HR Habeas Data
HR Habeas Data
has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered,
collected or stored.
The writ of habeas data shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.
Sec. 5. Docket Fees. - No docket and other lawful fees shall be required
from an indigent petitioner. The petition of the indigent shall be docked
and acted upon immediately, without prejudice to subsequent submission
of proof of indigency not later than fifteen (15) days from the filing of the
petition.
SEC. 6. Petition. - A verified written petition for a writ of habeas
data should contain:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it
affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or
information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office,
and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or
information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification,
suppression or destruction of the database or information or files kept by
the respondent.
In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining
the act complained of; and
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.
SEC. 7. Issuance of the Writ. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court,
justice or judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its
face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the writ under the seal
of the court and cause it to be served within three (3) days from the
issuance; or, in case of urgent necessity, the justice or judge may issue the
writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer or person
serve it.
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the
petition which shall not be later than ten (10) work days from the date of
its issuance.
SEC. 8. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Writ. - A clerk of
court who refuses to issue the writ after its allowance, or a deputized
person who refuses to serve the same, shall be punished by the court,
justice or judge for contempt without prejudice to other disciplinary
actions.
SEC. 9. How the Writ is Served. - The writ shall be served upon the
respondent by a judicial officer or by a person deputized by the court,
justice or judge who shall retain a copy on which to make a return of
service. In case the writ cannot be served personally on the respondent,
the rules on substituted service shall apply.
SEC. 10. Return; Contents. - The respondent shall file a verified written
return together with supporting affidavits within five (5) working days from
service of the writ, which period may be reasonably extended by the Court
for justifiable reasons. The return shall, among other things, contain the
following:
(a) The lawful defenses such as national security, state secrets, privileged
communications, confidentiality of the source of information of media and
others;
(b) In case of respondent in charge, in possession or in control of the data
or information subject of the petition;
(i) a disclosure of the data or information about the petitioner, the nature
of such data or information, and the purpose for its collection;
(ii) the steps or actions taken by the respondent to ensure the security and
confidentiality of the data or information; and,
(iii) the currency and accuracy of the data or information held; and,
(c) Other allegations relevant to the resolution of the proceeding.
A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed.
SEC. 11. Contempt. - The court, justice or judge may punish with
imprisonment or fine a respondent who commits contempt by making a
SEC. 14. Return; Filing. - In case the respondent fails to file a return, the
court, justice or judge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte, granting
the petitioner such relief as the petition may warrant unless the court in its
discretion requires the petitioner to submit evidence.
SEC. 15. Summary Hearing. - The hearing on the petition shall be
summary. However, the court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary
conference to simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining
stipulations and admissions from the parties.
SEC. 16. Judgment. - The court shall render judgment within ten (10)
days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations
in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall enjoin
the act complained of, or order the deletion, destruction, or rectification of
the erroneous data or information and grant other relevant reliefs as may
be just and equitable; otherwise, the privilege of the writ shall be denied.
Upon its finality, the judgment shall be enforced by the sheriff or any lawful
officers as may be designated by the court, justice or judge within five (5)
working days.
SEC. 17. Return of Service. - The officer who executed the final
judgment shall, within three (3) days from its enforcement, make a verified
return to the court. The return shall contain a full statement of the
proceedings under the writ and a complete inventory of the database or
information, or documents and articles inspected, updated, rectified, or
deleted, with copies served on the petitioner and the respondent.
The officer shall state in the return how the judgment was enforced and
complied with by the respondent, as well as all objections of the parties
regarding the manner and regularity of the service of the writ.
SEC. 18. Hearing on Officers Return. - The court shall set the return
for hearing with due notice to the parties and act accordingly.
SEC. 19. Appeal. - Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order
to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of
fact or law or both.
The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from the date of notice
of the judgment or final order.
given
the
same
priority
as
in habeas
1.
2.
Castillo v. Cruz
G.R. No. 182165
25 November 2009
PONENTE: Carpio Morales, J.
PARTIES:
1.
2.
Despite the said judgment, respondents refused to vacate the property and
filed cases against the Provincial Government of Bulacan and the judges
who presided over the case. Notwithstanding the cases filed by the
respondents, judgment for ejectment was executed on 25 January 2008
pursuant to a Second Alias Writ of Demolition issued by the MTC. However,
the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan acted favorably on an application for a
temporary restraining order (TRO) by the respondents.
Thus, the Spouses Cruz, along with their sonsrespondents Nixon and
Ferdinand, thereupon entered the property, placed several container vans
and purportedly represented themselves as owners of the property which
was for lease.
In response, the Mayor of Malolos sought assistance from the Philippine
National Police who were led by Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo
and sought to protect, secure and maintain the possession of the
property. The respondents, however, refused to surrender possession
invoking a prior permanent injunction issued by the RTC of Malolos which
they claimed enjoined the Provincial Government of Bulacan from
repossessing the property.
On 03 March 2008, respondents herein filed for a Respectful MotionPetition for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data alleging that despite the
permanent injunction, petitioners entered the property and arrested the
respondents when they attempted to resist the entry.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:
The RTC of Malolos granted the petition for amparo and habeas data as the
respondents has sufficiently proven that the petitioners committed acts
2.
1.
No
2.
No.
SUPREME COURT RULINGS:
security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners entry into
the property.
It bears emphasis that respondents petition did not show any actual
violation, imminent or continuing threat to their life, liberty and security.
Bare allegations that petitioners in unison, conspiracy and in contempt of
court, there and then willfully, forcibly and feloniously with the use of force
and intimidation entered and forcibly, physically manhandled the
petitioners
(respondents)
and
arrested
the
herein
petitioners
(respondents) will not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the
writ of amparo. No undue confinement or detention was present. In fact,
respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a day after thei r
arrest.
Habeas data cannot be invoked when respondents are not
gathering, collecting, or storing data or information Oddly,
respondents also seek the issuance of a writ of habeas data when it is not
even alleged that petitioners are gathering, collecting or storing data or
information regarding their person, family, home and correspondence.
More importantly, respondent Amanda and one of her sons, Francisco Jr.,
likewise filed a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data before the
Sandiganbayan, they alleging the commission of continuing threats by
petitioners after the issuance of the writs by the RTC. Such petition was
correctly dismissed for insufficiency and forum shopping.
It thus appears that respondents are not without recourse and have in fact
taken full advantage of the legal system with the filing of civil, criminal and
administrative charges.
It need not be underlined that respondents petitions for writs of amparo
and habeas data are extraordinary remedies which cannot be used as tools
to stall the execution of a final and executory decision in a property
dispute.
An independent action for Amparo and Habeas Data is improper once
criminal proceedings have been commenced; must be raised by motion in
the criminal proceedings At all events, respondents filing of the petitions
for writs of amparo and habeas data should have been barred, for criminal
proceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested in
flagrante delicto and proceeded against in accordance with Section 6, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or the proceedings
conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set up by respondents
during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data.
The reliefs afforded by the writs may, however, be made available to the
aggrieved party by motion in the criminal proceedings.
It bears stressing that nowhere in the transcript of the CA hearing on
December 3, 2009, nor in the Order recited in open court by Justice Pizarro,
is there an affirmation of petitioner Sos claim that the confinement of
accused Guisande at the NCMH was illegal. Neither were the respective
acts performed by respondents Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente in ascertaining
the mental condition of accused Guisande to withstand trial declared
unlawful. On the contrary, the NCMH, a well-reputed government forensic
facility, albeit not held in high regard by petitioner Sos and accused
Guisandes family, had assessed Guisande fit for trial.
DISPOSITIVE:
The Supreme Court granted the Supreme Court granted the petition for
review on certiorari. Accordingly, the 04 March 2008 Order of the RTC of
Malolos, Bulacan is declared null and void, and its 28 March 2008 Decision
is reversed and set aside. The Supreme Court likewise dismissed Special
Civil Action No. 53-M-2008.
The Rules on the Writs of habeas corpus and amparo are clear; the
act or omission or the threatened act or omission complained of
confinement and custody for habeas corpus and violations of, or threat to
violate, a persons life, liberty, and security for amparo cases should be
illegal or unlawful.
As was held in Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the privilege of the writ of
amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life,
liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the
quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in
light of and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and
enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to
and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be
diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for
purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection
and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.
On the other hand, in Ampatuan v. Macaraig, the Court held that the
general purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or
not a particular person is legally held. The essential object and purpose of
the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom
if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of
action is sufficient. In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court
or judge must first inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of
his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of
detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause
is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the
petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be
refused.
In the cases at bar, the question before the CA was correctly limited to
which hospital, the NCMH or a medical facility of accuseds own choosing,
accused Guisande should be referred for treatment of a supposed mental
condition. In addition, we note that it was procedurally proper for the RTC
to ask the NCMH for a separate opinion on accuseds mental fitness to be
arraigned and stand trial. Be that as it may, the CA allowed the transfer of
accused to St. Clares Medical Center under the custody of Dr. Rene Yat.
Notwithstanding, Guisande remained in custody of the law to answer for
the non-bailable criminal charge against her, and was simply allowed to
pursue medical treatment in the hospital and from a doctor of her choice.
Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo
G.R. No. 189155
07 September 2010
PONENTE: Perez, J.
PARTIES:
1.
2.
1.
2.
it was not convinced that the respondents were responsible for the
abduction and torture of Roxas.
Aggrieved, Roxas filed an appeal with the Supreme Court.
PERTINENT ISSUES:
FACTS:
1.
2.
3.
On 19 May 2009, after doing survey work in Tarlac, Roxas and her
companions rested in the house of Mr. Jesus Paolo in Sitio Bagong Sikat.
While Roxas and her companions were resting, 15 heavily armed men in
civilian clothes forcibly entered the house and dragged them inside a van.
When they alighted from the van, she was informed that she is being
detained for being a member of Communist Party of the Philippines-New
Peoples Army (CPP-NPA). She was then separated from her companions
and was brought to a room, from where she could hear sounds of gunfire,
noise of planes taking off and landing, and some construction bustle.
ANSWERS:
1.
2.
She was interrogated and tortured for 5 straight days to convince her to
abandon her communist beliefs. She was informed by a person named
RC that those who tortured her came from the Special Operations
Group and that she was abducted because her name is included in the
Order of Battle.
On 25 May 2009, Roxas was finally released and was given a cellular phone
with a sim card. She was sternly warned not to report the incident to the
group Karapatan or something untoward will happen to her and her family.
After her release, Roxas continued to receive calls from RC thru the cell
phone given to her. Out of apprehension, she threw the phone and the sim
card.
Hence, on 01 June 2009, Roxas filed a petition for the issuance of Writs of
Amparo and Habeas Data before the Supreme Court, impleading the highranking officials of military and Philippine National Police (PNP), on the
belief that it was the government agents who were behind her abduction
and torture.
On 09 June 2009, the Supreme Court issued the writs and referred the case
to the Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate
action. The Court of Appeals granted the privilege of writs of amparo and
habeas data. However, the court a quo absolved the respondents because
3.
No.
It depends. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable must be
preferred over mere circumstantial evidence.
Yes.
SUPREME COURT RULINGS:
1.
DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND THE WRIT OF
AMPARO
Command responsibility as justification in impleading respondents
is legally inaccurate The use of the doctrine of command responsibility
as justification in impleading the respondents in her amparo petition, is
legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. Such doctrine is a rule of substantive
law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal
basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition.
The Writ of Amparo as a protective remedy As held in the case of
Rubrico v. Arroyo, the writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at
providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures
and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific
violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or
security. It does not fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats,
whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable
substantive law. Since the application of command responsibility
2.
3.
4.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. However,
it modified the directive of the Court of the Appeals for further
investigation, as follows:
PARTIES:
1.
1.
2.
PETITIONERS: MANILA
DEYTO and RUBEN A. SAPITULA
ELECTRIC
COMPANY,
ALEXANDER
S.
2.
act and omission consisting of their continued failure and refusal to provide
her with details or information about the alleged report which MERALCO
purportedly received concerning threats to her safety and security amount
to a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and security, correctible
by habeas data. Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining petitioners from effecting her
transfer to the MERALCO Alabang Sector.
In its Decision dated 22 September 2008, the RTC granted respondents
petition including the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directing
petitioners to desist from implementing respondents transfer until such
time that petitioners comply with the disclosures required. The trial court
justified its ruling by declaring that recourse to a writ of habeas data
should extend not only to victims of extra-legal killings and political
activists but also to ordinary citizens, like respondent whose rights to life
and security are jeopardized by petitioners refusal to provide her with
information or data on the reported threats to her person.
Thus, the petition for review.
Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen.
ANSWER: No.
In a Memorandum dated 04 July 2008, Alexander Deyto, Head of
MERALCOs Human Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent
to MERALCOs Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as A/F OTMS Clerk, effective
July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt of reports that there were
accusations and threats directed against [her] from unknown individuals
and which could possibly compromise [her] safety and security.
The respondent however, did not agree with her transfer and filed an
appeal with Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice- President and Head of MERALCOs
Human Resource Administration, and requested for a dialogue so she could
voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the
punitive nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process. She
likewise claimed the grueling travel from her residence in Pampanga to
Alabang and back entails, and violation of the provisions on job security of
their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her
transfer pending resolution of the issues she raised.
No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan. She claimed petitioners unlawful