Frantzen Et Al v. Slater Et Al - Document No. 4
Frantzen Et Al v. Slater Et Al - Document No. 4
Frantzen Et Al v. Slater Et Al - Document No. 4
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Case 1:05-cv-01026-LEK-RFT Document 4 Filed 08/16/2005 Page 1 of 4
Plaintiffs,
-against- 05-CV-1026
(LEK/RFT)
ZACKARY SLATER; KENNETH CRENNA,
Public Defender, both in his personal capacity
and in his official capacity as Public Defender
of Melissa Frantzen, mother of Julian Frantzen,
the Infant Minor; DENNIS VETRANO, Court
Appointed Legal Guardian of Julian Frantzen,
both in his personal capacity and in his official
capacity as court appointed legal guardian of the
Infant Minor; MS. MELINDA VICK, both in her
personal capacity and as CPS worker for Columbia
County Dept. of Social Services; THE COLUMBIA
COUNTY DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES;
BRIANNA CONTE in her personal capacity and
in her capacity as a counselor for Twin County
Recovery Systems, Inc.; TWIN COUNTY
RECOVERY SYSTEMS, INC.; JUDGE
JONATHAN D. NICHOLS, both in His personal
capacity and as the Judge presiding in Family Court
in Columbia County,
Defendants.
I. Background
On August 15, 2005, Plaintiffs Melissa Frantzen (“Frantzen”) and Colleen Frantzen
Zamiellio (“Zamiellio”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint and an “Ex Parte Emergency
Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order or Other Discretionary Relief” pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
Dockets.Justia.com
Case 1:05-cv-01026-LEK-RFT Document 4 Filed 08/16/2005 Page 2 of 4
1983. Plaintiffs allege that the circumstances surrounding the placement of Frantzen’s infant son
Julian Frantzen (“Julian”) in foster care, and then with his father, Defendant Zackary Slater
(“Slater”), violated various constitutional rights of Plaintiffs and Julian. Specifically, Plaintiffs
contend that all Defendants, individually and in concert with each other, wrongfully and unlawfully
removed Julian from Plaintiffs’ custody in violation of their First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs also claim a violation of the Americans with Disabilities
Act. Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief (namely, the return of Julian to their custody) and monetary
damages.1
II. Discussion
“[I]n our federal system of limited jurisdiction any party or the court sua sponte, at any stage
of the proceedings, may raise the question of whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction.”
United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 919, AFL-CIO v. CenterMark Props. Meriden
Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1994); see FED . R. CIV . P. 12(h)(3). Dismissal is mandatory
when jurisdiction is lacking. FED . R. CIV . P. 12(h)(3). Therefore, before a court can proceed to the
Pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “inferior federal courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction ‘over cases that effectively seek review of judgments of state courts and that federal
review, if any, can occur only by way of a certiorari petition to the [United States] Supreme Court.’”
Formanek v. Pines, 69 Fed. Appx. 504, 506 (2d Cir. 2003); see Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263
U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). This is
1
For a complete statement of the claims, reference is made to the complaint.
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Case 1:05-cv-01026-LEK-RFT Document 4 Filed 08/16/2005 Page 3 of 4
so even if the federal challenges allege that the state court actions are unconstitutional.2 Conway v.
Garvey, No. 03 Civ. 7958(DC), 2003 WL 22510384, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2003), aff’d 117 Fed.
Appx. 792 (2d Cir. 2004). Claims made in federal court are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
if such claims are “inextricably intertwined” with a state court’s determination. Formanek, 69 Fed.
Appx. at 506. “[I]f adjudication of a claim in federal court would require the court to determine that
a state court judgment was erroneously entered or was void, the claim is inextricably intertwined
with the merits of the state court judgment.” Kropelnicki v. Siegel, 290 F.3d 118, 129 (2d Cir.
2002).
Even when viewed with the liberality afforded to pro se litigants, there are no claims in the
complaint over which this Court has jurisdiction. Each of the claims made by Plaintiffs clearly
challenge the validity of the decisions of the Family Court to place Julian first in foster care, and
then with Slater. Plaintiffs present various reasons to persuade this Court that Slater is unfit to care
for Julian, but determining the best interests of a child is not the province of this Court. Further,
Plaintiffs’ claims that the procedures utilized in the placement of Julian in foster care and with
Slater were unconstitutional are likewise inextricably intertwined with the decisions of the Family
Court. Formarek, 69 Fed. Appx. at 506. The adjudication of those claims would require this Court
Because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the complaint must be dismissed.
Although generally courts will permit a pro se plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended complaint
after a sua sponte dismissal, there is no need to do so here, “as plaintiff presents no arguably
2
The only exception, which is not applicable here, is a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254.
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meritorious issue.” Conway, 2003 WL 22510384, at *4. The Court sympathizes with Plaintiffs’
emotional distress over the loss of custody of Julian, and understands their desire to have him
returned. However, the proper forum for these claims is the New York State court system and then,
III. Conclusion
ORDERED, that Plaintiffs’ “Ex Parte Emergency Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order
ORDERED, that the Clerk serve a copy of this order on all parties.