The Brent Spar

Factual information, lessons learned, and reasons why the risk communications program failed
are extracted from The Brent Spar Controversy: An Example of Risk Communication Gone
Wrong, by Ragnar Lofstedt and Ortwin Renn, in Risk Analysis (Vol. 17, No. 2, pages 131136).
This handout appears in the Business and Industry Crisis Management Course, on the web at
http://www.training.fema.gov/emiweb/edu/busind.asp.
Additional sources of factual information:
Anonymous. 1995. Greenpeace: We Erred in Brent Spar Controversy. Oil and Gas
Journal. Vol. 93, No. 37. Page 22.
Shell Exploration and Production Brent Spar Internet Site at: http://www.brentspar.com/.
Case History:
The Brent Spar was an oil storage buoy (platform and reservoir) for holding oil for oil tankers
prior to the construction of an oil pipe line which became operational in 1989. Brent Spar was
originally commissioned in 1976 and was jointly owned by Shell Oil and Exxon. Since Shell Oil
maintained operational control of Brent Spar, it was responsible for the decommissioning
procedure when the decision was made to dispose of the buoy in 1992.
Brent Spar was located in British territorial waters of a depth greater than 75 meters and weighed
more than 4,000 tons (actually 14,500 tons), which placed it in the International Maritime
Organizations (IMO) classification for disposal that included being sunk at its current location.
Shell commissioned no fewer than 30 separate studies to consider the technical, safety, and
environmental implications of disposal within four possible options:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Disposal on land
Sinking the buoy at its current location (acceptable by IMO guidelines)
Decomposition of the buoy on the spot
Deep-sea dumping (depth greater than 2,000 meters) within U.K. territorial waters

After considering the options, with their risks and benefits, Shell concluded that only options 1
and 4 were viable. Options 2 and 3 were judged as unfeasible or environmentally harmful.
Option 4 became Shells choice because of the relatively low cost and small environmental
impact (best practical environmental option BPEO). Option 1, the only other option considered
as acceptable by Shell, was estimated to cost four times more and present a high risk (six times
higher) for workers. There also was some low but measurable risk of inshore pollution that might
result if the buoy were to break up during transport.

Armed with the results of the studies, Shell requested permission to dispose of the Brent Spar
through deep-sea sinking from the U.K. Department of Trade and Industry on the assumption
that this was the BPEO. The request was approved in December 1994 and, in compliance with
the provisions of the existing convention on the marine environment (the Oslo-Paris
Convention), the U.K. completed the required notification of European nations in February 1995.
No nation responded with its objection to the proposed method of disposal within the sixty-day
period established in the convention. Accordingly, the U.K. issued the disposal license
authorizing deep-sea sinking of the Brent Spar.
Before the disposal could be accomplished, Greenpeace activists and journalists (23 in total)
occupied the Brent Spar on April 30, 1995. A Shell team consisting of Shell security personnel,
police, and a representative of the North Scott Press Agency (invited as an independent witness)
were dispatched to remove the protestors. The removal operation was accomplished without
incident other than using bolt cutters to cut chains used by protestors to attach themselves to
Brent Spar. The media embraced the story and predominantly supported Greenpeace in its
coverage. Greenpeace activists were portrayed as brave defenders of the environment who were
willing to stand up to Shell and the U.K.
On May 9, 1995, the German environmental and agricultural ministries protested the disposal
plan to the U.K., claiming that the land disposal option had not been adequately investigated.
Since this protest came after the sixty-day period called for in the Oslo-Paris Convention, the
U.K. rejected it.
Extensive media coverage, largely supportive of Greenpeace, continued throughout May 1995.
Greenpeace, with the support of conservative groups, mobilized an effective consumer boycott of
Shell gasoline stations in Germany, Holland, and parts of Scandinavia. In Germany, Shell
gasoline sales declined by 20%, fifty gas stations were vandalized, two were fire bombed, and an
attempt was made to deliver a mail bomb to a Shell manager. Shell Germany and Shell
Netherlands, feeling the pressure of the boycott, publicly criticized Shell U.K. and the U.K.
government and questioned the disposal decision.
The U.K. government persisted in its support of the deep-sea sinking option as the BPEO but
was unsuccessful in convincing other countries. Shell U.K. likewise received little or no support
from within the company, particularly from Shell Germany and Shell Netherlands, who were
losing business due to the consumer boycotts.
On June 5,1995, the North Sea Protection Conference, including representatives of the countries
bordering the North Sea, took place in Denmark. With the exception of the U.K. and Norway, all
of the official representatives condemned the proposed sinking of the Brent Spar and its support
by the U.K. On June 6, 1995, the German Environmental Minister demanded a halt to all deepsea disposal.
On June 16, 1995, the Brent Spar was again occupied by Greenpeace activists who boarded it
from a helicopter as it was being readied for transport. A Shell tugboat sprayed other Greenpeace
activists with water as they attempted to board Brent Spar from boats in an attempt to keep them
away. Pictures of the Greenpeace activists braving the assault of water cannons adorned the front

pages of newspapers throughout the world. At this point, Greenpeace made claims regarding
their scientific analysis of the contents of storage tanks on Brent Spar, stating that there were
large quantities of heavy metals and other highly toxic organic materials present and that Shell
had failed to declare in their analyses.
On June 20, 1995, only hours before the scheduled disposal of Brent Spar, Shell announced that
it was calling off the deep-sea sinking option. The U.K. government felt betrayed by its
European neighbors and Shell. The U.K. Energy Minister, Tim Eggar, made a public statement
saying that Shell should have proceeded with the deep-sea disposal as the BPEO.
On June 27, 1995, Shell began an active public relations campaign aimed primarily at its German
and Danish customers. Although admitting mistakes and flawed policies concerning the Brent
Spar decisions, Shell maintained that deep-sea disposal was correct in light of the technical and
environmental considerations. In July 1995, Shell engaged the Norwegian company Det Norske
Veritas to investigate Greenpeaces public assertions concerning the contents of the storage tanks
on Brent Spar. Two weeks prior to the release of the report, which broadly supported the figures
provided by Shell, the executive director of Greenpeace U.K. sent a letter to Shell U.K. admitting
that the Greenpeace analysis was flawed in its reporting of the quantities of pollutants, but also
reasserted the position that the deep-sea disposal of Brent Spar would have been wrong. Shell
U.K. accepted Greenpeaces letter, and the CEO of Shell U.K. publicly stated that the
Greenpeace letter was a step in the right direction in the Brent Spar debate.
Assessment of Deep-Sea Disposal Risks:
The various studies commissioned by Shell claimed to quantify the pollution and occupational
risks associated with the disposal options. Disassembly on land as compared to deep-sea sinking
carried with it a higher (by a factor of 6) occupational risk. Land disposal had the lowest
environmental risks, but deep-sea sinking was judged to not pose any significant environmental
risks. The total amount of pollutants that could escape Brent Spar if disposed of at sea was less
than 1% of the total discharged by ships in the North Sea every year. The possible localized
effects in the area of the pollutant release were not fully researched, but the experts consulted by
Shell U.K. dismissed the risk as minute compared to existing levels of pollution.
The U.K. Select Committee on Science and Technology reviewed the Brent Spar controversy
and confirmed the low risk associated with deep-sea disposal. In May 1996, an independent
group of scientists, comprising the U.K. governments Scientific Group on Decommissioning,
confirmed Shells environmental risk assessment but pointed out several problems associated
with risk communications, the need for more open procedures, greater mobilization of scientific
expertise, international forums to discuss such issues, and full consideration of public
perceptions.
Overall, Shells risk assessment and selection of the deep-sea alternative were supported by
independent scientific review, but the whole episode generated a public relations crisis for Shell
and wasted millions of dollars. The problems were primarily the result of an ineffective risk
communications program.

Why the Risk Communications Program Failed:

Greenpeace was seen as and generally portrayed by the media as the public champion and
defender of the environment that challenged and defeated the large multi-national company,
Shell, and the U.K. government that supported it. This was not by accident. Greenpeace took the
initiative to prepare professional-quality footage of their confrontations with Shell and to make
sure that it was distributed to the major television networks.
Shells choice of deep-sea sinking as the BPOE was viewed as greedy since it was the least
expensive option. The land disposal option carried with it a slightly lower environmental risk
with an appreciably higher cost (four times as much). The public saw this as a decision by Shell
to take the cheapest option and disregard the environmental impact.
It was easy for the public to boycott Shell. Rallied by the demands of Greenpeace and the largely
anti-Shell media coverage, the public felt empowered in its ability to drive past the Shell gas
stations and on to a competitors stations.
Politicians from North Sea-bordering countries except the U.K. and Norway supported the
Greenpeace position for their own political advantage. During the sixty-day period for official
comment and protest (as provided for in the Olso-Paris Convention), not one nation responded
negatively to Shells disposal application. As soon as the Brent Spar became a public issue, the
politicians vocally decried Shell and the U.K. government for its support. Interestingly,
Germany, Denmark, and Sweden, the nations most vocal in their opposition to deep-sea disposal,
do not have any oil reserves of their own and had nothing to lose economically by opposing
Shell.
Regardless of scientific analysis and the quantification of risk, the fact remains that polluting the
ocean is a highly emotional issue. A popular position is that any amount of pollution, if at all
avoidable, should not be allowed. Supporting pollution from a dollars-saved position is doomed
to failure regardless of the strength of the numbers.
Brent Spar remained in the media due to the sensational nature of the Greenpeace activists
seizing control of the buoy and the so-called David versus Goliath confrontation.
Shell was generally viewed as dishonest and greedy while Greenpeace was generally viewed as
honest and concerned solely with protecting the environment. Information presented by Shell
was treated as self-serving and not trustworthy, while information presented by Greenpeace was
accepted as the truth.
Despite having the deck stacked against them by the above factors, both Shell and the U.K.
government chose a one-way communication strategy. They did not engage Greenpeace or the
public in dialogue. Instead, Shell and the U.K. government presented only the information that
they considered important, thus alienating the public and appearing arrogant and unyielding to
outside concerns. As noted in the May 1996 report of the Scientific Group on Decommissioning,
Shell was remiss in not consulting all of the available scientists who had something to add to the
analysis of deep-sea disposal.

Risk Communication Lessons Learned:

For the reasons outlined above, once Brent Spar was first occupied by Greenpeace on April 30,
1998, Shell and the U.K. government probably had no chance of changing public opinion to a
point where deep-sea disposal remained a viable option. An improved risk communication
strategy leading up to the April 30th event, and/or better risk communication after that date, could
have served both Shell and the U.K. government well in terms of their image with the U.K. and
the international public.
Shell should have recognized the potential for controversy and confrontation where the issue of
polluting the environment was concerned. Obviously, Shell leadership believed that the first two
developmental stages of risk communication (Fischoffs stages) were sufficient to support their
deep-sea disposal decision before the precipitating incident 1. All we have to do is get the
numbers right and 2. All we have to do is tell them the numbers. After April 30th, Shell at least
attempted the next two stages 3. All we have to do is explain what we mean by the numbers
and 4. All we have to do is show them that theyve accepted similar risks in the past. One of
Shells studies made the point that the total release of pollutants from Brent Spar would be less
than 1% of the total amount discharged by ships into the North Sea every year, but at that point
nothing was going to dramatically change public opinion. Stages 5 and 6 were totally ignored as
Shell U.K. and the U.K. government did not make use of, convincing comparisons between the
risks associated with the various option disposals and did little to show respect for the opinions
of the public or to win their trust.
What was needed from the start was all of the steps up to and including stage 7. All we have to
do is make them partners. A dialogue approach, including special interest groups such as
Greenpeace, other North Sea Nations, industry, scientists, and other experts, whose deliberations
would be open to the publics scrutiny, was needed for this highly emotional and far-reaching
issue. Following this approach would not necessarily have cleared the way for Shell to follow the
deep-sea disposal option. It would, however, have identified issues and allowed for their proper
consideration in selecting the best option for all concerned.