Lambino vs. Comelec

160
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lambino vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 174153. October 25, 2006.*
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952
REGISTERED VOTERS, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., intervenor.
ONEVOICE, INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III,
BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE, and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., intervenors.
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, intervenor.
BAYAN represented by its Chairperson Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, BAYAN MUNA
represented by its Chairperson Dr. Reynaldo Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO
represented by its Secretary General Joel Maglunsod, HEAD represented by its
Secretary General Dr. Gene Alzona Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM
represented by Fr. Dionito Cabillas, MIGRANTE represented by its Chairperson
Concepcion Bragas-Regalado, GABRIELA represented by its Secretary General
Emerenciana de Jesus, GABRIELA WOMENS PARTY represented by Sec. Gen. Cristina
Palabay, ANAKBAYAN represented by Chairperson Eleanor de Guzman, LEAGUE OF
FILIPINO STUDENTS represented by Chair Vencer Crisostomo Palabay, JOJO PINEDA
of the League of Concerned Professionals and Businessmen, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO
of the Solidarity of Health Against
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* EN BANC.
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Charter Change, DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS of Health Action for Human Rights,
intervenors.
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA THERESA HONTIVEROSBARAQUEL, intervenors.
LUWALHATI RIACASA ANTONINO, intervenor.
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, intervenor.
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor.

LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO, intervenor.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA,
TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS,
JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG, intervenors.
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, and RUELO BAYA, intervenors.
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and MR.
VICTORINO F. BALAIS, intervenors.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR.,
intervenor.
SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., intervenor.
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L.
SALVADOR, and RANDALL TABAYOYONG, intervenors.
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CITY AND CEBU PROVINCE CHAPTERS,
intervenors.
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and SENATORS SERGIO R.
OSMEA III, JAMBY MADRIGAL, JING162
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GOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO LACSON, intervenors.
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, intervenors.
G.R. No. 174299. October 25, 2006.*
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A.V. SAGUISAG,
petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S.
ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A.
TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, and
John Doe and Peter Doe, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Amendments and Revisions of the Constitution; Peoples
Initiative; The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the
peoplefirst, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal, and,
second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a
petition; The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the
face of the petition, or attached to it, and if so attached, the petition must state the
fact of such attachment.The essence of amendments directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition is that the entire proposal on its face is a
petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First,
the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the
proposal must be embodied in a petition. These essential elements are present only
if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express
their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition only if the
people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the
petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such
attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of
signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments
before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to
prove that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the
proposed amendments before signing.
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Same; Same; Same; The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed the concept
of peoples initiative from the United States where various State constitutions
incorporate an initiative clause; A signature requirement would be meaningless if
the person supplying the signature has not first seen what it is that he or she is
signing.The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed the concept of peoples
initiative from the United States where various State constitutions incorporate an
initiative clause. In almost all States which allow initiative petitions, the unbending
requirement is that the people must first see the full text of the proposed
amendments before they sign to signify their assent, and that the people must sign
on an initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. The
rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in several decisions of
various courts. Thus, in Capezzuto v. State Ballot Commission, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, affirmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, declared: [A] signature
requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the signature has not
first seen what it is that he or she is signing. Further, and more importantly, loose
interpretation of the subscription requirement can pose a significant potential for
fraud. A person permitted to describe orally the contents of an initiative petition to a
potential signer, without the signer having actually examined the petition, could
easily mislead the signer by, for example, omitting, downplaying, or even flatly
misrepresenting, portions of the petition that might not be to the signers liking.
This danger seems particularly acute when, in this case, the person giving the
description is the drafter of the petition, who obviously has a vested interest in
seeing that it gets the requisite signatures to qualify for the ballot.
Same; Same; Same; While the Constitution does not expressly state that the
petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments, the deliberations
of the framers of the Constitution clearly show that the framers intended to adopt
the relevant American jurisprudence on peoples initiative. Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full
text of the proposed amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our
Constitution clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the relevant American
jurisprudence on peoples initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the
people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign,
and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full text. Indeed,
Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act that
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the Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires that the people must sign the petition
x x x as signatories.
Same; Same; Same; There is no presumption that the proponents observed the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signaturesthe proponents bear the
burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in
gathering the signatures, i.e., that the petition contained, or incorporated by
attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.The proponents of the
initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure the
signatures in their private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are
not disinterested parties who can impartially explain the advantages and
disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people. The proponents present
favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against
their proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather the
signatures. Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the
burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in
gathering the signaturesthat the petition contained, or incorporated by
attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.
Same; Same; Same; It is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed
amendment must be incorporated with, or attached to, the initiative petition signed
by the people; The Lambino Groups citation of Corpus Juris Secundum pulls the rug
from under their feet.The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris
Secundum, stating that a signer who did not read the measure attached to a
referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not
understand the nature of the act. The Lambino Group quotes an authority that
cites a proposed change attached to the petition signed by the people. Even the
authority the Lambino Group quotes requires that the proposed change must be
attached to the petition. The same authority the Lambino Group quotes requires the
people to sign on the petition itself. Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence
that the proposed amendment must be incorporated with, or attached to, the
initiative petition signed by the people. In the present initiative, the Lambino
Groups proposed changes were not incorporated with, or attached to, the signature
sheets. The Lambino Groups citation of Corpus Juris Secundum pulls the rug from
under their feet.
Same; Same; Same; Logrolling; There is logrolling when the initiative petition
incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same petition; Under American
jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire proposi165
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tion and not only the unrelated subject matter.The Lambino Groups initiative
springs another surprise on the people who signed the signature sheets. The
proposed changes mandate the interim Parliament to make further amendments or
revisions to the Constitution. The proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory
Provisions, provides: Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these
amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or
revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy,
decentralization and a strong bureaucracy. During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino
stated that this provision is a surplusage and the Court and the people should
simply ignore it. Far from being a surplusage, this provision invalidates the Lambino
Groups initiative. Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from
the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system. American
jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this as logrollingwhen the initiative petition
incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same petition. This puts the people
in a dilemma since they can answer only either yes or no to the entire proposition,
forcing them to sign a petition that effectively contains two propositions, one of
which they may find unacceptable. Under American jurisprudence, the effect of
logrolling is to nullify the entire proposition and not only the unrelated subject
matter.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people.
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air Alaska v. McAlpine,
698 P.2d 1173, 1184 (1985), the Supreme Court of Alaska warned against
inadvertence, stealth and fraud in logrolling: Whenever a bill becomes law
through the initiative process, all of the problems that the single-subject rule was
enacted to prevent are exacerbated. There is a greater danger of logrolling, or the
deliberate intermingling of issues to increase the likelihood of an initiatives
passage, and there is a greater opportunity for inadvertence, stealth and fraud in
the enactment-by-initiative process. The drafters of an initiative operate
independently of any structured or supervised process. They often emphasize
particular provisions of their proposition, while remaining silent on other (more
complex or less appealing) provisions, when communicating to the public. x x x
Indeed, initiative promoters typically use simplistic advertising to present their
initiative to potential petition-signers and eventual voters. Many voters will never
read the full text of the initiative before the election. More importantly, there is no
process for amending or splitting the several provisions in an initiative proposal.
These difficulties clearly distinguish the initiative from the legislative process.
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Same; Same; Same; An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without
first showing to the people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a
deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people.The signature
sheets do not explain this discrimination against the Senators. The 6.3 million
people who signed the signature sheets could not have known that their signatures
would be used to discriminate against the Senators. They could not have known
that their signatures would be used to limit, after 30 June 2010, the interim
Parliaments choice of Prime Minister only to members of the existing House of
Representatives. An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first
showing to the people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a
deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That is why the
Constitution requires that an initiative must be directly proposed by the people x x
x in a petitionmeaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains the
full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nations
fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be
hidden from the people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed,
faceless, and unelected individuals. The Constitution entrusts to the people the
power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. This Court trusts the
wisdom of the people even if the members of this Court do not personally know the
people who sign the petition. However, this trust emanates from a fundamental
assumption: the full text of the proposed amendment is first shown to the people
before they sign the petition, not after they have signed the petition.
Same; Same; Same; Amendment and Revision, Distinguished; Words and
Phrases; The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction
between amendment and revision of the Constitution.There can be no mistake
about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction
between amendment and revision of the Constitution. The framers intended,
and wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions
to the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a peoples initiative may
propose only amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent and language of
the Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to propose revisions to
the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are empowered
to propose amendments.
Same; Same; Same; A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million signatures,
cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes prescribed in the
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Constitution itself.Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a
peoples initiative can only propose amendments to the Constitution since the
Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments. There can be no deviation from
the constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A popular clamor,
even one backed by 6.3 million signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the
specific modes prescribed in the Constitution itself.
Same; Same; Same; Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle
in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system
of checks-and-balances, and there is also revision if the change alters the
substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial
provisions of the constitution; Amendment broadly refers to a change that adds,
reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved; Revision generally
affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects
only the specific provision being amended.Courts have long recognized the
distinction between an amendment and a revision of a constitution. One of the
earliest cases that recognized the distinction described the fundamental difference
in this manner: [T]he very term constitution implies an instrument of a permanent
and abiding nature, and the provisions contained therein for its revision indicate the
will of the people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the
substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding
nature. On the other hand, the significance of the term amendment implies such
an addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an
improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed. (Emphasis
supplied) Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the
constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of
checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial
entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the
constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds,
reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally
affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects
only the specific provision being amended.
Same; Same; Same; The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is so
extensive in its provisions as to change directly the substantial entirety of the
constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisionsthe
court examines only the number of provisions affected and
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does not consider the degree of change; The qualitative test inquires into the
qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitutionthe main inquiry is
whether the change will accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our
basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision.In California where the
initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in
our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and
the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is so
extensive in its provisions as to change directly the substantial entirety of the
constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions. The court
examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree
of the change. The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the
proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will
accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan
as to amount to a revision. Whether there is an alteration in the structure of
government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, a change in the nature of [the]
basic governmental plan includes change in its fundamental framework or the
fundamental powers of its Branches. A change in the nature of the basic
governmental plan also includes changes that jeopardize the traditional form of
government and the system of check and balances.
Same; Same; Same; Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino
Groups initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment; A change in the
structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great
co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution is reduced into two; A
shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
system is a revision of the Constitutionmerging the legislative and executive
branches is a radical change in the structure of the government.Under both the
quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Groups initiative is a revision and
not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Groups proposed changes
overhaul two articlesArticle VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive
affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the

proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from
presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. A
change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the
three great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are
reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift
from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
system is a revision of the Constitution. Merg169
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ing the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of
government.
Same; Same; Same; By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a
Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition
of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is
beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. The abolition alone of the Office
of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of powers and
thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one
chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the
legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution. By any legal test and
under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a UnicameralParliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the
abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere
amendment. On the face alone of the Lambino Groups proposed changes, it is
readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the framework of government
as set forth in the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the
Constitution contradict the Lambino Groups theoryany theory advocating that a
proposed change involving a radical structural change in government does not
constitute a revision justly deserves rejection.The express intent of the framers
and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino Groups theory.
Where the intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and
plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language. Any
theory espousing a construction contrary to such intent and language deserves
scant consideration. More so, if such theory wreaks havoc by creating
inconsistencies in the form of government established in the Constitution. Such a
theory, devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and inviting inconsistencies in the
Constitution, only exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Groups position. Any
theory advocating that a proposed change involving a radical structural change in

government does not constitute a revision justly deserves rejection.
Same; Same; Same; Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision
of the Constitution without affecting any other section or article, the change may
generally be considered an amendment and not a revision.We can visualize
amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end green for amendments and at
the other end red for revisions. Towards the middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and
difficulties arise in determining whether there is an amendment or revision. The
present initiative is indisputably located at
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the far end of the red spectrum where revision begins. The present initiative seeks a
radical overhaul of the existing separation of powers among the three co-equal
departments of government, requiring far-reaching amendments in several sections
and articles of the Constitution. Where the proposed change applies only to a
specific provision of the Constitution without affecting any other section or article,
the change may generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. For
example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years is an
amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of
mass media companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not a
revision. Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for
election to the Presidency is an amendment and not a revision.
Same; Same; Same; There can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an
amendment or a revisiona change in a single word of one sentence of the
Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment.There can be no fixed rule
on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a single word of
one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For
example, the substitution of the word republican with monarchic or theocratic
in Section 1, Article II of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of
government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each
specific change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects
other provisions, as well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully
crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the
existing Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or
several provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings
is best suited to undertake a revision.Since a revision of a constitution affects
basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body with
recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision requires
harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered principles with those
that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies
like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On
the other hand, constitutions allow peoples initiatives, which do not have fixed and
identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only
amendments and not revisions.
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Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The basic rule in statutory construction
is that if a later law is irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law, the later law
prevails.In the present initiative, the Lambino Groups proposed Section 2 of the
Transitory Provisions states: Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the
incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and
Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby
retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless
they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of government, in which case,
they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of
government; x x x x (Emphasis supplied) The basic rule in statutory construction is
that if a later law is irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law, the later law
prevails. This rule also applies to construction of constitutions. However, the
Lambino Groups draft of Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions turns on its head this
rule of construction by stating that in case of such irreconcilable inconsistency, the
earlier provision shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary
form of government. The effect is to freeze the two irreconcilable provisions until
the earlier one shall be amended, which requires a future separate constitutional
amendment.
Same; Same; Same; A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential to a UnicameralParliamentary system requires harmonizing several provisions in many articles of
the Constitution; Revision of the Constitution through a peoples initiative will only
result in gross absurdities in the Constitution. Now, what unicameral
parliamentary form of government do the Lambino Groups proposed changes refer
tothe Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand models, which are among
the few countries with unicameral parliaments? The proposed changes could not
possibly refer to the traditional and well-known parliamentary forms of government
the British, French, Spanish, German, Italian, Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian
models, which have all bicameral parliaments. Did the people who signed the
signature sheets realize that they were adopting the Bangladeshi, Singaporean,
Israeli, or New Zealand parliamentary form of government? This drives home the
point that the peoples initiative is not meant for revisions of the Constitution but
only for amendments. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential to a

Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires harmonizing several provisions in many
articles of the Constitution. Revision of the Constitution through a peoples initiative
will only result in gross absurdities in the Constitution.
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Same; Same; Same; Initiative and Referendum Act (R.A. No. 6735); Judicial Review;
There is no need to revisit the Courts ruling in Santiago v. Commission on Elections,
270 SCRA 106 (1997), declaring R.A. No. 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting
in essential terms and conditions to cover the system of initiative to amend the
Constitutionan affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of
the present petition; The Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the
constitutionality of a statute if the case before the Court can be resolved on some
other grounds.The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with
the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct
and scope of a peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to
revisit this Courts ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions to cover the system of initiative to
amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the
outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago
which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the
Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.
This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute if
the case before the Court can be resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance
is a logical consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts will not pass upon
the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved on some other grounds.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the people must
sign the petition as signatories.Even then, the present initiative violates Section
5(b) of RA 6735 which requires that the petition for an initiative on the 1987
Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of
registered voters as signatories. Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the people
must sign the petition x x x as signatories. The 6.3 million signatories did not sign
the petition of 25 August 2006 or the amended petition of 30 August 2006 filed with
the COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty. Alberto
C. Agra signed the petition and amended petition as counsels for Raul L. Lambino
and Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners. In the COMELEC the Lambino Group, claiming
to act together with the 6.3 million signatories, merely attached the signature
sheets to the petition and amended petition. Thus, the petition and amended
petition filed with the COMELEC did not even comply with the basic requirement of
RA 6735 that the Lambino Group claims as valid.
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Same; Same; Same; Same; The Lambino Groups logrolling initiative also violates
Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, No petition embracing more than one (1) subject
shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x.The Lambino Groups logrolling
initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, No petition embracing
more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x. The proposed
Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to
propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter
totally unrelated to the shift in the form of government. Since the present initiative
embraces more than one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits submission of the
initiative petition to the electorate. Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid, the Lambino
Groups initiative will still fail.
Same; Same; Same; Certiorari; Commission on Elections; For following the Courts
ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the COMELEC.In dismissing
the Lambino Groups initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc merely followed this
Courts ruling in Santiago and Peoples Initiative for Reform, Modernization and
Action (PIRMA) v. COMELEC. For following this Courts ruling, no grave abuse of
discretion is attributable to the COMELEC. On this ground alone, the present petition
warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this Court should reiterate its unanimous ruling in
PIRMA: The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of
discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the
petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the
dispositions in the Decisions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March
19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.
Same; Same; Same; A revolving-door constitution does not augur well for the rule of
law in the country.The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves
the utmost respect and obedience of all the citizens of this nation. No one can
trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in blatant violation of
the clearly specified modes of amendment and revision laid down in the
Constitution itself. To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the
Constitution in unchartered waters, to be tossed and turned by every dominant
political group of the day. If this Court allows today a cavalier change in the
Constitution outside the constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the new
dominant political group that comes will demand its own set of changes in the same
cavalier and unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door constitution does not augur
well for the rule of law in this country.
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Same; Same; Same; Incantations of peoples voice, peoples sovereign will, or
let the people decide cannot override the specific modes of changing the
Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution itself.No amount of signatures, not
even the 6,327,952 million signatures gathered by the Lambino Group, can change
our Constitution contrary to the specific modes that the people, in their sovereign
capacity, prescribed when they ratified the Constitution. The alternative is an extraconstitutional change, which means subverting the peoples sovereign will and
discarding the Constitution. This is one act the Court cannot and should never do.
As the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, this Court is sworn to perform its
solemn duty to defend and protect the Constitution, which embodies the real
sovereign will of the people. Incantations of peoples voice, peoples sovereign
will, or let the people decide cannot override the specific modes of changing the
Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution itself. Otherwise, the Constitutionthe
peoples fundamental covenant that provides enduring stability to our society
becomes easily susceptible to manipulative changes by political groups gathering
signatures through false promises. Then, the Constitution ceases to be the bedrock
of the nations stability.
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Separate Concurring Opinion:

Initiative; Initiative and Referendum Act (R.A. No. 6735); Certiorari; Commission on
Elections; Even assuming arguendo that Comelec erred in ruling on a very difficult
and unsettled question of law, the Supreme Court still cannot attribute grave abuse
of discretion to the poll body with respect to that action.The Comelec did not
violate the Constitution, the laws or any jurisprudence. Neither can whim, caprice,
arbitrariness or personal bias be attributed to the Commission. Quite the contrary, it
prudently followed this Courts jurisprudence in Santiago and PIRMA. Even assuming
arguendo that Comelec erred in ruling on a very difficult and unsettled question of
law, this Court still cannot attribute grave abuse of discretion to the poll body with
respect to that action.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Until and unless Santiago v. Commission
on Elections, 270 SCRA 106 (1997), is revisited and changed by this Court or the
legal moorings of the exercise of the right are substantially changed, the Comelec
cannot be faulted for acting in accord with the Supreme Courts pronouncements.
Until and unless Santiago is revisited and changed by this Court or the legal
moorings of the exercise of the right are substantially changed, the Comelec cannot
be faulted for acting in accord with this Courts pronouncements. Respondent
Commission has no discre175
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tion, under any guise, to refuse enforcement of any final decision of this Court. The
refusal of the poll body to act on the Lambino Petition was its only recourse. Any
other mode of action would appear not only presumptuous, but also contemptuous.
It would have constituted defiance of the Court and would have surely been struck
down as grave abuse of discretion and contumacious disregard of the supremacy of
this Court as the final arbiter of justiciable controversies.
PUNO, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Initiative; Pleadings and Practice; Parties; There is no need for the more than six (6)
million signatories to execute separate documents to authorize petitioners to file
the petition for initiative in their behalf.Oppositors-intervenors contend that
petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are not the proper parties to file the instant
petition as they were not authorized by the signatories in the petition for initiative.
The argument deserves scant attention. The Constitution requires that the petition
for initiative should be filed by at least twelve per cent (12%) of all registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
cent (3%) of all the registered voters therein. The petition for initiative filed by
Lambino and Aumentado before the COMELEC was accompanied by voluminous
signature sheets which prima facie show the intent of the signatories to support the
filing of said petition. Stated above their signatures in the signature sheets is the
following: x x x My signature herein which shall form part of the petition for initiative
to amend the Constitution signifies my support for the filing thereof. There is thus
no need for the more than six (6) million signatories to execute separate documents
to authorize petitioners to file the petition for initiative in their behalf.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Any person aggrieved by the act or inaction of
the respondent tribunal, board or officer may file a petition for certiorari or
mandamus before the appropriate court.Neither is it necessary for said
signatories to authorize Lambino and Aumentado to file the petition for certiorari
and mandamus before this Court. Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides who may file a petition for certiorari and mandamus. Sections 1 and 3 of
Rule 65 read: SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, a
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person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court x x x x.
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station x x x and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court x x x x. Thus, any
person aggrieved by the act or inaction of the respondent tribunal, board or officer
may file a petition for certiorari or mandamus before the appropriate court.
Certainly, Lambino and Aumentado, as among the proponents of the petition for
initiative dismissed by the COMELEC, have the standing to file the petition at bar.
Same; Same; Same; Initiative and Referendum Act (R.A. No. 6735); Judgments;
Stare Decisis; Words and Phrases; The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta
movere means stand by the thing and do not disturb the calm; The doctrine of
stare decisis started with the English Courts and later migrated to the United States.
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means stand by the thing
and do not disturb the calm. The doctrine started with the English Courts.
Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the 18th century, it is an established
rule to abide by former precedents where the same points come again in litigation.
As the rule evolved, early limits to its application were recognized: (1) it would not
be followed if it were plainly unreasonable; (2) where courts of equal authority
developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was the
actual principle or principles necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning
used to reach the decision. The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was
recognized by the framers of the U.S. Constitution. According to Hamilton, strict
rules and precedents are necessary to prevent arbitrary discretion in the courts.
Madison agreed but stressed that x x x once the precedent ventures into the realm
of altering or repealing the law, it should be rejected. Prof. Consovoy well noted
that Hamilton and Madison disagree about the countervailing policy considerations
that would allow a judge to abandon a precedent. He added that their ideas reveal
a deep internal conflict between the concreteness required by the rule of law and
the flexibility demanded in error correction. It is this internal conflict that the
Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two centuries.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Two strains of stare decisis have
been isolated by legal scholarsthe first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with
the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher
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courts to cases involving the same facts, and the second, known as horizontal stare
decisis requires that high courts must follow their own precedents; Vertical stare
decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been
viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a command. Two centuries of
American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoys observation although stare decisis
developed its own life in the United States. Two strains of stare decisis have been
isolated by legal scholars. The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the
duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving
the same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high
courts must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that
vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare
decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a command. Indeed,
stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is also instructive to distinguish
the two kinds of horizontal stare decisisconstitutional stare decisis and statutory
stare decisisthe distinction being important for courts enjoy more flexibility in
refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations.It is also instructive to
distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisisconstitutional stare decisis and
statutory stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations
of the Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes.
The distinction is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply
stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis view on the binding effect
of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds sway today. In soothing prose,
Brandeis stated: Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The
rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from,
is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to
consider a question once decided. In the same vein, the venerable Justice
Frankfurter opined: the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution
itself and not what we have said about it. In contrast, the application of stare
decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens
explains: after a statute has been construed, either by this Court or by a consistent
course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that
should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself.
This stance reflects both respect for Congress role and the need to preserve the
courts limited resources.
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Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Reasons for Following and Refusing
the Stare Decisis Rule.In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an
ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes
judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to
be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its application perpetuates illegitimate
and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate changing social and
political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law
solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for
future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An examination of decisions on
stare decisis in major countries will show that courts are agreed on the factors that
should be considered before overturning prior rulings, viz., workability, reliance,
intervening developments in the law and changes in fact, aside from the fact that
courts put in the balance the following determinantscloseness of the voting, age
of the prior decision and its merits.An examination of decisions on stare decisis in
major countries will show that courts are agreed on the factors that should be
considered before overturning prior rulings. These are workability, reliance,
intervening developments in the law and changes in fact. In addition, courts put in
the balance the following determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the prior
decision and its merits. The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow
the stare decisis rule in constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It
established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1) determine whether the rule has
proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2) consider whether
the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the
consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3)
determine whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have the
old rule no more than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out
whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently, as to have robbed
the old rule of significant application or justification.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In enacting R.A. 6735, it is daylight luminous that
Congress intended the said law to implement the right of the people, thru initiative,
to propose amendments to the Constitution by direct action. Let us reexamine the
validity of the view of the six (6) justices that R.A. 6735 is insufficient to implement
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution allowing amendments to the
Constitution to be directly proposed by the people through initiative. When laws are
challenged as unconstitu179
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tional, courts are counseled to give life to the intent of legislators. In enacting R.A.
6735, it is daylight luminous that Congress intended the said law to implement the
right of the people, thru initiative, to propose amendments to the Constitution by
direct action.
Same; Same; Same; Same; R.A. 6735 clearly expressed the legislative policy for the
people to propose amendments to the Constitution by direct action, and the fact
that the legislature may have omitted certain details in implementing the peoples
initiative in R.A. 6735, does not justify the conclusion that, ergo, the law is
insufficientwhat were omitted were mere details and not fundamental policies
which Congress alone can and has determined.The tragedy is that while
conceding this intent, the six (6) justices, nevertheless, ruled that x x x R.A. No.
6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar
as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned for the following
reasons: (1) Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to
the Constitution; (2) the Act does not provide for the contents of the petition for
initiative on the Constitution; and (3) while the Act provides subtitles for National
Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum
(Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. To say the
least, these alleged omissions are too weak a reason to throttle the right of the
sovereign people to amend the Constitution through initiative. R.A. 6735 clearly
expressed the legislative policy for the people to propose amendments to the
Constitution by direct action. The fact that the legislature may have omitted certain
details in implementing the peoples initiative in R.A. 6735, does not justify the
conclusion that, ergo, the law is insufficient. What were omitted were mere details
and not fundamental policies which Congress alone can and has determined.
Implementing details of a law can be delegated to the COMELEC and can be the
subject of its rule-making power. Under Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution,
the COMELEC has the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of initiatives. Its rule-making power has long been
recognized by this Court. In ruling R.A. 6735 insufficient but without striking it down
as unconstitutional, the six (6) justices failed to give due recognition to the
indefeasible right of the sovereign people to amend the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Amendment and Revision, Distinguished; Words and
Phrases; The words simple and substantial are not subject to any accurate
quantitative or qualitative test; We stand on unsafe ground if we use simple
arithmetic to determine whether the proposed changes are simple
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or substantial.The words simple and substantial are not subject to any

accurate quantitative or qualitative test. Obviously, relying on the quantitative test,
oppositors-intervenors assert that the amendments will result in some one hundred
(100) changes in the Constitution. Using the same test, however, it is also arguable
that petitioners seek to change basically only two (2) out of the eighteen (18)
articles of the 1987 Constitution, i.e. Article VI (Legislative Department) and Article
VII (Executive Department), together with the complementary provisions for a
smooth transition from a presidential bicameral system to a parliamentary
unicameral structure. The big bulk of the 1987 Constitution will not be affected
including Articles I (National Territory), II (Declaration of Principles and State
Policies), III (Bill of Rights), IV (Citizenship), V (Suffrage), VIII (Judicial Department),
IX (Constitutional Commissions), X (Local Government), XI (Accountability of Public
Officers), XII (National Economy and Patrimony), XIII (Social Justice and Human
Rights), XIV (Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports), XV (The
Family), XVI (General Provisions), and even XVII (Amendments or Revisions). In fine,
we stand on unsafe ground if we use simple arithmetic to determine whether the
proposed changes are simple or substantial.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The proposed changes will not change the
fundamental nature of our state as a democratic and republican state. Nor can
this Court be surefooted if it applies the qualitative test to determine whether the
said changes are simple or substantial as to amount to a revision of the
Constitution. The well-regarded political scientist, Garner, says that a good
constitution should contain at least three (3) sets of provisions: the constitution of
liberty which sets forth the fundamental rights of the people and imposes certain
limitations on the powers of the government as a means of securing the enjoyment
of these rights; the constitution of government which deals with the framework of
government and its powers, laying down certain rules for its administration and
defining the electorate; and, the constitution of sovereignty which prescribes the
mode or procedure for amending or revising the constitution. It is plain that the
proposed changes will basically affect only the constitution of government. The
constitutions of liberty and sovereignty remain unaffected. Indeed, the proposed
changes will not change the fundamental nature of our state as x x x a democratic
and republican state. It is self-evident that a unicameral-parliamentary form of
government will not make our State any less democratic or any less republican in
character. Hence, neither will the use of the qualitative test resolve the issue of
whether the proposed changes are simple or substantial.
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Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Our Constitutions carried the traditional
distinction between amendment and revision, i.e., amendment means
change, including complex changes while revision means complete change,

including the adoption of an entirely new covenant.Our Constitutions did not
adopt any quantitative or qualitative test to determine whether an amendment is
simple or substantial. Nor did they provide that substantial amendments are
beyond the power of the people to propose to change the Constitution. Instead, our
Constitutions carried the traditional distinction between amendment and
revision, i.e., amendment means change, including complex changes while
revision means complete change, including the adoption of an entirely new
covenant. The legal dictionaries express this traditional difference between
amendment and revision. Blacks Law Dictionary defines amendment as [a]
formal revision or addition proposed or made to a statute, constitution, pleading,
order, or other instrument; specifically, a change made by addition, deletion, or
correction. Blacks also refers to amendment as the process of making such a
revision. Revision, on the other hand, is defined as [a] reexamination or careful
review for correction or improvement. In parliamentary law, it is described as [a]
general and thorough rewriting of a governing document, in which the entire
document is open to amendment. Similarly, Ballentines Law Dictionary defines
amendmentas [a] correction or revision of a writing to correct errors or better
to state its intended purpose and amendment of constitution as [a] process of
proposing, passing, and ratifying amendments to the x x x constitution. In contrast,
revision, when applied to a statute (or constitution), contemplates the reexamination of the same subject matter contained in the statute (or constitution),
and the substitution of a new, and what is believed to be, a still more perfect rule.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; It is familiar learning,
however, that opinions in a constitutional convention, especially if inconclusive of
an issue, are of very limited value as explaining doubtful phrases, and are an unsafe
guide (to the intent of the people) since the constitution derives its force as a
fundamental law, not from the action of the convention but from the powers (of the
people) who have ratified and adopted it. The oppositors-intervenors who peddle
the above proposition rely on the opinions of some Commissioners expressed in the
course of the debate on how to frame the amendment/revision provisions of the
1987 Constitution. It is familiar learning, however, that opinions in a constitutional
convention, especially if inconclusive of an issue, are of very limited value as
explaining doubtful phrases, and are an unsafe guide (to the intent of the peo182
182
ple) since the constitution derives its force as a fundamental law, not from the
action of the convention but from the powers (of the people) who have ratified and
adopted it. Debates in the constitutional convention are of value as showing the
views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but
they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much
less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument
the force of fundamental law. Indeed, a careful perusal of the debates of the
Constitutional Commissioners can likewise lead to the conclusion that there was no
abandonment of the traditional distinction between amendment and revision.
For during the debates, some of the commissioners referred to the concurring
opinion of former Justice Felix Q. Antonio in Javellana v. The Executive Secretary,
that stressed the traditional distinction between amendment and revision.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is arguable that when the framers of the
1987 Constitution used the word revision, they had in mind the rewriting of the
whole Constitution, or the total overhaul of the Constitutionanything less is an
amendment or just a change of specific provisions only.It is arguable that
when the framers of the 1987 Constitution used the word revision, they had in
mind the rewriting of the whole Constitution, or the total overhaul of the
Constitution. Anything less is an amendment or just a change of specific
provisions only, the intention being not the change of the entire Constitution, but
only the improvement of specific parts or the addition of provisions deemed
essential as a consequence of new conditions or the elimination of parts already
considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of the times. Under this view,
substantial amendments are still amendments and thus can be proposed by the
people via an initiative.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The constitution does not derive its force
from the convention which framed it, but from the people who ratified it, the intent
to be arrived at is that of the people, and it is not to be supposed that they have
looked for any dark or abstruse meaning in the words employed, but rather that
they have accepted them in the sense most obvious to the common understanding,
and ratified the instrument in the belief that that was the sense designed to be
conveyed; A constitution is not to be interpreted on narrow or technical principles,
but liberally and on broad general lines, to accomplish the object of its
establishment and carry out the great principles of governmentnot to defeat
them.As we cannot be guided with certainty by the inconclusive opinions of the
Commissioners on the difference
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between simple and substantial amendments or whether substantial
amendments amounting to revision are covered by peoples initiative, it behooves
us to follow the cardinal rule in interpreting Constitutions, i.e., construe them to give
effect to the intention of the people who adopted it. The illustrious Cooley explains
its rationale well, viz.: x x x the constitution does not derive its force from the
convention which framed it, but from the people who ratified it, the intent to be
arrived at is that of the people, and it is not to be supposed that they have looked
for any dark or abstruse meaning in the words employed, but rather that they have
accepted them in the sense most obvious to the common understanding, and
ratified the instrument in the belief that that was the sense designed to be
conveyed. These proceedings therefore are less conclusive of the proper
construction of the instrument than are legislative proceedings of the proper
construction of a statute; since in the latter case it is the intent of the legislature we
seek, while in the former we are endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the people
through the discussion and deliberations of their representatives. The history of the
calling of the convention, the causes which led to it, and the discussions and issues
before the people at the time of the election of the delegates, will sometimes be
quite as instructive and satisfactory as anything to be gathered form the
proceedings of the convention. Corollarily, a constitution is not to be interpreted on
narrow or technical principles, but liberally and on broad general lines, to
accomplish the object of its establishment and carry out the great principles of
governmentnot to defeat them. One of these great principles is the sovereignty of
the people.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The argument that the people through
initiative cannot propose substantial amendments to change the Constitution turns
sovereignty on its head.The end result is Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution which expressed the right of the sovereign people to propose
amendments to the Constitution by direct action or through initiative. To that
extent, the delegated power of Congress to amend or revise the Constitution has to
be adjusted downward. Thus, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution has to be
reminted and now provides: The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress
of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives,
except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum. Prescinding from these baseline premises, the argument that the
people through initiative cannot propose substantial amendments to change the
Constitution turns sovereignty on its head. At the very least, the submission
constricts the democratic space for the exercise of the direct sovereignty of the
people. It also denigrates the
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sovereign people who they claim can only be trusted with the power to propose
simple but not substantial amendments to the Constitution. According to Sinco,
the concept of sovereignty should be strictly understood in its legal meaning as it
was originally developed in law. Legal sovereignty, he explained, is the possession
of unlimited power to make laws. Its possessor is the legal sovereign. It implies the
absence of any other party endowed with legally superior powers and privileges. It
is not subject to law for it is the author and source of law. Legal sovereignty is thus
the equivalent of legal omnipotence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Sovereignty or popular sovereignty,
emphasizes the supremacy of the peoples will over the state which they
themselves have created.Sovereignty or popular sovereignty, emphasizes the
supremacy of the peoples will over the state which they themselves have created.
The state is created by and subject to the will of the people, who are the source of
all political power. Rightly, we have ruled that the sovereignty of our people is not
a kabalistic principle whose dimensions are buried in mysticism. Its metes and
bounds are familiar to the framers of our Constitutions. They knew that in its
broadest sense, sovereignty is meant to be supreme, the jus summi imperu, the
absolute right to govern.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; Judgments; COMELECs reliance on
Santiago v. Commission on Elections, 336 Phil. 848 (1997), constitutes grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdictionthe Santiago case did not establish
the firm doctrine that R.A. 6735 is not a sufficient law to implement the
constitutional provision allowing peoples initiative to amend the Constitution.I
respectfully submit that COMELECs reliance on Santiago constitutes grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Santiago case did not establish the
firm doctrine that R.A. 6735 is not a sufficient law to implement the constitutional
provision allowing peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. To recapitulate, the
records show that in the original decision, eight (8) justices voted that R.A. 6735
was not a sufficient law; five (5) justices voted that said law was sufficient; and one
(1) justice abstained from voting on the issue holding that unless and until a proper
initiatory pleading is filed, the said issue is not ripe for adjudication. Within the
reglementary period, the respondents filed their motion for reconsideration. On June
10, 1997, the Court denied the motion. Only thirteen (13) justices resolved the
motion for Justice Torres inhibited himself. Of the original majority of eight (8)
justices, only six (6) reiterated their ruling that R.A. 6735 was an insufficient law.
Justice Hermosisima, originally part of the majority of eight (8) justices, changed his
vote and
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joined the minority of five (5) justices. He opined without any equivocation that R.A.
6735 was a sufficient law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Under any alchemy of law, a deadlocked
vote of six (6) is not a majority and a non-majority cannot write a rule with
precedential value.It ought to be beyond debate that the six (6) justices who
voted that R.A. 6735 is an insufficient law failed to establish a doctrine that could
serve as a precedent. Under any alchemy of law, a deadlocked vote of six (6) is not
a majority and a non-majority cannot write a rule with precedential value.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In the United States, an affirmance in the
Federal Supreme Court upon equal division of opinion is not an authority for the
determination of other cases, either in that Court or in the inferior federal courts.
The jurisprudence that an equally divided Court can never set a precedent is wellsettled. Thus, in the United States, an affirmance in the Federal Supreme Court
upon equal division of opinion is not an authority for the determination of other
cases, either in that Court or in the inferior federal courts. In Neil v. Biggers, which
was a habeas corpus state proceeding by a state prisoner, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that its equally divided affirmance of petitioners state court conviction was not
an actual adjudication barring subsequent consideration by the district court on
habeas corpus. In discussing the non-binding effect of an equal division ruling, the
Court reviewed the history of cases explicating the disposition affirmed by an
equally divided Court: In this light, we review our cases explicating the disposition
affirmed by an equally divided Court. On what was apparently the first occasion of
an equal division, The Antelope, 10 Wheat, 66, 6 L. Ed. 268 (1825), the Court simply
affirmed on the point of division without much discussion. Id., at 126-127. Faced
with a similar division during the next Term, the Court again affirmed, Chief Justice
Marshall explaining that the principles of law which have been argued, cannot be
settled; but the judgment is affirmed, the court being divided in opinion upon it.
Etting v. Bank of United States, 11 Wheat. 59, 78, 6 L. Ed. 419 (1826). As was later
elaborated in such cases, it is the appellant or petitioner who asks the Court to
overturn a lower courts decree. If the judges are divided, the reversal cannot be
had, for no order can be made. The judgment of the court below, therefore, stands
in full force. It is indeed, the settled practice in such case to enter a judgment of
affirmance; but this is only the most convenient mode of expressing the fact that
the cause is finally disposed of in conformity with the action of the court below, and
that that court can proceed to enforce its judgment. The legal effect would be the
same
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if the appeal, or writ of error, were dismissed. Durant v. Essex Co., 7 Wall. 107, 112,
19 L. Ed. 154 (1869). Nor is an affirmance by an equally divided Court entitled to
precedential weight. Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 264, 80 S. Ct. 1463,
1464, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1708 (1960). x x x This doctrine established in Neil has not been
overturned and has been cited with approval in a number of subsequent cases, and
has been applied in various state jurisdictions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The prevailing doctrine is that, the
affirmance by an equally divided court merely disposes of the present controversy
as between the parties and settles no issue of lawthe affirmance leaves unsettled
the principle of law presented by the case and is not entitled to precedential weight
or value.After a tour of these cases, we can safely conclude that the prevailing
doctrine is that, the affirmance by an equally divided court merely disposes of the
present controversy as between the parties and settles no issue of law; the
affirmance leaves unsettled the principle of law presented by the case and is not
entitled to precedential weight or value. In other words, the decision only has res
judicata and not stare decisis effect. It is not conclusive and binding upon other
parties as respects the controversies in other actions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Republicanism; Stripped of its abstractions, democracy
is all about who has the sovereign right to make decisions for the people and our
Constitution clearly and categorically says it is no other than the people themselves
from whom all government authority emanatesthis right of the people to make
decisions is the essence of sovereignty, and it cannot receive any minimalist
interpretation from this Court.The first principle enthroned by blood in our
Constitution is the sovereignty of the people. We ought to be concerned with this
first principle, i.e., the inherent right of the sovereign people to decide whether to
amend the Constitution. Stripped of its abstractions, democracy is all about who has
the sovereign right to make decisions for the people and our Constitution clearly
and categorically says it is no other than the people themselves from whom all
government authority emanates. This right of the people to make decisions is the
essence of sovereignty, and it cannot receive any minimalist interpretation from this
Court. If there is any principle in the Constitution that cannot be diluted and is nonnegotiable, it is this sovereign right of the people to decide.
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QUISUMBING, J., Separate Opinion:

Initiative; Clearly, by the power of popular initiative, the people have the sovereign
right to change the present Constitution.It must be stressed that no less than the
present Constitution itself empowers the people to directly propose amendments
through their own initiative. The subject of the instant petition is by way of
exercising that initiative in order to change our form of government from
presidential to parliamentary. Much has been written about the fulsome powers of
the people in a democracy. But the most basic concerns the idea that sovereignty
resides in the people and that all government authority emanates from them.
Clearly, by the power of popular initiative, the people have the sovereign right to
change the present Constitution. Whether the initial moves are done by a
Constitutional Convention, a Constitutional Assembly, or a Peoples Initiative, in the
end every amendmenthowever insubstantial or radicalmust be submitted to a
plebiscite. Thus, it is the ultimate will of the people expressed in the ballot, that
matters.
Same; Same; Same; Initiative and Referendum Act (R.A. No. 6735); Now that we
have revisited the Santiago v. COMELEC, 336 Phil. 848 (1997), decision, there is
only one clear task for COMELECin my view, the only doable option left for the
COMELEC, once factual issues are heard and resolved, is to give due course to the
petition for the initiative to amend our Constitution so that the sovereign people can
vote on whether a parliamentary system of government should replace the present
presidential system.I see no objection to the remand to the COMELEC of the
petition of Messrs. Lambino and Aumentado and 6.327 million voters, for further
examination of the factual requisites before a plebiscite is conducted. On page 4 of
the assailed Resolution of the respondent dated August 31, 2006, the COMELEC
tentatively expressed its view that even if the signatures in the instant Petition
appear to meet the required minimum per centum of the total number of registered
voters, the COMELEC could not give the Petition due course because of our view
that R.A. No. 6735 was inadequate. That, however, is now refuted by Mr. Justice
Punos scholarly ponencia. Now that we have revisited the Santiago v. COMELEC
decision, there is only one clear task for COMELEC. In my view, the only doable
option left for the COMELEC, once factual issues are heard and resolved, is to give
due course to the petition for the initiative to amend our Constitution so that the
sovereign people can vote on whether a parliamentary system of government
should replace the present presidential system.
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Separate Opinion:

Initiative; Evidently, for the people to propose amendments to the Constitution, they
must, in the first instance, know exactly what they are proposingit is not enough
that they merely possess a general idea of the proposed changes, as the
Constitution speaks of a direct proposal by the people.The necessity of setting
forth the text of the proposed constitutional changes in the petition for initiative to
be signed by the people cannot be seriously disputed. To begin with, Article XVII,
Section 2 of the Constitution unequivocally states that [a]mendments to this
Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon
a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of
the registered voters therein. Evidently, for the people to propose amendments to
the Constitution, they must, in the first instance, know exactly what they are
proposing. It is not enough that they merely possess a general idea of the proposed
changes, as the Constitution speaks of a direct proposal by the people.
Same; Same; Same; The requirement of setting forth the complete text of the
proposed changes in the petition for initiative is a safeguard against fraud and
deception.The requirement of setting forth the complete text of the proposed
changes in the petition for initiative is a safeguard against fraud and deception. If
the whole text of the proposed changes is contained in or attached to the petition,
intercalations and riders may be duly avoided. Only then can we be assured that the
proposed changes are truly of the people and that the signatories have been fully
apprised of its implications. If a statutory provision is essential to guard against
fraud, corruption or deception in the initiative and referendum process, such
provision must be viewed as an indispensable requirement and failure to
substantially comply therewith is fatal. The failure of petitioners in this case to
comply with the full text requirement resultantly rendered their petition for initiative
fatally defective.
Same; Same; Same; Logrolling; One-Subject One-Title Rule; The one subject rule, as
relating to an initiative to amend the Constitution, has the same object and purpose
as the one subject-one bill rule embodied in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the
Constitution; As applied to the initiative process, the one subject rule is essentially
designed to prevent surprise and fraud on the electorate.The petition for initiative
is likewise irretrievably infirm because it violates the one subject rule under Section
10(a) of R.A. 6735: SEC. 10. Prohibited Measures.The following cannot be the
subject of an initiative or
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referendum petition: (a) No petition embracing more than one subject shall be
submitted to the electorate; x x x The one subject rule, as relating to an initiative to
amend the Constitution, has the same object and purpose as the one subject-one
bill rule embodied in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution. To elaborate, the
one subject-one bill rule was designed to do away with the practice of inserting two
or more unrelated provisions in one bill, so that those favoring one provision would
be compelled to adopt the others. By this process of log-rolling, the adoption of both
provisions could be accomplished and ensured, when neither, if standing alone,
could succeed on its own merits. As applied to the initiative process, the one subject
rule is essentially designed to prevent surprise and fraud on the electorate. It is
meant to safeguard the integrity of the initiative process by ensuring that no

unrelated riders are concealed within the terms of the proposed amendment. This in
turn guarantees that the signatories are fully aware of the nature, scope and
purpose of the proposed amendment.
Same; Same; Same; It is not difficult to see that while the proposed changes appear
to relate only to a shift in the form of government, it actually seeks to affect other
subjects that are not reasonably germane to the constitutional alteration that is
purportedly sought.The proposed changes to the Constitution cover other subjects
that are beyond the main proposal espoused by the petitioners. Apart from a shift
from the presidential to a parliamentary form of government, the proposed changes
include the abolition of one House of Congress, and the convening of a constituent
assembly to propose additional amendments to the Constitution. Also included
within its terms is an omnibus declaration that those constitutional provisions under
Articles VI and VII, which are inconsistent with the unicameral-parliamentary form of
government, shall be deemed amended to conform thereto. It is not difficult to see
that while the proposed changes appear to relate only to a shift in the form of
government, it actually seeks to affect other subjects that are not reasonably
germane to the constitutional alteration that is purportedly sought. For one, a shift
to a parliamentary system of government does not necessarily result in the
adoption of a unicameral legislature. A parliamentary system can exist in many
different hybrid forms of government, which may or may not embrace
unicameralism. In other words, the shift from presidential to parliamentary structure
and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature is neither the cause nor effect of
the other.
Same; Same; Same; The distinction between the two termsamendment and
revisionis not as significant in the context of the past constitutions, as it should
be now under the 1987 Constitution since under the
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past constitutions, it was Congress alone, acting either as a constituent assembly or
by calling out a constitutional convention, that exercised authority to either amend
or revise the Constitution through the procedures therein described.The foregoing
traditional exposition of the difference between amendment and revision has indeed
guided us throughout our constitutional history. However, the distinction between
the two terms is not, to my mind, as significant in the context of our past
constitutions, as it should be now under the 1987 Constitution. The reason for this is
apparent. Under our past constitutions, it was Congress alone, acting either as a
constituent assembly or by calling out a constitutional convention, that exercised
authority to either amend or revise the Constitution through the procedures therein
described. Although the distinction between the two terms was theoretically
recognized under both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the need to highlight the
difference was not as material because it was only Congress that could effect
constitutional changes by choosing between the two modalities. However, it is
different now under the 1987 Constitution. Apart from providing for the two modes
of either Congress constituting itself as a constituent assembly or calling out for a
constitutional convention, a third mode was introduced for proposing changes to the
Constitution. This mode refers to the peoples right to propose amendments to the
fundamental law through the filing of a petition for initiative.
Same; Same; Same; The proposed changes will have serious qualitative
consequences on the Constitution.It may thus be conceded that, quantitatively,
the changes espoused by the proponents in this case will affect only two (2) out of
the eighteen (18) articles of the 1987 Constitution, namely, Article VI (Legislative
Department) and Article VII (Executive Department), as well as provisions that will
ensure the smooth transition from a presidential-bicameral system to a
parliamentary-unicameral structure of government. The quantitative effect of the
proposed changes is neither broad nor extensive and will not affect the substantial
entirety of the 1987 Constitution. However, it is my opinion that the proposed
changes will have serious qualitative consequences on the Constitution. The
initiative petition, if successful, will undoubtedly alter, not only our basic
governmental plan, but also redefine our rights as citizens in relation to
government. The proposed changes will set into motion a ripple effect that will
strike at the very foundation of our basic constitutional plan. It is therefore an
impermissible constitutional revision that may not be effected through a peoples
initiative.
Same; Same; Same; The shift from presidential to parliamentary form of
government cannot be regarded as anything but a drastic change. It will
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require a total overhaul of our governmental structure and involve a reorientation in
the cardinal doctrines that govern our constitutional set-up.In the proposed
parliamentary system, there is an obvious lack of formal institutional checks on the
legislative and executive powers of the state, since both the Prime Minister and the
members of his cabinet are drawn from parliament. There are no effective limits to
what the Prime Minister and parliament can do, except the will of the parliamentary
majority. This goes against the central principle of our present constitutional scheme
that distributes the powers of government and provides for counteraction among
the three branches. Although both the presidential and parliamentary systems are
theoretically consistent with constitutional democracy, the underlying tenets and
resulting governmental framework are nonetheless radically different.

Consequently, the shift from presidential to parliamentary form of government
cannot be regarded as anything but a drastic change. It will require a total overhaul
of our governmental structure and involve a reorientation in the cardinal doctrines
that govern our constitutional set-up. As explained by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a
switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision
because of its over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure. It cannot, by
any standard, be deemed as a mere constitutional amendment.
Same; Same; Same; The inclusion of a proposal to convene a constituent assembly
likewise shows the intention of the proponents to effect even more farreaching
changes in our fundamental law; The proposal to convene a constituent assembly,
which by its terms is mandatory, will practically jeopardize the future of the entire
Constitution and place it on shaky grounds.The inclusion of a proposal to convene
a constituent assembly likewise shows the intention of the proponents to effect
even more far-reaching changes in our fundamental law. If the original intent were
to simply shift the form of government to the parliamentary system, then there
would have been no need for the calling out of a constituent assembly to propose
further amendments to the Constitution. It should be noted that, once convened, a
constituent assembly can do away and replace any constitutional provision which
may not even have a bearing on the shift to a parliamentary system of government.
The inclusion of such a proposal reveals the proponents plan to consider all
provisions of the constitution, either to determine which of its provisions should be
altered or suppressed or whether the whole document should be replaced with an
entirely new one. Consequently, it is not true that only Articles VI and VII are
covered by the alleged peoples initiative. The proposal to convene a constituent
assembly, which by its terms is mandatory, will practically jeopardize the future of
the entire Constitution and
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place it on shaky grounds. The plan of the proponents, as reflected in their proposed
changes, goes beyond the shifting of government from the presidential to the
parliamentary system. Indeed, it could even extend to the fundamental nature of
our state as a democratic and republican state.
Same; Same; Same; The voice and will of our people cannot be any clearer when
they limited peoples initiative to mere amendments of the fundamental law and
excluded revisions in its scope; Article XVII on amendments and revisions is called a
constitution of sovereignty because it defines the constitutional meaning of
sovereignty of the peopleit is through these provisions that the sovereign
people have allowed the expression of their sovereign will and have canalized their
powers which would otherwise be plenary.Our people too have spoken when they
overwhelmingly ratified the 1987 Constitution, with the provisions on amendments
and revisions under Article XVII. The voice and will of our people cannot be any
clearer when they limited peoples initiative to mere amendments of the
fundamental law and excluded revisions in its scope. In this regard, the task of the
Court is to give effect to the peoples voice, as expressed unequivocally through the
Constitution. Article XVII on amendments and revisions is called a constitution of
sovereignty because it defines the constitutional meaning of sovereignty of the
people. It is through these provisions that the sovereign people have allowed the
expression of their sovereign will and have canalized their powers which would
otherwise be plenary. By approving these provisions, the sovereign people have
decided to limit themselves and future generations in the exercise of their sovereign
power. They are thus bound by the constitution and are powerless, whatever their
numbers, to change or thwart its mandates, except through the means prescribed
by the Constitution itself.
Same; Same; Same; While Section 1 of Article XVII may be considered as a provision
delegating the sovereign powers of amendment and revision to Congress, Section 2,
in contrast, is a self-limitation on that sovereign power; In choosing to exercise selflimitation, there is no absence or lack of even a fraction of the sovereign power of
the people since self-limitation itself is an expression of that sovereign power.It is
thus misplaced to argue that the people may propose revisions to the Constitution
through peoples initiative because their representatives, whose power is merely
delegated, may do so. While Section 1 of Article XVII may be considered as a
provision delegating the sovereign powers of amendment and revision to Congress,
Section 2, in contrast, is a self-limitation on that sovereign power. In the words of
Cooley: x x x Although by their constitutions the people have delegated the exercise
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partments, they have not thereby divested themselves of the sovereignty. They
retain in their own hands, so far as they have thought it needful to do so, a power to
control the governments they create, and the three departments are responsible to
and subject to be ordered, directed, changed or abolished by them. But this control
and direction must be exercised in the legitimate mode previously agreed upon. The
voice of the people, acting in their sovereign capacity, can be of legal force only
when expressed at the times and under the conditions which they themselves have
prescribed and pointed out by the Constitution, or which, consistently with the
Constitution, have been prescribed and pointed out for them by statute; and if by
any portion of the people, however large, an attempt should be made to interfere
with the regular working of the agencies of government at any other time or in any
other mode than as allowed by existing law, either constitutional or statutory, it

would be revolutionary in character, and must be resisted and repressed by the
officers who, for the time being, represent legitimate government. (Italics supplied)
Consequently, there is here no case of the spring rising above its source. Nor is it
one where the peoples sovereign power has been relegated to a lesser plane than
that of Congress. In choosing to exercise self-limitation, there is no absence or lack
of even a fraction of the sovereign power of the people since self-limitation itself is
an expression of that sovereign power. The people have chosen to delegate and
limit their sovereign power by virtue of the Constitution and are bound by the
parameters that they themselves have ordained. Otherwise, if the people choose to
defy their self-imposed constitutional restraints, we will be faced with a
revolutionary situation.
Same; Same; Same; Even as we affirm, however, that aspect of direct democracy,
we should not forget that, first and foremost, we are a constitutional democracy.It
has repeatedly been emphasized that ours is a democratic and republican state.
Even as we affirm, however, that aspect of direct democracy, we should not forget
that, first and foremost, we are a constitutional democracy. To uphold direct
democracy at the expense of the fundamental law is to sanction, not a
constitutional, but an extra-constitutional recourse. This is clearly beyond the
powers of the Court who, by sovereign mandate, is the guardian and keeper of the
Constitution.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Initiative; Republicanism; Caution should be exercised in choosing ones battlecry,
lest it does more harm than good to ones cause.Vox populi
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vox Deithe voice of the people is the voice of God. Caution should be exercised in
choosing ones battlecry, lest it does more harm than good to ones cause. In its
original context, the complete version of this Latin phrase means exactly the
opposite of what it is frequently taken to mean. It originated from a holy man, the
monk Alcuin, who advised Charlemagne, nec audiendi qui solent dicere vox populi
vox Dei quum tumultuositas vulgi semper insaniae proxima sit, meaning, And
those people should not be listened to who keep on saying, The voice of the people
is the voice of God, since the riotousness of the crowd is always very close to
madness. Perhaps, it is by providence that the true meaning of the Latin phrase is
revealed upon petitioners and their alliesthat they may reflect upon the sincerity
and authenticity of their peoples initiative.
Same; Same; Same; Same; History has been a witness to countless iniquities
committed in the name of God; After a thorough consideration of the petitions, I
have come to realize that man, with his ingenuity and arrogance, has perfected the
craft of imitating the voice of God.History has been a witness to countless
iniquities committed in the name of God. Wars were waged, despotism tolerated
and oppressions justifiedall these transpired as man boasted of Gods imprimatur.
Today, petitioners and their allies hum the same rallying call, convincing this Court
that the peoples initiative is the voice of the people and, therefore, the voice of
God. After a thorough consideration of the petitions, I have come to realize that
man, with his ingenuity and arrogance, has perfected the craft of imitating the voice
of God. It is against this kind of genius that the Court must guard itself.
Same; Same; Same; Judicial Review; The Resolution of respondent COMELEC
denying due course to the petition for initiative on the basis of a case (Santiago)
decided by this Court cannot, in any way, be characterized as capricious or
whimsical, patent and gross, or arbitrary and despotic. Jurisprudence teaches
that an act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave
abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility. The Resolution of respondent COMELEC denying due course to the petition
for initiative on the basis of a case (Santiago) decided by this Court cannot, in any
way, be characterized as capricious or whimsical, patent and gross, or
arbitrary and despotic. On the contrary, it was the most pru195
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dent course to take. It must be stressed that in Santiago, this Court permanently
enjoins respondent COMELEC from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall
have been validly enacted. It being a fact that Congress has not enacted a
sufficient law, respondent COMELEC has no alternative but to adhere to Santiago.
Otherwise, it is vulnerable to a citation for contempt.
Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; Judgments; Stare Decisis; There is considerable
literature about whether this doctrine of stare decisis is a good or bad one, but the
doctrine is usually justified by arguments which focus on the desirability of stability
and certainty in the law and also by notions of justice and fairness.The maxim
stare decisis et non quieta movere translates stand by the decisions and disturb
not what is settled. As used in our jurisprudence, it means that once this Court
has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it would
adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are
substantially the same as in the earlier controversy. There is considerable literature
about whether this doctrine of stare decisis is a good or bad one, but the doctrine is
usually justified by arguments which focus on the desirability of stability and
certainty in the law and also by notions of justice and fairness. Justice Benjamin
Cardozo in his treatise, The Nature of the Judicial Process stated: It will not do to
decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite
way between another. If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties
expect the same decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on
opposite principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday when I was a
defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I am plaintiff. To decide
differently would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be
an infringement, material and moral, of my rights. Adherence to precedent must
then be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the evenhanded administration of justice in the courts.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is fundamental jurisprudential policy
that prior applicable precedent usually must be followed even though the case, if
considered anew, might be decided differently by the current justices, and this
policy is based on the assumption that certainty, predictability and stability in the
law are the major objectives of the legal system, i.e., that parties should be able to
regulate their conduct and enter into relationships with reasonable assurance of the
governing rules of law.Although
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the doctrine of stare decisis does not prevent re-examining and, if need be,
overruling prior decisions, It is x x x a fundamental jurisprudential policy that prior
applicable precedent usually must be followed even though the case, if considered
anew, might be decided differently by the current justices. This policy x x x is based
on the assumption that certainty, predictability and stability in the law are the major
objectives of the legal system; i.e., that parties should be able to regulate their
conduct and enter into relationships with reasonable assurance of the governing
rules of law. Accordingly, a party urging overruling a precedent faces a rightly
onerous task, the difficulty of which is roughly proportional to a number of factors,
including the age of the precedent, the nature and extent of public and private
reliance on it, and its consistency or inconsistency with other related rules of law.
Here, petitioners failed to discharge their task.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Santiago v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106
(1997), was decided by this Court on March 19, 1997 or more than nine (9) years
ago, and during that span of time, the Filipino people, specifically the law
practitioners, law professors, law students, the entire judiciary and litigants have
recognized this Courts Decision as a precedent.Santiago v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA
106 (1997), was decided by this Court on March 19, 1997 or more than nine (9)
years ago. During that span of time, the Filipino people, specifically the law
recognized this Courts Decision as a precedent. In fact, the Santiago doctrine was
applied by this Court in the subsequent case of PIRMA. Even the legislature has
relied on said Decision, thus, several bills have been introduced in both Houses of
Congress to cure the deficiency. I cannot fathom why it should be overturned or set
aside merely on the basis of the petition of Lambino, et al. Indeed, this Courts
conclusion in Santiago that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned remains a precedent and must be upheld.
Phrases; Both revision and amendment connote changeany distinction
between the two must be based upon the degree of change contemplated. Both
revision and amendment connote change; any distinction between the two must
be based upon the degree of change contemplated. In Kelly v. Laing, 242 N.W. 891
259 Mich 212, the Supreme Court of Michigan made the follow-ing comparison of
the two terms: Revision and amendment have the common characteristics of
working changes in the charter, and are sometimes
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used in exactly the same sense but there is an essential difference between them.
Revision implies a reexamination of the whole law and a redraft without obligation
to maintain the form, scheme, or structure of the old. As applied to fundamental
law, such as a constitution or charter, it suggests a convention to examine the
whole subject and to prepare and submit a new instrument whether the desired
changes from the old are few or many. Amendment implies continuance of the
general plan and purpose of the law, with corrections to better accomplish its
purpose. Basically, revision suggests fundamental change, while amendment is a
correction of detail.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Although, at first glance, petitioners proposed changes
appear to cover isolated and specific provisions only, however, upon careful
scrutiny, it becomes clear that the proposed changes will alter the very structure of
our government and create multifarious ramificationsthe proposed changes will
have a domino effect or, more appropriately, ripple effect on other provisions of
the Constitution.In summary, it would seem that any major change in
governmental form and scheme would probably be interpreted as a revision and

should be achieved through the more thorough process of deliberation. Although, at
first glance, petitioners proposed changes appear to cover isolated and specific
provisions only, however, upon careful scrutiny, it becomes clear that the proposed
changes will alter the very structure of our government and create multifarious
ramifications. In other words, the proposed changes will have a domino effect or,
more appropriately, ripple effect on other provisions of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; The doctrine of separation of
powers is so interwoven in the fabric of our Constitution that any change affecting
such doctrine must necessarily be a revision.A shift from a presidential to a
parliamentary form of government affects the well-enshrined doctrine of separation
of powers of government, embodied in our Constitution, by providing for an
Executive, Legislative and Judiciary Branches. In a Parliamentary form of
government, the Executive Branch is to a certain degree, dependent on the direct or
indirect support of the Parliament, as expressed through a vote of confidence. To
my mind, this doctrine of separation of powers is so interwoven in the fabric of our
Constitution, that any change affecting such doctrine must necessarily be a
revision.
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Same; Same; Same; Initiative and Referendum Act (R.A. No. 6735); R.A. No. 6735 is
not the enabling law contemplated by the Constitution.R.A. No. 6735 does not
specify the procedure how initiative on the Constitution may be accomplished. This
is not the enabling law contemplated by the Constitution. As pointed out by
oppositor-intervenor Alternative Law Groups Inc., since the promulgation of the
Decision in Santiago, various bills have been introduced in both Houses of Congress
providing for a complete and adequate process for peoples initiative.
Same; Same; Same; The phrase directly proposed by the people excludes any
person acting as representative or agent of the 12% of the total number of
registered voters; The plea that the Court should hear and heed the peoples
voice is baseless and misleadingthere is no peoples voice to be heard and
heeded as the petition for initiative is not truly theirs, but only of petitioners
Lambino and Aumentado and their allies.Petitioners Lambino and Aumentado
have no authority whatsoever to file the petition as representatives of the alleged
6.3 million registered voters. Such act of representation is constitutionally
proscribed. To repeat, Section 2 strictly requires that amendments to the
Constitution shall be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters.
Obviously, the phrase directly proposed by the people excludes any person acting
as representative or agent of the 12% of the total number of registered voters. The
Constitution has bestowed upon the people the right to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution. Such right cannot be usurped by anyone under the
guise of being the peoples representative. Simply put, Section 2 does not recognize
acts of representation. For it is only the people (comprising the minimum of 12%
of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein) who are
the proper parties to initiate a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution.
Verily, the petition filed with the COMELEC by herein petitioners Lambino and
Aumentado is not a peoples initiative. Necessarily, it must fail. Corollarily, the plea
that this Court should hear and heed the peoples voice is baseless and
misleading. There is no peoples voice to be heard and heeded as this petition for
initiative is not truly theirs, but only of petitioners Lambino and Aumentado and
their allies.
Same; Same; Same; Considering the political scenario in our country today, it is my
view that the so-called peoples initiative to amend our Constitution from bicameralpresidential to unicameral-parliamentary is actually not
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an initiative of the people, but an initiative of some of our politicians.In fine,
considering the political scenario in our country today, it is my view that the socalled peoples initiative to amend our Constitution from bicameral-presidential to
unicameral-parliamentary is actually not an initiative of the people, but an initiative
of some of our politicians. It has not been shown by petitioners, during the oral
arguments in this case, that the 6.3 million registered voters who affixed their
signatures understood what they signed. In fact, petitioners admitted that the
Constitutional provisions sought to be amended and the proposed amendments
were not explained to all those registered voters. Indeed, there will be no means of
knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether they really understood what
petitioners and their group asked them to sign.
Same; Same; Same; Let us not repeat the mistake committed by this Court in
Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30 (1973). The Court then ruled that
This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new
Constitution being considered in force and effect, although it had notice that the
Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified
by the people in accordance with the 1935 Constitution.Let us not repeat the
mistake committed by this Court in Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA
30 (1973). The Court then ruled that This being the vote of the majority, there is no
further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and
effect, although it had notice that the Constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified by the people in accordance with
the 1935 Constitution. The Court concluded, among others, that the viva voce
voting in the Citizens Assemblies was and is null and void ab initio. That was
during martial law when perhaps majority of the justices were scared of the dictator.
Luckily at present, we are not under a martial law regime. There is, therefore, no
reason why this Court should allow itself to be used as a legitimizing authority by
the so-called peoples initiative for those who want to perpetuate themselves in
power.
CORONA, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Initiative; Supreme Court; Judgments; Res Judicata; There is no identity of parties in
Santiago v. Commission on Elections, 270 SCRA 106 (1997) and the instant case.
Res judicata is the rule that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their
privies and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action
involving the same claim, demand or
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cause of action. It has the following requisites: (1) the former judgment or order
must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the
subject matter and of the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits
and (4) there must be identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action
between the first and second actions. There is no identity of parties in Santiago and
the instant case. While the COMELEC was also the respondent in Santiago, the
petitioners in that case and those in this case are different. More significantly, there
is no identity of causes of action in the two cases. Santiago involved amendments
to Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII and Section 8 of Article X of
the Constitution while the present petition seeks to amend Sections 1to 7 of Article
VI and Sections 1 to 4 of the 1987 Constitution. Clearly, therefore, the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that the present petition for
initiative was barred by Santiago and, on that ground, dismissed the petition.
Same; Same; Same; The Court cannot unnecessarily and unreasonably restrain the
peoples right to directly propose changes to the Constitution by declaring a law
inadequate simply for lack of a sub-heading and other grammatical but insignificant
omissions.While the legislature is authorized to establish procedures for
determining the validity and sufficiency of a petition to amend the constitution, that
procedure cannot unnecessarily restrict the initiative privilege. In the same vein,
this Court cannot unnecessarily and unreasonably restrain the peoples right to
directly propose changes to the Constitution by declaring a law inadequate simply
for lack of a sub-heading and other grammatical but insignificant omissions.
Otherwise, the constitutional intent to empower the people will be severely
emasculated, if not rendered illusory.
Same; Same; Same; Republicanism; If Congress and a constitutional convention,
both of which are mere representative bodies, can propose changes to the
Constitution, there is no reason why the supreme body politic itselfthe people
may not do so directly.If Congress and a constitutional convention, both of which
are mere representative bodies, can propose changes to the Constitution, there is
no reason why the supreme body politic itselfthe peoplemay not do so directly.
Resort to initiative to amend the constitution or enact a statute is an exercise of
direct democracy as opposed to representative democracy. The system of
initiative allows citizens to directly propose constitutional amendments for the
general electorate to adopt or reject at the polls, particularly in a plebiscite. While
representative government was envisioned to refine and enlarge the public views,
by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom
may
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best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of
justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations, the
exercise of direct democracy through initiative reserves direct lawmaking power
to the people by providing them a method to make new laws via the constitution, or
alternatively by enacting statutes. Efforts of the represented to control their
representatives through initiative have been described as curing the problems of
democracy with more democracy.
CALLEJO, SR., J., Separate Concurring Opinion:

Initiative; Judicial Review; Certiorari; It is a travesty for the Court to declare the act
of the COMELEC in denying due course to the petition for initiative as capricious,
despotic, oppressive or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.In the present case, it appears from the assailed Resolution of the
COMELEC that it denied the petition for initiative solely in obedience to the mandate
of this Court in Santiago v. Commission on Elections. In said case, the Court En Banc
permanently enjoined the COMELEC from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system. When
the COMELEC denied the petition for initiative, there was as yet no valid law
enacted by Congress to provide for the implementation of the system. It is a
travesty for the Court to declare the act of the COMELEC in denying due course to
the petition for initiative as capricious, despotic, oppressive or whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. In fact, in so doing, the
COMELEC merely followed or applied, as it ought to do, the Courts ruling in
Santiago to the effect that Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the system
of initiative is a non self-executory provision and requires an enabling law for its
implementation. In relation thereto, RA 6735 was found by the Court to be
incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions to
implement the constitutional provision on initiative. Consequently, the COMELEC
was permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition
for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have
been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system. The decision
of the Court En Banc interpreting RA 6735 forms part of the legal system of the
Philippines. And no doctrine or principle laid down by the Court En Banc may be
modified or reversed except by the Court En Banc, certainly not by the COMELEC.
Until the Court En Banc modifies or reverses its decision, the COMELEC is bound to
follow the same.
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Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; Judgments; To get to the true intent and
meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be resorted to but the
same must be considered in its entiretya resolution or ruling may and does
appear in other parts of the decision and not merely in the fallo thereof. In the
present case, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) takes the side of petitioners
and argues that the COMELEC should not have applied the ruling in Santiago to the
petition for initiative because the permanent injunction therein referred only to the
Delfin petition. The OSG buttresses this argument by pointing out that the
Temporary Restraining Order dated December 18, 1996 that was made permanent
in the dispositive portion referred only to the Delfin petition. The OSGs attempt to
isolate the dispositive portion from the body of the Courts decision in Santiago is
futile. It bears stressing that the dispositive portion must not be read separately but
in connection with the other portions of the decision of which it forms a part. To get
to the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be
resorted to but the same must be considered in its entirety. Hence, a resolution or
ruling may and does appear in other parts of the decision and not merely in the fallo
thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Given that a clear majority of the members of the
Court, eight Justices, concurred in the decision in Santiago v. Commission on
Elections, 270 SCRA 106 (1997), the pronouncement therein that RA 6735 is
incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned constitutes a definitive
ruling on the matter.Santiago was concurred in, without any reservation, by eight
Justices, or the majority of the members of the Court, who actually took part in the
deliberations thereon. On the other hand, five Justices, while voting for the dismissal
of the Delfin petition on the ground of insufficiency, dissented from the majority
opinion as they maintained the view that RA 6735 was sufficient to implement the
system of initiative. Given that a clear majority of the members of the Court, eight
Justices, concurred in the decision in Santiago, the pronouncement therein that RA
6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions
insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned constitutes a
definitive ruling on the matter. In the Resolution dated June 10, 1997, the motions
for reconsideration of the Santiago decision were denied with finality as only six
Justices, or less than the majority, voted to grant the same. The Resolution
expressly stated that the motion for reconsideration failed to persuade the
requisite majority of the Court to modify or reverse the Decision of 19 March 1977.
In fine, the pronouncement in Santi203
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ago as embodied in the Decision of March 19, 1997 remains the definitive ruling on
the matter.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Stare Decisis; Ten (10) years after Santiago and
absent the occurrence of any compelling supervening event, i.e., passage of a law
to implement the system of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution, that would warrant the re-examination of the ruling therein, it
behooves the Court to apply to the present case the salutary and well-recognized
doctrine of stare decisis.The respective explanatory notes of the said Senate and
House bills uniformly recognize that there is, to date, no law to govern the process
by which constitutional amendments are introduced by the people directly through
the system of initiative. Ten (10) years after Santiago and absent the occurrence of
any compelling supervening event, i.e., passage of a law to implement the system
of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, that would warrant the
reexamination of the ruling therein, it behooves the Court to apply to the present
case the salutary and well-recognized doctrine of stare decisis. As earlier shown,
Congress and other government agencies have, in fact, abided by Santiago. The
Court can do no less with respect to its own ruling.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Parties should not be encouraged to seek
re-examination of determined principles and speculate on fluctuation of the law with
every change in the expounders of it.Contrary to the stance taken by petitioners,
the validity or constitutionality of a law cannot be made to depend on the individual
opinions of the members who compose itthe Supreme Court, as an institution, has
already determined RA 6735 to be incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential
terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned and therefore the same remains to be so regardless of any change in
the Courts composition. Indeed, it is vital that there be stability in the courts in
adhering to decisions deliberately made after ample consideration. Parties should
not be encouraged to seek re-examination of determined principles and speculate
on fluctuation of the law with every change in the expounders of it.
Same; Same; Same; The Constitution received its force from the express will of the
people, and in expressing that will, the Filipino people have incorporated therein the
method and manner by which the same can be amended and revised, and when the
electorate have incorporated into the fundamental law the particular manner in
which the same may be altered or changed, then any course which disregards that
express will is a direct violation of the fundamental law.The Constitution is the
fundamental law of the state, containing the principles upon which the government
is founded, and regulating
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the division of sovereign powers, directing to what persons each of those powers is
to be confided and the manner in which it is to be exercised. The Philippines has
followed the American constitutional legal system in the sense that the term
constitution is given a more restricted meaning, i.e., as a written organic
instrument, under which governmental powers are both conferred and
circumscribed. The Constitution received its force from the express will of the
people. An overwhelming 16,622,111, out of 21,785,216 votes cast during the
plebiscite, or 76.30% ratified the present Constitution on February 2, 1987. In
expressing that will, the Filipino people have incorporated therein the method and
manner by which the same can be amended and revised, and when the electorate
have incorporated into the fundamental law the particular manner in which the
same may be altered or changed, then any course which disregards that express
will is a direct violation of the fundamental law.
Phrases; Considering the encompassing scope and depth of the changes that would
be effected, not to mention that the Constitutions basic plan and substance of a
tripartite system of government and the principle of separation of powers
underlying the same would be altered, if not entirely destroyed, there can be no
other conclusion than that the proposition of petitioners Lambino, et al. would
constitute a revision of the Constitution rather than an amendment.Considering
the encompassing scope and depth of the changes that would be effected, not to
mention that the Constitutions basic plan and substance of a tripartite system of
government and the principle of separation of powers underlying the same would
be altered, if not entirely destroyed, there can be no other conclusion than that the
proposition of petitioners Lambino, et al. would constitute a revision of the
Constitution rather than an amendment or such an addition or change within the
lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement or better carry out the
purpose for which it was framed. As has been shown, the effect of the adoption of
the petitioners proposition, rather than to within the lines of the original
instrument constitute an improvement or better carry out the purpose for which it
was framed, is to substantially alter the purpose and to attain objectives clearly
beyond the lines of the Constitution as now cast.
Same; Same; Same; Initiative and Referendum Act (R.A. No. 6735); Delegation of
Power; The law mandates upon the election registrar to personally verify the
signatures, a solemn and important duty imposed on the election registrar which he
cannot delegate to any other person, even to barangay officials.The law mandates
upon the election registrar to personally verify
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the signatures. This is a solemn and important duty imposed on the election
registrar which he cannot delegate to any other person, even to barangay officials.
Hence, a verification of signatures made by persons other than the election
registrars has no legal effect. In patent violation of the law, several certifications
submitted by petitioners showed that the verification of signatures was made, not
by the election registrars, but by barangay officials.
Same; Same; Same; Same; There is nothing in RA 6735, as well as in COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, granting that it is valid to implement the former statute, that
authorizes the COMELEC to conduct any kind of hearing, whether full-blown or trialtype hearing, summary hearing or administrative hearing, on a petition for initiative.
According to the dissenting opinion, the sufficiency of the petition for initiative
and its compliance with the requirements of RA 6735 on initiative and its
implementing rules is a question that should be resolved by the COMELEC at the
first instance. It thus remands the case to the COMELEC for further proceedings. To
my mind, the remand of the case to the COMELEC is not warranted. There is nothing
in RA 6735, as well as in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, granting that it is valid to
implement the former statute, that authorizes the COMELEC to conduct any kind of
hearing, whether full-blown or trial-type hearing, summary hearing or administrative

hearing, on a petition for initiative.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The remand of the case to the COMELEC for reception of
evidence of the parties on the contentious factual issues is, in effect, an
amendment of the abovequoted rules of the COMELEC by this Court which the Court
is not empowered to do.Clearly, following the foregoing procedural rules, the
COMELEC is not authorized to conduct any kind of hearing to receive any evidence
for or against the sufficiency of the petition for initiative. Rather, the foregoing rules
require of the COMELEC to determine the sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition
for initiative on its face. And it has already been shown, by the annexes submitted
by the petitioners themselves, their petition is, on its face, insufficient in form and
substance. The remand of the case to the COMELEC for reception of evidence of the
parties on the contentious factual issues is, in effect, an amendment of the
abovequoted rules of the COMELEC by this Court which the Court is not empowered
to do.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Political Questions; Even if the present petition involves
the act, not of a governmental body, but of purportedly more than six million
registered voters who have signified their assent to the proposal to amend the
Constitution, the same still constitutes a justiciable controversy, hence, a nonpolitical question.Even if the present petition involves the act,
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not of a governmental body, but of purportedly more than six million registered
voters who have signified their assent to the proposal to amend the Constitution,
the same still constitutes a justiciable controversy, hence, a non-political question.
There is no doubt that the Constitution, under Article XVII, has explicitly provided for
the manner or method to effect amendments thereto, or revision thereof. The
question, therefore, of whether there has been compliance with the terms of the
Constitution is for the Court to pass upon.
Same; Same; Same; Same; I strongly take exception to the view that the people, in
their sovereign capacity, can disregard the Constitution altogether.There is no
denying that the Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. However,
I find to be tenuous the asseveration that the argument that the people through
sovereignty in its head. At the very least, the submission constricts the democratic
space for the exercise of the direct sovereignty of the people. In effect, it is
theorized that despite the unambiguous text of Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution withholding the power to revise it from the system of initiative, the
people, in their sovereign capacity, can conveniently disregard the said provision. I
strongly take exception to the view that the people, in their sovereign capacity, can
disregard the Constitution altogether. Such a view directly contravenes the
fundamental constitutional theory that while indeed the ultimate sovereignty is in
the people, from whom springs all legitimate authority; nonetheless, by the
Constitution which they establish, they not only tie up the hands of their official
agencies, but their own hands as well; and neither the officers of the state, nor the
whole people as an aggregate body, are at liberty to take action in opposition to this
fundamental law. The Constitution, it should be remembered, is the protector of
the people, placed on guard by them to save the rights of the people against injury
by the people. This is the essence of constitutionalism: Through constitutionalism
we placed limits on both our political institutions and ourselves, hoping that
democracies, historically always turbulent, chaotic and even despotic, might now
become restrained, principled, thoughtful and just. So we bound ourselves over to a
law that we made and promised to keep. And though a government of laws did not
displace governance by men, it did mean that now men, democratic men, would try
to live by their word.
Same; Same; Same; It is for the protection of minorities that constitutions are
framedsometimes constitutions must be interposed for the protection of
majorities even against themselves.Indisputably, the issues posed in
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the present case are of transcendental importance. Accordingly, I have approached
and grappled with them with full appreciation of the responsibilities involved in the
present case, and have given to its consideration the earnest attention which its
importance demands. I have sought to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution
at whatever hazard. I share the concern of Chief Justice Day in Koehler v. Hill: it is
for the protection of minorities that constitutions are framed. Sometimes
constitutions must be interposed for the protection of majorities even against
themselves. Constitutions are adopted in times of public repose, when sober reason
holds her citadel, and are designed to check the surging passions in times of
popular excitement. But if courts could be coerced by popular majorities into a
disregard of their provisions, constitutions would become mere ropes of sand, and
there would be an end of social security and of constitutional freedom. The cause of
temperance can sustain no injury from the loss of this amendment which would be
at all comparable to the injury to republican institutions which a violation of the
constitution would inflict. That large and respectable class of moral reformers which
so justly demands the observance and enforcement of law, cannot afford to take its
first reformatory step by a violation of the constitution. How can it consistently
demand of others obedience to a constitution which it violates itself? The people
can in a short time re-enact the amendment. In the manner of a great moral reform,
the loss of a few years is nothing. The constitution is the palladium of republican
freedom. The young men coming forward upon the stage of political action must be
educated to venerate it; those already upon the stage must be taught to obey it.
Whatever interest may be advanced or may suffer, whoever or whatever may be
voted up or voted down, no sacrilegious hand must be laid upon the constitution.
AZCUNA, J., Separate Opinion:

Initiative; Constituent Powers; When Congress acts under Article XVII, which is the
Constitution of Sovereignty, it acts not as a legislature exercising legislative powers
but as a constituent body exercising constituent powers.Constitutions have three
partsthe Constitution of Liberty, which states the fundamental rights of the
people; the Constitution of Government, which establishes the structure of
government, its branches and their operation; and the Constitution of Sovereignty,
which provides how the Constitution may be changed. Article XVII is the
Constitution of Sovereignty. As a result, the powers therein provided are called
constituent powers. So when Congress acts under this provision, it acts not as a
legislature exercising legislative powers. It acts as a constituent body exercising
constituent pow208
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ers. The rules, therefore, governing the exercise of legislative powers do not apply,
or do not apply strictly, to the actions taken under Article XVII.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Initiative and Referendum Act (R.A. No. 6735); Since
Article XVII states that Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise
of the peoples right directly to propose amendments to the Constitution through
initiative, the act of Congress pursuant thereto is not strictly a legislative action but
partakes of a constituent act; The provisions of Republic Act No. 6735 relating to the
procedure for proposing amendments to the Constitution, can and should be
upheld, despite shortcomings perhaps in legislative headings and standards.
Accordingly, since Article XVII states that Congress shall provide for the
implementation of the exercise of the peoples right directly to propose
amendments to the Constitution through initiative, the act of Congress pursuant
thereto is not strictly a legislative action but partakes of a constituent act. As a
result, Republic Act No. 6735, the act that provides for the exercise of the people of
the right to propose a law or amendments to the Constitution is, with respect to the
right to propose amendments to the Constitution, a constituent measure, not a
mere legislative one. The consequence of this special character of the enactment,
insofar as it relates to proposing amendments to the Constitution, is that the
requirements for statutory enactments, such as sufficiency of standards and the
like, do not and should not strictly apply. As long as there is a sufficient and clear
intent to provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right, it should be
sustained, as it is simply a compliance of the mandate placed on Congress by the
Constitution. Seen in this light, the provisions of Republic Act No. 6735 relating to
the procedure for proposing amendments to the Constitution, can and should be
upheld, despite shortcomings perhaps in legislative headings and standards.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; I concur in the view that Santiago v. Commission
on Elections, 270 SCRA 106 (1997), should be re-examined and, after doing so, that
the pronouncement therein regarding the insufficiency or inadequacy of the
measure to sustain a peoples initiative to amend the Constitution should be
reconsidered in favor of allowing the exercise of this sovereign right.For this
reason, I concur in the view that Santiago v. Comelec should be re-examined and,
after doing so, that the pronouncement therein regarding the insufficiency or
inadequacy of the measure to sustain a peoples initiative to amend the
Constitution should be reconsidered in favor of allowing the exercise of this
sovereign right. And applying the doctrine stated in Senarillos v. Hermosisima,
penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in relation to Article 8 of the Civil Code, that a
decision of this Court interpreting a law
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forms part of the law interpreted as of the time of its enactment, Republic Act No.
6735 should be deemed sufficient and adequate from the start.
Same; Same; Same; The reason why revisions are not allowed through direct
proposals by the people through initiative is a practical one, namely, there is no one
to draft such extensive changes, since 6.3 million people cannot conceivably come
up with a single extensive document through a direct proposal from each of them.
Revisions are changes that affect the entire Constitution and not mere parts of it.
The reason why revisions are not allowed through direct proposals by the people
through initiative is a practical one, namely, there is no one to draft such extensive
changes, since 6.3 million people cannot conceivably come up with a single
extensive document through a direct proposal from each of them. Someone would
have to draft it and that is not authorized as it would not be a direct proposal from
the people. Such indirect proposals can only take the form of proposals from
Congress as a Constituent Assembly under Article XVII, or a Constitutional
Convention created under the same provision. Furthermore, there is a need for such
deliberative bodies for revisions because their proceedings and debates are duly
and officially recorded, so that future cases of interpretations can be properly aided
by resort to the record of their proceedings.
Same; Same; Same; Article VIII on Judicial Department cannot stand as is, in a
parliamentary system, for under such a system, the Parliament is supreme, and
thus the Courts power to declare its act a grave abuse of discretion and thus void
would be an anomaly.Even a cursory reading of the proposed changes contained
in the petition for initiative herein involved will show on its face that the proposed
changes constitute a revision of the Constitution. The proposal is to change the
system of government from that which is bicameral-presidential to one that is
unicameral-parliamentary. While purportedly only Articles VI, VII, and XVIII are
involved, the fact is, as the petition and text of the proposed changes themselves
state, every provision of the Constitution will have to be examined to see if they
conform to the nature of a unicameral-parliamentary form of government and
changed accordingly if they do not so conform to it. For example, Article VIII on
Judicial Department cannot stand as is, in a parliamentary system, for under such a
system, the Parliament is supreme, and thus the Courts power to declare its act a
grave abuse of discretion and thus void would be an anomaly.
Same; Same; Same; For the proposed changes can be separated and are, in my
view, separable in nature, a unicameral legislature is one, and a parliamentary form
of government is anotherthe first is a mere amendment and
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contains only one subject matter while the second is clearly a revision that affects
every article and every provision in the Constitution to an extent not even the
proponents could at present fully articulate.Neither does it comply with Republic
Act No. 6735, which states in Section 10 that not more than one subject shall be
proposed as an amendment or amendments to the Constitution. The petition herein
would propose at the very least two subjectsa unicameral legislature and a
parliamentary form of government. Again, for this clear and patent violation of the
very act that provides for the exercise of the power, the proposed initiative cannot
lie. This does not mean, however, that all is lost for petitioners. For the proposed
changes can be separated and are, in my view, separable in naturea unicameral
legislature is one; a parliamentary form of government is another. The first is a mere
amendment and contains only one subject matter. The second is clearly a revision
that affects every article and every provision in the Constitution to an extent not
even the proponents could at present fully articulate. Petitioners Lambino, et al.
thus go about proposing changes the nature and extent of which they do not as yet
know exactly what. The proposal, therefore, contained in the petition for initiative,
regarding a change in the legislature from a bicameral or two-chamber body to that
of a unicameral or one-chamber body, is sustainable. The text of the changes

needed to carry it out are perfunctory and ministerial in nature. Once it is limited to
this proposal, the changes are simply one of deletion and insertions, the wordings of
which are practically automatic and non-discretionary.
TINGA, J., Separate Opinion:

Initiative; Supreme Court; Judgments; The Court has long been mindful of the rule
that it necessitates a majority, and not merely a plurality, in order that a decision
can stand as precedent.I agree with Justice Puno that Santiago v. COMELEC and
PIRMA v. COMELEC had not acquired value as precedent and should be reversed in
any case. I add that the Court has long been mindful of the rule that it necessitates
a majority, and not merely a plurality, in order that a decision can stand as
precedent. That principle has informed the members of this Court as they
deliberated and voted upon contentious petitions, even if this consideration is not
ultimately reflected on the final draft released for promulgation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The curious twist to Santiago v. COMELEC, 270
SCRA 106 (1997), and PIRMA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 129754, 23 September 1997, is
that for all the denigration heaped upon Rep. Act No. 6735 in those cases, the Court
did not invalidate any provision of the
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statuteeven if R.A. No. 6735 is truly inadequate, the Court in Santiago should
not have simply let the insufficiency stand given that it was not minded to
invalidate the law itself.The curious twist to Santiago and PIRMA is that for all the
denigration heaped upon Rep. Act No. 6735 in those cases, the Court did not
invalidate any provision of the statute. All the Court said then was that the law was
inadequate. Since this inadequate law was not annulled by the Court, or
repealed by Congress, it remained part of the statute books. I maintain that even if
Rep. Act No. 6735 is truly inadequate, the Court in Santiago should not have
simply let the insufficiency stand given that it was not minded to invalidate the law
itself. Article 9 of the Civil Code provides that [n]o judge or court shall decline to
render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. As
explained by the Court recently in Reyes v. Lim, [Article 9] calls for the application
of equity, which[, in the revered Justice Cardozos words,] fills the open spaces in
the law. Certainly, any court that refuses to rule on an action premised on Rep.
Act No. 6735 on the ground that the law is inadequate would have been found in
grave abuse of discretion. The previous failure by the Court to fill the open spaces
in Santiago further highlights that decisions status as an unfortunate aberration.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The ruling in Santiago is erroneous, illogical, and
should not be perpetuated.Santiago established a tenet that the Supreme Court
may affirm a law as constitutional, yet declare its provisions as inadequate to
accomplish the legislative purpose, then barred the enforcement of the law. That
ruling is erroneous, illogical, and should not be perpetuated.
Same; Same; Same; Certiorari; Commission on Elections; By any measure, the
COMELECs failure to perform its executive and administrative functions under Rep.
Act No. 6735 constitutes grave abuse of discretion.Rep. Act No. 6735 is a law
relative to the conduct of a plebiscite. The primary task of the COMELEC under Rep.
Act No. 6735 is to enforce and administer the said law, functions that are essentially
executive and administrative in nature. Even the subsequent duty of the COMELEC
of determining the sufficiency of the petitions after they have been filed is
administrative in character. By any measure, the COMELECs failure to perform its
executive and administrative functions under Rep. Act No. 6735 constitutes grave
abuse of discretion.
Same; Same; Same; Statutes; One-Subject, One-Title Rule; For as long as it can be
established that an initiative petition embraces a single general subject, the petition
may be allowed no matter the number of constitutional provisions proposed for
amendment if the amendments are germane to the
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subject of the petition.The precedents governing the one-subject, one-title rule
under the Constitution should apply as well in the interpretation of Section 10 of
Rep. Act No. 6735. For as long as it can be established that an initiative petition
embraces a single general subject, the petition may be allowed no matter the
number of constitutional provisions proposed for amendment if the amendments
are germane to the subject of the petition. Both the Sigaw ng Bayan and the
Lambino initiative petitions expressly propose the changing of the form of
government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary. Such a
proposal may strike as comprehensive, necessitating as it will the reorganization of
the executive and legislative branches of government, nevertheless it ineluctably
encompasses only a single general subject still.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Congress may not restrict the right to initiative on
grounds that are not provided for in the Constitution.I am not even entirely
comfortable with the theoretical underpinnings of Section 10. The Constitution
indubitably grants the people the right to seek amendment of the charter through
initiative, and mandates Congress to provide for the implementation of the

exercise of this right. In doing so, Congress may not restrict the right to initiative
on grounds that are not provided for in the Constitution. If for example the
implementing law also provides that certain provisions of the Constitution may not
be amended through initiative, that prohibition should not be sustained. Congress is
tasked with the implementation, and not the restriction of the right to initiative.
Same; Same; Same; If the absence of a record of deliberations stands as so serious
a flaw as to invalidate or constrict processes which change a constitution or its
provisions, then the entire initiative process authorized by the Constitution should
be scarlet-marked as well.During the hearing on the petitions, the argument was
raised that provisions of the Constitution amended through initiative would not have
the benefit of a reference source from the record of a deliberative body such as
Congress or a constitutional convention. It was submitted that this consideration
influenced the Constitutional Commission as it drafted Section 2, Article XVII, which
expressly provided that only amendments, and not revisions, may be the subject of
initiative petitions. This argument clearly proceeds from a premise that accords
supreme value to the record of deliberations of a constitutional convention or
commission in the interpretation of the charter. Yet if the absence of a record of
deliberations stands as so serious a flaw as to invalidate or constrict processes
which change a constitution or its provisions, then the entire initiative process
authorized by the Constitution should be scarlet-marked as well.
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Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The proper interpretation of a
constitution depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than
the framers understanding thereofthe constitutional record is hardly the Rosetta
Stone that unlocks the meaning of the Constitution.Even if there is need to refer
to extrinsic sources in aid of constitutional interpretation, the constitutional record
does not provide the exclusive or definitive answer on how to interpret the
provision. The intent of a constitutional convention is not controlling by itself, and
while the historical discussion on the floor of the constitutional convention is
valuable, it is not necessarily decisive. The Court has even held in Vera v. Avelino
that the proceedings of the [constitutional] convention are less conclusive of the
proper construction of the fundamental law than are legislative proceedings of the
proper construction of a statute, since in the latter case it is the intent of the
legislature that courts seek, while in the former courts are endeavoring to arrive at
the intent of the people through the discussions and deliberations of their
representatives. The proper interpretation of a constitution depends more on how
it was understood by the people adopting it than the framers understanding
thereof. If there is fear in the absence of a constitutional record as guide for
interpretation of any amendments adopted via initiative, such absence would not
preclude the courts from interpreting such amendments in a manner consistent with
how courts generally construe the Constitution. For example, reliance will be placed
on the other provisions of the Constitution to arrive at a harmonized and holistic
constitutional framework. The constitutional record is hardly the Rosetta Stone that
unlocks the meaning of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; The initiative process involves participatory democracy at its
most elementalwherein the consequential debate would not be confined to the
august halls of Congress or the hallowed chambers of this Court, as it would spill
over to the public squares and town halls, the academic yards and the Internet
blogosphere, the dining areas in the homes of the affluent and the impoverished
alike.And even should the COMELEC find the initiative petitions sufficient, the
matter of whether the Constitution should be amended would still depend on the
choice of the electorate. The oppositors are clearly queasy about some of the
amendments proposed, or the imputed motives behind the amendments. A
referendum, should the COMELEC find the petitions as sufficient, would allow them
to convey their uneasiness to the public at large, as well as for the proponents of
the amendment to defend their proposal. The campaign period alone would allow
the public to be involved in the significant deliberation on the course our nation
should take, with the ensuing net benefit of a more informed, more politically aware
populace. And of course, the choice on whether the Constitution should
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be amended would lie directly with the people. The initiative process involves
participatory democracy at its most elemental; wherein the consequential debate
would not be confined to the august halls of Congress or the hallowed chambers of
this Court, as it would spill over to the public squares and town halls, the academic
yards and the Internet blogosphere, the dining areas in the homes of the affluent
and the impoverished alike.
Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; The biases we should enforce as magistrates
are those of the Constitution and the elements of democracy on which our rule of
law is foundeddirect democracy, as embodied in the initiative process, is but a
culmination of the evolution over the centuries of democratic rights of choice and
self-governance.The biases we should enforce as magistrates are those of the
Constitution and the elements of democracy on which our rule of law is founded.
Direct democracy, as embodied in the initiative process, is but a culmination of the
evolution over the centuries of democratic rights of choice and self-governance. The
reemergence of the Athenian democratic ideal after centuries of tyrannical rules
arrived very slowly, the benefits parceled out at first only to favored classes. The
Magna Carta granted limited rights to self-determination and self-governance only

to a few English nobles; the American Constitution was originally intended to give a
meaningful voice only to free men, mostly Caucasian, who met the property-holding
requirements set by the states for voting.
Same; Same; Same; The initiative process should be acknowledged as the purest
implement of democratic rule under law.By allowing the sovereign people to
directly propose and enact constitutional amendments, the initiative process should
be acknowledged as the purest implement of democratic rule under law. This right
granted to over sixty million Filipinos cannot be denied by the votes of less than
eight magistrates for reasons that bear no cogitation on the Constitution.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Initiative; While it is but proper to accord great respect and reverence to the
Philippine Constitution of 1987 for being the supreme law of the land, we should not
lose sight of the truth that there is an ultimate authority to which the Constitution is
also subordinatethe will of the people; If the Constitution is the expression of the
will of the sovereign people, then, in the event that the people change their will, so
must the Constitution be revised or amended to reflect such change.While it is but
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spect and reverence to the Philippine Constitution of 1987 for being the supreme
law of the land, we should not lose sight of the truth that there is an ultimate
authority to which the Constitution is also subordinatethe will of the people. No
less than its very first paragraph, the Preamble, expressly recognizes that the
Constitution came to be because it was ordained and promulgated by the sovereign
Filipino people. It is a principle reiterated yet again in Article II, Section 1, of the
Constitution, which explicitly declares that [t]he Philippines is a democratic and
republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them. Thus, the resolution of the issues and controversies raised by
the instant Petition should be guided accordingly by the foregoing principle. If the
Constitution is the expression of the will of the sovereign people, then, in the event
that the people change their will, so must the Constitution be revised or amended to
reflect such change. Resultantly, the right to revise or amend the Constitution
inherently resides in the sovereign people whose will it is supposed to express and
embody. The Constitution itself, under Article XVII, provides for the means by which
the revision or amendment of the Constitution may be proposed and ratified.
Same; Same; Same; The right of the sovereign people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through initiative is more superior than the power
they delegated to Congress or to a constitutional convention to amend or revise the
Constitution.It is my earnest opinion that the right of the sovereign people to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative is more superior
than the power they delegated to Congress or to a constitutional convention to
amend or revise the Constitution. The initiative process gives the sovereign people
the voice to express their collective will, and when the people speak, we must be
ready to listen. Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution recognizes and guarantees
the sovereign peoples right to initiative, rather than limits it. The enabling law
which Congress has been tasked to enact must give life to the said provision and
make the exercise of the right to initiative possible, not regulate, limit, or restrict it
in any way that would render the peoples option of resorting to initiative to amend
the Constitution more stringent, difficult, and less feasible, as compared to the other
constitutional means to amend or revise the Constitution. In fact, it is worth
recalling that under Article VI, Section 1 of the Constitution, the legislative power of
Congress is limited to the extent reserved to the people by the provisions on
initiative and referendum.
Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; Judgments; After a careful reading of Santiago
v. Commission on Elections, 270 SCRA 106 (1997), I believe in earnest that the
permanent injunction actually issued by this Court against
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the COMELEC pertains only to the petition for initiative filed by Jesus S. Delfin, and
not to all subsequent petitions for initiative to amend the Constitution.The
COMELEC had indeed committed grave abuse of discretion when it summarily
dismissed Lambino and Aumentados petition for initiative entirely on the basis of
the Santiago case which, allegedly, permanently enjoined it from entertaining or
taking cognizance of any petition for initiative to amend the Constitution in the
absence of a sufficient law. After a careful reading, however, of the Santiago case, I
believe in earnest that the permanent injunction actually issued by this Court
against the COMELEC pertains only to the petition for initiative filed by Jesus S.
Delfin, and not to all subsequent petitions for initiative to amend the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Initiative and Referendum Act (R.A. No. 6735); The declaration
of the Court that Republic Act No. 6735 is insufficient or inadequate actually gave
rise to more questions rather than answers, due to the fact that there has never
been a judicial precedent wherein the Court invalidated a law for insufficiency or
inadequacy.The declaration of the Court that Republic Act No. 6735 is insufficient
or inadequate actually gave rise to more questions rather than answers, due to the
fact that there has never been a judicial precedent wherein the Court invalidated a
law for insufficiency or inadequacy. The confusion over such a declaration thereby
impelled former Chief Justice Davide, Jr., the ponente in the Santiago case, to
provide the following clarification in his separate opinion to the Resolution in the
PIRMA case, thusSimply put, Santiago did, in reality, declare as unconstitutional
that portion of R.A. No. 6735 relating to Constitutional initiatives for failure to
comply with the completeness and sufficient standard tests with respect to
permissible delegation of legislative power or subordinate legislation. However
petitioners attempt to twist the language in Santiago, the conclusion is inevitable;
the portion of R.A. No. 6735 was held to be unconstitutional. It is important to note,
however, that while the Decision in the Santiago case pronounced repeatedly that
Republic Act No. 6735 was insufficient and inadequate, there is no categorical
declaration therein that the said statute was unconstitutional. The express finding
that Republic Act No. 6735 is unconstitutional can only be found in the separate
opinion of former Chief Justice Davide to the Resolution in the PIRMA case, which
was not concurred in by the other members of the Court.
VELASCO, JR., J., Separate Opinion:

Initiative; Initiative and Referendum Act (R.A. No. 6735); In Santiago v. Commission
on Elections, 270 SCRA 106 (1997), the Court focused on what D
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RA 6735 was not, and lost sight of what RA 6735 was.The decision in Santiago
focused on what it perceived to be fatal flaws in the drafting of the law, in the
failings of the way the law was structured, to come to the conclusion that the law
was inadequate. The Court itself recognized the legislators intent, but disregarded
this intent. The law was found wanting. The Court then saw the inclusion of the
Constitution in RA 6735 as an afterthought. However, it was included, and it should
not be excluded by the Court via a strained analysis of the law. The difficult
construction of the law should not serve to frustrate the intent of the framers of the
1987 Constitution: to give the people the power to propose amendments as they
saw fit. It is a basic precept in statutory construction that the intent of the
legislature is the controlling factor in the interpretation of a statute. The intent of
the legislature was clear, and yet RA 6735 was declared inadequate. It was not
specifically struck down or declared unconstitutional, merely incomplete. The Court
focused on what RA 6735 was not, and lost sight of what RA 6735 was.
Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; Judgments; A judgment must be distinguished

from an opinionthe latter is an informal expression of the views of the court and
cannot prevail against its final order or decisionand while the two may be
combined in one instrument, the opinion forms no part of the judgment; We often
encounter in judicial decisions lapses, findings, loose statements and generalities
which do not bear on the issues or are apparently opposed to the otherwise sound
and considered result reached by the court as expressed in the dispositive part, so
called, of the decision.A judgment must be distinguished from an opinion. The
latter is an informal expression of the views of the court and cannot prevail against
its final order or decision. While the two may be combined in one instrument, the
opinion forms no part of the judgment. So there is a distinction between the findings
and conclusions of a court and its Judgment. While they may constitute its decision
and amount to the rendition of a judgment, they are not the judgment itself. It is not
infrequent that the grounds of a decision fail to reflect the exact views of the court,
especially those of concurring justices in a collegiate court. We often encounter in
judicial decisions lapses, findings, loose statements and generalities which do not
bear on the issues or are apparently opposed to the otherwise sound and
considered result reached by the court as expressed in the dispositive part, so
called, of the decision.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; When there are gray areas in
legislation, especially in matters that pertain to the sovereign peoples political
rights, courts must lean more towards a more liberal interpretation favoring the
peoples right to exercise their sovereign power.In this case, the Lambino petition
is not concerned with rewriting the entire Constitution. It
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was never its intention to revise the whole Constitution. It merely concerns itself
with amending a few provisions in our fundamental charter. When there are gray
areas in legislation, especially in matters that pertain to the sovereign peoples
political rights, courts must lean more towards a more liberal interpretation favoring
the peoples right to exercise their sovereign power.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Demosthenes B. Donato co-counsel for petitioner.
R.A.V. Saguisag for petitioners in G.R. No. 174299.
Alberto C. Agra for petitioner Erico B. Aumentado.
Arnel Z. Dolendo and Ocampo, Arciaga-Santos, Nuez, Lomangaya and Ribao for
petitioner-intervenor.
Topacio Law Office co-counsel for petitioner-intervenor.
Seno, Mendoza & Associates Law Office for intervenor TUCP.
Neri Javier Colmenares and Marvic M.V.F. Leonen for intervenors-oppositors
Bayan, Bayan Muna, Kilusang Mayo Uno, HEAD, Ecumenical Bishops Forum,
Migrante, Gabriela, Gabriela Womens Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino
Students, League of Concerned Professionals and Businessmen, Solidarity of Health
Against Charter Change and Health Action for Human Rights.
Pete Quirino-Quadra for and in his own behalf.
Carlos P. Medina, Amparita S. Sta. Maria, Gilbert V. Sembrano, Melencio S. Sta.
Maria, Giovanni F. Vallente, Ray Paulo J. Santiago and Ma. Ngina Teresa V. ChanGonzaga for oppositors One Voice, et al.
Marlon J. Manuel for movant-intervenor Alternative Law Groups, Inc.
Ibarra M. Gutierrez III and Rosselynn Jaye G. De la Cruz for intervenors Loreta
Ann P. Rosales, et al.
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M.M. Lazaro & Associates for intervenors Philconsa and Estrella.
Ongkiko, Kalaw, Manhit & Acorda Law Offices for intervenors Philconsa, Toledo
and Bacungan.
Reynaldo Y. Maulit for intervenors Tajon, Venus, Aguas and Gat Inciong.
Pablo P. Garcia for intervenor-oppositors.
Rufus B. Rodriguez for intervenors.
Aquilino L. Pimentel III for movant respondents-intervenors.
Janijay B. Alonzo for movants R. Adamat, R.M. Rivera and R. Baya.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) denying due course to an initiative petition
to amend the 1987 Constitution.
Antecedent Facts
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and
Erico B. Aumentado (Lambino Group), with other groups1 and individuals,
commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section
5(b) and (c)2
_______________
1 Including Sigaw ng Bayan and Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP).
2 This provision states: Requirements.x x x x
(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve
per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least
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and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act (RA
6735).
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952
individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters,
with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its
registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election
registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Groups initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying
Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4
_______________
three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution
may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the1987
Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.
(c) The petition shall state the following:

c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or
rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;
c.2. the proposition;
c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall
be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.
3 This provision states: Verification of Signatures.The Election Registrar shall
verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters affidavits and
voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.
4 Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI will be changed thus:
Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in a unicameral
Parliament which shall be composed of as many members as may be provided by
law, to be apportioned among the provinces, representative districts, and cities in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, with at least three
hundred thousand inhabitants per district, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio. Each district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact and adjacent territory, and each province must have at least one member.
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and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department)5 and by adding Article XVIII
entitled Transitory Provisions.6 These proposed
_______________
(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at

least twenty-five years old on the day of the election, a resident of his district for at
least one year prior thereto, and shall be elected by the qualified voters of his
district for a term of five years without limitation as to the number thereof, except
those under the party-list system which shall be provided for by law and whose
number shall be equal to twenty per centum of the total membership coming from
the parliamentary districts.
5 Sections 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Article VII will be changed thus:

Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State. The executive
power shall be exercised by a Prime Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet.
The Prime Minister shall be elected by a majority of all the Members of Parliament
from among themselves. He shall be responsible to the Parliament for the program
of government.
6 Sections 1-5 of the Transitory Provisions read:
Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall serve until the
expiration of their term at noon on the thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue
to exercise their powers under the 1987 Constitution unless impeached by a vote of
two thirds of all the members of the interim parliament.
(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of the
incumbent President, the incumbent Vice President shall succeed as President. In
case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of both the
incumbent President and Vice President, the interim Prime Minister shall assume all
the powers and responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article VII as amended.
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice
President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which
shall be deleted, all other sections of Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered
sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the
Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to
conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; provided, however,
that any and all references therein to Congress, Senate, House of
Representatives and Houses of Congress
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changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a UnicameralParliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group
_______________
shall be changed to read Parliament; that any and all references therein to
Member[s] of Congress, Senator[s] or Member[s] of the House of
Representatives shall be changed to read as Member[s] of Parliament and any
and all references to the President and or Acting President shall be changed to
read Prime Minister.
President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution which are hereby amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which
are hereby deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and
renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be
inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended so
as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary System of government; provided
however that any and all references therein to Congress, Senate, House of
Representatives and Houses of Congress shall be changed to read Parliament;
that any and all references therein to Member[s] of Congress, Senator[s] or
Member[s] of the House of Representatives shall be changed to read as
Member[s] of Parliament and any and all references to the President and or
Acting President shall be changed to read Prime Minister.
Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these amendments, an
interim Parliament which shall continue until the Members of the regular Parliament
shall have been elected and shall have qualified. It shall be composed of the
incumbent Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the
incumbent Members of the Cabinet who are heads of executive departments.
(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a Member of Parliament
until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010. He shall also be a member of the
cabinet and shall head a ministry. He shall initially convene the interim Parliament
and shall preside over its sessions for the election of the interim Prime Minister and
until the Speaker shall have been elected by a majority vote of all the members of
the interim Parliament from among themselves.
(3) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim
Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this
Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a
strong bureaucracy.
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prayed that after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the
following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters ratification:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT
BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND
PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT
FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the
COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory
Provisions) of their initiative.7
_______________
Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief Executive, shall nominate,
from among the members of the interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who
shall be elected by a majority vote of the members thereof. The interim Prime
Minister shall oversee the various ministries and shall perform such powers and
responsibilities as may be delegated to him by the incumbent President.
(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of
Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election
of all local government officials. Thereafter, the Vice President, as Member of
Parliament, shall immediately convene the Parliament and shall initially preside over
its session for the purpose of electing the Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a
majority vote of all its members, from among themselves. The duly elected Prime
Minister shall continue to exercise and perform the powers, duties and
responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until the expiration of the term of
incumbent President and Vice President.
7 As revised, Article XVIII contained a new paragraph in Section 4 (paragraph 3) and
a modified paragraph 2, Section 5, thus:
Section 4. x x x x
(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members of Parliament until
noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
xxxx
Section 5. x x x x
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The Ruling of the COMELEC
On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the
Lambino Groups petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to
amend the Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this Courts ruling in Santiago v.
Commission on Elections8 declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative
clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.9
_______________
of all local government officials. The duly elected Prime Minister shall continue to
exercise and perform the powers, duties and responsibilities of the interim Prime
Minister until the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice
President.
8 336 Phil. 848; 270 SCRA 106 (1997); Resolution dated 10 June 1997.
9 The COMELEC held:
We agree with the Petitioners that this Commission has the solemn Constitutional
duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of, as
in this case, initiative.
This mandate, however, should be read in relation to the other provisions of the
Constitution particularly on initiative.
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative, upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented
by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
The afore-quoted provision of the Constitution being a non self-executory provision
needed an enabling law for its implementation. Thus, in order to breathe life into
the constitutional right of the people under a system of initiative to directly propose,
enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or
resolution, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6735.
However, the Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Santiago vs. Commission on
Elections struck down the said law for being incom225
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006

225
In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of
certiorari and mandamus to set aside the COMELEC Resolution of 31 August 2006
and to compel the COMELEC to give due course to their initiative petition. The
Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying due course to their petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent.
Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims that Santiago binds only the parties to that
case, and their petition deserves cognizance as an expression of the will of the
sovereign people.
In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners (Binay Group) pray that the Court require
respondent COMELEC Commissioners to show cause why they should not be cited in
contempt for the COMELECs verification of signatures and for entertaining the
Lambino Groups peti_______________
plete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative

on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.
The Supreme Court likewise declared that this Commission should be permanently
enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly
enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
Thus, even if the signatures in the instant Petition appear to meet the required
minimum per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district is represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein, still the Petition cannot be given due course since the Supreme Court
categorically declared R.A. No. 6735 as inadequate to cover the system of initiative
on amendments to the Constitution.
This Commission is not unmindful of the transcendental importance of the right of
the people under a system of initiative. However, neither can we turn a blind eye to
the pronouncement of the High Court that in the absence of a valid enabling law,
this right of the people remains nothing but an empty right, and that this
Commission is permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Considering the foregoing, We are therefore constrained not to entertain or give due
course to the instant Petition.
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226
tion despite the permanent injunction in Santiago. The Court treated the Binay
Groups petition as an opposition-in-intervention.
In his Comment to the Lambino Groups petition, the Solicitor General joined causes
with the petitioners, urging the Court to grant the petition despite the Santiago
ruling. The Solicitor General proposed that the Court treat RA 6735 and its
implementing rules as temporary devises to implement the system of initiative.
Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting or
opposing the Lambino Groups petition. The supporting intervenors10 uniformly
hold the view that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in relying on
Santiago. On the other hand, the opposing intervenors11 hold the contrary view and
maintain that Santiago is a binding precedent. The opposing intervenors also
challenged (1) the Lambino Groups standing to file the petition; (2) the validity of
the signature gathering and verification process; (3) the Lambino Groups
compliance with the minimum requirement for the percentage of voters supporting
an initiative peti_______________
10 Arturo M. De Castro; Ronald L. Adamat, Rolando Manuel Rivera, Ruelo Baya;

Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization (PTGWO); Trade Union
Congress of the Philippines; Sulong Bayan Movement Foundation, Inc.
11 Onevoice, Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L. Quezon III,
Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople and Carlos P. Medina, Jr.; Alternative Law
Groups, Inc.; Atty. Pete Quirino Quadra; Bayan, Bayan Muna, Kilusang Mayo Uno,
Head, Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante, Gabriela, Gabriela Womens Party,
Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students, Jojo Pineda, Dr. Darby Santiago, Dr.
Reginald Pamugas; Loreta Ann P. Rosales, and Mario Joyo Aguja, Ana Theresa
Hontiveros-Baraquel, Luwalhati Ricasa Antonino; Philippine Constitution
(PHILCONSA), Conrado F. Estrella, Tomas C. Toledo, Mariano M. Tajon, Froilan M.
Bacungan, Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., Fortunato P. Aguas, and Amado Gat Inciong; Senate
of the Philippines; Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat,
Antonio L. Salvador and Randall C. Tabayoyong, Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Cebu City and Cebu Province Chapters; Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel,
Jr., and Senators Sergio R. Osmea III, Jamby Madrigal, Jinggoy Estrada, Alfredo S.
Lim and Panfilo Lacson; Joseph Ejercito Estrada and Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino.
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227
tion under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;12 (4) the nature of the
proposed changes as revisions and not mere amendments as provided under
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; and (5) the Lambino Groups
compliance with the requirement in Section 10(a) of RA 6735 limiting initiative

petitions to only one subject.
The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on 26 September
2006. After receiving the parties memoranda, the Court considered the case
submitted for resolution.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples
initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement
the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due
course to the Lambino Groups petition.
The Ruling of the Court
There is no merit to the petition.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the
Constitution for conducting a peoples initiative.
_______________
12 This provision states: Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly

proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per
centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein.
No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the
ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years.
228
228
Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the present petition warrants
dismissal based alone on the Lambino Groups glaring failure to comply with the
basic requirements of the Constitution. For following the Courts ruling in Santiago,
no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the Commission on Elections.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2,Article XVII of the
Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision
that allows a peoples initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This
section states:
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented
by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the meaning of
an amendment directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition,
thus:
MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to
propose a constitutional amendment. Is the draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment ready to be shown to the people when they are asked to sign?
MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to them
before they sign. Now, who prepares the draft?
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they sign there is already a draft shown to them
and they are asked whether or not they want to propose this constitutional
amendment.
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229
MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare that proposal and pass it
around for signature.13 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the draft of the proposed
constitutional amendment should be ready and shown to the people before
they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that before they sign there is
already a draft shown to them. The framers also envisioned that the people
should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must prepare that
proposal and pass it around for signature.
The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people.
This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author
and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their
behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a
petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed
amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such
complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition only if the people sign on a petition that
contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the
petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such
attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of
signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments
before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to
prove that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the
proposed amendments before signing.
_______________
13 I RECORD, pp. 387-388.

230
230
The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed14 the concept of peoples
initiative from the United States where various State constitutions incorporate an
initiative clause. In almost all States15 which allow initiative petitions, the
unbending requirement is that the people must first see the full text of the proposed
amendments before they sign to signify their assent, and that the people must sign
on an initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.16
_______________
14 During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Rene V.

Sarmiento made the following report (I RECORD 389):
MR. SARMIENTO: Madam President, I am happy that the Committee on Amendments
and Transitory Provisions decided to retain the system of initiative as a mode of
amending the Constitution. I made a survey of American constitutions and I
discovered that 13 States provide for a system of initiative as a mode of amending
the ConstitutionArizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Massachusetts, Michigan,

Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma and Oregon. The
initiative for ordinary laws only is used in Idaho, Maine, Montana and South Dakota.
So, I am happy that this was accepted or retained by the Committee.
xxxx
The Americans in turn copied the concept of initiatives from the Swiss beginning in
1898 when South Dakota adopted the initiative in its constitution. The Swiss
cantons experimented with initiatives in the 1830s. In 1891, the Swiss incorporated
the initiative as a mode of amending their national constitution. Initiatives promote
direct democracy by allowing the people to directly propose amendments to the
constitution. In contrast, the traditional mode of changing the constitution is known
as indirect democracy because the amendments are referred to the voters by the
legislature or the constitutional convention.
15 Florida requires only that the title and summary of the proposed amendment are
printed in clear and unambiguous language. Advisory Opinion to the Attorney
General RE Right of Citizens to Choose Health Care Providers, No. 90160, 22 January
1998, Supreme Court of Florida.
16 State ex. rel Patton v. Myers, 127 Ohio St. 95, 186 N.E. 872 (1933); Whitman v.
Moore, 59 Ariz. 211, 125 P.2d 445 (1942); Heidtman v. City of Shaker Heights, 99
Ohio App. 415, 119 N.E. 2d 644 (1954); Christen v. Baker, 138 Colo. 27, 328 P.2d
951 (1958); Stop the Pay Hike Committee v. Town Council of Town of Irvington, 166
N.J. Super. 197, 399 A.2d 336 (1979); State
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231
The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in several
decisions of various courts. Thus, in Capezzuto v. State Ballot Commission, the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts, affirmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals,
declared:
[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the
signature has not first seen what it is that he or she is signing. Further, and more
importantly, loose interpretation of the subscription requirement can pose a
significant potential for fraud. A person permitted to describe orally the contents of
an initiative petition to a potential signer, without the signer having actually
examined the petition, could easily mislead the signer by, for example, omitting,
downplaying, or even flatly misrepresenting, portions of the petition that might not
be to the signers liking. This danger seems particularly acute when, in this case,
the person giving the description is the drafter of the petition, who obviously has a
vested interest in seeing that it gets the requisite signatures to qualify for the
ballot.17 (Boldfacing and italics supplied)
Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury,18 the Court of Appeals of Oregon explained:
The purposes of full text provisions that apply to amendments by initiative
commonly are described in similar terms. x x x (The purpose of the full text
requirement is to provide sufficient information so that registered voters can
intelligently evaluate whether to sign the initiative petition.); x x x (publication of
full text of amended constitutional provision required because it is essential for the
elector to have x x x the section which is proposed to be added to or subtracted
from. If he is to vote intelligently, he must have this knowledge. Otherwise in many
instances he would be required to vote in the dark.) (Emphasis supplied)
_______________
ex rel Evans v. Blackwell, Slip copy, 2006 WL 1102804 (Ohio App. 10 Dist.), 2006Ohio-2076.
17 407 Mass. 949, 955 (1990). Affirmed by the District Court of Massachusetts in
Henry v. Conolly, 743 F. Supp. 922 (1990) and by the Court of Appeals, First Circuit,
in Henry v. Conolly, 9109 F. 2d. 1000 (1990), and cited in Marino v. Town Council of
Southbridge, 13 Mass.L.Rptr. 14 (2001).
18 89 P.3d 1227, 1235 (2004).
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232
Moreover, an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature
and effect of that which is proposed and failure to do so is deceptive and
misleading which renders the initiative void.19
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition
must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments. However, the deliberations
of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that the framers intended to adopt
the relevant American jurisprudence on peoples initiative. In particular, the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers
intended that the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments
before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full
text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and Referendum
Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires that the people must sign the
petition x x x as signatories.
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The
proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as public officials.
The proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially explain the
advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people. The
proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the
arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often pay
those who gather the signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of
proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signaturesthat the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text
of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of
the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group
submitted to this Court a copy of a
_______________
19 Stumpf v. Law, 839 P. 2d 120, 124 (1992).

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233
signature sheet20 after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed
their Memorandum on 11 October 2006. The signature sheet with this Court during
the oral arguments was the signature sheet attached21 to the opposition in
intervention filed on 7 September 2006 by intervenor Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra.
The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadras opposition and the signature sheet
attached to the Lambino Groups Memorandum are the same. We reproduce below
the signature sheet in full:
Province:
City/Municipality:
No. of Verified Signatures:
Legislative
District:
Barangay:
PROPOSITION: DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF

THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE
PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND
ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?
I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987 Constitution. My signature
herein which shall form part of the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution
signifies my support for the filing thereof
Precinct
Number
Name
Last
Name,
First
Name,
M.I.
Address
Birthdate
MM/DD/YY
Signature
Verification
1
_______________
20 Exhibit B of the Lambino Groups Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006.

21 Annex B of the Comment/Opposition in Intervention of Atty. Pete QuirinoQuadra filed on 7 September 2006.
234
234
2
10
_______________
_______________
_______________
Barangay Official
(Print Name and Sign)
Witness
Witness
There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Groups
proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state
that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino
admitted this during the oral arguments before this Court on 26 September 2006.
The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from
the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government.
The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes
before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not
the petition that the framers of the Constitution envisioned when they formulated
the initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the signature-gathering

from February to August 2006, the Lambino Group circulated, together with the
signature sheets, printed copies of the Lambino Groups draft petition which they
later filed on 25 August 2006 with the COMELEC. When asked if his group also
circulated the draft of their amended petition filed on 30 August 2006 with the
COMELEC, Atty. Lambino initially replied that they circulated both. However, Atty.
Lambino changed his answer and stated that what
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235
his group circulated was the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, not the
draft of the 25 August 2006 petition.
The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they prepared the draft of
the 30 August 2006 amended petition almost seven months earlier in February
2006 when they started gathering signatures. Petitioner Erico B. Aumentados
Verification/Certification of the 25 August 2006 petition, as well as of the 30
August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC, states as follows:
I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended] Petition in my personal
capacity as a registered voter, for and on behalf of the Union of Local Authorities of
the Philippines, as shown by ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 hereto attached, and as
representative of the mass of signatories hereto. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 to the
present petition. However, the Official Website of the Union of Local Authorities of
the Philippines22 has posted the full text of Resolution No. 2006-02, which
provides:
RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02
RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE PEOPLES CONSULTATIVE

COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLES INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines
(ULAP) to adopt a common stand on the approach to support the proposals of the
Peoples Consultative Commission; on Charter Change;
_______________
22 www.ulap.gov.ph.
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236
WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms as embodied in the
ULAP Joint Declaration for Constitutional Reforms signed by the members of the
ULAP and the majority coalition of the House of Representatives in Manila Hotel
sometime in October 2005;
WHEREAS, the Peoples Consultative Commission on Charter Change created by Her
Excellency to recommend amendments to the 1987 Constitution has submitted its
final report sometime in December 2005;
WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political developments in Congress
which militates against the use of the expeditious form of amending the 1987
Constitution;
WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional members and the failure of
Congress to amend the Constitution as a constituent assembly, ULAP has
unanimously agreed to pursue the constitutional reform agenda through Peoples
Initiative and Referendum without prejudice to other pragmatic means to pursue the
same;
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE MEMBERLEAGUES OF THE UNION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ULAP)
SUPPORT THE PORPOSALS (SIC) OF THE PEOPLES CONSULATATIVE (SIC)
COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLES INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;
DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special meeting held on 14
January 2006 at the Century Park Hotel, Manila.23 (Italics supplied)
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner Aumentado to prepare
the 25 August 2006 petition, or the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the
COMELEC. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 support(s) the porposals (sic) of the
Consulatative (sic) Commission on Charter Change through peoples initiative and
referendum as a mode of amending the 1987 Constitution. The proposals of the
Consultative Commission24 are vastly different
_______________
23 www.ulap.gov.ph/reso2006-02.html.
24 The full text of the proposals of the Consultative Commission on Charter Change
can be downloaded at its official website at www.concom.ph.
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237
from the proposed changes of the Lambino Group in the 25 August 2006 petition or
30 August 2006 amended petition filed with the COMELEC.
For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative Commission affect all
provisions of the existing Constitution, from the Preamble to the Transitory
Provisions. The proposed revisions have profound impact on the Judiciary and the
National Patrimony provisions of the existing Constitution, provisions that the
Lambino Groups proposed changes do not touch. The Lambino Groups proposed
changes purport to affect only Articles VI and VII of the existing Constitution,
including the introduction of new Transitory Provisions.
The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006 or more than six
months before the filing of the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006
amended petition with the COMELEC. However, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does
not establish that ULAP or the Lambino Group caused the circulation of the draft
petition, together with the signature sheets, six months before the filing with the
COMELEC. On the contrary, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 casts grave doubt on the
Lambino Groups claim that they circulated the draft petition together with the
signature sheets. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not refer at all to the draft
petition or to the Lambino Groups proposed changes.
In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before the COMELEC, the
Lambino Group declared:
After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized that the proposed
amendments alleged in the Petition, more specifically, paragraph 3 of Section 4 and
paragraph 2 of Section 5 of the Transitory Provisions were inaccurately stated and
failed to correctly reflect their proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the petition because
the amended petition was what they had shown to the people during the February
to August 2006 signature-gathering. Instead, the Lambino Group alleged that the
petition of 25 August 2006 inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their
proposed amendments.
238
238

The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August
2006 amended petition with the COMELEC that they circulated printed copies of the
draft petition together with the signature sheets. Likewise, the Lambino Group did
not allege in their present petition before this Court that they circulated printed
copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets. The signature sheets
do not also contain any indication that the draft petition is attached to, or circulated
with, the signature sheets.
It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-Interventions that the
Lambino Group first claimed that they circulated the petition for initiative filed with
the COMELEC, thus:
[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that (w)here there is not (sic) fraud, a
signer who did not read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot
question his signature on the ground that he did not understand the nature of the
act. [82 CJS. S128h. Mo. State v. Sullivan, 224, S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546.] Thus, the
registered voters who signed the signature sheets circulated together with the
petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC below, are presumed to voters who
signed the signature sheets circulated together with the petition for initiative filed
with the COMELEC below, are presumed to have understood the proposition
contained in the petition. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Groups statement that they circulated to the people the petition for
initiative filed with the COMELEC appears an afterthought, made after the
intervenor Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Cebu City Chapter and Cebu Province
Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had pointed out that the signature sheets did not
contain the text of the proposed changes. In their Consolidated Reply, the Lambino
Group alleged that they circulated the petition for initiative but failed to mention
the amended petition. This contradicts what Atty. Lambino finally stated during the
oral arguments that what they circulated was the draft of the amended petition of
30 August 2006.
The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating that a signer
who did not read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question
his signature on the ground that he did not understand the nature of the act. The
Lambino
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VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006

239
Group quotes an authority that cites a proposed change attached to the petition
signed by the people. Even the authority the Lambino Group quotes requires that
the proposed change must be attached to the petition. The same authority the
Lambino Group quotes requires the people to sign on the petition itself.
Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed amendment must be
incorporated with, or attached to, the initiative petition signed by the people. In the
present initiative, the Lambino Groups proposed changes were not incorporated
with, or attached to, the signature sheets. The Lambino Groups citation of Corpus
Juris Secundum pulls the rug from under their feet.
It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed, circulated, from
February to August 2006 during the signature-gathering period, the draft of the
petition or amended petition they filed later with the COMELEC. The Lambino Group
are less than candid with this Court in their belated claim that they printed and
circulated, together with the signature sheets, the petition or amended petition.
Nevertheless, even assuming the Lambino Group circulated the amended petition
during the signature-gathering period, the Lambino Group admitted circulating only
very limited copies of the petition.
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they printed only
100,000 copies of the draft petition they filed more than six months later with the
COMELEC. Atty. Lambino added that he also asked other supporters to print
additional copies of the draft petition but he could not state with certainty how
many additional copies the other supporters printed. Atty. Lambino could only
assure this Court of the printing of 100,000 copies because he himself caused the
printing of these 100,000 copies.
Likewise, in the Lambino Groups Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006, the
Lambino Group expressly admit that petitioner Lambino initiated the printing and
reproduction of 100,000 copies of the petition for initiative x x x.25 This admission
_______________
25 The Lambino Groups Memorandum, p. 5.

240
240
binds the Lambino Group and establishes beyond any doubt that the Lambino Group
failed to show the full text of the proposed changes to the great majority of the
people who signed the signature sheets.
Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could have received
with certainty one copy each of the petition, assuming a 100 percent distribution
with no wastage. If Atty. Lambino and company attached one copy of the petition to
each signature sheet, only 100,000 signature sheets could have circulated with the
petition. Each signature sheet contains space for ten signatures. Assuming ten
people signed each of these 100,000 signature sheets with the attached petition,
the maximum number of people who saw the petition before they signed the
signature sheets would not exceed 1,000,000.
With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically impossible
for all or a great majority of the 6.3 million signatories to have seen the petition
before they signed the signature sheets. The inescapable conclusion is that the
Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million signatories the full text of the
proposed changes. If ever, not more than one million signatories saw the petition
before they signed the signature sheets.
In any event, the Lambino Groups signature sheets do not contain the full text of
the proposed changes, either on the face of the signature sheets, or as attachment
with an indication in the signature sheet of such attachment. Petitioner Atty.
Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments, and this admission binds the
Lambino Group. This fact is also obvious from a mere reading of the signature sheet.
This omission is fatal. The failure to so include the text of the proposed changes in
the signature sheets renders the initiative void for non-compliance with the
constitutional requirement that the amendment must be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition. The signature sheet is not the petition
envisioned in the initiative clause of the Constitution.
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature
sheets did not see the fall text of the proposed changes
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before signing. They could not have known the nature and effect of the proposed
changes, among which are:
1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus members of
Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely;26
2, The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its members,
who are almost all the present members of Congress, decide to call for new
parliamentary elections. Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will determine
the expiration of their own term of office;27
3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the interim
Parliament shall convene to propose further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution.28
These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the Lambino
Groups signature sheets. The people who signed the signature sheets had no idea
that they were proposing these amendments. These three proposed changes are
highly controversial. The people could not have inferred or divined these proposed
changes merely from a reading or rereading of the contents of the signature sheets.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he and his group
assured the people during the signaturegathering that the elections for the regular
Parliament would
_______________
26 Under the proposed Section 1(2), Article VI of the Constitution, members of

Parliament shall be elected for a term of five years without limitation as to the
number thereof.
27 Under the proposed Section 4(1), Article XVIII, Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution, the interim Parliament shall continue until the Members of the regular
Parliament shall have been elected and shall have qualified. Also, under the
proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII, of the same Transitory Provisions, the interim
Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament.
28 Under the proposed Section 4(3), Article XVIII, Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution, the interim Parliament, within 45 days from ratification of the proposed
changes, shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this
Constitution.
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be held during the 2007 local elections if the proposed changes were ratified before
the 2007 local elections. However, the text of the proposed changes belies this.
The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as found in the
amended petition, states:
Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members
of Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the
election of all local government officials. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular Parliament will be held
simultaneously with the 2007 local elections. This section merely requires that the
elections for the regular Parliament shall be held simultaneously with the local
elections without specifying the year.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter of the proposed
changes, could have easily written the word next before the phrase election of all
local government officials. This would have insured that the elections for the
regular Parliament would be held in the next local elections following the ratification
of the proposed changes. However, the absence of the word next allows the
interim Parliament to schedule the elections for the regular Parliament
simultaneously with any future local elections.
Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the expiration of their own
term of office. This allows incumbent members of the House of Representatives to
hold office beyond their current three-year term of office, and possibly even beyond
the five-year term of office of regular members of the Parliament. Certainly, this is
contrary to the representations of Atty. Lambino and his group to the 6.3 million
people who signed the signature sheets. Atty. Lambino and his group deceived the
6.3 million signatories, and even the entire nation.
This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an initiative petition that
contains the full text of the proposed amendments to avoid fraud or
misrepresentation. In the present initiative, the 6.3 million signatories had to rely on
the verbal representa243
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243
tions of Atty. Lambino and his group because the signature sheets did not contain
the full text of the proposed changes. The result is a grand deception on the 6.3
million signatories who were led to believe that the proposed changes would require
the holding in 2007 of elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with the
local elections.
The Lambino Groups initiative springs another surprise on the people who signed
the signature sheets. The proposed changes mandate the interim Parliament to
make further amendments or revisions to the Constitution. The proposed Section
4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides:
Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the
interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this
strong bureaucracy. (Emphasis supplied)
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is a surplusage
and the Court and the people should simply ignore it. Far from being a surplusage,
this provision invalidates the Lambino Groups initiative.
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the BicameralPresidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system. American jurisprudence on
initiatives outlaws this as logrollingwhen the initiative petition incorporates an
unrelated subject matter in the same petition. This puts the people in a dilemma
since they can answer only either yes or no to the entire proposition, forcing them
to sign a petition that effectively contains two propositions, one of which they may
find unacceptable.
Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire
proposition and not only the unrelated subject matter. Thus, in Fine v. Firestone,29
the Supreme Court of Florida declared:
_______________
29 448 So.2d 984, 994 (1984), internal citations omitted.

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244
Combining multiple propositions into one proposal constitutes logrolling, which, if
our judicial responsibility is to mean anything, we cannot permit. The very
broadness of the proposed amendment amounts to logrolling because the
electorate cannot know what it is voting onthe amendments proponents
simplistic explanation reveals only the tip of the iceberg, x x x x The ballot must
give the electorate fair notice of the proposed amendment being voted on. x x x x
The ballot language in the instant case fails to do that. The very broadness of the
proposal makes it impossible to state what it will affect and effect and violates the
requirement that proposed amendments embrace only one subject. (Emphasis
supplied)
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air Alaska v. McAlpine,30
the Supreme Court of Alaska warned against inadvertence, stealth and fraud in
logrolling:
Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the problems
that the single-subject rule was enacted to prevent are exacerbated. There is a
greater danger of logrolling, or the deliberate intermingling of issues to increase the
likelihood of an initiatives passage, and there is a greater opportunity for
inadvertence, stealth and fraud in the enactment-by-initiative process. The
drafters of an initiative operate independently of any structured or supervised

process. They often emphasize particular provisions of their proposition, while
remaining silent on other (more complex or less appealing) provisions, when
communicating to the public. x x x Indeed, initiative promoters typically use
simplistic advertising to present their initiative to potential petition-signers and
eventual voters. Many voters will never read the full text of the initiative before the
election. More importantly, there is no process for amending or splitting the several
provisions in an initiative proposal. These difficulties clearly distinguish the initiative
from the legislative process. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for further
amendments or revisions to be undertaken by the interim Parliament as a
constituent assembly. The people who signed the signature sheets could not have
known that their signatures would be used to propose an amendment mandating
the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution.
_______________
30 698 P.2d 1173, 1184 (1985).

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Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4) to compel the
interim Parliament to amend or revise again the Constitution within 45 days from
ratification of the proposed changes, or before the May 2007 elections. In the
absence of the proposed Section 4(4), the interim Parliament has the discretion
whether to amend or revise again the Constitution. With the proposed Section 4(4),
the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament mandated to immediately
amend or revise again the Constitution.
However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in amending
or revising again so soon the Constitution. The signature sheets do not also explain
what specific amendments or revisions the initiative proponents want the interim
Parliament to make, and why there is a need for such further amendments or
revisions. The people are again left in the dark to fathom the nature and effect of
the proposed changes. Certainly, such an initiative is not directly proposed by the
people because the people do not even know the nature and effect of the proposed
changes.
There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Groups amended

petition of 30 August 2006. The proposed Section 4(3) of the Transitory Provisions
states:
Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be members of
Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as member of
Parliament if the interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular
Parliament by 30 June 2010. However, there is no counterpart provision for the
present members of the House of Representatives even if their term of office will all
end on 30 June 2007, three years earlier than that of half of the present Senators.
Thus, all the present members of the House will remain members of the interim
Parliament after 30 June 2010.
The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010. Thereafter, the Prime
Minister exercises all the powers of the President. If the interim Parliament does not
schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010, the Prime Minister
will come
246
246
only from the present members of the House of Representatives to the exclusion of
the present Senators.
The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the Senators. The
6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets could not have known that their
signatures would be used to discriminate against the Senators. They could not have
known that their signatures would be used to limit, after 30 June 2010, the interim
Parliaments choice of Prime Minister only to members of the existing House of
Representatives.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the
people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can
operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That is why the Constitution requires that
an initiative must be directly proposed by the people x x x in a petitionmeaning
that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nations fundamental law, the
writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the people
under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected
individuals.
The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments
to the Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of the people even if the members
of this Court do not personally know the people who sign the petition. However, this
trust emanates from a fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed
amendment is first shown to the people before they sign the petition, not after they
have signed the petition.
In short, the Lambino Groups initiative is void and unconstitutional because it
dismally fails to comply with the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution that the initiative must be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition.
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing
Revision through Initiatives
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A peoples initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the
Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional
convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution. Article
XVII of the Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or
(2) A constitutional convention.
people through initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution.
The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The
second mode is through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a
peoples initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to [A]ny
amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution. In contrast, Section 2 of Article
XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to [A]mendments to this
Constitution. This distinction was intentional as shown by the following
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.

May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that
pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a
complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision
governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete
committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly
propose amendments to this Consti248
248
tution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This
proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came
about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated
from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1.
The committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to
amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the entire
Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed
Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x x
xxxx
MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a
separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to
accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph
(c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as if it were a
self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this
process of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand
into a revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the
sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the
coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision;
whereas, the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only
apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam President.
xxxx
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner Davides proposed amendment
on line 1 refers to amendments. Does it not cover the word revision as defined
by Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words
amendments and revision?
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MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because amendments and revision should be
covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to
amendments not revision.
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.31 (Emphasis supplied)
There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and
wrote, a clear distinction between amendment and revision of the Constitution.
The framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional convention
may propose revisions to the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a
peoples initiative may propose only amendments to the Constitution. Where the
intent and language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power
to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even
as they are empowered to propose amendments.
This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the United States.
Thus, in McFadden v. Jordan,32 the Supreme Court of California ruled:
The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to the Constitution x x
x applies only to the proposing and the adopting or rejecting of laws and
amendments to the Constitution and does not purport to extend to a constitutional
revision. x x x x It is thus clear that a revision of the Constitution may be
accomplished only through ratification by the people of a revised constitution
proposed by a convention called for that purpose as outlined hereinabove.
Consequently if the scope of the proposed initiative measure (hereinafter termed
the measure) now before us is so broad that if such measure became law a
substantial revision of our present state Constitution would be effected, then the
measure may not properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first
agreed upon by a constitutional convention, and the writ sought by petitioner
should issue. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
_______________
31 I RECORD 386, 392, 402-403.
32 196 P.2d 787, 790 (1948). See also Lowe v. Keisling, 130 Or.App. 1, 882 P.2d 91
(1994).
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250
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v. Appling:33
It is well established that when a constitution specifies the manner in which it may
be amended or revised, it can be altered by those who favor amendments, revision,
or other change only through the use of one of the specified means. The
constitution itself recognizes that there is a difference between an amendment and
a revision; and it is obvious from an examination of the measure here in question
that it is not an amendment as that term is generally understood and as it is used in
Article IV, Section 1. The document appears to be based in large part on the revision
of the constitution drafted by the Commission for Constitutional Revision
authorized by the 1961 Legislative Assembly, x x x and submitted to the 1963
Legislative Assembly. It failed to receive in the Assembly the two-thirds majority
vote of both houses required by Article XVII, Section 2, and hence failed of adoption,
x x x.
While differing from that document in material respects, the measure sponsored by
the plaintiffs is, nevertheless, a thorough overhauling of the present constitution x x
x.
To call it an amendment is a misnomer.
Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a measure as can be
submitted to the people through the initiative. If a revision, it is subject to the
requirements of Article XVII, Section 2(1); if a new constitution, it can only be
proposed at a convention called in the manner provided in Article XVII, Section 1. x
xxx
Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a peoples initiative can
only propose amendments to the Constitution since the Constitution itself limits
initiatives to amendments. There can be no deviation from the constitutionally
prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed
by 6.3 million signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes
prescribed in the Constitution itself.
As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative Petition No. 364:34
_______________
33 392 P.2d 636, 638 (1964).

34 930 P.2d 186, 196 (1996), internal citations omitted.
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It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be revised or amended in
the manner prescribed by the instrument itself, and that any attempt to revise a
constitution in a manner other than the one provided in the instrument is almost
invariably treated as extra-constitutional and revolutionary. x x x x While it is
universally conceded that the people are sovereign and that they have power to
adopt a constitution and to change their own work at will, they must, in doing so,
act in an orderly manner and according to the settled principles of constitutional
law. And where the people, in adopting a constitution, have prescribed the method
by which the people may alter or amend it, an attempt to change the fundamental
law in violation of the self-imposed restrictions, is unconstitutional. x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the Constitution,
cannot shirk from its solemn oath and duty to insure compliance with the clear
command of the Constitutionthat a peoples initiative may only amend, never
revise, the Constitution.
The question is, does the Lambino Groups initiative constitute an amendment or
revision of the Constitution? If the Lambino Groups initiative constitutes a revision,
then the present petition should be dismissed for being outside the scope of Section
2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision
of a constitution. One of the earliest cases that recognized the distinction described
the fundamental difference in this manner:
[T]he very term constitution implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding
nature, and the provisions contained therein for its revision indicate the will of the
people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the substantial
entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature. On the
other hand, the significance of the term amendment implies such an addition or
change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or
better carry out the purpose for which it was framed.35 (Emphasis supplied)
_______________
35 Livermore v. Waite, 102 Cal. 113, 118-119 (1894).
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252
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution,
like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-andbalances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the
constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution.
On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or
deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects
several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the
specific provision being amended.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the
constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the
quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the
proposed change is so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the
substantial entirety of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous
existing provisions.36 The court examines only the number of provisions affected
and does not consider the degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in
the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will accomplish such far
reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a
revision.37 Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a
proper subject of inquiry. Thus, a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental
plan includes change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of
its Branches.38 A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also
includes changes that jeopardize the traditional form of government and the
system of check and balances.39
_______________
36 Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Board of Equalization, 583
P.2d 1281, 1286 (1978).
37 Id.
38 Legislature of the State of California v. EU, 54 Cal.3d 492, 509 (1991).
39 California Association of Retail Tobacconists v. State, 109 Cal. App.4th 792, 836
(2003).
253 [Lambino vs. Commission on Elections, 505 SCRA 160(2006)]
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006

253
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Groups initiative is a
revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Groups
proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII
on the Executiveaffecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution.40
Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of
government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a
unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when
the three great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are
reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift
from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive
branches is a radical change in the structure of government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power
alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution.
Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of
checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the
Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to
a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the
President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision,
not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the Lambino Groups proposed
changes, it is readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the framework of
government as set forth in the Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading
member of the Constitutional Commission, writes:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable
provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific
parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to
suppress specific portions that may have become obso_______________
40 See note 44, infra.

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254

lete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original
intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of
provisions of the document which have over-all implications for the entire
document, to determine how and to what extent they should be altered. Thus, for
instance a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be
a revision because of its over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure. So
would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system be because of its
effect on other important provisions of the Constitution.41(Emphasis supplied)
In Adams v. Gunter42 an initiative petition proposed the amendment of the Florida
State constitution to shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. The issue
turned on whether the initiative was defective and unauthorized where [the]
proposed amendment would x x x affect several other provisions of [the]
Constitution. The Supreme Court of Florida, striking down the initiative as outside
the scope of the initiative clause, ruled as follows:
The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to
provide for a Unicameral Legislature affects not only many other provisions of the
Constitution but provides for a change in the form of the legislative branch of
government, which has been in existence in the United States Congress and in all of
the states of the nation, except one, since the earliest days. It would be difficult to
visualize a more revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a Senate is
basic in the American form of government. It would not only radically change the
whole pattern of government in this state and tear apart the whole fabric of the
Constitution, but would even affect the physical facilities necessary to carry on
government.
xxxx
We conclude with the observation that if such proposed amendment were adopted
by the people at the General Election and if the Legislature at its next session
should fail to submit further amendments to revise and clarify the numerous
inconsistencies and conflicts which would result, or if after
_______________
41 Joaquin Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A

Commentary, p. 1294 (2003).
42 238 So.2d 824 (1970).
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submission of appropriate amendments the people should refuse to adopt them,
simple chaos would prevail in the government of this State. The same result would
obtain from an amendment, for instance, of Section 1 of Article V, to provide for
only a Supreme Court and Circuit Courts-and there could be other examples too
numerous to detail. These examples point unerringly to the answer.
The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of men and women and
many sessions of the Legislature in bringing about the Constitution of 1968 was to
eliminate inconsistencies and conflicts and to give the State a workable, accordant,
homogenous and up-to-date document. All of this could disappear very quickly if we
were to hold that it could be amended in the manner proposed in the initiative
petition here.43 (Emphasis supplied)
The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater force to the present
petition. The Lambino Groups initiative not only seeks a shift from a bicameral to a
unicameral legislature, it also seeks to merge the executive and legislative
departments. The initiative in Adams did not even touch the executive department.
In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections of the Florida
Constitution that would be affected by the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral
legislature. In the Lambino Groups present initiative, no less than 105 provisions of
the Constitution would be affected based on the count of Associate Justice Romeo J.
Callejo, Sr.44 There is no doubt that the Lambino Groups present initiative seeks far
more radical changes in the structure of government than the initiative in Adams.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between amendment and
revision is only one of procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that
when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution,
substantive changes are called revisions because members of the deliberative
body work full-time on the changes. However, the same substantive changes, when
proposed through an initiative, are called amend_______________
43 Id., at pp. 830-832.

44 As stated by Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. during the 26 September
2006 oral arguments.
256
256
ments because the changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an
occupation, profession, or vocation out of such endeavor.
Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of their theory in their
Memorandum:
99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the constitutional provisions
expressly provide for both amendment and revision when it speaks of legislators
and constitutional delegates, while the same provisions expressly provide only for
amendment when it speaks of the people. It would seem that the apparent
distinction is based on the actual experience of the people, that on one hand the
common people in general are not expected to work full-time on the matter of
correcting the constitution because that is not their occupation, profession or
vocation; while on the other hand, the legislators and constitutional convention
delegates are expected to work fulltime on the same matter because that is their
occupation, profession or vocation. Thus, the difference between the words
revision and amendment pertain only to the process or procedure of coming up
with the corrections, for purposes of interpreting the constitutional provisions.
100. Stated otherwise, the difference between amendment and revision cannot
reasonably be in the substance or extent of the correction. x x x x (Underlining in
the original; boldfacing supplied)
The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a constitutional convention
had drafted the same proposed changes that the Lambino Group wrote in the
present initiative, the changes would constitute a revision of the Constitution. Thus,
the Lambino Group concedes that the proposed changes in the present initiative
constitute a revision if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the
changes. However, since the Lambino Group as private individuals drafted the
proposed changes, the changes are merely amendments to the Constitution. The
Lambino Group trivializes the serious matter of changing the fundamental law of the
land.
The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution
contradict the Lambino Groups theory. Where the intent of the framers and the
language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from
such categorical intent
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and language.45 Any theory espousing a construction contrary to such intent and
language deserves scant consideration. More so, if such theory wreaks havoc by
creating inconsistencies in the form of government established in the Constitution.
Such a theory, devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and inviting inconsistencies in
the Constitution, only exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Groups position. Any
theory advocating that a proposed change involving a radical structural change in
government does not constitute a revision justly deserves rejection.
The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative proponents in American
jurisdictions have attempted to advance without any success. In Lowe v. Keisling,46
the Supreme Court of Oregon rejected this theory, thus:
Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to changes to the
constitution proposed by initiative. His theory is that Article XVII, section 2 merely
provides a procedure by which the legislature can propose a revision of the
constitution, but it does not affect proposed revisions initiated by the people.
Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes a wholesale change to
the constitution that cannot be enacted through the initiative process. They assert
that the distinction between amendment and revision is determined by reviewing
the scope and subject matter of the proposed enactment, and that revisions are not
limited to a formal overhauling of the con-stitution. They argue that this ballot
measure proposes far reaching changes outside the lines of the original instrument,
including profound impacts on existing fundamental rights and radical restructuring
of the governments relationship with a defined group of citizens. Plaintiffs assert
that, because the proposed ballot measure will refashion the most basic principles
of Oregon constitutional law, the trial court correctly held that it violated Article
XVII, section 2, and cannot appear on the ballot without the prior approval of the
legislature.
_______________
45 Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, 10 November 2003,

415 SCRA 44; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 142 Phil. 393; 31
SCRA 413 (1970); Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259 (1938).
46 882 P.2d 91, 96-97 (1994). On the merits, the Court in Lowe v. Keisling found the
amendment in question was not a revision.
258
258
We first address Mabons argument that Article XVII, section 2(1), does not prohibit
revisions instituted by initiative. In Holmes v. Appling, x x x, the Supreme Court
concluded that a revision of the constitution may not be accomplished by initiative,
because of the provisions of Article XVII, section 2. After reviewing Article XVII,
section 1, relating to proposed amendments, the court said:
From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1, authorizes the use of the
initiative as a means of amending the Oregon Constitution, but it contains no similar
sanction for its use as a means of revising the constitution. x x x x
It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to revisions, and said: It is the only
section of the constitution which provides the means for constitutional revision and
it excludes the idea that an individual, through the initiative, may place such a
measure before the electorate. x x x x
Accordingly, we reject Mabons argument that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply
to constitutional revisions proposed by initiative. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Groups theory which negates the
express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution.
We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end green for
amendments and at the other end red for revisions. Towards the middle of the
spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties arise in determining whether there is an
amendment or revision. The present initiative is indisputably located at the far end
of the red spectrum where revision begins. The present initiative seeks a radical
overhaul of the existing separation of powers among the three co-equal
departments of government, requiring far-reaching amendments in several sections
and articles of the Constitution.
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution
without affecting any other section or article, the change may generally be
considered an amendment and not a revision. For example, a change reducing the
voting age from 18 years to 15 years47 is an amendment and not a revision.
Similarly, a change
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47 Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.

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reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100 percent to 60
percent is an amendment and not a revision.48 Also, a change requiring a college
degree as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment
and not a revision.49
The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles
of the Constitution other than the specific provision being amended. These changes
do not also affect the structure of government or the system of checks-andbalances among or within the three branches. These three examples are located at
the far green end of the spectrum, opposite the far red end where the revision
sought by the present petition is located.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a
revision. A change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a
revision and not an amendment. For example, the substitution of the word
republican with monarchic or theocratic in Section 1, Article II50 of the
Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government and the
fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will
have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions, as
well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted system of
checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing
Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a
constitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to
undertake a revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions,
but also the altered principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions
normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional
conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow peoples
initiatives, which do not have fixed and
_______________
48 Section 11(1), Article XVI of the Constitution.

49 Section 2, Article VII of the Constitution.
50 This section provides: The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them.
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260
identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only
amendments and not revisions.
In the present initiative, the Lambino Groups proposed Section 2 of the Transitory
Provisions states:
shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered
conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; x x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is irreconcilably
inconsistent with a prior law, the later law prevails. This rule also applies to
construction of constitutions. However, the Lambino Groups draft of Section 2 of
the Transitory Provisions turns on its head this rule of construction by stating that in
case of such irreconcilable inconsistency, the earlier provision shall be amended to
conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government. The effect is to
freeze the two irreconcilable provisions until the earlier one shall be amended,
which requires a future separate constitutional amendment.
Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment, petitioner Atty. Lambino
readily conceded during the oral arguments that the requirement of a future
amendment is a surplusage. In short, Atty. Lambino wants to reinstate the rule of
statutory construction so that the later provision automatically prevails in case of
irreconcilable inconsistency. However, it is not as simple as that.
The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed Section 2 of the
Transitory Provisions is not between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
and a provision in the proposed changes. The inconsistency is between a provision
in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the Parliamentary system of
government, and the
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inconsistency shall be resolved in favor of a unicameral parliamentary form of
government.
Now, what unicameral parliamentary form of government do the Lambino Groups
proposed changes refer tothe Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand
models, which are among the few countries with unicameral parliaments? The
proposed changes could not possibly refer to the traditional and well-known
parliamentary forms of governmentthe British, French, Spanish, German, Italian,
Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian models, which have all bicameral parliaments.
Did the people who signed the signature sheets realize that they were adopting the
Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand parliamentary form of

government?
This drives home the point that the peoples initiative is not meant for revisions of
the Constitution but only for amendments. A shift from the present BicameralPresidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires harmonizing several
provisions in many articles of the Constitution. Revision of the Constitution through
a peoples initiative will only result in gross absurdities in the Constitution.
In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Groups initiative is a
revision and not an amendment. Thus, the present initiative is void and
unconstitutional because it violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
limiting the scope of a peoples initiative to [A]mendments to this Constitution.
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic
requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope
of a peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this
Courts ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions to cover the system of initiative to amend the
Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of
the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which
effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not com262
262
ply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on
amendments to the Constitution.
This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute if
the case before the Court can be resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance
is a logical consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts will not pass upon
the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved on some other
grounds.51
Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the constitutional
provision on initiatives to amend the Constitution, this will not change the result
here because the present petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
To be a valid initiative, the present initiative must first comply with Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution even before complying with RA 6735.
Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which requires that
the petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per
centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories. Section 5(b)
of RA 6735 requires that the people must sign the petition x x x as signatories.
The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or the
amended petition of 30 August 2006 filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino,
Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty. Alberto C. Agra signed the petition and
amended petition as counsels for Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado,
Petitioners. In the COMELEC the Lambino Group, claiming to act together with
the 6.3 million signatories, merely attached the signature sheets to the petition and
amended petition. Thus, the petition and amended petition filed with the COMELEC
did not even comply with the basic requirement of RA 6735 that the Lambino Group
claims as valid.
The Lambino Groups logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735
stating, No petition embracing more than one
_______________
51 Spouses Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 760; 351 SCRA 44 (2001); Intia, Jr.
v. Commission on Audit, 366 Phil. 273; 306 SCRA 593 (1999).
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(1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x. The proposed Section 4(4) of
the Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose further
amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated to
the shift in the form of government. Since the present initiative embraces more than
one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits submission of the initiative petition to the
electorate. Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid, the Lambino Groups initiative will still fail.
4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the
Lambino Groups Initiative
In dismissing the Lambino Groups initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc merely
followed this Courts ruling in Santiago and Peoples Initiative for Reform,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. COMELEC.52 For following this Courts ruling,
no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the COMELEC. On this ground alone,
the present petition warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this Court should reiterate its
unanimous ruling in PIRMA:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could
be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by
PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the dispositions in the
Decisions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its
Resolution of June 10, 1997.
5. Conclusion
The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost respect
and obedience of all the citizens of this nation. No one can trivialize the Constitution
by cavalierly amending or revising it in blatant violation of the clearly specified
modes of amendment and revision laid down in the Constitution itself.
To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution in
unchartered waters, to be tossed and turned by every dominant political group of
the day. If this Court allows today a cava_______________
52 G.R. No. 129754, Resolution dated 23 September 1997.

264
264
lier change in the Constitution outside the constitutionally prescribed modes,
tomorrow the new dominant political group that comes will demand its own set of
changes in the same cavalier and unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door
constitution does not augur well for the rule of law in this country.
An overwhelming majority16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3 percent of the total
votes cast53approved our Constitution in a national plebiscite held on 11 February
1987. That approval is the unmistakable voice of the people, the full expression of
the peoples sovereign will. That approval included the prescribed modes for
amending or revising the Constitution.
No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures gathered by the
Lambino Group, can change our Constitution contrary to the specific modes that the
people, in their sovereign capacity, prescribed when they ratified the Constitution.
The alternative is an extra-constitutional change, which means subverting the
peoples sovereign will and discarding the Constitution. This is one act the Court
cannot and should never do. As the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, this Court
is sworn to perform its solemn duty to defend and protect the Constitution, which
embodies the real sovereign will of the people.
Incantations of peoples voice, peoples sovereign will, or let the people
decide cannot override the specific modes of changing the Constitution as
prescribed in the Constitution itself. Otherwise, the Constitutionthe peoples
fundamental covenant that provides enduring stability to our societybecomes

easily susceptible to manipulative changes by political groups gathering signatures
through false promises. Then, the Constitution ceases to be the bedrock of the
nations stability.
The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the peoples voice. However, the
Lambino Group unabashedly states in ULAP
_______________
53 Presidential Proclamation No. 58 dated February 11, 1987, entitled Proclaiming

the Ratification of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines Adopted by the
Constitutional Commission of 1986, including the Ordinance Appended thereto.
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Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the COMELEC, that
ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms. The Lambino Group thus
admits that their peoples initiative is an unqualified support to the agenda of
the incumbent President to change the Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be
wary of incantations of peoples voice or sovereign will in the present initiative.
This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the Constitution.
The Constitution, which embodies the peoples sovereign will, is the bible of this
Court. This Court exists to defend and protect the Constitution. To allow this
constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by deceptively gathered signatures, to
alter basic principles in the Constitution is to allow a desecration of the Constitution.
To allow such alteration and desecration is to lose this Courts raison detre.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio-Morales, J., concur.
Panganiban (C.J.), See Separate Concurring Opinion.
Puno, J., Pls. see Dissent.
Quisumbing and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., Pls. See Separate Opinions.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., Pls. see my Concurring Opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., I also concur with Justice Callejo.
Corona, J., See Dissenting Opinion.

Callejo, Sr., J., Please see Concurring Opinion.
Azcuna, J., I concur in Separate Opinion.
Tinga, J., See Separate Opinion.
266
266
Chico-Nazario, J., I join the Dissenting Opinion of J. PunoPlease see Separate
Opinion.
Garcia, J., I join the Dissenting Opinion of J. Puno.
Velasco, Jr., J., I join the Dissent of J. Puno.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
PANGANIBAN, C.J.:
Without the rule of law, there can be no

lasting prosperity and certainly no liberty.
Beverley McLachlin 1
Chief Justice of Canada
After a deep reflection on the issues raised and a careful evaluation of the parties
respective argumentsboth oral and writtenas well as the enlightened and
enlightening Opinions submitted by my esteemed colleagues, I am fully convinced
that the present Petition must be dismissed.
I write, however, to show that my present disposition is completely consistent with
my previous Opinions and votes on the two extant Supreme Court cases involving
an initiative to change the Constitution.
In my Separate Opinion in Santiago v. Comelec,2 I opined that taken together and
interpreted properly and liberally, the Constitu_______________
1 Chief Justice McLachlin spoke on Liberty, Prosperity and the Rule of Law in her
speech before the Global Forum on Liberty and Prosperity held on October 18-20,
2006 in Manila. She further stated: Without the rule of law, government officials
are not bound by standards of conduct. Without the rule of law, the dignity and
equality of all people is not affirmed and their ability to seek redress for grievances
and societal commitments is limited. Without the rule of law, we have no means of
ensuring meaningful participation by people in formulating and enacting the norms
and standards which organize the kinds of societies in which we want to live.
2 G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 336 Phil. 848; 270 SCRA 106. For ease of
reference, my Separate Opinion is reproduced in full:
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tion (particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), Republic Act 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300
provide more than sufficient authority to implement,
_______________
Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing for the
majority, holds that:
(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
entertaining the initiatory Delfin Petition.
(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to be directly proposed by the
people through initiative, there is no implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.
(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2300, insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on
the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void.
I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory petition can show
the required number of signaturesin this case, 12% of all the registered voters in
the Philippines with at least 3% in every legislative districtno public funds may be
spent and no government resources may be used in an initiative to amend the
Constitution. Verily, the Comelec cannot even entertain any petition absent such
signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully from the majoritys two other
rulings. Let me explain.
Under the above restrictive holdings espoused by the Courts majority, the
Constitution cannot be amended at all through a peoples initiative. Not by Delfin,
not by PIRMA, not by anyone, not even by all the voters of the country acting
together. This decision will effectively but unnecessarily curtail, nullify, abrogate and
render inutile the peoples right to change the basic law. At the very least, the
majority holds the right hostage to congressional discretion on whether to pass a
new law to implement it, when there is already one existing at present. This right to
amend through initiative, it bears stressing, is guaranteed by Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution, as follows:
SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
by
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268
effectuate and realize our peoples power to amend the Constitution.
_______________
at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under
this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
With all due respect, I find the majoritys position all too sweeping and all too
extremist. It is equivalent to burning the whole house to exterminate the rats, and
to killing the patient to relieve him of pain. What Citizen Delfin wants the Comelec
to do we should reject. But we should not thereby preempt any future effort to
exercise the right of initiative correctly and judiciously. The fact that the Delfin
Petition proposes a misuse of initiative does not justify a ban against its proper use.
Indeed, there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time and for the right
reason.
Taken Together and Interpreted Properly, the Constitution, R.A. 6735 and Comelec
Resolution 2300 Are Sufficient to Implement Constitutional Initiatives
While R.A. 6735 may not be a perfect law, it wasas the majority openly concedes
intended by the legislature to cover and, I respectfully submit, it contains enough
provisions to effectuate an initiative on the Constitution. I completely agree with the
inspired and inspiring opinions of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno and Mr. Justice Ricardo
J. Francisco that RA 6735, the Roco law on initiative, sufficiently implements the
right of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution. Such views, which I
shall no longer repeat nor elaborate on, are thoroughly consistent with this Courts
unanimous en banc rulings in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Commission on

Elections, that provisions for initiative . . . are (to be) liberally construed to
effectuate their purposes, to facilitate and not hamper the exercise by the voters of
the rights granted thereby; and in Garcia vs. Comelec, that any effort to trivialize
the effectiveness of peoples initiatives ought to be rejected.
No law can completely and absolutely cover all administrative details. In
recognition of this, R.A. 6735 wisely empowered the Commission on Election to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of this Act. And pursuant thereto, the Comelec issued its Resolution 2300
on 16 January 1991.
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Six months after, in my Separate Opinion in Peoples Initiative for Reform,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. Comelec, I joined the
_______________
Such Resolution, by its very words, was promulgated to govern the conduct of
initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local
laws, not by the incumbent Commission on Elections but by one then composed of
Acting Chairperson Haydee B. Yorac, Comms. Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr., Leopoldo L.
Africa, Andres R. Flores, Dario C. Rama and Magdara B. Dimaampao. All of these
Commissioners who signed Resolution 2300 have retired from the Commission, and
thus we cannot ascribe any vile motive unto them, other than an honest, sincere
and exemplary effort to give life to a cherished right of our people.
The majority argues that while Resolution 2300 is valid in regard to national laws
and local legislations, it is void in reference to constitutional amendments. There is
no basis for such differentiation. The source of and authority for the Resolution is
the same law, R.A. 6735.
I respectfully submit that taken together and interpreted properly and liberally, the
Constitution (particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), R.A. 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300
provide more than sufficient authority to implement, effectuate and realize our
peoples power to amend the Constitution.
Petitioner Delfin and the Pedrosa Spouses Should Not Be Muzzled
I am glad the majority decided to heed our plea to lift the temporary restraining
order issued by this Court on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibited Petitioner
Delfin and the Spouses Pedrosa from exercising their right of initiative. In fact, I
believe that such restraining order as against private respondents should not have
been issued, in the first place. While I agree that the Comelec should be stopped
from using public funds and government resources to help them gather signatures, I
firmly believe that this Court has no power to restrain them from exercising their
right of initiative. The right to propose amendments to the Constitution is really a
species of the right of free speech and free assembly. And certainly, it would be
tyrannical and despotic to stop anyone from speaking freely and persuading others
to conform to his/her beliefs. As the eminent Voltaire once said, I may disagree with
what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it. After
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270
Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. Comelec,3 I joined the
_______________
all, freedom is not really for the thought we agree with, but as Justice Holmes wrote,
freedom for the thought that we hate.
Epilogue
By way of epilogue, let me stress the guiding tenet of my Separate Opinion.

Initiative, like referendum and recall, is a new and treasured feature of the Filipino
constitutional system. All three are institutionalized legacies of the world-admired
EDSA people power. Like elections and plebiscites, they are hallowed expressions of
popular sovereignty. They are sacred democratic rights of our people to be used as
their final weapons against political excesses, opportunism, inaction, oppression and
misgovernance; as well as their reserved instruments to exact transparency,
accountability and faithfulness from their chosen leaders. While on the one hand,
their misuse and abuse must be resolutely struck down, on the other, their
legitimate exercise should be carefully nurtured and zealously protected.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition of Sen. Miriam D. Santiago, et al. and to
DIRECT Respondent Commission on Elections to DISMISS the Delfin Petition on the
ground of prematurity, but not on the other grounds relied upon by the majority. I
also vote to LIFT the temporary restraining order issued on 18 December 1996
insofar as it prohibits Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa from
exercising their right to free speech in proposing amendments to the Constitution.
3 G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997 (still unpublished in the Philip-pine Reports
or in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated). Again, for ease of reference, I
reproduce my Separate Opinion in full:
Petitioners assail the July 8, 1997 Resolution of Respondent Commission dismissing
their petition for a peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. Said petition before
the Comelec (henceforth, PIRMA petition) was backed up by nearly six (6) million
signatures constituting about 16% of the registered voters of the country with at
least 3% in each legislative district. The petition now before us presents two
grounds:
1. In refusing to act on the PIRMA petition, the Comelec allegedly acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
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rest of the members of the Court in ruling by a unanimous vote, that no grave
abuse of discretion could be attributed to the Comelec in
_______________
2. In declaring R.A. 6735 inadequate to cover its system of initiative on

amendments to the Constitution and declaring void those parts of Resolution
2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the
conduct of [an] initiative [on] amendments to the Constitution, the Supreme
Courts Decision in G.R. No. 127325 entitled Miriam Defensor Santiago vs.
Commission on Elections (hereafter referred to as Santiago) should be reexamined
because said Decision is allegedly unconstitutional, and because, in any event,
the Supreme Court itself, in reconsidering the said issue per its June 10, 1997
Resolution, was deadlocked at six votes one each side.
The following in my position on each of these two issues:
First Issue:
No Grave Abuse of Discretion
in Comelecs Refusal to Act
The Respondent Commissions refusal to act on the prayers of the PIRMA petition
cannot in any wise be branded as grave abuse of discretion. Be it remembered
that the Courts Decision in Santiago permanently enjoined the Comelec from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to

the Constitution x x x. While concededly, petitioners in this case were not direct
parties in Santiago, nonetheless the Courts injunction against the Comelec covered
ANY petition, not just the Delfin petition which was the immediate subject of said
case. As a dissenter in Santiago, I believed, and still do, that the majority gravely
erred in rendering such a sweeping injunction, but I cannot fault the Comelec for
complying with the ruling even if it, too, disagreed with said decisions ratio
decidendi. Respondent Comelec was directly enjoined by the highest Court of the
land. It had no choice but to obey. Its obedience cannot constitute grave abuse of
discretion. Refusal to act on the PIRMA petition was the only recourse open to the
Comelec. Any other mode of action would have constituted defiance of the Court
and would have been struck down as grave abuse of discretion and contumacious
disregard of this Courts supremacy as the final arbiter of justiciable controversies.
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272
dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, since the Commission had only
complied with the Santiago Decision.
_______________
Second Issue:
Sufficiency of RA 6735
I repeat my firm legal position that RA 6735 is adequate to cover initiatives on the
Constitution, and that whatever administrative details may have been omitted in
said law are satisfactorily provided by Comelec Resolution 2300. The promulgation
of Resolution 2300 is sanctioned by Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, which
vests upon the Comelec the power to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum
and recall. The Omnibus Election Code likewise empowers the electoral body to
promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this Code or other
laws which the Commission is required to enforce and administer x x x. Finally and
most relevantly, Section 20 of RA 6735 specifically authorizes Comelec to
promulgate rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of
this Act.
In my dissent in Santiago, I wrote that there is a right way to do the right thing at
the right time and for the right reason. Let me explain further.
The Right Thing
A peoples initiative is direct democracy in action. It is the right thing that citizens
may avail themselves of to articulate their will. It is a new and treasured feature of
the Filipino constitutional system. Even the majority implicitly conceded its value
and worth in our legal firmament when it implored Congress not to tarry any longer
in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for implementation of the
right (of initiative) of the people x x x. Hence, in the en banc case of Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority vs. Comelec, [G.R. No. 125416, September 26, 1996, 262
SCRA 492], this Court unanimously held that (l)ike elections, initiative and
referendum are powerful and valuable modes of expressing popular sovereignty.
And this Court as a matter of policy and doctrine will exert every effort to nurture,
protect and promote their legitimate exercise.
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I added that my position upholding the adequacy of RA 6735 and the validity of
Comelec Resolution 2300 will not ipso facto validate
_______________
The Right Way
From the outset, I have already maintained the view that taken together and
interpreted properly and liberally, the Constitution (particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), RA
6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide more than sufficient authority to
implement, effectuate and realize our peoples power to amend the Constitution.
Let me now demonstrate the adequacy of RA 6735 by outlining, in concrete terms,
the steps to be takenthe right wayto amend the Constitution through a peoples
initiative.
Pursuant to Section 3(f) of the law, the Comelec shall prescribe the form of the
petition which shall contain the proposition and the required number of signatories.
Under Sec. 5(c) thereof, the petition shall state the following:
c.1 contents or text of the [provision or provisions] sought to be x x x amended, x x
x;
c.2 the proposition [in full text];
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor [fully and clearly explained];

c.4 that it is not one of exceptions provided herein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition in not more than one hundred (100) words
which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.
Section 8(f) of Comelec Resolution 2300 additionally requires that the petition
include a formal designation of the duly authorized representatives of the
signatories.
Being a constitutional requirement, the number of signatures becomes a condition
precedent to the filing of the petition, and is jurisdictional. Without such requisite
signatures, the Commission shall motu proprio reject the petition.
Where the initiators have substantially complied with the above requirements, they
may thence file the petition with the Comelec which is tasked to determine the
sufficiency thereof and to verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of
voters, voters affidavits and voters identification cards. In deciding whether the
petition is suffi274
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the PIRMA petition and automatically lead to a plebiscite to amend
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cient, the Comelec shall also determine if the proposition is proper for an initiative,
i.e., if it consists of an amendment, not a revision, of the Constitution. Any decision
of the electoral body may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days
from notice.
Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, and after the determination of
its sufficiency, the Comelec shall publish the same in Filipino and English at least
twice in newspapers of general and local circulation, and set the date of the
plebiscite. The conduct of the plebiscite should not be earlier than sixty (60) days,
but not later than ninety (90) days after certification by the Comelec of the
sufficiency of the petition. The proposition, if approved by a majority of the votes
cast in the plebiscite, becomes effective as of the day of the plebiscite.
From the foregoing, it should be clear that my position upholding the adequacy of
RA 6735 and the validity of Comelec Resolution 2300 will not ipso facto validate the
PIRMA petition and automatically lead to a plebiscite to amend the Constitution. Far
from it. Among others, PIRMA must still satisfactorily hurdle the following searching
issues:
1. Does the proposed changethe lifting of the term limits of elective officials
constitute a mere amendment and not a revision of the Constitution?
2. Which registry of voters will be used to verify the signatures in the petition? This
question is relevant considering that under RA 8189, the old registry of voters used
in the 1995 national elections was voided after the barangay elections on May 12,
1997, while the new list may be used starting only in the elections of May 1998.
3. Does the clamor for the proposed change in the Constitution really emanate from
the people who signed the petition for initiative? Or it is the beneficiaries of term
extension who are in fact orchestrating such move to advance their own political
self-interest?
4. Are the six million signatures genuine and verifiable? Do they really belong to
qualified warm bodies comprising at least 12% of the registered voters nationwide,
of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered
voters therein?
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the Constitution. Far from it. I stressed that PIRMA must show the following, among
others:
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I shall expound on the third question in the next section, The Right Reason.
Question Nos. 1 and 2 above, while important, are basically legal in character and
can be determined by argumentation and memoranda. However, Question No. 4
involves not only legal issues but gargantuan hurdles of factual determination. This
to my mind is the crucible, the litmus test, of a peoples petition for initiative. If
herein petitioners, led by PIRMA, succeed in provingnot just allegingthat six
million voters of this country indeed want to amend the Constitution, what power on
earth can stop them? Not this Court, not the Comelec, not even the President or
Congress.
It took only one million people to stage a peaceful revolution at EDSA, and the very
rafters and foundations of the martial law society trembled, quaked and crumbled.
On the other hand, PIRMA and its co-petitioners are claiming that they have
gathered six million signatures. If, as claimed by many, these six million signatures
are fraudulent, then let them be exposed and damned for all history in a signatureverification process conducted under our open system of legal advocacy.
More than anything else, it is the truth that I, as a member of this Court and as a
citizen of this country, would like to seek: Are these six million signatures real? By
insisting on an entirely new doctrine of statutory inadequacy, the majority
effectively suppressed the quest for that truth.
The Right Reason
As mentioned, the third question that must be answered, even if the adequacy of
RA 6735 and the validity of Comelec Resolution 2300 were upheld by the majority
is: Does the clamor for the proposed change to the Constitution really emanate from
the people who signed the petition for initiative? Or is it the beneficiaries of term
extension who are in fact orchestrating such move to advance their own political
self-interests? In other words, is PIRMAs exercise of the right to initiative being done
in accordance with our Constitution and our laws? Is such attempted exercise
legitimate?
In Garcia vs. Commission on Elections, we described initiative, along with
referendum, as the ultimate weapon of the people to negate government
malfeasance and misfeasance. In Subic Bay, we specified that initiative is entirely
the work of the electorate x x x a process of
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276
(1) The proposed changethe lifting of term limits of elective officials
constitute[s] a mere amendment and not a revision of the Constitution.
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lawmaking by the people themselves without the participation and against the
wishes of their elected representatives. As ponente of Subic Bay, I stand foursquare
on this principle: The right to amend through initiative belongs only to the people
not to the government and its minions. This principle finds clear support from
utterances of many constitutional commissioners like those quoted below:
[Initiative is] a reserve power of the sovereign people, when they are dissatisfied
with the National Assembly x x x [and] precisely a fallback position of the people in
the event that they are dissatisfied.Commissioner Ople
[Initiative is] a check on a legislative that is not responsive [and resorted to] only if
the legislature is not as responsive to the vital and urgent needs of people.
Commissioner Gascon
[Initiative is an] extraordinary power given to the people [and] reserved for the
people [which] should not be frivolously resorted to.Commissioner Romulo
Indeed, if the powers-that-be desire to amend the Constitution, or even to revise it,
our Charter itself provides them other ways of doing so, namely, by calling a
constitutional convention or constituting Congress into a constituent assembly.
These are officialdoms weapons. But initiative belongs to the people.
In the present case, are PIRMA and its co-petitioners legitimate peoples
organizations or are they merely fronts for incumbents who want to extend their
terms? This is a factual question which, unfortunately, cannot be judicially answered
anymore, because the Supreme Court majority ruled that the law that implements
it, RA 6735, is inadequate or insufficient insofar as initiatives to the Constitutions
are concerned. With such ruling, the majority effectively abrogated a constitutional
right of our people. That is why in my Separate Opinion in Santiago, I exclaimed that
such precipitate action is equivalent to burning the whole house to exterminate the
rats, and to killing the patient to relieve him of pain. I firmly maintain that to defeat
PIRMAs effort, there is no need to burn the constitutional right to initiative. If
PIRMAs exercise is not legitimate, it can be exposed as such in the
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(2) The six million signatures are genuine and verifiable; and they really belong
to qualified warm bodies comprising at least 12%
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ways I have discussedshort of abrogating the right itself. On the other hand, if
PIRMAs position is proven to be legitimateif it hurdles the four issues I outlined
earlierby all means, we should allow and encourage it. But the majoritys theory of
statutory inadequacy has pre-emptedunnecessarily and invalidly, in my viewany
judicial determination of such legitimacy or illegitimacy. It has silenced the quest for
truth into the interstices of the PIRMA petition.
The Right Time
The Constitution itself sets a time limitation on when changes thereto may be
proposed. Section 2 of Article XVII precludes amendments within five years
following [its] ratification x x x nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
Since its ratification, the 1987 Constitution has never been amended. Hence, the
five-year prohibition is now inoperative and amendments may theoretically be
proposed at any time.
Be that as it may, I believegiven the present circumstancesthat there is no
more time to lift term limits to enable incumbents to seek reelection in the May 11,
1998 polls. Between today and the next national elections, less than eight (8)
months remain. Santiago, where the single issue of the sufficiency of RA 6735 was
resolved, took this Court three (3) months, and another two (2) months to decide
the motion for reconsideration. The instant case, where the same issue is also
raised by the petitioners, took two months, not counting a possible motion for
reconsideration. These time spans could not be abbreviated any further, because
due process requires that all parties be given sufficient time to file their pleadings.
Thus, even if the Court were to rule now in favor of the adequacy of RA 6735as I
believe it shouldand allow the Comelec to act on the PIRMA petition, such eightmonth period will not be enough to tackle the four weighty issues I mentioned
earlier, considering that two of them involve tedious factual questions. The
Comelecs decision on any of these issues can still be elevated to this Court for
review, and reconsiderations on our decisions on each of those issues may again be
sought.
Comelecs herculean task alone of verifying each of the six million signatures is
enormously time-consuming, considering that any
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of the registered voters nationwide, of which every legislative districtis represented
by at least 3% of the registered voters therein.
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person may question the authenticity of each and every signature, initially before
the election registrar, then before the Comelec on appeal and finally, before this
Court in a separate proceeding. Moreover, the plebiscite itselfassuming such
stage can be reachedmay be scheduled only after sixty (60) but not more than
ninety (90) days, from the time the Comelec and this Court, on appeal, finally
declare the petition to be sufficient.
Meanwhile, under Comelec Resolution 2946, political parties, groups organizations

or coalitions may start selecting their official candidates for President, Vice
President and Senators on November 27, 1997; the period for filing certificates of
candidacy is from January 11 to February 9, 1998; the election period and campaign
for national officials start on February 10, 1998, while the campaign period for other
elective officials, on March 17, 1998. This means, by the time PIRMAs proposition is
readyif everfor submission directly to the voters at large, it will have been
overcome by the elections. Time will simply run out on PIRMA, if the intention is to
lift term limits in time for the 1998 elections.
That term limits may no longer be lifted prior to the 1998 elections via a peoples
initiative does not detract one whit from (1) my firm conviction that RA 6735 is
sufficient and adequate to implement this constitutional right and, more important,
(2) my faith in the power of the people to initiate changes in local and national laws
and the Constitution. In fact, I think the Court can deliberate on these two items
even more serenely and wisely now that the debates will be free from the din and
distraction of the 1998 elections. After all, jurisprudence is not merely for the here
and now but, more so, for the hereafter and the morrow. Let me therefore stress, by
way of epilogue, my unbending credo in favor of our peoples right to initiative.
Epilogue
I believe in democracyin our peoples natural right to determine our own destiny.
I believe in the process of initiative as a democratic method of enabling our people
to express their will and chart their history. Initiative is an alternative to bloody
revolution, internal chaos and civil
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In both Opinions, I concluded that we must implement the right thing [initiative] in
the right way at the right time and for the right reason.
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strife. It is an inherent right of the peopleas basic as the right to elect, the right to
self-determination and the right to individual liberties. I believe that Filipinos have
the ability and the capacity to rise above themselves, to use this right of initiative
wisely and maturely, and to choose what is best for themselves and their posterity.
Such beliefs, however, should not be equated with a desire to perpetuate a

particular official or group of officials in power. Far from it. Such perpetuation is
anathema to democracy. My firm conviction that there is an adequate law
implementing the constitutional right of initiative does not ipso facto result in the
victory of the PIRMA petition or of any proposed constitutional change. There are,
after all, sufficient safeguards to guarantee the proper use of such constitutional
right and to forestall its misuse and abuse. First, initiative cannot be used to revise
the Constitution, only to amend it. Second, the petitioners signatures must be
validated against an existing list of voters and/or voters identification cards. Third,
initiative is a reverse power of and by the people, not of incumbent officials and
their machinators. Fourth and most important of all, the signatures must be verified
as real and genuine; not concocted, fictitious or fabricated. The only legal way to do
this is to enable the Commission on Elections to conduct a nationwide verification
process as mandated by the Constitution and the law. Such verification, it bears
stressing, is subject to review by this Court.
There were, by the most generous estimate, only a million people who gathered at
EDSA in 1986, and yet they changed the history of our country. PIRMA claims six
times that number, not just from the National Capital Region but from all over the
country. Is this claim through the invention of its novel theory of statutory
insufficiency, the Courts majority has stifled the only legal method of determining
whether PIRMA is real or not, whether there is indeed a popular clamor to lift term
limits of elected officials, and whether six million voters want to initiate
amendments to their most basic law. In suppressing a judicial answer to such
questions, the Court may have unwittingly yielded to PIRMA the benefit of the legal
presumption of legality and regularity. In its misplaced zeal to exterminate the rats,
it burned down the whole house. It unceremoniously divested the people of a basic
constitutional right.
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280
In the present case, I steadfastly stand by my foregoing Opinions in Santiago and
PIRMA. Tested against them, the present Petition of Raul Lambino and Erico
Aumentado must be DISMISSED. Unfortunately, the right thing is being rushed in
the wrong way and for the wrong reasons. Let me explain.
No Grave Abuse of Discretion by Comelec
As in PIRMA, I find no grave abuse of discretion in Comelecs dismissal of the
Lambino Petition. After all, the Commission merely followed the holding in Santiago
permanently enjoining the poll body from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
Indeed, the Comelec did not violate the Constitution, the laws or any
jurisprudence.4 Neither can whim, caprice, arbitrariness or personal bias be
attributed to the Commission.5 Quite the contrary, it prudently followed this Courts
jurisprudence in Santiago and PIRMA. Even assuming arguendo that Comelec erred
in ruling on a very difficult and unsettled question of law, this Court
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In the ultimate, the mission of the judiciary is to discover truth and to make it
prevail. This mission is undertaken not only to resolve the vagaries of present
events but also to build the pathways of tomorrow. The sum total of the entire
process of adversarial litigation is the verity of facts and the application of law
thereto. By the majority copout in this mission of discovery, our country and our
people have been deprived not only of a basic constitutional right, as earlier noted,
but also of the judicial opportunity to verify the truth.
4 Republic v. COCOFED, 423 Phil. 735; 372 SCRA 462, December 14, 2001.
5 Well-entrenched is this definition of grave abuse of discretion. Id.; Benito v.
Commission on Elections, 349 SCRA 705, January 19, 2001; Defensor-Santiago v.
Guingona, Jr., 359 Phil. 276; 298 SCRA 756, November 18, 1998; and Philippine
Airlines, Inc. v. Confesor, 231 SCRA 41, March 10, 1994.
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still cannot attribute grave abuse of discretion to the poll body with respect to that
action.6
The present Lambino Petition is in exactly the same situation as that of PIRMA in
1997. The differences pointed out by Justice Reynato S. Puno are, with due respect,
superficial. It is argued that, unlike the present Lambino Petition, PIRMA did not
contain verified signatures. These are distinctions that do not make a difference.
Precisely, Justice Puno is urging a remand, because the verification issue is
contentious and remains unproven by petitioners. Clearly, both the PIRMA and the
Lambino Petitions contain unverified signatures. Therefore, they both deserve the
same treatment: DISMISSAL.
Besides, the only reason given in the unanimous Resolution on PIRMA v. Comelec
was that the Commission had only complied with this Courts Decision in Santiago,
the same reason given by Comelec in this case. The Separate Opinions in PIRMA
gave no other reason. No one argued, even remotely, that the PIRMA Petition should
have been dismissed because the signatures were unverified.
To stress, I adhere to my Opinion in PIRMA that, [b]eing a constitutional

requirement, the number of signatures becomes a condition precedent to the filing
of the petition, and is jurisdictional.7 Without those signatures, the Comelec shall
motu proprio reject the petition.
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6 In PIRMA, I submitted as follows: I believed, and still do, that the majority gravely
erred in rendering such a sweeping injunction [that covered ANY petition, not just
the Delfin petition], but I cannot fault the Comelec for complying with the ruling
even if it, too, disagreed with said decisions ratio decidendi. Respondent Comelec
was directly enjoined by the highest Court of the land. It had no choice but to obey.
Its obedience cannot constitute grave abuse of discretion. Refusal to act on the
PIRMA petition was the only recourse open to the Comelec. Any other mode of
action would have constituted defiance of the Court and would have been struck
down as grave abuse of discretion and contumacious disregard of this Courts
supremacy as the final arbiter of justiciable controversies.
7 42 Am. Jr. 2d, 26, citing Birmingham Gas Co. v. Bessemer; 250 Ala 137, 33 So 2d
475, 250 Ala 137; Tacker v. Board of Comrs., 127 Fla 248, 170
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282
So, until and unless Santiago is revisited and changed by this Court or the legal
moorings of the exercise of the right are substantially changed, the Comelec cannot
be faulted for acting in accord with this Courts pronouncements. Respondent
Commission has no discretion, under any guise, to refuse enforcement of any final
decision of this Court.8 The refusal of the poll body to act on the Lambino Petition
was its only recourse. Any other mode of action would appear not only
presumptuous, but also contemptuous. It would have constituted defiance of the
Court and would have surely been struck down as grave abuse of discretion and
contumacious disregard of the supremacy of this Court as the final arbiter of
justiciable controversies.
Even assuming further that this Court rules, as I believe it should (for the reasons
given in my Opinions in Santiago and PIRMA), that Republic Act 6735 is indeed
sufficient to implement an initiative to amend the Constitution, still, no grave abuse
of discretion can be attributed to the Comelec for merely following prevailing
jurisprudence extant at the time it rendered its ruling in question.
Only Amendments, Not Revisions
I reiterate that only amendments, not revisions, may be the proper subject of an
initiative to change the Constitution. This principle is crystal clear from even a
laypersons reading of the basic law.9
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So 458; Hoxie V. Scott, 45 Neb 199, 63 NW 387; Gill v. Board of Comrs., 160 NC 176,
76, SE 204.
8 Partido ng Manggagawa v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 164702, March 15,
2006, 484 SCRA 671.
9 Article XVII (AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS)
SEC. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon the vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
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I submit that changing the system of government from presidential to parliamentary
and the form of the legislature from bicameral to unicameral contemplates an
overhaul of the structure of government. The ponencia has amply demonstrated
that the merger of the legislative and the executive branches under a unicameralparliamentary system, [b]y any legal test and under any jurisdiction, will
radically alter the framework of government as set forth in the Constitution.
Indeed, the proposed changes have an overall implication on the entire
Constitution; they effectively rewrite its most important and basic provisions. The
prolixity and complexity of the changes cannot be categorized, even by semantic
generosity, as amendments.
In addition, may I say that of the three modes of changing the Constitution,
revisions (or amendments) may be proposed only through the first two: by Congress
or by a constitutional convention. Under
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people though initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under
SEC. 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a
constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the
electorate the question of calling such a convention.
SEC. 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof
shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall
be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of
such amendment or revision.
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later
than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the
sufficiency of the petition.
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the third modepeoples initiativeonly amendments are allowed. Many of the
justices Opinions have cited the historical, philosophical and jurisprudential bases
of their respective positions. I will not add to the woes of the reader by reiterating
them here.
Suffice it to say that, to me, the practical test to differentiate an amendment from a
revision is found in the Constitution itself: a revision may be done only when the
proposed change can be drafted, defined, articulated, discussed and agreed upon
after a mature and democratic debate in a deliberative body like Congress or a
Convention. The changes proposed must necessarily be scrutinized, as their
adoption or non-adoption must result from an informed judgment.
Indeed, the constitutional bodies that drafted the 1935, the 1972 and the 1987
Constitutions had to spend many months of purposeful discussions, democratic
debates and rounds of voting before they could agree on the wordings covering the
philosophy, the underlying principles, and the structure of government of our
Republic.
Verily, even bills creating or changing the administrative structure of local
governments take several weeks or even months of drafting, reading, and debating
before Congress can approve them. How much more when it comes to constitutional
changes?
A change in the form of government of our country from presidential-bicameral to

parliamentary-unicameral is monumental. Even the initiative proponents admit this
fact. So, why should a revision be rammed down our peoples throats without the
benefit of intelligent discussion in a deliberative assembly?
Added to the constitutional mandate barring revisions is the provision of RA 6735
expressly prohibiting petitions for initiative from embracing more than one subject
matter.10 The present initiative
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10 Republic Act 6735, Sec. 10, provides:

SEC. 10. Prohibited Measures.The following cannot be the subject of an initiative
or referendum petition:
(a) No petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the
electorate; and
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covers at least two subjects: (1) the shift from a presidential to a parliamentary form
of government; and (2) the change from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.11
Thus, even under Republic Act 6735the law that Justice Puno and I hold to be
sufficient and validthe Lambino Petition deserves dismissal.
12 Percent and 3 Percent Thresholds Not Proven by Petitioners
The litmus test of a peoples petition for initiative is its ability to muster the
constitutional requirement that it be supported by at least
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(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are specifically
vested in Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject to referendum until ninety
(90) days after its effectivity.
11 The principle of separation of powers operates at the core of a presidential form
of government. Thus, legislative power is given to the legislature; executive power,
to a separate executive (from whose prominent position in the system, the
presidential nomenclature is derived); and judicial power, to an independent
judiciary. This system embodies interdependence by separation.
On the other hand, a parliamentary system personifies interdependence by

integration, its essential features being the following: (1) The members of the
government or cabinet or the executive arm are, as a rule, simultaneously members
of the legislature. (2) The government or cabinet, consisting of the political leaders
of the majority party or of a coalition who are also members of the legislative, is in
effect a committee of the legislature. (3) The government or cabinet has a
pyramidal structure, at the apex of which is the Prime Minister or his equivalent. (4)
The government or cabinet remains in power only for as long as it enjoys the
support of the majority of the legislature. (5) Both government and legislature are
possessed of control devices with which each can demand of the other immediate
political responsibility. These control devices are a vote of no-confidence (censure),
whereby the government may be ousted by the legislature; and the power of the
government to dissolve the legislature and call for new elections. (J. BERNAS, THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES A COMMENTARY, Vol. II, 17-18
(1988 ed.).
With respect to the transformation from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature, the
change involves the form of representation and the lawmaking process.
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286
12 percent of the registered voters nationwide, of which at least 3 percent of the
registered voters in every legislative district must be represented. As pointed out by
Intervenors One Voice, Inc., et al., however, records show that there was a failure to
meet the minimum percentages required.12
Even Justice Puno concedes that the 12 percent and 3 percent constitutional
requirements involve contentious facts, which have not been proven by the
Lambino Petition. Thus, he is urging a remand to the Comelec.
But a remand is both imprudent and futile. It is imprudent because the Constitution
itself mandates the said requisites of an initiative petition. In other words, a petition
that does not show the required percentages is fatally defective and must be
dismissed, as the Delfin Petition was, in Santiago.
Furthermore, as the ponencia had discussed extensively, the present Petition is void
and unconstitutional. It points out that the Petition dismally fails to comply with the
constitutional requirement that an initiative must be directly proposed by the
people. Specifically, the ponencia has amply established that petitioners were
unable to show that the Lambino Petition contained, or incorporated by attachment,
the full text of the proposed changes.
So, too, a remand is futile. Even if the required percentages are proven before the
Commission, the Petition must still be dismissed for proposing a revision, not an
amendment, in gross violation of the Constitution. At the very least, it proposes

more than one subject, in violation of Republic Act 6735.
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12 Attached to the Opposition-in-Intervention of Intervenors One Voice Inc., etc., is a

photocopy of the Certification dated August 23, 2006, issued by Atty. Marlon S.
Casquejo, the election officer for the 3rd District and the officer-in-charge for the 1st
and the 2nd Districts of Davao City. The Certification states that this office (First,
Second and Third District, Davao City) has not verified the signatures of registered
voters x x x.
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Summation
Petitioners plead with this Court to hear the voice of the people because, in the
words of Justice Puno who supports them, the peoples voice is sovereign in a
democracy.
I, too, believe in heeding the peoples voice. I reiterate my Separate Opinion in
PIRMA that initiative is a democratic method of enabling our people to express
their will and chart their history. x x x. I believe that Filipinos have the ability and
the capacity to rise above themselves, to use this right of initiative wisely and
maturely, and to choose what is best for themselves and their posterity.
This belief will not, however, automatically and blindly result in an initiative to
change the Constitution, because the present Petition violates the following:
The Constitution (specifically Article XVII, which allows only amendments, not
revisions, and requires definite percentages of verified signatures)
The law (specifically, Republic Act 6735, which prohibits petitions containing more
than one subject)
Jurisprudence (specifically, PIRMA v. Comelec, which dismissed the Petition then
under consideration on the ground that, by following the Santiago ruling, the
Comelec had not gravely abused its discretion).
I submit further that a remand of the Lambino Petition is both imprudent and futile.
More tellingly, it is a cop-out, a handwashing already discredited 2000 years ago.
Instead of finger-pointing, I believe we must confront the issues head on, because
the people expect no less from this august and venerable institution of supreme
justice.
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Epilogue
At bottom, the issue in this case is simply the Rule of Law.13 Initiative, like
referendum and recall, is a treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional system. It
was born out of our world-admired and often-imitated People Power, but its misuse
and abuse must be resolutely rejected. Democracy must be cherished, but mob rule
vanquished.
The Constitution is a sacred social compact, forged between the government and
the people, between each individual and the rest of the citizenry. Through it, the
people have solemnly expressed their will that all of them shall be governed by
laws, and their rights limited by agreed-upon covenants to promote the common
good. If we are to uphold the Rule of Law and reject the rule of the mob, we must
faithfully abide by the processes the Constitution has ordained in order to bring
about a peaceful, just and humane society. Assuming arguendo that six million
people allegedly gave their assent to the proposed changes in the Constitution, they
are nevertheless still bound by the social covenantthe present Constitution
which was ratified by a far greater majority almost twenty years ago.14 I do not
denigrate the majesty of the sovereign will;
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13 In People v. Veneracion, the Court held: Obedience to the rule of law forms the
bedrock of our system of justice. If judges, under the guide of religious or political
beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are
required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes
meaningless. A government of laws, not of men, excludes the exercise of broad
discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, judges
are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought to protect and enforce it without fear or
favor, resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the
interference of their own personal beliefs. (249 SCRA 244, October 13, 1995, per
Kapunan, J.)
14 An American professor on legal philosophy, A. Altman, puts it thus: By ratifying
the constitution that included an explicit amendment process, the sovereign people
committed themselves to following the rule of law, even when they wished to make
changes in the basic system of government. A. ALTMAN, ARGUING ABOUT LAW 94
(2001).
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rather, I elevate our society to the loftiest perch, because our government must
remain as one of laws and not of men.
Upon assuming office, each of the justices of the Supreme Court took a solemn oath
to uphold the Constitution. Being the protectors of the fundamental law as the
highest expression of the sovereign will, they must subject to the strictest scrutiny
any attempt to change it, lest it be trivialized and degraded by the assaults of the
mob and of ill-conceived designs. The Court must singlemindedly defend the
Constitution from bogus efforts falsely attributed to the sovereign people.
The judiciary may be the weakest branch of government. Nonetheless, when ranged
against incessant voices from the more powerful branches of government, it should
never cower in submission. On the other hand, I daresay that the same weakness of
the Court becomes its strength when it speaks independently through decisions that
rightfully uphold the supremacy of the Constitution and the Rule of Law. The
strength of the judiciary lies not in its lack of brute power, but in its moral courage
to perform its constitutional duty at all times against all odds. Its might is in its
being right.15
During the past weeks, media outfits have been ablaze with reports and innuendoes
about alleged carrots offered and sticks drawn by those interested in the outcome
of this case.16 There being no judicial proof of these allegations, I shall not
comment on them for the nonce, except to quote the Good Book, which says,
There is nothing hidden that will not be revealed, and nothing secret that will not
be known and come to light.17
Verily, the Supreme Court is now on the crossroads of history. By its decision, the
Court and each of its members shall be judged by posterity. Ten years, fifty years, a
hundred yearsor even a thousand yearsfrom now, what the Court did here, and
how each justice
_______________
15 See my Separate Opinion in Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 415 SCRA

45, November 10, 2003.
16 See, for instance, the front page Malaya report entitled Lobbyists soil dignity of
Supreme Court (October 23, 2006).
17 Lk 8:17.
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opined and voted, will still be talked about, either in shame or in pride. Indeed, the
hand-washing of Pontius Pilate, the abomination of Dred Scott, and the loathing of
Javellana still linger and haunt to this day.
Let not this case fall into the same damnation. Rather, let this Court be known
throughout the nation and the world for its independence, integrity, industry and
intelligence.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petition.
DISSENTING OPINION
PUNO, J.:
It is a Constitution we are expounding1

Chief Justice John Marshall
The petition at bar is not a fight over molehills. At the crux of the controversy is the
critical understanding of the first and foremost of our constitutional principlesthe
Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them.2 Constitutionalism dictates
that this creed must be respected with deeds; our belief in its validity must be
backed by behavior.
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus to set aside the resolution of
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated August 31, 2006, denying
due course to the Petition for Initiative filed by petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico
B. Aumentado in their own behalf and together with some 6.3 million registered
voters who have affixed their signatures thereon, and praying for the issuance of a
writ of mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to set the date of the plebiscite
for the ratification of the proposed amendments to the Constitution in accordance
with Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
_______________
1 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 407 (1819).

2 Section 1, Article II, 1987 Constitution.
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First, a flashback of the proceedings of yesteryears. In 1996, the Movement for
Peoples Initiative sought to exercise the sovereign peoples power to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative under Section 2, Article
XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Its founding member, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, filed with
the COMELEC on December 6, 1996, a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift
Term Limits of Elective Officials, by Peoples Initiative (Delfin Petition). It proposed
to amend Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of
Article X of the 1987 Constitution by deleting the provisions on the term limits for all
elective officials.
The Delfin Petition stated that the Petition for Initiative would first be submitted to
the people and would be formally filed with the COMELEC after it is signed by at
least twelve per cent (12%) of the total number of registered voters in the country.
It thus sought the assistance of the COMELEC in gathering the required signatures
by fixing the dates and time therefor and setting up signature stations on the
assigned dates and time. The petition prayed that the COMELEC issue an Order (1)
fixing the dates and time for signature gathering all over the country; (2) causing
the publication of said Order and the petition for initiative in newspapers of general
and local circulation; and, (3) instructing the municipal election registrars in all the
regions of the Philippines to assist petitioner and the volunteers in establishing
signing stations on the dates and time designated for the purpose.
The COMELEC conducted a hearing on the Delfin Petition.
On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla and
Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition before this Court,
seeking to restrain the COMELEC from further considering the Delfin Petition. They
impleaded as respondents the COMELEC, Delfin, and Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa
(Pedrosas) in their capacities as founding members of the Peoples Initiative for
Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) which was likewise engaged in signature
gathering to support an initiative to amend the Constitution. They argued that the
constitutional provision on peoples initiative may only be implemented by a
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292
law passed by Congress; that no such law has yet been enacted by Congress; that
Republic Act No. 6735 relied upon by Delfin does not cover the initiative to amend
the Constitution; and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, the implementing rules
adopted by the COMELEC on the conduct of initiative, was ultra vires insofar as the
initiative to amend the Constitution was concerned. The case was docketed as G.R.
No. 127325, entitled Santiago v. Commission on Elections.3
Pending resolution of the case, the Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin Petition and the Pedrosas
from conducting a signature drive for peoples initiative to amend the Constitution.
On March 19, 1997, the Court rendered its decision on the petition for prohibition.
The Court ruled that the constitutional provision granting the people the power to
directly amend the Constitution through initiative is not self-executory. An enabling
law is necessary to implement the exercise of the peoples right. Examining the
provisions of R.A. 6735, a majority of eight (8) members of the Court held that said
law was incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions
insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned,4 and thus
voided portions of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules and regulations
on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It was also held that
even if R.A. 6735 sufficiently covered the initiative to amend the Constitution and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was valid, the Delfin Petition should still be dismissed
as it was not the proper initiatory pleading contemplated by law. Under Section 2,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. 6735, a petition for
initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least twelve per cent (12%) of
the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district is
represented by at least three per cent (3%) of the registered voters therein. The
Delfin
_______________
3 270 SCRA 106, March 19, 1997.

4 Id., at p. 153.
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Petition did not contain signatures of the required number of voters. The decision
stated:
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the

Constitution should no longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood,
energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying with the
constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the right of the people
under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard
for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on
Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or
amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition
(UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent
against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private
respondents.5
Eight (8) members of the Court, namely, then Associate Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
(ponente), Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, and Associate Justices Florenz D.
Regalado, Flerida Ruth P. Romero, Josue N. Bellosillo, Santiago M. Kapunan, Regino
C. Hermosisima, Jr. and Justo P. Torres, fully concurred in the majority opinion.
_______________
5 Id., at p. 157.
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294
While all the members of the Court who participated in the deliberation6 agreed
that the Delfin Petition should be dismissed for lack of the required signatures, five
(5) members, namely, Associate Justices Jose A.R. Melo, Reynato S. Puno, Vicente V.
Mendoza, Ricardo J. Francisco and Artemio V. Panganiban, held that R.A. 6735 was
sufficient and adequate to implement the peoples right to amend the Constitution
through initiative, and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 validly provided the
details for the actual exercise of such right. Justice Jose C. Vitug, on the other hand,
opined that the Court should confine itself to resolving the issue of whether the
Delfin Petition sufficiently complied with the requirements of the law on initiative,
and there was no need to rule on the adequacy of R.A. 6735.
The COMELEC, Delfin and the Pedrosas filed separate motions for reconsideration of
the Courts decision.
After deliberating on the motions for reconsideration, six (6)7 of the eight (8)
majority members maintained their position that R.A. 6735 was inadequate to
implement the provision on the initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Justice
Torres filed an inhibition, while Justice Hermosisima submitted a Separate Opinion
adopting the position of the minority that R.A. 6735 sufficiently covers the initiative
to amend the Constitution. Hence, of the thirteen (13) members of the Court who
participated in the deliberation, six (6) members, namely, Chief Justice Narvasa and
Associate Justices Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo and Kapunan voted to deny
the motions for lack of merit; and six (6) members, namely, Associate Justices Melo,
Puno, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima and Panganiban voted to grant the same.
Justice Vitug maintained his opinion that the matter was not ripe for judicial
adjudication. The motions for reconsideration were therefore
_______________
6 Justice Teodoro R. Padilla did not take part in the deliberation as he was related to
a co-petitioner and co-counsel of petitioners.
7 Justice Davide (ponente), Chief Justice Narvasa, and Justices Regalado, Romero,
Bellosillo, and Kapunan.
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denied for lack of sufficient votes to modify or reverse the decision of March 19,
1997.8
On June 23, 1997, PIRMA filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to Propose
Amendments to the Constitution (PIRMA Petition). The PIRMA Petition was supported
by around five (5) million signatures in compliance with R.A. 6735 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, and prayed that the COMELEC, among others: (1) cause the
publication of the petition in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of
general and local circulation; (2) order all election officers to verify the signatures
collected in support of the petition and submit these to the Commission; and (3) set
the holding of a plebiscite where the following proposition would be submitted to
the people for ratification:
Do you approve amendments to the 1987 Constitution giving the President the
chance to be reelected for another term, similarly with the Vice-President, so that
both the highest officials of the land can serve for two consecutive terms of six
years each, and also to lift the term limits for all other elective government officials,
thus giving Filipino voters the freedom of choice, amending for that purpose,
Section 4 of Article VII, Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI and Section 8 of Article X,
respectively?
The COMELEC dismissed the PIRMA Petition in view of the permanent restraining
order issued by the Court in Santiago v. COMELEC.
PIRMA filed with this Court a Petition for Mandamus and Certiorari seeking to set
aside the COMELEC Resolution dismissing its petition for initiative. PIRMA argued
that the Courts decision on the Delfin Petition did not bar the COMELEC from acting
on the PIRMA Petition as said ruling was not definitive based on the deadlocked
voting on the motions for reconsideration, and because there was no identity of
parties and subject matter between the two petitions. PIRMA also urged the Court to
re-examine its ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC.
_______________
8 Resolution dated June 10, 1997, G.R. No. 127325.

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The Court dismissed the petition for mandamus and certiorari in its resolution dated
September 23, 1997. It explained:
Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127325 promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its
The Court next considered the question of whether there was need to resolve the
second issue posed by the petitioners, namely, that the Court reexamine its ruling
as regards R.A. 6735. On this issue, the Chief Justice and six (6) other members of
the Court, namely, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Torres, JJ.,
voted that there was no need to take it up. Vitug, J., agreed that there was no need
for re-examination of said second issue since the case at bar is not the proper
vehicle for that purpose. Five (5) other members of the Court, namely, Melo, Puno,
Francisco, Hermosisima, and Panganiban, JJ., opined that there was a need for such
a re-examination x x x x9
In their Separate Opinions, Justice (later Chief Justice) Davide and Justice Bellosillo
stated that the PIRMA petition was dismissed on the ground of res judicata.
Now, almost a decade later, another group, Sigaw ng Bayan, seeks to utilize anew
the system of initiative to amend the Constitution, this time to change the form of
government from bicameralpresidential to unicameral-parliamentary system.
Let us look at the facts of the petition at bar with clear eyes.
On February 15, 2006, Sigaw ng Bayan, in coordination with Union of Local
Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP), embarked on a nationwide drive to gather
signatures to support the move to adopt the parliamentary form of government in
the country through charter change. They proposed to amend the Constitution as
follows:
_______________
9 Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. Commission

on Elections, G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997.
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A. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI shall be amended to read as follows:
B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution are hereby amended
to read, as follows:
of government.
C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-Presidential
to a unicameral-Parliamentary form of government, there shall be a new Article
XVIII, entitled Transitory Provisions, which shall read, as follows:
case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal
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298
from office of both the incumbent President and Vice President, the interim Prime
Minister shall assume all the powers and responsibilities of Prime Minister under
Article VII as amended.
that any and all references therein to Member(s) of Congress, Senator(s) or
Member(s) of the House of Representatives shall be changed to read as
Member(s) of Parliament and any and all references to the President and/or
as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary System of government; provided,
however, that any all references therein to Congress, Senate, House of
Member(s) of Parliament and any and all references to the President and or
cabinet and shall head a ministry. He shall initially convene
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the interim Parliament and shall preside over its sessions for the election of the
interim Prime Minister and until the Speaker shall have been elected by a majority
vote of all the members of the interim Parliament from among themselves.
strong bureaucracy.
of all local government officials. The duly elected Prime Minister shall continue to
President.10
Sigaw ng Bayan prepared signature sheets, on the upper portions of which were
written the abstract of the proposed amendments, to wit:
Abstract: Do you approve of the amendment of Articles VI and VII of the 1987
Constitution, changing the form of government from the present bicameralpresidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system of government, in order to
achieve greater efficiency, simplicity and economy in government; and providing an
Article XVIII as Transitory Provisions for the orderly shift from one system to
another?
The signature sheets were distributed nationwide to affiliated nongovernment
organizations and volunteers of Sigaw ng Bayan, as well as to the local officials.
Copies of the draft petition for initiative con_______________
10 Amended Petition for Initiative, pp. 4-7.

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300
taining the proposition were also circulated to the local officials and multi-sectoral
groups.
Sigaw ng Bayan alleged that it also held barangay assemblies which culminated on
March 24, 25 and 26, 2006, to inform the people and explain to them the proposed
amendments to the Constitution. Thereafter, they circulated the signature sheets
for signing.
The signature sheets were then submitted to the local election officers for
verification based on the voters registration record. Upon completion of the
verification process, the respective local election officers issued certifications to
attest that the signature sheets have been verified. The verified signature sheets
were subsequently transmitted to the office of Sigaw ng Bayan for the counting of
the signatures.
On August 25, 2006, herein petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado
filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to Amend the Constitution entitled
In the Matter of Proposing Amendments to the 1987 Constitution through a
Peoples Initiative: A Shift from a Bicameral Presidential to a Unicameral

Parliamentary Government by Amending Articles VI and VII; and Providing Transitory
Provisions for the Orderly Shift from the Presidential to the Parliamentary System.
They filed an Amended Petition on August 30, 2006 to reflect the text of the
proposed amendment that was actually presented to the people. They alleged that
they were filing the petition in their own behalf and together with some 6.3 million
registered voters who have affixed their signatures on the signature sheets
attached thereto. Petitioners appended to the petition signature sheets bearing the
signatures of registered voters which they claimed to have been verified by the
respective city or municipal election officers, and allegedly constituting at least
twelve per cent (12%) of all registered voters in the country, wherein each
legislative district is represented by at least three per cent (3%) of all the registered
voters therein.
As basis for the filing of their petition for initiative, petitioners averred that Section 5
(b) and (c), together with Section 7 of R.A. 6735, provide sufficient enabling details
for the peoples exercise of
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the power. Hence, petitioners prayed that the COMELEC issue an Order:
1. Finding the petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4, Article XVII of the
1987 Constitution;
2. Directing the publication of the petition in Filipino and English at least twice in
newspapers of general and local circulation; and
3. Calling a plebiscite to be held not earlier than sixty nor later than ninety days
after the Certification by the COMELEC of the sufficiency of the petition, to allow the
Filipino people to express their sovereign will on the proposition.
Several groups filed with the COMELEC their respective oppositions to the petition
for initiative, among them ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin,
Manuel L. Quezon III, Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople, and Carlos P. Medina, Jr.;
Alternative Law Groups, Inc., Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.,
Senators Sergio Osmea III, Jamby A.S. Madrigal, Alfredo S. Lim, Panfilo M. Lacson,
Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada, and Jinggoy Estrada; Representatives Loretta Ann P.
Rosales, Mario Joyo Aguja, and Ana Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel; Bayan, Kilusang
Mayo Uno, Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante, Gabriela, Gabriela Womens Party,
Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students, Leonardo San Jose, Jojo Pineda, Drs. Darby
Santiago and Reginald Pamugas; Attys. Pete Quirino-Quadra, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz,
Byron D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L. Salvador, and Randall C.
Tabayoyong.
On August 31, 2006, the COMELEC denied due course to the Petition for Initiative. It
cited this Courts ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC11 permanently enjoining the
Commission from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
Forthwith, petitioners filed with this Court the instant Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus praying that the Court set aside the Au_______________
11 G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.

302
302
gust 31, 2006 resolution of the COMELEC, direct respondent COMELEC to comply
with Section 4, Article XVII of the Constitution, and set the date of the plebiscite.
They state the following grounds in support of the petition:
I.
The Honorable public respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in

refusing to take cognizance of, and to give due course to the petition for initiative,
because the cited Santiago ruling of 19 March 1997 cannot be considered the
majority opinion of the Supreme Court en banc, considering that upon its
reconsideration and final voting on 10 June 1997, no majority vote was secured to
declare Republic Act No. 6735 as inadequate, incomplete and insufficient in
standard.
II.
The 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, Republic Act No. 8189 and existing
appropriation of the COMELEC provide for sufficient details and authority for the
exercise of peoples initiative, thus, existing laws taken together are adequate and
complete.
III.
The Honorable public respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in

refusing to take cognizance of, and in refusing to give due course to the petition for
initiative, thereby violating an express constitutional mandate and disregarding and
contravening the will of the people.
A.
Assuming in arguendo that there is no enabling law, respondent COMELEC cannot

ignore the will of the sovereign people and must accordingly act on the petition for
initiative.
1.
The framers of the Constitution intended to give the people the power to propose
amendments and the people themselves are now giving vibrant life to this
constitutional provision.
2.
Prior to the questioned Santiago ruling of 19 March 1997, the right of the people to
exercise the sovereign power of initiative and recall has been invariably upheld.
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3.
The exercise of the initiative to propose amendments is a political question which

shall be determined solely by the sovereign people.
4.
By signing the signature sheets attached to the petition for initiative duly verified by
the election officers, the people have chosen to perform this sacred exercise of their
sovereign power.
B.
The Santiago ruling of 19 March 1997 is not applicable to the instant petition for
initiative filed by the petitioners.
C.
The permanent injunction issued in Santiago vs. COMELEC only applies to the Delfin
petition.
1.
It is the dispositive portion of the decision and not other statements in the body of
the decision that governs the rights in controversy.
IV.
The Honorable public respondent failed or neglected to act or perform a duty

mandated by law.
A.
The ministerial duty of the COMELEC is to set the initiative for plebiscite.12
The oppositors-intervenors, ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin,
Manuel L. Quezon III, Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople, and Carlos P. Medina, Jr.;
Alternative Law Groups, Inc.; Bayan, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Ecumenical Bishops Forum,
Migrante, Gabriela, Gabriela Womens Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino
Students, Leonardo San Jose, Jojo Pineda, Dr. Darby Santiago, and Dr. Reginald
Pamugas; Senate Minority Leader
_______________
12 Petition, pp. 12-14.

304
304
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., and Senators Sergio Osmea III, Jamby A.S. Madrigal,
Alfredo S. Lim, Panfilo M. Lacson, Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada, and Jinggoy Estrada;
Representatives Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Mario Joyo Aguja, and Ana Theresia
Hontiveros-Baraquel; and Attys. Pete Quirino-Quadra, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron

D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L. Salvador, and Randall C. Tabayoyong
moved to intervene in this case and filed their respective Oppositions/Comments-inIntervention.
The Philippine Constitution Association, Conrado F. Estrella, Tomas C. Toledo,
Mariano M. Tajon, Froilan M. Bacungan, Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., Fortunato P. Aguas, and
Amado Gat Inciong; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Cebu City and Cebu
Province Chapters; former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and Pwersa ng Masang
Pilipino; and the Senate of the Philippines, represented by Senate President Manuel
Villar, Jr., also filed their respective motions for intervention and Comments-inIntervention.
The Trade Union Congress of the Philippines, Sulongbayan Movement Foundation,
Inc., Ronald L. Adamat, Rolando Manuel Rivera, Ruelo Baya, Philippine Transport and
General Workers Organization, and Victorino F. Balais likewise moved to intervene
and submitted to the Court a Petition-in-Intervention. All interventions and
oppositions were granted by the Court.
The oppositors-intervenors essentially submit that the COMELEC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the petition for initiative as it
merely followed this Courts ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC as affirmed in the case
of PIRMA v. COMELEC, based on the principle of stare decisis; that there is no
sufficient law providing for the authority and the details for the exercise of peoples
initiative to amend the Constitution; that the proposed changes to the Constitution
are actually revisions, not mere amendments; that the petition for initiative does
not meet the required number of signatories under Section 2, Article XVII of the
1987 Constitution; that it was not shown that the people have been informed of the
proposed amendments as there was disparity between the proposal presented to
them and the proposed amendments attached to the petition for initiative, if indeed
there was; that the verification
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process was done ex parte, thus rendering dubious the signatures attached to the
petition for initiative; and that petitioners Lambino and Aumentado have no legal
capacity to represent the signatories in the petition for initiative.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in compliance with the Courts resolution
of September 5, 2006, filed its Comment to the petition. Affirming the position of
the petitioners, the OSG prayed that the Court grant the petition at bar and render
judgment: (1) declaring R.A. 6735 as adequate to cover or as reasonably sufficient
to implement the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution and as
having provided sufficient standards for subordinate legislation; (2) declaring as

valid the provisions of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 on the conduct of initiative or
amendments to the Constitution; (3) setting aside the assailed resolution of the
COMELEC for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction; and, (4) directing the COMELEC to grant the petition
for initiative and set the corresponding plebiscite pursuant to R.A. 6735, COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, and other pertinent election laws and regulations.
The COMELEC filed its own Comment stating that its resolution denying the petition
for initiative is not tainted with grave abuse of discretion as it merely adhered to the
ruling of this Court in Santiago v. COMELEC which declared that R.A. 6735 does not
adequately implement the constitutional provision on initiative to amend the
Constitution. It invoked the permanent injunction issued by the Court against the
COMELEC from taking cognizance of petitions for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution until a valid enabling law shall have been passed by Congress. It
asserted that the permanent injunction covers not only the Delfin Petition, but also
all other petitions involving constitutional initiatives.
On September 26, 2006, the Court heard the case. The parties were required to
argue on the following issues:13
_______________
13 Advisory issued by Court, dated September 22, 2006.

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1. Whether petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are proper parties to file the
present Petition in behalf of the more than six million voters who allegedly signed
the proposal to amend the Constitution.
2. Whether the Petitions for Initiative filed before the Commission on Elections
complied with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
3. Whether the Courts decision in Santiago v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325, March
19, 1997) bars the present petition.
4. Whether the Court should re-examine the ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC that
there is no sufficient law implementing or authorizing the exercise of peoples
initiative to amend the Constitution.
5. Assuming R.A. 6735 is sufficient, whether the Petitions for Initiative filed with the
COMELEC have complied with its provisions.
5.1 Whether the said petitions are sufficient in form and substance.
5.2 Whether the proposed changes embrace more than one subject matter.
6. Whether the proposed changes constitute an amendment or revision of the
Constitution.
6.1 Whether the proposed changes are the proper subject of an initiative.
7. Whether the exercise of an initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution
is a political question to be determined solely by the sovereign people.
8. Whether the Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the Petitions for Initiative filed before it.
With humility, I offer the following views to these issues as profiled:
I
Petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are proper parties to file the present Petition in
behalf of the more than six million voters who allegedly signed the proposal to
amend the Constitution.
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Oppositors-intervenors contend that petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are not
the proper parties to file the instant petition as they were not authorized by the
signatories in the petition for initiative.
The argument deserves scant attention. The Constitution requires that the petition
for initiative should be filed by at least twelve per cent (12%) of all registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
cent (3%) of all the registered voters therein. The petition for initiative filed by
Lambino and Aumentado before the COMELEC was accompanied by voluminous
signature sheets which prima facie show the intent of the signatories to support the
filing of said petition. Stated above their signatures in the signature sheets is the
following:
x x x My signature herein which shall form part of the petition for initiative to
amend the Constitution signifies my support for the filing thereof.14
There is thus no need for the more than six (6) million signatories to execute
separate documents to authorize petitioners to file the petition for initiative in their
behalf.
Neither is it necessary for said signatories to authorize Lambino and Aumentado to

file the petition for certiorari and mandamus before this Court. Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure provides who may file a petition for certiorari and
mandamus. Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 65 read:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court x x x x.
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station x x x and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
_______________
14 Exhibit B, Memorandum of Petitioner Lambino.

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308
course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court x x x x.
Thus, any person aggrieved by the act or inaction of the respondent tribunal, board
or officer may file a petition for certiorari or mandamus before the appropriate
court. Certainly, Lambino and Aumentado, as among the proponents of the petition
for initiative dismissed by the COMELEC, have the standing to file the petition at
bar.
II
The doctrine of stare decisis does not bar the reexamination of Santiago.
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means stand by the thing and
do not disturb the calm. The doctrine started with the English Courts.15 Blackstone
observed that at the beginning of the 18th century, it is an established rule to
abide by former precedents where the same points come again in litigation.16 As
the rule evolved, early limits to its application were recognized: (1) it would not be
followed if it were plainly unreasonable; (2) where courts of equal authority
developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was the
actual principle or principles necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning
used to reach the decision.17
The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers of the
U.S. Constitution.18 According to Hamilton, strict rules and precedents are
necessary to prevent arbitrary discretion in the courts.19 Madison agreed but
stressed that x x x once
_______________
15 Barnhart, Principled Pragmatic Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases, 80 Notre

Dame Law Rev., 1911-1912, (May 2005).
16 Ibid.
17 Id., at p. 1913.
18 Consovoy, The Rehnquist Court and the End of Constitutional Stare Decisis:
Casey, Dickerson and the Consequences of Pragmatic Adjudication, 53 Utah Law
Rev. 53, 67 (2002).
19 Id., at p. 68.
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the precedent ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be
rejected.20 Prof. Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and Madison disagree about
the countervailing policy considerations that would allow a judge to abandon a
precedent.21 He added that their ideas reveal a deep internal conflict between
the concreteness required by the rule of law and the flexibility demanded in error
correction. It is this internal conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal
with for over two centuries.22
Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoys
observation although stare decisis developed its own life in the United States. Two
strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal scholars.23 The first, known as
vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of
the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The second, known as
horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts must follow its own precedents.
Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an
obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing
choice but not a command.24 Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in
stone in our Constitution.
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis

constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare decisis.25 Constitutional stare decisis
involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare decisis
involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy
more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice
Brandeis view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still
holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: Stare decisis is not . . . a
universal
_______________
20 Id., at p. 69.
21 Id., at p. 67.
22 Id., at p. 69.
23 Consovoy, supra note 18, at p. 57.
24 Id., at p. 58.
25 Id., at p. 64.
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310
and inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall
be followed or departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the
court, which is again called upon to consider a question once decided.26 In the
same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: the ultimate touchstone of
constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it.27 In
contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more
inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: after a statute has been construed, either by
this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal judges and
agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had
been drafted by the Congress itself.28 This stance reflects both respect for
Congress role and the need to preserve the courts limited resources.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons,29 viz.: (1)
it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows
for predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule
where30 (1) its application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings;
(2) it cannot accommodate changing social and political understandings; (3) it
leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress;
and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts while judges that
respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.
_______________
26 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 405-06 (1932) (Justice Brandeis,
dissenting).
27 Graves v. New York ex rel. OKeefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-492 (Justice Frankfurter,
concurring).
28 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fink, 483 U.S. 89 (1987) (Justice Stevens,
dissenting).
29 Barnhart, supra note 15, at p. 1922.
30 Id., at p. 1921.
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In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare
decisis rule and reversed its decisions in 192 cases.31 The most famous of these
reversals is Brown v. Board of Education32 which junked Plessy v. Fergusons33
separate but equal doctrine. Plessy upheld as constitutional a state law
requirement that races be segregated on public transportation. In Brown, the U.S.
Supreme Court, unanimously held that separate . . . is inherently unequal. Thus,
by freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the
colored Americans from the chains of inequality. In the Philippine setting, this Court
has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in order to
promote public welfare. In La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos,34 we
reversed our original ruling that certain provisions of the Mining Law are
unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion,35 we overturned our
first ruling and held, on motion for reconsideration, that a private respondent is
bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process.
An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts
are agreed on the factors that should be considered before overturning prior rulings.
These are workability, reliance, intervening developments in the law and changes in
fact. In addition, courts put in the balance the following determinants: closeness of
the voting, age of the prior decision and its merits.36
The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in
constitutional litigations is Planned Parent_______________
31 Filippatos, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Protection of Civil Rights and
Liberties in the Rehnquist Court, 11 Boston College Third World Law Journal, 335,
343 (Summer 1991).
32 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
33 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
34 G.R. No. 127882, December 1, 2004, 445 SCRA 1.
35 G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000, 343 SCRA 377.
36 Barnhart, supra note 15, at p. 1915.
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312
hood v. Casey.37 It established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1) determine
whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability;
(2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a
special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of
repudiation; (3) determine whether related principles of law have so far developed
as to have the old rule no more than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4)
find out whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently, as to have
robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.
Following these guidelines, I submit that the stare decisis rule should not bar the reexamination of Santiago. On the factor of intolerability, the six (6) justices in
Santiago held R.A. 6735 to be insufficient as it provided no standard to guide
COMELEC in issuing its implementing rules. The Santiago ruling that R.A. 6735 is
insufficient but without striking it down as unconstitutional is an intolerable
aberration, the only one of its kind in our planet. It improperly assails the ability of
legislators to write laws. It usurps the exclusive right of legislators to determine how
far laws implementing constitutional mandates should be crafted. It is elementary
that courts cannot dictate on Congress the style of writing good laws, anymore than
Congress can tell courts how to write literate decisions. The doctrine of separation
of powers forbids this Court to invade the exclusive lawmaking domain of Congress
for courts can construe laws but cannot construct them. The end result of the ruling
of the six (6) justices that R.A. 6735 is insufficient is intolerable for it rendered
lifeless the sovereign right of the people to amend the Constitution via an initiative.
On the factor of reliance, the ruling of the six (6) justices in Santiago did not induce
any expectation from the people. On the contrary, the ruling smothered the hope of
the people that they could amend the Constitution by direct action. Moreover,
reliance is a nonfactor in the case at bar for it is more appropriate to consider in
decisions involving contracts where private rights are adjudicated. The
_______________
37 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).

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case at bar involves no private rights but the sovereignty of the people.
On the factor of changes in law and in facts, certain realities on ground cannot be
blinked away. The urgent need to adjust certain provisions of the 1987 Constitution
to enable the country to compete in the new millennium is given. The only point of
contention is the mode to effect the changewhether through constituent
assembly, constitutional convention or peoples initiative. Petitioners claim that they
have gathered over six (6) million registered voters who want to amend the
Constitution through peoples initiative and that their signatures have been verified
by registrars of the COMELEC. The six (6) justices who ruled that R.A. 6735 is
insufficient to implement the direct right of the people to amend the Constitution
through an initiative cannot waylay the will of 6.3 million people who are the
bearers of our sovereignty and from whom all government authority emanates. New
developments in our internal and external social, economic, and political settings
demand the re-examination of the Santiago case. The stare decisis rule is no reason
for this Court to allow the people to step into the future with a blindfold.
III
A reexamination of R.A. 6735 will show that it is sufficient to implement the peoples
initiative.
Let us reexamine the validity of the view of the six (6) justices that R.A. 6735 is
insufficient to implement Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution allowing
amendments to the Constitution to be directly proposed by the people through
initiative.
When laws are challenged as unconstitutional, courts are counseled to give life to
the intent of legislators. In enacting R.A. 6735, it is daylight luminous that Congress
intended the said law to implement the right of the people, thru initiative, to
propose amendments to the Constitution by direct action. This all-important intent
is palpable from the following:
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314
First. The text of R.A. 6735 is replete with references to the right of the people to
initiate changes to the Constitution:
The policy statement declares:
Sec. 2. Statement of Policy.The power of the people under a system of initiative
and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon
compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and
guaranteed. (emphasis supplied)
It defines initiative as the power of the people to propose amendments to the
Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the
purpose, and plebiscite as the electoral process by which an initiative on the
Constitution is approved or rejected by the people.
It provides the requirements for a petition for initiative to amend the Constitution,
viz.:
(1) That (a) petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least
twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum
(3%) of the registered voters therein;38 and
(2) That (i)nitiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years
from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years
thereafter.39
It fixes the effectivity date of the amendment under Section 9(b) which provides
that (t)he proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of
the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the
plebiscite.
Second. The legislative history of R.A. 6735 also reveals the clear intent of the
lawmakers to use it as the instrument to implement peoples initiative. No less than
former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., the ponente in Santiago, concedes:40
_______________
38 Section 5(b).
39 Ibid.
40 Santiago v. Commission on Elections, supra note 11, at p. 145.
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We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative
to propose amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill
No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17 x x x x The Bicameral Conference Committee
consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was
subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate and by the House of
Representatives. This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
Third. The sponsorship speeches by the authors of R.A. 6735 similarly demonstrate
beyond doubt this intent. In his sponsorship remarks, the late Senator Raul Roco
(then a Member of the House of Representatives) emphasized the intent to make
initiative as a mode whereby the people can propose amendments to the
Constitution. We quote his relevant remarks:41
SPONSORSHIP REMAKRS (sic) OF REP. ROCO
MR. ROCO. Mr. Speaker, with the permission of the committee, we wish to speak in
support of House Bill No. 497, entitled: INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ACT OF 1987,
which later on may be called Initiative and Referendum Act of 1989.
As a background, we want to point out the constitutional basis of this particular bill.
The grant of plenary legislative power upon the Philippine Congress by the 1935,
1973 and 1987 Constitutions, Mr. Speaker, was based on the principle that any
power deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition is necessarily possessed by
the Philippine Congress unless the Organic Act has lodged it elsewhere. This was a
citation from Vera vs. Avelino (1946).
The presidential system introduced by the 1935 Constitution saw the application of
the principle of separation of powers. While under the parliamentary system of the
1973 Constitution the principle remained applicable, Amendment 6 or the 1981
amendments to the 1973 Constitution ensured presidential dominance over the
Batasang Pambansa. Our constitutional history saw the shifting and sharing of
legislative power between the legislature and the executive.
_______________
41 85 RECORD OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 140-142 (February 14, 1989).

316
316
Transcending such changes in the exercise of legislative power is the declaration in
the Philippine Constitution that he Philippines is a Republican State where
sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them.
In a Republic, Mr. Speaker, the power to govern is vested in its citizens participating
through the right of suffrage and indicating thereby their choice of lawmakers.
Under the 1987 Constitution, lawmaking power is still preserved in Congress.
However, to institutionalize direct action of the people as exemplified in the 1986
Revolution, there is a practical recognition of what we refer to as peoples sovereign
power. This is the recognition of a system of initiative and referendum.
Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides, and I quote:
The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to
the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
In other words, Mr. Speaker, under the 1987 Constitution, Congress does not have
plenary powers. There is a reserved legislative power given to the people expressly.
Section 32, the implementing provision of the same article of the Constitution
provides, and I quote:
The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and
referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose
and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the
Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed
by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, or which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters thereof.
In other words, Mr. Speaker, in Section 1 of Article VI which describes legislative
power, there are reserved powers given to the people. In Section 32, we are
specifically told to pass at the soonest possible time a bill on referendum and
initiative. We are specifically mandated to share the legislative powers of Congress
with the people.
Of course, another applicable provision in the Constitution is Section 2, Article XVII,

Mr. Speaker. Under the provision on amending the Constitution, the section reads,
and I quote:
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Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number
of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
We in Congress therefore, Mr. Speaker, are charged with the duty to implement the
exercise by the people of the right of initiative and referendum.
House Bill No. 21505, as reported out by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral
Reforms last December 14, 1988, Mr. Speaker, is the response to such a
constitutional duty.
Mr. Speaker, if only to allay apprehensions, allow me to show where initiative and
referendum under Philippine law has occurred.
Mr. Speaker, the system of initiative and referendum is not new. In a very limited
extent, the system is provided for in our Local Government Code today. On
initiative, for instance, Section 99 of the said code vests in the barangay assembly
the power to initiate legislative processes, to hold plebiscites and to hear reports of
the sangguniang barangay. There are variations of initiative and referendum. The
barangay assembly is composed of all persons who have been actual residents of
the barangay for at least six months, who are at least 15 years of age and citizens
of the Philippines. The holding of barangay plebiscites and referendum is also
provided in Sections 100 and 101 of the same Code.
Mr. Speaker, for brevity I will not read the pertinent quotations but will just submit
the same to the Secretary to be incorporated as part of my speech.
To continue, Mr. Speaker these same principles are extensively applied by the Local
Government Code as it is now mandated by the 1987 Constitution.
In other jurisdictions, Mr. Speaker, we have ample examples of initiative and
referendum similar to what is now contained in House Bill No. 21505. As in the 1987
Constitutions and House Bill No. 21505, the various constitutions of the states in the
United States recognize the right of registered voters to initiate the enactment of
any statute or to reject any existing law or parts thereof in a referendum. These
states are Alaska, Alabama, Montana, Massachusetts, Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,

and practically all other states.
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318
In certain American states, the kind of laws to which initiative and referendum
applies is also without ay limitation, except for emergency measures, which is
likewise incorporated in Section 7(b) of House Bill No. 21505.
The procedure provided by the House billfrom the filing of the petition, the
requirement of a certain percentage of supporters to present a proposition to
submission to electorsis substantially similar to those of many American laws. Mr.
Speaker, those among us who may have been in the United States, particularly in
California, during election time or last November during the election would have
noticed different propositions posted in the city walls. They were propositions
submitted by the people for incorporation during the voting. These were in the
nature of initiative, Mr. Speaker.
Although an infant then in Philippine political structure, initiative and referendum is
a tried and tested system in other jurisdictions, and House Bill No. 21505 through
the various consolidated bills is patterned after American experience in a great
respect.
What does the bill essentially say, Mr. Speaker? Allow me to try to bring our
colleagues slowly through the bill. The bill has basically only 12 sections. The
constitutional Commissioners, Mr. Speaker, saw this system of initiative and
referendum as an instrument which can be used should the legislature show itself
indifferent to the needs of the people. That is why, Mr. Speaker, it may be timely,
since we seem to be amply criticized, as regards our responsiveness, to pass this
bill on referendum and initiative now. While indifference would not be an
appropriate term to use at this time, and surely it is not the case although we are so
criticized, one must note that it is a felt necessity of our times that laws need to be
proposed and adopted at the soonest possible time to spur economic development,
safeguard individual rights and liberties, and share governmental power with the
people.
With the legislative powers of the President gone, we alone, together with the
Senators when they are minded to agree with us, are left with the burden of
enacting the needed legislation.
Let me now bring our colleagues, Mr. Speaker, to the process advocated by the bill.
First, initiative and referendum, Mr. Speaker, is defined. Initiative essentially is what
the term connotes. It means that the people, on their own political judgment,
submit fore the consideration and voting of the general electorate a bill or a piece of
legislation.
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Under House Bill No. 21505, there are three kinds of initiative. One is an initiative to
amend the Constitution. This can occur once every five years. Another is an
initiative to amend statutes that we may have approved. Had this bill been an
existing law, Mr. Speaker, it is most likely that an overwhelming majority of the
barangays in the Philippines would have approved by initiative the matter of direct
voting.
The third mode of initiative, Mr. Speaker, refers to a petition proposing to enact
regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay laws or ordinances. It comes from
the people and it must be submitted directly to the electorate. The bill gives a
definite procedure and allows the COMELEC to define rules and regulations to give
teeth to the power of initiative.
On the other hand, referendum, Mr. Speaker, is the power of the people to approve
or reject something that Congress has already approved.
For instance, Mr. Speaker, when we divide the municipalities or the barangays into
two or three, we must first get the consent of the people affected through plebiscite
or referendum.
Referendum is a mode of plebiscite, Mr. Speaker. However, referendum can also be
petitioned by the people if, for instance, they do not life (sic) the bill on direct
elections and it is approved subsequently by the Senate. If this bill had already
become a law, then the people could petition that a referendum be conducted so
that the acts of Congress can be appropriately approved or rebuffed.
The initial stage, Mr. Speaker, is what we call the petition. As envisioned in the bill,
the initiative comes from the people, from registered voters of the country, by
presenting a proposition so that the people can then submit a petition, which is a
piece of paper that contains the proposition. The proposition in the example I have
been citing is whether there should be direct elections during the barangay
elections. So the petition must be filed in the appropriate agency and the
proposition must be clear stated. It can be tedious but that is how an effort to have
direct democracy operates.
Section 4 of the bill gives requirements, Mr. Speaker. It will not be all that easy to
have referendum or initiative petitioned by the people. Under Section 4 of the
committee report, we are given certain limitations. For instance, to exercise the
power of initiative or referendum, at least 10 percent of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3

percent of the registered voters thereof, shall sign a petition. These numbers, Mr.
Speaker, are not taken from the air. They are mandated by the Constitution. There
must be a requirement of 10 percent for ordinary laws and 3 percent representing
all districts. The same requirement
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320
is mutatis mutandis or appropriately modified and applied to the different sections.
So if it is, for instance, a petition on initiative or referendum for a barangay, there is
a 10 percent or a certain number required of the voters of the barangay. If it is for a
district, there is also a certain number required of all towns of the district that must
seek the petition. If it is for a province then again a certain percentage of the
provincial electors is required. All these are based with reference to the
constitutional mandate.
The conduct of the initiative and referendum shall be supervised and shall be upon
the call of the Commission on Elections. However, within a period of 30 days from
receipt of the petition, the COMELEC shall determine the sufficiency of the petition,
publish the same and set the date of the referendum which shall not be earlier than
45 days but not later than 90 days from the determination by the commission of the
sufficiency of the petition. Why is this so, Mr. Speaker? The petition must first be
determined by the commission as to its sufficiency because our Constitution
requires that no bill can be approved unless it contains one subject matter. It is
conceivable that in the fervor of an initiative or referendum, Mr. Speaker, there may
be more than two topics sought to be approved and that cannot be allowed. In fact,
that is one of the prohibitions under this referendum and initiative bill. When a
matter under initiative or referendum is approved by the required number of votes,
Mr. Speaker, it shall become effective 15 days following the completion of its
publication in the Official Gazette. Effectively then, Mr. Speaker, all the bill seeks to
do is to enlarge and recognize the legislative powers of the Filipino people.
Mr. Speaker, I think this Congress, particularly this House, cannot ignore or cannot
be insensitive to the call for initiative and referendum. We should have done it in
1987 but that is past. Maybe we should have done it in 1988 but that too had
already passed, but it is only February 1989, Mr. Speaker, and we have enough time
this year at least to respond to the need of our people to participate directly in the
work of legislation.
For these reasons, Mr. Speaker, we urge and implore our colleagues to approve
House Bill No. 21505 as incorporated in Committee Report No. 423 of the
Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms.
In closing, Mr. Speaker, I also request that the prepared text of my speech, together
with the footnotes since they contain many references to statutory history and
foreign jurisdiction, be reproduced as part of the Record for future purposes.
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Equally unequivocal on the intent of R.A. 6735 is the sponsorship speech of former
Representative Salvador Escudero III, viz.:42
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF REP. ESCUDERO
MR. ESCUDERO. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker and my dear colleagues: Events in recent years highlighted the need to
heed the clamor of the people for a truly popular democracy. One recalls the
impatience of those who actively participated in the parliament of the streets, some
of whom are now distinguished Members of this Chamber. A substantial segment of
the population feel increasingly that under the system, the people have the form
but not the reality or substance of democracy because of the increasingly elitist
approach of their chosen Representatives to many questions vitally affecting their
lives. There have been complaints, not altogether unfounded, that many candidates
easily forge their campaign promises to the people once elected to office. The 1986
Constitutional Commission deemed it wise and proper to provide for a means
whereby the people can exercise the reserve power to legislate or propose
amendments to the Constitution directly in case their chose Representatives fail to
live up to their expectations. That reserve power known as initiative is explicitly
recognized in three articles and four sections of the 1987 Constitution, namely:
Article VI, Section 1; the same article, Section 312; Article X, Section 3; and Article
XVII, Section 2. May I request that he (sic) explicit provisions of these three articles
and four sections be made part of my sponsorship speech, Mr. Speaker.
These constitutional provisions are, however, not self-executory. There is a need for
an implementing law that will give meaning and substance to the process of
initiative and referendum which are considered valuable adjuncts to representative
democracy. It is needless to state that this bill when enacted into law will probably
open the door to strong competition of the people, like pressure groups, vested
interests, farmers group, labor groups, urban dwellers, the urban poor and the like,
with Congress in the field of legislation.
Such probability, however, pales in significance when we consider that through this
bill we can hasten the politization of the Filipino which in turn
_______________
42 85 RECORD OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 142-143 (February 14, 1989).

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will aid government in forming an enlightened public opinion, and hopefully produce
better and more responsive and acceptable legislations.
Furthermore, Mr. Speaker, this would give the parliamentarians of the streets and
cause-oriented groups an opportunity to articulate their ideas in a truly democratic
forum, thus, the competition which they will offer to Congress will hopefully be a
healthy one. Anyway, in an atmosphere of competition there are common interests
dear to all Filipinos, and the pursuit of each sides competitive goals can still take
place in an atmosphere of reason and moderation.
Mr. Speaker and my dear colleagues, when the distinguished Gentleman from
Camarines Sur and this Representation filed our respective versions of the bill in
1987, we were hoping that the bill would be approved early enough so that our
people could immediately use the agrarian reform bill as an initial subject matter or
as a take-off point.
However, in view of the very heavy agenda of the Committee on Local Government,
it took sometime before the committee could act on these. But as they say in
Tagalog, huli man daw at magaling ay naihahabol din. The passage of this bill
therefore, my dear colleagues, could be one of our finest hours when we can set
aside our personal and political consideration for the greater good of our people. I
therefore respectfully urge and plead that this bill be immediately approved.
Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
We cannot dodge the duty to give effect to this intent for the [c]ourts have the
duty to interpret the law as legislated and when possible, to honor the clear
meaning of statutes as revealed by its language, purpose and history.43
The tragedy is that while conceding this intent, the six (6) justices, nevertheless,
ruled that x x x R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential
terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned for the following reasons: (1) Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an
initiative on amendments to the Constitution; (2) the Act does not provide for the
contents of the petition for initiative on the Constitution; and (3) while the Act
provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local
Initiative and Referendum
_______________
43 Zeringue v. State Dept. of Public Safety, 467 So. 2d 1358.

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(Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution.
To say the least, these alleged omissions are too weak a reason to throttle the right
of the sovereign people to amend the Constitution through initiative. R.A. 6735
clearly expressed the legislative policy for the people to propose amendments to
the Constitution by direct action. The fact that the legislature may have omitted
certain details in implementing the peoples initiative in R.A. 6735, does not justify
the conclusion that, ergo, the law is insufficient. What were omitted were mere
details and not fundamental policies which Congress alone can and has determined.
Implementing details of a law can be delegated to the COMELEC and can be the
subject of its rule-making power. Under Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution,
the COMELEC has the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of initiatives. Its rule-making power has long been
recognized by this Court. In ruling R.A. 6735 insufficient but without striking it down
as unconstitutional, the six (6) justices failed to give due recognition to the
indefeasible right of the sovereign people to amend the Constitution.
IV
The proposed constitutional changes, albeit substantial, are mere amendments and
can be undertaken through peoples initiative.
Oppositors-intervenors contend that Sections 1 and 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution, only allow the use of peoples initiative to amend and not to revise the
Constitution. They theorize that the changes proposed by petitioners are substantial
and thus constitute a revision which cannot be done through peoples initiative.
In support of the thesis that the Constitution bars the people from proposing
substantial amendments amounting to revision, the oppositors-intervenors cite the
following deliberations during the Constitutional Commission, viz.:44
_______________
44 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 386, 392 (July 9, 1986).

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MR. SUAREZ: x x x x This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of
initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary developments this year,
has to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as
embodied in Section 1. The Committee members felt that this system of initiative
should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from
the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision.
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of

initiative as a separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be
amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another
subpararaph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as
if it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this
sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the
whereas the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.
Commissioner (later Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr., espoused the same view:45
MR. DAVIDE. x x x x We are limiting the right of the people, by initiative, to submit a
proposal for amendment only, not for revision, only once every five years x x x x
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davides proposed amendment
on line 1 refers to amendment. Does it cover the word revision as defined by
Commissioner Padilla when he
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45Id., at pp. 400, 402-403.

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made the distinction between the words amendments and revision?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because amendments and revision should be
amendments not revision.
Commissioner (now a distinguished Associate Justice of this Court) Adolfo S. Azcuna
also clarified this point46
MR. OPLE. To more closely reflect the intent of Section 2, may I suggest that we add
to Amendments OR REVISIONS OF to read: Amendments OR REVISION OF this
Constitution.
MR. AZCUNA. I think it was not allowed to revise the Constitution by initiative.
MR. OPLE. How is that again?
MR. AZCUNA. It was not our intention to allow a revision of the Constitution by
initiative but merely by amendments.
MR. BENGZON. Only by amendments.
MR. AZCUNA. I remember that was taken on the floor.
MR. RODRIGO. Yes, just amendments.
The oppositors-intervenors then point out that by their proposals, petitioners will
change the very system of government from presidential to parliamentary, and the
form of the legislature from bicameral to unicameral, among others. They allegedly
seek other major revisions like the inclusion of a minimum number of inhabitants
per district, a change in the period for a term of a Member of Parliament, the
removal of the limits on the number of terms, the election of a Prime Minister who
shall exercise the executive power, and so on and so forth.47 In sum, oppositorsintervenors submit that the proposed changes to the Constitution effect major
changes in the political structure and system, the fundamental powers and duties of
the branches of the government, the political rights of the people, and the
_______________
46 V RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 806 (October 10, 1986).

47 Opposition-in-Intervention filed by ONEVOICE, p. 39.
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modes by which political rights may be exercised.48 They conclude that they are
substantial amendments which cannot be done through peoples initiative. In other
words, they posit the thesis that only simple but not substantial amendments can
be done through peoples initiative.
With due respect, I disagree. To start with, the words simple and substantial are
not subject to any accurate quantitative or qualitative test. Obviously, relying on the
quantitative test, oppositors-intervenors assert that the amendments will result in
some one hundred (100) changes in the Constitution. Using the same test, however,
it is also arguable that petitioners seek to change basically only two (2) out of the
eighteen (18) articles of the 1987 Constitution, i.e. Article VI (Legislative
Department) and Article VII (Executive Department), together with the
complementary provisions for a smooth transition from a presidential bicameral
system to a parliamentary unicameral structure. The big bulk of the 1987
Constitution will not be affected including Articles I (National Territory), II
(Declaration of Principles and State Policies), III (Bill of Rights), IV (Citizenship), V
(Suffrage), VIII (Judicial Department), IX (Constitutional Commissions), X (Local
Government), XI (Accountability of Public Officers), XII (National Economy and
Patrimony), XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights), XIV (Education, Science and
Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports), XV (The Family), XVI (General Provisions),
and even XVII (Amendments or Revisions). In fine, we stand on unsafe ground if we
use simple arithmetic to determine whether the proposed changes are simple or
substantial.
Nor can this Court be surefooted if it applies the qualitative test to determine
whether the said changes are simple or substantial as to amount to a revision of
the Constitution. The wellregarded political scientist, Garner, says that a good
constitution should contain at least three (3) sets of provisions: the constitution of
liberty which sets forth the fundamental rights of the people and
_______________
48 Opposition-in-Intervention filed by Alternative Law Groups, Inc., p. 30.

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imposes certain limitations on the powers of the government as a means of

securing the enjoyment of these rights; the constitution of government which deals
with the framework of government and its powers, laying down certain rules for its
administration and defining the electorate; and, the constitution of sovereignty
which prescribes the mode or procedure for amending or revising the
constitution.49 It is plain that the proposed changes will basically affect only the
constitution of government. The constitutions of liberty and sovereignty remain
unaffected. Indeed, the proposed changes will not change the fundamental nature
of our state as x x x a democratic and republican state.50 It is self-evident that a
unicameral-parliamentary form of government will not make our State any less
democratic or any less republican in character. Hence, neither will the use of the
qualitative test resolve the issue of whether the proposed changes are simple or
substantial.
For this reason and more, our Constitutions did not adopt any quantitative or
qualitative test to determine whether an amendment is simple or substantial.
Nor did they provide that substantial amendments are beyond the power of the
people to propose to change the Constitution. Instead, our Constitutions carried the
traditional distinction between amendment and revision, i.e., amendment
means change, including complex changes while revision means complete
change, including the adoption of an entirely new covenant. The legal dictionaries
express this traditional difference between amendment and revision. Blacks
Law Dictionary defines amendment as [a] formal revision or addition proposed or
made to a statute, constitution, pleading, order, or other instrument; specifically, a
change made by addition, deletion, or correction.51 Blacks also refers to
amendment as the process of making such a revision.52 Revision, on the other
hand, is defined as [a] reexamination
_______________
49 Introduction to Political Science, pp. 397-398.

50 Section 1, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution.
51 Eighth Edition, p. 89 (2004).
52 Ibid.
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or careful review for correction or improvement.53 In parliamentary law, it is
described as [a] general and thorough rewriting of a governing document, in which
the entire document is open to amendment.54 Similarly, Ballentines Law

Dictionary defines amendmentas [a] correction or revision of a writing to
correct errors or better to state its intended purpose55 and amendment of
constitution as [a] process of proposing, passing, and ratifying amendments to the
x x x constitution.56 In contrast, revision, when applied to a statute (or
constitution), contemplates the re-examination of the same subject matter
contained in the statute (or constitution), and the substitution of a new, and what is
believed to be, a still more perfect rule.57
One of the most authoritative constitutionalists of his time to whom we owe a lot of
intellectual debt, Dean Vicente G. Sinco, of the University of the Philippines College
of Law, (later President of the U.P. and delegate to the Constitutional Convention of
1971) similarly spelled out the difference between amendment and revision. He
opined: the revision of a constitution, in its strict sense, refers to a consideration of
the entire constitution and the procedure for effecting such change; while
amendment refers only to particular provisions to be added to or to be altered in a
constitution.58
Our people were guided by this traditional distinction when they effected changes in
our 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. In 1940, the changes to the 1935 Constitution
which included the conversion from a unicameral system to a bicameral structure,
the shortening of the tenure of the President and Vice-President from a six-year
term without reelection to a four-year term with one reelection, and the
establishment of the COMELEC, together with the complementary constitutional
provisions to effect the changes, were considered amendments only, not a revision.
_______________
53 Id., at p. 1346.
54 Ibid.
55 Third Edition, p. 67 (1969).
56 Id., at p. 68.
57 Id., at p. 1115.
58 Vicente G. Sinco, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW, 2nd ed., p. 46.
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The replacement of the 1935 Constitution by the 1973 Constitution was, however,
considered a revision since the 1973 Constitution was a completely new
fundamental charter embodying new political, social and economic concepts.59

Among those adopted under the 1973 Constitution were: the parliamentary system
in place of the presidential system, with the leadership in legislation and
administration vested with the Prime Minister and his Cabinet; the reversion to a
single-chambered lawmaking body instead of the twochambered, which would be
more suitable to a parliamentary system of government; the enfranchisement of the
youth beginning eighteen (18) years of age instead of twenty-one (21), and the
abolition of literacy, property, and other substantial requirements to widen the basis
for the electorate and expand democracy; the strengthening of the judiciary, the
civil service system, and the Commission on Elections; the complete nationalization
of the ownership and management of mass media; the giving of control to Philippine
citizens of all telecommunications; the prohibition against alien individuals to own
educational institutions, and the strengthening of the government as a whole to
improve the conditions of the masses.60
The 1973 Constitution in turn underwent a series of significant changes in 1976,
1980, 1981, and 1984. The two significant innovations introduced in 1976 were (1)
the creation of an interim Batasang Pambansa, in place of the interim National
Assembly, and (2) Amendment No. 6 which conferred on the President the power to
issue decrees, orders, or letters of instruction, whenever the Batasang Pambansa
fails to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires
immediate action, or there is grave emergency or threat or imminence thereof, with
such decrees, or letters of instruction to form part of the law of the land. In 1980,
the retirement age of seventy (70) for justices and judges was restored. In 1981, the
presidential system with parliamentary features was in_______________
59 Concurring Opinion of Mr. Justice Felix Q. Antonio in Javellana v. The Executive

Secretary, No. L-361432, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30, 367368.
60 J. M. Aruego, THE NEW PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION EXPLAINED, iii-iv (1973).
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330
stalled. The transfer of private land for use as residence to naturalborn citizens who
had lost their citizenship was also allowed. Then, in 1984, the membership of the
Batasang Pambansa was reapportioned by provinces, cities, or districts in Metro
Manila instead of by regions; the Office of the Vice-President was created while the
executive committee was abolished; and, urban land reform and social housing
programs were strengthened.61 These substantial changes were simply considered
as mere amendments.
In 1986, Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino assumed the presidency, and repudiated the 1973
Constitution. She governed under Proclamation No. 3, known as the Freedom
Constitution.
In February 1987, the new constitution was ratified by the people in a plebiscite and
superseded the Provisional or Freedom Constitution. Retired Justice Isagani Cruz
underscored the outstanding features of the 1987 Constitution which consists of
eighteen articles and is excessively long compared to the Constitutions of 1935 and
1973, on which it was largely based. Many of the original provisions of the 1935
Constitution, particularly those pertaining to the legislative and executive
departments, have been restored because of the revival of the bicameral Congress
of the Philippines and the strictly presidential system. The independence of the
judiciary has been strengthened, with new provisions for appointment thereto and
an increase in its authority, which now covers even political questions formerly
beyond its jurisdiction. While many provisions of the 1973 Constitution were
retained, like those on the Constitutional Commissions and local governments, still
the new 1987 Constitution was deemed as a revision of the 1973 Constitution.
It is now contended that this traditional distinction between amendment and
revision was abrogated by the 1987 Constitution. It is urged that Section 1 of Article
XVII gives the power to amend or revise to Congress acting as a constituent
assembly, and to a Constitutional Convention duly called by Congress for the
purpose. Section 2 of the same Article, it is said, limited the peoples right to
change
_______________
61 E. Quisumbing-Fernando, PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, pp. 422-425 (1984).

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the Constitution via initiative through simple amendments. In other words, the
people cannot propose substantial amendments amounting to revision.
With due respect, I do not agree. As aforestated, the oppositorsintervenors who
peddle the above proposition rely on the opinions of some Commissioners
expressed in the course of the debate on how to frame the amendment/revision
provisions of the 1987 Constitution. It is familiar learning, however, that opinions in
a constitutional convention, especially if inconclusive of an issue, are of very limited
value as explaining doubtful phrases, and are an unsafe guide (to the intent of the
people) since the constitution derives its force as a fundamental law, not from the
action of the convention but from the powers (of the people) who have ratified and
adopted it.62 Debates in the constitutional convention are of value as showing the
views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but
they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much
less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument
the force of fundamental law.63 Indeed, a careful perusal of the debates of the
Constitutional Commissioners can likewise lead to the conclusion that there was no
abandonment of the traditional distinction between amendment and revision.
For during the debates, some of the commissioners referred to the concurring
opinion of former Justice Felix Q. Antonio in Javellana v. The Executive Secretary,64
that stressed the traditional distinction between amendment and revision, thus:65
MR. SUAREZ: We mentioned the possible use of only one term and that is,
amendment. However, the Committee finally agreed to use the terms
amendment or revision when our attention was called by the
_______________
62 N. Gonzales, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 30 (1969 ed.).

63 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991,
194 SCRA 317, 337 quoting Commonwealth v. Ralph, 111 Pa. 365, 3 Alt. 220 (1886).
64 L-36142, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30, 367.
65 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 373 (July 8, 1986).
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honorable Vice-President to the substantial difference in the connotation and
significance between the said terms. As a result of our research, we came up with
the observations made in the famousor notoriousJavellana doctrine, particularly
the decision rendered by Honorable Justice Makasiar,66 wherein he made the
following distinction between amendment and revision of an existing
Constitution: Revision may involve a rewriting of the whole Constitution. On the
other hand, the act of amending a constitution envisages a change of specific
provisions only. The intention of an act to amend is not the change of the entire
Constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts or the addition of provisions
deemed essential as a consequence of new conditions or the elimination of parts
already considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of the times.
The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935 Constitution. It is a
completely new fundamental Charter embodying new political, social and economic
concepts.
So, the Committee finally came up with the proposal that these two terms should be
employed in the formulation of the Article governing amendments or revisions to
the new Constitution.
To further explain revision, former Justice Antonio, in his concurring opinion, used
an analogyWhen a house is completely demolished and another is erected on the
same location, do you have a changed, repaired and altered house, or do you have
a new house? Some of the material contained in the old house may be used again,
some of the rooms may be constructed the same, but this does not alter the fact
that you have altogether another or a new house.67
Hence, it is arguable that when the framers of the 1987 Constitution used the word
revision, they had in mind the rewriting of the whole Constitution, or the total
overhaul of the Constitution. Anything less is an amendment or just a change of
specific provisions only, the intention being not the change of the entire
Constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts or the addition of provisions
deemed essential as a consequence of new conditions or the elimination of parts
already considered obsolete or unre_______________
66 The opinion was actually made by Justice Felix Antonio.

67 Javellana v. Executive Secretary, supra note 64, citing Wheeler v. Board of
Trustees, 37 S.E.2d 322, 327 (1946).
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sponsive to the needs of the times. Under this view, substantial amendments are
still amendments and thus can be proposed by the people via an initiative.
As we cannot be guided with certainty by the inconclusive opinions of the
Commissioners on the difference between simple and substantial amendments
or whether substantial amendments amounting to revision are covered by
peoples initiative, it behooves us to follow the cardinal rule in interpreting
Constitutions, i.e., construe them to give effect to the intention of the people who
adopted it. The illustrious Cooley explains its rationale well, viz.:68
x x x the constitution does not derive its force from the convention which framed,
but from the people who ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is that of the people,
and it is not to be supposed that they have looked for any dark or abstruse meaning
in the words employed, but rather that they have accepted them in the sense most
obvious to the common understanding, and ratified the instrument in the belief that
that was the sense designed to be conveyed. These proceedings therefore are less
conclusive of the proper construction of the instrument than are legislative
proceedings of the proper construction of a statute; since in the latter case it is the
intent of the legislature we seek, while in the former we are endeavoring to arrive at
the intent of the people through the discussion and deliberations of their
representatives. The history of the calling of the convention, the causes which led to
it, and the discussions and issues before the people at the time of the election of
the delegates, will sometimes be quite as instructive and satisfactory as anything to
be gathered form the proceedings of the convention.
Corollarily, a constitution is not to be interpreted on narrow or technical principles,
but liberally and on broad general lines, to accomplish the object of its
establishment and carry out the great principles of governmentnot to defeat
them.69 One of these great principles is the sovereignty of the people.
_______________
68 T. M. Cooley, I A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 143-144 (8th ed.

1927).
69 H.C. Black, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW S. 47, p. 67 (2nd
ed. 1897).
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Let us now determine the intent of the people when they adopted initiative as a
mode to amend the 1987 Constitution. We start with the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies which Sinco describes as the basic political creed of the
nation70 as it lays down the policies that government is bound to observe.71
Section 1, Article II of the 1935 Constitution and Section 1, Article II of the 1973
Constitution, similarly provide that the Philippines is a republican state.
them. In a republican state, the power of the sovereign people is exercised and
delegated to their representatives. Thus in Metropolitan Transportation Service v.
Paredes, this Court held that a republican state, like the Philippines x x x (is)
derived from the will of the people themselves in freely creating a government of
the people, by the people, and for the peoplea representative government
through which they have agreed to exercise the powers and discharge the duties of
their sovereignty for the common good and general welfare.72
In both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the sovereign people delegated to
Congress or to a convention, the power to amend or revise our fundamental law.
History informs us how this delegated power to amend or revise the Constitution
was abused particularly during the Marcos regime. The Constitution was changed
several times to satisfy the power requirements of the regime. Indeed, Amendment
No. 6 was passed giving unprecedented legislative powers to then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos. A conspiracy of circumstances from above and below,
however, brought down the Marcos regime through an extra constitutional
revolution, albeit a peaceful one by the people. A main reason for the peoples
revolution was the failure of the representatives of the people to effectuate timely
changes in the Constitution either by acting as a constituent assembly or by calling
a constitutional convention. When the representatives of the people defaulted in
_______________
70 V. Sinco, supra note 58.

71 Ibid.
72 No. L-1232, 79 Phil. 819, 826 (1948).
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using this last peaceful process of constitutional change, the sovereign people
themselves took matters in their own hands. They revolted and replaced the 1973
Constitution with the 1987 Constitution.
It is significant to note that the people modified the ideology of the 1987
Constitution as it stressed the power of the people to act directly in their capacity as
sovereign people. Correspondingly, the power of the legislators to act as
representatives of the people in the matter of amending or revising the Constitution
was diminished for the spring cannot rise above its source. To reflect this significant
shift, Section 1, Article II of the 1987 Constitution was reworded. It now reads: the
Philippines is a democratic and republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them. The commissioners of the 1986
Constitutional Commission explained the addition of the word democratic, in our
first Declaration of Principles, viz.:
MR. NOLLEDO. I am putting the word democratic because of the provisions that
we are now adopting which are covering consultations with the people. For
example, we have provisions on recall, initiative, the right of the people even to
participate in lawmaking and other instances that recognize the validity of
interference by the people through peoples organizations x x x x73
MR. OPLE. x x x x The Committee added the word democratic to republican,

and, therefore, the first sentence states: The Philippines is a republican and
democratic state x x x x
May I know from the committee the reason for adding the word democratic to
republican? The constitutional framers of the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions were
content with republican. Was this done merely for the sake of emphasis?
MR. NOLLEDO. x x x x democratic was added because of the need to emphasize
people power and the many provisions in the Constitution that we have approved
related to recall, peoples organizations, initiative and the like, which
_______________
73 IV RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 735 (September 17, 1986).

336
336
recognize the participation of the people in policy-making in certain circumstances x
xxx
MR. OPLE. I thank the Commissioner. That is a very clear answer and I think it does
meet a need x x x x
MR. NOLLEDO. According to Commissioner Rosario Braid, democracy here is
understood as participatory democracy. 74 (emphasis supplied)
The following exchange between Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento and Adolfo S.
Azcuna is of the same import:75
MR. SARMIENTO. When we speak of republican democratic state, are we referring to
representative democracy?
MR. AZCUNA. That is right.
MR. SARMIENTO. So, why do we not retain the old formulation under the 1973 and
1935 Constitutions which used the words republican state because republican
state would refer to a democratic state where people choose their representatives?
MR. AZCUNA. We wanted to emphasize the participation of the people in
government.
MR. SARMIENTO. But even in the concept republican state, we are stressing the
participation of the people x x x x So the word republican will suffice to cover
popular representation.
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, the Commissioner is right. However, the committee felt that in
view of the introduction of the aspects of direct democracy such as initiative,
referendum or recall, it was necessary to emphasize the democratic portion of
republicanism, of representative democracy as well. So, we want to add the word
democratic to emphasize that in this new Constitution there are instances where
the people would act directly, and not through their representatives. (emphasis
supplied)
Consistent with the stress on direct democracy, the systems of initiative,
referendum, and recall were enthroned as polestars in the
_______________
74 Id., at p. 752.
75 Id., at p. 769.
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1987 Constitution. Thus, Commissioner Blas F. Ople who introduced the provision on
peoples initiative said:76
MR. OPLE. x x x x I think this is just the correct time in history when we should
introduce an innovative mode of proposing amendments to the Constitution, vesting
in the people and their organizations the right to formulate and propose their own
amendments and revisions of the Constitution in a manner that will be binding upon
the government. It is not that I believe this kind of direct action by the people for
amending a constitution will be needed frequently in the future, but it is good to
know that the ultimate reserves of sovereign power still rest upon the people and
that in the exercise of that power, they can propose amendments or revision to the
Constitution. (emphasis supplied)
Commissioner Jose E. Suarez also explained the peoples initiative as a safety valve,
as a peaceful way for the people to change their Constitution, by citing our
experiences under the Marcos government, viz.:77
MR. SUAREZ. We agree to the difficulty in implementing this particular provision, but
we are providing a channel for the expression of the sovereign will of the people
through this initiative system.
MR. BENGZON. Is Section 1, paragraphs (a) and (b), not sufficient channel for
expression of the will of the people, particularly in the amendment or revision of the
Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. Under normal circumstances, yes. But we know what happened during
the 20 years under the Marcos administration. So, if the National Assembly, in a
manner of speaking, is operating under the thumb of the Prime Minister or the
President as the case may be, and the required number of votes could not be
obtained, we would have to provide for a safety valve in order that the people could
ventilate in a very peaceful way their desire for amendment to the Constitution.
_______________
76 Id., at pp. 767-769.

77 Id., at p. 377.
338
338
It is very possible that although the people may be pressuring the National
Assembly to constitute itself as a constituent assembly or to call a constitutional
convention, the members thereof would not heed the peoples desire and clamor. So
this is a third avenue that we are providing for the implementation of what is now
popularly known as peoples power. (emphasis supplied)
Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong opined that the peoples initiative could avert
a revolution, viz.:78
MR. MAAMBONG. x x x x the amending process of the Constitution could actually
avert a revolution by providing a safety valve in bringing about changes in the
Constitution through pacific means. This, in effect, operationalizes what political law
authors call the prescription of sovereignty. (emphasis supplied)
The end result is Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution which expressed
the right of the sovereign people to propose amendments to the Constitution by
direct action or through initiative. To that extent, the delegated power of Congress
to amend or revise the Constitution has to be adjusted downward. Thus, Section 1,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution has to be reminted and now provides: The
legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved
to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
Prescinding from these baseline premises, the argument that the people through
sovereignty on its head. At the very least, the submission constricts the democratic
space for the exercise of the direct sovereignty of the people. It also denigrates the
sovereign people who they claim can only be trusted with the power to propose
simple but not substantial amendments to the Constitution. According to Sinco,

the concept of sovereignty should be strictly understood in its legal meaning as it
_______________
78 Id., at p. 395.
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was originally developed in law.79 Legal sovereignty, he explained, is the
possession of unlimited power to make laws. Its possessor is the legal sovereign. It
implies the absence of any other party endowed with legally superior powers and
privileges. It is not subject to law for it is the author and source of law. Legal
sovereignty is thus the equivalent of legal omnipotence.80
To be sure, sovereignty or popular sovereignty, emphasizes the supremacy of the
peoples will over the state which they themselves have created. The state is
created by and subject to the will of the people, who are the source of all political
power. Rightly, we have ruled that the sovereignty of our people is not a kabalistic
principle whose dimensions are buried in mysticism. Its metes and bounds are
familiar to the framers of our Constitutions. They knew that in its broadest sense,
sovereignty is meant to be supreme, the jus summi imperu, the absolute right to
govern.81
James Wilson, regarded by many as the most brilliant, scholarly, and visionary
lawyer in the United States in the 1780s, laid down the first principles of popular
sovereignty during the Pennsylvania ratifying convention of the 1787 Constitution of
the United States:82
There necessarily exists, in every government, a power from which there is no
appeal, and which, for that reason, may be termed supreme, absolute, and
uncontrollable.
x x x x Perhaps some politician, who has not considered with sufficient accuracy our
political systems, would answer that, in our governments, the supreme power was
vested in the constitutions x x x x This opinion approaches a step nearer to the
truth, but does not reach it. The truth is, that in our governments, the supreme,
absolute, and uncontrollable power remains in the people. As our constitutions are
superior to our legislatures, so the people are superior to our constitutions. Indeed
the superiority, in this last instance, is much greater; for the people possess over
our constitution, control in act, as well as right. (emphasis supplied)
_______________
79 Sinco, supra note 58, at p. 22.

80 Id., at pp. 20-21.
81 Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996, 257 SCRA
727.
82 G. Wood, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 530.
340
340
I wish to reiterate that in a democratic and republican state, only the people is
sovereignnot the elected President, not the elected Congress, not this unelected
Court. Indeed, the sovereignty of the people which is indivisible cannot be reposed
in any organ of government. Only its exercise may be delegated to any of them. In
our case, the people delegated to Congress the exercise of the sovereign power to
amend or revise the Constitution. If Congress, as delegate, can exercise this power
to amend or revise the Constitution, can it be argued that the sovereign people who
delegated the power has no power to substantially amend the Constitution by direct
action? If the sovereign people do not have this power to make substantial
amendments to the Constitution, what did it delegate to Congress? How can the
people lack this fraction of a power to substantially amend the Constitution when by
their sovereignty, all power emanates from them? It will take some mumbo jumbo
to argue that the whole is lesser than its part. Let Sinco clinch the point:83
But although possession may not be delegated, the exercise of sovereignty often
is. It is delegated to the organs and agents of the state which constitute its
government, for it is only through this instrumentality that the state ordinarily
functions. However ample and complete this delegation may be, it is nevertheless
subject to withdrawal at any time by the state. On this point Willoughby says:
Thus, States may concede to colonies almost complete autonomy of government
and reserve to themselves a right to control of so slight and so negative a character
as to make its exercise a rare and improbable occurrence; yet so long as such right
of control is recognized to exist, and the autonomy of the colonies is conceded to be
founded upon a grant and continuing consent of the mother countries the
sovereignty of those mother countries over them is complete and they are to be
considered as possessing only administrative autonomy and not political
independence.
At the very least, the power to propose substantial amendments to the Constitution
is shared with the people. We
_______________
83 Sinco, supra note 58, at p. 29.

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should accord the most benign treatment to the sovereign power of the people to
propose substantial amendments to the Constitution especially when the proposed
amendments will adversely affect the interest of some members of Congress. A
contrary approach will suborn the public weal to private interest and worse, will
enable Congress (the delegate) to frustrate the power of the people to determine
their destiny (the principal).
All told, the teaching of the ages is that constitutional clauses acknowledging the
right of the people to exercise initiative and referendum are liberally and generously
construed in favor of the people.84 Initiative and referendum powers must be
broadly construed to maintain maximum power in the people.85 We followed this
orientation in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. Commission on Elections.86 There
is not an iota of reason to depart from it.
V
The issues at bar are not political questions.
Petitioners submit that [t]he validity of the exercise of the right of the sovereign
people to amend the Constitution and their will, as expressed by the fact that over
six million registered voters indicated their support of the Petition for Initiative, is a
purely political question which is beyond even the very long arm of this Honorable
Courts power of judicial review. Whether or not the 1987 Constitution should be
amended is a matter which the people and the people alone must resolve in their
sovereign capacity.87 They argue that [t]he power to propose amendments to the
Constitution is a right explicitly bestowed upon the sovereign people. Hence, the
determina_______________
84 State v. Moore, 103 Ark 48, 145 SW 199 (1912); Whittemore v. Seydel, 74 Cal
App 2d 109 (1946).
85 Town of Whitehall v. Preece, 1998 MT 53 (1998).
86 G.R. No. 125416, September 26, 1996, 262 SCRA 492, 516-517, citing 42 Am. Jur.
2d, p. 653.
87 Memorandum for petitioner Aumentado, pp. 151-152.
342
342
tion by the people to exercise their right to propose amendments under the system
of initiative is a sovereign act and falls squarely within the ambit of a political
question. 88
The petitioners cannot be sustained. This issue has long been interred by Sanidad v.
Commission on Elections, viz.:89
Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a
particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity
of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. What is in
the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in
proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to
perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the
amending process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is
therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the
actuation of the President would merely be a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution
provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that
Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed
was valid or not.
We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of nonjusticiability, that the question of the Presidents authority to propose amendments
and the regularity of the procedure adopted for submission of the proposals to the
people ultimately lie in the judgment of the latter. A clear Descartes fallacy of
vicious cycle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided
for the authority and procedure for the amending process when they ratified the
present Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, that constitutional provision has
been followed or not is indisputably a proper subject of inquiry, not by the people
themselvesof coursewho exercise no power of judicial review, but by the
Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which
includes the competence to determine whether the constitutional norms for
amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a priori not
a posteriori, i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people.
In the instant case, the Constitution sets in black and white the requirements for the
exercise of the peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. The amendments must
be proposed by the people upon
_______________
88 Id., at pp. 153-154.

89 L-44640, October 12, 1976, 73 SCRA 333, 360-361.
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343
a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of
the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized
within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once
every five years thereafter.90 Compliance with these requirements is clearly a
justiciable and not a political question. Be that as it may, how the issue will be
resolved by the people is addressed to them and to them alone.
VI
Whether the Petition for Initiative filed before the COMELEC complied with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution and R.A. 6735 involves contentious issues of fact
which should first be resolved by the COMELEC.
Oppositors-intervenors impugn the Petition for Initiative as it allegedly lacks the
required number of signatures under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Said
provision requires that the petition for initiative be supported by at least twelve per
cent (12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per cent (3%) of the registered voters
therein. Oppositors-intervenors contend that no proper verification of signatures
was done in several legislative districts. They assert that mere verification of the
names listed on the signature sheets without verifying the signatures reduces the
signatures submitted for their respective legislative districts to mere scribbles on a
piece of paper.
Oppositor-intervenor ONEVOICE, Inc., submitted to this Court a certification dated
August 23, 2006 issued by Atty. Marlon S. Casquejo, Election Officer IV, Third District
and OIC, First and Second District, Davao City, stating that his office has not verified
the
_______________
90 Section 2, Article XVII, 1987 Constitution.
344
344
signatures submitted by the proponents of the peoples initiative. The certification
reads:
This is to CERTIFY that this office (First, Second and Third District, Davao City) HAS
NOT VERIFIED the signatures of registered voters as per documents submitted in
this office by the proponents of the Peoples Initiative. Consequently, NO ELECTION
DOCUMENTS AND/OR ORDER ISSUED BY HIGHER SUPERIORS used as basis for such
verification of signatures.91
Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., among others, further clarified that
although Atty. Casquejo and Reynne Joy B. Bullecer, Acting Election Officer IV, First
District, Davao City, later issued certifications stating that the Office of the City
Election Officer has examined the list of individuals appearing in the signature
sheets,92 the certifications reveal that the office had verified only the names of the
signatories, but not their signatures. Oppositors-intervenors submit that not only the
names of the signatories should be verified, but also their signatures to ensure the
identities of the persons affixing their signatures on the signature sheets.
Oppositor-intervenor Luwalhati Antonino also alleged that petitioners failed to
obtain the signatures of at least three per cent (3%) of the total number of
registered voters in the First Legislative District of South Cotabato. For the First
District of South Cotabato, petitioners submitted 3,182 signatures for General
Santos City, 2,186 signatures for Tupi, 3,308 signatures for Tampakan and 10,301
signatures for Polomolok, or 18,977 signatures out of 359,488 registered voters of
said district. Antonino, however, submitted to this Court a copy of the certification
by Glory D. Rubio, Election Officer III, Polomolok, dated
_______________
91 Annex 3, Opposition-In-Intervention of Oppositors-Intervenors ONEVOICE, INC.,

et al.
92 Certification dated April 21, 2006 issued by Reynne Joy B. Bullecer, Annex B,
Memorandum of Oppositor-Intervenor Pimentel, et al.; Certification dated April 20,
2006 issued by Atty. Marlon S. Casquejo, Annex C, Memorandum of OppositorIntervenor Pimentel, et al.; Certification dated April 26, 2006 issued by Atty. Marlon
S. Cascuejo, Annex D, Memorandum of Oppositor-Intervenor Pimentel, et al.
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May 8, 2006, showing that the signatures from Polomolok were not verified because
the Book of Voters for the whole municipality was in the custody of the Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Polomolok, South Cotabato.93
Excluding the signatures from Polomolok from the total number of signatures from
the First District of South Cotabato would yield only a total of 8,676 signatures
which falls short of the three per cent (3%) requirement for the district.
Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino likewise
submitted to this Court a certification issued by Atty. Stalin A. Baguio, City Election
Officer IV, Cagayan de Oro City, stating that the list of names appearing on the
signature sheets corresponds to the names of registered voters in the city, thereby
implying that they have not actually verified the signatures.94
The argument against the sufficiency of the signatures is further bolstered by
Alternative Law Groups, Inc., which submitted copies of similarly worded
certifications from the election officers from Zamboanga del Sur95and from
Compostela Valley.96 Alternative Law Groups, Inc., further assails the regularity of
the verification process as it alleged that verification in some areas were conducted
by Barangay officials and not by COMELEC election officers. It filed with this Court
copies of certifications from Sulu and Sultan Kudarat showing that the verification
was conducted by local officials instead of COMELEC personnel.97
Petitioners, on the other hand, maintain that the verification conducted by the
election officers sufficiently complied with the requirements of the Constitution and
the law on initiative.
Contravening the allegations of oppositors-intervenors on the lack of verification in
Davao City and in Polomolok, South Cotabato, peti_______________
93 Annex 1, Memorandum of Oppositor-Intevenor Antonino.

94 Annex 10-A, Memorandum of Oppositor-Intevenor Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et
al.
95 Annexes 1-29, Memorandum of Oppositor-Intevenor Alternative Law Groups,
Inc.
96 Annexes 30-31, Id.
97 Annexes 44-64, Id.
346
346
tioner Aumentado claimed that the same election officers cited by the oppositorsintervenors also issued certifications showing that they have verified the signatures
submitted by the proponents of the peoples initiative. He presented copies of the
certifications issued by Atty. Marlon S. Casquejo for the Second and Third Legislative
Districts of Davao City stating that he verified the signatures of the proponents of
the peoples initiative. His certification for the Second District states:
This is to CERTIFY that this Office has examined the list of individuals as appearing
in the Signature Sheets of the Registered Voters of District II, Davao City, submitted
on April 7, 2006 by MR. NONATO BOLOS, Punong Barangay, Centro, Davao City for
verification which consists of THIRTY THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO (30,662)
signatures.
Anent thereto, it appears that of the THIRTY THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO
(30,662) individuals, only TWENTY-TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-EIGHT
(22,668) individuals were found to be REGISTERED VOTERS, in the Computerized
List of Voters of SECOND CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT, DAVAO CITY.98
It was also shown that Atty. Casquejo had issued a clarificatory certification
regarding the verification process conducted in Davao City. It reads:
Regarding the verification of the signatures of registered voters, this Office has
previously issued two (2) separate certifications for the 2nd and 3rd Districts of
Davao City on April 20, 2006 and April 26, 2006, respectively, specifically relating to
the voters who supported the peoples initiative. It was stated therein that the
names submitted, comprising 22,668 individual voters in the 2nd District and
18,469 individual voters in the 3rd District, were found [to] be registered voters of
the respective districts mentioned as verified by this Office based on the
Computerized List of Voters.
It must be clarified that the August 23, 2006 Certification was issued in error and by
mistake for the reason that the signature verification has not been fully completed
as of that date.
I hereby CERTIFY that this Office has examined the signatures of the voters as
appearing in the signature sheets and has compared these with the
_______________
98 Consolidated Reply of Petitioner Aumentado, p. 54.

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signatures appearing in the book of voters and computerized list of voters x x x99
Petitioner Aumentado also submitted a copy of the certification dated May 8, 2006
issued by Polomolok Election Officer Glory D. Rubio to support their claim that said
officer had conducted a verification of signatures in said area. The certification
states:
This is to certify further, that the total 68,359 registered voters of this municipality,
as of the May 10, 2004 elections, 10,804 names with signatures were submitted for
verification and out of which 10,301 were found to be legitimate voters as per
official list of registered voters, which is equivalent to 15.07% of the total number of
registered voters of this Municipality.100
In addition to the lack of proper verification of the signatures in numerous legislative
districts, allegations of fraud and irregularities in the collection of signatures in
Makati City were cited by Senator Pimentel, among others, to wit:
(1) No notice was given to the public, for the benefit of those who may be
concerned, by the Makati COMELEC Office that signature sheets have already been
submitted to it for verification. The camp of Mayor Binay was able to witness the
verification process only because of their pro-active stance;
(2) In District 1, the proponents of charter change submitted 43,405 signatures for
verification. 36,219 alleged voters signatures (83% of the number of signatures
submitted) were rejected outright. 7,186 signatures allegedly passed COMELECs
initial scrutiny. However, upon examination of the signature sheets by Atty. Mar-len
Abigail Binay, the said 7,186 signatures could not be accounted for. Atty. Binay
manually counted 2,793 signatures marked with the word OK and 3,443
signatures marked with a check, giving only 6,236 apparently verified signatures.
Before the COMELEC officer issued the Certification, Atty. Binay already submitted to
the said office not less than 55 letters of signature withdrawal, but no action was
ever taken thereon;
_______________
99 Exhibit E, Memorandum of Petitioner Lambino.

100 Annex A, Consolidated Response of Petitioner Aumentado.
348
348

(3) In District 2, 29,411 signatures were submitted for verification. 23,521 alleged
voters signatures (80% of those submitted) were rejected outright. Of the 5,890
signatures which allegedly passed the COMELECs initial scrutiny, some more will
surely fail upon closer examination;
(4) In the absence of clear, transparent, and uniform rules the COMELEC personnel
did not know how to treat the objections and other observations coming from the
camp of Mayor Binay. The oppositors too did not know where to go for their remedy
when the COMELEC personnel merely listened to their objections and other
observations. As mentioned earlier, the COMELEC personnel did not even know
what to do with the many letters of signature withdrawal submitted to it;
(5) Signatures of people long dead, in prison, abroad, and other forgeries appear on
the Sigaw ng Bayan Signature Sheets. There is even a 15-year old alleged signatory;
(6) There are Signature Sheets obviously signed by one person;
(7) A Calara M. Roberto and a Roberto M. Calara both allegedly signed the Signature
Sheets.101
Also, there are allegations that many of the signatories did not understand what
they have signed as they were merely misled into signing the signature sheets.
Opposed to these allegations are rulings that a person who affixes his signature on
a document raises the presumption that the person so signing has knowledge of
what the document contains. Courts have recognized that there is great value in the
stability of records, so to speak, that no one should commit herself or himself to
something in writing unless she or he is fully aware and cognizant of the effect it
may have upon her on him.102 In the same vein, we have held that a person is
presumed to have knowledge of the contents of a document he has signed.103 But
as this Court is not a trier of facts, it cannot resolve the issue.
In sum, the issue of whether the petitioners have complied with the constitutional
requirement that the petition for initiative be signed by at least twelve per cent
(12%) of the total number of regis_______________
101 Memorandum of Oppositor-Intevenor Pimentel, et al., pp. 12-13.

102 Helvey v. Wiseman, 199 F. Supp. 200, 8 A.F.T.2d 5576 (1961).
103 BNO Leasing Corp. v. Hollins & Hollins, Inc., 448 So.2d 1329 (1984).
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349

tered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per cent (3%) of the registered voters therein, involves contentious facts. Its
resolution will require presentation of evidence and their calibration by the
COMELEC according to its rules. During the oral argument on this case, the
COMELEC, through Director Alioden Dalaig of its Law Department, admitted that it
has not examined the documents submitted by the petitioners in support of the
petition for initiative, as well as the documents filed by the oppositors to buttress
their claim that the required number of signatures has not been met. The
exchanges during the oral argument likewise clearly show the need for further
clarification and presentation of evidence to prove certain material facts.104
_______________
104
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
How many copies of the petition, that you mention(ed), did you print?
ATTY. LAMBINO:
We printed 100 thousand of this petition last February and we distributed to the
different organizations that were volunteering to support us.
So, you are sure that you personally can say to us that 100 thous and of these were
printed?
ATTY. LAMBINO:
It could be more than that, Your Honor.
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
But you asked your friends or your associates to re-print, if they can(?)
ATTY. LAMBINO:
Yes, Your Honor.

Okay, so you got 6.3 Million signatures, but you only printed 100 thousand. So
youre saying, how many did your friends print of the petition?
350
350
The only basis used by the COMELEC to dismiss the petition for initiative was this
Courts ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC that
_______________
ATTY. LAMBINO:
I can no longer give a specific answer to that, Your Honor. I relied only to the
assurances of the people who are volunteering that they are going to reproduce the
signature sheets as well as the draft petition that we have given them, Your Honor.
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
Did you also show this amended petition to the people?

ATTY. LAMBINO:
Your Honor, the amended petition reflects the copy of the original petition that we
circulated, because in the original petition that we filed before the COMELEC, we
omitted a certain paragraph that is, Section 4, paragraph 3 which were part of the
original petition that we circulated and so we have to correct that oversight because
that is what we have circulated to the people and we have to correct that
But you just stated now that what you circulated was the petition of August 25, now
you are changing your mind, youre saying what you circulated was the petition of
August 30, is that correct?
ATTY. LAMBINO:
In effect, yes, Your Honor.

So, you circulated the petition of August 30, but what you filed in the COMELEC on
August 25 was a different petition, thats why you have to amend it?
ATTY. LAMBINO:
We have to amend it, because there was an oversight, Your Honor, that we have
omitted one very important paragraph in Section 4 of our proposition.
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
Okay, lets be clear. What did you circulate when you gathered the signatures, the
August 25 which you said you circulated orthe August 30?
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R.A. 6735 was insufficient. It has yet to rule on the sufficiency of the form and
substance of the petition. I respectfully submit that this issue should be properly
litigated before the COMELEC where both parties will be given full opportunity to
prove their allegations.
For the same reasons, the sufficiency of the Petition for Initiative and its compliance
with the requirements of R.A. 6735 on initiative and its implementing rules is a
question that should be resolved by the COMELEC at the first instance, as it is the
body that is mandated by the Constitution to administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and

recall.105
_______________
ATTY. LAMBINO:
Both the August 25 petition that included all the provisions, Your Honor, and as
amended on August 30. Because we have to include the one that we have
inadvertently omitted in the August 25 petition, Your Honor.
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
And (you cannot tell that) you can only say for certain that you printed 100
thousand copies?
ATTY. LAMBINO:
That was the original printed matter that we have circulated by the month of
February, Your Honor, until some parts of March, Your Honor.
That is all you can assure us?

ATTY. LAMBINO:
That is all I can assure you, Your Honor, except that I have asked some friends, like
for example (like) Mr. Liberato Laos to help me print out some more of this petition
(TSN, September 26, 2006, pp. 7-17)
105 Section 2 (1), Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution.
352
352

VII
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied due course to the Lambino
and Aumentado petition.
In denying due course to the Lambino and Aumentado petition, COMELEC relied on
this Courts ruling in Santiago permanently enjoining it from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a
sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of
the system.
Again, I respectfully submit that COMELECs reliance on Santiago constitutes grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Santiago case did not
establish the firm doctrine that R.A. 6735 is not a sufficient law to implement the
constitutional provision allowing peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. To
recapitulate, the records show that in the original decision, eight (8) justices106
voted that R.A. 6735 was not a sufficient law; five (5) justices107 voted that said
law was sufficient; and one (1) justice108 abstained from voting on the issue
holding that unless and until a proper initiatory pleading is filed, the said issue is not
ripe for adjudication.109
Within the reglementary period, the respondents filed their motion for
reconsideration. On June 10, 1997, the Court denied the motion. Only thirteen (13)
justices resolved the motion for Justice Torres inhibited himself.110 Of the original
majority of eight (8) justices,
_______________
106 Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa and Justices Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Florenz D.
Regalado, Flerida Ruth P. Romero, Josue N. Bellosillo, Santiago M. Kapunan, Regino
C. Hermosisima, Jr. and Justo P. Torres.
107 Justices Jose A.R. Melo, Reynato S. Puno, Vicente V. Mendoza, Ricardo J.
Francisco and Artemio V. Panganiban.
108 Justice Jose C. Vitug.
109 Only fourteen (14) justices participated in the deliberations as Justice Teodoro
R. Padilla took no part on account of his relationship with the lawyer of one of the
parties.
110 Citing conscience as ground.
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only six (6) reiterated their ruling that R.A. 6735 was an insufficient law. Justice
Hermosisima, originally part of the majority of eight (8) justices, changed his vote
and joined the minority of five (5) justices. He opined without any equivocation that
R.A. 6735 was a sufficient law, thus:
It is one thing to utter a happy phrase from a protected cluster; another to think
under fireto think for action upon which great interests depend. So said Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, and so I am guided as I reconsider my concurrence to the
holding of the majority that R.A. No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution and to have failed to provide sufficient
standard for subordinate legislation and now to interpose my dissent thereto.
xxx
WHEREFORE, I vote to dismiss the Delfin petition.
I vote, however, to declare R.A. No. 6735 as adequately providing the legal basis for
the exercise by the people of their right to amend the Constitution through initiative
proceedings and to uphold the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 insofar as it
does not sanction the filing of the initiatory petition for initiative proceedings to
amend the Constitution without the required names and/or signatures of at least
12% of all the registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. (emphasis supplied)
Justice Vitug remained steadfast in refusing to rule on the sufficiency of R.A. 6735.
In fine, the final vote on whether R.A. 6735 is a sufficient law was 6-6 with one (1)
justice inhibiting himself and another justice refusing to rule on the ground that the
issue was not ripe for adjudication.
It ought to be beyond debate that the six (6) justices who voted that R.A. 6735 is an
insufficient law failed to establish a doctrine that could serve as a precedent. Under
any alchemy of law, a deadlocked vote of six (6) is not a majority and a nonmajority
cannot write a rule with precedential value. The opinion of the late Justice Ricardo J.
Francisco is instructive, viz.:
As it stands, of the thirteen justices who took part in the deliberations on the issue
of whether the motion for reconsideration of the March 19, 1997
354
354
decision should be granted or not, only the following justices sided with Mr. Justice
Davide, namely: Chief Justice Narvasa, and Justices Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo and
Kapunan. Justices Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Panganiban and the
undersigned voted to grant the motion; while Justice Vitug maintained his opinion
that the matter was not ripe for judicial adjudication. In other words, only five, out
of the other twelve justices, joined Mr. Justice Davides June 10, 1997 ponencia
finding R.A. No. 6735 unconstitutional for its failure to pass the so called
completeness and sufficiency standards tests. The concurrence of a majority of
the members who actually took part in the deliberations which Article VII, Section
4(2) of the Constitution requires to declare a law unconstitutional was, beyond
dispute, not complied with. And even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the
constitutional requirement on the concurrence of the majority was initially
reached in the March 19, 1997 ponencia, the same is inconclusive as it was still
open for review by way of a motion for reconsideration. It was only on June 10, 1997
that the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6735 was settled with finality, sans the
constitutionally required majority. The Courts declaration, therefore, is manifestly
grafted with infirmity and wanting in force necessitating, in my view, the
reexamination of the Courts decision in G.R. No. 127325. It behooves the Court not
to tarry any longer nor waste this opportunity accorded by this new petition (G.R.
No. 129754) to relieve the Courts pronouncement from constitutional infirmity.
The jurisprudence that an equally divided Court can never set a precedent is wellsettled. Thus, in the United States, an affirmance in the Federal Supreme Court
upon equal division of opinion is not an authority for the determination of other
cases, either in that Court or in the inferior federal courts. In Neil v. Biggers,111
which was a habeas corpus state proceeding by a state prisoner, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that its equally divided affirmance of petitioners state court conviction
was not an actual adjudication barring subsequent consideration by the district
court on habeas corpus. In discussing the non-binding effect of an equal division
ruling, the Court reviewed the history of cases explicating the disposition affirmed
by an equally divided Court:
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111 409 U.S. 188, 93 S. Ct. 375, 34 L. Ed. 2d 401 (1972).

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In this light, we review our cases explicating the disposition affirmed by an equally
divided Court. On what was apparently the first occasion of an equal division, The
Antelope, 10 Wheat, 66, 6 L. Ed. 268 (1825), the Court simply affirmed on the point
of division without much discussion. Id., at 126-127. Faced with a similar division
during the next Term, the Court again affirmed, Chief Justice Marshall explaining
that the principles of law which have been argued, cannot be settled; but the
judgment is affirmed, the court being divided in opinion upon it. Etting v. Bank of
United States, 11 Wheat. 59, 78, 6 L. Ed. 419 (1826). As was later elaborated in
such cases, it is the appellant or petitioner who asks the Court to overturn a lower
courts decree. If the judges are divided, the reversal cannot be had, for no order
can be made. The judgment of the court below, therefore, stands in full force. It is
indeed, the settled practice in such case to enter a judgment of affirmance; but this
is only the most convenient mode of expressing the fact that the cause is finally
disposed of in conformity with the action of the court below, and that that court can
proceed to enforce its judgment. The legal effect would be the same if the appeal,
or writ of error, were dismissed. Durant v. Essex Co., 7 Wall. 107, 112, 19 L. Ed. 154
(1869). Nor is an affirmance by an equally divided Court entitled to precedential
weight. Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 264, 80 S. Ct. 1463, 1464, 4 L. Ed.
2d 1708 (1960). x x x
This doctrine established in Neil has not been overturned and has been cited with
approval in a number of subsequent cases,112 and has been applied in various
state jurisdictions.
In the case of In the Matter of the Adoption of Erin G., a Minor Child,113 wherein a
putative father sought to set aside a decree granting petition for adoption of an
Indian child on grounds of noncompliance with the requirements of Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA), the Supreme Court of Alaska held that its decision in In re
Adoption of T.N.F. (T.N.F.),114 which lacked majority opinion supporting holding that
an action such as the putative fathers would be governed by the states one-year
statute of limitations, was
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112 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 97 S. Ct. 2264 (1977); Arkansas Writers
Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 107 S. Ct. 1722, 1730 n. 7, 95 L. Ed. 2d (1987); France v.
Nelson, 292 Ark. 219, 729 S.W. 2d 161 (1987).
113 40 P. 3d 886 (2006).
114 781 P. 2d 973 (Alaska, 1989).
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356
not entitled to stare decisis effect. In T.N.F., a majority of the justices sitting did not
agree on a common rationale, as two of four participating justices agreed that the
states one-year statute of limitations applied, one justice concurred in the result
only, and one justice dissented. There was no narrower reasoning agreed upon by
all three affirming justices. The concurring justice expressed no opinion on the
statute of limitations issue, and in agreeing with the result, he reasoned that ICWA
did not give the plaintiff standing to sue.115 The two-justice plurality, though
agreeing that the states one-year statute of limitations applied, specifically
disagreed with the concurring justice on the standing issue.116 Because a majority
of the participating justices in T.N.F. did not agree on any one ground for affirmance,
it was not accorded stare decisis effect by the state Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court of Michigan likewise ruled that the doctrine of stare decisis does
not apply to plurality decisions in which no majority of the justices participating
agree to the reasoning and as such are not authoritative interpretations binding on
the Supreme Court.117
In State ex rel. Landis v. Williams,118 the Supreme Court of Florida, in an equally
divided opinion on the matter,119 held that chapter 15938, Acts of 1933 must be
allowed to stand, dismissing a quo warranto suit without prejudice. The Court held:
In a cause of original jurisdiction in this court a statute cannot be declared
unconstitutional nor its enforcement nor operation judicially interfered with, except
by the concurrence of a majority of the members of the Supreme
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115 Id., at pp. 982-84 (Compton, J., concurring).

116 Id., at pp. 975-78.
117 Negri v. Slotkin, 244 N.W. 2d 98 (1976).
118 112 Fla. 734, 151 So. 284 (1933).
119 Penned by Justice Whitfield, and concurred in by Chief Justice Davis and Justice
Terrell; Justices Ellis, Brown and Buford are of the opinion that chapter 15938, Acts
of 1933, is a special or local law not duly advertised before its passage, as required
by sections 20 and 21 of article 3 of the state Constitution, and therefore invalid.
This evenly divided vote resulted in the affirmance of the validity of the statute but
did not constitute a binding precedent on the Court.
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Court sitting in the cause wherein the constitutionality of the statute is brought in
question or judicial relief sought against its enforcement. Section 4 of Article 5,
state Constitution.
Therefore in this case the concurrence of a majority of the members of this court in
holding unconstitutional said chapter 15938, supra, not having been had, it follows
that the statute in controversy must be allowed to stand and accordingly be
permitted to be enforced as a presumptively valid act of the Legislature, and that
this proceeding in quo warranto must be dismissed without prejudice. Spencer v.
Hunt (Fla.) 147 So. 282. This decision is not to be regarded as a judicial precedent
on the question of constitutional law involved concerning the constitutionality vel
non of chapter 15938. State ex rel. Hampton v. McClung, 47 Fla. 224, 37 So. 51.
Quo warranto proceeding dismissed without prejudice by equal division of the court
on question of constitutionality of statute involved.
In U.S. v. Pink,120 the Court held that the affirmance by the U.S. Supreme Court by
an equally divided vote of a decision of the New York Court of Appeals that property
of a New York branch of a Russian insurance company was outside the scope of the
Russian Soviet governments decrees terminating existence of insurance companies
in Russia and seizing their assets, while conclusive and binding upon the parties as
respects the controversy in that action, did not constitute an authoritative
precedent.
In Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc.,121 the U.S. Court of Appeals Second Circuit, in
holding that printed lyrics which had the same meter as plaintiffs lyrics, but which
were in form a parody of the latter, did not constitute infringement of plaintiffs
copyrights, ruled that the prior case of Benny v. Loews, Inc.,122 which was affirmed
by an equally divided court, was not binding upon it, viz.:
Under the precedents of this court, and, as seems justified by reason as well as by
authority, an affirmance by an equally divided court is as between the parties, a
conclusive determination and adjudication of the matter ad_______________
120 62 S. Ct. 552 (1942).

121 329 F. 2d 541 (1964).
122 239 F. 2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956).
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358
judged; but the principles of law involved not having been agreed upon by a
majority of the court sitting prevents the case from becoming an authority for the
determination of other cases, either in this or in inferior courts.123
In Perlman v. First National Bank of Chicago,124 the Supreme Court of Illinois

dismissed the appeal as it was unable to reach a decision because two judges
recused themselves and the remaining members of the Court were so divided, it
was impossible to secure the concurrence of four judges as is constitutionally
required. The Court followed the procedure employed by the U.S. Supreme Court
when the Justices of that Court are equally divided, i.e. affirm the judgment of the
court that was before it for review. The affirmance is a conclusive determination and
adjudication as between the parties to the immediate case, it is not authority for the
determination of other cases, either in the Supreme Court or in any other court. It is
not entitled to precedential weight. The legal effect of such an affirmance is the
same as if the appeal was dismissed.125
The same rule is settled in the English Courts. Under English precedents,126 an
affirmance by an equally divided Court is, as between the parties, a conclusive
determination and adjudication of the matter adjudged; but the principles of law
involved not having been agreed upon by a majority of the court sitting prevents
the case from becoming an authority for the determination of other cases, either in
that or in inferior courts.
After a tour of these cases, we can safely conclude that the prevailing doctrine is
that, the affirmance by an equally divided court merely disposes of the present
controversy as between the parties and settles no issue of law; the affirmance
leaves unsettled the principle of law presented by the case and is not entitled to
precedential weight or value. In other words, the decision
_______________
123 Citing Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 30 S. Ct. 621 (1910).
124 331 N.E. 2d 65 (1975).
125 Neil v. Biggers, supra note 108.
126 Catherwood v. Caslon, 13 Mees. & W. 261; Beamish v. Beamish, 9 H. L. Cas.
274.
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only has res judicata and not stare decisis effect. It is not conclusive and binding
upon other parties as respects the controversies in other actions.
Let us now examine the patent differences between the petition at bar and the
Delfin Petition in the Santiago case which will prevent the Santiago ruling from
binding the present petitioners. To start with, the parties are different. More
importantly, the Delfin Petition did not contain the signatures of the required
number of registered voters under the Constitution: the requirement that twelve per
cent (12%) of all the registered voters in the country wherein each legislative
district is represented by at least three per cent (3%) of all the registered voters
therein was not complied with. For this reason, we ruled unanimously that it was not
the initiatory petition which the COMELEC could properly take cognizance of. In
contrast, the present petition appears to be accompanied by the signatures of the
required number of registered voters. Thus, while the Delfin Petition prayed that an
Order be issued fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the
country, the Lambino and Aumentado petition, prayed for the calling of a plebiscite
to allow the Filipino people to express their sovereign will on the proposition.
COMELEC cannot close its eyes to these material differences.
Plainly, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in denying due course to the Lambino and Aumentado petition on the
basis of its mistaken notion that Santiago established the doctrine that R.A. 6735
was an insufficient law. As aforestressed, that ruling of six (6) justices who do not
represent the majority lacks precedential status and is non-binding on the present
petitioners.
The Courts dismissal of the PIRMA petition is of no moment. Suffice it to say that we
dismissed the PIRMA petition on the principle of res judicata. This was stressed by
former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., viz.:
The following are my reasons as to why this petition must be summarily dismissed:
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360
First, it is barred by res judicata. No one aware of the pleadings filed here and in
Santiago v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325, 19 March 1997) may plead ignorance of the
fact that the former is substantially identical to the latter, except for the reversal of
the roles played by the principal parties and inclusion of additional, yet not
indispensable, parties in the present petition. But plainly, the same issues and
reliefs are raised and prayed for in both cases.
The principal petitioner here is the PEOPLES INITIATIVE FOR REFORM,
MODERNIZATION, AND ACTION (PIRMA) and spouses ALBERTO PEDROSA and
CARMEN PEDROSA. PIRMA is self-described as a nonstock, non-profit organization
duly organized and existing under Philippine laws with office address at Suite 403,
Fedman Suites, 199 Salcedo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City, with ALBERTO
PEDROSA and CARMEN PEDROSA as among its officers. In Santiago, the
PEDROSAS were made respondents as founding members of PIRMA which, as
alleged in the body of the petition therein, proposes to undertake the signature
drive for a peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. In Santiago then, the
PEDROSAS were sued in their capacity as founding members of PIRMA.
The decision in Santiago specifically declared that PIRMA was duly represented at
the hearing of the Delfin petition in the COMELEC. In short, PIRMA was intervenorpetitioner therein. Delfin alleged in his petition that he was a founding member of
the Movement for Peoples Initiative, and under footnote no. 6 of the decision, it was
noted that said movement was [l]ater identified as the Peoples Initiative for
Reforms, Modernization and Action, or PIRMA for brevity. In their Comment to the
petition in Santiago, the PEDROSAS did not deny that they were founding members
of PIRMA, and by their arguments, demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt that
they had joined Delfin or his cause.
No amount of semantics may then shield herein petitioners PIRMA and the
PEDROSAS, as well as the others joining them, from the operation of the principle of
res judicata, which needs no further elaboration. (emphasis supplied)
Justice Josue N. Bellosillo adds:
The essential requisites of res judicata are: (1) the former judgment must be final;
(2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the
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merits; and (4) there must be between the first and second actions identity of
parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of action.127
Applying these principles in the instant case, we hold that all the elements of res
judicata are present. For sure, our Decision in Santiago v. COMELEC, which was
promulgated on 19 March 1997, and the motions for reconsideration thereof denied
with finality on 10 June 1997, is undoubtedly final. The said Decision was rendered
by this Court which had jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition under Rule 65.
Our judgment therein was on the merits, i.e., rendered only after considering the
evidence presented by the parties as well as their arguments in support of their
respective claims and defenses. And, as between Santiago v. COMELEC case and
COMELEC Special Matter No. 97-001 subject of the present petition, there is identity
of parties, subject matter and causes of action.
Petitioners contend that the parties in Santiago v. COMELEC are not identical to the
parties in the instant case as some of the petitioners in the latter case were not
parties to the former case. However, a perusal of the records reveals that the
parties in Santiago v. COMELEC included the COMELEC, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, spouses
Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa, in their capacities as founding members of PIRMA, as
well as Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra, another founding member of PIRMA, representing
PIRMA, as respondents. In the instant case, Atty. Delfin was never removed, and the
spouses Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa were joined by several others who were made
parties to the petition. In other words, what petitioners did was to make it appear
that the PIRMA Petition was filed by an entirely separate and distinct group by
removing some of the parties involved in Santiago v. COMELEC and adding new
parties. But as we said in Geralde v. Sabido128
A party may not evade the application of the rule of res judicata by simply
including additional parties in the subsequent case or by not including as parties in
the later case persons who were parties in the previous suit. The joining of new
parties does not remove the case from the operation of the rule on res judicata if
the party against whom the judgment is offered in evidence was a party in the first
action; otherwise, the parties might renew the litigation by simply joining new
parties.
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127 Maglalang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85692, July 31, 1989, 175 SCRA 808,
811, 812; Development Bank of the Philippines v. Pundogar, G.R. No. 96921, January
29, 1993, 218 SCRA 118.
128 No. L-35440, August 19, 1982, 115 SCRA 839, citing Anticamara v. Ong, No. L29689, April 14, 1978, 82 SCRA 337.
362
362
The fact that some persons or entities joined as parties in the PIRMA petition but
were not parties in Santiago v. COMELEC does not affect the operation of the prior
judgment against those parties to the PIRMA Petition who were likewise parties in
Santiago v. COMELEC, as they are bound by such prior judgment.
Needless to state, the dismissal of the PIRMA petition which was based on res
judicata binds only PIRMA but not the petitioners.
VIII
Finally, let the people speak.
It is a Constitution we are expounding solemnly intoned the great Chief Justice

John Marshall of the United States in the 1819 case of McCulloch v. Maryland.129
Our Constitution is not a mere collection of slogans. Every syllable of our
Constitution is suffused with significance and requires our full fealty. Indeed, the rule
of law will wither if we allow the commands of our Constitution to underrule us.
The first principle enthroned by blood in our Constitution is the sovereignty of the
people. We ought to be concerned with this first principle, i.e., the inherent right of
the sovereign people to decide whether to amend the Constitution. Stripped of its
abstractions, democracy is all about who has the sovereign right to make decisions
for the people and our Constitution clearly and categorically says it is no other than
the people themselves from whom all government authority emanates. This right of
the people to make decisions is the essence of sovereignty, and it cannot receive
any minimalist interpretation from this Court. If there is any principle in the
Constitution that cannot be diluted and is non-negotiable, it is this sovereign right of
the people to decide.
This Court should always be in lockstep with the people in the exercise of their
sovereignty. Let them who will diminish or destroy the sovereign right of the people
to decide be warned. Let not
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129 Supra note 1.

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their sovereignty be diminished by those who belittle their brains to comprehend
changes in the Constitution as if the people themselves are not the source and
author of our Constitution. Let not their sovereignty be destroyed by the masters of
manipulation who misrepresent themselves as the spokesmen of the people.
Be it remembered that a petition for peoples initiative that complies with the
requirement that it must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of
registered voters of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of
the registered voters therein is but the first step in a long journey towards the
amendment of the Constitution. Lest it be missed, the case at bar involves but a
proposal to amend the Constitution. The proposal will still be debated by the people
and at this time, there is yet no fail-safe method of telling what will be the result of
the debate. There will still be a last step to the process of amendment which is the
ratification of the proposal by a majority of the people in a plebiscite called for the
purpose. Only when the proposal is approved by a majority of the people in the
plebiscite will it become an amendment to the Constitution. All the way, we cannot
tie the tongues of the people. It is the people who decide for the people are not an
obscure footnote in our Constitution.
The peoples voice is sovereign in a democracy. Let us hear them. Let us heed them.
Let us not only sing paens to the peoples sovereignty. Yes, it is neither too soon nor
too late to let the people speak.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, I vote to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the resolution of the
Commission on Elections dated August 31, 2006, denying due course to the Petition
for Initiative filed by Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado in their own behalf
and together with some 6.3 million registered voters who affixed their signatures
thereon and to REMAND the petition at bar to the Commission on Elections for
further proceedings.
364
364
SEPARATE OPINION
QUISUMBING, J.:
1. With due respect to the main opinion written by J. Antonio T. Carpio, and the
dissent of J. Reynato S. Puno, I view the matter before us in this petition as one
mainly involving a complex political question.1 While admittedly the present
Constitution lays down certain numerical requirements for the conduct of a Peoples
Initiative, such as the percentages of signaturesbeing 12% of the total number of
registered voters, provided each legislative district is represented by at least 3%
they are not the main points of controversy. Stated in simple terms, what this Court
must decide is whether the Commission on Elections gravely abused its discretion
when it denied the petition to submit the proposed changes to the Constitution
directly to the vote of the sovereign people in a plebiscite. Technical questions, e.g.
whether petitioners should have filed a Motion for Reconsideration before coming to
us, are of no moment in the face of the transcendental issue at hand. What deserve
our full attention are the issues concerning the applicable rules as well as statutory
and constitutional limitations on the conduct of the Peoples Initiative.
2. It must be stressed that no less than the present Constitution itself empowers the
people to directly propose amendments through their own initiative. The subject
of the instant petition is by way of exercising that initiative in order to change our
form of government from presidential to parliamentary. Much has been written
about the fulsome powers of the people in a democracy. But the most basic
concerns the idea that sovereignty resides in the people and that all government
authority emanates from them. Clearly, by the power of popular initiative, the
people have the sovereign right to change the
_______________
1 Political questions have been defined as Questions of which the courts of justice
will refuse to take cognizance, or to decide, on account of their purely political
character, or because their determination would involve an encroachment upon the
executive or legislative powers; e.g., what sort of government exists in a state.
Blacks Law Dictionary, p. 1319 citing Kenneth v. Chambers, 14 How. 38, 14 L.Ed.
316.
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present Constitution. Whether the initial moves are done by a Constitutional
Convention, a Constitutional Assembly, or a Peoples Initiative, in the end every
amendmenthowever insubstantial or radicalmust be submitted to a plebiscite.
Thus, it is the ultimate will of the people expressed in the ballot, that matters.2
3. I cannot fault the COMELEC, frankly, for turning down the petition of Messrs.
Lambino, et al. For the COMELEC was just relying on precedents, with the common
understanding that, pursuant to the cases of Santiago v. COMELEC3 and PIRMA v.
COMELEC,4 the COMELEC had been permanently enjoined from entertaining any
petition for a peoples initiative to amend the Constitution by no less than this
Court. In denying due course below to Messrs. Lambino and Aumentados petition, I
could not hold the COMELEC liable for grave abuse of discretion when they merely
relied on this Courts unequivocal rulings. Of course, the Santiago and the PIRMA
decisions could be reviewed and reversed by this Court, as J. Reynato S. Puno
submits now. But until the Court does so, the COMELEC was duty bound to respect
and obey this Courts mandate, for the rule of law to prevail.
4. Lastly, I see no objection to the remand to the COMELEC of the petition of Messrs.
Lambino and Aumentado and 6.327 million voters, for further examination of the
factual requisites before a plebiscite is conducted. On page 4 of the assailed
Resolution of the respondent dated August 31, 2006, the COMELEC tentatively
expressed its view that even if the signatures in the instant Petition appear to meet
the required minimum per centum of the total number of registered voters, the
COMELEC could not give the Petition due course because of our view that R.A. No.
6735 was inadequate. That, however, is now refuted by Mr. Justice Punos scholarly
ponencia. Now that we have revisited the Santiago v. COMELEC decision, there is
only one clear task for COMELEC. In my view, the only doable option left for the
COMELEC, once factual issues are heard and resolved, is to give due course to the
petition for the initiative to amend our Constitution so that the sovereign people can
vote on
_______________
2 See 1987 Const., Art. XVII, Sec. 2.

3 G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.
4 G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997.
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366
whether a parliamentary system of government should replace the present
presidential system.
5. I am therefore in favor of letting the sovereign people speak on their choice of the
form of government as a political question soonest. (This I say without fear of media
opinion that our judicial independence has been tainted or imperiled, for it is not.)
Thus I vote for the remand of the petition. Thereafter, as prayed for, COMELEC
should forthwith certify the Petition as sufficient in form and substance and call for
the holding of a plebiscite within the period mandated by the basic law, not earlier
than sixty nor later than ninety days from said certification. Only a credible
plebiscite itself, conducted peacefully and honestly, can bring closure to the instant
political controversy.
SEPARATE OPINION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
I agree with the ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Justice Reynato Puno, that the
Courts ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC1 is not a binding precedent. However, it is my
position that even if Santiago were reversed and Republic Act No. 6735 (R.A. 6735)
be held as sufficient law for the purpose of peoples initiative to amend the
Constitution, the petition for initiative in this case must nonetheless be dismissed.
There is absolutely no showing here that petitioners complied with R.A. 6735, even
as they blindly invoke the said law to justify their alleged peoples initiative. Section
5(b) of R.A. 6735 requires that [a] petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution
must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered
voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. On the other hand,
Section 5(c)2 of the same law requires
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1 G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.

2 SEC. 5. Requirements.x x x
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that the petition should state, among others, the proposition3 or the contents or
text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed. If we were to apply Section 5(c) to an initiative to amend the
Constitution, as petitioners submit, the petition for initiative signed by the required
number of voters should incorporate therein a text of the proposed changes to the
Constitution. However, such requirement was not followed in the case at bar.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Lambino admitted that they printed a mere
100,000 copies of the text of the proposed changes to the Constitution. According to
him, these were subsequently distributed to their agents all over the country, for
attachment to the sheets of paper on which the signatures were to be affixed. Upon
being asked, however, if he in fact knew whether the text was actually attached to
the signature sheets which were distributed for signing, he said that he merely
assumed that they were. In other words, he could not tell the Court for certain
whether their representatives complied with this requirement.
The petition filed with the COMELEC, as well as that which was shown to this Court,
indubitably establish that the full text of the proposed changes was not attached to
the signature sheets. All that the signature sheets contained was the general
proposition and abstract, which falls short of the full text requirement of R.A. 6735.
_______________

c.3. the reason or reasons therefore;

c.6. an abstract or summary proposition in not more than one hundred (100) words
3 SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall
mean: x x x
(d) Proposition is the measure proposed by the voters.
368
368
The necessity of setting forth the text of the proposed constitutional changes in the
petition for initiative to be signed by the people cannot be seriously disputed. To
begin with, Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution unequivocally states that
[a]mendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
least three per centum of the registered voters therein. Evidently, for the people to
propose amendments to the Constitution, they must, in the first instance, know
exactly what they are proposing. It is not enough that they merely possess a
general idea of the proposed changes, as the Constitution speaks of a direct
proposal by the people.
Although the framers of the Constitution left the matter of implementing the
constitutional right of initiative to Congress, it might be noted that they themselves
reasonably assumed that the draft of the proposed constitutional amendments
would be shown to the people during the process of signature gathering. Thus
MR. RODRIGO. Section 2 of the complete committee report provides: upon petition
of at least 10 percent of the registered voters. How will we determine that 10
percent has been achieved? How will the voters manifest their desire, is it by
signature?
MR. SUAREZ. Yes, by signatures.
MR. RODRIGO. Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to
propose a constitutional amendment. Is the draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment ready to be shown to the people when they are asked to sign?
MR. SUAREZ. That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to them
before they sign. Now, who prepares the draft?
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.4

It may thus be logically assumed that even without Section 5(c) of R.A. 6735, the
full text of the proposed changes must necessarily be
_______________
4 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 387-389 (July 9, 1986).

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stated in or attached to the initiative petition. The signatories to the petition must
be given an opportunity to fully comprehend the meaning and effect of the
proposed changes to enable them to make a free, intelligent and well-informed
choice on the matter.
Needless to say, the requirement of setting forth the complete text of the proposed
changes in the petition for initiative is a safeguard against fraud and deception. If
the whole text of the proposed changes is contained in or attached to the petition,
intercalations and riders may be duly avoided. Only then can we be assured that the
proposed changes are truly of the people and that the signatories have been fully
apprised of its implications.
If a statutory provision is essential to guard against fraud, corruption or deception in
the initiative and referendum process, such provision must be viewed as an
indispensable requirement and failure to substantially comply therewith is fatal.5
The failure of petitioners in this case to comply with the full text requirement
resultantly rendered their petition for initiative fatally defective.
The petition for initiative is likewise irretrievably infirm because it violates the one
subject rule under Section 10(a) of R.A. 6735:
SEC. 10. Prohibited Measures.The following cannot be the subject of an initiative
or referendum petition:
(a) No petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the
electorate; x x x
The one subject rule, as relating to an initiative to amend the Constitution, has the
same object and purpose as the one subject-one bill rule embodied in Article VI,
Section 26(1)6 of the Constitution.7 To
_______________
5 Community Gas and Service Company, Inc. v. Walbaum, 404 P.2d 1014, 1965 OK
118 (1965).
6 Section 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
7 The late Senator (then Congressman) Raul S. Roco stated this fact in his
sponsorship presentation of H.B. No. 21505, thus:
xxxx
D. Prohibited Subjects.
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elaborate, the one subject-one bill rule was designed to do away with the practice of
inserting two or more unrelated provisions in one bill, so that those favoring one
provision would be compelled to adopt the others. By this process of log-rolling, the
adoption of both provisions could be accomplished and ensured, when neither, if
standing alone, could succeed on its own merits.
As applied to the initiative process, the one subject rule is essentially designed to
prevent surprise and fraud on the electorate. It is meant to safeguard the integrity
of the initiative process by ensuring that no unrelated riders are concealed within
the terms of the proposed amendment. This in turn guarantees that the signatories
are fully aware of the nature, scope and purpose of the proposed amendment.
Petitioners insist that the proposed changes embodied in their petition for initiative
relate only to one subject matter, that isthe shift from presidential to a
parliamentary system of government. According to petitioners, all of the other
proposed changes are merely incidental to this main proposal and are reasonably
germane and necessary thereto.8 An examination of the text of the proposed
changes reveals, however, that this is not the case.
The proposed changes to the Constitution cover other subjects that are beyond the
main proposal espoused by the petitioners. Apart from a shift from the presidential
to a parliamentary form of government, the proposed changes include the abolition
of one House of Congress,9
_______________
The bill provides for two kinds of measures which cannot be the subject of an
initiative or referendum petition. A petition that embraces more than one subject
cannot be submitted to the electorate as it would be violative of the constitutional
proscription on passing bills containing more than one subject, and statutes
involving emergency measures cannot be subject to referendum until 90 days after
its effectivity. [JOURNAL AND RECORD OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,SECOND REGULAR SESSION, VOL. 6, P. 975 (FEBRUARY 14,
1989).]
8 Memorandum of petitioner Aumentado, p. 117.
9 The proposed Section 4(3) of Article XVIII of the Constitution states that Senators
whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be members of parliament until noon of the
thirtieth day of June 2010. No counterpart provision
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371
and the convening of a constituent assembly to propose additional amendments to
the Constitution.10 Also included within its terms is an omnibus declaration that
those constitutional provisions under Articles VI and VII, which are inconsistent with
the unicameralparliamentary form of government, shall be deemed amended to
conform thereto.
It is not difficult to see that while the proposed changes appear to relate only to a
shift in the form of government, it actually seeks to affect other subjects that are
not reasonably germane to the constitutional alteration that is purportedly sought.
For one, a shift to a parliamentary system of government does not necessarily result
in the adoption of a unicameral legislature. A parliamentary system can exist in
many different hybrid forms of government, which may or may not embrace
unicameralism.11 In other words, the shift from presidential to parliamentary
structure and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature is neither the cause nor
effect of the other.
I also fail to see the relation of convening a constituent assembly with the proposed
change in our system of government. As a subject matter, the convening of a
constituent assembly to amend the Constitution presents a range of issues that is
far removed from the subject of a shift in government. Besides, the constituent
assembly is supposed to convene and propose amendments to the Constitution
after the proposed change in the system of government has already taken place.
This only goes to show that the convening of the constituent assembly is not
necessary to effectuate a change to a parliamentary system of government.
_______________
was provided for members of the House of Representatives who, as members of the
interim parliament under the proposed changes, shall schedule the elections for the
regular parliament in its discretion.
10 The proposed Section 4(3), Article XVIII of the Constitution states that the interim
parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, the
Constitution within 45 days from ratification of the proposed changes.
11 The United Kingdom, for instance, has a two-house parliament, the House of
Lords and the House of Commons.
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372
The omnibus statement that all provisions under Articles VI and VII which are
inconsistent with a unicameral-parliamentary system of government shall be
deemed amended is equally bothersome. The statement does not specify what
these inconsistencies and amendments may be, such that everyone is left to guess
the provisions that could eventually be affected by the proposed changes. The
subject and scope of these automatic amendments cannot even be spelled out with
certainty. There is thus no reasonable measure of its impact on the other
constitutional provisions.
The foregoing proposed changes cannot be the subject of a peoples initiative under
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Taken together, the proposed changes
indicate that the intendment is not simply to effect substantial amendments to the
Constitution, but a revision thereof. The distinction between an amendment and
revision was explained by Dean Vicente G. Sinco, as follows:
Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves alterations of different
portions of the entire document. It may result in the rewriting either of the whole
constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only some of its important
provisions. But whatever results the revision may produce, the factor that
characterizes it as an act of revision is the original intention and plan authorized to
be carried out. That intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the
provisions of the constitution to determine which one should be altered or
suppressed or whether the whole document should be replaced with an entirely new
one.
The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only a
few specific provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not to consider the
advisability of changing the entire constitution or of considering that possibility. The
intention rather is to improve specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to
it provisions deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress

portions of it that seem obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect.12
_______________
12 Philippine Political Law [1954 ed.], Vicente G. Sinco, pp. 43-44, quoted in
Separate Opinion of J. Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in PIRMA v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997, p. 7.
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The foregoing traditional exposition of the difference between amendment and

revision has indeed guided us throughout our constitutional history. However, the
distinction between the two terms is not, to my mind, as significant in the context of
our past constitutions, as it should be now under the 1987 Constitution. The reason
for this is apparent. Under our past constitutions, it was Congress alone, acting
either as a constituent assembly or by calling out a constitutional convention, that
exercised authority to either amend or revise the Constitution through the
procedures therein described. Although the distinction between the two terms was
theoretically recognized under both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the need to
highlight the difference was not as material because it was only Congress that could
effect constitutional changes by choosing between the two modalities.
However, it is different now under the 1987 Constitution. Apart from providing for
the two modes of either Congress constituting itself as a constituent assembly or
calling out for a constitutional convention, a third mode was introduced for
proposing changes to the Constitution. This mode refers to the peoples right to
propose amendments to the fundamental law through the filing of a petition for
initiative.
Otherwise stated, our experience of what constitutes amendment or revision under
the past constitutions is not determinative of what the two terms mean now, as
related to the exercise of the right to propose either amendments or revision. The
changes introduced to both the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973 could have indeed
been deemed an amendment or revision, but the authority for effecting either
would never have been questioned since the same belonged solely to Congress. In
contrast, the 1987 Constitution clearly limits the right of the people to directly
propose constitutional changes to amendments only. We must consequently not be
swayed by examples of constitutional changes effected prior to the present
fundamental law, in determining whether such changes are revisory or amendatory

in nature.
374
374
In this regard, it should be noted that the distinction laid down by Justice Felix Q.
Antonio in Javellana v. Executive Secretary13 related to the procedure to be
followed in ratifying a completely new charter proposed by a constitutional
convention. The authority or right of the constitutional convention itself to effect
such a revision was not put in issue in that case. As far as determining what
constitutes amendments for the purpose of a peoples initiative, therefore, we
have neither relevant precedent nor prior experience. We must thus confine
ourselves to Dean Sincos basic articulation of the two terms.
It is clear from Dean Sincos explanation that a revision may either be of the whole
or only part of the Constitution. The part need not be a substantial part as a change
may qualify as a revision even if it only involves some of the important provisions.
For as long as the intention and plan to be carried out contemplate a consideration
of all the provisions of the Constitution to determine which should be altered or
suppressed, or whether the whole document should be replaced with an entirely
new one, the proposed change may be deemed a revision and not merely an
amendment.
Thus, it is not by the sheer number alone of the proposed changes that the same
may be considered as either an amendment or revision. In so determining, another
overriding factor is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out by
the proposed changes. If the same relates to a re-examination of the entire
document to see which provisions remain relevant or if it has far-reaching effects on
the entire document, then the same constitutes a revision and not a mere
amendment of the Constitution.
From the foregoing, it is readily apparent that a combination of the quantitative and
qualitative test is necessary in assessing what may be considered as an amendment
or revision. It is not enough that we focus simply on the physical scope of the
proposed changes, but also consider what it means in relation to the entire
document. No clear demarcation line can be drawn to distinguish the two terms and
each circumstance must be judged on the basis of its own peculiar condi_______________
13 151-A Phil. 35; 50 SCRA 30 (1973).
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tions. The determination lies in assessing the impact that the proposed changes
may have on the entire instrument, and not simply on an arithmetical appraisal of
the specific provisions which it seeks to affect.
In McFadden v. Jordan,14 the California Supreme Court laid down the groundwork for
the combination of quantitative and qualitative assessment of proposed
constitutional changes, in order to determine whether the same is revisory or
merely amendatory. In that case, the McFadden court found the proposed changes
extensive since at least 15 of the 25 articles contained in the California Constitution
would either be repealed in their entirety or substantially altered, and four new
topics would be introduced. However, it went on to consider the qualitative effects
that the proposed initiative measure would have on Californias basic plan of
government. It observed that the proposal would alter the checks and balances
inherent in such plan, by delegating far-reaching and mixed powers to an
independent commission created under the proposed measure. Consequently, the
proposal in McFadden was not only deemed as broad and numerous in physical
scope, but was also held as having a substantive effect on the fundamental
governmental plan of the State of California.
The dual aspect of the amendment/revision analysis was reiterated by the California
Supreme Court in Raven v. Deukmeijan.15 Proposition 115, as the initiative in that
case was called, would vest in the United States Supreme Court all judicial
interpretative powers of the California courts over fundamental criminal defense
rights in that state. It was observed that although quantitatively, the proposition did
not seem so extensive as to change directly the substantial entirety of the
Constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions, the
same, nonetheless, would substantially alter the substance and integrity of the
state Constitution as a document of independent force and effect. Quoting Amador
Valley Joint Union
_______________
14 196 P. 2d 787 (Cal. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949).
15 801 P. 2d 1077 (Cal. 1990).
376
376

High School District v. State Board of Equalization,16 the Raven court said:
. . . apart from a measure effecting widespread deletions, additions and
amendments involving many constitutional articles, even a relatively simple
enactment may accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a revision also [A]n enactment which
purported to vest all judicial power in the Legislature would amount to a revision
without regard either to the length or complexity of the measure or the number of
existing articles or sections affected by such change. (Italics supplied and
citations omitted)
Thus, in resolving the amendment/revision issue, the California Court examines both
the quantitative and qualitative effects of a proposed measure on its constitutional
scheme. Substantial changes in either respect could amount to a revision.17
I am persuaded that we can approach the present issue in the same manner. The
experience of the courts in California is not far removed from the standards
expounded on by Dean Sinco when he set out to differentiate between amendment
and revision. It is actually consistent, not only with our traditional concept of the
two terms, but also with the mindset of our constitutional framers when they
referred to the disquisition of Justice Antonio in Javellana.18 We must thus consider
whether the proposed changes in this case affect our Constitution in both its
substantial physical entirety and in its basic plan of government.
The question posed is: do the proposed changes, regardless of whether these are
simple or substantial, amount to a revi_______________
16 583 P. 2d 1281 (Cal. 1982).

17 Raven v. Deukmeijan, supra, citing Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P. 2d 274 (Cal.
1982).
18 Supra note 13. It may well be pointed out that in making the distinction between
amendment and revision, Justice Antonio relied not only in the analogy presented in
Wheeler v. Board of Trustees, 37 S.E. 2d 322, but cited also the seminal ruling of the
California Supreme Court in McFadden v. Jordan, supra.
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377
sion as to be excluded from the peoples right to directly propose amendments to

the fundamental law?
As indicated earlier, we may apply the quantitative/quailtative test in determining
the nature of the proposed changes. These tests are consistent with Dean Sincos
traditional concept of amendment and revision when he explains that,
quantitatively, revision may result in the rewriting either of the whole constitution,
or the greater part of it, or perhaps only some of its provisions. In any case, he
continues, the factor that characterizes it as an act of revision is the original
intention and plan authorized to be carried out. Unmistakably, the latter statement
refers to the qualitative effect of the proposed changes.
It may thus be conceded that, quantitatively, the changes espoused by the
proponents in this case will affect only two (2) out of the eighteen (18) articles of
the 1987 Constitution, namely, Article VI (Legislative Department) and Article VII
(Executive Department), as well as provisions that will ensure the smooth transition
from a presidential-bicameral system to a parliamentary-unicameral structure of
government. The quantitative effect of the proposed changes is neither broad nor
extensive and will not affect the substantial entirety of the 1987 Constitution.
However, it is my opinion that the proposed changes will have serious qualitative
consequences on the Constitution. The initiative petition, if successful, will
undoubtedly alter, not only our basic governmental plan, but also redefine our
rights as citizens in relation to government. The proposed changes will set into
motion a ripple effect that will strike at the very foundation of our basic
constitutional plan. It is therefore an impermissible constitutional revision that may
not be effected through a peoples initiative.
Petitioners main proposal pertains to the shifting of our form of government from
the presidential to the parliamentary system. An examination of their proposal
reveals that there will be a fusion of the executive and legislative departments into
one parliament that will be elected on the basis of proportional representation. No
term limits are set for the members of parliament except for those elected under
the party-list system whose terms and number shall be provided by
378
378
law. There will be a President who shall be the head of state, but the head of
government is the Prime Minister. The latter and his cabinet shall be elected from
among the members of parliament and shall be responsible to parliament for the
program of government.
The preceding proposal indicates that, under the proposed system, the executive
and legislature shall be one and the same, such that parliament will be the
paramount governing institution. What this implies is that there will be no

separation between the law-making and enforcement powers of the state, that are
traditionally delineated between the executive and legislature in a presidential form
of government. Necessarily, the checks and balances inherent in the fundamental
plan of our U.S.-style presidential system will be eliminated. The workings of
government shall instead be controlled by the internal political dynamics prevailing
in the parliament.
Our present governmental system is built on the separation of powers among the
three branches of government. The legislature is generally limited to the enactment
of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws and the judiciary to the
application of laws. This separation is intended to prevent a concentration of
authority in one person or group that might lead to an irreversible error or abuse in
its exercise to the detriment of our republican institutions. In the words of Justice
Laurel, the doctrine of separation of powers is intended to secure action, to forestall
overaction, to prevent despotism and obtain efficiency.19
In the proposed parliamentary system, there is an obvious lack of formal
institutional checks on the legislative and executive powers of the state, since both
the Prime Minister and the members of his cabinet are drawn from parliament.
There are no effective limits to what the Prime Minister and parliament can do,
except the will of the parliamentary majority. This goes against the central principle
of our present constitutional scheme that distributes the powers of government and
provides for counteraction among the three branches. Although both the
presidential and parliamentary systems are theoreti_______________
19 Philippine Political Law, 1995 ed., Justice Isagani A. Cruz, p. 71, citing Pangasinan
Transportation Co. v. PSC, 40 O.G., 8th Supp. 57.
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379
cally consistent with constitutional democracy, the underlying tenets and resulting
governmental framework are nonetheless radically different.
Consequently, the shift from presidential to parliamentary form of government
cannot be regarded as anything but a drastic change. It will require a total overhaul
of our governmental structure and involve a re-orientation in the cardinal doctrines
that govern our constitutional set-up. As explained by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a
switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision
because of its over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure.20 It cannot, by

any standard, be deemed as a mere constitutional amendment.
suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be
dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan
contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the
document which have over-all implications for the entire document, to determine
how and to what extent they should be altered.21 (Italics supplied)
The inclusion of a proposal to convene a constituent assembly likewise shows the
intention of the proponents to effect even more far-reaching changes in our
fundamental law. If the original intent were to simply shift the form of government
to the parliamentary system, then there would have been no need for the calling
out of a constituent assembly to propose further amendments to the Constitution. It
should be noted that, once convened, a constituent assembly can do away and
replace any constitutional provision which may not even have a bearing on the shift
to a parliamentary system of government. The inclusion of such a proposal reveals
the proponents plan to consider all provisions of the constitution, either to
determine
_______________
20 The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., Fr. Joaquin G.
Bernas, S.J., p. 1161.
21 Id.
380
380
which of its provisions should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole
document should be replaced with an entirely new one.
Consequently, it is not true that only Articles VI and VII are covered by the alleged
peoples initiative. The proposal to convene a constituent assembly, which by its
terms is mandatory, will practically jeopardize the future of the entire Constitution
and place it on shaky grounds. The plan of the proponents, as reflected in their
proposed changes, goes beyond the shifting of government from the presidential to
the parliamentary system. Indeed, it could even extend to the fundamental nature
of our state as a democratic and republican state.
To say that the proposed changes will affect only the constitution of government is
therefore a fallacy. To repeat, the combined effect of the proposed changes to
Articles VI and VII and those pertaining to the Transitory Provisions under Article
XVIII indubitably establish the intent and plan of the proponents to possibly affect
even the constitutions of liberty and sovereignty. Indeed, no valid reason exists for
authorizing further amendments or revisions to the Constitution if the intention of
the proposed changes is truly what it purports to be.
There is no question here that only amendments to the Constitution may be
undertaken through a peoples initiative and not a revision, as textually reflected in
the Constitution itself. This conclusion is inevitable especially from a comparative
examination of Section 2 in relation to Sections 1 and 4 of Article XVII, which state:
SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
SECTION 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the
total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No
amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the
ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
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xxxx
SECTION 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1
hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the
approval of such amendment or revision.
than ninety days after the certification by the Commission of Elections of the
sufficiency of the petition. (Italics supplied)
It is clear that the right of the people to directly propose changes to the Constitution
is limited to amendments and does not include a revision thereof. Otherwise, it
would have been unnecessary to provide for Section 2 to distinguish its scope from
the rights vested in Congress under Section 1. The latter lucidly states that
Congress may propose both amendments and a revision of the Constitution by
either convening a constituent assembly or calling for a constitutional convention.
Section 2, on the other hand, textually commits to the people the right to propose
only amendments by direct action.
To hold, therefore, that Section 2 allows substantial amendments amounting to
revision obliterates the clear distinction in scope between Sections 1 and 2. The
intention, as may be seen from a cursory perusal of the above provisions, is to
provide differing fields of application for the three modes of effecting changes to the
Constitution. We need not even delve into the intent of the constitutional framers to
see that the distinction in scope is definitely marked. We should thus apply these
provisions with a discerning regard for this distinction. Again, McFadden22 is
instructive:
. . . The differentiation required is not merely between two words; more accurately
it is between two procedures and between their respective fields of application.
Each procedure, if we follow elementary principles of statutory construction, must
be understood to have a substantial field of application, not to be x x x a mere
alternative procedure in the same field. Each of the two
_______________
22 Supra note 14.

382
382
words, then, must be understood to denote, respectively, not only a procedure but
also a field of application appropriate to its procedure. The people of this state have
spoken; they made it clear when they adopted article XVIII and made amendment
relatively simple but provided the formidable bulwark of a constitutional convention
as a protection against improvident or hasty (or any other) revision, that they
understood that there was a real difference between amendment and revision. We
find nothing whatsoever in the language of the initiative amendment of 1911 (Art.
IV, 1) to effect a breaking down of that difference. On the contrary, the distinction
appears to be x x x scrupulously preserved by the express declaration in the
amendment x x x that the power to propose and vote on amendments to the
Constitution is reserved directly to the people in initiative proceedings, while
leaving unmentioned the power and the procedure relative to constitutional
revision, which revisional power and procedure, it will be remembered, had already
been specifically treated in section 2 of article XVIII. Intervenors contentionthat
any change less than a total one is but amendatorywould reduce to the rubble of
absurdity the bulwark so carefully erected and preserved. Each situation involving
the question of amendment, as contrasted with revision, of the Constitution must,
we think, be resolved upon its own facts.
Thus, our people too have spoken when they overwhelmingly ratified the 1987
Constitution, with the provisions on amendments and revisions under Article XVII.
The voice and will of our people cannot be any clearer when they limited peoples
initiative to mere amendments of the fundamental law and excluded revisions in its
scope. In this regard, the task of the Court is to give effect to the peoples voice, as
expressed unequivocally through the Constitution.
Article XVII on amendments and revisions is called a constitution of sovereignty
because it defines the constitutional meaning of sovereignty of the people. It is
through these provisions that the sovereign people have allowed the expression of
their sovereign will and have canalized their powers which would otherwise be
plenary. By approving these provisions, the sovereign people have decided to limit
themselves and future generations in the exercise of their sovereign power.23 They
are thus bound by the constitution and are powerless,
_______________
23 The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1st ed., Fr. Joaquin G.
Bernas, S.J., p. 567, citing B. Schwartz, I The Powers of Government (1963).
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whatever their numbers, to change or thwart its mandates, except through the
means prescribed by the Constitution itself.24
It is thus misplaced to argue that the people may propose revisions to the
Constitution through peoples initiative because their representatives, whose power
is merely delegated, may do so. While Section 1 of Article XVII may be considered
as a provision delegating the sovereign powers of amendment and revision to
Congress, Section 2, in contrast, is a self-limitation on that sovereign power. In the
words of Cooley:
x x x Although by their constitutions the people have delegated the exercise of
sovereign powers to the several departments, they have not thereby divested
themselves of the sovereignty. They retain in their own hands, so far as they have
thought it needful to do so, a power to control the governments they create, and the
three departments are responsible to and subject to be ordered, directed, changed
or abolished by them. But this control and direction must be exercised in the
legitimate mode previously agreed upon. The voice of the people, acting in their
sovereign capacity, can be of legal force only when expressed at the times and
under the conditions which they themselves have prescribed and pointed out by the
Constitution, or which, consistently with the Constitution, have been prescribed and
pointed out for them by statute; and if by any portion of the people, however large,
an attempt should be made to interfere with the regular working of the agencies of
government at any other time or in any other mode than as allowed by existing law,
either constitutional or statutory, it would be revolutionary in character, and must
be resisted and repressed by the officers who, for the time being, represent
legitimate government.25 (Italics supplied)
Consequently, there is here no case of the spring rising above its source. Nor is it
one where the peoples sovereign power has been relegated to a lesser plane than
that of Congress. In choosing to exercise self-limitation, there is no absence or lack
of even a fraction of the sovereign power of the people since self-limitation itself is
an expression of that sovereign power. The people have chosen to delegate and
limit their sovereign power by virtue of the Constitution
_______________
24 16 C.J.S. 3 at p. 24.
25 14 T.M. Cooley, II Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed. (1927), p. 1349.
384
384
and are bound by the parameters that they themselves have ordained. Otherwise, if
the people choose to defy their self-imposed constitutional restraints, we will be
faced with a revolutionary situation.26
It has repeatedly been emphasized that ours is a democratic and republican
state.27 Even as we affirm, however, that aspect of direct democracy, we should
not forget that, first and foremost, we are a constitutional democracy. To uphold
direct democracy at the expense of the fundamental law is to sanction, not a
constitutional, but an extra-constitutional recourse. This is clearly beyond the
powers of the Court who, by sovereign mandate, is the guardian and keeper of the
Constitution.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.
CONCURRING OPINION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Vox populi vox Deithe voice of the people is the voice of God. Caution should be
exercised in choosing ones battlecry, lest it does more harm than good to ones
cause. In its original context, the complete version of this Latin phrase means
exactly the opposite of what it is frequently taken to mean. It originated from a holy
man, the monk Alcuin, who advised Charlemagne, nec audiendi qui solent dicere
vox populi vox Dei quum tumultuositas vulgi semper insaniae proxima sit,
meaning, And those people should not be listened to who
_______________
26 A bogus revolution, Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 11, 2006, Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, S.J., p. A15.
27 Article II, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution.
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keep on saying, The voice of the people is the voice of God, since the riotousness
of the crowd is always very close to madness.1 Perhaps, it is by providence that
the true meaning of the Latin phrase is revealed upon petitioners and their allies
that they may reflect upon the sincerity and authenticity of their peoples
initiative.
History has been a witness to countless iniquities committed in the name of God.
Wars were waged, despotism tolerated and oppressions justifiedall these
transpired as man boasted of Gods imprimatur. Today, petitioners and their allies
hum the same rallying call, convincing this Court that the peoples initiative is the
voice of the people and, therefore, the voice of God. After a thorough
consideration of the petitions, I have come to realize that man, with his ingenuity
and arrogance, has perfected the craft of imitating the voice of God. It is against
this kind of genius that the Court must guard itself.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
In 1996, the Movement for Peoples Initiative sought to exercise the power of
initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by
ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter,
The exercise was thwarted by a petition for prohibition filed with this Court by
Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, et al., entitled
_______________
1 Works, Letter 164.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Latin_phrases_%28P%E2%80%93Z
%29#endnote_ODoQ.
386
386
Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla and Maria Isabel Ongpin, petitioners,
v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen
Pedrosa, in their capacities as founding members of the Peoples Initiative for
Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents.2 The case was docketed
as G.R. No. 127325. On March 19, 1997, this Court rendered its Decision in favor of
petitioners, holding that Republic Act No. 6735 (R.A. No. 6735), An Act Providing for
a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, is
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. A majority of eight (8)
Justices fully concurred with this ruling, while five (5) subscribed to the opposite
view. One (1) opined that there is no need to rule on the adequacy of R.A. No. 6735.
On motion for reconsideration, two (2) of the eight (8) Justices reconsidered their
positions. One (1) filed an inhibition and the other one (1) joined the minority
opinion. As a consequence, of the thirteen (13) Justices who participated in the
deliberation, six (6) voted in favor of the majority opinion, while the other six (6)
voted in favor of the minority opinion.3
A few months thereafter, or on September 23, 1997, the Court dismissed a similar
case, entitled Peoples Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v.
Commission on Elections4 on the ground that the COMELEC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion when it dismissed PIRMAs Petition for Initiative to Propose
Amendments to the Constitution it appearing that that it only complied with the
dispositions in the Decision of the Court in G.R. No. 127325 (Santiago v. COMELEC)
promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997. Seven (7)
Justices voted that there was no need to re-examine its ruling, as regards the issue
of the sufficiency of R.A. No. 6735. Another Justice concurred,
_______________
2 G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.

3 Resolution dated June 10, 1997, G.R. No. 127325.
4 G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997. Joining PIRMA as petitioners were its
founding members, spouses Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa.
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387
but on the different premise that the case at bar is not the proper vehicle for such
re-examination. Five (5) Justices opined otherwise.
This time, another group known as Sigaw ng Bayan, in coordination with the Union
of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP), have gathered signatures in support of
the proposed amendments to the Constitution, which entail a change in the form of
government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary, thus:
of government.
XVIII, entitled Transitory Provisions, which shall read, as follows:
388
388
sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatium up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with
the Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to
Constitution which are hereby be amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12
which are hereby deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and
however, that any and all references therein to Congress, Senate, House of
interim Parliament which shall continue until the Members
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389
of the regular Parliament shall have been elected and shall have qualified. It shall be
composed of the incumbent Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the incumbent Members of the Cabinet who are heads of
executive departments.
and shall preside over its sessions for the election of the interim Prime Minister and
strong bureaucracy.
Parliament which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of
all local government officials. The duty (sic) elected Prime Minister shall continue to
President.
Sigaw ng Bayan prepared signature sheets, and written on its upper right hand
portion is the abstract of the proposed amendments, quoted as follows:
Abstract: Do you approve of the amendment of Article VI and VII of the 1987
Constitution, changing the form of government from the present bicameralpresidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system of government, in order to
achieve greater efficiency, simplicity and economy in government; and providing an
Article XVIII as Transitory Provisions for the orderly shift from one system to
another?
390
390
On August 25, 2006, Raul L. Lambino and Enrico B. Aumentado, herein petitioners,
filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to Amend the Constitution.5 Five (5)
days thereafter, they filed an Amended Petition alleging that they are filing the
petition in their own behalf and together with some 6.3 million registered voters
who have affixed their signatures on the signature sheets attached thereto. They
claimed that the signatures of registered voters appearing on the signature sheets,
constituting at least twelve per cent (12%) of all registered voters in the country,
wherein each legislative district is represented by at least three per cent (3%) of all
the registered voters, were verified by their respective city or municipal election
officers.
Several organizations opposed the petition. 6
In a Resolution dated August 31, 2006, the COMELEC denied due course to the
petition, citing as basis this Courts ruling in Santiago, permanently enjoining it
from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments
to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide
for the implementation of the system.
_______________
5 Entitled In the Matter of Proposing Amendments to the 1987 Constitution through

a Peoples Initiative: A Shift from a Bicameral Presidential to a Unicameral
Parliamentary Government by Amending Articles VI and VII; and Providing Transitory
Provisions for the Orderly Shift from the Presidential to the Parliamentary System.
6 Among them ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L.
Quezon III, Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople, and Carlos P. Medina, Jr.,
Alternative Law Groups, Inc., Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., and
Senators Sergio Osmea III, Jamby A.S. Madrigal, Alfredo S. Lim, Panfilo M. Lacson,
Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada, and Jinggoy Estrada, Representatives Loretta Ann P.

Rosales, Mario Joyo Aguja, and Ana Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel, Bayan, Kilusang
Mayo Uno, Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante, Gabriela, Gabriela Womens Party,
Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students, Leonardo San Jose, Jojo Pineda, Drs. Darby
Santiago and Reginald Pamugas, and Attys. Pete Quirino-Quadra, Jose Anselmo I.
Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L. Salvador, and Randall C.
Tabayoyong.
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Hence, the present petition for certiorari and mandamus praying that this Court set
aside the COMELEC Resolution and direct the latter to comply with Section 4, Article
XVII of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 4. x x x
I vote to dismiss the petition of Lambino, et al. in G.R. No. 174153 and grant the
petition of Mar-len Abigail Binay, et al. in G.R. No. 174299. Here, petitioners pray
that the COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners be required to show why they
should not be punished for contempt7 of court for disregarding the permanent
injunction issued by this Court in Santiago.
_______________
7 Grounds for contempt

3. From the time the so-called Peoples Initiative (hereafter PI) now subject of
Lambino v. Comelec, was initiated, respondents did nothing to stop what was clearly
lawless, and even arguably winked at, as it were, if not condoned and allowed, the
waste and misuse of its personnel, time, facilities and resources on an enterprise
that had no legal basis and in fact was permanently enjoined by this Honorable
Court in 1997. Seemingly mesmerized, it is time to disenthrall them.
3.1. For instance, undersigned counsel happened to be in the Senate on August 29,
2006 (on other business) when respondent Chair sought to be stopped by the body
from commenting on PI out of prudential considerations, could not be restrained. On
contentious issues, he volunteered that Sigaw ng Bayan would not cheat in Makati
as it was the opposition territory and that the fact that out of 43,405 signatures,
only 7,186 were found authentic in one Makati District, to him, showed the
efficiency of Comelec personnel. He could not appreciate 1) that Sigaw had no
choice but to get the constitutionality-required 3% in every district, [Const., Art. VII,
Sec. 2] friendly or otherwise, including admini
392
392
I
Respondent COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion
Without necessarily brushing aside the other important issues, I believe the
resolution of the present petition hinges on this singular issuedid the COMELEC
commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied Lambino, et al.s petition for
initiative to amend the Constitution on the basis of this Courts Decision in Santiago
v. COMELEC?
In other words, regardlessof how the other remaining issues are resolved, still, the
ultimate yardstick is the attendance of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the COMELEC.
Jurisprudence teaches that an act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as
committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a
capricious or whimsical exercise of judg_______________
stration critics turfs, and 2) that falsus in 36,319 (93.30%) falsus in omnibus, in an
exercise that could never be free, orderly, honest and credible, another
constitutional requirement. [Nothing has been heard about probing and prosecuting
the falsifiers.]
xxx
xxx
xxx
3.2.It was excessively obvious to undersigned and other observers that respondent
Chairman, straining at the leash, was lawyering for Sigaw ng Bayan in the Senate! It
was discomfiting that he would gloss over the seeming wholesale falsification of
96.30% of the signatures in an exercise with no credibility! Even had he been asked,
he should have pled to be excused from answering as the matter could come up
before the Comelec for an official collegial position (different from conceding that it
is enjoined).
xxx
xxx
xxx
4.Respondents Commissioners Borra and Romeo A. Brawner, for their part, even
issued widely-publicized written directives to the field, [Annex C, as to
Commissioner Brawner; that as to Commissioner Borra will follow.] while the
Commission itself was trying to be careful not to be explicit in what it was abetting
implicitly, in hypocritical defiance of the injunction of 1997.
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393
ment. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.8
The Resolution of respondent COMELEC denying due course to the petition for
initiative on the basis of a case (Santiago) decided by this Court cannot, in any way,
be characterized as capricious or whimsical, patent and gross, or arbitrary and
despotic. On the contrary, it was the most prudent course to take. It must be
stressed that in Santiago, this Court permanently enjoins respondent COMELEC
from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments
to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted. It being a
fact that Congress has not enacted a sufficient law, respondent COMELEC has no
alternative but to adhere to Santiago. Otherwise, it is vulnerable to a citation for
contempt. As succinctly stated by Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban (then
Associate Justice) in his Separate Opinion in the subsequent case of PIRMA vs.
COMELEC:9
x x x I cannot fault the Comelec for complying with the ruling even if it, too,
disagreed with said decisions ratio decidendi. Respondent Comelec was directly
enjoined by the highest Court of the land. It had no choice but to obey. Its
obedience cannot constitute grave abuse of discretion. Refusal to act on the PIRMA
petition was the only recourse open to the Comelec. Any other mode of action
would have constituted defiance of the Court and would have been struck down as
grave abuse of discretion and contumacious disregard of this Courts supremacy as
the final arbiter of justiciable controversies.
It need not be emphasized that in our judicial hierarchy, this Court reigns supreme.
All courts, tribunals and administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions are
obliged to conform to its pronouncements. It has the last word on what the law is; it
is the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy. In other words,
_______________
8 Intestate Estate of Carmen de Luna v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.

72424, February 13, 1989, 170 SCRA 246.
9 Supra.
394
394
there is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take
their bearings.10 As a warning to lower court judges who would not adhere to its
rulings, this Court, in People v. Santos,11 held:
Now, if a judge of a lower Court feels, in the fulfillment of his mission of deciding
cases, that the application of a doctrine promulgated by this Superiority is against
his way of reasoning, or against his conscience, he may state his opinion on the
matter, but rather than disposing of the case in accordance with his personal views
he must first think that it is his duty to apply the law as interpreted by the Highest
Court of the Land, and that any deviation from a principle laid down by the latter
would unavoidably cause, as a sequel, unnecessary inconveniences, delays and
expenses to the litigants. And if despite of what is here said, a Judge still believes
that he cannot follow Our rulings, then he has no other alternative than to place
himself in the position that he could properly avoid the duty of having to render
judgment on the case concerned (Art. 9, C.C.), and he has only one legal way to do
that.
Clearly, respondent COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the
petition of Lambino, et al. for it merely followed this Courts ruling in Santiago.
Significantly, in PIRMA vs. COMELEC,12 a unanimous Court implicitly recognized that
its ruling in Santiago is the established doctrine and that the COMELEC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in invoking it, thus:
PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the dispositions of this Court
in G.R. No. 127325 promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its resolution on June 10,
1997.
_______________
10 Development Bank of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission,

March 1, 1995, 242 SCRA 59; Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VI),
L-26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948.
11 56 O.G. 3546 cited in Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VI), id.
12 Supra.
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Indeed, I cannot characterize as a grave abuse of discretion the COMELECs
obedience and respect to the pronouncement of this Court in Santiago.
II
The doctrine of stare decisis bars the re-examination of Santiago
It cannot be denied that in Santiago, a majority of the members of this Court or
eight (8) Justices (as against five (5) Justices) concurred in declaring R.A. No. 6735
an insufficient law. When the motion for reconsideration was denied via an equallydivided Court or a 6-6 vote, it does not mean that the Decision was overturned. It
only shows that the opposite view fails to muster enough votes to modify or reverse
the majority ruling. Therefore, the original Decision was upheld.13 In Ortigas and
Company Limited Partnership vs. Velasco,14 this Court ruled that the denial of a
motion or reconsideration signifies that the ground relied upon have been found,
upon due deliberation, to be without merit, as not being of sufficient weight to
warrant a modification of the judgment or final order.
With Santiago being the only impediment to the instant petition for initiative,
petitioners persistently stress that the doctrine of stare decisis does not bar its reexamination.
I am not convinced.
The maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere translates stand by the decisions
and disturb not what is settled.15 As used in our jurisprudence, it means that
once this Court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts, it
_______________
13 Separate Opinion of Justice Ricardo J. Francisco, G.R. No. 129754, September 23,
1997.
14 G.R. No. 109645, March 4, 1996, 254 SCRA 234.
15 Philippine National Bank v. Palma, G.R. No. 157279, August 9, 2005, 466 SCRA
307, citing Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary (1988), 3rd ed. (citing Santiago v.
Valenzuela, 78 Phil. 397, [1947]).
396
396
would adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are
substantially the same as in the earlier controversy.16
There is considerable literature about whether this doctrine of stare decisis is a
good or bad one, but the doctrine is usually justified by arguments which focus on
the desirability of stability and certainty in the law and also by notions of justice and
fairness. Justice Benjamin Cardozo in his treatise, The Nature of the Judicial Process
stated:
It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and
the opposite way between another. If a group of cases involves the same point, the
parties expect the same decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate
cases on opposite principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday when I
was a defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I am plaintiff. To decide
differently would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be
an infringement, material and moral, of my rights. Adherence to precedent must
then be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the evenhanded administration of justice in the courts.17
That the doctrine of stare decisis is related to justice and fairness may be
appreciated by considering the observation of American philosopher William K.
Frankena as to what constitutes injustice:
The paradigm case of injustice is that in which there are two similar individuals in
similar circumstances and one of them is treated better or worse than the other. In
this case, the cry of injustice rightly goes up against the responsible agent or group;
and unless that agent or group can establish that there is some relevant
dissimilarity after all
_______________
16 Id., citing Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126183, March 25, 1999, 305
SCRA 303, citing Government v. Jalandoni, No. 837-R, August 30, 1947, 44 O.G.
1840.
17 Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven and London:
Yale University Press, 1921), pp. 33-34.
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397
between the individuals concerned and their circumstances, he or they will be guilty
as charged.18
Although the doctrine of stare decisis does not prevent reexamining and, if need be,
overruling prior decisions, It is x x x a fundamental jurisprudential policy that prior
applicable precedent usually must be followed even though the case, if considered
anew, might be decided differently by the current justices. This policy x x x is based
on the assumption that certainty, predictability and stability in the law are the major
objectives of the legal system; i.e., that parties should be able to regulate their
conduct and enter into relationships with reasonable assurance of the governing
rules of law.19 Accordingly, a party urging overruling a precedent faces a rightly
onerous task, the difficulty of which is roughly proportional to a number of factors,
including the age of the precedent, the nature and extent of public and private
reliance on it, and its consistency or inconsistency with other related rules of law.
Here, petitioners failed to discharge their task.
Santiago v. COMELEC was decided by this Court on March 19, 1997 or more than
nine (9) years ago. During that span of time, the Filipino people, specifically the law
recognized this Courts Decision as a precedent. In fact, the Santiago doctrine was
applied by this Court in the subsequent case of PIRMA. Even the legislature has
relied on said Decision, thus, several bills have been introduced in both Houses of
Congress to cure the deficiency. I cannot fathom why it should be overturned or set
aside merely on the basis of the petition of Lambino, et al. Indeed, this Courts
conclusion in Santiago that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
Constitution is concerned remains a precedent and must be upheld.
_______________
18 William K. Frankena, Ethics, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc.,)
1973, p. 49.
19 Moradi-Shalal v. Firemans Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 296.
398
398

III
The proposed constitutional changes constitute Revisions and not mere
amendments
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution lays down the means for its amendment and
revision. Thus:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(2) A Constitutional Convention.
total number of registered votes (sic), of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x.
(Emphasis supplied)
At the outset, it must be underscored that initiative and referendum, as means by
which the people can directly propose changes to the Constitution, were not
provided for in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. Thus, under these two (2)
Constitutions, there was no demand to draw the distinction between an amendment
and a revision, both being governed by a uniform process. This is not so under our
present Constitution. The distinction between an amendment and a revision
becomes crucial because only amendments are allowed under the system of
peoples initiative. Revisions are within the exclusive domain of Congress, upon a
vote of three-fourths of all its members, or of a Constitutional Convention.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission is explicit that Section 2,
Article XVII covers only amendments, thus:
The sponsor, Commissioner Suarez, is recognized.
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully call the attention of
the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given us last night,
we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7
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399
which embodies the proposed provision governing initiative. This is now covered by
Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members,
may I quote Section 2:
propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten
percent of the registered voters.
proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative which came
from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section
1.The committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to
amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the entire
Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed
Article on Amendment or Revision.
xxx
xxx
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG: Madam President, will the distinguished proponent of the

amendment yield to a few questions?
MR. DAVIDE: With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question, Commissioner Davides proposed amendment
on line I refers to amendments. Does it not cover the word revision as defined
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because amendments and revision should be
amendments not revision
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.20
Considering that the initiative on the Constitution only permits amendments, it is
imperative to examine whether petitioners proposed changes partake of the nature
of amendments, not revisions.
The petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC by Lambino, et al. sought to
amend the following provisions of the 1987 Constitution:
_______________
20 July 9, 1986. Records of the Constitutional Commission, No. 26.

400
400

Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Article VI (The Legislative Department); Sections 1,
2, 3 and 4 of Article VII (The Executive Department). It further includes Article XVIII
(Transitory Provisions) for the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the
bicameralpresidential to a unicameral-parliamentary form of government.
Succinctly, the proposals envision a change in the form of government, from
bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary; conversion of the present
Congress of the Philippines to an Interim National Assembly; change in the terms of
Members of Parliament; and the election of a Prime Minister who shall be vested
with executive power.
Petitioners contend that the proposed changes are in the nature of amendments,
hence, within the coverage of a peoples initiative.
I disagree.
The noted constitutionalist, Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., who was also a member
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, characterized an amendment and a revision
to the Constitution as follows:
dangerous. In revision however, the guiding original intention and plan
contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the
document which have overall implications for the document to determine how and
to what extent they should be altered.21
Obviously, both revision and amendment connote change; any distinction
between the two must be based upon the degree of change contemplated. In Kelly
v. Laing,22 the Supreme Court of Michigan made the following comparison of the
two terms:
_______________
21 Bernas, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY, 1996

Ed., p. 1161.
22 242 N. W. 891 259 Mich 212.
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401

Revision and amendment have the common characteristics of working
changes in the charter, and are sometimes used in exactly the same sense but
there is an essential difference between them.
Revision implies a re-examination of the whole law and a redraft without
obligation to maintain the form, scheme, or structure of the old. As applied to
fundamental law, such as a constitution or charter, it suggests a convention to
examine the whole subject and to prepare and submit a new instrument whether
the desired changes from the old are few or many. Amendment implies continuance
of the general plan and purpose of the law, with corrections to better accomplish its
purpose. Basically, revision suggests fundamental change, while amendment is a
correction of detail.
Although there are some authorities which indicate that a change in a citys form of
government may be accomplished by a process of amendment, the cases which
so hold seem to involve statutes which only distinguish between amendment and
totally new charters.23 However, as in Maine law, where the statute authorizing the
changes distinguishes between charter amendment and charter revision, it has
been held that (a) change in the form of government of a home rule city may be
made only by revision of the city charter, not by its amendment.24
In summary, it would seem that any major change in governmental form and
scheme would probably be interpreted as a revision and should be achieved
through the more thorough process of deliberation.
Although, at first glance, petitioners proposed changes appear to cover isolated
and specific provisions only, however, upon careful scrutiny, it becomes clear that
the proposed changes will alter the very structure of our government and create
multifarious ramifications. In other words, the proposed changes will have a
domino effect or, more appropriately, ripple effect on other provisions of the
Constitution.
_______________
23 State v. Orange [Tex. x. Civ. App.] 300 SW 2d 705, People v. Perkins 137, p. 55.
24 City of Midland v. Arbury, 38 Mich. App. 771, 197 N.W. 2d 134.
402
402
At this juncture, it must be emphasized that the power reserved to the people to
effect changes in the Constitution includes the power to amend any section in such
a manner that the proposed change, if approved, would be complete within itself,
relate to one subject and not substantially affect any other section or article of the
Constitution or require further amendments to the Constitution to accomplish its
purpose.25 This is clearly not the case here.
Firstly, a shift from a presidential to a parliamentary form of government affects the
well-enshrined doctrine of separation of powers of government, embodied in our
Constitution, by providing for an Executive, Legislative and Judiciary Branches. In a
Parliamentary form of government, the Executive Branch is to a certain degree,
dependent on the direct or indirect support of the Parliament, as expressed through
a vote of confidence. To my mind, this doctrine of separation of powers is so
interwoven in the fabric of our Constitution, that any change affecting such doctrine
must necessarily be a revision.
In McFadden vs. Jordan,26 the California Supreme Court ruled as follows:
It is thus clear that that a revision of the Constitution may be accomplished only
through ratification by the people of a revised constitution proposed by a
convention called for that purpose x x x. Consequently, if the scope of the proposed
initiative measure now before us is so broad that if such measure became law a
substantial revision of our present state Constitution would be effected, then the
measure may not properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first
agreed upon by a constitutional convention. x x x.
Secondly, the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral form of government is not a
mere amendment, but is in actuality a revision, as set forth in Adams v. Gunter:27
_______________
25 Adams v. Gunter Fla, 238 So. 2d 824.

26 196 P.2d 787.
27 Adams v. Gunter Fla. 238 So.2d 824.
403
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006

403
The proposal here to amend Section I of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to
provide for a Unicameral Legislature affects not only many other provisions of the
Constitution but provides for a change in the form of the legislative branch of
government, which has been in existence in the United States Congress and in all of
the states of the nation, except one, since the earliest days. It would be difficult to
visualize a more revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a Senate is
basic in the American form of government. It would not only radically change the
whole pattern of the government in this state and tear apart the whole fabric of the
Constitution, but would even affect the physical facilities necessary to carry on
government.
Thirdly, the proposed changes, on their face, signify revisions rather than
amendments, especially, with the inclusion of the following omnibus provision:
C.For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-Presidential to
a unicameral-Parliamnetary form of government, there shall be a new Article XVIII,
entitled Transitory Provisions which shall read, as follows:
xxx
xxx
xxx
Section 3.Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and VicePresident, with the exceptions of Section 1,2,3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution which are hereby amended x x x x x x and all other Sections of Article
VII shall be retained and numbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14,
unless they shall be inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be
deemed amended so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary system of
government x x x x x x .
xxx
xxx
xxx
Section 4.(1) x x x
(3)Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the Interim
Constitution, consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and
a strong bureaucracy.
The above provisions will necessarily result in a ripple effect on the other
provisions of the Constitution to make them conform to the qualities of unicameralparliamentary form of government. With one
404
404
sweeping stroke, these proposed provisions automatically revise some provisions of
the Constitution. In McFadden, the same practice was considered by the Court to be
in the nature of substantial revision, necessitating a constitutional convention. I
quote the pertinent portion of its ruling, thus:
There is in the measure itself, no attempt to enumerate the various and many
articles and sections of our present Constitution which would be affected, replaced
or repealed. It purports only to add one new article but its framers found it
necessary to include the omnibus provision (subdivision (7) of section XII) that If
any section, subsection, sentence, clause or phrase of the constitution is in conflict
with any of the provisions of this article, such section, subsection, sentence, clause,
or phrase is to the extent of such conflict hereby repealed. x x x Consequently, if
the scope of the proposed intitiative measure now before us is so broad that if such
measure become law a substantial revision of our present state Constitution would
be be effected, then the measure may not properly be submitted to the electorate
until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional convention.28
Undoubtedly, the changes proposed by the petitioners are not mere amendments
which will only affect the Articles or Sections sought to be changed. Rather, they are
in the nature of revisions which will affect considerable portions of the Constitution
resulting in the alteration of our form of government. The proposed changes cannot
be taken in isolation since these are connected or interlocked with the other
provisions of our Constitution. Accordingly, it has been held that: If the changes
attempted are so sweeping that it is necessary to include the provisions interlocking
them, then it is plain that the plan would constitute a recasting of the whole
Constitution and this, we think, it was intended to be accomplished only by a
convention under Section 2 which has not yet been disturbed.29
_______________
28 Mc Fadden v. Jordan, supra.

29 Rivera-Cruz v. Gray, 104 So.2d 501, p. 505 (Fla. 1958).
405
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006

405
I therefore conclude that since the proposed changes partake of the nature of a
revision of the Constitution, then they cannot be the subject of an initiative. On this
matter, Father Bernas expressed this insight:
But why limit initiative and referendum to simple amendments? The answer, which
one can easily glean from the rather long deliberation on initiative and referendum
in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, is practicality. In other words, who is to
formulate the revision or how is it to be formulated? Revision, as concretely being
proposed now, is nothing less than a rebuilding of the Philippine constitutional
structure. Who were involved in formulating the structure? What debates ensued?
What records are there for future use in interpreting the provisions which may be
found to be unclear?
In a deliberative body like Congress or a Constitutional Convention, decisions are
reached after much purifying debate. And while the deliberations proceed, the
public has the opportunity to get involved. It is only after the work of an authorized
body has been completed that it is presented to the electorate for final judgment.
Careful debate is important because the electorate tends to accept what is
presented to it even sight unseen.30
IV
R.A. No. 6735 is insufficient to implement the Peoples initiative
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
_______________
30 Joaquin Bernas, Sounding Board: AMENDMENT OR REVISION, Philippine Daily

Inquirer, September 25, 2006.
406
406
On its face, Section 2 is not a self-executory provision. This means that an enabling
law is imperative for its implementation. Thus, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6735 in
order to breathe life into this constitutional provision. However, as previously
narrated, this Court struck the law in Santiago for being incomplete, inadequate, or
wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned.
The passage of time has done nothing to change the applicability of R.A. No. 6735.
Congress neither amended it nor passed a new law to supply its deficiencies.
Notwithstanding so, this Court is being persuaded to take a 360degree turn,

enumerating three (3) justifications why R.A. No. 6735 must be considered a
sufficient law, thus:
1) The text of R.A. No. 6735 is replete with references to the right of people to
initiate changes to the Constitution;
2) The legislative history of R.A. No. 6735 reveals the clear intent of the lawmakers
to use it as instrument to implement the peoples initiative; and
3) The sponsorship speeches by the authors of R.A. No. 6735 demonstrate the
legislative intent to use it as instrument to implement peoples initiative.
I regret to say that the foregoing justifications are wanting.
A thorough reading of R.A. No. 6735 leads to the conclusion that it covers only
initiatives on national and local legislation. Its references to initiatives on the
Constitution are few, isolated and misplaced. Unlike in the initiatives on national
and local legislation, where R.A. No. 6735 provides a detailed, logical, and
exhaustive enumeration on their implementation,31 however, as regards initiative
on the Constitution, the law merely:
_______________
31 See Sections 8-12 for national initiative and referendum, and sections 13-19 for
local initiative and referendum.
407
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006

407
(a) mentions the word Constitution in Section 2;32
(b) defines initiative on the Constitution and includes it in the enumeration of the
three systems of initiative in Section 3;33
(c) speaks of plebiscite as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on
the Constitution may be approved or rejected by the people;34
(d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who should
sign the petition;35 and
(e) provides the date for the effectivity of the approved proposition.36
In other words, R.A. No. 6735 does not specify the procedure how initiative on the
Constitution may be accomplished. This is not the enabling law contemplated by the
Constitution. As pointed out by oppositor-intervenor Alternative Law Groups Inc.,
since the promulgation of the Decision in Santiago, various bills have been
introduced in both Houses of Congress providing for a complete and adequate
process for peoples initiative, such as:
_______________
32 Section 2. Statement of Policy.The power of the people under a system of

initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in
part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative
body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed,
recognized and guaranteed.
33 Section 3. Definition of terms.
xxx
a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments
to the Constitution;
xxx
34 See Section 3(e).
35 Section 5 (b)A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at
least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as
signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three
per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may
be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution
and only once every five (5) years thereafter.
xxx
36 Section 9 (b)The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a
majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of
the plebiscite.
408
408
Names, signatures and addresses of petitioners who shall be registered voters;
A statement of the provision of the Constitution or any part thereof sought to be
amended and the proposed amendment;
The manner of initiationin a congressional district through a petition by any

individual, group, political party or coalition with members in the congressional
district;
The language used: the petition should be printed in English and translated in the
local language;
Signature stations to be provided for;
Provisions pertaining to the need and manner of posting, that is, after the
signatures shall have been verified by the Commission, the verified signatures shall
be posted for at least thirty days in the respective municipal and city halls where
the signatures were obtained;
Provisions pertaining to protests allowed any protest as to the authenticity of the
signatures to be filed with the COMELEC and decided within sixty (60) days from the
filing of said protest. None of the above necessary details is provided by R.A. No.
6735, thus, demonstrating its incompleteness and inadequacy.
V
Petitioners are not Proper Parties to File the Petition for Initiative
VI
The Petition for Initiative Filed with the COMELEC Does not Comply with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution and R.A. No. 6735
I shall discuss the above issues together since they are interrelated and
inseparable. The determination of whether petitioners are proper parties to file the
petition for initiative in behalf of the alleged 6.3 million voters will require an
examination of whether they have complied with the provisions of Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution.
409
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006

409
To reiterate, Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
(Italics supplied)
The mandate of the above constitutional provisions is definite and categorical. For a
peoples initiative to prosper, the following requisites must be present:
1. It is the people themselves who must directly propose amendments to the
Constitution;
2. The proposed amendments must be contained in a petition of at least twelve per
centum of the total number of registered voters; and
3. The required minimum of 12% of the total number of registered voters must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters of every
legislative district.
In this case, however, the above requisites are not present.
The petition for initiative was filed with the COMELEC by petitioners Lambino and
Aumentado, two registered voters. As shown in the Verification/Certification with
Affidavit of Non-Forum Shopping contained in their petition, they alleged under
oath that they have caused the preparation of the petition in their personal capacity
as registered voters and as representatives of the supposed 6.3 million registered
voters. This goes to show that the questioned petition was not initiated directly by
the 6.3 million people who allegedly comprised at least 12% of the total number of
registered voters, as required by Section 2. Moreover, nowhere in the petition itself
could be found the signatures of the 6.3 million registered voters. Only the
signatures of petitioners Lambino and Aumentado
410
410
were affixed therein as representatives of those 6.3 million people. Certainly, that
is not the petition for peoples initiative contemplated by the Constitution.
Petitioners Lambino and Aumentado have no authority whatsoever to file the
petition as representatives of the alleged 6.3 million registered voters. Such act of
representation is constitutionally proscribed. To repeat, Section 2 strictly requires
that amendments to the Constitution shall be directly proposed by the people
of registered voters. Obviously, the phrase directly proposed by the people
excludes any person acting as representative or agent of the 12% of the total
number of registered voters. The Constitution has bestowed upon the people the
right to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Such right cannot be
usurped by anyone under the guise of being the peoples representative. Simply
put, Section 2 does not recognize acts of representation. For it is only the people
(comprising the minimum of 12% of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters therein) who are the proper parties to initiate a petition proposing
amendments to the Constitution. Verily, the petition filed with the COMELEC by
herein petitioners Lambino and Aumentado is not a peoples initiative. Necessarily,
it must fail.
Corollarily, the plea that this Court should hear and heed the peoples voice is
baseless and misleading. There is no peoples voice to be heard and heeded as this
petition for initiative is not truly theirs, but only of petitioners Lambino and
Aumentado and their allies.
VII
The issues at bar are not political questions.
Lambino and Aumentado, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, vehemently argue that:
(1) [t]he validity of the exercise of the right of the sovereign people to amend the
Constitution and their will, as ex411
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006

411
pressed by the fact that over six million registered voters indicated their support of
the Petition for initiative is a purely political question; and (2) [t]he power to
propose amendments to the Constitution is a right explicitly bestowed upon the
sovereign people. Hence, the determination by the people to exercise their right to
propose amendments under the system of initiative is a sovereign act and falls
squarely within the ambit of a political question.
The political question doctrine was first enunciated by the US Supreme Court in
Luther v. Borden.37 Faced with the difficult question of whether the Supreme Court
was the appropriate institution to define the substantive content of republicanism,
the US Supreme Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Roger B. Taney, concluded that
the sovereignty in every State resides in the people, as to how and whether they
exercised it, was under the circumstances of the case, a political question to be
settled by the political power. In other words, the responsibility of settling certain
constitutional questions was left to the legislative and executive branches of the
government.
The Luther case arose from the so-called Dorr Rebellion in the State of Rhode
Island. Due to increased migration brought about by the Industrial Revolution, the
urban population of Rhode Island increased. However, under the 1663 Royal Charter
which served as the State Constitution, voting rights were largely limited to
residents of the rural districts. This severe mal-apportionment of suffrage rights led
to the Dorr Rebellion. Despairing of obtaining remedies for their
disenfranchisement from the state government, suffrage reformers invoked their
rights under the American Declaration of Independence to alter or abolish the
government and to institute a new one. The reformers proceeded to call for and
hold an extralegal constitutional convention, drafted a new State Constitution,
submitted the document for popular ratification, and held elections under it. The
State government, however, refused to cede power, leading to an anomalous
situation in that for a few months in 1842, there were two opposing
_______________
37 7 How (48 US) 1 (1849).

412
412
state governments contending for legitimacy and possession of state of offices.
The Rhode Island militia, under the authority of martial law, entered and searched
the house of Martin Luther, a Dorr supporter. He brought suit against Luther Borden,
a militiaman. Before the US Supreme Court, Luthers counsel argued that since the
States archaic Constitution prevented a fair and peaceful address of grievances
through democratic processes, the people of Rhode Island had instead chosen to
exercise their inherent right in popular sovereignty of replacing what they saw as an
oppressive government. The US Supreme Court deemed the controversy as nonjusticiable and inappropriate for judicial resolution.
In Colgrove v. Green,38 Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter, coined the phrase political
thicket to describe situations where Federal courts should not intervene in political
questions which they have neither the competence nor the commission to decide. In
Colgrove, the US Supreme Court, with a narrow 4-3 vote branded the apportionment
of legislative districts in Illinois as a political question and that the invalidation of
the districts might, in requiring statewide elections, create an evil greater than that
sought to be remedied.
While this Court has adopted the use of Frankfurters political thicket,
nonetheless, it has sought to come up with a definition of the term political
question. Thus, in Vera v. Avelino,39 this Court ruled that properly, political
questions are those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. In Taada and Macapagal v. Cuenco,40 the Court held that the term
political question connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance,

namely, a question of
_______________
38 328 US 549 (1946).

39 77 Phil. 192 (1946).
40 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).
413
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006

413
policy. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.
In Aquino v. Enrile,41 this Court adopted the following guidelines laid down in Baker
v. Carr42 in determining whether a question before it is political, rather than judicial
in nature, to wit:
1) there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or
2) there is a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it; or
3) there is the sheer impossibility of deciding the matter without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or
4) there is the sheer impossibility of the Courts undertaking an independent
resolution without expressing lack of respect due the coordinate branches of
government; or
5) there is an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or
6) there exists the potentiality of embarrassment arising from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.
None of the foregoing standards is present in the issues raised before this Court.
Accordingly, the issues are justiciable. What is at stake here is the legality and not
the wisdom of the act complained of.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the issues raised before this Court are
political in nature, it is not precluded from resolving them under its expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon it by Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, following

Daza v. Singson.43 As pointed out in Marcos v. Manglapus,44 the present
Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope
of judicial power which the Court, under previous charters, would have normally and
ordinarily left to the political departments to decide.
_______________
41 G.R. No. 35546, September 17, 1974, 50 SCRA 559.

42 369 US 186 (1962).
43 G.R. No. 85344, December 21, 1989, 180 SCRA 496.
44 G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989, 177 SCRA 668.
414
414
CONCLUSION
In fine, considering the political scenario in our country today, it is my view that the
so-called peoples initiative to amend our Constitution from bicameral-presidential
to unicameral-parliamentary is actually not an initiative of the people, but an
initiative of some of our politicians. It has not been shown by petitioners, during the
oral arguments in this case, that the 6.3 million registered voters who affixed their
signatures understood what they signed. In fact, petitioners admitted that the
Constitutional provisions sought to be amended and the proposed amendments
were not explained to all those registered voters. Indeed, there will be no means of
knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether they really understood what
petitioners and their group asked them to sign.
Let us not repeat the mistake committed by this Court in Javellana v. The Executive
Secretary.45 The Court then ruled that This being the vote of the majority, there is
no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and
effect, although it had notice that the Constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified by the people in accordance with
the 1935 Constitution. The Court concluded, among others, that the viva voce
voting in the Citizens Assemblies was and is null and void ab initio. That was
during martial law when perhaps majority of the justices were scared of the dictator.
Luckily at present, we are not under a martial law regime. There is, therefore, no
reason why this Court should allow itself to be used as a legitimizing authority by
the so-called peoples initiative for those who want to perpetuate themselves in
power.
At this point, I can say without fear that there is nothing wrong with our present
government structure. Consequently, we must not change it. America has a
presidential type of government. Yet, it thrives ideally and has become a super
power. It is then safe to conclude that what we should change are some of the
people running the government, NOT the SYSTEM.
_______________
45 Nos. L-36142, L-36164, L-36165, L-36236, and L-36283, March 31, 1973, 50
SCRA 30.
415
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415
According to petitioners, the proposed amendment would effect a more efficient,
more economical and more responsive government.
Is there hope that a new breed of politicians, more qualified and capable, may be
elected as members and leaders of the unicameralparliament? Or will the present
members of the Lower House continue to hold their respective positions with
limitless terms?
Will the new government be more responsive to the needs of the poor and the
marginalized? Will it be able to provide homes for the homeless, food for the
hungry, jobs for the jobless and protection for the weak?
This is a defining moment in our history. The issue posed before us is crucial with
transcendental significance. And history will judge us on how we resolve this issue
shall we allow the revision of our Constitution, of which we are duty bound to guard
and revere, on the basis of a doubtful peoples initiative?
Amending the Constitution involving a change of government system or structure is
a herculean task affecting the entire Filipino people and the future generations. Let
us, therefore, entrust this duty to more knowledgeable people elected as members
of a Constitutional Convention.
Yes, the voice of the people is the voice of God. But under the circumstances in this
case, the voice of God is not audible.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153 and to GRANT the
petition in G.R. No. 174299.
DISSENTING OPINION
CORONA, J.:
The life of the law is not logic but experience.1 Our collective experience as a nation
breathes life to our system of laws, especially to the Constitution. These cases
promise to significantly contribute to our collective experience as a nation. Fealty to
the primary constitutional principle that the Philippines is not merely a republican
State
_______________
1 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616.

416
416
but a democratic one as well behooves this Court to affirm the right of the people to
participate directly in the process of introducing changes to their fundamental law.
These petitions present such an opportunity. Thus, this is an opportune time for this
Court to uphold the sovereign rights of the people.
I agree with the opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato Puno who has sufficiently explained
the rationale for upholding the peoples initiative. However, I wish to share my own
thoughts on certain matters I deem material and significant.
Santiago Does Not Apply to This Case But Only to the 1997 Delfin Petition
The COMELEC denied the petition for initiative filed by petitioners purportedly on
the basis of this Courts ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC2 that: (1) RA 6753 was
inadequate to cover the system of initiative regarding amendments to the
Constitution and (2) the COMELEC was permanently enjoined from entertaining or
taking cognizance of any petition for initiative regarding amendments to the
Constitution until a sufficient law was validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the initiative provision.
However, Santiago should not apply to this case but only to the petition of Delfin in
1997. It would be unreasonable to make it apply to all petitions which were yet
unforeseen in 1997. The fact is that Santiago was focused on the Delfin petition
alone.
Those who oppose the exercise of the peoples right to initiate changes to the
Constitution via initiative claim that Santiago barred any and all future petitions for
initiative by virtue of the doctrines of stare decisis and res judicata. The argument is
flawed.
The ponencia of Mr. Justice Puno has amply discussed the arguments relating to
stare decisis. Hence, I will address the argument from the viewpoint of res judicata.
Res judicata is the rule that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of
_______________
2 336 Phil. 848; 270 SCRA 106 (1997).

417
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006

417
the parties and their privies and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a
subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of action.3 It has the
following requisites: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the
parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits and (4) there must be
identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action between the first and
second actions.4
There is no identity of parties in Santiago and the instant case. While the COMELEC
was also the respondent in Santiago, the petitioners in that case and those in this
case are different. More significantly, there is no identity of causes of action in the
two cases. Santiago involved amendments to Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section
4 of Article VII and Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution while the present
petition seeks to amend Sections 1 to 7 of Article VI and Sections 1 to 4 of the 1987
Constitution. Clearly, therefore, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
when it ruled that the present petition for initiative was barred by Santiago and, on
that ground, dismissed the petition.
The present petition and that in Santiago are materially different from each other.
They are not based on the same facts. There is thus no cogent reason to frustrate
and defeat the present direct action of the people to exercise their sovereignty by
proposing changes to their fundamental law.
Peoples Initiative Should Not Be Subjected to Conditions
Peoples initiative is an option reserved by the people for themselves exclusively.
Neither Congress nor the COMELEC has the power to curtail or defeat this exclusive
power of the people to change
_______________
3 Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134787, 15 November 2005, 475 SCRA 1.
4 Feria and Noche, CIVIL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED, vol. I, 2001 edition, p. 419.
418
418
the Constitution. Neither should the exercise of this power be made subject to any
conditions, as some would have us accept.
Oppositors to the peoples initiative point out that this Court ruled in Santiago that
RA 6735 was inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution and, thus, no law existed to enable the people to directly propose
changes to the Constitution. This reasoning is seriously objectionable.
The pronouncement on the insufficiency of RA 6735 was, to my mind, out of place. It
was unprecedented and dangerously transgressed the domain reserved to the
legislature.
While the legislature is authorized to establish procedures for determining the
validity and sufficiency of a petition to amend the constitution,5 that procedure
cannot unnecessarily restrict the initiative privilege.6 In the same vein, this Court
cannot unnecessarily and unreasonably restrain the peoples right to directly
propose changes to the Constitution by declaring a law inadequate simply for lack
of a sub-heading and other grammatical but insignificant omissions. Otherwise, the
constitutional intent to empower the people will be severely emasculated, if not
rendered illusory.
Peoples Right and Power to Propose Changes to the Constitution Directly Should not
be Unreasonably Curtailed
If Congress and a constitutional convention, both of which are mere representative
bodies, can propose changes to the Constitution, there is no reason why the
supreme body politic itselfthe peoplemay not do so directly.
Resort to initiative to amend the constitution or enact a statute is an exercise of
direct democracy as opposed to representative democracy. The system of
initiative allows citizens to directly propose
_______________
5 Sec. 30, Petitions and initiatives by the people, 16 Am Jur 2d 380, citing State ex
rel. Stenberg v. Beermann, 240 Neb. 754, 485 N.W. 2d 151 (1992).
6 Id., citing Coalition for Political Honesty v. State Board of Elections, 83 Ill. 2d 236,
47 Ill. Dec. 363, 415 N.E. 2d 368 (1980).
419
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006

419
constitutional amendments for the general electorate to adopt or reject at the polls,
particularly in a plebiscite. While representative government was envisioned to
refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a
chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their
country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to
temporary or partial considerations,7 the exercise of direct democracy through
initiative reserves direct lawmaking power to the people by providing them a
method to make new laws via the constitution, or alternatively by enacting
statutes.8 Efforts of the represented to control their representatives through
initiative have been described as curing the problems of democracy with more
democracy.9
The Constitution celebrates the sovereign right of the people and declares that
sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them.10 Unless the present petition is granted, this constitutional principle will be
nothing but empty rhetoric, devoid of substance for those whom it seeks to
empower.
The right of the people to pass legislation and to introduce changes to the
Constitution is a fundamental right and must be jealously guarded.11 The people
should be allowed to directly seek redress of the
_______________
7 Balitzer, Alfred, The Initiative and Referendum: A Study and Evaluation of Direct
Legislation, The California Roundtable 13 (1981). The American Founding Fathers
recognized that direct democracy posed a profound threat to individual rights and
liberty. The U.S. Constitution was designed to provide a system of government that
would prevent either a tyranny of the majority or a tyranny of the few. James
Madison warned against the power of a majority or a minority of the population
united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to
the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interest of the
community.
8 Gilbert Hahn & Steven C. Morton, Initiative and ReferendumDo They Encourage
or Impair Better State Government? 5 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 925, 927 (1977).
9 Florida Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations, Initiatives and

Referenda: Issues in Citizen Lawmaking (1986).
10 Sec. 1, Article II, Constitution.
11 In re Initiative Petition No. 362 State Question 669, 899 P.2d 1145 (Okla. 1995).
420
420
problems of society and representative democracy with the constitutional tools they
have reserved for their use alone.
Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 174513.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
I am convinced beyond cavil that the respondent Commission on Elections

(COMELEC) did not commit an abuse of its discretion in dismissing the amended
petition before it. The proposals of petitioners incorporated in said amended petition
are for the revision of the 1987 Constitution. Further, the amended petition before
the respondent COMELEC is insufficient in substance.
The Antecedents
On August 25, 2006, petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado filed with
the COMELEC a petition entitled IN THE MATTER OF PROPOSING AMENDMENTS TO
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION THROUGH A PEOPLES INITIATIVE: A SHIFT FROM A
BICAMERAL PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT BY
AMENDING ARTICLES VI AND VII; AND PROVIDING TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE
ORDERLY SHIFT FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL TO THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM. The
case was docketed as EM (LD)-06-01. On August 30, 2006, petitioners filed an
amended petition. For brevity, it is referred to as the petition for initiative.
Petitioners alleged therein, inter alia, that they filed their petition in their own behalf
and together with those who have affixed their signatures to the signature sheets
appended thereto who are Filipino citizens, residents and registered voters of the
Philippines, and they constitute at least twelve percent (12%) of all the registered
voters in the country, wherein each legislative district is represented by at least
three percent (3%) of all the registered voters therein.
Petitioners further alleged therein that the filing of the petition for initiative is based
on their constitutional right to propose amend-
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421
ments to the 1987 Constitution by way of peoples initiative, as recognized in
Section 2, Article XVII thereof, which provides:
According to petitioners, while the above provision states that (T)he Congress shall
provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right, the provisions of
Section 5(b) and (c), along with Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) 6735,1 are sufficient
enabling details for the peoples exercise of the power. The said sections of RA 6735
state:
Sec. 5. Requirements.(a) To exercise the power x x x
(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve
per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of
the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only
after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once
every five (5) years thereafter.
c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;
_______________
1 Entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and

Appropriating Funds Therefor.
422
422
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall
be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.
xxxx
Sec. 7. Verification of Signatures.The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures
on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters affidavits and voters identification
cards used in the immediately preceding election.
They also alleged that the COMELEC has the authority, mandate and obligation to
give due course to the petition for initiative, in compliance with the constitutional
directive for the COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.2
Petitioners incorporated in their petition for initiative the changes they proposed to
be incorporated in the 1987 Constitution and prayed that the COMELEC issue an
order:
1. Finding the Petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution;
2. Directing the publication of the Petition in Filipino and English at least twice in
after the Certification by this Honorable Commission of the sufficiency of this
Petition, to allow the Filipino people to express their sovereign will on the
proposition.
Petitioners pray for such other reliefs deemed just and equitable in the premises.
The Ruling of the respondent COMELEC
On August 31, 2006, the COMELEC promulgated the assailed Resolution denying
due course and dismissing the petition for initiative. The COMELEC ruled that:
_______________
2 Section 2(1), Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution.
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423
We agree with the petitioners that this Commission has the solemn Constitutional
duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of, as
in this case, initiative.
This mandate, however, should be read in relation to the other provisions of the
Constitution particularly on initiative.
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may, likewise, be directly proposed by the
people through initiative, upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x.
The aforequoted provision of the Constitution being a non-selfexecutory provision
needed an enabling law for its implementation. Thus, in order to breathe life into
the constitutional right of the people under a system of initiative to directly propose,
enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or
resolution, Congress enacted RA 6735.
However, the Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Santiago v. Commission on
Elections struck down the said law for being incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
Constitution is concerned.
The Supreme Court, likewise, declared that this Commission should be permanently
Thus, even if the signatures in the instant Petition appear to meet the required
minimum per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district is represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein, still the Petition cannot be given due course since the Supreme Court
categorically declared RA 6735 as inadequate to cover the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.
This Commission is not unmindful of the transcendental importance of the right of
the people under a system of initiative. However, neither can we turn a blind eye to
the pronouncement of the High Court that in the absence of a valid enabling law,
this right of the people remains nothing but an empty right, and that this
Commission is permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any

petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution. (Citations omitted.)
424
424
Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the case to this Court on a petition for certiorari and
mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The Petitioners Case
In support of their petition, petitioners alleged, inter alia, that:
I.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF, AND TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO
THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE, BECAUSE THE CITED SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH
1997 CANNOT BE CONSIDERED THE MAJORITY OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT EN
BANC, CONSIDERING THAT UPON ITS RECONSIDERATION AND FINAL VOTING ON 10
JUNE 1997, NO MAJORITY VOTE WAS SECURED TO DECLARE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735
AS INADEQUATE, INCOMPLETE AND INSUFFICIENT IN STANDARD.
II.
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 AND
EXISTING APPROPRIATION OF THE COMELEC PROVIDE FOR SUFFICIENT DETAILS AND
AUTHORITY FOR THE EXERCISE OF PEOPLES INITIATIVE, THUS, EXISTING LAWS
TAKEN TOGETHER ARE ADEQUATE AND COMPLETE.
III.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF, AND IN REFUSING TO GIVE
DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE, THEREBY VIOLATING AN EXPRESS
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE AND DISREGARDING AND CONTRAVENING THE WILL OF
THE PEOPLE.
A.
THE SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT

PETITION FOR INITIATIVE FILED BY THE PETITIONERS.
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VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006

425
1.
THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION INTENDED TO GIVE THE PEOPLE THE POWER
TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS AND THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES ARE NOW GIVING
VIBRANT LIFE TO THIS CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
2.
PRIOR TO THE QUESTIONED SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997, THE RIGHT OF

THE PEOPLE TO EXERCISE THE SOVEREIGN POWER OF INITIATIVE AND RECALL HAS
BEEN INVARIABLY UPHELD
3.
THE EXERCISE OF THE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS IS A POLITICAL

QUESTION WHICH SHALL BE DETERMINED SOLELY BY THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE.
4.
BY SIGNING THE SIGNATURE SHEETS ATTACHED TO THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE

DULY VERIFIED BY THE ELECTION OFFICERS, THE PEOPLE HAVE CHOSEN TO
PERFORM THIS SACRED EXERCISE OF THEIR SOVEREIGN POWER.
B.
THE SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT

PETITION FOR INITIATIVE FILED BY THE PETITIONERS
C.
THE PERMANENT INJUNCTION ISSUED IN SANTIAGO V. COMELEC ONLY APPLIES TO

THE DELFIN PETITION.
1.
IT IS THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE DECISION AND NOT OTHER STATEMENTS IN

THE BODY OF THE DECISION THAT GOVERNS THE RIGHTS IN CONTROVERSY.
IV.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT FAILED OR NEGLECTED TO ACT OR

PERFORM A DUTY MANDATED BY LAW.
426
426
A.
THE MINISTERIAL DUTY OF THE COMELEC IS TO SET THE INITIATIVE FOR

PLEBISCITE.3
Petitioners Failed to Allege and Demonstrate All the Essential Facts To Establish the
Right to a Writ of Certiorari
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 1. Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there
is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in
the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
A writ for certiorari may issue only when the following requirements are set out in
the petition and established:
(1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions;
(2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. x x x4
_______________
3 Petition, pp. 12-14.

4 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129368, August 25,
2003, 409 SCRA 455, 480.
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427
The Court has invariably defined grave abuse of discretion, thus:
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it must be shown that the
discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. For certiorari to lie, there must
be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the
judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law and common law
traditions.5
There is thus grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it acts in a
capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.6 The only
question involved is jurisdiction, either the lack or excess thereof, and abuse of
discretion warrants the issuance of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari only when
the same is grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility. A writ of certiorari is a
remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgment.7 An error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction, which error is reversible only by an appeal.8
In the present case, it appears from the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC that it
denied the petition for initiative solely in obedience to the mandate of this Court in
Santiago v. Commission on Elections.9 In said case, the Court En Banc permanently
enjoined the COMELEC from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for
initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been
validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system. When the
COMELEC denied the petition for initiative,
_______________
5 Rodson Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141857, June 9, 2004, 431
SCRA 469, 480.
6 People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144332, June 10, 2004, 431 SCRA 610.
7 Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Galauran & Pilares Construction Co., G.R. No. L35630, November 25, 1982, 118 SCRA 664.
8 People v. Court of Appeals, supra.
9 G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.
428 [Lambino vs. Commission on Elections, 505 SCRA 160(2006)]
428
there was as yet no valid law enacted by Congress to provide for the
implementation of the system.
It is a travesty for the Court to declare the act of the COMELEC in denying due
course to the petition for initiative as capricious, despotic, oppressive or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. In fact, in so doing, the
COMELEC merely followed or applied, as it ought to do, the Courts ruling in
Santiago to the effect that Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the system
of initiative is a non self-executory provision and requires an enabling law for its
implementation. In relation thereto, RA 6735 was found by the Court to be
incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions to
implement the constitutional provision on initiative. Consequently, the COMELEC
was permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition
for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have
been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system. The decision
of the Court En Banc interpreting RA 6735 forms part of the legal system of the
Philippines.10 And no doctrine or principle laid down by the Court En Banc may be
modified or reversed except by the Court En Banc,11 certainly not by the COMELEC.
Until the Court En Banc modifies or reverses its decision, the COMELEC is bound to
follow the same.12 As succinctly held in Fulkerson v. Thompson:13
Whatever was before the Court, and is disposed of, is considered as finally settled.
The inferior court is bound by the judgment or decree as the law of the case, and
must carry it into execution according to the mandate. The inferior court cannot
vary it, or judicially examine it for any other purpose than execution. It can give no
other or further relief as to any matter decided by the Supreme Court even where
there is error apparent; or in any manner
_______________
10 Article 8, New Civil Code provides that [j]udicial decisions applying or

interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines.
11 Suson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126749, August 27, 1997, 278 SCRA 284.
12 Calderon v. Carale, G.R. No. 91636, April 23, 1992, 208 SCRA 254.
13 974 S.W.2d 451 (1998).
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429
intermeddle with it further than to execute the mandate and settle such matters as
have been remanded, not adjudicated by the Supreme Court.
The principles above stated are, we think, conclusively established by the authority
of adjudged cases. And any further departure from them would inevitably mar the
harmony of the whole judiciary system, bring its parts into conflict, and produce
therein disorganization, disorder, and incalculable mischief and confusion. Besides,
any rule allowing the inferior courts to disregard the adjudications of the Supreme
Court, or to refuse or omit to carry them into execution would be repugnant to the
principles established by the constitution, and therefore void.14
At this point, it is well to recall the factual context of Santiago as well as the
pronouncement made by the Court therein. Like petitioners in the instant case, in
Santiago, Atty. Jesus Delfin, the Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and
Action (PIRMA), et al., invoked Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution as they filed
with the COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of
Elective Officials, By Peoples Initiative (the Delfin petition). They asked the
COMELEC to issue an order fixing the time and date for signature gathering all over
the country; causing the necessary publications of said order and their petition in
newspapers of general and local circulation and instructing municipal election
registrars in all regions all over the country and to assist petitioners in establishing
signing stations. Acting thereon, the COMELEC issued the order prayed for.
Senator Miriam Santiago, et al. forthwith filed with this Court a petition for
prohibition to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing its order. The Court, speaking
through Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (later Chief Justice), granted the petition as it
declared:
1. RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions
insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned;
_______________
14 Id., at p. 453.
430
430
2. COMELEC Resolution No. 230015 invalid insofar as it prescribed rules and
regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution because
the COMELEC is without authority to promulgate the rules and regulations to
implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments
to the Constitution through the system of initiative; and
3. The Delfin petition insufficient as it did not contain the required number of
signatures of registered voters.
The Court concluded in Santiago that the COMELEC should be permanently
enacted to provide for the implementation of the system. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
b) DECLARING RA 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments
to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate
legislation;
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the Delfin petition
(UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on December 18, 1996 is made permanent
as against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private
respondents.16
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santiago in another petition which was filed with
the Court by PIRMA and the spouses Alberto
_______________
15 Entitled In Re: Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative in the
Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws.
16 Supra note 10, p. 157.
431
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431
and Carmen Pedrosa (who were parties in Santiago) docketed as PIRMA v.
Commission on Elections.17 The said petitioners, undaunted by Santiago and
claiming to have gathered 5,793,213 signatures, filed a petition with the COMELEC
praying, inter alia, that COMELEC officers be ordered to verify all the signatures
collected in behalf of the petition and, after due hearing, that it (COMELEC) declare
the petition sufficient for the purpose of scheduling a plebiscite to amend the
Constitution. Like the Delfin petition in Santiago, the PIRMA petition proposed to
submit to the people in a plebiscite the amendment to the Constitution on the lifting
of the term limits of elected officials.
The opinion of the minority that there was no doctrine enunciated by the Court in
PIRMA has no basis. The COMELEC, in its Resolution dated July 8, 1997, dismissed
the PIRMA petition citing the permanent restraining order issued against it by the
Court in Santiago. PIRMA and the spouses Pedrosa forthwith elevated the matter to
the Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in refusing
to exercise jurisdiction over, and thereby dismissing, their petition for initiative to
amend the Constitution.
The Court dismissed outright, by a unanimous vote, the petition filed by PIRMA and
the spouses Albert Pedrosa. The Court declared that the COMELEC merely complied
with the dispositions in the decision of the Court in Santiago and, hence, cannot be
held to have committed a grave abuse of its discretion in dismissing the petition
before it:
Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its
The Court next considered the question of whether there was need to resolve the
second issue posed by the petitioners, namely, that the Court reexamine its ruling
as regards R.A. 6735. On this issue, the Chief Justice and six (6) other members of
the Court, namely, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bel-
_______________
17 G.R. No. 129754.

432
432
losillo, Kapunan and Torres, JJ., voted that there was no need to take it up. Vitug, J.,
agreed that there was no need for re-examination of said second issue since the
case a bar is not the proper vehicle for that purpose. Five (5) other members of the
Court, namely, Melo, Puno, Francisco, Hermosisima and Panganiban, JJ., opined that
there was need for such a re-examination. x x x
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.18 (Italics supplied.)
In the present case, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) takes the side of
petitioners and argues that the COMELEC should not have applied the ruling in
Santiago to the petition for initiative because the permanent injunction therein
referred only to the Delfin petition. The OSG buttresses this argument by pointing
out that the Temporary Restraining Order dated December 18, 1996 that was made
permanent in the dispositive portion referred only to the Delfin petition.
The OSGs attempt to isolate the dispositive portion from the body of the Courts
decision in Santiago is futile. It bears stressing that the dispositive portion must not
be read separately but in connection with the other portions of the decision of which
it forms a part. To get to the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific
portion thereof should be resorted to but the same must be considered in its
entirety. Hence, a resolution or ruling may and does appear in other parts of the
decision and not merely in the fallo thereof.19
The pronouncement in the body of the decision in Santiago permanently enjoining
the COMELEC from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative
on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly
enacted to provide for the implementation of the system is thus as much a part of
the Courts decision as its dispositive portion. The ruling of this Court is of the
nature of an in rem judgment barring any and all Filipinos from filing a petition for
initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been
val_______________
18 Minute Resolution, September 23, 1997, pp. 1-2.
19 Republic v. De los Angeles, No. L-26112, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 422.

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433
idly enacted. Clearly, the COMELEC, in denying due course to the present petition
for initiative on amendments to the Constitution conformably with the Courts ruling
in Santiago did not commit grave abuse of discretion. On the contrary, its actuation
is in keeping with the salutary principle of hierarchy of courts. For the Court to find
the COMELEC to have abused its discretion when it dismissed the amended petition
based on the ruling of this Court in Santiago would be sheer judicial apostasy.
As eloquently put by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, there is only one Supreme Court from
whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings.20 This truism applies
with equal force to the COMELEC as a quasi-judicial body for, after all, judicial
decisions applying or interpreting laws or the Constitution assume the same
authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily
become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the
actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but also of those duty
bound to enforce obedience thereto.21
Petitioners Cannot Ascribe Grave Abuse of Discretion on the COMELEC Based on the
Minority Opinion in Santiago
It is elementary that the opinion of the majority of the members of the Court, not
the opinion of the minority, prevails. As a corollary, the decision of the majority
cannot be modified or reversed by the minority of the members of the Court.
However, to eschew the binding effect of Santiago, petitioners argue, albeit
unconvincingly, that the Courts declaration therein on the inadequacy,
incompleteness and insufficiency of RA 6735 to implement the system of initiative
to propose constitutional amendments
_______________
20 Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila, No. L-26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA
948.
21 Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19,
1994, 235 SCRA 506.
434
434
did not constitute the majority opinion. This contention is utterly baseless.
Santiago was concurred in, without any reservation, by eight Justices,22 or the
majority of the members of the Court, who actually took part in the deliberations
thereon. On the other hand, five Justices,23 while voting for the dismissal of the
Delfin petition on the ground of insufficiency, dissented from the majority opinion as
they maintained the view that RA 6735 was sufficient to implement the system of
initiative.
Given that a clear majority of the members of the Court, eight Justices, concurred in
the decision in Santiago, the pronouncement therein that RA 6735 is incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned constitutes a definitive ruling on the
matter.
In the Resolution dated June 10, 1997, the motions for reconsideration of the
Santiago decision were denied with finality as only six Justices, or less than the
majority, voted to grant the same. The Resolution expressly stated that the motion
for reconsideration failed to persuade the requisite majority of the Court to modify
or reverse the Decision of 19 March 1977.24 In fine, the pronouncement in
Santiago as embodied in the Decision of March 19, 1997 remains the definitive
ruling on the matter.
_______________
22 Then Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, Justices Florenz D. Regalado, Flerida Ruth
P. Romero, Josue N. Bellosillo, Santiago M. Kapunan and Justo P. Torres, Jr. fully
concurred in the ponencia of Justice Davide.
23 Justices Jose A.R. Melo, Vicente V. Mendoza, Reynato S. Puno, Ricardo J.
Francisco, Jr. and Artemio V. Panganiban (now Chief Justice).
24 The voting on the motion for reconsideration was as follows: Six Justices, namely,
Chief Justice Narvasa, and Justices Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo and
Kapunan, voted to deny the motions for lack of merit; and six Justices, namely,
Justices Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Francisco, Jr., Regino C. Hermosisima and Panganiban
voted to grant the same. Justice Vitug maintained his opinion that the matter was
not ripe for judicial adjudication. Justices Teodoro R. Padilla and Torres inhibited from
participation in the deliberations.
435
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006
435
It bears stressing that in PIRMA, petitioners prayed for the Court to resolve the issue
posed by them and to re-examine its ruling as regards RA 6735. By a vote of seven
members of the Court, including Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Justice Jose C. Vitug,
the Court voted that there was no need to resolve the issue. Five members of the
Court opined that there was a need for the re-examination of said ruling. Thus, the
pronouncement of the Court in Santiago remains the law of the case and binding on
petitioners.
If, as now claimed by the minorty, there was no doctrine enunciated by the Court in
Santiago, the Court should have resolved to set aside its original resolution
dismissing the petition and to grant the motion for reconsideration and the petition.
But the Court did not. The Court positively and unequivocally declared that the
COMELEC merely followed the ruling of the Court in Santiago in dismissing the
petition before it. No less than Senior Justice Reynato S. Puno concurred with the
resolution of the Court. It behooved Justice Puno to dissent from the ruling of the
Court on the motion for reconsideration of petitioners precisely on the ground that
there was no doctrine enunciated by the Court in Santiago. He did not. Neither did
Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, who was a member of the Court.
That RA 6735 has failed to validly implement the peoples right to directly propose
constitutional amendments through the system of initiative had already been
conclusively settled in Santiago as well as in PIRMA. Heeding these decisions,
several lawmakers, including no less than Solicitor General Antonio Eduardo
Nachura when he was then a member of the House of Representatives,25 have filed
separate bills to implement the system of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution.
In the present Thirteenth (13th) Congress, at least seven (7) bills are pending. In the
Senate, the three (3) pending bills are: Senate Bill No. 119 entitled An Act Providing
for Peoples Initiative to Amend the Constitution introduced by Senator Luisa Loi P.
Ejercito Estrada; Senate Bill No. 2189 entitled An Act Providing for Peoples Initiative
_______________
25 House Bill No. 457 filed by then Rep. Nachura during the Twelfth Congress.
436
436
to Amend the Constitution introduced by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago; and

Senate Bill No. 2247 entitled An Act Providing for a System of Peoples Initiative to
Propose Amendments to the Constitution introduced by Senator Richard Gordon.
In the House of Representatives, there are at least four (4) pending bills: House Bill
No. 05281 filed by Representative Carmen Cari, House Bill No. 05017 filed by
Representative Imee Marcos, House Bill No. 05025 filed by Representative Roberto
Cajes, and House Bill No. 05026 filed by Representative Edgardo Chatto. These
House bills are similarly entitled An Act Providing for Peoples Initiative to Amend
the Constitution.
The respective explanatory notes of the said Senate and House bills uniformly
recognize that there is, to date, no law to govern the process by which
constitutional amendments are introduced by the people directly through the
system of initiative. Ten (10) years after Santiago and absent the occurrence of any
compelling supervening event, i.e., passage of a law to implement the system of
initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, that would warrant the
reexamination of the ruling therein, it behooves the Court to apply to the present
case the salutary and well-recognized doctrine of stare decisis. As earlier shown,
Congress and other government agencies have, in fact, abided by Santiago. The
Court can do no less with respect to its own ruling.
Contrary to the stance taken by petitioners, the validity or constitutionality of a law
cannot be made to depend on the individual opinions of the members who compose
itthe Supreme Court, as an institution, has already determined RA 6735 to be
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned and therefore the same
remains to be so regardless of any change in the Courts composition.26 Indeed, it
is vital that there be stability in the courts in adhering to decisions deliberately
made after ample consideration. Parties should not be encouraged to seek reexamination of determined
_______________
26 See Pagdayawon v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 154569, September 23, 2002,
389 SCRA 480.
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437
principles and speculate on fluctuation of the law with every change in the
expounders of it.27
Proposals to Revise the Constitution, As in the Case of the Petitioners Proposal to

Change the Form of Government, Cannot be Effected Through the System of
Initiative, Which by Express Provision of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, is
Limited to Amendments
Even granting arguendo the Court, in the present case, abandons its
pronouncement in Santiago and declares RA 6735, taken together with other extant
laws, sufficient to implement the system of initiative, still, the amended petition for
initiative cannot prosper. Despite the denomination of their petition, the proposals
of petitioners to change the form of government from the present
bicameralpresidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system of government are
actually for the revision of the Constitution.
Petitioners propose to amend Articles VI and VII of the Constitution in this manner:
_______________
27 London Street Tramways Co., Ltd. v. London County Council, [1898] A.C. 375,
cited in COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 117-118.
438
438
of government.
XVIII, entitled Transitory Provisions, which shall read as follows:
Representatives and
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439
House of Congress, Senator[s] or Member[s] of the House of Representatives
and House of Congress shall be changed to read Parliament; that any and all
references therein to Member[s] of the House of Representatives shall be changed
to read as Member[s] of Parliament and any and all references to the President
and or Acting President shall be changed to read Prime Minister.
however, that any and all references therein to Congress, Senate, House of
that any and all references therein to Member[s] of Congress, Senator[s] or
Member[s] of the House of Parliament and any and all references to the
President and of Acting President shall be changed to read Prime Minister.
and shall preside over its session for the election of the interim Prime Minister and
strong bureaucracy.
from among the members of the interim Parliament, an
440
440
interim Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of the members
thereof. The interim Prime Minister shall oversee the various ministries and shall
perform such powers and responsibilities as may be delegated to him by the
incumbent President.
of all local government officials. [Thereafter, the VicePresident, as Member of
Parliament, shall immediately convene the Parliament and shall initially preside over
its session for the purpose of electing the Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a
majority vote of all its members, from among themselves.] The duly-elected Prime
Minister shall continue to exercise and perform the powers, duties and
responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until the expiration of the term of the
incumbent President and Vice President.28
Petitioners claim that the required number of signatures of registered voters have
been complied with, i.e., the signatories to the petition constitute twelve percent
(12%) of all the registered voters in the country, wherein each legislative district is
represented by at least three percent (3%) of all the registered voters therein.
Certifications allegedly executed by the respective COMELEC Election Registrars of
each municipality and city verifying these signatures were attached to the petition
for initiative. The verification was allegedly done on the basis of the list of registered
voters contained in the official COMELEC list used in the immediately preceding
election.
The proposition, as formulated by petitioners, to be submitted to the Filipino people
in a plebiscite to be called for the said purpose reads:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT
BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND
PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT
FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?29
_______________
28 Amended Petition for Initiative, pp. 4-7.

29 Id., at p. 7.
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441
According to petitioners, the proposed amendment of Articles VI and VII would effect
a more efficient, more economical and more responsive government. The
parliamentary system would allegedly ensure harmony between the legislative and
executive branches of government, promote greater consensus, and provide faster
and more decisive governmental action.
Sections 1 and 2 of Article XVII pertinently read:
Article XVII
SECTION 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by
It can be readily gleaned that the above provisions set forth different modes and
procedures for proposals for the amendment and revision of the Constitution:
1. Under Section 1, Article XVII, any amendment to, or revision of, the Constitution
may be proposed by
a. Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
b. A constitutional convention.
2. Under Section 2, Article XVII, amendments to the Constitution may be likewise
directly proposed by the people through initiative.
The framers of the Constitution deliberately adopted the terms amendment and
revision and provided for their respective modes
442
442
and procedures for effecting changes of the Constitution fully cognizant of the
distinction between the two concepts. Commissioner Jose E. Suarez, the Chairman
of the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions, explained:
MR. SUAREZ. One more point, and we will be through.
We mentioned the possible use of only one term and that is, amendment.
However, the Committee finally agreed to use the termsamendment or
revision when our attention was called by the honorable Vice-President to the
substantial difference in the connotation and significance between the said terms.
As a result of our research, we came up with the observations made in the famous
or notoriousJavellana doctrine, particularly the decision rendered by Honorable
Justice Makasiar, wherein he made the following distinction between amendment
and revision of an existing Constitution: Revision may involve a rewriting of the

whole Constitution. On the other hand, the act of amending a constitution envisages
a change of specific provisions only. The intention of an act to amend is not the
change of the entire Constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts or the
addition of provisions deemed essential as a consequence of new conditions or the
elimination of parts already considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of the
times.
The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935 Constitution. It is a
completely new fundamental Charter embodying new political, social and economic
concepts.
So, the Committee finally came up with the proposal that these two terms should be
employed in the formulation of the Article governing amendments or revisions to
the new Constitution.30
Further, the framers of the Constitution deliberately omitted the term revision in
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution because it was their intention to reserve
the power to propose a revision of the Constitution to Congress or the constitutional
convention. Stated in another manner, it was their manifest intent that revision
thereof shall not be undertaken through the system of initiative. Instead, the
revision of the Constitution shall be done either by Congress or by a constitutional
convention.
_______________
30 I RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 373.

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It is significant to note that, originally, the provision on the system of initiative was
included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or Revision proposed by the
Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions. The original draft provided:
SEC. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article __
Section __ of the Constitution.31
However, after deliberations and interpellations, the members of the Commission

agreed to remove the provision on the system of initiative from Section 1 and,
instead, put it under a separate provision, Section 2. It was explained that the
removal of the provision on initiative from the other traditional modes of changing
the Constitution was precisely to limit the former (system of initiative) to
amendments to the Constitution. It was emphasized that the system of initiative
should not extend to revision.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that
pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a
complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision
governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete
committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:
propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten
percent of the registered voters.
proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came
from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution
_______________
31 Id., at p. 371.
444
444
as embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative
should be limited to amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to the
revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1
of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x32
The intention to exclude revision of the Constitution as a mode that may be
undertaken through the system of initiative was reiterated and made clear by
Commissioner Suarez in response to a suggestion of Commissioner Felicitas Aquino:
MR. SUAREZ. Section 2 must be interpreted together with the provisions of Section
4, except that in Section 4, as it is presently drafted, there is no take-off date for the
60-day and 90-day periods.
MS. AQUINO. Yes. In other words, Section 2 is another alternative mode of proposing
amendments to the Constitution which would further require the process of
submitting it in a plebiscite, in which case it is not selfexecuting.
MR. SUAREZ. No, not unless we settle and determine the take-off period.
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of
initiative as a separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be
amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another
subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section
as if it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this
sense conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the
whereas, the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned by the Committee.33
_______________
32 Id., at p. 386.
33 Id., at p. 392.
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Then Commissioner Hilario P. Davide, Jr. (later Chief Justice) also made the
clarification with respect to the observation of Commissioner Regalado Maambong:
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davides proposed amendment
on line 1 refers to amendments. Does it not cover the word revision as defined
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because amendments and revision should be
amendments not revision.34
After several amendments, the Commission voted in favor of the following wording
of Section 2:
AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY
THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT
OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE
REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE
AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
Sections 1 and 2, Article XVII as eventually worded read:
Article XVII
people through initiative, upon a petition of at least twelve
_______________
34 Id., at pp. 402-403.

446
446
per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years
following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.
The final text of Article XVII on Amendments or Revisions clearly makes a
substantial differentiation not only between the two terms but also between two
procedures and their respective fields of application. Ineluctably, the system of

initiative under Section 2, Article XVII as a mode of effecting changes in the
Constitution is strictly limited to amendmentsnot to a revisionthereof.
As opined earlier, the framers of the Constitution, in providing for amendment and
revision as different modes of changing the fundamental law, were cognizant of
the distinction between the two terms. They particularly relied on the distinction
made by Justice Felix Antonio in his concurring opinion in Javellana v. Executive
Secretary,35 the controversial decision which gave imprimatur to the 1973
Constitution of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, as follows:
There is clearly a distinction between revision and amendment of an existing
constitution. Revision may involve a rewriting of the whole constitution. The act of
amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only specific
provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not the change of the entire
constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts of the existing constitution
of the addition of provisions deemed essential as a consequence of new conditions
or the elimination of parts already considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs
of the times. The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935
Constitution. It is a completely new fundamental charter embodying new political,
social and economic concepts.36
Other elucidation on the distinction between amendment and revision is
enlightening. For example, Dean Vicente G. Sinco, an
_______________
35 No. L-36142, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30.

36 Id., at p. 367.
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447
eminent authority on political law, distinguished the two terms in this manner:
provisions. But whatever results the revisions may produce, the factor that
one.
intention rather is to improve the specific parts of the existing constitution or to add
to it provisions deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress
portions of it that seemed obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect.37
In the United States, the Supreme Court of Georgia in Wheeler v. Board of
Trustees38 had the occasion to make the distinction between the two terms with
respect to Ga.L. 1945, an instrument which amended the 1877 Constitution of
Georgia. It explained the term amendment:
Amendment of a statute implies its survival and not destruction. It repeals or
changes some provision, or adds something thereto. A law is amended when it is in
whole or in part permitted to remain, and something is added to or taken from it, or
it is in some way changed or altered to make it more complete or perfect, or to fit it
the better to accomplish the object or purpose for which it was made, or some other
object or purpose.39
On the other hand, the term revision was explained by the said US appellate
court:
_______________
37 SINCO, PHILIPPINEPOLITICAL LAW 43-44.

38 37 S.E.2d 322 (1946).
39 Id., at p. 330.
448
448
x x x When a house is completely demolished and another is erected on the same
location, do you have a changed, repaired and altered house, or do you have a new
house? Some of the materials contained in the old house may be used again, some
of the rooms may be constructed the same, but this does not alter the fact that you
have altogether another or a new house. We conclude that the instrument as
contained in Ga.L. 1945, pp. 8 to 89, inclusive, is not an amendment to the
constitution of 1877; but on the contrary it is a completely revised or new
constitution.40
Fairly recently, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ, a member of the Constitutional Commission,
expounded on the distinction between the two terms thus:
dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplate
a re-examination of the entire documentor of provisions of the document (which
have overall implications for the entire document or for the fundamental
philosophical underpinnings of the document)to determine how and to what
extent it should be altered. Thus, for instance, a switch from the presidential system
to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of its overall impact on the
entire constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a
unicameral system because of its effect on other important provisions of the
Constitution.
It is thus clear that what distinguishes revision from amendment is not the quantum
of change in the document. Rather, it is the fundamental qualitative alteration that
effects revision. Hence, I must reject the puerile argument that the use of the plural
form of amendments means that a revision can be achieved by the introduction of
a multiplicity of amendments!41
Given that revision necessarily entails a more complex, substantial and far-reaching
effects on the Constitution, the framers thereof wisely withheld the said mode from
the system of initiative. It should be recalled that it took the framers of the present
Constitution four
_______________
40 Id.
41 Sounding Board, Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 3, 2006.
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months from June 2, 1986 until October 15, 1986 to come up with the draft
Constitution which, as described by the venerable Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma, the
President of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, gradually and painstakingly
took shape through the crucible of sustained sometimes passionate and often
exhilarating debates that intersected all dimensions of the national life.42
Evidently, the framers of the Constitution believed that a revision thereof should, in
like manner, be a product of the same extensive and intensive study and debates.
Consequently, while providing for a system of initiative where the people would
directly propose amendments to the Constitution, they entrusted the formidable
task of its revision to a deliberative body, the Congress or Constituent Assembly.
The Constitution is the fundamental law of the state, containing the principles upon
which the government is founded, and regulating the division of sovereign powers,
directing to what persons each of those powers is to be confided and the manner in
which it is to be exercised.43 The Philippines has followed the American
constitutional legal system in the sense that the term constitution is given a more
restricted meaning, i.e., as a written organic instrument, under which governmental
powers are both conferred and circumscribed.44
The Constitution received its force from the express will of the people. An
overwhelming 16,622,111, out of 21,785,216 votes cast during the plebiscite, or
76.30% ratified the present Constitution on February 2, 1987.45 In expressing that
will, the Filipino people have incorporated therein the method and manner by which
the same can be amended and revised, and when the electorate have incorporated
into the fundamental law the particular manner in which the same may be altered
or changed, then any course which
_______________
42 Introduction to the Journal of the Constitutional Commission.

43 BLACK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1-2, citing 1 BOUV. INST. 9.
44 SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1.
45 Proclamation No. 58, 83 O.G. No. 23, pp. 2703-2704, June 8, 1987.
450
450
disregards that express will is a direct violation of the fundamental law.46
Further, these provisions having been incorporated in the Constitution, where the
validity of a constitutional amendment or revision depends upon whether such
provisions have been complied with, such question presents for consideration and
determination a judicial question, and the courts are the only tribunals vested with
power under the Constitution to determine such question.47
Earlier, it was mentioned that Article XVII, by the use of the terms amendment
and revision, clearly makes a differentiation not only between the two terms but
also between two procedures and their respective fields of application. On this
point, the case of McFadden v. Jordan48 is instructive. In that case, a purported
initiative amendment (referred to as the proposed measure) to the State
Constitution of California, then being proposed to be submitted to the electors for
ratification, was sought to be enjoined. The proposed measure, denominated as
California Bill of Rights, comprised a single new article with some 208 subsections
which would repeal or substantially alter at least 15 of the 25 articles of the
California State Constitution and add at least four new topics. Among the likely
effects of the proposed measure were to curtail legislative and judicial functions,
legalize gaming, completely revise the taxation system and reduce the powers of
cities, counties and courts. The proposed measure also included diverse matters as
ministers, mines, civic centers, liquor control and naturopaths.
The Supreme Court of California enjoined the submission of the proposed measure
to the electors for ratification because it was not an amendment but a revision
which could only be proposed by a convention. It held that from an examination of
the proposed measure itself, considered in relation to the terms of the California
State Constitution, it was clear that the proposed initiative enactment amounted
substantially to an attempted revision, rather than
_______________
46 See McBee v. Brady, 15 Idaho 761, 100 P. 97 (1909).

47 Id.
48 196 P.2d 787 (1948).
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451
amendment, thereof; and that inasmuch as the California State Constitution
specifies (Article XVIII 2 thereof) that it may be revised by means of constitutional
convention but does not provide for revision by initiative measure, the submission
of the proposed measure to the electorate for ratification must be enjoined.
As piercingly enunciated by the California State Supreme Court in McFadden, the
differentiation required (between amendment and revision) is not merely between
two words; more accurately it is between two procedures and between their
respective fields of application. Each procedure, if we follow elementary principles
of statutory construction, must be understood to have a substantial field of
application, not to be a mere alternative procedure in the same field. Each of the
two words, then, must be understood to denote, respectively, not only a procedure
but also a field of application appropriate to its procedure.49
Provisions regulating the time and mode of effecting organic changes are in the
nature of safety-valvesthey must not be so adjusted as to discharge their peculiar
function with too great facility, lest they become the ordinary escape-pipes of party
passion; nor, on the other hand, must they discharge it with such difficulty that the
force needed to induce action is sufficient also to explode the machine. Hence, the
problem of the Constitution maker is, in this particular, one of the most difficult in
our whole system, to reconcile the requisites for progress with the requisites for
safety.50
Like in McFadden, the present petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is, despite its denomination, one for its revision. It purports to seek the
amendment only of Articles VI and VII of the Constitution as well as to provide
transitory provisions. However, as will be shown shortly, the amendment of these
two provisions will necessarily affect other numerous provisions of the Constitution
particularly those pertaining to the specific powers of Congress and the President.
These powers would have to be transferred to the Parliament and the Prime Minister
and/or President, as the
_______________
49 Id., at p. 798.
50 Ellingham v. Dye, 99 N.E. 1 (1912).
452
452
case may be. More than one hundred (100) sections will be affected or altered
thereby:
1. Section 19 of Article III (Bill of Rights) on the power of Congress to impose the
death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes;
2. Section 2 of Article V (Suffrage) on the power of Congress to provide for securing
the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting;
3. All 32 Sections of Article VI on the Legislative Department;
4. All 23 Sections of Article VII on the Executive Department;
5. The following Sections of Article VIII (Judicial Department):
Section 2 on power of Congress to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction

of various courts;
Section 7 on the power of Congress to prescribe the qualifications of judges of
lower courts;
Section 8 on the composition of Judicial Bar Council (JBC) which includes
representatives of Congress as ex officio members and on the power of the
President to appoint the regular members of the JBC;
Section 9 on the power of the President to appoint the members of the Supreme
Court and judges of lower courts;
Section 16 on duty of Supreme Court to make annual report to the President and
Congress.
6. The following Sections of Article IX (Constitutional Commissions);
(B) Section 3 on duty of Civil Service Commission to make annual report to the
President and Congress;
(B) Section 5 on power of Congress to provide by law for the standardization of
compensation of government officials;
(B) Section 8 which provides in part that no public officer shall accept, without
the consent of Congress, any present, emolument, etc. x x x
(C) Section 1 on the power of the President to appoint the Chairman and
Commissioners of the Commission on Elections with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments;
(C) Section 2 (7) on the power of the COMELEC to recommend to Congress
measures to minimize election spending x x x;
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453
(C) Section 2 (8) on the duty of the COMELEC to recommend to the President the
removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other
disciplinary action x x x;
(C) Section 2 (9) on the duty of the COMELEC to submit to the President and
Congress a report on the conduct of election, plebiscite, etc.;
(C) Section 5 on the power of the President, with the favorable recommendation of
the COMELEC, to grant pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for
violation of election laws, rules and regulations;
(C) Section 7 which recognizes as valid votes cast in favor of organization

registered under party-list system;
(C) Section 8 on political parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list
system;
(D) Section 1 (2) on the power of the President to appoint the Chairman and
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) with the consent of the
Commission of Appointments;
Section 4 on duty of the COA to make annual report to the President and
Congress.
7. The following Sections of Article X (Local Government):
Section 3 on the power of Congress to enact a local government code;
Section 4 on the power of the President to exercise general supervision over local
government units (LGUs);
Section 5 on the power of LGUs to create their own sources of income x x x,
subject to such guidelines as Congress may provide;
Section 11 on the power of Congress to create special metropolitan political
subdivisions;
Section 14 on the power of the President to provide for regional development
councils x x x;
Section 16 on the power of the President to exercise general supervision over
autonomous regions;
Section 18 on the power of Congress to enact organic act for each autonomous
region as well as the power of the President to appoint the representatives to the
regional consultative commission;
454
454
Section 19 on the duty of the first Congress elected under the Constitution to pass
the organic act for autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
8. The following Sections of Article XI (Accountability of Public Officers):
Section 2 on the impeachable officers (President, VicePresident, etc.);
Section 3 on impeachment proceedings (exclusive power of the House to initiate
complaint and sole power of the Senate to try and decide impeachment cases);
Section 9 on the power of the President to appoint the Ombudsman and his
deputies;
Section 16 which provides in part that x x x no loans or guaranty shall be granted
to the President, Vice-President, etc.
Section 17 on mandatory disclosure of assets and liabilities by public officials
including the President, Vice-President, etc.
9. The following Sections of Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony):
Section 2 on the power of Congress to allow, by law, small-scale utilization of
natural resources and power of the President to enter into agreements with foreignowned corporations and duty to notify Congress of every contract;
Section 3 on the power of Congress to determine size of lands of public domain;
Section 4 on the power of Congress to determine specific limits of forest lands;
Section 5 on the power of Congress to provide for applicability of customary laws;
Section 9 on the power of Congress to establish an independent economic and
planning agency to be headed by the President;
Section 10 on the power of Congress to reserve to Filipino citizens or domestic
corporations (at least 60% Filipino-owned) certain areas of investment;
Section 11 on the sole power of Congress to grant franchise for public utilities;
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Section 15 on the power of Congress to create an agency to promote viability of
cooperatives;
Section 16 which provides that Congress shall not, except by general law, form
private corporations;
Section 17 on the salaries of the President, Vice-President, etc. and the power of
Congress to adjust the same;
Section 20 on the power of Congress to establish central monetary authority.
10. The following Sections of Article XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights):
Section 1 on the mandate of Congress to give highest priority to enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of people x x x
Section 4 on the power of Congress to prescribe retention limits in agrarian

reform;
Section 18 (6) on the duty of the Commission on Human Rights to recommend to
Congress effective measures to promote human rights;
Section 19 on the power of Congress to provide for other cases to fall within the
jurisdiction of the Commission on Human Rights.
11. The following Sections of Article XIV (Education, Science and Technology, etc.):
Section 4 on the power of Congress to increase Filipino equity participation in
educational institutions;
Section 6 which provides that subject to law and as Congress may provide, the
Government shall sustain the use of Filipino as medium of official communication;
Section 9 on the power of Congress to establish a national language commission;
Section 11 on the power of Congress to provide for incentives to promote
scientific research.
12. The following Sections of Article XVI (General Provisions):
Section 2 on the power of Congress to adopt new name for the country, new
national anthem, etc.;
Section 5 (7) on the tour of duty of the Chief of Staff which may be extended by
the President in times of war or national emergency declared by Congress;
456
456
Section 11 on the power of Congress to regulate or prohibit monopolies in mass
media;
Section 12 on the power of Congress to create consultative body to advise the
President on indigenous cultural communities.
13. The following Sections of Article XVII (Amendments or Revisions):
Section 1 on the amendment or revision of Constitution by Congress;
Section 2 on the duty of Congress to provide for the implementation of the system
of initiative;
Section 3 on the power of Congress to call constitutional convention to amend or
revise the Constitution.
14. All 27 Sections of Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions).

The foregoing enumeration negates the claim that the big bulk of the 1987
Constitution will not be affected.51 Petitioners proposition, while purportedly
seeking to amend only Articles VI and VII of the Constitution and providing
transitory provisions, will, in fact, affect, alter, replace or repeal other numerous
articles and sections thereof. More than the quantitative effects, however, the
revisory character of petitioners proposition is apparent from the qualitative effects
it will have on the fundamental law.
I am not impervious to the commentary of Dean Vicente G. Sinco that the revision
of a constitution, in its strict sense, refers to a consideration of the entire
constitution and the procedure for effecting such change; while amendment refers
only to particular provisions to be added to or to be altered in a constitution.52
For clarity and accuracy, however, it is necessary to reiterate below Dean Sincos
more comprehensive differentiation of the terms:
provisions. But whatever results the revisions may
_______________
51 Dissenting Opinion of Justice Puno, p. 36.

52 Id., at p. 39.
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457
produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act of revision is the original intention
and plan authorized to be carried out. That intention and plan must contemplate a
consideration of all the provisions of the constitution to determine which one should
be altered or suppressed or whether the whole document should be replaced with
an entirely new one.
intention rather is to improve the specific parts of the existing constitution or to add
to it provisions deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress
portions of it that seemed obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect.53
A change in the form of government from bicameral-presidential to unicameralparliamentary, following the above distinction, entails a revision of the Constitution
as it will involve alteration of different portions of the entire document and may
result in the rewriting of the whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or
perhaps only some of its important provisions.
More importantly, such shift in the form of government will, without doubt,
fundamentally change the basic plan and substance of the present Constitution. The
tripartite system ordained by our fundamental law divides governmental powers
into three distinct but coequal branches: the legislative, executive and judicial.
Legislative power, vested in Congress which is a bicameral body consisting of the
House of Representatives and the Senate, is the power to make laws and to alter
them at discretion. Executive power, vested in the President who is directly elected
by the people, is the power to see that the laws are duly executed and enforced.
Judicial power, vested in the Supreme Court and the lower courts, is the power to
construe and apply the law when controversies arise concerning what has been
done or omitted under it. This separation of powers furnishes a system of checks
and balances which guards against the establishment of an arbitrary or tyrannical
government.
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53 Supra note 38.

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458
Under a unicameral-parliamentary system, however, the tripartite separation of
power is dissolved as there is a fusion between the executive and legislative
powers. Essentially, the President becomes a mere symbolic head of State while
the Prime Minister becomes the head of government who is elected, not by direct
vote of the people, but by the members of the Parliament. The Parliament is a
unicameral body whose members are elected by legislative districts. The Prime
Minister, as head of government, does not have a fixed term of office and may only
be removed by a vote of confidence of the Parliament. Under this form of
government, the system of checks and balances is emasculated.
Considering the encompassing scope and depth of the changes that would be
effected, not to mention that the Constitutions basic plan and substance of a
tripartite system of government and the principle of separation of powers
underlying the same would be altered, if not entirely destroyed, there can be no
other conclusion than that the proposition of petitioners Lambino, et al. would
constitute a revision of the Constitution rather than an amendment or such an
addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an
improvement or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed.54 As has
been shown, the effect of the adoption of the petitioners proposition, rather than to
within the lines of the original instrument constitute an improvement or better
carry out the purpose for which it was framed, is to substantially alter the purpose
and to attain objectives clearly beyond the lines of the Constitution as now cast.55
To paraphrase McFadden, petitioners contention that any change less than a total
one is amendatory would reduce to the rubble of absurdity the bulwark so carefully
erected and preserved. A case might, conceivably, be presented where the question
would be occasion to undertake to define with nicety the line of demarcation; but
we have no case or occasion here.
_______________
54 McFadden v. Jordan, supra note 48.

55 Id., at p. 799.
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As succinctly by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a switch from the presidential system to a
parliamentary system would be a revision because of its overall impact on the
entire constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a
unicameral system because of its effect on other important provisions of the
Constitution. It is thus clear that what distinguishes revision from amendment is not
the quantum of change in the document. Rather, it is the fundamental qualitative
alteration that effects revision.56
The petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution filed by petitioners
Lambino, et al., being in truth and in fact a proposal for the revision thereof, is
barred from the system of initiative upon any legally permissible construction of
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
The Petition for Initiative on Amendments to the Constitution is, on its Face,
Insufficient in Form and Substance
Again, even granting arguendo RA 6735 is declared sufficient to implement the
system of initiative and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, as it prescribed rules
and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is
valid, still, the petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution must be
dismissed for being insufficient in form and substance.
Section 5 of RA 6735 requires that a petition for initiative on the Constitution must
state the following:
1. Contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed, as the case may be;
2. The proposition;
3. The reason or reasons therefor;
4. That it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
5. Signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
_______________
56 Supra note 41.

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460
6. An abstract or summary proposition in not more than one hundred (100) words
Section 7 thereof requires that the signatures be verified in this wise:
SEC. 7. Verification of Signatures.The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures
The law mandates upon the election registrar to personally verify the signatures.
This is a solemn and important duty imposed on the election registrar which he
cannot delegate to any other person, even to barangay officials. Hence, a
verification of signatures made by persons other than the election registrars has no
legal effect.
In patent violation of the law, several certifications submitted by petitioners showed
that the verification of signatures was made, not by the election registrars, but by
barangay officials. For example, the certification of the election officer in Lumbatan,
Lanao del Sur reads in full:
LOCAL ELECTION OFFICERS CERTIFICATION57
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that based on the verifications made by the Barangay Officials
in this City/Municipality, as attested to by two (2) witnesses from the same
Barangays, which is part of the 2nd Legislative District of the Province of Lanao del
Sur, the names appearing on the attached signature sheets relative to the proposed
initiative on Amendments to the 1987 Constitution, are those of bonafide resident of
the said Barangays and correspond to the names found in the official list of
registered voters of the Commission on Elections and/or voters affidavit and/or
voters identification cards.
It is further certified that the total number of signatures of the registered voters for
the City/Municipality of LUMBATAN, LANAO DEL SUR as appearing in the affixed
signatures sheets is ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (1,180).
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57 Annex 1363.
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April 2, 2006
IBRAHIM M. MACADATO
Election Officer
(Italics supplied)
The ineffective verification in almost all the legislative districts in the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) alone is shown by the certifications, similarly
worded as above-quoted, of the election registrars of Buldon, Maguindanao;58
Cotabato City (Special Province);59 Datu Odin Sinsuat, Maguindanao;60 Matanog,
Maguindanao;61 Parang, Maguindanao;62 Kabantalan, Maguindanao;63 Upi,
Maguinadano (sic);64 Barira, Maguindanao;65 Sultan, Mastura;66 Ampatuan,
Maguindanao;67 Buluan, Maguindanao;68 Datu Paglas, Maguindanao;69 Datu
Piang, Maguindanao;70 Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao;71 Pagalungan,
Maguindanao;72 Talayan, Maguindanao;73 Gen. S.K. Pendatun, Maguindanao;74
Mamasapano, Maguindanao;75 Talitay, Maguindanao;76 Guindulungan,
Maguindanao;77 Datu Saudi Ampatuan, Maguin_______________
58 Annex 1368.
59 Annex 1369.
60 Annex 1370.
61 Annex 1371.
62 Annex 1372.
63 Annex 1374.
64 Annex 1375.
65 Annex 1376.
66 Annex 1377.
67 Annex 1378.
68 Annex 1379.
69 Annex 1380.
70 Annex 1381.
71 Annex 1382.
72 Annex 1383.
73 Annex 1385.
74 Annex 1387.
75 Annex 1388.
76 Annex 1389.
77 Annex 1391.
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462
danao;78 Datu Unsay, Maguindanao;79 Pagagawan, Maguindanao;80 Rajah Buayan,
Maguindanao;81 Indanan, Sulu;82 Jolo, Sulu;83 Maimbung, Sulu;84 Hadji Panglima,
Sulu;85 Pangutaran, Sulu;86 Parang, Sulu;87 Kalingalan Caluang, Sulu;88 Luuk,
Sulu;89 Panamao, Sulu;90 Pata, Sulu;91 Siasi, Sulu;92 Tapul, Sulu;93 Panglima
Estino, Sulu;94 Lugus, Sulu;95 and Pandami, Sulu.96
Section 7 of RA 6735 is clear that the verification of signatures shall be done by the
election registrar, and by no one else, including the barangay officials. The
foregoing certifications submitted by petitioners, instead of aiding their cause,
justify the outright dismissal of their petition for initiative. Because of the illegal
verifications made by barangay officials in the above-mentioned legislative districts,
it necessarily follows that the petition for initiative has failed to comply with the
requisite number of signatures, i.e., at least twelve percent (12%) of the total
by at least three percent (3%) of the registered voters therein.
_______________
78 Annex 1392.
79 Annex 1393.
80 Annex 1395.
81 Annex 1396.
82 Annex 1397.
83 Annex 1398.
84 Annex 1399.
85 Annex 1400.
86 Annex 1401.
87 Annex 1402.
88 Annex 1404.
89 Annex 1405.
90 Annex 1406.
91 Annex 1407.
92 Annex 1408.
93 Annex 1409.
94 Annex 1410.
95 Annex 1411.
96 Annex 1412.
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Petitioners cannot disclaim the veracity of these damaging certifications because

they themselves submitted the same to the COMELEC and to the Court in the
present case to support their contention that the requirements of RA 6735 had been
complied with and that their petition for initiative is on its face sufficient in form and
substance. They are in the nature of judicial admissions which are conclusive and
binding on petitioners.97 This being the case, the Court must forthwith order the
dismissal of the petition for initiative for being, on its face, insufficient in form and
substance. The Court should make the adjudication entailed by the facts here and
now, without further proceedings, as it has done in other cases.98
It is argued by petitioners that, assuming arguendo that the COMELEC is correct in
relying on Santiago that RA 6735 is inadequate to cover initiative to the
Constitution, this cannot be used to legitimize its refusal to heed the peoples will.
The fact that there is no enabling law should not prejudice the right of the sovereign
people to propose amendments to the Constitution, which right has already been
exercised by 6,327,952 voters. The collective and resounding act of the particles of
sovereignty must not be set aside. Hence, the COMELEC should be ordered to
comply with Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution via a writ of mandamus.
The submission of petitioners, however, is unpersuasive.
Mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who act to enforce a public right and to
compel the persons of a public duty most especially when mandated by the
Constitution.99 However, under Section 3, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court, for a
petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition
is a ministerial act or duty and not purely discretionary on the part of the board,
officer or person, and that petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to
warrant the grant thereof. A purely ministerial act or
_______________
97 Arroyo, Jr. v. Taduran, G.R. No. 147012, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 423.
98 See, for example, Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, No. L-62089, March 9, 1988, 158
SCRA 508.
99 Licaros v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 145851, November 22, 2001, 370 SCRA 394.
464
464
duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard
to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act
done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public official and gives him the right to
decide how or when the duty should be performed, such duty is discretionary and
not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires
neither the exercise of an official discretion nor judgment.100
To stress, in a petition for mandamus, petitioner must show a well defined, clear and
certain right to warrant the grant thereof.101 In this case, petitioners failed to
establish their right to a writ of mandamus as shown by the foregoing disquisitions.
Remand of the Case to the COMELEC is Not Authorized by RA 6735 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300
The dissenting opinion posits that the issue of whether or not the petition for
initiative has complied with the requisite number of signatures of at least twelve
percent (12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three percent (3%) of the registered voters
therein, involves contentious facts. The dissenting opinion cites the petitioners
claim that they have complied with the same while the oppositors-intervenors have
vigorously refuted this claim by alleging, inter alia, that the signatures were not
properly verified or were not verified at all. Other oppositors-intervenors have
alleged that the signatories did not fully understand what they have signed as they
were misled into signing the signature sheets.
According to the dissenting opinion, the sufficiency of the petition for initiative and
its compliance with the requirements of RA 6735 on initiative and its implementing
rules is a question that should be
_______________
100 Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 150605, December 10, 2002, 393 SCRA 639.
101 Teope v. People, G.R. No. 149687, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 540.
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resolved by the COMELEC at the first instance. It thus remands the case to the
COMELEC for further proceedings.
To my mind, the remand of the case to the COMELEC is not warranted. There is
nothing in RA 6735, as well as in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, granting that it is
valid to implement the former statute, that authorizes the COMELEC to conduct any
kind of hearing, whether full-blown or trial-type hearing, summary hearing or
administrative hearing, on a petition for initiative.
Section 41 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 provides that [a]n initiative shall be
conducted under the control and supervision of the Commission in accordance with
Article III hereof. Pertinently, Sections 30, 31 and 32 of Article III of the said
implementing rules provide as follows:
Sec. 30. Verification of signatures.The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures
Sec. 31. Determination by the Commission.The Commission shall act on the
findings of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum.
If it should appear that the required number of signatures has not been obtained,
the petition shall be deemed defeated and the Commission shall issue a declaration
to that effect.
If it should appear that the required number of signatures has been obtained, the
Commission shall set the initiative or referendum in accordance with the succeeding
sections.
Sec. 32. Appeal.The decision of the Commission on the findings of the sufficiency
and insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum may be appealed to the
Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from notice hereof.
Clearly, following the foregoing procedural rules, the COMELEC is not authorized to
conduct any kind of hearing to receive any evidence for or against the sufficiency of
the petition for initiative. Rather, the foregoing rules require of the COMELEC to
determine the sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative on its face.
And it has already been shown, by the annexes submitted by the petitioners
466
466
themselves, their petition is, on its face, insufficient in form and substance. The
remand of the case to the COMELEC for reception of evidence of the parties on the
contentious factual issues is, in effect, an amendment of the abovequoted rules of
the COMELEC by this Court which the Court is not empowered to do.
The Present Petition Presents a Justiciable Controversy; Hence, a Non-Political
Question. Further, the People, Acting in their Sovereign Capacity, Have Bound
Themselves to Abide by the Constitution
Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
government.102 A political question has two aspects: (1) those matters that are to
be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity; and (2) matters which
have been specifically designated to some other department or particular office of
the government, with discretionary power to act.103
In his concurring and dissenting opinion in Arroyo v. De Venecia,104 Senior
Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno explained the doctrine of political question vis-vis the express mandate of the present Constitution for the courts to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government:
In the Philippine setting, there is more compelling reason for courts to categorically
reject the political question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of
power. For Section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to
empower courts ... to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. This
_______________
102 Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).

103 Id.
104 G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997, 277 SCRA 268, 311-312.
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power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions.
It was also not xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution.
The CONCOM [Constitutional Commission] granted this enormous power to our
courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state
power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question
doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM
expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis--vis the
Executive and the Legislative departments of government. In cases involving the
proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus, it is
now beyond dubiety that the government can no longer invoke the political question
defense.
xxxx
To a great degree, it diminished its [political question doctrine] use as a shield to
protect other abuses of government by allowing courts to penetrate the shield with
new power to review acts of any branch or instrumentality of the government . . .

to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Even if the present petition involves the act, not of a governmental body, but of
purportedly more than six million registered voters who have signified their assent
to the proposal to amend the Constitution, the same still constitutes a justiciable
controversy, hence, a nonpolitical question. There is no doubt that the Constitution,
under Article XVII, has explicitly provided for the manner or method to effect
amendments thereto, or revision thereof. The question, therefore, of whether there
has been compliance with the terms of the Constitution is for the Court to pass
upon.105
In the United States, in In re McConaughy,106 the State Supreme Court of
Minnesota exercised jurisdiction over the petition questioning the result of the
general election holding that an examination of the decisions shows that the courts
have almost uniformly exercised the authority to determine the validity of the
proposal, submission, or ratification of constitutional amendments. The cases cited
were Day_______________
105 Dissenting Opinion of Justice Fernando in Javellana v. Executive Secretary, supra

note 36.
106 119 N.W. 408 (1909).
468
468
ton v. St. Paul,107 Rice v. Palmer,108 Bott v. Wurtz,109 State v. Powell,110 among
other cases.
There is no denying that the Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
them.111 However, I find to be tenuous the asseveration that the argument that
the people through initiative cannot propose substantial amendments to change the
Constitution turns sovereignty in its head. At the very least, the submission
constricts the democratic space for the exercise of the direct sovereignty of the
people.112 In effect, it is theorized that despite the unambiguous text of Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution withholding the power to revise it from the system of
initiative, the people, in their sovereign capacity, can conveniently disregard the
said provision.
I strongly take exception to the view that the people, in their sovereign capacity,
can disregard the Constitution altogether. Such a view directly contravenes the
fundamental constitutional theory that while indeed the ultimate sovereignty is in
the people, from whom springs all legitimate authority; nonetheless, by the
Constitution which they establish, they not only tie up the hands of their official
agencies, but their own hands as well; and neither the officers of the state, nor the
whole people as an aggregate body, are at liberty to take action in opposition to this
fundamental law.113 The Constitution, it should be remembered, is the protector
of the people, placed on guard by them to save the rights of the people against
injury by the people.114 This is the essence of constitutionalism:
_______________
107 22 Minn. 400 (1876).

108 96 S.W. 396 (1906).
109 63 N.J. Law 289.
110 77 Miss. 543 (1900).
111 Section 1, Article II, 1987 Constitution.
112 Dissenting Opinion of Justice Puno, p. 49.
113 COOLEY, ATREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 56, cited in
Ellingham v. Dye, supra.
114 Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal. Co., 154 N.W. 1037 (1915).
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Through constitutionalism we placed limits on both our political institutions and
ourselves, hoping that democracies, historically always turbulent, chaotic and even
despotic, might now become restrained, principled, thoughtful and just. So we
bound ourselves over to a law that we made and promised to keep. And though a
government of laws did not displace governance by men, it did mean that now men,
democratic men, would try to live by their word.115
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the system of initiative is limited only to
proposals to amend to the Constitution, and does not extend to its revision. The
Filipino people have bound themselves to observe the manner and method to effect
the changes of the Constitution. They opted to limit the exercise of the right to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative, but did not
extend the same to the revision thereof. The petition for initiative, as it proposes to
effect the revision thereof, contravenes the Constitution. The fundamental law of
the state prescribes the limitations under which the electors of the state may
change the same, and, unless such course is pursued, the mere fact that a majority
of the electors are in favor of a change and have so expressed themselves, does not
work a change. Such a course would be revolutionary, and the Constitution of the
state would become a mere matter of form.116
The very term Constitution implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding
nature, and the provisions contained therein for its revision indicated the will of the
people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the substantial
entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature.117
The Filipino people have incorporated the safety valves of amendment and revision
in Article XVII of the Constitution. The Court is mandated to ensure that these safety
valves embodied in the Constitution to guard against improvident and hasty
changes thereof are not easily trifled with. To be sure, by having overwhelmingly
ratified
_______________
115 ALTMAN, ARGUING ABOUTTHELAW 94 (2001), citing AGRESTO, THE SUPREME

COURTANDCONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1984)
116 McBee v. Brady, 100 P. 97 (1909).
117 McFadden v. Jordan, supra note 48.
470
470
the Constitution, the Filipino people believed that it is a good Constitution and in
the words of the learned Judge Cooley:
x x x should be beyond the reach of temporary excitement and popular caprice or
passion. It is needed for stability and steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the
people; not to the whim of the people, or the thought evolved in excitement or hot
blood, but the sober second thought, which alone, if the government is to be safe,
can be allowed efficiency. Changes in government are to be feared unless the
benefit is certain. As Montaign says: All great mutations shake and disorder a state.
Good does not necessarily succeed evil; another evil may succeed and worse.118
Indisputably, the issues posed in the present case are of transcendental importance.
Accordingly, I have approached and grappled with them with full appreciation of the
responsibilities involved in the present case, and have given to its consideration the
earnest attention which its importance demands. I have sought to maintain the
supremacy of the Constitution at whatever hazard. I share the concern of Chief
Justice Day in Koehler v. Hill:119 it is for the protection of minorities that
constitutions are framed. Sometimes constitutions must be interposed for the
protection of majorities even against themselves. Constitutions are adopted in times
of public repose, when sober reason holds her citadel, and are designed to check
the surging passions in times of popular excitement. But if courts could be coerced
by popular majorities into a disregard of their provisions, constitutions would
become mere ropes of sand, and there would be an end of social security and of
constitutional freedom. The cause of temperance can sustain no injury from the loss
of this amendment which would be at all comparable to the injury to republican
institutions which a violation of the constitution would inflict. That large and
respectable class of moral reformers which so justly demands the observance and
enforcement of law, cannot afford to take its first reformatory
_______________
118 Cooley, Am.Law.Rev. 1889, p. 311, cited in Ellingham v. Dye, supra.

119 15 N.W. 609 (1883).
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step by a violation of the constitution. How can it consistently demand of others
obedience to a constitution which it violates itself? The people can in a short time
re-enact the amendment. In the manner of a great moral reform, the loss of a few
years is nothing. The constitution is the palladium of republican freedom. The young
men coming forward upon the stage of political action must be educated to
venerate it; those already upon the stage must be taught to obey it. Whatever
interest may be advanced or may suffer, whoever or whatever may be voted up or
voted down, no sacrilegious hand must be laid upon the constitution.120
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153 and to GRANT the
petition in G.R. No. 174299.
SEPARATE OPINION
AZCUNA, J.:
Why, friends, you go to do you know not what.
Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act III, Sc. 2.

Article XVII of the Constitution states:
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
by at least three per centum of the registered votes (sic) therein. No amendment
under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of
this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
_______________
120 Id., at p. 630.

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Sec. 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a
constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the
electorate the question of calling such a convention.
Sec. 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof
shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall
be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of
such amendment or revision.
This Article states the procedure for changing the Constitution.
Constitutions have three partsthe Constitution of Liberty, which states the

fundamental rights of the people; the Constitution of Government, which establishes
the structure of government, its branches and their operation; and the Constitution
of Sovereignty, which provides how the Constitution may be changed.
Article XVII is the Constitution of Sovereignty.
As a result, the powers therein provided are called constituent powers. So when
Congress acts under this provision, it acts not as a legislature exercising legislative
powers. It acts as a constituent body exercising constituent powers.
The rules, therefore, governing the exercise of legislative powers do not apply, or do
not apply strictly, to the actions taken under Article XVII.
Accordingly, since Article XVII states that Congress shall provide for the
implementation of the exercise of the peoples right directly to propose
amendments to the Constitution through initiative, the act of Congress pursuant
thereto is not strictly a legislative action but partakes of a constituent act.
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As a result, Republic Act No. 6735, the act that provides for the exercise of the
people of the right to propose a law or amendments to the Constitution is, with
respect to the right to propose amendments to the Constitution, a constituent
measure, not a mere legislative one.
The consequence of this special character of the enactment, insofar as it relates to
proposing amendments to the Constitution, is that the requirements for statutory
enactments, such as sufficiency of standards and the like, do not and should not
strictly apply. As long as there is a sufficient and clear intent to provide for the
implementation of the exercise of the right, it should be sustained, as it is simply a
compliance of the mandate placed on Congress by the Constitution.
Seen in this light, the provisions of Republic Act No. 6735 relating to the procedure
for proposing amendments to the Constitution, can and should be upheld, despite
shortcomings perhaps in legislative headings and standards.
For this reason, I concur in the view that Santiago v. Comelec1 should be reexamined and, after doing so, that the pronouncement therein regarding the
insufficiency or inadequacy of the measure to sustain a peoples initiative to amend
the Constitution should be reconsidered in favor of allowing the exercise of this
sovereign right.
And applying the doctrine stated in Senarillos v. Hermosisima,2 penned by Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, in relation to Article 8 of the Civil Code, that a decision of this Court
interpreting a law forms part of the law interpreted as of the time of its enactment,
Republic Act No. 6735 should be deemed sufficient and adequate from the start.
This next point to address, there being a sufficient law, is whether the petition for
initiative herein involved complies with the requirements of that law as well as
those stated in Article XVII of the Constitution.
True it is that ours is a democratic state, as explicitated in the Declaration of
Principles, to emphasize precisely that there are instances recognized and provided
for in the Constitution where our people
_______________
1 G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997 and June 10, 1997; 270 SCRA 106.
2 100 Phil. 501 (1956).
474
474
directly exercise their sovereign powers, new features set forth in this People Power
Charter, namely, the powers of recall, initiative and referendum.
Nevertheless, this democratic nature of our polity is that of a democracy under the
rule of law. This equally important point is emphasized in the very Preamble to the
Constitution, which states:
. . . the blessings of . . . democracy under the rule of law . . . .
Such is the case with respect to the power to initiate changes in the Constitution.
The power is subject to limitations under the Constitution itself, thus: The power
could not be exercised for the first five years after the Constitution took effect and
thereafter can only be exercised once every five years; the power only extends to
proposing amendments but not revisions; and the power needs an act of Congress
providing for its implementation, which act is directed and mandated.
The question, therefore, arises whether the proposed changes in the Constitution
set forth in the petition for initiative herein involved are mere amendments or rather
are revisions.
Revisions are changes that affect the entire Constitution and not mere parts of it.
The reason why revisions are not allowed through direct proposals by the people
through initiative is a practical one, namely, there is no one to draft such extensive
changes, since 6.3 million people cannot conceivably come up with a single
extensive document through a direct proposal from each of them. Someone would
have to draft it and that is not authorized as it would not be a direct proposal from
the people. Such indirect proposals can only take the form of proposals from
Congress as a Constituent Assembly under Article XVII, or a Constitutional
Convention created under the same provision. Furthermore, there is a need for such
deliberative bodies for revisions because their proceedings and debates are duly
and officially recorded, so that future cases of interpretations can be properly aided
by resort to the record of their proceedings.
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475
Even a cursory reading of the proposed changes contained in the petition for
initiative herein involved will show on its face that the proposed changes constitute
a revision of the Constitution. The proposal is to change the system of government
from that which is bicameral-presidential to one that is unicameral-parliamentary.
While purportedly only Articles VI, VII, and XVIII are involved, the fact is, as the
petition and text of the proposed changes themselves state, every provision of the
Constitution will have to be examined to see if they conform to the nature of a
unicameralparliamentary form of government and changed accordingly if they do
not so conform to it. For example, Article VIII on Judicial Department cannot stand as
is, in a parliamentary system, for under such a system, the Parliament is supreme,
and thus the Courts power to declare its act a grave abuse of discretion and thus
void would be an anomaly.
Now, who is to do such examination and who is to do such changes and how should
the changes be worded? The proposed initiative does not say who nor how.
Not only, therefore, is the proposed initiative, on this score, a prohibited revision but
it also suffers from being incomplete and insufficient on its very face.
It, therefore, in that form, cannot pass muster the very limits contained in providing
for the power under the Constitution.
Neither does it comply with Republic Act No. 6735, which states in Section 10 that
not more than one subject shall be proposed as an amendment or amendments to
the Constitution. The petition herein would propose at the very least two subjects
a unicameral legislature and a parliamentary form of government. Again, for this
clear and patent violation of the very act that provides for the exercise of the power,
the proposed initiative cannot lie.
This does not mean, however, that all is lost for petitioners.
For the proposed changes can be separated and are, in my view, separable in
naturea unicameral legislature is one; a parliamentary form of government is
another. The first is a mere amendment and contains only one subject matter. The
second is clearly a revision that
476
476
affects every article and every provision in the Constitution to an extent not even
the proponents could at present fully articulate. Petitioners Lambino, et al. thus go
about proposing changes the nature and extent of which they do not as yet know
exactly what.
The proposal, therefore, contained in the petition for initiative, regarding a change
in the legislature from a bicameral or two-chamber body to that of a unicameral or
one-chamber body, is sustainable. The text of the changes needed to carry it out
are perfunctory and ministerial in nature. Once it is limited to this proposal, the
changes are simply one of deletion and insertions, the wordings of which are
practically automatic and non-discretionary.
As an example, I attach to this opinion an Appendix A showing how the
Constitution would read if we were to change Congress from one consisting of the
Senate and the House of Representatives to one consisting only of the House of
Representatives. It only affects Article VI on the Legislative Department, some
provisions on Article VII on the Executive Department, as well as Article XI on the
Accountability of Public Officers, and Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions. These are
mere amendments, substantial ones indeed but still only amendments, and they
address only one subject matter.
Such proposal, moreover, complies with the intention and rationale behind the
present initiative, which is to provide for simplicity and economy in government and
reduce the stalemates that often prevent needed legislation.
For the nonce, therefore, I vote to DISMISS the petition, without prejudice to the
filing of an appropriate initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution to
change Congress into a unicameral body. This is not say that I favor such a change.
Rather, such a proposal would come within the purview of an initiative allowed
under Article XVII of the Constitution and its implementing Republic Act, and should,
therefore, be submitted to our people in a plebiscite for them to decide in their
sovereign capacity. After all is said and done, this is what democracy under the rule
of law is about.
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477
APPENDIX A
THE 1987
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
ARTICLE VI
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to
the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
xxx
[Sec. 2. Deleted]
[Sec. 3. Deleted]
[Sec. 4. Deleted]
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations, and the senators whose term has not
expired, until their term expires.
xxx
Sec. 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Members of the
House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.
Sec. 9. In case of vacancy in the House of Representatives, a special election may
be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Member of
the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
Sec. 10. The salaries of Members of the House of Representatives shall be
determined by law. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the House of Representatives
approving such increase.
478
478
Sec. 11. A Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable
by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any
other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
Sec. 12. All Members of the House of Representatives shall, upon assumption of
office, make a full disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall
notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the
filing of a proposed legislation of which they are authors.
Sec. 13. No Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be
appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof
increased during the term for which he was elected.
Sec. 14. No Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as
counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunal, or quasi-judicial
and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested
financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by
the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term
of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government
for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his
office.
xxx
Sec. 16. (1). The House of Representatives shall elect its Speaker by a majority vote
of all its Members. THE House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary.
(2) A majority of THE House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller
number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent
Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as THE House may provide.
(3) THE House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members,
suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not

exceed sixty days.
(4) THE House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish
the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect
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479
national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of
one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal.
THE House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
[Subsec. (5) deleted.]
xxx
Sec. 17. The House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of its Members. THE Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice,
and the remaining six shall be Members of the House of Representatives, who shall
be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the Speaker of
the House, as ex officio Chairman, and TWENTY-FOUR (24) Members of the House of
Representatives, elected by THE House on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except
in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within
thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall
rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
Sec. 19. The Electoral Tribunal and the Commission on Appointments shall be
constituted within thirty days after the House of Representatives shall have been
organized with the election of the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall
meet only while the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority
of all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as are herein conferred
upon it.
xxx
Sec. 21. The House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be
respected.
Sec. 22. The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent
of the President, or upon the request of THE House, as the rules of THE House shall
provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to
their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives at least three days
480
480
before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written
questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or
the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance
shall be conducted in executive session.
Sec. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds, shall have the sole power to
declare the existence of a state of war.
xxx
[Sec. 24 deleted]
xxx
Sec. 25. (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations;
however, the President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by
law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
xxx
(2) No bill passed by THE House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed,
and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays
entered in the Journal.
xxx
Sec. 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be
presented to the President. If he approves the same he shall sign it; otherwise, he
shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House OF
REPRESENTATIVES, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and
proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, twothirds of all the Members
of THE House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the
votes of THE House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the
Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall
communicate his veto of any bill to the House OF REPRESENTATIVES within thirty
days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had
signed it.
xxx
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481
ARTICLE VII
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
xxx
Sec. 4. The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified
by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the
Congress, directed to the SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. Upon
receipt of the certificates of canvass, the SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE shall, not later
than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the
presence of the House of Representatives in public session, and the Congress, upon
determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided
by law, canvass the votes.
xxx
Sec. 7. Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or shall have
qualified, or where both shall have died or become permanently disabled, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall act as President until a President or a
Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified.
xxx
Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of
the President, the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired
term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of

both the President and Vice-President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
shall then act as President until the President or Vice-President shall have been
elected and qualified.
xxx
Sec. 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the VicePresident during the
term for which he was elected, the President shall nominate a Vice-President from
among the Members of the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon
confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of THE House.
xxx
Sec. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the
contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as
Acting President.
482
482
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the VicePresident shall immediately
assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume
the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members
of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that
purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours,
in accordance with its rules and without need of call.
xxx
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding
sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.
The Congress, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special
session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be
set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in
the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public
safety requires it.
xxx
Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES.
xxx
ARTICLE XI
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
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483
Sec. 3. (4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at
least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the
Articles of Impeachment, and trial shall forthwith proceed.
xxx
(6) The HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES shall have the sole power to try and decide all
cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the MEMBERS shall be on
oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted
without the concurrence of twothirds of all the Members.
xxx
ARTICLE XVIII
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
xxx
Sec. 2. The Members of the House of Representatives, and the local officials first
elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
xxx
Sec. 4. All existing treaties or international agreements which have not been ratified
shall not be renewed or extended without the concurrence of at least two-thirds of
all the Members of the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
xxx
Sec. 17. Until the Congress provides otherwise, the President shall receive an annual
salary of three hundred thousand pesos; the VicePresident, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, two hundred
forty thousand pesos each; Members of the House of Representatives, the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court, and the Chairmen of the Constitutional Commissions,
two hundred four thousand pesos each; and the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, one hundred eighty thousand pesos each.
xxx
Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States of America concerning military bases, foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed
484
484
in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES and, when the Congress so requires; ratified by a majority of the
votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. x x x
SEPARATE OPINION
TINGA, J.:
I join in full the opinion of Senior Associate Justice Puno. Its enviable sang-froid,
inimitable lucidity, and luminous scholarship are all so characteristic of the author
that it is hardly a waste of pen and ink to write separately if only to express my
deep admiration for his disquisition. It is compelling because it derives from the
fundamental democratic ordinance that sovereignty resides in the people, and it
seeks to effectuate that principle through the actual empowerment of the sovereign
people. Justice Punos opinion will in the short term engender reactions on its
impact on present attempts to amend the Constitution, but once the political
passion of the times have been shorn, it will endure as an unequivocal message to
the taongbayan that they are to be trusted to chart the course of their future.
Nothing that I inscribe will improve on Justice Punos opinion. I only write separately
to highlight a few other points which also inform my vote to grant the petitions.
I.
I agree with Justice Puno that Santiago v. COMELEC1 and PIRMA v. COMELEC2 had
not acquired value as precedent and should be reversed in any case. I add that the
Court has long been mindful of the rule that it necessitates a majority, and not
merely a plurality, in order that a decision can stand as precedent. That principle
has informed the members of this Court as they deliberated and voted upon
contentious petitions, even if this consideration is not ultimately reflected on the
final draft released for promulgation.
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1 G.R. No. 127325, 19 March 1997, 270 SCRA 106.

2 G.R. No. 129754, 23 September 1997.
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485
The curious twist to Santiago and PIRMA is that for all the denigration heaped upon
Rep. Act No. 6735 in those cases, the Court did not invalidate any provision of the
statute. All the Court said then was that the law was inadequate. Since this
inadequate law was not annulled by the Court, or repealed by Congress, it
remained part of the statute books.3
I maintain that even if Rep. Act No. 6735 is truly inadequate, the Court in Santiago
should not have simply let the insufficiency stand given that it was not minded to
invalidate the law itself. Article 9 of the Civil Code provides that [n]o judge or court
shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency
of the laws.4 As explained by the Court recently in Reyes v. Lim,5 [Article 9] calls
for the application of equity, which[, in the revered Justice Cardozos words,] fills
the open spaces in the law.6 Certainly, any court that refuses to rule on an action
premised on Rep. Act No. 6735 on the ground that the law is inadequate would
have been found in grave abuse of discretion. The previous failure by the Court to
fill the open spaces in Santiago further highlights that decisions status as an
unfortunate aberration.
I am mindful of the need to respect stare decisis, to the point of having recently
decried a majority ruling that was clearly minded to reverse several precedents but
refused to explicitly say so.7 Yet the
_______________
3 Petitioner Aumentado aptly refers to the comment of the late Senator Raul Roco
that the Santiago ruling created a third specie of invalid laws, a mongrel type of
constitutional but inadequate and, therefore, invalid law. Memorandum for
Aumentado, p. 54.
4 See CIVIL CODE, Art. 9.
5 456 Phil. 1; 408 SCRA 560 (2003).
6 Id., at p. 10; p. 566; citing I ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES 43 (1990) and JUSTICE BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF
THEJUDICIAL PROCESS 113 (1921).
7 See Dissenting Opinion, Manila International Airport Authority v. City of
Paraaque, G.R. No. 155650, 20 July 2006, 495 SCRA 591. In my ponencia in Globe
Telecom v. NTC, G.R. No. 143964, 26 July 2004, 435 SCRA 110, I further observed
that while an administrative agency was not enslaved to obey its own precedent, it
was essential, for the sake of clarity and intellectual honesty, that if an
administrative agency decides inconsistently with
486
486
principle is not immutable.8 The passionate words of Chief Justice Panganiban in
Osmea v. COMELEC9 bear quoting:
Before I close, a word about stare decisis. In the present case, the Court is
maintaining the ad ban to be consistent with its previous holding in NPC vs.
Comelec. Thus, respondent urges reverence for the stability of judicial doctrines. I
submit, however, that more important than consistency and stability are the verity,
integrity and correctness of jurisprudence. As Dean Roscoe Pound explains, Law
must be stable but it cannot stand still. Verily, it must correct itself and move in
cadence with the march of the electronic age. Error and illogic should not be
perpetuated. After all, the Supreme Court, in many cases, has deviated from stare
decisis and reversed previous doctrines and decisions.10 It should do no less in the
present case.
_______________
previous action, that it explain thoroughly why a different result is warranted, or if

need be, why the previous standards should no longer apply or should be
overturned. Id., at p. 144. Happily, Justice Punos present opinion expressly
elucidates why Santiago should be reversed.
8 As Justice Frankfurter once wrote: We recognize that stare decisis embodies an
important social policy. It represents an element of continuity in law, and is rooted in
the psychologic need to satisfy reasonable expectations. But stare decisis is a
principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision,
however recent and questionable, when such adherence involves collision with a
prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by
experience This Court, unlike the House of Lords, has from the beginning rejected
a doctrine of disability at self-correction. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119121 (1940).
9 351 Phil. 692; 288 SCRA 447 (1998).
10 As Chief Justice Panganiban then cited: For instance, Ebralinag vs. Division
Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA 256, March 1, 1993, reversed the
Courts 34-year-old doctrine laid down in Gerona vs. Secretary of Education, 106
Phil. 2, August 12, 1959, and upheld the right of Jehovahs Witnesses to refuse to
salute the Philippine flag on account of their religious beliefs. Similarly, Olaguer vs.
Military Commission, 150 SCRA 144, May 22, 1987, abandoned the 12-year-old
ruling in Aquino, Jr. vs. Military Commission, 63 SCRA 546, May 9, 1975, which
recognized the jurisdiction of military tribunals to try civilians for offenses allegedly
committed during martial law. The Court likewise reversed itself in EPZA vs. Dulay,
149 SCRA 305, April 29, 1987, when it vacated its earlier ruling in National Housing
Authority vs. Reyes, 123 SCRA 245, June 29, 1983, on the validity of certain
presidential
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487
Santiago established a tenet that the Supreme Court may affirm a law as
constitutional, yet declare its provisions as inadequate to accomplish the legislative
purpose, then barred the enforcement of the law. That ruling is erroneous, illogical,
and should not be perpetuated.11
II.
Following Justice Punos clear demonstration why Santiago should not be respected
as precedent, I agree that the COMELECs failure to take cognizance of the petitions
as mandated by Rep. Act No. 6735 constitutes grave abuse of discretion correctible
through the petitions before this Court.
The Court has consistently held in cases such as Abes v. COMELEC,12 Sanchez v.
COMELEC,13 and Sambarani v. COMELEC14 that the functions of the COMELEC
under the Constitution are essentially executive and administrative in nature.15
More pertinently, in Buac v. COMELEC,16 the Court held that the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC relative to the enforcement and administration of a law relative to a
plebiscite fell under the jurisdiction of the poll body under its constitutional mandate
to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of a x x x
plebiscite.17
_______________
decrees regarding the determination of just compensation. In the much earlier case
of Philippine Trust Co. vs. Mitchell, 59 Phil. 30, December 8, 1933, the Court revoked
its holding in Involuntary Insolvency of Mariano Velasco & Co., 55 Phil. 353,
November 29, 1930, regarding the relation of the insolvency law with the then Code
of Civil Procedure and with the Civil Code. Just recently, the Court, in Kilosbayan vs.
Morato, 246 SCRA 540, July 17, 1995, also abandoned the earlier grant of standing
to petitioner-organization in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110, May 5, 1994.
Id., at p. 780; p. 540.
11 Ibid.
12 129 Phil. 507, 516; 21 SCRA 1252, 1258 (1967).
13 G.R. Nos. L-78461, L-79146, & L-79212, 12 August 1987, 153 SCRA 67, 75.
14 G.R. No. 160427, 15 September 2004, 438 SCRA 319, 326.
15 Ibid.
16 G.R. No. 155855, 26 January 2004, 421 SCRA 92.
17 Id., at p. 104. Relatedly, the Court held that [c]ontests which do not involve the
election, returns and qualifications of elected officials are not
488
488
Rep. Act No. 6735 is a law relative to the conduct of a plebiscite. The primary task of
the COMELEC under Rep. Act No. 6735 is to enforce and administer the said law,
functions that are essentially executive and administrative in nature. Even the
subsequent duty of the COMELEC of determining the sufficiency of the petitions
after they have been filed is administrative in character. By any measure, the
COMELECs failure to perform its executive and administrative functions under Rep.
Act No. 6735 constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
III.
It has been argued that the subject petitions for initiative are barred under Republic
Act No. 6735 as they allegedly embrace more than one subject. Section 10 of Rep.
Act No. 6735 classifies as a prohibited measure, a petition submitted to the
electorate that embraces more than one subject.18 On this point, reliance is
apparently placed on the array of provisions which are to be affected by the
amendments proposed in the initiative petition.
Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735 is a reflection of the long-enshrined constitutional
principle that the laws passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof.19 The one-subject requirement under the
Constitution is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to
the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with
or foreign to the general subject and title.20 An act having a single general subject,
indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse
they may be, so long as they are
_______________
subjected to the exercise of the judicial or quasi-judicial powers of courts or

administrative agencies. Ibid.
18 See e.g., Memorandum of Oppositors-Intervenors Senators Pimentel, Jr., et al.,
pp. 19-22; Memorandum for Intervenor Senate of the Philippines, pp. 34-35.
19 See 1987 CONST., Art. VI, Sec. 26(1). See also Section 19[1]. 1987 CONST, Art.
VIII.
20 See e.g., Sumulong v. Commission on Elections, 73 Phil. 288, 291 (1941);
Cordero v. Hon. Jose Cabatuando, et al., 116 Phil. 736, 741; 6 SCRA 418, 422 (1962).
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not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in
furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out
the general object.21
The precedents governing the one-subject, one-title rule under the Constitution
should apply as well in the interpretation of Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735. For as
long as it can be established that an initiative petition embraces a single general
subject, the petition may be allowed no matter the number of constitutional
provisions proposed for amendment if the amendments are germane to the subject
of the petition.
Both the Sigaw ng Bayan and the Lambino initiative petitions expressly propose the
changing of the form of government from bicameral-presidential to unicameralparliamentary. Such a proposal may strike as comprehensive, necessitating as it will
the reorganization of the executive and legislative branches of government,
nevertheless it ineluctably encompasses only a single general subject still.
The 1987 Constitution (or any constitution for that matter) is susceptible to division
into several general spheres. To cite the broadest of these spheres by way of
example, Article III enumerates the guaranteed rights of the people under the Bill of
Rights; Articles VI, VII and VIII provide for the organizational structure of
government; while Articles II, XII, XIII & XIV, XV and XVI enunciate policy principles
of the State. What would clearly be prohibited under Section 10 of Rep. Act No.
6735 is an initiative petition that seeks to amend provisions which do not belong to
the same sphere. For example, had a single initiative petition sought not only to
change the form of government from presidential to parliamentary but also to
amend the Bill of Rights, said petition would arguably have been barred under
Section 10, as that petition ostensibly embraces more than one subject, with each
subject bearing no functional relation to the other. But that is not the case with the
present initiative petitions.
_______________
21 See Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, G.R. No. L-75697, 18 June 1987, 151
SCRA 208, 214-215; citing Public Service Co., Recktenwald, 290 Ill. 314, 8 A.L.R.
466, 470. See also Farias v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 147387 & 152161, 10
December 2003, 417 SCRA 503, 519.
490
490
Neither can it be argued that the initiative petitions embrace more than one subject
since the proposed amendments seek to affect two separate branches of
government. The very purpose of the initiative petitions is to fuse the powers of the
executive and legislative branches of government; hence, the amendments
intended to effect such general intent necessarily affects the two branches. If it
required that to propose a shift in government from presidential to parliamentary,
the amendments to Article VII (Executive Branch) have to be segregated to a
different petition from that which would propose amendments to Article VI
(Legislative Branch), then the result would be two initiative petitionsboth subject
to separate authentications, consideration and even plebiscites, all to effect one
general proposition. This scenario, which entertains the possibility that one petition
would ultimately fail while the other succeeds, could thus allow for the risk that the
executive branch could be abolished without transferring executive power to the
legislative branch. An absurd result, indeed.
I am not even entirely comfortable with the theoretical underpinnings of Section 10.
The Constitution indubitably grants the people the right to seek amendment of the
charter through initiative, and mandates Congress to provide for the
implementation of the exercise of this right. In doing so, Congress may not restrict
the right to initiative on grounds that are not provided for in the Constitution. If for
example the implementing law also provides that certain provisions of the
Constitution may not be amended through initiative, that prohibition should not be
sustained. Congress is tasked with the implementation, and not the restriction of
the right to initiative.
The one-subject requirement under Section 10 is not provided for as a bar to
amendment under the Constitution. Arguments can be supplied for the merit of
such a requirement, since it would afford a measure of orderliness when the vital
question of amending the Constitution arises. The one-subject requirement does
allow the voters focus when deliberating whether or not to vote for the
amendments. These factors of desirability nonetheless fail to detract from the fact
that the one-subject requirement imposes an additional restriction on the right to
initiative not contemplated by the Constitution. Short of invalidating the
requirement, a better course of action would be to
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insist upon its liberal interpretation. After all, the Court has consistently adhered to
a liberal interpretation of the one-subject, one-title rule.22 There is no cause to
adopt a stricter interpretative rule with regard to the one-subject rule under Section
10 of Rep. Act No. 6735.
IV.
During the hearing on the petitions, the argument was raised that provisions of the
Constitution amended through initiative would not have the benefit of a reference
source from the record of a deliberative body such as Congress or a constitutional
convention. It was submitted that this consideration influenced the Constitutional
Commission as it drafted Section 2, Article XVII, which expressly provided that only
amendments, and not revisions, may be the subject of initiative petitions.
This argument clearly proceeds from a premise that accords supreme value to the
record of deliberations of a constitutional convention or commission in the
interpretation of the charter. Yet if the absence of a record of deliberations stands as
so serious a flaw as to invalidate or constrict processes which change a constitution
or its provisions, then the entire initiative process authorized by the Constitution
should be scarlet-marked as well.
Even if this position can be given any weight in the consideration of these petitions,
I would like to point out that resort to the records of deliberations is only one of
many aids to constitutional construction. For one, it should be abhorred if the
provision under study is itself clear, plain, and free from ambiguity. As the Court
held in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary:23
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of
the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the
resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only
_______________
22 As a policy, this Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one titleone
subject rule. Tatad v. Secretary of Department of Energy, 346 Phil. 321, 359; 282
SCRA 337, 349 (1997).
23 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 83896 & 83815; 22
February 1991, 194 SCRA 317.
492
492
when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the
Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention
are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the
reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large
majority who did not talk . . . We think it safer to construe the constitution from
what appears upon its face.24
Even if there is need to refer to extrinsic sources in aid of constitutional

interpretation, the constitutional record does not provide the exclusive or definitive
answer on how to interpret the provision. The intent of a constitutional convention is
not controlling by itself, and while the historical discussion on the floor of the
constitutional convention is valuable, it is not necessarily decisive. The Court has
even held in Vera v. Avelino25 that the proceedings of the [constitutional]
convention are less conclusive of the proper construction of the fundamental law
than are legislative proceedings of the proper construction of a statute, since in the
latter case it is the intent of the legislature that courts seek, while in the former
courts are endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the people through the discussions
and deliberations of their representatives.26 The proper interpretation of a
constitution depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than
the framers understanding thereof.27
_______________
24 Id., at p. 337. I have previously expressed my own doubts in relying on the

constitutional or legislative deliberations as a definitive source of construction. It is
easy to selectively cite passages, sometimes out of their proper context, in order to
assert a misleading interpretation. The effect can be dangerous. Minority or solitary
views, anecdotal ruminations, or even the occasional crude witticisms, may
improperly acquire the mantle of legislative intent by the sole virtue of their
publication in the authoritative congressional record. Hence, resort to legislative
deliberations is allowable when the statute is crafted in such a manner as to leave
room for doubt on the real intent of the legislature. Southern Cross Cement
Corporation v. Phil. Cement Manufacturers, G.R. No. 158540, 8 July 2004, 434 SCRA
65, 95.
25 77 Phil. 192 (1946).
26 Id., at p. 215.
27 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, supra note 23, at p. 338; citing
Household Finance Corporation v. Shaffner, 203 S.W. 2d 734, 356 Mo. 808.
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If there is fear in the absence of a constitutional record as guide for interpretation of
any amendments adopted via initiative, such absence would not preclude the courts
from interpreting such amendments in a manner consistent with how courts
generally construe the Constitution. For example, reliance will be placed on the
other provisions of the Constitution to arrive at a harmonized and holistic
constitutional framework. The constitutional record is hardly the Rosetta Stone that
unlocks the meaning of the Constitution.
V.
I fully agree with Justice Puno that all issues relating to the sufficiency of the
initiative petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC. Rep. Act No. 6735 clearly
reposes on the COMELEC the task of determining the sufficiency of the petitions,
including the ascertainment of whether twelve percent (12%) of all registered
voters, including three percent (3%) of registered voters in every legislative district
have indeed signed the initiative petitions.28 It should be remembered that the
COMELEC had dismissed the initiative petitions outright, and had yet to undertake
the determination of sufficiency as required by law.
It has been suggested to the end of leading the Court to stifle the initiative petitions
that the Court may at this juncture pronounce the initiative petitions as insufficient.
The derivation of the factual predicates leading to the suggestion is uncertain,
considering that the trier of facts, the COMELEC in this instance, has yet to
undertake the necessary determination. Still, the premise has been floated that
petitioners have made sufficient admissions before this Court that purportedly
established the petitions are insufficient.
That premise is highly dubitable. Yet the more fundamental question that we should
ask, I submit, is whether it serves well on the Court to usurp trier of facts even
before the latter exercises its functions? If the Court, at this stage, were to declare
the petitions as in_______________
28 See Sections 5(b) & 8, Rep. Act No. 6735. See also 1987 CONST., Sec. 2, Art. XVI.
494
494
sufficient, it would be akin to the Court pronouncing an accused as guilty even
before the lower court trial had began.
Matugas v. COMELEC29 inveighs against the propriety of the Court
uncharacteristically assuming the role of trier of facts, and resolving factual
questions not previously adjudicated by the lower courts or tribunals:
[P]etitioner in this case cannot enervate the COMELECs findings by introducing
new evidence before this Court, which in any case is not a trier of facts, and then
ask it to substitute its own judgment and discretion for that of the COMELEC.
The rule in appellate procedure is that a factual question may not be raised for the
first time on appeal, and documents forming no part of the proofs before the
appellate court will not be considered in disposing of the issues of an action. This is
true whether the decision elevated for review originated from a regular court or an
administrative agency or quasi-judicial body, and whether it was rendered in a civil
case, a special proceeding, or a criminal case. Piecemeal presentation of evidence is
simply not in accord with orderly justice.30
Any present determination by the Court on the sufficiency of the petitions
constitutes in effect a trial de novo, the Justices of the Supreme Court virtually
descending to the level of trial court judges. This is an unbecoming recourse, and it
simply is not done.
VI.
The worst position this Court could find itself in is to acquiesce to a plea that it make
the choice whether to amend the Constitution or not. This is a matter which should
not be left to fifteen magistrates who have not been elected by the people to make
the choice for them.
A vote to grant the petitions is not a vote to amend the 1987 Constitution. It is
merely a vote to allow the people to directly exercise that option. In fact, the
position of Justice Puno which I share would not even guarantee that the Lambino
and Sigaw ng Bayan initiative petitions would be submitted to the people in a
referendum. The
_______________
29 G.R. No. 151944, January 20, 2004, 420 SCRA 365.

30 Id., at p. 377. Emphasis supplied.
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COMELEC will still have to determine the sufficiency of the petition. Among the
questions which still have to be determined by the poll body in considering the
sufficiency of the petitions is whether twelve percent (12%) of all registered voters
nationwide, including three percent (3%) of registered voters in every legislative
district, have indeed signed the initiative petitions.31
And even should the COMELEC find the initiative petitions sufficient, the matter of
whether the Constitution should be amended would still depend on the choice of the
electorate. The oppositors are clearly queasy about some of the amendments
proposed, or the imputed motives behind the amendments. A referendum, should

the COMELEC find the petitions as sufficient, would allow them to convey their
uneasiness to the public at large, as well as for the proponents of the amendment to
defend their proposal. The campaign period alone would allow the public to be
involved in the significant deliberation on the course our nation should take, with
the ensuing net benefit of a more informed, more politically aware populace. And of
course, the choice on whether the Constitution should be amended would lie
directly with the people. The initiative process involves participatory democracy at
its most elemental; wherein the consequential debate would not be confined to the
august halls of Congress or the hallowed chambers of this Court, as it would spill
over to the public squares and town halls, the academic yards and the Internet
blogosphere, the dining areas in the homes of the affluent and the impoverished
alike.
The prospect of informed and widespread discussion on constitutional change
engaged in by a people who are actually empowered in having a say whether these
changes should be enacted, gives fruition to the original vision of pure democracy,
as formulated in Athens two and a half millennia ago. The great hero of Athenian
democracy, Pericles, was recorded as saying in his famed Funeral Oration, We
differ from other states in regarding the man who keeps aloof from public life not as
private but as useless; we decide or debate, care_______________
31 See Sections 5(b) & 8, Rep. Act No. 6735. See also 1987 CONST., Sec. 2, Art. XVI.
496
496
fully and in person all matters of policy, and we hold, not that words and deeds go ill
together, but that acts are foredoomed to failure when undertaken undiscussed.32
Unfortunately, given the highly politicized charge of the times, it has been peddled
that an act or vote that assists the initiative process is one for the willful extinction
of democracy or democratic institutions. Such a consideration should of course
properly play its course in the public debates and deliberations attendant to the
initiative process. Yet as a result of the harum-scarum, the temptation lies heavy for
a member of this Court perturbed with the prospect of constitutional change to
relieve those anxieties by simply voting to enjoin any legal procedure that initiates
the amendment or revision of the fundamental law, even at the expense of the
peoples will or what the Constitution allows. A vote so oriented takes the
conservative path of least resistance, even as it may gain the admiration of those
who do not want to see the Constitution amended.
Still, the biases we should enforce as magistrates are those of the Constitution and
the elements of democracy on which our rule of law is founded. Direct democracy,
as embodied in the initiative process, is but a culmination of the evolution over the
centuries of democratic rights of choice and self-governance. The reemergence of
the Athenian democratic ideal after centuries of tyrannical rules arrived very slowly,
the benefits parceled out at first only to favored classes. The Magna Carta granted
limited rights to self-determination and selfgovernance only to a few English nobles;
the American Constitution was originally intended to give a meaningful voice only to
free men, mostly Caucasian, who met the property-holding requirements set by the
states for voting. Yet even the very idea of popular voting, limited as it may have
already been within the first few years of the American Union, met resistance from
no less a revered figure as Alexander Hamilton, to whom the progressive historian
Howard Zinn attributes these disconcerting words:
_______________
32 From the Funeral Oration by Pericles, as recorded by Thucydides in the History

of the Peloponnesian War.
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The voice of the people has been said to be the voice of God; and however
generally this maxim has been quoted and believed, it is not true in fact. The people
are turbulent and changing; they seldom judge or determine right. Give therefore to
the first class a distinct permanent share in the government Can a democratic
assembly who annually revolve in the mass of the people be supposed steadily to
pursue the public good? Nothing but a permanent body can check the imprudence
of democracy33
This utterly paternalistic and bigoted view has not survived into the present age of
modern democracy where a persons poverty, color, or gender no longer impedes
the exercise of full democratic rights. Yet a democracy that merely guarantees its
citizens the right to live their lives freely is incomplete if there is no corresponding
allowance for a means by which the people have a direct choice in determining their
countrys direction. Initiative as a mode of amending a constitution may seem
incompatible with representative democracy, yet it embodies an even purer form of
democracy. Initiative, which our 1987 Constitution saw fit to grant to the people, is a
progressive measure that is but a continuation of the line of evolution of the
democratic ideal.
By allowing the sovereign people to directly propose and enact constitutional
amendments, the initiative process should be acknowledged as the purest
implement of democratic rule under law. This right granted to over sixty million
Filipinos cannot be denied by the votes of less than eight magistrates for reasons
that bear no cogitation on the Constitution.
I VOTE to GRANT the petitions.
DISSENTING OPINION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The people made the constitution, and the people can unmake it. It is the creature
of their will, and lives only by their will. But this supreme and irresistible power to
make or unmake, resides only in the whole body of the people; not in any
subdivision of them.
_______________
33 H. Zinn, APEOPLESHISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1980 ed.), at 95.

498
498
Marshall, C.J., Cohens v. Virginia (1821, US) 6
Wheat 264, 389, 5 L ed. 257, 287.
I express my concurrence in the discussions and conclusions presented in the
persuasive and erudite dissent of Justice Reynato S. Puno. However, I make some
additional observations in connection with my concurrence.
While it is but proper to accord great respect and reverence to the Philippine
Constitution of 1987 for being the supreme law of the land, we should not lose sight
of the truth that there is an ultimate authority to which the Constitution is also
subordinatethe will of the people. No less than its very first paragraph, the
Preamble,1 expressly recognizes that the Constitution came to be because it was
ordained and promulgated by the sovereign Filipino people. It is a principle
reiterated yet again in Article II, Section 1, of the Constitution, which explicitly
declares that [t]he Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. Thus, the
resolution of the issues and controversies raised by the instant Petition should be
guided accordingly by the foregoing principle.
If the Constitution is the expression of the will of the sovereign people, then, in the
event that the people change their will, so must the Constitution be revised or
amended to reflect such change. Resultantly, the right to revise or amend the
Constitution inherently resides in the sovereign people whose will it is supposed to
express and embody. The Constitution itself, under Article XVII, provides for the
means by which the revision or amendment of the Constitution may be proposed
and ratified.
_______________
1 The full text of the Preamble reads:

We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to
build a just and humane society and establish a Government that shall embody our
ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our
patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of independence
and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love,
equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
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Under Section 1 of the said Article, proposals to amend or revise the Constitution
may be made (a) by Congress, upon a vote of threefourths of all its Members, or (b)
by constitutional convention. The Congress and the constitutional convention
possess the power to propose amendments to, or revisions of, the Constitution not
simply because the Constitution so provides, but because the sovereign people had
chosen to delegate their inherent right to make such proposals to their
representatives either through Congress or through a constitutional convention.
On the other hand, the sovereign people, well-inspired and greatly empowered by
the People Power Revolution of 1986, reserved to themselves the right to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative, to wit
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.2
The afore-quoted section does not confer on the Filipino people the right to amend
the Constitution because, as previously discussed, such right is inherent in them.
The section only reduces into writing this right to initiate amendments to the
Constitution where they collectively and willfully agreed in the manner by which
they shall exercise this right: (a) through the filing of a petition; (b) supported by at
least twelve percent (12%) of the total number of registered voters nationwide; (c)
with each legislative district represented by at least three percent (3%) of the
registered voters therein; (d) subject to the limitation that no such petition may be
filed within five years after the ratification of the Constitution, and not oftener than
once every five years thereafter; and (e) a delegation to Congress of the
_______________
2 Article XVII, Constitution.

500
500
authority to provide the formal requirements and other details for the
implementation of the right.
It is my earnest opinion that the right of the sovereign people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through initiative is more superior than the power
they delegated to Congress or to a constitutional convention to amend or revise the
Constitution. The initiative process gives the sovereign people the voice to express
their collective will, and when the people speak, we must be ready to listen. Article
XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution recognizes and guarantees the sovereign peoples
right to initiative, rather than limits it. The enabling law which Congress has been
tasked to enact must give life to the said provision and make the exercise of the
right to initiative possible, not regulate, limit, or restrict it in any way that would
render the peoples option of resorting to initiative to amend the Constitution more
stringent, difficult, and less feasible, as compared to the other constitutional means
to amend or revise the Constitution. In fact, it is worth recalling that under Article
VI, Section 1 of the Constitution, the legislative power of Congress is limited to the
extent reserved to the people by the provisions on initiative and referendum.
It is with this frame of mind that I review the issues raised in the instant Petitions,
and which has led me to the conclusions, in support of the dissent of Justice Puno,
that (a) The Commission on Election (COMELEC) had indeed committed grave abuse
of discretion in summarily dismissing the petition for initiative to amend the
Constitution filed by herein petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado; (b)
The Court should revisit the pronouncements it made in Santiago v. Commission on
Elections;3 (c) It is the sovereign peoples inherent right to propose changes to the
Constitution, regardless of whether they constitute merely amendments or a total

revision thereof; and (d) The COMELEC should take cognizance of Lambino and
Aumentados petition for initiative and, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, determine
the factual issues raised by the oppositors before this Court.
_______________
3 G.R. No. 127325, 19 March 1997, 270 SCRA 106.

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I
The COMELEC had indeed committed grave abuse of discretion when it summarily
dismissed Lambino and Aumentados petition for initiative entirely on the basis of
the Santiago case which, allegedly, permanently enjoined it from entertaining or
taking cognizance of any petition for initiative to amend the Constitution in the
absence of a sufficient law.
After a careful reading, however, of the Santiago case, I believe in earnest that the
permanent injunction actually issued by this Court against the COMELEC pertains
only to the petition for initiative filed by Jesus S. Delfin, and not to all subsequent
petitions for initiative to amend the Constitution.
The Conclusion4 in the majority opinion in the Santiago case reads
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently
under that system.
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on

_______________
4 Id., at p. 157.
502
502
(UND-96-037).
as against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private
respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
It is clear from the fallo, as it is reproduced above, that the Court made permanent
the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) it issued on 18 December 1996 against the
COMELEC. The said TRO enjoined the COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin
Petition, and Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a signature drive for
peoples initiative.5 It was this restraining order, more particularly the portion
thereof referring to the Delfin Petition, which was expressly made permanent by the
Court. It would seem to me that the COMELEC and all other oppositors to Lambino
and Aumentados petition for initiative gave unwarranted significance and weight to
the first paragraph of the Conclusion in the Santiago case. The first and second
paragraphs of the Conclusion, preceding the dispositive portion, merely express the
opinion of the ponente; while the definite orders of the Court for implementation are
found in the dispositive portion.
We have previously held that
The dispositive portion or the fallo is what actually constitutes the resolution of the
court and which is the subject of execution, although the other parts of the decision
may be resorted to in order to determine the ratio decidendi for such a resolution.
Where there is conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion of the court
contained in the text of the decision, the former must prevail over the latter on the
theory that the dispositive portion is the final order while the opinion is merely a
statement ordering nothing. Hence execution must conform more particularly to
that ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision.6
_______________
5 Id., at p. 124.
6 Olac v. Rivera, G.R. No. 84256, 2 September 1992, 213 SCRA 321, 328329; See
also the more recent cases of Republic v. Nolasco, G.R. No. 155108,
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Is there a conflict between the first paragraph of the Conclusion and the dispositive
portion of the Santiago case? Apparently, there is. The first paragraph of the
Conclusion states that the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to
the Constitution until the enactment of a valid law. On the other hand, the fallo only
makes permanent the TRO7 against COMELEC enjoining it from proceeding with the
Delfin Petition. While the permanent injunction contemplated in the Conclusion
encompasses all petitions for initiative on amendments to the Constitution, the fallo
is expressly limited to the Delfin Petition. To resolve the conflict, the final order of
the Court as it is stated in the dispositive portion or the fallo should be controlling.
Neither can the COMELEC dismiss Lambino and Aumentados petition for initiative
on the basis of this Courts Resolution, dated 23 September 1997, in the case of
Peoples Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. The Commission
on Elections, et al.8 The Court therein found that the COMELEC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the PIRMA Petition for initiative to amend the
Constitution for it only complied with the Decision in the Santiago case.
It is only proper that the Santiago case should also bar the PIRMA Petition on the
basis of res judicata because PIRMA participated in the proceedings of the said case,
and had knowledge of and, thus, must be bound by the judgment of the Court
therein. As explained by former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in his separate
opinion to the Resolution in the PIRMA case
First, it is barred by res judicata. No one aware of the pleadings filed here and in
Santiago v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325, 19 March 1997) may plead ignorance of the
fact that the former is substantially identical to the latter, except for the reversal of
the roles played by the principal parties and
_______________
27 April 2005, 457 SCRA 400; and PH Credit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 421
Phil. 821; 370 SCRA 155 (2001).
7 Supra note 2 at p. 124.
8 G.R. No. 129754.
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inclusion of additional, yet not indispensable, parties in the present petition. But
plainly, the same issues and reliefs are raised and prayed for in both cases.
The principal petitioner here is the PEOPLES INITIATIVE FOR REFORM,
MODERNIZATION, AND ACTION (PIRMA) and Spouses ALBERTO PEDROSA and
CARMEN PEDROSA. PIRMA is self-described as a nonstock, non-profit organization
duly organized and existing under Philippine laws with office address at Suite 403,
Fedman Suites, 199 Salcedo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City, with ALBERTO
PEDROSA and CARMEN PEDROSA as among its officers. In Santiago, the
PEDROSAS were made respondents as founding members of PIRMA which, as
alleged in the body of the petition therein, proposes to undertake the signature
drive for a peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. In Santiago then, the
PEDROSAS were sued in their capacity as founding members of PIRMA.
The decision in Santiago specifically declared that PIRMA was duly represented at
the hearing of the Delfin petition in the COMELEC. In short, PIRMA was intervenorpetitioner therein. Delfin alleged in his petition that he was a founding member of
the Movement for Peoples Initiative, and under footnote no. 6 of the decision, it was
noted that said movement was [l]ater identified as the Peoples Initiative for
Reforms, Modernization and Action, or PIRMA for brevity. In their Comment to the
petition in Santiago, the PEDROSAS did not deny that they were founding members
of PIRMA, and by their arguments, demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt that
they had joined Delfin or his cause.
No amount of semantics may then shield herein petitioners PIRMA and the
PEDROSAS, as well as the others joining them, from the operation of the principle of
res judicata, which needs no further elaboration.9
While the Santiago case bars the PIRMA case because of res judicata, the same
cannot be said to the Petition at bar. Res judicata is an absolute bar to a subsequent
action for the same cause; and its requisites are: (a) the former judgment or order
must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be one on the merits; (c) it must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
_______________
9 Separate Opinion of former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. to the Resolution,
dated 23 September 1997, in G.R. No. 129754, PIRMA v. Commission on Elections,
pp. 2-3.
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VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006

505
parties; and (d) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of
parties, of subject matter and of causes of action.10
Even though it is conceded that the first three requisites are present herein, the last
has not been complied with. Undoubtedly, the Santiago case and the present
Petition involve different parties, subject matter, and causes of action, and the
former should not bar the latter.
In the Santiago case, the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution was filed
by Delfin alone. His petition does not qualify as the initiatory pleading over which
the COMELEC can acquire jurisdiction, being unsupported by the required number of
registered voters, and actually imposing upon the COMELEC the task of gathering
the voters signatures. In the case before us, the petition for initiative to amend the
Constitution was filed by Lambino and Aumentado, on behalf of the 6.3 million
registered voters who affixed their signatures on the signature sheets attached
thereto. Their petition prays that the COMELEC issue an Order
1. Finding the petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution;
2. Directing the publication of the petition in Filipino and English at least twice in
after the Certification by the COMELEC of the sufficiency of the petition, to allow the
Filipino people to express their sovereign will on the proposition.
Although both cases involve the right of the people to initiate amendments to the
Constitution, the personalities concerned and the other factual circumstances
attendant in the two cases differ. Also dissimilar are the particular prayer and reliefs
sought by the parties from the COMELEC, as well as from this Court.
For these reasons, I find that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it summarily dismissed the petition for
_______________
10 Mirpuri v. Court of Appeals, 376 Phil. 628, 650; 318 SCRA 516, 537 (1999).
506
506
initiative filed by Lambino and Aumentado. It behooves the COMELEC to accord due
course to a petition which on its face complies with the rudiments of the law.
COMELEC was openly negligent in summarily dismissing the Lambino and
Aumentado petition. The haste by which the instant Petition was struck down is
characteristic of bad faith, which, to my mind, is a patent and gross evasion of
COMELECs positive duty. It has so obviously copped out of its duty and
responsibility to determine the sufficiency thereof and sought protection and
justification for its craven decision in the supposed permanent injunction issued
against it by the Court in the Santiago case. The COMELEC had seemingly expanded
the scope and application of the said permanent injunction, reading into it more
than what it actually states, which is surprising, considering that the Chairman and
majority of the members of COMELEC are lawyers who should be able to understand
and appreciate, more than a lay person, the legal consequences and intricacies of
the pronouncements made by the Court in the Santiago case and the permanent
injunction issued therein.
No less than the Constitution itself, under the second paragraph of Article XVII,
Section 4, imposes upon the COMELEC the mandate to set a date for plebiscite after
a positive determination of the sufficiency of a petition for initiative on amendments
to the Constitution, viz.
SEC. 4. x x x
As a rule, the word shall commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is
inconsistent with the idea of discretion, and that the presumption is that the word
shall when used, is mandatory.11 Under the above-quoted constitutional
provision, it is the mandatory or
_______________
11 Pioneer Texturizing Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.

118651, 16 October 1997; 280 SCRA 806.
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VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006

507
imperative obligation of the COMELEC to (a) determine the sufficiency of the
petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution and issue a certification on
its findings; and (b) in case such petition is found to be sufficient, to set the date for
the plebiscite on the proposed amendments not earlier than 60 days nor later than
90 days after its certification.
The COMELEC should not be allowed to shun its constitutional mandate under the
second paragraph of Article XVII, Section 4, through the summary dismissal of the
petition for initiative filed by Lambino and Aumentado, when such petition is
supported by 6.3 million signatures of registered voters. Should all of these
signatures be authentic and representative of the required percentages of
registered voters for every legislative district and the whole nation, then the
initiative is a true and legitimate expression of the will of the people to amend the
Constitution, and COMELEC had caused them grave injustice by silencing their voice
based on a patently inapplicable permanent injunction.
II
We should likewise take the opportunity to revisit the pronouncements made by the
Court in its Decision in the Santiago case, especially as regards the supposed
insufficiency or inadequacy of Republic Act No. 6735 as the enabling law for the
implementation of the peoples right to initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.
The declaration of the Court that Republic Act No. 6735 is insufficient or inadequate
actually gave rise to more questions rather than answers, due to the fact that there
has never been a judicial precedent wherein the Court invalidated a law for
insufficiency or inadequacy. The confusion over such a declaration thereby impelled
former Chief Justice Davide, Jr., the ponente in the Santiago case, to provide the
following clarification in his separate opinion to the Resolution in the PIRMA case,
thus
Simply put, Santiago did, in reality, declare as unconstitutional that portion of R.A.
No. 6735 relating to Constitutional initiatives for failure to comply with the
completeness and sufficient standard tests with respect to permissible delegation
of legislative power or subordinate legislation. How508
508

ever petitioners attempt to twist the language in Santiago, the conclusion is
inevitable; the portion of R.A. No. 6735 was held to be unconstitutional.
It is important to note, however, that while the Decision in the Santiago case
pronounced repeatedly that Republic Act No. 6735 was insufficient and inadequate,
there is no categorical declaration therein that the said statute was
unconstitutional. The express finding that Republic Act No. 6735 is unconstitutional
can only be found in the separate opinion of former Chief Justice Davide to the
Resolution in the PIRMA case, which was not concurred in by the other members of
the Court.
Even assuming arguendo that the declaration in the Santiago case, that Republic
Act No. 6735 is insufficient and inadequate, is already tantamount to a declaration
that the statute is unconstitutional, it was rendered in violation of established rules
in statutory construction, which state that
[A]ll presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a
statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable
doubt (Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54 [1974). In fact, this
Court does not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless that question is
properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a
determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be lis mota
presented (Tropical Homes v. National Housing Authority, 152 SCRA 540 [1987]).
First, the Court, in the Santiago case, could have very well avoided the issue of
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6735 by ordering the COMELEC to dismiss the
Delfin petition for the simple reason that it does not constitute an initiatory pleading
over which the COMELEC could acquire jurisdiction. And second, the
unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 6735 has not been adequately shown. It was
by and large merely inferred or deduced from the way Republic Act No. 6735 was
worded and the provisions thereof arranged and organized by Congress. The
dissenting opinions rendered by several Justices in the Santiago case reveal the
other side to the argument, adopting the more liberal interpretation that would
allow the Court to sustain the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6735. It would
seem that the
509
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006

509
majority in the Santiago case failed to heed the rule that all presumptions should be
resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the statute.
The Court, acting en banc on the Petition at bar, can revisit its Decision in the
Santiago case and again open to judicial review the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 6735; in which case, I shall cast my vote in favor of its constitutionality, having
satisfied the completeness and sufficiency of standards tests for the valid
delegation of legislative power. I fully agree in the conclusion made by Justice Puno
on this matter in his dissenting opinion12 in the Santiago case, that reads
R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently states the policy and the standards to guide the
COMELEC in promulgating the laws implementing rules and regulations of the law.
As aforestated, Section 2 spells out the policy of the law; viz.: The power of the
people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact,
approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or
resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements
of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. Spread out all over R.A.
No. 6735 are the standards to canalize the delegated power to the COMELEC to
promulgate rules and regulations from overflowing. Thus, the law states the number
of signatures necessary to start a peoples initiative, directs how initiative
proceeding is commenced, what the COMELEC should do upon filing of the petition
for initiative, how a proposition is approved, when a plebiscite may be held, when
the amendment takes effect, and what matters may not be the subject of any
initiative. By any measure, these standards are adequate.
III
The dissent of Justice Puno has already a well-presented discourse on the difference
between an amendment and a revision of the Constitution. Allow me also to
articulate my additional thoughts on the matter.
Oppositors to Lambino and Aumentados petition for initiative argue that the
proposed changes therein to the provisions of the Consti_______________
12 Santiago v. Commission on Elections, supra note 2 at pp. 170-171.

510
510
tution already amount to a revision thereof, which is not allowed to be done through
peoples initiative; Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution on peoples initiative
refers only to proposals for amendments to the Constitution. They assert the
traditional distinction between an amendment and a revision, with amendment
referring to isolated or piecemeal change only, while revision as a revamp or

rewriting of the whole instrument.13
However, as pointed out by Justice Puno in his dissent, there is no quantitative or
qualitative test that can establish with definiteness the distinction between an
amendment and a revision, or between a substantial and simple change of the
Constitution.
The changes proposed to the Constitution by Lambino and Aumentados petition for
initiative basically affect only Article VI on the Legislative Department and Article VII
on the Executive Department. While the proposed changes will drastically alter the
constitution of our government by vesting both legislative and executive powers in
a unicameral Parliament, with the President as the Head of State and the Prime
Minister exercising the executive power; they would not essentially affect the other
16 Articles of the Constitution. The 100 or so changes counted by the oppositors to
the other provisions of the Constitution are constituted mostly of the nominal
substitution of one word for the other, such as Parliament for Congress, or Prime
Minister for President. As eloquently pointed out in the dissent of Justice Puno, the
changes proposed to transform our form of government from bicameral-presidential
to unicameral-parliamentary, would not affect the fundamental nature of our state
as a democratic and republican state. It will still be a representative government
where officials continue to be accountable to the people and the people maintain
control over the government through the election of members of the Parliament.
Furthermore, should the people themselves wish to change a substantial portion or
even the whole of the Constitution, what or who is to stop them? Article XVII,
Section 2 of the Constitution which, by the way it is worded, refers only to their right
to initiative on amend_______________
13 Isagani A. Cruz, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW, 1996 ed., p. 352.

511
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006

511
ments of the Constitution? The delegates to the Constitutional Convention who,
according to their deliberations, purposely limited Article XVII, Section 2 of the
Constitution to amendments? This Court which has the jurisdiction to interpret the
provision? Bearing in mind my earlier declaration that the will of the sovereign
people is supreme, there is nothing or no one that can preclude them from initiating
changes to the Constitution if they choose to do so. To reiterate, the Constitution is
supposed to be the expression and embodiment of the peoples will, and should the
peoples will clamor for a revision of the Constitution, it is their will which should
prevail. Even the fact that the people ratified the 1987 Constitution, including
Article XVII, Section 2 thereof, as it is worded, should not prevent the exercise by
the sovereign people of their inherent right to change the Constitution, even if such
change would be tantamount to a substantial amendment or revision thereof, for
their actual exercise of the said right should be a clear renunciation of the limitation
which the said provision imposes upon it. It is the inherent right of the people as
sovereign to change the Constitution, regardless of the extent thereof.
IV
Lastly, I fail to see the injustice in allowing the COMELEC to give due course to and
take cognizance of Lambino and Aumentados petition for initiative to amend the
Constitution. I reiterate that it would be a greater evil if one such petition which is
ostensibly supported by the required number of registered voters all over the
country, be summarily dismissed.
Giving due course and taking cognizance of the petition would not necessarily mean
that the same would be found sufficient and set for plebiscite. The COMELEC still
faces the task of reviewing the petition to determine whether it complies with the
requirements for a valid exercise of the right to initiative. Questions raised by the
oppositors to the petition, such as those on the authenticity of the registered voters
signatures or compliance with the requisite number of registered voters for every
legislative district, are already factual in nature and require the reception and
evaluation of evidence of the
512
512
parties. Such questions are best presented and resolved before the COMELEC since
this Court is not a trier of facts.
In view of the foregoing, I am of the position that the Resolution of the COMELEC
dated 31 August 2006 denying due course to the Petition for Initiative filed by
Lambino and Aumentado be reversed and set aside for having been issued in grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and that the Petition be
remanded to the COMELEC for further proceedings.
In short, I vote to GRANT the petition for Initiative of Lambino and Aumentado.
SEPARATE OPINION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Introduction
The fate of every democracy, of every government based on the Sovereignty of the
people, depends on the choices it makes between these opposite principles;
absolute power on the one hand, and on the other the restraints of legality and the
authority of tradition.
John Acton
In this thorny matter of the peoples initiative, I concur with the erudite and highly
persuasive opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno upholding the peoples initiative and
raise some points of my own.
The issue of the peoples power to propose amendments to the Constitution was
once discussed in the landmark case of Santiago v. COMELEC.1 Almost a decade
later, the issue is once again before the Court, and I firmly believe it is time to
reevaluate the pronouncements made in that case.
The issue of Charter Change is one that has sharply divided the nation, and its
proponents and opponents will understandably take
_______________
1 G.R. No. 127535, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.

513
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006

513
all measures to advance their position and defeat that of their opponents. The
wisdom or folly of Charter Change does not concern the Court. The only thing that
the Court must review is the validity of the present step taken by the proponents of
Charter Change, which is the Peoples Initiative, as set down in Article XVII, Sec. 2 of
the 1987 Constitution:
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
In the Santiago case, the Court discussed whether the second paragraph of that
section had been fulfilled. It determined that Congress had not provided for the
implementation of the exercise of the peoples initiative, when it held that Republic
Act No. 6735, or The Initiative and Referendum Act, was inadequate to cover the
system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to
provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation.2
With all due respect to those Justices who made that declaration, I must disagree.
Republic Act No. 6735 is the proper law for proposing constitutional amendments
and it should not have been considered inadequate.
The decision in Santiago focused on what it perceived to be fatal flaws in the
drafting of the law, in the failings of the way the law was structured, to come to the
conclusion that the law was inadequate. The Court itself recognized the legislators
intent, but disregarded this intent. The law was found wanting. The Court then saw
the in_______________
2 Id.
514
514
clusion of the Constitution in RA 6735 as an afterthought. However, it was included,
and it should not be excluded by the Court via a strained analysis of the law. The
difficult construction of the law should not serve to frustrate the intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution: to give the people the power to propose
amendments as they saw fit. It is a basic precept in statutory construction that the
intent of the legislature is the controlling factor in the interpretation of a statute.3
The intent of the legislature was clear, and yet RA 6735 was declared inadequate. It
was not specifically struck down or declared unconstitutional, merely incomplete.
The Court focused on what RA 6735 was not, and lost sight of what RA 6735 was.
It is my view that the reading of RA 6735 in Santiago should have been more
flexible. It is also a basic precept of statutory construction that statutes should be
construed not so much according to the letter that killeth but in line with the
purpose for which they have been enacted.4 The reading of the law should not have
been with the view of its defeat, but with the goal of upholding it, especially with its
avowed noble purpose.
Congress has done its part in empowering the people themselves to propose
amendments to the Constitution, in accordance with the Constitution itself. It should
not be the Supreme Court that stifles the people, and lets their cries for change go
unheard, especially when the Constitution itself grants them that power.
The courts ruling in the Santiago case does not bar the present petition because
the fallo in the Santiago case is limited to the Delfin petition.
The Santiago case involved a petition for prohibition filed by Miriam DefensorSantiago, et al., against the COMELEC, et al.,
_______________
3 Commission on Audit of the Province of Cebu v. Province of Cebu, G.R. No.

141386, November 29, 2001, 371 SCRA 196, 202.
4 United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Association of
International Shipping Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 133763, November 13, 2002, 391 SCRA
522, 533.
515
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006

515
which sought to prevent the COMELEC from entertaining the Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by Peoples Initiative filed by
Atty. Jesus Delfin. In the body of the judgment, the Court made the following
conclusion, viz.:
This petition must then be granted and the COMELEC should be permanently
enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition or initiative on
amendments on the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly
enacted to provide for the implementation of the system (emphasis supplied).
under that system.
In the said case, the Courts fallo states as follows:
b) DECLARING R.A. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolutions No. 2300 of the Commission on

(UND-96-037).
as against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED against private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
SO ORDERED.
The question now is if the ruling in Santiago is decisive in this case. It is elementary
that when there is conflict between the dispositive portion or fallo of the decision
and the opinion of the court con516
516
tained in the text or body of the judgment, the former prevails over the latter. An
order of execution is based on the disposition, not on the body, of the decision.5
The dispositive portion is its decisive resolution; thus, it is the subject of execution.
The other parts of the decision may be resorted to in order to determine the ratio
decidendi for the disposition. Where there is conflict between the dispositive part
and the opinion of the court contained in the text or body of the decision, the former
must prevail over the latter on the theory that the dispositive portion is the final
order, while the opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing. Hence, the
execution must conform with that which is ordained or decreed in the dispositive
portion of the decision.6
A judgment must be distinguished from an opinion. The latter is an informal
expression of the views of the court and cannot prevail against its final order or
decision. While the two may be combined in one instrument, the opinion forms no
part of the judgment. So there is a distinction between the findings and conclusions
of a court and its Judgment. While they may constitute its decision and amount to
the rendition of a judgment, they are not the judgment itself. It is not infrequent that
the grounds of a decision fail to reflect the exact views of the court, especially those
of concurring justices in a collegiate court. We often encounter in judicial decisions
lapses, findings, loose statements and generalities which do not bear on the issues
or are apparently opposed to the otherwise sound and considered result reached by
the court as expressed in the dispositive part, so called, of the decision.7
Applying the foregoing argument to the Santiago case, it immediately becomes

apparent that the disposition in the latter case categorically made permanent the
December 18, 1996 Temporary Restraining Order issued against the COMELEC in
the Delfin petition but did NOT formally incorporate therein any directive PERMA_______________
5 PH Credit Corporation v. Court of Appeals and Carlos M. Farrales, G.R. No. 109648,
November 22, 2001, 370 SCRA 155, 166-167.
6 Id.
7 Florentino v. Rivera, et al., G.R. No. 167968, January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 522, 529.
517
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006

517
NENTLY enjoining the COMELEC from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
petition for initiative on amendments. Undeniably, the perpetual proscription
against the COMELEC from assuming jurisdiction over any other petition on Charter
Change through a Peoples Initiative is just a conclusion and cannot bind the poll
body, for such unending ban would trench on its constitutional power to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recall under Section 2, Article IX of the Constitution. RA
6735 gave the COMELEC the jurisdiction to determine the sufficiency of the petition
on the initiative under Section 8, Rule 11 and the form of the petition under Section
3, Rule I; hence, it cannot be barred from entertaining any such petition.
In sum, the COMELEC still retains its jurisdiction to take cognizance of any petition
on initiative under RA 6735 and it can rule on the petition and its action can only be
passed upon by the Court when the same is elevated through a petition for
certiorari. COMELEC cannot be barred from acting on said petitions since jurisdiction
is conferred by law (RA 6735) and said law has not been declared unconstitutional
and hence still valid though considered inadequate in the Santiago case.
Respondents, however, claim that the Court in the subsequent case of PIRMA v.
Commission on Elections8 confirmed the statement of the Court in the Santiago
case that the COMELEC was permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments. Much reliance is placed
on the ruling contained in a Minute Resolution which reads:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of Discretion could
be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in Dismissing the petition filed by
PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only Complied with the DISPOSITIONS in the
Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its
_______________
8 G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997.

518
518
Take note that the Court specifically referred to dispositions in the March 19, 1997
Decision. To reiterate, the dispositions in the Santiago case decision refer
specifically to the December 18, 1996 TRO being made permanent against the
COMELEC but do not pertain to a permanent injunction against any other petition
for initiative on amendment. Thus, what was confirmed or even affirmed in the
Minute Resolution in the PIRMA case pertains solely to the December 18, 1996 TRO
which became permanent, the declaration of the inadequacy of RA 6735, and the
annulment of certain parts of Resolution No. 2300 but certainly not the alleged
perpetual injunction against the initiative petition. Thus, the resolution in the PIRMA
case cannot be considered res judicata to the Lambino petition.
Amendment or Revision
One last matter to be considered is whether the petition may be allowed under RA
6735, since only amendments to the Constitution may be the subject of a peoples
initiative.
The Lambino petition cannot be considered an act of revising the Constitution; it is
merely an attempt to amend it. The term amendment has to be liberally construed
so as to effectuate the peoples efforts to amend the Constitution.
As an eminent constitutionalist, Dean Vicente G. Sinco,9 explained:
provisions. But whatever results the revision may produce, the factor that
one.
_______________
9 Sinco, Vicente G., PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW,PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPT 46

(1962).
519
VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006

519
intention rather is to improve specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to
it provisions deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress
portions of it that seem obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their effect.
In this case, the Lambino petition is not concerned with rewriting the entire
Constitution. It was never its intention to revise the whole Constitution. It merely
concerns itself with amending a few provisions in our fundamental charter.
When there are gray areas in legislation, especially in matters that pertain to the
sovereign peoples political rights, courts must lean more towards a more liberal
interpretation favoring the peoples right to exercise their sovereign power.
Conclusion
Sovereignty residing in the people is the highest form of sovereignty and thus
deserves the highest respect even from the courts. It is not something that can be
overruled, set aside, ignored or stomped over by whatever amount of technicalities,
blurred or vague provisions of the law.
As I find RA 6735 to be adequate as the implementing law for the Peoples Initiative,
I vote to grant the petition in G.R. No. 174153 and dismiss the petition in G.R. No.
174299. The Amended Petition for Initiative filed by petitioners Raul L. Lambino and
Erico B. Aumentado should be remanded to the COMELEC for determination whether
or not the petition is sufficient under RA 6735, and if the petition is sufficient, to
schedule and hold the necessary plebiscite as required by RA 6735.
It is time to let the peoples voice be heard once again as it was twenty years ago.
And should this voice demand a change in the Constitution, the Supreme Court
should not be one to stand in its way.
520
520

Petition in G.R. No. 174153 dismissed.
Notes.When the sovereignty of the people expressed thru the ballot is at stake, it
is not enough for the Supreme Court to make a statement but it should do
everything to have that sovereignty obeyed by allwell done is always better than
well said. (Loong vs. Commission on Elections, 305 SCRA 832 [1999])
It is familiar learning that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful
revolution by people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government
automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. (Estrada vs. Desierto, 353 SCRA
452 [2001])
Ours is a representative democracyas distinguished from a direct democracyin
which the sovereign will of the people is expressed through the ballot, whether in an
election, referendum, initiative, recall (in the case of local officials) or plebiscite.
(Justice Mendoza, Concurring in Estrada vs. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452 [2001])
The Supreme Court should never validate the action of a mob and declare it
constitutional. (Justice Ynares-Santiago, Separate Opinion in Estrada v. Desierto, 353
SCRA 452 [2001])
No doomsday scenario will ever justify the thrashing of the Constitutionthe
Constitution is meant to be our rule both in good times as in bad times. (Justice
Puno, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Abakada Guro Party List vs. Ermita, 469
SCRA 1 [2005])
Our people express their mighty sovereignty mainly thru the election ballot where
they decide, free from any fetter, who will represent them in governmentin a
representative government, the choice by the people of who will be their voice is
nothing less than sacred, hence, its desecration is unpardonable. (People v.
Hernandez, 499 SCRA 688 [2006])
o0o
521
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Commission on Elections, 505 SCRA 160(2006)]

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160

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006

TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor.

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affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the

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theory advocating that a proposed change involving a radical structural change in

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only for amendments. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential to a

VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006

Constitutional Law; Amendments and Revisions of the Constitution; Peoples

VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006

Constitutional Law; Amendments and Revisions of the Constitution; Peoples

VOL. 505, OCTOBER 25, 2006

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or substantial.The words simple and substantial are not subject to any

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change, including complex changes while revision means complete change,

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Constitutional Law; Amendments and Revisions of the Constitution; Peoples

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meant to safeguard the integrity of the initiative process by ensuring that no

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resulting governmental framework are nonetheless radically different.

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other mode than as allowed by existing law, either constitutional or statutory, it

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governmental form and scheme would probably be interpreted as a revision and

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Constitutional Law; Amendments and Revisions of the Constitution; Peoples

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Constitutional Law; Amendments and Revisions of the Constitution; Peoples

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hearing, whether full-blown or trial-type hearing, summary hearing or administrative

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Constitutional Law; Amendments and Revisions of the Constitution; Peoples

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of a unicameral or one-chamber body, is sustainable. The text of the changes

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initiative, and mandates Congress to provide for the implementation of the

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Magna Carta granted limited rights to self-determination and self-governance only

Constitutional Law; Amendments and Revisions of the Constitution; Peoples

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Constitutional Law; Amendments and Revisions of the Constitution; Peoples

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Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; Judgments; A judgment must be distinguished

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(c) The petition shall state the following:

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(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at