A Krafty Combination

February 3, 2010

Pershing Square Capital Management, L.P.

Disclaimer

The analyses and conclusions of Pershing Square Capital Management, L.P. ("Pershing Square") contained in
this presentation are based on publicly available information. Pershing Square recognizes that there may be
confidential information in the possession of the companies discussed in the presentation that could lead
these companies to disagree with Pershing Square’s conclusions. This presentation and the information
contained herein is not a recommendation or solicitation to buy or sell any securities.

The analyses provided may include certain statements, estimates and projections prepared with respect to,
among other things, the historical and anticipated operating performance of the companies, access to capital
markets and the values of assets and liabilities. Such statements, estimates, and projections reflect various
assumptions by Pershing Square concerning anticipated results that are inherently subject to significant
economic, competitive, and other uncertainties and contingencies and have been included solely for
illustrative purposes. No representations, express or implied, are made as to the accuracy or completeness of
such statements, estimates or projections or with respect to any other materials herein. Actual results may
vary materially from the estimates and projected results contained herein. Accordingly, no party should
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expressly disclaims liability on account of any party’s reliance on the information contained herein with
respect to any such purchases or sales.

Funds managed by Pershing Square and its affiliates have invested in the equity of Kraft Foods. Pershing
Square manages funds that are in the business of trading - buying and selling – securities and financial
instruments. It is possible that there will be developments in the future that cause Pershing Square to change
its position regarding the companies discussed in this presentation. Pershing Square may buy, sell, cover or
otherwise change the form of its investment regarding such companies for any reason. Pershing Square
hereby disclaims any duty to provide any updates or changes to the analyses contained here including,
without limitation, the manner or type of any Pershing Square investment.

1
Kraft Foods

f World’s 2nd largest food company

f Recently acquired Cadbury (closing pending) at an

Recent stock attractive price
price: $28
f We believe the transaction will be transformational
4% dividend   Significantly improves Kraft’s business quality and organic
yield
growth profile

PF Kraft
f Investment thesis
Market Cap:   Attractively priced business standalone…
~$49bn
  …with a transformative event, catalyzing margin
improvement and leading to earnings accretion and
multiple re-rating
  “Pro Forma Kraft/Cadbury” (or “PF Kraft”) currently
trades at under 10x 2012 EPS
Assumes GBP / USD=
1.60 throughout
presentation
2
Cadbury: Great Asset at a
Good Price
Cadbury is an Attractive Asset

One of the great businesses of the world

3 Confectionary is a resilient food category
3 Good pricing power, very limited private label threat
3 Attractive competitive “moat”
3 Strong long-term global growth
3 Iconic brands (Dentyne, Trident, Cadbury, Halls)

Cadbury is extremely well positioned in emerging markets

3 >40% of sales in fast growing emerging markets
3 Distribution in emerging markets is difficult to greenfield
3 As a 186-year-old UK company, Cadbury has greatly benefited from
UK’s colonial presence in parts of the emerging world
4
Cadbury is Currently Under-Earning

f Cadbury’s current EBIT margins are only ~13.5%

f Given the mix of categories (chocolate, gum and candy), we believe

appropriate EBIT margins for CBRY should be in the mid-to-high teens

f CBRY management has invested significantly in the company

  Increased marketing spend and built new R&D facilities
  New plants in low-cost labor countries (only now coming on line) which
should cut enormous waste out of the supply chain
  Developed technologies which have not yet benefited the entire global
portfolio (center-filled gum, candy-layered gum)
  Recently launched core brands in “white spaces” (i.e., Trident in the U.K.)

f These investments are currently pressuring Cadbury margins, but will lead
to margin improvement and strong organic growth

f Kraft should be the beneficiary of these investments, given the timing of its
hostile takeover
5
Kraft is Paying an Attractive Price for Cadbury

Based on the headline offer of 8.40 GBP, Kraft is paying 14x 2009E
EPS and under 12x 2011E EPS for Cadbury, inclusive of $675mm of
run-rate synergies (less than 7% of CBRY sales)

2009 2010e 2011e

Run-Rate Synergies ($675m)
EV / EBITDA 9.2 x 8.7 x 8.2 x
EV / EBIT 10.9 x 10.3 x 9.6 x
P/E 14.1 x 13.0 x 11.8 x

CBRY EBIT Margins go to 15%

Kraft is acquiring Cadbury while Cadbury is still under-earning and only

beginning to see its margins expand given recent investments in
infrastructure, R&D and product development

6
Kraft Standalone: Significant
Margin Opportunity
Kraft (Standalone)
United States: ~50% rev

Snacks (cookies, crackers)

Beverages (coffee, drinks)

Cheese

Grocery (mac & cheese,

dressing, desserts, condiments)

Meals (cold cuts, lunchables)

Canada(1): ~10% Rev

Europe: ~20% Rev

Developing Markets: ~20%

1) Includes N.A. Foodservice revenues 8

Kraft Standalone: More Attractive Than Perceived

f ~40% of portfolio is Snacks

(cookies, crackers, chocolate)

f More than 80% of portfolio is from

#1 share positions Grocery,
10.0%
  Strong scale in US

f ~40% of revenue outside North Meals, 15.0% Snacks, 38.0%

America
(Cookies,
Cheese, 18.0% crackers,
f More than 50% from categories chocolate)
where its marketplace position is Beverages,
20.0%
twice the size of nearest competitor

f Strong DSD distribution capabilities

creates a significant competitive
advantage versus other U.S. food Note: Includes the N.A. Frozen Pizza
companies business which was sold to Nestle
9
Kraft: Turnaround Opportunity

f Yes, Kraft has been a turnaround story for years…

  In 2004 KFT started a major restructuring program focused on decentralizing its business and
reducing overhead
  Despite cost cuts, severe commodity inflation and the need for significant “catch up”
R&D/marketing spend pressured margins down
  Private brands pressured KFT’s pricing in many categories eroding margins even further

f KFT today: Pershing Square view — Turnaround is achievable

  Fixing a company like KFT (many brands, regions) often takes five+ years
z Witness Cadbury, Unilever—only now seeing impact of several years of restructuring
  Investors have lost patience –-hence why the turnaround is discounted in the stock price
  Not just about cost cuts, but innovating and improving the brands through R&D and marketing
  New CEO has made smart decisions regarding brand investment and portfolio M&A
  Brands are better positioned today, given improved price/value equation and improved
product quality
  Significant opportunities still remain in COGS and overhead—however some of it should be
reinvested in the business to strengthen brands
  Clearly, MARGINS SHOULD BE MUCH HIGHER—we believe it’s a matter of time…

10
Historical EBIT Margins

Kraft’s EBIT margins have dramatically fallen from 21% in ’02 to a low of 12.8%
in ’08 due to misplaced investments, lack of marketing, pricing erosion,
required catch-up R&D and commodity headwinds
25.0 %

21.0 %
19.1 %
20.0 %

16.4 %
15.3 % 15.0 %
14.8 %
15.0 % 14.3 %
13.2 % 13.6 %
12.8 %

10.0 %

5.0 %

0.0 %
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009e 2010e 2011e

Kraft’s target is for mid-teen (~15%) margins by 2011, driven by improved

product quality/value, mix shift, supply chain efficiencies, SKU rationalization,
and overhead productivity efficiencies. We believe this goal is achievable
11
EBIT Margins Relative to Comparables

Kraft currently has low EBIT margins relative to its peers, despite
being the largest food company in North America and participating in
high gross margin categories

20.0 %
17.7 % 17.7 % 17.5 %
18.0 % 16.4 %
16.2 % 15.6 % 14.9 %
16.0 % 14.8 % 14.6 %
13.6 % 13.5 %
14.0 %

12.0 %

10.0 %

8.0 %

6.0 %

4.0 %

2.0 %

0.0 %
Kraft Cadbury General J.M. Campbell Kellogg Hershey Danone Heinz Unilever Nestlé
Mills Smucker
Food &
Beverage

Note: Kraft, Cadbury and Nestle are based on Pershing estimates for 2009, except Nestle, which is LTM. Nestle data is food and beverage only (ex-Alcon) adjusted to deduct trade
promotions from revenue (assumed 12% of revenue) to be comparable. Campbell, Heinz, Unilever, Danone and Kellogg’s are per Wall Street research and are LTM, except Unilever,
Danone, and Kellogg’s which are 2009e. General Mills is per company filings and excludes mark-to-market gains / losses on commodities derivatives and is LTM. J.M. Smucker is PF for
Folger’s, so 2010e margin used, per Wall Street research.
12
Appropriate EBIT Margins Based on Categories

Estimate for
Based on our global Est. % of Appropriate
category analysis, Global category Global Revenues EBIT margin
KFT should have Snacks (see memo) 38% 16%
EBIT margins in the Beverages (see memo) 20% 20%
(1)
mid-to-high teens Meals 15% 11%
(2)
Cheese 18% 16%
(3)
Grocery 10% 32%
Less corporate (0.8)%
Appropriate KFT EBIT Margin 17%
We believe that KFT current 2009E EBIT Margin (1) 13.6%
Snacks and
Memo:
Beverages are the Appropriate
Est. Revenue Mix EBIT Margin Reference Margin
categories where Snacks
Cookies / crackers 75% 17% Kellogg's consolidated margins (including G&A)

KFT is materially European Chocolate

Est. Margin
25% 15% Nestle confectionary (GAAP Adjusted)
16.5%

under-earning Beverages
Coffee 50% 22% Folgers (pre G&A, before Smuckers acquisition)
RTD 25% 12% Typical RTD
Powders 25% 35% Dr. Pepper concentrate / Coca Cola consolidated
Based on peers 23%
Discount for KFT 20%

(1) Includes NA Frozen Pizza. Based on current EBIT margins

(2) Based on US Cheese segment 3-year average
(3) Based on US Grocery segment 3-year average
13
 Opportunity: Gross Margins Are Too Low

Kraft currently has the lowest gross margins among its peer group,
despite having #1 market share in 80% of its categories and
participating in high margin categories like cookies, crackers,
confectionary, beverages and condiments
60.0 %
54.0 %

47.1 %
50.0 %
45.6 %
43.1 %
41.1 %
38.8 % 38.1 % 37.5 %
40.0 %
35.0 % 35.3 %

30.0 %

20.0 %

10.0 %

0.0 %
Kraft Danone Unilever Cadbury Kellogg Campbell General Mills Hershey J.M. Smucker Heinz

Note: Kraft and Cadbury are based on Pershing estimates for 2009e. Campbell, Heinz, Unilever, Danone and Kellogg’s are per Wall Street research and are LTM, except Unilever, Danone,
and Kellogg’s which are 2009e. General Mills is per company filings and excludes mark-to-market gains / losses on commodities derivatives and is LTM. J.M. Smucker is PF for Folger’s,
so 2010e used, per Wall Street research.
14
 KFT Gross Margins Should be Closer to 40%
Appropriate
Gross % of Revenue % Market
Margin Segment Total Share
U.S. Beverages 8%
Powdered
Coffee
Ready to Drink
65%
35%
20%
25%
50%
25%
52%
29%
59%
Based on our estimates for
Total Segment 38% 100% appropriate gross margins in
U.S. Cheese 9%
Sandwich, Recipe & Grated
Natural
30%
30%
45%
20%
30-40%
22%
each of Kraft’s food categories,
Cultured & Snacking
Cream Cheese
30%
30%
15%
20%
25%
66% Kraft should have gross margins
Total Segment 30% 100%

U.S. Convenient Meals 11 %

in the 37% - 40% range
Cold Cuts & Hot Dogs 30% 40% 30%
Bacon, Boca & Pickles 30% 15% 20%
Meal Combos 45% 15% 91%
Pizza 40% 30% 40%
Total Segment 35% 100%

U.S. Grocery 9%
Dressings
Desserts
40%
45%
30%
20%
35%
65%
Kraft’s 2009E gross margin is
Mac & Cheese 40% 20%
Condiments and Other 50% 30% only 35%, about 300bps below
Total Segment 44% 100%

U.S. Snacks 13 %
appropriate levels
Biscuits 45% 80%

Bars & Nuts 40% 20%

Total Segment 44% 100%

Canada & N.A. Foodservice 28% 10 %

Total Segment 28%

Europe 21 %
Biscuits 40% 25% 22%
Chocolate 40% 25% 13%
Local Categories 40% 25%
Cheese 30% 12% 40%
Coffee 35% 12% 22%
Total Segment 38%

Emerging Markets 40% 19 %

Kraft Appropriate GM 38% 15

Observations: Europe EBIT Margins Too Low

On a regional basis, Kraft’s Europe business has been materially

under-earning, despite an attractive portfolio of food products.
Increased scale from the 2007 LU acquisition should help improve
margins

% of EBIT 2006 2007 2008 LTM

North America 69 % 17.5 % 16.1 % 15.7 % 16.8 %
Y-o-Y Change (bps) (136) (47) 110

Europe 14 % 10.8 % 8.8 % 8.7 % 9.4 % Opportunity

Y-o-Y Change (bps) (195) (10) 67

Developing Markets 17 % 11.5 % 10.5 % 12.2 % 12.8 %

Y-o-Y Change (bps) (93) 165 59

Segment EBIT 15.4 % 13.8 % 13.4 % 14.4 %

Y-o-Y Change (bps) (160) (40) 105

Less: Corporate Costs (0.6)% (0.6)% (0.6)% (1.0)%

Y-o-Y Change (bps) (2) (1) (40)

EBIT 14.8 % 13.2 % 12.8 % 13.4 %

Y-o-Y Change (bps) (162) (41) 65

16
Opportunity: Europe EBIT Margins

KFT’s Europe segment participates in higher margin categories such

as biscuits (cookies), chocolate, and coffee. European EBIT margins
should be in the 13%-15% range. Fixing this business alone could
lead to ~100bps of total margin expansion for the company

European Segment Est. Attractive

Food Category Revenue Mix Margin?
~65% of revenues Europe
come from Biscuits 25% Yes
generally mid-to- Chocolate 25% Yes
high teens EBIT Local Categories 25% Unclear
margin categories Coffee 13% Yes
Cheese 13% No
Total Segment 100%

Illustrative Opportunity:
LTM Kraft Europe EBIT Margins 9.4%
Increase in Europe margins to 14% 460bps
Kraft Europe as % of Total KFT Revenues 21.4%
Increase in KFT Consolidated EBIT Margins 98bps

17
Margin Opportunity: Adding it Up

We believe that ~15% EBIT margins are easily achievable for

Kraft even in a world where commodity prices spike ahead of
organic pricing growth

Opportunity: Commentary

2009E EBIT Margin 13.6%

COGS productivity (1) 260bps SKU Rationalization, mix, productivity increase

G&A / overhead savings 150bps Predominantly from European business overhead cuts

EBIT margin improvement potential 17.7%

Less: Incremental marketing spend -100bps ~8% of sales as A&P spend, at high end of big cap food group

Less: Commodity cushion -170bps Commodity increases of ~4% that are not offset by price

2011 EBIT Margin 15.0%

(1) Assumes 4% COGS productivity, based on Kraft management guidance.

18
Pro Forma KFT + Cadbury:
A Great Company
Pro Forma Kraft is a Great Company and Stock

The new Kraft is a better company than the old Kraft

f Higher organic growth profile
f Improved category mix and overall business quality
f Increased emerging markets scale and distribution
f Improved access to instant consumption channels

Many opportunities to significantly increase earnings

f Margin improvement opportunity at both Kraft and Cadbury
  Both companies materially under-earning with EBIT margins
at ~13.5%, far below peers
f $675mm of stated cost synergies (over 10% of PF Kraft’s 2009 EBIT)
f Strong revenue synergies (mgmt has not yet stated a target)
f Lower effective tax rate

20
PF Kraft: Leading Global Confectionary Business

PF KFT would be the world’s leading confectionary business by

total confectionary marketplace position

PF Kraft: Strong Stable of

Confectionary Brands

Source: Bernstein Research, Kraft company presentation.

21
PF Kraft: Improved Business Quality

Over 50% of PF Kraft’s sales will be comprised of Confectionary,

Cookies and Crackers – all high quality, branded food categories

Standalone Pro Forma

Grocery,
10.0% Beverages,
16.6%

Meals, 15.0% Snacks, 38.0% Snacks, 31.5%

(Cookies,
Grocery,
(Cookies, Confectionary,
8.3% crackers,
crackers,
Confectionary)
Cookies and
Confectionary)
Crackers
Cheese, 18.0% Meals, 9.2%
represent
Cadbury ~50%
Beverages, Confectionary,
20.0% Cheese, 14.9%
19.4%

Pro Forma for Cadbury acquisition and sale of N.A. Frozen Pizza business. 22
 Confectionary, Cookies and Crackers

Confectionary, cookies and crackers are great food businesses

f Low private branding in developed markets

  Gum: store brands are virtually non-existent (1)

  Chocolate: ~5% of category = store brands (1)

  Cookies and crackers: ~10% = store brands (1)

f Strong emerging markets potential

  High branded products with broad global appeal
particularly to children/young folks
  Easily shipped, generally low spoilage
  Cheap and affordable “western” treats

f High gross margins

1) Based on US private brand share estimates. Cookies have higher private brand reach at around 15% of sales and crackers have lower reach at around 7% of sales.
23
Confectionary, Cookies and Crackers (cont’d)

Confectionary, cookies and crackers are great food businesses

f Attractive barriers to entry:

  Scale required to be profitable

  Marketing spend requirements, given branded goods

  Retail shelf-space scarcity particularly in confectionary –

front-of-the-counter retail shelf space is owned by a few
companies – hard for new entrants to penetrate

f In developed markets, cookies and crackers are DSD

  Direct-to-store-delivery (DSD) distribution is difficult to build
and limits competitive entry
  KFT’s large scale DSD is a strong competitive advantage
which can increase Cadbury growth in North America
24
Improved Emerging Markets Access

PF Kraft will have 25% of sales in emerging markets, the highest

exposure out of all its North American-based food peers, including
Kellogg, General Mills, Hershey, H.J. Heinz and Campbell Soup

Kraft Cadbury Combined

North America 58% 22% 51%
Europe 22% 34% 25%
Developing Markets 20% 44% 25%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100%

Based on Pershing Square’s estimates. Developing markets includes Australia and Japan.
Percentages may not add up due to rounding.

Kraft’s existing portfolio of dry goods (cookies, crackers, mac &

cheese, dry desserts and powdered beverages) is well suited for
Cadbury’s distribution platform in emerging markets

25
Enhanced Go-To-Market Strategy

The transaction will significantly expand Kraft’s ability to push

single-serve offerings of its popular brands in instant
consumption channels

Source: KFT company presentation

26
Higher Organic Growth Profile

We believe an organic growth rate of 4.5%– 5% is achievable for

PF Kraft based on estimated growth rates in developed markets
and emerging markets. We believe “Old” Kraft was capable of
only 3%–3.5% organic growth

Est. Organic Growth

Low High
Emerging Markets 8% 12%
Developed Markets 2.5% 3.5%

Total Organic Growth 4% 6%

27
PF Kraft is Significantly Undervalued

f Based on our estimates, Kraft trades at less than ~10x 2012 EPS(1)

OR another way to look at it

f PF Kraft trades at less than 15x 2009 EPS, excluding any

synergies or other benefits from the transaction

f You pay under 15x LTM EPS and you get, for free:
3 $675mm of cost saving synergies (>10% of Pro Forma EBIT)
3 Revenues synergies
3 Kraft standalone margin opportunity (margins up 150bps to ~15%)
3 Cadbury margin opportunity (margins up 150bps to ~15%)
3 Multiple expansion (better business, faster growth)
3 4% dividend yield, while you wait…
(1) Based on recurring earnings per share and includes the estimated non-cash impact of 7 cents / share of step-up amortization as a
result of the transaction. Kraft has not yet determined the step up in amortization.
28
What Is it Worth?

At the recent price of $28 per share, we believe an investment in

Kraft represents a 2-year IRR of 24% - 36%, depending on
management’s integration of Cadbury and market conditions. Our
midpoint price for Kraft is roughly $45 per share in two years

Low High
(1)
2012 EPS $2.70 $2.90

NTM P/E Multple 15.0x 17.0x

2-Year Price Target $41 - $49

Plus: Dividend (two years) $2.32 $2.32

Total $ received per share $43 - $52

Total Return 52.9% 84.4%

2 Year IRR 24% - 36%

(1) Based on recurring earnings per share and includes the estimated non-cash impact of 7 cents / share of step-up amortization as a
result of the transaction. Kraft has not yet determined the step up in amortization.
29
Why We Think the Stock is Not Appreciated

f Limited sell-side research on the transaction

  Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, UBS, Lehman, Deutsche

Bank, Lazard, Citigroup and others are advising on the deal

  As a result, many the major sell-side analysts have suspended

coverage on Kraft until the transaction is consummated (could
be mid-February)

  Kraft is covered by US analysts / Cadbury has European

coverage

f Merger arbs shorting Kraft and going long Cadbury

f Near-term concerns regarding “flow back” from the

transaction

30