World Bank - ADB-MOF Report On Philippines PEPFMR

Report No.
Philippines
Improving Government Performance:
Discipline, Efficiency, and Equity in
Managing Public Resources
A Public Expenditure, Procurement, and

Financial Management Review
30 April 2003
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit Philippines Country Office

East Asia and Pacific Region Southeast Asia Department
The World Bank Asian Development Bank
A Joint Document Of
The Government of the Philippines, the World Bank, and Asian Development Bank
CURRENCY AND EXCHANGE RATES (P/US$)
Currency Unit – Philippine peso (PhP)
Exchange Rate (as of 30 April 2003): PhP52.8
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES
The metric system is used throughout the report.
FISCAL YEAR
1 January to 31 December
World Bank Asian Development Bank

Vice President: Jemal-ud-din Kassum Vice President: Joseph Eichenberger
Country Director: Robert Vance Pulley Director-General: Khaja Moinuddin
Sector Director: Homi Kharas Country Director: Thomas Crouch
Sector Manager: Barbara Nunberg
Task Team Leaders: Amitabha Mukherjee (PEPFMR) Task Team Leader: Xuelin Liu
Christian Rey (CPAR)
Wijaya Wickrema (CFAA)
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADB Asian Development Bank
ACUBES agency-based system
AFMA Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act
AFMP Agriculture and fisheries modernization program
AFPRSBS AFP Retirement and Separation Benefit System
AGILE Acceleration Growth Investment Liberalization with Equity
AIM Asian Institute of Management
AO Administrative Order
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARB Agrarian Reform Beneficiary
ARC Agrarian Reform Community
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BAC Bids and Awards Committee
BAP Budget Advocacy Project
BAS Bureau of Agricultural Statistics
BEATS Budget Execution and Accountability Tracking System
BFAD Bureau of Food and Drugs
BHS Baranggay Health Station
BLGF Bureau of Local Government Finance
BIR Bureau of Internal Revenue
BOC Bureau of Customs
BOS Budget Operations Statement
BOT build-operate-transfer
BLGF Bureau of Local Government Finance
BSP Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
BTR Bureau of the Treasury
CAR Cordillera Administrative Region
CARP Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
CDF Congressional Development Fund
CES Career Executive Service
CHED Commission on Higher Education
CIAC Construction Industry Arbitration Commission
CIAP Construction Industry Authority of the Philippines
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
CO Collection Officer
COA Commission on Audit
CPAR Country Procurement Assessment Report
CPBO Congressional Planning and Budget Office
CPPR Country Portfolio Performance Review
CPMC Cash Programming and Monitoring Committee
CPSD consolidated public sector deficit
CRPP Currency Risk Protection Program
CSC Civil Service Commission
CUBES Customized Budget Execution System
DA Department of Agriculture
DAP Development Academy of the Philippines
DAR Department of Agrarian Reform
DBCC Development Budget Coordination Committee
DBM Department of Budget and Management
DBP Development Bank of the Philippines
DECS Department of Education, Culture and Sports
DepEd Department of Education
DENR Department of Environment and Natural Resources
DICT Department of Information and Communications Technology
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DILG Department of Interior and Local Government

DND Department of National Defense
DOE Department of Energy
DOF Department of Finance
DOH Department of Health
DOJ Department of Justice
DOLE Department of Labor and Employment
DOTC Department of Transportation and Communications
DPWH Department of Public Works and Highways
DTI Department of Trade and Industry
DSWD Department of Social Welfare and Development
EO Executive Order
EFPS Electronic Filing and Payment System
EPIRA Electric Power Industry Reform Act
EPS Electronic Procurement Service
FAP foreign-assisted project
FPPO Fiscal Policy and Planning Office
FY fiscal year
GAA General Appropriations Act
GAAM Government Accounting and Auditing Manual
GAD gender and development
GAS general administration and support services
GDP gross domestic product
GIF General Insurance Fund
GFI government financial institution
GMIS Government Management Information system
GNP gross national product
GOCC government-owned and/or -controlled corporation
GOP Government of the Philippines
GPIS Government Procurement Information System
GPPB Government Procurement Policy Board
GSIS Government Service Insurance System
GSP Generalized System of Preferences
GVA gross value added
HDMF Home Development Mutual Fund
HSRA Health Sector Reform Agenda
HUDCC Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council
IATF Inter-Agency Task Force on the Improvement of Tax Related Database
IA implementing agency
ICB international competitive bidding
ICC Investment Coordination Committee
IDC International Data Corporation
IDF Institutional Development Facility
IFC International Finance Corporation
IMF International Monetary Fund
IMR infant mortality rate
INFRACOM Committee on Infrastructure
IPP independent power producer
IRA Internal Revenue Allotment
IRR Implementing Rules and Regulations
ITC Industry Tripartite Council
JBIC Japan Bank for International Cooperation
LBP Land Bank of the Philippines
LCE local chief executive
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LFP locally-funded projects

LFS labor force survey
LGA Local Government Academy
LGC Local Government Code
LGU local government unit
LMC Labor Management Council
LOC letter of credit
LOI letter of intent
LRA Land Registration Authority
LTS Large Taxpayer Service
MLSD Middle Level Skills Development
MOOE maintenance and other operating expenses
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MTEF Medium Term Expenditure Framework
MTPIP Medium-Term Public Investment Program
MTPDP Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan
NCA notice of cash allocation
NCB national competitive bidding
NCIP National Commission On Indigenous Peoples
NCMB National Conciliation and Mediation Board
NCR National Capital Region
NCRFW National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women
NEDA National Economic and Development Authority
NG National Government
NGAS New Government Accounting System
NGO nongovernmental organization
NIA National Irrigation Authority
NPC National Power Corporation
NSO National Statistics Office
NTC National Telecommunications Commission
NTRC National Tax Research Center
ODA official development assistance
OECD Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
OPIF Organizational Performance Indicator Framework
OSEC Office of the Secretary
PAP Programs, Activities and Projects
PARC Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
PCAB Philippine Contractors Accreditation Board
PCCS position classification and compensation system
PCEG Presidential Commission on Effective Governance
PD presidential decree
PDAF Priority Development Assistance Fund
PDIC Philippine Deposit Insurance Company
PEAC Pre-Qualification Evaluation and Awards Committee
PEM Public expenditure management
PEMIP Public Expenditure Management Improvement Program
PEPFMR Public Expenditure, Procurement and Finanacial Management Review
PERA personal equity retirement account
PGF Philippine Governance Forum
PHAP Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Association of the Philippines
PHIC Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
PMO project management office
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PPB Procurement Policy Board

PSA Philippines Shippers’ Bureau
PSALM Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation
PSB Procurement Service Board
PSO Procurement Service Office
PSP private sector participation
PUP Polytechnic University of the Philippines
PWI Procurement Watch, Incorporated
RA republic act
RDC Regional Development Council
RDP regional development plan
RELIEF Reconciliation List for Enforcement
RIV requisition and issue voucher
SAFDZ Strategic Agriculture and Fisheries Development Zone
SAR Special Administrative Region
SCR Securities Regulation Code
SDDS Statistical dissemination database system
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission
SEER sector effectiveness and efficiency review
SEI Science Education Institute
SEMP Social Expenditure Management Program
SIE statement of income and expenditures
SONA State of the Nation Address
SPAV special purpose asset vehicle
SSL Salary Standardization Law
SSS Social Security System
SUC state universities and colleges
SWS Social Weather Stations
SY School year
TESDA Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
TOP Treasury of the Philippines
TRANSCO National Transmission Corporation
TTL Task Team Leader
TVET technical and vocational education and training
TWG technical working group
USAID United States Agency for International Development
VAT value-added tax
WTO World Trade Organization
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FOREWORD
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CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.................................................................................................... VIII
AN UPDATE… ..................................................................................................................... X
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................... XIII
SECTION A. AGGREGATE FISCAL DISCIPLINE..................................................... 1
1. OVERVIEW: THE INSTITUTIONAL AND FISCAL CONTEXT ...... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT
DEFINED.
Matching The State’s Role To Its Capability......................................................... 2
The Fiscal Context ................................................................................................. 5
Recommendations................................................................................................ 12
2. EXPENDITURES AND REVENUES: TRENDS AND ISSUES ................................................ 13
Expenditures ........................................................................................................ 13
Revenues .............................................................................................................. 14
3. OFF-BUDGET RISKS AND THEIR MANAGEMENT .......................................................... 21
Fiscal Risks .......................................................................................................... 21
Managing Off-Budget Risks ................................................................................ 22
SECTION B. ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY ............................................................... 30
4. ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY ............................................................................................. 31
Economic Composition of Spending ................................................................... 31
Agriculture and Agrarian Reform ........................................................................ 32
Education ............................................................................................................. 34
Health Care .......................................................................................................... 37
Allocative Distortions .......................................................................................... 39
5. THE MEDIUM TERM EXPENDITURE FRAMEWORK AND THE BUDGET CYCLE .............. 48
Policies, Plans, and Budgets: The Political Dimension ....................................... 48
Planning: Processes and Instruments ................................................................... 49
The Medium Term Perspective: Revenue & Expenditure Planning & Budgeting54
Management of the MTEF................................................................................... 62
Budget Foundation and Process Issues ................................................................ 63
6. BUDGET EXECUTION, TREASURY CONTROL AND EXTERNAL OVERSIGHT .................. 67
Financial Management......................................................................................... 67
Performance Management: The Filipino Experience in International Context ... 76
SECTION C. OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY............................................................. 87
7. THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT REGIME............................................................................ 88
Modernizing The Legal and Institutional Framework ......................................... 89
Electronic Procurement........................................................................................ 93
Civil Society Oversight........................................................................................ 95
8. STRENGTHENING FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT ............................................................... 97
Public Financial Accountability In The Philippines ............................................ 97
External Audit...................................................................................................... 97
Accounting........................................................................................................... 98
Internal Audit ....................................................................................................... 99
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9. CONTROLLING THE WAGE BILL ................................................................................. 100

Public Employment: Size, Structure, Cost......................................................... 100
Compensation .................................................................................................... 101
Strengthening the Public Administration........................................................... 103
Institutional Issues ............................................................................................. 104
Education Sector: An Example .......................................................................... 106
Recommendations.............................................................................................. 110
10. IMPLEMENTATION OF FOREIGN-ASSISTED PROJECTS .............................................. 112
Enhancing Absorptive Capacity......................................................................... 112
Improving Project Identification and Preparation.............................................. 112
Increasing The Predictability Of Project Financing........................................... 113
Strengthening The Sustainability Of Project Outcomes .................................... 113
Rationalizing Implementation Arrangements .................................................... 114
SECTION D. DECENTRALIZATION....................................................................... 116
11. DECENTRALIZATION: A SELECTIVE OVERVIEW ....................................................... 117
Intergovernmental Finances and Service Delivery ............................................ 117
Public Expenditure Management ....................................................................... 118
Revenue Administration .................................................................................... 118
Human Resource Management .......................................................................... 119
Financial Management....................................................................................... 119
Procurement ....................................................................................................... 120
Performance Monitoring .................................................................................... 121
SECTION E. NEXT STEPS AND ACTION PLAN................................................... 125
12. NEXT STEPS ............................................................................................................... 126
Dissemination Strategy ...................................................................................... 126
Next Steps .......................................................................................................... 126
ACTION PLAN .................................................................................................................. 127
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................... 171
DETAILED ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND LIST OF WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS................. 181
Detailed Acknowledgements ............................................................................. 181
List of Workshop Participants............................................................................ 182
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This Public Expenditure, Procurement and Financial Management Review (PEPFMR) has been
jointly prepared by a team comprising counterparts from the Government of the Philippines (GOP)
and staff of the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
From the GOP side, a Steering Committee comprising Secretary Emilia T. Boncodin (Department of
Budget and Management [DBM] – Chair), Secretary Jose Lina (Department of Interior and Local
Government [DILG]), and Chairman Guillermo Carague (Commission on Audit [COA]) oversaw the
PEPFMR work. Three GOP technical working groups worked intensively with the World Bank-
ADB task team. The principal interlocutor on the PEPFMR was Undersecretary Laura B. Pascua
(DBM), who also chaired the GOP Public Expenditure Working Group. The Financial Management
Working Group was chaired by Commissioner Emmanuel Dalman (COA). The Procurement
Working Group was chaired by Undersecretary Teodoro Encarnacion (Department of Public Works
and Highways[DPWH]). All three GOP Working Groups and associated resource persons
contributed substantially to the analytics and recommendations, for which the PEPFMR team
expresses its grateful thanks. A complete listing of TWG members and resource persons, as well as
GOP and local government participants in workshops held during the PEPFMR preparation process,
have been individually acknowledged in this report. The team would also like to express its sincere
thanks and gratitude to Civil Service Commission Chair Karina Constantino-David, Undersecretary
Juanita Amatong (Department of Finance [DOF]) and Assistant Secretary Austere Panadero (DILG),
all of whom have been unstinting in their assistance, insights and advice throughout the process.
The overall World Bank-ADB team comprised three integrated teams: (i) the procurement team,
comprising Mmes./Messrs. Christian A. Rey (Task Team Leader [TTL] for the procurement
element), Cecilia Vales (coordinator), Federico Gimenez (consultant), Sofronio Ursal (consultant),
Jaime Galvez-Tan (consultant), Omar Costibolo (consultant), Benjamin Albarece (consultant),
Norman Cabangal (consultant), and Hiroki Kobayashi (ADB); (ii) the financial management team,
comprising Mmes./Messrs. Wijaya Wickrema (TTL for the financial management element), Joseph
G. Reyes (Financial Management Specialist), and Preethi Wijeratne (consultant); and (iii) the public
expenditure team, comprising Mmes./Messrs. Joven Balbosa (Economist, World Bank), Joseph
Capuno (consultant), Tarun Das (consultant), Malcolm Green (consultant), Chris Jones (consultant),
Xuelin Liu (Country Economist for the Philippines, ADB), Hazel Malapit (consultant), Rosario
Manasan (consultant), Edward Mountfield (Economist, World Bank), Amitabha Mukherjee (TTL,
public expenditure element and coordinator for the PEPFMR), Miguel Navarro-Martin (Senior
Financial Sector Specialist, World Bank), Merwin Salazar (consultant), Robert Taliercio (Economist,
World Bank), Cesar Umali (consultant), Laura Walker (Governance Specialist, ADB), and Elizabeth
White (World Bank). Administrative and logistical support to the three teams has been ably provided
by Mmes. Gloria Elmore, Abigail Llamas, Laura A. Mitchell, Evelyn Quirante and Araceli Tria
(World Bank), and Marlene Albutra and Cynthia Reyes (ADB).
The team has received overall guidance from Messrs./Mmes. Homi Kharas (EASPR Sector Director
and Chief Economist, World Bank East Asia and Pacific Region), Robert Vance Pulley (World Bank
Country Director for the Philippines), Thomas Crouch (ADB Country Director for the Philippines),
Gunther Hecker (former ADB Country Director for the Philippines), Ronald Points (Regional
Financial Management Adviser), Denis Robitaille (Regional Procurement Adviser), Barbara
Nunberg (Sector Manager), Sanjay Dhar and Lloyd McKay (Lead Economists), Sudarshan Gooptu
and Sergei Shatalov (Senior Economists). The three World Bank Sector BoardsPublic Sector and
Governance, Procurement and Financial Management have provided guidance on the integration
process. The team would like to express its special thanks to Ms. Cheryl Gray (then Director, Public
Sector and Governance Board), Mr. Sanjay Pradhan (Director, Public Sector and Governance
Board), Mr. Armando Araujo (Head, Procurement Board), Mr. Paul Bermingham (Head, Financial
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Management Board), Mr. Richard Allen (PEFA Program, Public Sector and Governance Board), and
Mr. Laszlo Lovei (Economic Adviser, OPCVP) for their support. Messrs./Mmes. Richard Anson,
Jayshree Balachander, Heidi Hennrich-Hanson, Susan Hume, Carolina Figueroa-Geron, Teresa Ho,
Vijay Jagannathan, Asad Maken, Tariq Niazi, Rajshree Paralkar, and Rahul Raturi provided
thoughtful insights and comments.
The peer reviewers were Mmes./Messrs. Jose Edgardo Campos (then Senior Strategy Adviser for
Public Sector Reform, DBM, GOP), Nigel Chalk (International Monetary Fund [IMF]), Bert Hofman
(Lead Economist, EASPR, World Bank), Anand Rajaram (Senior Economist, PRMPS, World Bank),
David Shand (Financial Management Adviser, OPCFM, World Bank), P.K. Subramanian (Senior
Financial Management Specialist, SARFM, World Bank), and Dana Weist (Senior Public Sector
Specialist, PRMPS, World Bank). ADB reviewers included Mmes./Messrs. Wendy Duncan
(Education Specialist, SERD), Cecile Gregory (Principal Project Specialist, SERD) and Clay
Wescott (Principal Regional Cooperation Specialist, RSDD). The team has benefited from their
thoughtful insights, suggestions, and guidance on content, process, and integration.
The team would also like to express its gratitude to GOP counterparts for coordinating field visits to
LGUs and for the participation of their regional and local representatives, and to the officials, elected
and appointed, of the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays visited.
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AN UPDATE…
Background. This PEPFMR was begun in October 2001, completed in May 2002, and delivered to the
Government of the Philippines (GOP) in June 2002. Comments received from the Government were
reflected in a revised draft, and a detailed chapter-by-chapter review was held with the Government in
October−November 2002. Thereafter a revised draft was again shared with the Government in
November 2002. GOP interlocutors and World Bank-Asian Development Bank (WB-ADB) team
members updated the Public Expenditure, Procurement and Financial Management Review
(PEPFMR) to reflect recent events till the third quarter of 2002. The analysis reflects this position.
Final clearance was received from the GOP in April 2003. Key developments between June and
October 2002 have been reflected in the text. Other developments are summarized in this update by
the WB-ADB team.
Overview. Economic growth in 2002 rose to its highest level since the Asian crisis, with real gross
national product (GNP) and gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates reaching 5.2% and 4.6%,
respectively, aided by an acceleration of growth at the end of the year: growth rates in the fourth
quarter exhibited their strongest pace in six years with GNP growth topping 7%. This performance
was anchored on stronger consumer demand and worker remittances, a moderate recovery in exports,
and favorable rains that boosted agricultural production in the final quarter. And it occurred despite
sluggish investment, continued weakness in financial markets and heightened conflict in Mindanao.
On the policy front, progress was achieved in various legislative areas including Congressional
passage of the Procurement Law, the Special Purpose Asset Vehicle Law, and amendments to the
Anti-Money Laundering Law. However, the fiscal deficit increased significantly in 2002 as revenue
and expenditure targets were both missed by wide margins. Revenues began a modest recovery in late
2002 in response to administrative initiatives, and preliminary estimates for the first quarter of 2003
indicate that revenues surpassed their target for the period, while measures were also announced to
contain certain discretionary expenditures. With large public sector deficits, debt and contingent
liabilities, a significant upturn in domestic interest rates albeit from historic lows in mid-2002,
depreciation of the real exchange rate and a rise in global bond spreads, the Philippines can ill afford a
repetition of the 2002 fiscal performance. This is particularly the case given the downside risks to the
global economy, exacerbated by the war in Iraq and the spread of the SARS virus, and the uncertain
repercussions to the Philippines in terms of exports, oil prices, remittances, and access to global
capital.
The key challenge for policy makers will therefore be to progress convincingly along the path of fiscal
consolidation, in the first instance to adhere to the National Government’s 2003 deficit target of
PhP202 billion (4.7% of GDP).
Fiscal Performance and Policy. A disappointing fiscal performance in 2002 was partially responsible
for financial market weaknesses. The National Government (NG) deficit increased from PhP147
billion in 2001 (4% of GDP) to PhP213 billion (5.3% of GDP) instead of falling to PhP130 billion as
originally targeted, contributing to a parallel increase in the consolidated public sector deficit to 7.2%
of GDP in 2002 (preliminary Department of Finance [DOF] estimate). Tax revenue was practically
stable in nominal terms, and continued to fall in real terms, thereby continuing the declining trend
witnessed since 1998: the tax effort fell to 12.4% of GDP in 2002 from its peak of 17% in 1997.
Through February 2003, tax revenue had risen by 7.4% relative to the same period in 2002, although
this pace, if maintained, would not be sufficient to reverse the trend of a declining tax effort in 2003.
Several factors contributed to the decline in revenue: (i) the concentration of growth in the lightly
taxed export and agriculture sectors; (ii) lower import tariffs that have reduced the revenue intake from
this source; (iii) the fall in interest rate that lowered withholdings on interest income; and, perhaps
most importantly; (iv) the persistence of administrative weaknesses that have resulted in revenue
losses in assessments and collection. In addition to focusing on strengthening administrative
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weaknesses, the real value of excise taxes needs to be restored to its 1997 level and indexed to avoid
further erosion with inflation. And losses incurred through tax incentives need to be limited in a
manner that is not detrimental to private investment. The bill to reform the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR)—now called the National Autonomous Revenue Agency Bill—is under discussion in Congress.
Efforts to improve tax revenue were made in the last quarter of 2002. BIR performance improved as
reflected in increased collections on net income and profits and the value-added tax (VAT), which
increased by 12.5% and 21%, respectively, compared to the corresponding period a year earlier.
Measures to enhance tax revenue by the BIR included: (i) sending over 1,700 demand letters to
delinquent VAT taxpayers since September 2002; (ii) expanding an electronic filing and payment
system for all types of tax payments; (iii) an alert system to taxpayers for tax payments. The rise in
revenues in the last quarter of 2002 showed that administrative revenue-enhancement measures were
beginning to take effect.
NG expenditures overshot their target by PhP24 billion despite a PhP18 billion saving on anticipated
interest payments (due to lower-than-anticipated domestic interest rates). In 2002, the Government did
not pursue the planned cut in capital outlays and instead allowed a significant increase in such
spending in its desire to stimulate the economy. NG expenditures had however stabilized through
February 2003, helping lower the deficit to PhP31.5 billion, down from PhP35.9 billion as of February
2002. As of March 2003, the Government was also pursuing further spending restraints, including a 15
% across-the-board cutback in discretionary spending. This, combined with the absence of public
sector employment adjustments, may adversely impact expenditures on poverty-reducing programs
and operations and maintenance in 2003.
Actual disbursements in 2002 (PhP769.8 billion) grew by 8.2% over those in 2001. The wage bill and
other mandated expenditures accounted for a large part of total NG and local government unit (LGU)
expenditures. Mandated payments included a payment of 50% of the last month’s pay of Government
employees (amounting to PhP9.0 billion in 2002) and further expansion of capital disbursements due
to settlement of accounts payable (PhP4.8 billion). However, personal services and maintenance
expenditures in general contracted in 2002 due to belt-tightening measures. During 2002, internal
revenue allotment to LGUs grew by 16.4% given the need to support LGUs in their poverty reduction
and peace and order programs. Capital outlays increased in 2002, amounting to 29.9% of total
expenditures, due to faster implementation of foreign-assisted projects.
Public Sector Institutional Reforms. On the institutional reform front, a major achievement was the
enactment of an omnibus Procurement Law in December 2002; its effect will begin to be felt once the
implementing rules and regulations are promulgated. The Commission on Audit initiated a phased
implementation of a new government accounting system (NGAS) from 2002, based on a modified
accrual accounting basis, with a single fund concept and a simplified chart of accounts. The
Government has begun work to put in place a personnel information system, a necessary first step
toward controlling the wage bill.
With nonfinancial public debt approximately equal to GDP not including sizeable contingent liabilities
within infrastructure, pensions, and banking, strengthening of public finances will be essential to
sustaining robust medium-term growth. A key element in that effort will be a sustained effort to
strengthen tax administration and policy to reverse the decline in real tax revenue over the past five
years.
Power Sector Reform. The recently enacted Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) provides
the overall framework for far reaching structural reform toward developing an open and competitive
power sector that is envisaged to attract substantial private investment. The EPIRA authorizes the
Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) to adopt alternative forms of internationally accepted rate-
setting methodology from the present return-on-rate base mechanism as it deems appropriate to ensure
reasonable prices for electricity and to promote efficiency in the transmission sector. In January 2003,
the ERC issued the final draft of a long-term performance-based regulatory framework in determining
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the transmission charges of the National Transmission Corporation (Transco). Finalization of this
regulatory framework is one of the preconditions for privatizing Transco operations. Separately, the
bill (approved by the House of Representatives) to provide Transco with the mandate to transfer its
franchise to a private concessionaire is still pending the approval of the Senate. Nevertheless, potential
investors were invited to express interest and the award of contract to the private concessionaire,
through competitive bidding, is currently targeted for mid-2003. In the absence of the approval of the
above franchise bill, the bid price from the concessionaire is likely to be lower than otherwise.
Further, special care has to be taken to balance the needs of investors with the desires of consumers for
lower tariffs in a financially sustainable manner. In particular, the recent Supreme Court decision for
Meralco to refund its customers is a contentious issue. Moreover, the preliminary decision of the ERC
on the unbundled rate of Meralco is significantly lower than that requested by the company. Meralco
has requested reconsideration of the above rulings, and its financial health will be critically dependent
on the final outcome of these decisions. The above examples of regulatory contention transmit
powerful signals to potential investors; the manner in which they are resolved will have repercussions
for the investment climate, not only in the power sector but for regulated utilities in general.
Anti-Money Laundering Law. The Philippines passed an Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Act in
September 2002 to comply with Financial Action Task Force (FATF) directives. However, the Act
contained weaknesses that needed to be addressed to bring it in line with international standards. Two
key amendments requested by the FATF were: (i) provision of authority to the AML Council to
scrutinize bank accounts without a court order; and (ii) reduction of the threshold amount of covered
transactions from PhP4 million to PhP500,000. The March 7, 2003 amendments to the AML Act were
acceptable to the FATF, which decided not to impose countermeasures on the Philippines. But the
Philippines will remain on the FATF list of noncooperating countries and territories until it has shown
that it is effectively implementing the amended AML law. The AML Council is currently preparing
the amended AML Act implementation plan, which will be submitted to the FATF for review. As of
March 2003, the AML Council had frozen PhP954 million in 450 accounts since the passage of the
legislation. In the coming weeks the number of reports that the AML Council will be handling is
expected to swell as the amendments to the AML law take effect.
Pension Reform. The slow pace of pension reforms continues to be a concern. In particular, the
financial condition of the Social Security System (SSS), the largest pension fund serving private sector
employees, remains problematic. The latest actuarial valuation indicates that from 1999 to 2001,
benefit payouts exceeded contributions by more than PhP7 billion. The deficit has been paid out from
the pension fund reserve, reducing the remaining life of the fund at an accelerated pace. The actuarial
valuation shows a possible depletion of the pension fund by 2015 without appropriate remedial
measures. In an effort to contain the short-term financial problems faced by SSS, some adjustments
have been made including a 1% increase in the employers’ contribution. However, a carefully planned
and phased-in increase in contribution rates together with other parametric and structural changes is
needed to ensure SSS’s medium- and long-term viability.
The problems of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) are different in scope from those
of the SSS but of concern nonetheless. The GSIS has accumulated excess liquidity in an amount of
approximately PhP30 billion and continues to face a shortage of investment options. This shortage has
meant that returns on investment continue to fall below the levels needed for long-term sustainability.
The GSIS needs to find alternative investment options (locally and/or abroad) to place its excess
liquidity, diversify its portfolio, and obtain better returns.
xiii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. The Philippine authorities, confronted with an unfavorable governance and macroeconomic
environment in 2001, established a consistent track record in 2001 in stabilizing the economy and
improving investor sentiment. The unfolding developments in 2002−2003, however, pose a threat to a
still fragile fiscal and institutional environment, and can dim the prospects for attaining the Philippines’
targets for higher growth and renewed poverty reduction. Fiscal sustainability and the Government’s
ability to finance poverty-reducing programs continues to be at risk from falling revenues, rising public
debt and debt service, and off-budget risks. This constrained environment makes it doubly important to
focus on increasing fiscal flexibility through increasing revenue collections and enhancing the discipline,
efficiency, and equity of public expenditures.
2. The objective of this Public Expenditure, Procurement and Financial Management Review
(PEPFMR) is to examine selected issues in the allocation and management of public resources of interest
to the Philippine authorities, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). It aims to help
the authorities establish more effective and transparent policies and processes for allocating and using
public resources to reduce poverty and promote economic growth.
3. This section summarizes the key PEPFMR findings and highlights critical actions to improve the
management of public expenditures. Some of the messages are not new, and indeed are well-known to
Philippine authorities and development partners. Moreover, the PEPFMR does not suggest that the
Philippines “do everything at once”; rather it demonstrates that sequencing and prioritization will be
critical for greater discipline in managing public expenditures.
Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
4. Fiscal flexibility is being steadily eroded as revenues shrink and mandated expenditures
remain high. Discretionary expenditures, severely constrained by low revenue collections, rising debt
service, and high expenditures on personal services, no longer provide adequate flexibility to respond to
evolving needs. Public investments are low, limiting public sector facilitation of rapid long-term growth
and diminishing the ability of the National Government (NG) to combat poverty. If public deficits are to
be reduced as targeted without further squeezing discretionary expenditure, ongoing government
initiatives to reverse the slide in tax revenues must be pursued with vigor.
5. The problem of constrained finances is multidimensional, involving declining revenues, rising
interest payments, and growing transfers to subnational levels of Government. Between 1997 and 2001,
as a percentage of gross national product (GNP), the gap between revenues and statutory expenditure
obligations has shrunk from 6.9% to 0.9% (Figure 1). Revenues have declined from 18.7% of GNP in
1997 to 14.6% in 2001, and the continued revenue slump through 2002 contributed to a significant
slippage in the NG deficit target for 2002. During 1997−2001, interest payments have risen from 3.1% of
GNP to 4.5%. Maintenance and other operating expenses (MOOE) and capital outlays continue to be
squeezed, and are insufficient for poverty reduction and improved delivery of basic services. Thus it is not
the rise or fall of any individual item, but the combined effect of decreasing revenues and increasing
statutory obligations that is having a pincer-like impact on the Government’s expenditure program.
6. Revenue collections need to increase, and/or wage bill expenditures need to diminish, to
adequately finance the Government’s growth and poverty-reduction agenda. The authorities are aware
that increasing fiscal flexibility in the short to medium term entails a three-pronged strategy of (i)
aggressively implementing a strategy to increase revenue collections; (ii) controlling the wage bill, the
only element of mandated expenditures amenable to short-term adjustment;, and (iii) streamlining the
executive.
xiv
7. Reversing the decline in public revenue

Figure 1. Increasing Budgetary Inflexibility: Total Revenues and Mandated Expenditures (% of
is widely recognized as a key challenge and a
GNP, 1997-2001)
20
priority: the Government must act quickly to
19
increase revenues and restore the credibility
18
18.7
of the revenue machinery. The continuance
17 of the revenue shortfall into 2002, and the fall
16.5
16 in tax revenue in real terms vis-à-vis 2001

Percent of GNP
15.3
15 collections, add urgency to this effort. 14.5
14.6
14
Complicating the situation, the performance 13.95
13
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)’s
12.3
11.8
11.8
Large Taxpayer Service (LTS) continues to
12
12.1
11
10
be below expectations, performance has
1 2
deteriorated on income and excise taxes, and
3 4 5
compliance rates have continued to fall since

Mandated Revenues
1997 (except for corporate income tax).

Furthermore, contemplated tax policy changes did not materialize in 2002.
8. An appropriate blend of administrative and policy measures is now essential to establish a
sound foundation for a sustained recovery in tax effort. Without a turnaround in the tax effort, the recent
gains on the macroeconomic front will be difficult to sustain, and the NG’s ability to allocate a minimal
level of public resources to essential infrastructure, human capital, and social needs will be compromised.
9. Administrative measures could focus on improving the effectiveness of the LTS. Key actions
could comprise provision of staffing and expansion of coverage; strengthening value-added tax (VAT)
administration through, for example, use of third-party information; improving audit performance to
increase compliance incentives through selective audits and prioritization (e.g., focusing on large
taxpayers, and on the BIR’s Reconciliation List for Enforcement or RELIEF); improving the quality of
BIR databases; and strengthening coordination between the Development Budget Coordination
Committee (DBCC), the Department of Finance (DOF), and the BIR.
10. On the policy side, the best option seems to be to enact the proposed reform of the excise tax on
alcohol and tobacco productsthis may yield up to additional PhP10 billion over 2 years. It would also
be desirable to consider rationalizing investment incentives to reduce their fiscal cost.
11. The planned BIR reforms are widely seen as constituting a litmus test of the administration’s
ability and willingness to increase revenues, implement rightsizing options and streamline the
executive. The announcement of a comprehensive set of reforms (comprising improving tax collection,
simplifying the tax structure and administration, minimizing discretion of tax examiners, broadening the
tax base and making the tax system more equitable) is being keenly watched as an indication of the
administration’s resolve to tackle difficult but critical institutional reform issues. The BIR leadership is
also seeking to address corruption problems through a reorganization of the BIRa bill to reform the BIR
(the National Autonomous Revenue Agency Bill) is pending in Congress. While the BIR reform is
important, work on this cannot be allowed to delay administrative and policy measures to raise revenues.
12. LGU-level revenue issues. Is there a possibility that local government units’ (LGUs’) collection
of revenues from their own sources can, to some extent, offset the national government’s weak revenue
performance and provide resources to LGUs to better deliver devolved services? The overall share of
revenues mobilized from local sources relative to gross domestic product (GDP) is not significantly
greater now than it was before the Local Government Code (LGC) was enacted in 1991. In many cases
internal revenue allotments (IRA) seem to have created disincentives to mobilize local revenues. Revenue
administration at the LGU level thus appears to be an area of great potential improvement.
13. Many LGUs seem to be able to collect only a small percentage of potential revenues due under
their respective local tax codes. The main problems include (i) lack of accurate taxpayer registration
xv
databases; (ii) lack of accurate cadastral information for property taxes; (iii) large numbers of nonfilers,
stop-filers, and nonpayers; (iv) inadequate audit presence for business taxes; (v) lack of trained
professional staff (which has led to the use of casual employees to collect some user fees, for example);
(vi) inadequate data on payment delinquencies; (vii) cash-based payment systems; and (viii) virtually
nonexistent taxpayer services.
14. Greater transparency and accountability at the LGU level in (i) the assessment process and
evaluation standards for assessment efficiency, and (ii) the setting, collecting, and auditing fees for public
markets and slaughterhouses, as well as in the leasing process for public markets, could greatly strengthen
governance and improve revenue collection at the LGU level.
15. Off-budget risks pose a significant threat to macroeconomic stability and fiscal discipline.
Public finance in the Philippines is replete with instances where taxpayers have bailed out, through re-
capitalization and debt assumption, troubled corporations owned or sponsored by the Government, or
shouldered the cost of having to sell some of these corporations at a fraction of what Government spent
for them: notable examples in recent years include the Philippine National Bank, the old Central Bank,
and the National Power Corporation. In many cases, the problems have built up over an extended
period—and recur even after bailout. Because macrostability is dependent on the effective management of
fiscal risks, achieving and maintaining fiscal discipline is critical; this in turn will depend on how
effectively contingent liabilities are managed.
16. Some estimates of the contingent liabilities of the Government run to about PhP3.1 trillion,
representing maximum exposures under obligations such as (i) unfunded liabilities of public pension
institutions (PhP1.8 trillion); (ii) direct guarantees on loans to Government-owned and -controlled
corporations (GOCCs) and government financial institutions (GFIs)—estimated at PhP66 billion; (iii)
guarantees on risks under build-operate-transfer (BOT) contracts, estimated at PhP45 billion; and (iv)
deposit insurance (PhP352 billion).
17. A first step is to construct a system for managing fiscal risks. Several specific tasks would be
required in the near term. These include quantifying contingent liabilities (a preliminary inventory has
been completed in early 2002); reviewing the charter provisions of GOCCs on NG guarantees; developing
a framework for recognition, management, reporting, and provisioning of contingent liabilities;
establishing a centralized risk management unit in the DOF in coordination with the Bureau of the
Treasury (BTR) with expertise in identification, measurement, monitoring, and management of all implicit
and explicit contingent liabilities; and reviewing the contractual obligations for public projects with private
sector participation. A presidential executive order (EO) has been issued to strengthen GOCC and GFI
governance structures and processes. DOF is also initiating special-purpose audits of critical GOCCs to
support the planned disposition program, and initiating benchmark audits for other pension and trust
funds. Some of the actions have already been initiated: it would be desirable to complete them as soon as
possible.
18. Complementary actions on other fronts are also needed. Given the significant unfunded liabilities
of pension institutions, it would be desirable to strengthen the performance of the Social Security System
(SSS) and the Armed Forces Personnel Retirement Savings and Benefit System (AFP RSBS).
19. For SSS, a core set of actions could comprise completion of an actuarial audit; narrowing the gap
between pension fund contributions and benefits through a phased increase in contribution rates; limiting the
administrative expenses of the SSS to the statutory 12%; improving the liquidity, yield, and safety of the
SSS investment portfolio by enhancing the collection efficiency of SSS salary loans; and highlighting the
impact of recent suggestions to use SSS for social policies. The AFP RSBS will need to specify and
initiate implementation of a time-bound action plan to improve the liquidity, yield, and safety of its
investment portfolio, and begin exploring options to attain viability.
xvi
20. The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) is under less immediate threat. Desirable
actions here could comprise the engagement of professional investment managers to manage a portion of
the GSIS portfolio, and permitting a portion of this portfolio to be invested abroad; enhancing collection
efficiency on salary loans; and resolution of past due contributions from the Government.
21. In the medium-term, actions to improve management of off-budget risks could include: (i)
moving towards a cash and accrual basis of accounting; (ii) improving audit: strengthening the internal
audit team to deal with management of contingent liabilities and ensure that transactions are properly
booked and financial statements are reflective of GOCCs’ true state and well-being; and (iii) provisioning
for contingent liabilities.
Allocative Efficiency
22. Composition of expenditures. The economic composition of spending has deteriorated in recent
years as both the MOOE and capital outlays have decreased as a share of GNP (Figure 2 provides an
example from the education sector). In very broad terms current expenditures have held steady at about
16.7% of GNP while capital outlays declined over the period 1997–2002. Interest payments rose from
3.1% to 4.5% over the same period. However, MOOE as a percentage of GNP has been declining every
year since 1996, with the exception of a slight
Figure 2. Department of Education (DepEd)
increase in 2000. At the same time capital
Budget by Expenditure Object expenditures fell considerably from 3.8% in 1997
% to 2% in 2002, with infrastructure outlays down
100.00
from 2% to 0.5% of GNP.
80.00
60.00 23. The decreases in the share of expenditures

40.00 to MOOE are worrisome. While reduced interest
20.00 payments would give the Government more room
0.00 to maneuver, it would still seem that a reallocation
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Year
from personal services to MOOE might improve
Personal Services MOOE Capital Outlay
the effectiveness and efficiency of government
spending. The share of capital expenditures in
2002 fell short of that in 1996–1997. Moreover, allocations to capital expenditures have been
characterized by high degrees of annual variation in recent years.
24. Allocative efficiency is also diminished by various distortions: although the Government has
made some progress recently with limiting the scope of distortion, more could be done to hold
“development fund” expenditures to higher standards. A major concern is the allocation of scarce
resources to special budget funds that are not necessarily aligned with NG policy priorities and non-
transparent in their use. The prevalence of special congressional funds in the national budget raises the
issue of budget comprehensiveness, as expenditures from these funds are frequently “off-budget” since
they are accounted for neither at the budget formulation nor at the execution stage. Individual senators
and congresspersons are also entitled to a variety of additional funds for development purposes, other
congressional initiatives, and compensatory allowances. These congressional funds in effect represent a
significant amount of “off-budget” resource allocation not subject to the prioritization, accountability, and
transparency requirements for other expenditures. An additional issue is the myriad of special authorities,
corporations, funds, and administrations affiliated with sectoral departments (e.g., the agriculture and
agrarian reform sector has 11 government corporations and numerous special-purpose funds, whose total
allocation represents more than twothirds of the total sectoral budget).
25. The picture regarding strategic long-term poverty-reducing expenditures is mixed. Expenditures
on social welfare, labor, and employment have increased. Sector allocations in agriculture, health,
education, and housing are declining, and subsectoral allocations in health may be deteriorating as well.1
xvii
Allocative distortions from congressional initiatives and earmarked revenues further constrain the
Government’s already limited flexibility.
26. In key social and economic services, sectoral allocations are falling, as a percentage of GNP and
of total NG expenditures. NG social service expenditures have declined from 4.9% in 1997 to 4.1% in
2001 as a percentage of GNP. Education, health and housing have declined as both a percentage of GNP
and of total NG expenditures (the only sub-sectors that grew were social welfare, labor, and employment),
and are also programmed to decline further in 2003 (comparatively, the Philippines spent 1.7% of GDP
on social services on average during 1990–1998, compared with 2.3% for lower middle-income
countries).
27. The decline is exacerbated by the budgetary inflexibilities that also exist at the sectoral level. For
instance, DepEd has limited room for maneuver given the high ratio of personnel costs to the total
recurrent budget (92.4% in 2001). In contrast, the average ratio of personnel costs to total recurrent
expenditure in education for lower middle-income countries is 64.1%. The trend in the agriculture
subsector is consistent with the trend in social services, though the agriculture sector grew in 2002.
Resources for agrarian reform, on the other hand, though declining as a percentage of GNP from 1997 to
1999, are projected to increase steadily from 2000 to 2003. The budget for 2002 further constrains
economic and social service spending due to the need to increase national defense and peace and order
expenditures that, though not statutory obligations, take on priority status in times of conflict.
28. Increasing sectoral allocations will not necessarily improve service delivery and reduce poverty.
To attain these goals the Government must focus on providing strategic public goods, and must address
issues of equity. At the subsectoral level there are likely mixed trends on these grounds. The analysis
suggests that subsectoral allocations in health appear to be deteriorating on both equity and efficiency
grounds, while expenditures in education seem to be moving in the right direction by supporting
productivity and focusing on the poor. The health sector concerns are reflected in a decline in
expenditures on preventive care from 36.4% of the total Department of Health (DOH) budget in 1996 to
26.4% in 2001.
29. Better medium-term expenditure planning and budgeting would make overall budget
management and expenditure allocation more responsive to national priorities. Currently, resource,
planning and implementation constraints are threatening maintenance and public investment in core
poverty-reducing public programs. Studies of service delivery have shed light on the access to, quality of,
and financing of basic public services. A snapshot of illustrative sectors below discloses the significant
progress made and also points to areas requiring further attention for improving outcomes.
30. Agriculture and agrarian reform. Public goods and services account for only 40% of allocations
(rice price stabilization, by contrast, gets 20% of budgetary allocations). The incomplete devolution of
functions and resources in the agriculture sector has added to the complexity of the problem: because the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is not yet fully devolved, LGUs have not really been involved in
agrarian reform—this seems to have contributed to the slowdown in the pace of land redistribution. And
the budgets of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and of DAR are growing faster than LGU budgets for
devolved services. Continuing challenges in service delivery constrain the NG’s ability to push the pro-
poor agenda in this sector—research and extension, for example, are delinked, demonstration farms are
not established, and essential sectoral infrastructure such as farm-to-market roads and communal
irrigation is deteriorating.
31. It would be desirable to focus on growth-enhancing public goods and services; explore alternative
sources to finance land acquisition for redistribution; and make greater use of market-oriented and
community-driven modalities of land transfer.
32. Education. A broad-based basic education subsector largely provided and funded by the public
sector coexists with a tertiary subsector with a high level of private sector involvement. Elementary
xviii
education is provided by both public and private sectors. Though public elementary schools do not charge
tuition fees, families spend about 2% of total household expenditures on each child enrolled in a public
elementary school (or 33% of total public elementary education costs). Access to public schools has
improved over time. But high participation rates tend to mask the poor’s difficulty in accessing quality
education at all levels. Children drop out for health and economic reasons; three quarters of dropouts are
from poor households. Class size, textbooks, and facilities are rated poorly for public schools. Poor
deployment of teachers results in higher average class size in rural areas (45) than the average teacher-
student ratio (35). Around five students, sometimes more, share one textbook.
33. An analysis of prioritization and financing policies and processes indicates that (i) within the
education sector, the share of basic education has risen, while that of higher education has fallen; (ii)
general government spending on education has declined after 1999, and is lower than other countries of
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, except Indonesia; (iii) the sector is characterized by very high
wage bill expenditures, and the relatively high teacher salary levels can create pressures on LGUs to
match such levels for LGU staff, constraining LGU financing of service delivery; (iv) state universities
and colleges (SUCs) generally have high staff costs (accounting for 83% of their budget), fee levels
comprise only 5% of SUC expenditures, and they have little incentive to improve efficiency. Households’
low satisfaction with public school class size, facilities, and textbooks is well known.
34. Key actions in this sector could comprise intensifying intrasectoral restructuring toward basic
education, continuing the reform of higher education, and working out how to devolve technical and
vocational education and training to LGUs.
35. Health. The health sector is more devolved than education. Overall health status has improved
through the nineties, and health indicators have improved quite significantly. For example, overall life
expectancy has improved from 64.5 years in 1991 to 67.6 years in 1999; the crude birth rate dropped from
31.9 (average for 1991-94) to 27.3 in 1999; the infant mortality rate fell from 51 in 1991 to 31 in 1999;
and the maternal mortality rate declined from 203 in 1991 to 172 in 1998. Despite the overall gains, the
improvement has not been uniform across economic classes, gender and regions in the country. Surveys
have also indicated inefficient and inequitable public health service utilization. There is an orientation
toward tertiary-level and urban-based facilities, limited health insurance coverage, and an overly
centralized public health service delivery system. The private sector accounts for about 54% of total
expenditures for health care, and is largely confined to the market for personal health care services.
36. The main plank of the government strategy for health care is the Health Sector Reform Agenda
(HSRA). Although total expenditures have increased since 1991, the bulk of the budget of the DOH goes
to tertiary care (LGUs finance primary and secondary care services). And while the DOH spends more or
less equally on personal services and MOOE, LGUs spend mainly on personal services: at the local level,
resources for drugs, equipment and facilities therefore tend to be insufficient.
37. While more resources do flow to poor regions, the distribution of health resources among poor
regions is still inequitable. Enrollment of poor families in the Philippines Health Insurance Corporation
(PHIC) Indigent Program has improved, but the poor remain vulnerable to health risks and have lower
access to basic health services. Regions in Mindanao still have the highest infant mortality rates (IMRs) in
the country. There is a resurgence of tuberculosis, malaria, and polio. Recent information on health
outcomes is scanty.
38. The DOH and Department of Budget and Management (DBM) are working on a set of core
priorities. These comprise improving the DOH regional budget allocation process to better match IMR
and poverty incidence; preparing a realistic implementation plan for the HSRA to sequence reforms and
prioritize technical assistance; completion of an actuarial study on the financial sustainability of PHIC;
and strengthening health statistics.
xix
39. For the past 3 years the Government has been implementing reforms in public expenditure
management, led by DBM. Such reforms require considerable time, commitment, and coordination to
yield the benefits of greater fiscal discipline, improved strategic allocation of resources, and gains in
operational efficiency. The policy framework for reforms and the basic building blocks of improved
public expenditure management have been put in place. At the national level, the Public Expenditure
Management Improvement Program (PEMIP) has begun to link the budget planning, execution, and
monitoring processes with nationally articulated priorities. The link between the Medium Term Philippine
Development Plan (MTPDP) and the budget, including the Medium Term Public Investment Program
(MTPIP), is also being strengthened, but more needs to be done: the MTPDP should provide cost
estimates for proposed strategies, targets, and programs; strategies and targets require to be prioritized in
terms of available resources; and more detail is needed in the MTPDP on the medium-term expenditure
perspective in terms of the sectoral allocation of resources (which is presented in aggregate terms). More
directly addressing the LGU planning agenda in the MTPDP could also make the latter more relevant as
an instrument for pro-poor interventions.
40. The Philippines has also introduced the elements of an Medium-Term Expenditure Framework
(MTEF). Its stated goal is to restructure the budget over the medium term to better support the
Government’s development strategy. The MTEF was also intended to improve technical efficiency in
sectors by “providing a more predictable resource environment for program planning and
implementation.” The MTEF is conceived of as a program of five interrelated components: (i) a 3-year
budgeting system to cost ongoing as well as proposed programs, activities, and projects (PAPs); (ii) better
integration of the planning and budgeting system; (iii) regular assessments of ongoing PAPs through
Sector Efficiency and Effectiveness Reviews (SEERs); (iv) development of performance indicators and a
performance measurement system; and (v) gradual simplification of budgeting rules at the agency level.
The approach has been to roll out the reforms on an incremental and somewhat flexible, or experimental
basis.
41. The challenges in moving forward are to maintain the momentum of reforms, to coordinate and
manage the process, to prioritize key actions, and to continue to refine and strengthen the institutional
framework. This requires sustained management and mainstreaming in line departments, coupled with the
establishment of effective processes to link national, regional, and LGU-level planning, prioritizing, and
implementation of poverty reduction programs and pro-poor services.2 Equally importantly, the MTEF
needs to attain a greater degree of technical credibility among line departments, and political credibility
among key political stakeholders, to be able to attain its true potential and utility. The MTPDP would be
strengthened by a chapter devoted to the MTEF, which could include a discussion of medium-term budget
composition, medium-term sector and departmental ceilings, and budget priorities clearly linked to
planning priorities in the MTPDP. The MTEF reform needs to be managed at the highest levels of the
executive branch, with actions to strengthen the MTEF, such as mainstreaming the MTEF in line
departments; moving toward an accord between the executive and the Congress on the MTEF; and
developing a realistic and time-bound implementation plan for the MTEF. At the same time, the
macroeconomic fiscal framework requires considerable strengthening through improved accuracy of
revenue forecasts, enhanced cooperation between the BIR, DOF, DBM, and the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA), and institutionalizing the revenue forecasting task force.
42. The SEERs are being applied for several years to evaluate budget programs, activities and
projects according to their relevance in attaining desired sectoral outcomes. In practice, however,
oversight agencies3 have been more advanced than line departments in implementing the SEERs because
of stronger capacity and skills. The Government has made important strides with the development of the
New Government Accounting System (NGAS). Now implementation needs to be managed carefully.
Additionally, internal control weaknesses create cash management risks that need to be addressed by
improving accounting and reporting requirements. The (OPIF)—in tandem with planning and SEER
xx
processes—is fundamental for implementing planning and budgeting reforms, innovative initiatives in
civil societ,y and legislative participation in budget process.
43. To strengthen budget execution, it would be desirable to (i) evaluate and address risks in NGAS
implementation, and link the Budget Execution and Tracking System (BEATS) and the Customized
Budget Execution System (CUBES) with the NGAS; (ii) promulgate a Government accounting and
auditing manual; (iii) promote greater coordination between DBM and Commission on Audit (COA) on
performance evaluation plans; (iv) enhance civil society’s role in oversight of the budget process; (v)
strengthen the capacity of the Congressional Budget and Planning Office (CBPO) in undertaking budget
and program analysis; and (vi) strengthen the agency controllership function.
Operational Efficiency
44. Procurement reforms to increase competition and transparency could enhance the cost efficiency
of resource use and also improve governance. The potential for, and possible gains from, procurement
reform are high. This is appropriately an area that has received much attention from reformers. In fiscal
year 2000–2002, outlays for procurement of goods, works, and services by national agencies, LGUs, and
GOCCs averaged more than PhP115 billion annually (Table 1).
Table 1. Philippines: Magnitude of Public Sector Procurement Outlays (billion peso)
2000 2001 2002(Budget)
Spending Entity
Amount % Amount % Amount %
National Government Agencies 65.1 56 49.7 43 57.3 42

Local Government Units 24.3 21 27.4 24 51.0 37
GOCCs 27.5 23 38.2 33 29.6 21
Total 116.9 100 115.3 100 137.9 100
Source: Department of Budget and Management, Budget of Expenditures and Sources of
Financing for Fiscal Year 2002
45. The Ombudsman, the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, and COA have estimated
that large amounts of public funds are lost to both political and bureaucratic procurement-related
corruption. Although no reliable estimates are available of losses due to public sector procurement-related
corruption, the perception of large leakages continues to persist. An October 2001 study by Procurement
Watch, Inc. indicated that the potential leakage through procurement corruption could have run to about
PhP95 billion in 2001. DBM estimates that this could have been used to fund DepEd twice over, or build
more than 500,000 houses, or construct more than 1,000 kilometers of farm-to-market roads. The
experience of textbook and drugs procurement under World Bank-financed projects indicates that
adopting improved procurement processes and practices could reduce prices by about 40%.
46. A key achievement has been the enactment in late 2002, and signing into law in January 2003, of
a new Procurement Reform Law. This follows several steps in recent years to streamline public
procurement rules and regulations. Thus, enactment and implementation of the Procurement Reform Law
applicable to the national government, LGUs, and GOCCs was appropriately the top administration
priority in procurement reform. Promulgation of the implementing rules and regulations will strengthen
the legal and institutional framework for procurement, enhance transparency and accountability, generate
further budgetary savings, and also contribute to improving governance. The law contains provisions to
simplify prequalification procedures, encourage electronic procurement, reduce officials’ discretion on
bids and awards, establish a Government Procurement Policy Board for oversight and regulation of
government procurement, professionalize the public procurement function, protect procurement officials
from unjust legal suits arising from the performance of their duties, and impose criminal and civil
liabilities for those found guilty of collusion.
xxi
47. Electronic procurement systems can enhance transparency, promote competition, and reduce the
time for procurement of standard supplies. Such systems have been developed in various public sector
agencies in the Philippines, including (i) the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) for
determining contractors’ eligibility; (ii) the Department of National Defense for procurement of military
uniforms and defense hardware; (iii) the National Power Corporation for coal procurement; (iv) DBM for
procurement of small-value office equipment, materials and supplies, and (v) by other agencies, including
DepEd and DOH. The Philippines has also been prominent in involving civil society in the public
procurement process at the national and local levels to enhance accountability and transparency.
48. Priority actions on the procurement front would comprise (i) promulgating IRRs for the
Procurement Reform Law; (ii) strengthening electronic procurement processes along with wider publicity
for government procurement through media such as newspapers, radio, and television; (iii) continued
support for civil society monitoring of procurement processes at the national and local levels; (iv)
establishing a procurement policy board as the sole regulatory and oversight entity for public
procurement; and (v) long-term support for building procurement capacity, including at the LGU level.
49. Strengthening accounting, auditing, reporting, and financial controls will initially reinforce
aggregate fiscal discipline and, eventually, improve resource allocation and operational efficiency.
Focusing on public sector financial accountability, the analysis and recommendations in this area covers
(i) the current legal and regulatory environment; (ii) the government financial management system
including budgeting, accounting, cash management and reporting; (iii) government auditing; and (iv)
financial management at the LGU level.
50. Accounting. Based on recommendations from existing analyses, COA has designed and initiated a
phased implementation of a new government accounting system (NGAS) from 1 January 2002. The
NGAS aims to (i) simplify government accounting; (ii) conform to international accounting standards;
and (iii) generate periodic and relevant financial statements for better performance monitoring. The
NGAS has several features that make it a significantly better system, including a modified accrual
accounting basis, improved accounting for assets, a single fund concept, and a simplified three-digit chart
of accounts. COA is developing an accounting software package for NGAS computerization.
51. With the introduction of the NGAS, a simplified annual financial reporting system is also
required. All agencies are required to prepare a balance sheet, income and expenditure statement ,and a
cash flow statement. There are approximately one hundred reports produced by agencies for budget and
financial control purposes. The introduction of the NGAS is an opportunity for the Government to review
the requirements of various oversight agencies and prescribe a more streamlined set monitoring reports
for their use. Pilots are under way in the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD),
DepEd, and DPWH to improve financial management reporting.
52. The introduction of NGAS means that approximately 2,000 independent accounting units at the
NG and LGU level, will have to switch to the new system. The logistics of such a large-scale change
without a period of parallel running carries very high risks. Notwithstanding COA’s piloting and training
efforts, the authorities will need to ensure that NGAS implementation take place without risks lack of a
detailed accounting procedures manual to guide agency and LGU financial staff; (ii) the possibility that
training of staff may have been insufficient; (iii) COA’s capacity to provide adequate trouble-shooting
support when implementation problems surface; (iv) lack of a link between the chart of accounts and
budgetary classification; and (v) the uncertainty surrounding the management reports needed to carry out
effective budget control.
53. To address these risks, COA has adopted a strategy of phased implementation, focusing first on
setting up the basic manual system to be followed by computerization. The final step will be to develop a
government integrated financial management system that will provide management and financial
information at various levels of government. To improve the chances of successful implementation, it
xxii
would be desirable to focus on capacity building, oversight mechanisms, provision of manuals, and
effective coordination between central and line agencies.
54. Internal audit. Internal auditing is not a well-developed function in government agencies.
Although internal audit units are authorized under the Internal Audit Code, budgetary considerations have
prevented their establishment in all government agencies and LGUs. Some agencies, though, have
internal control units that perform some functions of an internal audit unit. With 11,000 auditors under
COA, a careful study needs to be carried out before embarking on a program to universally establish
internal audit units. Such a study should review the transfer of some of the routine audit functions from
COA to internal audit units and the implications on COA staffing due to the establishment of internal
audit units.
55. External audit. COA has undertaken an organizational restructuring in 2002. This has distributed
audit responsibility from a regional basis to an agency-nationwide basis. The nationwide government
agencies and GOCCs are being organized into audit clusters with a director taking responsibility for audit
at the national and regional levels. The audit of LGUs in several regions will be clustered under a director
who will take responsibility for all local government audits in the cluster. This restructuring is meant to
facilitate promoting the audit team approach, which COA has not been able to fully implement in the past,
and may offer valuable lessons for planning and implementing administrative restructuring in the central
executive.
56. COA also plans to focus its work on financial and value for money audits and progressively move
toward a risk-based auditing model. COA is being assisted by UNDP and AUSAID in these efforts. As
COA is currently fully engaged in the reform of the accounting system and computerization of the
accounting, development of a risk assessment model and training of staff will be done gradually over the
next 2-3 years.
57. With the planned computerization of the accounting system, another area that would need COA’s
attention is the development of information technology (IT) audit capabilities. COA has agreed for the
World Bank to carry out a peer review to enhance its quality assurance program. COA is also pilot testing
a program to encourage participatory audits, allowing civil society organizations to participate in selected
audits.
58. Financial management at the LGU level. The internal control environment and institutional
arrangements for financial accountability remain extremely weak at the LGU level: in 2000, only 250 of
the 1,689 LGUs audited were given clean audit reports by COA. Although there are many reports of good
practice in LGUs, weak internal control practices have been frequently flagged in COA annual reports,
and the internal audit function is nonexistent in most LGUs. Special attention hence needs to be given to
financial management in LGUs.
59. A reallocation of expenditures from personal services to MOOE can improve the effectiveness
and efficiency of government spending: civil service reform is now crucial for flexibility to implement
new performance-based public sector reforms and could make an important contribution to public
sector efficiency and flexibility. Given the pressing fiscal constraints, it is clear that the size and cost of
the civil service requires review and adjustment as a priority, especially given the potential in the short to
medium term for reallocation of personal services expenditures to MOOE. The key civil service
constraints are well known to policymakers: establishment control, compensation, the legal and
institutional framework, and institutional capacity.
60. The cost of the civil service has created a significant fiscal burden. The personal services category
accounted for some 35% of total NG expenditures in 2002, and exceeded this level in key sectors. The
same trend is evident at the LGU level: in Negros Occidental province, personal services accounted for
75% of the 2002 budget.
xxiii
61. Establishment control is relatively weak despite efforts in recent years to control recruitment and
impose selective hiring freezes. At present, there is no reliable method of verifying information on the
number of filled and unfilled positions. DBM, GSIS, and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) currently
maintain their own personnel information databases, but these are not integrated with each other. The
situation is exacerbated by the employment of considerable numbers of nonpermanent staff such as
casuals and contractuals.
62. There may be specific sources of “flexibility” that can be tapped in the short run. “Flexible” items
within the overall personal services allocation comprise wages of nonpermanent personnel, per diems,
fringe benefits, and certain other items. Roughly 18.4% of the 2002 personal services allocations across
the national budget can be deemed to be “flexible.”
63. Low salary levels for executives in the top pay grades and for professionals in the middle grades
compared with the private sector have made it difficult to attract and retain key categories of personnel,
including lawyers, auditors, IT professionals, and doctors. There is pressure, especially from GOCCs and
GFIs, to grant exemptions from the Salary Standardization Law. And allowances are often nontransparent
and do not fulfill their objectives.
64. Key steps in controlling the wage bill could consist of expediting the establishment of a workable
personnel information system, and deciding on fiscally affordable compensation improvement and
rightsizing options. The latter would involve a review of the compensation policy, and assessing the fiscal
impact of options for adjusting employment and compensation.
65. On administrative streamlining, which would need to accompany employment and compensation
adjustments, expediting NG initiatives to streamline the structure and functioning of the executive would
be appropriate, e.g. by eliminating overlapping or unnecessary functions and entities, and efficiency
improvements. Starting and sustaining the transformation of BIR would be widely seen as a litmus test of
the ability and willingness to implement core institutional reforms.
66. CSC has drafted a new Civil Service Code (now under legislative review) focusing on merit-
based recruitment; more competitive compensation within fiscal constraints and linking compensation to
performance; protecting upright civil servants; and strengthening accountability and integrity
mechanisms. While executive commitment to modernizing the civil service legal framework is
undoubted, the key issue—given the earlier history of such legislation—is whether the draft Code will be
enacted.
67. Capacity building also needs to be addressed: fiscal pressures cannot by themselves be sufficient
for sustainable civil service reform. It is desirable that the constitutional entity tasked with development
and oversight of civil service policy—the CSC—be strengthened on a priority basis, and that coordination
between the CSC and DBM be intensified.
68. Operational efficiency could be enhanced through more effective implementation of foreign-
assisted projects (FAPs). The key concerns relate to enhancing absorptive capacity; improving project
identification, preparation, and design; increasing the predictability of project financing; and
strengthening the sustainability of project outcomes. These are being addressed through, for example, the
completion of SEERs to sharpen prioritization of activities; more thorough project design and project
evaluation arrangements; minimizing multiagency implementation; development of a 3-year investment
program; issuance of an executive order (EO) on resettlement, and high-level attention to right-of-way
issues that impede land acquisition. Rationalizing project management units would ensure speedier
project implementation and facilitate ownership and accountability for projects. Once the teething
problems are surmounted, the strengthened implementation arrangements—and speedier
implementation—could bolster institutional capacity at NG and LGU levels, better sustain project
outcomes, and ensure faster absorption of ODA. The institutional capacity of LGUs involved in FAPs is
also being strengthened, especially for procurement and financial management. Strengthening the linkage
xxiv
between planning and budgeting, and between the MTPDP and the MTPIP, is also likely to improve the
predictability of resource flows over the medium term.
Decentralization
69. Capacity building at the LGU level, including and especially in procurement and financial
management, will be key to strengthening accountability and service delivery.
70. The Philippines Local Government Code of 1991 is one of the most far-reaching decentralization
reforms in the developing world. Anecdotal evidence (e.g., from the Galing Pook awards) suggests that
decentralization has encouraged greater innovation at the local level, strengthened local management
capability, and promoted greater cooperation with the private sector and other LGUs. However, the
preliminary evidence also suggests that, despite these achievements, the expected benefits of
decentralization have yet to be fully realized. Institutional arrangements for service delivery remain
unclear in many cases, with national agencies playing a significant role in some functions that should
have been fully devolved to LGUs. In addition, unfunded NG mandates such as the Salary
Standardization Law increase the cost of local services and impede local autonomy. Sufficient resources
do not seem to be channeled to poorer LGUs, and NG ability to equalize fiscal capacity and monitor the
financial performance of LGUs remains weak.
71. Planning and investment appraisal seem to be the weakest links in the chain of LGU public
expenditure management. LGUs are also limited in their ability to manage and develop their human
resources. The potential for improving revenue collection by LGUs has been outlined earlier, as have
weaknesses in the internal control environment and financial accountability.
72. Improving LGU capacity to deliver basic services seems to hinge on four critical factors: (i) on
the revenue side, improved assessment and collection of revenues from local sources to reduce LGU
dependence on IRA; (ii) on the expenditure side, strengthening planning, investment appraisal,
procurement, and financial management; (iii) improving the quality of LGU public administration by
controlling wage bill expenditures and strengthening LGU administrative capacity, accountability, and
oversight; and (iv) replicating innovative LGU practices in managing revenues, expenditures, and
personnel, and promoting greater competition between jurisdictions. All of this requires long-term
capacity building.
73. There are plenty of examples of effective home-grown solutions to common problems. For
example, cities such as Lapu-Lapu, Gingoog, Surigao, Cotabato, and Puerto Princesa have adopted
innovative measures to cope with the increasing demand for more and higher-quality health services from
their constituencies. Perhaps the more exemplary among these innovations are the barangay primary
health care facilities established by the provincial government of Negros Occidental and the provincial
health insurance program adopted by Bukidnon and Guimaras. In the area of controlling personnel size
and costs, and accessing non-IRA sources of funding, the example of Cabanatuan City seems noteworthy.
74. Although the 1991 LGC has been the key instrument for decentralization, and specific aspects of
decentralization have been studied, no systematic assessment of how decentralization has worked on
different dimensions has yet been carried out. It therefore seems apposite to undertake a Decentralization
and Service Delivery Study to review the fiscal, administrative, and political aspects of decentralization in
the Philippines, and their impact on service delivery. The resulting diagnosis could help improve
government performance and promote healthy competition between LGUs.
Looking Ahead
75. The preceding pages have outlined the key PEPFMR findings. It is desirable that on the
implementation-related issues (e.g., on revenue measures, BIR reforms, and administrative streamlining)
the Government act quickly and decisively. For planning and diagnostic-type issues where assistance or
xxv
advice from development partners could be valuable, the Philippines’ development partners stand ready to
provide the needed support.
76. The chapters that follow lay out the findings, issues, and recommendations in greater detail. This
report is arranged in three main sections—aggregate fiscal discipline, allocative efficiency, and
operational efficiency. A fourth section on decentralization highlights some issues as a prelude to a
review of the decentralization experience since 1991 and its impact on issues such as service delivery,
equity, and efficiency. Themes such as accountability and transparency pervade this report and have not
been dealt with separately.
77. The action plan attached to this executive summary indicates the most pressing issues confronting
the authorities, and on which immediate actions seem to be called for—in a sense, the overarching
importance of the still-unfolding fiscal developments dictates quite clearly the sequencing and
prioritization of the actions to be taken. The more detailed action plan at the end of this report contains the
joint recommendations of the Government and the task team.
78. The dissemination strategy for the PEPFMR envisages sharing this report and the action plan with
a wider audience, comprising national agencies, LGUs, legislators, development partners, civil society,
and the media. A dissemination workshop has been tentatively planned for May 2003; the exact dates will
be finalized in consultation with the Government.
xxvi
Philippines: Public Expenditure, Procurement, and Financial Management Review
xxvi
Action Plan—Short-Term Actions
Area of Concern Joint GOP-Task Team Recommendation Agency
A. Aggregate Fiscal Discipline

Revenue Mobilization Reverse the decline in revenues as a share of GNP BIR, DOF
Enact the proposed reform of the excise tax on alcohol and tobacco products
Improve the effectiveness of the Large Taxpayers Service:
• Clarify its audit priorities by focusing on the RELIEF program and the issue-oriented audits
• Prioritize selective audits (e.g., on VAT) over comprehensive ones
• Increase the size of the proposed special audit team and require it to concentrate on large taxpayers
• Require the special audit team to provide feedback to management on the LTS audit program, which should
be subject to management approval
Make a decision on the course and phasing of the medium-term BIR reform
Contingent Liabilities Strengthen the recognition, management, reporting, and provisioning for contingent liabilities: DOF
and Off-Budget Risks
• Complete the quantification of contingent liabilities and establish a centralized risk management unit in DOF
Relating to GOCCs
in coordination with Bureau of Treasury (BTr)
• Initiate special-purpose audits (financial, management, and personnel audit) of critical GOCCs to support the
planned disposition program
• Initiate a benchmark audit for pension and trust funds such as the AFP RSBS, HGC, Pag-ibig, PHIC
Effectively implement the new power sector law DOE
Reform of the Reforming SSS: DOF, SSS
Pension System • Complete an actuarial audit of the SSS
• Design and begin implementation of a phased action program to increase contributions from the present 8.4 %
to say 14 % (depending on the actuarial audit)
• Highlight the impact of suggestions to use SSS for social policies by estimating the impact of the proposed
socialized contributions under the current system prior to implementing them, and assessing the fiscal impact
of enrolling informal sector workers under SSS
• Improve the liquidity, yield and safety of SSS investment portfolio by enhancing the collection efficiency on
SSS salary loans
• Develop a strategy and implementation plan for the organizational restructuring of the SSS and a plan to limit
administrative expenses to the statutory 12% ceiling
xxvii
Reforming GSIS: DOF, GSIS

• Improve GSIS investment portfolio performance and shield the portfolio from inappropriate or undue
influence and manipulation by
o engaging professional investment managers to manage a portion of the GSIS portfolio, and permit a
portion of this portfolio to be invested abroad
o enhanceing the collection efficiency on GSIS salary loans through mandatory deduction of past due
amounts from pension payments
o resolving the issue of past due contributions from the Government to GSIS
Protecting the AFP RSBS: DOF, AFP
• Specify and initiate implementation of a time-bound action plan to improve the liquidity, yield and safety of RSBS
the AFP RSBS investment portfolio
• Articulate options to attain viability for the AFP RSBS
B. Allocative Efficiency
Composition of
• Articulate a strategy to reallocate from personal services to MOOE and/or capital outlays DBM, NEDA
Expenditures
Sectoral Issues Agriculture and Agrarian Reform: DA, DAR,
• Focus on growth-enhancing public goods and services DBM, NEDA
Education: DepEd, DBM,
• Intensify intrasectoral restructuring toward basic education NEDA
• Continue reform of higher education
• Assess means to devolve technical and vocational education and training to LGUs
Health Care: DOH, DBM,
• Improve the DOH regional budget allocation process to better match IMR and poverty incidence NEDA
• Prepare a realistic implementation plan for Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA) to sequence reforms and
prioritize technical assistance
• Complete an actuarial study on the financial sustainability of the PHIC
Budget Management, • Issue guidelines to eliminate/reduce the potential distortionary effect of Congressional initiatives DBM, NEDA
MTEF and the • Establish a joint technical committee with representation from DBM, NEDA and line departments to DBM, NEDA
Macrofiscal mainstream the MTEF and SEERs
Framework
• Provide incentives to national government agencies to accelerate revenue generation from fees and charges
(e.g., by allowing them, as a special case, to retain a specified percentage of such revenues to fund nonwage DBM, NEDA
xxvii
operating and maintenance expenditures)
• Improve the linkage between planning and budgeting by linking the MTEF with the MTPDP: Include a
xxviii
statement of the MTEF (forward estimates) in the MTPDP, with sections on medium-term budget DBM, NEDA
xxviii
composition (including costing of key programs) and on the explicit link between planning priorities and the
budget (a draft document should be discussed in DBCC before official inclusion in the MTPDP)
• Build up sector expenditure frameworks through more developed SEERS: train oversight and line agencies in
program costing and cost-effectiveness analysis and pilot costing and cost-effectiveness analysis of high DBM, NEDA
priority PAPs in select departments
• Improve the accuracy of revenue forecasts by
o improving the quality of BIR databases by developing systems to capture and analyze data at district level BIR, DOF,
DBM, NEDA
o enhancing cooperation between the BIR, DOF, DBM, and NEDA through the new DBCC revenue
forecasting task force
o establishing an official “revenue forecasting calendar” with clearly delineated functions and
responsibilities to coincide with the annual budget calendar
C. Operational Efficiency
Public Procurement • Promulgate implementing rules and regulations for the Procurement Reform Law DBM
• Complete a study under the auspices of the Construction Industry Authority of the Philippines on the
feasibility of allowing foreign contractors to bid without a Philippine license
Financial • Promulgate a systems and procedures manual for the new government accounting system DBM, COA
Management • Design and pilot-test an agency-level financial management training program
• Prepare a position paper with an implementation plan to strengthen the agency controllership function
Wage Bill Control • Continue hiring freeze on nonessential personnel DBM, CSC
and Administrative • Prepare a position paper with options for employment and pay rationalization, including estimates of the
Streamlining fiscal impact of different options
• Complete analytical work to design and cost a personnel information system shared by CSC, DBM, and
GSIS, and decide on source of funds to finance implementation
• Prepare an implementation plan for administrative measures to streamline the structures, functions, and
programs of selected agencies, task forces and similar NG bodies
• Implement a pilot exercise to resolve mismatches between priorities, functional assignments, structures, and
staffing in one department
xxix
D. Decentralization
Financing and DBM, DOF,
Delivery of Basic • Initiate a cross-sectoral review of the fiscal, administrative, and political aspects of decentralization, with NEDA, COA,
Services special reference to the impact of decentralization on service delivery DILG
AFP RSBS= Armed Forces of the Philippines Personnel Retirement Savings and Benefit System, BIR=Bureau of Internal Revenue, BTr=Bureau of Treasury, COA=Commission
on Audit,CSC=Civil Service Commission, DepEd=Department of Education, DA=Department of Agriculture, DAR=Department of Agrarian Reform, DBCC=Development
Budget and Coordination Committee, DBM=Department of Budget and Management, DOE=Department of Energy, DOF= Department of Finance, GNP=gross national product,
GOCC=government-owned and –controlled corporations, GOP=Government of the Philippines, GSIS= Government Service Insurance System, HGC= Home guaranty
Corporation, HSRA=Health Sector Reform Agenda, IMR=infant mortality rate, LGU=local government unit, LTS= Large Taxpayer Service, MTEF=Medium-Term Expenditure
Framework, MTPDP=Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan, NEDA=National Economic and Development Authority, O&M=operating and maintenance, Pag-ibig=,
PAP=programs, activities, and projects, PHIC=Philippine Health Insurance Commission,, RELIEF= Reconciliation List for Enforcement, SEER=Sector Effectiveness and
Efficiency Review, SSS=Social Security System, VAT=value-added tax.
xxix
SECTION A. AGGREGATE FISCAL DISCIPLINE
1. Overview: The Institutional and Fiscal Context

2. Expenditures and Revenues: Trends And Issues
3. Off-Budget Risks And Their Management
2
1. OVERVIEW: THE INSTITUTIONAL AND FISCAL CONTEXT

1.1 The Philippine authorities, confronted with an unfavorable governance
and macroeconomic environment in 2001, established a consistent track record in The unfolding
2001 in stabilizing the economy and improving investor sentiment. The
unfolding developments in 2002–2003, however, pose a threat to a still fragile developments
fiscal and institutional environment, and can dim the prospects for attaining the
in 2002–2003
Philippines’ targets for higher growth and renewed poverty reduction. Fiscal
sustainability and the Government’s ability to finance poverty-reducing programs pose a threat to
continues to be at risk from falling revenues, rising public debt, and debt service
and off-budget risks. This constrained environment makes it doubly important to a still fragile
focus on increasing fiscal flexibility by increasing revenue collections and fiscal and
enhancing the discipline, efficiency, and equity of public expenditures.
1.2 The objective of this Public Expenditure, Procurement and Financial institutional
Management Review (PEPFMR) is to examine selected issues in the allocation environment.
and management of public resources of interest to the Philippine authorities, the
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). It aims to help the
authorities establish more effective and transparent policies and processes for
allocating and using public resources to reduce poverty and promote economic
growth. The audience for this report comprises the Philippine authorities, the
World Bank, ADB, other development partners of the Philippines and civil
society.
Matching the State’s Role to its Capability
1.3 Spread over 7,100 islands in three major island groups, the Philippines
has a population of 74 million (1999) and a total land area of 300,000 square
kilometers. History and a dispersed geographical setting provide the specific
context to the Philippine decentralization arrangements: following the enactment
of the 1991 Local Government Code, one of the most far-reaching
decentralization reforms in the developing world, the country now has three tiers
of local government units (LGUs). At the top are 80 provinces followed by a
second tier comprising 114 cities and 1,496 municipalities; 41,585 barangays
comprise the third tier of local government. The country’s territory is also
divided into 16 regions for administrative purposes. These regions are not LGUs
but essentially consist of groups of provinces and their component LGUs that are
served by the deconcentrated regional offices of central departments and
agencies.
1.4 Performing state functions efficiently and equitably tends to be a major
concern in most countries. The Philippines is no exception. Figure 1.1 illustrates
some of the generic functions that many states - including the Philippines -
perform. However, the Philippine bureaucracy has been characterized by
institutional dysfunctions that have weakened state capability and led to
perpetuation of governance problems. Hence, the role, functions, and architecture
of the executive department are being rethought as part of a long-standing quest
for institutional strengthening and improved service delivery, particularly in the
light of greater public demand amidst tighter resource constraints. Recent
institutional reform efforts have focused on streamlining the bureaucracy,
simplifying procedures, and delivering better public services. Public demand for
3
such improvements has been allied with demands for greater transparency and
accountability in using and managing public resources.
Figure 1.1. Functions of the State

Addressing Market Failure Improving Equity
Core Providing pure public goods Protecting the poor
functions Defense, peace and order, property rights, macroeconomic Antipoverty programs,
management, basic education, public health, safe water disaster relief
Intermediate Addressing Regulating Overcoming imperfect Providing social
functions externalities monopoly information insurance
Environmental Utility Insurance (health, life, Redistributive pensions,
protection regulation, pensions), financial family allowances,
antitrust regulation, consumer unemployment insurance
policy protection
Activist Coordinating private activity Redistribution
functions Fostering markets Asset redistribution
Source: Adopted from World Development Report, 1997.
1.5 The judiciary has already similarly initiated an institutional reform

process to speed up the dispensation of justice and upgrade the quality of the
country’s court system. The blurring in practice of the respective roles of the
executive and legislative branches in setting spending priorities and allocating
public resources is gradually being addressed given the long recognition by the
Philippine authorities of the need to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of
public sector fiscal and economic management for better public sector outcomes.
All of this underscores the necessity of streamlining and rationalizing state Lessons learnt
entities in the Philippines as a prerequisite for improved governance and more
efficient utilization and management of state resources. over the last 2–3
1.6 Figure 1.2 illustrates the structure and magnitude of public employment years, in particular,
in the Philippines—the implications are discussed in Chapter 9. There have been
in designing and
several attempts since 1985 to pass legislation on restructuring the executive and
reengineering the bureaucracy—all of them unsuccessful. The current strategy is implementing
a more pragmatic twin-track approach to institutional reform—reliance on
administrative and executive measures that can be implemented without recourse specific reforms,
to legislation, while continuing advocacy for passage of legislation on now provide a
reengineering the bureaucracy.
solid foundation
1.7 The administration is pursuing a public sector institutional strengthening
program, led by the Presidential Commission on Effective Governance (PCEG), for moving ahead
aimed at improving the Government’s service delivery and institutional capacity.
The program seeks to strengthen core functions and strategic roles and on key reforms to
responsibilities of the Government, in accordance with socio-economic priorities improve public
and resource constraints, by (i) defining the role of the state and thereby the
scope, level, and focus of government interventions; (ii) rationalizing the sector
distribution of functions between the public and private sectors, between national
and local governments, and among government agencies; and (iii) designing performance.
administrative structures and systems to improve government operating
efficiency and effectiveness.
4
1.8 Lessons learnt in the last 2–3 years, in particular, in designing and
implementing specific reforms, now provide a solid foundation for moving
ahead on key reforms to improve public sector performance. Facilitating factors
include a shared vision of institutional reform among key policy makers,
improved cooperation among central oversight agencies, and a recognition of the
need to engage civil society in monitoring progress in implementing reforms.
1.9 A key lesson learnt is that institutional reforms need to be accompanied
by an impact mitigation program with agency-specific and culture-sensitive Institutional
change implementation strategies. It seems to be now possible to move ahead
more aggressively on some of the more difficult but necessary reforms, such strengthening
movement being facilitated by the credibility of reform measures undertaken so now requires
Figure 1.2 Philippines: Structure of Public Employment, 2002 deciding on and
TOTAL PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT quickly
1,531,430
implementing key
reforms that do
GENERAL
GOCC/GFI
90,641
GOVERNMENT not require
1,440,789
legislation, based
Total Civilian on the ongoing
Armed Forces National Total LGU
124,696 Government 344,576 PCEG-led review
971,517
of the scope and
functions of
Total education
employment { Education
543,941
Education
N/A central executive
entities.
Total health
employment { Health
26,625
Health
N/A
Total police
employment { Police
111,743
Police
N/A
Civilian
LGU
National Govt.
(excluding
(excluding
education, health,
education,
police)
health, police)
344,576
289,208
Often known as
the “civil
service”
{ Permanent
950,039
Permanent
249,895
Casual/ Casual/ Casual/

contractual
employees
{ contractual
21,478
contractual
94,681
Source: DBM
5
far and the “window of opportunity” afforded by the fact that the next
presidential election is not due till mid-2004. Institutional strengthening now
requires deciding on and quickly implementing key reforms that do not require
legislation, based on the ongoing PCEG-led review of the scope and functions
of central executive entities.
The Fiscal Context
1.10 Review of the Full Structure of General Government Expenditures.

This section reviews and analyzes the fiscal developments for the consolidated
public sector, the National Government (NG), local government units (LGUs),
Government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) and other
Government-owned entities, and provides an overview for subsequent chapters.
1.11 Since the last public expenditure review was completed in 1995, there
have been several noteworthy developments. First, after several years of surplus
in the mid-1990s due to improved tax collections, fiscal deficits have reemerged
since 1998 in both NG and consolidated public sector finances (Table 1.1).
Second, the financial position of GOCCs still requires strengthening despite
privatization and management improvements, signifying the importance of
continued efforts to improve GOCC performance (Table 1.2). Third, since 1994
the budget has become more rigid and inflexible because mandatory spending is
crowding out productive spending on investment and maintenance (Table 1.3).
Lastly, LGUs seem to lack financial resources for maintenance and other
operating expenditures and for development. Strengthening fiscal management is
therefore a key issue both at the national and LGU levels for the foreseeable
future. This section examines key issues relating to the first two features above.
The third development is examined in the next chapter and in Section B of this
report, while the fourth development is expanded in Section D.
Table 1.1 Consolidated Public Sector Financial Position: 1991–2001
(billion pesos)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Total Public Sector -26.0 -26.0 -25.9 -8.4 -4.1 7.3 -24.1 -83.2 -102.8 -141.3 -166.3
Balance
% of GNP -2.1 -1.9 -1.7 -0.5 -0.2 0.3 -1.0 -3.0 -3.3 -4.4 -4.3
National Government -26.4 -16.0 -21.9 16.3 11.1 6.3 1.6 -50.0 -111.7 -136.1 -147.0
Monitored GOCCs -7.4 -10.7 -25.6 -9.7 -1.3 -11.2 -17.2 -38.0 -4.6 -19.1 -24.5
OPSF 10.1 5.4 -7.9 2.6 -9.2 4.8 -0.8 0.7 1.9 0.3 0.8
CB Restructuring 0.0 0.0 -15.1 -24.3 -20.0 -13.8 -25.7 -26.4 -20.5 -19.1 -23.5
GFIs 2.4 3.8 6.1 3.1 5.0 8.4 4.3 5.4 3.3 3.2 3.9
SSS/GSIS 8.1 8.2 11.7 -12.0 0.01 8.5 3.9 17.8 36.4 15.4 15.6
Others/Adjustment 0.4 -1.6 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 -6.1 -6.6 0.1
CB=Central Bank, GFI=government financial institution, GNP=gross national product,
GOCC=government-owned and –controlled corporation, GSIS=Government Service Insurance System,
OPSF = Oil Price Stabilization Fund, SSS=Social Security System.
Source: Department of Finance
6
Table 1.2 Consolidated Public Sector Deficit and Surplus

(% of GNP)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Consolidated Public Sector Financial 0.29 -0.95 -2.95 -3.18 -4.34 -4.32
Position
of which:
National Government 0.28 0.06 -1.78 -3.56 -3.84 -3.81
Central Bank Restructuring -0.61 -1.02 -0.94 -0.65 -0.55 -0.61
GOCCs -0.49 -0.68 -1.36 -0.15 -0.55 -0.64
OPSF 0.21 -0.03 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.02
Others 0.87 0.61 1.01 1.20 0.66 0.82
GNP = gross national product, GOCC = government-owned and -controlled corporation,
OPSF = Oil Price Stabilization Fund (eliminated in 2001).
Note: Totals may not add up due to rounding.
Sources: Department of Budget and Management (DBM), Department of Finance
Table 1.3 Fiscal Aggregates 1992–2001

(as % of GNP)
1992–1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Total Revenues 17.5 19.4 18.4 18.2 18.7 16.5 15.3 14.5 14.6
W/oTax Revenues 15.3 15.6 15.9 16.3 16.3 14.9 13.8 12.9 12.7
Current Expenditures 15.8 16.0 14.8 15.6 16.6 16.7 16.7 16.6 15.6
Capital Expenditures 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.1 1.9 1.6 2.0 1.7 2.7
Infrastructure, etc 1.9 1.0 1.6 1.2 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 1.7
Total Expenditure 18.8 18.8 17.5 17.9 18.6 18.3 18.8 18.4 18.4
NG Deficit -1.3 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.1 -1.8 -3.6 -3.9 -3.8
Source: Department of Budget and Management
1.12 The consolidated public sector financial position, which consists of the
revenues and expenditures of the NG, the Central Bank Restructuring Fund, the
GOCCs, and others, disclosed a deficit of PhP172.2 billion or 4.5% of gross
national product (GNP) in 2001, compared to 3.2% in 1999 and 4.5% in 2000
(Table 1.1).
1.13 NG’s fiscal position deteriorated from a deficit of 1.8 % of GNP in 1998
to 3.8 % in 2000. In 2001 the deficit was limited to the targeted 3.8 % and the
authorities targeted to balance the budget by 2006. In 2002, however, there was a
slippage in the deficit target – the first nine months disclosed a deficit of about
PhP166.5 billion against the 2002 target of PhP130 billion.
1.14 The main finance problem has been a shortfall in revenues, caused by a
continuous decline of tax collections, 70% of which is collected by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) and 18% by the Bureau of Customs (BOC). With the
onset of the financial crisis, BIR collections fell from its peak of 12.4% of GNP
in 1997 to 10.9% in 1999, 10.3% in 2000 and down to 10.1% in 2001. In the
same manner, import duties fell from its pinnacle of 5.5% of GNP in 1995 to
7
2.7% in 1998–2000 and 2.5% in 2001. The decline of tax efforts has forced the
Government to trim necessary maintenance and capital expenditures.
1.15 The consolidated public sector deficit (CPSD) has increased in recent
years. There are two main constituents of this deficit besides the NG: the Central
Bank Restructuring Fund and GOCCs. The GOCCs’ deficit, however, has been
narrowed by privatizing certain GOCCs and improving GOCC management
during 1990–2000. The CPSD was relatively sustainable before 1997 with a
combination of increased tax efforts and management, and with privatization
proceeds that improved both the NG and GOCCs’ accounts. A decline in capital
outlay expenditures and budgetary support to GOCCs during the nineties has
contributed to limiting the CPSD. However, the CPSD position has worsened
since 1998, when the NG began to run a deficit (Table 1.2).
1.16 Consolidated Public Investment. The behavior of consolidated public
investment has reflected that of NG investment, but its composition has shifted,
indicating the priorities of successive administrations. It was above 4 % of GNP
through the nineties and up to 1997. Both public investments and maintenance
outlays have suffered since 2000—much of the decline being due to strict limits
on the overall public sector deficit imposed by the stabilization program. The
consolidated public investment diminished from about 5.6 % of GNP in 1994 to
about 3 % of GNP in the early 2000s. These cuts in productive expenditures have
deteriorated infrastructure provision.
1.17 The National Government. The NG has continued to play an important
role in economic development: the share of government expenditures has
remained at about 18–19% of GNP during 1990–2001. However, the wage bill
and other mandated expenditures accounted for a large part of total expenditures
for both NG and LGUs.
1.18 Since 1996, current expenditures have stabilized at about 14–15% of
GNP, maintaining the 15% in the first half of the nineties, but have largely
become mandated (Figure 1 and Table 1.4). As a result, the share of capital
investments has been reduced to only 2–3% of GNP (Table 1.5), insufficient for
poverty reduction and better delivery of basic services. Maintenance and other
operating expenditures (MOOE) have fallen from 2.7% of GNP in 1995 to 1.9%
in 2002, and are well below the average of 2.8% for the period 1990–1994
(Figure 1.3).
Figure 1.3 Operation and Maintenance Expenditures

(percent of GNP)
3.5
3.0
2.5
% of GNP
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Source: DBM
8
Table 1.4 Budgetary Inflexibilities Due To Mandated Expenditures: 1990-2001

(% of GNP)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Wages 5.8 5.8 5.4 5.2 5.3 5.6 6.0 6.8 7.0 6.5 6.4 6.2
Interest 6.6 6.0 5.8 5.1 4.6 3.7 3.4 3.1 3.6 3.4 4.0 4.5
Local Government 0.7 0.8 1.5 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.6 2.8 2.6 3.1 2.9 3.0
Unit Transfers
Total Mandated 13.1 12.5 12.7 12.8 12.6 12.1 12.0 12.7 13.1 12.9 13.3 13.8
Expenditures
Revenues 16.9 17.6 17.7 17.4 19.4 18.4 18.2 18.7 16.5 15.3 14.7 14.6
Difference Between
Total Mandated 3.8 5.1 5.0 4.5 6.7 6.3 6.2 5.9 3.4 2.3 1.4 0.9
Expenditures and
Revenues
Source: Department of Budget and Management
1.19 The NG was able to maintain a surplus during 1994–1997 largely due to
privatization proceeds and tax management improvements. Interest payments
also contracted from 6.6% of GNP in 1990 to 3.1% by 1997 with improvement of
the fiscal position. Coupling expenditure cuts with improvements in revenue
generation, the NG was successful in maintaining a surplus until 1997. However,
since then, the NG’s tax effort has plummeted from 16.3% of GNP in 1997 to
13.2% in 2000 and 12.7% in 2001, severely constraining the NG’s fiscal
flexibility.
1.20 The structure and composition of expenditures have been outlined in
Chapters 2 and 4.
Table 1.5 Capital Outlays 1996-2001

(% of GNP)
Revenue collections
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Capital Outlays 3.5 3.8 3.3 3.1 2.5 2.7 need to increase,
Infrastructure 1.9 2.0 1.5 1.8 0.4 1.7 and/or wage bill
Corporate Equity 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
Other Outlays 0.9 1.1 0.5 0.5 1.9 0.3 expenditures need to
Transfer to LGUs 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6
Source: Department of Budget and Management diminish, to
adequately finance the
1.21 Local Government Units. Since the enactment of the Local Government Government’s growth
Code (LGC) in 1991, locally elected officials have been expected to deliver
services that reflect local needs and preferences at a level and quality equal to or and poverty-reduction
better than national agencies. A national revenue-sharing scheme—the Internal agenda.
Revenue Allotment (IRA)—provides annual block grants to LGUs under the
General Appropriations Act. The distribution of the IRA among LGUs follows
the prescribed formula: 23% for provinces, 34% for municipalities and 23% for
9
barangays. The share of each LGU in turn is computed based on the following
weights: population 50%, land area 25% and equal share 25%. While there has
been significant increase in the IRA, the distribution does not consider the
poverty incidence and development phase of individual LGUs. The IRA
continues to be the fastest growing item in the national budget (Table 1.6).
Table 1.6 Assistance to LGUs from the National Budget
Year Assistance to LGUs NG Budget (a) as
(billion pesos) (billion pesos) Percentage
(a) (b) of (b)
1992 19.7 262.0 7.5
1993 37.0 276.9 13.4
1994 47.4 330.2 14.4
1995 57.3 372.1 15.4
1996 62.3 416.1 15.0
1997 74.9 491.8 15.2
1998 77.5 537.4 14.4
1999 103.8 593.6 17.5
2000 129.6 682.4 19.0
2001 139.0 710.8 19.5
Source: Department of Budget and Management.
1.22 Despite being on the front line of basic service delivery, however, LGUs
account for a small portion of total government financial resources: the average
percentage share of LGUs in total consolidated expenditures during 1994–2000
was only 4.4%, as against the NG share of 17.9% and the GOCC share of 78.5%
(Table 1.7). There seems to be an issue here as to the adequacy of financial
support for LGUs. According to the LGC, the IRA comprises 40% of the total
internal revenue collection of 3 years ago. The IRA accounts for 67.4% of
provinces’ expenditure and 60.8% of municipalities’. However, barangays—the
lowest tier of LGUs—depend totally on the IRA for their finances.4 Overall, IRA
transfers seem to act as a disincentive for some categories of LGUs to generate
revenue from their own sources5.
Table 1.7 Total Public Sector Resource Distribution
(billion pesos)
Of which
Year NG GOCC GFIs LGU Total
1994 259.2 3,176.4 3,020.1 64.0 3,499.6
1995 293.4 3,365.4 3,238.7 66.3 3,745.2
1996 336.4 1,298.8 1,143.1 81.5 1,716.6
1997 401.1 1,869.0 1,607.3 104.9 2,274.7
1998 442.1 1,516.0 1,295.0 108.2 2,066.5
1999 460.1 883.5 1,423.7 104.8 1,448.5
2000 535.5 2,039.2 1,809.9 95.4 2,670.2
2001 573.5 4,080.2 1,945.3 124.2 4,777.9
2002 619.3 4,555.3 0 139.0 5,313.7
GFI=government financial institution, GOCC=government-owned and –controlled corporation,
LGU=local government unit, NG=National Government
10
1.23 Government-Owned and -Controlled Corporations. GOCCs were

mainly established to improve provision of infrastructure services. Despite
progress in enhancing efficiency, GOCCs in general still require management
strengthening for more efficient functioning. They contributed less than 2% of
GNP by value added, but their budgetary support needs accounted for 60% of
public sector spending. To enhance efficiency in service delivery, the
Government privatized more than 200 GOCCs and strengthened the performance
of the remainder. The number of GOCCs now stands at about 98 (including
subsidiaries). A supervision unit was established within the Department of
Finance (DOF) to monitor the activities and operations of 14 major GOCCs.6
1.24 Many GOCCs still depend on NG resource transfers. Data on net flow of
funds from the NG to major GOCCs suggests that the net flow significantly
increased during the last 2 years due to increased tax payments. To ameliorate
their financial position, many GOCCs curtailed their investment programs. The
14 monitored GOCCs decreased capital expenditures from PhP68 billion in 1996
to PhP35 billion in 2001. The National Power Corporation (NPC) alone reduced
its capital expenditure from PhP32 billion in 1996 to PhP17 billion in 2001,
reflecting reform efforts initiated by the Government.7 Excluding NPC, internal
cash generation in the aggregate financed 61.8% of GOCCs’ financial
requirements between 1990–2000 (Table 1.8), domestic borrowing 14. % and
external borrowing the remaining 23.3%.
Table 1.8 Total Internal Cash Generation of Major GOCCs
(billion pesos)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
All 14 GOCCs 7.68 13.15 15.40 15.96 32.34 21.05 20.40 17.85 5.99 15.11 6.09
% of GNP 0.71 1.04 1.11 1.06 1.86 1.07 0.89 0.71 0.21 0.48 0.17
Without NPC 4.22 9.75 4.93 8.26 17.83 8.79 5.11 7.14 1.12 4.56 (2.58)
% of GNP 0.39 0.77 0.36 0.55 1.03 0.45 0.22 0.28 0.04 0.15 (0.07)
GNP=gross national product, GOCC=government-owned and –controlled corporation,
NPC=National Power Corporation
Source: Department of Finance–Corporate Affairs Group.
1.25 The NPC’s borrowings have accounted for about 50% of the total
contingent liabilities of GOCCs. The NPC’s heavy reliance on debt finance, and
the financial crisis in the region, caused a major depreciation of the peso against
foreign currencies in NPC’s debt portfolio and IPP contracts. The Electric Power
Industry Reform Act (EPIRA),8 passed in June 2001, provides the legal
framework for restructuring the electric power industry by privatizing NPC and
unbundling the electric power industry into generation, transmission, distribution,
and supply sectors. The EPIRA reduces the role of NPC to the operator of the
Small Power Utilities Group and other nonprivatized assets, and creates two new
GOCCs, the National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO) and the Power
Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM). The PSALM’s
principal role is that of a liquidator, to manage the orderly sale, disposition, and
privatization of NPC’s generating assets, IPP contracts, and other properties. The
transmission and subtransmission assets of NPC, including NPC’s nationwide
franchise for the operation of the transmission system and the grid, will be
transferred to TRANSCO. These reforms are under way. Restructuring and
11
privatizing the electric supply is expected to encourage greater competition and

efficiency.9
1.26 Other Entities of General Government. The Social Security System
(SSS) is the social security entity for private sector employees. With the
implementation of the Social Security Law in 1957, the Government adopted the
social insurance approach to social security, covering the employed segment of
the private sector labor force. In 1993, household helpers earning at least
PhP1,000 monthly were included in the compulsory coverage of employees.
1.27 SSS net revenues have declined greatly since 1998. Benefit payments
have been surpassing contributions since 1993. In 2000, for example,
contributions amounted to PhP30.3 billion while benefits paid amounted to
PhP33.9 billion. If the SSS does not increase its contribution rate or extend the
contribution period, it is estimated that its resources will dry up by 2015. A
second reason for the decline in financial resources is the low yield from
investments. The SSS managed to avoid financial risks by using multiple
investment options. However, since interest rates declined from time to time, it
could not attain the needed income levels. Third, in 1992 the Additional Benefit
Enhancement in Republic Act 8282 regulated minimum pensions, increased
dependents’ pensions, and gave them the option to receive the first 18 months’
pension in a lump sum, but without augmenting contributions. This
fundamentally worsened the financial situation of SSS. Fourth, the SSS was
mandated to provide subsidized interest rates for housing and member loans—
this led to a further income decline. Lastly, reported misuse of the fund also
inflicted losses on the SSS. It is time to
1.28 The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) is the Philippines’ streamline the
state insurance company, offering retirement, disability, and other benefits to all
workers employed by any level of government or by a government-owned architecture of the
corporation. GSIS administers the General Insurance Fund (GIF), which offers a national government
full range of insurance products to the general public and to all entities controlled
by the Government or with a government shareholding interest. —without relying on
1.29 SSS and GSIS have investment funds of about PhP250 billion, large passage of
enough to dominate the local stock market and initiate a takeover of any
company in the country. Hence, without a significant increase in the contribution legislation.
rates, the reserves could be depleted, forcing benefits to be cut or not paid at all.
For these reasons, pension reform efforts began in 1997 in both entities with the
so-called "Social Security Act" but are not sufficient to ensure their long-term
sustainability. Both entities need to embark on serious structural reforms to
improve their financial sustainability and, at the same time enhance the quality of
their staff, management, and the services they provide.
1.30 Possible solutions to protect the viability of SSS range from increasing
the contribution rate and contribution period, to expanding coverage to overseas
Filipino workers, and strengthening the financial management of SSS, or even—
in the future—a merger of SSS and GSIS. Chapter 3 outlines the key issues
confronting these and other state-owned entities and, more broadly, the
importance of recognizing and managing fiscal risks.
12
Recommendations
1.31 To reverse the steadily diminishing flexibility that threatens to

undermine the country’s growth and antipoverty agenda, it is critical to intensify
efforts to reverse the decline in revenues to permit a reduction in the deficit as
targeted, and to begin freeing up resources for adequate investments in human
development, infrastructure, and MOOE.
1.32 Second, it would be desirable to accelerate ongoing administrative
initiatives to streamline the architecture of the central executive and ensure
effective financing for the performance of core state functions such as those
relating to the provision of pure public goods and antipoverty programs. PCEG
is now pursuing the following specific actions: (i) preparing and implementing
administrative measures to streamline the structures, functions, and programs of
all attached agencies, task forces, and similar bodies in the national government,
based on its ongoing review; (ii) implementing a pilot exercise to resolve
mismatches between priorities, functional assignments, structures, staff
complement, and composition in one department; and (iii) continuing the
abolition of unnecessary, duplicate, or obsolete central executive entities.
13
2. EXPENDITURES AND REVENUES: TRENDS AND ISSUES

2.1 This chapter briefly overviews some issues and trends in public
expenditures before turning to a discussion of revenue trends and issues.
2.2 A revenue shortfall through the year was the source of the PhP212.7
billion national government deficit in 2002. Tax revenue also fell in real terms
vis-à-vis 2001 collections. These developments, which threaten to undo the gains
from the sound economic management in 2001, prompted the authorities to
initiate expenditure control measures for 2002 and into 2003. Departments and
agencies were asked to make spending cuts. Moreover, as in 2001, line
departments were given the flexibility to determine where to cut and by how
much in 2002.
2.3 Compared with other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
countries, public expenditures as a percentage of GNP are low for the Philippines
(Table 2.1). The Philippines has the lowest expenditure-to-GNP ratios among all
four ASEAN countries.
Table 2.1 Public Revenues and Expenditures
Selected ASEAN Countries 1994–1999 (% of GNP)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Revenues
Indonesia 18.7 18.2 17.4 18.7 17.6 19.8
Malaysia 29.2 25.6 25.8 24.4 21.2 21.0
Philippines 19.4 18.4 18.2 18.7 16.6 15.3
Thailand 18.6 18.9 19.3 18.9 16.9 16.5
Expenditures
Indonesia 16.6 15.1 15.0 18.5 19.3 21.7
Malaysia 24.5 23.1 22.7 20.8 23.4 24.8
Philippines 18.4 17.9 17.9 18.6 18.3 18.8
Thailand 16.5 16.0 16.8 20.7 23.5 25.9
Source: IMF: Government Finance Statistics 2001.
Expenditures
2.4 NG expenditures are distributed by the following major components:

economic services, social services, defense, general public services, net lending,
and debt-service-interest payments. Sectoral allocations have been greatly
impacted by the fiscal constraints within which financing decisions have been
made. The share for economic activities was more or less stable during 1990–
2002, while the share of economic services in total expenditure declined from
24.2% in 1990 to 20.9% in 2002. Within this category, however, the share of
agriculture, agrarian reform, and natural resources declined from 7.3% in 1990 to
3.8% in 2002. The share of communications, roads, and other transport has
remained steady between 8.1% in 1990 and 7.4% in 2002.
2.5 Expenditures for social services in 1990 constituted 22.0% of total
expenditures, increasing to 30.7% in 2001. The share of education showed a
slight decline from 17.0% in 1990 to 16.8% in 2002.
2.6 Expenditure for social security in 2002 accounted for 4.4% of the total
expenditures, compared with 0.9% in 1990. The budget for general public
services amounted to P121.1 billion. In 2002, financial subsidies to LGUs totaled
PhP134.3 billion (the bulk of which represented IRAs), while interest payments
14
and related expenses amounted to PhP191.9 billion. The share of debt servicing
increased to 24.9% of total expenditures in 2002.
2.7 Structure and composition of expenditures. The share of current
expenditure to total expenditure has remained at around 87.7% during 1999–
2002 period, of which 8.9% was MOOE (after loan and interest payments and
transfers to LGUs and GOCCs). Capital expenditures have also remained at
about 12.3% of total expenditures during this period. The structure of
expenditures has evolved from a low surplus configuration in the mid–1990s to a
low-investment-high-deficit configuration since the 1997–98 financial crisis.
Postcrisis restoration efforts pushed down capital and MOOE spending, while
interest payments rose due to increased relative reliance on domestic financing of
budget deficits. Wage expenditures also increased gradually since 1990.
Government revenues, however, did not rise at the same pace as expenditures
since 1998, and recurrent expenditures rose faster due primarily to the continued
rise in interest payments, with public savings shrinking from 0.3% in 1990 to a Fiscal flexibility
negative savings rate in 2001.
2.8 Current expenditures. As a rough estimate, since 1996 current
is being steadily
expenditures have increased to about 16–17% of GNP from below 15% in the eroded as
first half of 1990s and become mandated because a great part (around 30% of
total expenditures) has been for wage bills. Since 1996, mandated current revenues shrink
expenditures have been crowding out discretionary expenditures: the latter,
and mandated
expressed as the difference between mandated expenditures and total revenues,
fell from above 6 % in the mid-1990s to only 0.9% in 2001. expenditures
2.9 “Personal services” (i.e., wage bill and associated costs) and other remain high
mandated expenditures now account for a large part of the total expenditures for
both the NG and LGUs. In addition, especially for LGUs, expenditures on
personal services tend to be understated, and overstated for those on MOOE and
on development, since these latter two categories sometimes include wages of
casual, contractual, and other categories of nonpermanent employees. The rise in
personal services expenditures is not difficult to explain: the wage bill, which had
been relatively low for a long time, rose to significantly higher levels with the
implementation of the first round of the Salary Standardization Act through
annual salary increases of civil servants. Furthermore, the 1991 Local
Government Code mandated the NG to transfer annually an amount exceeding
10% of the total expenditures (2–3% of GNP) to LGUs since 1994, adding to the
non-discretionary portion of NG expenditures.
2.10 In an effort to compress discretionary expenditures, operational and
maintenance spending has been reduced in the 1990s. This used to be as high as
4% of GNP in the eighties. It fell to 2% in 2001, and declined further in 2002.
These figures are likely to include an element of overestimation, since various
sectors include other expenditure items within the MOOE category (such as
wages for casual workers or administrative expenses unrelated to maintenance)
and not the cost of physical maintenance itself.
Revenues
2.11 Public revenues consist of revenues from taxes, tariffs, charges, and
proceeds from privatization. The national agencies chiefly responsible for
revenue collection are the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), the Bureau of
15
Customs (BOC) and the Bureau of the Treasury (BTR). For several years,
revenue and expenditure targets were missed by wide margins, and financing
costs rose in line with the larger deficits (Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1 Fiscal Performance

% of GNP
21
18
15
12
9
6
3 0.5
0
-3
-6 -1.78 -3.6 -3.8 -3.8
-9 -5.0
1994 to 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Average
Deficit Expenditure Tax Revenue

2.12 The outturn on the revenue side during 1990–2002 highlights the urgent
need to improve the revenue performance of the NG. Although tax revenues
declined gradually, they still accounted for 79.5% of total revenues in 2002. In
2002, taxes on net income, excise tax and value-added tax (VAT)10 accounted
roughly for 46.0%, 12.0% and 12.1% of total tax revenues, respectively.
Figure 2. Selected Taxes to GNP Ratio
8.00
7.00
6.00
5.00
Consistent under-
4.00
3.00 achievement of the

2.00
tax collection
1.00
0.00
target by BIR
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
seems to be the
Net Income & Profits Excise T axes
Sales T ax & Licenses Import Duties main problem on
Source: Bureau of Treasury the revenue side.
2.13 The revenue performance of the NG has been weak: two thirds of the
contraction in revenue during 1990–2002 (or 2 percentage points of GNP) is due
to reduction in tax revenues collected by BIR, while the remainder (or 1
percentage point of GNP) is attributable to the fall in BOC revenues. The
slippage in nontax revenues is largely explained by the decrease in the income of
BTR following the decline in domestic interest rates.
2.14 The slide in tax revenues has been a major source of concern. Collections
from import duties, excise taxes, income taxes, and value added tax with licenses
16
have exhibited the largest reductions. In particular, collection of import duties

that were at 4.2% of GNP in 1990, had declined to 2.3% of GNP by 2001.
Collections from excise taxes declined only slightly, from 2.7% to 2.3% of GNP,
while revenues from taxes on income and profits increased from 4.6% to 5.2% of
GNP. Collections from VAT and licenses rose from 1.9% to 2.1% of GNP during
the same period. In addition to the revenue shortfalls, tax evasion also continued
due to underdeclaration of incomes and a distorted tax base.
2.15 Consistent underachievement of the tax collection target by BIR seems to
be the main problem on the revenue side. The picture is evident from Table 2.1
below.11
Table 2.1 BIR Collections and Goals, 1991-2002
(PhP million)
Difference
Year Collection Goal
Amount percentage
1991 116,256 117,760 -1,504 -1.28%
1992 133,904 139,100 -5,196 -3.74%
1993 145,927 143,337 2,590 1.81%
1994 187,444 185,486 1,958 1.06%
1995 210,195 222,060 -11,865 -1.23%
1996 260,774 258,825 1,949 0.75%
1997 314,698 334,450 -19,752 -5.91%
1998 337,177 355,064 -17,889 -5.04%
1999 341,320 353,631 -12,311 -3.48%
2000 360,802 397,764 -36,962 -9.29%
2001 388,679 388,059 611 0.0016
2002 394,549 424,516 -29.967 -7.06%
Source: Bureau of Internal Revenue.
2.16 An overview of BIR goals and collections during 1990–2002 reveals that
before 1997, the BIR was more or less able to attain its collection targets, despite
some small discrepancies and overfulfillment. Table 2.1 indicates that 1997 was
a turning point: collections deteriorated due to the recession and collapse of
corporate profits caused by the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis. In 1997, while the
programmed BIR revenue target was PhP334.4 billion, the actual collection was
PhP314.7 billion: the shortfall was 5.9% of the target. In 2000, the shortfall grew
to PhP37 billion or 9.3% of the programmed revenues. When BIR “fulfilled” its
collection target in 2001, this was achieved after a PhP20 billion reduction of the
collection target. The tax effort deteriorated from 16.3% of GNP in 1997 to
11.6% in 2002.12 The tax effort on average was 15.4% of GNP during 1990–
1997, declining to 13.6% on average during 1998–2000.
2.17 An overview of excise taxes reveals that the problem here lies in the
structure of the tax rather than in a deterioration of the revenue administration,
except for 2000 when a 12% adjustment in the excise tax rates on alcoholic
beverages and cigarettes was put into effect but did not result in a corresponding
improvement in the effective tax rates. Revenues from excise taxes on tobacco,
alcoholic beverages and petroleum products have all declined by some 10
17
percentage points when measured relative to nominal gross value added (GVA)
in their products.
2.18 Withholding tax has gradually increased from 39.8% of the tax on net
income and profits in 1990 to 55.8% in 2001 (Table 2.2). However, other income
tax, mainly the corporate income tax revenues, dropped from 3.3% to 2.6% of
GNP during the same period. Nevertheless, within the total withholding tax,
individual withholding tax accounted for only 5.3% in 2001. This seems to
indicate continued leakage in the individual income tax system and its inability or
unwillingness to reach hard-to-tax groups such as professionals and the self-
employed.
Table 2.2 Withholding Tax to Total Income Tax, 1990-2001 (%)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Net Income and Profits 61.0 70.1 74.4 94.2 111.2 136.3 164.2 183.1 184.0 203.8 223.4
o/w Withholding tax 25.0 30.1 34.1 45.6 50.0 64.7 83.5 95.0 104.6 112.3 129.3
Individual Withholding 1.5 2.1 3.9 4.2 6.2 5.2 5.5 7.2 8.1 7.2 6.6
Withholding/Income, % 41.0 43.0 45.8 48.4 45.0 47.4 50.9 51.9 56.8 55.1 57.9
Individual/total 6.0 7.0 11.4 9.2 12.4 8.0 6.6 7.6 7.7 6.4 5.1
withholding, %
Source: Bureau of Internal Revenue.
2.19 The Government’s announcement of comprehensive reforms to the tax

system (comprising improving tax collection, simplifying the tax structure,
transforming BIR, minimizing discretion of tax examiners, broadening the tax Progress on the
base, and making the tax system more equitable) is being keenly watched as an
indication of the administration’s resolve to tackle difficult but critical comprehensive tax
institutional reform issues. BIR is reviewing the options for simplifying tax
administration to make tax collection easier and efficient. The current BIR
system reforms will
leadership is also keen on addressing corruption through a reorganization of BIR. be seen as an
2.20 The significant constraints to BIR performance, however, seem to remain indication of the
quite entrenched: (i) rent-seeking behavior of taxpayers and revenue examiners
(contributing to revenue leakages); (ii) a complicated income tax system that administration’s
creates discrepancies in tax collection and provides opportunities for evasion in
tax assessments; and (iii) lack of modern tax management facilities and expertise. resolve to tackle
2.21 A review of BIR’s performance during 2002 discloses the following. difficult but critical
(i) Improvements in collections due to administrative measures started to institutional reform
kick off starting August 2002 with the changed management style of the
new BIR Commissioner. Collections in August 2002 were 19.7% above issues.
year-ago levels and in September 2002 were 31.2% above. And for the
first time since March 2002, cumulative collection for the year surpassed
2001 levels.
(ii) However, the performance of the Large Taxpayer Service (LTS), which
accounted for 52% of total BIR revenues, has fallen below expectations,
as measured against the official target and 2002 collections.
(iii) Low compliance rates continue to be the most pressing problem
confronting the Government’s fiscal machinery, and DOF data show
compliance rates dropping from 1997 for all major taxes, with the
exception of the corporate income tax (Figure 2.3). However, several
initiatives being introduced by BIR including a more effective manual
18
VAT audit system, a voluntary assessment and abatement program, new

payment systems to minimize bank frauds, and electronic filing and Low compliance
payment systems could improve taxpayer compliance over time.
rates continue to
Figure 2.3. Compliance Rate by Major Tax, 1997-2000 (%) erode the
credibility of the
75%
fiscal machinery.
65%
55%
45%
35%
25% 1997 1998 1999 2000

VAT Individual Corporate Percentage Excise
(Domestic IT IT Taxes Taxes
Source: Department of Finance.

(iv) The outlook for improving the tax effort (internal revenue collections as
a percentage of GNP) in 2003, absent revenue-enhancing tax policy
reform, still seems uncertain.
(v) BIR has developed a program of short-term administrative measures to
improve collections performance, yet its planning process was delayed
such that new measures did not take effect until the third quarter of 2002.
BIR has also had difficulties implementing its plans.
(vi) Increasing the number of large taxpayers is proving difficult and slow. An appropriate
The entire LTS currently serves 1,133 taxpayers. With slow growth in
both LTS staffing and the number of large taxpayers, it is uncertain blend of
whether BIR did in fact increase the total number of large taxpayers to
administrative and
1,500 by the end of 2002. Moreover, given slow progress thus far and
administrative difficulties, it might make more sense to focus scarce policy measures to
resources on improving services to existing large taxpayers, rather then
widening the scope even more in the context of stagnant or deteriorating raise the level of
service (including audit) quality. revenue collections
Recommendations should now be
2.22 Expenditures. Specific recommendations on expenditures are provided aggressively
in subsequent chapters of this volume.
implemented.
2.23 Revenue mobilization. An appropriate blend of administrative and
policy measures for raising the level of revenue collections should now be
aggressively implemented. To increase the probability of substantially
19
improving the tax effort, the Government should seriously consider tax policy
reform, including tightening up on tax incentives. The best option at this
point is enacting the proposed reform of the excise tax on alcohol and
tobacco products. DOF’s initial estimation of revenue impact is an additional
PhP10 billion over 2 years.
2.24 The main elements of the draft bill are (i) indexation of tax brackets and
tax rates to restore the real value of the unit taxes to their January 1997 levels,
based on an accumulated inflation rate of 37.3%; (ii) indexation of tax brackets
and rates biannually after the initial indexation; (iii) immediate reclassification of
products based on their current retail price and biannually thereafter; and (iv)
introduction of a single structure of excise tax rates on distilled spirits regardless
of the raw material used. The bill is intended to increase tax revenues, resolve
World Trade Organization(WTO)-related issues, and ensure a more equitable
treatment for different product brands. The draft bill proposes phasing in the
bracket and rate indexation so that the increase in tax rates occurs over an initial
two-year period, with 50% of the increase effective in the first year of
implementation.
2.25 It would also be desirable to take quick measures to improve the
effectiveness of the Large Taxpayers Service. Presently the LTS, which
consists of a central office and two regional offices, Makati and Cebu, has filled
775 out of 891 authorized positions, which represents a staffing ratio of 87%.
The Cebu office became operational in March 2002, but still does not have a
chief. There are plans to open a third office in Manila. A recent shakeup of top
management in LTS led to the appointment of a new management team in
February 2002. Further effort is needed to provide adequate staffing to the LTS,
expand the coverage, and improve audit performance to increase compliance
incentives. BIR’s audit program for 2002 was released in May 2002, and its other
audit initiatives are now being implemented. To achieve success it will be
important for BIR management to (i) clarify its audit priorities by focusing on the Administrative
Reconciliation List for Enforcement (RELIEF) program and the issue-oriented
measures could
audits; (ii) prioritize selective audits (e.g., on VAT) over comprehensive ones;
(iii) increase the size of the proposed special audit team and require it to focus on
concentrate on large taxpayers; (iv) require that the special audit team provide
feedback to management on the LTS audit program, which should be subject to improving the
management approval. effectiveness of
2.26 BIR has established a program of short-term administrative measures for
2002 intended to increase discretionary revenue collection by PhP16 billion, but the LTS.
implementation thus far has been limited. BIR’s RELIEF program is promising,
but it is unclear how much revenue impact it will have. Given likely
implementation constraints, and the late start in planning 2002 programs, it
seems improbable that BIR will reach its target of additional collections through
improved administration. At the same time BIR is making progress in planning
for its transformation to a taxpayer-based revenue authority. However, the radical
transformation envisioned by BIR’s management would require the full political
support of both the executive and the legislature, thus making its timing
uncertain. To decrease the uncertainty associated with BIR’s transformation
program, the Government needs to make a decision on the course of medium-
term BIR reform. The sooner Government can decide this and provide its full
20
support to a specific time-bound reform program, the sooner it will begin to have
an impact on revenues.
2.27 It is possible that the BIR leadership may gear up for special steps to
facilitate collection and check corruption, such as formation of an internal audit
unit to check audit methods of the examiners, coupled with prosecution of erring
collectors. The manual VAT audit is being piloted in Valenzuela (Bulacan) and
erring companies are to be closed. The piloting is to be extended to other Metro
Manila cities (Manila, Makati, and Quezon City). It remains to be seen to what
extent such actions will actually translate into an improvement in collections.
Philippines PEPFMR 21
3. OFF-BUDGET RISKS AND THEIR MANAGEMENT13

3.1 Public finance in the Philippines is replete with instances where
taxpayers have bailed out, through recapitalization and debt assumption, troubled
corporations owned or sponsored by the government, or shouldered the cost of Macroeconomic
having to sell some of these corporations at a fraction of what government spent stability is
for them: notable examples in recent years include the Philippine National Bank,
the old Central Bank, and the National Power Corporation. In many of these critically
cases, the problems have built up over an extended period—and recur even after
bailout. Because macro stability is dependent on the effective management of dependent on the
fiscal risks, of which contingent liabilities are a major element, effective effective
management of contingent liabilities will be vital.
management of
3.2 It will be especially important to establish clear criteria as to when
contingent liabilities will be accumulated, and accrue them sparingly. In a well- off-budget risks.
managed program, the government debt office may be called on to assist in
evaluating the Government’s cost and risks under contingent liabilities, and to
recommend policies for managing these risks.
Fiscal Risks
3.3 Based on an inventory of contingent liabilities, DOF is now estimating

the quantitative dimension of contingent liabilities. However, some estimates of
the contingent liabilities of the Government run to about PhP3.1 trillion,
representing maximum exposures under obligations such as (i) unfunded
liabilities of public pension institutions (PhP1.8 trillion); (ii) direct guarantees on
loans to GOCCs and GFIs—estimated at PhP66 billion; (iii) guarantees on risks
under build-operate-transfer (BOT) contracts, estimated at PhP45 billion; and (iv)
deposit insurance (PhP352 billion).
3.4 Contingent liabilities in the Philippines may be described in terms of a
fiscal risk matrix classifying sources of potential risks on government finance
into four types: direct or contingent, each of which may be explicit or implicit
(Table 3.1).
3.5 Table 3.1 The Philippines: A Fiscal Risk Matrix
Liabilities Direct Contingent
Explicit • Sovereign debt • Direct guarantees on GOCCs’ obligations
(domestic and • Guarantees on currency risks of GFIs' foreign
external) loans
• Expenditures - • Guarantees on various types of risks
nondiscretionary (including market, currency, regulatory,
and legally binding political) in BOT contracts
in the long term • Umbrella guarantees for various types of loans
(civil service (agriculture, microenterprise, housing)
salaries and • Deposit insurance (P100,000 per account)
pensions) • Guarantees on benefits (unfunded liabilities)
of the social security system
• Future health care financing
• Tax credit certificates
Implicit • Future recurrent • Bank failure (beyond state insurance)
costs of public • Possible default of the Central Bank
investment projects • Possible need to further re-capitalize
22
government banks
•
Cleanup of liabilities of privatized entities
•
Support to enterprises (covering losses and
assuming non-guaranteed obligations)
BOT=build-operate-transfer, GFI=government financial institution, GOCC=government-
owned and –controlled corporation
Managing Off-Budget Risks
3.5 Philippine practices. At present, the Government has only one tool to
manage its contingent liabilities: the Foreign Borrowings Act sets a $7.5 million
ceiling on outstanding government guarantees of foreign loans of GOCCs.
However, borrowings of certain GOCCs (e.g., Light Rail Transit Authority
[LRTA], Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System [MWSS], NDC, NEA,
National Irrigation Authority [NIA], Philippine National Oil Company [PNOC],
and Philippine National Railway [PNR]) are explicitly exempted in their charters
from being charged against this ceiling. These exemptions render this ceiling a
less effective control mechanism, especially since corporations exempted are
some of the largest GOCCs with large outstanding loan balances.
3.6 Beyond guaranteed GOCC loans, other types of government contingent
liabilities are largely unmonitored. There are ongoing efforts in the DOF and
BTR to monitor government guarantees for various types of risks under BOT
contracts, but these are still in the initial stages. The Government also does not
monitor the foreign risk exposures for loans secured by the Land Bank and the The consideration
Development Bank of the Philippines from official creditors and onlent to
accredited private financial institutions in pesos. Likewise, the unfunded of contingent
liabilities of the pension institutions (SSS, GSIS, and AFPRSBS), also
guaranteed by the government, are not monitored and managed. There is also liabilities is an
currently no system for bringing together information on outstanding guarantees integral part of
of government guarantee institutions that are explicitly or implicitly backed by
the NG. improving
3.7 Overview of international experience. A quick survey of the transparency in
experiences of ten countries—Australia, Canada, Colombia, Czech Republic,
Hungary, India, New Zealand, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States— government
with regard to the management of contingent liabilities discloses that while operations in
individual country practices differ in their dealing with contingent liabilities, all
these countries share a common set of principles to capture contingent liabilities general and fiscal
to the maximum extent possible, as they affect the government budget. The
choice of countries was based on the advanced nature of the consideration of the transparency in
problem of contingent liabilities and ready availability of such information. particular.
3.8 In all the above countries, the consideration of contingent liabilities is an
integral part of improving transparency in government operations in general and
fiscal transparency in particular. Indeed it is tied to a process of ushering in more
openness in Government, so that citizens and outsiders (such as foreign investors,
commercial banks, credit rating organizations, and multilateral financial
institutions) can more accurately assess the Government’s financial position. All
frameworks tended to look at the issue as part of the Government fiscal
framework, in line with the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF)’s Guidelines on
Fiscal Transparency. In addition, these countries also disseminate information of
the International Investment Position and report information on the new foreign
exchange reserves template introduced by IMF under the Statistical

Dissemination Database System (SDDS).
3.9 Definition of contingent liabilities. While all frameworks generally
define contingent liabilities as costs borne by the Government if a particular
event occurs, the precise scope and the detailed items reported vary across
countries. Nevertheless, in most frameworks there are provisions to publish
information in the form of quantifiable and nonquantifiable contingent liabilities.
Some examples of quantifiable contingent liabilities are loan guarantees, nonloan
guarantees, indemnities, warranties, promissory notes, callable share capital in
international organizations and liabilities arising out of legal proceedings and
disputes (though usually within maximum limits). Nonquantifiable liabilities
include guaranteed benefits payable by national pension, provident and insurance
schemes, environmental contingencies, exchange rate risks and in some cases
(e.g., in the UK) liabilities relating to privatization. There is also an implicit
reason for the nondisclosure or partial disclosure of contingent liabilities for
tactical reasons such as “moral hazard” (arising out of, say, bank failures) or
litigation claims against the Government (e.g., litigation involving health
matters).
3.10 Legal and institutional framework. Most governments have in place
legislation relating to powers to borrow, invest, and enter into other financial
obligations on behalf of its citizens, and the responsibility to report major
contingent liabilities to the legislature through budget documents and other
financial reports. The legal framework usually sets out the maximum amount of
new borrowing and guarantees that the legislature or the Minister of Finance can
approve over a specified period, usually the fiscal year. The authority to borrow
and to issue guarantees is delegated to the Minister of Finance or the principal
public debt manager under the Ministry of Finance or Treasury, and requires the
Minister of Finance to be accountable for these decisions to the legislature. Box
3.1 provides an overview of the legal ceilings in selected countries on
government debt and contingent liabilities.
3.11 In all regimes, the need to report on contingent liabilities is also
underpinned by fiscal legislation and regulations. The most comprehensive
example is the Federal Reform Act of the United States, whose key objective is
to neutralize budgetary incentives, making policy makers indifferent as to
whether they choose grants, direct loans, or guarantees. The conditions for the
recognition, measurement and disclosure of contingent liabilities are clearly spelt
out.
3.12 The regimes generally delegate authority to the Minister of Finance on
the design and issue of guarantee instruments and other implementation aspects.
Some countries, however, such as Colombia and Sweden, pass on this
responsibility to the government debt manager. In the case of Sweden, the
Swedish National Debt Office is the only government agency that can issue
government guarantees. The Office has developed a model for pricing guarantees
in which clients are charged a risk-based premium and all revenues and losses are
met from a fund separate from the Budget. In Colombia, the General Directorate
of Public Credit is currently developing a methodology for valuing contingent
liabilities based on Monte Carlo simulations. It plans to use this model to
evaluate the risks associated with a wide range of government guarantees, and to
establish clear budgetary procedures for disclosure and provisioning.
24
Box 3.1 Legal Ceilings on Government Debt and Contingent Liabilities
Australia. The Charter of Budget Honesty Act 1998 provides for the clear enunciation of government
fiscal objectives consistent with principles of sound fiscal management. It provides the general framework
for fiscal transparency on an accrual accounting basis: contingent liabilities are defined as costs faced by
the Government if a particular event occurs. Contingent liabilities include loan guarantees, nonloan
guarantees, warranties, indemnities, uncalled for capital, and letters of comfort. The Budget provides a
Statement of Risks which, among other events that affect the fiscal outcome, specifically includes the
realization of contingent liabilities. The first budget under the system was presented for 1999–2000.
Canada. The Public Accounts of Canada, as required under Section 64(1) of the Financial Administration
Act, are tabled each year by the President of the Treasury Board. The Annual Financial Report contains
the Condensed Financial Statements of Canada in addition to audited financial statements and finance
operations. The basic purpose of these condensed financial statements is to provide an overview of the
financial affairs of the Government and the resources for which it is responsible under authority granted
by Parliament. Responsibility for the integrity and objectivity of these statements rests with the
government. Along with financial information, the statements also set out contingent or potential
liabilities that include guarantees by the Government; callable share capital in international organizations;
claims and pending and threatened litigation; and environmental contingencies.
Colombia. Law 448 of 1998 deals with effective management of contingent liabilities. The Law indicates
the measures to be adopted for the administration of contingent liabilities of state entities, as also other
measures in respect of public debt. According to the Organic Budget Law, the nation, territorial entities,
and decentralized entities must include in their debt service budgets the necessary appropriations to cover
possible losses due to contingent liabilities. The National Government specifies the methodology for the
inclusion of these liabilities in the budgets and distinguishes between contingent liabilities acquired prior
to coming into effect of Law 448 and those acquired later. Likewise, the Government regulates the events
under which the mentioned funds must be transferred to a State Entities Contingent Fund established
under the Law: this Fund is to be utilized to attend to the contingent liabilities of the state entities that the
Government determines. The Government also determines the types of risks that can be covered by the
Fund. The deposits made to the Fund can only be reimbursed to the depositing entities when there is a
definite extinction of the related risks. The resources of the Fund comprise deposits made by the state
entities, transfers from the national budget, financial returns of its resources, and recovery of overdue
assets. The General Directorate of Public Credit of the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit approves the
valuations of the contingent liabilities done by the state entities that make deposits to the Fund. Likewise,
this Directorate carries out periodic verifications of the evolution of the risks covered by the Fund and
determines the increase or decrease of the deposits necessary.
Czech Republic. The general government includes the central government (including state financial
assets and extra budgetary funds) and the local and municipal governments. The fiscal operations of the
central government are governed by the Law on Budgetary Rules and secondary legislation. In addition,
there are specific laws governing individual extra budgetary funds. The legal framework for Czech
budgetary operations tends to rely more on principles of handling public funds, combined with detailed
instructions and regulations, rather than on high-level codified procedures and strong administrative
control. A new Law on Budgetary Rules, however, provides a more comprehensive fiscal framework
emphasizing greater transparency and accountability, including improving monitoring and reporting of
information on guarantees, tax arrears, equity holdings, and the use of appropriate methods of asset
valuation. While the distinction between fiscal and private sector activity is generally clear, there are
several areas where the distinction is blurred, which is understandable for a country in transition. There
are several institutions that were established under the Commercial Code, which are neither a part of the
government sector, nor respond completely to private market incentives. The obligations of these
institutions are either explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Government, but their operations, which
are of a fiscal nature, are not completely captured in the fiscal accounts.
Source: Tarun Das (PEPFMR Background Paper).
3.13 Accounting. In four countries (Colombia, the Czech Republic, India, and
the United Kingdom), as in the Philippines, a conventional budget is prepared on
the basis of cash accounting, i.e., transactions and events are recognized when
cash is received or paid. Financial results are measured in terms of inflows and
outflows of cash and changes in the cash balance. The focus of such reporting is
on budgetary compliance and maintaining liquidity solvency—two aspects of
Government’s finances that are of prime concern to the legislature and to the
executive for current decision making. However, cash accounting has many
serious drawbacks.
(i) It fails to take account of future commitments, guarantees, or other
contingent liabilities. A liability is not recognized until cash is paid to
settle the debt. The most significant omission is the pension liability of
the Government, which is handled on a pay-as-you-go basis.
(ii) It fails to accurately represent the amount of resource usage. For
instance, a large capital acquisition will distort expenditure upward in the
first year but the usage of that asset will not be recognized in subsequent
years. Cash-based
(iii) Recognition of cash payments alone sometimes results in an unnoticed accounting
deterioration in fixed assets. systems are not
(iv) Perhaps the most significant deficiency is the absence of a system of cost
allocation. The focus of cash costs alone results in understatement of well-suited to
costs incurred by the government departments in delivering goods and record contingent
services.
liabilities, which
3.14 In other countries (such as Australia, Canada, Colombia, Hungary, New
Zealand, and the United States) there is a clear preference for using the accrual are often treated
accounting framework, although the extent of implementation of this method
varies from country to country. Accrual accounts also show cash transactions but as off-balance
also record contingent liabilities when they are created. By measuring changes in sheet items.
assets and liability structure, it also provides invaluable information on the
financial position of the Government.
3.15 Such an accrual and consolidation model requires that (i) a financial flow
be reported at the time when an economic value is created, transformed,
exchanged, transferred or extinguished, whether or not cash is exchanged at the
time; (ii) all economic costs, cash or non-cash, be covered and matched with the
revenue (measured in terms of economic benefits) of the period; (iii) both short-
term and long-term items be included in the financial statements; and (iv) all sub-
entities are aggregated for the entity.
3.16 It is generally accepted that cash-based accounting systems are not
wellsuited to record contingent liabilities, which are often treated as off-balance
sheet items. The preferred method is the accrual-based accounting systems,
which can capture contingent liabilities as they are created. Within such systems,
contingent liabilities are recorded at face value and expected present value of
contracts. The governments of Canada and the United States have formulated
standards for accounting contingent liabilities.
3.17 None of the frameworks, though, actually set out the valuation methods
for estimating the contingent liabilities. The greatest reliance is placed on the
exposure method, which lists the maximum exposure or the maximum potential
26
amount that can be lost from contingent liabilities. Thus a guarantee covering the
full amount of a loan outstanding would be recorded at the full nominal value of
the underlying loan. Such lists are available in the Australian, New Zealand, and
United Kingdom regimes. The obvious limitation of the method is that there is no
information on the likelihood of the contingency occurring, and further research
is necessary to ascertain the valuation methodologies that underpin the
calculation of the contingent liabilities.
3.18 Recording, monitoring, and management. In most of the regimes
surveyed, further work is required to ascertain at the country level how each
contingent liability is identified, measured, recorded, monitored, and managed.
Moreover, it is essential to evaluate vulnerabilities relating to the financial sector
or the external sector. For this, additional information has to be ascertained from
sources outside the fiscal sector; for example, the reporting of international
reserves, Central Bank Balance Sheets, and private sector potential external
liabilities. In other words, the frameworks for contingent liability disclosures tend
to focus only on potential government liability, and not on other sources of A first step to
systemic risks that the public and private sectors have to bear in special
unforeseen circumstances. strengthen the
3.19 The conclusion is that in understanding the comprehensive range of management of
contingent liabilities that the Government faces, the fiscal frameworks governing
contingent liabilities
them are only one of many sources of information for monitoring and
management. Information emanating from the fiscal framework requires to be is to construct a
supplemented by a range of information and disclosure requirements for early
and effective identification of external and financial sector vulnerability. system for
3.20 It also needs to be emphasized that there is no uniform system for managing fiscal
reporting off-budget risks. Standards and benchmarks need to be developed
taking into account the diversity in country circumstances. While codes for data risks.
disclosures in a range of activities are being developed by IMF, it will be left to
individual countries to establish their own practical frameworks for the
identification, measurement, disclosure, and management of the range of off-
budget risks that confront the Government.
Recommendations
3.21 For a government seeking to manage risks for contingent liabilities, the
first step should be to determine its degree of risk aversion in the area of
contingent liabilities and the extent of the balance sheet risk it wishes to be
accountable for. It also needs to decide whether it wishes to manage its own
balance sheet solely, or whether to be accountable for risks generated in other
parts of the public sector or in the private sector. International experience
suggests that more complete disclosure, better risk sharing arrangements,
improved governance structures for state-owned entities and sound economic
policies can lead to very substantial reductions in the Government’s exposure to
contingent liabilities.
3.22 Specific tasks that could be completed in the near term can set the stage
for strengthening institutional capacity to manage off-budget risks. Some of these
have already been initiated by the Government. The near-term tasks on which the
Government intends to focus include the following.
(i) Completing the quantification of contingent liabilities and conduct of

a risk assessment based on the recently completed inventory of
contingent liabilities, including those relating to GOCCs and review of It would be desirable
the charter provisions—explicit or implicit—on NG guarantees. DOF has to create a
completed a summary review of charters with technical assistance from
United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Grant- centralized risk
based technical assistance has been requested to take this work forward.
management unit in
(ii) Creating a full-fledged centralized risk management unit in DOF, in
coordination with BTR, to manage contingent liabilities. This may entail DOF, in coordination
significant capacity building. The unit needs to have the necessary
with BTR, to manage
expertise for identification, measurement, monitoring, and management
of all implicit and explicit contingent liabilities. The unit can also advise contingent liabilities.
the Government on (i) designing appropriate guarantee instruments; (ii)
reviewing and restructuring of existing guarantees for minimizing
government risks; (iii) formulating policies and regulations for new
commitments; and (iv) evaluating risks and screening of future projects
before recommending provision of government guarantees to them, thus
putting an end to the practice of automatically guaranteeing various
obligations of certain GOCCs.
(iii) Initiating special-purpose audits of critical GOCCs to support the
planned disposition program, start of benchmark audits for pension and
trust funds such as the AFP RSBS, the Housing Guarantee Corporation,
the Philippines Health Insurance Corporation, and the Home
Development Mutual Fund (HDMF), and recommendations on
accounting and disclosure practices. An administrative issuance
transferring supervisory authority from the Office of the President to
DOF will be required for the latter to move quickly on this front.
(iv) Dealing with contingent liabilities arising out of private sector For SSS, a core set
participation (PSP). The purpose is to review the contractual obligations
for BOT/PSP projects for estimating monetary obligations, suggesting of actions could
inputs for possible unbundling of risks, specifying early warning systems
for defaults, providing inputs for possible renegotiating of contracts, and comprise
strengthening the legal and regulatory framework for BOT/PSP projects. completion of an
Although work has been initiated (risk estimation has been completed for
11 out of 80 contracts examined), continued technical assistance is actuarial audit;
required for the work to be completed expeditiously.
narrowing the gap
(v) Completing a capacity building needs assessment and developing a
timebound implementation plan. This should include training on between pension
accounting for, and treatment of, contingent liabilities. fund contributions
3.23 Complementary actions on other fronts are also needed, such as
effectively implementing the new power sector law. Moreover, given the
and benefits
significant unfunded liabilities of pension institutions, it would be desirable to through a phased
address the immediate financial sustainability risks—or strengthen the
performance—of SSS, GSIS, and the AFPRSBS. This will also provide time for increase in
designing comprehensive and longer-term institutional reforms and obtaining
contribution rates.
consensus for their implementation.
3.24 For SSS, a core set of actions could comprise completing an actuarial
audit; narrowing the gap between pension fund contributions and benefits by
28
finalizing an action plan for a phased increase in contributions from the present
8.4% to 14%, and initiating implementation of a phased increase in contribution
rates; limiting the administrative expenses of SSS to the statutory 12% and
specifying/publishing milestones to assess whether the program is on track;
improving the liquidity, yield, and safety of the SSS investment portfolio by
enhancing the collection efficiency of SSS salary loans; assessing and publishing
the fiscal impact of the commitment to enroll informal sector workers under SSS
and specifying steps to address the financial stress and contain the administrative
costs of doing so; and developing a strategy and implementation plan for
organizational restructuring of SSS.
3.25 In the case of GSIS, which is under less immediate threat, the situation
calls for actions to shield the pension plan from possible losses from the General
Insurance Group, improve its investment portfolio performance, and shield the
portfolio from inappropriate or undue influence and manipulation. This could be
accomplished by, for example, completely separating the books of the general
insurance group from those of the pension plan; diversifying GSIS investments;
engaging professional investment managers and permitting a portion of its
portfolio to be invested abroad;14 enhancing the collection efficiency on GSIS
salary loans through mandatory deduction of past due amounts from pension
payments; and resolving the issue of past due contributions from the Government
to GSIS.15
3.26 The AFPRSBS will need to specify and initiate implementation of a
time-bound action plan to improve the liquidity, yield, and safety of its
investment portfolio, and articulation of options to attain viability.
3.27 A personal equity retirement account (PERA) has been proposed—its
clear objective should be to ensure financial health of providers and protect the
funds. This could be facilitated by avoiding promising a defined benefit, an
effective supervisory body with an appropriate governance structure, clear
regulations (e.g., on vesting periods, investments, management of accounts,
information disclosure, etc.), and penalties for early withdrawals.
3.28 Medium-term actions to improve the management of off-budget risks in
the Philippines could comprise the following:
(i) Agreement between Government and Congress to set limits to the
accrual of contingent liabilities. Without such a political concord,
establishing technical criteria alone may not be sufficient.
(ii) Moving toward a cash and accrual basis of accounting. It would be
desirable to move toward the requirements under the Revised
Government Finance Statistics system (GFS 2000) recommended by
IMF. For uniformity and comparability of annual balance sheets, the
Government is moving toward prescribing a set of accounting rules for
various types of contingent liabilities—it would be appropriate to
expedite this effort. Given the lack of common accounting standards for
government nonbank financial institutions, an essential step would be to
have an accounting manual for these entities, prescribing acceptable
practices for income recognition or interest accrual, and setting standards
on provisioning and treatment of past due accounts.
(iii) Strengthening internal audit arrangements in GOCCs. Strengthening

the internal audit team to deal with management of contingent liabilities,
and a broader role for resident auditors in reviewing the financial
statement of GOCCs, would ensure that not only are transactions
properly booked but that financial statements are reflective of the true
state and well-being of GOCCs.
(iv) Provisioning for contingent liabilities. In the long run, budgeting for
contingent liabilities could ideally follow the United States’ example
where direct and contingent liabilities are integrated in the budget based
on their subsidy costs, i.e., for loans, the present value of amounts not
repaid and the difference between the interest rate charged from
borrowers and government’s cost of funds; for guarantees, the present
value of the difference between cash payments for defaults and cash
received from fees and recoveries. The main advantage of adopting this
approach is that government becomes indifferent as to choosing between
a cash subsidy, a loan, or a guarantee on loans.
30
SECTION B. ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY
4. Allocative Efficiency: Selected Issues

5. The Medium Term Expenditure Framework and The Budget Cycle
6. Budget Execution, Financial Management And External Oversight
4. ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY
4.1 Recent trends in national government sectoral allocations have been
greatly affected by the fiscal context in which allocative decisions have been
made. As mentioned earlier, the amount of total discretionary expenditures
available for allocation has been steadily shrinking for the past several years. The
difference between revenues and statutory expenditure obligations (i.e., wages,
interest and LGU transfers) decreased from 6.3% of GNP in 1995 to 2.3% in
1999 and down to 0.9% in 2001.
4.2 The problem is multidimensional, involving declining revenues, and
rising interest payments, and LGU transfers. Revenues steadily declined from
18.4% of GNP in 1995 to 14.6% in 2001, slumping to a low of 13.4% of GNP in
2002. Interest payments have risen as a percentage of national expenditures from
16.6% in 1997 to 24.7% in 2001. At the same time national government transfers
to LGUs (the bulk of which is IRA), which stood at 15.1% of total expenditures
in 1997, have grown to 18.0% in 2002. Thus, it is not the rise or fall of any
individual item, but the combined effect of decreasing revenues and high levels
of statutory obligations that is having a pincer-like impact on the Government’s
expenditure program.
4.3 This chapter examines selected issues relating to allocative efficiency,
especially from the standpoint of key sectoral priorities in the Government’s own
reform agenda as enunciated in the Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan
(MTPDP), namely agriculture and agrarian reforms, education and health care.
Economic Composition of Spending
4.4 In very broad terms, current operating expenditures increased as a share

of GNP, while capital outlays declined during 1996–2001. Personal services The economic
increased rapidly from 1996 to 1998. Likewise, interest payments have been
composition of
expanding yearly by 22% since 1997. MOOE on the other hand, has remained at
2.2% of GNP since 1996 compared with 2.8% from 1986 to1991. At the same spending has
time capital expenditures have fallen considerably from 3.8% in 1997 to 2.7% in
2001. deteriorated in recent
4.5 The low share of expenditures to MOOE is worrisome. The problem is a years as both outlays
result, to some extent, of the increased share of the current budget dedicated to for MOOE and capital
interest payments. While reduced interest payments would give the Government
more room to maneuver, it would still seem that an additional reallocation from have decreased as a
personal services to MOOE might improve the effectiveness and efficiency of
share of GNP.
government spending. The share allocated to capital expenditures in 2002 is
likewise expected to decline versus that in 1996–1997. The ratio of capital
expenditures to total national government expenditures is low, while the ratio of
wages and salaries to total national government expenditures is high, especially
as compared with other lower middle-income countries.16 Moreover, allocations
to capital expenditures have been characterized by high degrees of annual
variation in recent years. Improving the planning process and its links with the
capital budgeting process might help reduce year-on-year variations.
32
Agriculture and Agrarian Reform
4.6 Persistent problems in the Philippine agriculture sector have prevented it

from achieving competitiveness and providing adequate income to small farmers.
It has been argued that the key sectoral bottlenecks go beyond the production
system, and that sectoral problems are rooted in inadequacies in the marketing
system beyond the farm level. In this view, the major traditional impediments to
sustained growth in the Philippine agriculture sector have been (i) inadequate
rural infrastructure, including irrigation and postharvest facilities, farm-to-market
roads, and communications infrastructure; (ii) lack of competition in the
agricultural marketing system, marked by monopsony in many local markets for
primary farm products; (iii) lack of access to formal credit by small farmers; (iv)
lack of processing facilities and/or enterprises; and (v) difficulty in providing
reliable, high-volume supplies to export markets.
4.7 The major policy directions of Government to address these issues
comprise (i) raising total factor productivity; (ii) modernizing agriculture (“with
equity”); (iii) investing in human capital and continuation of asset distribution
reforms; and (iv) strengthening governance arrangements. Agriculture and
agrarian policy reforms in the Philippines are anchored in four landmark
legislations: (i) the Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act of 1997; (ii) the
Fisheries Code of 1998; (iii) the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988;
and (iv) Republic Act 8532 which augments agrarian reform program funding.
4.8 Agriculture. The agricultural system has been traditionally heavily
dominated by rice, corn, coconut, and sugar. However, there now appears to be
potential benefit in reorienting policy and resource support toward nontraditional,
high-value crops, especially given trends in international agricultural trade. At
the institutional level, this requires beefing up the ability of the Department of
Agriculture (DA) to respond more effectively to the needs of the sector. A key
constraint has been the department’s low absorptive capacity for budgetary
resources. According to some estimates, DA is able to expend an average of
about 70–80% of its resources from the General Appropriations Act (GAA) by
December each year. The record for official development assistance (ODA)
funds is reportedly 60–70% on the average. There is typically a rush to spend the
rest of the annually budgeted resources within the final month (to avoid budget
reductions in the succeeding year), leading to inefficiencies and waste of
resources.
4.9 There are, however, two issues beyond the influence of DA, of particular
relevance to improving the competitiveness of Philippine agriculture: (i)
inordinately high transport costs, especially relating to cabotage; and (ii) high
costs and limited access of majority of the country's farmers to formal credit
markets. Both these issues have been extensively studied and debated, but
resolution has been elusive. They remain fundamental reasons for high
transaction costs and weak competitiveness, especially for agricultural products.
In the case of cabotage, vested interests and virtual monopoly powers of the
Philippine Ports Authority make inter-island shipping and handling both
excessively expensive and inefficient, especially for fresh produce. In the case of
credit, past policies have contributed to many producers being in arrears. In
addition, majority of banks/financial institutions continue to be unwilling to lend
to agriculture and agriculture-related enterprises, due to perceptions of risks in

agribusiness ventures and credit unworthiness of most producer groups.
4.10 Given the myriad institutional constraints, it remains to be seen if the
recent positive performance of agriculture and fisheries can be sustained over
time. Currently, the Government is financing a wide range of goods and services
to promote modernization. Crop productivity is expected to be the major source
of sustained growth in the future. Strategically prioritized public expenditure of
increased magnitudes—within an improved policy environment—could be the
major determinants of stable and sustained agricultural growth. But this would
depend on the DA’s ability to transform itself into a catalyst of change, able to
use budgetary resources more effectively, and partner with LGUs.
4.11 Agrarian reform. The key issue here is the continuing slowdown in the
pace of land transfer, owing to a shift in coverage toward privately owned lands.
The total scope of the agrarian reform program is 8.06 million hectares of land
for redistribution, responsibility for which is divided between the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). Of this total, DAR is responsible for 4.29 million hectares
(53%) and DENR for 3.77 million hectares (47%). The significance of agrarian
reform to the national economy can be seen in two ways: (i) the DAR program
coverage is more than one third of the country’s total arable land area of 10
million hectares; and (ii) initial results of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) impact assessment suggest that agrarian reform has led to
higher real per capita income of program beneficiaries. Poverty incidence among
agrarian reform beneficiaries (ARBs) is lower than among non-ARBs. However,
there has been a sustained deceleration in the pace of DAR’s land redistribution
in recent years relative to target: achievement diminished from 84% (July 1992–
June 1998) to 77% (July 1998–2000), and lower still to 70% in 2000. Land
redistribution has become more difficult in light of declining allocations for
landowner compensation, coverage of contentious privately owned lands, and
operational problems (e.g., untitled properties and uncooperative landowners). At
the current pace of land transfer, it could take another 12 years to complete
redistribution of DAR’s remaining balance, unless policy, institutional, and
implementation constraints are effectively tackled.
4.12 Service delivery. Between agriculture and agrarian reform, it is certain
functions of the former that have been devolved to LGUs. With the enactment of
the LGC in 1991, some 17,000 DA field personnel were devolved to LGUs, to
whom substantial responsibility for agriculture and fisheries development had
been officially transferred. Thus, delivery of agriculture services is now shared
between the DA and LGUs. The Philippine Agriculture and Fisheries
Modernization Plan 2001–2004 and the Fisheries Code of 1998 outline the role
of the DA, while the 1991 LGC defines the role of LGUs. DA has 38 operating
units composed of 14 regional offices, 4 staff bureaus, 11 attached agencies, and
9 attached corporations. These are overseen by the Office of the Secretary
(OSEC)—including the Policy, Planning, Research and Regulation Group,
Operations Group, and Fisheries and Livestock Group—which serves as the hub
for orchestrating the delivery of agriculture and fisheries services. The DAR
organizational structure, unlike that of the DA, has not been affected by the
devolution. Thus, DAR still has an office in each region plus offices in each of
the provinces and municipalities throughout the country. Besides DA and DAR,
34
other major entities active in the rural sector include DENR, Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP), Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE), Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH), Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), Local
Government Academy (LGA), Department of Education (DepEd), National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) and Land Registration Authority
(LRA). LGUs are responsible for delivering “front line” goods and services.
Given this multitude of institutions, all actively seeking to spur the growth of the
rural sector, the continuing challenge is how to operationalize convergence
between and among not only government agencies, but also government
agencies, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), and the private sector.
4.13 In delivering agrarian reform services, national-local coordination
remains relatively effective, because the DAR organizational structure is intact
down to the municipal level. Agrarian reform planning, budgeting, programming,
implementation, and monitoring thus follow a relatively unified approach. The
biggest challenge, however, is for LGUs to become more actively involved in
agrarian reform: LGU case studies undertaken for the PEPFMR indicate that
neither Negros Occidental nor Nueva Vizcaya Province, for example, finances
any agrarian reform activity from LGU sources. More broadly, the challenge is
for greater “convergence” among DAR, DA, LGUs, and NGOs.
4.14 Delivering agriculture services seems to be more challenging. When DA
field personnel were absorbed by LGUs, there was an expected “transition
period” during which LGU capacities were to be built up, and service quality was
temporarily expected to decline. More than a decade after devolution, however,
LGUs feel that while personnel and responsibilities have been devolved,
resources have not: DA and DAR budgets (especially for support services)
continue to grow faster than LGU budgets for devolved services. Consequently,
gaps in service delivery persist: (i) research and extension are delinked; (ii) farm-
to-market roads and communal irrigation are deteriorating due to inadequate
maintenance; (iii) demonstration farms have not been established; (iv) farmers’
organizations are not being as vigorously supported; and (v) training for
agricultural extension workers has steeply declined.
Education
4.15 The 1987 Constitution mandates the establishment and maintenance of a

system of free public education in the elementary and secondary levels, and also
ordains that the state should assign the highest budgetary priority to education.
The Philippine education system consists of a broad-based basic education
subsector that is largely provided by the public sector. The Government thus has
been the dominant provider of basic education: the public sector accounts for
over 92% of total enrollment at the elementary level. In contrast, the public
sector has traditionally been a relatively small player at the tertiary level.
However, NG has become increasingly involved in directly providing post
secondary vocational education and higher education through the continued
creation of state universities and colleges (SUCs): SUCs’ share in total tertiary
enrollment has increased from 10% in school year (SY) 1981–1982 to 26% in SY
1999–2000. Table 4.1 indicates the public-private mix of institutions and
enrollments in the Philippines in SY 1999–2000.
Table 4.1 Philippines: Public-Private Mix of Institutions & Enrolments

SY 1999–2000
Public Private % Private

Institutions
Basic Education
- Elementary 35,757 3,555 9.04
- Secondary 4,193 2,935 41.2
Technical/Vocational Education 302 1,466 82.9
Higher Education 232 1,173 83.5
Enrollments (thousands)
Basic Education
- Elementary 11,770 911 7.2
- Secondary 3,920 1,247 24.1
Technical/Vocational Education 82 212 72.1
Higher Education 663 1,872 73.8
Data refers to 1999–2000.
Sources: DECS and Commission on Higher Education (CHED) (statistical bulletin);
Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA).
4.16 Service delivery: utilization, access, and satisfaction. The distribution

of public school enrollment becomes increasingly skewed in favor of the rich as
the level of education rises. Thus, while 61.1% of public elementary school
students come from poor families, this figure goes down to 49.1% in public
secondary schools and 28.6% in public tertiary institutions.17 Only 27.6% of SUC
students come from poor households. Region wise, the proportion of poor
students to the total number of public school students at the elementary and
secondary levels ranges from a low of 32.6% and 21.3%, respectively, in the
National Capital Region (NCR) to a high of 74.5% and 67.7%, respectively, in
Central Mindanao. In contrast, the percentage of poor students in public tertiary
institutions varies from 9.6% in NCR to 60.5% in Cordillera Administrative
Region (CAR). Meanwhile, there is a wide variation in the proportion of poor
students to the total number of students in SUCs, from a low of 9.6% in NCR to a
high of 58.1% in CAR. The 2001 Filipino Report Card on Pro-Poor Services
shows that households currently sending their children to public elementary
schools expressed least satisfaction with facilities, textbooks, and class size.
4.17 Prioritization and management of education expenditures. In the
Philippines, education finance closely follows education provision: most public
funding goes to public educational institutions while private financial
contribution to such institutions is generally low. Public subsidies to private
education are also low. A review of government spending in the education sector
(1990–1996) showed a relative increase in public spending on higher education
and a relative decrease in public financing of basic education. This pattern was
clearly regressive, since children from poor households were less likely to remain
in school than children from rich households. However, recent policy initiatives
have resulted in a re-alignment of spending priorities such that the share of basic
education in general government education expenditure increased from 78.4% in
1996 to 81.6% in 1999 before slipping to 80.8% in 2000. In contrast, the share of
higher education fell from 16.0% in 1996 to 14.5% in 2000.
36
4.18 The share of general government spending on the entire education sector
expanded from an average of 14.7% of the total budget (or 2.9% of gross
domestic product [GDP]) in 1987–1991 to 20.3% (or 4.3% of GDP) in 1998. It
has declined since then to 17.8% (or 3.6% of GDP) in 2001. Thus, it appears that
government expenditure on the sector was adversely affected by the fiscal
difficulties that followed the Asian financial crisis. Moreover, whether expressed
as a ratio of total government expenditure or GDP, government spending on
education is lower than that of its ASEAN neighbors, with the exception of
Indonesia.
4.19 In the 2001 budget, each of the 109 SUCs received a separate budget
line, amounting to a total of PhP15.3 billion, or 13.1% of central government
expenditure for the entire education sector. For this large slice of the education
budget the taxpayer receives a very mixed bag, ranging from a few high-quality
institutions like the University of the Philippines and the Philippine Normal
University (the leading teacher training institute) to many poorly performing
SUCs. The latter are generally more costly to run than their private counterparts.
4.20 The fees charged by most SUCs are minimal (generally less than
PhP2000 per year per student). Moreover, SUCs charge tuition fees that are on
average 75% lower than those of private universities and colleges. These fees
account for 5% of total SUC expenditures.18 Consequently, cost recovery in
public higher education institutions is considerably lower than in their private
counterparts. However, SUCs have not taken advantage of the greater managerial
autonomy granted under Republic Act (RA) 8292 to improve their operational
efficiency. For this to happen, the budget allocation that each SUC receives from
the central government is to be determined on the basis of norms or average per
student costs by level and type of program (Johanson 1999) even as they are
allowed greater financial flexibility. Hence, MOOE funds are distributed among
SUCs based on the following factors: weighted enrolled units, 30%; research and
development, 30%; and quality of instructions, 40%. However, at present, the
budget process essentially guarantees the salaries of all their staff as of a cut-off
date. Given that 83% of SUCs’ budget is for personal services expenditures, the
application of normative financing rules to the SUCs’ MOOE allocation alone
will not be enough to address systemic inefficiencies. Other incentive schemes to
encourage SUCs to institute cost recovery programs such as conditioning the
opening of new degree programs or establishing branches on the use of internally
generated funds will need to be developed and sustained.
4.21 Personal services is the single biggest item in the DepEd budget. Its
share in the DepEd budget rose from 74% in 1990 to 91% in 2001. The dramatic
rise in personnel expenditures is largely attributable to adjustments in the salaries
of public school teachers that were implemented by the Government in the late
1980s and most of the 1990s. By 1997, the entry-level salary of a public school
teacher was 70% higher than its private school counterpart. Moreover, public
school teacher salaries appear to be on the high side by international standards:
teacher remuneration as a ratio of GNP per capita in the Philippines is equal to
3.0 in 1997 compared to an “Asian” mean of around 2.5 at the primary level.19
4.22 The growth in teacher salaries was accommodated at the expense of
MOOE, i.e., nonpersonnel recurrent expenditures and capital outlays.
Consequently, the share of MOOE in the DECS budget was halved from 16.4%
in 1990 to 8.3% in 2001, while that of capital expenditures dropped from 9.2% to
1.1%. Concomitant with these developments, per student DepEd MOOE at 2000
prices declined on average by 5.1% a year in real terms from PhP878 in 1990 to
PhP422 in 2000.20 This squeeze on MOOE has resulted in constrained supplies of
key educational inputs like textbooks, teaching/instructional materials, science
laboratory equipment and supplies, school desks, as well as provisions for
teacher training and the maintenance of school buildings.
4.23 Meanwhile, although the increase in the number of teachers in
government schools did not keep pace with the growth of enrollment, the
student-teacher ratio in public schools in 1999–2000 (36 at the elementary level
and 34 at the secondary level) is still within the range of 35–40 that educators
consider appropriate. But, the average class size during the same year was 45 and
50, respectively, in public elementary and secondary schools. These numbers
suggest an imbalance in the deployment of public school teachers. One problem
is related to the Magna Carta for public school teachers, which prohibits
reassignment of teachers across geographical borders without the latter’s explicit
assent. Another relates to the current practice of assigning teachers to
administrative/clerical functions (that should otherwise be assigned to lower level
positions) at school and district offices. DepEd officials point out that this
practice came about because of the difficulty in securing the approval of DBM
for nonteaching positions. Such a practice unnecessarily increases cost, as
clerical salaries are 30% lower than teacher salaries in government. The
Government, mindful of this, has already been creating some 2,700 nonteaching
positions for public schools since 1999.
4.24 However, households’ dissatisfaction with class size in public schools is
surprising given that personal services is the single biggest item in the DepEd
budget, and given also that the share of personal services in the DepEd budget
rose from 74% in 1990 to 91% in 2000.
4.25 A continuing challenge in the education sector—in common with other
sectors—is how to strengthen the link between planning and budgeting, and
especially between the MTPDP and the budget. This is important in view of its
implications for the achievement of at least one of the Millennium Development
Goals—achievement of universal primary education. Manasan (2002) has shown,
for example, that the estimated recurrent cost of basic education that would be
necessary to meet the program targets set in the MTPDP exceeds the actual
budget allocated by PhP23-28 billion (or 0.5% of GNP) per year in 2002–2004.
How to strengthen these linkages, and better assure financing for core poverty
alleviation and human development goals, has been explored in more detail in
chapters 5 and 6.
Health Care
4.26 Health outcomes. Overall health status continued to improve through

the 1990s. However, the poor remain vulnerable to health risks, the regions in
Mindanao still have the highest infant mortality rates in the country, and male
infants and children have higher death rates than their female counterparts.
Worryingly, tuberculosis and malaria have not yet been controlled in recent
years.
4.27 Similar to other Southeast Asian countries, the Philippines exhibits
patterns of morbidity and mortality that suggest an epidemiological transition
38
during which the country faces a “dual burden of disease,” i.e., while infectious
or communicable diseases remain the major causes of illness, chronic or
noncommunicable diseases have emerged as the leading causes of death.
4.28 Recent, complete, and detailed information on health outcomes is not
available. The Philippine Health Statistics are no longer regularly published,21
and available local-level health information may not be reliable.22 To address
this, Executive Order (EO) 25 has been issued and initial consultations have been
completed between the Department of Health (DOH) and DILG for drafting
implementing regulations.
4.29 Delivery of basic health services. According to the 1998 National
Demographic and Health Survey, the poor continue to have relatively lower
access even to basic health services such as immunization, medical treatment of
diarrhea, and maternal/child care than other income groups. But the number of
poor families enrolled under the PHIC Indigent Program has increased
tremendously between 1998 and 2001; together they are reported to account for
about 10% of the total number of poor families in 2001. Surveys show that
barangay health stations (BHSs) and rural health units are considered inferior to
other government hospitals or to private hospitals/clinics in quality of health
services: a high proportion of health facility users bypass BHSs despite the
relative proximity of these facilities. Most of the patients in the BHSs are the
poor. Moreover, the number of BHSs is increasing and these are mostly attended
by low-skilled barangay health workers. The Philippines fares better than many
countries in terms of immunization coverage, but Bangladesh, Indonesia, and
Viet Nam have higher immunization coverage.
4.30 Health sector public expenditures. The private sector, though largely
confined to the market for personal care services, dominates the country’s health
sector in terms of contribution to total health expenditures. The public sector,
however, provides both public health care services and personal care services.
The two main players in the public sector are DOH, which allocates the bulk of
its expenditures on personal care services, and the local governments, whose
collective resources are spent more on public care services. Although social
health insurance has been growing in recent years, it remains a minor source of
health care financing.
4.31 Total public sector health expenditures have been increasing since 1991.
Nominally, per capita public sector health expenditures have increased by an
average of 12% annually during the period 1991–99. In real terms, however, the
average annual increase over the same period is 3.8%. The total expenditure on
public health during the 1995–98 was about 2% of GDP, at par with the People’s
Republic of China, and higher than that of Bangladesh, Cambodia, India,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, or Viet Nam.
4.32 In terms of level of care, the bulk of the DOH budget goes to tertiary care
services, while that of the LGUs goes to primary and secondary care services. In
terms of functions, the DOH allocates roughly the same budget shares to personal
services and MOOE. In contrast, the bulk of LGU health expenditures goes to
personal services: resources are insufficient for drugs, medicines, supplies, and
facility improvements (see Box 4.1).
Box 4.1 Issues in Health Care Financing

Why does the bulk of the DOH budget go to tertiary care? Tertiary hospitals were retained by
DOH while primary and secondary hospital care were mostly devolved to LGUs. DOH
estimates that the funding needs for retained and renationalized hospitals will account for 72%
of its 2003 budget allocation. This will come at the cost of adequately funding public health.
A second reason is the propensity of Congress to legislate increases in existing hospitals’ bed
capacities (and thereby the budget) without adequately considering the demand side. In such
cases, too, DOH is compelled to accommodate the increases by under-funding other sub-
sectors such as public health.
What is the role of LGUs in health care? LGU investments in health care are believed to be
rising, and LGUs are said to be emerging as the main actors in health service provision.
However, this masks the fact that 70–80 % of LGU expenditures are on personal services,
leaving very little for MOOE and investment. In this context, central funding for national
health programs such as vaccines and tuberculosis drugs is said to provide work for LGU
health staff who would be otherwise underemployed.
4.33 There is a positive but low correlation between the regional budgets of DOH
on the one hand, and infant mortality rate and poverty incidence on the other. While
more resources are now channeled to poor regions as a whole, the distribution of
health resources among poor regions is still inequitable. The major source of finance
for local health services remains the IRA. User fees remain negligible to support
even partial cost recovery.
4.34 Prioritization and management of public expenditures. The Health
Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA) is the main plank of DOH strategy. It is now
partially implemented in selected “convergence sites.” Though broadly consistent
with the MTPDP and other government policy pronouncements (e.g., State of the
Nation Address), the HSRA differs from them in specifics.23 Since it is deemed best
adopted as a bundle of reforms, the HSRA does not yet fit easily into the While the
prioritization process used for the Sector Effectiveness and Efficiency Review Philippines system
(SEER) for ranking programs, activities and projects. The expected benefits from
HSRA, either to the whole country or to the convergence sites, have not yet been provides for local
estimated in comparison with costs, which are relatively detailed (although they too
may benefit from more accurate estimation). Local-level health planning is largely interests to be
procedural. In many cases, the local health board is convened to provide inputs to the incorporated in the
local health plan. The local chief executive’s role is decisive in determining health
priorities, programs and projects. budget through
4.35 Budget execution data reveal variations between budget allocations and special projects of
actual disbursements in DOH projects, especially foreign-assisted projects (FAPs) .
There seem to be two reasons for this. The first is DOH’s ability to secure members of
counterpart funds to access ODA assistance. Moreover, reported logistical problems Congress, this also
hamper the delivery of drugs, medicine, supplies, equipment, and other assistance
from the central office to the regional offices and other field health offices. The weakens the budget
second is the limited absorptive capacity of the recipient LGUs. ODA fund
utilization is especially low when LGUs are required to cofinance the DOH-initiated process by
local programs and projects. The problem becomes acute when the targets of introducing
assistance are the lower-income LGUs. Arguably, therefore, securing LGU finances
for health will help improve the utilization rate of ODA funds. allocative
Allocative Distortions distortions.
4.36 The increasingly tight budget situation makes it imperative that all
expenditures are held at high standards of efficiency, effectiveness, accountability,
and transparency if growth and poverty reduction are to be promoted. The major
40
concern is the allocation of scarce resources to special budget funds that are (i) not
necessarily aligned with the Government’s policy priorities and (ii) not transparent in
their use.
4.37 Congressional allocations and initiatives. Congressional initiatives are
budgetary reallocations for programs or projects or new items in the budgets of some
agencies and for creation of special purpose funds. The release of these funds is
subject to presidential approval pursuant to Section 25(5), Article VI of the
Constitution, and in accordance with the requirements of Section 35, Chapter 5,
Book VI of EO No. 292. Allocation of funds through congressional initiative can be
made as a lump sum item or as a specific project. Projects are each presented in the
GAA, with information on the name, type and allocation for the project. Lump sum
items, on the other hand, are incorporated in the DPWH budget, for example, under
“Various Infrastructures Including Local Projects.” This category shows the total
amount of infrastructure project for several members of Congress in a specific area
without naming specific projects intended for the area.
4.38 One of the most prominent Congressional allocations, the Countrywide
Development Fund (CDF), was adopted and appropriated in the annual budget from
1990 to 1998. It was included in the National Expenditure Program submitted by the
President and deliberated and acted upon by Congress. In 1999, the CDF was
replaced by Congress with budgetary items providing similar lump sum allocations
for (i) Rural Urban Development Infrastructure Fund; (ii) Food Security Program
Fund; and (iii) “Lingap Para sa Mahirap” Fund. In 2000, the name was changed to
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), one of the lump sum items currently
in the GAA. Apart from the CDF and its successors, Congressional allocations are, as
mentioned above, also routed through lump sum allocations in the budgets of DPWH
and other departments. In 2002 however, a significant breakthrough was
accomplished by government when these congressional allocations were localized to
the PDAF and DPWH lump-sum budgets, sparing other department budgets from its
distorting impact. But regardless of whether the allocation comes from the PDAF or
the DPWH Infrastructure Fund, the expenditure is identified by the members of
Congress but implemented by a national government agency, an LGU, or by a
GOCC.
4.39 During the nineties, the budgetary allocation for the CDF was PhP2.2
billion.24 In 1999, when the CDF was divided into three components, the amount
increased to PhP5 billion. In 2000, when the PDAF came along, the amount was
brought down to PhP3.3 billion although the allocations incorporated in the other
agency budgets were increased. The 2002 PDAF amounted to PhP5.6 billion.
4.40 Identification of projects is initiated by Congress, which prepares a project
menu and forwards it to DBM. Once the GAA provides the regular and lump-sum
funds, the implementing guidelines are outlined. The DBM Secretary sits with both
Houses of Congress and they agree on the menu of projects that can be funded from
the allocation. All projects are then published in a newspaper of general circulation
and later on the DBM web site. The publication lists the names, amounts, and the
purposes of the projects. Generally, PDAF appropriations have to be allocated to
provincial projects for education, health, agriculture, and livelihood: identification
and prioritization of specific projects is made by and implemented in consultation
with members of Congress; and release of funds is made directly to the appropriate
government implementing agency or LGU. A schedule of releases is determined in
consultation with Congress (e.g., for 2002, Congress and DBM agreed that 50%
would be released in March, 25% in June–July, and 25% in October).
4.41 As the foregoing demonstrates, a significant issue affecting the credibility of

the annual and forward budget estimates in the Philippines is the role of the congress
vis-à-vis the executive in the budget process. Many countries restrict the legislature
from increasing the aggregate budget, most also impose limitations on the types or
amounts of reallocations that the legislature may propose. In the case of the
Philippines, the Constitution prohibits Congress from increasing the national budget
submitted by the President. However, in previous years, Congress resorted to
superficial cuts on projected debt service payments to shift resources to their priority
projects. Moreover, the existing system provides a mechanism for local interests to
be incorporated in the budget through special projects of members of Congress. This
allocative distortion weakens the budget process. To minimize this distortion, the
Committee on Appropriations, in consultation with the DBM, has imposed
restrictions for the past 2 years on the categories of expenditure allowed for
Congressional allocations, although the overall size of the CDF has increased. It has
also stopped the practice of resorting to ad hoc cuts on debt service funds.
Box 4.2 Congressional Allocations and Initiatives
Opacity renders the estimation of congressional allocations and initiatives in all their forms extremely
difficult, though rough estimates put the CDF and other related funds at PhP15 billion annually. Such a
large amount of discretionary funds that do not pass through the normal budget process diminishes the
credibility of Government’s strategic allocation procedures and efforts to instill fiscal discipline. CDF
issues may also be seen as part of a broader governance problem. Viewed through the project cycle lens,
the main distortionary effects can be summarized below
Project formulation. It is debatable whether local-level and community consultations are adequately or
appropriately done: even where needs and priorities are laid out, local plans reportedly may not be
considered in selecting CDF projects. As a result, legislators’ interventions may lead to inappropriate
selection of projects and interruption of funding for previously identified projects. More importantly,
CDF projects sustain the patronage mentality among LGUs who view CDF allocations as additional
sources of funds for desired projects. This, however, subverts national government efforts to minimize
the use of national funds for devolved activities and induce fiscal discipline in LGUs.
Project procurement. Preidentification of products, suppliers, and contractors by Congressmen preempts
competitive government bidding processes. And notwithstanding detailed guidelines and adequate
procurement capability of national agencies, waivers of existing policies are known to be obtained for
suppliers/contractors preselected by legislators.
Project implementation. National government agencies are commonly used as implementing agencies
for CDF projects. It is commonly agreed that their performance in implementing CDF projects can be
improved considerably. Implementation weaknesses stem from (i) lack of consultation with LGUs and
stakeholders, (ii) such projects often not being part of the implementing agency’s core functions, (iii)
field personnel (DPWH in particular) becoming vulnerable to undue influence from congressmen who
have the influence to have them replaced. A common problem in managing CDF resources is the frequent
realignment of funds ordered by legislators from previously identified projects. DBM has issued
guidelines to minimize such realignments and prevent wasteful use of resources.
Project audit. The role and impact of the Commission on Audit in respect of CDF projects is somewhat
unclear since these funds do not fall under the regular audit procedures. Greater disclosure of COA audit
findings on such projects can help throw light on the manner, processes and quality of project selection,
implementation, supervision, and impact.
Monitoring, transparency and public oversight. While efforts are made to publish the list of CDF
projects, the public is generally not aware of how CDF resources are spent on projects and whether such
allocations have resulted in actual benefits. Misuse and waste of CDF resources is perceived to be so
widespread that it becomes “everybody’s problem and nobody’s personal responsibility.” The CDF’s
opacity has been attributed to government inability to provide information for public disclosure.
Historically, though, the CDF has had such a negative connotation that there seems to be a tendency on
the part of both the legislature and the executive to veil CDF issues from public scrutiny.
Despite the drawbacks outlined above, it is also true that Congress has yet to be drawn productively into
ongoing efforts to improve planning and budgeting, and Congress’ need to be actively engaged in public
expenditure management and budget monitoring and evaluation has not yet been given adequate
importance.
42
4.42 Adjustments are made to the proposed budget as it makes its way through
Congress, which has the power to reallocate within the total amount recommended
by the President, but not to increase the total amount. While reallocations from the
President’s proposed budget national expenditure program (NEP) to the
congressionally-approved budget in the GAA typically do not generate large shifts in
sectoral allocation, they can have significant impacts on particular departments and
funds. In fiscal year (FY) 2000, for example, Congress reduced the gross NEP by
PhP50.2 billion (PhP15.8 billion from departments, including Transportation and
Communication, Education, Interior and Local Government, and other executive
departments, and PhP34.4 billion from special purpose funds, including the
allocation to local government units, the FAPs support fund, and Agriculture and
Fisheries Modernization Act fund).25 At the same time it increased the gross NEP by
PhP28.2 billion, PhP10.2 billion of which was reallocated to DPWH and PhP17.2
billion of which was reallocated to special purpose funds (PhP13.2 for the Salary
Adjustment Fund and PhP3.3 for the priority development assistant fund). In the
agriculture, agrarian reform and natural resources (AARNR) sector appropriations
declined from 7.4% to 7.1% of total budgetary allocations. In other priority sectors,
namely health and education, however, the share of sector allocations increased
slightly.
4.43 Three interesting patterns emerge from the congressional reallocation data in
FY2000 (further analyses would have to be done to determine whether these patterns
hold over time). First, funds were reallocated to locally funded projects (LFPs)
within departments (for example, DECS, DOH, DPWH, and DSWD). DPWH saw a
net increase of PhP10.2 billion in its budget, with a large increase in LFPs, which
jumped by nearly PhP12 billion. Congress also created entirely new LFPs in
infrastructure, local infrastructure projects, other national public works, and water
supply projects. The concern is the effectiveness and efficiency of these
expenditures, which were not vetted by DPWH as part of the budget process.
Requiring an evaluation of all LFPs would help ensure that all expenditures were
subject to evaluation standards.
4.44 Second, in many departments Congress reduced funds available for FAPs.26
In FY2000, the reductions were quite drastic in some cases. FAPs in DECS were cut
by nearly 19%, in DA by 30%, in DOTC by 43%, in DOH by 66%, and in DILG by
84%, indicating an apparent lack of consensus in Congress about the utility of the
FAP resource allocations approved by the executive through the NEDA ICC process.
Congressional realignments may likely stem from political reasons disregarding in
the process the ICC evaluation methodology, and the relevance of FAPs to the
Medium-Term Public Investment Program (MTPIP) and Medium-Term Philippine
Development Plan (MTPDP).
4.45 Third, in most departments Congress reduced allocations for general
administration and support services (GAS), in some cases considerably (32% in
DECS and DOF, 24% in DILG, and 20% in DPWH). Reductions in GAS were
mainly due to reallocation of terminal and retirement benefits to fund the mandatory
salary adjustment of government employees. In some instances, however, it is
unclear whether congressional cuts are efficient in removing bureaucratic waste or
inefficient in cutting back necessary administrative functions. This suggests that the
effectiveness of GAS expenditures should figure prominently in the next round of the
SEER.27 It also suggests that there may be a counterproductive dynamic, in which
departments, anticipating that Congress will reduce their GAS appropriations, inflate
them in their budget proposals.
4.46 In sum, to the extent that Congress and the executive do not share the same
priorities or preferences for certain types of spending in the annual budget process,
not to mention the forward estimates developed in the MTEF, the program of annual
and multiyear budgeting becomes less effective, and line agencies become less
convinced of the credibility of budget figures. DBM has broached the idea of seeking
a “budget accord” with Congress. The budget accord could be fleshed out by
focusing on the areas of apparent disagreement identified in this analysis.
4.47 The prevalence of special congressional initiatives in the national budget
process also raises the issue of budget comprehensiveness, as expenditures from such
funds are frequently “off-budget” in the sense that they are not evaluated during the
budget formulation stage. Individual senators and congresspersons are also entitled to
a variety of additional funds for development purposes, other congressional
initiatives, and compensation allowances. These congressional funds in effect
represent a significant amount of “off-budget” resource allocation not subject to the
prioritization, and transparency requirements imposed on other expenditures during
the budget preparation process.
Recommendations
4.48 Agriculture and agrarian reform. It would be desirable to support and

intensify government strategies and plans to sustain agricultural growth and increase
crop productivity as laid out in the MTPDP (2001–2004). The Plan highlights the
need to focus public investments on public goods and services that would support the
(i) attainment of sustained food security including self-sufficiency on rice and white
corn, (ii) smallholder productivity and competitiveness, and (iii) diversification of
farming systems, rural livelihood and employment toward high value-added
production. MTPDP also highlights the need to expand and further enhance existing
resource counterpart schemes among national government agencies, LGUs, and rural
communities in program and project planning, implementation and monitoring to
extend and multiply limited budgetary resources, which may address the concern on
the lack of LGU resources for agriculture development.
4.49 The Government is of the view that such areas targeted for allocation of
more resources are best pursued under an institutional setting of greater private sector
participation, enhanced NG-LGU collaboration, and amidst operational convergence
approaches among stakeholders, consistent with the SEER.
4.50 In the case of agriculture, given resource constraints, public expenditure will
need to be more narrowly focused on “growth-enhancing public goods and services”
for which less than 40% of budgetary appropriations has been allocated.28
Conversely, nongrowth-enhancing expenditure such as rice price stabilization, which
accounted for 20% of allocations, should be phased out. The Government has
expressed determination in resolving issues related to the removal of the National
Food Authority’s monopoly to import rice, and to allow farmers’ organizations to
undertake direct importation.29 Major sources of growth in crop production are
envisaged to require sustained public expenditure on improved and strategically
located irrigation and farm-to-market roads, increased farmer access and adoption of
improved seed varieties, and limited area expansion.
4.51 For strengthening agrarian reform, key recommendations could comprise (i)
exploring the financing of land acquisition more through alternative sources,30 in
view of the sheer magnitude of resources required; (ii) greater use of market-oriented
and community-driven modalities of land transfer, as is being pilot-tested under the
World Bank-financed Agrarian Reform Communities Development Project Phase II
(dependent, of course, on such modalities being proven to be effective and efficient);
44
and (iii) pursuit of a “parallel approach” that balances public expenditure on land
acquisition and distribution with provision of support services to previously
redistributed landholdings—this being pursued through a convergence approach
among rural development agencies and stakeholders.
4.52 The authorities are keen to further strengthen the resource utilization and
budget process, which has improved in recent years. Two key recommendations
could comprise: (i) moving towards a functional allocation of resources, from the
existing commodity-based structure still in vogue in DA; and (ii) moving to greater
convergence of resources and eliminating duplication of functions.31 Short-term
actions—on which work is ongoing—comprise strengthening the linkage between
planning and budgeting within each agency, and further simplification of the
reporting system. Medium-term actions could comprise gradually decentralizing
budget controls to regional and LGU levels consonant with strengthening capacity
and accountability, finding ways to make levels of LGU financing proportionate to
devolved responsibilities; increasing the regularity of the budget calendar and budget
process; and strengthening the capacity of budget and accounting offices of line
agencies. In the longer term, perhaps sector representation could be invited in the
sector budget ceiling-setting process.
4.53 For prioritizing programs, activities, and projects (PAPs), key
recommendations comprise (i) in the short term, pursuit of a “plan-driven” approach
to budgeting with stronger output-outcome linkages, and a systematic review of the
key reasons for reversion of funds at year-end; (ii) in the medium term, strengthening
strategic planning capacity in agencies and LGUs, development and use of
quantitative methodologies for prioritizing agency and LGU PAPs, development and
piloting of sector-level, agency and LGU performance monitoring and assessment
methodologies; and (iii) in the longer term, adjustment of sector allocations based on
sector performance assessment results, adjustment of interagency and LGU
allocations based on performance assessment results, and developing congressional
capacity for more effective oversight of the planning and budgeting process.
4.54 Regarding the levels of expenditure in agriculture and agrarian reform, key
actions could comprise (i) in the short term, a more detailed review of apparent
agency and LGU underspending on agriculture and agrarian reform based on AFMA,
AFMP, and other objective criteria, exploring alternative methods of financing and
implementing new land acquisition; (ii) in the medium term, a review of agriculture
sector allocations based on AFMA levels, building LGU capacity to access
alternative financing schemes (e.g., BOT) for agriculture and agrarian reform PAPs
(because LGUs’ IRA dependency in the agriculture sector may now be as high as 90
%); and (iii) in the longer term, employment of alternative financing schemes and
modalities for new land acquisition, and design and implementation of alternative
LGU financing schemes.
4.55 The composition of expenditures could be improved by the following
actions: (i) in the short term, the Government of the Philippines (GOP) could begin
to phase out from private and nongrowth-enhancing goods and services including
price stabilization (which benefits only 3% of rice farmers) and production inputs
(e.g., seeds), continue to study and implement recommendations on more efficient
achievement of price stabilization and subsidy objectives, and move LGUs toward
financing major gaps in devolved responsibilities (especially communal irrigation,
research and extension and strengthening of farmers’ institutions), and channel more
resources more efficiently for agriculture development in Mindanao, considering its
untapped potential; (ii) in the medium term, a sharpened focus on growth-enhancing
public goods (e.g., irrigation, roads, research), a clearer division of labor and
complementarity between and among national government agencies, between them

and LGUs, and between and among levels of LGUs, and continued improvement of
the policy environment for private investment (e.g., removal of rural credit policy
bottlenecks); in the longer term, it would be desirable for the GOP to phase out from
private and nongrowth-enhancing goods and services.
4.56 Actions would also be needed to strengthen impact on outcomes and service
delivery: (i) in the short term, desirable actions could comprise strengthening the
SEER process, strengthen capacity at the LGU level (e.g., for agriculture sector
planning, budgeting, and extension), initiating the conduct of independent impact and
outcome assessments as one of the bases for resource allocation, and pursuing the
development of civil society performance rating systems; (ii) in the medium term,
pursuit of effective cost-sharing mechanisms for expenditures on infrastructure,
research, development and extension, and production inputs; pursuit of convergence
PAPs across DA, DAR, LGUs and the private sector especially in agrarian reform
communities;and conduct of independent impact and outcome assessments at sector,
agency and LGU levels; (iii) in the longer term, it may be necessary to “mainstream”
key issues regarding implementation of externally financed projects (e.g., project
staffing, financial management, and lessons learned).32
4.57 The proposed World Bank-financed Diversified Farm Income and Market
Development Project seeks to help reorient the current production-oriented approach
of public sector support for the agriculture sector, to one focusing on promoting
market development and private investment in the sector.
4.58 Education. The intrasectoral restructuring of the education budget in favor
of basic education evident from 1996 to 2001 requires to be at least sustained if not
intensified. However, the scope for doing so will be increasingly limited without
wide-ranging reform of higher education. Such reforms are contained in the policy
component of the proposed Education Sector Development Program of CHED.
4.59 The extent to which education sector expenditures can be rationalized and
prioritized depends on how effectively the Government can deal with the issue of
SUCs. The proliferation of SUCs (as of October 2002 there were 111 SUCs) has led
to a high burden on the education budget, and diverted scarce resources away from
more productive uses.33 Hence government proposals to rationalize budget
allocations to SUCs are entirely appropriate and deserve support.34 The Higher
Education Modernization Act of 1997 (RA 8292) has provided significant
operational flexibility to SUCs by waiving the requirement that SUCs deposit
proceeds from fees to the Treasury, provided the Board of Regents of the SUC
allows this for operational uses. In addition, increasing SUC tuition fees would not
only reduce their continued dependence on the national government budget but
would also induce discipline in their operations. However, it is desirable that
increased cost recovery be implemented hand in hand with a higher budget for a
targeted scholarship program in higher education if equity and efficiency goals are to
be addressed simultaneously. The issue of increasing the number of scholarships and
the budget implications should also be seen in relation to increasing tuition fees and
the need to increase the budget for basic education. The recommendations from
ADB’s analytical work on higher education reform are currently being discussed
with Government.
4.60 It would be desirable for TESDA to devolve the operation of the technical
and vocational education and training (TVET) centers to LGUs/private sector in line
with the SEER principles. TESDA has been requested to firm up a medium-term
‘phase-out plan’ of its direct involvement in local training centers by the end of 2004.
This would transform TESDA into an effective oversight agency, focusing on
46
planning, resource allocation, standard-setting, and coordination of the Middle Level

Skills Development (MLSD) sector.
4.61 It is desirable that monies allocated to basic education be used more
efficiently. Given resource constraints, increased allocation for MOOE would require
some relative reallocation away from personal services, for which there appears to be
considerable scope. And improvements in facilities and textbooks cannot be achieved
without increasing budget allocation for MOOE. At the school level, improving class
size could be addressed by improving the deployment of teachers: current initiatives
under the World Bank-financed first and second SEMP projects should be sustained
and accelerated. The issue of raising teachers’ salaries and the potential impact on the
wage bill should also take into account the rapid growth of population. Lastly, the
procurement reforms initiated in the education sector (e.g., textbook procurement)
should be sustained so that goods and services can be obtained efficiently and
promptly and greater savings realized.35
4.62 Health care. It would be desirable to continue the reforms being designed
and implemented by DOH and DBM, key among which include: (i) strengthening the
health statistics system; (ii) strengthening the allocation process for DOH regional
budgets so as to better match infant mortality rate (IMR) and poverty incidence; (iii)
improving the design and implementation of DOH transfers to LGUs within the
context of a wider effort to improve the overall system of intergovernmental fiscal
transfers in the Philippines; (iv) formulating and executing a more detailed
implementation plan for the HSRA to increase its effectiveness, in particular, a cost-
benefit analysis of the HSRA even as it is implemented in the convergence sites.
Such an analysis could provide pointers for sequencing reforms, prioritizing
technical assistance to LGUs and identifying possible remedial measures; (v) a
comprehensive health care plan for nonconvergence sites to help improve the quality
of health services at the barangay level, where most of the poor avail of health care
facilities; (vi) completion of an actuarial study to ensure financial sustainability of
the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHIC) as it aggressively expands
indigent coverage, to make clearer the fiscal and other implications of the current
policy of aggressively enrolling those with high health risks (the poor)—such an
assessment would also be relevant for HSRA implementation, which aims to expand
indigent coverage.
4.63 Other actions are also desirable to address DOH and DBM concerns. In the
short term: (i) the IRRs for EO 25 require promulgation and regular publication of
the Philippine Health Statistics to strengthen the health statistics system; and (ii)
more detailed internal performance indicators would require to be developed and
adopted to improve performance measurement and monitoring.36 Medium-term
actions could include developing sentinel sites to monitor health outbreaks;
reviewing continued DOH jurisdiction over supposedly devolved functions to avoid
overlap in DOH and LGU roles in health care delivery; strengthening the SEER
process in the health sector;37 phased adoption of new and more effective drug
procurement systems; and enhancing LGU capacity for health care planning,
budgeting, and service delivery. Finally, in the context of primary health care
services, the shift toward the provision of local health services, which are not as
efficient, requires careful examination, as does the demand side of health care
services, especially the provision of more private health care services. DOH would
also like to put in place a mechanism for monitoring utilization of national and local
government health budgets, given the continuing practice of realignment of budget
allocations to other “priorities.”
4.64 Allocative distortions. The Government has made some progress recently
with limiting the scope of distortion, but more could be done to hold “development
fund” expenditures to higher standards, e.g., by issue of more stringent guidelines for
such expenditures. For example, a standard cost-effectiveness or cost-benefit
evaluation could be required for all congressional initiatives.
4.65 Specific recommendations to address CDF issues include the following.
(i) Enhancing the transparency of CDF expenditures through wider public
disclosure of funds allocated for CDFs, transparent reflection of CDF allocations
in the GAA as a budgetary item, regular publication of information on DBM
fund releases for ongoing projects, generating supporting financial information
for project monitoring by beneficiaries/communities;
(ii) Minimizing individual discretion by promulgating guidelines/criteria for
prioritizing projects in accordance with a sectoral plan, and strengthening the
Regional Development Council and its sectoral committees to match projects
with actual community needs;
(iii) Improving the effectiveness of CDF expenditures by making the Development
Budget Coordinating Committee (DBCC) responsible for programming
sustainable CDF allocations; standardizing consultation processes between
congressmen, implementing agencies, LGUs, and beneficiary communities
(barangays) at the project identification phase; and subjecting CDF policy and
guidelines to periodic reviews to inform policy makers of their impact on project
effectiveness and costs; and
(iv) Strengthening public oversight through, for example, beneficiary or participatory
monitoring,38 establishing a national-level NGO to monitor CDF projects and
programs (e.g., a “CDF Watch” as propounded by Congressman Villarama), and
mounting public advocacy for tightening processes for congressional initiatives.
48
5. The MEDIUM-TERM EXPENDITURE FRAMEWORK

and the BUDGET CYCLE
5.1 The National Government’s Public Expenditure Management
Improvement Program (PEMIP) has set out a multiyear program of reform that Better medium-term
has the potential to impact all significant aspects of public expenditure
management in the Philippines. The centerpiece of the PEMIP is the use of a expenditure
medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF), which addresses macrofiscal
planning as well as key sectoral expenditure issues. At this early stage, the policy planning and
framework for reforms and the basic building blocks have been put in place. budgeting could
These include the elements of an MTEF, a performance evaluation framework,
and mechanisms to improve the link between planning and budgeting. Such make overall budget
reforms require considerable time, commitment, and coordination to yield the
benefits of greater fiscal discipline, and improved strategic allocation of
management and
resources and gains in operational efficiency. The challenges now are to maintain expenditure
the momentum of reforms, to coordinate and manage the process, to prioritize
key actions, and to continue to refine the institutional framework. allocation more
Policies, Plans, and Budgets: The Political Dimension responsive to
5.2 The technical aspects of the policy-making, planning, and budgeting national priorities.
processes make sense only in relation to the political processes that underpin
them. In the Philippines the key political actors who determine the outcomes of
these processes, and are ultimately responsible for linking them, are the
President, the Cabinet, and the Congress. Within the executive branch DBM is
principally responsible for formulating and implementing the budget while the
National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) Board, acting through
its Secretariat, is responsible for formulating and coordinating “social and
economic policies, plans, and programs.” It is the Congress, however, from
which appropriation and revenue bills must originate. The way in which the
President, in conjunction with DBM and NEDA, and the Congress interact
determines how, and how effectively, policies and plans are translated into
budgets.
5.3 Within the executive branch most of the key political decisions about
budget formulation, which must be approved by the President, are made by
DBCC. DBCC39 is responsible for recommending to the President the annual
aggregate level of expenditure as well as key sectoral ceilings and the allocation
of expenditures between current and capital outlays.40 Four concerns, which are
treated in this chapter and the next, arise about the political and bureaucratic
processes by which plans and budgets are put together in the executive branch.
5.4 First, DBCC has no formal role, as yet, in the Government’s medium-
term expenditure program, as DBCC is only required to make a recommendation
to the President on the annual budget. The forward year estimates of the
MTEFare presented as part of the annual budget call, but unless they are given
greater importance by means of cabinet endorsement, it is unclear whether they
will be regarded as credible by key political actors.
5.5 Second, the National Government’s policy-making process could be
strengthened somewhat in comparison with the more technical planning process
coordinated by the NEDA Secretariat. The policy-making process largely centers
around the President’s State of the Nation Address (SONA), which is a general
statement of policy directions, priorities, and goals. A more active policy-making
process, managed by the Cabinet, would help strengthen the planning process
and make it more relevant to political realities.
5.6 Third, clarifying the responsibilities between NEDA and DBM over
budget formulation as well as budget evaluation would make the budget process
less complex and more transparent. For example, in some cases the complexity of
the processes has led to the use of informal channels to make or convey
departmental allocation decisions. In addition, greater clarity about the division
of labor between NEDA and DBM over the SEER and the organizational
performance indicator framework (OPIF) is necessary to avoid confusion at the
line department level. DBM and NEDA have begun to address these concerns
(three harmonization workshops were held in 2002), but further progress is
needed.
5.7 An additional concern arises about the working relationship between the
executive and the legislature during the annual budget process. At times the
relationship has been conflictual, as would be expected in a democracy. The
question is how to manage the policy and political differences that exist. Three
key issues emerge. The first is the extent to which Congress revises the
President’s budget according to its own priorities, possibly shifting resources
from the President’s priorities. The second issue is the extent to which Congress
and the executive tussle over budget prioritization issues via the budget execution
process. The third issue, which is relevant from a longer-term perspective, is the
extent to which the MTEF’s forward year estimates are credible without
congressional endorsement.
5.8 These political and bureaucratic realities undergird the technical aspects
of the Philippines budget formulation and execution process. The extent to which
reform recommendations are successful will depend on whether they take into Greater integration of
account these political realities, yet, at the same time, certain reform measures (a) sectoral and
will necessarily address these realities directly. This chapter and the next analyze
the technical aspects of the public expenditure management process, addressing national planning, (b)
and building on the political issues outlined above.
national and regional
Planning: Processes and Instruments
planning, and (c) the
A. Medium-Term Planning and Budgeting: Issues and Actions Taken MTPDP with the
5.9 The key document in the planning process is the MTPDP, a 6-year plan MTPIP development
that coincides with the presidential term and is updated and revised in the third
year of the President’s term. The starting point for the MTPDP is the President’s process would
SONA, which is a broad statement of policy directions, priorities, and goals. enhance the utility of
5.10 In recent years the MTPDP has proven to be an impressive document
the MTPDP and its
that details key issues and policies in each sector as well as for the Government
as a whole. The challenge is now to improve the link between the MTPDP and link with the budget.
the budget process, and subject the MTPDP to the resource-constraining function
of the budget.
5.11 The link between the MTPDP and the budget, including the MTPIP, is
known to still require strengthening, and toward the end of the presidential term,
when the MTPDP has less relevance, there tends to be less linkage between the
50
MTPDP and the budget. The major concern about the MTPIP is that it is not
resource-constrained, though the Government is moving toward developing
forward budget ceilings that will be used to constrain the MTPIP in line with
available resources. Another shortcoming is that the MTPDP does not provide
cost estimates for proposed strategies, targets, or programs. Manasan (2002) has
shown, for example, that the estimated recurrent cost of basic education that
would be necessary to meet the program targets set in the MTPDP exceeds the
actual budget allocated of about 0.5% of GNP per year in 2002–2004. The
MTPDP could draw on some cost estimates provided in sector plans, as in the
case of health, which provided a cost estimate for its medium-term plan (though
it identified a funding gap of PhP36 billion). The MTPDP could also usefully
indicate the indicative breakdown of funding by source: national budget, LGU
resources, private sector participation, and funds from cost-recovery policies.
Neither are strategies and targets prioritized in terms of available resources.
Moreover, the MTPDP contains only a very limited discussion of medium-term
expenditures in terms of the sectoral allocation of resources.
5.12 The MTPDP would be strengthened by a more substantive discussion of
the planned composition of expenditures over the medium term and clear
linkages between the medium-term estimates and the strategies and targets
presented in the sector chapters. The usefulness of the MTPDP would be greatly
enhanced by the inclusion of an additional chapter devoted to a presentation of
the medium-term expenditure framework, which would ideally include a
discussion of the rationale for medium-term budget composition and budgets
clearly linked to planning priorities. Over the longer term, the Government might
consider preparing an annual policy and budget statement, which would not only
show how policy commitments in the MTPDP are to be funded, but also would
explain deviations from previous forward estimates.
5.13 Though the weak link between planning and budgeting is clearly the
major concern, there are challenges inherent in the current planning process that
need to be overcome to enhance the utility of the MTPDP and its link with the
budget. These include the greater integration of (i) sectoral and national planning,
(ii) national and regional planning, and (iii) the MTPDP and the MTPIP.
B. Sectoral and National Planning: Issues and Actions Taken
5.14 All sectors in the Philippines engage in some form of planning. Some
departments have sophisticated planning processes that provide more than just
inputs into the national planning process. DOH, for example, produces its own
planning document, the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA),41 intended to
serve as the basis of its short- to medium-term planning, programming, and
budgeting process, is presented in external fora to solicit feedback and is used as
an input for the MTPDP.
5.15 The national planning process aims to ensure that sectoral planning is
fully integrated into the national planning process through the MTPDP.
Comparing the HSRA (1999–2004) with the MTPDP (1999–2002) and the
revised, mid-term MTPDP (2001–2004) is instructive for three reasons. First, it
indicates that although the priority reforms are broadly consistent at the general
level, there are different emphases in the underlying direction, which may result
in different policy and resource allocation decisions (including target setting).
For example, the HSRA emphasizes the need for additional funding for public
health, while the MTPDP (1999-2002) emphasizes management reform. In

practice this will result in differences of opinion about the proper level of funding
of public health programs. The HSRA and the midterm MTPDP show greater
discrepancies on the issues of tertiary sector reform. This would seem to indicate
that in some cases sectoral planning is not fully integrated into the national
planning process though the concern should be placed on the rolling nature of the
planning process, which evolves over time.
5.16 Second, different emphases of the plans can result in different sectoral
budget allocations. For example, the midterm MTPDP includes two priority
actions from the SONA that would likely require either additional resource
allocations or the reallocation of resources within the sector. These measures
might “crowd out” in a budgetary sense the other priority reforms identified both
in the MTPDP and the HSRA. If sectoral plans are not well linked with the
budget process, some planning priorities do not become real budgetary priorities.
5.17 Third, the plan as designed by DOH in this case is intended to be holistic
as its specific elements are intended to be complementary. When certain elements
of its plan are deemphasized and other elements added, the plan loses some of its
complementarity among components, and thus becomes less effective.
5.18 Another recurring challenge for the Government has been the stove-
piping of the planning process in individual departments, which has resulted in
the loss of a more comprehensive vision in some sectors. This has occurred in
spite of NEDA’s efforts to bring together the planning process at the sectoral
level in its social and infrastructure committees, which suggests that there has not
been as much communication across the departments as intended by the system.
As part of the government’s PEMIP, however, there has been some progress in
moving from departmental to sectoral planning (e.g., DBM’s issuance of sectoral
The LGU
budget ceilings). planning agenda
C. Regional and National Planning: Issues and Actions Taken needs to be more
5.19 Given that the MTPDP is based on sectoral and regional planning, the directly
LGU planning agenda is not directly addressed in the MTPDP. Rather, the
MTPDP process works on the assumption that sectoral planning has already addressed in the
incorporated the regional planning process, which in turn is supposed to have MTPDP to make
already incorporated LGU planning priorities. Thus, regional planning is
indirectly reflected in the MTPDP. There are constraints, however, that limit the the latter more
genuine integration of regional priorities in the MTPDP.
relevant as an
5.20 The sectoral-regional planning link could be improved in general, though
there are some regions in which the link is stronger than in others. The LGC of instrument for
1991 empowered LGUs to engage in their own planning processes, which pro-poor
implied a reduced role for NEDA, the national planning and policy coordinating
body.42 Many LGUs at the municipal and provincial levels engage in interventions.
comprehensive planning processes. NEDA, on the other hand, maintains 12
regional offices that serve the regional development councils (RDCs), which are
meant to liaise with the LGUs in their areas and focus on issues of inter-
provincial impact to produce regional development plans (RDPs). RDCs are also
intended to influence LGU planning processes through central planning
guidelines and policy pronouncements. RDPs, however, do not explicitly
52
consider local priorities unless they have regionwide impact. The result is a
limited integration of LGU and regional plans.
5.21 An additional concern is the break in the planning chain, which is
composed of two segments. The LGU segment runs from the barangays to the
municipalities/cities to the provinces, and the national segment runs from the
regions to the sectors to the central level. The break occurs between the
provincial and regional levels, indicating the need for a more formal linkage
between the LGU and national planning chains, though fully respecting LGU
autonomy. One option would be to reorient the RDCs/RDPs so that they become
a forum for integrating sectoral and LGU planning. The RDC, presided over by
the governor, could become a forum in which the sectors and relevant LGUs
actually integrate their planning processes to strengthen complementarities and
improve coordination without infringing on local autonomy. The key would be to
make regional sectoral offices reflect LGU priorities in their planning
submissions before forwarding those submissions on to their central offices,
though regional and LGU planning timetables would have to be adjusted.
Actually empowering RDCs to do this important work would likely be difficult
in the short run, which would seem to suggest a pilot approach in a small number
of regions to begin the transition to a more integrated local-national planning
system (see Box 5.1).
Box 5.1 Integrating National and Local Planning in the Health Sector
Since 2001, the HSRA has been implemented in areas called “convergence sites,” which
are mainly selected on the basis of the willingness of LGUs in these areas to support the
HSRA. In 2001, 13 LGUs were selected and an additional 20 are targeted for 2002. By
2004, an additional 32 provinces and cities will be included in the program. Essentially,
DOH provides technical assistance and other grants, facilitates the agreement among the
LGUs within a convergence site (say, a province), and acts as a third-party enforcer and
monitor of LGU commitments. The partial implementation of the HSRA is envisioned to
cause ripple effects that will generate interest and advocacy for reform in neighboring
areas.
D. Planning and the Capital Budget: Issues and Actions Taken
5.22 The MTPIP is a rolling, multiyear public expenditure program, which is

updated annually. The MTPIP includes not only capital investments, both
ongoing and new, but also programs as well. The MTPIP also covers all
departments and agencies, including domestically financed and ODA projects.
The MTPIP is intended as a companion to the MTPDP and is scheduled to be
published 1 month after the release of the MTPDP.
5.23 In practice there has not always been a tight link between the MTPDP
and the MTPIP, though the Government realizes this and has been working to
improve the link. In 2001, departments were required to submit 4-year lists of
their priority projects and programs. The prioritization of PAPs as well as
projects, however, was not completely successful and the MTPIP continues to be
a list of projects and programs lacking in prioritization. For example, the MTPIP
has contained even low-ranked projects, which means that it has not fulfilled its
role of allocating resources to the priorities set out in the MTPDP. To avoid this,
sector plans would have to be prioritized in greater detail.
5.24 There are two main reasons for the difficulties linking the MTPIP with
the MTPDP. The first is the status of the MTPIP itself: it is not a definitive
budget in the sense that projects must still be evaluated and approved for funding
even after being included in the MTPIP. Moreover, sector departments have
every incentive to have projects included in the MTPIP as it serves as a
gatekeeper for the actual investment budget. The result is that in practice the
MTPIP serves less a function of allocating resources to priority programs and
projects than encouraging departments to prepare lists of projects for which they
might seek funding. To resolve this problem, the MTPIP needs to be constrained
by the available resources. That is, indicative forward estimates approved by the
DBCC as part of the MTEF need to be used to set limits on aggregate and
sectoral resource allocations (any variations from the approved ceilings should
also be approved at the cabinet level). Moreover, the ceilings should include
estimated allocations for recurrent costs resulting from the new investments. The
second problem stems from the difficulty the sectors have had prioritizing their
PAPs (discussed in the next section).
5.25 For a project to be approved for funding it must pass through an
evaluation process conducted by the Investment Coordination Committee (ICC),
which is responsible for conducting technical, financial, economic, social,
institutional, and environmental analyses of the investment projects submitted.
Yet approval by the ICC guarantee funding, as the ICC process does not evaluate
the budgetary implications of new investment decisions; DBM must still make a
decision based on department ceilings about the inclusion of projects in the
budget. The process could be simplified by eliminating one of the three stages,
namely, by requiring ICC approval before listing projects in the MTPIP, which
would potentially improve the linkage between the MTPIP and the MTPDP.
Though it would be difficult to do this for the entire MTPIP, especially the outer
years, prior ICC approval could be required for projects intended to be
implemented in the early years (say over 12–24 months).
E. Planning and Gender Issues: Innovative Action in the Philippines
5.26 The issuance of a directive in 1993 by then President Fidel V. Ramos to

DBM and NEDA to ensure budgetary support for the gender and development
(GAD) approach paved the way for institutionalizing gender concerns in
mainstream programs and projects of Government. The following year, NEDA,
DBM and the National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW)
issued Joint Memorandum Circular No. 94-1, which provided the policy
framework and procedures for the integration of GAD into agency plans and
budget proposals.
5.27 Under RA 7192, NEDA is mandated to ensure the participation of
women as recipients of foreign aid, grants, and loans and for determining the
amount to be allocated for development activities involving women. Together
with the NCRFW, it is also tasked to assess the extent to which agencies’ PAPs
integrate women in the development process and of the impact of PAPs on
women. It is also mandated to devise measures to build and strengthen linkages
with the concerned legislative subcommittees to ensure complementarity in
policy directions and recommend gender issues for the legislative agenda.
5.28 The 1995 GAA was a milestone in Philippine budgeting history in that it
required all government departments, bureaus, offices, and agencies to set aside
54
5% of their appropriations for projects designed to address gender issues in

accordance with RA 7192. The same provision of the budget law provided for a Through its MTEF, the
reporting mechanism to enable NCRFW to monitor compliance. This policy has
since been incorporated annually in the GAA, though revisions have been made Government has put in
to ensure effective implementation of the GAD budget policy. The advantage of place the elements of a
this approach is that the inclusion of the GAD Budget law in the GAA has served
as an enabling and advocacy tool that could be used by NCRFW and its partners, state-of-the-art public
from both government and nongovernment organizations, in working toward
GAD mainstreaming. As an advocacy tool, it helps draw the attention of agencies expenditure
to important gender concerns. However, some have raised concerns about the management reform
problem of earmarking and the additional complexity it introduces into the
budget process. program, but much
5.29 On the whole, the implementation of the GAD budget policy has work is required to
improved since its inception in 1995 as evidenced by the increasing number of
reporting agencies as well as the amount of allocation to gender-related spending. institutionalize and
However, the total amount of GAD budget resources of all government agencies mainstream the MTEF.
accounted for an average of only 0.48% of the total general appropriations per
year. In addition, the lack of a strategy to synchronize agency planning and
budgeting for GAD with the Government’s budgeting cycle poses a major
obstacle to increasing the number of GAD-related budget proposals submitted by
agencies. Thus, much progress has yet to be achieved in monitoring the actual
implementation of PAPs that were funded under the GAD budget. The lack of a
budget code that will help DBM monitor the extent of agencies’ implementation
of GAD-related PAPs exacerbates the problem, indicating the need for a
monitoring and evaluation system for GAD-related PAPs.
The Medium-Term Perspective: Revenue and Expenditure
Planning and Budgeting
5.30 EO 292 lays down that “The annual budgets of the national government
shall be prepared as an integral part of a long-term budget picture.” Through its
MTEF, the Government has put in place the elements of a state-of-the-art public
expenditure management reform program. The central oversight agencies that
lead the different elements of these reforms, such as DBM, NEDA, and COA,
realize that—as is to be expected with such reforms—much work is required over
the medium term to institutionalize and mainstream these reforms.
5.31 The Philippines began to introduce the MTEF with the FY2000 National
Budget Call.43 The stated goals of the MTEF were to restructure the budget over
the medium term to better support the Government’s development strategy and
improve technical efficiency in the sectors by “providing a more predictable
resource environment for program planning and implementation.” The
Government’s reform program (PEMIP) is being rolled out on an incremental
and somewhat flexible basis. The instruction on agency performance measures,
which became the OPIF, was introduced in the FY2000 Budget Call along with
the MTEF, and was refined in the FY2001 and FY2002 budget calls, while the
periodic assessment of ongoing PAPs was introduced in the FY2001 Budget Call
as the SEERs The MTEF, OPIF, and SEER constitute the three pillars of the
Government’s public expenditure management reform program. There is no
doubt that the Government’s PEMIP is comprehensive and far-reaching; the next
stage of reform should focus on consolidating the program and making the
Government’s vision a reality.
A. Macroeconomic-Fiscal Framework: Issues and Actions Taken
5.32 The key issues comprise (i) improving the accuracy of revenue forecasts
(by strengthening BIR’s capacity to collect and analyze data), (ii) enhancing
cooperation between DOF, BIR, NEDA, and DBM through the DBCC, and (iii)
institutionalizing the revenue forecasting process to provide the necessary
impartial and technical expertise.
5.33 Improving the accuracy of revenue forecasting. One of the
prerequisites of a medium-term perspective in budgeting is the capacity to make
realistic macroeconomic and fiscal forecasts. The credibility of the entire
medium-term perspective hinges on the credibility of the macroeconomic-fiscal
framework. While the Government has taken some measures to improve its
ability to estimate aggregate resources, concrete results have thus far been
somewhat limited. The problem is both technical, in the sense of information
systems and modeling, and institutional, in the sense of the organizational
arrangements used to produce the resource estimates.
5.34 The Government’s medium-term fiscal framework serves as the basis for
determining the annual budget proposal. The fiscal framework includes some
discussion of the specific measures the government will pursue to increase tax
revenues, though some of the measures are vague and, taken together, they seem
rather more like a long list of generic reforms, lacking a strategy and timetable.
Neither is the specific impact or timing of each measure considered. The
Government could enhance the credibility of its fiscal framework by prioritizing
reforms annually and estimating the likely tax revenue impact of each reform
measure.
5.35 Given the importance of revenue target setting to the overall
management of public expenditures, it is especially critical that the targets be as
realistic as possible. Recent experience suggests a pattern of undercollection
relative to the official government target, especially in internal revenues. In
7years out of 10, BIR’s collections have not met the target goal. The breach
between the goal and actual collections has grown since the late 1990s. The
ripples from poor estimation of the resource envelope are felt throughout the
entire expenditure management process. Inaccurate revenue estimation has
undermined attempts by the Government to improve budgetary predictability and
the nascent MTEF as well.
5.36 In practice, revenue estimates are calculated using multiple sources of
data and multiple methodologies, which seem to have undermined the official
estimates by generating ambiguity and controversy. In addition to DOF, tax
revenues are also estimated by NEDA, BIR, and the National Tax Research
Center (NTRC). Each uses different datasets and different methodologies.
Estimates from different sources (though only DOF forecasts are official) have
resulted in a lack of consistency.
5.37 To improve the predictability of resource allocations, the breach between
forecast and actual collections needs to be reduced as much as practically
possible. One way to do this is to improve BIR’s performance (see Chapter 2).
The other way is to improve the accuracy of the revenue estimates. There are two
56
problems with the formulation of the revenue estimates at present. The first
concerns deficiencies in the tax revenue database maintained by BIR, which does
not capture all the necessary data. For example, BIR compiles data by major tax
type and region, but not by industry. The problem is compounded by the fact that
only 43 of the 116 BIR districts are computerized. An even more pressing
problem is that not all computerized districts actually input data into the system.
There are also some issues with the design of BIR’s tax forms. DOF will need to
work closely with BIR to improve information capture and management.
5.38 Interagency cooperation and coordination. The second concern with
the formulation of revenue estimates is how they are produced. MOF’s Fiscal
Policy and Planning Office (FPPO) has formal responsibility for producing the
official revenue targets, which are then discussed and issued by DBCC.
Coordination between DOF and BIR, however, has been less than satisfactory,
though BIR is represented on a DBCC technical working group. The lack of
high-level BIR participation and coordination means that BIR’s views are not
necessarily taken into account, which, to the extent that BIR has asymmetrical
information about expected revenues, may result in suboptimal projections.
Improved coordination would strengthen accountability as BIR would be
required to explain how new administrative measures would impact collections.
5.39 In response to the apparent problem with revenue forecasting, the BIR
organized the Inter-Agency Task Force on the Improvement of Tax Related
Database (IATF) in February 2001 to address issues with the sources and
integrity of data, as well as the methodologies utilized to estimate revenues. The
IATF was composed of four technical subgroups, each of which evaluated
existing BIR databases and tax forecasting models. The IATF made
recommendations on improving both the databases and the models, some of
which are being considered for implementation.
5.40 The IATF has benefited from the participation of highly regarded
researchers. The benefit of having independent researchers accrues not only in
the application of their technical expertise to the challenge of accurately
forecasting revenues, but also in their impartial, professional interest in carrying
out the exercise. Given the perception that the revenue estimation process in the
Philippines is undermined by political incentives, it would be desirable to make
the process both more transparent and methodologically sounder. DOF has
already begun to take measures: (i) improving the forecasting models, (ii)
creating a new revenue forecasting task force under DBCC, and (iii)
adoptingadministrative arrangements to improve the exchange of data and allow
for development of models on a continuous basis. The Government should also
consider establishing a “revenue forecasting calendar,” by means of an official
circular to coincide with the budget calendar, in which a timetable as well as a
clear division of responsibilities, including provision and analysis of data, would
be regularized.
B. Sector Expenditure Frameworks: Issues and Actions Taken
5.41 The Government is keenly aware that the SEERs should continue to
provide the basic building block of the sector expenditure frameworks, but also
that the central oversight agencies should refine the instrument to include
selected analysis of priority program costs, provide the necessary training and
technical support to mainstream the instrument, and explore ways of increasing

sector ownership.
5.42 The Government has been making progress toward the development of
sound sector expenditure management by introducing the MTEF and the Sector
Effectiveness and Efficiency Reviews (SEERs). The Government has also
improved on the budget process by introducing a baseline budgeting approach,
which has increased the transparency of the budgeting process. Moreover, the
Government has taken seriously the challenge of developing medium-term
expenditure estimates and linking them with its medium-term planning process.
The challenge for the medium term is to improve and institutionalize the
frameworks, which will require additional training and human resources in both
oversight and line departments.
5.43 Baseline and above-the-baseline budgeting in the MTEF. The
framework for sector expenditures is founded on the principle of baseline
budgeting, and begins when DBM issues a circular containing 3-year
departmental baseline budget ceilings (budget year 2 outer years). The
calculation of baseline budgets for 2001–2003 was done according to an iterative
process.44 In the first iteration baseline budgets were calculated as a function of
net current operating expenditures for the previous year, funding for ongoing
multiyear projects, funding to maintain newly completed capital and
infrastructure projects and programs, and other nonrecurring items. Net
maintenance and other operating expenditures (MOOE) were calculated taking
into account the absorptive capacity (or the proportion of actual obligations
incurred to allotments released) of the department over the previous2 years and
adjusting it by a targeted efficiency improvement rate. Using this method,
however, yielded individual ceilings greater than the total budget ceiling for
2001. DBM then carried out a second iteration in which “across –the-board cuts”
were applied to the MOOE of low- and medium-priority PAPs, and then a third
iteration, in which MOOE and capital outlays were cut uniformly by sector (with
the exception of provisions for FAPs). The resulting allocations formed the
baseline budget.
5.44 For the FY2003 budget call, additional changes have been introduced.45
Indicative ceilings for each department correspond to their specific appropriation
levels for FY2002. Agencies are also required to submit their estimated
expenditures for FY2004 and FY2005. DBM has initiated work on estimating
actual costs of PAPs in FY2002 to complement the “top down” resource
envelopes with “bottom up” cost estimates, and will refine these costings for the
FY2004 budget call. DBM jointly with line departments is developing uniform
procedures for the costing exercise. Forward estimates for FY2004–FY2005 will
then be informed by the results.
5.45 There are several ways in which the Government might consider
improving its approach with the objectives of increasing the transparency of
allocation decisions and improving the prioritization of resource allocation. The
main concern is that the forward estimate methodology is not primarily based on
the prioritization of resources. That is, it takes as its starting point the previous
year’s budget, which may or may not accurately reflect inter- and intrasectoral
government priorities, and makes further uniform reductions to MOOE and
capital expenditures, which are by definition devoid of any priority-enhancing
impact. It is only in the second iteration in which reductions are made according
58
to government priorities. Indeed, beginning the process with the previous year’s
baseline does not allow for any prioritization. The use of prioritization criteria
should be adopted in the first iteration. Reductions could be made in low-priority
PAPs in the first iteration and further reductions, if necessary, could be made to
medium-priority PAPs. The replacement of across the board, uniform reductions
with priority-based reductions in all sectors would also make the calculation
process more transparent to line departments. For instance, instead of reducing
expenditures “across-the-board,” reductions could be made according to the
medium-term forward estimates of expenditures by sector, which are presented in
the MTPDP. This would introduce the criteria of intersectoral prioritization,
which was not explicitly used in the baseline budget approach.
5.46 Another potential improvement in the process would be to avoid the
assumption of efficiency improvements in absorptive capacity. Basing the
calculation on actual capacity would give agencies incentives to improve their
resource execution mechanisms. In 2002 DBM initiated comprehensive midyear
reviews of agency performance focusing on income generation (where
applicable), physical accomplishments, and financial management. The results of
the midyear review were used to allocate the remaining 25% of allotments for the
fourth quarter based on agency performance. The mid-year review is an
important innovation in the national expenditure management system and should
be harmonized with the SEER process to maximize impact.
5.47 Some of the prioritization problem may be mitigated by existing
measures. DBM has introduced an important measure allowing department
secretaries and agency heads to “reallocate baseline budgets among the
component agencies of the department,” subject to certain limitations on
personnel services and ongoing FAPs.46 In theory, departments could reallocate
their baseline budgets to higher-priority PAPs. DBM should also give
departments the option of sharing in some of the cost savings by allowing them
to reallocate resources from low-priority PAPs toward new high-priority PAPs.
This would serve as a positive incentive for departments to prioritize
expenditures. Given the difficulties with the ranking process thus far, it is unclear
how much actual reallocation has taken place at the departmental level.
Moreover, given the constraints on reducing personal services, which account for
large shares of departmental budgets, it is unclear how much room for maneuver
departments have.
5.48 The design of the current methodology is such that MOOE and capital
expenditures bear the brunt of baseline reductions. Given the statutory nature of
personal service obligations (for filled permanent positions) and the high priority
accorded to FAPs, it is not surprising that nonwage recurrent and capital
expenditures are reduced in the face of budget squeezes. A more effective
approach would be to reduce all expenditures for low-priority PAPs, including
those on personal services. If personal services, MOOE and capital expenditures
were all reduced for low-priority PAPs as necessary, it might be possible to avoid
any cuts of medium-priority PAPs, or at least to minimize them.
5.49 In spite of DBM’s reform program, there is some concern that it has not
taken root at the departmental level. For example, in DepEd, on the whole, the
current budgeting process at the national level largely involves incremental
budgeting (Manasan and Atkins 2001). Thus, the DepEd central office, in
conjunction with the regional and division offices, prepares an annual budget that
is primarily based on the previous year’s level of expenditures after allowing for
salary increases, inflation adjustment (for MOOE) and major changes in
provision (e.g., creation of new schools). Moreover, DepEd does not prepare
forward estimates of its budget requirements. The SEER process and costing
exercise under way have the potential to address the problem of incremental
budgeting.
5.50 Credibility of the annual and forward budget estimates. Another
issue of great import is the credibility of the baseline budgets and forward
estimates. If the baseline budgets and forward estimates are not credible, their
usefulness as management tools will be reduced. Moreover, if the forward
estimates are not realistic, departments will not be assured of the predictability
they need to develop meaningful plans. Though the baselines were issued in
April 2000 for FY2001, the budget for FY2001 turned out to be a reenactment of
the FY2000 budget, given that Congress did not pass a new budget by the
required date. The reenactment of the FY2000 budget, with adjustments made for
the FY2001 resource envelope, meant that many priority departments received
less than their proposed baselines, even though the baselines were meant as a
minimum owing to the fact that they did not include above the baseline
allocations. DA, DepEd, DOH, and DOTC all received less than their baseline
budgets.47 The reenacted budget undermined the government’s efforts to move
toward a medium-term perspective. Strengthening the credibility of the forward
estimates also requires greater attention to the link between planning and
budgeting. It is not clear at the moment that sectors consider even the 1-year
forward estimate as a solid allocation on which to base management decisions.
5.51 How the role of the Congress vis-à-vis the executive in the budget
process affects the credibility of the annual and forward budget estimates has
been outlined in Chapter 2. The key patterns to emerge from an analysis of the
FY2002 budget process are: (i) funds were reallocated to locally funded projects
within departments and Congress also created entirely new LFPs, which raises
concerns about these expenditures, given that they have not been vetted by
departments during the budget process; (ii) in many departments Congress
reduced funds available for FAPs (in some cases, quite drastically; and (iii) in
most departments Congress reduced allocations for the GAS, in some cases
considerably (32% in DepEd and DOF, for example).
5.52 To the extent that Congress and the executive do not share the same
priorities or preferences, the program of annual and multiyear budgeting becomes
less effective, and budget figures become less credible. DBM has broached the
idea of seeking a “Budget Accord” with Congress, which could be fleshed out
over the medium term by focusing on these apparent areas of disagreement.
5.53 Sector Effectiveness and Efficiency Reviews (SEERs). The
Government is also building the MTEF from the “bottom up” by conducting
SEERs, which are intended to strengthen the link between planning and
budgeting. The introduction of SEERs is an important step toward prioritization
of public expenditures in line with the MTPDP. The purpose of the SEER is to
evaluate existing budgetary PAPs according to their relevance in attaining
desired sectoral and departmental outcomes.
5.54 To undertake these SEERS, agencies are required to perform the
following steps: (i) reach consensus on sector outcomes; (ii) specify their major
60
final outputs (MFOs) and the link of MFOs to sector outcomes; (iii) specify the
relation of each of the PAPs to the relevant MFO(s); and (iv) classify all PAPs by The Government is
priority. The priority ranking is determined by the extent to which an individual
PAP contributes to the attainment of an outcome, consistent with both the legal building the MTEF
basis of the agency and the priorities of the MTPDP. from the “bottom
5.55 NEDA, the lead agency for the SEER process, was also supported by
48 up” by conducting
DBM. NEDA and DBM issued joint guidelines to line departments for the
development of their SEERs. Line agencies were then required to undertake an Sector Effectiveness
internal SEER, focusing on identifying sector outcomes and agency MFOs, and
ranking PAPs in relation to MFOs. Agency SEERs were then reviewed by and Efficiency
NEDA and DBM, which provided recommendations on improving SEER Reviews (SEERS),
outputs. The SEER process was also to include congressional staff to foster
greater appreciation about the linkages between agency outputs and sectoral intended to
outcomes.49 Based on the FY2001 experience, NEDA and DBM are drafting new
SEER guidelines that focus on systematizing the rankings of PAPs and strengthen the link
expanding the notion of MFOs to cover departmental objective statements. In between planning
addition, NEDA and DBM will require departments to specify basic information
about each MFO: what is delivered, why, for whom, and how. With the new and budgeting.
guidelines, NEDA and DBM will work with departments to refine their PAPs
and MFOs for the FY2004 budget call.
5.56 The SEER component of the MTEF reform is an important innovation
with promise for improving the public expenditure management (PEM) process
in the Philippines. There is evidence that the SEER process is improving the way
agencies think about formulating their budgets, though some departments have
benefited more than others. In DepEd the SEER exercise has helped improve the
relationship between the planning and budgeting units. Given the early stage of
the SEER process, the Government is interested in improving how SEERs are
conducted, and there are many ways in which the SEER instrument can be
improved.
5.57 One of the problems characterizing the first SEER exercise was the
reluctance of agencies to classify any PAPs as low, for fear of budget cuts
(budget memoranda specified that low-priority PAPs would be cut as part of the
iterative baseline calculation procedure). Indeed, in the first round of the SEER
exercise most agencies rated their PAPs as high or medium. Some agencies
initially ranked all their PAPs as high. Agencies were even more reluctant to rank
PAPs ordinally, and some major departments refused or were unable to do so.
5.58 The problem of ineffective rankings was addressed by NEDA, which
reclassified PAPs in some agencies. However, some agencies disagreed with
NEDA’s reranking of PAPs, resulting in stalemates over the outputs of the
prioritization exercise. Since some agencies did not agree with NEDA’s ranking,
the prioritization exercise did not officially become part of the budget.
5.59 The explicit link between the SEER rankings and the calculation of
budget ceilings also reduced the level of departmental ownership of the SEERs,
which in turn reduced the usefulness of the exercise. If departments do not “own”
their SEERS, and if SEERs only produce a limited ranking of priority programs,
it is unlikely that agencies would use the SEER exercise to reallocate resources.
Agencies did not have incentives to reveal their preferences about existing PAPs.
Given the serious scarcity of budget resources, however, the Government is right
to link prioritization to budget cuts. The challenge is to find a way to do so,

which does not impede the prioritization process or limit ownership from the
sectoral side. One option would be to require agencies to identify a
predetermined number of low-priority programs, expressed as a percentage of the
agency’s total budget. Agencies would then be allowed to retain and reallocate a
set percentage of this amount to high-priority PAPs. This would mean that
agencies would not have to provide an ordinal ranking of PAPs, but would have
to focus on an explicit ranking of the lowest priority ones, and that agencies
would have incentives to reveal their preferences.
5.60 Another concern was the lack of an explicit link between the SEER and
program costings. Instead of estimating any actual program costs, agencies
worked from their previous baseline budgets. The lack of unit cost estimates for Human resource
PAPs in some departments, such as education, has hindered management in its
attempt to link cost with performance. Most agencies have not engaged in cost- capacity in sectoral
effectiveness analysis through the SEER exercise, which also limits its utility, budget departments
though agencies will work with DBM to estimate PAP costs. Introducing cost-
effectiveness analysis on a selective basis, initially for high-priority PAPs, would is generally weaker
help improve the efficiency of expenditures.
than in the oversight
5.61 There were other technical inadequacies that prevented departments from
fully utilizing and adopting the methodologies, which were in some cases quite agencies. The
sophisticated, developed by NEDA and DBM. In the case of the DepEd, for oversight agencies
example, many PAPs as they appear in the GAA are so broadly defined that it is
difficult to rank them. The PAPs themselves may have to be redefined in some have moved past
cases to facilitate meaningful prioritization. Moreover, many agencies do not
have the capacity to engage in a sophisticated evaluation process and some line agencies in
disengaged from it as a result. In many cases the specification of MFOs are still developing
quite crude, which impeded effective prioritization. The difficulties with the
specification of MFOs reveal a lack of understanding about the basic elements of potentially useful
the SEER process.
methodologies that
5.62 Human resource capacity in sectoral budget departments is considerably
weaker in many cases than in the oversight agencies. It seems that the oversight cannot be fully
agencies have moved past line agencies in developing potentially useful implemented by line
methodologies that simply cannot be fully implemented by line agencies at
present. agencies at present.
5.63 Though NEDA and DBM have provided training in several short
workshops, the training has been insufficient for sectoral needs. Training during
FY2002 is focusing first on DBM and NEDA, including regional offices, before
addressing line agency needs. The Government needs a technical assistance
strategy to develop line agency capacity and to strengthen capacity in the
oversight agencies. NEDA plans to develop an SEER manual, which would be a
helpful start. However, capacity-building efforts should also move beyond this,
toward substantive training in line departments. That is, DBM and NEDA should
develop capacity-building programs for line agencies, tailored to their specific
needs, in terms of strategy development, program costings, and cost-effectiveness
analysis (program costing and cost-effectiveness evaluation should be piloted for
high-priority PAPs in select departments). The technical assistance should help
departments develop monitoring and information systems for program
evaluation.
62
5.64 The joint management of the SEER and OPIF processes (see Chapter 6),
which are tightly linked, by NEDA and DBM has been challenging for both
agencies. There are still some ambiguous areas in the division of labor, and even
definitions of the elements of each process, which have complicated
implementation for line departments. Some line agencies perceived ambiguity in
guidance coming from the two oversight agencies, and there are even some areas
of disagreement between the two agencies. A harmonization process is under
way and should result in greater clarity about the organizational roles of NEDA
and DBM, but greater cooperation is necessary to support implementation of
these important initiatives. Given the overlap between the two instruments, it
might make sense to have a joint DBM-NEDA committee with joint technical
working groups responsible for both the SEERs and OPIF.
5.65 The SEER process, in seeking to prioritize departmental PAPs and
provide greater focus on key organizational mandates, naturally implies critical
thinking about agency missions, as well as analysis of organizational design and
The MTEF reform
structure. To the extent that the SEER is used to reallocate resources within
organizations, it may be necessary to rethink organizational missions and now needs to be
structures. Thus, there is an element of a functional analysis embedded in the
SEER process that is being undertaken at the departmental level across managed at the
government. Given the work of the PCEG on functional reviews, Government highest levels of the
should ensure that the two processes are integrated and complementary.
executive branch,
Management of the MTEF
according to an
5.66 The MTEF reform should be managed at the highest levels of the
executive branch, according to an explicit time-bound reform program, to explicit timetable.
improve the chances of successful implementation in line agencies and to build
support for the MTEF in congress.
5.67 The MTEF reform has been managed principally by DBM and NEDA
with the involvement of the DBCC on high-level decisions. To date, the
Government has focused on the more technical side of the MTEF. Given the
breadth of the MTEF reform, which cuts across all sectors as well as national
planning and budgeting processes, however, the MTEF needs to be managed at a
higher political level. Increasing the involvement of the DBCC in the
management process would give the MTEF greater political clout and would
increase the chances of mainstreaming the reform. Moreover, the involvement of
the executive at the highest levels in the MTEF is necessary for gaining
congressional support, over the medium term, for the initiative. The Government
should require submission of the MTEF forward estimates and expenditure
composition to the Cabinet for endorsement. Currently baseline budget forward
estimates are presented to the Cabinet for discussion, but forward estimates
inclusive of above-the-baseline allocations are not. Cabinet endorsement for
inclusive forward estimates would provide additional support for the MTEF.
5.68 Once the Government’s macrofiscal outlook is presented to Congress for
endorsement, Cabinet-endorsed forward projections could then be presented to
Congress for discussion. Presentation of MTEF forward estimates and
expenditure composition to Congress for discussion would foster greater interest,
and perhaps support, in the legislature.
5.69 Implementation of the MTEF could also be strengthened by developing a

concrete time-bound plan. The Government has proceeded with implementation
without specifying its targets for mainstreaming the reform. DBM should draw
up a plan to phase in implementation of both the macroeconomic-fiscal
framework and the sector expenditure frameworks.
Budget Foundation and Process Issues
A. Legal Foundations: Issues and Actions Taken
5.70 EO 292 provides a comprehensive and sound budget framework, but it

has not been fully implemented nor updated. It has a relatively low legal status
given the importance of the national budget. EO 292 could be updated to take
account of the LGC and of upgrading it to a budget law at the appropriate point.
5.71 In many countries, because of the importance of the budget in giving
effect to national plans for development, there is a budget law that provides the
legal basis for developing and implementing the budget. A budget law provides
clear rules that all stakeholders need to adhere to in preparing and executing the
budget, and it can provide for sanctions to be applied where the rules are not
followed.
5.72 In the Philippines at present, the legal framework seems to encompass
three core components. The 1987 Constitution is the supreme law and it
enshrines general principles guiding the budget process. Although it predates the
Constitution, PD 117750 and its associated budgeting manual are still relevant.
Several key elements of PD 1177 were incorporated into the subsequent EO 292,
which sets out the framework for national government budgeting.
5.73 The advantage of having a new budget law is that it would allow the
Government to update the legal framework in light of recent reforms. A new law
would bring together under one umbrella all the elements of the budget process.
In particular it could provide for the integration of local, regional, and national
planning and budgeting, while respecting LGU autonomy. A budget law would
institutionalize the budget process so that it is not subject to ad hoc amendments
by incoming administrations, although it is argued that the downside is that a law
introduces inflexibilities, particularly at this juncture when the process is still
undergoing significant reforms. The budget law could be framed to enshrine the
general principles, such as a medium-term horizon and the interdependence of
planning and budgeting, while leaving specific procedural details to the
implementing rules and regulations. A law can also introduce greater
accountability as it can provide for penal sanctions whereas an executive order
can only impose administrative sanctions. Given the importance of the national
budget, the greater weight of potential penal sanctions for mismanagement or
misappropriation for personal use is important.
5.74 Although EO 292 was drafted a decade prior to the current wave of
budget reforms being implemented, it provides a comprehensive framework that
embodies the key features of the current reform process. It does not, however,
specifically refer to the need to provide forward estimates of fiscal aggregates,
revenues, or expenditures. Though a legal study would be necessary, a new law
might be needed to institutionalize the MTEF and the OPIF. The EO provides
guidelines for budget preparation, including the format and content of the budget
64
and the information to be included in budget submissions. The EO further

contains important provisions on budget accountability including sanctions for
illegal use of funds although these have not been enforced.
5.75 Still, EO 292, along with the LGU code and the PEM manual, should be
reviewed and updated, to take account of developments over the past decade,
especially the LGC of 1991, to remove unnecessarily detailed provisions on
budget execution, and to provide the general framework for budget preparation.
It should provide guidelines for linking national and local budget processes and
clarify roles and responsibilities of key agencies. To accompany a budget law
and a revised EO 292, the existing PEM manual should be revised, updated, and
finalized, to incorporate all the existing guidelines so that there is only one
manual used by all of Government. In addition, thought should be given to
developing a separate PEM manual for LGUs.
B. Institutional Budget Process Issues: Issues and Actions Taken
5.76 Prior to 1999, budget preparation was exclusively the responsibility of

DBM and a line item approach was used to propose a budget for presidential
consideration. As part of the 1999 reforms, NEDA planning committees (PCs)
were given a significant role. A strength of planning committees is that they
include representatives from Congress, the private sector, and civil society. It
also gives determination of “relative priority” to a technical department, when, in
fact, prioritization should be a political choice presented to the Cabinet. The 2001
mid-term planning process showed that the PCs were ineffective precisely
because they were reluctant to make reallocations between sectors. Thus, the role
of the PCs should be recast to serve as consultative bodies to advise on key issues
raised by the Government. A final decision on the relative priority of spending
proposals and any reallocation of sectoral ceilings should be made by DBCC, or
a full Cabinet, based on the technical information provided. DBCC should issue
recommendations for consideration by full Cabinet. Cabinet should make
decisions on final sectoral and subsectoral allocations and the final choice on
policy options.
5.77 The process of evaluation within technical budget hearings (TBHs) is an
important step as it represents an opportunity for departments and agencies to
defend their proposals and to compete against the requests of other departments.
Proposals should be made by the department or agency, with independent input
or evaluation from PCs on the validity of prioritization and recommendations for
adjustments. From these hearings, recommendations should be formulated for
DBCC/Cabinet consideration. There should not be other avenues for negotiating
allocations, including conferring with Congress and within the executive branch,
as these practices undermine the technical process.
C. Budget Calendar: Issues and Actions Taken
5.78 Recent government initiatives in this area can be strengthened by

implementing a more realistic budget timetable based on a budget framework law
and harmonizing the process of producing and collecting budgetary data. From a
line agency perspective, the budget calendar is very tight. Agencies are asked to
implement significant changes in the way they plan, budget, account for funds
and activities, and report on performance. They are required to consult with civil
society in drawing up their plans, and they are asked to complete numerous forms
by the oversight agencies. If there are delays in the issuance of budget ceilings, or
in the review processes of the oversight agencies, it places undue pressure on
agencies.
5.79 The draft PEM manual sets out a clear, logical, and well-sequenced
budget timetable that begins 13 months prior to submission of the budget to Key short-term
Congress. It identifies all necessary steps and responsible agencies at each stage
of the process. However, the timetable has not been fully implemented. Shifts in actions could
the political and economic environment also placed some activities out of include improving
sequence for the 2002 budget preparation. Updating of the baselines and
reprioritizing programs and projects should take place early in the budget cycle, the presentation of
prior to the budget call being issued. Delays in finalizing the MTPDP in early
2001 due to the change of administration rippled through the rest of the process, the fiscal framework;
resulting in delays in the issuance of budget ceilings and undermining the allowing
credibility of the process.
departments to
Recommendations
reallocate a
5.80 Key short-term actions could include (i) including a statement of the specified percentage
medium-term expenditure framework in the MTPDP, with sections on medium-
term budget composition and on the explicit link between planning and budget of resources from
priorities; (ii) allowing departmental managers to reallocate a specified
percentage of resources from low-priority PAPs to new high-priority PAPs, thus
low-priority PAPs to
providing positive incentives for departments to prioritize; (iii) establishing an new high-priority
appropriate technical assistance program to strengthen capacity in line agency
budget departments and in central oversight agencies, focusing on strategy PAPs, and
development, program costings, and cost-effectiveness analysis (program costing
establishing a joint
and cost-effectiveness evaluation should be piloted for high-priority PAPs in
select departments); (iv) establishing a joint DBM-NEDA committee with line DBM-NEDA
department representatives and joint technical working groups to manage the
SEER and OPIF reforms; (v) presenting MTEF forward estimates to Cabinet for committee with line
endorsement and publishing them after cabinet approval; (vi) fully implementing department
the budget timetable set out in the PEM manual; (vii) improving the quality of
the BIR databases by rolling out its IT system to all districts and making changes representatives and
to its tax forms to collect data necessary for improving revenue estimation and
reducing opportunities for evasion; and (viii) establishing an official “revenue joint technical
forecasting calendar” to coincide with the annual budget calendar. Other short- working groups to
term actions to strengthen revenue collection have been outlined in Chapter 2.
manage the SEER
5.81 Medium-term actions could include (i) establishing a task force
composed of NEDA, DBM, and planning officers from key line agencies to work and OPIF reforms.
out an agreement on improving the linkages between the national and sectoral
planning cycles; (ii) revising the MTPIP so that it is constrained by medium-term
forward estimates of budget ceilings and includes estimates of recurrent cost
obligations of capital expenditures; (iii) establishing a monitoring and evaluation
system in NCRFW to monitor GAD mainstreaming, and institutionalizing
reporting on the GAD budget during the formal annual budget process; (iv) using
prioritization criteria from the start of the baseline budget estimation process to
avoid across-the-board cuts to MOOE and capital expenditures; (v) incorporating
criteria for intersectoral prioritization in the calculation of baseline budgets; (vi)
allowing department managers to reduce personal service expenditures (subject
to a predetermined maximum) for low-priority PAPs; (vii) requiring agencies to
66
conduct cost-effectiveness analyses of selected high-priority PAPs; (ix) resenting

the macrofiscal framework and MTEF forward estimates to Congress for
discussion prior to the start of the annual budget process; (x) reviewing and
updating EO 292 to take account of recent reforms, including the LGCe of 1991
and the budget framework law (if applicable).
5.82 Longer term actions could comprise (i) elevating the core budget
process framework to the status of a budget framework law; and (ii) recasting
RDCs in the planning process so that they become formal, effective fora for
integrating sectoral and LGU planning.
6. BUDGET EXECUTION, TREASURY CONTROL,

AND EXTERNAL OVERSIGHT
6.1 The Government’s reforms in public expenditure management must

ultimately be underpinned by sound financial management practices and
oversight arrangements to increase accountability and efficiency, and improve
public sector performance. Hence, concurrent with expenditure management
reforms, the Government is likewise implementing a wide-ranging reform of its
financial management system to support its performance-oriented management
framework, make financial reports more timely and understandable, and promote
accountability through better performance reporting and greater engagement with
civil society and Congress. This chapter analyzes the important challenges facing
the Philippines as it pursues this reform program.
Financial Management
A. Institutional Arrangements: Issues and Actions Taken
6.2 The responsibility for financial management in the Philippines is shared

by several oversight departments headed by cabinet-level secretaries. DOF has Internal control
the major responsibility for revenue mobilization, cash management and
borrowings, and oversight of GOCC and LGU finances. Within DOF, planning weaknesses create
and management of the government’s cash balances and debt is handled by the cash management
BTR. Tax administration and collections are undertaken primarily by BIR and
BOC. DBM, on the other hand, manages the budget, public sector compensation risks that need to
policy, and organizational management. The Commission on Audit (COA) issues
accounting rules and regulations in addition to its audit tasks. This fragmentation be addressed by
of the responsibility for financial management oversight has put a considerable improved
strain on the sector departments and agencies. Inevitably, they have had to deal
with conflicting policies and guidelines as well as numerous and overlapping accounting and
regulatory reports to satisfy the needs of the oversight departments.
reporting
6.3 The most successful international model for efficient financial
management is the establishment of a comptroller-general or an accountant- requirements.
general function with responsibility for budgeting, accounting, and financial
reporting. However, given the current legal and institutional system in the
Philippines, creation of such an office is not considered feasible, as it involves a
constitutional change. It has been suggested to the Government that an
interagency committee take the lead in integrating and harmonizing its planning,
budgeting, accounting, and financial monitoring and reporting activities. The
inter-agency committee will ensure that accounting policies, rules, and
regulations issued by COA are consistently applied in all public sector entities.
The committee can also provide professional leadership to the agency finance
staff in improving financial management; and ensure that standards of accounting
and financial reporting are maintained.
6.4 The Government plans to establish this interagency financial
management committee. Initially led by DBM with representatives from DOF,
NEDA, COA, and DILG, this body will be responsible for integrating and
harmonizing budget and cash management, accounting, financial monitoring and
reporting. An essential subcommittee will be headed by COA to coordinate the
68
implementation and the computerization of the New Government Accounting

System (NGAS). The subcommittee, which should be in operation until the The formation of an
successful completion of the NGAS project, is responsible for implementing the interagency
decisions of the interagency committee and for acting as a facilitator for further
improvement. committee to integrate
B. Budget Execution: Issues and Actions Taken planning, budgeting,
6.5 The Philippines maintains an impressive amount of data on budget accounting, and
execution. Government databases are so comprehensive that detailed analyses of
budget execution can be carried out by COA for audit and DBM for planning and financial monitoring
management. The systematic computerization of these databases at both
will facilitate
oversight and agency levels will facilitate and enhance oversight and managerial
control, which controls will become more important as responsibilities are further implementation of
devolved.
financial management
6.6 In the budget execution phase, agencies are required to submit the
agency budget matrix (ABM) and the quarterly performance target—both serve reforms.
as their financial and physical plans. This is supported by a cash program
showing the monthly cash requirement of the agency to achieve the planned
targets for the year. DBM approves the ABM and releases the obligation
authorization or allotments to agencies. Allotments for ongoing and specified
projects and programs are released at the beginning of the year. DBM then issues
the notice of cash allocation (NCA) to the agencies either monthly or quarterly,
which signals the availability of cash funds to agencies for settling maturing
obligations. The amount of NCAs are issued by DBM in consultation with BTR
to facilitate the latter’s cash management and adhere to budget deficit targets.
DBM’s role in managing the cash flow to agencies is therefore quite important
for overall fiscal management, and in determining actual expenditures and
ultimately service delivery.
6.7 However, the uncertainty and unpredictability of revenue inflows has
made implementing a budget strategy that creates the proper balance between
fiscal discipline and managing for results difficult. To assure resource flows to
agencies, DBM prior to FY1999, released all obligation allotments for on-going
and specified agency projects at the beginning of a fiscal year, with the GAA
serving as the appropriation authority.51 However, reserves or expenditure cuts
were usually imposed on nonpersonnel expenditures. Ranging 5–10%, the
amount of reserves depended upon the extent of projected revenue collection
shortfalls vis-à-vis the targets made during budget preparation. In FY1999, 2000,
and again 2002 however, alternative arrangements were tried in an effort to
increase the credibility of the GAA enacted by Congress and to enhance the
predictability of resources to agencies. The imposition of the reserves at the
beginning of the year was discontinued and the portion of the annual budget
released to agencies at the start of the year was reduced: from 82% of the agency
budget (1999) to 85% (2000), and down to 75% (2002). In addition, in 2002 , the
release of the remaining 25% was conditioned on the result of the midyear
performance review. However, with the inability to improve revenue collection
as targeted, coupled with the acceleration of agency disbursements because of
other policy initiatives (i.e., the timely settlement of accounts payables in 2000,
the pump-priming effort in 2001 and the close monitoring of agency performance
by the President in 2002), the policy of doing away with expenditure reserves
was not successfully implemented and the deficit exceeded targets. For 2001
therefore, the FY2000 budget was reenacted and departments and agencies were
subjected once again to economy measures and across-the-board expenditure
cuts. In 2003, the release of allotments is planned to be made quarterly. This will
be accompanied by a call for expenditure reserves as well as a midyear
evaluation of agency performance.
6.8 The DBM is also in the process of automating budget releasing and
tracking through the Budget Execution and Accountability Tracking System The DBM’s Budget
(BEATS). The system is targeted to be operational in 2003. The BEATS consists
of the central programming and releasing system—the Customized Budget Execution and
Execution System (CUBES), housed in DBM—and an agency-based system Accountability
(ACUBES) that will link budget execution with accounting at the agency level.
The CUBES will automate the programming and issuance of Allotment Release System (BEATS)
Orders, including special allotment release orders (SAROs), which are released
to authorize capital projects covered by lump-sum appropriations and other will automate
similar expenditures requiring additional clearance. It will also automate the budget releases
programming and release of NCAs by linking the CUBES with the ACUBES
modules in the line departments. This will facilitate programming on a and tracking; this
departmental basis.
will be linked to the
6.9 The BEATS will be linked to the NGAS, first on a pilot basis in several
departments, which will include the oversight agencies. The same budget codes New Government
will be used in the NGAS and the BEATS. The Government is also pursuing the Accounting
unification of the coding of personnel numbers used in the agency payroll with
those used by the Civil Service Commission (CSC), DBM, and GSIS. The System (NGAS).
expected benefits of linking the NGAS with the budget execution system are
high. Better integration of the financial accounting management and budget
execution systems will lead to improvements in the oversight and control of
budget execution, and enhance transparency, thereby fortifying the credibility of
the MTEF.
6.10 Analyzing data on budget execution for key poverty-reducing subsectors
however, is instructive in indicating the aspects of government operations that
need to be improved for more efficient service delivery. One important indicator
is the change of the composition of spending from budget appropriations to
actual spending. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show the share distribution of appropriations,
allotments, and obligations for two high-priority sectors at the subsectoral level.
The data show that the appropriated sub-sectoral shares do not always correspond
to actual expenditures (on an obligation basis). In the health sector, for example,
primary care received 42% of the budget allocation in 1996, but only spent 30%
(obligations basis). There is the same pattern of reduced shares for primary health
care services in expenditures as compared with appropriations held from 1996–
1999.
6.11 In 2000, however, expenditures on primary health care exceeded annual
appropriations with the release of additional spending authorities to the health
department from continuing appropriations. In some years the gap between
appropriations and allotments in primary health services was fairly large,
indicating that DBM withheld authorization of funding, while in other years the
gap between allotments and obligations was quite large, indicating that DOH was
not able to obligate the allotment releases while appropriations were valid, due to
procurement and other implementation problems. The discrepancies in
appropriations and expenditures merit further attention, given the importance of
70
the subsector to the goal of poverty reduction, as there seems to have been a
pattern of reduced actual expenditures during 1996–1999. The data for 2000
seems to foreshadow the resolution of the problem, although data for 2001
should be examined to see if the problem has been resolved fully.
Table 6.1: Health: Schedule of Budget Appropriations, Allotments and Obligations
by Function, 1996 by Function, 1996-2000, Share Distribution (%)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

Appro Oblig App Allot Obli App Allot Obli App Allot Obli App Allot Obli
pa Allotb b
ropa b
gb ropa b
gb ropa b
gb ropa b
gb
Primary 42.0 32.8 30.2 34.8 33.5 28.0 36.3 32.1 19.0 26.4 30.8 23.6 25.7 31.3 30.9
Secondary 3.0 3.6 3.7 3.5 3.2 4.0 2.9 3.1 3.7 3.9 3.5 2.7 - - -
Tertiary 39.7 46.3 47.8 45.0 45.3 49.6 44.0 45.4 54.6 50.0 44.5 51.7 53.0 48.0 49.4
Gen.
Admin. 7.8 8.8 9.4 8.4 8.9 9.3 8.3 9.8 11.2 9.5 11.0 11.0 10.6 10.3 10.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: Values represent percentage share of each category in total Appropriations, Allotments and Obligations.
a
Appropriations are based on annual General Appropriations Act approved by Congress.
b
Allotments and obligations include current and continuing projects.
Source: Department of Health.
6.12 The other source of discrepancy between budget allocations and actual
disbursements in DOH pertains to projects, especially FAPs. There seem to be
two reasons for this: (i) DOH’s ability to secure budgetary funds to access ODA
and implement FAPs; and (ii) reported logistical problems hamper the delivery of
drugs, medicine, supplies, equipmen,t and other assistance from the central office
to the regional offices and other field health offices. Implementation problems
particularly hound projects involving LGUs because of the limited absorptive
capacity of the recipient LGUs. ODA fund utilization is especially low when
LGUs are required to co-finance the DOH-initiated local programs and projects.
The problem becomes acute when the targets of assistance are the lower-income
LGUs.
T a b le 6 .2 : E d u c a tio n : S c h e d u le o f B u d g e t A p p ro p ria tio n s , A llo tm e n ts an d O b lig a tio n s

b y F u n c tio n , 1 9 9 6– 2 00 0 S h are D is trib u tio n (% )
1 99 6 1 99 7 1 99 8 1 99 9 2 00 0
A p p ro A p p ro A p p ro Ap p ro Ap p r
pa Allo t b
O b lig b
p Allo t O b lig p A llo t O b lig p Allo t O b lig op A llo t O b lig
P rim ary 6 1 .0 6 1 .5 62 .4 59 .4 61 .0 6 2 .0 60 .1 61 .5 6 2.2 5 9.7 6 1.2 6 1.8 5 8.9 6 1.3 6 1.2
S ec o n da ry 1 9 .4 1 9 .5 19 .8 19 .1 19 .7 2 0 .0 19 .2 19 .6 1 9.8 1 9.2 1 9.7 1 9.9 1 9.0 1 9.8 1 9.7
TVETc 1 .3 1 .6 1 .0 2 .1 2 .1 1 .0 2 .1 2 .1 1.6 2.5 2.4 2.0 2.5 2.2 2. 1
H igh er
E du c a tion d 1 8 .2 1 7 .4 16 .7 19 .3 17 .1 1 6 .9 18 .5 16 .7 1 6.3 1 8.4 1 6.6 1 6.1 1 9.5 1 6.6 1 6.8
T o tal 10 0 .0 10 0 .0 1 00 .0 1 00 .0 1 00 .0 10 0 .0 1 00 .0 1 00 .0 1 00 .0 1 0 0.0 10 0.0 10 0.0 1 0 0.0 10 0.0 10 0.0
N ote: V alu es rep re s en t p erc en tage s h are of e ac h c ateg o ry in to ta l A pp ro priatio ns , A llotm ents a n d O bliga tion s .
a
A p prop ria tion s are bas e d on the an nu al G e ne ra l A p prop riatio ns A ct a pp ro ve d by C o n gre s s
b
A llotm e nts an d o bligatio ns inc lu de cu rren t a nd c ontin uin g p ro jec ts .
c
Inc lu de s T ec h nica l a nd V o c atio nal E duc a tio n (D e pE d) a n d T ec hn ica l E d uc a tion an d S k ills D eve lo pm en t A uth ority (D O LE )
d
In c lu de s C om m is s io n o n H igh er E d uc a tion an d S tate C olleg es a nd U niversities .
S ou rc e : D ep artm en t of E d uca tion, C o m m is sion on A u dit.
6.13 In education, the primary level tended to do better in actual expenditures

(obligation basis), getting a larger share of the total budget than that initially
indicated from appropriations (though Box 6.1 highlights additional concerns).
The opposite held true for higher education, which saw a smaller share of
expenditures to the total budget as compared with appropriations. On the whole,
DepEd registered high allotment-to-appropriation ratios and obligation-to-

allotment ratios from 1996–2000, with the former ranging from 98% to 99%, and In health and
the latter from 9% to 99%. This is partly due to the major portion of the DepEd
budget (95%) going to salaries of teachers and its workforce. education, two key
6.14 However, closer scrutiny of the data reveals problems during the budget elements in the
execution phase in the purchase of textbooks and desks, the hiring of new
budget execution
teachers, and nonformal education programs. It is striking that the allotment-to-
appropriation ratio for the purchase of textbooks was low at 59%, 30%, and 36%, process impacting
respectively, in 1996, 1997 and 1998. Though rising to 100% in 1999, it declined
sharply to 19% in 2000, raising concerns about the cash rationing strategy of service delivery are
DBM. Equally worrisome is the low utilization of the already low allotments as (a) the extent to
indicated by an obligation-to-allotment ratio of 42% for textbooks in 1997 and
0% in 1998, which indicate weak capacity in procurement planning and which DBM issues
monitoring in the department. In FY2000 however, DepEd began a major effort
to improve its procurement processes to address reported anomalies in the allotments in line
existing decentralized processes by recentralizing textbook procurement while with appropriations,
capacity and systems in its regional and division offices are upgraded. The low
utilization rate, however, also points to problems in intradepartmental budget and (b) the extent to
management having to do with the role of division offices and the lack of budget
authority for local service delivery units. which the agency is
6.15 As in the health sector, there are two key issues: the extent to which able to spend its
DBM issues allotments in line with appropriations, and the extent to which the authorized funds.
agency is able to spend its authorized funds. Both issues played a role in the
difference between appropriations and actual expenditures in these sectors over
the years examined, and merit further attention because of their impact on the
quality of service delivery.
6.16 Congress, concerned about DBM’s role in reallocating the budget
appropriations, introduced an anti-impoundment provision in the FY2002
General Appropriations Bill. The “Prohibition Against Impoundment of
Appropriations” required that DBM issue guidelines on the imposition of
reserves in coordination with the congressional committees on appropriations and
finance. Congress’ intent was to limit DBM’s ability to steer resources toward its
preferred programs and increase executive accountability to Congress. DBM’s
response has been to release 75% of allotments at the beginning of the fiscal
year, basing the release of the remainder on the results of its midyear review.
This may turn out to be the forerunner of a scheme to move away from across-
the-board budget cuts and support the performance management system (viz. the
OPIF) that DBM is putting in place.
72
Box 6.1 Budget Execution and Service Delivery in the Education Sector
Improvements in service delivery are often attributed, in part, to increasing local
control over resource use decisions. However, in the Philippine education sector,
local service delivery units have little control over resource allocation decisions, in
spite of recent attempts to devolve greater budgetary control.
In FY2000 the Department of Education (DepEd), with the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM), launched a system whereby MOOE funds are released
directly to division offices and autonomous high schools. However, only those
schools that had the appropriate finance personnel (one accountant/bookkeeper and
one disbursing officer) were able to take advantage of this arrangement. The
administration of MOOE is not devolved to the remaining secondary schools (known
as “non-autonomous”). Instead, the division office makes the payments on the
schools’ behalf and is tasked to keep records on what has been spent per school so
that expenditures can be checked against appropriations.
For elementary schools, the arrangements are different. The General Appropriations
Act (GAA) does not specify the MOOE allocation for each elementary school for
flexibility and manageability, the schools numbering some 40,000. Moreover, it also
appears that MOOE allocation for elementary schools is not tracked for them at
division level. Instead, it is spent on their behalf by their respective division offices
and the goods and services purchased are delivered directly to the schools concerned.
Elementary schools do not therefore “see” any MOOE funds directly. In most
divisions, the district offices and the elementary schools receive supplies and
materials “in kind” even as the division offices pay for the utility bills of the
elementary schools and the travel expenses of district supervisors (CHEG 2000a). In
addition, some MOOE appropriated for elementary schools are actually utilized by
the division offices to meet their expenses, since no formal allocation is made for
such expenses in the GAA. Thus, some district offices and elementary schools get no
MOOE at all from DepEd because many division superintendents claim there is not
52
enough to reach all elementary schools (Nuqui and Solis 2000). Consequently,
access to resources and control over resource allocation decision making at the level
of the school continue to be seriously limited.
It has been argued that the direct release system to schools has the advantage of COA has initiated
being supportive of the school-based management initiative that has been started
(CHED 2000a). In terms of cash management, it also offers the advantage of the design and
reducing the “cash float” and enhancing the control over cash resources. However,
the direct release system requires the presence of a competent financial management
implementation of a
and monitoring function at the level of divisions and schools. new government
accounting system
C. Accounting, Reporting, and the New Government Accounting
System (NGAS): Issues and Actions Taken (NGAS), and is
6.17 Based on recommendations from existing analyses for improvements in working to develop
accounting, COA, which is constitutionally mandated to promulgate policies, an accounting
rules, and procedures on accounting and auditing, has designed and initiated a
phased implementation of a NGAS from January 2002. The NGAS aims to: (a) software package for
simplify government accounting; (b) conform to international accounting
standards; and (c) generate periodic and relevant financial statements for better
its computerization.
performance monitoring. COA is also developing an accounting software
package for computerizing the NGAS.
6.18 All national government agencies adopted the new system starting
January 2002. The NGAS has several features that make it a significantly better
system, including a modified accrual accounting basis, improved accounting for

assets, in which all depreciable assets shall be capitalized and depreciation shall
be recognized in the income and expenditure statements, the adoption of a single The NGAS has
fund concept, and a simplified three-digit chart of accounts, among others. COA several features that
is also developing a computerized version of the NGAS.
6.19 With the introduction of the NGAS, a simplified annual financial make it a
reporting is also required. All agencies are required to prepare a balance sheet, significantly better
income and expenditure statement, and a cash flow statement. There are
approximately 100 reports produced by agencies for budget and financial control system. However,
purposes. Introducing the NGAS is an opportunity for the Government to review
implementation
the requirements of various oversight agencies and prescribe a more streamlined
set monitoring reports for their use. Pilots are under way in DSWD, DepEd, and needs to be carefully
DPWH to improve financial management reporting.
managed to avoid
6.20 The introduction of NGAS means that approximately 3,700 independent
accounting units at the national and local government levels will have to switch the risk of a
to the new system. The logistics of such a large-scale change without a period of
parallel implementation carry very high risks. However, given the complexities breakdown of
of the old system, COA had no option but to opt for a “big bang” approach in financial controls
installing the NGAS and organized a nationwide training of trainers during the 3
months preceding the introduction of the new system. during the transition.
6.21 Notwithstanding the above efforts, the Government will have to take
careful measures to ensure that NGAS implementation takes place without the
risk of a serious breakdown of financial controls during the transition. The main
risks arise from (i) the fast tracking of the development of an accounting
procedures manual to guide agency and LGU financial staff; (ii) ensuring the full
coverage and adequate training of agency and LGU staff; (iii) COA’s capacity to
provide adequate troubleshooting support when implementation problems
surface; (iv) synchronization of the linking of the new chart of accounts with the
budgetary accounts; and (v) the development of the management information
system needed to carry out effective budget control at the oversight and agency
levels.
6.22 To address these risks, COA has adopted a strategy of phased
implementation, focusing first on setting up the basic manual system. This will
be followed by computerization. The final step will be to develop a government
integrated financial management system that will provide management and
financial information at various levels of Government.
6.23 It must be stressed, though, that implementation and sequencing issues
will require very careful monitoring during the pilot phase, and users’ queries
and system problems sorted out. It will be crucial to develop linkages between
the NGAS on the one hand, and the BEATS and other oversight agency systems
on the other, as early as possible. This will entail very close coordination and
consultation between COA, DBM, BTR, and NEDA.
D. Treasury, Payment and Cash Management: Issues and Actions
Taken
6.24 The DOF’s Bureau of Treasury (BTR) is responsible for all cash
collections, payments, and management of the public debt in the Philippines. As
74
a result, DBM as manager of appropriations and BTR as manager of government

bank accounts are closely involved in the cash management function.
6.25 The DBCC has the overall responsibility for budget and cash
management. The DBCC Technical Group includes the Cash Programming and
Monitoring Committee (CPMC), chaired by the Treasurer of the Philippines. The
CPMC regularly meets to assess the fiscal performance of the national
government and recommends to the DBCC the annual and quarterly cash budget
programs of the NG. These cash budget programs are monitored closely and
updated from time to time to take into account significant fiscal developments
and status of resources and expenditures.
6.26 In addition, BTR monitors the Treasury’s cash flow through a Cash Flow
Committee. The Committee, chaired by the Treasurer of the Philippines, also
reports the forecast on the level and direction of the yield rates for government
securities to guide the Auction Committee composed of BTR, DOF and the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). The Committee updates cash forecasts based
on daily estimates of cash inflow, outflow, and debt service requirements.
6.27 The authorization for government agencies to incur expenditure begins
with DBM issuing budget allotments pursuant to appropriations authorized by the
Congress. In addition, DBM also issues NCAs in consultation with BTR. The
NCA acts as a second level of control as recipients of allotments can incur
obligations but cannot make payments until they receive NCAs.
6.28 All government payments are made through authorized government
service banks through the Modified Disbursement System (MDS) introduced in
1990. Under the MDS, BTR deposits seed funds (estimated to equal 2 days of
cash disbursements) with the head offices of the government service banks. The
authorized government service banks maintain separate sub-MDS accounts by
fund for each agency and for the central and regional offices. The spending
agencies receive NCAs, which are treated as deposits, or authorizations to issue
checks. Agencies issue checks against NCAs, which are honored by the
respective service bank branch. A summary of checks paid and a request for
replenishment is submitted daily by the head office of the service banks to BTR.
A daily summary of MDS checks negotiated is also sent to BTR through its
provincial and regional offices. BTR validates the replenishment requests
received from the service bank head offices against the data received from the
regional offices and releases the replenishment daily.
6.29 The MDS system was designed to rationalize the payments system to a
few bank accounts (currently only four banks are used) and eliminate idle cash
by centralizing the cash floats to these banks. However, the system has some
control weaknesses. Although BTR regional and provincial offices are required
to reconcile the bank accounts with summaries of issued checks sent by the
agencies, reconciliation is carried out several months in arrear. Also, BTR has no
access to agency books of accounts (such access is given only to COA).
Instructions on reconciling these pro forma accounts with the accounts kept by
banks have yet to be developed.
6.30 Although the primary recipients of NCAs are required to use MDS bank
accounts for disbursing funds, any secondary allocation of NCAs to district
offices or another agency requires funding by commercial check. The recipients
of these secondary allocations deposit these checks to separate bank accounts
until they are actually disbursed. There are several thousand such accounts
currently in existence. The total amount in deposit as of 2000 amounted to PhP52
billion. DOF-DBM Joint Circular 1-90 requires that the provincial offices and
operating units receiving these funding checks withdraw the unexpended balance
of the deposit account at the end of the year and remit the amount to BTR. A
copy of the remittance advice is given to the pertinent regional office of the
agency concerned. In addition, cash advances are made from the MDS bank
accounts to disbursing officers for payment of salaries and other expenses. The
unliquidated cash advances with government disbursing officers at the end of
2000 amounted to PhP11 billion. The above cash balances are outside BTR
control and pose a serious fiduciary risk.
6.31 Tax and customs collections are deposited into accredited bank accounts
and transferred to the BSP on designated periods for the account of BTR. In
collecting and remitting BIR taxes, three systems are adopted. First, taxes
collected by authorized agent banks, which are mostly over-the-counter payments
made by nonlarge taxpayers, are required to be transferred by the collecting
banks to the account of BTR with BSP on the sixth calendar day, counted from
the day of collection. BSP provides BTR with a credit advice supported by a
summary list by date of the bank’s daily total collections and remittances.
Second, taxes collected by government financial institutions (the Land Bank of
the Philippines and the Development Bank of the Philippines) from large
taxpayers are credited to the TOP account with the GFIs on the day of collection.
BTR monitors the collection on-line. BTR withdraws the amount on day 6
through a letter authority. Third, taxes collected by BIR collecting officers (COs),
COs of other government offices and LGUs, or local treasurers are deposited
with the GFIs. These collections are credited to the BTR account on day 1 also.
BTR withdraws the amount on day 6. The system of reporting and reconciliation
is the same for national collections.
6.32 Effective August 2002, another system of collecting BIR taxes was
implemented: the Electronic Filing and Payment System (EFPS). As of 30
September 2002, there were two private banks, in addition to the three GFIs,
which were collecting taxes through the EFPS. Participating banks are required
to credit the tax collections to the BTR-BIR hinged account. This is a settlement
account that is emptied/transferred by the banks at the end of the day to a liability
account called “due to BTR.” On the fifth calendar day, counted from the day of
collection, the banks remit collected taxes to the BTR deposit account with the
banks in the case of the GFIs, or the BTR account with BSP in the case of the
private banks.
6.33 In collecting and remitting customs duties, on the other hand, two
systems are adopted. First, customs duties collected by the authorized agent
banks are transferred by the collecting banks to the BTR account with the BSP on
the 11th calendar day from the day of collection. BSP provides BTR with a credit
advice. Second, customs duties collected by BOC’s collecting officers are
deposited with the GFIs, which in turn credit the BTR account on day 1. BTR
withdraws the amount on day 6. BIR and BOC maintain records of collections
and reconcile with BTR. BTR accesses its bank statement with BSP
electronically. BSP also prepares credit advice of banks’ daily remittances with a
summary list of banks’ daily collections by collection date and by remittance
date.
76
6.34 The accounting group at BTR reconciles remittances with BIR and BOC
records (in the past, such reconciliation has proved difficult and has been a cause
for concern). As with cash payments, delays in reconciling bank deposits with
BIR and BOC records pose a serious control weakness in the current system.
6.35 The NGAS proposes a separate set of national books to be maintained by
the collecting agencies with a reciprocal set of books by BTR for accounting for
government revenue that are required by law to be remitted to BTR. It is
expected that this new accounting arrangement would largely solve the
reconciliation problems encountered in the past. COA needs to develop more
detailed accounting instructions, as part of the proposed accounting procedures
manual, to avoid the past problems in accounting for revenues/collections.
6.36 Internal control weaknesses and resulting risks in cash management arise
from (i) BTR reliance on bank information on deposits to account for revenue
collection; (ii) delayed ability or inability to fully reconcile bank information
with collecting agency records; (iii) reliance on bank information on payments
for replenishment of service bank accounts and the backlog of reconciliation with
agency records; and (iv) large sums of cash and bank deposits are being
maintained by agencies or disbursing officers outside BTR control.
6.37 Internal control weaknesses create cash management risks that need to be
addressed by improved accounting and reporting requirements. As indicated, the
NGAS has changed the accounting arrangements for both payments and receipts
of cash. The accounting rules and mapping of old accounting codes (on which
BTR’s computerized cash management system is based) to new accounting codes
have been developed. However, problems are encountered in the compliance of
agencies with regards to the new revenue coding system.
Performance Management:
The Filipino Experience in the International Context
A. Organizational Performance Indicator Framework (OPIF):

Issues and Actions Taken
6.38 The OPIF is at the stage where it should be refined based on good
practice in selected agencies and supported by systematic organizational The OPIF now
development (including capacity building) for line agencies in the use of the
framework. needs to be refined
6.39 The focus of the MTEF on outcomes is dependant upon the ability of the based on good
Government to link and effectively use various elements of a performance
measurement and management framework. In addition to the planning and SEER practice in selected
processes, the OPIF is fundamental for operationalizing planning and budgeting agencies and
reforms. The Government has introduced a performance measurement and
management framework at the national level and is currently in the process of supported by
rolling it out to line agencies. Linked to the SEER and budgeting process, the
goal of the OPIF, which was first introduced in the FY2000 Budget Call, is to systematic training
increase the accountability of the agencies through a reporting of their outputs programs for line
and outcomes that measures the agency impact on the development goals and
objectives set out in the MTPDP. agencies.
6.40 The OPIF was subsequently refined. As presented in the FY2002 Budget
Call, it requires the presentation of (i) intermediate sectoral outcomes, which are
based on the MTPDP; (ii) intermediate subsectoral outcomes, which typically

correspond to departmental outcomes; and (iii) intermediate organizational
outcomes, which are the agency-specific disaggregation of subsector outcomes.53
BP206 requires agencies to specify performance indicators, capturing those
intermediate outcomes over which the department has “significant influence or
control.” Agencies are also required to specify their MFOs and performance
indicators for each MFO. Types of performance indicators will include quantity,
quality or timeliness, key processes, and client satisfaction feedback indicators.
6.41 The OPIF is still at an early stage of development, though it seems that
the system envisaged by the oversight agencies has outpaced the capacity of the
line agencies to implement it. During the FY2000 and FY2001 budget cycles,
agencies submitted performance indicators that conformed to the traditional
input-based indicators. Many agencies submitted indicators such as number of
meetings attended and number of reports produced. The health sector, for
example, is thus far focusing on administrative indicators, rather then output-
based indicators. Performance indicators submitted by DOH include, for
example, number of clinical practice guidelines developed, number of training
sessions provided, and number of licenses issued, which would fall under the
classification of input indicator. It seems clear that the OPIF system has not been
fully understood by line agencies. As a result, few agencies have thus far
complied fully with BP206, and some agencies, though they have specified some
performance measures, have not presented any performance data.
6.42 In the 2002 midyear performance review, however, while reported
performance indicators were still primarily on quantities of accomplishments (i.e.
vis-à-vis quality indicators), hospitals for instance have started reporting on
survival rates, length of stay, and number of relapse. Another hurdle to
implementation has been the difficulty agencies have in defining their MFOs and
linking them with the MTPDP. Sectoral outcomes as specified in the MTPDP are
not presented uniformly across sectors, resulting in some sectors having
difficulty identifying their MFOs from the MTPDP. NEDA and DBM lent
support to the sectors on deducing their MFOs, though a problem deducing
MFOs from the MTPDP suggests both insufficient capacity at the line agency
level to utilize the OPIF and a lack of clarity in the MTPDP itself. Refining the
planning process at the level of the oversight agencies and improving the sectoral
planning process so that sectoral outcomes are clearly specified in all sectors
could help develop performance indicators by line agencies.
6.43 Currently, DBM plans to discuss submissions of performance indicators
with line departments during the FY2004 budget process. The goal is to agree on
performance indicators, jointly develop targets, and present the indicators and
targets as part of the FY2004 budget. However, given that many agencies have
yet to develop adequate MFOs, the plan may be premature. To ensure that the
development of the OPIF system in the oversight agencies does not continue to
surpass line agency implementation capacity, DBM should consider how
performance data can be included in the FY2003 budget in a meaningful way that
will make a difference for managing line agencies and improving service
delivery. Extensive capacity building might be required before this is feasible.
Moreover, new initiatives, unless departments are sure they can implement them,
should be postponed until the existing OPIF system is consolidated.
78
6.44 DBM’s approach thus far has been to allow wide latitude to the agencies
to develop their indicators. Both DAR (Box 6.2) and DSWD have made progress
in the fleshing out of the OPIF to their respective departments. It would benefit
DBM as well as other line agencies if the experiences to date with the OPIF were
studied and disseminated. By producing a lessons-learned note, DBM could
distill key challenges and successes that agencies have had in adopting the OPIF.
To the extent that performance contracting at the level of agency managers is
being adopted (as in the case of DSWD), DBM, CSC, and the Career Executive
Service Board can assist the agency to linking personnel evaluation systems with
agency organizational performance targets and use their learnings to replicate the
activity to others.
Box 6.2 Performance Measurement and Management
in Agriculture and Natural Resources
The Sub-Committee on Plan Performance Indicator System (SCPPIS) for the agriculture
and natural resources sector has been in the forefront of initiatives to enhance sector
performance. Originally, the link between “sector outcomes” and “agency-level outputs”
was not clear. Agency performance was assessed in terms of a minutiae of “input
indicators,” such as the number of meetings. Agencies have complained about tedious
reporting on input indicators and the resulting perception of “micromanagement” by
oversight agencies. Now, there is agreement among the rural sector agencies (DA, DAR,
DENR) regarding sector level outcomes, and each agency’s expected contributions
defined in terms of major final outputs—and an emerging shift toward results
management. This is a first step toward sector performance enhancement, to ensure that
each agency’s programs, activities, and projects are directly and strongly linked to agreed
sector outcomes. As a result of this initiative, the social sector and other sectors are
developing their own performance indicator systems.
The next step is for an independent and objective performance assessment system to be
established for the sector as a whole, and for each agency. This is addressed under the on-
going Capacity Building for Operationalizing and RD/NRM Plan Performance
Monitoring Project supported by the World Bank. Under this project, each agency’s
monitoring and evaluation system is improved such that within 12 to 18 months, outcome
and impact indicators can be subjected to objective assessment by third parties. This is
intended to clarify and strengthen accountability and transparency in each agency,
including an active role for the private sector and civil society. In the rural sector, this has
begun with the participation of private sector and civil society representatives in various
consultation forums related to the capacity-building project. They are expected to
participate more actively in the future and even to run a parallel performance indicator
system.
The SCPPIS is careful in addressing the political sensitivity of interagency resource
allocation. The idea is to follow a phased approach. The first step is to enhance the
intraagency resource allocation system, and then to subject results to an independent
objective assessment. The result of such an assessment can then serve as a basis for
resource reallocation within and across agencies. After applying this system over a few
planning and budgeting cycles, possible reallocation of resources to more efficient uses
can be considered.
6.45 Indeed, the shift from measuring and controlling inputs to measuring and
controlling performance is huge, and requires not only a change in mind-set but
the necessary capacity building to adopt the new framework. It also requires an
institutional framework that supports the application of a performance orientation
on the job and aligns incentives accordingly (Box 6.3). The internal and external
forces that drive the shift to performance of the Government as a whole must be
coupled with a shift to performance by individual agencies and workers in those
agencies. All actors in Government must see that the derivation and sharing of
information is a vital factor in achieving objectives, allocating scarce resources,
and delivering benefits, and in doing so eclipse the simplistic notion of a system
only for rewards and punishments. The strategy should reinforce the importance
of performance at the level of the individual, managers within agencies, the
executive branch, and the larger system within which Government operates.
6.46 Though DBM and NEDA conducted some workshops on the OPIF over
the past few years, there is a clear, pressing need for a sustained capacity-
building program at both the line and oversight agency levels. Some agencies
reported that the workshops were inadequate for their needs and decided to
pursue reforms without requesting direct assistance from the oversight agencies.
As a result DBM initiated sessions to coach agencies in the development of
outcome-based performance indicators in 2002. This was followed by the
undertaking of the midyear performance review of DBM, focusing on results.
These efforts will have to be sustained and NEDA and DBM can reinforce the
message to agencies in the planning and budgeting activities.
Text Box 6.3 Good Practice in Performance Monitoring and Evaluation
For the past 2 decades, governments have been “in search of results.” Although strategies
vary across countries, similar elements appear to contribute to a successful shift to a
results-based culture. Among these elements are (i) a well-defined and comprehensive
strategy, with phased implementation and strong leadership (champions) at the most
senior levels of Government; (ii) incentives for change—economic pressures, pressures
from civil society, increased need for resource control and service delivery at
decentralized levels, or external pressures; (iii) a clear mandate for making a shift to
performance coupled with adequate capacity to do so; (iv) pockets of innovation to use as
models for good practice and pilot programs; and (v) clear links to budget and resource
allocation decisions.
No single best method exists to introduce performance management into the many
institutions and policy-making activities of Government. Some countries have, over
several years, introduced strategic plans, performance indicators, and annual performance
plans and integrated them into annual budget documents (Australia, United States). Other
countries have included program performance indicators that can be audited in their
annual financial reports (Finland, Sweden), or used performance agreements between
ministers and heads of government agencies (New Zealand, United Kingdom). Argentina
and Romania are initiating performance-based budgeting strategies. In these two
countries, performance indicators for government programs are being linked to allocated
budget envelopes, reported in budget annexes at the start of each budgeted year, and
audited at year’s end.
While most Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries
have adopted government-wide approaches in introducing performance management,
many countries began with performance pilots or with initiatives confined to one or more
sectors. Some countries have granted freestanding authorities greater flexibility to use
resources within an overall budget envelope in exchange for greater accountability from
leaders and organizations for specific results (next steps agencies in the UK). Other
countries have supported pilot activities within government organizations to lead the way
and encourage more initiatives and replication (reinvention laboratories). By beginning
with a few programs and sectors, governments attempt to create favorable conditions for
public sector learning and experimentation before mainstreaming the effort. Other
80
countries find that encouraging and supporting sectors where a clear reform effort is
under way (for example, the health sector in Bangladesh, Ghana, and the Kyrgyz
Republic) allows innovative efforts to move forward, regardless of commitment from the
highest political levels to implement a more comprehensive strategy.
Still other countries have found it useful to focus on the users or beneficiaries of
government services or on one client group, such as women and girls or children (United
Kingdom, Citizens’ Charter). This strategy includes developing key performance
indicators that cut across line ministries, with a specific focus on improving those
government programs to support a particular group of citizens. This strategy can also help
move forward a national agenda in a program area, rather than waiting for the entire
government to embrace performance management.
Finally, a few countries, such as Malaysia, have adapted to public sector reform a model
known as ‘total quality management,’ developed by industry to improve manufacturing
processes. Total quality management has generally been introduced after reform
processes are well under way, but the focus of quality management on customers is
relevant to reform efforts at all stages.
Clearly, an array of strategies is required because each country is unique. International
experience recognizes that reform strategies evolve and are modified over time, but to be
sustainable, a results focus requires a solid foundation on which these systems must be
built. The foundation includes incentives to support a performance culture, clearly
defined roles and responsibilities, accountability, and sufficient technical and managerial
capacity. It also requires a sustained commitment, a mix of positive internal and external
pressures, sufficient capacity, and clear linkages to the country’s reform agenda and
resources.
6.47 In the Philippines, there has been considerable investment by donors

throughout the 1990s in capacity development for oversight bodies, line agencies,
local governments, and project implementation units. While these may have
helped create awareness and proponents of improved performance at the policy
level in agencies, sufficient capacity to shift to performance management remains
weak. This is perhaps due in part to the predominate focus of capacity-building
programs on training, development of manuals, software, and use of international
consultants without sufficient attention to institutional systems, personal
responsibility, and incentives for sustainable integration of new skills into the
workplace. Ongoing or future capacity-building programs should be developed
within a comprehensive organizational development model for human resources,
including strategies for incentives and support structures in the workplace.
6.48 DBM and COA should also coordinate their performance evaluation
plans, as COA is moving more into value for money (VFM) type audits.
Integrating targeted VFM audits into the OPIF might help line agencies learn
how to improve performance measurement. The traditional financial compliance
and efficiency focus of independent agency audits should be augmented with a
focus on if and how the agency is working to achieve its mission and its
effectiveness. COA performs this role, but predominantly focused on traditional
audit functions, with minimal VFM audits, which in most cases focus on
efficiency rather than effectiveness of programs.
B. External Performance Management and Oversight: Issues and

Actions Taken
6.49 The Government has undertaken innovative initiatives in fostering

greater civil society and legislative participation in the budget process and these
should be extended and deepened.
6.50 Of the four stages of the budget process, performance evaluation and
oversight remains the most underdeveloped. Structures and mechanisms for
oversight exist, but there is a reluctance to enforce sanctions or to take remedial
action. There is limited capacity for independent budget monitoring, evaluation,
and analysis, particularly at the local level. Oversight should be a fundamental
role of Congress, but it is not fulfilling this function effectively. Enhancing
transparency at all stages of the budget process will help increase accountability The government’s
and strengthen the oversight role of civil society groups. In most countries, the
legislature and civil society form partnerships to oversee the executive. In the
innovative
Philippines, there is a strong partnership between civil society and the executive, initiatives in
and more limited collaboration with Congress.
fostering greater
6.51 The Role of Civil Society in Budget Performance Management and
Oversight. A movement toward greater transparency and accountability in public civil society
sector budgeting has accompanied the growing trend of introducing public
expenditure reforms in developing countries. Historically, drawing up the budget participation in the
was considered the exclusive domain of the executive, and was a closed process. budget process
Transparency, accountability, and participation are mutually reinforcing and joint
requirements for improving government performance. To hold Government should be
accountable, Congress and civil society need access to timely, reliable, and
understandable information on priorities, budget allocations, and outcomes. If
extended and
transparency is to lead to greater accountability, monitoring and evaluation deepened.
should be converted into action, and civil society should have avenues for using
the information for active participation. The Philippines has a long history of
civil society monitoring of various aspects of public services, including quality,
access, and corruption. The Government has stressed the importance of
partnerships with the private sector and civil society to improve transparency and
accountability.
6.52 The involvement of actors outside of the executive can improve policy
and allocation decisions by bringing different perspectives to budget debates, and
in particular in representing community interests. In many countries, the
involvement of civil society in the budget is restricted to commenting on the final
product once it has been passed by the legislature. In that regard, the Philippines
can be considered progressive, since civil society is involved in the budget
planning and preparation process. The Budget Call for the 2002 budget
preparation specifically required agencies to consult with civil society “to ensure
that the people’s participation in the formulation of the FY2002 budget proposals
is maximized.” For the first time civil society groups were invited to attend the
technical budget hearings as observers to orient them in the procedures and
mechanics of the budget process. In addition, civil society groups are represented
on NEDA planning committees. Such participation allows civil society to make
inputs early in the process and increases understanding of the budget process and
the trade-offs made.
82
6.53 A further encouraging development in fostering accountability has been

the initiative to institutionalize client service delivery surveys, including those
conducted by independent agencies. The results of such surveys serve as a useful
input into the overall as well as agency planning and evaluation processes as they
indicate priority areas for improvement, as perceived by users of the final outputs
of agencies.
6.54 In the Philippines, civil society has formed a much stronger partnership
with the executive than with Congress, and in particular with the Committee on
Appropriations. Although the committee allows civil society groups to attend
budget hearings as observers, and to distribute materials to members, they are not
permitted to make formal submissions unless requested to provide expert input
on specific topics. Part of the reason for the development of strong working
relationships between civil society and the executive at the national level is the
nature of civil society itself. A well-developed informal network of relationships
exists between the executive, academe, and NGOs, allowing greater
understanding of policy issues, processes, and the sharing of information. For
example, oversight agencies interact with, and have given budget briefings to
several watchdog groups such as Procurement Watch, the Philippine Governance
Forum (PGF) and Government Watch. The risk of this type of engagement is that
it can lead to a diluting of independent analysis and critical reflection. The
challenge for civil society is to play the role of critical ally, whereby a working
relationship is established that allows civil society to work with government in
providing research, training, and monitoring, but that retains the ability to
provide constructive criticism where necessary.
6.55 Building these relationships can strengthen the budget process in many
ways. Civil society groups can play an invaluable role in demystifying the budget
and enhancing participation. Civil society groups (including private sector
organizations and the media) can develop budget literacy and stimulate debate
among citizens, interest groups and legislators. One common problem is that civil
society groups themselves lack the technical expertise or resources to undertake
this type of work. PGF has begun to do this type of work through the Budget
Advocacy Project (BAP) and Government Watch. To date, however, the majority
of technical inputs at briefings have been made by resource persons from the
executive.
6.56 Budget advocacy tends to be demand-driven, because budget analysis
takes time and requires some technical skills. NGOs tend to be sectorally based,
and focus more on policy issues than on budget analysis or expenditure tracking.
For example, one area in which civil society coalitions are particularly active is
anticorruption. Three particularly active groups in this arena are Procurement
Watch, the Transparent Accountable Government Network, and the Philippine
Center for Investigative Journalism. These groups are gaining credibility and a
constituency, but their focus is on monitoring and reporting on corruption rather
than on budget issues.
6.57 The BAP has been established to promote a more transparent national
budget process. Its four main objectives are to (i) develop the capacity of sector
NGOs analyzing sector budgets; (ii) provide reliable, timely data to allow
organizations to intervene; (iii) provide independent budget analysis; and (iv) to
raise budget literacy. To date the BAP has focused only on three departments—
DA, DAR, and DENR. The focus has also been on the national level, given
resource constraints. Very few NGOs currently have the capacity to effectively
track expenditures, although the Legal Resources Center and the Agrarian
Reform Alliance have begun to track local government expenditures in a limited
number of locations.
6.58 Under its Government Watch project, PGF is initiating expenditure
tracking in projects of the DOH, DPWH, DepEd, and DSWD since these
agencies have large budgets with significant social welfare implications. As
mentioned previously, the partnership developed between the executive and the
PGF facilitates access to information and has led to a collaborative effort. The
emphasis is on assisting the departments to track and verify the quantity and
quality of reported outputs and assist the department improve aspects of
operations; it is not primarily intended as an exercise in performance assessment.
A memorandum of understanding is signed with the agencies concerned, and
Government Watch tracks priority projects agreed with the agency. The findings
of the studies are shared with the department prior to being published such that
the initiative is collaborative rather than confrontational. A key strength of this
initiative, in contrast to more detailed tracking studies, is that it relies on a simple
monitoring mechanism that needs little technical expertise and could be easily
replicated by local level.
6.59 Although these are innovative projects, they are presently restricted to
the national level. Points of access for civil society intervention at the local level
are more limited. They have tended to be concentrated in development planning
committees (as required by the LGC), school boards and so on. Some groups
have formed linkages with the Sanggunian but these are not institutionalized.
Many NGOs active at the local level do not have the capacity to engage with
budget issues and concentrate only on participation in planning.
6.60 To enhance the ability of civil society to engage in budget analysis and
advocacy and to hold Government accountable, access to credible, timely and
user-friendly information is critical. Publishing a summary of broad expenditure
allocations by sector and subsector, in conjunction with an explanation of the
policy thrust of the MTEF, would go a long way to improving transparency and
generating public support. These documents could serve as an indication of how
the SONA commitments will be met over the medium term. If the medium-term
projections were submitted to Congress for discussion it could also help in
promoting fiscal discipline. If Congress were to endorse the broad fiscal
aggregates and sectoral ceilings, and this is publicized, it would be more difficult
to backtrack or to make deviations from these during the approval process,
without having to provide a public explanation. An appropriate strategy and
timetable for gaining greater congressional commitment to the MTEF should be
developed as the political situation allows.
6.61 The Role of Congress in Budget Performance Management and
Oversight. Legislative oversight is an essential mandate and responsibility of
Congress, yet it is broadly accepted that the oversight function of Congress
remains weak. A report by the newly constituted Committee on Oversight notes
that “The legislative output and initiatives of Congress arising from the exercise
of its oversight power is dismally low if not totally absent.”54 One measure the
committee refers to is that since 1991, 23 laws of national significance have been
enacted but not implemented owing to a lack of funds. In recognition of the
importance of legislative oversight, the rules and regulations of the House of
84
Representatives during the Ninth Congress specifically mandated all committees

to create a subcommittee on oversight. These subcommittees became optional in
subsequent congresses, and are regarded as largely being ineffective, owing in
part to a lack of "resources, staff, and expertise.”55
6.62 This observation is particularly pertinent with regard to the budget.
Considerably more attention is paid by Congress to the budget approval process,
where reallocations may be made, than to monitoring budget execution or
evaluating the impact of expenditures. The Philippine Congress has considerable
authority to make amendments or reallocations within the proposed budget, as is
typical in presidential systems. A presidential system provides the mechanism for
local interests to be incorporated in the budget through special projects of
members of Congress, but this also provides opportunities for introducing
distortions. To minimize these distortions, however, for the past 2 years
restrictions have been imposed by the Committee on Appropriations (in
consultation with DBM) on the categories of expenditure allowed for
congressional discretionary funds, although the overall size has increased. In
addition, the amount of congressional initiatives in agency budgets has decreased
over time.
6.63 It is in the context of congressional attention to resource allocation
decisions during the budget approval process that questions about the credibility
of the MTEF arise. Given the importance of Congress’ role in the budget process,
congressional support for the MTEF will be absolutely necessary for its success.
Efforts must be made to convince congress that the intent of the MTEF is not to
limit congressional control over resource allocation. To that end the executive
should develop a strategy for engaging Congress’ interest in the MTEF and
building support for the medium-term vision, both in terms of plans and budgets,
through greater consultation and discussion. DBM has broached the idea of a law
with Congress on the principles of fiscal responsibility following examples in the
Australia, New Zealand, and United States, recognizing the need for stronger
cooperation on expenditure policy and allocation.
6.64 In technical, as opposed to political, terms, the capacity of Congress to
undertake budget analysis and reprioritization of proposed expenditure
allocations is limited and fragmented. The Committee on Appropriations has its
own technical staff, several of whom were recruited from DBM and as such have
requisite expertise in budget analysis. Many other sectoral committees, however,
do not have the technical staff necessary to undertake technical budget analysis.
In addition to the appropriations committee, independent analysis of the
President’s budget proposal is also provided by the Congressional Planning and
Budget Office (CPBO), whose reports are used predominantly by members of the
minority parties, the media, and civil society groups. The institutional
relationship between the CPBO and the Committee on Appropriations, however,
is currently weak. The Appropriations Committee also currently maintains strong
relationships with executive agencies, and as such has open access to budgetary
information. CPBO is working to establish closer linkages with the oversight
agencies of the executive—COA, DBM, DOF, and NEDA—in order to improve
access to information and to promote collaboration.
6.65 Moreover, the new Committee on Oversight has committed itself to
conducting independent and objective policy and program analyses. The
Committee has identified four main issues on which it will focus: (i) fighting
graft and corruption in the Philippines; (ii) improving the generation and
utilization of scarce resources; (iii) ensuring that Government’s antipoverty
reduction programs reach the intended beneficiaries and (iv) strengthening
governance by institutionalizing a Filipino report card-type system in
Government. Despite these laudable objectives, however, the Committee has
made it clear that it intends to limit its oversight to undertaking monitoring
activities and issuing recommendations. It remains to be seen whether the
committees on appropriations and oversight will increase congressional capacity
to improve budget oversight.
Recommendations
6.66 In the short term the Government is pursuing the following actions
(i) DBM and COA are linking the BEATS with the NGAS and simplifying key
resource-releasing processes
(ii) DBM is working with DepEd, DOH and DSWD in procurement, financial
management, and information technology under the Social Expenditure
Management Project (SEMP), in light of the problems with budget execution
procedures at the departmental level, to formulate a plan to improve
absorptive capacity and install the needed systems.
(iii) A position paper for an agency controllership function is being prepared
(with an implementation plan), aimed at fully integrating financial
management into agency management processes under the SEMP technical
assistance program.
(iv) BTR with the assistance of DOF is addressing the identified internal control
weaknesses by taking immediate action to tighten cash control and
management. A working group has been established under the DBCC to
better define accounting and reporting requirements for revenue remittance
and cash management by agencies and BTR. Moreover, an electronic link is
planned to be established between DBCC member agencies to facilitate the
monitoring of fiscal performance. As part of the review, consideration should
also be given to transferring responsibility for issue of NCAs to BTR. This
will separate the cash and budget management functions and place BTR as
the sole responsible agency for cash management.
(v) DBM, NEDA, and the line agencies should review the OPIF experience to
date to prepare a time-bound action plan (with estimates of resources needed
at the central and line department level) for OPIF implementation
government-wide. Specifically, the Government could review the OPIF
experience in selected departments to produce a lessons learned note on best
practice pilot experiences with the OPIF and disseminate the findings to line
agencies; the review could also be used to prepare the time-bound action plan
referred to above.
6.67 In the medium term, desirable actions could comprise the following:
(i) DBM, in conjunction with line agencies, should develop a medium-term
capacity building program by including a strategy for change management
for line agencies in implementing the OPIF.
86
(ii) The executive should develop a strategy for engaging Congress’ interest in
the MTEF and building support for the medium-term vision, both in terms of
plans and budgets, through greater consultation and discussion.
(iii) To strengthen the credibility of the MTEF and build broad-based consensus
on MTEF priorities across political lines, it would be desirable for the
executive to negotiate a joint resolution on the principles of fiscal
responsibility with Congress, the principal elements of which could be
(a) endorsement by Congress of the MTEF in terms of policy directions, the
fiscal framework, and 3-year expenditure allocations; (b) agreements about
the categories or amounts of expenditure reallocations that could be made;
(c) dispositive actions on unfunded laws; and (d) training workshops for
congress on selected public expenditure management issues.
(iv) It would also be appropriate to strengthen the capacity of the House
Committee of Appropriations, Senate Finance Committee, and the CPBO to
undertake budget and program analysis. Similarly, budget advocacy efforts
with the civil society organizations should be promoted. The CPBO and
CSOs can be enabled to become a more significant player in congressional-
executive budget deliberations.
6.68 In the longer term, it would be preferable to develop a program to
strengthen the controllership function, both at the agency and oversight levels,
and develop a profile of future agency controllers.
SECTION C. OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY
7. The Public Procurement Regime

8. Strengthening Financial Management
9. Controlling the Wage Bill
10. Implementation of Foreign-Assisted Projects
88
7. THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT REGIME

7.1 The last several years has seen a continued impetus from the executive for
reforming public procurement in the Philippines. This chapter outlines the key
initiatives taken so far.56 It also indicates that it is important to sustain the systems
improvements and capacity building needed to support procurement reforms to
increase competition and transparency: this will have a significant impact on Continued
increasing the cost efficiency of resource use and also contribute to strengthening
governance. procurement
7.2 From FY1997 to FY2001, annual outlays for procurement of goods, works, reforms to increase
and services by national agencies averaged more than PhP113 billion (Table 7.1).
competition and
This excludes procurement undertaken by LGUs and GOCCs which amount to about
PhP50 billion a year and for BOT projects, estimated at about PhP372 billion in transparency could
2001.57 The Ombudsman, the Commission on Audi,t and the Philippine Center for
Investigativhe Journalism have reported that large amounts of public funds are lost to increase the cost
both political and bureaucratic procurement-related corruption. Although no reliable efficiency of
estimates are available of losses due to public sector procurement-related corruption,
the perception of large leakages continues to persist. An October 2001 study by resource use, and
Procurement Watch, Inc. reported that the potential leakage from national
government coffers through procurement corruption could have run to about PhP21 also contribute to
billion in 2001 (equivalent to 14% of the budget deficit of about PhP145 billion that strengthening
year). The additional potential leakage in public-private transactions under BOT
projects was estimated conservatively at PhP74 billion. The DBM estimates that the governance.
PhP21 billion lost by Government from uncompetitive and nontransparent
procurement practices could have been used to fund the DOH twice over, or build
more than 60,000 school buildings, or construct about 3,000 kilometers of concrete
farm-to-market roads.
Table 7.1 Philippines: Magnitude of National Government Procurement Outlays
(PhP billion)
Expe nse Cla ss 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Supplies and Materials 15.750 15.587 17.012 20.295 16.879

Library Books and Materials 0.034 0.158 0.094 0.225 0.071
Other Services 15.096 17.232 15.430 18.676 19.322
Gasoline, Oil and Lubricants 1.883 1.766 2.099 2.593 2.622
Land and Land Improvements Outlay 43.621 68.337 50.406 63.497 59.985
Buildings and Structures Outlay 17.533 12.579 10.175 11.431 6.570
Furniture, Fixtures, Equipment and Books Outlay 11.275 6.307 9.23 5.723 3.642
Information Technology (IT) Equipment Outlay 0.010 0.226 0.799 0.716 0.932
TOTAL 105.202 122.192 105.245 123.156 110.023

Source: Tab les B.1 and B.14, Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing, Fys 1999, 2000,
2001, 2002 and 2003
7.3 The potential for procurement reform, and the budgetary savings realizable
from more transparent and accountable procurement, is thus, high. The experience of
textbook and drugs procurement under World Bank-financed projects demonstrated
that adoption of more transparent procurement processes and greater competitive ICB
practices reduced unit prices of textbooks by about 40%. This translated into a saving
of about PhP1.2 billion58 for DepEd. In the case of DOH, unit prices of tuberculosis
drugs were cut by 33–94%, similarly translating into substantial savings for DOH.
However, the possibility of reforms being blocked by vested interests remain major
concerns, as well as the extensive capacity-building needed.
Modernizing The Legal and Institutional Framework
7.4 Rapid modernization of the legal and institutional framework for public
procurement is unambiguously recognized as the key issue in procurement reform in
the Philippines today by the executive, legislature, and civil society. Enactment of an
appropriate public
The Legal Framework
7.5 Public procurement in the Philippines was governed by more than 60 laws,
procurement law
executive orders, presidential decrees and administrative orders, including issuances applicable to the NG,
from government agencies applicable to respective departments. Furthermore, most
EOs and IRRs seem to have been promulgated to fill the gaps caused by the absence LGUs, and GOCCs
of procurement legislation, although their theoretical role is circumscribed to
was rightly at the top
providing implementing details of an existing law, not to substitute for the lack of
legislation. Additionally, many executive instructions (especially earlier ones) do not of the GOP
cite the laws authorizing their promulgation, although administrative issuances
normally require a specific legal or statutory basis for their validity. And they do not procurement reform
indicate in their repealing clauses the specific provisions of previous EOs and IRRs agenda. The law now
which have been amended, modified, or repealed. This results in confusion and
conflicting interpretation of some of the provisions, increasing the likelihood of needs to be followed
rigged bidding, delay, and irregularities in the bid evaluation process.
by quick
7.6 The Government has taken several steps in recent years to streamline public
procurement rules and regulations, culminating with the issuance in October 2001 of promulgation and
Executive Order 40 followed in early 2002 by its IRRs. These rules consolidated a
implementation of
plethora of existing executive orders and instructions on National Government
procurement and streamlined and standardized the procurement for goods, works, IRRs.
and services. However, reforms initiated need to be institutionalized through
legislative enactment. Issues such as the composition and the manner of appointment
of BAC members, the influence that LGU chief executives can exercise in this
regard, and a stronger incentive system to professionalize the cadre of government
procurement personnel and minimize graft and corruption required a legislative
enactment which could modify, amend, repeal, or consolidate inadequate or
conflicting provisions, policies, and practices.
7.7 Thus, enactment and implementation of a new law on public procurement
applicable to the national government, LGUs and GOCCs was appropriately the top
administration priority in procurement reform.59 The Government Procurement
Reform Act was signed into law by the President on 10 January 2003 as Republic Act
9184. The law requires posting of procurement opportunities in the Government’s
electronic procurement system so that a single source of public procurement
opportunities is created. Moreover, it simplifies prequalification procedures,
strengthens the postqualification process, reduces officials’ discretion on bids and
awards, establishes a Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) for oversight
and regulation of government procurement, professionalizes the public procurement
function, protects procurement officials from unjust legal suits arising from the
90
performance of their duties, and imposes criminal and civil liabilities for those found
guilty of collusion and other anomalies.
7.8 The new law addresses the following fundamental issues:
(i) proliferation of laws on public sector procurement, which has
facilitated inefficiency, rent-seeking, and leakage of scarce
public resources;
(ii) reorganizing and strengthening agency and LGU BACs and
procurement units to ensure accountability in the processes and
procedures and the sustained improvement of systems for greater
cost efficiency;
(iii) establishing one authoritative regulatory and oversight entity for
all public procurement for NG, LGUs, and GOCCs—the law
consolidates the regulatory and oversight functions in a
Government Procurement Policy Board, and provides it more
teeth and independence;60
(iv) anomalous procurement practices such as rigged bidding, fake
advertising notices, misrepresentations in bid proposals,
irregularities in bid evaluation process or at the inspection stage
or at the contract implementation stages, and weak warranty
provisions for infrastructure projects;
(v) lack of proficient procurement staff and professional
practitioners in the civil service;
(vi) strengthening the system of rewards and punishments in the
performance of the procurement function; and
(vii) establishment of an appropriate complaints mechanism.
Institutional Arrangements
7.9 Procuring entities. The primary responsibility for the implementation and
execution of procurement laws and regulations rests with: (i) the head of each
national agency or instrumentality; (ii) the governing board for each GOCC; and (iii)
the elected head of each LGU. The size and capacity of the procurement setup in
each organization would depend on the complexity, variety, and volume of
procurement handled. Regulations such as PD 1594, EO 262, and EO 164 mandate
that evaluation and award processes be handled by ad hoc committees established in
each agency or office, such as (i) a Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) for
procurement of works and goods and (ii) a Prequalification Evaluation and Awards
Committee (PEAC) for the selection of consultant services. Technical working
groups (TWGs) assist the committees in the technical evaluation of bids. These
committees are assisted by secretariats to handle the administrative function in the
bidding process.
7.10 EO 40 constituted the BAC, which determines the eligibility of prospective
bidders or consultants, receives and opens bids or proposals, conducts the evaluation
of bids or offers, undertakes prequalification for complex works and post-
qualification proceedings, including eligibility screening, and recommends the award
of contract. The scope of the BAC activities spans the pre-procurement conference up
to the recommendation of the award. The BAC is a five-member team composed of
the chairperson and four members designated by the head of the agency. Three of
these consist of regular BAC members; the other two are provisional members.
Representatives from NGOs and COA are invited as observers. EO 40 mandates the
creation of a permanent Procurement Secretariat with fixed responsibility, for greater
efficiency. It also prohibits the head of agency and/or the contract approving
authority from any involvement in the bid evaluation process.
7.11 Although EO 40 mandated the constitution of a permanent BAC and fulltime
secretariats in agencies, these entities in most agencies at this time are still ad hoc and
their members are designated together with the Committees. Departments such as the
DOH and DPWH designate officials from among their senior and middle managers
to be committee members for a year. In other agencies, such as the DedEd, the
Department Secretary nominates members of the Committee for each specific
procurement package from among the numerous departmental officials on a rotating
basis.
7.12 In many agencies, proficient procurement staff are still lacking. Worse, those
considered proficient staff refuse to be designated as members of the committees
because of fear of harassment and legal suits from bidders in the absence of any legal
or appropriate assistance from government.
7.13 Procurement practices and concerns. In general, laws and administrative
issuances mandate the transparency of procurement proceedings. Competitive public
bidding requires the public advertisement of requests for bid quotations in
newspapers of general circulation, through the posting of notices in conspicuous
public places, and lately through government web sites and the Electronic
Procurement System (EPS). Thus, invitations to bid are required to be publicly
advertised at least twice within 2 weeks with at least seven days between publications
in two newspapers of general circulation. Public bid opening is undertaken by the
BAC with the participation of observers from expert organizations from the private
sector, civil society, and COA. It is required to follow the prescribed procedure for
evaluating bids. Biddings are conducted according to the two or three-envelope
system, where the eligibility requirements, technical proposal and bid price are
submitted in separate envelopes. The bid opening is public, and may be attended by
bidders or their representatives.
7.14 In spite of the enactment of the Procurement Reform Law and the issuance of
EO 40, prevailing procurement policies and practices still disclose numerous areas of
concern, key among which include the following:
(i) Transparency. It is recognized that the transparency of public procurement is
not sufficient. There are still too many influences jeopardizing the efficiency
and integrity of the procurement process including high rates of rebidding,
especially at the LGU level, and price negotiations before award create concern
about the process. Rebidding sometimes results when the bidding is not in line
with expectations, or the lowest bidder is not qualified.
(ii) Lead Time. Delays or lengthy processes characterize public procurement, and
bid activities are sometimes extended regularly. EO 40, which supersedes AO
129, stipulates a maximum time per activity. It is desirable that this be enforced
by the heads of agencies and the BACs, and monitored by the BAC Secretariat
and enforced through procurement audits.
(iii) Procurement Plans. Procurement plans are developed for budget purposes,
but their implementation is not monitored, neither their potential benefit for
92
facilitating timely and quality agency service delivery as an accountability

mechanism for procurement. Moreover, some plans are not implemented due to
changing agency priorities and budget cuts. Consequently, there is often no
clear link between budget formulation, planning of activities, and procurement
execution.
(iv) Registration and Licensing of Foreign Contractors and Suppliers. For
locally funded procurement, foreign bidders are required to be registered and
licensed in the Philippines prior to the bidding. The contractor and supplier has
to embark on a long and tedious process of licensing and registration, which
also require them to establish offices in the country and to comply with
citizenship requirement of at least 75% or 60% Filipino ownership in the case
of infrastructure and goods procurement, respectively, before getting the
license. These raise the costs for potential bidders and may be an undue barrier
to entry.
(v) Negotiation of Contract Price. Price negotiation is said to be a key entry point
for possible corruption in the procurement process. While EO 40 prohibits
price negotiation, most bidding documents still do not allow the reduction of
quantities along preagreed percentages. Hence, some parties negotiate with the
lowest bidder to stay within the approved budget.
(vi) Congressional Initiative and CDF. The actual procurement practice in
district-level projects tends to be nontransparent as some elected officials are
reported to pre-determine the winning contractors. This jeopardizes the
credibility of theprocess and compromises the integrity of BAC members.
(vii) Price Monitoring. Currently, a small number of agencies such as the PS,
COA, DOH, and DTI maintain a price list of commonly used goods, drugs, and
medicines. However, price monitoring should form part of a standard and
efficient procurement function in all departments. There is also a need for an
oversight entity to supervise, monitor, and compare prices across different
departments. In essence, this will result in closer monitoring of public
procurement expenditures.
(viii) Bonds, Bank Guarantees, and Letters of Credit. It is common to use surety
bonds as bid and performance security. However, these surety bonds are not
actually callable on demand and difficult to garnish, demonstrating that a bond
is not an irrevocable guarantee. Most foreign-assisted projects require bank
guarantees. However, banks in the Philippines normally ask for the full amount
of the guarantee (in cash or in property). The situation is the same for LCs,
although access to LCs seems easier because suppliers provide them to cover
guarantees related to contracts.
(ix) Other Monopolistic Practices. PD 1466 requires that imported goods should
be transported by Philippine vessels. Since Philippine vessels go only to Japan
and the Republic of Korea, suppliers from these two countries are at a
disadvantage compared with the other countries of the region, which can
choose any vessel available. One can transport goods on another vessel only if
the fare on Philippine vessels is more than 10% higher than the rest. A waiver
must be secured from the Philippine Shippers Board before a non-Philippine
vessel can be used. Again, this provision is monopolistic, expensive, and
contrary to open competition. Competitors are sometimes dissuaded by
cumbersome administrative processes, e.g., relating to licensing of foreign
contractors, transport on Philippine vessels, restricted access to foreign

textbooks, difficult access to the cheapest drugs from foreign countries, etc.
(x) Preshipment Inspection. The Government no longer engages in automatic
pre-shipment inspection. Public and private sector inspectors make their own
arrangements. The result is that, in many cases, the preshipment inspection is
neglected or inspection is done only upon arrival in Philippine ports. This
increases the burden or risk of the importer. When inspection is done at the
destination port, it increases the cost of the remedy because goods have to be
shipped back to the manufacturer for repair or replacement.
(xi) International Arbitration. According to the Contractor Industry Authority of
the Philippines (CIAP) and the Philippines Constructors Accreditation Board
(PCAB), the settlement of disputes provision, which culminates in an
international body, is not binding. The local party to the contract, if he/she so
desires, may insist on having the final step of the process heard in a Philippine
court.
(xii) Oversight Arrangements. Several central agencies and ad hoc bodies
currently perform varying oversight responsibilities, either directly or
indirectly, over the procurement function: the Procurement Policy Board, the
Committee on Infrastructure (INFRACOM) of NEDA, the Philippine
Licensing Board for Contractors, the Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission, and DBM’s Procurement Service.
7.15 Other issues that emerged in a review of procurement conducted for national
government agencies—and which are expected to be addressed by the proposed
legislation—include (i) compromising the transparency of procurement due to
incomplete and slow records retrieval; (ii) lapses in disclosure of information vital to
a fair and open competition, during the advertisement and the evaluation of bids; and
(iii) absence of a mechanism for systematic monitoring and feedback on suppliers’
performance.
Electronic Procurement
7.16 E-procurement systems have been developed in various public sector

agencies in the Philippines, including (i) DBM-EPS (see Box 7.1), (ii) DPWH for
determining the eligibility of contractors; (iii) the Department of National Defense
(DND) for procurement of military uniforms and defense hardware; (iv) NPC for the
procurement of coal; (v) DBM-Procurement Service for the procurement of small-
value office equipment, materials, and supplies, and (vi) other agencies, including
DepEd and DOH.
Box 7.1 The Philippine Government Electronic Procurement System
On 22 November 2000 the Procurement Service (PS) of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM), with a grant from the Canadian International Development Agency
(CIDA), launched an internet-based pilot electronic procurement system (EPS) composed of a
public tender board, electronic catalog, and supplier registry. The system improved access to
government opportunities, saved cost, and enhanced the efficiency and transparency of
government procurement.
DBM oversees government expenditures through the release of budgetary allotments for
different government agencies and departments, while its PS handles the purchase of goods
and services for over 1,800 client agencies, and monitors prices of goods and services.
Transparency in government procurement is a systemic problem in the Philippines, and added
94
to this are inefficiency, poor service delivery, and low sales volumes resulting from manual
and paper-driven procurement processes. A 1999 study conducted by PS with CIDA
assistance showed that a pilot EPS could improve transparency, efficiency, and value for
money in government procurement.
The system went live on 1 December 2000, and is now being marketed by DBM to other
agencies. The EPS advertises bids electronically. Bids are received in hard copy and evaluated
by hand. The evaluation and award results are then posted electronically.
The EPS is supported by several EOs and administrative orders (AOs). EO 40 of October
2001 and RA 8792, dated 14 June 2000, recognize and encourage the use of electronic
commerce in general and of electronic procurement in particular. Section 27 of the E-
Commerce Law (RA 8792) also mandates that by mid-2002, agencies/GOCC/GFIs shall
“transact government business and/or perform governmental functions using electronic data
messages or electronic documents …”, leaving room for the selective application of electronic
procurement, depending upon the degree of sophistication of the existing systems, as well as
their applicability to specific types of procurement and specific procurement processes. The
implementing rules and regulations of EO 262 state that “bid requirements should be placed
in two consecutive issues of two newspapers of general circulation and posted in the EPS and
the website of the concerned agency.” The previous practice was to advertise the bids in three
major newspapers—advertising on the EPS has saved the Government money in advertising
costs.
The total cost of the EPS pilot program is estimated at about US$400,000, shared equally
between DBM and CIDA. Within six months after going live, the EPS had 86 agencies and 62
suppliers registered, and 71 bid notices posted on the EPS. (As of 10 October 2002, there are
1,797 agencies, 2,377 suppliers registered and 9,214 bid notices posted.) Eventually all
government procurement notices are envisaged to be posted on the EPS. Suppliers are able to
access government bid opportunities 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
While the system has great potential for improving the transparency and efficiency of
procurement, the Government had noted the implementation challenges early and is taking
steps to address them. For example, even with high interest and support for the EPS, its initial
implementation was relatively slow. The reasons were numerous—agencies did not have the
same resources or capacity for supporting the EPS, only about 25% of agencies trained in the
EPS were ready for Internet access, only about 8% of Filipinos were using the Internet in
1999, there was resistance to change from employees who thought the EPS would lead to a
loss of jobs, and this was also a time of larger political uncertainty and turbulence in the
Philippines (the pilot testing ran into the presidential impeachment trial, the EDSA II people
power revolution, and the assumption of office by a new government). Second, a key lesson
learnt has been that the technology being used must consider the users’ level of knowledge
and skill, access to the necessary infrastructure/equipment and services, and needs and
expectations. Third, leadership has to come from the highest levels of the Government, and be
sustained. Fourth, the agencies using the EPS must have intimate knowledge of their target
market and know how to segment it —each segment will require a different marketing
strategy and will have different service level expectations. Customers will start using a new
system continuously only if it adds and continues to add value through its content and quality
of information, and if the system and its support services meet or exceed their service level
expectations. Third, for the technical and logistical support to be provided on a timely basis,
implementation and maintenance of the electronic procurement service is being bid out to the
private sector.
Source: DBM Case Study on the EPS
Civil Society Oversight
7.17 The Philippines has been prominent in involving civil society in the public
procurement process to enhance accountability and transparency at both national and
local levels.
The GOP has been
7.18 Procurement Watch, Incorporated (PWI) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan, civil
society organization created by a group of concerned individuals from government, prominent in
academe, the legal profession and the private sector, brought together by the involving civil
challenge of reducing graft and corruption in government procurement through
research, partnerships, training, and advocacy. Established on 15 February 2001 with society in the public
support from an ASEM Trust Fund managed by the World Bank, PWI promotes
transparency and accountability and assists in streamlining procedures in government procurement
procurement of goods, supplies, materials, services and infrastructure projects. process to enhance
7.19 Active procurement monitoring, public fora, roundtable discussions,
accountability and
workshops, technical assistance to government, research, publications, and media
releases comprise some of PWI’s activities. By exposing inefficiencies in public transparency at both
procurement policies and procedures, and presenting alternatives based on well-
grounded research, PWI believes it can push for reforms that enhance competitive national and local
public bidding and lessen the possibility of corruption.
levels.
7.20 PWI has partnerships with several government agencies for monitoring
implementation of EO 262 and PD 1594 and its implementing rules and regulations
(IRRs). PWI has attended agency BAC meetings and monitored the public bidding
for certain projects. PWI’s recommendations based on its observations on the actual
bidding process provide an independent evaluation and feedback mechanism for
procuring agencies, and it also monitors whether its recommendations are
implemented by the agency. PWI also provides training on existing procurement
guidelines and provides updates on reforms to agency personnel.
7.21 In the area of policy advocacy, PWI participated in the formulation of the
pending Procurement Bill, which aims to improve transparency and increase
competition and efficiency in government procurement procedures. PWI also
participated in the crafting of EO 40 and its IRR.
Recommendations
7.22 The Government and Procurement Watch, Inc. have shepherded the Public
Procurement Law through Congress. This law consolidates existing legal acts and
presidential/administrative issuances, addresses existing gaps and inconsistencies,
and provides a comprehensive legal basis for procurement by NG agencies, LGUs,
and GOCCs. Passage of this law was appropriately a top administration priority: this
now needs to be followed by promulgation and implementation of IRRs.
7.23 At the same time, the administration’s institutional strengthening efforts
require long-term support. These initiatives focus on (i) establishing a government
procurement policy board as the sole regulatory and oversight entity for public
procurement and defining its scope of work—this will be transformed into an
appropriate oversight and regulatory entity through IRRs once the Procurement Bill
is enacted; (ii) establishing an appropriate protest and complaints mechanism;
(iii) setting up an incentive system to professionalize the procurement function
including the establishment of a national training program for procurement officers
96
and for COA auditors on procurement audit; and (iv) conducting a study to
corporatize PS as an independent entity.
7.24 Other ongoing initiatives to strengthen procurement include (i) continued
development of the government electronics porcurement system (GEPS) to include e-
bidding and e-payment; (ii) nonacceptance of surety bonds as a form of security with
bank guarantees, LCs. or other reliable instruments, proposed to be done through
IRRs; (iii) review of the BOT Law and the “unsolicited proposals” rule and tabling of
suitable amendments based on the recommendations from the study; and (v) allowing
foreign contractors to bid without a license from the PCAB.
8. STRENGTHENING FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

8.1 The financial accountability perspective in this PEPFMR focuses on the
public sector. Some aspects—such as budgeting, accounting, cash management Improvements need to
and reporting—have been covered in Chapter 6. This chapter focuses on the
current legal and regulatory environment, government auditing, and the be continued in key
unfolding COA restructuring.61 focus areas such as
Public Financial Accountability In The Philippines government
8.2 There is a long history of accounting and auditing development in the accounting, reporting,
public and private sectors. COA—now an independent constitutional body and
the country’s supreme audit institution—was initially established in 1935 with and auditing at the
considerable powers and independence from the executive branch of the national and local
Government. The accounting profession is well developed, with a national
institute of certified public accountants. The 1987 Constitution further government levels.
strengthened public financial accountability structures.
8.3 In recent years the Government, in association with development
partners, has carried out several analyses on improving financial management
and auditing in the Philippines. At the outset of the PEPFMR process it was
agreed that the exercise should build on the wealth of existing analyses and
recommendations. In view of these developments, the financial management
aspect of the PEPFMR exercise focuses on proposed reforms, implementation
plans and what further work needs to be done. The recommendations are
supportive of ongoing reforms, and a short list of feasible actions has been
preferred to a long list of desirable actions.
External Audit
8.4 COA has undertaken a restructuring of its organization to address

existing institutional limitations. The restructuring distributes audit responsibility
from a regional basis to an agency-nationwide basis. The nationwide government
The COA
agencies and GOCCs will be organized into audit clusters with a director taking reorganization will
responsibility for audit at the national and regional level. The audit of the LGUs
in several regions will be clustered under a director who will take responsibility be keenly watched
for all local government audits in the cluster. This restructuring is meant to
for the lessons it
promote the audit team approach that COA has not been able to fully implement
in the past. COA has implemented the restructuring plan in 2002. This exercise holds for
will be keenly watched for lessons to be drawn for other restructuring initiatives
in Government. restructuring
8.5 COA also plans to focus its work on financial and value-for-money initiatives in
audits and progressively move towards a risk-based auditing model. COA is
being assisted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the
Government.
Australian Agency for International Development (AUSAID) in these efforts. As
COA is currently fully engaged in the reform of the accounting system and
computerization of accounting, development of a risk assessment model and
training of staff will be done gradually over the next 2–3 years.
8.6 With the planned computerization of the accounting system, another area
that would need COA’s attention is the development of information technology
(IT) audit capabilities. COA already has several auditors trained in audit of
98
computerized applications. COA plans to develop a strategy to improve its

computer auditing capability and the upgradeof IT software and hardware.
8.7 COA has agreed for the World Bank to carry out a peer review to
enhance its quality assurance program. COA is also pilot testing a program to
encourage participatory audits, allowing civil society organizations to participate
in selected audits. COA plans to mainstream this audit approach after reviewing
the experience of the pilots. COA’s public disclosure of audit findings is
enhanced by the establishment of a website (www.coa.gov.ph) where all audit
reports are placed for public access.
Accounting
8.8 Based on recommendations from existing analyses for improvements in

accounting, COA, which is constitutionally mandated to promulgate policies,
rules and procedures on accounting and auditing, has designed and initiated a
phased implementation of the NGAS from 1 Januar 2002. The NGAS aims to: (i)
simplify government accounting; (ii) conform to international accounting
standards; and (iii) generate periodic and relevant financial statements for better
performance monitoring. COA is also developing an accounting software
package for computerization of the NGAS.
8.9 All NG agencies have adopted the new system starting 1 January 2002.
The NGAS has several features that make it a significantly better system,
including a modified accrual accounting basis, improved accounting for assets, in
which all depreciable assets shall be capitalized and depreciation shall be
recognized in the income and expenditure statements, the adoption of a single The Philippines has
fund concept, and a simplified three-digit chart of accounts, among others. COA
is also developing a computerized version of the NGAS. made important
8.10 With the introduction of the NGAS, a simplified annual financial strides with the
reporting is also required. All agencies are required to prepare a balance sheet,
income and expenditure statement, and a cash flow statement. There are development of the
approximately 100 reports produced by agencies for budget and financial control NGAS, but its
purposes. The introduction of the NGAS is an opportunity for the Government to
review the requirements of the various oversight agencies and prescribe a more implementation needs
streamlined set monitoring reports for their use. Pilots are under way in DSWD,
DepEd, and DPWH to improve financial management reporting. to be carefully
8.11 The introduction of the NGAS means that approximately 2,000 managed to avoid the
independent accounting units at the national and local government level will have
risk of a breakdown in
to switch to the new system. The logistics of such a large-scale change without a
period of parallel implementation carry very high risks. However, given the financial controls
complexities of the old system, COA had no option but to opt for a “big bang”
approach in installing the NGAS and organized a nationwide training of trainers during the transition.
during the 3 months preceding the introduction of the new system.
8.12 Notwithstanding the above efforts, the Government will have to take
careful measures to ensure that NGAS implementation takes place without the
risk of a serious breakdown of financial controls during the transition to the new
system. The main risks arise from (i) the lack of a detailed accounting procedures
manual to guide agency and LGU financial staff; (ii) the possibility that training
of staff may have been insufficient; (iii) COA’s capacity to provide adequate
troubleshooting support when implementation problems surface; (iv) the lack of a
link between the chart of accounts and budgetary classification; and (e) the
uncertainty surrounding the management reports needed to carry out effective
budget control.
8.13 To address these risks, COA has adopted a strategy of phased
implementation, focusing first on setting up the basic manual system. This will
be followed by computerization. The final step will be to develop a Government
integrated financial management system that will provide management and
financial information at various levels of Government.
8.14 It must be stressed, though, that implementation and sequencing issues
will require very careful monitoring during the pilot phase, and users’ queries
and system problems sorted out. It will be crucial to develop linkages between
the NGAS on the one hand, and the BEATS and CUBES on the other, as early as
possible. This will entail very close coordination and consultation between BTR,
COA, DBM, and NEDA.
Internal Audit
8.15 Internal audit is not a well-developed function in government agencies. The internal audit
Although internal audit units are authorized under the Internal Audit Code, function needs to be
budgetary considerations have prevented their establishment in all government
agencies and local government units. Some agencies, though, have internal strengthened at
control units that carry out some functions of an internal audit unit.
national and LGU
Recommendations
levels, and should
8.16 NGAS implementation. To ensure successful implementation, the be closely
Government has appropriately focused on capacity building, oversight
mechanisms, provision of manuals, and effective coordination between central coordinated with
and line agencies, and it is desirable that the attention being given to such details
and the high-level intensive oversight of implementation, be continued till such COA.
time as the initial system implementation problems are ironed out and the NGAS
is securely established.
8.17 Strengthening audit. Institutionalization of peer reviews of COA audits
would promote a culture of openness and upgrade audit functions and services.
8.18 Internal audit. The internal audit function needs to be strengthened at
national and LGU levels, in careful coordination with COA: with 11,000 auditors
in COA alone, a careful study is a prerequisite to embarking on a program to
universally establish internal audit units. Such a study should review the transfer
of some routine audit functions from COA to internal audit units and the
implications on COA staffing due to the establishment of such units.
8.19 Given the importance of effectively managing contingent liabilities, it is
also desirable that internal audit systems in GOCCs be strengthened to deal with
management of contingent liabilities, and a broader role assigned for resident
auditors in reviewing the financial statements of GOCCs.
100
9. CONTROLLING THE WAGE BILL

9.1 Civil service reform is now critical for flexibility and could make an
important contribution to public sector efficiency. This is because personal
services expenditures—salaries, allowances, payments to wages of casual
workers, bonuses, and the like—have emerged as the key variable (absent
increases in tax collections) that the Government can influence if it is to better
finance core poverty-reducing investments and MOOE. In particular, it would
seem that a reallocation from personal services to MOOE might improve the The cost of the civil
effectiveness and efficiency of government spending, especially in sectors such
as education. Actions to address civil service employment and compensation service has created
issues are hence overdue, especially given the potential in the short to
a significant fiscal
mediumterm for reallocation of personal services expenditures to MOOE.
Public Employment: Size, Structure, Cost burden: a
reallocation from
9.2 The structure and size of public employment in the Philippines has been
depicted in Figure 1.2. Leaving aside the armed forces, GOCCs/GFIs, and LGUs, personal services to
the national budget pays for a total of 950,039 permanent staff (including
MOOE might
education, health, police, and other uniformed personnel) and approximately
21,478 casual/contractual and temporary positions. The five largest employers of improve the
permanent staff in 2001 were DepEd (480,348 filled positions), SUCs (58,189),
DOH (26,625), the Judiciary (26,422), and DENR (21,023); they were followed effectiveness and
by DOF (19,145), DPWH (18,145), and DOTC (16,957). DA and DAR together efficiency of
employ 20,117 permanent staff.
9.3 The quality of the civil service at national and local levels affects the government
quality of policy advice and policy development on the one hand, and the quality spending.
of policy implementation and service delivery on the other. The key civil service
constraints are well known to policy makers: they involve issues relating to the
fiscal weight of the wage bill; compensation levels and structure; establishment
control and staffing; the legal framework; and capacity building.
9.4 The cost of the civil service has created a significant fiscal burden in the
Philippines. Personal services expenditures accounted for some 35% of total
national government expenditures in FY2000 and 2001 and, if mandatory
expenditures (debt service and IRA) are excluded, 58% of national government
expenditures. This is not a recent development: in 1996–2001, personal services
rose from a low of 6.1% of GNP to a high of 7.4 % in 1998. Thereafter they have
declined to 6.7% in 2000 and have remained at about that level through 2002.
9.5 There are good fiscal reasons why these expenditures need to be
controlled even more tightly: low revenue collections, coupled with increasing
debt service obligations, have squeezed the budget so much that the most realistic
path to adequately protect the growth and antipoverty agenda—apart from
increasing revenue collections—is to rein in the wage bill more speedily.
9.6 The effort to control the wage bill has been led by PCEG, DBM, and
CSC. The broad government strategy has been to control the wage bill through a
series of incremental measures: minimizing contractual positions, containing the
growth of permanent positions, and controlling LGU and GOCC expenditures on
personal services. In 2001, PCEG began a serious effort at streamlining the
executive department. Beginning with the Office of the President, scores of
contractual positions were abolished in 2002. That year the President also issued
Memorandum Order No. 20 directing GOCCs and GFIs exempted from the
Salary Standardization Law to standardize their pay practices and make the
compensation of their senior officers comparable with their counterpart positions
in the national agencies. DBM and COA were tasked to monitor implementation
of this order. The CSC issued Memorandum Circular No. 17, which obliges both
national government agencies and LGUs to submit their job orders for
contractual and casual employees to the CSC for review. This begins the
gathering of information about this segment of employees, which had heretofore
escaped systematic hiring and compensation regulation. In 2002, DBM also
issued Local Budget Circular No. 75 to clarify and reiterate the guidelines with
respect to waiver of the personal services cap provided for under the LGC. The
net impact of these steps on the wage bill, however, has been minimal so far.
9.7 The Government has also taken a decision in principle to integrate stand-
alone project management offices (PMO) of foreign-funded projects into regular
government structures to ensure operational sustainability and the alignment of
project concerns with the overall agency program. This will arrest the increasing
number of contractual personnel and minimize yet another avenue for avoiding
salary standardization, through the use of higher-paid contractual positions for
essentially core PMO functions such as administration, finance, project
monitoring, and evaluation. Additional contractual positions will as a rule be
only for technical positions not readily available from the regular plantilla or
existing contractual positions of the agency. The impact of this decision will Civil service
become clearer in the months ahead. compensation reform
Compensation
is overdue: salaries
9.8 Salaries. There are three main constraints that DBM and CSC are are generally low,
working to remove
allowances non-
(i) Civil service salaries are unsustainably low by comparison with
equivalent jobs in the private sector. A 1997 pay survey suggested that transparent, and
civil service salaries for senior managers might be as little as 20 % of
private sector equivalents. More notably, salaries for senior executives in disparate retirement
the top grades and for professionals in the middle grades lag well behind laws have caused
salaries for equivalent jobs in the private sector, whereas salaries for
lower pay groups are comparable. demoralization.
(ii) Civil service salaries are also compressed—they hardly allow room for
reward and significant milestones.
(iii) Compensation levels are not adequate to attract, retain, and motivate staff
in certain jobs. The number of vacancies are rising and have remained
unfilled in key professional categories including auditors, lawyers, IT
professionals, and medical professionals.
9.9 The single civil service salary schedule, with 33 grades each with 8 steps,
is coming under increasing pressure. Many GOCCs and GFIs have already
broken away, fuelling pressures. It has been contended that the principle of equal
pay for equal work is no longer being followed: fiscal pressures have led to
numerous entities being granted exemptions from salary standardization on the
basis of their revenue-generating capacity. These exemptions have created a
special class of civil servants whose compensation has increased
102
disproportionately to those covered by the Salary Standardization Law. This

debasement of the salary standardization principle enunciated in the Constitution
has demoralized civil servants, and is part of the reason why national government
agencies completely dependent on the budget are finding it difficult to recruit or
retain personnel for highly technical and managerial positions.
9.10 These issues are being partly addressed. Across-the-board salary
increases were granted in 2000 (10%) and 2001 (5%). The pay of the uniformed
personnel was also increased starting 2000 for the Philippine National Police and
starting 2002 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines. But more importantly,
PCEG has also approved the general framework for improvement of government
compensation, namely that it be market-driven for high-turnover skills, and
performance-based to the maximum extent possible. Notwithstanding the above,
there is still pressure for proliferation of salary schedules. DBM is trying to stem
the tide by piloting in its regional offices the development of generic job
descriptions. These are meant to minimize the diversity of positions, and
broadband skills.
9.11 Allowances. There is a growing abundance of increasingly perverse and
nontransparent “allowances,” especially in GOCCs and GFIs. Pressure to contain
the defined benefit pension bill has resulted in growth of unconsolidated
allowances rather than increased basic salary. In addition, the productivity and
performance pay has degenerated into merely another allowance, paid at a flat
rate to almost all employees. Its original intention has been lost. On the other
hand, geographical differences in pay and allowances have been abolished. But
this has led to an unintended consequence: NG staff in regional offices are now
said to be better off in real terms than their Metro Manila counterparts, and
experienced staff are now reluctant to move to the national capital area from
regional offices.
9.12 Pensions. Disparate retirement laws cause demoralization and are a
burden to a stretched national budget. In addition, the three key pension funds
(SSS, GSIS, and the AFP RSBS) either face immediate financial sustainability
risks (SSS and AFP RSBS) or need to strengthen their performance (GSIS) while
comprehensive and longer-term pension reforms are designed and consensus is
obtained for their implementation.
9.13 Sources of “flexibility”. Allocations for wages of nonpermanent
personnel, per diems, fringe benefits, bonuses and incentives, other benefits, and
certain other items are known as “flexible” items within the overall personal
services allocation. Seen thus, roughly 18.4% of the 2002 personal services
allocations across the national budget can be deemed to be “flexible” (within
Congress, the comparable figure is 34%). There are departments with seemingly
high allocations for wages of nonpermanent personnel, such as DepEd (PhP638
million) and DND (PhP508.6 million), but these comprise less than 2% of their
allocations for salaries of permanent staff. However, allocations for wages of
nonpermanent staff, as a ratio of the allocation for salaries of permanent staff,
seem to be relatively high for some entities such as the Agriculture and Fisheries
Modernization Program (1.4:1) and the Office of the President (1.1:1).
9.14 The data seem to show that reallocation from personal services to MOOE
and/or capital outlays in sectors such as health and education could improve the
efficiency of government spending. As discussed, some 95% of the DepEd
budget is eaten up by personal services. The education sector is later used in this
chapter to illustrate the interlinked personnel-related issues (size, structure and
cost), and their effect in suppressing capital outlays and MOOE.
9.15 Effect of congressional initiatives. As mentioned in Chapter 4,
congressional initiatives to improve service delivery (e.g., by creating SUCs, or
increasing the number of beds in hospitals) have led to increasing pressure on the
NG to fund all or part of the costs of the associated positions. The NG has
attempted to deal with this by allowing SUCs, for example, to fund staff
compensation from fees and charges, some of which may be off-budget.
Strengthening the Public Administration
9.16 The high cost of personal services—as demonstrated in the preceding

sections—is compounded by proliferation of agencies, functional duplication, Executive action to
and overlaps among agencies and within and between departments. Some
agencies seem to be overstaffed, while some are also overlayered, with too much restructure and
middle management. There are staff surpluses in many functions and staffing
realign selected
shortages in others. Equitable distribution of staff across regions and provinces is
an issue. Overlap and duplication of functions also add to numbers. agencies seems to
9.17 As has been mentioned earlier, the “legislative track” to restructuring is be the most feasible
pending in Congress. Various drafts of a restructuring bill have been stalled for 9
years in 3 successive Congresses. Comprehensive streamlining does not seem to route: the BIR
be likely in the near term. Particular agency reorganizations, however, have been
enacted by Congress, such as those of the Securities and Exchange Commission
reforms are a litmus
(SEC), NPC, and DepEd. Thus, the “administrative track” to restructuring is the test of willingness
current focus. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has upheld the authority of the
President to reorganize the executive branch. Executive action to restructure and to tackle core
realign selected agencies in conformity with state priorities and policies seems to
institutional
be the most feasible route.
9.18 The streamlining of agencies and offices attached to the Office of the reforms.
President has been completed, based on a PCEG-led review. A first step was the
issue, in February 2002, of EO 72, which abolished 77 offices and transferred 13
other offices to other agencies and departments where their functions are more
aligned. Those abolished include interagency committees, ad hoc committees,
and other bodies, most of which have already accomplished their mandate but
have been allowed to continue. The fiscal impact of this abolition has been
minimal, most of the affected employees being casual or contractual employees.
Permanent employees in those offices will continue to be employed and have
been placed in a pool administered by CSC; the latter will place those civil
servants into other agencies. But the signal this EO sent was welcome—that the
government was keen in taking administrative measures to reduce overlaps and
duplication. Similar streamlining efforts are being pursued under the
administrative track in BIR, DBM, Department of Energy (DOE), DOH, and the
DSWD.
9.19 Another signal of planned but fundamental restructuring comes from
COA—with more than 10,500 employees across all regions, COA has begun the
difficult process of restructuring its offices and reporting arrangements to
strengthen its external audit function. The first round of changes are expected to
be completed within 2002. To sustain these restructuring efforts, DBM is leading
104
a review of structures, functions, and programs of all attached agencies, task

forces, and similar bodies in the NG. The expected outcome is abolition of
unnecessary and proliferating attached agencies and ad hoc bodies. DBM is
currently preparing profiles of such entities. The Government expects to
deactivate 13 agencies through this process and support this with a more
reasonable separation benefit package.
Institutional Issues
9.20 Establishment control. Establishment control is relatively weak despite

efforts in recent years to control recruitment and impose selective hiring freezes.
At present, departments do not present accurate information on the number of
filled and unfilled positions and there is no reliable method of verifying the
submissions to oversight agencies. DBM, CSC and GSIS currently maintain their
own personnel information databases, but these cannot “communicate” with each
The Government is
other, cover different sets of employees, and have their own reliability and
accuracy issues. The situation is also exacerbated by the employment of putting in place a
considerable numbers of nonpermanent staff such as casuals and contractuals.
What this means in reality is that there is only weak control over staffing—and human resource
efforts to control staffing may founder on the rock of insufficient control points management
and outdated/incorrect information, unless addressed expeditiously.
9.21 Establishment controls need strengthening by having one authentic
information system —
source of information on authorized positions (the approved plantilla) and filled a first step towards
positions, both also for use for payroll data, for more effective control of civil
service employment and costs. An initiative to design and implement a common strengthening
civil service personnel information system is under way. It seeks to harmonize
establishment control.
existing disparate databases so that the information residing in different agencies
can be used for payroll purposes and establishment control. An interagency
working group (CSC, DBM, GSIS) has been established to review and
recommend options for integrating the existing systems in CSC, DBM, and
GSIS.
9.22 A key issue constraining the setting up of effective establishment control
mechanisms has been the limited capacity of CSC. This has meant in effect that
DBM has had to shoulder much of the burden of establishment control. However,
CSC has been making a concerted effort over the last 2 years to enhance its
capacity. It has prepared a Strategic Plan to address key civil service reform
issues (Box 9.1).
9.23 Some progress on pay and employment reform at the NG level has been
recently made with the development of a modeling tool that can help authorities
forecast the payroll, assess the fiscal consequences of pay and employment
reform options, and apply it to national departments and agencies.
9.24 Institutional weaknesses. The CSC’s strategic plan sets out the key
institutional weaknesses constraining the professional upgrading of the
Philippines civil service. Although they are well known and have persisted for
decades, they are nevertheless worth outlining
Box 9.1. The Civil Service Commission’s Strategic Plan, 2002–2004

The Civil Service Commission’s (CSC)’s strategic plan is significant because it
represents the first integrated vision of strengthening the civil service in the medium term
by harnessing the strengths of key stakeholders such as CSC, national government
agencies, public sector unions, local government units, and, most importantly, the users
of the public services that civil servants provide. The objective of the plan is to gradually
transform the civil service into an institution enjoying the trust of the Filipino people.
The plan is frank in assessing bureaucratic gaps and weaknesses: overlapping
organizational mandates, inefficient systems and procedures are more concerned with
adhering to rules rather than attaining results and improving productivity, patronage-
based appointment to executive and other key career positions, and a spotty record on
enforcing accountability and weeding out incompetent civil servants.
The plan focuses on six key result areas: (i) effective and efficient administrative justice;
(ii) civil service professionalization; (iii) improving public service delivery;
(iv) harnessing public sector unionism; (v) strengthening external relations; and
(vi) management and support services. Specific actions are proposed for each key result
area.
CSC has held several rounds of consultations with relevant stakeholders. Next steps
comprise costing the pan, sequencing the steps, and finalizing the timeline for attaining
the proposed results.
Source: Civil Service Commission
(i) The bureaucracy functions too much as an adjunct of the political

executive. Civil servants see themselves as mere implementers and
followers of the prevailing political leadership, and are vulnerable to the
dictates of the political executive.
(ii) The operational behavior of the bureaucracy is still largely top-down,
Political influence and
and there are few debates or consensus-building activities on issues
affecting the civil service. the spoils system hold
(iii) Civil servants see themselves primarily as individuals employed by the sway in appointments
organizations they serve, rather than as members of an institution
dedicated to serving the people or driven by the ethos of public service. to senior career
Rigid implementation of rules continues to offer scope for graft and
positions. Open
corruption.
(iv) Political influence and the spoils system continue to hold sway in selection for career
appointments to senior and other key career positions. Open selection for executive positions is
career executive positions continues to be eroded by political influence.
This is exacerbated by the fact that the President is the legally mandated eroded by political
appointing authority for most career executive service positions: the
President appoints no less than 11,000 personnel comprising 3,000 influence. The
constitutional positions, 6,000 career executive service positions, 1,650 President appoints no
prosecutors, and 500 other positions created by special laws.62
less than 11,000
(v) Some minimum qualification standards have been established for
appointment. But they hardly guarantee real competence and desired central personnel.
behavioral attributes. There is too much emphasis on academic
requirements, training, and experience. Value dimensions of public
service employment, e.g., service orientation, work ethic, and character
integrity, have yet to be factored into the system.
106
(vi) The impact of information technology on productivity improvements has

yet to be felt, and personnel management is crippled by a lack of
integration of existing data systems.
(vii) The existing compensation regime does not attract and retain the best and
the brightest in public service.
9.25 Modernizing the legal framework. CSC has worked extensively to
prepare an updated draft of a new Civil Service Code, which has been submitted
to the legislature and is currently under review. Among other things, it aims to (i)
improve merit-based recruitment, performance evaluation, and promotion
processes; (ii) make compensation more competitive within fiscal constraints,
and link compensation to performance; (iii) protect upright civil servants in the
discharge of their functions; (iv) strengthen accountability and integrity
mechanisms; (v) clearly separate political and professional positions (at present
there are numerous “positions of confidence,” i.e., political or so-called
“elective” appointments, and the practice of offering “courtesy resignations” with
changes of administration creates the potential for high turnover of senior
officials); (vi) strengthen the third level or the career executive officers;
(vii) allow CSC to appoint and discipline those below assistant secretary
positions; and (viii) reinforce the contempt power of CSC. While the executive’s
commitment to updating the legal framework is undoubted, the real issue is
whether this latest draft will be approved by the legislature, or whether it will
meet the same fate as earlier attempts.
9.26 On the integrity front, the PCEG is working with the Presidential Anti-
Graft Commission and the Transparency and Accountability Network in
formulating an integrated anticorruption strategy for the Government to
strengthen integrity in the civil service.
9.27 Capacity building needs also require to be addressed: international
experience shows that fiscal pressures cannot by themselves be sufficient for
sustainable and longer-term civil service reform. And in order that civil service
issues can be effectively addressed, it is desirable that the constitutional entity
tasked with development and oversight of civil service policy—the Civil Service
Commission—be strengthened on a priority basis, and that coordination between
the Commission and the DBM be intensified.
Education Sector: An Example
9.28 The education sector has the largest share of public employment. A
review of data indicates the significance of personal services expenditures across
this sector, and also the deleterious effect it has had on MOOE and capital
outlays.
9.29 Basic education. In the basic education subsector, personal services
comprises the single biggest item in the DepEd budget. The share of personal
services in the DepEd budget rose incessantly from 80.1% in 1994 to 88.3% in
2001. The dramatic rise in personnel expenditure is largely attributable to
adjustments in the salaries of public school teachers that were implemented by
the Government in the late 1980s and most of the 1990s. On the other hand, the
growth in teachers’ salaries was accommodated at the expense of MOOE (i.e.,
nonpersonnel recurrent expenditures) and capital outlays. Consequently, the
share of MOOE in the DepEd budget was halved from 10.9% in 1994 to 8.1% in
2001 while that of capital expenditures dropped from 9.0% to 3.6%. Concomitant
with these developments, per student DepEd MOOE at 2000 prices declined on
average by 5.1% a year in real terms from PhP878 in 1990 to PhP422 in 2000.
The squeeze on MOOE has resulted in a short supply of key educational inputs
like textbooks, teaching/instructional materials, science laboratory equipment and
supplies, school desks, as well as provisions for teacher training and the
maintenance of school buildings. Thus, it should come as no surprise that
households sending their children to public schools gave low satisfaction ratings
to school facilities and textbooks.
9.30 Overall, between 1990 and 2001, personal services expenditures on basic
education as a percentage of general government expenditures have grown from
73.7% to 87.5%. At the same time, the share of MOOE has fluctuated between
9.5% and 11% between 1997 and 2001—but lower than the levels during 1990–
1996. Capital outlays have been squeezed far more—steadily dropping from
more than 10% in 1995 to less than 2% by 2001. Table 9.1 indicates these
expenditures during 1990–2001.
Table 9.1 General Government Expenditures on Basic Education by Object, 1990–2001
Level 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
(PhP million)
Personal Services 20,955 18,700 26,432 27,189 32,993 42,105 50,517 68,407 77,022 81,340 86,854 90,912
MOOE 4,875 5,642 5,214 5,770 5,406 6,488 7,216 7,671 9,939 8,909 10,766 11,407
Capital Outlay 2,603 3,324 2,185 2,130 3,614 5,545 6,014 5,790 3,997 3,181 3,480 1,578
TOTAL 28,432 27,666 33,831 35,089 42,013 54,138 63,747 81,868 90,958 93,429 101,100 103,897
% Distribution 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Personal Services 73.70 67.59 78.13 77.49 78.53 77.77 79.25 83.56 84.68 87.06 85.91 87.50
MOOE 17.14 20.39 15.41 16.44 12.87 11.98 11.32 9.37 10.93 9.54 10.65 10.98
Capital Outlay 9.16 12.01 6.46 6.07 8.60 10.24 9.43 7.07 4.39 3.40 3.44 1.52
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Sources: Department of Education, Department of Budget and Management
9.31 In spite of the prevailing expenditure assignments, data show that LGUs
do provide funding support for teacher salaries and honorarium, textbooks and
instructional materials, supplies, school supervision, and utilities.63 In fact, LGU
spending on basic education is more evenly divided into personnel services,
MOOE and capital outlays than one would expect given expenditure assignments
across levels of Government. The share of capital outlays in total basic education
expenditure of all LGUs was 38% on the average in 1992-1995 compared to
28.0% for personal services and 33.8% for MOOE. However, LGUs appear to
have also given increasing priority to personal services and MOOE during 1996–
2000. The share of capital outlays in total education spending of LGUs declined
to 34.6% in 1996–2001 to provide for the expansion of personal services
expenditures to 29.6% during this period.
9.32 On the whole, changes in the composition of LGU expenditures on basic
education reinforced the trend in central government expenditures. Thus, the
composition of general government expenditures on basic education became
even more skewed in favor of personal services expenditures in 1996–2001
relative to the situation prevailing during 1992–1995.
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9.33 Higher education. The composition of SUCs expenditures exhibited a

trend similar to that of basic education. The share of personal services in the
combined budget of all SUCs rose from 64.1% in 1987 to 83.3% in 2001 (Figure
9.3). This reallocation came at the expense of MOOE and capital outlays whose
budget shares dropped, respectively, from 19.4% and 16.6% in 1987 to 16.7%
and 7.2% in 1999. This budget shift was further reinforced in 2000–2001
following the implementation of a policy by government to reduce the budget
allocation for SUCS by 10% annually in nominal terms relative to 1999 levels in
order to shift the funds to basic education. Thus, the budget share of MOOE
contracted further to 14.1% in 2001 while that of capital outlays declined to
2.6%. On the other hand, since LGU expenditures on higher education is less
skewed in favor of personnel services than those of the SUCs, the share of wages
and salaries in general government expenditures on higher education was lower
than that of the central government expenditures. The upward trend in the budget
share of personnel services that is evident for the central government is also,
however, observable for the general government. It is also notable that the
expansion in the share of personnel services in higher education spending of the
general government came at the expense of capital outlays alone.
Figure 9.3 General Government Expenditures on SUCs (By Object, 1987-2000)
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
-
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
PS MOOE CO
9.34 High administrative costs in SUCs have been associated with low
internal efficiency. Tan (1995) shows that the ratio of administrative costs to
instructional costs is unduly high in many SUCs: these ratios were 35% for 47%
of SUCs, and were as high as 45 % for another 35% of SUCs.
9.35 It may be argued that low internal efficiency may reflect low utilization
of resources. Johanson (1999) shows that the share of personal services in total
operating cost is fairly invariant across SUCs. Part of the problem appears to be
that teachers are used less intensively in SUCs than they are in private
institutions. The student-teacher ratio is 18 for SUCs compared with 29 for
private institutions, indicating the absence of standardization of budget subsidies
on a per-student basis. Clearly, unless this issue in the area of personal services is
addressed, recent initiatives to reduce the budget allocation of SUCs may not be
enough to turn the tide in reducing overall allocation on higher education.
9.36 Remuneration in the education sector. Between 1985 and 1997, the
remuneration of government teachers went up by a multiple of 5 in nominal terms
and by a multiple of 3 in real terms. It is notable that in 1997 the entry-level salary of
a public school teacher was 70% higher than its private school counterpart. While public school
Moreover, even by international standards, public school teacher salaries appear to
be on the high side: teacher remuneration as a ratio of GNP per capita in the teachers’
Philippines is equal to 3.0 in 1997 compared with an “Asian” mean of around 2.5 at remuneration in the
the primary level.64
9.37 Given budget constraints, high teacher salaries naturally constrain the
Philippines is higher
Government’s capacity to hire new teachers to cope with expanding enrollments. In than in other Asian
basic education, the increase in the number of teachers (teachers holding position
titles Master Teachers I–II and Teacher I–III) in government schools did not keep countries, this also
pace with the growth of enrollment. At the elementary level, the number of teachers
rose by 1.3% yearly on average, from 261,131 in SY1981–1982 to 329,198 in constrains national
SY1999–2000, while enrollment grew by 2.1% on average. At the secondary level, government capacity
the number of public school teachers grew by 3.9% from 54,555 to 107,706,
compared with the average growth of 5.1% in enrollment. Consequently, the student- to hire new teachers
teacher ratio in government elementary schools went up from 31 in SY1981–1982 to
36 in SY1999–2000 while that in government secondary schools increased from 29 to cope with
to 34. expanding
9.38 Employment and deployment of teachers. Despite the above movement,
the gross student-to-teacher ratio across schools is not too far from the standard ratio
enrollment.
of 34:1 being used by DBM. However, there is a wide disparity between the average
class size and the gross student-to-teacher ratio in public elementary and secondary
schools. In SY1999–2000, the average class sizes were 45 and 50, respectively, in
government elementary and secondary schools compared with gross student-teacher
ratios of 36 and 34. These numbers suggest an imbalance in the deployment of public
school teachers. One problem is related to RA 4760 (the so-called Magna Carta for
Public School Teachers) that prohibits the transfer of teachers from one station to
another (i.e., across geographical borders) without the latter’s explicit assent.65
Another relates to the current practice of assigning teachers to administrative and
clerical functions that can otherwise be assigned to nonteaching personnel at school
and district offices because of the absence of these positions. Realizing the problem,
non-teaching positions have been created annually for DepEd in recent years. This
has included positions for bookkeepers and accountants, created for district
elementary and secondary schools to strengthen their financial management and pave
the way for greater school-based management.
9.39 About 15,000 new teacher positions and 5,000 nonteaching positions were
created under the General Appropriations Act for 2002. In addition, the DepEd
received technical assistance on improving teacher deployment under the Social
Expenditure Management Program (SEMP), which recommended that (i) the
placement of newly created teacher positions be targeted at divisions where they are
most needed; (ii) existing teacher positions in teacher-surplus divisions and schools
be transferred to teacher-shortage jurisdictions when these positions fall vacant
through retirement or death;66 (iii) unfilled teacher positions in teacher-surplus
divisions and schools be transferred to teacher-shortage jurisdiction;67 and
(iv) teachers currently doing administrative tasks be reassigned to teaching (Somerset
2001). Field work suggests a need to revisit and clarify the flexibility regarding
reassignment of teachers within a given division in the Magna Carta for teachers.
Prospectively, there also seems to be a need in the near term to factor in the number
110
of LGU-paid teachers in determining the teacher requirement of divisions and

schools for deciding the assignment of newly-created teacher positions.
9.40 The discussion above highlights that some LGUs, particularly the more
urbanized cities, do fund additional teachers. In the medium term, however, unless
the assignment of the education function across levels of Government is changed, it
seems that the DepEd will have to absorb LGU-paid teachers on its rolls.
Recommendations
9.41 Rationalizing employment and compensation. Given the pressing fiscal

constraints, it is clear that the size and cost of the civil service require review and
adjustment as a first priority. There are three aspects to this. The first is to establish
an effective system to control employment and the wage bill. The second—
keeping within the bounds of fiscal realities—is to increase the transparency and
competitiveness of civil service compensation while at the same time
decompressing salary levels for key civil service grades. Third, it would be desirable
to design and implement a feasible strategy for adjusting civil service
employment to the appropriate role, functions, and structure of the state—in concert
with budget process reforms and administrative restructuring efforts.
9.42 Two key initial steps in controlling the wage bill could include the
expeditious establishment of a workable civil service personnel information system,
and deciding on fiscally affordable compensation improvement and rightsizing
options using a civil service pay and employment financial modeling tool recently
customized to the Philippine context. The former would involve the sustained pursuit
of the development of a common database on government personnel to be shared
by CSC, DBM, GSIS, and other oversight agencies. Simply put, the objectives of the
common database would be to ensure that each permanent appointment is to an Sustained actions to
authorized position funded under the Government’s fiscal targets, that no person can improve efficiency,
be appointed to more than one authorized position, and that no person can draw pay
from more than one payroll or obtain more than one set of benefits. The latter would attack duplication of
involve reviewing the compensation policy, preparing options for compensation
and employment reform, and assessing the fiscal impact of employment and functions, and
compensation adjustment through (i) a mix of attrition and other measures, and (ii)
abolish obsolete
a phased upward adjustment of compensation for key skills.
9.43 Strengthening public administration. On the administrative streamlining entities are desirable.
front, sustained actions to improve efficiency, attack duplication and overlap of While the COA
functions, and do away with obsolete functions and entities are necessary. The
precedent set by the PCEG review-inspired EO 72, which initiated the streamlining reorganization is a
of the Office of the President, now needs to be taken to line departments and
agencies. The composition and functional assignment of staff require adjustment to good example, the
better match priorities. Quick actions seem to be called for, although it will be
important to avoid unsustainable precedents being set. The planned deactivation of
litmus test will be the
13 agencies will be an important step in the right direction. But this will clearly not implementation of the
be enough.
BIR organizational
9.44 Actions here would need to go hand in hand with the employment and
compensation adjustments. Such a process would clearly need to include (i) actions reforms.
to streamline the central executive departments by eliminating duplication and
overlaps, doing away with inappropriate and unnecessary functions and entities,
efficiency improvements through further simplification of business processes and
reduction of red tape; and (iv) starting and sustaining the transformation of the BIR.
In particular, the implementation of the BIR organizational reforms would
constitute a litmus test of the ability and willingness to undertake core

institutional reforms.
9.45 It would be desirable to sequence and implement these actions hand in hand
with public expenditure management reforms intended to clarify the roles and
mandates of state entities, and prioritize their programs and activities. Actions to
reform the civil service and streamline the administration will also involve a delicate
balance between flexibility in redeployment of human resources including hiring and
firing, and providing the performance-based security and protection that neutral and
impartial civil servants need to perform professionally through changes in
administration at national and local levels.
9.46 Passage of the Civil Service Code is necessary, but it is not yet clear whether
this will pass in Congress, given the length of time it has been awaiting legislation.
However, an important beginning can be made by basing civil service appointments
and promotions more transparently on merit, and not only on “fitness”.
112
10. IMPLEMENTATION OF FOREIGN-ASSISTED PROJECTS

10.1 The Government has been pursuing efforts to utilize official
development assistance (ODA) more efficiently by stepping up the pace of
implementation of foreign-assisted projects (FAPs). This has assumed urgency
because the pace of implementation of FAPs has been comparatively slow, and
the budget squeeze, especially the declining flexibility in discretionary
expenditures, has made FAPs an important source of financing development. The
challenges in this area, and the key actions taken so far by the administration, are
summarized below.
Enhancing Absorptive Capacity The declining
flexibility in
10.2 Recent significant actions to improve portfolio performance include (i)
reducing the number of signatories for project documents; (ii) partially cancelling discretionary
about $500 million equivalent of loans in 2001 to declog the ODA portfolio of
nonperforming or poorly designed projects and excess loan components; expenditures has
(iii) conducting quarterly portfolio reviews by the Government with the three made foreign-assisted
largest funding agencies to address bottlenecks; (iv) accessing quick-disbursing
program loans generally intended to assist in overall deficit financing in projects (FAPs) an
exchange for implementing policy reforms; (v) initiating reforms in the power
sector and other steps to improve governance. important source of
10.3 The above measures appear to be bearing fruit. For the first semester of financing
2002, disbursement level posted an increase of more than 20% against the same
development. Faster
period in 2001. Actual disbursement against target was 95%. Provided this rate is
sustained, the Government will be on track to meet the call of ODA partners to ODA absorption could
increase disbursement ratio to 20% by 2004.
speed FAP
Improving Project Identification and Preparation
implementation and
10.4 Actions in this area also address weak demand for on-lending programs.
strengthen
Strengthening the linkages between planning and budgeting, and between the
MTPDP and MTPIP, is expected to lead to improved project prioritization and development
more sustainable project financing. The implementation of SEERs has helped
agencies to begin prioritizing their activities in order to align their projects to financing.
directly contribute to their major final outputs and sector outcomes. In addition,
the integration of the project management offices into the mainstream operations
of agencies should also reinforce the SEER and prevent FAPs in being over-
designed but rather address persistent issues and concerns of the implementing
agencies. The ICC has recently sent standards for implementing cost-sharing
schemes with LGUs.
10.5 Under laws (e.g., build-operate-transfer), as well as executive and
administrative orders, the Government is increasingly providing incentives for
private sector to take a more active role in services delivery to rural areas. What
remains to be done, however, is to enhance the timing and adequacy of public
expenditure, such that these are able to effectively leverage private investments.
Related initiatives to mobilize and synchronize public and private resources are
on agrarian reform community (ARC) development planning, preparation of
regional and local AFMPs (which incorporate various fund sources including
private sector), and preparation of the special agriculture and fishery

development zone (SAFDZ) plans.
Increasing the Predictability of Project Financing
10.6 Constraints here include the timely and predictable provision of

counterpart funds. The 2001 (reenacted) budget led to a mismatch between
previously allocated funds and new financial requirements of projects, and
project financing was slowed by budget deficit reduction measures. Some PhP41
billion was allocated for FAPs in the 2002 budget (as against PhP29 billion in
2001). The same extent of budgetary support for FAPs was incorporated in the
2003 budget.
10.7 The Government is also reviewing the NG-LGU cost-sharing
arrangements for FAPs. It is proposed that NG-LGU cost sharing in the
implementation of FAPs be defined across all sectors that are devolved,
maintaining a maximum 50% grant by the NG, and a minimum LGU cash equity
of 10% of project cost.
Strengthening The Sustainability Of Project Outcomes
Strengthening
10.8 This is being addressed through appropriate project design and improved implementation
institutional arrangements for project coordination, management,
implementation, and evaluation. Slower project implementation in 2001 was arrangements and
attributed to the change in administration (contracts were reviewed by new sets
of agency/LGU officials, and agencies’ and LGUs’ priorities changed) and by 11
speed could ensure
September 2001 (which delayed deliveries of imported supplies and materials). faster ODA
10.9 Unlike most regular government programs, FAPs have been subjected to absorption, enhance
independent evaluations and thus their impacts and outcomes are well
documented. The main challenge is to mainstream these projects in terms of (i) institutional capacity
lessons learned, as these relate to policy reform and refinements in strategies and
programs; (ii) budgeting and funds flow, particularly the continuing need to at national and local
streamline the regular government fund release system; and (iii) management, to levels and help
ensure that capacities are internalized within regular structures, and to reduce
disparity in salary rates. sustain project
10.10 Two of the bothersome “distortions” accompanying FAPs are (i) budget outcomes.
and finance—particularly special priority in budgeting and funds flow outside of
the regular system; and (ii) higher salary rates of project staff compared with
regular government personnel. The trade-off is between operational efficiency
(using enclaved project-specific “special arrangements”) on the one hand, and
capacity building and institutionalization of resource flows and personnel
reforms, the other.
10.11 Significant actions to strengthen sustainability have included the
following.
(i) EO 109 further streamlined the contract review process (except for
contracts required by law to be acted upon and/or approved by the
President, the EO gave full authority to department secretaries to give
final approval and/or enter into all government contracts of their
respective departments, awarded through public bidding, regardless of
the amount involved).
114
(ii) EO 40 and the subsequent enactment of a consolidated procurement

reform law to streamline procurement and harmonize local procurement
procedure with best practices worldwide.
(iii) RA 8974 defines the procedure for right-of-way acquisition for
infrastructure projects.
(iv) RA 8975 now prohibits issuance by lower courts of temporary
restraining orders on government projects.
(v) Designate project implementation officers at the undersecretary (i.e.
deputy minister) level in implementing agencies who are responsible and
accountable for efficient implementation of their respective projects.
Rationalizing Implementation Arrangements
10.12 Most FAPs are implemented through project

management/implementation units. Often confronted with a choice between (i)
the twin demands of ease and speed of project implementation and disbursement,
and (ii) the need to foster permanent implementation capacity, implementing
agencies and development partners have adopted a pragmatic approach.
Wherever necessary, they supported the establishment of dedicated units, both The ongoing
within and outside government structures, to assist speedy and effective
implementation of FAPs. These have varied, however, from coordination units rationalization of
staffed by civil servants and located within existing organizational structures of
project management
the implementing department or agency to stand-alone and legally separate
entities. offices is an
10.13 To address issues on capacity building and sustainability of project important step in
outcomes, the Government created a task force to look into the rationalization of
project management offices (PMOs). Four major agencies (DA, DOTC, DPWH, enhancing ownership
and the National Irrigation Authority [NIA]) were reviewed. The task force
recommendations include: (i) creating a single or unified PMO for each
and sustainability of
department; (ii) implementing agency-based rationalization strategies; and (iii) FAPs.
issuing policy guidelines on PMO rationalization in the interim, i.e., deploying
organic personnel, adopting a scrap-and-build strategy and no net increase in
agency staffing and personal services.
10.14 Typical implementation issues—confronted by implementing agencies,
the central oversight entities, and development partners—relate to fiduciary
responsibilities (such as procurement, financial controls, reporting, accounts and
audit) and personnel policies and practices. The Government oftentimes
encounters differences in policies and procedures with financing institutions.
These include, among others, compensation of project-affected persons,
disbursement procedures (use of reimbursement scheme), selection of
consultants, protocols for closure of loan accounts, and procurement procedures.
Recommendations
10.15 Absorptive capacity could be increased through (i) periodic undertaking

of SEERs to sharpen prioritization of activities and so lead to improved project
identification; (ii) more thorough project design and project evaluation,
especially for those with LGU participation and/or with multiagency
participation; and (iii) minimizing multiagency implementation.
10.16 Sustainability of project outcomes could be enhanced by

(i) strengthening project implementation arrangements and capacity (especially Increased absorptive
for procurement and financial management) in implementing agencies and
relevant LGUs; (ii) addressing changes in project scope and design during capacity, improved
implementation; (iii) dealing effectively with poor contractor performance; sustainability of
(iv) strengthening line agency and LGU capacity to prepare, evaluate, oversee,
and monitor project implementation, and assess project sustainability and impact; project outcomes
(v) involving civil society for accountable and transparent implementation;
(vi) addressing peace and order issues impacting projects; (vii) issuing an EO on and greater
resettlement, and high-level attention to right-of-way issues in land acquisition predictability of
for projects, and (viii) further strengthening coordination between implementing
agencies and coordinating agencies, and removal of functional overlaps and project financing
duplication among NG agencies.
can enable more
10.17 Greater predictability in project financing could be ensured through
(i) a 3-year investment program with an indicative budget for each implementing efficient utilization of
agency; (ii) conducting SEERs of individual agency portfolios to establish ODA.
medium-term priorities within the ICC process; and (iii) continued streamlining
of document processing and fund flow within implementing agencies.
116
SECTION D. DECENTRALIZATION
11. Decentralization: A Selective Overview

11. DECENTRALIZATION: A SELECTIVE OVERVIEW

11.1 The Philippines Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 is considered to
be one of the most far-reaching decentralization reforms in the developing world.
The reform devolved to three tiers of LGUs—provinces, cities, and
municipalities and barangays—important responsibilities in areas such as
agriculture, environment, natural resource management, health, public works and
highways, as well as up to 40% of NG revenues. There are about 43,635 LGUs in
the country today: 80 provinces, 114 cities, 1,496 municipalities, and 41,945
barangays.
Intergovernmental Finances and Service Delivery
11.2 So far there has been no systematic evaluation of how local governments
have performed under decentralization. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
decentralization has encouraged greater innovation at the local level (i.e. the Decentralization may
Galing Pook awards), strengthened local management capability and promoted have encouraged
greater cooperation with the private sector and other LGUs. However, the
preliminary evidence also suggests that, despite these achievements, the expected greater innovation at
benefits of decentralization have yet to be fully realized. Sufficient resources do
not seem to be channeled to poorer LGUs, and the national government’s ability
the local level.
to equalize fiscal capacity and monitor the financial performance of LGUs is However, the
weak.
preliminary evidence
11.3 Institutional arrangements for service delivery remain unclear in many
cases, with national agencies playing a significant role in some functions that also suggests that,
should have been fully devolved to LGUs. In addition, unfunded mandates from
the NG such as the Salary Standardization Law, have increased the cost of local despite these
services and impeded local autonomy. achievements, the
11.4 The increase in aggregate Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) to expected benefits of
provinces, cities, and municipalities appears to have exceeded the cost of
devolved functions and other mandates, even when adjusted for inflation and decentralization
population growth.68 Despite this aggregate funding “surplus,” poorer LGUs
seem to suffer from insufficient resources. It is encouraging, however, that the have yet to be fully
NG is taking steps at strengthening its ability to equalize fiscal capacity and realized.
monitor the financial performance of LGUs.
11.5 In spite of challenges, there are plenty of examples of effective
homegrown solutions to common problems. For example, in health service
delivery and financing, cities such as Cotabato, Gingoog, Lapu-Lapu, Puerto
Princesa, and Surigao have adopted innovative measures to cope with the
increasing demand for more and better quality health services from their
constituencies. Several municipalities have also introduced innovations. Perhaps
the more exemplary among these innovations are the barangay primary health
care facilities established by the provincial government of Negros Occidental and
the provincial health insurance program adopted by Bukidnon and Guimaras. In
controlling personnel size and costs, and accessing non-IRA sources of funding,
the example of Cabanatuan City seems noteworthy.
118
Public Expenditure Management
11.6 Planning and investment appraisal appears to be the weakest links in the
chain of LGU public expenditure management. Two key issues merit attention:
(i) the coordination of the planning function across government levels; and (ii)
the efficiency of LGU expenditures. First, NG-LGU planning coordination seems
to be limited. Allocation decisions are conformed by LGU development plans,
which are supposed to be coordinated with regional and national plans.
Preliminary observations indicate that the coordination of national and LGU
plans is weak in some cases and nonexistent in others, undermining the effort to
focus expenditures on key priority areas, especially to pro-poor services.
11.7 Second, most LGUs may lack adequate project evaluation capacity. It is
not clear that investment decisions are made on a technical basis or that there is a
system for filtering and ranking investment projects. Many LGUs have weak
capacity to formulate development projects. This is important because a large
percentage of the small amount of capital expenditures in the Philippines occurs
at the LGU level, especially in key economic and social sectors.
Revenue Administration
11.8 The overall share of revenues mobilized from local sources relative to
GDP is not significantly greater now than it was before the LGC. In many cases
IRA transfers appear to have created disincentives for mobilizing local revenues. LGU capacity to
11.9 Revenue administration is thus an area of great potential improvement. assess and
Many LGUs seem to be able to collect only a small percentage of potential
revenues due under their respective local tax codes. The main problems include collect revenues
(i) lack of accurate, computerized taxpayer registration databases (many taxes could be greatly
and fees do not have taxpayer registries); (ii) lack of accurate cadastral
information for property taxes; (iii) large numbers of nonfilers, stop-filers, and improved,
nonpayers; (iv) inadequate audit presence for business taxes; (v) lack of trained
professional staff (which has led to the use of casual employees to collect some reducing reliance
user fees, for example); (vi) inadequate data on payment delinquencies; on IRA transfers.
(vii) cash-based payment systems; and (viii) virtually nonexistent taxpayer
services.
11.10 The confluence of these problems has led to underassessment as well as
undercollection of most taxes and fees, thus perpetuating LGU reliance on
transfers from the central government. Improving the assessment and collection
capacity could reduce reliance on IRA transfers. Moreover, improving tax
administration is necessary to ward off pressures to increase tax rates at the local
level (anecdotal evidence indicates low collections are prompting local officials
to call for higher tax rates, which would only make the system more
distortionary). There are other significant institutional issues which, if
appropriately addressed, could greatly strengthen governance and improve
revenue collection at the LGU level: for example, greater transparency and
accountability in (i) assessment process and in the standards by which assessment
efficiency can be evaluated, and (ii) the setting, collecting, and auditing of fees
for public markets and slaughterhouses, as well as in the leasing process for
public markets.
Human Resource Management
11.11 LGUs are limited in their ability to manage and develop their human
Strengthening the
resources. As a result, LGU capacity for expenditure management is uneven,
especially in planning, investment appraisal, financial management, and management and
personnel functions. Moreover, LGU financial integrity is often weak: COA
reports have cited numerous LGUs for inadequate financial management. deployment of
11.12 Improving the quality of public administration at the LGU level assumes human resources by
importance because administrative capacity, incentive systems, skills mix, and
the management and deployment of human resources can significantly impact the
LGUs would greatly
operational efficiency of public expenditures. The main issues comprise the improve the
following: (i) expenditures on personal services (PS) constitute the largest
category, squeezing out MOOE and capital outlays; (ii) although PS expenditure operational
is formally capped at 45–55% of total LGU resources, it needs to be seen
efficiency of public
whether such expenditures are higher in reality if payments to casual and
contractual workers are taken into account; (iii) the cost of personal services is expenditures and
sometimes charged to MOOE; (iv) remuneration levels and structure vary
enormously depending on the resources—and resourcefulness—of LGUs, and service delivery.
grant of allowances and benefits to LGU officials without legal basis is not
unknown; (v) even for functions and positions whose personnel costs are
supposed to be funded entirely by the NG budget, LGUs commonly supplement
such NG allocations (reliable data on the amount and nature of such supplements
does not seem to exist, though); and (vi) managers and administrators seem to be
slack in enforcing basic fiscal discipline in their offices (e.g., claims for
disallowed payments have been rising steadily, and stood at PhP1.7 million at
end-2000—leniency in pursuing remedial measures against delinquent officials is
reported to be the main cause). Otherwise, as the 2000 COA Annual Financial
Report on Local Governments notes, the “injudicious discharge of fiscal
responsibilities” will continue to contribute “to the failure of local government
units to become self-reliant communities.”
11.13 Recent actions taken to strengthen human resource management have
focused on (i) improving the management and career development of tax
assessors and treasurers; (ii) examining how to scale up pilots on governance and
service delivery performance indicators and management; (iii) developing an
LGU “hall of fame” to enable recognition for outstanding performance or
The weak internal
outcomes; and (iv) pilot-testing a customer feedback survey in 21 sites to financial
increase citizens’ access to information, develop two-way feedback with citizens,
and involve citizens and agencies in setting performance and service delivery management and
standards.
control environment
Financial Management
in LGUs needs
11.14 LGU financial management rests with the local chief executive substantial
(governor/mayor). The chief executive is assisted by three key financial officials:
the treasurer, the budget officer, and the accountant. Each of these officials strengthening for
reports directly to the chief executive and are independent from one another. The
LGU accountability
treasurer is appointed by the Bureau of Local Government Finance (BLGF) of
DOF from among three nominees recommended by the chief executive. to improve.
11.15 The accounting and budgeting guidelines are issued by COA and DBM,
respectively. A new local government accounting system (LGAS) consistent with
120
accounting principles of NGAS has been introduced (starting January 2002).

COA has the power to audit LGUs.
11.16 The internal control environment and institutional arrangements for
financial accountability remain extremely weak at the LGU level. In 2000, for
instance, only 250 of the 1,689 LGUs audited were given clean audit reports by
COA. Although there are reports of best practice in many LGUs, weak internal
control practices have been frequently flagged by COA annual reports, and the
internal audit function is nonexistent in most LGUs. The main reasons for this
poor internal control environment seem to be (i) frequent turnover of elected
officials; (ii) disregard of laws, rules and regulations by elected and appointed
officials; (iii) lack of clarity in the oversight agencies; and (iv) inadequate LGU-
level financial management capacity.
11.17 The principal LGU-level financial management weaknesses identified by
COA are (i) lack of compliance with laws, rules, and regulations; (ii) weak
control over fixed assets and lack of recording and inventory of fixed assets; (iii)
weak control over cash management due to retention of collected revenue in cash
by treasurers in contravention of regulations requiring deposits at authorized
banks; (iv) weak control over accounts payable; (v) weak human resource
capacity in financial management, particularly in rural LGUs where it is difficult
to find qualified and experienced accountants; (vi) incomplete implementation of
audit findings.
11.18 Financial management capacity in most LGUs is very weak. BLGF, the
principal oversight agency, has played a somewhat passive role. There is no clear
financial leadership role as responsibilities are split among the three principal
officials. Financial management reporting is essentially regulatory in nature.
There are no updated accounting, treasury, and budget management manuals, and
similar reports submitted to oversight agencies often contain different data.
11.19 The Government acknowledges that reforming and improving such a
diverse group of independent political and administrative units will take time and
resources. Several initiatives aimed at capacity building are under way, including
a World Bank-financed Local Government Finance Development Project and an
IDF Grant to assist financial management capacity building.
Procurement
11.20 Rule 35 of the IRR of RA 7160, known as the Local Government Code
LGU capacity to
(LGC) of 1991, governs the procurement process of LGUs for supply of property develop
or goods, and PD 1594 serves as the basis for infrastructure contracts. PD 1594,
which has been repealed by the LGC of 1991 insofar as locally funded procurement plans
infrastructure is involved, is still widely applied among LGUs.
and implement
11.21 Except as otherwise provided, the general policy on procurement and
acquisition or property by LGUs is through competitive public bidding. The them needs
procurement process, however, especially the bidding process, is generally sustained
perceived to have resulted in higher procurement costs at the local level. In
general, cities seem to have the most problems, followed by municipalities and strengthening.
then provinces. The process of implementing procurement laws and rules appear
to give rise to inconsistencies. Significant adaptations or so-called shortcuts of
various rules and procedures apparently abound, and some LGUs have
established enabling resolutions for legal application. Box 11.1 outlines the
procurement process for medical supplies in one province of the Philippines.
Box 11.1 Procurement of Medical Supplies in Agusan del Norte
The provincial health officer (PHO) submits an annual procurement program that
includes everything the hospitals need for their operations for a year. Once approved
by higher authorities, the PHO submits a purchase request (PR) for a quarter for
drugs, medicines, office and medical supplies, and reagents to the Provincial General
Services Office (PGSO). The PGSO then schedules the bidding with the participation
of the provincial auditor, treasurer, budget officer, accountant, and representatives of
the Governor and the PHO, who together constitute the prequalification, bidding and
awards committee (PBAC) of the province.
Potential bidders for medical supplies are accredited upon submission of a governor’s
permit, accreditation from DOH, company profile, notarized price list, tax
identification number, and a proof of good track record as appraised by the PGSO.
Closed bidding procedures are followed in Agusan del Norte. Suppliers submit closed
bids to the PGSO who then turns the bids over to the PBAC, which opens them in
public. The winning bidder is then furnished a copy of the purchase order (PO). Due
to limited funds, however, the PO usually covers only a quarter’s supply of drugs,
medicines, and other supplies. Bids are called and scheduled only if the total worth of
the PO exceeds PhP150,000. POs for less than this amount are issued on the basis of
canvassing from at least three potential suppliers.
Performance Monitoring
11.22 LGUs are now subject to several different reporting requirements, which
use a variety of reporting formats, periods, and frequency. This, however, has
meant that information about LGU performance is dispersed, there are
inconsistencies in data and information, and duplication. BLGF, for instance,
now consolidates the data by provinces, cities, and municipalities on a quarterly
basis. Recent attempts to take stock of LGU performance monitoring indicators
disclosed that there are more than 40 indicators of varying coverage and quality
developed by Government, donors, academe, and civil society organizations.
11.23 Of the several ongoing government efforts to develop an integrated
performance monitoring system, BLGF has piloted a new fiscal and financial
reporting format for LGUs in 2001. The new report, called the statement of
income and expenditures (SIE), will replace the existing budget operations
statement (BOS), which reports LGU fiscal operations on a yearly basis. The
BOS is cumbersome and takes time to complete. Oftentimes, too, the reports
come in late (sometimes 6 months and more). The SIE, by contrast, is more user-
friendly: there is a one-page summary of the fiscal operations of LGUs with
attached schedules that contain more details. Reporting is on a quarterly basis.
DBM has agreed to use the SIE instead of developing another format. The SIE
may now provide a single source of data on LGU fiscal and financial operations.
11.24 BLGF has also developed 14 fiscal performance indicators, and plans to
pilot them after revising the fiscal reporting format. These indicators, it is hoped,
will be able to show how LGUs are performing in terms of local resource
mobilization and expenditure management (e.g., whether they are spending more
122
for current vs. development expenditures, their debt management performance).

There are 13 BLGF regional offices nationwide whose staff are trained to
develop regional data bases and analyze the data by regions.
Recommendations
11.25 Decentralization and intergovernmental finances. It now seems time

to review the fiscal, administrative, and political aspects of decentralization in the
Philippines and assess how the Local Government Code and related legislation
have worked in practice. Such an assessment could entail an examination of how
decentralization has worked in relation to objectives like service delivery,69
accountability and governance.70 Reviewing the intergovernmental transfer
mechanism to identify opportunities for greater equalization and clarifying
institutional arrangements and responsibilities could lead to improved service
delivery. Such information could be used to clarify LGU responsibilities and
assess the need for transfers from the NG. However, given the political and
institutional complexities involved, this needs to be carefully handled, with the A decentralization
widest possible participation and debate at all levels.
and service delivery
11.26 It therefore seems appropriate to undertake a cross-sectoral analytical
exercise—a decentralization and service delivery study—to examine the above study could be an
issues in the context of decentralization in the Philippines. This study would
appropriate lens
address the “supply side” of decentralization (i.e., policies, practices, and
processes). A companion survey-based exercise—a governance and service through which to
delivery diagnostic—could examine the “demand side”: it could benchmark the
effectiveness of the NG and LGUs in delivering selected public services— assess the
especially those to the poorest and most vulnerable—and assess related decentralization
governance issues such as accountability and transparency. This diagnostic
assessment could be based on three sets of surveys of key stakeholder groups. experience, a
Representative samples of enterprise managers and households could be
surveyed about their interactions with state entities and LGUs; their responses decade into the
can provide external assessments of the access to, quality of, and satisfaction implementation of
with services provided by various bodies, as well as about their experiences with
corruption, from the perspective of the users of these services. A representative the landmark Local
sample of public officials could also be surveyed, providing the insiders’
perspective, as well as self-evaluations of the quality of their work. Such a survey Government Code.
of public officials can also highlight progress in the actual implementation of
governance-related reforms in key areas such as procurement, financial
management, budgeting, revenue assessment, revenue collection, and public
administration, and can provide information on the business culture of NG and
LGU offices. The resulting diagnosis, based on the dual analytics, could help
improve public sector performance and promote healthy competition between
LGUs to improve service delivery.
11.27 Service delivery. There is a clear need to strengthen LGU capacity on
several fronts, to enable them to better deliver services. The diagnostic proposed
above could inform the assessment of service delivery and governance, and be of
use to the authorities. Improving service delivery hinges on three factors: (i) on
the revenue side, improving the assessment and collection of revenues from local
sources to reduce LGU dependence on IRA, and to offset weaknesses in NG
revenue collection, (ii) on the expenditure side, strengthening planning,
investment appraisal, procurement and financial management, and
(iii) controlling expenditures on personal services and improving the quality of

public administration through stronger accountability and integrity arrangements. LGU capacity to
All three will require long-term capacity building, including replication of
innovative LGU-level approaches and practices. better deliver basic
11.28 Public expenditure management. In the medium term, a high priority is services hinges on
improving local fiscal and performance information, including updating the
long-term capacity-
income classification system and establishing local government information
systems as part of the government financial management information system. building aimed at (a)
BLGF could build on its work under way to computerize local accounts to
develop a comprehensive information system on LGU finances. Indicators could improving
include revenue and expenditure data, outstanding debt and future debt service, assessment and
budgets, procurement, and some performance indicators.
11.29 Human resource management. The proposed decentralization study collection of own
could develop detailed recommendations for (i) reviewing LGU compliance with source revenues, (b)
the cap on “personal service” expenditures as percentage of total resources in
light of employment of and expenditures on casual, contractual, and other non- strengthening
permanent workers; (ii) reviewing the levels and structure of remuneration,
planning, investment
which vary enormously across LGUs (including unofficial allowances, benefits,
and perks for LGU officials); (iii) reviewing the LGU practice of providing appraisal,
salary supplements for functions and positions whose personnel costs are
supposed to be funded entirely by the NG; (iv) improving the coverage and procurement and
quality of human resource-related statistical data. financial
11.30 Financial management. Improved management and career development
of assessors and treasurers can enhance the quality of fiscal management.
management, and (c)
Introducing the LGAS will provide an opportunity to address accounting improving the
procedures and training of LGU accounting staff. However, the large volume of
staff and LGUs that need to be trained and supervised makes this a challenging quality of LGU
task. COA will need to augment its existing capacity speedily to meet LGU
public
needs. BLGF will pilot the introduction of 14 performance indicators to monitor
LGU performance from 2002. The LGAS will also require submission of administration.
standard financial statements starting from end-2002. These initiatives, if
implemented and observed by LGUs, could go a long way in addressing financial
discipline issues at the LGU level.
11.31 A desirable strategy would be to build on government- and donor-funded
initiatives and develop a program that includes (i) strengthening BLGF by
empowering it to be the main driver of local government finance;
(ii) strengthening the internal control environment in the short term; and
(iii) designing an LGU-level financial management improvement program to
build capacity over the longer term.
11.32 Procurement. Key actions that the Government proposes to take, and
which would be desirable, include (i) ensuring that LGU procurement is
adequately covered in IRRs for the Procurement Reform Law; (ii) prohibiting
local chief executives from chairing bid and award committees; (iii) mandating
strict implementation of the annual procurement plan by procuring entities;
(iv) incorporating consultations with LGUs in preparing national procurement
plans; (v) professionalizing the procurement function and strengthening
procurement capacity at the LGU level; and (vi) streamlining payment of
contractors and suppliers.
124
11.33 Performance management. Building on the results of piloting the SIE

and the fiscal performance indicators, it would be desirable to rank LGUs by
performance, and to develop an incentive system for well-performing LGUs. The
Government is keen on computerizing data gathering and analysis of LGU fiscal
operation—this will require early development of an action plan and cost
estimates for technical assistance and financing.
SECTION E. NEXT STEPS AND ACTION PLAN

126
12. NEXT STEPS

Dissemination Strategy
12.1 The preceding pages have outlined the key PEPFMR findings: some are
diagnostic in nature, others relate to planning, still others pertain to
implementation issues. It is desirable that on the implementation-related issues
(e.g,. revenue collections, BIR reforms, or reallocating personal services
expenditures) the Government act quickly and decisively—in a sense, the
overarching importance of the still-unfolding fiscal developments dictates quite
clearly the sequencing and prioritization of the actions to be taken. The more
detailed matrix at the end of this volume contains the joint recommendations of
the Government and the task team.
12.2 The dissemination strategy for the PEPFMR envisages sharing of this
report and the matrix of recommendations with a wider audience once they have
been reviewed and endorsed by the World Bank and ADB management and by
the Government. This wider audience comprises national agencies and LGUs,
legislators, development partners, academe, civil society, and the media. A first
dissemination workshop has been tentatively planned with the Government for
May 2003. The exact workshop dates will be finalized in consultation with the
Government.
Next Steps
12.3 This PEPFMR is a joint document of the Government of the Philippines,

the Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank. The litmus test of its
relevance will be the extent to which its recommendations will be taken on board
and implemented over the medium term.
12.4 Some actions have already been initiated by the Government even as the
PEPFMR exercise was under way. For example, working with ADB and the
World Bank, a series of grant-based technical assistance programs have been
prepared. These are aimed at building capacity at the national level in critical
areas (e.g., for management of contingent liabilities, strengthening BIR, and
expenditure management) or for more detailed diagnostic work (e.g., pension
reform, pay and employment modeling).
12.5 Next steps in the PEPFMR process could comprise
(i) a series of consultations and workshops to develop some of the themes
outlined here more fully and obtain consensus on the actions proposed in
this PEPFMR; and
(ii) chalking out more detailed and costed action plans to address such
issues.
12.6 For those planning and diagnostic-type issues where assistance or advice
from development partners could be valuable, the Philippines’ development
partners stand ready to provide the needed support.
ACTION PLAN71
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE, PROCUREMENT AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REVIEW
ACTION PLAN
Joint GOP-Task Team

Chapter Issue/Area of Concern Actions Taken by GOP Recommendations Agency
Part A. Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
1. Overview: The Institutional and Fiscal Content

1.1 Fiscal flexibility has been Aggressive efforts to contain the deficit Achieving and maintaining fiscal discipline, and Specifics are
steadily declining as revenues were and are being undertaken continued attention to improving governance and in the rest of
shrink and mandated • On the revenue side, efforts to identify institutions, will be critical for poverty reduction, this Action
expenditures grow. new tax and nontax revenue measures economic growth, and investor confidence. Plan.
have been coupled with plans for the
After several years of surplus in institutional transformation of BIR Details are in the rest of this Action Plan.
the mid-1990s due to improved
tax collections, the fiscal deficit • On the expenditure side, cost cutting
has re-emerged since 1998 in and mandatory savings have been
both NG and consolidated mandated and budget execution is
public sector finances72 being closely monitored to control
expenditures
Specific actions taken have been outlined
in this Action Plan.
128 Philippines PEPFMR
128
Joint GOP-Task Team
Philippines PEPFMR
• The Government’s growth • Part B of this Action Plan. Part B of this Action Plan.
and poverty agenda is
threatened by the budget • GOP is trying to put in place better
squeeze. medium-term expenditure planning and
budgeting to ensure that overall budget
• Budgetary inflexibilities have management and expenditure
become more rigid because allocation are tightly focused on the
high mandated expenditures national priorities and strategies
and resource, planning and enunciated in the MTPDP and the 2001
implementation constraints and 2002 SONAs.
are suppressing core poverty-
reducing capital and • Steps are being taken to improve the
maintenance expenditures. predictability of resource allocations
and resource flows to strengthen
operational efficiency.
Technical and operational Part C of this Action Plan. Part C of this Action Plan.
constraints—e.g., those relating
to procurement, financial
management, and human
resources processes—limit the
efficiency with which available
resources can be utilized, and
key public services delivered.
Capacity building at the LGU Part D of this Action Plan. • Part D of this Action Plan.
level, including and especially
in procurement and financial • Dissemination and replication of in-country good
management, is critical for practices and innovations
strengthening accountability • Augmentation of LGU capacity to obtain, allocate,
and service delivery, especially and manage financial, human, and physical
of those services targeted to the resources
poor, the disadvantaged and the
vulnerable. • Strengthen LGU accountability and transparency
1.2 Strengthening the core The PCEG is leading an initiative aimed • Start streamlining the bureaucracy by reducing CSC, DBM,
functions, strategic roles, and at administrative streamlining and committees and task forces and abolishing or NEDA
responsibilities of the business process re-engineering based on deactivating redundant agencies. (concerned
Government in accordance with examination of the following issues for agencies under
socioeconomic priorities and each sector: • Implement restructuring/realignment of selected PCEG
resource constraints agencies in priority sectors based on laws and guidance)
Joint GOP-Task Team
resource constraints (i) The role of the state vis-a-vis the administrative fiats when possible and in guidance)
private sector and civil society coordination with ongoing budget process reforms
(ii) Existing and appropriate functional and proposed civil service reforms
relationship between the national and
local governments • Submission to Congress of Public Sector
(iii) Existing organizational setup of Institutional Strengthening Bill
executive departments and agencies • Completion of strategic reviews for agriculture,
and their functional transformation social, and infrastructure sectors (details in Part B)
based on the appropriate role of the (by 12/02)
state
(iv) Existing systems and operations of
departments concerned and potential
improvements thereto based on the
desired role of the Government
(v) Other relevant re-engineering issues
The twin-track reform strategy envisages

the following.
• Pursue passage of a bill to rationalize
the scope and functions of government
agencies. Lack of clear enabling
legislation for comprehensive
executive restructuring including an
attractive separation package may
constrain implementation of such
reforms. The Administration version of
the Public Sector Institutional
Strengthening Bill was refiled in 2002.
If passed into law, the reorganization of
Government could be expedited.
Passage of this law in Congress will be
a challenge, given that such bills have
stalled in Congress for the last 7 years
• Complete strategic reviews of high-
priority sectors (e.g., social sectors,
infrastructure) to serve as basis for
proposed passage of individual laws to
130
Joint GOP-Task Team
Philippines PEPFMR
reorganize departments and begin
streamlining small executive agencies
within the existing legal framework.
Some results have been achieved in
DBM, DOH, DND, DSWD, and NSO.
This is a more pragmatic and practical
approach. Details are in Part B.
2. Aggregate Fiscal Discipline

Key message: Financing for the Government’s growth and poverty reduction agenda is inadequate without revenue
increases—an appropriate blend of administrative and policy measures is now essential to establish a sound foundation
for a sustained recovery in tax effort.
2.1 Revenue administration: selected reform issues
2.1.1 Transformation of BIR. Strengthen DOF-BIR relationship. • Adequate allocation for BIR’s operating budget BIR, DBCC,
during 2002–2004 DBM, DOF
• The DO on delineation of roles and
responsibilities between DOF and BIR
has been done and provided to BIR for BIR
finalization including the following: • Complete individual planning down to staff
mechanism to discuss key taxation • Issue reorganization EO for BIR DOF, OP
issues;
• Undertake independent evaluation of BIR’s
establishing a calendar of key computerization program DOF
events and milestones in the
annual budget formulation and • Outsource BIR’s IT to accelerate its refinement BIR
monitoring cycle; and use
establishing joint DOF-BIR
working groups on revenue
leakages and revenue forecasting;
ensuring that BIR provides DOF
with necessary tax return data.
• The organizational effectiveness study
was completed in February 2002.
• The strategic planning and operational
planning, including performance
Joint GOP-Task Team
indicators for departments and
divisions in BIR, were completed.
• Individual planning down to regional
directors and district officers level was
completed in April 2002.
• The reorganization EO to structure BIR
according to taxpayers was submitted
in May 2002.
2.1.2 Other tax administration • The rate of withholding taxes were • Develop an electronic linkage between BIR, BOC, BIR
issues increased to enhance Government and petroleum refineries to support reporting,
access to tax revenue collection and to monitoring, and collection of excise taxes.
provide savings in public debt interest
outlays (BIR Revenue Regulation 12- • Develop mechanism to establish benchmarks for BIR
2001, Sept. 2001). withholding of taxes of professionals (i.e.,
presumptive income).
• Benchmarks for input VAT by industry
will be completed by June 2002.
• Intensify VAT audit work for large
taxpayers services based on industry
benchmarks (2002).
• Compromise settlement program. BIR
• Devise formal guidelines for negotiating tax BIR
settlements and a more comprehensive approach
for assessing applications for compromise based
on financial incapacity.
Metering machines in banks were • Continue to install additional metering machines DOF
installed in 2001. in other establishments
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Joint GOP-Task Team
Philippines PEPFMR
Submitted tax bills to Congress to • Enact and implement legislation on excise taxes. DOF, NTRC
• increase the specific rates for alcoholic
beverages, tobacco products, and • Implement the CTRP. DOF, NTRC
petroleum products to restore their real • Seek technical assistance to learn about best
value to that of January 1997; and practices in excise tax collection for different DOF
• expand the automobile excise to products.
include all vehicles that can be used as
family cars.
Implemented the CTRB by
• finalizing revenue regulations on
ceilings on representation expenses;
• limiting regulations relating to
accelerated depreciation to depreciation
methods; and
• redrafting regulations relating to travel
and entertainment expenses.
3. Off-Budget Risks
Key message: Effective management of off-budget risks is critical for sound fiscal management and macr stability
3.1 Improving recognition of A task force has been set up by DBCC to • Develop a framework for recognition, COA, DBM,
contingent liabilities look into CLs and their management management, reporting, and provisioning of CLs. DOF, NEDA
Complete quantification of CLs (2003).
An initial inventory of CLs has been
completed by DOF. • Extend and complete ongoing inventory of CLs to
(i) encompass all categories of CLs (explicit and DOF
implicit), (ii) analyze institutional arrangements
for recognition, management, and provisioning of
CLs—analysis to include inter- and intraagency
arrangements (2003).
• Use (i) the inventory of CLs, (ii) reporting COA, DBM,
mechanisms, and (iii) training and capacity- DOF, NEDA
building needs assessment to develop a timebound
implementation plan (including the need to
develop contingency plans based on risk
assessment) (2003).
Joint GOP-Task Team
3.2 Strengthening institutional DOF has begun working with BTR to • Establish a centralized risk management unit in BTR, DOF,
capacity to monitor and establish a centralized risk monitoring DOF in coordination with BTR; ensure adequate PCEG
manage fiscal risks and management unit in DOF. DOF staffing and capacity to review and act on
reports from GOCCs/GFIs (2003–2004).
• Undertake capacity-building needs assessment for DOF
DOF (2003).
3.3 Direct guarantees on GOCC Completed review of GOCC charters to Determine which type of guarantees are suitable and DBM, DOF,
loans identify different degrees of guarantees draft a bill prohibiting issue of automatic guarantees DOJ
Fiscal risks emanate from given. (2003–2004)
• GOCCs that have outstanding
"advances" from BTR and Phase 1 of GOCC reform completed in Other steps to improve management of CLs include COA, DBM,
appear to be in no position to 1987. Now DOF to complete Phase 2, • conducting a special purpose audit (financial, DOF
repay, and i.e., reform the role and appropriation of management, and personnel audit) of critical
GOCCs. GOCCs to support planned disposition program
• GOCCs that may not be (2003–2004);
generating sufficient tariff
revenue to service debts. AO issued transferring GCMCC • empowering DOF to recommend sanctions on
functions to DOF (August 2001). corporations, including assignment of financial
controller, suspension of future eligibility for
guarantees, recommendation to President for
management/Board revamp (beyond 2004); and
• commissioning a benchmark audit to be done by a
Benchmark audit completed for SSS and recognized auditing firm for rest of pension and
GSIS. trust funds: HGC, PHIC Pag-ibig, and RSBS
(2003).
3.4 Guarantees on benefits of the • Address immediate fiscal sustainability risks of DOF
social security system SSS and AFP RSBS and strengthen performance
Substantial risk factors are due Market-oriented financial and credit of GSIS
to policies have been adopted. (i) adopting a more conservative investment
• actuarial mismatch between portfolio through international best practice
contributions and benefits Fund management: Both SSS and GSIS principles of safety, liquidity, and good yields
that could force SSS and charters allow this; both intend to hire to improve asset allocation, reduce risk, and
GSIS into insolvency; external fund managers to enhance obtain better return on investments;
• pressure to keep contribution investment capacities. (ii) outsourcing fund management;
rate at existing unsustainable (iii) increasing collection efficiency of
level (they have never been AO 5 already mandates cost cutting contributions and loan portfolio
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Joint GOP-Task Team
Philippines PEPFMR
increased since SSS was measures. MO20 has been issued to cap (iv) increasing SSS contribution rates;
founded); the salary of chief executives. (v) increasing interest rates on salary loans;
• high levels of evasion and (vi) increasing the minimum number of
underreporting; contributions for a 1-year service credit from
• pressure to increase benefits Through the proposed Personal Equity 6 months to 12 months;
across the board; and Retirement Account (PERA) Bill, public (vii) moratorium on across-the-board pension
• poor returns on investments and private employees as well as self- increases; and
due to pressures to invest in employed individuals can open a (viii) reducing administrative expenses.
politically driven investment retirement account with either a bank or a
vehicles, e.g., housing loans, nonbank financial institution. This is • Shift to a new architecture for the pension system,
directed credit to "strategic" expected to encourage savings being by adopting a mandatory, fully funded defined
sectors, current member portion of personal contributions to contribution system that combines workers in the
benefits savings fund and enjoy certain tax public and private sectors. In such a system, the
privileges. defined benefit system is split into
(i) a smaller defined benefit system to be
managed with conservative investment
guidelines; and
(ii) a defined contribution system where
individuals are free to choose their savings
instruments and financial intermediaries
among accredited institutions at any time
(portable).
3.5 Guarantees on various types • Administrative instruction already • Draft a bill on removing automatic guarantees on DOF
of risks involving PSP existing: Office of President (OP) certain GOCCs (2003).
contracts requires all applications for guarantees • Charge risk-based guarantee premiums that will
Substantial risk factors, beyond a certain single transaction size include foreign exchange risk premiums (2003). DOF
including from and/or aggregate threshold to go • Below are other measures for management of
• Currency risks through DOF for approval. contingent liabilities: (2003–2004).
• Demand risks • Provisioning for CLs begun in 2001 Build capacity in line and oversight agencies COA, DBM,
• Construction delays based on guidelines to be jointly to undertake risk assessment of projects. DOF
• Other factors developed by COA, DBM, and DOF. At start of year, DOF should report on CLs by
Regulatory • GOCCs now required to submit reports sector on cumulative basis to establish an
Political on CLs to DOF, and to disclose these annual limit on commitments to explicit
Force majeure in budget documents. guarantees for the entire Government.
Design • Move to accrual accounting initiated. Start provisioning for CLs (charged directly
O&M • COA NGAS mandated disclosure of against agency budget) based on guidelines to
Financing CLs under accrual accounting. be jointly developed by COA, DBM, and
DOF.
Joint GOP-Task Team
Continue the move to accrual accounting.
Identify other measures to lessen coverage of
guarantees.
3.6 Umbrella guarantees for • Commission a benchmark audit by a recognized DOF
various types of loans in audit firm, including recommendations on future
agriculture, microenterprise, accounting and disclosure practices
housing, etc. • Issuance of an EO
Substantial risk factors a) limiting/restraining automatic guarantees on DOF
• HGC solvency threatened by certain GOCCs;
poor program design of APCs b) requiring all guarantees to be charged against
and pressures to revert to guarantee ceiling in RA 4860; and
failed NHMFC formula c) requiring all applications for guarantees beyond
lending approach a certain single transaction size and/or aggregate
threshold to go through DOF for approval.
• Substantial losses incurred in
other guarantee institutions
(Quedancor, SBGFC,
GFSME) requiring periodic
capital infusion
3.7 Timely, regular and accurate • issued EO in 2002 to strengthen the • COA should review and oversee introduction of COA
reporting by GOCCs and governance structure of GOCCs and uniformity of standards and practices in
GFIs GFIs (enhancing the accountability of accounting, reporting, and disclosure by GOCCs
directors, requiring them to undergo and GFIs (2003).
mandatory training etc).
3.8 Recovery of costs of assuming • Share the upside, i.e., make provision for recovery DOF
risks by NG in an appropriate manner (e.g., link level of
guarantee fees to risks, impose recovery through
dividends, etc.) (2003).
3.9 Preventive steps to avoid • NG agencies should stress quality at entry for DOF, ICC
unnecessary fiscal risks projects, ensure that projects undergo/are subject
to adequate risk analysis, and that NG agencies
(especially DOF) are provided with top-quality
legal and technical advice for informed
decisionmaking regarding assumption of fiscal
risks (2002–2004)
136
Chapter Issue/Area of Concern Actions Taken by GOP Joint GOP-Task Team Recommendations Agency
Philippines PEPFMR
Part B. Allocative Efficiency: Selected Issues
4. Allocative Efficiency
Key Message: Strengthen implementation of sector effectiveness and efficiency reviews (SEERs) and organizational
performance indicator framework (OPIF) to focus on and prioritize resource use to antipoverty programs.
4.1 Reconsideration of the roles and • Started measures to address the • Review the implication of the sectoral composition DBCC, DBM,
functions of key sectoral agencies declines in outlays for MOOE and of spending to ensure that resources are used for NEDA, line
(also covered in Parts A and C of capital expenditures, which have priority programs and projects, particularly departments
this Action Plan). decreased (as a share of GNP) due antipoverty projects.
to increased interest payments and
Overview of economic and a wage bill, which though it has • Map out a realistic medium-term strategy through DBCC, DBM,
sectoral allocations decreased slightly as a share of the MTEF for increasing the share of discretionary NEDA
GNP, remains high (2002): expenditures for poverty-related expenditures and
capital investment.
issuing department ceilings, DBCC, DBM,
• Start refinement of agency MFOs in 2003 budget
mandatory savings, and preparation exercise and 2002 midyear performance NEDA, line
review of borrowing strategy. review for full implementation in 2004 budget departments
preparation.
• DBM and NEDA have initiated
the formulation and or refinement
of government line agencies’
major final outputs, an exercise by
which sectors and agencies with
overlapping functions or irrelevant
activities are identified.
• Restructuring of specific sectors is
under examination by the PCEG.
This is a fallback option in case of
nonpassage of a law that would
authorize a comprehensive
restructuring of the executive
• Selected sector reviews • Complete selected sector reviews and prepare time- DBM, NEDA,
(agriculture, infrastructure, social bound implementation plan to address issues. line departments
sectors) are expected to produce
sectoral and departmental
restructuring plans with strategic

adjustments to roles, functions,
organization structures, operations,
and systems of agencies within
specific sectors.
4.2 • Protection of pro-poor policy • In fiscal 2001, DBM protected • At subsectoral level, conduct SEER for primary DBM, ICC,
agenda and overview of priority agencies from expenditure health, basic education, and key antipoverty NEDA, line
selected subsectoral allocations cuts: their allocations were cut by programs to focus and protect key allocations. departments
in agriculture, health and 5%, as against a 10% cut for all
education other agencies.
4.3 Agriculture and agrarian Agriculture DA, DBM,

reform • Focus on growth-enhancing public goods and NEDA, LGUs
• Sustainability of agriculture services.
sector growth and increase in • Phase out nongrowth-enhancing expenditure such as
crop productivity rice price stabilization, whose objective can be
• Continuing slowdown in the achieved through other and more efficient means.
pace of land transfer • Resolution of issues related to the removal of the
• Greater LGU involvement in NFA’s monopoly to import rice.
agrarian reform Agrarian reform
• More resources to LGUs for • Move toward financing land acquisition through
agriculture alternative sources, including progressive land
taxation, land conversion tax, idle land tax, foreign DAR, DBM,
funding, etc. DENR, NEDA,
• Increase use of market-oriented and community- LGUs
driven modalities of land transfer.
• Pursue a “parallel approach” that balances public
expenditure on land acquisition and provision of
support services to previously redistributed
landholdings.
4.4 Education financing and service • Recent policy initiatives have • Sustain and intensify intrasectoral restructuring of CHED, DepEd,
delivery resulted in a realignment of education budget in favor of basic education. DBM, NEDA
• 83% of SUCs’ budget is for spending priorities such that the • Initiate work to design reform of higher education.
personal services expenditures; share of basic education in general • Move towards devolving operation of TVET to
fees are low government education expenditure LGUs.
• Growth in teacher salaries at has increased. • Reduce SUCs’ continued dependence on the national
the expense of MOOE and • SEMP and SEMP II projects are budget and induce discipline on their operations:
capital outlays addressing critical issues in support government efforts at rationalizing budget
138
• Imbalance in deployment of education financing, especially support government efforts at rationalizing budget
Philippines PEPFMR
public school teachers constrained input supply and allocations to SUCs and increase SUC tuition fees.
• Constrained educational inputs teacher deployment. • Implement increased SUC cost recovery hand in
and training, leading to low • The GOP is moving to strengthen hand with a higher budget for a targeted scholarship
household satisfaction levels the links between planning and program in higher education for addressing equity
with class size, facilities and budgeting in general, and between and efficiency goals.
textbooks the MTPDP and the budget in • Given resource constraints, increased allocation for
Millennium Development Goal particular (Chapters 5 and 6) MOOE would require some relative reallocation
– achievement of universal away from personal services.
primary education • Finance improvements in facilities and textbooks by
• The estimated recurrent cost of increasing budget allocation for MOOE.
basic education necessary to • Improve class size by increasing the deployment of
meet the program targets set in teachers (support, sustain, and accelerate current
the MTPDP exceeds the actual initiatives under SEMP and SEMP II projects).
budget allocated by PhP23–28 • Strengthen the link between planning and budgeting, DepEd, DBM,
billion (or 0.5% of GNP) per and especially between the MTPDP and the budget, NEDA
year in 2002–2004. to enable program targets to be met,
4.5 Health care financing and • Budget process reforms are being • Continue the reforms being designed and DBM, DOH,
service delivery: pursued by DOH (see Chapters 5 implemented by the DBM, DOH, and NEDA LGUs, NEDA
• Poor remain vulnerable to and 6). • Strengthen the health statistics system by
health risks and continue to • The SEER and OPIF processes are promulgating IRRs for EO 25, and
have relatively lower access being further refined. resuming regular publication of the Philippine
even to basic health services. Health Statistics
• Regions in Mindanao still have • Strengthen allocation process for DOH regional
the highest infant mortality budgets to better match IMR and poverty incidence.
rates in the country. • Improve performance measurement and monitoring
• Male infants and children have by adopting a more detailed internal performance
higher death rates than their indicators.
female counterparts. • Improve the design and implementation of DOH
• Resurgence of TB, malaria, and transfers to LGUs within the context of a wider
polio in recent years. effort to improve the overall system of
• DOH budget mainly provides intergovernmental fiscal transfers in the Philippines
for tertiary care services. • Formulate and execute a more detailed
• The bulk of LGU health implementation plan for the HSRA
expenditures go to personal • Develop a comprehensive health care plan for non-
services convergence sites to help improve the quality of
health services at the barangay level, where most of
the poor avail of health care facilities
• Recent, complete, and detailed • Facilitate completion of an actuarial study to ensure

information on health outcomes financial sustainability of the PHIC as it aggressively
is not available expands indigent coverage.
• Develop sentinel sites for monitoring health
Millennium Development Goals: outbreaks.
reduce child mortality • Review continued DOH jurisdiction over supposedly
improve maternal health devolved functions to avoid overlap in DOH and
combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and LGU roles in health care delivery.
other diseases • Strengthen the SEER process in the health sector.
• Financing may be insufficient • Implement a phased adoption of new and more
to meet MTPDP targets or to effective drug procurement systems.
finance HSRA unless link • Enhance LGU capacity for health planning,
between planning and budgeting, and service delivery.
budgeting is strengthened.
4.6 Allocative distortions—impact • Starting 1999, DBM has tried to • Develop a “Fiscal Responsibility Act” that can serve DBCC, DBM
on allocation and efficiency of finalize a budget accord with as a budget accord with Congress, setting fiscal
• Congressional initiatives and Congress that would result in a targets and expenditure policy to be followed by
insertions joint agreement on the medium- executive and legislature (2002–2003).
term fiscal framework, obtain joint
• Earmarked revenues by virtue commitment on the use and • Review current need and relevance of earmarked DBM, DOF
of laws management of budget funds, and revenues for amendment of pertinent law (2003–
introduce greater discipline to the 2004.
reallocation process. • Present to Cabinet and Congress of fiscal scenarios DBCC
• For the last 2 years guidelines have on the impact of earmarked revenues (2003–2004).
been issued limiting the use of the • Strengthen the capacity of the CPBO to undertake
priority development fund to budget and program analysis (medium term). DBM, NEDA
infrastructure and social programs
supportive of agricultural • Orient members of Congress and their staff on
MTEF, OPIF, and SEER, particularly committees on DBM, NEDA
modernization. For 2002 the focus
is on antipoverty programs appropriation and finance (2002–2004).
• For the 2002 budget, Congress was • Require a standard cost-effectiveness or cost-benefit
encouraged not to cut interest evaluation of all LFPs created by Congress (short Congress, DBM
payments to reallocate funds to term).
other projects.
• A task force (DBM and DOF) has
been formed by DBCC to make an
inventory of earmarked revenues
140
to measure the magnitude of “free
Philippines PEPFMR
revenues” for presentation to
Congress (June 2002).
4.7 Other issues • A 1997 Report of the Presidential • Subject congressional allowances to the same Congress, DBM,
• Transparency and Commission on Graft and review, disclosure, and audit guidelines and COA
accountability for congressional Corruption outlined the issues processes as those for senior officials of the
allowances: the manner of relating to lack of accountability executive branch (2004).
creation and spending of such and transparency in respect of
allowances can distort the way amounts paid to and expenses • Promote greater transparency in the release of funds DBM
obligations are incurred, incurred by members of the by completing details of releases on the web site.
resources allocated, and legislature. • Expand partnership with civil society in monitoring
expenditures incurred. government programs and projects, procurement, DBM
• DBM has started publishing
allocations on its web site from and budget formulation.
2002 and instructed posting of • Institutionalize report card surveys to obtain DBM
these releases at conspicuous feedback from citizens on the allocation of budget
places at local levels. DBM is resources .
working with NGO groups to
involve them in budget
preparation, monitoring of key
projects, and agency procurement.
5. The Medium-Term Expenditure Framework and the Budget Cycle

Key message: Better medium-term expenditure planning and budgeting would ensure that overall budget management and
expenditure allocation are responsive to national priorities.
5.1 Medium term planning and • Strengthened link between MTPIP • Improve planning through DBM, NEDA,
budgeting: coordination and budget to ensure that new better coordination between sector planning units line departments
mechanisms projects included in the budget are and NEDA/DBM by establishing regularized,
approved in the MTPIP. standardized interaction with full participation in
• National and sectoral planning The ICC has issued a directive each other’s planning processes (this implies
that requires agencies to present harmonizing sector reform agenda and MTPDP
• National and regional (LGU) their budget strategy over the planning cycles) (2003–2004); and
planning medium term to ensure that improve integration of national and regional/LGU DBM, DILG,
• Planning and the capital budget projects for review by the ICC planning by reforming role of regional LGUs, NEDA
(MTPIP) can be funded within budget development councils to give them responsibility
ceilings. for overseeing incorporation of LGU plans into the
ICC has started requiring MTPDP process (beyond 2004).
proponent agencies to submit a • Institutionalize resource-constrained MTPIP by

project logical framework that linking investment programming formulation with 3-
captures performance indicators year baseline ceilings (2003). DBM, NEDA
and targets.
• Include a statement of the MTEF in the MTPDP,
• Harmonization meeting conducted with sections on medium term budget composition DBM, NEDA
by DBM and NEDA (March- and on the explicit link between planning and budget
April) to priorities (Short Term).
adopt common terminologies; • Make MTPIP a more definitive budget by reforming
define delineation of ICC process so that ICC evaluation precedes “entry” DBM, NEDA
responsibilities in MTPIP and into MTPIP (2003-2004)
budget formulation; and
refine concept of major final • Strengthen ICC Approval Process by capturing DBM, NEDA
outputs and performance major locally funded projects into the ICC process
indicators.
5.2 Medium-Term Expenditure • Introduced 3-year budgeting in • Enhance credibility of the MTEF by improving
Framework (MTEF) 2001 budget call. revenue forecasting techniques (ongoing:
presentation of enhanced DOF methodologies; BIR, DOF
• Macroeconomic/Fiscal • Developed medium-term fiscal and
Framework program consistent with contestability of revenue forecasting—each BIR, BOC, DBM,
macroeconomic projections, oversight agency shall have a revenue forecasting DOF, NEDA
featured in MTPDP, and updated model (2002–2004).
• Sector Expenditure semiannually to serve as basis for
Frameworks: Developing sector setting annual budget proposals. • Improve the presentation of the fiscal framework by BSP, DBM, DOF,
budgets, improving resource prioritizing reforms in tax policy and administration NEDA
predictability, and rationalizing • Departments were issued 3-year and estimating the likely impact on tax revenue.
and prioritizing expenditures baseline budgets starting 2000
budget preparation and granted • BIR should improve the quality of its databases by
greater flexibility in reallocating (i) rolling out its IT system to all the districts and
• MTEF Management: baseline budgets to higher priority ensuring that all districts input the necessary data; BIR, DOF
participation of line agencies PAPs. and (ii) making changes to its tax forms to collect
and high-level political support Issued sector/subsector budget data necessary for improving revenue estimation and
ceilings rather than reducing opportunities for evasion (short term).
departmental ceilings
DBM and NEDA conducted • Improve coordination between the BIR, DBCC, and BIR, DOF
SEERs for 2000 budget DOF by increasing BIR’s participation in DBCC
preparation and 2001 budget decision-making processes as resource persons .
execution to approve new
program proposals and to
142
program proposals and to • Institutionalize the Inter-Agency Task Force on the BIR, DOF
Philippines PEPFMR
prioritize agency programs Improvement of Tax Related Database (IATF) by
within budget ceilings. placing it under DOF and establishing formal role
Granted flexibility to for other agencies in DBCC to validate methodology
departments to redeploy staff to (short term).
subdepartmental agencies
(Circular Letter 2000-4). • Build up capacity of BIR to analyze data and BIR, DOF
forecast revenues (2002–2003).
• Drafted PEM manual.
• Develop 3-year department budgets to guide
• Starting 2000, conducted MTEF departments in planning and programming new and DBM, NEDA
training for departments/agencies ongoing PAPs (April 2002–2003):
and trained a group of DBM finalize agency MFOs with agency heads;
technical staff to serve as pool of clean up agency baseline programs; and
trainers on PEM. develop cost standards to link budget formulation
with output targets.
• Align incentives of line agencies
to support MTEF implementation • Use prioritization criteria from the start of the DBM, NEDA,
(e.g., provide agencies incentives baseline budget estimation process to avoid across- line departments
to prioritize their PAPs without the-board cuts to MOOE and capital expenditures
fear of budget cuts as a (medium term).
consequence):
adopt scrap-and-build policy; • Discontinue use of the targeted efficiency
improvement rate to provide better incentives to line DBM, NEDA
encourage agencies to re-deploy
resources to higher priority agencies (short term).
programs; • Incorporate criteria of intersectoral prioritization in
lay down department ceiling; the calculation of baseline budgets (medium term). DBM
agencies to go back to ICC for
project extension; and • Allow departmental managers to reallocate some
undertake midyear assessment percentage of resources from low-priority PAPs to DBM, NEDA
of agency budget from financial new high-priority PAPs, providing positive
and physical points of view incentives for departments to prioritize (short term).
• Promote greater transparency in • Allow departmental managers to reduce personal

the release of funds by publishing service expenditures (subject to a predetermined DBM, NEDA
details of releases in web site maximum) for low-priority PAPs (Medium Term)
(ongoing).
DBM, NEDA
DBM, NEDA
• Automate MTEF to systematize updating, data
• Formulate a system on the archiving, and tracking of budget levels (2003– DBM, NEDA
inclusion of contingent liabilities 2005): (i) design and development stage, (ii)
into the budget (ongoing). implementation stage.
DBM, NEDA
• Simplify PEM manual.
• Develop a plan for outsourcing PEM training to be DBM, COA,
funded from GAA and donor cofinancing. NEDA
• Establish an appropriate technical assistance DBM, NEDA

program to support SEERs and strengthen human
resource capacity in line agency budget departments
and central oversight agencies (short term).
• Implement harmonization process for oversight on DBM, NEDA
forms, reports, information sharing, data: improve
ability of line agencies to generate and use budget
and performance data by making data useful to
agencies; rationalize and simplify data collection and
reporting (2002–2004).
• Ensure that SEERs evaluate the effectiveness of DBM, NEDA
GAS expenditures (medium term).
• Require line agencies to identify low-priority
DBM, NEDA
programs expressed as a predetermined percentage
of the agency’s budget (short term).
• Require agencies to conduct cost-effectiveness DBM, NEDA
analyses of high-priority PAPs (medium term).
• Integrate the SEER process with the PCEG’s DBM, NEDA
functional reviews to ensure that both initiatives are
complementary in their approaches and
recommendations (short term).
• Develop capacity in oversight agencies to provide DBM, NEDA
tailored SEER implementation training to sectors
(2002–2003).
• Produce manual on SEERs. DBM, NEDA
144
• Provide a formal role for DBCC in managing and DBCC, DBM,
Philippines PEPFMR
overseeing MTEF process: NEDA
require DBCC/cabinet approval for MTEF
forward estimates (2003); and
require DBCC to oversee development of
forward estimates by sectors.
• Continue advocacy and capacity building within
DBM and across agencies and congress on MTEF: Congress, DBM,
orient congressional committees on MTEF DOF, NEDA
forward estimate development and overall PEM
strategy and program (2002–2004); and
require formal presentation of MTEF forward
estimates to Congress for discussion (2004).
• Based on the above recommendations, develop an DBM, NEDA,
action plan for improving MTEF implementation DOF
(short term).
5.3 Build partnerships to support • Continue workshops with civil society, e.g., budget DBM, NEDA
MTEF implementation briefings, governance forum.
• Develop advocacy materials: PEM, MTEF (2002). DBM, NEDA
• Identify NGOs that can train other NGOs—
Philippine Governance Forum, CBCP, FEF, FOCIG, DBM, NEDA
IPD (2002).
• Build core team reformers in agencies (2002). DBM, NEDA,
line departments
• Publish “Public Eye” newsletter on budget reform to DBM, DOF,

provide information on concepts, status of reforms, NEDA
and best practice (2003).
• Line agencies should develop capacity on
DBM, NEDA
MTEF preparation and the basics;
how to advocate, work with civil society,
Congress;
information made useful at ground level for
management; and
working toward a fully developed MTEF by

2005 using the NEDA rural sector development
approach.
• Reactivate Budget Dialogue Group (consisting of DBM, COA,

public-private representatives) to provide input into NEDA
budget preparation and guide efforts on civil society
role in other budget processes (2002).
DBM, NEDA,
• Institutionalize use of client satisfaction surveys and DILG
report card survey to influence budget allocation and
enhance accountability for performance (2003)
• Develop a proposal to provide legal foundation for DBM, NEDA
the budget framework through a Fiscal
Responsibility Act by elevating the core budget
process framework to the status of a budget
framework law.
DBM, NEDA
• Review and update EO 292 to take account of recent
reforms, including the Local Government Code of
1991 and the budget framework law (if applicable)
(long term).
• Fully implement the budget timetable set out in the DBM, NEDA
Budget process • NEDA planning committees were PEM manual (short term).
involved in the process of project NEDA, DBM
Budget Framework review and determination of • Revise and update existing PEM manual to
ceilings (1999 budget preparation) incorporate all existing budget guidelines (medium
Comprehensiveness term).
• Introduced PEM innovations DBM, NEDA
Calendar developed by DBM and NEDA • Rationalize programs and projects structure of
and applied to all departments agencies and establish their proper costing (2002–
Predictability of allocations 2003).
• DBM encouraged Congress to
and resource flows broaden program classification and • Consolidate existing budget preparation guidelines DBM
move beyond line-item in the Public Expenditure Manual (2003–2004).
categorization.
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Sustainability and credibility • DOF and DBM made efforts to • Streamline and improve formulation and DBM, NEDA
of forward estimates stop congress practice of illusory promulgation of indicative budget ceilings for
cuts on debt payments to shift sectors/departments (if necessary, study process to
Calculation of baselines to be funds to preferred programs. figure out sources of delays) (2002–2003)
consistent with ceilings
• DBM efforts to rationalize areas of • Subject LFPs to the same screening, prioritization, Congress, DBM
Unfunded policy mandates Congressional intervention/ and other processes as FAPs.
participation in agency projects
and program implementation. • Cost policy proposals in accordance with the MTEF
Flexibility for contingencies as part of the legislative process. Evaluate existing DBM, NEDA
• Unprogrammed funds may not be laws creating expenditure mandates for fiscal
Limited flexibility to agency accessed unless overall revenue sustainability (beyond 2004).
heads to reallocate resources target has been exceeded.
to meet MFOs • Present the NEP at a more aggregate level (for DBM, NEDA
• Introduced MFOs to prioritize example, at program/project level) to provide more
PAP; outputs to budget flexibility and in more user-friendly form for
allocations; shift to outcome-based transparency and greater accountability (2004).
performance indicators allocations. DBCC, NEDA
• Limit the role of NEDA planning committees to
• Strengthened sequencing of conducting technical analyses and proposing
activities such that SEER is done recommended reallocations, subject to approval by
prior to budget preparation so that the DBCC (short term).
priorities and strategies in MTPDP
are funded.
Budget formulation • NEDA planning committees were • Develop a proposal to provide legal foundation for DBM, DOF,
involved in the process of project budget framework through a Fiscal Responsibility NEDA
• Budget framework review and determination of Act.
ceilings.
• Comprehensiveness • Extend budget timetable (particularly if GAA
• DBM drafted budget preparation delayed): budget cycle should begin earlier, prior to
• Process and calendar manual and applied to all approval of GAA, to allow adequate time for
• Predictability of allocations and departments. evaluation, consultation, updating of baselines and
resource flows reprioritization (2003–2004).
• MFOs were introduced to link
• Sustainability and credibility of outputs to budget allocations. • Rationalize programs and project structure of
forward estimates agencies and establish their proper costing (2002–
• Clear guidelines were issued for 2004).
• Calculation of baselines to be fund release strategy at start of
consistent with ceilings year. • Consolidate existing budget preparation guidelines
in the Public Expenditure Manual (2003–2004).
• DBM lobbied with Congress to
• Unfunded policy mandates broaden program classification and • Implement harmonization process for oversight on
move beyond line-item budget-related forms, reports, information sharing,
• Flexibility for contingencies: categorization. and data; simplify forms for budget preparation to
Limited flexibility to agency only capture information necessary for the NEP
• Stopped earlier policy of imposing
heads to reallocate resources (2002–2003).
10% internal reserve on budget
to meet MFOs. allocations. • Eliminate delays in formulation and promulgation of
indicative budget ceilings for sectors/departments
• Unprogrammed funds may not be
(2002).
accessed unless overall revenue
target has been exceeded • Subject LFPs to the same screening, prioritization,
and other processes as FAPs.
• Cost policy proposals in accordance with the MTEF
as part of the legislative process. Evaluate existing
laws creating expenditure mandates for fiscal
sustainability (beyond 2004).
• Present the NEP at a more aggregate level (for
example, at program/project level) to provide more
flexibility (2004).
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6.
BUDGET EXECUTION, TREASURY CONTROL AND EXTERNAL OVERSIGHT
6.1 Budget Execution • Finalized testing of BEAT for • Continue streamlining current budget allotment DBM
implementation in May 2002. and cash authorization system for better budget
and cash management (2002 onwards).
• Shifted to quarterly releasing of NCA
starting April 2002. • Link BEATS with COA NGAS (starting 2003). COA, DBM
• Focusrf budget execution on
performance monitoring; midyear
• Simplify releasing process (2002–2003). DBM
review (August 2002) of agency
performance undertaken prior to
release of remaining 25% of agency • Simplify regulatory reports (2002–2003).
allocation. COA, DBM,
NEDA
• Improved cash management in the
agencies by imposing a 2-month • Develop flash reporting system for better cash
DBM
validity on NCAs released for accounts management (2003–2004).
payable. • Review separation of budget and cash BTR, COA,
management by transferring issue of NCAs to DBM
BTR starting with the IRA (2003).
• Introduced performance indicators in • Refine implementation of performance indicator DBM
2001. framework.
• Introduce a variance table on financial and DBM
physical performance of agencies in budget
documents to be submitted to Congress (2004).
6.2 Treasury and cash • The NGAS has reformed the previous • Strengthen the MDS by BTR, COA
management interlocking ledger system that resulted requiring BTR regional and provincial offices
in most of the reconciliation problems to reconcile bank accounts with summaries of
checks issued sent by the agencies on a more
timely basis (2002); and
developing instructions on how to reconcile
new proforma bank accounts (under the NGAS)
with corresponding accounts kept by banks
(2003).
Joint GOP-Task Team
• Establish BTR control over NCA secondary
allocation accounts and unliquidated cash
advances (2003).
• Reduce BTR reliance on bank deposit information
used in accounting for revenue collection (2003–
2004).
• BTR should establish a working group to better
define accounting and reporting requirements for
cash management by agencies and BTR.
• Transfer responsibility for issue of NCA to BTR,
which will separate the cash and budget
management functions and place BTR as the sole
responsible agency for cash management (2002–
2004).
6.3 Performance measurement • The OPIF concept (BP 206) was • Establish a joint DBM-NEDA committee with line DBM, NEDA
and management introduced in 2001 and 2002 budget agency representatives and joint technical working
• Internal: OPIF calls. groups to manage the SEER and OPIF reforms
(Short Term).
• External: NGOs • Agencies were required to submit
performance targets/MFOs as part of • Refine Organizational Performance Indicator DBM, NEDA
2002 budget submission and asked to (OPIF) and Sector Efficiency and Effectiveness
group PAPs according to contribution (SEER) methodologies: DBM and NEDA will
to MFO. work together to promote consistency and
eliminate ambiguities (2002–2005)
• Training sessions on OPIF have been
conducted for oversight and • Review OPIF experience to date to prepare a time-
implementing agencies. bound action plan (with estimates of resources DBM, NEDA,
needed at the central and line department level) for line
• Started involving civil society in OPIF implementation government-wide (Medium departments
budget preparation through briefings Term)
on budget processes and concepts and
participation in technical budget • Assess capacity (skill, organizational model) of
hearings as observers. different agencies to adopt and use OPIF and DBM
MTEF for developing capacity-building program
• NEDA-DBM harmonization targeted at need and audience (2002).
workshops held on 28 February and 7
March 2002.
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Recommendations
Philippines PEPFMR
PART C. Operational Efficiency—Selected Issues
The Public Procurement Regime

7.
Key message: Continued procurement reforms to increase competition and transparency could increase the cost efficiency of
resource use, and also contribute to improved governance.
Strengthen legal and institutional Government has initiated a series of • Facilitate early promulgation of IRRs for DBM
7.1
framework for public measures to modernize the legal Procurement Reform Law.
procurement framework for procurement, key
being the following. • Finalize proposed amendments to the BOT
• Procurement Reform Law was Law, including the “unsolicited proposals” NEDA
enacted. Presidential assent thereto rule.
in January 2003;
• EO 40 issued in October 2001 • Review the law on arbitration to align it
consolidating existing executive with international practice (31 December
instructions and removing 2003). PCAB
inconsistencies and overlaps;
• IRRs were drafted and • Study feasibility of allowing foreign
promulgated for EO 40 (20 March contractors to bid without PCAB license CIAP
2002); but only present the license prior to award.
• A review of the BOT Law was
initiated, including the “unsolicited
proposals” rule;
• Draft IRRs were prepared for the
Procurement Reform Law (April
2002).
Recommendations
Enhance transparency of Electronic procurement
7.2
procurement through:
• DBM has installed initial phase of • Push for exceeding 60% participation of DBM-Procurement
• electronic procurement, and
an electronic bidding system all government agencies in the GEPS for Service (DBM-PS)
• facilitation of civil society which includes tender board, the purchase of common goods/supplies/
oversight and monitoring of supplier registry, and electronic materials.
procurement process. catalogue.
• All projects should use computerized
• DPWH has established a registry following progress of DPWH
computerized registry of computerization.
contractors and computerized
eligibility screening for • Encourage civil society organizations to PPB
contractors. acquire training in monitoring of
procurement at all levels.
• COA and DOH have likewise
established respective
computerization programs on
procurement.
• Completed government electronic
procurement system (GEPS) to
include virtual store, electronic
payment system, and e-bidding
systems
Civil society participation:
• Complete 60% participation by all
• Civil society participation in DBM-PS
agencies of GEPS (31 December 2002).
procurement at all levels is being
encouraged and implemented (EO • All projects should use computerized
40 and IRR). registry following progress of DPWH
computerization (31 December 2002).
• Encourage and monitor civil society PPB
participation in procurement at all levels.
• Develop guidelines and training of NGOs
and civil society (ongoing). DBM
7.3 Strengthen organization and • The Procurement Policy Board • Establish the Government Procurement CSC, DBM, NEDA
staffing was merged with the NEDA- Policy Board through IRRs after passage
Infrastructure Committee on of Procurement Reform Law
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Recommendations
Philippines PEPFMR
procurement related matters of Procurement Reform Law
DBM/CSC, PPB
• Establish and implement a continuing
national training program for government
procurement officers, program officers,
and financial management personnel
(2002).
• Study to corporatize procurement service CSC, DOJ, PPB
as an independent entity.
• Professionalize the procurement function COA, Infracom, PPB
by
Designing a system and implementation
plan, and
implementing the program.
• Improve enforcement of procurement DBM, COA, PPB
processing milestones (AO 129 and EO 40)
by monitoring and applying sanctions.
7.4 Procurement practices and Existing IRR of EO 40 already • Enforce the regulation on transparency COA
processes prohibits negotiation of price and through procurement audit
contract amount (goods and works) Develop and implement procurement
after bid opening. audit training program for COA
auditors.
• Study registration and licensing of CIAP-PDCB, DPWH,
contractors; design and implement an NEDA
action plan to streamline processes for
registration and licensing of contractors.
BSP, DBM, DOJ, NEDA
• Replace surety bond with bank
guarantee/letters of credit/other forms
(IRR).
ADB, BSP, World Bank
• Review the operation of the irrevocable
LCs as performance bonds to reduce
transaction costs and expedite payments.
• Provide the same waiver for goods from DTI, Phil Shippers
the Republic of Korea and Japan as other Bureau
countries per Philippine Flag Vessel Law.
Recommendations
countries per Philippine Flag Vessel Law.
DBM
• Included price monitoring as an important
function of oversight Board (IRR). Agencies
• Strictly implement procurement plan.
CSC, DOJ, PPB
• Provide support to BAC/PEAC members
subjected to harassment.
Strengthening Financial Management
8
Key message: Strengthening government accounting reporting, financial controls and auditing will initially reinforce
aggregate fiscal discipline and, over time, improve resource allocation and operational efficiency.
8.1 Accounting and Reporting • Strengthen agency controllership function Interagency Committee
and financial management (starting 2002).
• The NGAS Accounting Policies • Enhance and finalize the NGAS COA
and Procedures Manual is being Accounting Policies and Procedures
developed. Manual including policies for
consolidation of national government and
• National sector exposure draft of LGU financial statements (end of 2002).
the manual has been issued by Complete the following
COA in March 2002 for the NG national manual (end of 2002), and
and LGUs LGU manual (end Feb 2003).
• Study of accounting standards for • Establish accounting rules for Innovative COA, NEDA
BOT initiated in 2000. Financing Arrangements (during 2002).
• The NGAS includes registry for • Formulate accounting policies for BTR, DOF, COA.
contingent liabilities arising from contingent liabilities and maintain register
BOT projects. of contingent liabilities.
• 2003 Budget Call required
agencies to disclose real and
contingent liabilities by putting
maximum claims base for
contracts.
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Recommendations
• Developed a computerized • Finalize computerized accounting system
Philippines PEPFMR
COA
accounting system for piloting in based on pilot.
11 agencies and LGUs by July
2002. • Continue development of integrated DBM, COA
financial management system using the
• Started design of GIFMIS in 1999 NGAS as initial building block for
through an interagency committee. integrating financial reporting
requirements.
Formulate implementation plan DBM
including annual budget allocation for
the NGAS rollout for 2002–2006.
Provide resources for developmental DBM
training through budget allocation for
conduct of training and skills
development of accountants and
budget officers on implementation of
the NGAS and BEAT.
8.2 Internal controls and internal • Numerous reviews of the financial • Develop a comprehensive manual of COA, DBM, NEDA
Audit management strengths and accounting policies and procedures as the
Review of current internal challenges have been undertaken NGAS implementation proceeds, as
control procedures and legal in collaboration with the revisions may have to be made to the
framework authorities, e.g., by the UNDP NGAS in light of practical experience
Review of internal audit
capacity • An Interagency Committee of • Introduce computerized accounting and COA
Review of proposed procedures BLGF, COA, DBM, DILG, DOF, integrated financial management system.
for authorizing and accounting NEDA has been established to
initiate work on the agency • Carry out a study to introduce internal
for public funds auditing in accordance with the Internal COA, DBM
Proposed COA reform program controllership function. DBM will
chair the committee. Auditing Code.
on accounting and reporting
• COA has initiated implementation • DBM should take the lead in initiating a DBM, Interagency
of the NGAS from 1 January 2002. financial management training program at Committee on FM
the agency level with emphasis on the use Development
• A subcommittee of Interagency of computerized accounting and reporting.
Committee chaired by COA will (2002–2004).
manage NGAS implementation.
• DBM should lead the development of an
agency controllership function to fully DBM, Interagency
integrate financial management into the Committee on FM
agency management (2003–2004). Development
Recommendations
Human Resource Management: Controlling the Wage Bill
9.
Key message: Wage bill control is crucial for flexibility in implementing new performance-based public sector reforms and
could make an important contribution to public sector efficiency and flexibility.
9.1 Wage bill: fiscal weight • Proposed Civil Service Code under • Enhance civil service professionalism and CSC, PCEG
• The rise in current expenditure deliberation by Congress. consistent standards (June 2002) through
has been driven mostly by passage of Civil Service Code
personal services expenditures, • Study on appropriate role and size
of government is ongoing; • Pursue the reorganization of government
which increased from below 5% through administrative fiat and legislation DBM, PCEG
of GNP in 1980s to 6–7% in the reorganization bill already filed in
Congress. (2002–2004).
1990s.
• Laws have been passed • Continue hiring freeze on nonessential DBM
• The personal services component positions.
of the NG budget is high, reorganizing agencies (DOE, SEC,
partaking about 55% of the etc.). • Design impact mitigation program for
DBM, PCEG
national budget in 2001 • Staffing modifications have been those who may be affected through
(excluding debt service, LGU encouraged through the budget retooling for redeployable staff; and
transfers, and net lending). call. early targeted separation scheme
• The high cost of personal services • Scrap-and-build policy: positions
is compounded by proliferation of can only be created if other non-
agencies, functional duplication, essential positions are abolished.
and overlaps among agencies
within and between departments. • As a general rule, only population-
related positions, such as for
teachers and police, are being
created.
• Fiscal discipline measures were
introduced in 2001, including a
hiring freeze on non-essential
personnel.
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9.2 Arrive at a national government-level civil service size and structure consonant with the envisioned role of a streamlined and efficient executive structure
9.2.1 Streamlining and rationalizing Current initiatives comprise: • Pursue the initiatives to streamline and PCEG
agencies attached to the Office of • tightening the management span of rationalize activities of national
the President: This is a key the Office of the President by government agencies.
component of public sector unloading direct responsibility of
institutional strengthening and supervising agencies whose
streamlining. functions are more properly aligned
with/subsumed under different
departments; and
• an ongoing review process aims at
greater operational efficiency and
better policy coordination capability
within the Office of the President.
• EO 72 (11 February 2002) Issue an EO targeting a second batch of CSC, DBM
abolished 77 offices and transferred entities and functions.
13 other offices under the OP to
other agencies and departments
where their functions are more
aligned. Those abolished include
interagency committees, adhoc
committees and other bodies, most
of which have already performed
their mandate but have been
allowed to continue.
• The impact of EO 72 on
employment and spending is so far
insignificant: the offices abolished
by EO 72 are mostly staffed by
contractual workers whose contracts
will be discontinued. For permanent
employees in those offices, the IRR
provides that those employees will
continue to be employed and will be
placed in a pool to be administered
by CSC; the latter will place those
Joint GOP-Task Team
civil servants into other agencies.
• Another batch of offices to be • Complete review. DBM, OP
abolished is currently under review.
• Issue and implement EO and IRRs.
• Technical assistance is being DBM
provided on winding-up of agencies (in coordination with
affected by the streamlining COA, CSC, OP)
process.
9.2.2 Rationalization of the proliferation • DBM reviewed structures, • Complete the review and submit DBM
and duplication of attached functions, and programs of all recommendations to PCEG.
agencies and adhoc bodies attached agencies, task forces and
similar bodies in the national
government. The expected outcome
is abolition of unnecessary and
proliferating attached agencies and
adhoc bodies. DBM is currently
preparing profiles of such entities.
9.2.3 Institutional strengthening of • BIR is being assisted in reviewing • Complete transformation of BIR. BIR
priority departments and agencies its substantive and support systems DBM
and in developing improvements • Continue documenting current efforts as a (in coordination with CSC
thereto. guide to undertaking similar initiatives in and other oversight
other agencies. agencies)
• Pilot two departments (e.g., DOH • Select a set of initial revenue-generating
and DSWD) and resolve agencies, frontline agencies, and oversight
mismatches between priorities, agencies (DBM/DOF/NEDA)where such
functional assignments, structures, initiatives will be extended, and develop
and staff complement and an action plan and timetable for such
composition. initiatives.
• Develop and implement technical
assistance programs for
streamlining/commercialization of priority
agencies e.g., DPWH.
9.2.4 Strengthening DBM capacity to DBM plays a key role in the public • Continue strengthening the PCEG DBM
function as the PCEG Secretariat: a sector institutional strengthening effort Secretariat to support the reorganization of
persistent internal constraint has and acts as the secretariat of the the Government.
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Joint GOP-Task Team
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been a lack of sufficient personnel PCEG. Its functions in this respect are the Government.
complement and staff skills to to
enable DBM to more effectively • provide technical staff support
undertake its secretariat functions (including conduct of studies and
development of policies and
strategies) to the PCEG and external
consultants; and
• facilitate coordination among
agencies and other stakeholders
involved in institutional
strengthening discussions and
actions.
DBM is currently receiving technical
assistance from UNDP.
9.3 Compensation: levels, structure and transparency of salaries, allowances, perquisites, pensions etc.
9.3.1 • Salaries are too low relative to • Across-the-board salary increases • Review existing position classification and DBM, CSC
the private sector for middle and were granted: 10% in 2000 and 5% compensation system (PCCS) to identify
senior executive levels to attract in 2001. weaknesses.
and retain talent.
• Develop a competitive compensation CSC, DBM
• Salary schedules are • PCEG approved the general package/scheme (both cash and noncash
compressed. framework for improvement of e.g., possibly including health and
government compensation education assistance) that takes into
• Uncompetitive pay for key consideration market factors and
professions such as lawyers, IT market driven
performance (2002–2003).
professionals and accountants high turnover
results in unfilled vacancies. performance based
Prepare a draft law including provision

Joint GOP-Task Team
9.3.2 Pressure for grant of exemptions • Grant of exemptions from the SSL of assistance during public hearings.
from the Salary Standardization has consistently been opposed by Prepare and implement advocacy
Law (SSL) DBM. MO 20 has been issued to strategy.
rationalize the relatively excessive Prepare a manual for implementation
pay of senior officials in exempt and maintenance of the PCCS.
GOCCs/GFIs. Implement capability building
program for implementors of the
PCCS.
Design a scheme allowing agency
heads to implement upgrading of
positions within authorized budget for
personal services. DBM (with PCEG)
9.3.3 • Allowances are often non- • Rationalize nontransparent and non-
transparent and do not fulfill productive allowances. PCEG (with DBM)
their objectives, particularly in
GOCCs/GFIs. • Prepare and implement a plan to extend
such rationalization to GFIs/GOCCs.
9.3.4 Disparate retirement laws • Employees are being encouraged to • Study existing discrete systems and design DBM
retire under the GSIS Law. and implement an interim measure
towards rationalizing existing retirement
laws.
• Rationalize existing laws within the public CSC, DBM, GSIS
sector.
• Draft a rationalized retirement bill (2003). CSC, DBM, GSIS
9.4 Setting, implementing and • CSC and DBM have several • Further strengthen coordination between CSC, DBM
overseeing civil service policy ongoing initiatives, and have also central entities involved in human
more effectively reached out to GOCCs/GFIs such as resource policy and management.
the GSIS to obtain better
information for policy making.
• Coordination between civil service
pay and employment reform
initiatives, reforms of the budget
process, and institutional
streamlining efforts has improved
during the last 2–3 years.
9.5 Strengthening establishment • An interagency working group • Establish a civil service personnel DBM, CSC, GSIS
control (CSC, DBM, GSIS) has been information system that could be accessed
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Joint GOP-Task Team
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(CSC, DBM, GSIS) has been information system that could be accessed
• Move to one authentic source for established to review and by central oversight agencies such as
information on authorized recommend options for integrating COA, CSC, and DBM and if necessary by
positions (approved plantilla) existing personnel information line departments, so that a unique
and filled positions, and for systems of CSC, DBM, and GSIS. identification number for each employee
payroll data, so that civil service • Each agency presently maintains its can ensure that
employment and wage bill size own database: each permanent appointment is made
can be controlled more DBM’s Government Manpower against an authorized position;
effectively. At present Information System (GMIS) no person can be appointed to more than
departments do not present has data on non-uniformed one authorized position; and
accurate information on the civilian national government no person can draw pay from more than
number of filled and unfilled positions. one payroll or obtain more than one set
positions and there is no reliable CSC has data on civil service of benefits.
method of verifying their applicants. • Pursue the development of the common CSC, DBM
submissions to oversight GSIS data cover enrollees database on government personnel to be
agencies. (about 1.1 million) and shared by CSC, DBM, and GSIS (2003–
pensioners (about 144,000) in 2004).
respect of their eligibility for • Review and—as required—augment CSC, DBM
benefits and for calculation and technical capacity in CSC and DBM to
disbursement of benefits. maintain and operate the database.
9.6 Link organizational performance • DBM has developed the OPIF and • Strengthen individual performance CSC, DBM, NEDA
framework to individual has begun implementation (see Part appraisal system linked to organizational
performance appraisal system B). performance measurement system.
Involve the Career Executive Service
Board in the career executive system.
CSC
9.7 Strengthen human resource Covered in Part D Covered in Part D Covered in Part D
management and capacity at the
LGU level, including
• appointment, performance
evaluation, and accountability;
• compensation issues; and
• employment issues.
9.8 Strengthen the civil service legal CSC has worked extensively to • Enact and implement an updated Civil CSC, DBM
framework for accountability, prepare an updated draft of a new Service Code that (i) separates
Joint GOP-Task Team
integrity, efficiency, and Civil Service Code, which has been professional civil service positions and
professionalism by updating the submitted to the legislature and is “positions of confidence” (political
Civil Service Code (this effort has currently under review by the appointments), (ii) separates key policy
been ongoing for several years) legislature. provisions from other details of
with the aim of employment, and (iii) provides for
• improving merit-based The PCEG has been formulating an appropriate accountability and integrity
recruitment, performance integrated anticorruption strategy for arrangements.
evaluation, and promotion; the Government aiming, among other
things, to strengthen integrity in the • Strengthen technical capacity of CSC to
• making compensation more civil service. oversee implementation of Civil Service
competitive within fiscal Code and to develop civil service policy.
constraints, and linking
• Promulgate and implement amendments to
compensation to performance;
the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292)
• protecting upright civil servants to align it with the provisions of the Civil
in the discharge of their Service Code once enacted.
functions; and
• Amend the definition applicable to civil
• strengthening accountability and servants’ selection and promotion to
integrity mechanisms. competitive assessment of merit.
• Review and redefine parameters for
appointment of non-Career Executive
Service (CES) individuals to CES
positions.
Implementation of Foreign-Assisted Projects
10.
Key message: Strengthening implementation arrangements and speed of implementation could ensure faster absorption of
ODA, strengthen institutional capacity at national agency and LGU levels, and help sustain project outcomes.
10.1 Enhancing absorptive capacity, Significant actions to improve Continue monitoring key indicators DBM, NEDA
key indicators for which include (as portfolio performance include the
proxies for physical following:
accomplishment) • Implementing agencies have
• disbursement level (down to less reduced the number of signatories
than $1 billion in January 2001); for project documents.
• disbursement rate • ICC endorsed partial cancellation
• availment rate (about 63% in of about $500 million.
1999-2000); and • Portfolio reviews were conducted
• disbursement ratio (2001 average with the three largest funding
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Joint GOP-Task Team
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was 12% for three biggest agencies in April and September
portfolios: ADB, GOJ, WB) 2001 to address bottlenecks.
(60 loans are beyond closing dates, • Power sector reforms and other
average time overrun is 2.3 years) steps were taken to improve
governance.
10.2 Improved project identification, • Implementation of SEERs has • Complete SEERs to sharpen prioritization DBM, NEDA
preparation and design, including helped focus agencies on of activities and so lead to improved
• addressing weak demand for on- prioritizing their activities. project identification.
lending programs
• Increase thorough project design and ICC, NEDA
project evaluation, especially for those
with LGU participation and/or with
multiagency participation.
• Minimize multiagency implementation.
ICC
10.3 Greater predictability in project • PhP41 billion allocated for FAPs • Envisage a 3-year investment program DBM, NEDA
financing, including provision of in 2002 budget (as against PhP29 with indicative budget for each
counterpart funds billion in 2001). implementing agency (see also Part B).
[The 2001 (reenacted) budget led to
a mismatch between previously • See Part B on strengthening • Conduct SEERs of individual agency ICC
allocated funds and new financial linkage between planning and portfolios to establish medium-term
requirements of projects; project budgeting, and between MTPDP priorities within the ICC process.
financing was slowed by budget and MTPIP.
• Continue streamlining odocument
deficit reduction measures.] processing and fund flow within Agencies
implementing agencies.
[See also Part B on strengthening linkage
between planning and budgeting.]
Joint GOP-Task Team
10.4 Strengthening sustainability of • AO 7 was issued (transferred • Issue an EO on resettlement. Oversight agencies (COA,
project outcomes through contract review function from OP to DBM, DOF, NEDA),
improved institutional NEDA, mandated a maximum • Give priority and high-level attention to DILG, and line
arrangements for project duration for the process, increased ROW issues. departments
coordination, management, accountability of cabinet secretaries • Review FAP management/coordination/
implementation, and evaluation, for project implementation, and implementation arrangements to enhance
including more effective oversight by the implementing agency ownership and
• srengthening capacity in Office of the President through a accountability.
implementing agencies and Presidential Adviser for ODA
relevant LGUs, Absorption). • Strengthen institutional capacity of LGUs
involved in FAPs, especially for
• addressing changes in project • EO 40 was issued to streamline procurement and financial management
scope and design during procurement processes (see Part C). (see also Parts C and D).
implementation;
• RA 8974 was enacted: it defines the • Further strengthen coordination between
• strengthening project procedure for right-of-way implementing agencies and coordinating
implementation arrangements; acquisition for infrastructure agencies, and remove functional overlaps
projects. and duplication among national
• dealing with poor contractor
performance; • RA 8975 enacted: it prohibits government agencies (see also Parts A
issuance by lower courts of and C).
• strengthening line agency and temporary restraining orders on
LGU capacity to prepare, • Take further steps to improve project
government projects procurement (see also Part C).
evaluate, oversee, and monitor
implementation of projects; • Project implementation officers • Develop further measures to strengthen
were (undersecretary level) project financial management (see also
• civil society involvement for designated in implementing
accountable and transparent Part C).
agencies.
implementation; • Give special attention to projects with
• Implementing agencies have largest backlogs since implementation.
• addressing peace and order reduced the number of signatories
issues impacting projects; and for project documents.
• slower project implementation
due to change in administration.
164
Chapter Issue/Area of Concern Actions Taken Joint GOP-Task Team Agency
Recommendations
Philippines PEPFMR
Part D. Decentralization
Decentralization: A Selective Overview

11.
Key message: Capacity building at the LGU level, including and especially in procurement and financial management, is
critical for strengthening accountability and service delivery.
11.1 Overview Various studies and analyses Conduct a decentralization study to review the COA, DBM,
of different aspects of fiscal, administrative, and political aspects of DILG, DOF,
decentralization and decentralization, including NEDA,
devolution have been PCEG, line
conducted in recent years by • actual devolution by the national government departments,
GOP, development partners, to LGUs; ADB, World
and the academe. • adequacy of the IRA transfer system and Bank
opportunities for greater equalization;
More than 10 years have
elapsed since the enactment of • LGC provisions regarding local taxation and
the 1991 Local Government fiscal matters;
Code (LGC). This is an • LGU responsibilities (e.g., by defining
appropriate time to take stock expenditure requirements and service
of the opportunities, strengths, standards by sector) and the need for transfers
and weaknesses of devolution from the national government;
and decentralization, review
the key findings and • impact of decentralization on the poor and
recommendations, and work other vulnerable groups; and
out an action plan to
• conduct a study on how to introduce a
strengthen the decentralization
performance-based system of fiscal transfers
process and delivery of basic
(ongoing).
services, especially to the
poorest and most vulnerable.
11.2 Expenditure assignment • In many cases institutional arrangements for DILG
• Key areas of formal responsibility service delivery need to be clarified and the
role of national government and its agencies
• Clarity of overall assignment reviewed (beyond 2004).
• Extent of unfunded mandates from national • Review imposition of unfunded mandates
government DBM, DILG,
(from the national government) on LGUs NEDA
• Key issues to be resolved • Develop a plan to transfer the implementation
of infrastructure services from DPWH to
Recommendations
of infrastructure services from DPWH to NEDA
qualified LGUs (2003).
11.3 Revenue assignment • Some LGUs have • Replicate establishment of accurate, taxpayer DOF
• Key local revenue sources established taxpayer registration databases including delinquent
databases (e.g., Bulacan). taxpayers (beyond 2004).
• Local authority to set tax rates
• Adequate training provided • Replicate setting up of accurate cadastral DOF
• Local administrative capacity for staffs and avoided use of information databases for property taxes
• Key issues to be resolved casual employees to collect (beyond 2004).
user fees.
• Review and reform procedures for detecting
• Amendment of the LGC has and managing non-filers, stop-filers and non- DOF
been submitted which will payers (2003–2004)
create a regional technical
valuation committee to • Improve audit process for business taxes. DOF
update the schedule of real There is a need to review confidentiality of
property values. ITR by BIR (2003–2004).
• Formulate an action plan to encourage
alternative payment schemes (2003–2004). DOF
• Continue to develop strategies for improving DILG, DOF

taxpayer services (beyond 2004)
• Eliminate/reduce tax exemptions: (2002) DOF
Review and rationalize/revoke DOF
circulars on tax exemption of
professionals.
11.4 Intergovernmental Transfers • DBM has clarified to LGUs • Issue implementing guidelines for the BIR, DOF
• Equalization: to what extent addressed in March 2002 the payment of EVAT shares of LGUs (2003).
methodology and
• Key issues to be resolved computation used for IRA • Continue to publish PDAF allocations each DBM–
releases, year in conspicuous places, community Regional
• IRA releases are not performance-based papers, LGU newspapers, LGU newsletters, Offices,
Schedule for IRA releases and • DBM has issued a circular DBM web site; furnish COA list of releases LGUs
computation used is not clear to LGUs on the project menu and (June 2002).
Unclear rules for allocation of Priority processes to guide the use DBM
of the PDAF, disseminated • DBM could issue a matrix to explain details
Development Assistance Funds (CDF)
widely through DBM-ROs of computation for 2002 IRA
No implementing guidelines for the
EVAT Law. No guidelines for the and publication in • Verify and clarify reports of discrepancies DBM
i f h G h i h l l/ i l
166
Recommendations
Philippines PEPFMR
computation of the LGU share in the local/regional newspapers. between DBM releases and amounts received
EVAT Law. by LGUs.
• Conduct a study on how to introduce a DBM, DILG,
performance-based system of fiscal transfers DOF, NEDA
(ongoing).
11.5 Local government borrowing • An LGU financing • Review and clarify IRA intercept provision in DBM, DILG,
• Regulatory framework framework was developed the LGC to enhance LGU creditworthiness NEDA
in 1996. Its implementation
• Mechanisms (e.g., direct borrowing, on- requires review and
lending from central authority) strengthening.
• LGU borrowing: trends, willingness, issues
11.6 Planning and budgeting at the LGU level: See Part B. • Review the national and local planning DILG, DBM,
policy, practice, issues processes to improve coordination on pro- NEDA
poor service delivery (beyond 2004).
• Accelerate strengthening of the capacity of DILG, NEDA
LGUs to formulate, appraise, and rank
development projects (beyond 2004).
11.7 Procurement in LGUs • LGU procurement is • The highest ranking career and permanent DBM
• Legal framework covered in the proposed official should chair the bid and award
Procurement Bill committees
• Policy and practices
• Make the implementation of the annual DILG/League
• Organization • The draft IRR for the Bill procurement plan by LGUs mandatory (30 of Cities
• Staffing includes the streamlining of June 2002).
procurement methods for DBM , DILG,
• Capacity issues LGUs (see also Part C) • Develop and implement training program on
procurement (see also Part C). CSC
11.8 Financial management in LGUs • Designate and strengthen • Strengthen BLGF by empowering it to be the DOF
• Legal framework BLGF as the focal agency main driver of local government finance
to enforce fiscal discipline (2002–2003).
• Policy and practices and restructure to play an
active role in LGU financial • Strengthen internal controls. BLGF, COA,
• Organization Form a subcommittee on LGU financial
management reform (2002– DBM, DILG,
• Staffing 2003). management under IAC on FM DOF
Development
• Capacity issues • Reengineering of BLGF Review and harmonize issuances on
i fi i l t
Recommendations
ongoing financial management.
Reconcile accounts/treatment accounts.
• The new local government Professionalize financial management
accounting system functions (to include capacity-building
(NLGAS) will require interventions) (ongoing).
submission of standard
financial statements starting
2002 (year-end). • Design a financial management improvement COA, DBM,
• In 2001, BLGF piloted a program to build capacity, focusing on LGAS DILG
new fiscal and financial implementation (2003–2004).
reporting format. The new • Issue circular requiring prospective treasurers
report, called the Statement to undergo competency examinations. DOF
of Income and Expenditures
or SIE replaced the old • Issue circular requiring municipal treasurers DOF
format of reporting. The to enforce bond requirement for barangay
Budget Operations officials and enforcing sanctions for violation.
Statement (BOS) reports the • Develop long term financial management
fiscal operations of the BLGF, COA,
improvement project including strengthening
LGUs on a yearly basis— DILG, LGA
of poor LGUs.
the report was cumbersome,
bulky and covered several • Develop an incentive system for well- BLGF, COA,
pages. The SIE is user performing LGUs. DBM, DILG,
friendly, and is reported on NEDA,
a quarterly basis. The
summary of the fiscal
operations of local
governments is contained in
one page but there are
schedules attached to the
summary sheet that show
more details. DBM has
agreed to use the SIE
instead of coming up with
their own reporting format.
Thus, a single source of
data on LGU fiscal and
financial operations will be
available. BLGF
168
Recommendations
Philippines PEPFMR
consolidates the data
quarterly by provinces,
cities, and municipalities.
• BLGF also developed 14
fiscal performance
indicators. In 2002, BLGF
piloted these indicators after
revising the fiscal reporting
format. With these
indicators, BLGF will be
able to see how LGUs are
performing in local resource
mobilization, and
expenditure management.
LGUS will be ranked on the
basis of their fiscal
performance.
• The next step is to develop
an incentive system for the
good-performing LGUs.
11.9 Human resources: management, • Improve management and The decentralization study proposes to develop
development, accountability and incentives career development of tax recommendations for the following
• Official data on LGU-level employment assessors and treasurers • Review LGU compliance with cap on COA, DBM,
understates the real situation. (ongoing). “personal service” expenditures as percentage DILG, DOF
of total resources in light of employment of
• Current high levels of employment in LGUs • Examine how to scale up and expenditures on casual, contractual, and
may not be compatible with competitive pilots on governance and other non-permanent workers
salaries and affordable size of the public service delivery
service at the LGU level. performance indicators and • Review levels and structure of remuneration, CSC, DBM,
management (ongoing). which vary enormously across LGUs DILG
• Most LGU expenditures seem to be on (including unofficial allowances, benefits, and
personnel. Hiring of casual, contractual and • Develop LGU “hall of perks for LGU officials).
project-related workers (not reflected in fame” to enable recognition
official data) is pervasive, resulting in for outstanding performance • Review LGU practice of providing salary
or outcomes (ongoing). supplements for functions and positions CSC,COA,
Diminution of resources available for DBM DILG,
whose personnel costs are supposed to be
MOOE and investment • Pilot-test Customer funded entirely by the national government
Feedback Survey in 21 sites
Recommendations
Avoidance of the legal cap on the extent of to achieve the following • Improve the quality of statistical data. BLGF, DBM,
personnel expenditures (ongoing). DILG,
Avoidance of transparent hiring procedures Harmonize forms, reporting formats, NEDA,
Increase citizens’ access classification system (ongoing).
Facilitation of patronage and other NSCB, NSO,
to information. Develop integrated database template to
undesirable practices other national
Develop two-way rationalize programs/system on information
• LGU-level remuneration varies enormously government
feedback with citizens. supply.
across levels and tiers of LGUs. While agencies
Involve citizens and Reduce the number of regulatory report
personal services expenditures are high,
agencies in setting requirements.
official salaries are low and the
compensation system is characterized by standards.
nontransparent official and unofficial • Build awareness of constituency on how to BLGF, DILG,
allowances, add-ons, perks, and benefits. access information using regional offices, NEDA
media, and community papers (starting 2002).
• Career prospects and professional
development of key categories of LGU staff
require review and modernization.
• Most LGU personnel are hired by the local
chief executive: accountability tends to be to
the person and not to the law, adversely
affecting the quality, efficiency, and equity
of resource use and service delivery.
11.10 Monitoring and Evaluation • Oversight agencies • Strengthen national government’s ability to DOF (BLGF)
• Capacity coordinated and monitor financial performance of LGUs.
synchronized plans/actions
• Regular fiscal reporting by using the MDFO as • Increase awareness and consultations with COA, NEDA,
lever (ongoing). Congress on executive initiatives: put in place DBM,
mechanisms to improve and institutionalize DILG,DOF,
• Developed a coordinated dialogue among LGUs, NGAs, and Congress
performance evaluation (e.g. preparation of national plan) (ongoing).
system (ongoing).
• BLGF is piloting
introduction of 14
performance indicators to
monitor LGU performance
11.11 Capacity-building at the LGU level • Numerous initiatives— • Develop framework, systems and institutions DILG, BLGF,
locally as well as externally to rationalize delivery and content of training DBM, COA,
financed—have been programs (2002–2003). CSC
170
Recommendations
Philippines PEPFMR
undertaken and are ongoing programs (2002–2003).
to strengthen LGU capacity.
Assess existing capacity level of LGUs
in the conduct of capacity buildings
• Facilitate exchange of good practice between BLGF, DILG
LGUs, NG, and international experience by
documenting and propagating information on
good practices (ongoing).
• Strengthen partnership implementation (on- BLGF,DILG,
going). DBM, DOF,
NEDA
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DETAILED ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND LIST OF WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS

Detailed Acknowledgements
As stated before, this Public Expenditure, Procurement and Financial Management Review
(PEPFMR) has been jointly prepared by a team comprising counterparts from the Government of
the Philippines (GOP) and staff of the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
While it is impossible to thank everyone from the Philippines Government and LGUs who
contributed, we would like to acknowledge and thank all GOP and LGU interlocutors who so
generously gave of their time, insights and patience.
From the GOP side, a Steering Committee comprising Secretary Emilia T. Boncodin (DBM—
Chair), Secretary Jose Lina (DILG) and Chairman Guillermo Carague (COA) oversaw the
PEPFMR work. Three GOP technical working groups worked intensively with the World Bank-
ADB task team. The principal interlocutor on the PEPFMR was Undersecretary Laura B. Pascua
(DBM), who also chaired the GOP Public Expenditure Working Group, comprising Deputy
Director General Gilbert Llanto (Vice Chair—NEDA), Assistant Secretary Austere Panadero
(DILG), Director Gisela Lopez (DBM), Director Joey Virtucio (NEDA), and Director Lyn
Capones (NEDA). Resource persons included Assistant Secretary Lourdes de Vera (DepEd),
Director Mario Villaverde (DOH), Director Agnes Miranda (DA), Director Tomas A. Cabuenos,
Jr. (DAR), Assistant Secretary Luicille Ortille (HUDCC), and Director Didith Tan (DOF). The
Financial Management Working Group was chaired by Commissioner Emmanuel Dalman (COA)
and comprised Assistant Secretary Evelyn Guerrero (Vice Chair), Deputy Treasurer Nina
Figueroa (BTR), Director Rolando Tungpalan (NEDA) and Assistant Secretary/Director, LGU
Supervision (DILG). The resource persons comprised Undersecretary Ernesto Pangan (DepEd);
Assistant Secretary/Director, Finance (DA); Assistant Secretary/Director, Finance (DOH);
Director Edilberto R. Ramirez (HUDCC); and Director Emily Tanquintic (DPWH). The
Procurement Working Group was chaired by Undersecretary Teodoro Encarnacion (DPWH) and
comprised Director Estanislao Granados (Vice Chair), Director Arcadio Cuenco (COA), Director
Normando Toledo (DILG), Director Ruben Reinoso (NEDA), and Mr. Cipriano Ravanes
(NEDA). The resource persons were Ms. Edna Formilleza (DepEd); Director Carol Herradura
(DOH), Director, Procurement (DA); Director Zacarias A. Abanes (HUDCC); Director Burt B.
Favorito (DPWH); Project Manager Antonio Molano (DPWH); and Atty. Edilu P. Hayag
(DOTC). All three GOP working groups contributed substantially to the analytics and
recommendations, for which the PEPFMR team expresses its grateful thanks. The team would
also like to express its thanks to Undersecretary Juanita Amatong (DOF) who was unstinting in
her assistance and advice throughout the process.
The overall World Bank-ADB PEPFMR task team comprised three integrated teams: (i) the
procurement team— omprising Mmes./Messrs. Christian A. Rey (TTL for the CPAR), Cecilia
Vales (coordinator), Federico Gimenez (consultant), Sofronio Ursal (consultant), Jaime Galvez-
Tan (consultant), Omar Costibolo (consultant), Benjamin Albarece (consultant), Norman
Cabangal (consultant) and Hiroki Kobayashi (ADB); (ii) the financial management team,
comprising Mmes./Messrs. Wijaya Wickrema (TTL for the CFAA), Joseph G. Reyes (Financial
Management Specialist), and Preethi Wijeratne (consultant); and (iii) the public expenditure
team, comprising Mmes./Messrs. Joven Balbosa (Economist, World Bank), Joseph Capuno
(consultant), Tarun Das (consultant), Malcolm Green (consultant), Chris Jones (consultant),
Xuelin Liu (Country Economist for the Philippines, ADB), Hazel Malapit (consultant), Rosario
Manasan (consultant), Edward Mountfield (Economist, World Bank), Amitabha Mukherjee
(TTL, public expenditure element and coordinator for the PEPFMR), Miguel Navarro-Martin
(Senior Financial Sector Specialist, World Bank), Merwin Salazar (consultant), Robert Taliercio
(Economist, World Bank), Cesar Umali (consultant), Laura Walker (Governance Specialist,
ADB), and Elizabeth White (World Bank). Administrative and logistical support to the three
teams has been ably provided by Mmes. Gloria Elmore, Abigail Llamas, Laura A. Mitchell,
Evelyn Quirante, Neena Shrestha, and Araceli Tria (World Bank) and Marlene Albutra and
Cynthia Reyes (ADB).
The team has received overall guidance from Messrs./Mmes. Homi Kharas (EASPR Sector
Director and Chief Economist, World Bank East Asia and Pacific Region), Robert Vance Pulley
(World Bank Country Director for the Philippines), Thomas Crouch (ADB Country Director for
the Philippines), Gunther Hecker (former ADB Country Director for the Philippines), Ronald
Points (Regional Financial Management Adviser), Denis Robitaille (Regional Procurement
Adviser), Barbara Nunberg (Sector Manager), Sanjay Dhar and Lloyd McKay (Lead
Economists), Sudarshan Gooptu and Sergei Shatalov (Senior Economists). The three World Bank
sector boards—Public Sector and Governance, Procurement and Financial Management—have
provided guidance on the integration process. The team would like to express its special thanks to
Ms. Cheryl Gray (then Director, Public Sector and Governance Board), Mr. Sanjay Pradhan
(Director, Public Sector and Governance Board), Mr. Armando Araujo (Head, Procurement
Board), Mr. Paul Bermingham (Head, Financial Management Board), Mr. Richard Allen (PEFA
Program, Public Sector and Governance Board), and Mr. Laszlo Lovei (Economic Adviser,
OPCVP) for their support. Messrs./Mmes. Richard Anson, Jayshree Balachander, Heidi
Hennrich-Hanson, Susan Hume, Carolina Figueroa-Geron, Teresa Ho, Vijay Jagannathan, Asad
Maken, Tariq Niazi, Rajshree Paralkar and Rahul Raturi provided thoughtful insights and
comments.
The peer reviewers were Mmes./Messrs. Jose Edgardo Campos (then Senior Strategy Adviser for
Public Sector Reform, DBM, GOP), Nigel Chalk (IMF), Bert Hofman (Lead Economist, EASPR,
World Bank), Anand Rajaram (Senior Economist, PRMPS, World Bank), David Shand (Financial
Management Adviser, OPCFM, World Bank), P.K. Subramanian (Senior Financial Management
Specialist, SARFM, World Bank), and Dana Weist (Senior Public Sector Specialist, PRMPS,
World Bank). ADB reviewers included Mmes./Messrs. Wendy Duncan, Cecile Gregory, and Clay
Wescott. The team has benefited from their thoughtful insights, suggestions, and guidance on
content, process, and integration.
The team would also like to express its gratitude to GOP counterparts for coordinating field visits
to LGUs and for the participation of their regional and local representatives, and to the officials,
elected and appointed, of the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays visited.
List of Workshop Participants
A consultation workshop was held on 24–25 January 2002, to test and validate PEPFMR
emerging messages. The team would like to thank all participants, whose names are listed below.
PEPFMR Preparation Workshop: 24–25 January 2002
List of Participants: 24 January 2002
A. Participants from National Government Agencies
Department of Agriculture
1. Ms. Lerma Abesamis, Division Chief, Public Investment Program Division, Planning Service
2. Ms. Nieva Natural, Senior Staff, Program Monitoring and Evaluation Division, Planning
Service
Department of Agrarian Reform

3. Ms. Clemencia Padrinao, Project Development Officer, Project Development and
Management Staff/Foreign-Assisted Projects Office
Department of Budget and Management

4. Mr. Jose Edgardo Campos, Senior Strategy Adviser for Public Sector Reform
5. Ms. Cynthia G. Castel, Undersecretary
6. Ms. Amelita Castillo, Director, Organization and Productivity Improvement Bureau
7. Ms. Carmencita N. Delantar, Director, Regional Operations and Coordination Service
8. Ms. Gisela Lopez, Director-OIC, Physical Planning Bureau
9. Ms. Laura Pascua, Undersecretary
10. Ms. Solita S. Recolizado, Director, Organization, Position Classification and Compensation
Bureau
Department of Education
11. Ms. Edna Formilleza, Bids and Awards Committee Coordinator
Department of Finance
12. Ms. Juanita Amatong, Undersecretary, International Finance Group
13. Mr. Gil Beltran, Assistant Secretary, Domestic Finance Group
14. Mr. Benjamin Geronimo, Director, Bureau of Local Government Finance
15. Mr. Norberto Malvar, Division Chief, Bureau of Local Government Finance
16. Ms. Salve Rios, Chief, Budget Division, Bureau of Treasury
Department of Health
17. Ms. Carol Herradura, Director, Procurement Logistics Service
18. Mr. Mario Villaverde, Director, Health Policy, Development and Planning Bureau
Department of Internal and Local Government

19. Mr. Rolando Acosta, Director, Bureau of Local Government Supervision
20. Mr. Austere Panadero, Assistant Secretary for Administration and Human Resources
Development
21. Ms. Ellen Pascua, Project Manager, Water Suppy and Sanitation Project
Commission on Audit
22. Ms. Divinia Alagon, State Auditor, Local Government Audit Office
23. Mr. Emmanuel Dalman, Commissioner
24. Ms. Estela dela Paz, Director, Corporate Audit Office
Civil Service Commission

25. Ms. Celia Bernardo, Director, Technical Cooperation and International Relations Service
Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council

26. Ms. Rowena Dineros, Project Evaluation Officer
National Economic and Development Authority

27. Ms. Rowena Cham, Chief Economic Development Specialist, Investment Planning Division,
Public Investment Staff
28. Mr. Elmer Dorado, Supervising Economic Development Specialist

29. Mr. Gilbert Llanto, Deputy Director-General
30. Ms. Aleli Rosario, Supervising Economic Development Specialist
31. Mr. Rolando Tungpalan, Assistant Director-General, Investment Programming
32. Mr. Joey Virtucio, Director, Agriculture Staff
B. Participants From Local Government Units
1. Hon. Rodolfo Agbayani, Governor, Province of Nueva Vizcaya

2. Atty. Honorio Alumno, Head, Research and Information, League of Municipalities
3. Hon. Estelita Aquino, Assistant Treasurer, League of Municipalities
4. Mr. Serafin Blanco, City Administrator, City of Mandaue, Cebu
5. Mr. Danny Buenviaje, Staff, Office of the Mayor, City of Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija
6. Ms. Anita Carbon, Clerk, Office of the Mayor, City of Valencia, Bukidnon
7. Mr. Jose de Leon, Jr., City Administrator, City of San Fernando, Pampanga
8. Ms. Edith de Luzuriaga, Staff, Office of the Mayor, City of Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija
9. Hon. Elpidio B. Dulay, Governor, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya
10. Mr. Rodenio Eduave, Program Manager, League of Barangays
11. Hon. Loreli Fajardo, Treasurer, League of Cities
12. Hon. Jose M. Galario, Jr., Mayor, City of Valencia, Bukidnon
13. Mr. Alfredo Guzman, City Engineer, City of Valencia, Bukidnon
14. Mr. Eugene Mintu, Staff, Office of the Mayor, City of Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija
15. Hon. Thadeo Z. Ouano, Mayor, City of Mandaue, Cebu
16. Hon. Roberto Pagdanganan, Foundation for Local Autonomy and Good Governance
17. Ms. Junaida Prantilla, City Planning Officer, City of Valencia, Bukidnon
18. Mr. Calvin Sadiua, Executive Director, League of Barangays
19. Mr. Rommel Sanson, Barangay Captain, Barangay Taculing, Bacolod City
20. Atty. Edwin Salvilla, City Administrator, City of Tagum, Davao del Norte
21. Hon. Luzviminda Valdez, Mayor, City of Bacolod, Negros Occidental
22. Hon. Julius Cesar Vergara, Mayor, City of Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija
C. Other Participants
Asian Development Bank

1. Ms. Xuelin Liu, Country Economist, Philippines Country Office
2. Ms. Laura Walker, Governance Specialist, Southeast Asia Department
GTZ
3. Mr. Herwig Mayer, GTZ Project Advisor, NEDA Institutional Strengthening Project
Procurement Watch, Inc.

4. Mr. Jun Ravanes, Executive Director
5. Mr. Jose Luis Syquia, Program Director
World Bank
6. Mr. Benjamin Albarece, Consultant
7. Mr. Joven Balbosa, Economist
8. Ms. Maribel Belizario, Operations Officer
9. Mr. Norman Cabangal, Consultant
10. Mr. Joseph Capuno, Consultant
11. Mr. Malcolm Green, Consultant

12. Ms. Hazel Jean L. Malapit, Consultant
13. Ms. Rosario G. Manasan, Consultant
14. Mr. Amitabha Mukherjee, Senior Public Sector Management Specialist
15. Mr. Christian Rey, Manager
16. Mr. Joseph Reyes, Operations Officer
17. Mr. Merwin H. Salazar, Consultant
18. Mr. Robert R. Taliercio, Economist
19. Mr. Sofronio B. Ursal, Consultant
20. Ms. Elizabeth White, Consultant
21. Mr. Wijaya Wickrema, Senior Financial Management Specialist
USAID Project Gold

22. Mr. Robert Wuertz
List of Participants: 25 January 2002

A. Participants From National Government Agencies
Department of Agriculture
1. Ms. Lerma Abesamis, Division Chief, Public Investment Program Division, Planning Service
2. Ms. Nieva Natural, Senior Staff, Program Monitoring and Evaluation Division, Planning
Service
Department of Agrarian Reform

3. Ms. Clemencia Padrinao, Project Development Officer, Project Development and
Management Staff/Foreign-Assisted Projects Office
Department of Budget and Management

4. Mr. Jose Edgardo Campos, Senior Strategy Adviser for Public Sector Reform
5. Ms. Cynthia G. Castel, Undersecretary
6. Ms. Amelita Castillo, Director, Organization and Productivity Improvement Bureau
7. Mr. Estanislao Granados, Director
8. Ms. Evelyn Guerrero, Assistant Secretary
9. Ms. Gisela Lopez, Director-OIC, Physical Planning Bureau
10. Ms. Laura Pascua, Undersecretary
11. Ms. Solita S. Recolizado, Director, Organization, Position Classification and Compensation
Bureau
Department of Education
12. Ms. Lourdes de Vera, Assistant Secretary
13. Ms. Edna Formilleza, Bids and Awards Committee Coordinator
14. Mr. Armando Ruiz, OIC, Budget Division
Department of Finance
15. Ms. Juanita Amatong, Undersecretary, International Finance Group
16. Mr. Ed Mendiola, Deputy Treasurer, Operations Subsector, Bureau of Treasury
17. Ms. Nieves Osorio, Undersecretary, Corporate Affairs Group
18. Ms. Salve Rios, Chief, Bureau Budget Division, Bureau of Treasury
Department of Health
19. Ms. Carol Herradura, Director, Procurement Logistics Service
20. Mr. Mario Villaverde, Director, Health Policy, Development and Planning Bureau
Department of Internal and Local Government

21. Ms. Ellen Pascua, Project Manager, Water Supply and Sanitation Project
Department of Public Works and Highways

22. Mr. Jun Molano, OIC-Assistant Director, Bureau of Research and Standards
Commission on Audit
23. Mr. Arcadio Cuenco, Director, Information Technology
23. Mr. Emmanuel Dalman, Commissioner
24. Ms. Estela dela Paz, Director, Corporate Audit Office
25. Ms. Emma Espina, Assistant Commissioner
Civil Service Commission

26. Ms. Celia Bernardo, Director, Technical Cooperation and International Relations Service
27. Ms. Maryann Fernandez, Assistant Commissioner
28. Mr. Fernando M. Porio, Chief Personnel Specialist, Office of the Assistant Commissioner
Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council

29. Ms. Rowena Dineros, Project Evaluation Officer
30. Ms. Emmy Molo, Computer Operator, Policy Formulation and Review Group
National Economic and Development Authority

31. Ms. Rowena Cham, Chief Economic Development Specialist, Investment Planning Division,
Public Investment Staff
32. Mr. Elmer Dorado, Supervising Economic Development Specialist
33. Ms. Aleli Rosario, Supervising Economic Development Specialist
34. Mr. Rolando Tungpalan, Assistant Director-General, National Development Office,
Investment Programming
35.Mr. Joey Virtucio, Director, Agriculture Staff
B. Participants From Local Government Units
1. Atty. Honorio Alumno, Head, Research and Information, League of Municipalities

2. Hon. Estelita Aquino, Assistant Treasurer, League of Municipalities
3. Mr. Serafin Blanco, City Administrator, City of Mandaue, Cebu
4. Ms. Anita Carbon, Clerk, Office of the Mayor, City of Valencia, Bukidnon
5. Mr. Jose de Leon, Jr., City Administrator, City of San Fernando, Pampanga
6. Hon. Elpidio B. Dulay, Governor, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya
7. Hon. Loreli Fajardo, Treasurer, League of Cities
8. Hon. Jose M. Galario, Jr., Mayor, City of Valencia, Bukidnon
9. Mr. Alfredo Guzman, City Engineer, City of Valencia, Bukidnon
10. Hon. Leonides Theresa B. Plaza, Mayor, City of Butuan, Agusan del Norte
11. Ms. Junaida Prantilla, City Planning Officer, City of Valencia, Bukidnon
12. Ms. Lorraine Reginalde, Staff, Office of the Governor, Municipality of Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya
13. Atty. Edwin Salvilla, City Administrator, City of Tagum, Davao del Norte
C. Other Participants
Asian Development Bank

1. Ms. Xuelin Liu, Country Economist, Philippines Country Office
2. Ms. Laura Walker, Governance Specialist, Southeast Asia Regional Department
GTZ
3. Mr. Herwig Mayer, GTZ Project Advisor, NEDA Institutional Strengthening Project
Procurement Watch, Inc.

4. Mr. Jun Ravanes, Executive Director
5. Mr. Jose Luis Syquia, Program Director
World Bank
6. Mr. Benjamin Albarece, Consultant
7. Ms. Maribel Belizario, Operations Officer
8. Mr. Norman Cabangal, Consultant
9. Mr. Joseph Capuno, Consultant
10. Mr. Jaime Galvez-Tan, Consultant
11. Mr. Malcolm Green, Consultant
12. Ms. Hazel Jean Malapit, Consultant
13. Ms. Rosario G. Manasan, Consultant
14. Mr. Amitabha Mukherjee, Senior Public Sector Management Specialist
15. Mr. Christian Rey, Manager
16. Mr. Joseph Reyes, Operations Officer
17. Mr. Merwin H. Salazar, Consultant
18. Mr. Robert R. Taliercio, Economist
19. Mr. Sofronio B. Ursal, Consultant
20. Ms. Cecilia Vales, Senior Operations Officer
21. Ms. Elizabeth White, Consultant
22. Mr. Wijaya Wickrema, Senior Financial Management Specialist
Amitabha Mukherjee
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1
E.g., preventive care expenditures as a percentage of the DOH budget have fallen from 36 to 26% during
1996–2001.
2
E.g., national government initiatives on public housing do not seem to be matched by LGUs, which cite
cumbersome and tortuous processes, lack of access of the poor to credit for down payments, and lack of
availability of suitable acquired land as impediments to speedy implementation of shelter programs for
the poor despite strong Presidential support for fast-tracking housing assistance implementation.
3
The Commission on Audit, the Department of Budget and Management, the Department of Finance, and
the National Economic and Development Authority comprise the oversight agencies.
4
Strengthening Public Finance and Planning of Local Government Units, TA 3145-PHI, ADB, April
2000.
5
Chapter 11 provides an overview of key LGU issues.
6
The 14 GOCCs comprise the Export Processing Zone Authority (later renamed Philippine Economic
Zone Authority), Local Water Utilities Administration, Light Rail Transit Authority, Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System, National Development Company, National Electrification
Administration, National Food Authority, National Housing Authority, National Irrigation
Administration, National Power Corporation, Philippine National Oil Company, Philippine National
Railways, Philippine Ports Authority, and MMTC. In 1994, MMTC was privatized. Effective 2000, the
Home Guaranty Corporation was considered a monitored GOCC.
7
The Power Sector Reform Act of 2001 was approved in June 2001.
8
The EPIR is the centerpiece for restructuring the power industry.
9
ADB and World Bank staff feel that the key question is the extent of legislative support for the
TRANSCO bill.
10
The rates for taxes on net income were 32% for corporate income tax and personal income tax. For VAT,
it was 10% on gross sales and for withholding income, 10% of net income. Taxes on net income were
classified as company taxes and individual taxes and others.
11
Issues and actions taken on revenue forecasting have been discussed in Chapter 5.
12
The tax effort in other ASEAN countries has also declined. In 2000, the tax effort in Malaysia, Thailand,
and Indonesia was recorded at 14.3%, 14.3% and 15.2% of GNP, respectively.
13
This draws on (i) extensive analytical work by Mr. Romeo Bernardo and Ms. Marie-Christine G. Tang;
(ii) a USAID-funded study on contingent liabilities, and (iii) a World Bank-funded consultant study by
Mr. Tarun Das.
14
Current regulations allow the GSIS to invest abroad but it has apparently been “advised” against
proceeding in this direction, and hence cannot effectively do so.
15
Past due contributions from the Government to GSIS reportedly exceed PhP14 billion to date (including
past due interest).
16
These data on the Philippines do not include expenditures at the LGU level. For example, including LGU
capital expenditures would raise the overall national share.
17
Over 60% of students in public elementary schools belong to poor households despite the fact that only 40 %
of households are considered poor because a disproportionate number of the children from nonpoor
households tend to go to private schools.
18
The income-to-expenditure ratio rises to 10% if income is reckoned inclusive of their income from business
enterprise.
19
The ratio for the Philippines is from Maglen and Manasan (1999) while the ratio for the average Asian country
is from Lewin (1997).
20
These items are expressed in 2000 prices.
21
DOH notes that these are in fact published, but that there is a 5-year lag (i.e., the latest available report in 2002
is that for 1997).
22
Delays in compilation of mortality statistics is due to the fact that registration of births and deaths is done at
the LGU level.
23
Chapter 5 discusses this in more detail.
24
World Bank staff estimates.
25
All data comparing FY2000 NEP with GAA are from “FY2000 General Appropriations Act: Analysis of
Budget Cuts/Additions Made by Congress and the Nature of the Cuts/Additions,” NEDA, n.d., ms.
26
According to one congressional source, this practice has been discontinued recently.
27
See Chapter 5 for a discussion on sector effectiveness and efficiency reviews.
28
This should cover conservation and management of natural resources, since they would be essential for
sustainable agricultural growth.
29
ADB has supported a Grains Sector Reform Program to help private sector participation.
30
The Government feels that this approach should be cautiously pursued and proposed measures evaluated from
the fiscal, efficiency, and welfare angles, and that the appropriate level of government to administer such
measures should also be carefully determined. The Government also feels that the proposed use of foreign
funds for agrarian reform should be carefully assessed given prevailing low recoupment rates from ARBs.
31
E.g., several agencies are involved in construction of farm-to-market roads.
32
These issues are discussed more fully in Chapter 10.
33
Most SUCs are legislated into being by congresspersons to demonstrate support for local and provincial
initiatives; the process effectively sidesteps contestable resource allocation processes.
34
Meanwhile, an independent initiative spearheaded by Senator John Osmena has mandated CHED to study the
possible restructuring of SUCs and other areas of rationalization.
35
Chapter 7 deals with procurement reforms, including in the education sector.
36
See chapters 5 and 6. DOH has requested WHO for assistance with performance assessment of LGU health
care services.
37
See chapters 5 and 6.
38
Regional and provincial-level officers of national line agencies are unavoidably beholden to the congressmen
of their districts. This relationship makes the implementing agencies quite vulnerable to interventions from
legislators. To protect local projects and local staff from possible after-effects of tightened CI processes, it
would be desirable to introduce a system of project monitoring by beneficiary communities as early as
possible.
39
The DBCC is composed of the Executive Secretary, the Director General of the NEDA Secretariat, and
the secretaries of Finance and Budget and Management.
40
Executive Order 292, Title II, Subtitle C, Chapter 2.
41
“Health Sector Reform Agenda: Philippines, 1999–2004,” DOH, December 1999.
42
DILG also has responsibilities for local planning.
43
National Budget Memorandum (NBM), No. 88, February 1999.
44
NBM, No. 91, April 2000. The baseline budget approach was continued for the FY2002 budget cycle
(NBM, No. 93).
45
NBM, No. 95, March 2002.
46
NBM, No. 91, April 2000.
47
Based on comparison of baselines issued in April 2000 (NBM 91) with 2001 budget allocations
(adjusted, from BESF FY2002).
48
NEDA is supported by GTZ’s Institutional Strengthening Project, which has played an important role in
the SEER process.
49
“A Manual on Public Expenditure Management in the Philippines,” Revised Draft, 13 December 2000.
50
Presidential Decree 1177, 1977 “Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary
Innovations of the New Society.”
51
Over the years as the resource backup for continuing appropriations for major programs such as the
public works and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program were depleted, the General
Appropriations Act or the GAA has become the major comprehensive appropriations law, incorporating
even the budget of the three major government power corporations.
52
Because of this, many public elementary schools are dependent on the LGUs’ SEF for their MOOE.
53
National Budget Memorandum No. 93, Budget Preparation Form #206.
54
“Enhancing Transparency, Accountability in Government: Institutionalization of an Efficient, Effective
Dynamic legislative Oversight System in Congress,” a concept paper of the Committee on Oversight,
January 2002.
55
“Pork and Other Perks: Corruption and Governance in the Philippines”, PCIJ 1998.
56
The procurement element of the PEPFMR is also available as background material.
57
Presentation by Dr. Jose Campos Jr., in Procurement Watch Inc. Press Briefing, 5 October 2001.
58
Textbook Procurement, A Philippine Experience by Mr. Noel Sta. Ines, 23 March 2001.
59
The Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) will shortly be completing its IRR with the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created under the law.
60
EO 359 creating the Procurement Policy Board under DBM for procurement of goods does not have the
mandate of a law enacted by Congress. EO 230 creating the Infrastructure Committee under the NEDA
Board to oversee procurement of works and consultancy services was issued in 1987.
61
Chapter 10 looks at financial management in foreign-assisted projects, while Chapter 11 outlines key
financial management issues pertaining to LGUs. The full text of the Country Financial Accountability
Assessment (CFAA) is also available as background material. This report does not cover private sector
financial accountability: a separate analysis of the private sector was undertaken for a recent Report on
the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC).
62
Judicial interpretations have also perpetuated the discretionary nature of the power of appointment by
defining appointment as a “political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the
appointing authority can decide.”
63
In this context, expenditures on school supervision refer to those made in support of the operations of the
DepEd division and district offices.
64
The ratio for the Philippines is from Maglen and Manasan (1999) while that for the average Asian
country is from Lewin (1997).
65
For elementary-level teachers, station is defined with reference to the division. For secondary-level
teachers, however, station is defined with reference to the school itself.
66
The scope for doing this at the elementary level appears to be large since there are a significant number
of teachers who are about to retire in the next 5 years.
67
In this regard, the study suggests the need for the installation of more flexible, less complex procedures
for the transfer of existing plantilla positions from one secondary school to another.
68
Manasan, Rosario G. (1999) “Impact of Local Government Code and Proposed Amendments on Ability
to Finance Infrastructure: Towards a Framework for LGU Finance,” mimeo.
69
E.g., assignment of services and expenditures; administrative and budgetary deconcentration, delegation
and devolution; coordination of local service delivery regionally and nationally.
70
E.g., transparency and accountability; user groups and community-driven development.
71
A World Bank-funded PEPFMR Preparation Workshop was held in Manila on 24–25 January 2002.
Participants included members of the GOP Working Groups, the World Bank-ADB task team and LGU
representatives. The objective was to confirm, validate and modify key messages emerging from the
exercise, and to more closely consolidate the three interconnected strands into a single integrated process
and report. In addition, the GOP also organized another workshop in April 2002 with participants from
the central oversight bodies and line departments to review the emerging findings and messages.
72
Consisting of the revenues and expenditures of the national government (NG), the Central Bank
Restructuring Fund, GOCCs, GFIs, SSLs ,and LGUs.

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Report No.

A Public Expenditure, Procurement, and

Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit Philippines Country Office

Currency Unit – Philippine peso (PhP)

Exchange Rate (as of 30 April 2003): PhP52.8

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

The metric system is used throughout the report.

World Bank Asian Development Bank

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

DILG Department of Interior and Local Government

LFP locally-funded projects

PPB Procurement Policy Board

9. CONTROLLING THE WAGE BILL ................................................................................. 100

7. Reversing the decline in public revenue

16 in tax revenue in real terms vis-à-vis 2001

compliance rates have continued to fall since

1997 (except for corporate income tax).

60.00 23. The decreases in the share of expenditures

National Government Agencies 65.1 56 49.7 43 57.3 42

Philippines: Public Expenditure, Procurement, and Financial Management Review

A. Aggregate Fiscal Discipline

Reforming GSIS: DOF, GSIS

1. Overview: The Institutional and Fiscal Context

1. OVERVIEW: THE INSTITUTIONAL AND FISCAL CONTEXT

Figure 1.1. Functions of the State

Source: Adopted from World Development Report, 1997.

1.5 The judiciary has already similarly initiated an institutional reform

Casual/ Casual/ Casual/

1.10 Review of the Full Structure of General Government Expenditures.

Table 1.2 Consolidated Public Sector Deficit and Surplus

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Table 1.3 Fiscal Aggregates 1992–2001

1992–1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Figure 1.3 Operation and Maintenance Expenditures

Table 1.4 Budgetary Inflexibilities Due To Mandated Expenditures: 1990-2001

Table 1.5 Capital Outlays 1996-2001

1.23 Government-Owned and -Controlled Corporations. GOCCs were

privatizing the electric supply is expected to encourage greater competition and

1.31 To reverse the steadily diminishing flexibility that threatens to

2. EXPENDITURES AND REVENUES: TRENDS AND ISSUES

2.4 NG expenditures are distributed by the following major components:

Figure 2.1 Fiscal Performance

Deficit Expenditure Tax Revenue

Source: Department of Budget and Management.

Figure 2. Selected Taxes to GNP Ratio

3.00 achievement of the

have exhibited the largest reductions. In particular, collection of import duties

2.19 The Government’s announcement of comprehensive reforms to the tax

VAT audit system, a voluntary assessment and abatement program, new

25% 1997 1998 1999 2000

Source: Department of Finance.

3. OFF-BUDGET RISKS AND THEIR MANAGEMENT13

3.3 Based on an inventory of contingent liabilities, DOF is now estimating

exchange reserves template introduced by IMF under the Statistical

Box 3.1 Legal Ceilings on Government Debt and Contingent Liabilities

(i) Completing the quantification of contingent liabilities and conduct of

(iii) Strengthening internal audit arrangements in GOCCs. Strengthening

SECTION B. ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY

4. Allocative Efficiency: Selected Issues