS. Respondent students may not use the argument that since they
were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written statements
which became the basis of petitioners' February 14, 1991 order, they were denied
procedural due process. Granting that they were denied such opportunity, the same
may not be said to detract from the observance of due process, for disciplinary
cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross
examination. An administrative proceeding conducted to investigate students'
participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial
proceeding. A closer examination of the March 2, 1991 hearing which characterized
the rules on the investigation as being summary in nature and that respondent
students have no right to examine affiants-neophytes, reveals that this is but a
reiteration of our previous ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA, Q.C. Branch, 161 SCRA 20.
Equal protection of the Laws
People vs. Vera [G.R. No. 45685, November 16, 1937]
EQUAL PROTECTION AND VALID CLASSIFICATION. This basic individual right
sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the three grand departments of
our government and on the subordinate instrumentalities and subdivisions thereof,
and on many constitutional powers, like the police power, taxation and eminent
domain. The equal protection of the laws, sententiously observes the Supreme
Court of the United States, "is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." Of course,
what may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question
not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated.
Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited. But
classification on a reasonable basis, and not made arbitrarily or capriciously, is
permitted. The classification, however, to be reasonable must be based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the
purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must
apply equally to each member of the class.
A LAW MAY APPEAR FAIR ON ITS FACE OR IMPARTIAL IN APPEARANCE, YET IF IT
PERMITS UNJUST AND ILLEGAL DISCRIMINATION, IT IS STILL SUBJECT TO THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION. - In the case at bar, however, the resultant
inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative
power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case. Adopting
the example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral
argument, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of
a probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a
case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the former province but not in the
latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law
would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while another
person similarly situated in another province would be denied those same benefits.
This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the
provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the
probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no inequality would
result for the obvious reason that probation would be in operation in each and
every province by the affirmative action of appropriation by all the provincial
boards. On that hypothesis, every person coming within the purview of the
30

Probation Act would be entitled to avail of the benefits of the Act. Neither will there
be any resulting inequality if no province, through its provincial board, should
appropriate any amount for the salary of the probation officer which is the
situation now and, also, if we accept the contention that, for the purposes of the
Probation Act, the City of Manila should be considered as a province and that the
municipal board of said city has not made any appropriation for the salary of a
probation officer. These different situations suggested show, indeed, that while
inequality may result in the application of the law and in the conferment of the
benefits therein provided, inequality is not in all cases the necessary result. But
whatever may be the case, it is clear that section 11 of the Probation Act creates a
situation in which discrimination and inequality are permitted or allowed. There are,
to be sure, abundant authorities requiring actual denial of the equal protection of
the law before courts should assume the task of setting aside a law vulnerable on
that score, but premises and circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that
section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal protection of the law
and is on that account bad. We see no difference between a law which denies equal
protection and a law which permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on
its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal
discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibition. In other words, statutes
may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation. If a law has
the effect of denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional. Under
section 11 of the Probation Act, not only may said Act be in force in one or several
provinces and not be in force in the other provinces, but one province may
appropriate for the salary of a probation officer of a given year and have
probation during that year and thereafter decline to make further appropriation,
and have no probation in subsequent years. While this situation goes rather to the
abuse of discretion which delegation implies, it is here indicated to show that the
Probation Act sanctions a situation which is intolerable in a government of laws, and
to prove how easy it is, under the Act, to make the guaranty of the equality clause
but "a rope of sand".
Ichong vs. Hernandez [G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957]
EQUAL PROTECTION. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor
and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression
of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not
demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall
be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for
making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do
not.
CITIZENSHIP IS A VALID CLASSIFICATION.
The above objectionable
characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which are actual and
real, furnish sufficient grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into
nationals and aliens. Some may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's
classification. To this we answer, that this is the prerogative of the law-making
power. Since the Court finds that the classification is actual, real and reasonable,
and all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it cannot be said that the
classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound to declare
that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it cannot declare that
the act transcends the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution.
Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and
classifications among persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of
the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a
31

law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the classification is
without reasonable basis. In addition to the authorities we have earlier cited, we
can also refer to the case of Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. (1911), 55 L.
ed., 369, which clearly and succinctly defined the application of equal protection
clause to a law sought to be voided as contrary thereto:
". . . '1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
does not take from the state the power to classify in the adoption of
police laws, but admits of the exercise of the wide scope of discretion
in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any
reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification
having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause
merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in
practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the classification in such
a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be
conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at
the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails
the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that
it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially
arbitrary.'"
The rule in general is as follows:
"Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a
classification otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the
class falls along the lines of nationality. That would be requiring a
higher degree of protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes
of American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in status
between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable
classification in the exercise of police power." (2 Am. Jur. 468-469.)
Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho [G.R. No. L-29646, November 10, 1978]
A LAW THAT DOES NOT SPECIFY THE MANNER OF EXERCISE OF DISCRIMINATION
IS VIOLATIVE OF EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. The contention that Ordinance No.
6537 is not a purely tax or revenue measure because its principal purpose is
regulatory in nature has no merit. While it is true that the first part which requires
that the alien shall secure an employment permit from the Mayor involves the
exercise of discretion and judgment in the processing and approval or disapproval
of applications for employment permits and therefore is regulatory in character the
second part which requires the payment of P50.00 as employee's fee is not
regulatory but a revenue measure. There is no logic or justification in exacting
P50.00 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. It is obvious that the
purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation.
The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails
to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are
required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not
forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification, should be based on real
and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the
particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every
employed alien, whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or
whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive.
Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor
of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the
basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While
it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its
territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due
32

process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of
protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all
persons, both aliens and citizens.
Dumlao vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. L-52245, January 22, 1980]
AGE IS A VALID CLASSIFICATION IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE. The assertion that
Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither
well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to
rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real
differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another
class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly
classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are
subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so
compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that
candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office,
if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification
although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be
to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On
the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good
elective local officials.
Coming now to the case of retirees. Retirement from government service may or
may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing,
there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may
neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could
be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a
provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for
the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged
provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree
for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the
retired employee has already declared himself tired an unavailable for the same
government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to
assume again. It is for the very reason that inequality will neither result from the
application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal
protection, neither does it permit such denial (see People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56
[1933]). Persons similarly situated are similarly treated.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal
classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and
unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable
classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those
belonging to the same class (Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30 [1978] citing Felwa
vs. Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966]; Rafael v. Embroidery and Apparel Control and
Inspection Board, 21 SCRA 336 [1967]; Inchong, etc., et al. vs. Hernandez, 101
Phil. 1155 [1957]). The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger
blood in local governments. The classification in question being pursuant to that
purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even if at times, it may be susceptible to
the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies: (Chief Justice
Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, 1977 ed., p. 547).

33

Philippine Association of Service Exporters vs. Drilon [G.R. No. L-81958, June
30, 1988]
GENDER IS A VALID CLASSIFICATION The petitioner has shown no satisfactory
reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that
Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not
thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that
"equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect identity
of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1)
such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they
apply equally to all members of the same class.
The Court is satisfied that the classification made the preference for female
workers rests on substantial distinctions.
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has
befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid
exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and
personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina
workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of
returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As
precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect
victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's
efforts.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is
no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been
afflicted with an identical predicament. The petitioner has proffered no argument
that the Government should act similarly with respect to male workers. The Court,
of course, is not impressing some male chauvinistic notion that men are superior to
women. What the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence (that
women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and not
upon some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in this case. It
is evidence capable indeed of unquestionable demonstration and evidence this
Court accepts. The Court cannot, however, say the same thing as far as men are
concerned. There is simply no evidence to justify such an inference. Suffice it to
state, then, that insofar as classifications are concerned, this Court is content that
distinctions are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is justified.
PROFESSION IS A VALID CLASSIFICATION. The Court finds, finally, the impugned
guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic overseas workers. That it does
not apply to "all Filipina workers" is not an argument for unconstitutionality. Had
the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have been unreasonable
and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly circumstanced.
What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of
persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or
resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of persons. To apply
the ban, say exclusively to workers deployed by A, but not to those recruited by B,
would obviously clash with the equal protection clause of the Charter. It would be a
classic case of what Chase refers to as a law that "takes property from A and gives
it to B." It would be an unlawful invasion of property rights and freedom of
contract and needless to state, an invalid act. (Fernando says: "Where the
classification is based on such distinctions that make a real difference as infancy,
sex, and stage of civilization of minority groups, the better rule, it would seem, is to
recognize its validity only if the young, the women, and the cultural minorities are
singled out for favorable treatment. There would be an element of
unreasonableness if on the contrary their status that calls for the law ministering to
their needs is made the basis of discriminatory legislation against them. If such be
34

the case, it would be difficult to refute the assertion of denial of equal protection."
In the case at bar, the assailed Order clearly accords protection to certain women
workers, and not the contrary.)
Himagan vs. People [G.R. No. 113811, October 7, 1994]
POLICE OFFICERS MAY BE DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER CIVIL SERVANTS
WITHOUT VIOLATING EQUAL PROTECTION. The reason why members of the PNP
are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or
administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is
concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be
used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in
the legislative discussions.
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serous offense is reinstated to
his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are
obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere
fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. the imposition of preventive
suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 of R.A. 6975 does not violate the
suspended policeman's constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.
The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended
to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the
existence of real differences among men, the equal protection clause does not
demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid
classifications, such as the one which exists in the instant case. If the classification
is based on real and substantial differences; is germane to the purpose of the law;
applies to all members of the same class; and applies to current as well as future
conditions, 18 the classification may not be impugned as violating the Constitution's
equal protection guarantee. A distinction based on real and reasonable
considerations related to a proper legislative purpose such as that which exists here
is neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded.
Almonte vs. Vazquez [G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995]
ACCEPTANCE OF UNSIGNED COMPLAINTS AGAINST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
DOES NOT AMOUNT TO UNJUST DISCRIMINATION. Nor is there violation of
petitioners' right to the equal protection of the laws. Petitioners complain that "in all
forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can only hale respondents via
their verified complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed,"
while in proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice
to start an investigation. In the first place, there can be no objection to this
procedure because it is provided in the Constitution itself. In the second place, it is
apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints "in any form and in a manner,"
the framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of the
people which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoings. As this
Court had occasion to point out, the Office of the Ombudsman is different from the
other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because those
subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and
influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them. 31 On the
other hand complainants are more often than not poor and simple folk who cannot
afford to hire lawyers.
Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission [G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010]
THE CLASSIFICATION MUST APPLY EQUALLY TO ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE SAME
CLASSS.
Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the
35

investigative power of the President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of
the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
1987 Constitution. Section 1 reads:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this
constitutional safeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to all
members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the previous
administration as its sole object makes the PTC an adventure in partisan
hostility.[66] Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission must also
cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that
of former President Arroyo.[67]
The petitioners argue that the search for truth behind the reported cases of graft
and corruption must encompass acts committed not only during the administration
of former President Arroyo but also during prior administrations where the same
magnitude of controversies and anomalies[68] were reported to have been
committed against the Filipino people. They assail the classification formulated by
the respondents as it does not fall under the recognized exceptions because first,
there is no substantial distinction between the group of officials targeted for
investigation by Executive Order No. 1 and other groups or persons who abused
their public office for personal gain; and second, the selective classification is not
germane to the purpose of Executive Order No. 1 to end corruption.[69] In order
to attain constitutional permission, the petitioners advocate that the commission
should deal with graft and grafters prior and subsequent to the Arroyo
administration with the strong arm of the law with equal force.[70]
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the
equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as
every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has
been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific
guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.
Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause.
But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice,
the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.[74]
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed.[75] It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.[76] The
purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a states
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by
the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the states duly
constituted authorities.[77] In other words, the concept of equal justice under the
law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions
between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective.[78]
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of
the legislature.[79] Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government
including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a
state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever
guise is taken. [80]

36

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or
things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the
same class.[81] Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.[82]
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or
embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class.[83] The classification will
be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both
as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the
classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of
the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial
similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the
classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging
to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is substantially
distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to
him.[84]
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so
constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be
of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or underinclude those that
should otherwise fall into a certain classification. As elucidated in Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers' Union[85] and reiterated in a long line of cases.[86]
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that
every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of
operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as
such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that
things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same.
The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are
different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the
grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in
certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea
of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere
fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is
required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member
of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or
distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably
arbitrary. [Citations omitted]
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down
as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned
truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported
cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration[87] only. The
intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
37

Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive
order. Specifically, these are:
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to
investigating and finding out the truth concerning the reported cases
of graft and corruption during the previous administration, and which
will recommend the prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for
all;
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created the
PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the
COMMISSION, which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and
toward this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such
scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical
sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and employees,
their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private
sector, if any, during the previous administration; and thereafter
recommend the appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to
ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or
favor.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall
have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter
9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to
conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft
and corruption referred to in Section 1, involving third level public
officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration and
thereafter submit its finding and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman. [Emphases supplied]
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a
member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its
own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness
which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution.
Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo administration
and other past administrations, these distinctions are not substantial enough to
merit the restriction of the investigation to the previous administration only. The
reports of widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be taken as
basis for distinguishing said administration from earlier administrations which were
also blemished by similar widespread reports of impropriety. They are not inherent
in, and do not inure solely to, the Arroyo administration. As Justice Isagani Cruz put
it, Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.[88]
The public needs to be enlightened why Executive Order No. 1 chooses to limit the
scope of the intended investigation to the previous administration only. The OSG
ventures to opine that to include other past administrations, at this point, may
unnecessarily overburden the commission and lead it to lose its effectiveness.[89]
The reason given is specious. It is without doubt irrelevant to the legitimate and
noble objective of the PTC to stamp out or end corruption and the evil it
breeds.[90]
The probability that there would be difficulty in unearthing evidence or that the
earlier reports involving the earlier administrations were already inquired into is
beside the point. Obviously, deceased presidents and cases which have already
prescribed can no longer be the subjects of inquiry by the PTC. Neither is the PTC
38

expected to conduct simultaneous investigations of previous administrations, given

the bodys limited time and resources. The law does not require the impossible
(Lex non cogit ad impossibilia).[91]
Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the Court logically recognizes
the unfeasibility of investigating almost a centurys worth of graft cases. However,
the fact remains that Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification. The
PTC, to be true to its mandate of searching for the truth, must not exclude the
other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to
investigate all past administrations. While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it
should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for being unconstitutional. In the
often quoted language of Yick Wo v. Hopkins.[92]
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if applied
and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as
practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the
prohibition of the constitution. [Emphasis supplied]
It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an ad hoc body, its scope is
limited. The Court, however, is of the considered view that although its focus is
restricted, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws should
not in any way be circumvented. The Constitution is the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority
administered.[93] Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken
down for being unconstitutional.[94] While the thrust of the PTC is specific, that is,
for investigation of acts of graft and corruption, Executive Order No. 1, to survive,
must be read together with the provisions of the Constitution. To exclude the earlier
administrations in the guise of substantial distinctions would only confirm the
petitioners lament that the subject executive order is only an adventure in
partisan hostility. In the case of US v. Cyprian,[95] it was written: A rather
limited number of such classifications have routinely been held or assumed to be
arbitrary; those include: race, national origin, gender, political activity or
membership in a political party, union activity or membership in a labor union, or
more generally the exercise of first amendment rights.
To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the requirements of
constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the
class.[96] Such a classification must not be based on existing circumstances only,
or so constituted as to preclude additions to the number included within a class, but
must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. Furthermore, all who are in situations and
circumstances which are relative to the discriminatory legislation and which are
indistinguishable from those of the members of the class must be brought under
the influence of the law and treated by it in the same way as are the members of
the class.[97]
The Court is not unaware that mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity
of a law under the equal protection clause.[98] Legislation is not unconstitutional
merely because it is not all-embracing and does not include all the evils within its
reach.[99] It has been written that a regulation challenged under the equal
protection clause is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because it happens to
be incomplete.[100] In several instances, the underinclusiveness was not
considered a valid reason to strike down a law or regulation where the purpose can
be attained in future legislations or regulations. These cases refer to the step by
step process.[101] With regard to equal protection claims, a legislature does not
run the risk of losing the entire remedial scheme simply because it fails, through

39

inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil that might conceivably have been
attacked.[102]
In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence. That the previous
administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned
from the fact that it was underscored at least three times in the assailed executive
order. It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention any
particular act, event or report to be focused on unlike the investigative commissions
created in the past. The equal protection clause is violated by purposeful and
intentional discrimination.[103]
To disprove petitioners contention that there is deliberate discrimination, the OSG
clarifies that the commission does not only confine itself to cases of large scale
graft and corruption committed during the previous administration.[104] The OSG
points to Section 17 of Executive Order No. 1, which provides:
SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the
judgment of the President there is a need to expand the mandate of
the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the
investigation of cases and instances of graft and corruption during the
prior administrations, such mandate may be so extended accordingly
by way of a supplemental Executive Order.
The Court is not convinced. Although Section 17 allows the President the discretion
to expand the scope of investigations of the PTC so as to include the acts of graft
and corruption committed in other past administrations, it does not guarantee that
they would be covered in the future. Such expanded mandate of the commission
will still depend on the whim and caprice of the President. If he would decide not to
include them, the section would then be meaningless. This will only fortify the fears
of the petitioners that the Executive Order No. 1 was crafted to tailor-fit the
prosecution of officials and personalities of the Arroyo administration.[105]
The Court tried to seek guidance from the pronouncement in the case of Virata v.
Sandiganbayan,[106] that the PCGG Charter (composed of Executive Orders Nos.
1, 2 and 14) does not violate the equal protection clause. The decision, however,
was devoid of any discussion on how such conclusory statement was arrived at, the
principal issue in said case being only the sufficiency of a cause of action.
Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc. vs. Treasurer of Ormoc City [G.R. No. L-23794,
February 17, 1968]
THE CLASSIFICATION MUST NOT BE LIMITED TO EXISTING CONDITIONS ONLY.
We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things
identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of
legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of
the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to
future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the
classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not
meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's
enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in
the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms
applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular
and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the
same class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a
similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance
40

expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied
upon.
Section 2 Searches and Seizures
People vs. Marti [G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991]
THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES APPLIES ONLY TO GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE AND CANNOT BE
INVOKED AGAINST PRIVATE INTRUSIONS. On the other hand, the case at bar
assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was
primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity
and without the intervention and participation of State authorities. Under the
circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated? Stated otherwise,
may an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional
rights, be invoked against the State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]:
"1.
This 'constitutional right (against unreasonable search and
seizure) refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or
alien, from interference by government, included in which is his
residence, his papers, and other possessions . . .
". . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the
access except under the circumstances above noted, for in the
traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus
is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called
upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the
privacies of his life . . ."
In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the
Court there in construing the right against unreasonable searches and seizures
declared that:
"(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and
seizures, and as shown in previous cases, its protection applies to
governmental action. Its origin and history clearly show that it was intended
as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not
intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies; as
against such authority it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to secure
the citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of his dwelling and the
possession of his property, subject to the right of seizure by process duly
served."
The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968]) where a
parking attendant who searched the automobile to ascertain the owner thereof
found marijuana instead, without the knowledge and participation of police
authorities, was declared admissible in prosecution for illegal possession of
narcotics.
And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was held that
the search and seizure clauses are restraints upon the government and its agents,
not upon private individuals, (citing People v. Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d 621, 49 Cap.

41

Rptr, 892 (1966); State v. Brown, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v. Olsen,
Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957).
Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517 (1967). The Court
there said:
"The search of which appellant complains, however, was made by a
private citizen the owner of a motel in which appellant stayed
overnight and in which he left behind a travel case containing the
evidence**** complained of. The search was made on the motel
owner's own initiative. Because of it, he became suspicious, called the
local police, informed them of the bag's contents, and made it
available to the authorities.
"The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require
exclusion of evidence obtained through a search by a private citizen.
Rather, the amendment only proscribes governmental action."
The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search
effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the
Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a
search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed
in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the
contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting
officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked
against acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law
of the land must always be subject to protection. But protection against whom?
Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights answers the
query which he himself posed, as follows:
"First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties
in the essence of constitutional democracy. Protection against whom?
Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship
between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation
between individuals, between a private individual and other
individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden
zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder."
(Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner Bernas; Record of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis
supplied)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore
applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked
with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to
whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally
be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is
made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its
own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of
police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be
invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In
sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit
of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
42

Stonehill vs. Diokno [G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967]

THE RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES IS PERSONAL.
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the
warrants in question may be split into (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found
and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and (b) those found
seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action
to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in
pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their
respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein
petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of
them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.
Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the
party whose rights have been impaired thereby,
and that the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties.
Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in
evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices
and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the
admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to
whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers
in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. Indeed, it has been held:
". . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers
belonging to the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the
personal defendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized and
thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they
were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other
defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a
seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have been invaded.
Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional
rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the
privacy of whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim
for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its
violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus
vs. United States (C.C.A.) 291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that
the question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged
unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the personal
defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property was
taken . . ." (A. Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3
F. 2d, 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
GENERAL WARRANTS ARE PROSCRIBED BY THE CONSTITUTION. Two points must
be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the
manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly
describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants.
Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and
juridical persons therein named had committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In
other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have
found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction
of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed
43

particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our

criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not
allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy,
of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," as
alleged in the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate
provision of said laws or codes.
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely
one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would
place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers.
This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision
above quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to
imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in
power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.
EXCLUSIONARY DOCTRINE. However, most common law jurisdictions have already
given up this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that
this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
"As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence
competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that
exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional
privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending
official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer.
Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials,
knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will that wrong be
repressed".
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already
declared:
"If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and
used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection
of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such
searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed
are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The
efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and
suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental
law of the land."
Soliven vs. Makasiar [G.R. No. 82585, November 14, 1988]
FOR WARRANTS OF ARRESTS, THE JUDGES ARE NOT REQUIRED TO PERSONALLY
EXAMINE THE COMPLAINANT AND HIS WITNESSES. The addition of the word
"personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority
by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be
authorized by law", has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the
Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of
arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of
the issuing judge to satisfy himself the existence of probable cause. In satisfying
himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
44

the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with
the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of
concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
Silva vs. Presiding Judge of RTC, Negros Oriental [G.R. No. 81756, October
21, 1991]
FOR SEARCH WARRANTS, THE JUDGE MUST PERSONALLY EXAMINE THE
COMPLAINANT AND HIS WITNESSES THROUGH SEARCHING QUESTIONS. The
purpose of the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures is to
prevent violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasion
of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial
sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted.
Thus, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provide for the requisites for
the issuance of a search warrant, to wit:
"SECTION 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. A search warrant
shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized.
"SECTION 4. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must,
before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of
searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements
together with any affidavits submitted."
Based on the aforecited constitutional and statutory provisions, the judge must,
before issuing a search warrant, determine whether there is probable cause by
examining the complainant and witnesses through searching questions and
answers.
In the case of Prudente vs. Dayrit, G.R. No. 82870, December 14, 1989, 180 SCRA
69, 767 this Court defined "probable cause" as follows:
"The 'probable cause' for a valid search warrant, has been defined 'as
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched'. This probable cause must be shown to be
within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he
may produce and not based on mere hearsay."
Mata vs. Bayona [G.R. No. 50720, March 26, 1984]
BEFORE ISSUING SEARCH WARRANTS, THE JUDGE MUST CONDUCT DEPOSITIONS
AND ATTACH THEM TO THE RECORDS OF THE CASE. Under the Constitution "no
45

search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge
or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce".
More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the constitutional
injunction, Section 4 of Rule 126 which provides that the judge must before issuing
the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any
witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to
the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written
deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine
the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the
person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of
the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in
writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.
The judge's insistence that she examined the complainants under oath has become
dubious by petitioner's claim that at the particular time when he examined all the
relevant papers connected with the issuance of the questioned search warrant, after
he demanded the same from the lower court since they were not attached to the
records, he did not find any certification at the back of the joint affidavit of the
complainants. As stated earlier, before he filed his motion to quash the search
warrant and for the return of the articles seized, he was furnished, upon his
request, certified true copies of the said affidavits by the Clerk of Court but which
certified true copies do not bear any certification at the back. Petitioner likewise
claims that his xerox copy of the said joint affidavit obtained at the outset of this
case does not show also the certification of respondent judge. This doubt becomes
more confirmed by respondent Judge's own admission, while insisting that she did
examine thoroughly the applicants, that "she did not take the deposition of Mayote
and Goles because to have done so would be to hold a judicial proceeding which will
be open and public", such that, according to her, the persons subject of the
intended raid will just disappear and move his illegal operations somewhere else.

Alvarez vs. CFI [G.R. No. 45358, January 29, 1937]

THE PROBABLE CAUSE MUST BE BASED ON PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE
COMPLAINANT OR HIS WITNESSES. The petitioner claims that the search warrant
issued by the court is illegal because it has been based upon the affidavit of agent
Mariano G. Almeda in whose oath he declared that he had no personal knowledge
of the facts which were to serve as a basis for the issuance of the warrant but that
he had knowledge thereof through mere information secured from a person whom
he considered reliable. To the question "What are your reasons for applying for this
search warrant", appearing in the affidavit, the agent answered: "It has been
reported to me by a person whom I consider to be reliable that there are being kept
in said premises, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits, and other papers used by
him in connection with his activities as a money- lender, charging a usurious rate of
interest, in violation of the law" and in attesting the truth of his statements
contained in the affidavit, the said agent stated that he found them to be correct
and true to the best of his knowledge and belief.
Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution, relative to the bill of
rights, provides that "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by
46

the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized." Section 97 of General Orders, No. 58
provides that "A search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause and upon
application supported by oath particularly describing the place to be searched and
the person or thing to be seized." It will be noted that both provisions require that
there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that
the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the
applicant and the witnesses he may produce.
OATH, DEFINITION - In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation
by which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully
and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an outward pledge given by the
person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense
of his responsibility to God. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts
within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the
purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making
the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable
cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search
warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be
charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused.
UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE - It will likewise be noted that section 1,
paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures. Unreasonable searches and seizures are a menace against which the
constitutional guaranties afford full protection. The term "unreasonable search and
seizure" is not defined in the Constitution or in General Orders, No. 58, and it is
said to have no fixed, absolute or unchangeable meaning, although the term has
been defined in general language. All illegal searches and seizures are unreasonable
while lawful ones are reasonable. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable
search or seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable
from a consideration of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the
search, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search
and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles
procured.
IN ISSUING WARRANTS, WITNESSES ARE NOT NECESSARY AS LONG AS THE
PROBABLE CAUSE IS SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED BY THE COMPLAINANT. Another
ground alleged by the petitioner in asking that the search warrant be declared
illegal and cancelled is that it was not supported by other affidavits aside from that
made by the applicant. In other words, it is contended that the search warrant
cannot be issued unless it be supported by affidavits made by the applicant and the
witnesses to be presented necessarily by him. Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III
of the Constitution provides that no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause,
to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 98 of General Orders, No.
58 provides that the judge or justice must, before issuing the warrant, examine
under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their
depositions in writing. It is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of
at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted that the
judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the
affidavit made by agent Mariano G. Almeda and that he did not require nor take the
deposition of any other witness. Neither the Constitution nor General Orders, No.
58 provides that it is of imperative necessity to take the depositions of the
witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the
affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of
depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the
existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or
complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses.
47

Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was insufficient because his
knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the
judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of
determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search
warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts
within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that
there exists probable cause; when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere
hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the
facts is necessary. We conclude, therefore, that the warrant issued is likewise illegal
because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal
knowledge of the facts.
Morano vs. Vivo [G.R. No. L-22196, June 30, 1967]
OTHER GOVERNMENT OFFICERS MAY ISSUE WARRANTS, BUT ONLY TO ENFORCE
FINAL JUDGMENTS. Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution, we perceive, does
not require judicial intervention in the execution of a final order of deportation
issued in accordance with law. The constitutional limitation contemplates an order
of arrest in the exercise of judicial power as a step preliminary or incidental to
prosecution or proceedings for a given offense or administrative action, not as a
measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a competent official, such as
a legal order of deportation, issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, in
pursuance of a valid legislation.
The following from American Jurisprudence, is illuminating:
"It is thoroughly established that Congress has power to order the
deportation of aliens whose presence in the country it deems hurtful.
Owing to the nature of the proceeding, the deportation of an alien who
is found in this country in violation of law is not a deprivation of liberty
without due process of law. This is so, although the inquiry devolves
upon executive officers, and their findings of fact, after a fair though
summary hearing, are made conclusive."
"The determination of the propriety of deportation is not a prosecution
for, or a conviction of, crime; nor is the deportation a punishment,
even though the facts underlying the decision may constitute a crime
under local law. The proceeding is in effect simply a refusal by the
government to harbor persons whom it does not want. The coincidence
of local penal law with the policy of congress is purely accidental, and,
though supported by the same facts, a criminal prosecution and a
proceeding for deportation are separate and independent."
In consequence, the constitutional guarantee set forth in Section 1(3), Article III of
the Constitution aforesaid requiring that the issue of probable cause be determined
by a judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings.
The view, we, here express finds support in the discussions during the
constitutional convention. The convention recognized, as sanctioned by due
process, possibilities and cases of deprivation of liberty, other than by order of a
competent court.
Indeed, the power to deport or expel aliens is an attribute of sovereignty. Such
power is planted on the "accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign
nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation,
to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions."
So it is, that this Court
once aptly remarked that there can be no controversy on the fact that where aliens
are admitted as temporary visitors, "the law is to the effect that temporary visitors
who do not depart upon the expiration of the period of stay granted them are
48

subject to deportation by the Commissioner of Immigration, for having violated the

limitation or condition under which they were admitted as non-immigrants
(Immigration Law, Sec. 37(a), subsection (7) C.A. 613, as amended)"
And, in a case directly in point, where the power of the Commissioner to issue
warrants of arrest was challenged as unconstitutional because "such power is only
vested in a judge by Section 1, paragraph 3, Article III of our Constitution", this
Court declared
"This argument overlooks the fact that the stay of appellant Ng Hua To
as temporary visitor is subject to certain contractual stipulations as
contained in the cash bond put up by him, among them, that in case of
breach the Commissioner may require the recommitment of the person
in whose favor the bond has been filed. The Commissioner did nothing
but to enforce such condition. Such a step is necessary to enable the
Commissioner to prepare the ground for his deportation under section
37 (a) of Commonwealth Act 613. A contrary interpretation would
render such power nugatory to the detriment of the State."

Harvey vs. Santiago [G.R. No. 82544, June 28, 1988]

WARRANTS FOR THE ARREST OF UNDESIRABLE ALIENS MAY BE ISSUED BY THE
COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION TO ENFORCE A FINAL DECISION OF
DEPORTATION. Section 37(a) is not constitutionally proscribed (Morano vs. Vivo,
L-22196, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 562). The specific constraints in both the 1935
and 1987 Constitutions, which are substantially identical, contemplate prosecutions
essentially criminal in nature. Deportation proceedings, on the other hand, are
administrative in character. An order of deportation is never construed as a
punishment. It is preventive, not a penal process. It need not be conducted strictly
in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings.
"It is of course well-settled that deportation proceedings do not constitute a
criminal action. The order of deportation is not a punishment, it being merely the
return to his country of an alien who has broken the conditions upon which he could
continue to reside within our borders. The deportation proceedings are
administrative in character, summary in nature, and need not be conducted strictly
in accordance with the ordinary court proceedings. It is essential, however, that the
warrant of arrest shall give the alien sufficient information about the charges
against him, relating the facts relied upon. It is also essential that he be given a fair
hearing with the assistance of counsel, if he so desires, before unprejudiced
investigators. However, all the strict rules of evidence governing judicial
controversies do not need to be observed; only such as are fundamental and
essential, like the right of cross-examination. Hearsay evidence may even be
admitted, provided the alien is given the opportunity to explain or rebut it.
The ruling in Vivo vs. Montesa (G. R. No. 24576, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 155) that
"the issuance of warrants of arrest by the Commissioner of Immigration, solely for
purposes of investigation and before a final order of deportation is issued, conflicts
with paragraph 3, Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution" (referring to the 1935
Constitution) 3 is not invocable herein. Respondent Commissioner's Warrant of
Arrest issued on 7 March 1988 did not order petitioners to appear and show cause
why they should not be deported. They were issued specifically "for violation of
Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code." Before that, deportation proceedings had been commenced
against them as undesirable aliens on 4 March 1988 and the arrest was a step
preliminary to their possible deportation.

49

"Section 37 of the Immigration Law, which empowers the

Commissioner of Immigration to issue warrants for the arrest of
overstaying aliens is constitutional. The arrest is a step preliminary to
the deportation of the aliens who had violated the condition of their
stay in this country." (Morano vs. Vivo, L-22196, June 30, 1967, 20
SCRA 562).
To rule otherwise would be to render the authority given the Commissioner
nugatory to the detriment of the State.
"The pertinent provision of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended,
which gives authority to the Commissioner of Immigration to order the
arrest of an alien temporary visitor preparatory to his deportation for
failure to put up new bonds required for the stay, is not
unconstitutional.
". . . Such a step is necessary to enable the Commissioner to prepare
the ground for his deportation under Section 37[a] of Commonwealth
Act 613. A contrary interpretation would render such power nugatory
to the detriment of the State." (Ng Hua To vs. Galang, G.R. No.
10145, February 29, 1964, 10 SCRA 411).
"The requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge,
does not extend to deportation proceedings." (Morano vs. Vivo, supra,
citing Tiu Chun Hai vs. Commissioner, infra). There need be no
"truncated" recourse to both judicial and administrative warrants in a
single deportation proceedings.
The foregoing does not deviate from the ruling in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation
Board (G. R. No. 10280, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 27 [1963]) reiterated in Vivo
vs. Montesa, supra, that "under the express terms of our Constitution (the 1935
Constitution), it is therefore even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may
be ordered by any authority other than a judge if the purpose is merely to
determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative
investigation." For, as heretofore stated, probable cause had already been shown to
exist before the warrants of arrest were issued.

People vs. Del Rosario [G.R. No. 109633, July 20, 1994]
THE OFFICERS SERVING THE WARRANT MAY ONLY SEIZE THE OBJECTS
DESCRIBED IN THE WARRANT. The search warrant implemented by the raiding
party authorized only the search and seizure of ".. the described quantity of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as shabu and its paraphernalia"
(Exh. O, p. 50, original record). Thus, the raiding party was authorized to seize only
shabu and paraphernalia for the use thereof and no other. A search warrant is not a
sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to
seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime.
The Constitution itself (Section 2, Article III) and the Rules of Court (Section 3,
Rule 126) specifically mandate that the search warrant must particularly describe
the things to be seized. Thus, the search warrant was no authority for the police
officers to seize the firearm which was not mentioned, much less described with
particularly, in the search warrant. Neither may it be maintained that the gun was
seized in the course of an arrest, for as earlier observed, accused-appellant's arrest
was far from regular and legal. Said firearm, having been illegally seized, the same
is not admissible in evidence (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 [1967]). The
Constitution expressly ordains the exclusion in evidence of illegally seized articles.
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
50

inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.(Section 3 [2], Article III,

Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines).With the exclusion in evidence of the
illegally seized firearm, there is, therefore, a total absence of evidence to support
the charge of illegal possession of firearm, against accused-appellant. The same
way may be said of the charge of illegal possession of ammunition.
People vs. Sucro [G.R. No. 93239, March 18, 1991]
AN OFFENSE IS COMMITTED WITHIN THE PRESENCE OF THE OFFICER EVEN IF THE
LATTER IS AT A DISTANCE. An offense is committed in the presence or within the
view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a
warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the
disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof (U.S. v.
Fortaleza, 12 Phil. 472 [1909]; and U.S. v. Samonte, 16 Phil. 516 [1910]).
The records show that Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado's house at C. Quimpo
Street to monitor the activities of the accused who was earlier reported to be selling
marijuana at a chapel two (2) meters away from Regalado's house.
Fulgencio, within a distance of two meters saw Sucro conduct his nefarious activity.
He saw Sucro talk to some persons, go inside the chapel, and return to them and
exchange some things. These, Sucro did three times during the time that he was
being monitored. Fulgencio would then relay the on-going transaction to P/Lt.
Seraspi.
Umil vs. Ramos [G.R. No. 81567, July 9, 1990]
ARREST MAY BE MADE ANYTIME AGAINST PERSONS CHARGED WITH CONTUNUING
CRIMES. However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New
Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a
continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can
be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses
committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct
assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes. As stated by
the Court in an earlier case:
"From the facts as above-narrated, the claim of the petitioners that
they were initially arrested illegally is, therefore, without basis in law
and in fact. The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and
offenses committed in the furtherance, on the occasion thereof, or
incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential
Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses
which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their
essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude.
Clearly then, the arrest of the herein detainees was well within the
bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.
2.
The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its
fighting armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in
furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the
course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose
of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The
arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the
prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of
the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial
warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable.
Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to
51

arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence

against government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in
pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus
impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very
survival of society and its government and duly constituted authorities.
If killing and other acts of violence against the rebels find justification
in the exigencies of armed hostilities which is of the essence of waging
a rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of invasion,
merely seizing their persons and detaining them while any of these
contingencies continues cannot be less justified. . . ."
Go vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992]
A PESON CANNOT BE ARRESTED WITHOUT A WARRANT FOR AN OFFENSE
COMMITTED SIX (6) DAYS EARLIER. We do not believe that the warrantless
"arrest" or detention of petitioner in the instant case falls within the terms of
Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as
follows: "Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a)
and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered
to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Rule 112, Section 7." Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the
shooting of Maguan. The arresting officers obviously were not present, within the
meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither
could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded
as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the
meaning of Section 5 (b). Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any
"personal knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had
shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been derived from
statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting -- one stated that
petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's
car's plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioner's wife's name.
That information did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge." It is thus clear
to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the
meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113.
People vs. Rodrigueza [G.R. No. 95902, February 4, 1992]
VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCHES. As provided in the present Constitution, a
search, to be valid, must generally be authorized by a search warrant duly issued
by the proper government authority (Section 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution).
True, in some instances, this Court has allowed government authorities to conduct
searches and seizures even without a search warrant. Thus, when the owner of the
premises waives his right against such incursion; when the search is incidental to a
lawful arrest; when it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws;
when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations of
smuggling or immigration laws; when it involves prohibited articles in plain view; or
in cases of inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire,
sanitary and building regulations, a search may be validly made even without a
search warrant. In the case at bar, however, the raid conducted by the NARCOM
agents in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza was not authorized by any search
warrant. It does not appear, either, that the situation falls under any of the
52

aforementioned cases. Hence, appellant's right against unreasonable search and

seizure was clearly violated. The NARCOM agents could not have justified their act
by invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation because the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had already been put under
surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their intention to conduct the raid,
then they should, because they easily could, have first secured a search warrant
during that time.
Posadas vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 89139, August 2, 1990]
A LAWFUL SEARCH WITHOUT A WARRANT MAY BE MADE EVEN WITHOUT BEING
PRECEDED BY AN ARREST. However, there are many instances where a warrant
and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest,
foremost of which is the "stop and search" without a search warrant at military or
police checkpoints, the constitutionality or validity of which has been upheld by this
Court in Valmonte vs. de Villa. As between a warrantless search and seizure
conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search thereat in the case at
bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering
that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The
probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee
with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something
illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the
same. It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the
possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for
the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too late.
The Court reproduces with approval the following disquisition of the Solicitor
General:
"The assailed search and seizure may still be justified as akin to a
"stop and frisk" situation whose object is either to determine the
identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo
momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information.
This is illustrated in the case of Terry vs. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In
this case, two men repeatedly walked past a store window and
returned to a spot where they apparently conferred with a third man.
This aroused the suspicion of a police officer. To the experienced
officer, the behavior of the men indicated that they were sizing up the
store for an armed robbery. When the police officer approached the
men and asked them for their names, they mumbled a reply.
Whereupon, the officer grabbed one of them, spun him around and
frisked him. Finding a concealed weapon in one, he did the same to
the other two and found another weapon. In the prosecution for the
offense of carrying a concealed weapon, the defense of illegal search
and seizure was put up. The United States Supreme Court held that "a
police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate
manner approach a person for the purpose of investigating possible
criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an
arrest." In such a situation, it is reasonable for an officer rather than
simply to shrug his shoulder and allow a crime to occur, to stop a
suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or
maintain the status quo while obtaining more information. . . .
Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the
exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been
violated."

53

People vs. Mengote [G.R. No. 87059, June 22, 1992]

INVALID SEARCH AND ARREST. It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the
revolver should not have been admitted in evidence because of its illegal seizure,
no warrant therefor having been previously obtained. Neither could it have been
seized as an incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself
unlawful, having been also effected without a warrant. The defense also contends
that the testimony regarding the alleged robbery in Danganan's house was
irrelevant and should also have been disregarded by the trial court. There is no
question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is
inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose. That is the absolute prohibition of
Article III, Section 3(2), of the Constitution. This is the celebrated exclusionary rule
based on the justification given by Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the
prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by
their wrong will the wrong be repressed."
The Solicitor General, while conceding the rule, maintains that it is not applicable in
the case at bar. His reason is that the arrest and search of Mengote and the seizure
of the revolver from him were lawful under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of
Court. We have carefully examined the wording of this rule and cannot see how we
can agree with the prosecution. Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as
Mengote was not an escapee from a penal institution when he was arrested. We
therefore confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness of his arrest under either
Par. (a) or Par. (b) of this section. Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1)
after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting
to commit an offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting officer. These
requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest
in question, the accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and
"holding his abdomen," according to the arresting officers themselves. There was
apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being actually
committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence. Par. (b) is no
less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not been
satisfied. The prosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an
offense had in fact just been committed and that the arresting officers had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they had was
hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be
committed.
Malacat vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 123595, December 12, 1997]
INVALID APPLICATION OF SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST AND STOP
AND FRISK.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the
following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental to a lawful
arrest; and (6) a "stop and frisk."
In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a "stop
and frisk" with "the seizure of the grenade from the accused [as] an appropriate
incident to his arrest," hence necessitating a brief discussion on the nature of these
exceptions to the warrant requirement.
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-andfrisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless
searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be
validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the
validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large
majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for
54

conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful
arrest before a search can be made the process cannot be reversed. At bottom,
assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee
and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to
destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission
of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or
which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing
violence.
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest
preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu,
the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating
that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be
committed.
Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the
search conducted on petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful
arrest.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as
a "limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry;
thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons
with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous,
where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself
as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in
the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear
for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself
and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment . . .
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to
conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will
not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police
officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the
person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk"
serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for
purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause;
and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the
police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is
not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against the police officer.
People vs. Aminnudin [G.R. No. L-74869, July 6, 1988]
INVALID WARRANTLESS ARREST AND SEARCH. In the case at bar, there was no
warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination
by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the
government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime
about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest
allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be
invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v.
55

Arca, for example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to
warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law because these
vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant
can be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of
the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could
have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming Iloilo on
the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its
arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have
persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of
a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The
Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of
the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that "search warrant was
not necessary."
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of
violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were
caught red-handed, as result of what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of
the narcotics agents. Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the precise time of
arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest,
committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just
done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and
there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he
was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It
was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he
suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger
that triggered his arrest. The identification by the informer was the probable cause
as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce
upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen
years of the despised dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will,
detained without charges and punished without trial, we will have only ourselves to
blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to return, to once more flaunt its
disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights guarantees.
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very
own words suggest that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he
is guilty. The constitutional presumption is that he is innocent, and he will be so
declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough
to convict him.
People vs. Malmstedt [G.R. No. 91107, June 19, 1991]
WARRANTLESS SEARCH BASED ON PROBABLE CAUSE. Accused was searched and
arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being
committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search
made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing
provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant
when the search was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under
the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers
to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead
a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
56

committed, and that the objects

place sought to be searched.
warrantless search and seizure
resolved according to the facts of

sought in connection with the offense are in the

The required probable cause that will justify a
is not determined by any fixed formula but is
each case.

Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this
Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of
marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused,
or where the
accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee.
Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming
from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their
Commanding Officer also received information that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his possession. Said
information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same
morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way to Baguio City.
When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of
herein accused, that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was
carrying with him prohibited drugs, there was no time to obtain a search warrant.
In the Tangliben case,
the police authorities conducted a surveillance at the
Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San Nicolas, San Fernando Pampanga,
against persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs, based on information
supplied by some informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting suspiciously and
pointed out by an informer was apprehended and searched by the police
authorities. It was held that when faced with on-the spot information, the police
officers had to act quickly and there was no time to secure a search warrant.
It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine
check of the bus (where accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and no
extensive search was initially made. It was only when one of the officers noticed a
bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the inspection, that accused
was required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his
identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion
of the officer that accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a regular
norm for an innocent man, who has nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily
present his identification papers when required to do so?
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had
prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to
produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to
reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the
authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the
warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the accused. In other
words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch
bag and in opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was
discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two (2) travelling bags containing two
(2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by accused's own
attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his passport, and by the
information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had
prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and
facility to act accordingly, including, to search even without warrant, in the light of
such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law
enforcement, to the detriment of society.
Espano vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 120431, April 1, 1998]
SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST MAY EXTEND TO PREMISES WITHIN
THE IMMEDIATE CONTROL OF THE PERSON ARRESTED. An exception to the said
57

rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or

anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. It may
extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or
surroundings under his immediate control. In this case, the ten cellophane bags of
marijuana seized at petitioner's house after his arrest at Pandacan and Zamora
Streets do not fall under the said exceptions.
In the case of People v. Lua, 12 this Court held:
"As regards the brick of marijuana found inside the appellant's house,
the trial court correctly ignored it apparently in view of its
inadmissibility. While initially the arrest as well as the body search was
lawful, the warrantless search made inside the appellant's house
became unlawful since the police operatives were not armed with a
search warrant. Such search cannot fall under "search made incidental
to a lawful arrest," the same being limited to body search and to that
point within reach or control of the person arrested, or that which may
furnish him with the means of committing violence or of escaping. In
the case at bar, appellant was admittedly outside his house when he
was arrested. Hence, it can hardly be said that the inner portion of his
house was within his reach or control."
The articles seized from petitioner during his arrest were valid under the doctrine of
search made incidental to a lawful arrest. The warrantless search made in his
house, however, which yielded ten cellophane bags of marijuana became unlawful
since the police officers were not armed with a search warrant at the time.
Moreover, it was beyond the reach and control of petitioner.
People vs. Musa [G.R. No. 96177, January 27, 1993]
SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST. While a valid search warrant is
generally necessary before a search and seizure may be effected, exceptions to this
rule are recognized. Thus, in Alvero v. Dizon, the Court stated that "[t]he most
important exception to the necessity for a search warrant is the right of search and
seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest." Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court
expressly authorizes a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest.
There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
authorizes the arresting officer to make a search upon the person of the person
arrested. As early as 1909, the Court has ruled that "[a]n officer making an arrest
may take from the person arrested and money or property found upon his person
which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or
which might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or of
escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause . . ." Hence, in
a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher, the law enforcement
agents may seize the marked money found on the person of the pusher
immediately after the arrest even without arrest and search warrants.
DOCTRINE OF "PLAIN VIEW". The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident
to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to
include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the
"plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.
The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches
and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely
to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied
where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It has also been
suggested that even if an object is observed in "plain view," the "plain view"
58

doctrine will not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of
the object is not apparent from the "plain view" of the object. Stated differently, it
must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may
be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched in the living
room. Failing to retrieve the marked money which they hoped to find, the NARCOM
agents searched the whole house and found the plastic bag in the kitchen. The
plastic bag was, therefore, not within their "plain view" when they arrested the
appellant as to justify its seizure. The NARCOM agents had to move from one
portion of the house to another before they sighted the plastic bag. Moreover, when
the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they
had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag
contained. When the appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the
marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana was visible to the police
officer's eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have discovered the
inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it. Even
assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag
because it was within their "plain view," what may be said to be the object in their
"plain view" was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating
nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the
"plain view" of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly
betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or
otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an observer. We, therefore, hold that
under the circumstances of the case, the "plain view" doctrine does not apply and
the marijuana contained in the plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be
presented in evidence pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution.
Papa vs. Mago [G.R. No. L-27360, February 28, 1968]
CUSTOMS SEARCHES. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require a search
warrant for purposes of enforcing customs and tariff laws. Under Sec. 2203 thereof,
persons having police authority may enter, pass through or search any land,
inclosure, warehouse, store or building not being a dwelling house and also, to
inspect, search and examine any vehicle or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or
envelope or any person on board or stop and search and examine any vehicle,
beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article
introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a
search warrant in said cases. Except in the search of a dwelling house, therefore,
persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and
seizure without search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.
Valmonte vs. De Villa [G.R. No. 83988, September 29, 1989]
CHECKPOINTS, VALID. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which
are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by
any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle
which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes
a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other
areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its
mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order
for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to
thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this
connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their
suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in
59

cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the
abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence
in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought
about by deteriorating economic conditions which all sum up to what one can
rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of
the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's
right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the
former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men
in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of
abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation
to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within
reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful
community.
Rules 113 and 126 of the Revised Rules of Court
Section 3 Privacy of Communication and Correspondence
Ople vs. Torres [G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998]
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT. Assuming, arguendo, that
A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional
muster as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to
privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone." In the 1965 case of
Griswold v. Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court gave more substance to
the right of privacy when it ruled that the right has a constitutional foundation. It
held that there is a right of privacy which can be found within the penumbras of the
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments:
"Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by
emanations from these guarantees that help give them life and
substance . . . Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of
association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one,
as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the
quartering of soldiers 'in any house' in time of peace without the
consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth
Amendment explicitly affirms the 'right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.' The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination
Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which
government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The
Ninth Amendment provides: 'The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people.'"
In the 1968 case of Morfe v. Mutuc, we adopted the Griswold ruling that there is a
constitutional right to privacy. Speaking thru Mr. Justice, later Chief Justice, Enrique
Fernando, we held:
The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the
use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its
amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of
married persons; rightfully it stressed "a relationship lying within the
zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees." It has wider implications though. The constitutional right
to privacy has come into its own.

60

So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded

recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly
apt: 'The concept of limited government has always included the idea that
governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the
citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited
government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his
life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited
government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly
distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of
this private sector protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the
individual has become increasingly important as modern society has developed.
All the forces of a technological age industrialization, urbanization, and
organization operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it.
In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life
marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society.'"
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is
recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. It is expressly
recognized in Section 3(1) of the Bill of Rights:
"Sec. 3.
(1) The privacy of communication and correspondence
shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when
public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law."
Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions
of the Bill of Rights, viz:
"Sec. 1.
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
Sec. 2.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 6.
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order
of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law.
Sec. 8.
The right of the people, including those employed in the
public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17.
himself."

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against

Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code
provides that "[e]very person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts
several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also
holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for
61

any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the
privacy of letters and other private communications. The Revised Penal Code makes
a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial
secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws
like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act and the Intellectual
Property Code. The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise recognize
the privacy of certain information.
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of
government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest
and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1)
the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently
transact business with basic service and social security providers and other
government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate,
fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services.
It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the
issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the
vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our
people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.
TESTS IN DETERMINING THE REASONABLE OF EXPECTANCY OF PRIVACY. Though
A.O. No. 308 is undoubtedly not narrowly drawn, the dissenting opinions would
dismiss its danger to the right to privacy as speculative and hypothetical. Again, we
cannot countenance such a laidback posture. The Court will not be true to its role
as the ultimate guardian of the people's liberty if it would not immediately smother
the sparks that endanger their rights but would rather wait for the fire that could
consume them.
We reject the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy with regard to the National ID and the use of biometrics
technology as it stands on quicksand. The reasonableness of a person's expectation
of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether by his conduct, the individual
has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one
that society recognizes as reasonable. The factual circumstances of the case
determines the reasonableness of the expectation. However, other factors, such as
customs, physical surroundings and practices of a particular activity, may serve to
create or diminish this expectation. The use of biometrics and computer technology
in A.O. No. 308 does not assure the individual of a reasonable expectation of
privacy. As technology advances, the level of reasonably expected privacy
decreases. The measure of protection granted by the reasonable expectation
diminishes as relevant technology becomes more widely accepted. The security of
the computer data file depends not only on the physical inaccessibility of the file but
also on the advances in hardware and software computer technology. A.O. No. 308
is so widely drawn that a minimum standard for a reasonable expectation of
privacy, regardless of technology used, cannot be inferred from its provisions.
Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996]
A PERSON BY CONTRACTING MARRIAGE DOES NOT SHED HIS INTEGRITY OR HIS
RIGHT TO PRIVACY AS AN INDIVIDUAL AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
IS EVER AVAILABLE TO HIM EVEN AFTER MARRIAGE. Indeed the documents and
papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction
declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is
no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her
husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to
be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a
"lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as

62

prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any
telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not
shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional
protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by
making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither
may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication
received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a
compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
Navarro vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 121087, August 26, 1999]
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4200 PROTECTS COMMUNICATIONS WHICH ARE INTENDED TO
BE PRIVATE. Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of
private communications. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and
Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.
Indeed, Jalbuenas testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had made. It
may be asked whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which
prohibits wire tapping. The answer is in the affirmative. The law provides:
SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized
by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap
any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken
word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or
however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in
the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly
possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such
record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word
secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the
manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other
person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either
verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether
complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of
such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall
not be covered by this prohibition.
SECTION 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence,
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any
part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured
by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall
not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative
or administrative hearing or investigation.

63

Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995]
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4200 MAY BE VIOLATED EVEN BY A PARTY TO THE
COMMUNICATION. The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it
illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private
communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder.
The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the
private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to
make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently,
as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" under this provision of R.A.
4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent
court' conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to
make illegal unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or
communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons. Thus:
Senator Taada:
The qualified only 'overhear'.
Senator Padilla:
So that when it is intercepted or recorded; the element of secrecy
would not appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the
recording is not made by all the parties but some parties and involved
not criminal cases that would be mentioned under section 3 but would
cover, for example civil cases or special proceedings whereby a
recording is made not necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by
some in an effort to show the intent of the parties because the
actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous even subsequent to the
contract or the act may be indicative of their intention. Suppose there
is such a recording, would you say, Your Honor, that the intention is to
cover it within the purview of this bill or outside?'
Senator Taada:
That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.
Senator Padilla:
Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense but
as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?
Senator Taada:
That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations
taken without the authorization of all the parties.
Senator Padilla:
Now, would that be reasonable. Your Honor?
Senator Taada:
I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the
observation of one without his knowing it and then using it against
him. It is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor,
is to record the intention of the parties. I believe that all the parties
should know that the observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla:
This might reduce the utility of records.
64

Senator Taada:
Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board of
directors where a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to this
if all the parties know. It is but fair that the people whose remarks and
observations are being made should know that these are being
recorded.
Senator Padilla:
Now, I can understand.
Senator Taada:
That is why when we take statements of persons, we say: "Please be
informed that whatever you say here may be used against you." That
is fairness and that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning,
he makes damaging statements against his own interest, well, he
cannot complain any more. But if you are going to take a recording of
the observations and remarks of a person without him knowing that it
is being taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is being
recorded may be used against him, I think it is unfair.
Senator Diokno:
Do you understand. Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as
now worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he would be
penalized under Section l? Because the speech is public, but the
recording is done secretly.
Senator Taada:
Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is the
communication between one person and another person not
between a speaker and a public.
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the
above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly
supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize
even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no
distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Section 4
Freedom of Expression
United States vs. Bustos [G.R. No. L-12592, March 8, 1918]
FREEDOM OF SPEECH INCLUDES THE FREEDOM TO COMMENT ON OFFICIAL
CONDUCT. The interest of society and the maintenance of good government
demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the
conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of
its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a
hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a
clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to
comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the
individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorize defamation.
Nevertheless, as the individual is less than the State, so must expected criticism be
born for the common good. Rising superior to any official, or set of officials, to the
Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary to any or all the agencies of
Government public opinion should be the constant source of liberty and
democracy. (See the well considered cases of Wason vs. Walter, 4 L.R. 4 Q. B., 73;
Seymour vs. Butterworth, 3 F. & F., 372; The Queen vs. Sir R. Garden, 5 Q. B. D.
65

The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial
conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether
the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If
the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other
public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled. Attempted terrorization of
public opinion on the part of the judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort. The
sword of Damocles in the hands of a judge does not hang suspended over the
individual who dares to assert his prerogative as a citizen and to stand up bravely
before any official. On the contrary, it is a duty which every one owes to society or
to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the
duty of all know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the
wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose
duty it is to inquire into and punish them. In the words of Mr. Justice Gayner, who
contributed so largely to the law of libel. "The people are not obliged to speak of
the conduct of their officials in whispers or with bated breath in a free government,
but only in a despotism." (Howarth vs. Barlow [1906], 113 App. Div., N. Y., 510.)
THE RIGHT TO ASSEMBLE IS COMPLEMENT TO THE FREE SPEECH. The right to
assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and
the complement of the right of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of
citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition
means that any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to
the appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The
persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the
charges made.
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION. Public policy, the welfare of society, and the
orderly administration of government have demanded protection for public opinion.
The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of
the doctrine of privilege.
"The doctrine of privileged communications rests upon public policy, 'which looks to
the free and unfettered administration of justice, though, as an incidental result, it
may in some instances afford an immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant
slanderer.'" (Abbott vs. National Bank of Commerce, Tacoma [1899], 175 U. S.,
409, 411.)
Privilege is classified as either absolute or qualified. With the first, we are not
concerned. As to qualified privilege, it is as the words suggest a prima facie
privilege which may be lost by proof of malice. The rule is thus stated by Lord
Campbell, C. J.
"A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party
communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is
privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it
contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and
actionable." (Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. & B., 344; 1 Jur. [N.S.], 846; 25 L. J. Q. B.,
25; 3 W. R., 474; 85 E. C. L., 344.)
A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is a complaint made
in good faith and without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public
official when addressed to an officer or a board having some interest or duty in the
matter. Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause
for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of
privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. But the statements must be
made under an honest sense of duty; a self-seeking motive is destructive. Personal
injury is not necessary. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient
administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is
66

privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good
faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. The
privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the communication is made in
intemperate terms. A further element of the law of privilege concerns the person to
whom the complaint should be made. The rule is that if a party applies to the wrong
person through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective functions of
various officials such unintentional error will not take the case out of the privilege.
People vs. Alarcon [G.R. No. 46551, December 12, 1939]
CRITICISMS OF JUDGMENT OF COURTS ARE PROTECTED BY THE FREEDOM OF
SPEECH, BUT CRITICISMS ON MATTERS STILL PENDING WITH THE COURT
CONSTITUTTES CONTEMPT. The rule suggested, which has its origin at common
law, is involved in some doubt under modern English law and in the United States,
"the weight of authority, however, is clearly to the effect that comment upon
concluded cases is unrestricted under our constitutional guaranty of the liberty of
the press." (Annotations, 68 L. R. A., 255.) Other considerations argue against our
adoption of the suggested holding. As stated, the rule imported into this jurisdiction
is that "newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or
influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding
constitute criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts; that the
rule is otherwise after the case is ended." (In re Lozano and Quevedo, supra; In re
Abistado, supra.) In at least two instances, this Court has exercised the power to
punish for contempt "on the preservative and on the vindicative principle" (Villa
vicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil., 778), "on the corrective and not on the retaliatory
idea of punishment". In re Lozano and Quevedo, supra.) Contempt of court is in the
nature of a criminal offense (Lee Yick Hon vs. Collector of Customs, 41 Phil., 548),
and in considering the probable effects of the article alleged to be contemptuous,
every fair and reasonable inference consistent with the theory of defendant's
innocence will be indulged (State v. New Mexican Printing Co., 25 N. M., 102, 177
p. 751), and where a reasonable doubt in fact or in law exists as to the guilt of one
of constructive contempt for interfering with the due administration of justice the
doubt must be resolved in his favor, and he must be acquitted.
Ayer Productions PTY Ltd. vs. Capulong [G.R. No. L-82380, April 29, 1988]
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF EXPRESSION INCLUDES THE FREEDOM TO FILM AND
PRODUCE MOTION PICTURES FOR PUBLIC SCREENING.
Considering first
petitioners' claim to freedom of speech and of expression, the Court would once
more stress that this freedom includes the freedom to film and produce motion
pictures and to exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through
television. In our day and age, motion pictures are a universally utilized vehicle of
communication and medium of expression. Along with the press, radio and
television, motion pictures constitute a principal medium of mass communication
for information, education and entertainment. In Gonzales v. Katigbak,
former
Chief Justice Fernando, speaking for the Court, explained:
"Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the
communication of ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse.
Their effects on the perception by our people of issues and public
officials or public figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits is
considerable. Nor as pointed out in Burstyn v. Wilson (343 US 495
[1942]) is the "importance of motion pictures as an organ of public
opinion lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well
as to inform' (Ibid, 501). There is no clear dividing line between what
involves knowledge and what affords pleasure. If such a distinction
were sustained, there is a diminution of the basic right to free
expression.

67

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IS AVAILABLE TO FOREIGN OWNED MOTION PICTURE

COMPANIES, AND IS NOT DISQUALIFIED ONLY BECAUSE THE MOTION PICTURE IS
A COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY. This freedom is available in our country both to locallyowned and to foreign-owned motion picture companies. Furthermore, the
circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a commercial activity
expected to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of
speech and of expression. In our community as in many other countries, media
facilities are owned either by the government or the private sector but the private
sector-owned media facilities commonly require to be sustained by being devoted in
whole or in part to revenue producing activities. Indeed, commercial media
constitute the bulk of such facilities available in our country and hence to exclude
commercially owned and operated media from the exercise of constitutionally
protected freedom of speech and of expression can only result in the drastic
contraction of such constitutional liberties in our country.
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF PUBLIC FIGURES IS NARROWER COMPARED TO
ORDINARY INDIVIDUALS. The counter-balancing claim of private respondent is to
a right of privacy. It was demonstrated sometime ago by the then Dean Irene R.
Cortes that our law, constitutional and statutory, does include a right of privacy. It
is left to case law, however, to mark out the precise scope and content of this right
in differing types of particular situations. The right of privacy or "the right to be let
alone," like the right of free expression, is not an absolute right. A limited intrusion
into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is
a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published
about him constitute matters of a public character. Succinctly put, the right of
privacy cannot be invoked to resist publication and dissemination of matters of
public interest. The interest sought to be protected by the right of privacy is the
right to be free from "unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the
private affairs and activities of an individual which are outside the realm of
legitimate public concern."
The subject matter of "The Four Day Revolution" relates to the non-bloody change
of government that took place at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in February 1986,
and the train of events which led up to that denouement. Clearly, such subject
matter is one of public interest and concern. Indeed, it is, petitioners' argue, of
international interest. The subject thus relates to a highly critical stage in the
history of this country and as such, must be regarded as having passed into the
public domain and as an appropriate subject for speech and expression and
coverage by any form of mass media. The subject matter, as set out in the
synopsis provided by the petitioners and quoted above, does not relate to the
individual life and certainly not to the private life of private respondent Ponce
Enrile. Unlike in Lagunzad, which concerned the life story of Moises Padilla
necessarily including at least his immediate family, what we have here is not a film
biography, more or less fictionalized, of private respondent Ponce Enrile. "The Four
Day Revolution" is not principally about, nor is it focused upon, the man Juan Ponce
Enrile; but it is compelled, if it is to be historical, to refer to the role played by Juan
Ponce Enrile in the precipitating and the constituent events of the change of
government in February 1986.
The extent of the intrusion upon the life of private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile
that would be entailed by the production and exhibition of "The Four Day
Revolution" would, therefore, be limited in character. The extent of that intrusion,
as this Court understands the synopsis of the proposed film, may be generally
described as such intrusion as is reasonably necessary to keep that film a truthful
historical account. Private respondent does not claim that petitioners threatened to
depict in "The Four Day Revolution" any part of the private life of private
respondent or that of any member of his family.

68

PUBLIC FIGURE, DEFINITION. At all relevant times, during which the momentous
events, clearly of public concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place,
private respondent was what Profs. Prosser and Keeton have referred to as a
"public figure:"
"A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his
accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession
or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his
affairs, and his character, has become a 'public personage.' He is, in
other words, a celebrity. Obviously to be included in this category are
those who have achieved some degree of reputation by appearing
before the public, as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball
player, a pugilist, or any other entertainer. The list is, however,
broader than this. It includes public officers, famous inventors and
explorers, war heroes and even ordinary soldiers, an infant prodigy,
and no less a personage than the Grand Exalted Ruler of a lodge. It
includes, in short, anyone who has arrived at a position where public
attention is focused upon him as a person.
Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least,
their right of privacy. Three reasons were given, more or less
indiscrimately, in the decisions" that they had sought publicity and
consented to it, and so could not complain when they received it; that
their personalities and their affairs had already become public, and
could no longer be regarded as their own private business; and that
the press had a privilege, under the Constitution, to inform the public
about those who have become legitimate matters of public interest. On
one or another of these grounds, and sometimes all, it was held that
there was no liability when they were given additional publicity, as to
matters legitimately within the scope of the public interest they had
aroused.
The privilege of giving publicity to news, and other matters of public
interest, was held to arise out of the desire and the right of the public
to know what is going on in the world, and the freedom of the press
and other agencies of information to tell it. 'News' includes all events
and items of information which are out of the ordinary humdrum
routine, and which have 'that indefinable quality of information which
arouses public attention.' To a very great extent the press, with its
experience or instinct as to what its readers will want, has succeeded
in making its own definition of news, as a glance at any morning
newspaper will sufficiently indicate. It includes homicide and other
crimes, arrests and police raids, suicides, marriages and divorces,
accidents, a death from the use of narcotics, a woman with a rare
disease, the birth of a child to a twelve year old girl, the reappearance
of one supposed to have been murdered years ago, and undoubtedly
many other similar matters of genuine, if more or less deplorable,
popular appeal.
The privilege of enlightening the public was not, however, limited to
the dissemination of news in the sense of current events. It extended
also to information or education, or even entertainment and
amusement, by books, articles, pictures, films and broadcasts
concerning interesting phases of human activity in general, as well as
the reproduction of the public scene in newsreels and travelogues. In
determining where to draw the line, the courts were invited to exercise
a species of censorship over what the public may be permitted to
read; and they were understandably liberal in allowing the benefit of
the doubt."
69

Borjal vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999]
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS WHICH ARE CONSIDERED IMPLICIT IN FREEDOM
OF THE PRESS. A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or
qualifiedly privileged. Absolutely privileged communications are those which are not
actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11,
Art. VI, of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member of Congress from
liability for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof.
Upon the other hand, qualifiedly privileged communications containing defamatory
imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without good
intention or justifiable motive. To this genre belong "private communications" and
"fair and true report without any comments or remarks."
Indisputably, petitioner Borjal's questioned writings are not within the exceptions of
Art. 354 of The Revised Penal Code for, as correctly observed by the appellate
court, they are neither private communications nor fair and true report without any
comments or remarks. However this does not necessarily mean that they are not
privileged. To be sure, the enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of
qualifiedly privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public
interest are likewise privileged. The rule on privileged communications had its
genesis not in the nation's penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution
guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press. As early as 1918, in United
States v. Caete, this Court ruled that publications which are privileged for reasons
of public policy are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech.
This constitutional right cannot be abolished by the mere failure of the legislature to
give it express recognition in the statute punishing libels.
The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press. As
held in Elizalde v. Gutierrez and reiterated in Santos v. Court of Appeals
To be more specific, no culpability could be imputed to petitioners for the alleged
offending publication without doing violence to the concept of privileged
communications implicit in the freedom of the press. As was so well put by Justice
Malcolm in Bustos: 'Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly
administration of government have demanded protection of public opinion. The
inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the
doctrine of privilege.'
The doctrine formulated in these two (2) cases resonates the rule that privileged
communications must, sui generis, be protective of public opinion. This closely
adheres to the democratic theory of free speech as essential to collective selfdetermination and eschews the strictly libertarian view that it is protective solely of
self-expression which, in the words of Yale Sterling Professor Owen Fiss, makes its
appeal to the individualistic ethos that so dominates our popular and political
culture. It is therefore clear that the restrictive interpretation vested by the Court of
Appeals on the penal provision exempting from liability only private
communications and fair and true report without comments or remarks defeats,
rather than promotes, the objective of the rule on privileged communications, sadly
contriving as it does, to suppress the healthy efflorescence of public debate and
opinion as shining linchpins of truly democratic societies.
To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and
constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair
comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made
is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially
proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the
discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it
is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public
70

official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment

based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on
established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as
long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF A PERSON WHO IS NOT A PUBLIC FIGURE MAY
LIKEWISE BE RESTRICTED IF HE IS INVOLVED IN A PUBLIC ISSUE. But even
assuming ex-gratia argumenti that private respondent, despite the position he
occupied in the FNCLT, would not qualify as a public figure, it does not necessarily
follow that he could not validly be the subject of a public comment even if he was
not a public official or at least a public figure, for he could be, as long as he was
involved in a public issue. If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it
cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved or
because in some sense the individual did not voluntarily choose to become
involved. The public's primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the
conduct of the participant and the content, effect and significance of the conduct,
not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety.
TRUTH IS IRRELEVANT IN LIBEL CASES. The U.S. Supreme Court speaking
through Mr. Justice William J. Brennan Jr. ruled against Sullivan holding that honest
criticisms on the conduct of public officials and public figures are insulated from
libel judgments. The guarantees of freedom of speech and press prohibit a public
official or public figure from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood
relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with
actual malice, i.e., with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.
The raison d'etre for the New York Times doctrine was that to require critics of
official conduct to guarantee the truth of all their factual assertions on pain of libel
judgments would lead to self-censorship, since would-be critics would be deterred
from voicing out their criticisms even if such were believed to be true, or were in
fact true, because of doubt whether it could be proved or because of fear of the
expense of having to prove it.
Even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or
even falsity alone does not prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are
inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with good
faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a point of
suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language. There
must be some room for misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment. Only by
giving them much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively
function as critical agencies in our democracy. In Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Noel
we held
A newspaper especially one national in reach and coverage, should be free to report
on events and developments in which the public has a legitimate interest with
minimum fear of being hauled to court by one group or another on criminal or civil
charges for libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keeps within the standards
of morality and civility prevailing within the general community.
To avoid the self-censorship that would necessarily accompany strict liability for
erroneous statements, rules governing liability for injury to reputation are required
to allow an adequate margin of error by protecting some inaccuracies. It is for the
same reason that the New York Times doctrine requires that liability for defamation
of a public official or public figure may not be imposed in the absence of proof of
"actual malice" on the part of the person making the libelous statement.
At any rate, it may be salutary for private respondent to ponder upon the advice of
Mr. Justice Malcolm expressed in U .S. v. Bustos, 48 that "the interest of society
71

and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs.
Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case
of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom.
Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound may
be assuaged by the balm of a clear conscience. A public official must not be too
thin-skinned with reference to comments upon his official acts."
We must however take this opportunity to likewise remind media practitioners of
the high ethical standards attached to and demanded by their noble profession. The
danger of an unbridled irrational exercise of the right of free speech and press, that
is, in utter contempt of the rights of others and in willful disregard of the cumbrous
responsibilities inherent in it, is the eventual self-destruction of the right and the
regression of human society into a veritable Hobbesian state of nature where life is
short, nasty and brutish. Therefore, to recognize that there can be no absolute
"unrestraint" in speech is to truly comprehend the quintessence of freedom in the
marketplace of social thought and action, genuine freedom being that which is
limned by the freedom of others. If there is freedom of the press, ought there not
also be freedom from the press? It is in this sense that self-regulation as
distinguished from self-censorship becomes the ideal mean for, as Mr. Justice
Frankfurter has warned, "[W]ithout lively sense of responsibility, a free press may
readily become a powerful instrument of injustice."
Lest we be misconstrued, this is not to diminish nor constrict that space in which
expression freely flourishes and operates. For we have always strongly maintained,
as we do now, that freedom of expression is man's birthright constitutionally
protected and guaranteed, and that it has become the singular role of the press to
act as its "defensor fidei" in a democratic society such as ours. But it is also worth
keeping in mind that the press is the servant, not the master, of the citizenry, and
its freedom does not carry with it an unrestricted hunting license to prey on the
ordinary citizen.
Reyes vs. Bagatsing [G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983]
CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER RULE. It is thus clear that the Court is called upon
to protect the exercise of the cognate rights to free speech and peaceful assembly,
arising from the denial of a permit. The Constitution is quite explicit: "No law shall
be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of
grievances."
Free speech, like free press, may be identified with the liberty to
discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or
punishment. There is to be then no previous restraint on the communication of
views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or
action for damages,
or contempt proceedings
unless there be a "clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a right to prevent."
Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for
consultation and discussion of matters of public concern.
It is entitled to be
accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear
and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent.
Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that it is
a necessary consequence of our republican institutions and complements the right
of free speech. To paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking for the
majority of the American Supreme Court in Thomas v. Collins,
it was not by
accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and of the
press were coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of the people
peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of
grievances. All these rights, while not identical, are inseparable. In every
case, therefore, where there is a limitation placed on the exercise of this right, the
judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged governmental
72

actuation. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so
fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a
character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals,
public health, or any other legitimate public interest.
Nowhere is the rationale that underlies the freedom of expression and peaceable
assembly better expressed than in this excerpt from an opinion of Justice
Frankfurter: "It must never be forgotten, however, that the Bill of Rights was the
child of the Enlightenment. Back of the guaranty of free speech lay faith in the
power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful means for gaining access to the
mind. It was in order to avert force and explosions due to restrictions upon rational
modes of communication that the guaranty of free speech was given a generous
scope. But utterance in a context of violence can lose its significance as an appeal
to reason and become part of an instrument of force. Such utterance was not
meant to be sheltered by the Constitution."
What was rightfully stressed is the
abandonment of reason, the utterance, whether verbal or printed, being in a
context of violence. It must always be remembered that this right likewise provides
for a safety valve, allowing parties the opportunity to give vent to their views, even
if contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion. For if the peaceful means of
communication cannot be availed of, resort to non-peaceful means may be the only
alternative. Nor is this the sole reason for the expression of dissent. It means more
than just the right to be heard of the person who feels aggrieved or who is
dissatisfied with things as they are. Its value may lie in the fact that there may be
something worth hearing from the dissenter. That is to ensure a true ferment of
ideas. There are, of course, well-defined limits. What is guaranteed is peaceable
assembly. One may not advocate disorder in the name of protest, much less preach
rebellion under the cloak of dissent. The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult
attending a rally or assembly. Resort to force is ruled out and outbreaks of violence
to be avoided. The utmost calm though is not required. As pointed out in an early
Philippine case, penned in 1907 to be precise, United States v. Apurado:
"It is
rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of
the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on
such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the
greater the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule,
will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers."
It
bears repeating that for the constitutional right to be invoked, riotous conduct,
injury to property, and acts of vandalism must be avoided. To give free rein to
one's destructive urges is to call for condemnation. It is to make a mockery of the
high estate occupied by intellectual liberty in our scheme of values.
USE OF PUBLIC PLACES CAN ONLY BE REGULATED, BUT NOT ABRIDGED. There
can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would
start. The Philippines is committed to the view expressed in the plurality opinion, of
1939 vintage, of Justice Roberts in Hague v. CIO: "Whenever the title of streets
and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such
use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the
privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of
the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on
national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but
relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and
convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the
guise of regulation, be abridged or denied."
The above excerpt was quoted with
approval in Primicias v. Fugoso.
Primicias made explicit what was implicit in
Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, a 1915 decision, where this Court categorically
affirmed that plazas or parks and streets are outside the commerce of man and
thus nullified a contract that leased Plaza Soledad of plaintiff-municipality.
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Reference was made to such plaza "being a promenade for public use,"
which
certainly is not the only purpose that it could serve. To repeat, there can be no
valid reason why a permit should not be granted for the proposed march and rally
starting from a public park that is the Luneta.
Pita vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 80806, October 5, 1989]
OBSCENITY. The Court states at the outset that it is not the first time that it is
being asked to pronounce what "obscene" means or what makes for an obscene or
pornographic literature. Early on, in People vs. Kottinger, the Court laid down the
test, in determining the existence of obscenity, as follows: "whether the tendency
of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are
open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article
charged as being obscene may fall." "Another test," so Kottinger further declares,
"is that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency."
Kottinger hastened to say, however, that "[w]hether a picture is obscene or
indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case," and that ultimately,
the question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the
community reached by it."
Yet Kottinger, in its effort to arrive at a "conclusive" definition, succeeded merely in
generalizing a problem that has grown increasingly complex over the years.
Precisely, the question is: When does a publication have a corrupting tendency, or
when can it be said to be offensive to human sensibilities? And obviously, it is to
beg the question to say that a piece of literature has a corrupting influence because
it is obscene, and vice-versa.
Apparently, Kottinger was aware of its own uncertainty because in the same breath,
it would leave the final say to a hypothetical "community standard" whatever
that is and that the question must supposedly be judged from case to case.
In a much later decision, Gonzalez v. Kalaw Katigbak, the Court, following trends
in the United States, adopted the test: "Whether to the average person, applying
contemporary standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interest." Kalaw-Katigbak represented a marked departure
from Kottinger in the sense that it measured obscenity in terms of the "dominant
theme" of the work rather than isolated passages, which were central to Kottinger
(although both cases are agreed that "contemporary community standards" are the
final arbiters of what is "obscene"). Kalaw-Katigbak undertook moreover to make
the determination of obscenity essentially a judicial question and as a consequence,
to temper the wide discretion Kottinger had given unto law enforcers.
The latest word, however, is Miller v. California,
which expressly abandoned
Massachusettes, and established "basic guidelines," to wit: "(a) whether 'the
average person, applying contemporary standards' would find the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . .; (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."
IMMORAL LITERATURE COMES WITHIN THE AMBIT OF FREE EXPRESSION, BUT NOT
ITS PROTECTION. Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or literature comes within the
ambit of free expression, although not its protection. In free expression cases, this
Court has consistently been on the side of the exercise of the right, barring a "clear
and present danger" that would warrant State interference and action. But, so we
asserted in Reyes v. Bagatsing, "the burden to show the existence of grave and
imminent danger that would justify adverse action . . . lies on the . . .
authorit[ies]."

74

"There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of the
existence of such clear and present danger." "It is essential for the validity of . . .
previous restraint or censorship that the . . . authority does not rely solely on his
own appraisal of what the public welfare, peace or safety may require."
"To justify such a limitation, there must be proof of such weight and sufficiency to
satisfy the clear and present danger test."
Social Weather Stations, Inc. vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001]
OBRIEN TEST IN DETERMINING VALID GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF FREE
SPEECH. What test should then be employed to determine the constitutional
validity of 5.4? The United States Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Warren,
held in United States v. O'Brien:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech,
expression and press] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance
of that interest.
This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing content-based from
content-neutral regulations and is said to have "become canonical in the review of
such laws." It is noteworthy that the O'Brien test has been applied by this Court in
at least two cases.
Assembly and Petition
Primicias vs. Fugoso [G.R. No. L-1800, January 27, 1948]
THE RIGHT TO PEACEABLY ASSEMBLE. The right to freedom of speech, and to
peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, are
fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the
constitutions of democratic countries. But it is a settled principle growing out of the
nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute
for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of
others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society.
The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed
the sovereign "police power," which is the power to prescribe regulations, to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general
welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by the government
through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other
constitutional and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such
as towns, municipalities and cities by authorizing their legislative bodies called
municipal and city councils to enact ordinances for the purpose.
THE RIGHT TO REGULATE THE USE OF STREETS AND OTHER PUBLIC PLACES DOES
NOT INCLUDE THE OUTRIGHT PROHIBITION OF THEIR USE. Under the above
delegated power, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, enacted sections 844
and 1119. Section 844 of the Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibits as an offense
against public peace, and section 1262 of the same Revised Ordinance penalizes as
a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to
disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd
for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any
lawful assembly." And section 1119 provides the following:

75

"SEC. 1119. Free for use of public. The streets and public places of
the city shall be kept free and clear for the use of the public, and the
sidewalks and crossings for the pedestrians, and the same shall only
be used or occupied for other purposes as provided by ordinance or
regulation: Provided, That the holding of athletic games, sports, or
exercises during the celebration of national holidays in any streets or
public places of the city and on the patron saint day of any district in
question, may be permitted by means of a permit issued by the Mayor,
who shall determine the streets or public places, or portions thereof,
where such athletic games, sports, or exercises may be held: And
provided, further, That the holding of any parade or procession in any
streets or public places is prohibited unless a permit therefor is first
secured from the Mayor, who shall, on every such occasion, determine
or specify the streets or public places for the formation, route, and
dismissal of such parade or procession: And provided, finally, That all
applications to hold a parade or procession shall be submitted to the
Mayor not less than twenty-four hours prior to the holding of such
parade or procession."
As there is no express and separate provision in the Revised Ordinance of the City
regulating the holding of public meeting or assembly at any street or public places,
the provisions of said section 1119 regarding the holding of any parade or
procession in any street or public places may be applied by analogy to meeting and
assembly in any street or public places.
Said provision is susceptible of two constructions: one is that the Mayor of the City
of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse to grant permit for
the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets
and other public places of the City of Manila; and the other is that the applicant has
the right to a permit which shall be granted by the Mayor, subject only to the
latter's reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to
be used for the purpose, with a view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure
convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate
and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder.
After a mature deliberation, we have arrived at the conclusion that we must adopt
the second construction, that is, construe the provisions of the said ordinance to
mean that it does not confer upon the Mayor the power to refuse to grant the
permit, but only the discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or specify the
streets or public places where the parade or procession may pass or the meeting
may be held.
Our conclusion finds support in the decision in the case of Willis Cox vs. State of
New Hampshire, 312 U. S., 569. In that case, the statute of New Hampshire P. L.
chap. 145, section 2, providing that "no parade or procession upon any ground
abutting thereon, shall be permitted unless a special license therefor shall first be
obtained from the selectmen of the town or from licensing committee," was
construed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as not conferring upon the
licensing board unfettered discretion to refuse to grant the license, and held valid.
And the Supreme Court of the United States, in its decision (1941) penned by Chief
Justice Hughes affirming the judgment of the State Supreme Court, held that "a
statute requiring persons using the public streets for a parade or procession to
procure a special license therefor from the local authorities is not an
unconstitutional abridgment of the rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and
press, where, as the statute is construed by the state courts, the licensing
authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a consideration of the
time, place, and manner of the parade or procession, with a view to conserving the
public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing, and
are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license, . . ."
76

We cannot adopt the other alternative construction or construe the ordinance under
consideration as conferring upon the Mayor power to grant or refuse to grant the
permit, which would be tantamount to authorizing him to prohibit the use of the
streets and other public places for holding of meetings, parades or processions,
because such a construction would make the ordinance invalid and void or violative
of the constitutional limitations. As the Municipal Board is empowered only to
regulate the use of streets, parks, and other public places, and the word "regulate,"
as used in section 2444 of the Revised Administrative Code, means and includes
the power to control, to govern, and to restrain, but can not be construed as
synonymous with "suppress" or "prohibit" (Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila, 41 Phil.,
103), the Municipal Board can not grant the Mayor a power which it does not have.
Besides, as the powers and duties of the Mayor as the Chief Executive of the City
are executive, and one of them is "to comply with and enforce and give the
necessary orders for the faithful performance and execution of the laws and
ordinances" (section 2434 [b] of the Revised Administrative Code), the legislative
police power of the Municipal Board to enact ordinances regulating reasonably the
exercise of the fundamental personal right of the citizens in the streets and other
public places, can not be delegated to the Mayor or any other officer by conferring
upon him unregulated discretion or without laying down rules to guide and control
his action by which its impartial execution can be secured or partiality and
oppression prevented.
TO REGULATE THE FREEDOM TO ASSEMBLE, THERE MUST CLEAR AND PRESENT
DANGER OF AN EVIL WHICH THE STATE HAS A RIGHT TO PREVENT. The reason
alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a
reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact
that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high,
that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and
confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted
authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public
order." As the request of the petition was for a permit "to hold a peaceful public
meeting," and there is no denial of that fact or any doubt that it was to be a lawful
assemblage, the reason given for the refusal of the permit can not be given any
consideration. As stated in the portion of the decision in Hague vs. Committee on
Industrial Organization, supra, "It does not make comfort and convenience in the
use of streets or parks the standard of official action. It enables the Director of
Safety to refuse the permit on his mere opinion that such refusal will prevent riots,
disturbances or disorderly assemblage. It can thus, as the record discloses, be
made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of views on
national affairs, for the prohibition of all speaking will undoubtedly 'prevent' such
eventualities." To this we may add the following, which we make our own, said by
Mr. Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Whitney vs. California, 71 U. S.
(Law. ed.), 1105-1107:
"Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech
and assembly. Men feared witches and burned women. It is the
function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To
justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to
fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must
be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is
imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to
be prevented is a serious one . . .
"Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards.
They did not fear political change. They did not exalt order at the cost
of liberty. . . .

77

"Moreover, even imminent danger cannot justify resort to prohibition

of these functions essential effective democracy, unless the evil
apprehended is relatively serious. Prohibition of free speech and
assembly is a measure so stringent that it would be inappropriate as
the means for averting a relatively trivial harm to a society. . . . The
fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of
property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the
probability of serious injury to the state. Among freemen, the
deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crimes are education and
punishment for violations of the law, not abridgment of the rights of
free speech and assembly." Whitney vs. California, U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep.,
71 Law., ed., pp. 1106-1107.)
Malabanan vs. Ramento [G.R. No. 62270, May 21, 1984]
THE STUDENTS RIGHT TO PEACEABLY ASSEMBLE AND FREE SPEECH WERE NOT
SHED AT THE SCHOOL HOUSE GATE. Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable
assembly and free speech. They are entitled to do so. They enjoy like the rest of
the citizens the freedom to express their views and communicate their thoughts to
those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this case. They do not, to
borrow from the opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines Community
School District,
"shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate." While, therefore, the authority of educational
institutions over the conduct of students must be recognized, it cannot go so far as
to be violative of constitutional safeguards. On a more specific level, there is
persuasive force to this formulation in the Fortas opinion: "The principal use to
which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate students during prescribed
hours for the purpose of certain types of activities. Among those activities is
personal intercommunication among the students. This is not only an inevitable
part of the process of attending school; it is also an important part of the
educational process. A student's rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the
classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the
campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on
controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without 'materially
and substantially interfering with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school' and without colliding with the rights of others. . . . But
conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason whether it
stems from time, place, or type of behavior materially disrupts classwork or
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not
immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech."
Objection is made by private respondents to the tenor of the speeches by the
student leaders. That there would be a vigorous presentation of views opposed to
the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of
Agriculture was to be expected. There was no concealment of the fact that they
were against such a move as it confronted them with a serious problem ("isang
malaking suliranin.")
They believed that such a merger would result in the
increase in tuition fees, an additional headache for their parents ("isa na naman
sakit sa ulo ng ating mga magulang.").
If in the course of such demonstration,
with an enthusiastic audience goading them on, utterances, extremely critical, at
times even vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite understandable. Student leaders
are hardly the timid, diffident types. They are likely to be assertive and dogmatic.
They would be ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious
language of the academe. At any rate, even a sympathetic audience is not disposed
to accord full credence to their fiery exhortations. They take into account the
excitement of the occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate, the
exuberance of youth. They may give the speakers the benefit of their applause, but
with the activity taking place in the school premises and during the daytime, no
clear and present danger of public disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice
78

to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct, which, to borrow from Tinker,
"materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others."
It would be most appropriate then, as was done in the case of Reyes v. Bagatsing,
for this Court to lay down the principles for the guidance of school authorities and
students alike. The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed
students of educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters
affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be subjected to previous
restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and
present danger to a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. As a
corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards
displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be
lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever
grievances that may be aired being susceptible to correction through the ways of
the law. If the assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought
from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request
arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to
the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of
work of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its
terms, the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.
De la Cruz vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 126183, March 25, 1999]
THE RIGHT TO PEACEABLY ASSEMBLE MUST BE EXERCISED WITHIN ALLOWABLE
LIMITS. As early as 18 December 1990 we have categorically ruled in the
consolidated cases of Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio Jr. and
Alliance of Concerned Teachers v. Hon. Isidro Cario that the mass actions of
September/October 1990 staged by Metro Manila public school teachers "amounted
to a strike in every sense of the term, constituting as they did, a concerted and
unauthorized stoppage of or absence from work which it was said teachers' sworn
duty to perform, carried out for essentially economic reasons to protest and
pressure the Government to correct what, among other grievances, the strikers
perceived to be the unjust or prejudicial implementation of the salary
standardization law insofar as they were concerned, the non-payment or delay in
payment of various fringe benefits and allowances to which they were entitled, and
the imposition of additional teaching loads and longer teaching hours." In Rolando
Gan v. Civil Service Commission, we denied the claim that the teachers were
thereby denied their rights to peaceably assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances reasoning that this constitutional liberty to be upheld, like any
other liberty, must be exercised within reasonable limits so as not to prejudice the
public welfare. But the public school teachers in the case of the 1990 mass actions
did not exercise their constitutional rights within reasonable limits. On the contrary,
they committed acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service by staging the
mass protests on regular school days, abandoning their classes and refusing to go
back even after they had been ordered to do so. Had the teachers availed of their
free time recess, after classes, weekends or holidays to dramatize their
grievances and to dialogue with the proper authorities within the bounds of law, no
one not the DECS, the CSC or even the Supreme Court could have held them
liable for their participation in the mass actions.
With respect to our ruling in PBM Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming
Mills Co., Inc., invoked by petitioners, we have likewise already ruled in the
Rolando Gan case that the PBM ruling that the rights of free expression and
assembly could not be lightly disregarded as they occupy a preferred position in the
hierarchy of civil liberties was not applicable to defend the validity of the 1990
mass actions because what were pitted therein against the rights of free expression
and of assembly were inferior property rights while the higher consideration
involved in the case of the striking teachers was the education of the youth which
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must, at the very least, be equated with the freedom of assembly and to petition
the government for redress of grievances.
We affirmed the foregoing rulings in Bagana v. Court of Appeals by denying a
similar petition filed by another group of teachers who participated in the 1990
mass actions but who claimed to have been merely exercising their constitutional
right to free assembly. We held in Bagana that the Court of Appeals committed no
reversible error in affirming the CSC resolutions finding the teachers guilty of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and imposing penalties of six
(6) months' suspension without pay. In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals we added
that the persistent refusal of the striking teachers to call the mass actions by the
conventional term "strike" did not erase the true nature of the mass actions as
unauthorized stoppages of work the purpose of which was to obtain a favorable
response to the teachers' economic grievances. We again stressed that the teachers
were penalized not because they exercised their right to peaceably assemble but
because of the manner by which such right was exercised, i.e., going on
unauthorized and unilateral absences thus disrupting classes in various schools in
Metro Manila which produced adverse effects upon the students for whose
education the teachers were responsible. But herein petitioners contend that
classes were not actually disrupted because substitute teachers were immediately
appointed by Secretary Cario. Besides being a purely factual assertion which this
Court cannot take cognizance of in a petition for review, the fact that the prompt
remedial action taken by Secretary Cario might have partially deflected the
adverse effects of the mass protests did not erase the administrative liability of
petitioners for the intended consequences thereof which were the very reason why
such prompt remedial action became necessary.
PBM Employees Association vs. Philippine Blooming Mills [G.R. No. L-31195,
June 5, 1973]
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IS PRIMARY OVER PROPERTY RIGHTS. The freedoms of
expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among the
immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice
Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish;
or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want to talk, but
also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen. And as Justice Douglas cogently
stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are
not safe unless the liberties of all are protected.
The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights
but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness
and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can
participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through
their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the
discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he
can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and
protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public
officers and employees.
While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights
over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of
sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government
regulation only "with narrow specificity."
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the
Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to
80

be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the

influential and powerful, and of oligarchs - political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly
occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of
our civil and political institutions;
and such priority "gives these liberties the
sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact
that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law
and its object or purpose that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor
oppressive would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property
rights.
On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights
requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate
danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. So it has been
stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and
reiterated by the writer of the opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer.
It should be added
that Mr. Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like Justices Douglas,
Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs. Sullivan,
believes that the freedoms of
speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress
of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised
in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be
governed,"
even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the balancing-of-interests test.
Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger rule formulated by Chief
Judge Learned Hand, viz. whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free expression as is necessary to avoid the
danger.
Bayan vs. Ermita [G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006]
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY, LIKE FREEDOM OF SPEECH, ENJOYS PRIMACY IN THE
REALM OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION. The first point to mark is that the right
to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances is, together with
freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in
the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very basis of a
functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be
meaningless and unprotected. As stated in Jacinto v. CA, the Court, as early as the
onset of this century, in U.S. v. Apurado, already upheld the right to assembly and
petition, as follows:
There is no question as to the petitioners' rights to peaceful assembly to petition
the government for a redress of grievances and, for that matter, to organize or
form associations for purposes not contrary to law, as well as to engage in peaceful
concerted activities. These rights are guaranteed by no less than the Constitution,
particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of Article IX, and
Section 3 of Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed pronouncements
defending and promoting the people's exercise of these rights. As early as the onset
of this century, this Court in U.S. vs. Apurado, already upheld the right to assembly
and petition and even went as far as to acknowledge:
"It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the
public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether
real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wrought
to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater, the grievance and the
more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule will be the
disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers. But
if the prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such
disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd as an excuse to
characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against
81

the authorities, then the right to assemble and to petition for redress
of grievances would expose all those who took part therein to the
severest and most unmerited punishment, if the purposes which they
sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting
authorities. If instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions,
the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefor, but
the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line between
disorderly and seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceable
assembly and a tumultuous uprising."
BP 880 IS CONTENT-NEUTRAL REGULATION. It is very clear, therefore, that B.P.
No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply
regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. This was adverted to in
Osmea v. Comelec, where the Court referred to it as a "content-neutral"
regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies.
A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all
kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to "lawful
cause" does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for
lawful causes, otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to protection.
Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of
public assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject. The words
"petitioning the government for redress of grievances" come from the wording of
the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for
the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the
expressions in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present
danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public
health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.
CALIBRATED PREEMPTIVE RESPONSE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. For this reason, the
so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament
and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses
our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand,
B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly
restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place
and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for
the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors of the
power to issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to the constitutionallysound "clear and present danger" standard.
In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in safeguarding liberty by
giving local governments a deadline of 30 days within which to designate specific
freedom parks as provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after that period, no such parks
are so identified in accordance with Section 15 of the law, all public parks and
plazas of the municipality or city concerned shall in effect be deemed freedom
parks; no prior permit of whatever kind shall be required to hold an assembly
therein. The only requirement will be written notices to the police and the mayor's
office to allow proper coordination and orderly activities.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 880

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Section 5 Freedom of Religion

Aglipay vs. Ruiz [G.R. No. 45459, March 13, 1937]
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.
It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our
Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration. Religious freedom,
however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for
religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession
of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized.
And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its
influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the
preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to
establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the
patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves
and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty
and democracy," they thereby manifested their intense religious nature and placed
unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The
elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In
fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects
and denominations. Our Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties
devoted exclusively to religious purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution
of the Philippines and sec. 1, subsec. Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment
Law, sec. 344, par [c], Adm. Code) sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest,
preacher, minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to the
armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or leprosarium (sec. 13,
subsec. 3 Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). Optional religious instruction in
the public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII,
Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to sec. 928, Ad. Code). Thursday and
Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays are made
legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code) because of the secular idea that their
observance is conducive to beneficial moral results. The law allows divorce but
punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against religious worship are
considered crimes against the fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and
133, Revised Penal Code).
Garces vs. Estenzo [G.R. No. L-53487, May 25, 1981]
PURCHASE OF WOODEN IMAGE OF PATRON SAINT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE
PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE. Resolution No. 5 of the
barangay council of Valenzuela, Ormoc City, "reviving the traditional socio-religious
celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Seor San Vicente Ferrer,
the patron saint of Valenzuela", and providing for: (1) the acquisition of the image
of San Vicente Ferrer; and (2) the construction of a waiting shed as the barangay's
projects, funds for which would be obtained through the "selling of tickets and cash
donations", does not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge
religious liberty, nor appropriate money for the benefit of any sect, priest or
clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money. The
construction of the waiting shed is entirely a secular matter. The wooden image was
purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the
patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion
nor interfering with religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of
the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be
placed in the church when the mass was celebrated. If there is nothing
unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the
barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such
as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. As noted
in the resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an
ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and
drudgery of the lives of the masses.
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Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and
which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding
separation of church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public
money or property.
American Bible Society vs. City of Manila [G.R. No. L-9637, April 30, 1957]
IMPOSING TAX ON RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM. The constitutional guaranty of the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right
to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can only be justified
like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear
and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to
prevent". (Taada and Fernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. I, 4th
ed., p. 297). In the case at bar the license fee herein involved is imposed upon
appellant for its distribution and sale of bibles and other religious literature.
"In the case of Murdock vs. Pennsylvania, it was held that an ordinance requiring
that a license be obtained before a person could canvass or solicit orders for goods,
paintings, pictures, wares or merchandise cannot be made to apply to members of
Jehovah's Witnesses who went about from door to door distributing literature and
soliciting people to 'purchase' certain religious books and pamphlets, all published
by the Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society. The 'price' of the books was twenty-five
cents each, the 'price' of the pamphlets five cents each. It was shown that in
making the solicitations there was a request for additional 'contribution' of twentyfive cents each for the books and five cents each for the pamphlets. Lesser sum
were accepted, however, and books were even donated in case interested persons
were without funds.
On the above facts the Supreme Court held that it could not be said that petitioners
were engaged in commercial rather than a religious venture. Their activities could
not be described as embraced in the occupation of selling books and pamphlets.
Then the Court continued:
'We do not mean to say that religious groups and the press are free
from all financial burdens of government. See Grosjean vs. American
Press Co., 297 U.S., 233, 250, 80 L. ed. 660, 668, 56 S. Ct. 444. We
have here something quite different, for example, from a tax on the
income of one who engages in religious activities or a tax on property
used or employed in connection with those activities. It is one thing to
impose a tax on the income or property of a preacher. It is quite
another thing to exact a tax from him for the privilege of delivering a
sermon. The tax imposed by the City of Jeannette is a flat license tax,
payment of which is a condition of the exercise of these constitutional
privileges. The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to
control or suppress its enjoyment. . . . Those who can tax the exercise
of this religious practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it
of the resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the
privilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can close
all its doors to all 'those who do not have a full purse. Spreading
religious beliefs in this ancient and honorable manner would thus be
denied the needy. . . .
It is contended however that the fact that the license tax can suppress
or control this activity is unimportant if it does not do so. But that is to
disregard the nature of this tax. It is a license tax a flat tax imposed
on the exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights . . . The
power to impose a license tax on the exercise of these freedoms is
84

indeed as potent as the power of censorship which this Court has

repeatedly struck down. . . . It is not a nominal fee imposed as a
regulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing the activities in
question. It is in no way apportioned. It is flat license tax levied and
collected as a condition to the pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is
guaranteed by the constitutional liberties of press and religion and
inevitably tends to suppress their exercise. That is almost uniformly
recognized as the inherent vice and evil of this flat license tax.'
Nor could dissemination of religious information be conditioned upon
the approval of an official or manager even if the town were owned by
a corporation as held in the case of Marsh vs. State of Alabama (326
U.S. 501) or by the United States itself as held in the case of Tucker
vs. Texas (326 U.S. 517). In the former case the Supreme Court
expressed the opinion that the right to enjoy freedom of the press and
religion occupies a preferred position as against the constitutional right
of property owners.
'When we balance the constitutional rights of owners of property
against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as
we must here, we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a
preferred position. . . . In our view the circumstance that the property
rights to the premises where the deprivation of property here involved,
took place, were held by others than the public, is not sufficient to
justify the State's permitting a corporation to govern a community of
citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties and the
enforcement of such restraint by the application of a State statute.'"
(Taada and Fernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. I,
4th ed., p. 304-306).
It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other
religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of
the same, but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business or
occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reason We believe that
the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied
to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its
religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious
beliefs.
With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, which requires the obtention of
the Mayor's permit before any person can engage in any of the businesses, trades
or occupations enumerated therein, We do not find that it imposes any charge upon
the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of
religious practices. In the case of Coleman vs. City of Griffin, 189 S.E. 427, this
point was elucidated as follows:
"An ordinance by the City of Griffin, declaring that the practice of distributing either
by hand or otherwise, circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind,
whether said articles are being delivered free, or whether same are being sold
within the city limits of the City of Griffin, without first obtaining written permission
from the city manager of the City of Griffin, shall be deemed a nuisance and
punishable as an offense against the City of Griffin, does not deprive defendant of
his constitutional right of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, even though it prohibits him from introducing and carrying out a
scheme or purpose which he sees fit to claim as a part of his religious system."
It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered
unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff Society. But as Ordinance No. 2529 of
the City of Manila, as amended, is not applicable to plaintiff-appellant and
85

defendant-appellee is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society

involved herein for, as stated before, it would impair plaintiff's right to the free
exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship, as well as its rights
of dissemination of religious beliefs, We find that Ordinance No. 3000, as amended,
is also inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff.
Iglesia Ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996]
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, THOUGH ENJOYS PREFERENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION, MAY BE REGULATED BY THE GOVERNMENT. We reject petitioner's
submission which need not set us adrift in a constitutional voyage towards an
uncharted sea. Freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status by the
framers of our fundamental laws, past and present. We have affirmed this preferred
status well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his
beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of
others and with the common good." We have also laboriously defined in our
jurisprudence the intersecting umbras and penumbras of the right to religious
profession and worship. To quote the summation of Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz, our
well-known constitutionalist:
Religious Profession and Worship
The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect,
viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's beliefs. The first
is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of
thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is
translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.
(1)

Freedom to Believe

The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases

concerning the hereafter. He may indulge his own theories about life
and death; worship any god he chooses, or none at all; embrace or
reject any religion; acknowledge the divinity of God or of any being
that appeals to his reverence; recognize or deny the immortality of his
soul in fact, cherish any religious conviction as he and he alone sees
fit. However absurd his beliefs may be to others, even if they be
hostile and heretical to the majority, he has full freedom to believe as
he pleases. He may not be required to prove his beliefs. He may not
be punished for his inability to do so. Religion, after all, is a matter of
faith. 'Men may believe what they cannot prove.' Every one has a right
to his beliefs and he may not be called to account because he cannot
prove what he believes.
(2)

Freedom to Act on One's Beliefs

But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions

that affect the public, his freedom to do so becomes subject to the
authority of the State. As great as this liberty may be, religious
freedom, like all the other rights guaranteed in the Constitution, can
be enjoyed only with a proper regard for the rights of others. It is
error to think that the mere invocation of religious freedom will
stalemate the State and render it impotent in protecting the general
welfare. The inherent police power can be exercised to prevent
religious practices inimical to society. And this is true even if such
practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction and not
merely for the purpose of evading the reasonable requirements or
prohibitions of the law.
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Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly: 'The constitutional provision on

religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did not create new
privileges. It gave religious liberty, not civil immunity. Its essence is
freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from
conformity to law because of religious dogma.
Accordingly, while one has full freedom to believe in Satan, he may
not offer the object of his piety a human sacrifice, as this would be
murder. Those who literally interpret the Biblical command to "go forth
and multiply" are nevertheless not allowed to contract plural marriages
in violation of the laws against bigamy. A person cannot refuse to pay
taxes on the ground that it would be against his religious tenets to
recognize any authority except that of God alone. An atheist cannot
express his disbelief in acts of derision that wound the feelings of the
faithful. The police power can be validly asserted against the Indian
practice of the suttee born of deep religious conviction, that calls on
the widow to immolate herself at the funeral pile of her husband.
We thus reject petitioner's postulate that its religious program is per se beyond
review by the respondent Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its religious program
brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches
even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of
religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear
and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to
prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health,
public morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can
be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its blind
adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in our country
today. Across the sea and in our shore, the bloodiest and bitterest wars fought by
men were caused by irreconcilable religious differences. Our country is still not safe
from the recurrence of this stultifying strife considering our warring religious beliefs
and the fanaticism with which some of us cling and claw to these beliefs. Even now,
we have yet to settle the near century old strife in Mindanao, the roots of which
have been nourished by the mistrust and misunderstanding between our Christian
and Muslim brothers and sisters. The bewildering rise of weird religious cults
espousing violence as an article of faith also proves the wisdom of our rule rejecting
a strict let alone policy on the exercise of religion. For sure, we shall continue to
subject any act pinching the space for the free exercise of religion to a heightened
scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the irrationality of man. For
when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still.
"The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any
restraint of such right can be justified like other restraints on freedom of expression
on the ground that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which
the State has the right to prevent." ". . . it is only where it is unavoidably necessary
to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the
smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger."
CRITICISMS OR ATTACK ON OTHER RELIGION IS COVERED BY THE FREEDOM OF
RELIGION. The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other
religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms,
however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task
of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another
religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace
among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom
of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. Vis-a-vis religious
87

differences, the State enjoys no banquet of options. Neutrality alone is its fixed and
immovable stance. In fine, respondent board cannot squelch the speech of
petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said
religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. In a State where
there ought to be no difference between the appearance and the reality of freedom
of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better theology. The bedrock of
freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the
marketplace of dueling ideas. When the luxury of time permits, the marketplace of
ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the spark of
opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth.
It is opined that the respondent board can still utilize "attack against any religion"
as a ground allegedly ". . . because section 3 (c) of PD No. 1986 prohibits the
showing of motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials which are
contrary to law and Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code punishes
anyone who exhibits "shows which offend any race or religion." We respectfully
disagree for it is plain that the word "attack" is not synonymous with the word
"offend." Moreover, Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code should be
invoked to justify the subsequent punishment of a show which offends any religion.
It cannot be utilized to justify prior censorship of speech. It must be emphasized
that E.O. 876, the law prior to PD 1986, included "attack against any religion" as a
ground for censorship. The ground was not, however, carried over by PD 1986. Its
deletion is a decree to disuse it. There can be no other intent.
Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of Cebu [G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993]
SINGING OF NATIONAL ANTHEM AND SALUTING THE FLAG MAY NOT BE IMPOSSED
AGAINST CITIZENS WHOSE RELIGIOUS BELIEF PROHIBIT THE SAME.
It is
somewhat ironic however, that after the Gerona ruling had received legislative
cachet by its incorporation in the Administrative Code of 1987, the present Court
believes that the time has come to reexamine it. The idea that one may be
compelled to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic
pledge, during a flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one's job or of
being expelled from school, is alien to the conscience of the present generation of
Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of Rights which guarantees their rights to
free speech ** and the free exercise of religious profession and worship (Sec. 5,
Article III, 1987 Constitution; Article IV, Section 8, 1973 Constitution; Article III,
Section 1[7], 1935 Constitution).
Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and
the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man
to his Creator (Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando's separate opinion in German vs.
Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 530-531).
"The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom
to believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the
belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation
where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare" (J.
Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1991 Ed., pp. 176-177).
Petitioners stress, however, that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag
ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offend their
countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the observance
of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to
show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn
proceedings (Annex F, Rollo of G.R. No. 95887, p. 50 and Rollo of G.R. No. 95770,
p. 48). Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for
their expulsion.

88

"The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious
freedom (according to the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee in his dissenting
opinion in German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517) is the existence of a grave
and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to
public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest,
that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat to public
safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified.
We hold that a similar exemptions may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses
with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious
beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, their
right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt
such patriotic exercises. Paraphrasing the warning cited by this Court in Non. vs.
Dames II, 185 SCRA 523, 535, while the highest regard must be afforded their
right to the exercise of their religion, "this should not be taken to mean that school
authorities are powerless to discipline them" if they should commit breaches of the
peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other
persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their
classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the
patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace,
or pose "a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public
morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a
right (and duty) to prevent" (German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517).
Estrada vs. Escritor [A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003; June 22, 2006]
In simplest terms, the Free Exercise Clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the
Establishment Clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with
rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion clauses
were intended to deny government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to
influence individual religious beliefs and practices.
The history of the religion clauses in the 1987 Constitution shows that these clauses
were largely adopted from the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution xxxx
Philippine jurisprudence and commentaries on the religious clauses also
continued to borrow authorities from U.S. jurisprudence without
articulating the stark distinction between the two streams of U.S.
jurisprudence [i.e., separation and benevolent neutrality]. One might simply
conclude that the Philippine Constitutions and jurisprudence also inherited the
disarray of U.S. religion clause jurisprudence and the two identifiable streams;
thus, when a religion clause case comes before the Court, a separationist
approach or a benevolent neutrality approach might be adopted and each will
have U.S. authorities to support it. Or, one might conclude that as the history of
the First Amendment as narrated by the Court in Everson supports the
separationist approach, Philippine jurisprudence should also follow this approach
in light of the Philippine religion clauses history. As a result, in a case where the
party claims religious liberty in the face of a general law that inadvertently burdens
his religious exercise, he faces an almost insurmountable wall in convincing the
Court that the wall of separation would not be breached if the Court grants him an
exemption. These conclusions, however, are not and were never warranted
by the 1987, 1973 and 1935 Constitutions as shown by other provisions on
religion in all three constitutions.
It is a cardinal rule in constitutional
construction that the constitution must be interpreted as a whole and apparently
conflicting provisions should be reconciled and harmonized in a manner that will
give to all of them full force and effect. From this construction, it will be
ascertained that the intent of the framers was to adopt a benevolent
neutrality approach in interpreting the religious clauses in the Philippine

89

constitutions, and the enforcement of this intent is the goal of construing the
constitution.
As previously stated, the compelling state interest test involves a three-step
process. We explained this process in detail, by showing the questions which must
be answered in each step, viz:
First, [H]as the statute or government action created a burden on the free
exercise of religion? The courts often look into the sincerity of the religious
belief, but without inquiring into the truth of the belief because the Free Exercise
Clause prohibits inquiring about its truth as held in Ballard and Cantwell. The
sincerity of the claimants belief is ascertained to avoid the mere claim of religious
beliefs to escape a mandatory regulation. xxx
Second, the court asks: [I]s there a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify
this infringement of religious liberty? In this step, the government has to
establish that its purposes are legitimate for the state and that they are
compelling. Government must do more than assert the objectives at risk if
exemption is given; it must precisely show how and to what extent those
objectives will be undermined if exemptions are granted. xxx
Third, the court asks: [H]as the state in achieving its legitimate purposes used the
least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more
than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state? The analysis requires
the state to show that the means in which it is achieving its legitimate state
objective is the least intrusive means, i.e., it has chosen a way to achieve its
legitimate state end that imposes as little as possible on religious liberties xxx.
To paraphrase Justice Blackmuns application of the compelling interest test, the
States interest in enforcing its prohibition, in order to be sufficiently compelling to
outweigh a free exercise claim, cannot be merely abstract or symbolic. The State
cannot plausibly assert that unbending application of a criminal prohibition is
essential to fulfill any compelling interest, if it does not, in fact, attempt to enforce
that prohibition. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest
in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner.
The State has never sought to prosecute respondent nor her partner. The States
asserted interest thus amounts only to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced
prohibition. Incidentally, as echoes of the words of Messrs. J. Bellosillo and Vitug, in
their concurring opinions in our Decision, dated August 4, 2003, to deny the
exemption would effectively break up an otherwise ideal union of two individuals
who have managed to stay together as husband and wife [approximately twentyfive years] and have the effect of defeating the very substance of marriage and
the family.
As previously discussed, our Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by
the Free Exercise Clause. Thus, in arguing that respondent should be held
administratively liable as the arrangement she had was illegal per se because, by
universally recognized standards, it is inherently or by its very nature bad,
improper, immoral and contrary to good conscience, the Solicitor General failed to
appreciate that benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
Section 6 Liberty of Abode and of Travel
Marcos vs. Manglapus [G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989]
THE RIGHT TO RETURN TO ONES COUNTRY IS NOT COVERED BY THE
CONDTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF LIBERTY OF ABODE AND THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL.
90

It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel
from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the
right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to
return to one's country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent
from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of
Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the
right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to
leave a country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights.
The Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of movement and residence within
the borders of each state" [Art. 13(1)] separately from the "right to leave any
country, including his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] On the other
hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to
choose his residence" [Art. 12(1)] and the right to "be free to leave any country,
including his own." [Art. 12(2)] which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are
necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or the
separate rights and freedoms of others." [Art. 12(3)] as distinguished from the
"right to enter his own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art.
12(4).] It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right
to return to one's country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of
abode and the right to travel.
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed
in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel,
but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a
generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part
of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and
separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily
deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be
allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the
constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel,
subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated
situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter
that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President
which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to
safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand
should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to
determine whether it must be granted or denied.
Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. L-62100, May 30, 1986]
RESTRICTION OF THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL IS A NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE OF A
BAIL. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail
bond.
Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and
given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will
appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in
the bail bond or recognizance.
"Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of
keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the accused as much
under the power of the court as if he were in custody of the proper officer, and to
secure the appearance of the accused so as to answer the call of the court and do
what the law may require of him."

91

The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times
whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right
to travel. As we have held in People v. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).
". . . the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold
the accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the
lower court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction
of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will
be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which
they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would
have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction."
Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient
reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.
"The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or filed of record,
and the prisoner released thereunder, is to transfer the custody of the accused from
the public officials who have him in their charge to keepers of his own selection.
Such custody has been regarded merely as a continuation of the original
imprisonment. The sureties become invested with full authority over the person of
the principal and have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state."
If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state, more
so then has the court from which the sureties merely derive such right, and whose
jurisdiction over the person of the principal remains unaffected despite the grant of
bail to the latter. In fact, this inherent right of the court is recognized by petitioner
himself, notwithstanding his allegation that he is at total liberty to leave the
country, for he would not have filed the motion for permission to leave the country
in the first place, if it were otherwise.
Silverio vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 94284, April 8, 1991]
THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL MAY BE IMPAIRED BY COURTS OF JUSTICE EVEN FOR
REASONS OTHER THE PROMOTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY, PUBLIC SAFETY OR
PUBLIC HEALTH. Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the 1987
Constitution recognizes the power of the Courts to curtail the liberty of abode within
the limits prescribed by law, it restricts the allowable impairment of the right to
travel only on grounds of interest of national security, public safety or public health,
as compared to the provisions on freedom of movement in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the liberty of abode and of travel were treated under
one provision. Article III, Section 1 (4) thereof reads: prcd
"The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired."
The 1973 Constitution altered the 1935 text by explicitly including the liberty of
travel, thus:
"The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon
lawful order of the court or when necessary in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health" (Article IV, Section 5).
The 1987 Constitution has split the two freedoms into two distinct sentences and
treats them differently, to wit:
"Sec. 6.
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order
92

of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law."
Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution, Courts can impair the
right to travel only on the grounds of "national security, public safety, or public
health."
The submission is not well taken.
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that
while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the
appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with
arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis
of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by
law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution,
Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263). Apparently, the
phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international
travel imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing
Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an
interested party (See Salonga v. Hermoso & Travel Processing Center, No. 53622,
25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as
delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry
their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law
jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, process and
other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or
officer (Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of Court).
Petitioner's argument that the ruling in Manotoc, Jr., v. Court of Appeals, et al.
(supra), to the effect that the condition imposed upon an accused admitted to bail
to make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence
operates as a valid restriction on the right to travel no longer holds under the 1987
Constitution, is far from tenable. The nature and function of a bail bond has
remained unchanged whether under the 1935, the 1973, or the 1987 Constitution.
Besides, the Manotoc ruling on that point was but a re-affirmation of that laid down
long before in People v. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).
Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail but has violated the
conditions thereof by failing to appear before the Court when required. Warrants for
his arrest have been issued. Those orders and processes would be rendered
nugatory if an accused were to be allowed to leave or to remain, at his pleasure,
outside the territorial confines of the country. Holding an accused in a criminal case
within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines
must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be
dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is
the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions
should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an
accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes.
Section 7 Right to Information
Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission [G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987]
THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN IS A SELFEXECUTING RIGHT. These constitutional provisions are self-executing. They supply
the rules by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A
Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 167 [1927]) by guaranteeing the right
93

and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the
fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the
ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature.
(Id. at, p. 165) What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable
conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity,
be consistent with the declared State policy of full public disclosure of all
transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28). However, it
cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed by the
Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III, Sec. 7 have become operative
and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter. Therefore, the right
may be properly invoked in a Mandamus proceeding such as this one.
For every right of the people recognized as fundamental, there lies a corresponding
duty on the part of those who govern, to respect and protect that right. That is the
very essence of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional regime. Only governments
operating under fundamental rules defining the limits of their power so as to shield
individual rights against its arbitrary exercise can properly claim to be constitutional
(Cooley, supra. at p. 5). Without a government's acceptance of the limitations
imposed upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties, without
an acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to
the citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry, and liberty, the ultimate illusion.
THE DUTY TO REGULATE INSPECTION OF THE PUBLIC DOCUMENTS DOES NOT
INCLUDE THE POWER TO PROHIBIT. It is clear from the foregoing pronouncements
of this Court that government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure
of, or access to, information of public concern. This is not to lose sight of the
reasonable regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in custody of public
records on the manner in which the right to information may be exercised by the
public. In the Subido case, We recognized the authority of the Register of Deeds to
regulate the manner in which persons desiring to do so, may inspect, examine or
copy records relating to registered lands. However, the regulations which the
Register of Deeds may promulgate are confined to:
. . . prescribing the manner and hours of examination to the end that
damage to or loss of, the records may be avoided, that undue
interference with the duties of the custodian of the books and
documents and other employees may be prevented, that the right of
other persons entitled to make inspection may be insured . . . (Subido
vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387).
Applying the Subido ruling by analogy, We recognized a similar authority in a
municipal judge, to regulate the manner of inspection by the public of criminal
docket records in the case of Baldoza vs. Dimaano (Adm. Matter No. 1120-MJ, May
5, 1976, 71 SCRA 14). Said administrative case was filed against the respondent
judge for his alleged refusal to allow examination of the criminal docket records in
his sala. Upon a finding by the Investigating Judge that the respondent had allowed
the complainant to open and view the subject records, We absolved the
respondent. In effect, We have also held that the rules and conditions imposed by
him upon the manner of examining the public records were reasonable.
In both the Subido and the Baldoza cases, We were emphatic in Our statement that
the authority to regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry
with it the power to prohibit. A distinction has to be made between the discretion to
refuse outright the disclosure of or access to a particular information and the
authority to regulate the manner in which the access is to be afforded. The first is a
limitation upon the availability of access to the information sought, which only the
Legislature may impose (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution). The second pertains to
the government agency charged with the custody of public records. Its authority to
regulate access is to be exercised solely to the end that damage to, or loss of,
94

public records may be avoided, undue interference with the duties of said agencies
may be prevented, and more importantly, that the exercise of the same
constitutional right by other persons shall be assured (Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra).
Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable
regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the
information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be
discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be
made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of
the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of
agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance
may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus in a proper case.
EXEMPTIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE. The incorporation in the
Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of public concern is a
recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a
democracy (Baldoza v. Dimaano, Adm. Matter No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 17 SCRA
14). In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with
the exigencies of their time (Thornhill vs. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 [1939]),
access to information of general interest aids the people in democratic decisionmaking (87 Harvard Law Review 1505 [1974] by giving them a better perspective
of the vital issues confronting the nation.
But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not
absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information. Under the
Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as
may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore
exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting
national security (Journal No. 90, September 23, 1986, p. 10; and Journal No. 91,
September 24, 1986, p. 32, 1986 Constitutional Commission). It follows that, in
every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be
circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public
concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law
from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is,
therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public
concern.
MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN, DEFINITION. In determining whether or not a
particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be
applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition.
Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to
know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such
matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it
is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is
of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
Valmonte vs. Belmonte, Jr. [G.R. No. 74930, February 13, 1989]
RIGHT TO INFORMATION, CONCEPT. An informed citizenry with access to the
diverse currents in political, moral and artistic thought and data relative to them,
and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the
democratic government envisioned under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this
republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the State.
In this system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of
the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to information on the inner
workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices
of those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate of public office as a
public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the
people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be mere empty words if
95

access to such information of public concern is denied, except under limitations

prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution.
Petitioners are practitioners in media. As such, they have both the right to gather
and the obligation to check the accuracy of information they disseminate. For them,
the freedom of the press and of speech is not only critical, but vital to the exercise
of their professions. The right of access to information ensures that these freedoms
are not rendered nugatory by the government's monopolizing pertinent information.
For an essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or
process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the
interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to
the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will.
Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is
informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants
in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating
thereto can such bear fruit.
The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and
expression. But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct
of and therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech
and of the press. Far from it. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the
constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is
meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decisionmaking as well in checking abuse in government.
THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION EXTENDS TO GOVERNMENT OWNED AND
CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS, AND MAY LIKEWISE COVER THE NEGOTIATION
STAGE OF THE TRANSACTIONS.
First of all, the "constituent ministrant"
dichotomy characterizing government function has long been repudiated. In ACCFA
v. Confederation of Unions and Government Corporations and Offices [G.R. Nos. L21484 and L-23605, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 644], the Court said that the
government, whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or running some
business, discharges the same function of service to the people.
Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary
function would not justify the exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and
scope of the right to information.
Moreover, the intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, to
include government-owned and controlled corporations and transactions entered
into by them within the coverage of the State policy of full public disclosure is
manifest from the records of the proceedings:
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco).
Commissioner Suarez is recognized.
MR. SUAREZ.
question?
MR. OPLE.

Thank you. May I ask the Gentleman a few

Very gladly.

MR. SUAREZ.
Thank you.
When we declare "a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions" referring to the transactions of the State and when
we say the "State" which I suppose would include all of the various
agencies, departments, ministries and instrumentalities of the
government. . . .
MR. OPLE.

Yes, and individual public officers, Mr. Presiding Officer.

96

MR. SUAREZ.
corporations.
MR. OPLE.

Including

government-owned

and

controlled

That is correct, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. SUAREZ.
And when we say "transactions which should be
distinguished from contracts, agreements, or treaties or whatever,
does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the consummation of
the contract, or does he refer to the contract itself?
MR. OPLE. The "transactions" used here, I suppose, is generic and,
therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a
consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ.
This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading
to the consummation of the transaction.
MR. OPLE. Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the
national interest.
MR. SUAREZ.
Thank you. [V Record
Commission 24-25.] (Emphasis supplied.)

of

the

Constitutional

Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding
upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that
government-owned and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or
governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that
transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created
by special legislation are within the ambit of the people's right to be informed
pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings.
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted
by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate
relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to or loss
of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the
custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons
entitled to inspect the records may be insured [Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,
supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387.] The petition, as to
the second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is
meritorious.
THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION DOES NOT INCLUDE THE RIGHT TO DEMAND COPIES
OF THE DOCUMENTS OR TO DEMAND SUMMARIES THEREOF. However, the same
cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e., "to furnish
petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to
the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before
the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady
Imelda Marcos."
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are
entitled to "access to official records," the constitution does not accord them a right
to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and
the like in their desire to acquire information or matters of public concern.
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the
applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded
and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required. The
corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be clear and
97

specific [Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November 29, 1968, 126 SCRA 203;
Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.] The request
of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of
respondent to prepare the list requested.

Province of Cotabato vs. The Govt. of the RP Peace Panel on Ancestral

Domain [G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008]

Echagaray vs. Secretary of Justice [G.R. NO. 132601, October 12, 1998]
THE MANUAL FOR DEATH EXECUTION IS A MATTER OF PUBLIC INTEREST.
However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. No. 8177 suffer
serious flaws that could not be overlooked. To begin with, something basic appears
missing in Section 19 of the implementing rules which provides:
"SEC. 19.
EXECUTION PROCEDURE. Details of the procedure prior
to, during and after administering the lethal injection shall be set forth
in a manual to be prepared by the Director. The manual shall contain
details of, among others, the sequence of events before and after
execution; procedures in setting up the intravenous line; the
administration of the lethal drugs; the pronouncement of death; and
the removal of the intravenous system.
Said manual shall be confidential and its distribution shall be limited to
authorized prison personnel."
Thus, the Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing rules
a veritable vacuum. The Secretary of Justice has practically abdicated the power to
promulgate the manual on the execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections, by not providing for a mode of review and approval thereof. Being a
mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could
not promulgate a manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the administrative
superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule-making authority under R.A. No. 8177.
Such apparent abdication of departmental responsibility renders the said paragraph
invalid.
As to the second paragraph of section 19, the Court finds the requirement of
confidentiality of the contents of the manual even with respect to the convict
unduly suppressive. It sees no legal impediment for the convict, should he so
desire, to obtain a copy of the manual. The contents of the manual are matters of
public concern "which the public may want to know, either because these directly
affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citizen." Section 7 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"SEC. 7.
The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as a basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitation as may be provided by law."
The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of
public concern is a recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and
information in a democracy. In the same way that free discussion enables members
of society to cope with the exigencies of their time, access to information of general
98

interest aids the people in democratic decision-making by giving them a better

perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation.
Chavez vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government [G.R. No. 130716,
December 9, 1998]
FULL PUBLIC DISCLOSURE EXTENDS TO INFORMATION RELATIVE TO THE
NEGOTIATION OF THE PUBLIC TRANSACTION.
But does the constitutional
provision likewise guarantee access to information regarding ongoing negotiations
or proposals prior to the final agreement? This same clarification was sought and
clearly addressed by the constitutional commissioners during their deliberations,
which we quote hereunder:
"MR. SUAREZ.
And when we say 'transactions' which should be distinguished
from contracts, agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the
Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the consummation of
the contract, or does he refer to the contract itself?
"MR. OPLE.
The 'transactions' used here, I suppose, is generic and,
therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract, and
already a consummated contract, Mr. Presiding. Officer.
"MR. SUAREZ.
This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the
consummation of the transaction?
"MR. OPLE.
Yes, subject to reasonable safeguards on the national interest."
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is
incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government
representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed
settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of
ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of
the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations
or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the
process of being formulated or are in the "exploratory" stage. There is a need, of
course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as
discussed earlier such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or
foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information.
LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION. The "information" and the
"transactions" referred to in the subject provisions of the Constitution have as yet
no defined scope and extent. There are no specific laws prescribing the exact
limitations within which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty
may be obliged. However, the following are some of the recognized restrictions: (1)
national security matters and intelligence information, (2) trade secrets and
banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential information.
Limitations to the Right:
(1)

National Security Matters

At the very least, this jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding that there is
a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets
regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters. But where there
is no need to protect such state secrets, the privilege may not be invoked to
99

withhold documents and other information, provided that they are examined "in
strict confidence" and given "scrupulous protection."
Likewise, information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of
treaties and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the
sake of national interest.
(2)

Trade Secrets and Banking Transactions

The drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that, aside from
national security matters and intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets
(pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code and other related laws) as well as
banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act) are also
exempted from compulsory disclosure.
(3)

Criminal Matters

Also excluded are classified law enforcement matters, such as those relating to the
apprehension, the prosecution and the detention of criminals, which courts may not
inquire into prior to such arrest, detention and prosecution. Efforts at effective law
enforcement would be seriously jeopardized by free public access to, for example,
police information regarding rescue operations, the whereabouts of fugitives, or
leads an covert criminal activities.
(4)

Other Confidential Information

The Ethical Standards Act further prohibits public officials and employees from
using or divulging "confidential or classified information officially known to them by
reason of their office and not made available to the public."
Other acknowledged limitations to information access include diplomatic
correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either
house of Congress, as well as the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.
Section 8 Right to Form Associations
SSS Employees Association vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989]
THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE GUARANTEE OF ASSOCIATION
TO GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES. By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the
right of all workers and employees, including those in the public sector, to strike.
But the Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this impression, for in the SubArticle on the Civil Service Commission, it provides, after defining the scope of the
civil service as "all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters," that "[t]he right to self-organization shall not be denied to government
employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(1) and (50)]. Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also
provides that "[t]he right of the people, including those employed in the public and
private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary
to law shall not abridged" [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question that
the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is
silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to strike.
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in
understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in
recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners
intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without
including the right to strike.
100

Thus, Commissioner Eulogio R. Lerum, one of the sponsors of the provision that
"[t]he right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees" [Art.
IX(B), Sec. 2(5)], in answer to the apprehensions expressed by Commissioner
Ambrosio B. Padilla, Vice-President of the Commission, explained:
MR. LERUM. I think what I will try to say will not take that long. When
we proposed this amendment providing for self-organization of
government employees, it does not mean that because they have the
right to organize, they also have the right to strike. That is a different
matter. We are only talking about organizing, uniting as a union. With
regard to the right to strike, everyone will remember that in the Bill of
Rights, there is a provision that the right to form associations or
societies whose purpose is not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Now then, if the purpose of the state is to prohibit the strikes coming
from employees exercising government functions, that could be done
because the moment that is prohibited, then the union which will go
on strike will be an illegal union. And that provision is carried in
Republic Act 875. In Republic Act 875, workers, including those from
the government-owned and controlled, are allowed to organize but
they are prohibited from striking. So, the fear of our honorable VicePresident is unfounded. It does not mean that because we approve
this resolution, it carries with it the right to strike. That is a different
matter. As a matter of fact, that subject is now being discussed in the
Committee on Social Justice because we are trying to find a solution to
this problem. We know that this problem exists; that the moment we
allow anybody in the government to strike, then what will happen if
the members of the Armed Forces will go on strike? What will happen
to those people trying to protect us? So that is a matter of discussion
in the Committee on Social Justice. But, I repeat, the right to form an
organization does not carry with it the right to strike. [Record of the
Constitutional Commission, vol. I, p. 569].
It will be recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (C.A. No. 875), which was repealed
by the Labor Code (PD. 442) in 1974, expressly banned strikes by employees in the
Government, including instrumentalities exercising governmental functions, but
excluding entities entrusted with proprietary functions:
Sec. 11.
Prohibition Against Strikes in the Government. The
terms and conditions of employment in the Government, including any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof, are governed by law
and it is declared to be the policy of this Act that employees therein
shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes or modification in
their terms and conditions of employment. Such employees may
belong to any labor organization which does not impose the obligation
to strike or to join in strike: Provided, however, That this section shall
apply only to employees employed in governmental functions and not
those employed in proprietary functions of the Government including
but not limited to governmental corporations.
On June 1, 1987, to implement the constitutional guarantee of the right of
government employees to organize, the President issued E.O. No. 180 which
provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government
employees. In Section 14 thereof, it is provided that "[t]he Civil Service law and
rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be
observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress." The
President was apparently referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the
Civil Service Commission under date April 21, 1987 which, "prior to the enactment
by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees . . .
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enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and

employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other
forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public
service." The air was thus cleared of the confusion. At present, in the absence of
any legislation allowing government employees to strike, recognizing their right to
do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, they are prohibited from striking, by
express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No. 180.
[At this juncture, it must be stated that the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 6
is not at issue].
The statement of the Court in Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor
and Employment [G.R. No. 60403, August 3, 1983, 124 SCRA 1] is relevant as it
furnishes the rationale for distinguishing between workers in the private sector and
government employees with regard to the right to strike:
The general rule in the past and up to the present is that "the terms
and conditions of employment in the Government, including any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by law"
(Section 11, the Industrial Peace Act, R.A. No. 875, as amended and
Article 277, the Labor Code, P.D. No. 442, as amended). Since the
terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law,
government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by
workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their
employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is
that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law.
Relations between private employers and their employees rest on an
essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of
wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and
conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are settled
through the process of collective bargaining. In government
employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given
delegated power, the administrative heads of government which fix
the terms and conditions of employment. And this is effected through
statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through
collective bargaining agreements. [At p. 13; Emphasis supplied].
Apropos is the observation of the Acting Commissioner of Civil Service, in his
position paper submitted to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and quoted with
approval by the Court in Alliance, to wit:
It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that by reason of the
nature of the public employer and the peculiar character of the public
service, it must necessarily regard the right to strike given to unions in
private industry as not applying to public employees and civil service
employees. It has been stated that the Government, in contrast to the
private employer, protects the interest of all people in the public
service, and that accordingly, such conflicting interests as are present
in private labor relations could not exist in the relations between
government and those whom they employ. [At pp. 16-17; also quoted
in National Housing Corporation v. Juco, G.R. No. 64313 January 17,
1985, 134 SCRA 172, 178-179].
E.O. No. 180, which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of
government employees, while clinging to the same philosophy, has, however,
relaxed the rule to allow negotiation where the terms and conditions of employment
involved are not among those fixed by law. Thus:
SECTION 13.
Terms
and
conditions
of
employment
or
improvements thereof, except those that are fixed by law, may be the
102

subject of negotiations between duly recognized

organizations and appropriate government authorities.

employees'

The same executive order has also provided for the general mechanism for the
settlement of labor disputes in the public sector, to wit:
SECTION 16.
The Civil Service and labor laws and procedures,
whenever applicable, shall be followed in the resolution of complaints,
grievances and cases involving government employees. In case any
dispute remains unresolved after exhausting all the available remedies
under existing laws and procedures, the parties may jointly refer the
dispute to the [Public Sector Labor-Management] Council for
appropriate action.
Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either
petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of
employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the
appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed
by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the
Public Sector Labor-Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in
the civil service may not resort to strikes, walkouts and other temporary work
stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the Government to accede
to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and
Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government Employees to SelfOrganization, which took effect after the instant dispute arose, "[t]he terms and
conditions of employment in the government, including any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof and government-owned and controlled corporations with
original charters are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the
purpose of securing changes thereof."
Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union [G.R. No. L-25246, September
12, 1974]
THE RIGHT TO JOIN ASSOCIATIONS INCLUDES THE RIGHT NOT TO JOIN. Both the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 875 recognize freedom of association. Section 1
(6) of Article III of the Constitution of 1935, as well as Section 7 of Article III of the
Constitution of 1973, provide that the right to form associations or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Section 3 of Republic Act No.
875 provides that employees shall have the right to self-organization and to form,
join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective
bargaining and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining and other mutual aid or protection. What the Constitution and the
Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the "right" to form or join
associations. Notwithstanding the different theories propounded by the different
schools of jurisprudence regarding the nature and contents of a "right", it can be
safely said that whatever theory one subscribes to, a right comprehends at least
two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i e., the absence of legal
restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented by
law; and second, power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain
from joining an association. It is, therefore, the employee who should decide for
himself whether he should join or not an association; and should he choose to join,
he himself makes up his mind as to which association he would join; and even after
he has joined, he still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his
membership with said organization at any time.
It is clear, therefore, that the
right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any union.
Inasmuch as what both the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act have
recognized, and guaranteed to the employee, is the "right" to join associations of
his choice, it would be absurd to say that the law also imposes, in the same breath,

103

upon the employee the duty to join associations. The law does not enjoin an
employee to sign up with any association.
The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by Section 3 of the
Industrial Peace Act is, however, limited. The legal protection granted to such right
to refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of law, where a labor union and an
employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may
employ only members of the collective bargaining union, and the employees must
continue to be members of the union for the duration of the contract in order to
keep their jobs. Thus Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act, before its
amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, provides that although it would be an unfair
labor practice for an employer "to discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization" the employer is, however, not precluded
"from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of
employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of
the employees". By virtue, therefore, of a closed shop agreement, before the
enactment of Republic Act No. 3350, if any person, regardless of his religious
beliefs, wishes to be employed or to keep his employment, he must become a
member of the collective bargaining union. Hence, the right of said employee not to
join the labor union is curtailed and withdrawn.
To that all embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement, Republic Act No.
3350 introduced an exception, when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial
Peace Act the following proviso: "but such agreement shall not cover members of
any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor
organization". Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application
and coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor
organization. What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said
religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said
unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed
shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or
dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the
collective bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from
infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of association, upholds and
reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members of said religious sects from affiliating
with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to
affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious
beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union,
they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign
up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law
prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer or labor union compel
them to join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the constitutional
provision on freedom of association.
NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE. According to Black, any statute which introduces a
change into the express terms of the contract, or its legal construction, or its
validity, or its discharge, or the remedy for its enforcement, impairs the contract.
The extent of the change is not material. It is not a question of degree or manner
or cause, but of encroaching in any respect on its obligation or dispensing with any
part of its force. There is an impairment of the contract if either party is absolved
by law from its performance.
Impairment has also been predicated on laws
which, without destroying contracts, derogate from substantial contractual rights.
It should not be overlooked, however, that the prohibition to impair the obligation
of contracts is not absolute and unqualified. The prohibition is general, affording a
broad outline and requiring construction to fill in the details. The prohibition is not
to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula, for it prohibits
104

unreasonable impairment only.

In spite of the constitutional prohibition, the
State continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people.
Legislation appropriate to safeguarding said interests may modify or abrogate
contracts already in effect.
For not only are existing laws read into contracts in
order to fix the obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential
attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal
order. All contracts made with reference to any matter that is subject to regulation
under the police power must be understood as made in reference to the possible
exercise of that power.
Otherwise, important and valuable reforms may be
precluded by the simple device of entering into contracts for the purpose of doing
that which otherwise may be prohibited. The policy of protecting contracts against
impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which
contractual relations are worthwhile a government which retains adequate
authority to secure the peace and good order of society. The contract clause of the
Constitution must, therefore, be not only in harmony with, but also in subordination
to, in appropriate instances, the reserved power of the state to safeguard the vital
interests of the people. It follows that not all legislations, which have the effect of
impairing a contract, are obnoxious to the constitutional prohibition as to
impairment, and a statute passed in the legitimate exercise of police power,
although it incidentally destroys existing contract rights, must be upheld by the
courts. This has special application to contracts regulating relations between capital
and labor which are not merely contractual, and said labor contracts, for being
impressed with public interest, must yield to the common good.
In re: IBP membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial Edillon [A.C. No.
1928, August 3, 1978]
THE RIGHT TO ASSOCIATION IS NOT VIOLATED BY INTEGRATING THE BAR. To
compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member
of any group of which he is not already a member. He becomes a member of the
Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to
provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member. Bar integration does
not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend
the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections
as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest
in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries
of the regulatory program the lawyers.
There is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Supreme Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the
1973 Constitution) from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers
are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the
profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed
as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and
purposes of integration.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate
personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected
to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of
the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes,
"Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this
fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated.
Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made
to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy (Calalang vs.
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Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some

individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
Section 10 Non-Impairment Clause
Rutter vs. Esteban [G.R. No. L-3708, May 18, 1953]
MORATORIUM LAWS ARE CONSTITUTIONAL. Statutes declaring a moratorium on
the enforcement of monetary obligations are not of recent enactment. These
moratorium laws are not new. "For some 1,400 years western civilization has made
use of extraordinary devices for saving the credit structure, devices generally
known as moratoria. The moratorium is postponement of fulfilment of obligations
decreed by the state through the medium of the courts or the legislature. Its
essence is the application of the sovereign power" (58 C.J. S., p. 1208 footnote
87). In the United States, many state legislatures have adopted moratorium laws
"during times of financial distress, especially when incident to, or caused by, a war"
(41 C.J., p.213). Thus, such laws "were passed by many state legislatures at the
time of the civil war suspending the rights of creditors for a definite and reasonable
time, . . . whether they suspend the right of action or make dilatory the remedy"
(12 C.J., p 1078). The laws were declared constitutional. However, some courts
have also declared that "such statutes are void as to contracts made before their
passage where the suspension of remedied prescribed is indefinite or unreasonable
in duration" (12C.J., 1078). The true test, therefore, of the constitutionality of the
moratorium statute lies in the determination of the period of a suspension of the
remedy. It is required that such suspension be definite and reasonable, otherwise it
would be violative of the constitution.
One of the arguments advanced against the validity of the moratorium law is the
fact that it impairs the obligation of contracts which is prohibited by the
Constitution. This argument, however does not now hold water. While this may be
conceded, it is however justified as a valid exercise by the State of its police power.
The leading case on the matter is Home Building and Loan Association vs. Blaisdell,
290 U. S., 398, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on January 8,
1934. Here appellant contested the validity of charter 339 of the laws of Minnesota
of 1933, approved April 13, 1933, called the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law,
as being repugnant to the contract clause of the Federal Constitution. The statute
was sustained by the Supreme Court of Minnesota as an emergency measure.
"Although conceding that the obligations of the mortgage contract was impaired,
the court decided that what it thus described as an impairment was,
notwithstanding the contract clause of the Federal Constitution, within the police
power of the State as that power was called into exercise by the public economic
emergency which the legislative had found to exist". This theory was up-held by the
Supreme Court. Speaking through Chief Justice Hughes, the court made the
following pronouncements:
Not only is the constitutional provision qualified by the measure of
control which the State retains over remedial processes, but the State
also continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interest of its
people. It does not matter that legislation appropriate to that end "has
the result of modifying or abrogating contracts already in effect." . . . .
Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations
as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of
sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal
order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment
presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which
contractual relations are worthwhile a government which retains
adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society. This
principle of harmonizing the constitutional prohibition with the

106

necessary residuum of state power has had progressive recognition in

the decision of this Court.
Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership vs. Feati Bank & Trust Co. [G.R. No. L-24670,
December 14, 1979]
ZONING REGULATION MAY IMPAIR THE CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS OF PARTIES.
The need for reconciling the non-impairment clause of the Constitution and the
valid exercise of police power may also be gleaned from Helvering v. Davis wherein
Mr. Justice Cardozo, speaking for the Court, resolved the conflict "between one
welfare and another, between particular and general, thus
Nor is the concept of the general welfare static. Needs that were
narrow or parochial a century ago may be interwoven in our day with
the well-being of the nation What is critical or urgent changes with the
times.
The motives behind the passage of the questioned resolution being reasonable, and
it being a " legitimate response to a felt public need," not whimsical or oppressive,
the non-impairment of contracts clause of the Constitution will not bar the
municipality's proper exercise of the power. Now Chief Justice Fernando puts it
aptly when he declared: "Police power legislation then is not likely to succumb to
the challenge that thereby contractual rights are rendered nugatory."
Furthermore, We restated in Philippine American Life Ins. Co. v. Auditor General
that laws and reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power are read into
contracts agreed upon by the parties. Thus
Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations
as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of
sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal
order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairments
presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which
contractual relations are worthwhile a government which retains
adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society.
Again, We held in Liberation Steamship Co., Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations,
through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, that ... the law forms part of, and is read into, every
contract, unless clearly excluded therefrom in those cases where such exclusion is
allowed." The decision in Maritime Company of the Philippines v. Reparations
Commission, written for the Court by Justice Fernando, now Chief Justice, restates
the rule.
Lozano vs. Martinez [G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986]
Ganzon vs. Inserto [G.R. No. L-56450, July 25, 1983]
COURTS CANNOT CHANGE THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES. Applying the
principles underlying the nature of a mortgage, the real estate mortgage
constituted on Lot No. 1901-E-61-B-lF of the subdivision plan Psd-27482, located in
the District of Molo, Iloilo City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-50324
can not be substituted by a surety bond as ordered by the trial court. The mortgage
lien in favor of Petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon is inseparable from the mortgaged
property. It is a right in rem, a lien on the property. To substitute the mortgage
with a surety bond would convert such lien from a right in rem, to a right in
personam. This conversion can not be ordered for it would abridge the rights of the
mortgagee under the mortgage contract.

107

Moreover, the questioned orders violate the non-impairment of contracts clause

guaranteed under the Constitution. Substitution of the mortgage with a surety bond
to secure the payment of the P40,000.00 note would in effect change the terms and
conditions of the mortgage contract. Even before trial on the very issues affecting
the contract, the respondent court has directed a deviation from its terms,
diminished its efficiency, and dispensed with a primary condition.
Section 12 Custodial Investigation
People vs. Bolanos [G.R. No. 101808, July 3, 1992]
CONFESSIONS MADE WHILE ON BOARD THE POLICE PATROL ON THE WAY TO THE
POLIE STATION IS ALREADY PART OF THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION. Being
already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on the
way to the Police Station where formal investigation may have been conducted,
appellant should have been informed of his Constitutional rights under Article III,
Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution which explicitly provides:
"(1)

Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense

shall have the right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the service of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.

"(2)

No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other

means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him.
Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.

"(3)

Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the

preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

"(4)

The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violation of
this section as well as compensation and rehabilitation of victims
of torture or similar practices and their families." (Emphasis
supplied)

Considering the clear requirements of the Constitution with respect to the manner
by which confession can be admissible in evidence, and the glaring fact that the
alleged confession obtained while on board the police vehicle was the only reason
for the conviction, besides appellant's conviction was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt, this Court has no recourse but to reverse the subject judgment under
review.
People vs. Andan [G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997]
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION. Plainly, any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right (1) to remain silent; (2) to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be
informed of such rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this
provision is inadmissible in evidence against him. The exclusionary rule is premised
on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and
runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for
compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. The incommunicado
character of custodial interrogation or investigation also obscures a later judicial
determination of what really transpired.

108

It should be stressed that the rights under Section 12 are accorded to "[a]ny
person under investigation for the commission of an offense." An investigation
begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to
focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts
interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an
alleged offense. As intended by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, this covers
"investigation conducted by police authorities which will include investigations
conducted by the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such other police
agencies in our government."
CONFESSIONS MADE VOLUNTARILY AND SPONTANEOUSLY ARE NOT COVERED BY
THE RIGHTS ON CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION. Under these circumstances, it
cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before the mayor is
inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and
control" over the local police and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement
officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in
response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question
appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was
appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a
private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his
guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law
enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his
constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on
custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited
through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby
appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is
the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under
Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as
would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely
and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence we hold that appellant's confession to the
mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.
CONFESSIONS TO THE MEDIA ARE NOT PART OF CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.
Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The
confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the
police or any other investigating officer. We have held that statements
spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are
deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence.
Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from any
undue influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news
reporters when they interviewed appellant. They were not acting under the
direction and control of the police. They were there to check appellant's confession
to the mayor. They did not force appellant to grant them an interview and reenact
the commission of the crime. In fact, they asked his permission before interviewing
him. They interviewed him on separate days not once did appellant protest his
innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even supplied all
the details in the commission of the crime, and consented to its reenactment. All
his confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by his family and other
relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in the interview of appellant by the
news reporters.
We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by
Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not
concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual.
It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions
therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents. They confirm that
certain rights of the individual exist without need of any governmental grant, rights
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that may not be taken away by government, rights that government has the duty
to protect. Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down
these limitations to protect the individual against aggression and unwarranted
interference by any department of government and its agencies.
People vs. Judge Ayson [G.R. No. 85215, July 7, 1989]
MIRANDA RIGHTS. In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural
safeguards laid down for a person in police custody, "in-custody interrogation"
being regarded as the commencement of an adversary proceeding against the
suspect.
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court
of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if
he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must
be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings
have been given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may
knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or
make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waivers are
demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as
a result of interrogation can be used against him.
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a policedominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement without full
warnings of constitutional rights."
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION. The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in
"custodial interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of accused persons." And, as
this Court has already stated, by custodial interrogation is meant "questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." The situation
contemplated has also been more precisely described by this Court.
. . . After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a
confrontation arises which at best may be termed unequal. The
detainee is brought to an army camp or police headquarters and there
questioned and "cross-examined" not only by one but as many
investigators as may be necessary to break down his morale. He finds
himself in strange and unfamiliar surroundings, and every person he
meets he considers hostile to him. The investigators are well-trained
and seasoned in their work. They employ all the methods and means
that experience and study have taught them to extract the truth, or
what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are
unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional rights. And even if
they were, the intimidating and coercive presence of the officers of the
law in such an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence. Section 20
of the Bill of Rights seeks to remedy this imbalance."
RIGHTS OF A PERSON ACCUSED OF A CRIME. In fine, a person suspected of
having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its commission in court,
has the following rights in that matter of his testifying or producing evidence, to
wit:
1)
BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for
preliminary investigation), but after having been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on being interrogated by the
police: the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed
110

thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other

means which vitiates the free will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of
these rights rejected; and
2)

AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT

a)
b)
c)
d)

to refuse to be a witness;
not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal;
to testify to his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution;
WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to
incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is prosecuted.

ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS ARE NOT PART OF THE CUSTODIAL

INVESTIGATION. It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe
Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation, as the term should be
properly understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the
discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand.
The constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no
relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered
questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative investigation, February
9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded, the record having
thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action subsequently filed
against him as Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit
K) that he sent to his superiors on February 8, 1986, the day before the
investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was a
free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on the
ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.
His Honor adverts to what he perceives to be the "greater danger (of) the violation
of the right of any person against self-incrimination when the investigation is
conducted by the complaining parties, complaining companies, or complaining
employers because being interested parties, unlike the police agencies who have no
propriety or pecuniary interest to protect, they may in their overeagerness or
zealousness bear heavily on their hapless suspects, whether employees or not, to
give statements under an atmosphere of moral coercion, undue ascendancy, and
undue influence." It suffices to draw attention to the specific and peremptory
requirement of the law that disciplinary sanctions may not be imposed on any
employee by his employer until and unless the employee has been accorded due
process, by which is meant that the latter must be informed of the offenses
ascribed to him and afforded adequate time and opportunity to explain his side. The
requirement entails the making of statements, oral or written, by the employee
under such administrative investigation in his defense, with opportunity to solicit
the assistance of counsel, or his colleagues and friends. The employee may, of
course, refuse to submit any statement at the investigation, that is his privilege.
But if he should opt to do so, in his defense to the accusation against him, it would
be absurd to reject his statements, whether at the administrative investigation, or
at a subsequent criminal action brought against him, because he had not been
accorded, prior to his making and presenting them, his "Miranda rights" (to silence
and to counsel and to be informed thereof, etc.) which, to repeat, are relevant only
in custodial investigations. Indeed, it is self-evident that the employee's
statements, whether called "position paper," "answer," etc., are submitted by him
precisely so that they may be admitted and duly considered by the investigating
officer or committee, in negation or mitigation of his liability.
Of course the possibility cannot be discounted that in certain instances the judge's
expressed apprehensions may be realized, that violence or intimidation, undue
pressure or influence be brought to bear on an employee under investigation or
for that matter, on a person being interrogated by another whom he has
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supposedly offended. In such an event, any admission or confession wrung from

the person under interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence, on proof of the
vice or defect vitiating consent, not because of a violation of Section 20, Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution, but simply on the general, incontestable proposition that
involuntary or coerced statements may not in justice be received against the
makers thereof, and really should not be accorded any evidentiary value at all.
People vs. Pinlac [G.R. Nos. 74123-24, September 26, 1988]
THE READING OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IS NOT SUFFICIENT, THE
OFICERS MUST LIKEWISE EXPLAIN THESE RIGHTS. When the Constitution requires
a person under investigation "to be informed" of his right to remain silent and to
counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of a meaningful
information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an
abstract constitutional principle. As a rule, therefore, it would not be sufficient for a
police officer just to repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of the
Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the
latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical terms, (See People
vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312; People vs. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2). In other words, the
right of a person under interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative
obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an
effective communication that results in understanding what is conveyed. Short of
this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the person has
been "informed" of his rights. (People vs. Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289).
"The Fiscal has the duty to adduce evidence that there was compliance
with the duties of an interrogating officer As it is the obligation of
the investigating officer to inform a person under investigation of his
right to remain silent and to counsel, so it is the duty of the
prosecution to affirmatively establish compliance by the investigating
officer with his said obligation. Absent such affirmative showing, the
admission or confession made by a person under investigation cannot
be admitted in evidence.
Thus, in People vs. Ramos, supra, the Court ruled that the verbal admission of the
accused during custodial investigation was inadmissible, although he had been
apprised of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel, for the reason that
the prosecution failed to show that those rights were explained to him, such that it
could not be said that "the appraisal was sufficiently manifested and intelligently
understood" by the accused." (People vs. Nicandro supra)
Going to the instant case, We find that the evidence for the prosecution failed to
prove compliance with these constitutional rights. Furthermore, the accused was
not assisted by counsel and his alleged waiver was made without the assistance of
counsel. The record of the case is also replete with evidence which was not
satisfactorily rebutted by the prosecution, that the accused was maltreated and
tortured for seven (7) solid hours before he signed the prepared extra-judicial
confession.
Gamboa vs. Cruz [G.R. No. L-56291, June 27, 1988]
POLICE LINE-UP, NOT PART OF CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION. The right to counsel
attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts
to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the
respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be
assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced
admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for
the commission of an offense.

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Any person under investigation must, among other things, be assisted by counsel.
The above-cited provisions of the Constitution are clear. They leave no room for
equivocation. Accordingly, in several cases, this Court has consistently held that no
custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel,
engaged by the person arrested, or by any person in his behalf, or appointed by the
court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone in his behalf, and
that, while the right may be waived, the waiver shall not be valid unless made in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor General, the police line-up (at least, in
this case) was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet
entitled, at such stage, to counsel. The Solicitor General states:
"When petitioner was identified by the complainant at the police lineup, he had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The
police line-up is not a part of the custodial inquest, hence, he was not
yet entitled to counsel. Thus, it was held that when the process had
not yet shifted from the investigators to the accusatory as when police
investigation does not elicit a confession the accused may not yet avail
of the services of his lawyer (Escobedo v. Illinois of the United States
Federal Supreme Court, 378 US 478, 1964). Since petitioner in the
course of his identification in the police line-up had not yet been held
to answer for a criminal offense, he was, therefore, not deprived of his
right to be assisted by counsel because the accusatory process had not
yet set in. The police could not have violated petitioner's right to
counsel and due process as the confrontation between the State and
him had not begun. In fact, when he was identified in the police lineup by complainant he did not give any statement to the police. He
was, therefore, not interrogated at all as he was not facing a criminal
charge. Far from what he professes, the police did not, at that stage,
exact a confession to be used against him. For it was not he but the
complainant who was being investigated at that time. He "was ordered
to sit down in front of the complainant while the latter was being
investigated" (par. 3.03, Petition). Petitioner's right to counsel had not
accrued."
As may be observed, the 1973 and 1987 Philippine Constitutions go farther and
beyond the guarantee of the right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. For while, under the latter, the right to
counsel "attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have
been initiated against him (the accused)," under the 1973 and 1987 Philippine
Constitutions, the right to counsel attaches at the start of investigation against a
respondent and, therefore, even before adversary judicial proceedings against the
accused have begun.
Given the clear constitutional intent in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, to extend
to those under police investigation the right to counsel, this occasion may be better
than any to remind police investigators that, while the Court finds no real need to
afford a suspect the services of counsel during a police line-up, the moment there is
a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or
even plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from
said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the
right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel.
People vs. Macam [G.R. Nos. 91011-12, November 24, 1994]
POLICE LINE UP AFTER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION HAS STARTED SHOULD BE
WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. Historically, the counsel guarantee was
intended to assure the assistance of counsel at the trial, inasmuch as the accused
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was "confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public
prosecutor." However, as a result of the changes in patterns of police investigation,
today's accused confronts both expert adversaries and the judicial system well
before his trial begins (U.S. v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 37 L Ed 2d 619, 93 S Ct 2568
[1973]). It is therefore appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical
stages of prosecution even before the trial. The law enforcement machinery at
present involves critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings "where the result might well settle the accused's fate and reduce
the trial itself to a mere formality." A police line-up is considered a "critical" stage
of the proceedings (U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 18 L Ed 2d 1149, 87 S Ct 1926
[1967]).
After the start of the custodial investigation, any identification of an uncounseled
accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible. This is particularly true in the case
at bench where the police officers first talked to the victims before the confrontation
was held. The circumstances were such as to impart improper suggestions on the
minds of the victims that may lead to a mistaken identification. Appellants were
handcuffed and had contusions on their faces.
Navallo vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 97214, July 18, 1994]
AUDIT EXAMINATIONS ARE NOT PART OF CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION. Accusedpetitioner claims to have been deprived of his constitutional rights under Section
12, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution. Well-settled is the rule that such rights are
invocable only when the accused is under "custodial investigation," or is "in custody
investigation," which we have since defined as any "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." A person under a normal
audit examination is not under custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself
can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement officer contemplated in the above
rule.
People vs. Dy [G.R. No. 74517, February 23, 1988]
SPONTANEOUS STATEMENT NOT ELICITED THROUGH QUESTIONING IS NOT PART
OF CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION. Contrary to the defense contention, the oral
confession made by the accused to Pat. Padilla that "he had shot a tourist" and that
the gun he had used in shooting the victim was in his bar which he wanted
surrendered to the Chief of Police (t.s.n., October 17, 1984, pp. 6-9), is competent
evidence against him. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the
offense charged may be given in evidence against him (Sec. 29, Rule 130, Rules of
Court). It may in a sense be also regarded as part of the res gestae. The rule is
that, any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is
competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and
understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such
a case it must be given in substance (23 C.J.S. 196, cited in People vs. Tawat, G.R.
No. 62871, May 25, 1985, 129 SCRA 431).
What was told by the Accused to Pat. Padilla was a spontaneous statement not
elicited through questioning, but given in an ordinary manner. No written
confession was sought to be presented in evidence as a result of formal custodial
investigation. (People vs. Taylaran, G.R. No. 49149, October 31, 1981, 108 SCRA
373). The Trial Court, therefore, cannot be held to have erred in holding that
compliance with the constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation is not
applicable in the instant case, as the defense alleges in its Error VII.

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People vs. Alicando [G.R. No. 117487, December 12, 1995]

THE EXCLUSIONARY EXTENDS TO EVIDENCE OBTAINED THROUGH THE
UNCOUNSELED CONFESSION. It is not only the uncounselled confession that is
condemned as inadmissible, but also evidence derived therefrom. The pillow and
the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains were evidence derived from the
uncounselled confession illegally extracted by the police from the appellant.
We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our jurisdiction. We
have also adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of the
poisonous tree," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated
case of Nardone v. United States. According to this rule, once the primary source
(the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative
evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. Stated otherwise,
illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The "fruit
of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence,
but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence
illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because
the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.
We applied this exclusionary rule in the recent case of People vs. Salanga, et al., a
ponencia of Mr. Justice Regalado. Salanga was the appellant in the rape and killing
of a 15-year old barrio lass. He was, however, illegally arrested. Soldiers took him
into custody. They gave him a body search which yielded a lady's underwear. The
underwear was later identified as that of the victim. We acquitted Salanga. Among
other reasons, we ruled that "the underwear allegedly taken from the appellant is
inadmissible in evidence, being a so-called " fruit of the poisonous tree."
Republic Act No. 7438
Section 13 Right to Bail
Basco vs. Rapatalo [Adm. Matter No. RTJ-96-1335, March 5, 1997]
BAIL, NATURE. A better understanding of bail as an aspect of criminal procedure
entails appreciating its nature and purposes. "Bail" is the security required by the
court and given by the accused to ensure that the accused appears before the
proper court at the scheduled time and place to answer the charges brought against
him or her. In theory, the only function of bail is to ensure the appearance of the
defendant at the time set for trial. The sole purpose of confining the accused in jail
before conviction, it has been observed, is to assure his presence at the trial. In
other words, if the denial of bail is authorized in capital offenses, it is only in theory
that the proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity,
rather than face the verdict of the court. Hence the exception to the fundamental
right to be bailed should be applied in direct ratio to the extent of probability of
evasion of the prosecution. In practice, bail has also been used to prevent the
release of an accused who might otherwise be dangerous to society or whom the
judges might not want to release."
It is in view of the abovementioned practical function of bail that it is not a matter
of right in cases where the person is charged with a capital offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Article 114, section 7 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, states, "No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is
strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal action."
HEARING IS MANDATORY WHEN AN APPLICATION FOR BAIL IS MADE. When the
grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the determination of
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whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion,
remains with the judge. "This discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly
be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since
the discretion is directed to the weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot
properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious
that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be
submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross examination and to
introduce his own evidence in rebuttal."
To be sure, the discretion of the trial court, "is not absolute nor beyond control. It
must be sound, and exercised within reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion, by its
very nature involves the exercise of the judge's individual opinion and the law has
wisely provided that its exercise be guided by well-known rules which, while
allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation of his own individual views,
prevent them from getting out of control. An uncontrolled or uncontrollable
discretion on the part of a judge is a misnomer. It is a fallacy. Lord Mansfield,
speaking of the discretion to be exercised in granting or denying bail said: "But
discretion when applied to a court of justice means sound discretion guided by law.
It must be governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague and
fanciful; but legal and regular."
Consequently, in the application for bail of a person charged with a capital offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether
summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, must actually be conducted to
determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. "A
summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of receiving and
considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose
of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for the purposes of
bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any
nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against
the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further
evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to
the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as
has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the
examination and cross examination." If a party is denied the opportunity to be
heard, there would be a violation of procedural due process.
Since the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused
is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, the judge is mandated to conduct a
hearing even in cases where the prosecution chooses to just file a comment or
leave the application for bail to the discretion of the court.
Corollarily, another reason why hearing of a petition for bail is required, as can be
gleaned from the abovecited case, is for the court to take into consideration the
guidelines set forth in Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in fixing the amount
of bail. This Court, in a number of cases held that even if the prosecution fails to
adduce evidence in opposition to an application for bail of an accused, the court
may still require that it answer questions in order to ascertain not only the strength
of the state's evidence but also the adequacy of the amount of bail.
DUTIES OF THE COURTS WHENEVER AN APPLICATION FOR BAIL IS FILED BEFORE
THEM. In the light of the applicable rules on bail and the jurisprudential principles
just enunciated, this Court reiterates the duties of the trial judge in case an
application for bail is filed:
(1)

Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him
to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as
amended);

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(2)

Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused
is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion
(Sections 7 and 8, supra);

(3)

Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison, supra);

(4)

If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be
denied.
People vs. Judge Donato [G.R. No. 79269, June 5, 1991]

THE CHARACTER OF BAIL SHALL BE DETERMINED BY THE LAW IN FORCE AT THE

TIME THAT THE APPLICATION IS PENDING. Unquestionably, at the time the
original and the amended Informations for rebellion and the application for bail
were filed before the court below the penalty imposable for the offense for which
the private respondent was charged was reclusion perpetua to death. During the
pendency of the application for bail Executive Order No. 187 was issued by the
President, by virtue of which the penalty for rebellion as originally provided for in
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code was restored. The restored law was the
governing law at the time the respondent court resolved the petition for bail.
We agree with the respondent court that bail cannot be denied to the private
respondent for he is charged with the crime of rebellion as defined in Article 134 of
the Revised Penal Code to which is attached the penalty of prision mayor and a fine
not exceeding P20,000.00.
It is, therefore, a bailable offense under Section 13 of
Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides thus:
"Sec. 13.
All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be prescribed by law. The right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."
Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, also provides:
"Bail, a matter of right: exception. All persons in custody shall,
before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except
those charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the
law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for
bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is
strong."
Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a
matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than
reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute.
Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail
becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong.
The court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is
strong. But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also
becomes a matter of right. In Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, supra., We held:
"The provision on bail in our Constitution is patterned after similar
provisions contained in the Constitution of the United States and that
of many states of the Union. And it is said that:
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'The Constitution of the United States and the constitution of the many
states provide that all persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties,
except for capital offenses, where the proof is evident or the
presumption of guilt is great, and, under such provisions, bail is a
matter of right which no court or judge can properly refuse, in all
cases not embraced in the exceptions. Under such provisions bail is a
matter of right even in cases of capital offenses, unless the proof of
guilt is evident or the presumption thereof is great!"
Accordingly, the prosecution does not have the right to present evidence for the
denial of bail in the instances where bail is a matter of right. However, in the cases
where the grant of bail is discretionary, due process requires that the prosecution
must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence
that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail.
THE RIGHT TO BAIL MAY BE WAIVED. We hereby rule that the right to bail is
another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is
personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a
right recognized by law.
Even the 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes a waiver of rights guaranteed by
its Bill of Rights. Section 12(1) of Article III thereof on the right to remain silent
and to have a competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice
states:
". . . These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel."
This provision merely particularizes the form and manner of the waiver; it,
nevertheless, clearly suggests that the other rights may be waived in some other
form or manner provided such waiver will not offend Article 6 of the Civil Code.
People vs. Fortes [G.R. No. 90643, June 25, 1993]
BAIL CANNOT BE GRANTED ON AN ACCUSED WHO HAS BEEN CONVICTED OF A
CAPITAL OFFENSE EVEN IF THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION IS APPEALED. The
clear implication, therefore, is that if an accused who is charged with a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to
suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor
of discretion on the part of the court. In such a situation, the court would not have
only determined that the evidence of guilt is strong which would have been
sufficient to deny bail even before conviction it would have likewise ruled that
the accused's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Bail must not then
be granted to the accused during the pendency of his appeal from the judgment of
conviction. Construing Section 3, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
as amended, this Court, in the en banc Resolution of 15 October 1991 in People vs.
Ricardo Cortez, ruled that:
"Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with
a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall
no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the
case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence
of his guilt of the offense charged is strong."

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Comendador vs. De Villa [G.R. No. 93177, August 2, 1991]

THE RIGHT TO BAIL IS NOT AVAILABLE TO THE MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES.
We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020
has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an
exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was
suggested in Arula, where we observed that "the right to a speedy trial is given
more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist."
The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as
follows:
The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to
exempt military men from the constitutional coverage on the right to
bail.
Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous
soldiers operate within the framework of democratic system, are
allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government for the
discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of
revenues collected from the people. All other insurgent elements carry
out their activities outside of and against the existing political system.
National security considerations should also impress upon this
Honorable Court that release on bail of respondents constitutes a
damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of say 1,000 putschists
roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25,
1990 Order were sustained, on 'provisional" bail. The sheer number
alone is already discomforting. But, the truly disquieting thought is
that they could freely resume their heinous activity which could very
well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including
this Honorable Court, and replace the same with a system consonant
with their own concept of government and justice.
The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the
equal protection clause is not acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment
only of persons or things similarly situated and does not apply where the subject of
the treatment is substantially different from others. The accused officers can
complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they
cannot say they have been discriminated against because they are not allowed the
same right that is extended to civilians.
Baylon vs. Judge Sison [Adm. Matter No. 92-7-360-0, April 6, 1995]
APPLICATION FOR BAIL SHALL FOLLOW THE 3-DAY MOTION RULE. Complainant
alleges that the prosecution was not given notice of the petition for bail at least
three (3) days prior to the scheduled hearing thereof. It bears emphasis that the
petition for bail was filed in court and a copy thereof served on the prosecution on
December 21, 1991, a Saturday, and was craftily set for hearing on December 23,
1991, thereby giving the prosecution only one day, a Sunday at that, to prepare its
opposition thereto. The stratagem employed by the defense which virtually
deprived the prosecution of an opportunity to adequately counter the
representations in its petition is too obvious to be ignored. Yet respondent judge
condoned the same and aggravated the situation by the unusual and precipitate
haste with which the petition was granted by respondent judge.
On top of that, he exacerbated his disregard of settled rules of procedure by
justifying his non-observance of the three-day notice rule under Section 4, Rule 15
of the Rules of Court on the theory that the petition for bail is an urgent motion and
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may therefore be heard on shorter notice. Such ratiocination, which espouses and
reveals a distorted notion as to the true nature and conditions of the right to bail,
does violence to the well-established rule of law that bail is not a matter of right
and requires a hearing where the accused is charged with an offense which is
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Given this
contingency, respondent judge should have carefully scrutinized the validity of the
petition for bail and the veracity of its allegations, rather than cavalierly considering
it outright as an urgent motion.
There are two main arguments invoked and relied on by respondent judge to
support and justify his grant of bail to the accused, namely, that time was of the
essence, considering that the accused had been detained since October 21, 1991;
and that the prosecution failed to interpose an objection to the granting of bail and
to ask for an opportunity to prove the strength of the evidence of guilt against the
accused.
We reject the first tenuous proposition that time was of the essence, since the
ambient circumstances obtaining prior to the grant of bail could not but have
cautioned respondent judge to be more circumspect in entertaining and resolving
the petition therefore. First, the accused were charged with double murder, each of
which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, hence bail is not a matter of
right. Second, no bail was recommended in the information which was filed on the
bases of the sworn statements of several eyewitnesses to the incident, thus
constituting clear and strong evidence of the guilt of all the accused. Third, at the
time of the application for bail, there was still pending a reinvestigation of the case
being conducted by the Office of the City Prosecutor. It must be noted that the
reinvestigation was at the instance of the accused themselves, hence any resultant
delay caused by the conduct thereof is naturally and logically attributable to them.
And, finally, the guileful setting of the hearing of the petition for bail on December
23, 1991, when the same was filed only on December 21, 1991 which was a
Saturday, readily casts doubt on the good faith in and the regularity of the
procedure adopted by the defense.
Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. L-62100, May 30, 1986]

Government of the U.S. vs. Judge Puruganan [G.R. No. 148571, September
24, 2002; December 17, 2002]
FIVE POSTULATES OF EXTRADITION. The substantive issues raised in this case
require an interpretation or construction of the treaty and the law on extradition. A
cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ascertain and give effect
to its intent. Since PD 1069 is intended as a guide for the implementation of
extradition treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory, understanding certain
postulates of extradition will aid us in properly deciding the issues raised here.
1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.
First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime
by facilitating the arrest and the custodial transfer of a fugitive from one state to
the other.
With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the flight of
affluent criminals from one country to another for the purpose of committing crime
and evading prosecution has become more frequent. Accordingly, governments are
adjusting their methods of dealing with criminals and crimes that transcend
international boundaries.

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Today, a majority of nations in the world community have come to look upon
extradition as the major effective instrument of international co-operation in the
suppression of crime. It is the only regular system that has been devised to return
fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in accordance with
municipal and international law.
An important practical effect x x x of the recognition of the principle
that criminals should be restored to a jurisdiction competent to try and
punish them is that the number of criminals seeking refuge abroad will be
reduced. For to the extent that efficient means of detection and the threat
of punishment play a significant role in the deterrence of crime within the
territorial limits of a State, so the existence of effective extradition
arrangements and the consequent certainty of return to the locus delicti
commissi play a corresponding role in the deterrence of flight abroad in
order to escape the consequence of crime. x x x. From an absence of
extradition arrangements flight abroad by the ingenious criminal receives
direct encouragement and thus indirectly does the commission of crime
itself.
In Secretary v. Lantion we explained:
The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing
crimes and one way to do it is to facilitate the extradition of persons
covered by treaties duly entered [into] by our government. More and more,
crimes are becoming the concern of one world. Laws involving crimes and
crime prevention are undergoing universalization. One manifest purpose of
this trend towards globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal whose
activities threaten the peace and progress of civilized countries. It is to the
great interest of the Philippines to be part of this irreversible movement in
light of its vulnerability to crimes, especially transnational crimes.
Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an
expanding ring of international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an
isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states in order to improve our
chances of suppressing crime in our own country.
2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have
examined, and that both accept and trust, each others legal system and judicial
process. More pointedly, our duly authorized representatives signature on an
extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and the willingness of the
other state to protect the basic rights of the person sought to be extradited. That
signature signifies our full faith that the accused will be given, upon extradition to
the requesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criminal proceedings that
will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have been signed, or would
have been directly attacked for its unconstitutionality.
3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, extradition proceedings
are not criminal in nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of the
accused are at fore; in extradition which is sui generis -- in a class by itself -- they
are not.
An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis.
It is not a criminal
proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition
does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused.
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His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he
will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only
relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be
invoked by an extraditee x x x.
There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a
criminal proceeding. An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while
criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In contradistinction to a
criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow
admission of evidence under less stringent standards. In terms of the
quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited
upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case. Finally, unlike in a
criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered
final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual
extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him. The
United States adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State
exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the
demands of the nations foreign relations before making the ultimate
decision to extradite.
Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to
ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the person sought to be extradited. Such
determination during the extradition proceedings will only result in needless
duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial
assistance through which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored
to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. It is not part of the function
of the assisting authorities to enter into questions that are the prerogative of that
jurisdiction. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to
determine whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty,
and whether the person sought is extraditable.
4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the
Extradition Treaty, and our legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries
the presumption that its implementation will serve the national interest.
Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity with the
requesting state. On the other hand, failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder
paints a bad image of our country before the world community. Such failure would
discourage other states from entering into treaties with us, particularly an
extradition treaty that hinges on reciprocity.
Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our
obligations under the Treaty. This principle requires that we deliver the accused to
the requesting country if the conditions precedent to extradition, as set forth in the
Treaty, are satisfied. In other words, [t]he demanding government, when it has
done all that the treaty and the law require it to do, is entitled to the delivery of the
accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the other government is under
obligation to make the surrender. Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and
in a position to deliver the accused, should it be found proper.
5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie
presumption finds reinforcement in the experience of the executive branch: nothing
short of confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the
requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the requesting state.
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The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought
to be extradited have a propensity to flee. Indeed, extradition hearings would not
even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to trial in the requesting
country. Prior acts of herein respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state right
before the conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the
requested state despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return and
that the crimes he is charged with are bailable -- eloquently speak of his aversion
to the processes in the requesting state, as well as his predisposition to avoid them
at all cost. These circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying high risk of
flight. He has demonstrated that he has the capacity and the will to flee. Having
fled once, what is there to stop him, given sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a
second time?
THE RIGHT TO BAIL DOES NOT APPLY IN EXTRADITION CASES. We agree with
petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word conviction, the constitutional
provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of
Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because
extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence
in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as
thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply
to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended does not detract
from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal
proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus finds application only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. Hence, the second
sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail
in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to
mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not
criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the
United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. To stress,
extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for
which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal
cases against him, not before the extradition court.
EXCEPTIONS IN THE NON-APPLICABILITY OF THE RIGHT TO BAIL ON EXTRADITION
CASES. The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition
cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of
discretion and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect and
enforce constitutional rights. Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process
is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the
right to due process extends to the life, liberty or property of every person. It is
dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application.
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after
a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail
may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing
showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a
danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and
compelling circumstancesi[71] including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the
highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition
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cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is
derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant
bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity,
precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is basically
an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential power to
conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of the nature of police
assistance amongst states, which is not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any
intrusion by the courts into the exercise of this power should be characterized by
caution, so that the vital international and bilateral interests of our country will not
be unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short, while this Court is ever
protective of the sporting idea of fair play, it also recognizes the limits of its own
prerogatives and the need to fulfill international obligations.
Government of Hong Kong vs. Hon. Olalia [G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007]
EXCEPTIONS IN THE GENERAL RULE. The modern trend in public international
law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the
sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may
properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable
doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to states was
dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one, the
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the unprecedented
spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of the laws of
war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the
Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and
crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant
events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations
and states gave recognition and importance to human rights. Thus, on December
10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental
rights of every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles
contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily
binding upon the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff
v. Director of Prisons,1[2] this Court, in granting bail to a prospective
deportee, held that under the Constitution,2[3] the principles set forth in
that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General
Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
which the Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined
therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed
to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our
Constitution which provides: The State values the dignity of every human person
and guarantees full respect for human rights. The Philippines, therefore, has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and
due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of
the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine
authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention
such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies
include the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the

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exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various
international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly
the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Courts ruling in Purganan is in
order.
First, we note that the exercise of the States power to deprive an individual of his
liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings.
Respondents in
administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine,3[4] have
likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our
jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the
right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons
who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in
this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of
administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the
Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights.
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco4[5] is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing
deportation for failure to secure the necessary certificate of registration was
granted bail pending his appeal. After noting that the prospective deportee had
committed no crime, the Court opined that To refuse him bail is to treat him as a
person who has committed the most serious crime known to law; and that while
deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery used is the
machinery of criminal law. Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to
deportation proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons5[6] and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration,6[7]
this Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges
have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an order of
deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal
declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainees right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not
also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no
reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are
administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is
not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction
must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines
concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these
treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines
should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law)
defines extradition as the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the
object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting
state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation
directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal
or criminal law of the requesting state or government.

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Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by
treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its
territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him
to the demanding state.7[8] It is not a criminal proceeding.8[9] Even if the potential
extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it
is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow
extradition.9[10]
It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations
It is not a trial to determine the guilt or
between different nations.10[11]
innocence of the potential extraditee.11[12]
Nor is it a full-blown civil
action, but one that is merely administrative in character.12[13] Its object is
to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his
return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.13[14]
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the
following:
(a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential
extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition
is also the machinery of criminal law. This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No.
1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the immediate arrest and
temporary detention of the accused if such will best serve the interest of
justice. We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state in case of
urgency to ask for the provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of
the request for extradition; and that release from provisional arrest shall not
prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is
received subsequently.
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all
earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to
arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the
demanding state following the proceedings. Temporary detention may be a
necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention
should be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and
remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his
admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for over two (2)
years without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an
extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to
liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the
extradition court to grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee,
however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a
right to due process under the Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in
criminal proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the
presumption of innocence of the accused. As Purganan correctly points out, it is
from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail
arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind
the issuance of the arrest warrant and the temporary detention is the possibility

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of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such
extraditee is a fugitive from justice.14[15] Given the foregoing, the prospective
extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight
risk and should be granted bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines
honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a
setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it
does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines
should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process.
More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also
by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not,
therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain
standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in
granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in
criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases.
While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in
administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which
is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his
Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed clear and convincing
evidence should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to
him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher
than preponderance of evidence.
The potential extraditee must prove by clear
and convincing evidence that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the
orders and processes of the extradition court.

Rule 114, Revised Rules of Court

Section 14
Criminal Due Process
Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. Nos. L-72335-39, March 21, 1988]
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the
Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the
accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law
governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance
with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the
prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the
fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but
under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in
Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the
inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close
to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the
circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of
the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative
assumption that "the delay may be due to a painstaking and gruelling scrutiny by
the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary
investigation merited prosecution of a former high ranking government official." In
the first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which
must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the

127

petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and
liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve
complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and gruelling
scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the
preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and
alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more
substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of
three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case.
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary
investigation should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a
preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of the information. True-but
the absence of a preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving the accused
such investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary investigation
can not be corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a device for setting
back time.
After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we are
constrained to hold that the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary
investigation and filing the information in the instant case is violative of the
constitutionally guaranteed right of the petitioner to due process and to a speedy
disposition of the cases against him. Accordingly, the informations in Criminal Cases
Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503 should be dismissed. In view of the
foregoing, we find it unnecessary to rule on the other issues raised by petitioner.
Galman vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 72670, September 12, 1986]
The fact of the secret Malacaang conference of January 10, 1985 at which the
authoritarian President discussed with the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan
and the entire prosecution panel the matter of the imminent filing of the criminal
charges against all the twenty-six accused (as admitted by respondent Justice
Fernandez to have been confirmed by him to the then President's "Coordinator"
Manuel Lazaro on the preceding day) is not denied. It is without precedent. This
was illegal under our penal laws, supra. This illegality vitiated from the very
beginning all proceedings in the Sandiganbayan court headed by the very Presiding
Justice who attended. As the Commission noted: "The very acts of being summoned
to Malacaang and their ready acquiescence thereto under the circumstances then
obtaining, are in themselves pressure dramatized and exemplified. ... Verily, it can
be said that any avowal of independent action or resistance to presidential pressure
became illusory from the very moment they stepped inside Malacanang Palace on
January 10, 1985."
No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions" from the
very President who by an amendatory decree (disclosed only at the hearing of oral
arguments on November 8, 1984 on a petition challenging the referral of the
Aquino-Galman murder cases to the Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan instead of to
a court martial, as mandatory required by the known P.D. 1850 at the time
providing for exclusive jurisdiction of courts martial over criminal offenses
committed by military men made it possible to refer the cases to the
Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial court, which is the very essence of due process
of law. As the writer then wrote, "jurisdiction over cases should be determined by
law, and not by preselection of the Executive, which could be much too easily
transformed into a means of predetermining the outcome of individual cases. "This
criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public
respondents at the secret Malacanang conference (and revealed only after fifteen
months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent
Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. This renders moot and irrelevant for
now the extensive arguments of respondents accused, particularly Generals Ver and
Olivas and those categorized as accessories, that there has been no evidence or
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witness suppressed against them, that the erroneous conclusions of Olivas as police
investigator do not make him an accessory of the crimes he investigated and the
appraisal and evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses presented and
suppressed. There will be time and opportunity to present all these arguments and
considerations at the remand and retrial of the cases herein ordered before a
neutral and impartial court.
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of
justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law
and justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to
be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress
the truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and
committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or
protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor
and removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice. More so, in the case at
bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity
of our judicial system is at stake. In life, as an accused before the military tribunal,
Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to due process of law
and trial in the regular civil courts before an impartial court with an unbiased
prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the victim of the "treacherous and vicious
assassination" and the relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties
plead once more for due process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with
an unbiased prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock
trial the non-trial of the century-and that the pre-determined judgment of acquittal
was unlawful and void ab initio.
Alonte vs. Savellano [G.R. No. 131652, March 9, 1998]
INDISPENSABLE ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS. It does seem to the
Court that there has been undue precipitancy in the conduct of the proceedings.
Perhaps the problem could have well been avoided had not the basic procedures
been, to the Court's perception taken lightly. And in this shortcoming, looking at
the records of the case, the trial court certainly is not alone to blame.
Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution provides the
fundamentals.
"(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law.
"(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable."
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular,
require (a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial
power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully
acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is given an
opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful
hearing.
The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and
deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and
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indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in
the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be met
without a "law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and
renders judgment only after trial."
Presumption of Innocence
People vs. Dramayo [G.R. No. L-21325, October 29, 1971]
ACCUSATION IS NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH GUILT. It is to be admitted that the
starting point is the presumption of innocence. So it must be, according to the
Constitution. That is a right safeguarded both appellants. Accusation is not,
according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the
prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called
upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the
requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt must
be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard, this Court has always been
committed. There is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony
of the state, both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense is
offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could
arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person
on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is
thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into
account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest
suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be
satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense
charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime.
What is required then is moral certainty.
So it has been held from the 1903 decision of United States v. Reyes. United States
v. Lasada, decided in 1910, yields this excerpt: "By reasonable doubt is not meant
that which of possibility may arise, but it is that doubt engendered by an
investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the
mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not
demanded by the law to convict of any criminal charge but moral certainty is
required, and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to
constitute the offense." To the same effect is an excerpt form the opinion of the late
Justice Tuason in People v. Esquivel. Thus; "In this connection it may not be out of
place to bring to the attention of prosecuting attorneys the absolute necessity of
laying before the court the pertinent facts as their disposal with methodical and
meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in
their evidence, to the end that the court's mind may not be tortured by doubts, that
the innocent may not suffer and the guilty not escape unpunished. Obvious to all,
this is the prosecution's prime duty to the court, to the accused, and to the state."
It is understandable why the stress should be on the absence of sufficient evidence
to establish the guilt of appellants beyond reasonable doubt, the defense of alibi
interposed hardly meriting any further discussion. It cannot be denied though that
the credible and competent evidence of record resulted in moral certainty being
entertained not only by the trial judge but by us as to the culpability of appellants.
The force of the controlling doctrines, on the other hand, required that the other
three accused be acquitted precisely because, unlike in the case of appellants, the
requisite quantum of proof to show guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not present.
There is no question as to the other two who testified for the state being likewise
no long subject to any criminal liability. The reference then to opinion of the late
Justice Laurel, stressing the need for adhering to the fundamental postulate that a
finding of guilt is allowable only when no reasonable doubt could be entertained, is
unavailing. This is evident from the very citation in the brief of appellants of the
opinion of Justice Laurel in People v. Manoji. Thus: "Upon the other hand there are
130

certain facts which if taken together are sufficient to raise in the mind of the court a
grave doubt as to the guilt of the defendant-appellant, 'that doubt engendered by
an investigation of the whole proof and an inability after such investigation, to let
the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.' (U.S. v. Lasada [1910], 18 Phil. 90,
96.) The finding of the two gold teeth of the deceased the suitcase of Maradani, and
the testimony of Erajio Ello that he gave the hat ... to Maradani not only engender
serious doubt in our minds as to the guilt of the appellant but also seems to sustain
the theory of the defense and strengthen the suspicion of the trial court, that
Maradani and Salupudin are not foreign to, or entirely ignorant of, the killing of
Seijin Ige. In the light of the facts and circumstances of record, we feel that it is
better to acquit a man upon the ground of reasonable doubt, even though he may
in reality be guilty, than to confine in the penitentiary for the rest of his natural life
a person who may be innocent. ..." The facts of the present case certainly do not
fit within the above mold. Reliance on the part of appellants on the above decision
is therefore futile.
Dumlao vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. L-52245, January 22, 1980]
PRESUMPTION OF GUILT UPON THE FILING OF CHARGES VIOLATES THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE. In so far as the petition of Igot
and Salapantan are concerned, the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted in full earlier, and which they challenged, may be divided
in two parts. The first provides:
"a
judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes
shall be conclusive evidence of such fact. . . . "
The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal principle. We are
aware of the presumption of validity that attached to a challenged statute, of the
well-settled principle that "all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of
constitutionality," and that Courts will not set aside a statute as constitutionally
defective "except in a clear case." (People vs. Vera, supra). We are constrained to
hold that this in one such clear case.
Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to
be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An
accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The
challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a
candidate is disqualified from running from public office on the ground alone that
charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns
before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no
distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against
whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to
run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that
charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a
person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it
the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of
the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and
therefore, may be rebutted, yet, there is "clear and present danger" that because
the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts
of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence
against him.
Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before
the Courts rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A
highly possible conflict of finding between two government bodies, to the extreme
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detriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a

legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be
substituted for a judicial determination.
Marquez vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 112889, April 18, 1995]
Petitioner's position is perspicuous and to the point. The law, he asseverates, needs
no further interpretation and construction. Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160,
is rather clear, he submits, and it disqualifies "fugitive from justice" includes not
only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who,
after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support
from jurisprudence (Philippine Law Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 399, by F.B.
Moreno; Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 671; King vs. Noe, 244 S.C. 344,
137 S.E. 2d 102, 103; Hughes vs. PFlanz, 138 Federal Reporter 980; Tobin vs.
Casaus, 275 Pacific Reporter, 2d., p. 792), and it may be so conceded as
expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.
Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon law by the officials
in charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas
Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166, 181). The
Court certainly agrees; however, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity
in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An
administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must
remain congruent to it. The Court believes and thus holds, albeit with some
personal reservations of the ponente (expressed during the Court's en banc
deliberations), that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from
justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final
judgment." is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not, in
fact, private respondent is a "fugitive from justice" as such term must be
interpreted and applied in the light of the Court's opinion. The omission is
understandable since the COMELEC dismissed outrightly the petition for quo
warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated
by the Oversight Committee. The Court itself, not being a trier of facts, is thus
constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination of this
unresolved factual matter.
Corpus vs. People [G.R. No. 74259, February 14, 1991]
EQUIPOISE RULE. The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only
where the evidence of the parties is evenly balanced, in which case the
constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the
accused. There is no such equipoise here. The evidence of the prosecution is
overwhelming and has not been overcome by the petitioner with his nebulous
claims of persecution and conspiracy. The presumed innocence of the accused must
yield to the positive finding that he malversed the sum of P50,310.87 to the
prejudice of the public whose confidence he has breached. His conviction must be
affirmed.
Feeder International Line vs. CA [G.R. No. 94262 May 31, 1991]
Before we proceed to a discussion of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, it
bears mention that petitioner, which is a corporate entity, has no personality to
invoke the right to be presumed innocent which right is available only to an
individual who is an accused in a criminal case.

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Right to be Heard by Himself and Counsel

People vs. Holgado [G.R. No. L-2809, March 22, 1950]
DUTIES OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE WHENEVER AN ACCUSED APPEARS BEFORE IT
WITHOUT COUNSEL. The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from the
beginning. It is expressly provided in our Rules of Court, Rule 112, section 3, that:
"If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by
the court that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned,
and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney. If he desires and
is unable to employ attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio
to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring
attorney."
Under this provision, when a defendant appears without attorney, the court has
four important duties to comply with: 1 It must inform the defendant that it is
his right to have attorney before being arraigned; 2 After giving him such
information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney; 3 If he
desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio
to defend him; and 4 If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own
the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor.
One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no
person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law",
and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In
criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an
opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it
does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or
educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules
of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty
but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen
more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that
the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a
constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is
not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is
not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential
that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or
grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.
People vs. Agbayani [G.R. No. 122770, January 16, 1998]
THE FAILURE OF THE RECORDS TO DISCLOSE THAT THE ACCUSED WAS INFORMED
OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL DOES NOT CONSTITUTE VIOLATION OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. This obviously means that the appointment had taken
place earlier. The trial court's order of 22 December 1994 states that said de oficio
counsel were "duly appointed by the Court with the consent of the accused." Since
appellant has miserably failed to show that he was not informed of his right to
counsel, the presumptions that the law has been obeyed and official duty has been
regularly performed by the trial court stand. In other words, the trial court is
presumed to have complied with its four-fold duties under Section 6 of Rule 116 of
the Rules of Court, namely, (1) to inform the accused that he has the right to have
his own counsel before being arraigned; (2) after giving such information, to ask
accused whether he desires the aid of counsel; (3) if he so desires to procure the
services of counsel, the court must grant him reasonable time to do so; and (4) if
he so desires to have counsel but is unable to employ one, the court must assign
counsel de oficio to defend him.

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It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge
advised the accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse
conviction. The reason being that the trial court must be presumed to have
complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases,
and that such a presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative showing to
the contrary. Thus it has been held that unless the contrary appears in the record,
or that it is positively proved that the trial court failed to inform the accused of his
right to counsel, it will be presumed that the accused was informed by the court of
such right.
In U .S. v. Labial, this Court held:
Adhering to the doctrine laid down in that case, the only question to be
determined in this case is whether the failure of the record to disclose
affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of their right to
have counsel is sufficient ground to reverse the judgment of conviction
and to send the case back for a new trial. Upon this point we are all
agreed that in the absence of an affirmative showing that the court
below did in fact fail to advise the accused of their rights under the
provisions of sections 17 of General Orders No. 58, as amended by
section 1 of Act No. 440, the mere omission from the record brought
here upon appeal of an entry affirmatively disclosing that he did so, is
not reversible error.
In the absence of an affirmative showing to the contrary, the court below must be
presumed in matters of this kind to have complied with the provisions of law
prescribing the procedure to be followed in the trial had before him.
While in People v. Miranda this Court explicitly stated:
However, said counsel calls attention to the fact that the record is
silent as to whether or not, at the time appellant was arraigned, the
trial court informed him of his right to be assisted by an attorney,
under section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
This precise issue was determined in United States vs. Labial (27 Phil. 87, 88), in
the sense that unless the contrary appears in the records, it will be presumed that
the defendant was informed by the court of his right to counsel. ". . . If we should
insist on finding every fact fully recorded before a citizen can be punished for an
offense against the laws, we should destroy public justice, and give unbridled
license to crime. Much must be left to intendment and presumption, for it is often
less difficult to do things correctly than to describe them correctly." (United States
vs. Labial, supra.) The same doctrine was reiterated in People vs. Abuyen (52 Phil.
722) and in United States vs. Custan (28 Phil. 19). We see no reason to modify it
now.
Amion vs. Judge Chiongson [A.M. No. RTJ-97-1371, January 22, 1999]
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO BE HEARED BY COUNSEL
CANNOT BE EXERCISED TO THE PREJUDICE OF OTHER PARTIES. The claim of
accused-complainant that respondent judge's appointment of a counsel de oficio
constitutes a clear violation of his right to due process and a deprivation of his
constitutional right to be defended by counsel of his own choice cannot be
countenanced by this Court.
An examination of related provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to
counsel, will show that the "preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more aptly
and specifically to a person under investigation rather than one who is the accused
in a criminal prosecution.

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Even if we were to extend the application of the concept of "preference in the

choice of counsel" to an accused in a criminal prosecution, such preferential
discretion cannot partake of a discretion so absolute and arbitrary as would make
the choice of counsel refer exclusively to the predilection of the accused.
As held by this Court in the case of People vs. Barasina:
"Withal, the word "preferably" under Section 12(1), Article 3 of the
1987 Constitution does not convey the message that the choice of a
lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude
other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling his
defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial
investigation, will be solely in the hands of the accused who can
impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply
selecting a lawyer, who for one reason or another, is not available to
protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been
contemplated by the framers of the charter"
Applying this principle enunciated by the Court, we may likewise say that the
accused's discretion in a criminal prosecution with respect to his choice of counsel is
not so much as to grant him a plenary prerogative which would preclude other
equally competent and independent counsels from representing him. Otherwise, the
pace of a criminal prosecution will be entirely dictated by the accused to the
detriment of the eventual resolution of the case.
Accused-complainant was not, in any way, deprived of his substantive and
constitutional right to due process as he was duly accorded all the opportunities to
be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense but he forfeited this
right, for not appearing in court together with his counsel at the scheduled
hearings.
Accused-complainant had more than sufficient time and every available opportunity
to present his side which would have led to the expeditious termination of the case.
A party cannot feign denial of due process when he had the opportunity to present
his side.
Moreover, there is no denial of the right to counsel where a counsel de oficio was
appointed during the absence of the accused's counsel de parte pursuant to the
court's desire to finish the case as early as practicable under the continuous trial
system.
Thus, it has been held by this Court in the case of Lacambra v. Ramos:
"The Court cannot help but note the series of legal maneuvers
resorted to and repeated importunings of the accused or his counsel,
which resulted in the protracted trial of the case, thus making a
mockery of the judicial process, not to mention the injustice caused
by the delay to the victim's family."
Undoubtedly, it was accused-complainant's own strategic machinations which
brought upon the need for the appointment of a counsel de oficio in as much as the
criminal case had been dragging on its lethargic course.

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Right to be Informed of the Nature and Cause of Accusation

People vs. Quitlong [G.R. No. 121562, July 10, 1998]
Overwhelming, such as it may have been thought of by the trial court, evidence of
conspiracy is not enough for an accused to bear and to respond to all its grave legal
consequences; it is equally essential that such accused has been apprised when the
charge is made conformably with prevailing substantive and procedural
requirements. Article III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution, in particular,
mandates that no person shall be held answerable for a criminal offense without
due process of law and that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall first be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.ii[17] The right to be
informed of any such indictment is likewise explicit in procedural rules.iii[18] The
practice and object of informing an accused in writing of the charges against him
has been explained as early as the 1904 decision of the Court in U.S. vs.
Karelsen;iv[19] viz:
First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge
against him as will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail
himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further
prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts
alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a
conviction, if one should be had. (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.,
542). In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated,
not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent;
these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of
time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short,
the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and
circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged.
An information, in order to ensure that the constitutional right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of his accusation is not violated, must state the
name of the accused; the designation given to the offense by the statute; a
statement of the acts or omissions so complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate time and date of the commission of
the offense; and the place where the offense has been committed.v[20] In
embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the information must set
forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability
of the accused so that the accused can properly prepare for and undertake his
defense. One such fact or circumstance in a complaint against two or more
accused persons is that of conspiracy. Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary
recital of fact which, if not excepted from or objected to during trial, may be
corrected or supplied by competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy, or
one that would impute criminal liability to an accused for the act of another or
others, is indispensable in order to hold such person, regardless of the nature and
extent of his own participation, equally guilty with the other or others in the
commission of the crime. Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated,
the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance,
the act of one being imputable to all the others.vi[21] Verily, an accused must know
from the information whether he faces a criminal responsibility not only for his acts
but also for the acts of his co-accused as well.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy
or allege all the details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have
performed, the evidence proving the common design or the facts connecting all the
accused with one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to
describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity required in describing a
substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a statement of the
facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise language,
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with as much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can
enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended, and with such
precision that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent
indictment based on the same facts. It is said, generally, that an indictment may be
held sufficient "if it follows the words of the statute and reasonably informs the
accused of the character of the offense he is charged with conspiring to commit, or,
following the language of the statute, contains a sufficient statement of an overt act
to effect the object of the conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and the
contemplated crime in the language of the respective statutes defining them."
Pecho vs. People [G.R. No. 111399, September 27, 1996]
AN ACCUSED MAY BE CONVICTED OF AN OFFENSE WHICH IS NECESSARILY
INCLUDED IN OR NECESSARILY INCLUDES THE OFFENSE PROVEN. In short, we
held that although the petitioner could not be convicted of the crime charged, viz.,
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended -- because the said section
penalizes only consummated offenses and the offense charged in this case was not
consummated -- he could, nevertheless, be convicted of the complex crime of
attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents, which
is necessarily included in the crime charged.
Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides:
"Sec. 4.
Judgment in case of variance between allegation and
proof. When there is variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information, and that proved or established by the
evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily
includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the
offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense
charged included in that which is proved.
Analyzing this provision, this Court stated in Esquerra vs. People:
"Stated differently, an accused may be convicted of an offense
provided it is included in the charge, or of an offense charged which is
included in that proved. Still stated differently, an accused can be
convicted of an offense only when it is both charged and proved. If it is
not charged although proved, or if it is not proved although charged,
the accused cannot be convicted thereof. In other words, variance
between the allegation and proof cannot justify conviction for either
the offense charged or the offense proved unless either is included in
the other."
Section of Rule 120 states when an offense includes or is included in the other:
"Sec. 5.
When an offense includes or is included in another. An
offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some
of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is
alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an
offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when
the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of
those constituting the latter.
In view of the aforesaid rules, it follows then that:
"a.

When the offense proved is less serious than, and is necessarily

included in, the offense charged (as when the offense proved is
homicide and the offense charged is murder), in which case the

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defendant shall be convicted of the offense proved (U.S. vs.

Macalintal, 2 Phil. 448; . . .).
b.

When the offense proved is more serious than and includes the
offense charged (as when the offense proved is serious physical
injuries and the offense charged is slight physical injuries), in
which case the defendant shall be convicted only of the offense
charged (U.S. vs. Guzman, 8 Phil. 21)."

As earlier adverted to, the evidence established by the prosecution proves beyond
reasonable doubt that the crime of estafa was only at its attempted stage and that
it was sought to be consummated through the falsification of the following
documents: the packing list (Exhibit "A-3") and Invoice (Exhibit "A-4"), which
appear to be prepared by the exporter, Kowa Tsusho Co. Ltd. through one Masayuki
Higuchi, its general manager; Bill of Lading (Exhibit "A-5") which appears to be
issued in Yokohama by the Kisen Kaishe Ltd.; the sworn Import Entry Declaration
(Exhibit "A-6") all of which show that the cargoes imported were "agricultural disc
blades and irrigation water pumps; as well as the Import Entry and Internal
Revenue Declaration signed by customs broker Constantino Calica and prepared on
the basis of the foregoing documents. The falsifications consist in making it appear
that the importer-consignee indicated is a legitimate importer or an existing
importer which had participated in such importation and authorized the accused to
request the release of the imported articles although, in truth, it is non-existent
and, therefore, had no participation in the importation; and in the untruthful
statements that what were imported were agricultural disc blades and irrigation
water pumps when in truth they were automotive diesel engines.
Soriano vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. L-65952, July 31, 1984]
THE DESCRIPTION IN THE COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION CONTROLS OVER THE
DESIGNATION OF THE OFFENSE. The principal issue in this petition to review a
decision of the Sandiganbayan is whether or not the preliminary investigation of a
criminal complaint conducted by a Fiscal is a "contract or transaction" so as to bring
it within the ambit of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The petitioner also claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under the Revised
Penal Code because to do so would be violative of his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Wrong. A reading
of the information which has been reproduced herein clearly makes out a case of
bribery so that the petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the right to be informed.
Borja vs. Mendoza [G.R. No. L-45667, June 20, 1977]
ARRAIGNMENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUIREMENT OF THE RIGHT OF THE
ACCUSED TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION
AGAINST HIM. An arraignment thus becomes indispensable as the means "for
bringing the accused into court and notifying him of the cause he is required to
meet . . ." Its importance was stressed by Justice Moreland as early as 1916 in the
leading case of United States v. Binayoh. He pointed out that upon the accused
being arraigned, "there is a duty laid by the Code [now the Rules of Court] upon
the court to inform [him] of certain rights and to extend to him, on his demand,
certain others. This duty is an affirmative one which the court, on its own motion,
must perform, unless waived." To emphasize its importance, he added: "No such
duty, however, is laid on the court with regard to the rights of the accused which he
may be entitled to exercise during the trial. Those are rights which he must assert
himself and the benefits of which he himself must demand. In other words, in the
arraignment the court must act of its own volition, . . . ." In the terse and apt

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language of the Solicitor General: "Arraignment is an indispensable requirement in

any criminal prosecution." Procedural due process demands no less.
Nor is it only the due process guarantee that calls for the accused being duly
arraigned. As noted, it is at that stage where in the mode and manner required by
the Rules, an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the
precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative that he is thus made fully aware
of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime
imputed to him. At the very least then, he must be fully informed of why the
prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him. An arraignment serves that
purpose. Thereafter, he is no longer in the dark. It is true, the complaint or
information may not be worded with sufficient clarity. He would be in a much worse
position though if he does not even have such an opportunity to plead to the
charge. With his counsel by his side, he is thus in a position to enter his plea with
full knowledge of the consequences. He is not even required to do so immediately.
He may move to quash. What is thus evident is that an arraignment assures that he
be fully acquainted with the nature of the crime imputed to him and the
circumstances under which it is allegedly committed. It is thus a vital aspect of the
constitutional rights guaranteed him. It is not useless formality, much less an idle
ceremony.
Right to Speedy, Impartial and Public Trial
People vs. Tee [G.R. Nos. 140546-47, January 20, 2003]
RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL. A speedy trial means a trial conducted according to the
law of criminal procedure and the rules and regulations, free from vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays. In Conde v. Rivera and Unson, 45 Phil. 650, 652
(1924), the Court held that "where a prosecuting officer, without good cause,
secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a
reasonable period of time, as in this instance, for more than a year, the accused is
entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the
information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his
freedom."
The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative. A determination as to whether
the right has been violated involves the weighing of several factors such as the
length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the conduct of the prosecution and
the accused, and the efforts exerted by the defendant to assert his right, as well as
the prejudice and damage caused to the accused.
The Speedy Trial Act of 1998, provides that the trial period for criminal cases in
general shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. However, in determining the right
of an accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical
computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the
case. The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when: (1) the proceedings
are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or (2) when
unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; or (3) when without cause or
justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having
his case tried.
Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or
discharge from custody. What is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention
as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of habeas corpus, for
even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of same
supervening events such as the instances mentioned in Section 4, Rule 102, be no
longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Any such supervening
events are the issuance of a judicial process preventing the discharge of the
detained person.
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As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondents rests
on the petitioner who attaches such restraints. Whether the return sets forth
process where on its face shows good ground for the detention of the petitioner, it
is incumbent on him to allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the
apparent effects of such process.
Moreover, the petitioner, in his motion for reconsideration with the CID, offered to
post a bail bond for his provisional release to enable him to secure the necessary
documents to establish the appropriate grounds for his permanent stay in the
Philippines. By offering to post a bail bond, the petitioner thereby admitted that he
was under the custody of the CID and voluntarily accepted the jurisdiction of the
CID.
Flores vs. People [G.R. No. L-25769, December 10, 1974]
WHEN PROCEEDINGS ANTERIOR TO THE TRIAL IS DELAYED, THE TRIAL IS
LIKEWISE DELAYED. The constitutional right to a speedy trial, as was noted in a
recent decision, Acebedo v. Sarmiento, "means one free from vexatious, capricious
and oppressive delays, . . ."
Thus, if the person accused were innocent, he may
within the shortest time possible be spared from anxiety and apprehension arising
from a prosecution, and if culpable, he will not be kept long in suspense as to the
fate in store for him, within a period of course compatible with his opportunity to
present any valid defense. As was also pointed out in Sarmiento: "The remedy in
the event of a non-observance of this right is by habeas corpus if the accused were
restrained of his liberty, or by certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus for the final
dismissal of the case."
The above ruling is a reiteration of the doctrine
announced, even before the 1935 Constitution, in Conde v. Rivera,
a 1924
decision. In that case, Justice Malcolm announced categorically that the trial, to
comply with the requirement of the then organic law, the Philippine Autonomy Act,
must be "free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays."
Further: "We
lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good
cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond
a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is
entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the
information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his
freedom."
In the first Supreme Court decision after the 1935 Constitution took effect, People
v. Castaeda,
where it was shown that the criminal case had been dragging on
for almost five years and that when the trial did finally take place, it was tainted by
irregularities, this Court set aside the appealed decision of conviction and acquitted
the accused. As was pointed out by the ponente, Justice Laurel: "The Government
should be the last to set an example of delay and oppression in the administration
of justice and it is the moral and legal obligation of this court to see that the
criminal proceedings against the accused come to an end and that they be
immediately discharged from the custody of the law."
It was on the basis of the
above judgment that the dismissal of a second information for frustrated homicide
was ordered by this Court, where the evidence disclosed that the first information
had been dismissed after a lapse of one year and seven months from the time the
original complaint was filed during which time on the three occasions the case was
set for trial, the private prosecutor twice asked for postponements and once the
trial court itself cancelled the entire calendar for the month it was supposed to have
been heard.
The same result followed in Esguerra v. De la Costa,
where the
first complaint was filed on August 29, 1936, the accused having been criminally
prosecuted for an alleged abuse of chastity in a justice of the peace court but after
over a year and three months, with the lower court twice dismissing the case, he
still had to face trial for the same offense on a new information, thus compelling
him to resort to a mandamus suit to compel the lower court to terminate the case
140

was his right to a speedy trial was violated, a remedy deemed appropriate by this
Court.
There was another occasion where Justice Laurel spoke for this Court on this
specific issue. That was in Mercado v. Santos.
Here, for a period of about twenty
months, the accused was arrested four times on the charge of falsifying his
deceased wife's will. Twice, the complaints were subsequently withdrawn. The third
time he was prosecuted on the same charge, he was able to obtain a dismissal.
Then came on the part of the provincial fiscal, a motion for reinvestigation. The
lower court was in a receptive mood. It ordered that the case be heard on the
merits. The accused moved to dismiss, but he did not succeed. He tried the Court
of Appeals, but he failed again. He elevated the matter to this Court; he prevailed.
It was stressed in Justice Laurel's opinion: "An accused person is entitled to a trial
at the earliest opportunity. . . . He cannot be oppressed by delaying the
commencement of trial for an unreasonable length of time. If the proceedings
pending trial are deferred, the trial itself is necessarily delayed."
The opinion
likewise considered as not decisive the fact that the provincial fiscal did not
intervene until an information was filed charging the accused with the crime of
falsification the third time. Thus: "The Constitution does not say that the right to a
speedy trial may be availed of only where the prosecution for crime is commenced
and undertaken by the fiscal. It does not exclude from its operation cases
commenced by private individuals. Where once a person is prosecuted criminally,
he is entitled to a speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the offense or the
manner in which it is authorized to be commenced."
The latest decision in point,
Acebedo v. Sarmiento,
presented an even clearer case. The information for
damage to property was filed on August 3, 1959. There the matter rested until May
19, 1965, when the accused moved to dismiss. The lower court denied the motion
in his order of July 10, 1965. Two more years elapsed, the period now covering
almost eight years, when the trial was commenced. When one of the witnesses for
the prosecution failed to appear, the provincial fiscal sought the postponement, but
the accused countered with a motion for dismissal. The lower court acceded, and
this Court sustained him, even if thereafter it changed its mind and reinstated the
case.
Petitioners can thus invoke the constitutional guarantee that the trial should be
speedy. In the absence of any valid decision, the stage of trial has not been
completed. In this case then, as of May 10, 1965, when they moved to dismiss in
the Court of Appeals, petitioners could validly contend that they had not been
accorded their right to be tried as promptly as circumstances permit. It was not the
pendency in the Court of Appeals of their cases that should be deemed material. It
is at times unavoidable that appellate tribunals cannot, even with due diligence, put
an end to suits elevated to them. What is decisive is that with the setting aside of
the previous decision in the resolution of August 5, 1959, petitioners could validly
premise their plea for dismissal on this constitutional safeguard. That is the sole
basis for the conclusion reached by us considering the controlling doctrine
announced with such emphasis by this Court time and time again.
Conde vs. Rivera [G.R. No. 21741, January 25, 1924]
RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL. Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena,
Tayabas, has been forced to respond to no less the five information for various
crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses and counsel at
hearings no less than on eight different occasions only to see the cause postponed,
has twice been required to come to the Supreme Court for protection, and now,
after the passage of more than one year from the time when the first information
was filed, seems as far away from a definite resolution of her troubles as she was
when originally charged.

141

Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde,
like all other accused persons, has a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent
she may go free, and she has been deprived of that right in defiance of law.
Dismissed from her humble position, and compelled to dance attendance on courts
while investigations and trials are arbitrarily postponed without her consent, is
palpably and openly unjust to her and a detriment to the public. By the use of upon
the appropriate information, could have attended to the formal preliminary
examination, and could have prepared the case for a trial free from vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays.
Once before, as intimated, the petitioner had to come to us for redress of her
grievances. We thought then we had pointed out the way for the parties. We hope
propose to do all in our power to assist this poor woman to obtain justice. On the
one hand has been the petitioner, of humble station, without resources, but
fortunately assisted by a persistent lawyer, while on the other hand has been the
Government of the Philippine Islands which should be the last to set an example of
delay and oppression in the administration of justice. The Court is thus under a
moral and legal obligation to see that these proceedings come to an end and that
the accused is discharged from the custody of the law.
We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good
cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond
a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is
entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the
information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his
freedom. (16 C.J., 439 et seq.; In the matter of Ford [1911], 160 Cal., 334; U.S.
vs. Fox [1880], 3 Montana, 512. See further our previous decision in Conde vs.
Judge of First Instance, Fourteenth Judicial District, and the Provincial Fiscal of
Tayabas, No. 21236.
Mateo, Jr. vs. Villaluz [G.R. Nos. L-34756-59, March 31, 1973]
IMPARTIAL JUDGE. It is now beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in
the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to
reassure litigants of his being fair and being just. Thereby there is the legitimate
expectation that the decision arrived at would be the application of the law to the
facts as found by a judge who does not play favorites. For him, the parties stand on
equal footing. In the language of Justice Dizon: "It has been said, in fact, that due
process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and
that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge." He should, to quote from another decision "at all times manifest depth
commitment and concern to the cause of justice according to legal norms, a
cerebral man who deliberately holds in check the tug and pull of purely personal
preferences and prejudices which he shares with the rest of his fellow mortals." A
judge then, to quote from the latest decision in point, Geotina v. Gonzales, penned
by Justice Castro, should strive to be at all times "wholly free, disinterested,
impartial and independent. Elementary due process requires a hearing before an
impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just
decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to
its fairness and as to his integrity." Nor is this to imply that prior to Gutierrez, there
had been no awareness of the due process aspect of an impartial tribunal even if
not explicitly referred to. As noted by Justice Street as far back as 1926 in
Government v. Abella, a 1926 decision, if the Supreme Court "were of the opinion
that the litigant had not had a fair trial, a new trial could be granted." There was a
reiteration of such a view in a case decided in 1933, Dais v. Torres, with Justice
Vickers as ponente, in these words: "Although a judge may not have been
disqualified [according to the Code of Civil Procedure], nevertheless if it appears to
this court that the appellant was not given a fair and impartial trial because of the
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trial judge's bias or prejudice, this court will order a new trial, if it deems it
necessary, in the interest of justice."
Conformably to what was so emphatically asserted in Gutierrez as the fundamental
requisite of impartiality for due process to be satisfied, the Rules of Court provision
on disqualification when revised three years later in 1964 contains this additional
paragraph: "A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself
from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above."
Thereby, it is made clear to the occupants of the bench that outside of pecuniary
interest, relationship or previous participation in the matter that calls for
adjudication, there may be other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of
objectivity, thus calling for inhibition. That is to betray a sense of realism, for the
factors that lead to preferences or predilections are many and varied. It is well,
therefore, that if any such should make its appearance and prove difficult to resist,
the better course for a judge is to disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being
misunderstood. His reputation for probity and objectivity is preserved. What is even
more important, the ideal of an impartial administration of justice is lived up to.
Thus is due process vindicated. There is relevance to what was said by Justice
Sanchez in Pimentel v. Salanga, drawing "attention of all judges to appropriate
guidelines in a situation where their capacity to try and decide a case fairly and
judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge from any one of the parties. A
judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion
is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias
or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of
inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He
should exercise his discretion in a way that the peoples faith in the courts of justice
is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflects the probability that a losing
party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge had
unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him. That passion on the part
judge may be generated because of serious charges misconduct against him by a
suitor or his counsel, is not altogether remote. He is a man, subject to the frailties
of other men. He should, therefore, exercise great care and caution before making
up his mind to act or withdraw from a suit where that party or counsel is involved.
He could in good grace inhibit himself where that case could be heard by another
judge and where no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to others involved
therein. On the result of his decisions to sit or not to sit may depend to a great
extent the all-important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. If after
reflection he should resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting a case where his
motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to be interpreted as
giving meaning and substance to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He
serves the cause of the law who forestalls miscarriage of justice."
Garcia vs. Domingo [G.R. No. L-30104, July 25, 1973]
PUBLIC TRIAL. The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of the
antecedents of this petition, as set forth at the outset, explicitly enumerated the
right to a public trial to which an accused was entitled. So it is, as likewise made
clear, under the present dispensation. As a matter of fact, that was one
constitutional provision that needed only a single, terse summation from the
Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, Delegate, later Justice, Jose P.
Laurel, to gain acceptance. As was stressed by him: "Trial should also be public in
order to offset any danger of conducting it in an illegal and unjust manner."
It
would have been surprising if its proposed inclusion in the Bill of Rights had
provoked any discussion, much less a debate. It was merely a reiteration of what
appeared in the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, popularly known as the Jones
Law.
Earlier, such a right found expression in the Philippine Bill of 1902, likewise
an organic act of the then government of this country as an unincorporated
territory of the United States.
Historically, as was pointed out by Justice Black,
speaking for the United States Supreme Court in the leading case of In re Oliver:
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"This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a public trial to an accused has its
roots in [the] English common law heritage."
He then observed that the exact
date of its origin is obscure, "but it likely evolved long before the settlement of [the
United States] as an accompaniment of the ancient institution of jury trial."
It
was then noted by him that there, "the guarantee to an accused of the right to a
public trial first appeared in a state constitution in 1776."
Later it was embodied
in the Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution ratified in 1791.
He could
conclude his historical survey thus: "Today almost without exception every state by
constitution, statute, or judicial decision, requires that all criminal trials be open to
the public."
Such is the venerable, historical lineage of the right to a public trial.
The crucial question of the meaning to be attached this provision remains. The
Constitution guarantees an accused the right to a public trial. What does it signify?
Offhand it does seem fairly obvious that here is an instance where language is to be
given a literal application. There is no ambiguity in the words employed. The trial
must be public. It possesses that character when anyone interested in observing
the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is
to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no
moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown. The thought that lies behind
this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further protection,
that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted with any
impropriety. It is not amiss to recall that Delegate Laurel in his terse summation of
the importance of this right singled out its being a deterrence to arbitrariness. It is
thus understandable why such a right is deemed embraced in procedural due
process.
Where a trial takes place, as is quite usual, in the courtroom and a
calendar of what cases are to be heard is posted, no problem arises. It is the usual
course of events that individuals desirous of being present are free to do so. There
is the well recognized exception though that warrants the exclusion of the public
where the evidence may be characterized as "offensive to decency or public
morals."
What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for the convenience of the parties,
and of the city court Judge, it was in the latter's air-conditioned chambers that the
trial was held. Did that suffice to vitiate the proceedings as violative of this right?
The answer must be in the negative. There is no showing that the public was
thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge
would reduce the number of those who could be present. Such a fact though is not
indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform
dimensions. Some are smaller than others. Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black
in his masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial
being public if the accused could "have his friends, relatives and counsel present,
no matter with what offense he may be charged."
In re: request for Live Radio and TV Coverage of the Trial in the
Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases against Former President Joseph
Estrada [A.M. No. 00-1-4-03-SC, September 13, 2001]
COURT PROCEEDINGS MAY BE FILMED FOR RECORD PURPOSES ONLY, AND NOT
FOR PUBLIC SHOWING. Thus, many important purposes for preserving the record
of the trials can be served by audio-visual recordings without impairing the right of
the accused to a fair trial.
Nor is the right of privacy of the accused a bar to the production of such
documentary. In Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, this Court set aside a
lower court's injunction restraining the filming of "Four Day Revolution," a
documentary film depicting, among other things, the role of then Minister of
National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in the 1986 EDSA people power. This Court
held: "A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as
permissible where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be
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elicited from him or to be published about him constitute matters of a public

character."
No one can prevent the making of a movie based on the trial. But, at least, if a
documentary record is made of the proceedings, any movie that may later be
produced can be checked for its accuracy against such documentary and any
attempt to distort the truth can thus be averted.
Indeed, a somewhat similar proposal for documentary recording of celebrated cases
or causes clbres was made way back in 1971 by Paul Freund of the Harvard Law
School. As he explained:
In fairness let me refer to an American experience many of my lay
friends found similarly moving. An educational television network
filmed a trial in Denver of a Black Panther leader on charges of
resisting arrest, and broadcast the document in full, in four
installments, several months after the case was concluded
concluded incidentally, with a verdict of acquittal.
No one could witness the trial without a feeling of profound respect for
the painstaking way in which the truth was searched for, for the ways
whereby law copes with uncertainties and ambiguities through
presumptions and burden of proof, and the sense of gravity with which
judge and jury carried out their responsibilities.
I agree in general with the exclusion of television from the courtroom,
for the familiar good reasons. And yet the use of television at a trial for
documentary purposes, not for the broadcast of live news, and with
the safeguards of completeness and consent, is an educational
experiment that I would be prepared to welcome. Properly
safeguarded and with suitable commentary, the depiction of an actual
trial is an agency of enlightenment that could have few equals in its
impact on the public understanding.
Understanding of our legal process, so rarely provided by our
educational system, is now a desperate need.
Professor Freund's observation is as valid today as when it was made thirty years
ago. It is perceptive for its recognition of the serious risks posed to the fair
administration of justice by live TV and radio broadcasts, especially when emotions
are running high on the issues stirred by a case, while at the same time
acknowledging the necessity of keeping audio-visual recordings of the proceedings
of celebrated cases, for public information and exhibition, after passions have
subsided.
WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of former President Estrada
before the Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be made, for the account of the
Sandiganbayan, under the following conditions: (a) the trial shall be recorded in its
entirety, excepting such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan determine should
not be held public under Rule 119, 21 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b)
cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the movement
of TV crews shall be regulated consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the
proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made for documentary
purposes only and shall be made without comment except such annotations of
scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them; (d) the live
broadcast of the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its
decision in all the cases against the former President shall be prohibited under pain
of contempt of court and other sanctions in case of violations of the prohibition; (e)
to ensure that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual recording of the
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proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan
or its Division concerned and shall be made pursuant to rules promulgated by it;
and (f) simultaneously with the release of the audio-visual recordings for public
broadcast, the original thereof shall be deposited in the National Museum and the
Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in
accordance with law.
People vs. Mapalao [G.R. No. 92415, May 14, 1991]
AN ACCUSED WHO IS TRIED IN ABSENTIA WAIVES HIS RIGHT TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE AS WELL AS HIS RIGHTS TO BAIL AND APPEAL. By the same token, an
accused who, after the filing of an information, is at large and has not been
apprehended or otherwise has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court,
cannot apply for bail or be granted any other relief by the courts until he submits
himself to its jurisdiction or is arrested.
In Gimenez vs. Nazareno, this Court had occasion to rule on a similar case in this
wise
"First of all, it is not disputed that the lower court acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the accused-private respondent when he appeared
during the arraignment on August 22, 1973 and pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged. In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of
the accused is acquired either by his arrest or voluntary appearance in
court. Such voluntary appearance is accomplished by appearing for
arraignment as what accused-private respondent did in this case.
But the question is this was that jurisdiction lost when the accused
escaped from the custody of the law and failed to appear during the
trial? We answer this question in the negative. As We have
consistently ruled in several earlier cases, jurisdiction once acquired is
not lost upon the instance of parties but continues until the case is
terminated.
To capsulize the foregoing discussion, suffice it to say that where the
accused appears at the arraignment and pleads not guilty to the crime
charged, jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his person and this
continues until the termination of the case, notwithstanding his escape
from the custody of the law.
Going to the second part of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution aforecited a 'trial in absentia' may be had when the
following requisites are present; (1) that there has been an
arraignment; (2) that the accused has been notified; and (3) that he
fails to appear and his failure to do so is unjustified.
In this case, all the above conditions were attendant calling for a trial
in absentia. As the facts show, the private respondent was arraigned
on August 22, 1973 and in the said arraignment he pleaded not guilty.
He was also informed of the scheduled hearings set on September 18
and 19, 1973 and this is evidenced by his signature on the notice
issued by the lower court. It was also proved by a certified copy of the
Police Blotter that private respondent escaped from his detention
center. No explanation for his failure to appear in court in any of the
scheduled hearings was given. Even the trial court considered his
absence unjustified.
The lower court in accordance with the aforestated provisions of the
1973 Constitution, correctly proceeded with the reception of the
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evidence of the prosecution and the other accused in the absence of

private respondent, but it erred when it suspended the proceedings as
to the private respondent and rendered a decision as to the other
accused only.
Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the duty to
rule upon the evidence presented in court. The court need not wait for
the time until the accused who escaped from custody finally decides to
appear in court to present his evidence and cross-examine the
witnesses against him. To allow the delay of proceedings for this
purpose is to render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in
absentia. As it has been aptly explained:
'. . . The Constitutional Convention felt the need for such a provision
as there were quite a number of reported instances where the
proceedings against a defendant had to be stayed indefinitely because
of his non-appearance. What the Constitution guarantees him is a fair
trial, not continued enjoyment of his freedom even if his guilt could be
proved. With the categorical statement in the fundamental law that his
absence cannot justify a delay provided that he has been duly notified
and his failure to appear is unjustified, such an abuse could be
remedied. That is the way it should be, for both society and the
offended party have a legitimate interest in seeing to it that crime
should not go unpunished.'
The contention of the respondent judge that the right of the accused to
be presumed innocent will be violated if a judgment is rendered as to
him is untenable. He is still presumed innocent. A judgment of
conviction must still be based upon the evidence presented in court.
Such evidence must prove him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Also,
there can be no violation of due process since the accused was given
the opportunity to be heard.
Nor can it be said that an escapee who has been tried in absentia
retains his rights to cross-examine and to present evidence on his
behalf. By his failure to appear during the trial of which he had notice,
he virtually waived these rights. This Court has consistently held that
the right of the accused to confrontation and cross-examination of
witnesses is a personal right and may be waived. In the same vein, his
right to present evidence on his behalf, a right given to him for his
own benefit and protection, may be waived by him.
Finally, at this point, We note that Our pronouncement in this case is
buttressed by the provisions of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
particularly Section 1(c) of Rule 115 which clearly reflects the intention
of the framers of our Constitution, to wit:
'. . . The absence of the accused without any justifiable cause at the
trial on a particular date of which he had notice shall be considered a
waiver of his right to be present during that trial. When an accused
under custody had been notified of the date of the trial and escapes,
he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on said date
and on all subsequent trial dates until custody is regained . . .'
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that an
escapee who has been duly tried in absentia waives his right to
present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine
witnesses who testified against him."

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People vs. Valeriano [G.R. Nos. 103604-05, September 23, 1993]

A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION MAY BE PROMULGATED AFTER THE ACCUSED HAS
BEEN TRIED IN ABSENTIA. The trial court further erred in holding that no penalty
could be imposed on accused Engracio Valeriano in Criminal Case No. 4584 because
he "is nowhere to be found, hence, not brought to the bar of justice, he being a
fugitive or at large." The court ignored the fact that Engracio jumped bail after he
had been arraigned, just before the retaking of evidence commenced. Paragraph
(2), Section 14, Article III of the Constitution permits trial in absentia after the
accused has been arraigned provided he has been duly notified of the trial and his
failure to appear thereat is unjustified. One who jumps bail can never offer a
justifiable reason for his non-appearance during the trial. Accordingly, after the trial
in absentia, the court can render judgment in the case and promulgation may be
made by simply recording the judgment in the criminal docket with a copy thereof
served upon his counsel, provided that the notice requiring him to be present at the
promulgation is served through his bondsmen or warden and counsel.
Right of Confrontation
United States vs. Javier [G.R. No. L-12990, January 21, 1918]
AFFIDAVIT OF A DECEASED PERSON WHO HAS NOT BEEN CROSS-EXAMINED IS
INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE. The foregoing statement of the facts and the law
disposes of all but one assignment of error, namely, that the lower court erred in
admitting Exhibit B of the prosecution as evidence. Exhibit B is the sworn statement
of sergeant Presca, now deceased, whose signature was identified, before the
justice of the peace of the municipality of Santo Tomas, Province of Batangas.
Appellant's argument is predicated on the provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights
which says, "That in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . .
to meet the witnesses face to face," and the provision of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, section 15 (5), which say that "In all criminal prosecutions the
defendant shall be entitled: . . . to be confronted at the trial by and to crossexamine the witnesses against him." With reference to the clause of the Bill of
Rights, which we have quoted, Justice Day said in a case of Philippine origin
(Dowdell vs. U.S. [1911], 221 U.S. 325) that it "intends to secure the accused in
the right to be tried, so far as facts provable by witnesses are concerned, by only
such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial, who give their testimony in his
presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-examination. It was
intended to prevent the conviction of the accused upon depositions or ex parte
affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the
recollection of the witness in the exercise of the right of cross-examination." In
other words, confrontation is essential because cross-examination is essential. A
second reason for the prohibition is that a tribunal may have before it the
deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying. (U.S. vs. Anastasio
[1906], 6 Phil., 413.) The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands has applied this
constitutional provision on behalf of accused persons in a number of cases. (See for
example U.S. vs. Tanjuanco [1902], 1 Phil., 374; U.S. vs. Bello [1908, 12 Phil. 87.)
It is for us now to determine whether the present facts entitle the accused to the
protection of the Bill of Rights or whether the facts fall under some exception
thereto.
Talino vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. Nos. L-75511-14, March 16, 1987]
IF SEVERAL CO-ACCUSED WERE TRIED SEPARATELY, TESTIMONIES MADE IN ONE
CASE CANNOT BE CONSIDERED IN THE OTHERS UNLESS THEY ARE ACCORDED
THEIR RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION. It is settled that if a separate trial is allowed to
one of two or more defendants, his testimony therein imputing guilt to any of the
co-accused is not admissible against the latter who was not able to cross-examine
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him. The issue in this case is whether or not such testimony was considered by the
respondent court against the petitioner, who claims that it was in fact the sole basis
of his conviction.
The right of confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution
to the person facing criminal prosecution who should know, in
fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a chance to cross-examine them
on their charges. No accusation is permitted to be made against his back or in his
absence nor is any derogatory information accepted if it is made anonymously, as
in poison pen letters sent by persons who cannot stand by their libels and must
shroud their spite in secrecy. That is also the reason why ex parte affidavits are not
permitted unless the affiant is presented in court and hearsay is barred save only
in the cases allowed by the Rules of Court, like the dying declaration.

Right to Compulsory Processes

Roco vs. Contreras [G.R. No. 158275, June 28, 2005]
A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify
at the hearing or trial of an action or at any investigation conducted under the laws
of the Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition.[6]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In this jurisdiction, there are two (2) kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad
testificandum and subpoena duces tecum. The first is used to compel a person to
testify, while the second is used to compel the production of books, records, things
or documents therein specified. As characterized in H.C. Liebenow vs. The
Philippine Vegetable Oil Company:[7]
The subpoena duces tecum is, in all respects, like the ordinary subpoena ad
testificandum with the exception that it concludes with an injunction that
the witness shall bring with him and produce at the examination the books,
documents, or things described in the subpoena.
Well-settled is the rule that before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court
must first be satisfied that the following requisites are present: (1) the books,
documents or other things requested must appear prima facie relevant to the issue
subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and (2) such books must be
reasonably described by the parties to be readily identified (test of definiteness).
Again, to quote from H.C. Liebenow:[8]
In determining whether the production of the documents described in a
subpoena duces tecum should be enforced by the court, it is proper to
consider, first, whether the subpoena calls for the production of
specific documents, or rather for specific proof, and secondly,
whether that proof is prima facie sufficiently relevant to justify
enforcing its production. A general inquisitorial examination of all the
books, papers, and documents of an adversary, conducted with a view to
ascertain whether something of value may not show up, will not be
enforced. (Emphasis supplied)
Further, in Universal Rubber Products, Inc. vs. CA, et al.,[9] we held:
Well-settled is Our jurisprudence that, in order to entitle a party to the
issuance of a 'subpoena duces tecum, it must appear, by clear and
unequivocal proof, that the book or document sought to be produced
contains evidence relevant and material to the issue before the court,
and that the precise book, paper or document containing such

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evidence has been so designated or described that it may be

identified. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 15 Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus

Lansang vs. Garcia [G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971]
THE SUPREME COURT HAD AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE
FACTUAL BASES OF THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS. A majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a consensus
that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for
the issuance of Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889 and 889-A (suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for all persons detained or to be detained for
the crimes of rebellion or insurrection throughout the Philippines, which area has
lately been reduced to some eighteen provinces, two subprovinces and eighteen
cities with the partial lifting of the suspension of the privilege effected by
Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889-B, 889-C and 889-D) and thus determine the
constitutional sufficiency of such bases in the light of the requirements of Article III,
sec 1, par. 14, and Article VII, sec. 10, par 2, of the Philippine Constitution; and
considering that the members of the Court are not agreed on the precise scope and
nature of the inquiry to be made in the premises, even as all of them are agreed
that the Presidential findings are entitled to great respect, the Court RESOLVED that
these cases be set for rehearing on October 8, 1971 at 9:30 A.M
Let us now consider the substantive validity of the proclamation, as amended.
Pursuant to the above-quoted provisions of the Constitution, two (2) conditions
must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the
writ, to wit: (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or pursuant
to paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution "imminent danger
thereof," and (b) "public safety" must require the suspension of the privilege. The
Presidential Proclamation under consideration declares that there has been and
there is actually a state of rebellion and that "public safety requires that immediate
and effective action be taken in order to maintain peace and order, secure the
safety of the people and preserve the authority of the State."
In our resolution of October 5, 1971, We stated that "a majority of the Court" had
"tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the
existence of the factual bases for the issuance of Presidential Proclamations Nos.
889 and 889-A . . . and thus determine the constitutional sufficiency of such bases
in the light of the requirements of Article III, sec. 1, par. 14, and Article VII, sec.
10, par 2, of the Philippine Constitution . . . ." Upon further deliberation, the
members of the Court are now unanimous in the conviction that it has the authority
to inquire into the existence of said factual bases in order to determine the
constitutional sufficiency thereof.
Indeed, the grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor
unqualified. The authority conferred by the Constitution, both under the Bill of
Rights and under the Executive Department, is limited and conditional. The precept
in the Bill of Rights establishes a general rule, as well as an exception thereto. What
is more, it postulates the former in the negative, evidently to stress its importance,
by providing that "(t)he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended . . . ." It is only by way of exception that it permits the suspension of
the privilege "in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or, under Art. VII of
the Constitution, "imminent danger thereof" "when the public safety requires it,
in any of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period
the necessity for such suspension shall exist." For from being full and plenary, the
authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is thus circumscribed, confined and
restricted, not only by the prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its
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existence, but, also, as regards the time when and the place where it may be
exercised. These factors and the aforementioned setting or conditions mark,
establish and define the extent, the confines and the limits of said power, beyond
which it does not exist. And, like the limitations and restrictions imposed by the
Fundamental Law upon the legislative department, adherence thereto and
compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be inquired into by courts of
justice. Otherwise, the explicit constitutional provisions thereon would be
meaningless. Surely, the framers of our Constitution could not have intended to
engage in such a wasteful exercise in futility.
Much less may the assumption be indulged in when we bear in mind that our
political system is essentially democratic and republican in character and that the
suspension of the privilege affects the most fundamental element of that system,
namely, individual freedom. Indeed, such freedom includes and connotes, as well
as demands, the right of every single member of our citizenry to freely discuss and
dissent from, as well as criticize and denounce, the views, the policies and the
practices of the government and the party in power that he deems unwise,
improper or inimical to the commonweal, regardless of whether his own opinion is
objectively correct or not. The untrammeled enjoyment and exercise of such right
which, under certain conditions, may be a civic duty of the highest order is
vital to the democratic system and essential to its successful operation and
wholesome growth and development.
Manifestly, however, the liberty guaranteed and protected by our Basic Law is one
enjoyed and exercised, not in derogation thereof, but consistently therewith, and,
hence, within the framework of the social order established by the Constitution and
the context of the Rule of Law. Accordingly, when individual freedom is used to
destroy that social order, by means of force and violence, in defiance of the Rule of
Law such as by rising publicly and taking arms against the government to
overthrow the same, thereby committing the crime of rebellion there emerges a
circumstance that may warrant a limited withdrawal of the aforementioned
guarantee or protection, by suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
when public safety requires it. Although we must be forewarned against mistaking
mere dissent no matter how emphatic or intemperate it may be for dissidence
amounting to rebellion or insurrection, the Court cannot hesitate, much less refuse
when the existence of such rebellion or insurrection has been fairly established
or cannot reasonably be denied to uphold the finding of the Executive thereon,
without, in effect, encroaching upon a power vested in him by the Supreme Law of
the land and depriving him, to this extent, of such power, and, therefore, without
violating the Constitution and jeopardizing the very Rule of Laws the Court is called
upon to epitomize.
Jackson vs. Macalino [G.R. No. 139255, November 24, 2003]
Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that "except as
otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto." The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a
person from unlawful restraint. It is essentially a writ of inquiry and is granted to
test the right under which he is detained. Section 4, Rule 102 of the said Rules
provides when the writ of habeas corpus is not allowed or discharged authorized:
Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharged authorized. If it
appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by
virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court
or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment; or
make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
151

appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by
reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order.
Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of
a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
The term "court" includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the
Bureau of Immigration.
Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or
discharge from custody. What is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention
as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of habeas corpus, for
even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of same
supervening events such as the instances mentioned in Section 4, Rule 102, be no
longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Any such supervening
events are the issuance of a judicial process preventing the discharge of the
detained person.
Moreover, the petitioner, in his motion for reconsideration with the CID, offered to
post a bail bond for his provisional release to enable him to secure the necessary
documents to establish the appropriate grounds for his permanent stay in the
Philippines. By offering to post a bail bond, the petitioner thereby admitted that he
was under the custody of the CID and voluntarily accepted the jurisdiction of the
CID.15[35]
Rules on Habeas Data
Rules on Writ of Amparo
Section 16 Right to a Speedy Disposition of Cases
Padua vs. Ericta [G.R. No. L-38570, May 24, 1988]
RIGHT TO A SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES. Courts should not brook undue
delays in the ventilation and determination of causes. It should be their constant
effort to assure that litigations are prosecuted and resolved with dispatch.
Postponements of trials and hearings should not be allowed except on meritorious
grounds; and the grant or refusal thereof rests entirely in the sound discretion of
the Judge. It goes without saying, however, that discretion must be reasonably and
wisely exercised, in the light of the attendant circumstances. Some reasonable
deferment of the proceedings may be allowed or tolerated to the end that cases
may be adjudged only after full and free presentation of evidence by all the parties,
specially where the deferment would cause no substantial prejudice to any part.
The desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases should not, if at all possible, result
in the precipitate loss of a party s right to present evidence and either in plaintiff's
being non-suited or the defendant's being pronounced liable under an ex parte
judgment.
". . . (T)rial courts have . . . the duty to dispose of controversies after
trial on the merits whenever possible. It is deemed an abuse of
discretion for them, on their own motion, 'to enter a dismissal which is
not warranted by the circumstances of the case' (Municipality of
Dingras v. Bonoan, 85 Phil. 458-59 [1950]). While it is true that the
dismissal of an action on grounds specified under Section 3, Rule 17 of
the Revised Rules of Court is addressed to their discretion (Flores v.
Phil. Alien Property Administrator, 107 Phil. 778 [1960]; Montelibano
v. Benares, 103 Phil. 110 [1958]; Adorable v. Bonifacio, 105 Phil.
1269 [1959]; Inter-Island Gas Service, Inc. v. De la Gerna, L-17631,

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October 19, 1966, 18 SCRA 390), such discretion must be exercised

soundly with a view to the circumstances surrounding each particular
case (Vernus-Sanciangco v. Sanciangco, L-12619, April 28, 1962, 4
SCRA 1209). If facts obtain that serve as mitigating circumstances for
the delay, the same should be considered and dismissal denied or set
aside (Rudd v. Rogerson, 15 ALR 2d 672; Cervi v. Greenwood, 147
Colo 190, 362 P. 2d 1050 [1961]), especially where the suit appears to
be meritorious and the plaintiff was not culpably negligent and no
injury results to defendant (27 C.J.S. 235-36; 15 ALR 3rd 680)."
(Abinales vs. Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City, Br. I, 70
SCRA 590, 595).
"It is true that the allowance or denial of petitions for postponement
and the setting aside of orders previously issued, rest principally upon
the sound discretion of the judge to whom they are addressed, but a
ways predicated on the consideration that more than the mere
convenience of the courts or of the parties of the case, the ends of
justice and fairness would be served thereby (Camara Vda. de Zubiri
v. Zubiri, et al., L-16745, December 17, 1966). When no substantial
rights are affected and the intention to delay is not manifest, the
corresponding motion to transfer the hearing having been filed
accordingly, it is sound judicial discretion to allow them (Rexwell Corp.
v. Canlas, L-16746, December 30, 1961)." (Panganiban vs. Vda. de
Sta. Maria, 22 SCRA 708, 712).
Flores vs. People [G.R. No. L-25769, December 10, 1974]

Section 17 Right Against Self-Incrimination

United States vs. Tan Teng [G.R. No. 7081, September 7, 1912]
The substance was taken from the body of the defendant without his objection, the
examination was made by competent medical authority and the result showed that
the defendant was suffering from said disease. As was suggested by Judge
Lobingier, had the defendant been found with stolen property upon his person,
there certainly could have been no question had the stolen property been taken for
the purpose of using the same as evidence against him. So also if the clothing
which he wore, by reason of blood stains or otherwise, had furnished evidence of
the commission of a crime, there certainly could have been no objection to taking
such for the purpose of using the same as proof. No one would think of even
suggesting that stolen property and the clothing in the case indicated, taken from
the defendant, could not be used against him as evidence, without violating the rule
that a person shall not be required to give testimony against himself.
The question presented by the defendant below and repeated in his first assignment
of error is not a new question, either to the courts or authors. In the case of Holt
vs. U.S. (218 U.S., 245), Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the court upon this
question, said:
But the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a
witness against himself, is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral
compulsion, to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of
his body as evidence, when it may be material. The objection, in
principle, would forbid a jury (court) to look at a person and compare
his features with a photograph in proof. Moreover we are not
considering how far a court would go in compelling a man to exhibit

153

himself, for when he is exhibited, whether voluntarily or by order,

even if the order goes too far, the evidence if material, is competent.
To admit the doctrine contended for by the appellant might exclude the testimony
of a physician or a medical expert who had been appointed to make observations of
a person who plead insanity as a defense, where such medical testimony was
against necessarily use the person of the defendant for the purpose of making such
examination. (People vs. Agustin, 199 N.Y., 446.) The doctrine contended for by
the appellants would also prevent the courts from making an examination of the
body of the defendant where serious personal injuries were alleged to have been
received by him. The right of the courts in such cases to require an exhibit of the
injured parts of the body has been established by a long line of decisions.
The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be
compelled to be a witness against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal
process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of
his guilt.
The doctrine contended for by appellant would prohibit courts from looking at the
fact of a defendant even, for the purpose of disclosing his identity. Such an
application of the prohibition under discussion certainly could not be permitted.
Such an inspection of the bodily features by the court or by witnesses, can not
violate the privilege granted under the Philippine Bill, because it does not call upon
the accused as a witness it does not call upon the defendant for his testimonial
responsibility. Mr. Wigmore says that evidence obtained in this way from the
accused, is not testimony but his body his body itself.
Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare no man is bound to accuse himself

Villaflor vs. Summers [G.R. No. 16444, September 8, 1920]

The sole legal issue from the admitted facts is whether the compelling of a woman
to permit her body to be examined by physicians to determine if she is pregnant,
violates that portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights and that portion of our Code of
Criminal Procedure which find their origin in the Constitution of the United States
and practically all state constitutions and in the common law rules of evidence,
providing that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself. (President's Instructions to the Philippine Commission; Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, section 5, paragraph 3; Act of Congress of August 29,
1916, section 3; paragraph 3; Code of Criminal Procedure, section 15 [4]; United
States Constitution, fifth amendment.) Counsel for petitioner argues that such
bodily exhibition is an infringement of the constitutional provision; the
representative of the city fiscal contends that it is not an infringement of the
constitutional provision. The trial judge in the instant case has held with the fiscal;
while it is brought to our notice that a judge of the same court has held on an
identical question as contended for by the attorney for the accused and petitioner.
The maxim of the common law, Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare, was recognized in
England in early days, but not in the other legal systems of the world, in a revolt
against the thumbscrew and the rack. A legal shield was raised against odious
inquisitorial methods of interrogating an accused person by which to extort
unwilling confessions with the ever present temptation to commit the crime of
perjury. The kernel of the privilege as disclosed by the textwriters was testimonial
compulsion. As forcing a man to be a witness against himself was deemed contrary
to the fundamentals of republican government, the principle was taken into the
American Constitutions, and from the United States was brought to the Philippine
Islands, in exactly as wide but no wider a scope as it existed in old English
days. The provision should here be approached in no blindly worshipful spirit, but
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with a judicious and a judicial appreciation of both its benefits and its abuses. (Read
the scholarly articles of Prof. Wigmore in 5 Harvard L. R. [1891], p. 71, and 15
Harvard L. R., 1902, p. 610 found in 4 Wigmore on Evidence, pp. 3069 et seq., and
U. S. vs. Navarro [1904], Phil., 143.)
Perhaps the best way to test the correctness of our position is to go back once
more to elements and ponder on what is the prime purpose of a criminal trial. As
we view it, the object of having criminal laws is to purge the community of persons
who violate the laws to the great prejudice of their fellow men. Criminal procedure,
the rules of evidence, and constitutional provisions, are then provided, not to
protect the guilty but to protect the innocent. No rule is intemended to be so rigid
as to embarrass the administration of justice in its endeavor to ascertain the truth.
No accused person should be afraid of the use of any method which will tend to
establish the truth. For instance, under the facts before us, to use torture to make
the defendant admit her guilt might only result in including her to tell a falsehood.
But no evidence of physical facts can for any substantial reason be held to be
detrimental to the accused except in so far as the truth is to be avoided in order to
acquit a guilty person.
Fully conscious that we are resolving a most extreme case in a sense, which on first
impression is a shock to one's sensibilities, we must nevertheless enforce the
constitutional provision in this jurisdiction in accord with the policy and reason
thereof, undeterred by merely sentimental influences. Once again we lay down the
rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against
compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that,
an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. The proviso is that
torture of force shall be avoided. Whether facts fall within or without the rule with
its corollary and proviso must, of course, be decided as cases arise.
It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and
disinterested physicians due care will be taken not to use violence and not to
embarass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no objection
to the physical examination being made by the family doctor of the accused or by
doctor of the same sex can be seen.
Beltran vs. Samson [G.R. No. 32025, September 23, 1929]
The question, then, is reduced to a determination of whether the writing from the
fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's
handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be
falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the
constitutional provision under examination.
Whenever the defendant, at the trial of his case, testifying in his own behalf, denies
that a certain writing or signature is in his own hand, he may on cross-examination
be compelled to write in open court in order that the jury maybe able to compare
his handwriting with the one in question.
But the cases so resolved cannot be compared to the one now before us. We are
not concerned here with the defendant, for it does not appear that any information
was filed against the petitioner for the supposed falsification, and still less as it a
question of the defendant on trial testifying and under cross-examination. This is
only an investigation prior to the information and with a view to filing it. And let it
further be noted that in the case of Sprouse vs. Com., the defendant performed the
act voluntarily.
Furthermore, in the case before us, writing is something more than moving the
body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it
155

requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing
means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not
he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that
it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of producing
documents or chattels in one's possession. And as to such production of documents
or chattels. which to our mind is not so serious as the case now before us, the
same eminent Professor Wigmore, in his work cited, says (volume 4, page 864):
We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a
similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and
one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in
both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself.
And we say that the present case is more serious than that of compelling the
production of documents or chattels, because here the witness is compelled to write
and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and
which may identify him as the falsifier. And for this reason the same eminent
author, Professor Wigmore, explaining the matter of the production of documents
and chattels, in the passage cited, adds:
For though the disclosure thus sought be not oral in form, and though
the documents or chattels be already in existence and not desired to
be first written and created by testimonial act or utterance of the
person in response to the process, still no line can be drawn short of
any process which treats him as a witness; because in virtue it would
be at any time liable to make oath to the identity or authenticity or
origin of the articles produced. (Ibid., pp. 864-865.) (Emphasis ours.)

People vs. Gallarde [G.R. No. 133025, February 27, 2000]

We cannot agree with the trial court's rejection of the photographs (Exhibits "I," "J"
and "K") taken of GALLARDE immediately after the incident on the ground that "the
same were taken while [GALLARDE] was already under the mercy of the police."
The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a
purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against selfincrimination.
The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination26 proscribes the use
of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not
the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical
acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his
guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required.27 The
essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the
giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act.28 Hence, it has been
held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical
examination to determine her pregnancy;29 and an accused may be compelled to
submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for
medical determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was
contracted by his victim;30 to expel morphine from his mouth;31 to have the outline
of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints;32 and to be
photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to
move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.33
Chavez vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. L-29169, August 19, 1968]
AN ACCUSED MAY INVOKE HIS RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION AT THE
ONSET AND REFUSED TO BE PRESENTED IN THE WITNESS STAND. Petitioner's
plea on this score rests upon his averment, with proof, of violation of his right
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constitutionally entrenched against self-incrimination. He asks that the hand of

this Court be made to bear down upon his conviction; that he be relieved of the
effects thereof. He asks us to consider the constitutional injunction that: "No person
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself," fully echoed in Section 1, Rule
115, Rules of Court where, in all criminal prosecutions, the defendant shall be
entitled: "(e) To be exempt from being a witness against himself."
It has been said that forcing a man to be a witness against himself is at war with
"the fundamentals of a republican government"; that "[i]t may suit the purposes
of despotic power but it can not abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and
personal freedom." Mr. Justice Abad Santos recounts the historical background of
this constitutional inhibition, thus: " 'The maxim Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare
had its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of
interrogating accused persons, which has long obtained in the continental system,
and, until the expulsion of the Stuarts from the British throne in 1688, and the
erection of additional barriers for the protection of the people against the exercise
of arbitrary power, was not uncommon even in England. While the admissions of
confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have always ranked
high in the scale of incriminating evidence, if an accused person be asked to explain
his apparent connection with a crime under investigation, the ease with which the
questions put to him may assume an inquisitorial character, the temptation to press
the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a
corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is so painfully evident in
many of the earlier state trials, notably in those of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, and
Udal, the Puritan minister, made the system so odious as to give rise to a demand
for its total abolition. The change in the English criminal procedure in that particular
seems to be founded upon no statute and no judicial opinion, but upon a general
and silent acquiescence of the courts in a popular demand. But, however, adopted,
it has become firmly embedded in English, as well as in American jurisprudence. So
deeply did the iniquities of the ancient system impress themselves upon the minds
of the American colonists that the states, with one accord, made a denial of the
right to question an accused person a part of their fundamental law, so that a
maxim which in England was a mere rule of evidence became clothed in this
country with the impregnability of a constitutional enactment.' (Brown vs. Walker,
161 U.S., 591, 597; 40 Law. ed., 819, 821.)." Mr. Justice Malcolm, in expressive
language, tells us that this maxim was recognized in England in the early days "in a
revolt against the thumbscrew and the rack."
An old Philippine case [1904]
speaks of this constitutional injunction as "older than the Government of the United
States"; as having "its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial methods of
interrogating the accused person"; and as having been adopted in the Philippines
"to wipe out such practices as formerly prevailed in these Islands of requiring
accused persons to submit to judicial examinations, and to give testimony
regarding the offenses with which they were charged."
So it is then that this right is "not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of
which is left to the discretion of the court"; it is mandatory; it secures to a
defendant a valuable and substantive right;
it is fundamental to our scheme of
justice. Just a few months ago, the Supreme Court of the United States (January
29, 1968), speaking thru Mr. Justice Harlan warned that "[t]he constitutional
privilege was intended to shield the guilty and imprudent as well as the innocent
and foresighted."
It is in this context that we say that the constitutional guarantee may not be
treated with unconcern. To repeat, it is mandatory; it secures to every defendant a
valuable and substantive right. Taada and Fernando (Constitution of the
Philippines, 4th ed., vol. I, pp. 583-584) takes note of U.S. vs. Navarro, supra,
which reaffirms the rule that the constitutional proscription was established on
broad grounds of public policy and humanity; of policy because it would place the
witness against the strongest temptation to commit perjury, and of humanity
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because it would be to extort a confession of truth by a kind of duress every species

and degree of which the law abhors.
Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his
will an admission of his guilt. Nor may a court as much as resort to compulsory
disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts usable against him as a confession of the
crime or the tendency of which is to prove the commission of a crime. Because, it is
his right to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the
witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine will.
Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of
violence; it may be the product of unintentional statements. Pressure which
operates to overbear his will, disable him from making a free and rational choice, or
impair his capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is
moral coercion "tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the
defendant."
With the foregoing as guideposts, we now turn to the facts. Petitioner is a
defendant in a criminal case. He was called by the prosecution as the first witness
in that case to testify for the People during the first day of trial thereof. Petitioner
objected and invoked the privilege of self-incrimination. This he broadened by the
clear-cut statement that he will not testify. But petitioner's protestations were met
with the judge's emphatic statement that it "is the right of the prosecution to ask
anybody to act as witness on the witness-stand including the accused," and that
defense counsel "could not object to have the accused called on the witness stand."
The cumulative impact of all these is that accused petitioner had to take the stand.
He was thus peremptorily asked to create evidence against himself. The foregoing
situation molds a solid case for petitioner, backed by the Constitution, the law, and
jurisprudence.
Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary
witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand
and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at
him, an accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to
answer any and all questions. For, in reality, the purpose of calling an accused as
a witness for the People would be to incriminate him. The rule positively intends to
avoid and prohibit the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person "to
furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction."
This rule may apply
even to a co-defendant in a joint trial.
And the guide in the interpretation of the constitutional precept that the accused
shall not be compelled to furnish evidence against himself "is not the probability of
the evidence but it is the capability of abuse." Thus it is, that it was undoubtedly
erroneous for the trial judge to placate petitioner with these words:
"What he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate him, counsel.
And there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the
witness-stand including the accused.
If there should be any question that is incriminating then that is the time for
counsel to interpose his objection and the court will sustain him if and when the
court feels that the answer of this witness to the question would incriminate him.
Counsel has all the assurance that the court will not require the witness to answer
questions which would incriminate him.
But surely, counsel could not object to have the accused called on the witnessstand."
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Paraphrasing Chief Justice Marshall in Aaron Burr's Trial, Robertsons Rep. I, 208,
244, quoted in VIII Wigmore, p. 355, while a defendant's knowledge of the facts
"remains concealed within his bosom, he is safe; but draw it from thence, and he is
exposed" to conviction.
The judge's words heretofore quoted "But surely, counsel could not object to
have the accused called on the witness-stand" wielded authority. By those
words, petitioner was enveloped by a coercive force; they deprived him of his will
to resist; they foreclosed choice: the realities of human nature tell us that as he
took his oath to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, no genuine
consent underlay submission to take the witness stand. Constitutionally sound
consent was absent.
Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners [G.R. No. L-25018, May 26, 1969]
The broad, all-embracing sweep of the self-incrimination clause,1 whenever
appropriately invoked, has been accorded due recognition by this Court ever since
the adoption of the Constitution.2 Bermudez v. Castillo,3 decided in 1937, was quite
categorical. As we there stated: "This Court is of the opinion that in order that the
constitutional provision under consideration may prove to be a real protection and
not a dead letter, it must be given a liberal and broad interpretation favorable to
the person invoking it." As phrased by Justice Laurel in his concurring opinion: "The
provision, as doubtless it was designed, would be construed with the utmost
liberality in favor of the right of the individual intended to be served." 4
Even more relevant, considering the precise point at issue, is the recent case of
Cabal v. Kapunan,5where it was held that a respondent in an administrative
proceeding under the Anti-Graft Law 6 cannot be required to take the witness stand
at the instance of the complainant. So it must be in this case, where petitioner was
sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the
first witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an
administrative charge for malpractice. That was a correct decision; we affirm it on
appeal.
It was noted in the opinion penned by the present Chief Justice that while the
matter referred to an a administrative charge of unexplained wealth, with the AntiGraft Act authorizing the forfeiture of whatever property a public officer or
employee may acquire, manifestly out proportion to his salary and his other lawful
income, there is clearly the imposition of a penalty. The proceeding for forfeiture
while administrative in character thus possesses a criminal or penal aspect. The
case before us is not dissimilar; petitioner would be similarly disadvantaged. He
could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a
medical practitioner, for some an even greater deprivation.
To the argument that Cabal v. Kapunan could thus distinguished, it suffices to refer
to an American Supreme Court opinion highly persuasive in character. 10 In the
language of Justice Douglas: "We conclude ... that the Self-Incrimination Clause of
the Fifth Amendment has been absorbed in the Fourteenth, that it extends its
protection to lawyers as well as to other individuals, and that it should not be
watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a
livelihood as a price for asserting it." We reiterate that such a principle is equally
applicable to a proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of the privilege to
practice the medical profession.
The appeal apparently proceeds on the mistaken assumption by respondent Board
and intervenors-appellants that the constitutional guarantee against selfincrimination should be limited to allowing a witness to object to questions the
answers to which could lead to a penal liability being subsequently incurred. It is
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true that one aspect of such a right, to follow the language of another American
decision, 11 is the protection against "any disclosures which the witness may
reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead
to other evidence that might be so used." If that were all there is then it becomes
diluted.lawphi1.et
The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back as
1905, we had occasion to declare: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent
and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." 12 Only last year, in
Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 13 speaking through Justice Sanchez, we reaffirmed the
doctrine anew that it is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain
silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand with undiluted, unfettered
exercise of his own free genuine will."
Why it should be thus is not difficult to discern. The constitutional guarantee, along
with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not
go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives
should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high
sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the
democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the
most heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the
constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ...
must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens." 14
It is likewise of interest to note that while earlier decisions stressed the principle of
humanity on which this right is predicated, precluding as it does all resort to force
or compulsion, whether physical or mental, current judicial opinion places equal
emphasis on its identification with the right to privacy. Thus according to Justice
Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables the citizen
to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to surrender to his
detriment." 15 So also with the observation of the late Judge Frank who spoke of "a
right to a private enclave where he may lead a private life. That right is the
hallmark of our democracy." 16 In the light of the above, it could thus clearly appear
that no possible objection could be legitimately raised against the correctness of the
decision now on appeal. We hold that in an administrative hearing against a
medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners
cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person
proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent.
Mapa, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 100295, April 26, 1994]
Our immunity statutes are of American origin. In the United States, there are two
types of statutory immunity granted to a witness. They are the transactional
immunity and the used-and-derivative-use immunity. Transactional immunity is
broader in the scope of its protection. By its grant, a witness can no longer be
prosecuted for any offense whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction. In
contrast, by the grant of use-and-derivative-use immunity, a witness is only
assured that his or her particular testimony and evidence derived from it will not be
used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution. In Kastigar vs. US, the
rationale of these immunity grants is well explained, viz:
The power of government to compel persons to testify in court or
before grand juries and other governmental agencies is firmly
established in Anglo-American jurisprudence . . . The power to compel
testimony, and the corresponding duty to testify, are recognized in the
Sixth Amendment requirements that an accused be confronted with
the witnesses against him, and have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor. . .

160

But the power to compel testimony is not absolute. There are a

number of exemptions from the testimonial duty, the most important
of which is the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination. The privilege reflects a complex of our fundamental
values and aspirations, and marks an important advance in the
development of our liberty. It can be asserted in any proceeding, civil
or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory;
and it protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably
believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other
evidence that might be so used. This Court has been zealous to
safeguard the values that underlie the privilege.
Immunity statutes, which have historical roots deep in Anglo-American
jurisprudence, are not incompatible with these values. Rather, they
seek a rational accommodation between the imperatives of the
privilege and the legitimate demands of government to compel citizens
to testify. The existence of these statutes reflects the importance of
testimony, and the fact that many offenses are of such a character
that the only persons capable of giving useful testimony are those
implicated in the crime. Indeed, their origins were in the context of
such offenses, and their primary use has been to investigate such
offenses . . . (E)very State in the Union, as well as the District of
Columbia and Puerto Rico, has one of more such statutes. The
commentators, and this Court on several occasions, have
characterized immunity statutes as essential to the effective
enforcement of various criminal statutes. . .

Section 18 Right Against Involuntary Servitude

Section 19 Prohibited Punishment

People vs. Estoista [G.R. No. L-5793, August 27, 1953]
As to the facts, the firearms with which the appellant was charged with having in
his possession was a rifle and belonged to his father, Bruno Estoista, who held a
legal permit for it. Father and son lived in the same house, a little distance from a
27-hectare estate belonging to the family which was partly covered with cogon
grass, tall weeds and second growth trees. From a spot in the plantation 100 to 120
meters from the house, the defendant took a shot at a wild rooster and hit Diragon
Dima a laborer of the family who was setting a trap for wild chicken and whose
presence was not perceived by the accused.
Without deciding whether the prohibition of the Constitution against infliction of
cruel and unusual punishment applies both to the form of the penalty and the
duration of imprisonment, it is our opinion that confinement from 5 to 10 years for
possessing of carrying firearm is not cruel or unusual, having due regard to the
prevalent conditions which the law proposes to suppress or curb. The rampant
lawlessness against property, person, and even the very security of the
Government, directly traceable in large measure to promiscuous carrying and use
of powerful weapons, justify imprisonment which in normal circumstances might
appear excessive. If imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is out of proportion to the
present case in view of certain circumstances, the law is not to be declared
unconstitutional for this reason. The constitutionality of an act of the legislature is
not to be judged in the light of exceptional cases. Small transgressors for which the
heavy net was not spread are like small fishes, bound to be caught, and it is to
meet such a situation as this that courts are advised to make a recommendation to

161

the Chief Executive for clemency or reduction of the penalty. (Art. 5, Revised Penal
Code; People vs. De la Cruz, 92 Phil., 906.)
The sentence imposed by the lower court is much below the penalty authorized by
Republic Act No. 4. The judgment is therefore modified so as to sentence the
accused to imprisonment for five years. However, considering the degree of malice
of the defendant, application of the law to its full extent would be too harsh and,
accordingly, it is ordered that copy of this decision be furnished to the President,
thru the Secretary of Justice, with the recommendation that the imprisonment
herein imposed be reduced to six months. the appellant will pay the costs of both
instances.
People vs. Esparas [G.R. No. 120034, August 20, 1996]
ALL DEATH PENALTY IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURTS ARE SUBJECT TO THE
AUTOMATIC REVIEW OF THE SUPREME COURT REGARDLESS WHETHER THE
ACCUSED JUMPED BAIL OR DOES NOT INTEND TO APPEAL. As the accused
remains at large up to the present time, the issue that confronts the Court is
whether or not it will proceed to automatically review her death sentence. The
issue need not befuddle us. In the 1910 ground-breaking case of U.S. vs. Laguna,
et al., we already held thru Mr. Justice Moreland, that the power of this Court to
review a decision imposing the death penalty cannot be waived either by
the accused or by the courts, viz.:
"It is apparent from these provisions that the judgment of conviction
and sentence thereunder by the trial court does not, in reality,
conclude the trial of the accused. Such trial is not terminated until the
Supreme Court has reviewed the facts and the law as applied thereto
by the court below. The judgment of conviction entered on the
trial is not final, can not be executed, and is wholly without
force or effect until the cause has been passed upon by the
Supreme Court. In a sense the trial court acts as a commissioner
who takes the testimony and reports thereon to the Supreme Court
with his recommendation. While in practice he enters a judgment of
conviction and sentences the prisoner thereunder, in reality, until
passed upon by the Supreme Court, it has none of the attributes of a
final judgment and sentence. It is a mere recommendation to the
Supreme Court, based upon the facts on the record which are
presented with it. This is meant in no sense to detract from the
dignity and power of Courts of First Instance. It means simply that
that portion of Spanish procedure which related to cases where capital
punishment was imposed still survives.
"The requirement that the Supreme Court pass upon a case in which
capital punishment has been imposed by the sentence of the trial
court is one having for its object simply and solely the protection of
the accused. Having received the highest penalty which the law
imposes, he is entitled under that law to have the sentence and all the
facts and circumstances upon which it is founded placed before the
highest tribunal of the land to the end that its justice and legality may
be clearly and conclusively determined.
Such procedure is
merciful. It gives a second chance for life. Neither the courts
nor the accused can waive it. It is a positive provision of the
law that brooks no interference and tolerates no evasions."
(Emphasis supplied)
"It shall not be necessary to forward to the Supreme Court the record,
or any part thereof, of any case in which there shall have been an
acquittal, or in which the sentence imposed is not death, unless such
162

case shall have been duly appealed; but such sentence shall be
executed upon the order of the court in which the trial was had. The
records of all cases in which the death penalty shall have been
imposed by any Court of First Instance, whether the defendant
shall have appealed or not, and of all cases in which appeals
shall have been taken shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court
for investigation and judgments as law and justice shall
dictate. The records of such cases shall be forwarded to the clerk of
the Supreme Court within twenty days, but not earlier than fifteen
days after the rendition of sentence."
We hold, however, that there is more wisdom in our existing jurisprudence
mandating our review of all death penalty cases, regardless of the wish of the
convict and regardless of the will of the Court. Nothing less than life is at stake
and any court decision authorizing the State to take life must be as errorfree as possible. We must strive to realize this objective, however elusive it may
be, and our efforts must not depend on whether appellant has withdrawn his appeal
or has escaped. Indeed, an appellant may withdraw his appeal not because he is
guilty but because of his wrong perception of the law. Or because he may want to
avail of the more speedy remedy of pardon. Or because of his frustration and
misapprehension that he will not get justice from the authorities. Nor should the
Court be influenced by the seeming repudiation of its jurisdiction when a convict
escapes. Ours is not only the power but the duty to review all death penalty cases.
No litigant can repudiate this power which is bestowed by the Constitution.
The power is more of a sacred duty which we have to discharge to assure
the People that the innocence of a citizen is our concern not only in crimes
that slight but even more, in crimes that shock the conscience. This
concern cannot be diluted.
The Court is not espousing a "soft, bended, approach" to heinous crimes for as
discussed above, we have always reviewed the imposition of the death penalty
regardless of the will of the convict. Our unyielding stance is dictated by the policy
that the State should not be given the license to kill without the final determination
of this Highest Tribunal whose collective wisdom is the last, effective hedge
against an erroneous judgment of a one-judge trial court. This enlightened
policy ought to continue as our beacon light for the taking of life ends all
rights, a matter of societal value that transcends the personal interest of a
convict. The importance of this societal value should not be blurred by the escape
of a convict which is a problem of law enforcement. Neither should this Court be
moved alone by the outrage of the public for the rise in statistics of heinous crimes
for our decisions should not be directed by the changing winds of the social
weather. Let us not for a moment forget that an accused does not cease to
have rights just because of his conviction. This principle is implicit in our
Constitution which recognizes that an accused, to be right, while the
majority, even if overwhelming, has no right to be wrong.

Echagaray vs. Secretary of Justice [G.R. No. 132601, October 12, 1998]
The main challenge to R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules is anchored on
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution which proscribes the imposition
of "cruel, degrading or inhuman" punishment. "The prohibition in the Philippine Bill
against cruel and unusual punishments is an Anglo-Saxon safeguard against
governmental oppression of the subject, which made its first appearance in the
reign of William and Mary of England in 'An Act declaring the rights and liberties of
the subject, and settling the succession of the crown,' passed in the year 1689. It
has been incorporated into the Constitution of the United States (of America) and
into most constitutions of the various States in substantially the same language as
that used in the original statute. The exact language of the Constitution of the
163

United States is used in the Philippine Bill." "The counterpart of Section 19 (1) in
the 1935 Constitution reads: 'Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and
inhuman punishment inflicted.' . . . In the 1973 Constitution the phrase became
'cruel or unusual punishment.' The Bill of Rights Committee of the 1986
Constitutional Commission read the 1973 modification as prohibiting 'unusual'
punishment even if not 'cruel.' It was thus seen as an obstacle to experimentation
in penology. Consequently, the Committee reported out the present text which
prohibits 'cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment' as more consonant with the
meaning desired and with jurisprudence on the subject."
Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and
inhuman punishment considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the
drugs to be used in carrying out lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be
administered, and the procedure in administering said drug/s into the accused; (2)
R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules are uncertain as to the date of execution,
time of notification, the court which will fix the date of execution, which
uncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for the convict; and (3) the
possibility of "botched executions" or mistakes in administering the drugs renders
lethal injection inherently cruel.
Before the Court proceeds any further, a brief explanation of the process of
administering lethal injection is in order.
In lethal injection, the condemned inmate is strapped on a hospital gurney and
wheeled into the execution room. A trained technician inserts a needle into a vein in
the inmate's arm and begins an intravenous flow of saline solution. At the warden's
signal, a lethal combination of drugs is injected into the intravenous line. The
deadly concoction typically includes three drugs: (1) a nonlethal dose of sodium
thiopenthotal, a sleep inducing barbiturate; (2) lethal doses of pancuronium
bromide, a drug that paralyzes the muscles; and (3) potassium chloride, which
stops the heart within seconds. The first two drugs are commonly used during
surgery to put the patient to sleep and relax muscles; the third is used in heart
bypass surgery.
Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment. In the oft-cited case of Harden v. Director of
Prisons, this Court held that "[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or
a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of
that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and
barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life." Would the lack
in particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by lethal injection
render said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"? The Court believes not. For reasons
hereafter discussed, the implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which
are properly left to the competence and expertise of administrative officials.
Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 25 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which
"court" will fix the time and date of execution, and the date of execution and time
of notification of the death convict. As petitioner already knows, the "court" which
designates the date of execution is the trial court which convicted the accused, that
is, after this Court has reviewed the entire records of the case and has affirmed the
judgment of the lower court. Thereupon, the procedure is that the "judgment is
entered fifteen (15) days after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the
records are remanded to the court below including a certified copy of the judgment
for execution." Neither is there any uncertainty as to the date of execution nor the
time of notification. As to the date of execution, Section 15 of the implementing
rules must be read in conjunction with the last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No.
8177 which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out "not earlier than
one (1) year nor later than eighteen (18) months after the judgment has become
final and executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his
164

executive clemency powers at all times." Hence, the death convict is in effect
assured of eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death
penalty became final and executory wherein he can seek executive clemency and
attend to all his temporal and spiritual affairs.
Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of possible
complications in the intravenous injection, considering and as petitioner claims, that
respondent Director is an untrained and untested person insofar as the choice and
administration of lethal injection is concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel,
degrading and inhuman punishment. Such supposition is highly speculative and
unsubstantiated.
Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the
execution of the death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional
proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense,
anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment
imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are
cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to
go unpunished." The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted
man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering
involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely. Numerous federal
and state courts of the United States have been asked to review whether lethal
injections constitute cruel and unusual punishment. No court has found lethal
injections to implicate prisoners' Eighth Amendment rights. In fact, most courts that
have addressed the issue state in one or two sentences that lethal injection clearly
is a constitutional form of execution. A few jurisdictions, however, have addressed
the merits of the Eighth Amendment claims. Without exception, these courts have
found that lethal injection does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. After
reviewing medical evidence that indicates that improper doses or improper
administration of the drugs causes severe pain and that prison officials tend to have
little training in the administration of the drugs, the courts have found that the few
minutes of pain does not rise to a constitutional violation.
What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning
as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice" and "must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society." Indeed, "[o]ther (U.S.) courts have focused on 'standards of
decency' finding that the widespread use of lethal injections indicates that it
comports with contemporary norms." The primary indicator of society's standard of
decency with regard to capital punishment is the response of the country's
legislatures to the sanction. Hence, for as long as the death penalty remains in our
statute books and meets the most stringent requirements provided by the
Constitution, we must confine our inquiry to the legality of R.A. No. 8177, whose
constitutionality we duly sustain in the face of petitioner's challenge. We find that
the legislature's substitution of the mode of carrying out the death penalty from
electrocution to lethal injection infringes no constitutional rights of petitioner herein.
Section 20 Non-Imprisonment for Debt
Serafin vs. Lindayag [A.M. No. 297-MJ, September 30, 1975]
Lozano vs. Martinez [G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986]
Section 21 Double Jeopardy
People vs. Obsania [G.R. No. L-24447, June 29, 1968]

165

REQUISITES OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY. An appeal by the prosecution in a criminal

case is not available if the defendant would thereby be placed in double jeopardy.
Correlatively, Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
"When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a
valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction, and after the defendant had
pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or
the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the
offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information."
In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in favor of an
accused, the following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution: (a)
a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had
pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the
case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
DISMISSAL WITH THE EXPRESS CONSENT OF THE ACCUSED. From the abovequoted statement, it is clear that what in Salico was repudiated in Labatete was the
premise that the dismissal therein was not on the merits and not the conclusion
that a dismissal, other than on the merits, sought by the accused, is deemed to be
with his express consent and therefore constitutes a waiver of his right to plead
double jeopardy in the event of an appeal by the prosecution or a second
indictment for the same offense. This Court, in Labatete, merely pointed out that
the controverted dismissal in Salico "was in fact an acquittal." Reasoning a
contrario, had the dismissal not amounted to acquittal, then the doctrine of waiver
would have applied and prevailed.
In Cloribel, the case dragged for three years and eleven months, that is, from
September 27, 1958 when the information was filed to August 15, 1962 when it
was called for trial, after numerous postponements, mostly at the instance of the
prosecution. On the latter date, the prosecution failed to appear for trial, and upon
motion of the defendants, the case was dismissed. This Court held "that the
dismissal here complained of was not truly a 'dismissal' but an acquittal. For it was
entered upon the defendants' insistence on their constitutional right to speedy trial
and by reason of the prosecution's failure to appear on the date of trial." (italics
supplied.)
Considering the factual setting in the case at bar, it is clear that there is no
parallelism between Cloribel and the case cited therein, on the one hand, and the
instant case, on the other. Here the controverted dismissal was predicated on the
erroneous contention of the accused that the complaint was defective and such
infirmity affected the jurisdiction of the court a quo, and not on the right of the
accused to a speedy trial and the failure of the Government to prosecute. The
appealed order of dismissal in this case now under consideration did not terminate
the action on the merits, whereas in Cloribel and in the other related cases the
dismissal amounted to an acquittal because the failure to prosecute presupposed
that the Government did not have a case against the accused, who, in the first
place, is presumed innocent.
The application of the sister doctrines of waiver and estoppel requires two sine qua
non conditions: first, the dismissal must be sought or induced by the defendant
personally or through his counsel; and second, such dismissal must not be on the
166

merits and must not necessarily amount to an acquittal. Indubitably, the case at
bar falls squarely within the periphery of the said doctrines which have been
preserved unimpaired in the corpus of our jurisprudence.
Paulin vs. Gimenez [G.R. No. 103323, January 21, 1993]
DOUBLE JEOPARDY. For double jeopardy to be validly invoked by petitioners, the
following requisites must have been obtained in the original prosecution:
a)
b)
c)
d)

a valid complaint or information;

a competent court;
the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and
the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent
(People v. Obsania, 23 SCRA 1249 [1968]; Caes v. IAC , 179 SCRA 54
[1989]).

Jurisprudence on double jeopardy as well as the exceptions thereto which finds

application to the case at bar has been laid down by this Court as follows:
". . . However, an appeal by the prosecution from the order of
dismissal (of the criminal case) by the trial court shall not constitute
double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the
express consent of the defendant; (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal
or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the
case; and (3) the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is
purely legal so that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case
would have to be remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant."
(People v. Villalon, 192 SCRA 521 [1990], at p. 529.)
For double jeopardy to attach, the dismissal of the case must be without the
express consent of the accused (People v. Gines, 197 SCRA 481 [1991]). Where the
dismissal was ordered upon motion or with the express assent of the accused, he is
deemed to have waived his protection against double jeopardy. In the case at bar,
the dismissal was granted upon motion of petitioners. Double jeopardy thus did not
attach. This doctrine of waiver of double jeopardy was examined and formally
introduced in People v. Salico (84 Phil. 722 [19491), where Justice Felicisimo Feria
stated:
". . . when the case is dismissed, with the express consent of the
defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for
the same offense; because, his action in having the case dismissed
constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right or privilege, for the
reason that he thereby prevents the court from proceeding to the trial
on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him."
(See also People v. Marapao (85 Phil. 832 [1950]); Gandicela v. Lutero
(88 Phil. 299 [1951]); People v. Desalisa (125 Phil. 27 [1966]); and,
more recently, People v. Aquino (199 SCRA 610 [1991]).
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ACQUITTAL AND DISMISSAL. In People v. Salico (supra),
distinctions between acquittal and dismissal were made, to wit:
". . . Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is
acquitted because the evidence does not show that defendant's guilt is
beyond reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on
the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissals terminate the
proceedings, either because the court is not a court of competent
jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was
167

committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the

complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form and
substance, etc. . . ." (at pp. 732-733.)
CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN DISMISSAL IS DEEMED FINAL. Jurisprudence recognizes
exceptional instances when the dismissal may be held to be final, disposing of the
case once and for all even if the dismissal was made on motion of the accused
himself, to wit:
1.

Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the

accused after the prosecution has rested, which has the effect of a
judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal.

2.

Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because

of the denial of his right to a speedy trial which is in effect a failure to
prosecute. (Caes v. IAC, 179 SCRA 54 [1989] at pp. 60-61.)

Philippine Savings Bank vs. Bermoy [ G.R. No. 151912, September 26, 2005]
The right against double jeopardy can be invoked if (a) the accused is charged with
the same offense in two separate pending cases, or (b) the accused is prosecuted
anew for the same offense after he had been convicted or acquitted of such
offense, or (c) the prosecution appeals from a judgment in the same case.19
The last is based on Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court20 which provides that
"[a]ny party may appeal from a final judgment or order, except if the accused
would be placed thereby in double jeopardy."
In terms of substantive law, the Court will not pass upon the propriety of the order
granting the Demurrer to Evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and
the consequent acquittal of the accused, as it will place the latter in double
jeopardy. Generally, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal made
with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion will not place the
accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two exceptions, namely:
insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to a speedy trial xxx In the case
before us, the resolution of the Demurrer to Evidence was based on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence xxx Hence, it clearly falls under one of the admitted
exceptions to the rule. Double jeopardy therefore, applies to this case and this
Court is constitutionally barred from reviewing the order acquitting the accused.22
(Emphasis supplied)
The strict rule against appellate review of judgments of acquittal is not without any
basis. As the Court explained in People v. Velasco
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial
court cuts deep into "the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over
the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State x x x x"
Thus, Green [v. United States] expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea,
one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence,
is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in
a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility
that even though innocent, he may be found guilty."
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted
defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of
his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of
acquittals is "part of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to
168

the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction." The interest in the
finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to
understand: it is a need for "repose," a desire to know the exact extent of ones
liability. With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a
protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a
jurys leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.
Related to his right of repose is the defendants interest in his right to have his trial
completed by a particular tribunal. xxx [S]ocietys awareness of the heavy personal
strain which the criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested
in the willingness to limit Government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate
its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws. The ultimate goal is
prevention of government oppression; the goal finds its voice in the finality of the
initial proceeding. As observed in Lockhart v. Nelson, "(t)he fundamental tenet
animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State should not be able to
oppress individuals through the abuse of the criminal process." Because the
innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution
conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair.
Petitioner, together with the Solicitor General, contends that the Court can inquire
into the merits of the acquittal of respondent spouses because the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was void. They contend that the trial court acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
disregarded evidence allegedly proving respondent spouses identity.
The contention has no merit. To be sure, the rule barring appeals from judgments
of acquittal admits of an exception. Such, however, is narrowly drawn and is limited
to the case where the trial court "act[ed] with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction due to a violation of due process i.e. the
prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case xxx or that the trial
was a sham xxx."

Lejano vs. People of the Philippines [G.R. No. 176389, January 18, 2011]
But, as a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the
accused under double jeopardy. The Constitution provides in Section 21, Article III,
that:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense. x x x
To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of being
punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved. There is reason for
this provision of the Constitution. In criminal cases, the full power of the State is
ranged against the accused. If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the
accused for the same offense after he has been acquitted, the infinite power and
capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation would eventually
overwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to fight.
As the Court said in People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan:
[A]t the heart of this policy is the concern that permitting the
sovereign freely to subject the citizen to a second judgment for the
same offense would arm the government with a potent instrument of
oppression. The provision therefore guarantees that the State shall not
be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an
alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense,
and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety
and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though
169

innocent he may be found guilty. Societys awareness of the heavy

personal strain which a criminal trial represents for the individual
defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit the government to a
single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in the
enforcement of criminal laws.
Of course, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible.
But the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the
accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a
mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State may assail the decision by
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.

Icasiano vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 95642, May 28, 1992]

DOUBLE JEOPARDY DOES NOT ATTACH WHEN THE FIRST ACTION IS
ADMINISTRATIVE IN NATURE. It is, therefore, correct for the Sandiganbayan to
hold that double jeopardy does not apply in the present controversy because the
Supreme Court case (against the herein petitioner) was administrative in character
while the Sandiganbayan case also against said petitioner is criminal in nature.
When the Supreme Court acts on complaints against judges or any of the personnel
under its supervision and control, it acts as personnel administrator, imposing
discipline and not as a court judging justiciable controversies. Administrative
procedure need not strictly adhere to technical rules. Substantial evidence is
sufficient to sustain conviction. Criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, on
the other hand, while they may involve the same acts subject of the administrative
case, require proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
To avail of the protection against double jeopardy, it is fundamental that the
following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution: (a) a valid
complaint or information; (b) a competent court; c) a valid arraignment; (d) the
defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (e) the defendant was acquitted, or
convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent. All these elements do not apply vis-a-vis the administrative
case, which should take case of petitioner's contention that said administrative case
against him before the Supreme Court, which was, as aforestated, dismissed,
entitled him to raise the defense of double jeopardy in the criminal case in the
Sandiganbayan.
The charge against petitioner Judge Icasiano before the Sandiganbayan is for grave
abuse of authority, manifest partiality and incompetence in having issued two (2)
orders of detention against complaining witness Magbago. Ordinarily, complainant's
available remedy was to appeal said orders of detention in accordance with the
Rules. It is only when an appellate court reverses the lower court issuing the
questioned orders can abuse, partiality or incompetence be imputed to the judge.
Here no appeal from the questioned orders of the issuing judge (petitioner
Icasiano) was taken: instead, administrative and criminal cases were filed against
the judge for issuing the orders.
It is precisely for this reason, among other, that the administrative case against
petitioner was dismissed by the Supreme Court for lack of merit; and yet, it cannot
be assumed at this point that petitioner is not criminally liable under R.A 3019, par.
3(e) for issuing the questioned orders of detention. In fact, the Ombudsman has
found a prima facie case which led to the filing of the information.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY DOES NOT ATTACH IN PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. In any
case, the dismissal by the Tanodbayan of the first complaint cannot bar the present
prosecution, since double jeopardy does not apply. As held in Cirilo Cinco, et al. vs.
170

Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines,

a preliminary investigation
(assuming one had been conducted in TBP-87-00924) is not a trial to which double
jeopardy attaches.
In Gaspar vs. Sandiganbayan, this Court also held:
"Moreover, there is no rule or law requiring the Tanodbayan to conduct
another preliminary investigation of a case under review by it (him).
On the contrary, under Presidential Decree No. 911, in relation to Rule
12, Administrative Order No. VII, the Tanodbayan may, upon review,
reverse the finding of the investigator, and thereafter `where he finds
a prima facie case, to cause the filing of an information in court
against the respondent, based on the same sworn statements or
evidence submitted, without the necessity of conducting another
preliminary investigation.'"

People vs. Balisacan [G.R. No. L-26376, August 31, 1966]

DOUBLE JEOPARDY REQUIRES A VALID PLEA. This Court now turns to Section 2,
Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which provides that: "The People of the Philippines
cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy." The
present state of jurisprudence in this regard is that the above provision applies
even if the accused fails to file a brief and raise the question of double jeopardy
(People vs. Ferrer, L-9072, October 23, 1956; People vs. Bao, 106 Phil. 243; People
vs. de Golez, 108 Phil. 855)
The next issue, therefore, is whether this appeal placed the accused in double
jeopardy. It is settled that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double
jeopardy (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851; People vs. Quimsing, L-19860, December
23, 1964). In the present case, it is true, the accused had first entered a plea of
guilty. Subsequently, however, he testified, in the course of being allowed to prove
mitigating circumstances, that he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony,
therefore as the court a quo recognized in its decision had the effect of vacating
his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required him to plead anew on
the charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This
was not done. It follows that in effect there having been no standing plea at the
time the court a quo rendered its judgment of acquittal, there can be no double
jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY WILL NOT ATTACH IF THE PROSECUTION WAS DENIED ITS
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. Furthermore, as afore-stated, the court a quo decided
the case upon the merits without giving the prosecution any opportunity to present
its evidence or even to rebut the testimony of the defendant. In doing so, it clearly
acted without due process of law. And for lack of this fundamental pre-requisite its
action is perforce null and void. The acquittal, therefore, being a nullity for want of
due process, is no acquittal at all, and thus can not constitute a proper basis for a
claim of former jeopardy (People vs. Cabero, 61 Phil. 121; 21 Am. Jur. 2d., 235;
McCleary vs. Hudspeth, 124 Fed. 2d., 445)
It should be noted that in rendering the judgment of acquittal, the trial judge below
already gave credence to the testimony of the accused. In fairness to the
prosecution, without in any way doubting the integrity of said trial judge, We deem
it proper to remand this case to the court a quo for further proceedings under
another judge of the same court, in one of the two other branches of the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Norte sitting at Laoag.

171

People vs. City Court of Silay [G.R. No. L-43790, December 9, 1976]
DISMISSAL ON THE GROUND OF DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE WILL SET IN MOTION
DOUBLE JEOPARDY EVEN IF THE SAME HAS BEEN ACTIVELY SOPUGHT BY THE
ACCUSED. It is true that the criminal case of falsification was dismissed on motion
of the accused; however, this was a motion filed after the prosecution had rested
its case, calling for an appreciation of the evidence adduced and its sufficiency to
warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on
the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused.
In the case of the herein respondents, however, the dismissal of the charge against
them was one on the merits of the case which is to be distinguished from other
dismissals at the instance of the accused. All the elements of double jeopardy are
here present, to wit: (1) a valid information sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction of the crime charged, (2) a court of competent jurisdiction, and
(3) an unconditional dismissal of the complaint after the prosecution had rested its
case, amounting to the acquittal of the accused. The dismissal being one on the
merits, the doctrine of waiver of the accused to a plea of double jeopardy cannot be
invoked.
Esmea vs. Pogoy [G.R. No. L-54110, February 20, 1981]
DISMISSAL BASED ON THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL IS DISMISSAL ON THE
MERITS. The petitioners were insisting on a trial. They relied on their constitutional
right to have a speedy trial. The fiscal was not ready because his witness was not in
court. Respondent judge on his own volition provisionally dismissed the case. The
petitioners did not expressly manifest their conformity to the provisional dismissal.
Hence, the dismissal placed them in jeopardy.
Even if the petitioners, after invoking their right to a speedy trial, moved for the
dismissal of the case and, therefore, consented to it, the dismissal would still place
them in jeopardy. The use of the word "provisional" would not change the legal
effect of the dismissal (Esguerra vs. De la Costa, 66 Phil. 134; Gandicela vs. Lutero,
88 Phil. 299).
"If the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial, he
should ask, not for the dismissal, but for the trial of the case. After the
prosecution's motion for postponement of the trial is denied and upon order of the
court the fiscal does not or cannot produce his evidence and, consequently, fails to
prove the defendant's guilt, the court upon defendant's motion shall dismiss the
case, such dismissal amounting to an acquittal of the defendant" (4 Moran's
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1980 Ed., p. 202, citing Gandicela vs. Lutero, 88
Phil. 299, 307 and People vs. Diaz, 94 Phil. 714, 717).
The dismissal of a criminal case upon motion of the accused because the
prosecution was not prepared for trial since the complainant and his witnesses did
not appear at the trial is a dismissal equivalent to an acquittal that would bar
further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense
People vs. Pineda [G.R. No. L-44205, February 16, 1993]
PRIOR CONVICTION OR ACQUITAL OR DISMISSAL OF THE CASE WITHOUT THE
CONSENT OF THE ACCUSED IS NECESSARY TO SET IN MOTION DOUBLE
JEOPARDY. Withal, the mere filing of two informations charging the same offense is
not an appropriate basis for the invocation of double jeopardy since the first
jeopardy has not yet set in by a previous conviction, acquittal or termination of the
case without the consent of the accused (People vs. Miraflores, 115 SCRA 586
[1982]; Nierras vs. Dacuycuy, 181 SCRA 8 [1990]).

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In People vs. Miraflores (supra), the accused therein, after he had pleaded to the
charge of multiple frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 88173 and subsequent to
his arraignment on a separate charge of Murder in Criminal Case No. 88174,
invoked the plea of double jeopardy but Justice Barredo who spoke for the Court
was far from convinced:
"But the more untenable aspect of the position of appellant is that
when he invoked the defense of double jeopardy, what could have
been the first jeopardy had not yet been completed or even began. It
is settled jurisprudence in this Court that the mere filing of two
informations or complaints charging the same offense does not yet
afford the accused in those cases the occasion to complain that he is
being placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense, for the simple
reason that the primary basis of the defense of double jeopardy is that
the accused has already been convicted or acquitted in the first case or
that the same has been terminated without his consent. (Bulaong vs.
People, L-19344, July 27, 1966, 17 SCRA 746; Silvestre vs. Military
Commission No. 21, No. L-46366, March 8, 1978, Buscayno vs.
Military Commissions Nos. 1, 2, 6 and 25, No. L-58284, Nov. 19, 1981,
109 SCRA 273)."
From the conclusion thus reached, it would appear that one simply "charged" may
claim possible jeopardy in another case. However, a closer study of the case
adverted to reveals that the ponente may have overlooked the fact that the
accused therein was not only charged, but he actually admitted his guilt to the
charge of serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence and more
importantly, he was convicted of such crime and commenced serving sentence.
Verily, there was no occasion in said case to speak of jeopardy being properly
invoked by a person simply charged with an offense if he is again charged for the
same or identical offense. It may be observed that in City Court of Manila the
accused therein pleaded on the first offense of which he was charged and
subsequently convicted, unlike in the scenario at bar where private respondent
entered her plea to the second offense. But the variance on this point is of no
substantial worth because private respondent's plea to the second offense is, as
aforesaid, legally incomplete to sustain her assertion of jeopardy for probable
conviction of the same felony, absent as there is the previous conviction, acquittal,
or termination without her express consent of the previous case for estafa, and it
being plain and obvious that the charges did not arise from the same acts. In short,
in order for the first jeopardy to attach, the plea of the accused to the charge must
be coupled with either conviction, acquittal, or termination of the previous case
without his express consent thereafter.
People vs. Tampal [G.R. No. 102485, May 22, 1995]
DISMISSAL OF A CASE BASED ON ERRONEOUS APPLICATION OF THE RIGHT TO
SPEEDY TRIAL MAY BE APPEALED WITHOUT VIOLATING THE RIGHT AGAINST
DOUBLE JEOPARDY. In dismissing criminal cases based on the right of the accused
to speedy trial, courts carefully weigh the circumstances attending each case. They
should balance the right of the accused and the right of the State to punish people
who violate its penal laws. Both the State and the accused are entitled to due
process.
In determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a
mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled
hearings of the case. What offends the right of the accused to speedy trial are
unjustified postponements which prolong trial for an unreasonable length of time.
We reiterate our ruling in Gonzales vs. Sandiganbayan:

173

". . . the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to

speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended
by vexatious, capricious or oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of trial are asked for and secured; or when without
cause or justifiable motive, along period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the
balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied
his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case that matter
in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defense are
weighed, and such factors as non-assertion of his right and prejudice
to the defendant resulting from delay, are considered."
Private respondents cannot also invoke their right against double jeopardy. The
three (3) requisites of double jeopardy are: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached
prior to the second, (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated, and
(3) a second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. Legal
jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court,
(3) after arraignment (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the
defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused.
It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that dismissal of cases on
the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar
further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It must be stressed,
however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the accused to
speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at bench considering
that the right of the private respondents to a speedy trial has not been violated by
the State. For this reason, private respondents cannot invoke their right against
double jeopardy.
Melo vs. People [G.R. No. L-3580, March 22, 1950]
DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY. "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense," according to Article III, section 1 (20) of our
Constitution. The rule of "double jeopardy" had a settled meaning in this jurisdiction
at the time our Constitution was promulgated. It meant that when a person is
charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction
or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again
be charged with the same or identical offense. This principle is founded upon the
law of reason, justice and conscience. It is embodied in the maxim of the civil law
non bis in idem, in the common law of England, and undoubtedly in every system of
jurisprudence, and instead of having specific origin it simply always existed. It
found expression in the Spanish law and in the Constitution of the United States
and is now embodied in our own Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of
the citizens.
It must be noticed that the protection of the Constitutional inhibition is against a
second jeopardy for the same offense, the only exception being, as stated in the
same Constitution, that "if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction
or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same
act." The phrase same offense, under the general rule, has always been construed
to mean not only that the second offense charged is exactly the same as the one
alleged in the first information, but also that the two offenses are identical. There is
identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for
one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other. This so- called
"same-evidence test" which was found to be vague and deficient, was restated by
the Rules of Court in a clearer and more accurate form. Under said Rules there is
identity between two offenses not only when the second offense is exactly the same
as the first, but also when the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a
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frustration thereof, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the

offense charged in the first information. (Rule 113, sec. 9; U.S. vs. Lim Suco, 11
Phil., 484; U.S. vs. Ledesma, 29 Phil., 431; People vs. Martinez, 55 Phil., 6.) In this
connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of
the essential ingredients of the former as alleged in the information constitute the
latter. And vice-versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another
when all the ingredients of the former constitute a part of the elements constituting
the latter (Rule 116, sec. 5.) In other words, one who has been charged with an
offense cannot be again charged with the same or identical offense though the
latter be lesser or greater than the former. "As the Government cannot begin with
the highest, and then go down step by step, bringing the man into jeopardy for
every dereliction included therein, neither can it begin with the lowest and ascend
to the highest with precisely the same result." (People vs. Cox, 107 Mich., 435,
quoted with approval in U.S. vs. Lim Suco, 11 Phil., 484; see also U.S. vs.
Ledesma, 29 Phil., 431 and People vs. Martinez, 55 Phil., 6, 10.)
DOUBLE JEOPARDY DOES NOT APPLY WHEN THE SECOND OFFENSE DOES NOT
EXIST AT THE TIME THE FIRST JEOPARDY ATTACHES. This rule of identity does not
apply, however, when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the
first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for
the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was
then inexistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and
after conviction the injured person dies, the charge for homicide against the same
accused does not put him twice in jeopardy. This is the ruling laid down by the
Supreme Court of the United States in the Philippine case of Diaz vs. U.S., 223
U.S., 442, followed by this Court in People vs. Espino, G.R. No. 46123, 69 Phil.,
471, and these two cases are similar to the instant case. Stating it in another form,
the rule is that "where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which
the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and,
together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense"
(15 Am. Jur., 66), the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted
for the new offense.
This is the meaning of "double jeopardy" as intended by our Constitution for it was
the one prevailing in the jurisdiction at the time the Constitution was promulgated,
and no other meaning could have been intended by our Rules of Court.
Accordingly, an offense may be said to necessarily include or to be necessarily
included in another offense, for the purpose of determining the existence of double
jeopardy, when both offenses were in existence during the pendency of the first
prosecution, for otherwise, if the second offense was then inexistent, no jeopardy
could attach therefor during the first prosecution, and consequently a subsequent
charge for the same cannot constitute second jeopardy. By the very nature of
things there can be no double jeopardy under such circumstance, and our Rules of
Court cannot be construed to recognize the existence of a condition where such
condition in reality does not exist. General terms of a statute or regulation should
be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an
absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that exceptions have
been intended to their language which would avoid results of this character. (In re
Allen, 2 Phil., 641.)
People vs. Adil [G.R. No. L-41863, April 22, 1977]
DOCTRINE OF SUPERVENING EVENT. In Silva, there was no question that the
extent of the damage to property and physical injuries suffered by the offended
parties therein were already existing and known when the prior minor case was
prosecuted. What is controlling then in the instant case is Melo vs. People, 85 Phil.
766, in which it was held:

175

"This rule of identity does not apply, however, when the second
offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for
the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the
accused during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense
that was then inexistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with
physical injuries and after conviction the injured dies, the charge of
homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in
jeopardy."
So also is People vs. Yorac, 42 SCRA, 230, to the following effect:
"Stated differently, if after the first prosecution 'a new fact supervenes'
on which defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the
character of the crime and giving rise to a new and distinct offense,
'the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the
new offense.'"
In People vs. Buling, 107 Phil. 112, We explained how a deformity may be
considered as a supervening fact. Referring to the decision in People vs. Manolong,
85 Phil. 829, We held:
"No finding was made in the first examination that the injuries had
caused deformity and the loss of the use of the right hand. As nothing
was mentioned in the first medical certificate about the deformity and
the loss of the use of the right hand, we presumed that such fact was
not apparent or could have been discernible at the time the first
examination was made. The course (not the length) of the healing of
an injury may not be determined before hand; it can only be definitely
known after the period of healing has ended. That is the reason why
the court considered that there was a supervening fact occurring since
the filing of the original information."
People vs. Relova [G.R. No. L-45129, March 6, 1987]
DOUBLE JEOPARDY OF PUNISHMENT FOR THE SAME ACT. The first sentence of
Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that
is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both
the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The
second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general
proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available
although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense
charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code,
provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts.
Put a little differently, where the offenses charged are penalized either by different
sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates
to the identity of offenses charged: the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is available only where an identity is shown to exist between the earlier
and the subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where one offense is charged
under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical
inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed
and which are alleged to have given rise to the two offenses: the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which constitute
or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same
acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute.
The question may be raised why one rule should exist where two offenses under
two different sections of the same statute or under different statutes are charged,
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and another rule for the situation where one offense is charged under a municipal
ordinance and another offense under a national statute. If the second sentence of
the double jeopardy provision had not been written into the Constitution, conviction
or acquittal under a municipal ordinance would never constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act under a national statute. An offense penalized by
municipal ordinance is, by definition, different from an offense under a statute. The
two offenses would never constitute the same offense having been promulgated by
different rule-making authorities though one be subordinate to the other and
the plea of double jeopardy would never be. The discussions during the 1934-1935
Constitutional Convention show that the second sentence was inserted precisely for
the purpose of extending the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a
situation which would not otherwise be covered by the first sentence.
The question of identity or lack of identity of offenses is addressed by examining
the essential elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are
set out in the respective legislative definitions of the offenses involved. The
question of identity of the acts which are claimed to have generated liability both
under a municipal ordinance and a national statute must be addressed, in the first
instance, by examining the location of such acts in time and space. When the acts
of the accused as set out in the two informations are so related to each other in
time and space as to be reasonably regarded as having taken place on the same
occasion and where those acts have been moved by one and the same, or a
continuing, intent or voluntary design or negligence, such acts may be
appropriately characterized as an integral whole capable of giving rise to penal
liability simultaneously under different legal enactments (a municipal ordinance and
a national statute).
It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not to
be understood with absolute literalness. The identity of offenses that must be
shown need not be absolute identity: the first and second offenses may be
regarded as the "same offense" where the second offense necessarily includes the
first offense or is necessarily included in such first offense or where the second
offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof. Thus, for the
constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements
constituting the first offense need be present in the technical definition of the
second offense. The law here seeks to prevent harassment of an accused person by
multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another are
nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical
elements. As Associate Justice and later Chief Justice Ricardo Paras cautioned in
People vs. del Carmen, et al., 88 Phil. 51 (1951):
"While the rule against double jeopardy prohibits prosecution for the
same offense, it seems elementary that an accused should be shielded
against being prosecuted for several offenses made out from a single
act. Otherwise, an unlawful act or omission may give use to several
prosecutions depending upon the ability of the prosecuting officer to
imagine or concoct as many offenses as can be justified by said act or
omission by simply adding or subtracting essential elements. Under
the theory of appellant the crime of rape may be converted into a
crime of coercion, by merely alleging that by force and intimidation the
accused prevented the offended girl from remaining a virgin." (88 Phil.
at 53; emphases supplied).
By the same token, acts of a person which physically occur on the same occasion
and are infused by a common intent or design or negligence and therefore form a
moral unity, should not be segmented and sliced, as it were, to produce as many
different acts as there are offenses under municipal ordinances or statutes that an
enterprising prosecutor can find.
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Section 22 Ex Post Facto Law and Bill of Attainder

ARTICLE IV - CITIZENSHIP
Section 2
Co vs. House of Representatives [G.R. Nos. 92191-92, July 30, 1991]
FORMAL ELECTION OF CITIZENSHIP APPLIES ONLY TO THOSE WHO HAVE YET TO
ACQUIRE PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP AND NOT TO THOSE WHO ARE ALREADY
FILIPINOS WHEN THE TIME TO ELECT COMES. Election becomes material because
Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to children
born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he
came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He
was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father
had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could
not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution
would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing
citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election
through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary
procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal
process.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that
the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises
constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact
pronouncement of the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship". (p. 52; emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has
established his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to
have elected citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare
rule.
The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar where there are no
alien enclaves and no racial distinctions. The respondent has lived the life of a
Filipino since birth. His father applied for naturalization when the child was still a
small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has worked for a sensitive government
agency. His profession requires citizenship for taking the examinations and getting
a license. He has participated in political exercises as a Filipino and has always
considered himself a Filipino citizen. There is nothing in the records to show that he
does not embrace Philippine customs and values, nothing to indicate any tinge of
alien-ness, no acts to show that this country is not his natural homeland. The mass
of voters of Northern Samar are fully aware of Mr. Ong's parentage. They should
know him better than any member of this Court will ever know him. They voted by
overwhelming numbers to have him represent them in Congress. Because of his
acts since childhood, they have considered him as a Filipino.

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The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who
still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect
came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering
a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a
qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other
categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for
these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien.
Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt
in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private
respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in
an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship?
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected citizenship.
It observed that "when protestee was only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong
Chuan became a naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act
squarely applies its benefit to him for he was then a minor residing in this country.
Concededly, it was the law itself that had already elected Philippine citizenship for
protestee by declaring him as such." (Emphasis supplied)
RESIDENCE IN ELECTION LAW IS EQUIVALENT TO DOMICILE. The petitioners lose
sight of the meaning of "residence" under the Constitution. The term "residence"
has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous
Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of
residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to
remain the same as that of domicile, to wit:
"Mr. Nolledo:
With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not
less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So
my question is: What is the Committee's concept of residence of a
candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept
of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National
Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides,
among others, 'and a resident thereof, that is, in the district, for a
period of not less than one year preceding the day of the election. This
was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given
to it was domicile." (Records of the 1987 Constitutional Convention,
Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 87)
xxx

xxx

xxx

"Mrs. Rosario Braid:

The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner
Nolledo has raised the same point that 'resident' has been interpreted
at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes:
Domicile.

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Ms. Rosario Braid:

Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper time to go back
to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes:
But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a
provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that
Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to
stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not
physical and actual residence." (Records of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 110)
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word
"residence" which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for
business or pleasure, one intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA
966 [1967]) The absence of a person from said permanent residence, no matter
how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that person. In other
words, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi. (Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA
147 [1966])
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his
parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose
Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the
present.
PROPERTY OWNERSHIP IS NOT MATERIAL IN DETERMINING THE RESIDENCE. Even
assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the
Supreme Court in the case of De los Reyes D. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held
that it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his
residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a
rented house or in that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis supplied)
To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for
Congress would be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only
requires that the candidate meets the age, citizenship, voting and residence
requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the candidate should
also own property in order to be qualified to run. (see Maquera v. Borra, 122 Phil.
412 [1965])
It has also been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a
profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected,
does not constitute loss of residence. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954])
As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of
finishing his studies and later to practice his profession. There was no intention to
abandon the residence in Laoang, Samar. On the contrary, the periodical journeys
made to his home province reveal that he always had the animus revertendi.
In re: Application for Admission to the Bar of Vicente Ching [B.M. No. 914,
October 1, 1999]
ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP IS A FORMAL AND EXPRESS ACT. C.A. No.
625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935
Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a
valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children
born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such
intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before
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any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period
within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter
only provides that the election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority."
The age of majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. In the
opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of
Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the
decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these
decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on
the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government
to the effect that the election should be made within a "reasonable time" after
attaining the age of majority. The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to
mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the
age of majority. However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, that the
three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable
period after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of
Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect
Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to
above, which period may be extended under certain circumstances, as
when the person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino.
However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect
Philippine citizenship is not indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became
of age on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951,
when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he
had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election has not been made
"upon reaching the age of majority."
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirtyfive (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15
June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority.
Based on the interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority,"
Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable
period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection,
that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a
registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine
citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by election.
Republic vs. Lim, G.R. No. 153883, January 13, 2004
Instead, in its first assignment of error, the Republic avers that respondent did not
comply with the constitutional requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when she
reached the age of majority. It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935
Constitution, which provides that the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless,
upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. Likewise,
the Republic invokes the provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, that
legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by
expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party
concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with
181

the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement
with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines."
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino
citizenship apply only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of
respondent who was concededly an illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese
father and Filipino mother were never married. As such, she was not required to
comply with said constitutional and statutory requirements to become a Filipino
citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically
became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth without
having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.
Tecson vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of
its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality
for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the
mother had custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support
her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate
against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that the
1935 Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of
birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither
conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the
Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." There utterly is
no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are
none provided.

Section 3
Yu vs. Defensor-Santiago [G.R. No. 83882, January 24, 1989]
AQCUISITION OF FOREIGN PASSPORT IS EQUIVALENT TO RENUNCIATION OF
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered
together constitute an express renunciation of petitioner's Philippine citizenship
acquired through naturalization. In Board of Immigration Commissioners vs. Go
Gallano,
express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made
known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner,
with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese
citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his
prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese
passport and represented himself as such in official documents even after he had
become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of
Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine
citizenship.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or ware to be
displayed when required and suppressed when convenient. This then resolves
adverse to the petitioner his motion for clarification and other motions mentioned in
the second paragraph, page 3 of this Decision.
Frivaldo vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989]
LOST
OF
FOREIGN
CITIZENSHIP
ACQUIRED
THROUGH
SUBSEQUENT
NATURALIZATION DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY CONFER PREVIOUS PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP. While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods, he
182

nevertheless claims he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid

repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the elections in this country,
he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States.
Such laws do not concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is between him and the
United States as his adopted country. It should be obvious that even if he did lose
his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the
effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier
renounced. At best, what might have happened as a result of the loss of his
naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless individual.
Frivaldo's contention that he could not have repatriated himself under LOI 270
because the Special Committee provided for therein had not yet been constituted
seems to suggest that the lack of that body rendered his repatriation unnecessary.
That is far-fetched if not specious. Such a conclusion would open the floodgates, as
it were. It would allow all Filipinos who have renounced this country to claim back
their abandoned citizenship without formally rejecting their adopted state and
reaffirming their allegiance to the Philippines.
It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that
by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively
recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law
envisions surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply
recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been convened, what that meant
simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization
by legislative or judicial proceedings.
It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is
favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should
be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced,
the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its
difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it
is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The
returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of
his loyalty and love.
Labo vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989]
FORFEITURE OF FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP DOES NOT RESTORE PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP FORMERLY LOST. The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in
Australia made him at worst only a dual national and did not divest him of his
Philippine citizenship. Such a specious argument cannot stand against the clear
provisions of CA No. 63, which enumerates the modes by which Philippine
citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance
to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which are applicable
to the petitioner. It is also worth mentioning in this connection that under Article
IV, Section 5, of the present Constitution, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to
the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia
was annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was
bigamous, that circumstance alone did not automatically restore his Philippine
citizenship. His divestiture of Australian citizenship does not concern us here. That
is a matter between him and his adopted country. What we must consider is the
fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine citizenship and willingly and
knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that he
may have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean
that he has been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.

183

RES JUDICATA DOES NOT APPLY TO QUESTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP. There is also

the claim that the decision can no longer be reversed because of the doctrine of res
judicata, but this too must be dismissed. This doctrine does not apply to questions
of citizenship, as the Court has ruled in several cases. Moreover, it does not appear
that it was properly and seasonably pleaded, in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer, having been invoked only when the petitioner filed his reply to the private
respondent's comment. Besides, one of the requisites of res judicata, to wit,
identity of parties, is not present in this case.
Republic vs. De la Rosa [G.R. No. 104654, June 6, 1994]
THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE NATURALIZATION LAW IS JURISDICTIONAL IN
NATURE. Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru
naturalization under the Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the
procedure prescribed by the said law. It is not for an applicant to decide for himself
and to select the requirements which he believes, even sincerely, are applicable to
his case and discard those which be believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance
value. The law does not distinguish between an applicant who was formerly a
Filipino citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does not provide a special
procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizens
akin to the repatriation of a woman who had lost her Philippine citizenship by
reason of her marriage to an alien.
The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of
private respondent. The proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath
of allegiance taken therein, are null and void for failure to comply with the
publication and posting requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law.
Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order
setting it for hearing must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in
the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation. Compliance therewith is
jurisdictional (Po Yi Bo v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]). Moreover, the
publication and posting of the petition and the order must be in its full text for the
court to acquire jurisdiction (Sy v. Republic, 55 SCRA 724 [1974]).
The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by Sections 2 and 6
of the Revised Naturalization Law, particularly: (1) that the petitioner is of good
moral character; (2) that he resided continuously in the Philippines for at least ten
years; (3) that he is able to speak and write English and any one of the principal
dialects; (4) that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the
filing of the petition until his admission to Philippine citizenship; and (5) that he has
filed a declaration of intention or if he is excused from said filing, the justification
therefor.
The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition (Po Yi Bi v. Republic, 205
SCRA 400 [1992]).
Likewise the petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible
persons who vouched for the good moral character of private respondent as
required by Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law. Private respondent also
failed to attach a copy of his certificate of arrival to the petition as required by
Section 7 of the said law.
The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the
hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a
publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2)
the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition;
(3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the

184

judgment; and (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the twoyear waiting period.
A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from its
promulgation and, insofar as the Solicitor General is concerned, that period is
counted from the date of his receipt of the copy of the decision (Republic v. Court
of First Instance of Albay, 60 SCRA 195 [1974]).
Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in
naturalization proceedings shall be executory until after two years from its
promulgation in order to be able to observe if: (1) the applicant has left the
country; (2) the applicant has dedicated himself continously to a lawful calling or
profession; (3) the applicant has not been convicted of any offense or violation of
government promulgated rules; and (4) the applicant has committed any act
prejudicial to the interest of the country or contrary to government announced
policies.
Even discounting the provisions of R.A. No. 530, the courts cannot implement any
decision granting the petition for naturalization before its finality.
Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-21289, October
4, 1971
With all these considerations in mind, We are persuaded that it is in the best
interest of all concerned that Section 15 of the Naturalization Law be given effect in
the same way as it was understood and construed when the phrase "who may be
lawfully naturalized," found in the American statute from which it was borrowed and
copied verbatim, was applied by the American courts and administrative
authorities. There is merit, of course in the view that Philippine statutes should be
construed in the light of Philippine circumstances, and with particular reference to
our naturalization laws. We should realize the disparity in the circumstances
between the United States, as the so-called "melting pot" of peoples from all over
the world, and the Philippines as a developing country whose Constitution is
nationalistic almost in the come. Certainly, the writer of this opinion cannot be the
last in rather passionately insisting that our jurisprudence should speak our own
concepts and resort to American authorities, to be sure, entitled to admiration, and
respect, should not be regarded as source of pride and indisputable authority. Still,
We cannot close our eyes to the undeniable fact that the provision of law now under
scrutiny has no local origin and orientation; it is purely American, factually taken
bodily from American law when the Philippines was under the dominating influence
of statutes of the United States Congress. It is indeed a sad commentary on the
work of our own legislature of the late 1920's and 1930's that given the opportunity
to break away from the old American pattern, it took no step in that direction.
Indeed, even after America made it patently clear in the Act of Congress of
September 22, 1922 that alien women marrying Americans cannot be citizens of
the United States without undergoing naturalization proceedings, our legislators still
chose to adopt the previous American law of August 10, 1855 as embodied later in
Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of 1874, which, it is worth reiterating, was
consistently and uniformly understood as conferring American citizenship to alien
women marrying Americans ipso facto, without having to submit to any
naturalization proceeding and without having to prove that they possess the special
qualifications of residence, moral character, adherence to American ideals and
American constitution, provided they show they did not suffer from any of the
disqualifications enumerated in the American Naturalization Law. Accordingly, We
now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise notwithstanding,
that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a
Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here
185

follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as
Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications
under said Section 4.
As under any other law rich in benefits for those coming under it, doubtless there
will be instances where unscrupulous persons will attempt to take advantage of this
provision of law by entering into fake and fictitious marriages or mala fide
matrimonies. We cannot as a matter of law hold that just because of these
possibilities, the construction of the provision should be otherwise than as dictated
inexorably by more ponderous relevant considerations, legal, juridical and practical.
There can always be means of discovering such undesirable practice and every case
can be dealt with accordingly as it arises.
The question that keeps bouncing back as a consequence of the foregoing views is,
what substitute is them for naturalization proceedings to enable the alien wife of a
Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established
so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to
perform an act or enter in to a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved
only to Filipinos? The ready answer to such question is that as the laws of our
country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure,
but such paucity is no proof that the citizenship under discussion is not vested as of
the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may
be, for the truth is that the same situation objections even as to native-born
Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a
judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative
authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res
adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may
demand. This, as We view it, is the sense in which Justice Dizon referred to
"appropriate proceeding" in Brito v. Commissioner, supra. Indeed, only the good
sense and judgment of those subsequently inquiring into the matter may make the
effort easier or simpler for the persons concerned by relying somehow on the
antecedent official findings, even if these are not really binding.
Bengzon III vs. HRET [G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001]
REPATRIATION HAS THE EFFECT OF REGAINING THE FORMER STATUS OF THE
REPATRIATE. There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by
naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of
citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the
time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citizenship."
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens
through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise
known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization
Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530. To be naturalized, an applicant
has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting
Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its
promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the
applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful
calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of
Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest
of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.

186

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in
the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act No. 63 (CA No. 63), enumerates
the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former
citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is
governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand,
naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to
reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the
disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who
lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; (2) service in the
armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of
the United States at any other time; (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;
and (5) political and economic necessity.
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply
consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person
concerned resides or last resided.
In Angara v. Republic, we held:
. . .. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965
and 2630], the person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship
would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he
had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place
of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines.
[Emphasis in the original.]
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means
that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status
as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a naturalborn citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his
former status as a natural-born Filipino.

Altajeros vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 163256, November 10, 2004

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public
office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure
that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our
people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to
govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the
law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship
on June 30, 1995the very day the term of office of governor (and other elective
officials) beganhe was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such
office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In
short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is
the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on
qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted. x x x
Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez v. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons, if the
purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country do
not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another
nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by
187

construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of

the elected official and at the start of his term. (Emphasis supplied.)
Moreover, in the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the Court ruled that
"the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his
application." In said case, the repatriation of Frivaldo was by virtue of Presidential
Decree No. 725, which took effect on June 5, 1975. The Court therein declared that
Presidential Decree No. 725 was a curative statute, which is retroactive in nature.
The retroactivity of Frivaldo's repatriation to the date of filing of his application was
justified by the Court, thus:
The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent
of the legislative authority that the law should apply to past events
i.e., situations and transactions existing even before the law came into
beingin order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos
possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the
constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative
intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is
all the more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or
retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions
subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation
granted to Frivaldo x x x can and should be made to take effect as of
date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the
law that would bar this or would show a contrary intention on the part
of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or
prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result from
giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that
there will result the impairment of any contractual obligation,
disturbance of any vested right or breach of some constitutional
guaranty.
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent
prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the
Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications
for any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless,
as Frivaldohaving already renounced his American citizenshipwas, may be
prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should not be. In case of doubt in
the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-making
body intended right and justice to prevail.
Republic Act No. 8171 has impliedly repealed Presidential `Decree No. 725. They
cover the same subject matter: Providing for the repatriation of Filipino women who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and of natural-born
Filipinos. The Court's ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections that repatriation
retroacts to the date of filing of one's application for repatriation subsists for the
same reasons quoted above.
Accordingly, petitioner's repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application
in 1997. Petitioner was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the
government in the May 10, 2004 elections. Apparently, the COMELEC was cognizant
of this fact since it did not implement the assailed Resolutions disqualifying
petitioner to run as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate.
Section 5
Aznar vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 83820, May 25, 1990]
THE FACT THAT A PERSON IS A HOLDER OF ALIEN CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION
DOES NOT CONCLUSIVELY MEAN THAT THAT THE PERSON IS NOT A FILIPINO
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CITIZEN. In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present
direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the
modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by
naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and
(3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a
foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmea did
not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by
any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.
In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the
United States of America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private
respondent was issued alien certificate of registration and was given clearance and
permit to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent is an
American and "being an American", private respondent "must have taken and
sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws." (p. 81,
Rollo)
Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who
are not. Whether or not a person is considered an American under the laws of the
United States does not concern Us here.
By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private
respondent is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that
private respondent had lost his Philippine citizenship. As earlier stated, however,
the petitioner failed to positively establish this fact.
In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he stresses the fact that
because Osmea obtained Certificates of Alien Registration as an American citizen,
the first in 1958 when he was 24 years old and the second in 1979, he, Osmea
should be regarded as having expressly renounced Philippine citizenship. To Our
mind, this is a case of non sequitur (It does not follow). Considering the fact that
admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has
a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino.
Thus, by way of analogy, if a person who has two brothers named Jose and Mario
states or certifies that he has a brother named Jose, this does not mean that he
does not have a brother named Mario; or if a person is enrolled as student
simultaneously in two universities, namely University X and University Y, presents a
Certification that he is a student of University X, this does not necessarily mean
that he is not still a student of University Y. In the case of Osmea, the Certification
that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he
is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation
here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of
said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine
citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of
Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either "express" or "implied ".
Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that "dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law" (Art. IV,
Sec. 5) has no retroactive effect. And while it is true that even before the 1987
Constitution, Our country had already frowned upon the concept of dual citizenship
or allegiance, the fact is it actually existed. Be it noted further that under the
aforecited proviso, the effect of such dual citizenship or allegiance shall be dealt
with by a future law. Said law has not yet been enacted.
Mercado vs. Manzano [G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999]
DUAL ALLEGIANCE NOT DUAL CITIZENSHIP IS PROSCRIBED BY THE
CONSTITUTION. To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.
189

The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different
laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the
said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents
are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a
state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without
any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the
following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1)
(2)
(3)

Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which

follow the principle of jus soli;
Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the
laws of their fathers' country such children are citizens of that country;
Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have
renounced Philippine citizenship.

There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without
performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are
clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While
dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's
volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law." This provision was included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of
Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as follows:
. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual
citizenship. I have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee
according to which a dual allegiance and I reiterate a dual allegiance
is larger and more threatening than that of mere double citizenship
which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never insidious. That is often
a function of the accident of mixed marriages or of birth on foreign
soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at all.
What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional
cognizance of the problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all know
what happens in the triennial elections of the Federation of FilipinoChinese Chambers of Commerce which consists of about 600 chapters
all over the country. There is a Peking ticket, as well as a Taipei ticket.
Not widely known is the fact that the Filipino-Chinese community is
represented in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in Taiwan.
And until recently, the sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the
People's Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative
Council for overseas Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including
some European and Latin countries were represented, which was
dissolved after several years because of diplomatic friction. At that
time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that Overseas
Council.
When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled
kind of allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but
who, by their acts, may be said to be bound by a second allegiance,
either to Peking or Taiwan. I also took close note of the concern
expressed by some Commissioners yesterday, including Commissioner
190

Villacorta, who were concerned about the lack of guarantees of

thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner Concepcion who
has always been worried about minority claims on our natural
resources.
Dual allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan,
Singapore, China or Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of
the great commercial places in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned,
owned by Filipino-Chinese it is of common knowledge in Manila. It
can mean a tragic capital outflow when we have to endure a capital
famine which also means economic stagnation, worsening
unemployment and social unrest.
And so, this is exactly we ask that the Committee kindly consider
incorporating a new section, probably Section 5, in the article on
Citizenship which will read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL
TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.
In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens
with dual allegiance, thus:
. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern
about dual citizenship in the sense that it implies a double allegiance
under a double sovereignty which some of us who spoke then in a
freewheeling debate thought would be repugnant to the sovereignty
which pervades the Constitution and to citizenship itself which implies
a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the Constitution is defined in
terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that citizenship including,
of course, the obligation to rise to the defense of the State when it is
threatened, and back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the
concern for national security. In the course of those debates, I think
some noted the fact that as a result of the wave of naturalization since
the decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic
of China was made in 1975, a good number of these naturalized
Filipinos still routinely go to Taipei every October 10; and it is asserted
that some of them do review their oath of allegiance to a foreign
government maybe so as to enter into the spirit of the occasion when
the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is commemorated. And
so, I have detected a genuine and deep concern about double
citizenship, with its attendant risk of double allegiance which is
repugnant to our sovereignty and national security. I appreciate what
the Committee said that this could be left to the determination of a
future legislature. But considering the scale of the problem, the real
impact on the security of this country, arising from, let us say,
potentially great numbers of double citizens professing double
allegiance, will the Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the
proper time that will prohibit, in effect, or regulate double citizenship?
Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional
Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who
maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.
Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854,
20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons
with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with
dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to
the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice
if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship
to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their
condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As
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Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional

Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us
because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We
recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen
of another country is something completely beyond our control."
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear
allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby
terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the
foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his
foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on 40(d)
between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line
41, page 17: "Any person with dual citizenship" is disqualified to
run for any elective local position. Under the present
Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a citizen
of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a natural-born
citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement that such a
natural born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must
elect or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports,
one belonging to the country of his or her father and one
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a
situation disqualify the person to run for a local government
position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL.
To my mind, Mr. President, it only means
that at the moment when he would want to run for public office,
he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but
the country of origin or the country of the father claims that
person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can renounce. There
are such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL.
Well, the very fact that he is running for
public office would, in effect, be an election for him of his desire
to be considered as a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does
not require an election. Under the Constitution, a person whose
mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen
without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL.
Yes. What we are saying Mr. President, is:
Under the Gentleman's example, if he does not renounce his
other citizenship, then he is opening himself to question. So, if
he is really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to
say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: I am a Filipino citizen,
and I have only one citizenship."
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine
law, Mr. President. He will always have one citizenship, and that
is the citizenship invested upon him or her in the Constitution of
the Republic.

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SENATOR PIMENTEL.
That is true, Mr. President. But if he
exercises acts that will prove that he also acknowledges other
citizenships, then he will probably fall under this disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce
"all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty" of
which at the time he is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a Certificate of
naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines.

Commonwealth Act No. 625

AN ACT PROVIDING THE MANNER IN WHICH THE OPTION TO ELECT PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP SHALL BE DECLARED BY A PERSON WHOSE MOTHER IS A FILIPINO
CITIZEN
Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection
(4), section 1, Article IV, of the Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be
signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to
administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party
shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.
Section 2. If the party concerned is absent from the Philippines, he may make the
statement herein authorized before any officer of the Government of the United
States2 authorized to administer oaths, and he shall forward such statement
together with his oath of allegiance, to the Civil Registry of Manila.

Republic Act No. 8171

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAVE
LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF NATURALBORN FILIPINOS.
Section 1. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to
aliens and natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including
their minor children, on account of political or economic necessity, may reacquire
Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended: Provided, That the applicant
is not a:
(1)

(2)
(3)
(4)

Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any

association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines
opposing organized government;
Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence,
personal assault, or assassination for the predominance of their ideas;
Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or
Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious
diseases.

Sec. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of
Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien
certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the
repatriated citizen.

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