Republic of the Philippines

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

10th Judicial Region
Branch 9
Malaybalay City, Bukidnon
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff,

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 14150-04 Mly.

-versus-

FOR: LIBEL

LOUI S. MALIZ, EDGARDO N.

MALIZA, MIKE Y. DACILLO,
FELICISIMO PERMALAN,
DIONISIO ASOK, JR., and
FELICITO MAGTRAYO,
Accused.
X- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -/

REPLY TO OPPOSITION

Come now, the above named-accused, by counsel and unto this

Honorable Court, most respectfully submit their Reply to the prosecutions
Opposition to the Motion to Quash and aver that:
I.
The prosecution builds their first argument in their opposition on the case
of In Re Emil (Emiliano) P. Jurado, A.M. No. 93-2-037, April 6, 1995.
With all due respect, the said case is incongruous and discernibly offtangent to the case at bar, in that the same is an administrative case against Atty.
Emil (Emiliano) P. Jurado for contempt of court in accordance with Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court. The nature of the said administrative case against Atty. Jurado
concerns on the inquiry into the limits of press freedom relating to public
comment about the courts and their workings within a constitutional order. Atty.
Jurado in this case was punished because he had been writing about alleged
improprieties and irregularities in the judiciary over several months. Thus, the

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Criminal Case No. 14150-04

issue then that came to fore and material to the said inquiry are Atty. Jurado's
published statements from late 1992 to the middle of February, 1993 where he
wrote of "(j)udges in a number of regional trial courts in Metro Manila (who) have
become so notorious in their dealings with litigants and lawyers that they are now
called the 'Magnificent Seven.' Aside from the "Magnificent Seven," he also wrote
about a group which he dubbed the "Dirty Dozen." In his column of October 21,
1992 he said that there are ". . . judges who have acquired such reputation for
graft and corruption that they are collectively known as the 'dirty dozen.' In his
November 9, 1992 column, he wrote about "a former appellate justice (who)
'holds office' at a restaurant near the Court of Appeals building. He is known as
the contact man of five CA divisions. Lawyers say that this former jurist really
delivers," "known for fixing cases for five CA divisions (that is what he tells
lawyers and litigants) for a fee. And in his column of March 24, 1993, he made
the claim that one can "get a temporary restraining order from a regional trial
court in Metro-Manila by paying the judge anywhere between P30, 000.00 and
P50, 000.00."
In the instant case, the alleged libelous act complained of is the
publication of the allegations of the accused-movants in their letter-complaint
against the private complainant, the Governor of the Province of Bukidnon, Hon.
Jose Ma. Zubiri, Jr. who is an elected public official, which letter-complaint, a
public record, indubitably deals with matters of public interest, as it involves the
purchase of the BRCI Tomato Paste Plant/Lot by the Bukidnon Provincial
Government under the administration of the herein private complainant. The
accused therefore have an interest and a duty thereto. As a rule, it is the right
and duty of a citizen to make a complaint of any misconduct on the part of public
officials, which comes to his notice. Thus, unlike in the case of In Re Emil P.
Jurado where the Supreme Court categorically stressed the importance in the
maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the

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Criminal Case No. 14150-04

citizens in the maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary in which the

High Court declared that respect for the Judiciary cannot be had if persons are
privileged to scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good purposes, and such
persons should not be permitted by subterranean means to diffuse inaccurate
accounts of confidential proceedings to the embarrassment of the parties and the
court. for every person exercising it is, as the Civil Code stresses, is obliged "to
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith,"
pursuant to Article 19 thereof considering the nature and gravity of Jurados
malicious imputations against the members of the judiciary which tend to
undermine its integrity and independence, and considering further that these
reports were unverified the article alleged to be libelous subject matter of this
case refers to their letter-complaint and none other. It was a true and fair report of
the fact that three of the accused herein, as complainants, filed a lettercomplainant before the Ombudsman-Mindanao. As easily seen in the article
reproduced in the Information, the subject article did not even contain any
comment or matters of opinion on the part of the writer. As far as the three
accused who are the complainants in the subject letter-complaint are concerned,
they were mentioned in the article as concerned citizens and complainants, that
they filed a case against the Governor for violation of specific provisions of
Republic Act 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and corrupt Practices Act,
R.A. 7160 and the indicative collusion/overprice transaction, respectively. The
article in fact mentioned that on their letter to Ombudsman dated September 16,
last year, the three complainants said Zubiri has wasted millions-of-peso money
of the province by way of purchasing a non-performing asset like the foreclosed
processing plant of the BRCI. It is therefore evident that the article charged as
libelous is a report about the three accused letter-complaint against the private
complainant before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao for Violation of R.A.
3019 and R.A. 7160, which complaint is a public record. Also, the article reported
the interview with accused Permalan. The statement given by Permalan in the

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Criminal Case No. 14150-04

said article obviously referred to the crux of their letter-complaint. Nothing was
added and there was no independent imputation thereof of a crime, vice or defect
other than the very accusation in their letter-complaint filed by them against the
private complainant.
The arguments of the prosecution from pages 1 to 7 in their opposition
were lifted verbatim from the said Emil P. Jurado case. It would naturally follow
that the same should not be considered in the determination of the herein Motion
to Quash since as already asserted, there is no comparison at all of that case to
this instant case. The facts and circumstances of the said case are not attendant
in this case at bar and the ruling in that said case is entirely inapplicable hereof.
II.
The prosecution also cited in their opposition the case of Sazon vs. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 120715, March 29, 1999. It is humbly submitted that the
said case is likewise extraneous and not germane to the issues in the case at
bar.
In the case of Sazon vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120715, March 29,
1999 cited by the prosecution, the accused Fernando Sazon was held guilty of
the crime of libel because the defamatory character of the words used by him
were shown by the very recitals thereof in the questioned article. He used the
following

words

and

phrases

in

describing

the

private

complainant:

"mandurugas," "mag-ingat sa panlilinlang," "matagal na tayong niloloko," "may

kasamang pagyayabang," "ang ating pobreng super kulit." "patuloy na
kabulastugan," "mastermind sa paninirang puri," etc. Because of the nature of
the words used by the accused, the Supreme Court thus declared that in libel
cases, the question is not what the writer of an alleged libel means, but what the
words used by him mean. The Jurisprudence has laid down, a test to determine
the defamatory character of words used in the following manner, viz: Words

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Criminal Case No. 14150-04

calculated to induce suspicion are sometimes more effective to destroy

reputation than false charges directly made. Ironically and metaphorical language
is a favored vehicle for slander. A charge is sufficient if the words are calculated
to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the person or persons
against whom they were uttered were guilty of certain offenses, or are sufficient
to impeach their honesty, virtue, or reputation, or to hold the person or persons
up to public ridicule . . . This test was satisfied in the case at bench. Branding
private complainant Reyes "mandurugas," et al. most certainly exposed him to
public contempt and ridicule. No amount of sophistical explanation on the part of
petitioner can hide, much less erase, the negative impression already created in
the minds of the readers of the libelous material towards private complainant.
Perceptibly, the ruling of the Supreme Court in the Sazon case relied upon by the
prosecution is unbefitting in the case at bar. No such similar imputations were
made by the herein accused in the same tenor. Moreover, the allegations made
by Sazon in that case which was published in their newsletter never referred to
any complaint filed by him against the person libeled who is not a public official
but was merely the president of a homeowners association in a subdivision.
Malice therefore was inherent in that case. On the other hand, the article
published in this instant case is a privileged communication where malice is not
presumed, as heretofore thrashed out and as consistently articulated in the
cases of, among others, Norberto Quisumbing vs. Eugenio Lopez, 96 Phil. 510;
Jimenez vs. Reyes, 27 Phil., 52; U.S. vs. O'Connel, 37 Phil. 767; U. S. vs. Sotto,
38 Phil., 666; Imperial, et al. vs. The Manila Publishing Co., Inc., et al., 13 C.A.
Rep. 990; Catalino P. Arafiles, vs. Philippine Journalists, Inc., Romy Morales,
Max Buan, Jr., and Manuel C. Villareal, Jr., G.R. No. 150256, March 25, 2004;
Bulletin Publishing Corporation vs. Hon. Judge Edilberto Noel, G.R. No. 76565,
November 9, 1988; Newsweek, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 171 [1986]);
Alonzo vs. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 51 [1995]); The United States vs. Felipe
Bustos, ET AL., G.R. No. L-12592, March 8, 1918; Lope O. Daez vs. The Hon.

Page 6 of Reply to Opposition

Criminal Case No. 14150-04

Court of Appeals, and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 47971, October 31,
1990; Nanerico D. Santos vs. The Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45031, October
21, 1991; U.S. vs. Santos, 33 Phil. 533; People vs. Velasco, C.A., 40 O.G. 3694;
Borjal vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999; People v.
Andres, 107 Phil. 1046 (1960); People v. Alvarez, L-19072, August 14, 1965, 14
SCRA 901; People vs. Aquino, L-23908, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 555;
Esteban C. Manuel vs. The Hon. Ernani Cruz Pano as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Br. XVIII, Q.C., Antonio A. Baranda, Edsel Labayen and
Rolando Gatmaitan, G.R. No. L-46079, April 17, 1989; and Manuel Elizalde vs.
Hon. Mario J. Gutierrez, G.R. No. L-33615, April 22, 1977.
III.
The prosecution maintains that the caption Zubiri pockets P33-million?
conveyed defamatory imputations and therefore malice is presumed. This
argument is flimsy and draws a distinction where there clearly is none.
It can very well be appreciated that the said caption is a summary of the
contents of the news item. What was filed against the herein private complainant
is exactly to that effect. Thus, the headline and the sub-headline are borne out
by the facts recited in the context of the news item. The same may fairly be said
to contain a correct description of the news story. It did not go beyond the actual
report of the news item, hence is likewise privileged in nature and covered under
the mantle of the Constitutional protection. In Norberto Quisumbing vs. Eugenio
Lopez 96 Phil. 510, the Supreme Court, in rejecting the theory of the prosecution
that the headline of the news item is libelous per se declared that the headline of
a newspaper story or publication claimed to be libelous must be read and
construed in connection with the language that follows.

x x x Press reporters

and editors should not, consistently with good faith and reasonable care, be held
to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the
1

Underscoring provided.

Page 7 of Reply to Opposition

Criminal Case No. 14150-04

choice of words. Also in the landmark cases of Jimenez vs. Reyes, 27 Phil., 52;
U. S. vs. O'Connel, 37 Phil. 767; U. S. vs. Sotto, 38 Phil., 666, it was consistently
decreed that the published matter alleged to be libelous must be construed as a
whole. The test of libelous meanings is not the analysis of a sentence into
component phrases with the meticulous care of the grammarian or stylist, but the
import conveyed of the entirety of the language to the ordinary reader.

In other

words, the article must be construed in its entirety including the headline, as they
may enlarge, explain, or restrict or be enlarged, explained or strengthened or
restricted by the context. Whether or not it is libelous depends upon the scope,
spirit and motive of the publication taken in its entirety.

Personal hurt or embarrassment or offense, even if real, is not,

automatically equivalent to defamation. The law against libel protects one's
interest in acquiring, retaining and enjoying a reputation "as good as one's
character and conduct warrant" in the community and it is to community
standards not personal or family standards that a court must refer in
evaluating a publication claimed to be defamatory. The term "community" may of
course be drawn as narrowly or as broadly as the user of the term and his
purposes may require. The reason why for purposes of the law on libel the more
general meaning of community must be adopted in the ascertainment of relevant
standards, is rooted deep in our constitutional law. That reason relates to the
fundamental public interest in the protection and promotion of free speech and
expression, an interest shared by all members of the body politic and territorial
community. 4

U.S. vs. OConnell, 37 Phil. 767.

Imperial, et al. vs. The Manila Publishing Co., Inc., et al., 13 C.A. Rep. 990; Catalino P. Arafiles,
vs. Philippine Journalists, Inc., Romy Morales, Max Buan, Jr., and Manuel C. Villareal, Jr., G.R.
No. 150256, March 25, 2004.
4
Bulletin Publishing Corporation vs. Hon. Judge Edilberto Noel, G.R. No. 76565, November 9,
1988, underscoring provided.
3

Page 8 of Reply to Opposition

Criminal Case No. 14150-04

For that matter, even sweeping exaggeration, unreasonable and absurd

statements in the material will not by themselves make the statements
defamatory. 5
There is no malice when the author of the imputation speaks in response
to a duty and not merely to injure the reputation of the person who claims to have
been defamed.

A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in

which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a

duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty,
although it contained incriminatory matter which without this privilege would be
slanderous and actionable. (Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. & B., 344; 1 Jur. [N.S.], 846;
25 L. J. Q. B., 25; 3 W. R., 474; 85 E. C. L., 344.)
A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is a complaint
made in good faith and without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a
public official when addressed to an officer or a board having some interest or
duty in the matter. 7
A complaint against public officials addressed to proper authorities is
qualifiedly privileged within the purview of paragraph 1 of Article 354 because the
filing thereof is being done in the performance of ones duty as a citizen.

As a rule, it is the right and duty of a citizen to make a complaint of any

misconduct on the part of public officials, which comes to his notice, to those
charged with supervision over them. Such a communication is qualifiedly
privileged and the author is not guilty of libel. The rule on privilege, however,
imposes an additional requirement. Such complaints should be addressed solely
to some official having jurisdiction to inquire into the charges, or power to redress
the grievance or has some duty to perform or interest in connection therewith
5

Newsweek, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 171 [1986]).

Alonzo vs. Court of Appeals241 SCRA 51 [1995]).
7
The United States vs. Felipe Bustos, ET AL., G.R. No. L-12592, March 8, 1918.
8
Aquino, Torts and Damages, page 548, 2001 Edition.
6

Page 9 of Reply to Opposition

Criminal Case No. 14150-04

(US v. Galeza, 31 Phil. 365).

In the instant case, the persons or office to whom

the letter-complaint was sent, is vested with the power of supervision over the
private complainant and the authority to investigate the charges made against
the latter.
IV.
The prosecution, in its futile attempt to emasculate the legitimate
arguments of the accused in their motion to quash, would now say that there was
no complaint filed by the three accused against the herein private complainant
before the Ombudsman-Mindanao. It attached to their opposition alleged
Certifications dated April 5, 2004 and April 16, 2004 to the effect that no pending
criminal or administrative cases are filed against him. However, it cannot be
denied that there was in fact a case filed against him before the OmbudsmanMindanao for violation of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and
R.A. 7160 (Implementing Rules/Regulations/Local Government Code). The same
was filed on September 16, 2003, at 2:40 PM and received by one Sarena, RA,
as shown by the stamp on the face of the complaint; copy thereof is hereto
attached as Annex 1, which said complaint is the basis of the article complained
of. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao indorsed the said letter-complaint to
the Commission on Audit. In fact, on July 26, 2004, the herein accused received
an official communication by the Office of the Ombudsman addressed to Atty.
Celso Vocal, Regional Cluster Director, Commission on Audit, Regional Office
No. X, Cagayan de Oro City in which the Deputy Ombudsman asked for a copy
of the audit report. The number and title of the case was mentioned in the said
letter, namely, CPL-M-03-0864, Felicisimo Permalan, et al., vs. Concerned
Provincial Officials of Malaybalay City; copy of the said letter is hereto attached
as Annex 2.

Lope O. Daez vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals, and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 47971,
October 31, 1990, underscoring provided.

Page 10 of Reply to Opposition

Criminal Case No. 14150-04

V.
Is the publication of a complaint filed in court or any quasi-judicial agency
before any action is taken thereon, privileged as a report of a judicial or official
proceeding? The Supreme Court took the affirmative stance in its decision in
Nanerico D. Santos vs. The Court of Appeals

10

where it ruled that:

Petitioner now insists that the published article

is privileged, being a fair and true report of a judicial
proceeding, without comments or remarks, and
therefore not punishable. He maintains that the
alleged libelous news report which came out in the
Manila Daily Bulletin was merely lifted from a
complaint word for word, except for the last innocuous
paragraph which he added to the effect that
"(i)investors and Sison's fellow brokers are eagerly
awaiting developments on these charges". Moreover,
he contends that the cited rulings in the cases of
Barreto vs. Philippine Publishing Co., 30 Phil. 88 and
Choa Tek Hee vs. Philippine Publishing Co., 34 Phil.
447, are no longer valid. Petitioner's arguments are
well-taken.
It would seem that the passage of time has
worked to petitioner's great advantage. In 1976, the
doctrine so fervently and eloquently espoused by
Justice Moreland in the Barreto case was overturned
by this Court through Justice Esguerra in Cuenco vs.
Cuenco, No. L-29560, March 31, 1976, 70 SCRA 212,
234-235. Thus:
The reason for the rule that pleadings in
judicial proceedings are considered privileged is not
only because said pleadings have become part of
public record open to the public to scrutinize, but also
due to the undeniable fact that said pleadings are
presumed to contain allegations and assertions lawful
and legal in nature, appropriate to the disposition of
issues ventilated before the courts for the proper
administration of justice and, therefore, of general
public concern. Moreover, pleadings are presumed to
contain allegations substantially true because they
can be supported by evidence presented in good
faith, the contents of which would be under the
scrutiny of courts, and therefore, subject to be purged
of all improprieties and illegal statements contained
therein.
We are firmly convinced that the correct role
on the matter should be that a fair and true report of a
complaint filed in court without remarks nor comments
10

G.R. No. L-45031, October 21, 1991, underscoring provided.

Page 11 of Reply to Opposition

Criminal Case No. 14150-04

even before an answer is filed or a decision

promulgated should be covered by the privilege.
In Manuel vs. Pano, supra, the Court, speaking
through Justice Cruz, categorically stated that the
publication of a complaint, being a true and fair report
of a judicial proceeding, made in good faith and
without comments or remarks, is privileged and
comes under Item 2 of Article 354. It is no longer
correct to state that Article 354 is not applicable
because the published complaint as filed would not by
itself constitute a judicial proceeding, as the issues
have not as yet been joined. That doctrine established
in the Barretto and Choa Tek Hee cases is no longer
controlling and has been superseded by the Cuenco
case. Moreover, it could also be argued that the
complaint, by itself, is a public record and may be
published as such under Rule 135, Section 2 of the
Rules of Court unless the court directs otherwise in
the interest of morality or decency.
We now
come
to
the
all-important
consideration of whether the prosecution, in an effort
to remove the protection of privilege, was able to
establish that the columnist charged with libel was in
fact motivated by malice.
It is plainly evident from a reading of the
published article itself that it is but a faithful
reproduction of a pleading filed before a quasi-judicial
body. There are no embellishments, wild imputations,
distortions or defamatory comments calculated to
damage the reputation of the offended parties and
expose them to public contempt. What petitioner has
done was to simply furnish the readers with the
information that a complaint has been filed against a
brokerage firm. Then he proceeded to reproduce that
pleading verbatim in his column. Now this is decidedly
part and parcel of petitioner's job as a columnist
whose "beat" happens to be the stock market. He is
obligated to keep the public abreast of the current
news in that particular field. On this crucial point, the
Court is inclined to resolve all doubts in favor of
petitioner and declare that there is no libel. It may be
well for us to keep in mind that the rule on privileged
communications in defamation cases developed
because "public policy, the welfare of society and the
orderly administration of justice" have demanded
protection for public opinion. Therefore, they should
not be subjected to microscopic examination to
discover grounds of malice and falsehood. Such
excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which
the law throws over privileged communications.
The controversial publication being a fair and
true report of a judicial proceeding and made without
malice, we find the author entitled to the protection

Page 12 of Reply to Opposition

Criminal Case No. 14150-04

and immunity of the rule on privileged matters under

Article 354 (2). It follows that he cannot be held
criminally liable for libel.
Thus what was said in the foregoing analogous case must be applied
mutatis mutandis to the case at bar: The privilege character of the article subject
matter of this case covers the right of access secured by law, and in which the
purpose and object of the law is to give publicity to the contents of the record or
document in the interest, or for the protection, of the public generally.

11

A matter

of public interest is a common property, and hence anybody may express an

opinion on it. Thus, it is a defense to an action for libel or slander that the words
complained of are fair comment on a matter of public interest. The conduct or
acts of public officers which are related to the discharge of their official duties are
matters of public interest. Defamatory remarks and comments on the conduct or
acts of public officers which are related to the discharge of their official duties will
not constitute libel .. Public acts of public men may lawfully be made the
subjects of comment and criticism. Where the imputation is based upon a matter
of public interest, the presumption of criminal intent does not arise from the mere
publication of defamatory matter.
matter of public concern.

The public conduct of every public man is a

Libelous remarks or comments connected for one

thing, with any speech or acts performed by officers in the exercise of their
functions are not actionable.. If the comment is an expression of an opinion,
based upon proven facts, then it is no matter that the opinion happens to be
mistaken so long as it might be reasonably inferred from the facts.. Comment
may be fair, although wrong.

12

Even assuming that the contents of the articles

are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual
malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free
expression and debate. 13

11

U.S. vs. Santos, 33 Phil. 533.

People vs. Velasco, C.A., 40 O.G. 3694.
13
Borjal vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999.
12

Page 13 of Reply to Opposition

Criminal Case No. 14150-04

VI.
Lastly, the prosecution posits that good intentions or justifiable motive are
matters of defense which are evidentiary in nature which does not in anyway
alter the findings of the existence of probable cause for libel, citing the cases of
and Lu Chu vs. Lu Tiong Gui, 76 Phil. 669 and People vs. Wenceslao Pascual,
102 Phil. 503.
These two cases were decided way back on May 11, 1946 and November
29, 1957, respectively. Contemporary doctrines have then evolved from more
recent cases. In the case of Esteban C. Manuel vs. The Hon. Ernani Cruz Pano
as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Br. XVIII, Q.C., Antonio A.
Baranda, Edsel Labayen and Rolando Gatmaitan, G.R. No. L-46079. April 17,
1989, the Supreme Court in quashing the Information of Libel ruled, thus:
We are not unmindful of the contention that
the information should not be dismissed outright
because the prosecution must first be given a chance
to introduce evidence to overcome the presumption.
This is indeed the normal procedure. However, where
it appears from the allegations in the information itself
that the accused acted in good faith and for justifiable
ends in making the allegedly libelous imputations, and
in pertinent pleadings, there is no need to prolong the
proceedings to the prejudice of the defendant. The
Court can and should dismiss the charge without
further ado. 14
x x x x
One wonders why the respondent judge did
not immediately grant the petitioner's motion to quash
the information on the obvious and valid ground that
the facts charged did not constitute an offense. This
decisive act could have avoided the needless
molestation of one more citizen and cleared the
clogged dockets of this Court of still another of the
persecutions big and small so rampant during those
days of martial law. More importantly, it would have
affirmed once again the freedom of expression
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights to which every one
was entitled even under the 1973 Constitution.
x x x x
14

Underscoring provided.

Page 14 of Reply to Opposition

Criminal Case No. 14150-04

We are convinced that the information against

the petitioner should never have been filed at all and
that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying the motion to quash the
information on the ground that the allegations therein
did not constitute an offense. The petitioner is entitled
to the relief he seeks from those who in the guise of
law and through the instrumentality of the trial court
would impose upon him this arrant tyranny.
But even in the early jurisprudence, the Supreme Court had time and
again sustained motions to quash on the ground of privilege communications. In
People v. Andres,

15

the Supreme Court sustained a court of first instance when it

quashed the information for libel because the facts charged do not constitute an
offense by reason of press freedom. In this case, it was argued by the
prosecution "that the trial court erred in dismissing the case on a mere motion to
quash, contending that the trial judge's conclusion on the face of the information
that defendant-appellee was prompted only by good motives assumes a fact to
be proved, and that the alleged privileged nature of defendant-appellee's
publication is a matter of defense and is not a proper ground for dismissal of the
complaint for libel . . . ."16 That contention was rejected in this wise: "While there
is some point to this contention, yet when in the information itself it appears, as it
does in the present case, that the communication alleged to be libelous is
contained in an appropriate pleading in a court proceeding, the privilege
becomes at once apparent and defendant need not wait until the trial and
produce evidence before he can raise the question of privilege. It would become
evident that the facts thus alleged in the information would not constitute an
offense of libel."

17

Similarly, a motion to quash was sustained in the later case of

People v. Alvarez,18 where it was pointed out: "As heretofore stated, this Court
has adopted a liberal attitude in favor of the writer in matter of the relevancy of
allegedly libelous statements in judicial pleadings. In People v. Aquino,
15

107 Phil. 1046 (1960)

Ibid, 1050
17
Ibid.
18
L-19072, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 901.
19
L-23908, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 555
16

19

Page 15 of Reply to Opposition

Criminal Case No. 14150-04

reference was made to People v. Andres to demonstrate that it is fitting and

appropriate for a court of first instance to dismiss an information on a motion to
quash where the privileged character of the alleged offending publication is
apparent. In the case of Manuel Elizalde vs. Hon. Mario J. Gutierrez, 20 the
Supreme Court also granted the motion to quash, saying that it is fitting and
appropriate for a court of first instance to dismiss an information to quash where
the privileged character of the alleged offending publication is apparent.
There is therefore no reason that the information in this instant case
should not be quashed on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense of libel. Since the privilege nature of the communication charged as
libelous is apparent on the face of the Information, the accused need not wait
until the trial and produce evidence before they can raise the question of
privilege.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the above-named accused most
respectfully reiterate their prayer that the information be QUASHED and that
pending the resolution thereof, the arraignment be suspended.
Other relief and remedies just and equitable in the premises are also
prayed for.
Most respectfully submitted, August 21, 2004.

KATHRYN PINEDA ~ DE LA SERNA

HOLLIS C. MONSANTO
ISIDRO A. CARACOL
FIDEL P. AQUINO
VEVENCIO P. ESTRADA
Counsels of the Accused-Movants

20

G.R. No. L-33615. April 22, 1977.

Page 16 of Reply to Opposition

Criminal Case No. 14150-04

By:

KATHRYN PINEDA ~ DE LA SERNA

Counsel of the Accused-Movants
Attorneys Roll No. 41099
IBP No. 581352 / 12/17/2003
PTR No. 1359739 / 01/07/04
All in Cagayan de Oro City
DELA SERNA BEJA & ASSOCIATES
Law Offices
Ground Floor, Door No. 2
Trinidad Building, Yacapin Street
Cagayan de Oro City 9000
COPY FURNISHED BY PERSONAL DELIVERY TO:
FISCAL MIRABEAUS A. UNDALOK
Public Prosecutor
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
Malaybalay City, Bukidnon

Received by: __________

Date:
__________

ATTY. GLICERIO ANTHONY S. CAVALIDA

Private Prosecutor
c/o Provincial Legal Office
Provincial Capitol,
Malaybalay City, Bukidnon

Received by: __________

Date:
__________