Oppheimher - Consequences of Erudite Vernacular
Oppheimher - Consequences of Erudite Vernacular
Oppheimher - Consequences of Erudite Vernacular
DANIEL M. OPPENHEIMER*
Princeton University, USA
SUMMARY
Most texts on writing style encourage authors to avoid overly-complex words. However, a majority
of undergraduates admit to deliberately increasing the complexity of their vocabulary so as to give
the impression of intelligence. This paper explores the extent to which this strategy is effective.
Experiments 1–3 manipulate complexity of texts and find a negative relationship between complex-
ity and judged intelligence. This relationship held regardless of the quality of the original essay, and
irrespective of the participants’ prior expectations of essay quality. The negative impact of
complexity was mediated by processing fluency. Experiment 4 directly manipulated fluency and
found that texts in hard to read fonts are judged to come from less intelligent authors. Experiment 5
investigated discounting of fluency. When obvious causes for low fluency exist that are not relevant
to the judgement at hand, people reduce their reliance on fluency as a cue; in fact, in an effort not to
be influenced by the irrelevant source of fluency, they over-compensate and are biased in the opposite
direction. Implications and applications are discussed. Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
When it comes to writing, most experts agree that clarity, simplicity and parsimony are
ideals that authors should strive for. In their classic manual of style, Strunk and White
(1979) encourage authors to ‘omit needless words.’ Daryl Bem’s (1995) guidelines for
submission to Psychological Bulletin advise, ‘the first step towards clarity is writing
simply.’ Even the APA publication manual (1996) recommends, ‘direct, declarative
sentences with simple common words are usually best.’
However, most of us can likely recall having read papers, either by colleagues or
students, in which the author appears to be deliberately using overly complex words.
Experience suggests that the experts’ advice contrasts with prevailing wisdom on how to
sound more intelligent as a writer. In fact, when 110 Stanford undergraduates were polled
about their writing habits, most of them admitted that they had made their writing more
complex in order to appear smarter. For example, when asked, ‘Have you ever changed the
words in an academic essay to make the essay sound more valid or intelligent by using
complicated language?’ 86.4% of the sample admitted to having done so. Nearly two-
thirds answered yes to the question, ‘When you write an essay, do you turn to the thesaurus
to choose words that are more complex to give the impression that the content is more
valid or intelligent?’
*Correspondence to: D. M. Oppenheimer, Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Green Hall Room
2-S-8, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA. E-mail: doppenhe@princeton.edu
There are many plausible reasons that the use of million-dollar words would lead
readers to believe that an author is smart. Intelligence and large vocabularies are positively
correlated (Spearman, 1904). Therefore, by displaying a large vocabulary, one may be
providing cues that he or she is intelligent as well. Secondly, writers are assumed to be
conforming to the Gricean maxim of manner, ‘avoid obscurity of expression’ (Grice,
1975). If authors are believed to be writing as simply as possible, but a text is nonetheless
complex, a reader might believe that the ideas expressed in that text are also complex,
defying all attempts to simplify the language. Further, individuals forced to struggle
through a complex text might experience dissonance if they believe that the ideas being
conveyed are simple (Festinger, 1957). Thus, individuals might be motivated to perceive a
difficult text as being more worthwhile, thereby justifying the effort of processing.
Indeed, there is some evidence that complex vocabulary can be indicative of a more
intelligent author. For example, Pennebaker and King (1999) have shown that the
percentage of long words used in class assignments positively correlates with SAT
scores and exam grades on both multiple choice and essay tests. However it is difficult
to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of a strategy of complexity from this data.
The study did not look at how readers of the texts containing the long words perceived
the authors’ intelligence. Thus, it is possible that although students using complex
vocabularies are objectively very knowledgeable, they might nonetheless be perceived
as being less so.
Why might we believe that the experts might be correct in recommending simplicity in
writing? One theory that predicts the effectiveness of straightforward writing is that of
processing fluency. Simpler writing is easier to process, and studies have demonstrated
that processing fluency is associated with a variety of positive dimensions. Fluency leads
to higher judgements of truth (Reber & Schwarz, 1999), confidence (Norwick & Epley,
2002), frequency (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), fame (Jacoby, Kelley, Brown, &
Jasechko, 1989), and even liking (Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998). Furthermore,
the effects of fluency are strongest when the fluency is discrepant—when the amount of
experienced fluency is surprising (Whittlesea & Williams, 2001a, 2001b). As such, it
would not be surprising if the lower fluency of overly complex texts caused readers to have
negative evaluations of those texts and the associated authors, especially if the complexity
was unnecessary and thus surprising readers with the relative disfluency of the text.
Both the experts and prevailing wisdom present plausible views, but which (if either) is
correct? The present paper provides an empirical investigation of the strategy of complex-
ity, and finds such a strategy to be unsuccessful. Five studies demonstrate that the loss of
fluency due to needless complexity in a text negatively impacts raters’ assessments of the
text’s authors.
EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 aimed to answer several simple questions. First, does increasing the
complexity of text succeed in making the author appear more intelligent? Second, to
what extent does the success of this strategy depend on the quality of the original, simpler
writing? Finally, if the strategy is unsuccessful, is the failure of the strategy due to loss of
fluency? To answer these questions, graduate school admission essays were made more
complex by substituting some of the original words with their longest applicable thesaurus
entries.
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Problems with long words 141
Results
The data of one participant was discarded due to an illegible answer. Analysis of the
manipulation check showed that more complex texts were more difficult to read. (x ¼ 2.9,
4.0 and 4.3 for simple, moderately complex and highly complex, respectively). These
differences were reliable, F(2, 68) ¼ 4.46, p < 0.05, Cohen’s f ¼ 0.18. For other analyses,
acceptance ratings (þ1 for accept, 1 for reject) were multiplied by confidence ratings to
create a 7 to 7 scale of admission confidence. Level of complexity had a reliable
influence on admission confidence ratings, F(2, 70) ¼ 2.46, p < 0.05, Cohen’s f ¼ 0.12.
1
With the exception of the dichotomous admissions decision, all dependent measures reported in this paper are
seven point scales ranging from 1 ¼ ‘not at all’ to 7 ¼ ‘very’.
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142 D. M. Oppenheimer
Highly complex essays (mean ¼ 2.1) were rated more negatively than moderately
complex essays (mean ¼ 0.17), which in turn were rated more negatively than the
original essays (x ¼ 0.67).2 These differences are summarized in Figure 1. Additionally,
the excerpts reliably varied in quality; average admissions confidence ratings ranged
from—3.1 to 1.8 F(5, 70) ¼ 2.2, p < 0.05, Cohen’s f ¼ 0.12. However, there was no
reliable interaction between the quality of the initial excerpt and the level of complexity
F(10, 70) ¼ 1.4, p > 0.10, Cohen’s f ¼ 0.07.
To determine if the negative influence of complexity on admissions ratings was due to
differences in fluency, a mediation analysis was run using difficulty of comprehension as a
mediator. Level of complexity was reliably correlated with acceptance ratings,
r(69) ¼ 0.24, p < 0.05 and difficulty of comprehension r(69) ¼ 0.32, p < 0.05. However,
when controlling for difficulty of comprehension, the relationship between complexity and
acceptance was drastically reduced r(69) ¼ 0.14, p > 0.1, while controlling for complex-
ity did not remove the relationship between difficulty and acceptance r(69) ¼ 0.25,
p < 0.05. A Sobel test demonstrated this mediation to be reliable, z ¼ 2.1, p < 0.05. These
results are summarized in Figure 2.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that contrary to prevailing wisdom, increasing the
complexity of a text does not cause an essay’s author to seem more intelligent. In fact, the
opposite appears to be true. Complex texts were less likely than clear texts to lead to
acceptance decisions in a simulated admissions review. Simple texts were given higher
ratings than moderately complex texts, which were, in turn, given better ratings than
highly complex texts. Additionally, this trend was found regardless of the quality of the
original essay. Complexity neither disguised the shortcomings of poor essays, nor
enhanced the appeal of high-quality essays. The mediation analysis suggests that the
2
Post-hoc analysis revealed that the ‘moderate complexity’ condition was not reliably different from either the
‘highly complexity’ or control conditions.
Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 20: 139–156 (2006)
Problems with long words 143
reason that simple texts are viewed more positively than complex texts was due to fluency.
Complex texts are difficult to read, which in turn leads to lower ratings.
Even though Experiment 1 is suggestive, there are several problems that need to be
resolved before any conclusions can be drawn. First, it is possible that the reason that
complexity was unsuccessful was that words were misused. In an effort to prevent
experimenter biases from influencing the data, the word replacement process was
algorithmic, and left little room for human judgement. Although only synonyms of the
appropriate linguistic sense were included, and grammatical editing took place, it is
nonetheless possible that some of the replacement words were used slightly out of context,
or led to awkward sounding sentences.
Secondly, the domain of college application essays may lead to biases against the
strategy of complexity. Participants likely are aware of the widespread use of the
strategy—especially in admissions essays—and may be actively discounting the use of
complex words. Finally, it could be the case that complexity is differentially successful as
a strategy depending upon a reader’s prior expectation of the author’s intelligence. In
Experiment 1, the readers had no reason to think that the authors were particularly
intelligent; maybe if the readers had believed the authors to be brilliant at the outset of the
experiment, the presence of complex vocabulary would have reinforced such a belief and
led to higher ratings.
As such, a second experiment was run to control for the confounds in Experiment 1 and
investigate the impact of prior beliefs.
EXPERIMENT 2
If actively replacing words in an essay may impair the quality of the text, then to test the
effects of complex words we need a more natural set of stimuli. Therefore, for Experiment
2 it was necessary to find two essays of identical content, but using different vocabulary, in
which the experimenters did not influence word selection. Many texts in foreign languages
have multiple translations, which conform to the original meaning of the text, but use
different words and grammatical construction. This provides the perfect domain for testing
whether complex phrasing and vocabulary hurts perceptions of a text.
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144 D. M. Oppenheimer
Results
Analysis of the manipulation check showed that the Heffernan (1990) translation (mean
complexity rating ¼ 5.4) was indeed perceived as more complex than the Tweyman (1993)
translation (mean complexity rating ¼ 4.5), t(37) ¼ 1.77, p < 0.05, Cohen’s d ¼ 0.58.
There were reliable main effects for both complexity, F(1, 39) ¼ 3.65, p < 0.05, Cohen’s
f ¼ 0.18, and prior belief, F(1, 39) ¼ 17.36, p < 0.05, Cohen’s f ¼ 0.45; participants who
read the simpler translation and attributed it to Descartes rated the author as more
intelligent (mean ¼ 6.5) than those reading the complex translation attributed to Descartes
(mean ¼ 5.6). Those who were given no source for the passage also rated the author as
more intelligent in the simple version (mean ¼ 4.7) than the complex version
(mean ¼ 4.0). However, there was no reliable interaction between prior belief and level
of complexity, F(1, 39) ¼ 0.08, p > 0.10, Cohen’s f ¼ 0.00. The results are summarized in
Figure 3.
To determine if the negative influence of complexity on intelligence ratings was due to
differences in fluency, a mediation analysis was run using difficulty of comprehension as a
mediator.4 Complexity was reliably correlated negatively with intelligence ratings,
r(37) ¼ 0.30, p < 0.05, and positively with difficulty of comprehension, r(37) ¼ 0.33,
p < 0.05. However, when controlling for difficulty of comprehension, the relationship
between complexity and intelligence ratings was reduced, although still marginally
significant, r(37) ¼ 0.24, 0.05 > p < 0.1, while controlling for complexity did not
remove the relationship between difficulty and intelligence ratings, r(37) ¼ 0.28,
3
Participants would all know who Descartes was, as they had all read his work (although not Meditation IV) in the
introduction to humanities class that all Stanford students are required to take.
4
Level of prior belief was statistically controlled for in all correlations reported here.
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Problems with long words 145
Figure 3. Intelligence ratings of the authors of two different translations of Descartes Meditation IV,
when attributed either to Descartes or to an anonymous author
p < 0.05. While these results are in the right direction and suggest a mediation effect, they
do not achieve statistical significance when analysed by a Sobel test, z ¼ 1.2, p > 0.05. The
results are summarized in Figure 4.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 support those of Experiment 1. Once again, complexity
negatively influenced raters’ assessments of texts. This relationship was found regardless
of the raters’ prior expectations of the author’s intelligence. While the data suggest that the
process may be mediated by fluency, the failure to reach statistical significance means that
it is difficult to draw strong conclusions. However, in light of the fact that the mediation
analysis was reliable in Experiment 1, and was in the predicted direction for Experiment 2,
normatively one should have increased confidence in the reliability of the effect (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1971). This is especially true in light of the fact that Sobel tests have been
shown to be overly conservative estimators of statistical significance (Mackinnon, Lock-
wood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002).
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146 D. M. Oppenheimer
However, aside from the mediation analysis, there are other challenges in interpreting
this experiment. Some translators are better than others. A less accomplished translator
might create a less fluent text for reasons completely unrelated to word complexity. It
seems possible that the reason that the more complex text was judged to have come from a
less intelligent author was simply because the translation was not as skillful.
Thus, results from the first two experiments could be due to the fact that the complex
essays were in actuality worse papers. As such, it was important to run a third study to try
and ensure that the lower ratings are due to the use of complex vocabulary instead of
inferior quality papers.
EXPERIMENT 3
The word replacement paradigm used in Experiment 1 was problematic because using an
algorithmic approach to word replacement leads to the possibility of including imprecise
synonyms, impairing flow and generally making the essay less coherent. If it were indeed
the case that algorithmic word replacement leads to poorer essays, then one would
expect that the process should also harm an essay modified to use simpler vocabulary.
However the fluency account leads to the opposite prediction; less complex essays should
be rated as coming from more intelligent authors. To test these contrasting predictions
Experiment 3 used the same procedure as Experiment 1 but systematically simplified text.
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Problems with long words 147
Results
Analysis of the manipulation check showed that the ‘simplified’ version was indeed
perceived as less complex (mean complexity rating ¼ 4.9) than the original excerpt (mean
complexity rating ¼ 5.6), t(83) ¼ 2.327, p < 0.05, Cohen’s d ¼ 0.53. There was also a
reliable effect of complexity on intelligence judgements; participants who read the
‘simplified’ version rated the author as more intelligent (mean ¼ 4.80) than those reading
the original version (mean ¼ 4.26), t(83) ¼ 1.988, p < 0.05, Cohen’s d ¼ 0.44.
To determine if the negative influence of complexity on intelligence judgements was
due to differences in fluency, a mediation analysis was run using difficulty of comprehen-
sion as a mediator. Complexity was reliably correlated with intelligence ratings,
r(85) ¼ 0.213, p < 0.05, and difficulty of comprehension, r(85) ¼ 0.247, p < 0.05.
However, when controlling for difficulty of comprehension, the relationship between
complexity and intelligence ratings was reduced, although still marginally significant,
r(85) ¼ 0.196, 0.05 > p < 0.1. While these results are in the right direction and suggest a
mediation effect, they do not achieve statistical significance when analyzed by a Sobel test,
z ¼ 0.75, p > 0.05.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 3 further support the notion that the use of overly complex
words leads to lower evaluations of a text’s author. While in Experiment 1 it could be
argued that the replacement of words leads to stilted sounding text, in Experiment 3 the
word-replacement condition actually increased judgements of intelligence. Further, given
the fact that the replacement process was algorithmic, it seems unlikely that the
improvements in the essays could be due to editing or experimenter bias. It is the use
of overly complex words—not the word replacement process—that leads to decreased
ratings of intelligence.
Additionally, in all three experiments the result appears to be at least partially mediated
by fluency. In all experiments the data conforms to the pattern that one would expect if
fluency were a mediator, and in Experiment 1 this pattern is demonstrated to be reliable.
This fits well into Kahneman and Frederick’s (2002) notion of attribute substitution;
rating a person’s intelligence or suitability for graduate admission is difficult, so people
might use fluency as a proxy for these judgements. However, it is difficult to conclude
that fluency is necessarily responsible for the effect because there was no direct
manipulation of fluency in the first three experiments. Further, the lack of statistical
reliability in the mediation analyses from Experiments 2 and 3 led to questions about
whether the lowered evaluations of the complex text were due to fluency at all. Thus, it
seems worthwhile to further explore the mechanism behind why added complexity lowers
ratings of intelligence.
EXPERIMENT 4
If the fluency hypothesis is correct, then any manipulation that substantially reduces
fluency should also reduce intelligence ratings. One method that has proven to be effective
in reducing fluency is presenting the text in a font that is difficult to read (Norwick &
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148 D. M. Oppenheimer
Epley, 2002). By manipulating font, it was possible to examine whether fluency can
influence intelligence ratings directly, or whether there was an unmeasured variable
driving the mediation effects in Experiments 1–3.
Figure 5. Illustrations of the fonts in both the fluent and non-fluent versions of the questionnaire
Each participant received only one excerpt. Participants were informed that the excerpt
came from a personal statement for graduate study in the Stanford English Department.
They were instructed to read the passage, and rate the author’s intelligence on a 7-point
scale. To prevent participants from believing that the author of the text had chosen that font
(as font selection could be cue about intelligence) the instructions and rating scales were
also written in the corresponding font. Thus, participants would attribute font selection to
the experimenter instead of the text’s author.
Results
Post-experimental interviews of randomly selected participants (n ¼ 5) confirmed that
participants attributed the font selection to the experimenter rather than to the author of the
essay. There was a reliable effect of font on intelligence judgements; participants who read
the ‘non-fluent’ version rated the author as less intelligent (mean ¼ 4.04) than those
reading the original version (mean ¼ 4.50), t(49) ¼ 1.69, p < 0.05 one-tailed, Cohen’s
d ¼ 0.48.
Discussion
Experiment 4 directly manipulated fluency, and found that fluency impacted intelligence
ratings. When texts were written in a font that was difficult to read, the author of the text
was judged to be less intelligent. Taken in conjunction with the mediation analyses in
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Problems with long words 149
Experiments 1–3, this strongly suggests that complex vocabulary makes texts harder to
read, which in turn lowers judgements of an author’s intelligence.
If, as Experiments 1–4 suggest, fluency is the driving factor behind these effects, then
one ought to be able to reverse the direction of the effect by making people aware that the
source of the low fluency is irrelevant to judgement. People tend to attribute events to a
single cause, rather than multiple causes (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Kelley, 1973). Thus,
when one cause is known to have occurred, people think that other causes are less likely to
have also occurred. This phenomenon applies to the metacognitive experience of fluency
(Oppenheimer, 2004; Schwarz, 2004; Whittlesea & Williams, 1998). When obvious
causes for low fluency exist that are not relevant to the judgement that is being made,
people reduce their reliance on fluency as a cue; in fact, in an effort not to be influenced by
the irrelevant source of fluency, they overcompensate and are biased in the opposite
direction (see Wilson & Brekke, 1994 for a review of overcompensation effects).
For example, Oppenheimer (2004) asked people to make judgements about surname
frequency, a task for which people typically use fluency as a cue (Tversky & Kahneman,
1973). In a series of experiments, he showed that in the presence of obvious causes for
fluency that had no bearing on frequency—such as personal relevance, or a famous
individual associated with that name—people no longer used fluency in making their
judgement. In fact, they tended to rate the fluent name as less frequent rather than more
frequent when a salient cause for fluency was available.
Spontaneous discounting of fluency suggests that conscious awareness of the source of
low fluency should undermine the effectiveness of the fluency manipulation. In fact, if
there is an obvious cause for lack of fluency the trends might actually reverse as people
overcompensate in their attempt not to be influenced by fluency. Experiment 5 investigates
this possibility.
EXPERIMENT 5
One method for lowering fluency and making the source of the decreased fluency obvious,
is the ‘low toner’ paradigm (Oppenheimer & Frank, under review). Documents printed
from a printer that is low in toner are hard to read because the text is not as dark on the
page as usual, and the text has streaks running through it. However, the cause of the lack of
fluency is immediately obvious to anybody who has ever observed a low toner document.
Because the reason for the low fluency will be obvious to participants, a fluency account
would predict that people would discount their lack of fluency. In an effort not to be
influenced by the irrelevant fluency information, people are likely to overcompensate, and
have their judgements skewed in the other direction (Oppenheimer, 2004).
Method
Participants and procedure
Twenty-seven Stanford University undergraduates participated to fulfil part of a course
requirement. The survey was included in a packet of unrelated one-page questionnaires.
Packets were distributed in class, and participants were given a week to complete the entire
packet.
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150 D. M. Oppenheimer
Figure 6. Scanned images of the low toner version of the excerpt, and the original excerpt that were
used in Experiment 5
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Problems with long words 151
Results
As in Experiment 1, acceptance ratings (þ1 for accept, 1 for reject) were multiplied by
confidence ratings to create a 7 to 7 scale of admission confidence. As predicted,
participants in the low toner condition were more likely to recommend acceptance for the
applicant (mean ¼ 2.0) than those in the normal font condition (mean ¼ 1.8). This
difference was reliable, t(25) ¼ 2.15, p < 0.05, Cohen’s d ¼ 0.86. Additionally, partici-
pants in the low toner conditions reliably rated the author as more intelligent (mean ¼ 5.0)
than those in the normal condition (mean ¼ 4.0), t(25) ¼ 2.72, p < 0.05, Cohen’s d ¼ 1.09.
Discussion
As predicted by the fluency account, when an obvious source for the lack of fluency is
present, people discount that lack of fluency when making their judgement. They do so to
such an extent that they end up biasing their judgement in the opposite direction! This
trend can not be explained by unpleasant mood lowering ratings across the board. Instead,
the effect seems to be constrained by the manner in which fluency is processed; when there
is no obvious source of fluency (Experiment 4) then intelligence judgements are lowered,
but in the presence of an obvious source of fluency (Experiment 5) intelligence judgements
increase.5
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In the first three experiments, the negative consequences of needless complexity were
shown in widely disparate domains (personal statements, sociology dissertation abstracts
and philosophical essays), across different types of judgements (acceptance decisions and
intelligence ratings), and using distinct paradigms (active word replacement and transla-
tion differences). The effect was demonstrated regardless of the quality of the original
essay or prior beliefs about a text’s quality. All in all, the effect is extremely robust:
needless complexity leads to negative evaluations.
The results further suggest that this effect is due to lowered processing fluency.
Experiment 4 shows that directly reducing fluency through a standard font manipulation
(e.g. Norwick & Epley, 2002) leads to lower intelligence judgements. Further, Experi-
ment 5 demonstrated that if the source of reduced fluency becomes obvious, partici-
pants will discount their lack of fluency, which reverses the direction of the effect.
Mediation analyses in Experiments 1–3 suggest a similar process is occurring with
complex vocabulary. However, it is worth noting that although Experiment 1 and
Experiment 3 were conceptually very similar, the results of the mediation analyses
varied in regard to their reliability. This suggests that while fluency clearly influences
intelligence judgements, there are most certainly other factors in play as well. For
5
One question that arises from this study is what sources are ‘obvious’ enough to elicit spontaneous discounting.
A challenge that arises in answering this question, is that how ‘obvious’ the source needs to be varies depending
on the situation; sources need to be much more salient to elicit discounting when time constraints are imposed,
and need be much less so when participants are highly motivated to thoroughly think through their judgements
(Oppenheimer & Monin, in prep). Further investigation in this area is clearly important, although well beyond the
scope of the current paper.
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152 D. M. Oppenheimer
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Problems with long words 153
Secondly, there are some exciting potential applications that become apparent by
examining when people are more likely to complicate their writing. Pennebaker and Lay
(2002) have shown that people are more likely to use big words when they are feeling the
most insecure. One can imagine that a minority student under stereotype threat (Steele,
1997) might be inclined to increase complexity in his/her writing which would backfire
and cause teachers to have lower opinions of the student’s intelligence. Likewise leaders
facing crucial decisions might use more complex vocabulary and end up undermining
others’ confidence in their leadership ability. Thus it may be worthwhile to investigate
ways of either preventing the tendency to use needless complexity, or look at ways that
fluency biases might be overcome.
In the interim, we can conclude one thing. The pundits are likely right: write clearly and
simply if you can, and you’ll be more likely to be thought of as intelligent.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This material is based on work supported under a National Science Foundation Graduate
Research Fellowship. The author thanks Chip Heath, Michelle Keller, Joel Allan, Busayo
Ojumu, Jessica Laughlin, Norbert Schwarz, Bruce Whittlesea, Colleen Kelley, Stephen
Lindsay, James Pennebaker, Benoit Monin, Herb Clark and the SLUGs, and several
anonymous reviewers for advice and support.
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Problems with long words 155
Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 20: 139–156 (2006)
156 D. M. Oppenheimer
than that I might try to emerge from the doubts into which I have gone in the pervious days
and that I might see whether something certain concerning material things could be had’.
Original
This dissertation presents a historical study of the institutional development of the
American religious sector. Through the lens of institutionalist perspectives developed in
organizational sociology I focus on the co-evolution of the modern denominational form
and the denominational system in the United States from 1790 to 1980. Through an
empirical study of American Protestant denominations I build arguments which advance
three theoretical issues within institutional theory.
Simplified
This thesis presents a historical study of the societal advance of the American religious
sector. Through the lens of social institution views developed in organizational sociology I
focus on the co-evolution of the modern denominational form and the denominational
system in the Unites States from 1790 to 1980. Through an empirical study of American
Protestant denominations I build arguments which advance three theoretical issues within
social theory.
Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 20: 139–156 (2006)