ALVAREZ vs GUINGONA

SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, SENATOR JOSE D. LINA, JR., MR. NICASIO B. BAUTISTA, MR. JESUS P. GONZAGA, MR. SOLOMON D.
MAYLEM, LEONORA C. MEDINA, CASIANO S. ALIPON, petitioners, vs. HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, HON. RAFAEL ALUNAN, in his capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as
Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. JOSE MIRANDA, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of Santiago and HON.
CHARITO MANUBAY, HON. VICTORINO MIRANDA, JR., HON. ARTEMIO ALVAREZ, HON. DANILO VERGARA, HON. PETER DE JESUS, HON.
NELIA NATIVIDAD, HON. CELSO CALEON and HON. ABEL MUSNGI, in their capacity as SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBERS, MR. RODRIGO
L. SANTOS, in his capacity as Municipal Treasurer, and ATTY. ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, in his capacity as Municipal Administrator,
respondents.

January 31, 1996

Hermosisima, Jr., J.

FACTS: Petitioners assail the validity of RA 7720 entitled An Act Converting the
Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an Independent Component City to be known as the
City of Santiago on 2 grounds: 1) the Act did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives as mandated by the Constitution1; and 2) the Municipality of Santiago
has not met the minimum average annual income required under Sec 450 of the LGC.
Legislative process of RA 7720:
On April 18, 1993, HB 8817 was filed in the HOR. It went through 3 readings. On January
28, 1994, HB 8817 was transmitted to the Senate.
A counterpart of HB 8817, SB 1243, was filed in the Senate on May 19, 1993.
Senate Committee on Local Government recommended that HB 8817 be approved
without amendment, taking into consideration that it was on all fours with SB No. 1243.
Senator Alvarez, one of the petitioners, approved of the recommendation. The bill was
eventually approved by the Senate. The HOR approved the amendments made by the
Senate. The enrolled bill was submitted to the President, and was signed into law as RA
7720. A plebiscite was held on July 13, 1994. A great majority of the registered voters of
Santiago voted in favor of the conversion of Santiago into a city.
ISSUE: WON Santiago could qualify into a city because its average annual income is
less than that prescribed by the LGC (YES)
WON RA 7720 complied with Sec 24, Art VI of the Constitution (Yes)
RATIO: Petitioners claim that Santiago could not qualify into a component city because
its average annual income for the last 2 consecutive years falls below the required
annual income of P20,000,000.00. In computing the income, petitioners deducted the
IRA of Santiago. They argue that IRAs are not actually income but transfers and/or
budgetary aid from the national government. Petitioners' computation of average annual
income: P13,109,560.47. Computation of the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the
Department of Finance: P20,974,581.97.
Petitioners are wrong. IRAs form part of the income of LGUs. LGU is a political subdivision
of the State which is constituted by law and possessed of substantial control over its own
affairs. It is an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but not intended, to
be an imperium in imperio. The LGUs are autonomous in the sense that they are given
more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources, which the LGUs to develop not
only at their own pace and discretion but also with their own resources and assets.
The vesting of duty, responsibility and accountability in every LGU is accompanied with a
provision for reasonably adequate resources. Availment of such resources is effectuated
through the vesting in every local government unit of (1) the right to create and broaden
its own source of revenue; (2) the right to be allocated a just share in national taxes,
such share being in the form of IRAs; and (3) the right to be given its equitable share in
the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth within its
territorial boundaries. The funds generated from these accrue to the general fund of the
LGU. IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds
of the LGU. IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of
any further action on the part of the LGU. They thus constitute income of the LGU.
Sec 450 (c), LGC: the average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
1

Sec 24, Art VI: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills,
shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

A bill of local application like HB 8817 should originate exclusively in the HOR. Petitioners
claim that RA 7720 did not originate exclusively in the HOR because a similar bill, SB
1243, was passed in the Senate. Their contention is untenable. It cannot be denied that
HB 8817 was filed first. It was the bill which initiated the legislative process with
culminated to RA 7720.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition dismissed.
BASCO vs PAGCOR
Humberto Basco, Edilberto Balce, Socrates Maranan, and Lorenzo Sanchez (Petitioners) vs Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation (Respondent)

May 14, 1991

Paras, J.

Facts: Petitioners filed the present petition seeking to annul the PD 1869, the PAGCOR Charter.
Among other things, hey contend that PD 1896 waived the Manila City government's right to
impose taxes and license fees, and that it has intruded into the local government's right to
impose local taxes and license fees, in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of
local autonomy.
Background on PAGCOR: PAGCOR was created by virtue of PF 1067-A, and was granted a
franchise under PD 1067-B. It proved to be a potential source of revenue, thus PD. 1399 was
passed for PAGCOR to fully attain this objective. PAGCOR was created under PD 1869 to enable
the Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise
or permitted by law. It was given territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines. PAGCOR is the
third largest source of government revenue, next to the BIR and Customs.

ISSUE: WON PAGCOR is invalid for violating the principle of local autonomy (No)

RATIO: Petitioners' argument is directed against Sec 13 par(2) of PD 1869 2. Their argument,
however, has no merit. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent
right to impose taxes. Its power to tax must always yield to a legislative act which is superior
having been passed upon by the state itself which has the inherent power to tax.
- The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. Municipal corporations are
mere creatures of Congress, which has the power to create and abolish municipal corporations.
Congress has the power of control over Local governments. It can grant the power to tax; it can
provide exemptions; it can take back the power.
- Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling has long been revoked by PD 771.
- Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR
is a GOCC with an original charter, PD 1869. Being an instrumentality of the Government,
PAGCOR is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or
subjected to control by a mere Local government.
- The above doctrine emanates from the supremacy of the National Government over local
governments.
- Holmes of US SC: no state or political subdivision can regulate a federal instrumentality in such
a way as to prevent it from consummating its federal responsibilities, or even to seriously burden
it in the accomplishment of them.
- Sec, 5 Art X of the Constitution (Local Autonomy Clause) provides: Each local government unit
shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other
charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with
the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the
local government.
- The power of local government to impose taxes and fees is always subject to "limitations" of
Congress. The exemption clause of PD 1869 remains as an exception to the exercise of the power
of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot be violative but rather is consistent with
the principle of local autonomy.
- The principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means decentralization
(Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission). It does not make local governments sovereign
within the state or an imperium in imperio.
- The Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a state which is
constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. Local governments can only be an
intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio. Local
government in such a system can only mean a measure of decentralization of the function of
government.
- As to what state powers should be decentralized, and be delegated to LGU remains a matter of
policy, which concerns wisdom, and is therefore a political question.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition dismissed.

VILAS vs CITY OF MANILA

VERISIMO VASQUEZ VILAS, Plff. in Err. and Appt., v. CITY OF MANILA. NO 53.
ESPERANZA OTERO TRIGAS et al., Plffs. in Err. and Appts., v. CITY OF MANILA. NO 54.
RICARDO AGUADO, Appt., v. CITY OF MANILA. NO 207.

April 3, 1911
Lurton, J. (US Supreme Court)

(2) Income and other taxes. a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise as well as fees, charges or levies of
whatever nature, whether National or Local, shall be assessed and collected under this franchise from the Corporation; nor shall any form or tax
or charge attach in any way to the earnings of the Corporation, except a franchise tax of five (5%) percent of the gross revenues or earnings
derived by the Corporation from its operations under this franchise. Such tax shall be due and payable quarterly to the National Government and
shall be in lieu of all kinds of taxes, levies, fees or assessments of any kind, nature or description, levied, established or collected by any
municipal, provincial or national government authority

FACTS: The plaintiffs in error, who were plaintiffs below, are creditors of the city of
Manila as it existed before the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States by
the treaty of Paris. The supreme court of the Philippine Islands denied relief, holding that
the present municipality is a totally different corporate entity, and in no way liable for
the debts of the Spanish municipality.
- Background of Manila and the present claims:
- Manila existed before the Spanish conquest as a community of Moros.
- In 1571 Spain occupied what is now known as Manila, and established it as a municipal
corporation. In 1574 there was conferred upon it the title of 'Illustrious and ever loyal city
of Manila.'
- On January 19, 1894, there was a reorganization of the city government under a royal
decree. Under that charter there was power to incur debts for municipal purposes and
power to sue and be sued. The obligations here in suit were incurred under the charter.
- War ensued between Spain and US. US eventually won and occupied the Philippines. On
July 31, 1901, US passed the present incorporating act of Manila, and the city since that
time has been an autonomous municipality.
- Sec 1 of the charter provides: The inhabitants of the city of Manila, residing within the
territory described in 2 of this act, are hereby constituted a municipality, which shall be
known as the city of Manila, and by that name shall have perpetual succession, and shall
possess all the rights of property herein granted or heretofore enjoyed and possessed by
the city of Manila as organized under Spanish sovereignty.
ISSUE: WON the City of Manila is liable for the obligations (Yes)
RATIO: The argument against the liability is that the predecessor of the present city, the
ayuntamiento of Manila was a corporate entity created by the Spanish government, and
that when the sovereignty of Spain was terminated the municipality ipso facto
disappeared for all purposes. This conclusion is reached upon the analogy to a principal
and agent, with the death of the principal ending the agency.
- The argument loses sight of the dual character of municipal corporations. They exercise
powers which are governmental, and powers which are of a private or business
character. In the former it is a governmental subdivision, which exercises part of the
sovereignty of the state. In the latter it is a mere legal entity or juristic person; this
character it stands for the community in the administration of local affairs wholly beyond
the sphere of the public purposes for which its governmental powers are conferred.
- There is no public reason for presuming a municipal corporation's total dissolution as a
mere consequence of military occupation or territorial cession. The suspension of such
governmental functions as are incompatible with the new political relations, But no such
implication may be reasonably indulged beyond that result.
- There is a total abrogation of the former political relations, but the great body of
municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights continues in force until
abrogated or changed by the new ruler.
- Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. McGlinn: whenever political jurisdiction... over any territory
are transferred from one nation or sovereign to another, the municipal laws of the
country, that is, laws which are intended for the protection of private rights, continue in
force until abrogated... by the new government... public property passes from one
government to the other, but private property remains as before, and with it those
municipal laws which are designed to secure its peaceful use and enjoyment.
- Downes v. Bidwell: during military occupation the affairs of the city were in a large part
administered by officials put in place by military order did not operate to dissolve the

corporation... The continuity of the corporate city was not inconsistent with military
occupation or the constitution or institutions of the occupying power...
- The inhabitants of the old city are the incorporators of the new. There is substantially
identity of area. Laying out of view any question of the constitutional guaranty against
impairment of the obligation of contracts, there is, in the absence of express legislative
declaration of a contrary purpose, no reason for supposing that the reincorporation of an
old municipality is intended to permit an escape from the obligations of the old. The
present city is, in every legal sense, the successor of the old. It is entitled to the property
of the predecessor corporation, and is subject to all of its liabilities.
DISPOSITIVE: Judgments reversed and remanded
LIDASAN vs COMELEC
Bara Lidasan (Petitioner) vs Commission on Election (Respondent)
October 25, 1967
Sanchez, J.
FACTS: RA 4790 entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of
Lanao del Sur" was enacted. It mandated that 21 barrios would become part of the new
municipality of Dianaton. However, out of the 21 municipalities stated, 12 belong to the
province of Cotabato, and not Lanao Del Sur.
- Comelec adopted a Resolution with regard to the elections of Dianaton. It issued
another Resolution stating that it will implement RA 4790.
- Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of one of the Cotabato municipalities included in RA
4790, filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with the SC. He argues that
the law is unconstitutional for violating the constitutional mandate that no law shall
embrace more than one subject as expressed in its title.
ISSUE: WON RA 4790 is unconstitutional for having more than one subject (Yes)
WON RA 4790 is divisible (No. It is indivisible. Thus, the whole act is void.)

RATIO: Dual limitation of the constitutional provision3 upon legislative power: 1)

Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous
subjects; 2) The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the
legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.
- The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading. A title which is so
uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the
enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading is bad.
- The title of the law created the impression that only the province of Lanao del Sur is
affected. It does not state that parts of Cotabato are included. The title is misleading and
deceptive. Thus, RA 4790 is null and void.
- Comelec suggests that the law can still be saved, that the Cotabato municipalities in
the law can be removed, and Dianaton can be created with the 9 remaining Lanao
municipalities.
- But while the valid portion of the law can be separated from the void portion, the valid
portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that
the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could not
constitutionally enact the other.
- The Court could not indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended to create the
restricted area of nine barrios in into the town of Dianaton, if the twelve barrios in
Cotabato were to be excluded.
- Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They serve as an instrumentality
of the State in carrying out the functions of government. Secondly. They act as an
agency of the community in the administration of local affairs. It is in the latter character
that they are a separate entity acting for their own purposes and not a subdivision of the
State.

Art VI, Sec 21(1), 1935 Constitution: No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in
the title of the bill.

- Consequently, several factors come into consideration of whether a group of barrios is

capable of maintaining itself as an independent municipality. Amongst these are
population, territory, and income, as shown in the bill's explanatory note 4.
- The totality of the 21 barrios, not 9, was in the mind of the law's proponent. This is
evident by the fact that the law itslef states that the seat of the government is in Togaig,
which is in Cotabato.
- Being indivisible, the whole law is void.
DISPOSITIVE: RA 4790 declared null and void.
Fernando (Dissenting):
- The title makes evident what is the subject matter of such an enactment. The mere fact
the statute contains barrios found in another province does not of itself suffice for a
finding of nullity.
- The law is not to be narrowly construed though as to cripple or impede proper
legislation. The construction must be reasonable and not technical. It is sufficient if the
title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which the
statute seeks to effect.
- Jurisprudence on the matter does not construe strictly. It is also a basic principle that a
statute must be given a construction which supports its constitutionality.

REPUBLIC vs CITY OF DAVAO

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), CLARENCE L. BAGUILAT, in his capacity as the Regional Executive Director of
DENR-Region XI and ENGR. BIENVENIDO L. LIPAYON, in his capacity as the Regional Director of the DENR-ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT BUREAU (DENR-EMB), Region XI, petitioners, vs. THE CITY OF DAVAO, represented by BENJAMIN C. DE GUZMAN, City
Mayor, respondent.

September 12, 2002

Ynares-Santiago, J.

FACTS: On August 11, 2000, Davao filed an application for a Certificate of Non-Coverage
(CNC) for its proposed project, the Davao City Artica Sports Dome, with the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), Region XI. Attached to the application were
the required documents for its issuance.
- EMB Region XI denied the application after finding that the proposed project was within
an environmentally critical area and ruled that, pursuant to Sec 2 of PD 1586, otherwise
known as the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) System, in relation to Sec 4 of PD
1151, also known as the Philippine Environment Policy, Davao must undergo the
4 The territory is now a progressive community; the aggregate population is large; and the collective income is sufficient to maintain an independent
municipality.
autonomy.

This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants concerned to govern themselves and enjoy the blessings of municipal

environmental impact assessment (EIA) process to secure an Environmental Compliance

Certificate (ECC), before it can proceed.
- Davao filed a petition for Mandamus with the RTC. It alleged that its proposed project
was neither an environmentally critical project nor within an environmentally critical
area; thus it was outside the scope of the EIS system.
- RTC ruled in favor of Davao. It said that there is nothing in the law which requires LGUs
to comply. Only agencies and instrumentalities of the national government, including
GOCCs, as well as private entities are mandated to go through the EIA process. A LGU is
not an agency or instrumentality of the National Government, thus not covered. It also
said that the project is not environmentally critical, and that it is not in an
environmentally critical area.
- The Republic filed an MR, which was denied. Hence, the present petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether Davao should be granted the certificate (Yes. Its project is not
environmentally critical.)
RATIO: Sec 15 of RA 7160 (Local Government Code): a local government unit is a body
politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law.
- It performs dual functions, governmental and proprietary. Governmental functions are
those that concern the health, safety and the advancement of the public good or welfare
as affecting the public generally. Proprietary functions are those that seek to obtain
special corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit and intended for private advantage
and benefit. When exercising governmental powers and performing governmental duties,
an LGU is an agency of the national government. When engaged in corporate activities,
it acts as an agent of the community in the administration of local affairs.
- Sec 16 LGC is the duty of the LGUs to promote the peoples right to a balanced ecology.
An LGU can not claim exemption from the coverage of PD 1586. As a body politic
endowed with governmental functions, an LGU has the duty to ensure the quality of the
environment, which is the very same objective of PD 1586.
- Sec 4 PD 1586 clearly states that no person, partnership or corporation shall
undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or area without
first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his duly
authorized representative. The Civil Code defines a person as either natural or juridical.
The state and its political subdivisions, i.e., the local government units are juridical
persons. Undoubtedly, LGUs are not excluded from the coverage of PD 1586.
- Whereas clause stresses that we adopt a comprehensive and integrated environmental
protection program where all the sectors of the community are involved. LGUs, as part of
the machinery of the government, cannot be deemed as outside the scope of the EIS
system.However, In the case at bar, Davao has sufficiently shown that the Artica Sports
Dome will not have a significant negative environmental impact because it is not an
environmentally critical project and it is not located in an environmentally critical area.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition denied.
SAN JUAN vs CSC
Reynaldo San Juan (Petitioner) vs Civil Service Commission, Department of Budget and Management, and Cecilia
Almajose (Respondents)

April 19, 1991

Gutierrez, Jr., J.
FACTS: On March 22, 1988, the position of Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) for the
province of Rizal was left vacant. Gov. San Juan of Laguna informed Director Abella of
DBM Region IV that Dalisay Santos assumed office as Acting PBO, and requested Director

Abella to endorse the appointment of Santos to the position of PBO of Rizal. Director
Abella recommended the appointment of Cecilia Almajose as PBO since she was the
most qualified. DBM Undersecretary Cabuquit signed the appointment papers of
Almajose upon the said recommendation.

- Gov. San Juan protested the said appointment of Almajose on the grounds that
Cabuquit is not legally authorized to appoint the PBO; and that under EO 1125, it is the
Provincial Governor, not the Regional Director or a Congressman, who has the power to
recommend nominees for the position of PBO.
- DBM, through its Director of the Bureau of Legal & Legislative Affairs (BLLA) Virgilio
Afurung, ruled that Gov. San Juan's protest is not meritorious as DBM validly exercised its
prerogative in filling-up the contested position since none of the San Juan's nominees
met the prescribed requirements.
- DBM Secretary denied San Juan's MR. San Juan wrote to CSC contesting the
appointment. CSC made a Resolution dismissing the appeal of San Juan.
- Hence, San Juan filed the present petition for certiorari with the SC.
ISSUE: Whether Almajose is lawfully entitled to discharge the title of PBO (No. She was
appointed without authority.)

PLACING ALL BUDGET OFFICERS OF PROVINCES, CITIES AND MUNICIPALITIES UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL
AND TECHNICAL SUPERVISION OF THE MINISTRY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT

RATIO: San Juan invokes Sec 1 of EO 1126. He states that the phrase "upon
recommendation of the local chief executive concerned" must be given mandatory
application in consonance with the state policy of local autonomy. He further argues that
his power to recommend be defeated by aa administrative issuance of DBM reserving to
itself the right to fill-up any vacancy in case the nominees do not meet the qualification
requirements
- CSC justified its ruling by saying that the recommendation of the local chief executive is
merely directory and not a condition sine qua non to the exercise by the Secretary of
DBM of his appointing prerogative; and that the PBO has been nationalized and is
directly under the control and supervision of the DBM Secretary.
- The issue at hand involves the application of the constitutional policy of local autonomy.
The clear mandate on local autonomy must be obeyed. Thus, where a law is capable of
two interpretations, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
- The exercise by local governments of meaningful power has been a national goal since
the turn of the century.
- McKinley's Instructions directed to give top priority to making local autonomy effective.
- 1935 Constitution provided that he has control of all the executive departments, but
exercises general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law.
- Tecson v. Salas: supervision... the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the
former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties... Control... means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate had done in the performance of their duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter.
- Principle of government in 1973 Constitution: The State shall guarantee and promote
the autonomy of local government units, especially the barangay to ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities.

All budget officers of provinces, cities and municipalities shall be appointed henceforth by the Minister of Budget and Management upon
recommendation of the local chief executive concerned, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, and they shall be placed under the
administrative control and technical supervision of the Ministry of Budget and Management.

- The exercise of greater local autonomy is even more marked in the present
Constitution7.
- When the CSC's interpretation went against the letter and spirit of the constitutional
provisions on local autonomy. Local Budget Circular No. 31 which states: The DBM
reserves the right to fill up any existing vacancy where none of the nominees of the local
chief executive meet the prescribed requirements is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set
aside. DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees by the Governor. If
none is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no
one meets the legal requirements and ask for new recommendees.
- The PBO is expected to synchronize his work with DBM. More important, however, is the
proper administration of fiscal affairs at the local level. They are prepared by the local
officials who must work within the constraints of those budgets. They are not formulated
in the inner sanctums of an all-knowing DBM
DISPOSITIVE: Petition granted. CSC resolution set aside. Appointment of Almajose
nullified.
PIMENTEL vs AGUIRRE
Aquilino Pimintel, Jr. (Petitioner) vs Hon. Aguirre, as Executive Secretary, Hon. Boncodin, as Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management (Respondents)

July 19, 2000

Panganiban, J.
FACTS: On December 27, 1997, the President Ramos issued AO 372. Among other
provisions, it contained the following:
SECTION 1. All government departments and agencies, including state universities and
colleges, government-owned and controlled corporations and local governments units
will identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for
the year by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services
items, along the following suggested areas:
xxx
SECTION 4. Pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget
Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10%
of the internal revenue allotment to local government units shall be withheld.
- On December 10, 1998, President Estrada issued AO 43, amending Sec 4 of AO 372, by
reducing 5% the amount of IRA to be withheld from the LGUs.
- Petitioner filed with the SC the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking (1)
to annul Sec 1 of AO 372, insofar as it requires LGUs to reduce their expenditures; and
(2) to enjoin respondents from implementing Sec 4, which withholds a portion of their
IRAs.
- Petitioner contends that the President, in issuing AO 372, was in effect exercising the
power of control over LGUs, whereas the Constitution vests in the President only the
power of general supervision, and that the directive to withhold 10% of their IRA is in
contravention of Sec 286 of the LGC, and of Sec 6 Art X of the Constitution, providing for
the automatic release to each LGU its share in the national revenue.
- The solicitor general claims that AO 372 constituted merely an exercise of the
President's power of supervision over LGUs, and that it does not violate local fiscal
autonomy, because it merely directs LGUs to identify measures that will reduce their
7

Sec 25, Art II. Art X on Local Governments, specifically Secs 2, 3, and 14.

total expenditures, and that the withholding of the IRA does not violate the statutory
prohibition because such withholding is temporary in nature pending the assessment and
evaluation by the Development Coordination Committee.
ISSUE: Whether AO 372 is unconstitutional (No. It does not constitute as an exercise of
control over LGUs. But the provision relating to the IRA contravenes the local fiscal
autonomy of LGUs. Thus, the AO should not be applied to LGUs.)
RATIO: Sec 4 Art X of the Constitution confines the President's power over local
governments to one of general supervision. This provision has been interpreted to
exclude the power of control.
- Mondano v. Silvosa contrasted the power of supervision over local government officials
with the power of control over executive officials of the national government:
supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the
former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
- Taule v. Santos: upervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere
oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such
body.
- The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos of the
President, thus they are subject to the his power of control. In contrast, the heads of
political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from
the electorate. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the Presidents supervision only,
not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate
powers.
- Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not
completely relinquished all its powers over local governments. Only administrative
powers over local affairs are delegated. The purpose of the delegation is to make
governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels.
- LGUs, in addition to having administrative autonomy in the exercise of their functions,
enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy means that LGUs have the power to
create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national
taxes, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own
priorities.
- Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule out any manner of national government
intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and
otherwise, are consistent with national goals.
- Consequently, Sec 284 of the LCG allows the President to make adjustments to the IRA.
But the following requisites must concur: 1) an unmanaged public sector deficit; 12)
consultations with the presiding officers of Congress, and the presidents of the various
local leagues; and 3) the corresponding recommendation of some Cabinet Secretaries.
- Petitioner points out that the said requirements were not complied with. On the other
hand, the Solicitor General contends that AO 372 is merely directory as it is intended
only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction
measure, and therefore does constitute the exercise of the power of control
- Court accepts the Solicitor General's assurance AO 372 is merely advisory in character,
and does not constitute a mandatory or binding order that interferes with local
autonomy. It is in this light that Sec 1 is sustained.

- Sec 4, however, cannot be upheld.

- A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs
in the national internal revenue as mandated by the Constitution8, and as implemented
by the LGC9.
- The provision clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law. The temporary nature of
the retention by the national government does not matter. Any retention is prohibited.
- Thus, while Sec 1 of AO 372 may be upheld as an advisory effected in times of national
crisis, Sec 4 has no color of validity at all.
- Refutation of dissent:
- No need to wait implementation before the illegal act can be questioned. The real issue
here is whether the Constitution and the law are contravened by Section 4 of AO 372, not
whether they are violated by the acts implementing it. By the mere enactment of the
questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have
ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act.
- The acts alluded to in the Dissent are indeed authorized by law; but, quite the opposite,
Sec 4 of AO 372 is bereft of any legal or constitutional basis.
- In striking down Sec, the Court is not ruling out any form of reduction in the IRAs.
Indeed, as the President may make necessary adjustments in case of an unmanageable
public sector deficit. The dissent, however, merely glances over a specific requirement in
the same provision that such reduction is subject to consultation with the presiding
officers of both Houses of Congress and, more importantly, with the presidents of the
leagues of local governments.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition granted. Respondents are prohibited from implementing the AOs
insofar as LGUs are concerned.
Kapunan (Dissenting):
- Sec 4 of AO 372 does not present a case ripe for adjudication. It does not conclusively
show that, on its face, the constitutional provision on the automatic release of the IRA
shares of the LGUs has been violated. Where the conduct has not yet occurred and the
challenged construction has not yet been adopted by the agency charged with
administering the AO, the determination of the scope and constitutionality in advance of
its immediate adverse effect involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper
exercise of judicial function. It is not shown that the IRA share of LGUs that was
temporarily withheld has not yet been released, or that the DBM has refused and
continues to refuse its release.
- The President is the chief fiscal officer of the country. He is ultimately responsible for
the collection and distribution of public money. As such, he supervises fiscal
development in the local government units and ensures that laws are faithfully executed.
- Local development plans must thus hew to national policies and standards. Local
budget plans and goals must also be harmonized, as far as practicable, with national
development goals and strategies in order to optimize the utilization of resources and to
avoid duplication in the use of fiscal and physical resources.
- Sec 4 of AO No. 372 was issued in the exercise by the President not only of his power of
general supervision, but also in conformity with his role as chief fiscal officer of the
country.
8

Sec 6, Art X Constitution.

Sec 286.

- The phrase "automatic release" of the LGUs' shares does not mean that the release of
the funds is mechanical, spontaneous, self-operating or reflex. IRAs must first be
determined, and the money for their payment collected. In this regard, administrative
documentations are also undertaken to ascertain their availability, limits and extent.
Thus, it should be used in the context of the whole budgetary process.
- All that Sec 286 of the LGC requires is the automatic release of the amount that the
LGUs are rightfully and legally entitled to.
- The power to determine whether there is an unmanageable public sector deficit is
lodged in the President. The President's determination, as fiscal manager of the country,
of the existence of economic difficulties which could amount to "unmanageable public
sector deficit" should be accorded respect.
- In resume, the withholding of the IRA was temporary pending determination by the
Executive of the actual share which the LGUs are rightfully entitled to on the basis of the
applicable laws, particularly Sec 284 of the LGC, authorizing the President to make the
necessary adjustments in the IRA in the event of an unmanageable public sector deficit.
GANZON VS CA
RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, respondents.

August 5, 1991
Sarmiento, J.
FACTS: The petitioners in this case are the Mayor of Iloilo City and a member of the
Sangguniang Panglunsod thereof. 10 administrative complaints were filed against
Ganzon on various charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave
misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the
Constitution, and arbitrary detention. These were brought by persons who included some
members of the local government. Hearings were conducted by the Department of Local
Government. The Secretary found probable cause against Ganzon and issued a
suspension order for a period of 60 days.
- With respect to one of the cases, prima facie evidence was found to exist so the
Secretary issued another suspension order. Ganzon filed a petition for prohibition with
the CA.
- The Secretary issued another order preventively suspending Ganzon. Ganzon filed
another petition for prohibition with the CA.
- The CA dismissed both petitions, hence the present recourse to the SC. CA certified the
petition of Mary Ann Artieda who was similarly charged by the Secretary.
- Ganzon claims that he was denied due process, and that the President, through the
Secretary does not have the power to suspend him.
ISSUE: Whether the Secretary can suspend Ganzon (Yes)

RATIO: It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution no longer allows the
President to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local officials. They
anchor this argument on the removal of the phrase as may be provided bylaw from the
provision10. They argue that because of the deletion, no law may provide for the power of
the President any longer.
- The Secretary acted in consonance with the legal provisions the LGC (Secs 62, and 63).
- Notwithstanding the change in the provision, the Constitution did not intend to divest
the legislature of its right or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing
legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. The omission of the
phrase signifies the local governments' autonomy from congress and their break
Congress' "control" over their affairs. It did not, however, intend to deprive the
legislature of all authority over municipal corporations.

10 Sec 4 Art X, 1985 Consti: The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to
component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component
units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions. 1935 Consti: The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all Local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.

- Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of LGUs. Autonomy is
subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature. "Local autonomy" is not
instantly self-executing, but subject to measures11 designed to realize autonomy at the
local level.

11 Consti. Art X, Secs 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 14.

- The Constitution allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions for
removal of local officials, which suggest that it may exercise removal powers, and as the
LGC has done, delegate its exercise to the President12.
- "Supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.
- Mondano v Silvosa: supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to
fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of
his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
- "Investigating" is not inconsistent with "overseeing", although it is a lesser power than
"altering".
- Removal and suspension of public officers are always controlled by the particular law
applicable and its proper construction subject to constitutional limitations. In the cases
where SC denied the President the power to suspend it was not because the President
can not exercise it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the
power elsewhere.
- The new Constitution did not repeal the LGC. "Supervision" and "removal" are not
incompatible terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger
expression of local autonomy under the new Charter.
- Local autonomy in the Constitution does nothing more than to break up the monopoly
of the national government over the affairs of local governments. It is not meant to end
the relation of partnership and inter-dependence between the central administration and
LGUs. LGUs, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for
no other purpose than precisely to enhance self- government.
- Decentralization means devolution of national administration but not power to the local
levels.
- The successive suspensions against Ganzon, however, was excessive. As he is facing
10 cases, the Secretary can suspend him for a total of 600 days, effectively suspending
him out of office. While a preventive suspension may be justified, its continuance for an
unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter he were
acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. Not only the
official is the victim, but also the people, who were deprived of the services of the person
they elected.
- The purpose of suspension is to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause
of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses. Under the
LGC it cannot exceed 60 days.
DISPOSITIVE: Petitions dismissed.
CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION VS COA
CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

January 29, 1990

Cruz, J.

FACTS: President Aquino issued EO 220, dated July 15, 1987, creating the CAR. Historical
background of EO 220:
- Fr. Conrado M. Balweg, S.V.D., broke off from the CPP-NPA.
12 Sec 3, Art X, Consti.

- After President Aquino was installed into office, she called on all revolutionary forces to
a peace dialogue. The Cordillera People's Liberation Army (CPLA) heeded this call.
- The parties arrived at an agreement in principle: the Cordillera people shall not
undertake their demands through armed and violent struggle but by peaceful means,
such as political negotiations.
- A joint agreement was signed between Fr. Balweg, and Ambassador Pelaez, the Chief
Negotiator of the government.
- EO 220 was enacted pursuant to the joint agreement. EO 220, which was issued by the
President in the exercise of her legislative powers, created CAR which covers the
provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City
of Baguio. It was created to accelerate economic and social growth in the region and to
prepare for the establishment of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras. Its main
function is to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in
the region, particularly, to coordinate with the local government units as well as with the
executive departments of the national government.
- The present petition was filed with the SC challenging EO 220 on the ground that it
preempts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress and the creation of' the
autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the act through a
plebiscite.
- During the pendency of this case, RA 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act
for the Cordillera Autonomous Region" was enacted and signed into law. The Act
recognizes the CAR and the offices and agencies created under EO 220.
ISSUE: Whether EO 220 preempts the creation of an autonomous region in the
Cordilleras (No)

RATIO: EO 220 envisions the consolidation and coordination of the delivery of services of
line departments and agencies of the National Government in the areas covered by the
administrative region as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras.
It does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. The
Constitution outlines the procedure for the creation of an autonomous region in the
Cordilleras13. All of these will take time. The President saw it fit to provide for some
measures to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the
organic act had not yet been passed and the autonomous region created. The transitory
nature of the CAR does not necessarily mean that it is the interim autonomous region in
the Cordilleras.
The Constitution provides for a basic structure of government in the autonomous region.
Using this as a guide, it can be seen that EO 220 did not establish an autonomous
regional government. It created a region, covering a specified area, for administrative
purposes with the main objective of coordinating the planning and implementation of
programs and services.
- The bodies created by EO 220 do not supplant the existing local governmental
structure, nor are they autonomous government agencies. They merely constitute the
mechanism that brings together the existing local governments, the National
Government, the ethno-linguistic groups, and NGOs in an effort to spur development in
the Cordilleras.
- A collateral issue raised by petitioners is the nature of the CAR: whether or not it is a
territorial and political subdivision. The relevant constitutional provisions are Sec 1, and
10 of Art X.
- EO 220 did not create a new territorial and political subdivision or merge existing ones
into a larger subdivision.
- CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have
a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities.
- The creation of administrative regions for the purpose of expediting the delivery of
services is nothing new. This was done before in the Integrated Reorganization Plan of
1972. CAR is in the same genre as the administrative regions created under the
Reorganization Plan.
- Petitioners incidentally argue that the creation of the CAR contravened the
constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy of the LGUs concerned.
- The constitutional guarantee of local autonomy refers to the administrative autonomy
of local government units or, the decentralization of government authority. On the other
hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Mindanao and the Cordilleras contemplates
the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy these regions.
- Petitioners failed to show how the creation of the CAR has actually diminished the local
autonomy of the covered provinces and city.
DISPOSITIVE: Petitions dismissed.
LIMBONA vs MANGELIN
Sultan Alimbosar Limbona (Petitioner) vs Conte Mangelin, Salic Ali, Salindato Ali, Pilimpinas Conding, Acmad Tomawis, Gerry Tomawis,
Jesus Ortix, Antonio Dela Fuente, Diego Palomares Jr., Raul Dagalangit, and Bimbo Sinsuat (Respondents)

February 28, 1989

Sarmiento, J.
13 Sec 18, Art X

FACTS: On September 24, 1986, Limbona was appointed as a member of the

Sangguniang Pampook, Regional Autonomous Government, Region XII, representing
Lanao del Sur. On March 12, 1987, he was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative
Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao
- On October 21, 1987, Congressman Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim
Affairs of the House of Representatives invited Limbona to the House to undertake
consultations.
- Consistent with the said invitation, Limbona informed the members of the Assemby that
there shall be no session in November since his presence in the House takes precedence
over any pending business in batasang pampook.
- On November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner's advice. The
seat of Limbona was declared vacant.
- Limbona filed with the SC the present petition assailing the actions of the acts of the
Sangguniang Pampook.
- During the pendency of the proceedings, the Court received a resolution from the
Sanggunian expelling Limbona since he caused the payment of salary to a certain
Abdula, who was considered resigned, and therefore exercised powers not authorized by
the Sanggunian.
ISSUE:
Whether Limbona was validly expelled (No. he was not give due process.)
Whether the court has jurisdiction in view of the principle of local autonomy (Yes.)
RATIO: The case has not been rendered moot and academic by reason simply of the
expulsion resolution so issued. The expulsion is of no force and effect. There is no
showing that the Sanggunian had conducted an investigation, and that Limbona had
been given the opportunity to be heard. It does not appear that Limbona was even made
aware of the charges against him.
- The resolution appears strongly to be a bare act of vendetta by the other Assemblymen
against Limbona.
- Limbona's reinstatement must therefore be ordered.
The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII by PD
1618. It established "internal autonomy... within the framework of the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines... It requires the
autonomous regional governments to "undertake all internal administrative matters for
the respective regions," except to "act on matters which are within the jurisdiction and
competence of the National Government..." In relation to the central government, it
provides that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control
over the Autonomous Regions..."
- Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power.
- Decentralization of administration: the central government delegates administrative
powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power, make
local governments more responsive and accountable, and ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the
pursuit of national development and social progress. The President exercises general
supervision over them; he has no control in the sense that he can substitute their
judgments with his own.
- Decentralization of power: abdication of political power in the favor of local
governments units. The autonomous government is free to shape its future with
minimum intervention from central authorities. It becomes accountable not to the central
authorities but to its constituency.

- Under the Constitution, there is autonomy in 2 senses. One is that in Secs 1 and 2 or
Art X, while the other is that in Sec 15 or Art X. An autonomous government that enjoys
autonomy of the latter category is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating
it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of autonomy. On the other hand, an
autonomous government of the former class is under the supervision of the national
government acting through the President.
- If the Sangguniang Pampook that of the first class its acts are beyond the domain of the
Court. But if it is that of the second class it comes under the Court's jurisdiction. An
examination of the PD creating the autonomous governments shows that they were
never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense. PD 1618 mandates that "[t]he
President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous
Regions.", and that the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to
discharge chiefly administrative services.
- Thus, the court can assume jurisdiction.
- Limbona could not have called a recess since at that time the Sanggunian is not yet in
session; no recess could be called. However, the members of the Sanggunian opened the
sessions behind Limbona's back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances
the recess called on the ground of good faith is upheld.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition granted.
PELAEZ vs AUDITOR GENERAL
Emmanuel Pelaez (Petitioner) vs The Auditor General (Respondent)

December 24, 1965

Concepcion, J.
FACTS: From September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President, purporting to act pursuant
to Sec 68 of the RAC, issued EOs 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating 33
municipalities.
- On November 10, 1964, Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President and as taxpayer, instituted
the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition against the Auditor General, to
restrain him from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of
said EOs and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
- Petitioner alleges that the EOs are null and void, upon the ground that said Sec 68 has
been impliedly repealed by RA 2370, and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power.
- RA 2370 became effective on January 1, 1960. Sec 3 of which reads: Barrios shall not
be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the
provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.
- Thus, petitioner contends that since the President cannot create a barrio, neither could
he create a municipality which is composed of barrios. The respondent argues otherwise,
upon the theory that a new municipality can be created without creating new barrios,
such as, by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the new municipality.
ISSUE: Whether the President has the power to create barrios (No)
RATIO: The respondent overlooks the argument that the statutory denial of the
presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to
create municipalities. The said argument cannot be offset except by a clear
manifestation of the intent of Congress to the contrary.

- The President executed the EOs based on Sec 68 of the RAC14.

- The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature.
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill
in the details the said law: (a) be complete in itself; it must set forth therein the policy to
be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fix a standard; the
limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable, to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his functions.
- Without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate could in effect arrogate upon
himself the power to make law.
- Sec 68 of the RAC does not meet the requirements for a valid delegation. It does not
enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it
give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to.
- If the validity of the delegation of powers were upheld, there would no longer be any
legal impediment for to the President to do anything which, in his opinion, may be
required by public welfare. Such grant of authority would be a virtual abdication of the
powers of Congress in favor of the Executive.
- Sec 10(1) Art VII of the Constitution ordains: The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local
governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.
- The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere
in the exercise of discretion in the officers of the executive departments. This power is
denied to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. It permits him to
wield no more authority than that of checking whether the local governmentsperform
their duties as provided by law.
- If the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of its
officials, by creating a new municipality. By exercising the power to create a new
municipality, he could compel local officials to submit to his dictation, thereby exercising
over them the power of control.
- The power of control of the President over executive departments does not include the
authority either to abolish or create a new one. Thus, the alleged power to create
municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority
even greater than that of control which he has over the executive departments. Sec 68
must be deemed repealed the Constitution which is utterly incompatible with said
statutory enactment.
DISPOSITIVE: EOs declared null and void.
NAVARRO VS ERMITA
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA, Petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO
ERMITA, representing the President of the Philippines; Senate of the Philippines, represented by the SENATE
PRESIDENT; House of Representatives, represented by the HOUSE SPEAKER; GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS,
representing the mother province of Surigao del Norte; GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN, representing the
new Province of Dinagat Islands, Respondents.

February 10, 2010

Peralta, J.

14 The President... may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality... or other political
subdivision... separate any political division... merge any of such subdivisions... name any new subdivision so created, and may change the seat
of government within any subdivision... as the public welfare may require....

FACTS: The province of Surigao del Norte is composed of 3 main group of islands: (1)
the Mainland and Surigao City; (2) Siargao Island and Bucas Grande; and (3) Dinagat
Island.
- Based on a 2000 census by the NSO, the population of Surigao is 481,416 broken down
as follows: Mainland 281,111; Surigao City 118,534; Siargao Island & Bucas Grande
93,354; Dinagat Island 106,951.
- Dinagat was proposed to become a province, but it did not meet the population
requirement in thee LGC.
- In July 2003, Surigao conducted a special census, with the assistance of an NSO to
determine the actual population of Dinagat in support of the house bill creating the
Province of Dinagat Islands.
- The special census yielded a population count of 371,576 inhabitants. The NSO,
however, did not certify the result of the special census. Instead, Surigao Governor
Robert Barbers issued a Proclamation, which declared as official the Special Census.
- The Bureau of Local Government Finance certified that the average annual income
Dinagat is P82,696,433.23. The land area of the proposed province is 802.12 square
kilometers.
- RA 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands) was enacted into law on
October 2, 2006. A plebiscite was held to determine whether the LGUs directly affected
approved of the creation of the Province of Dinagat .The plebiscite yielded 69,943
affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes. The Plebiscite Provincial Board of
Canvassers proclaimed the creation of Dinagat as a separate province, and was ratified
by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite.
- On January 26, 2007, a new set of provincial officials took their oath of office following
their appointment by the President. Another set of provincial officials was elected during
the synchronized national and local elections held on May 14, 2007. The elected
provincial officials took their oath of office; hence, the Province of Dinagat began its
corporate existence.
- The petitioners, as taxpayers and residents of Surigao, filed the present petition for
certiorari seeking to nullify RA 9355 for being unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether RA 9355 violated the Constitution (Yes)
RATIO: Petitioners contend that Dinagat is not qualified to become a province because it
failed to comply with the land area or the population requirement, despite its compliance
with the income requirement, and that Congress erroneously relied on par 2 Art 9 of the
IRR of the LGC, which states that "[t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the
proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands" asserting that this is in
conflict with the LGC and therefore not in effect.
- The constitutional provision on the creation of a province is found in Sec 10 Art X. The
criteria for the creation of a province is found in Sec 461 of the LGC.
- The territorial requirement under the LGC is at least 2,000 square kilometers
contiguous territory. However, it need not be contiguous if it comprises 2 or more islands
or is separated by a chartered city that does not contribute to the income of the
province.
- The word territory, as clarified by the case of Tan v Comelec, only includes the land
mass, and not the water over which the political unit exercises control. "Contiguous" is
used when it describes physical contact, or a touching of sides of two solid masses of
matter.
- The IRR went beyond the criteria prescribed by Sec 461 of the LGC when it added the
questioned provision. Under Sec 461, the only instance when the territorial requirement
need not be complied with is when there is already compliance with the population

requirement. Since there is a discrepancy between the law and the IRR, that portion of
the IRR in conflict with the law is held void.
- Dinagat failed to comply with the territorial requirement since it only had a territory of
802.12 sq. km. It also failed the population requirement since it only had a population of
106,951 according to the NSO. The special census was not certified by the NSO as
required by the LGC. It was also not shown that the population in special census would
not reduce the population of the original unit to less than that prescribed.
- The Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of LGUs must follow the criteria
established in the LGC. Any derogation from the criteria prescribed in the LGC violates
Sec 10 Art X of the Constitution. Hence, RA 9355 is unconstitutional for its failure to
comply with the criteria for the creation of a province prescribed in Sec 461 of the LGC.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition granted.
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINE VS COMELEC
November 18, 2008
Carpio, J.
FACTS: During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into 33 laws each converting a
municipality into a city. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other
municipalities into cities.
- During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted RA 9009 (AN ACT AMENDING SECTION 450 OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991, BY INCREASING THE
AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME REQUIREMENT FOR A MUNICIPALITY OR CLUSTER OF BARANGAYS TO BE CONVERTED INTO
A COMPONENT CITY.) , which took effect on June 30, 2001. It amended Sec 450 of the LGC by

increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city
from P20M to P100M. The amendment sought to restrain the mad rush of municipalities
to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the IRA despite their being
incapable of fiscal independence.
- After the effectivity of RA 9009, the HOR adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought
to exempt from the P100M requirement the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were
not approved in the 11th Congress. The Senate was not able to approve the Resolution.
- During the 13th Congress, the HOR re-adopted the Resolution. However, the Senate
again failed to approve it.
- 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills,
which all contained a common provision exempting the municipalities from the P100M
requirement.
- Both HOR and the Senate approve the bills. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood
Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President's signature.
- The Cityhood Laws direct the Comelec to hold plebiscites.
- Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for
violation of Sec 10, Art X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal
protection clause.
ISSUE: Whether the Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional (Yes)
RATIO: Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the effectivity of RA 9009.
Respondent municipalities cannot invoke the principle of non-retroactivity of laws. RA
9009, an earlier law, is not being applied retroactively but prospectively.
- Sec 10, Art X is clear. The creation of LGUs must follow the criteria established in the
Local Government Code and not in any other law. The Constitution requires Congress to
stipulate in the LGC all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city. It cannot write

such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. The clear intent of the Constitution
is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same
uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the LGC. Thus, the exemption in the
Cityhood Laws clearly violates Sec 10, Art X of the Constitution.
- Sec 6, Art X of the Constitution requires that LGUs shall have a just share in the national
taxes. If the criteria in creating LGUs are not uniform, there can be no fair and just
distribution. A city with an annual income of only P20M, all other criteria being equal,
should not receive the same share in national taxes as a city with an annual income of
P100M. Since the exemptions do not follow the income criterion in the LGC, they prevent
the fair and just distribution of the IRA.
- Sec 450 of the LGC is plain and unambiguous. There can be no resort to extrinsic aids
such as deliberations of Congress. Since the law is clear, any municipality desiring to
convert into a city must meet the increased income requirement.
- While the 11th Congress made deliberations with regard to providing exemptions from
the increased income requirement, such was not written into law. These deliberations
cannot be used to interpret bills enacted into law in the 13th or subsequent Congresses.
- Even if Sec 450 contained an exemption for municipalities whose cityhood bills are
pending, the said provision would violate the equal protection clause. There is no valid
classification. There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending
cityhood bills and municipalities that did not have pending bills.
DISPOSITIVE: Petitions granted. Cityhood Laws declared unconstitutional.
Reyes, J. (Dissenting):
- The intent of RA 9009 is to exempt respondent municipalities from the income
requirement of P100M. Thus, the cityhood laws, which merely carry out the intent of RA
9009, are in accordance with the "criteria established in the Local Government Code,"
pursuant to Sec 10 Art X of the 1987 Constitution.
- What Congress had in mind is not at all times accurately reflected in the language of
the statute. The literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless; and lead to
absurdity, injustice, or contradiction. When this happens, and following the rule that the
intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be had to the principle that
the spirit of the law controls its letter. Not to the letter that killeth, but to the spirit that
vivifieth.
- At the time that RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, Congress was also well aware
that several municipalities wanting to become cities and which qualified under the
income threshold of P20M under the old LGC provision had pending cityhood bills. These
included respondent municipalities.
- Legislative records show that Congress intended that the then pending cityhood bills
would not be covered by the income requirement of P100M imposed by RA. 9009. It is
also clear that RA 9009 would not have any retroactive effect.
- The basis for the inclusion of the exemption clause of the cityhood laws is the clear-cut
intent of the Legislature of not giving retroactive effect to RA 9009
- Each of the 12 municipalities has all the requisites for conversion into a component city
based on the old requirements. Is is unfair to apply law now; they already qualified in the
past. The peculiar conditions of respondent municipalities, which are actual and real,
furnish sufficient grounds for legislative classification.
- The classification is germane to the purpose of the law. The exemption of respondent
municipalities from the P100M income requirement was unquestionably designed to
insure that fairness and justice were accorded to respondent municipalities, as their

cityhood bills were not enacted by Congress in view of intervening events and for
reasons beyond their control.
- The cityhood laws are curative statutes. They seek to prevent the great injustice which
would be committed to respondent municipalities.
December 21, 2009
Velasco, Jr., J
RATIO: Since Congress wields the vast poser of creating political subdivisions, surely it
can exercise the lesser authority of requiring a set of criteria for their creation. The
reason why the Constitution employs the clause "in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code" is to lay stress that it is Congress alone, and
no other, which can impose the criteria.
- When the 1987 Constitution speaks of the LGC, the reference cannot be to any specific
statute. At the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, BP 337, the then LGC, was
still in effect. Had the framers intended to isolate the embodiment of the criteria only in
the LGC, then they would have actually referred to BP 337.
- Consistent with its plenary legislative power on the matter, Congress can, via either a
consolidated set of laws or a much simpler, single-subject enactment, impose the said
verifiable criteria of viability. These criteria need not be embodied in the local
government code.
- Petitioners theory that Congress must provide the criteria solely in the LGC and not in
any other law is illogical. If their argument is pursued to its logical conclusion, RA 9009
would also suffer the vice of unconstitutionality.
- The legislative intent not to subject respondent LGUs to the more stringent
requirements of RA 9009 finds expression in the following uniform provision of the
cityhood laws: The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement
prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.
- The cityhood laws, which merely carried out the intent of RA 9009, adhered, in the final
analysis, to the "criteria established in the Local Government Code".
- The basis for the inclusion of the exemption clause of the cityhood laws is the clear-cut
intent of Congress of not according retroactive effect to RA 9009. Not only do the
congressional records bear the legislative intent of exempting the cityhood laws from the
income requirement of P100M. Congress has now made its intention to exempt express
in the challenged cityhood laws.
- Legislative intent is part and parcel of the law, the controlling factor in interpreting a
statute. In construing a statute, the proper course is to start out and follow the true
intent of the Legislature and to adopt the sense that best harmonizes with the context
and promotes in the fullest manner the policy and objects of the legislature
- It is immaterial if Congress is not a continuing legislative body. What is important is that
the deliberations taken in the enactment of the law were part of its legislative history
and may be consulted as aids in the interpretation of the law.
- LCP cannot invoke the equal protection clause because no deprivation of property
results by virtue of the enactment of the cityhood laws. The LCPs claim that the IRA of
its member-cities will be substantially reduced; it is presumptuous to already stake a
claim on the IRA, as if it were their property, as the IRA is yet to be allocated.
- The favorable treatment accorded the 16 municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on
substantial distinction. The respondent LGUs are substantially different from other
municipalities desirous to be cities. They had pending cityhood bills before the passage
of RA 9009. Years before the enactment of RA 9009, they had already met the income

criterion. Due to extraneous circumstances, however, the bills for their conversion
remained unacted upon by Congress.
- Because of events they had absolutely nothing to do with, a spoiler in the form of RA
9009 supervened. To impose on them the much higher income requirement after what
they have gone through would be unfair. The imperatives of fairness dictate that they
should be given a legal remedy by which they would be allowed to prove that they have
all the necessary qualifications for city status, using the criteria prior to its amendment
by RA 9009. The peculiar conditions of respondent LGUs, which are actual and real,
provide sufficient grounds for legislative classification.
- The classification is also germane to the purpose of the law. The exemption was meant
to reduce the inequality occasioned by the passage of RA 9009.
- The exemption clause in the cityhood laws is an application of the non-retroactive
effect of RA 9009 on the cityhood bills. It is not a declaration of certain rights, but a mere
declaration of prior qualification with the non-retroactive effect of RA 9009.
- New cities appear to have been organized and are functioning accordingly, with new
sets of officials and employees. The operative fact doctrine provides another reason for
upholding the constitutionality of the cityhood laws in question.
Carpio (Dissenting):
- The Court, by a majority vote, ruled that the 16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional in
its 18 November 2008 Decision. The Court, by another majority vote, denied the first
motion for reconsideration of the 18 November 2008 Decision. Then, the Court, by a
split-vote, denied the second motion for reconsideration. Contrary to respondents'
perception, there is nothing left unresolved by the Court. The 18 November 2008
Decision became final on 21 May 2009. As a consequence, it has become immutable and
unalterable, no longer subject to attack and cannot be modified directly or indirectly by
this Court, which had lost jurisdiction to alter it.
MUN. OF CANDIJAY vs CA
Municipality of Candijay, Bohol, acting through its Sanguniang Bayan and Mayor (Petitioner) vs CA, and the
Municipality of Alicia, Bohol (Respondents)

December 28, 1995

Panganiban, J.

FACTS: The Municipality of Candijay had a territorial dispute with the Municipality of Alicia over
Barrio Pagahat. Candijay filed with the RTC of Tagbiliran, Bohol a case against Alicia for
settlement of boundary dispute and quieting of title over Barrio Pagahat.
- The trial court ruled in favor of Candijay ruling that the Barrio belonged to the said Municipality.
- On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court. It rejected the boundary line claimed
by Candijay, and dismissed the complaint of Candijay. After an examination of the respective
survey plans the parties, the CA found that both plans are inadequate insofar as identifying the
boundary line. It thus applied the equipoise rule and ruled against the plaintiff Candijay.
- It's MR denied, Candijay filed with the SC the present petition for review on certiorari. It
contends that the equipoise rule was improperly applied, that Alicia lacked juridical personality
for having been created by a void EO, and that CA decision does not solve the problem.
- SC noted that the 1st and 3rd grounds were adequately passed upon by the CA thus it limited
its discussion on the 2nd ground.
ISSUE: Whether the Municipality of Alicia had legal personality (Yes)
RATIO: Candijay commenced its collateral attack on the juridical personality of Alicia on 19
January 1984 (or some thirty five years after Alicia first came into existence in 1949) during the
proceedings in the lower court. Candijay asked the trial court to bar Alicia from presenting

evidence on the ground that it had no juridical personality, contending that EO 265 which
created Alicia is null and void, inasmuch as Sec 68 of the RAC, on which said EO was based, was
declared unconstitutional in the case of Pelaez v Auditor General.
- The ruling in Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v Mendez, Sr. is very instructive:
[EO 353] creating... San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty
(30) years... that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the
[EO]. In the meantime... San Andres, began and continued to exercise the powers and authority
of a duly created [LGU]. In the same manner that the failure of a public officer to question his
ouster or the right of another to hold a position within a one-year period can abrogate an action
belatedly filed, so also, if not indeed with greatest imperativeness, must a quo warranto
proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political subdivision be timely raised. Public interest
demands it.
Granting that [EO 353] was a complete nullity... the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case
hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least
attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de
facto municipal corporation. Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be otherwise... Created in
1959... San Andres had been in existence for more than six years when... Pelaez vs. Auditor
General was promulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the
unconstitutionality of [EO 353] but it was not to be the case. On the contrary, certain
governmental acts all pointed to the State's recognition of the continued existence of the
Municipality of San Andres...
At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled.
Under the Ordinance... appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has
been considered to be one... municipalities... of the province of Quezon... [Sec 442(d) of the
LGC]... that municipal districts 'organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders
and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of
the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.'... The
power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that when
it has incorporated Section 442 (d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in essence are
retrospective, and aimed at giving 'validity to acts done that would have been invalid under
existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with,' are validly accepted in this
jurisdiction...
the de jure status of... San Andres... must now be conceded.
- Alicia's situation is similar to that of San Andres. Alicia was created by virtue of EO 265 in 1949,
and had been in existence for 16 years when Pelaez was promulgated. Various governmental
acts throughout the years all indicate the State's recognition and acknowledgment of the
existence thereof. For instance, under AO 33, Alicia was covered by the 7th Municipal Circuit
Court of Alicia-Mabini. Likewise, under the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, the
Municipality of Alicia is one of twenty municipalities comprising the Third District of Bohol.
- Inasmuch as Alicia is similarly situated as San Andres, it should likewise benefit from the effects
of Sec 442 (d) of the LGC, and should be considered as a regular, de jure municipality.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition denied.

CALANZA VS PICOP
LEONORA P. CALANZA, EVA M. AMOREN, GENE P. ROO, SANNY C. CALANZA, GREGORIO C. YNCIERTO II AND ANGEL M.
PUYO, PETITIONERS, VS. PAPER INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (PICOP), GOOD EARTH MINERAL CORP.
(GEMCOR), EVARISTO NARVAEZ, JR., RICARDO G. SANTIAGO, ROBERTO A. DORMENDO AND REYDANDE D. AZUCENA,
RESPONDENTS.

April 24, 2009

Chico-Nazario, J.

FACTS: Leonora Calanza, et. al. filed with the Mines and Geo-Sciences Development
Service,DENR, Region XI, of Davao City, applications for small-scale mining permits for
the purpose of extracting gold. In their applications, they stated that the area where they
will conduct mining operations was in the Municipality of Boston, Davao Oriental. This
was approved by the governor of Davao Oriental.
- Since the mining areas were within the PICOP's logging concession area under Timber
License Agreements (TLAs) which covered large tracts of forest lands of the Provinces of
Surigao del Sur, Agusan del Sur, Davao Oriental and Davao del Norte, Calanza, et. al.
negotiated with PICOP for their entry into the mining site.
- PICOP refused on the grounds that it has the exclusive right of occupation over the
area; that the mining permits are defective since they were issued by the governor of
Davao Oriental when in fact the mining area is situated in Barangay Pagtilaan,
Municipality of Lingig, Surigao del Sur; and that mining permits cannot be issued over
areas covered by TLAs.
- Calanza, et. al. filed a Complaint for Injunction against PICOP and its officers before the
RTC of Banganga, Davao Oriental. PICOP countered that the court has no jurisdiction
since the disputed area is situated in the Province of Surigao del Sur; and that mining
permits cannot be issued over areas covered by TLAs.
- RTC ruled in favor of the Calanza, et. al. It opined that Barangay Pagtilaan (as claimed
by PICOP) or Catihan (as claimed by petitioners) is within the territory of the Province of
Davao Oriental. Citing Sec 465, par (b), Sub-par (3)iv LGC which states to the effect that
the governor has the power to issue licenses and permits, the RTC ruled that the
governor is vested with the power to issue the small-scale mining permits.
- On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint. The CA
stated that the RTC erred in passing upon the issue of the boundary dispute between the
provinces of Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur since the resolution of the boundary
dispute primarily resides with the sangguniang panlalawigans of the two provinces. The
CA also said that the governor has no power to issue small-scale mining permits since
such authority under Sec 9 of RA. 7076 is vested with the Provincial Mining Regulatory
Board.
- After their motion for reconsideration was denied, Calanza, et. al. filed the present
petition for review with the SC.
ISSUE: Whether the mining permits are valid (No)
RATIO: There is boundary dispute when a portion or the whole of the territorial area of a
LGU is claimed by two or more LGUs.
- Procedure for settling boundary disputes is provided in Sec 118 of the LCG. Under
par(c) the settlement of a boundary dispute involving municipalities or component cities
of different provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective
sanggunians or the provincial boards of the different provinces involved.
- Sec 119 gives a dissatisfied party an avenue to question the decision of the sanggunian
to the RTC having jurisdiction over the area.
- Art 17, Rule III of the IRR outlines the procedures governing boundary disputes, which
succinctly includes the filing of the proper petition, and in case of failure to amicably
settle, a formal trial will be conducted and a decision will be rendered thereafter. An
aggrieved party can appeal the decision of the sanggunian to the appropriate RTC.
- This is not a case where the sangguniang panlalawigans of Davao Oriental and Surigao
del Sur jointly rendered a decision resolving the boundary dispute. RTC cannot exercise
appellate jurisdiction over the case since there was no petition that was filed and

decided by the sangguniang panlalawigans of Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur since
there was no petition that was filed with the sangguniang panlalawigans.
- Neither can the RTC assume original jurisdiction over the boundary dispute since the
LGC allocates such power to the sangguniang panlalawigans of Davao Oriental and
Surigao del Sur. Since the RTC has no jurisdiction, its decision is a total nullity.
- The small-scale mining permits are legally questionable. Pursuant to RA 7076, approval
of the applications for mining permits and for mining contracts are vested in the
Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. Considering that the governor is without legal
authority to issue said mining permits, the same permits are null and void.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition denied.
BRGY. SANGALANG vs MAGUIHAN

Barangay Sangalang, represented by its Chairman, Dante Marcellana (Petitioner) vs Barangay

Maguihan, represented by its Chairman, Arnulfo Villarez (Respondent)
Date: December 23, 2009
Ponente: Peralta, J.
Facts:
- Barangay jurisdiction dispute between Barangay Sangalang and Barangay Maguihan, both
situated in Lemery, Batangas over certain properties. Each barangay claims the lots to be within
their respective territorial boundary.
- The case was lodged before the Sangguniang Bayan, which referred it to a hearing committee.
The committee reported that the properties belonged to Sangalang. This was affirmed by the
Sanggunian.
- Maguihan appealed to the RTC pursuant to Sec 119 of the LGC. The RTC ruled in favor of
Maguihan. MR was filed but was denied, so Sangalang appealed to the CA.
- CA dismissed Sangalang's appeal on procedural grounds (availed of Rule 41 instead of Rule 42).
MR was filed but was denied, so Sangalang filed the presented Rule 45 petition with the SC.
ISSUE:
WON Should SC take cognizance of the petition (Yes)
To what barangay should the disputed properties belong? (Barangang Maguihan)
RATIO: Sangalang questions the dismissal of its appeal to the CA on procedural grounds, but it
also questions on procedural grounds the appeal taken by Maguihan of the Sanggunian's
decsision to the RTC.
- Sangalang only raised the non-payment of docket fees by Maguihan in the RTC in its
Supplemental MR. Maguihan was able to explain its non-payment of docket fees, and its
willingness to comply with the requirement. Failure to pay docket fees does not automatically
result in the dismissal of an appeal, it being discretionary on the part of the appellate court to
give it due course or not
- CA is correct in holding that Sangalan availed of the wrong remedy.
- Under Sec 118 of the LGC, the boundary disputes, such as the present one, should be lodged to
the Sangguniang Bayan. Sec 119 provides that the decision of the Sanggunian may be appealed
to the RTC having jurisdiction over the area in dispute, as prescribed by the Rules of Court.
- In the case at bar, it is clear that when the case was appealed to the RTC, the latter took
cognizance of the case in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, not its original jurisdiction.
Since the RTC tried the case in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, Sangalang should have
filed a Rule 42 petition instead of a Rule 41 appeal.
- But in any case, in the interest of justice, the CA should have relaxed the ruled, and not
dismissed the case.
Ideally, the case should be remanded to the CA since a question of fact is involved. However,
the case has been pending for almost 13 years; the Court deems is best to rule on the
controversy.

- Sangalan presented the following documents: 1) Copy of a certification from the Office of the
Provincial Assessor stating that disuputed area covered by Tax Declarations are all within the
territorial jurisdiction of Sangalang; 2) Copies of Tax Declarations; and 3) Old Map of Sangalang.
- Maguihan presents the following documents: 1) Certified copy of the cadastral map of the
Lemery Cadastre approved on March 17, 1983 by the Director of Lands, DENR; and 2)
Certification of the CENRO, DENR dated September 9, 1997.

- Art 17, Rule III outlines the procedure for the settlement of boundary disputes 15.
- Neither of the parties satisfied the requirement that all the enumerated documents must be
attached to the petition. There is no other option but to select which between the documents
presented by the parties carries greater weight. The documents presented by Sangalan were
sourced from the tax assessors office, whereas the documents presented by Maguihan were
sourced from the land management bureau.
- The cadastral map, which was approved by the Director of Lands 10 years before the
controversy, should be given more weight. The Land Management Bureau is the principal
government agency tasked with the survey of lands; more weight should be given to the
documents relating to its official tasks. Between a geodetic engineer and a tax assessor, the
formers certification as to the location of properties in dispute is controlling, absent any finding
of abuse of discretion.The duty of provincial and municipal assessors is primarily the assessment
of taxes and not the survey of lands.
- Sangalang alludes to a petition allegedly of persons residing in the properties in dispute to the
effect they are under the jurisdiction of Sangalan. However, the determination as to whether the
properties in dispute are within a certain jurisdiction is not a decision to be made by the
populace.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition partially granted. CA decision reversed. RTC decision affirmed.

PADILLA vs COMELEC

Hon. Roy Padilla, in his capacity as Governor of the Province of Camarines Norte (Petitioner)
vs Commission on Elections (Respondent)

October 19, 1992

Romero, J.
FACTS: Pursuant to RA 7155, which created the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the
Province of Camarines Norte, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2312 to hold a
plebiscite in the the barangays comprising the proposed nunicipality, and the remaining
areas of the mother Municipality of Labor.
- Only 2,890 votes favored its creation while 3,439 voters voted against the creation of
the municipality. Thus, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared the rejection and
disapproval of the independent Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa.
- Gov Padilla filed with the SC the present petition for certiorari. He contends that the
plebiscite is invalid since it must have been conducted only in the political unit or units
affected, i.e. the 12 barangays comprising the new municipality.
15 Art. 17. Procedures for Settling Boundary Disputes. The following procedures shall govern the settlement of boundary disputes:

(c)

Documents attached to petition - The petition shall be accompanied by:

1.Duly authenticated copy of the law or statute creating the LGU or any other document showing proof of creation of the LGU;
2. Provincial, city, municipal, or barangay map, as the case may be, duly certified by the LMB;
3. Technical description of the boundaries of the LGUs concerned;
4. Written certification of the provincial, city, or municipal assessor, as the case may be, as to territorial jurisdiction over the disputed area
according to records in custody;
5. Written declarations or sworn statements of the people residing in the disputed area; and
6. Such other documents or information as may be required by the sanggunian hearing the dispute.

ISSUE: WON the plebiscite is valid (Yes)

RATIO: Petitioner contends that the ruling in Tan v COMELEC has been superseded with
the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, thus reinstating the earlier ruling in Paredes v
COMELEC is untenable; and that since Tan vs. COMELEC was based on the 1973
Constitution the ruling in the said case is no longer applicable under 1987 Constitution,
especially since the latter deleted the words "unit or."
- The deletion of the phrase "unit or" in Sec 10 Art X of the 1987 Constitution from its
precursor, Sec 3 Art XI of the 1973 Constitution did not affect the ruling in Tan v Comelec
as explained by then CONCOM Commissioner Davide in the debates in the Constitutional
Commission, to wit: I precisely asked for the deletion of the words "unit or" because in
the plebiscite to be conducted, it must involve all the units affected. If it is the creation of
a barangay plebiscite because it is affected. It would mean a loss of a territory.
- When the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units directly
affected," it means that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by
the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. Those to be included in
such political areas are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed municipality as well
as those living in the parent municipality.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition dismissed

TAN VS COMELEC
PATRICIO TAN, FELIX FERRER, JUAN M. HAGAD, SERGIO HILADO, VIRGILIO GASTON, CONCHITA MINAYA, TERESITA
ESTACIO, DESIDERIO DEFERIA, ROMEO GAMBOA, ALBERTO LACSON, FE HOFILENA, EMILY JISON, NIEVES LOPEZ AND
CECILIA MAGSAYSAY, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, respondents

July 11, 1986

Alampay, J.
FACTS: BP 885 An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as
the Province of Negros del Norte was enacted, and took effect on December 3, 1985. It
contained a provision on conducting a plebiscite which states in part: A plebiscite shall
be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas affected...
- Tan, et. al. filed with the SC the present petition for Prohibition against the Comelec to
enjoin it from conducting the plebiscite as provided in the law because the law is
unconstitutional.
- The SC was not able to immediately act on the petition, so Comelec was able to hold
the plebiscite. The plebiscite was confined only in the the cities and municipalities which
would comprise the proposed province.
- Petitioners argue that the law and the plebiscite violated the constitutional requirement
that a plebiscite be made in the unit or units involved. Thus, they assert that the the
cities and municipalities of mother province be included in the plebiscite.
- Respondents assert otherwise, citing the case of Paredes v Executive Secretary, arguing
that the constitutional provision only requires the plebiscite of the local government
being created.
ISSUE: WON BP 885 is unconstitutional (Yes)

RATIO: The constitutional provision involved is Art XI, Sec 3 of the (1973) Constitution16.
It makes imperative that there be first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in
the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" whenever a province is created, divided or
merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries.
- The boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental would necessarily be
substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries in order that there can be
created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte. Clearly, two political units would
be affected the parent province, and the proposed province.
- The statements made in Paredes v Executive Secretary should not be taken as
doctrinal. The case was based on a claimed prerogative of the Court then to exercise its
discretion on the matter. It did not resolve the question of how the pertinent provision of
the Constitution should be correctly interpreted.
- The reasons in the older cases invoked by respondents were formerly considered
acceptable because of the views then taken that local autonomy would be better
promoted. However, even this consideration no longer retains persuasive value.
- To form the new province, no less than 3 cities and 8 municipalities will be subtracted
from the parent province. This will result in the removal of approximately 2,768.4 sq km
from its land area. The boundaries will be consequently substantially altered. The
economy of the parent province as well as that of the new province will be inevitably
affected. Both of these political groups will be affected and they are, therefore, the unit
or units referred to in constitutional provision.
DISPOSITIVE: BP 885 declared unconstitutional.
DELA CRUZ VS PARAS
VICENTE DE LA CRUZ, RENATO ALIPIO, JOSE TORRES III, LEONCIO CORPUZ, TERESITA CALOT, ROSALIA FERNANDEZ, ELIZABETH
VELASCO, NANETTE VILLANUEVA, HONORATO BUENAVENTURA, RUBEN DE CASTRO, VICENTE ROXAS, RICARDO DAMIAN, DOMDINO
ROMDINA, ANGELINA OBLIGACION, CONRADO GREGORIO, TEODORO REYES, LYDIA ATRACTIVO, NAPOLEON MENDOZA, PERFECTO
GUMATAY, ANDRES SABANGAN, ROSITA DURAN, SOCORRO BERNARDEZ, and PEDRO GABRIEL, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
EDGARDO L. PARAS, MATIAS RAMIREZ as the Municipal Mayor, MARIO MENDOZA as the Municipal Vice-Mayor, and THE MUNICIPAL
COUNCIL OF BOCAUE, BULACAN, respondents

July 25, 1983

Fernando, C.J.

16 No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units
affected.

FACTS: The municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan enacted an Ordinance17 which prohibited

the operation within its jurisdiciton of night clubs which employed professional
hostesses or hospitality girls. It revoked the licenses of the said entities, and provided
for a penal clause.
- 2 cases of Prohibition was filed with the CFI of Bulacan, aguing that the ordinance is null
and void as a municipality has no authority to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or
calling; that it is violative of the right to due process, as the licenses were withdrawn
without judicial hearing; and that under PD 189, as amended, the power to regulate
tourist-oriented businesses including night clubs, has been transferred to the
Department of Tourism.
- The municipality answered, saying that the it is authorized not only to regulate but to
prohibit the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs; that the right to
due process was not violated, since property rights are subordinate to public interests.
- The lower court dismissed the petitions saying that the enactment of the ordinance is
within the police power of the municipality.
- The present petition for certiorari was then filed with the SC.
ISSUE: WON the ordinance was within the power of the municipality to enact (No)

17 Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975.

RATIO: Police power is granted to municipal corporations in general terms in the RAC18.
An ordinance enacted by virtue thereof is valid, unless it contravenes the Constitution, or
an Act of the Legislature, or it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive,
partial, discriminating, or in derogation of common right.
- US v Salaviera, where the said provision was applied: The general welfare clause has
two branches: One branch attaches itself to the main trunk of municipal authority, and
relates to such ordinances and regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect...
powers and duties... the municipal council... The second branch... is much more
independent of the specific functions of the council which are enumerated by law. It
authorizes such ordinances... necessary... to provide for the health and safety, promote
the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the
municipality and the inhabitants thereof...
- Ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare clause
must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation,
and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.
- The exercise of Bocaue of its lawmaking power is not reasonable. The ordinance on its
face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have
been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. In the
guise of a police regulation, there was a clear invasion of personal or property rights.
- While RA 938 was amended to include the word Prohibit in the powers that a
municipality may have as against clubs and similar establishment, its title remained the
same not containing the word Prohibit, but only the power to regulate.
- Under the LGC, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of
night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business.
The legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject
to appropriate regulations.
- The conclusion reached is not to be interpreted as a retreat from the Court's resolute
stand sustaining police power to promote public morals. Legislation of that character is
deserving of the fullest sympathy from the judiciary.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition granted. Ordinance declared void and unconstitutional.
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS VS CA
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. NARCISO T. ATIENZA as Presiding Judge,
Bulacan, RTC, and HON. VICENTE CRUZ, Acting Mayor and the MUNICIPALITY OF STA. MARIA, BULACAN, respondents.

January 21, 1991

Gancayco, J.
FACTS: - Technology Developers is a domestic private corporation engaged in the
manufacture and export of charcoal briquette.
- It received a letter from acting mayor Pablo Cruz, ordering the full cessation of the
operation of the its plant at Sta. Maria, Bulacan, until further order. The letter also
requested that the corporation bring some documents (Building permit; Mayor's permit;
Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit) to the
office of the mayor.
18 Sec 2283: General power of council to enact ordinances and make regulations. - The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make
such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and
such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order,
comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.

- The Corporation tried to secure the permit from the DENR, and it was given a
temporary permit to operate. It then tried to get a mayor's permit but it was not
entertained.
- Without notice, Cruz ordered the Municipality's station commander to padlock the
premises of the corporation's plant, thus effectively causing the stoppage of its
operation.
- Technology Developers instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with
preliminary injunction against Cruz. The lower court granted a preliminary mandatory
injunction.
- Upon further hearing of the case, the following were presented against the corporation:
1) an investigation report on the Technology Developers saying that its factory produces
hazardous material; 2) sheets of paper containing signatures of residents near the
factory; 3) a letter addressed to the governor complaining about the smoke coming out
of the factory.
- Reassessing the evidence adduced, the lower court set aside its previous order. It's MR
having been denied, it filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which was denied. It's
MR in the CA also having been denied, it filed with the SC the present petition for review
on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON the writ of preliminary should be granted (No)
RATIO: The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound judicial
discretion of the trial court; it shall not be disturbed unless it acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of its discretion.
- The following circumstances militate against the maintenance of the writ of preliminary
injunction:
- No mayor's permit had been secured. While the matter of determining whether there is
a pollution of the environment that requires control if not prohibition of the operation of a
business is essentially addressed to the Environmental Management Bureau, the mayor
of a town has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution. By virtue of
his police power, he may deny the application for a permit to operate a business or
otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures are taken.
- The acting mayor called the attention of Technology Developers to the pollution it
emitted.
- The action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents.
- The closure order was issued only after an investigation was made.
- Technology Developers failed to produce a building permit from the municipality of Sta.
Maria.
- It had not exerted any effort to extend or validate its temporary operating permit much
less to install any device to control the pollution and prevent any hazard to the health of
the residents of the community.
- Technology Developers makes a plea focusing on its huge investment in this dollarearning industry. However, concomitant with the need to promote the growth of the
economy is the equally essential imperative of protecting the health of the people from
the deleterious effect of the pollution of the environment.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition denied.
CHUA HUAT VS CA
CHUA HUAT, ONG CHOAN, DOMINADOR FELINO, RUFINO CLEMENTE, TEODORA CLEMENTE, and LOURDES MEMPIN,
petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE ELVIRO PERALTA, SHERIFF OF MANILA, and THE ROMAN
CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, and MANUEL UY AND SONS, INC., respondents.

July, 9, 1991

Davide, Jr., J.
FACTS: Present case is a consolidation of 2 cases. The first is a petition for review on
certiorari of the decision of the CA. The second is a petition for prohibition directed
against the notices of condemnation and the demolition orders issued by the respondent
City Engineer, upon authority of the respondent City Mayor, concerning the buildings
occupied by petitioners.
- On 31 May 1972, a decision was rendered in Civil Case No. 74634 by the CFI against
the petitioners, ordering them to pay the plaintiff, and to vacate the property.
- The petitioners appealed all the way to the SC, but their appeals were denied.
- After the decision in Civil Case No. 74634 became final and executory, the plaintiffs
filed a motion to execute the same, which was granted by the trial court.
G.R. No. 53851
- Chua Huat filed with the CFI of Manila a complaint for the annulment of the judgment in
Civil Case No. 74634. Ong Choan and others also filed a separate complaint for
annulment of judgment. Both complaints were based on the ground that the CFI of
Manila had no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 74634 because the said action was one for
ejectment and not for recovery of possession (accion publiciana) which was, therefore,
cognizable by the City Court of Manila.
- Despite the filing of the cases for annulment of judgment, the CFI ordered the execution
of the judgment in Civil Case No. 74634. Petitioners then filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with the CA, which denied their petition.
- Hence, the petitioners filed this petition for review with the SC.
G.R. No. 63863
- Respondent Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc. requested Romulo del Rosario the City Engineer
and Building Officials, of Manila, to condemn the dilapidated structures located at 1271
to 1277 Pedro Gil St. and 1553 to 1557 Paz St., Paco, Manila, all occupied by petitioners.
- Notices of condemnation were addressed to the petitioners, stating that the subject
buildings were are in dangerous condition and therefore condemned, subject to the
confirmation of the Mayor as required by the Ordinances of the City of Manila. The orders
were based on the inspection reports made by Architect Oscar Andres and the
Memorandum-Reports made by the Evaluation Committee of the Office of the City
Engineer.
- Petitioners formally protested against said notices of condemnation on the ground that
the buildings are still in good physical condition and are structurally sound based on the
certification of Civil Engineer Romulo Molas, a private practitioner, who inspected the
structures upon the request of petitioners.
- The City Engineer issued a demolition order with respect one of the buildings.
Petitioners filed the instant Petition for Prohibition, with Preliminary Injunction against
City Mayor, City Engineer, Building Officer, and Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc.,
- The Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order, but the Mayor issued the demolition
orders directed against the other petitioners.
- The respondents prayed that the petition be dismissed on the following grounds: a) it
involves questions of facts; b) the buildings were ordered removed after it was
established that they had suffered from defects or deterioration thereby posing perils to
the public in general; c) the power to condemn buildings in the City of Manila falls within
the exclusive domain of the City Engineer; d) the power to condemn and remove
buildings is an exercise of the police power granted the City of Manila to promote public
safety; and e) administrative decisions falling within the executive jurisdiction cannot be

set aside by courts of justice except on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error
of law.
- This petition was consolidated with the other petition.
ISSUE: Whether the petitions should be dismissed (Yes)
RATIO: G.R. No. 53851 is frivolous and is dismally bereft of merit. The antecedent facts
unmistakably disclose a clear pattern to make a mockery of the judicial process, or to
abuse it. The decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA and the SC, had long
become final.
- G.R. No. 63863 must equally fall. Petitioners have no valid grievance for the remedy of
certiorari under Rule 65 to be available to them. Petitioners failed to show that the
respondents acted without or in excess of urisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion,
and that there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.
- The power to condemn buildings and structures in the City of Manila falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the City Engineer, who is at the same time the Building Official.

- The authority of the City Engineer is found in Secs 27519 and 27520 of the Compilation of
Ordinances of the City of Manila, and in Section 215 of PF 109621, otherwise known as the
National Building Code.
- It is unquestionable that the Building Official has the authority to order the
condemnation and demolition of buildings which are found to be in a dangerous or
ruinous condition, and that the Mayor has the power to confirm or deny the action taken
by the Building Official with respect to the dangerous or ruinous buildings. Respondent
City Engineer and Building Official can, therefore, validly issue the questioned
condemnation and demolition orders. This is also true with the respondent Mayor who
can approve or deny the condemnation orders.
- No grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent City Engineer because the
orders were made only after thorough ocular inspections were conducted by the City's
Building Inspectors. The results of the inspections were set forth in a memorandum
stating the defects of the building.
- Respondent Mayor's act of approving the condemnation orders was done in accordance
with law. The protest made by petitioners was beyond the seven days prescribed under
Sec 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila.
- Appeal was likewise available to petitioners, as provided in the IRR promulgated by the
Ministry of Public Works to implement PD 1096. Certiorari will not lie because petitioners
failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.
DISPOSITIVE: Petitions dismissed.
MUN. OF MAKATI VS COA
Hon. Jejomar Binay, and the Municipality of Makati (Petitioner) vs Hon. Eufemio Doming, and the
Commission on Audit (Respondents)

September 11, 1991

Paras, J.

19 Sec. 275. Deterioration and Defects. All buildings or parts of buildings which show defects in any essential parts shall be repaired and put in
safe condition at once, or if the deterioration be greater than fifty per centum of the value of the building, as estimated by the city engineer, they
shall be removed.

20 Sec. 276. Condemnation Proceeding. Whenever in the judgment of the City Engineer any building or portion of building has been damaged
by any cause to such an extent as to be dangerous for use, he may condemn the same and shall immediately notify the owner and the Mayor of
his action. If the owner or his agent be not willing to abide by this order of condemnation, he may make formal objection within the period of
seven days following such notification. The Mayor shall hear the owner or his agent and his experts and also the city engineer, deciding the case
on the evidence presented. If the Mayor confirms the action of the city engineer, the owner or his agent shall immediately proceed to remove the
building within fifteen days from the date on which he was notified of such final action. Should the owner or his agent not comply with the
decision of the Mayor the building shall be removed at his expense and the city will proceed to recover against him for the amount expended.

21 When any building or structure is found or declared to be dangerous or ruinous, the Building Officials, shall order its repair, vacation or
demolition depending upon the degree of danger to life, health, or safety. This is without prejudice to further action that may be taken under the
provisions of Articles 482 and 694 to 707 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

FACTS: On September 27, 1988, Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No.
6022. Qualified beneficiaries, under the Program, are bereaved families of Makati whose
gross family income does not exceed P2,000.00/month. The beneficiaries, upon
fulfillment of other requirements, would receive the amount of P500.00 from Makati.
- Metro Manila Commission approved the. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a
disbursement fund of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the Program.
- COA disapproved Resolution No. 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of finds
for the implementation thereof.
- Mayor Binay sought reconsideration, invoking the principles of police power and parens
patriae. COA denied this, saying there is no connection between the objective sought to
be attained under the Resolution, and the alleged public safety, and general welfare of
the inhabitants of Makati.
- Binay then filed the present petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the Resolution of Makati should be allowed (Yes)
RATIO: Police power is a governmental function, and an inherent attribute of
sovereignty. However, it is not inherent in municipal corporations. Before a municipal
corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by
the legislature.
- A valid delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred
from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; as a general rule,
municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of
their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly
granted.

22 A RESOLUTION TO CONFIRM AND/OR RATIFY THE ONGOING BURIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM INITIATED BY THE OFFICE OF
THE MAYOR, OF EXTENDING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE OF FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) TO A BEREAVED FAMILY, FUNDS
TO BE TAKEN OUT OF UNAPPROPRIATED AVAILABLE FUNDS EXISTING IN THE MUNICIPAL TREASURY.

- Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause23.
- Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most
essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. It is elastic and must be responsive to
various social conditions.
- In the present case, COA tries to re-define the scope of police power by circumscribing
its exercise to "public safety, general welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati."
- The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be
commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the
people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with
private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all
legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. Thus, it is inadvisable
to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police
power.
- COA objects on the ground that the Resolution should be for a public purpose, and
should be for the benefit of the whole of Makati, and not for the benefit of only the few.
- COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not unconstitutional
merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons.
- This decision, however, must not be taken as a precedent for municipal governments to
embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition granted. COA decision set aside.
TATEL VS MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC
CELESTINO TATEL, petitioner, vs. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC, SALVADOR A. SURTIDA, in his capacity as Mayor of Virac,
Catanduanes; GAVINO V. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Virac, Catanduanes; JOSE T. BUEBOS, in his
capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; ANGELES TABLIZO, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes;
ELPIDIO T. ZAFE, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; MARIANO ALBERTO, in his capacity as Councilor of
Virac, Catanduanes; JULIA A. GARCIA, in her capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; and PEDRO A. GUERRERO, in
his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes, respondents

March 11, 1992

Nocon, J.
FACTS: Celestino Tatel is a businessman engaged in the import and export of abaca and
other products. He had a warehouse in Virac, Catanduanes.
- Residents complained of his warehouse because of the disturbance caused by bailing
machine in the warehouse emitted smoke, obnoxious odor, and dust.
- A committee was sent to investigate. It noted the crowded nature of the neighborhood
such that an accidental fire within the warehouse could be dangerous to the
neighborhood.
- Consequently,S the Municipal Council of Virac issued Resolution No 29 declaring the
warehouse of Tatel a public nuisance within the purview of Art 694 of the Civil Code, and
directing the transfer of such warehouses to a more suitable place 2 months from the
receipt of the resolution.
- Tatel filed a petition for prohibition in the CFI of Catanduanes.

23 they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience,
maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and
insure the protection of property therein."

- The municipality also contended that the warehouse violated Ordinance No. 1324
prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses without maintaining
the necessary distance of 200 meters; tatel contends that the ordinance is
unconstitutional, violating the due process and equal protection clause.
- The lower court ruled in favor of the municipality. It said that the ordinance is a valid
exercise of police power, and that the warehouse of Tatel is a public nuisance.
- Tatel appealed to the SC.
ISSUE: WON there was proper exercise of police power (YES)
RATIO: Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of
its police power. Municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and
maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with police powers in
order to effectively accomplish the declared objects of their creation. Its authority
derives from the general welfare clause of the Administrative Code.25

24

AN ORDINANCE STRICTLY PROHIBITING THE CONSTRUCTION OF WAREHOUSE IN ANY FORM NEAR A BLOCK OF
HOUSES EITHER IN POBLACION OR BARRIO WITH NECESSARY DISTANCE TO AVOID GREAT LOSSES OF PROPERTY AND
LIVES BY FIRE ACCIDENT.

25

Sec 2238: The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to
carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the
health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.

- For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the
municipality, but must also meet the following criteria: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and
consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable. Ordinance No. 13 meets
these criteria.
- What is regulated by the ordinance is the construction of warehouses wherein
inflammable materials are stored, and not the construction per se of a warehouse. The
purpose is to avoid the loss of life and property in case of fire which is one of the
primordial obligation of the government.
- As to the claim that similarly situated warehouses were not prosecuted, it is no reason
to claim that the ordinance is discriminatory. A distinction must be made between the
law itself and the manner in which said law is implemented .
DISPOSITIVE: Petition dismissed.
TAMIN VS CA
RTC JUDGE CAMILO E. TAMIN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur and the
MUNICIPALITY OF DUMINGAG, ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR; represented by MAYOR DOMICIANO E. REAL, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE MEDINA and FORTUNATA ROSELLON, respondents

May 8, 1992
Gutierrez, Jr., J.
FACTS: On September 24, 1990, the Municipality of Dumingag represented by its mayor,
Domiciano Real filed with the RTC a complaint denominated as Ejectment with
preliminary injunction and damages against Medina and Rosellon. The complaint
alleged that Dumingag owned a parcel of land; that that the parcel of land was reserved
for public plaza under Proclamation 365; that during the incumbency of the previous
mayor, the municipality leased a portion of the land to the defendants subject to the
condition that they should vacate in case it is needed; that the defendants paid the
rentals, but subsequently stopped; that the incumbent mayor discovered that the
defendants filed a Cadastral case over said lot; that the defendants refused to vacate.
- Medina and Rosellon filed a motion to dismiss alleging the lack of jurisdiction, since the
complaint is for illegal detainer which is within the original jurisdiction of the municipal
court. It also raised the pendency of a cadastral case over the same parcel of land.
- Judge Tamin denied the motion, and issued a writ of possession and an ancillary writ of
demolition. He said that the court has jurisdiction because the action is for recovery of
ownership; and that the cadastral court has no jurisdiction since the subject land is a
public plaza.
- The municipality implemented the writs issued resulting in the dispossession of the
Medina and Rosellon from the parcel of land and the demolition of structures and
buildings they owned thereon.
- Medina and Rosellon filed their answer to the complaint alleging that the subject parcel
of land is owned Medina since 1947 when he bought it from a Subanan native; that
Rosellon leased from Medina a portion of the land; that they were never lessees of the
municipality; that Proclamation 365 recognized "private rights"; and that a case is
pending before the Cadastral court.
- Before Judge Tamin could act, Medina and Rosellon filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA.
- The CA granted the petition, and declared null and void the orders of the lower court.
Hence, the present petition filed with the SC

ISSUE: WON the municipality is entitled to a writ of possession (No. It was prematurely issued.)

RATIO: The RTC has jurisdiction. According to the CA: although a lease is alleged in the
complaint, based on the allegations the lease would be void; therefore the action is one
of recovery of possession properly cognizable by the RTC.
- Based on finding that the complaint is for recovery of possession, the CA concluded
that the RTC did not have authority to issue a writ of possession and a writ of demolition.
It said that the writ of possession is available in the following instances: (1)land
registration proceeding, which is a proceeding in rem; (2)extra-judicial foreclosure of
mortgage; (3)judicial foreclosure of mortgage, a quasi in rem proceeding; and
(4)execution sales.

- Petitioners now contend that the allegations in the complaint constitute a cause of
action for abatement of public nuisance under Arts 69426 and 69527 of the Civil Code,
which would entitle the municipality to the writ of possession and writ of demolition.

26 Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property or anything else which:

xxx xxx xxx

(5)

Hinders or impairs the use of property.

27 Art. 695 Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons,
although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal...

- Thus, the complaint alleges factual circumstances of a complaint for abatement of

public nuisance. The issue however is not the nature of the cause of action but whether
the municipality is entitled to a writ of possession. Art 69928 provides the remedies
against a public nuisance.
- Of the 3 remedies available to it, the municipality chose to file a civil action. It was
aware that under the then LGC the Sangguniang Bayan has to first pass an ordinance
before the municipality may summarily abate a public nuisance. (Sec 149(z) (ee)).
- A public plaza is outside the commerce of man and constructions thereon can be
abated summarily by the municipality. Therefore, if the allegations in the complaint are
true and that the parcel of land is indeed a public plaza, the writs would have been
justified. In fact, there would have been no need for a writ of possession since the
occupation over the land can not be recognized by any law. A writ of demolition would
have been sufficient to eject the respondents.
- However, the status of the subject parcel of land has yet to be decided. Proclamation
365 recognizes private rights which may have been vested on other persons.
- Even before the Proclamation, the parcel of land was the subject of cadastral
proceedings. At the time of the filing of the instant case, the cadastral proceedings were
still pending.
- Technically, there is no prejudicial question since the two actions involved are both civil
in nature. However, the fact that the cadastral proceedings will ultimately settle the real
ownership of the disputed parcel of land must be considered. In case Medina is adjudged
the owner, then the writs would necessarily be null and void.
- The issuance of the writs was premature. The Judge should have stopped the
proceedings and wait for the final outcome of the cadastral proceedings.
- The legality of the occupation by Medina and Rosellon is still to be resolved in the
cadastral proceedings. If Medina is declared owner of the land, he would be entitled to
just compensation for the precipitate demolition of the buildings. On the other hand, if
Medina is declared to have no rights over the land, he would not be entitled to any
compensation since the demolition of the buildings would have been justified.
- In the interest of justice, the municipality must put up a bond to be determined by the
trial court to answer for just compensation to which the private respondents may be
entitled in case the demolition of their buildings is adjudged to be illegal.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition dismissed.
PATALINHUG vs CA
Alfredo Patalinghug (Petitioner) vs CA, Ricardo Cribillo, Martin Arapol, Corazon Alcasid, Primitiva Sedo (Respondents)

January 27, 1994

Romero, J.

28 Article 699 of the Civil Code provides for the following remedies against a public nuisance:
local ordinance; or
(2) A civil action; or
(3) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.

(1) A prosecution under the Penal Code or any

FACTS: On November 17, 1982, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted
Ordinance No. 36329. It is provided that Funeral Parlors... shall be established not less
than 50 meters from any residential structures, churches and other institutional
buildings.
- Upon prior approval and certification of zoning compliance by Zoning Administrator
Hector Esguerra, Building Official Demetrio Alindad issued a Building Permit in favor of
Patalinghug for the construction of a funeral parlor. Patalinghug commenced the
construction of his funeral parlor.
- Acting on the complaint of several residents that Patalinghugr's funeral parlor violated
Ordinance No. 363, the Sangguniang Panlungsod conducted an investigation and found
that the nearest residential structure to the funeral parlor is only 8 inches. The said
structure was owned by Tepoot.
- Cribillo, et. al. filed a case for the declaration of nullity of Patalinghug's building permit.
After conducting its own ocular inspection the lower court dismissed the complaint
finding that the building of the complainants is more than 50 meters away; that the
adjacent residential building of Tepoot is actually used in a laundry business; and that
complainants failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
- Hence, Cribillo, et. al. appealed to the CA. It reversed the trial court's decision. It said
that while Tepoot's building was used commercially by the lessee, it is still a residential
lot as reflected in its tax declaration.
Hence, Patalinghug appeals to the SC.
ISSUE: WON Patalinghug's building violated the Ordinance (No)
RATIO: The testimony of City Councilor Vergara shows that Tepoot's building was used
for a dual purpose both as a dwelling and as a place where a laundry business was
conducted. But while its commercial aspect has been established by the presence of
machineries and laundry paraphernalia, its use as a residence, other than being declared
for taxation purposes as such, was not fully substantiated.
- A tax declaration is not conclusive of the nature of the property for zoning purposes. A
property may have been declared by its owner as residential for real estate taxation
purposes but it may well be within a commercial zone.
- A tax declaration only enables the assessor to identify the property for assessment
levels. In fact, a tax declaration does not bind a provincial/city assessor, for under Sec 22
of the Real Estate Tax Code, appraisal and assessment are based on the actual use
irrespective of any previous assessment. A piece of land declared by a taxpayer as
residential may be assessed by the provincial or city assessor as commercial because its
actual use is commercial.
- That Tepoot's building is commercial is strengthened by the fact that the Sangguniang
Panlungsod has declared the questioned area as commercial. Even if the building was
declared as for taxation purposes as residential, once a local government has reclassified
an area as commercial, that determination for zoning purposes must prevail.
- The declaration of the said area as a commercial zone is an exercise of police power to
promote the good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. The state, in
order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property,
and with business and occupations. Thus, persons may be subjected to certain kinds of
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general welfare.
DISPOSITIVE: CA decision reversed. RTC decision reinstated.
29 Expanded Zoning Ordinance of Davao City

GREATER BALANGA DEV'T CORPORATION VS MUNICIPALITY OF BALANGA

GREATER BALANGA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner. vs. MUNICIPALITY OF BALANGA, BATAAN; SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF
BALANGA, BATAAN; HON. MELANIO S. BANZON, JR.; HON. DOMINGO D. DIZON; HON. AGRIPINO C. BANZON; HON. EDUARDO P.
TUAZON; HON. GABRIEL J. NISAY; HON. LORENZO P. TAPAN; HON. FEDERICO S. BUSTAMANTE; HON. ROLANDO H. DAVID; HON.
EDILBERTO Q. DE GUZMAN; HON. ALFREDO C. GUILA; and HON. GAVINO S. SANTIAGO, respondents

December 27, 1994

Quiason, J.
FACTS: This case involves a parcel of land, Lot 261-B-6-A-3, in the Municipality of
Balanga, Province of Bataan. It is registered under a TCT in the name of Greater Balanga
Development Corporation (GBDC), which is a domestic corporation owned and controlled
by the Camacho family, and which donated to the Municipality of Balanga the present
site of the Balanga Public Market. The lot in dispute lies behind the Balanga Public
Market.
- GBDC conducted a relocation survey of the area, and discovered that certain portions
of the property had been usurped by the Municipality of Balanga, which had allowed the
construction of shanties and market stalls on the land.
- On January 11, 1988, GBDC applied with the Office of the Mayor of Balanga for a
business permit to engage in business in the said area. Mayor Banzon issued a Mayor's
Permit, granting the privilege of a "real estate dealer/privately-owned public market
operator". The permit was to expire on December 31, 1988.
- The Sangguniang Bayan of Balanga passed a Resolution annulling the Mayor's permit,
and advising the Mayor to revoke the permit to operate a public market. The mayor
revoked the permit insofar as it authorized the operation of a public market.
- GBDC filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. The
municipality asserted that the Mayor may issue, deny or revoke municipal licenses and
permits; and that the Resolution was a legitimate exercise of local legislative authority.
- GBDC replied that since it had not violated any law or ordinance, there was no reason
to revoke the Mayor's permit. The municipality pointed out that GBDC deliberately made
a false statement in the application form when it failed to provide the information that
their place of business is the subject of adverse claims; that it failed to apply for two
separate permits for the two lines of business it proposed to engage in; and that
pursuant to Sec 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code, the permit can be revoked.
ISSUE: WON the municipality could have revoked the permit (No)
RATIO: The application for Mayor's permit in this case requires the applicant to state
what type of business is being applied for. GBDC left this entry bank in its application
form. Thus, the permit should not have been issued without the required information.
However, revoking the permit because of a false statement in the application form
cannot be justified. There must be proof of willful misrepresentation and deliberate intent
to make a false statement. GBDC did not make any false statement in the entry.
- Applying for two businesses in one permit is not ground for revocation. The second
paragraph of Sec 3A-06(b) does not expressly require two permits for their conduct of
two or more businesses, but only that separate fees be paid for each business. The
powers of municipal corporations are to be construed in strictissimi juris against the
municipality.
- Under the law, the Sangguniang Bayan has the power to provide for the establishment
and maintenance of public markets in the municipality and to regulate any business, and
prescribe the conditions under which a municipal license may be revoked. It was this
authority which the Sangguniang Bayan invoked when it issued the Resolution.

- As may be gleaned from said Resolution, the reason for the revocation of the Mayor's
permit was the controversy with regard to the ownership of the land since it was subject
to a separate civil case.
- The question of ownership over the land had already been settled with finality by the
SC in 1983. When the Mayor's permit was revoked on February 19, 1988, five years had
already elapsed. Clearly, for all intents and purposes, GBDC appeared to be the true
owner of Lot 261-B-6-A-3 when the municipality revoked its permit to engage in business
on its own land.
- The municipality did not establish or maintain any public market on the subject lot. The
resolution merely mentioned the plan to acquire the lot for expansion of the public
market. Until expropriation proceedings are instituted, the landowner cannot be deprived
of its right over the land.
- Of course, the Sangguniang Bayan has the duty in the exercise of its police powers to
regulate any business. But the "anxiety, uncertainty, restiveness" among the stallholders
and traders cannot be a valid ground for revoking the permit of GBDC. After all, the
stallholders were doing business on property not belonging to the Municipality. The claim
that the municipality's acts were measures "designed to promote peace and order and
protect the general welfare of the people of Balanga" is too amorphous and convenient
an excuse to justify its acts.
- Since the municipality is not the owner of the land, there is no legal basis for it to
impose and collect market fees and market entrance fees. Only the owner has the right
to do so. However, the Mayor's permit issued on January 11, 1988 cannot now be
reinstated despite the nullity of its revocation since it expired on December 31, 1988.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition for certiorari and prohibition granted. Petition for mandamus
denied.

TANO VS SOCRATES
August 21, 1997
Davide, Jr., J.
FACTS: On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City
enacted Ordinance No. 15-9230

30 AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM
JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF

- To implement the ordinance, then Acting City Mayor Amado Lucero issued Office Order
No. 23.
- On February 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of
Palawan enacted Resolution No. 3331

31 A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THE CATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE
MARINE CORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS, TO WIT: FAMILY: SCARIDAE (MAMENG), EPINE PHELUS FASCIATUS
(SUNO). CROMILEPTES ALTIVELIS (PANTHER OR SENORITA), LOBSTER BELOW 200 GRAMS AND SPAWNING, TRADACNA
GIGAS (TAKLOBO), PINCTADA MARGARITEFERA (MOTHER PEARL, OYSTERS, GIANT CLAMS AND OTHER SPECIES),
PENAEUS MONODON (TIGER PRAWN-BREEDER SIZE OR MOTHER), EPINEPHELUS SUILLUS (LOBA OR GREEN GROUPER)
AND FAMILY: BALISTIDAE (TROPICAL AQUARIUM FISHES) FOR A PERIOD FIVE (5) YEARS IN AND COMING FROM PALAWAN
WATERS

- The ordinances were implemented thereby depriving all the fishermen of Palawan and
the City of Puerto Princesa of their only means of livelihood and Airline Shippers
Association of Palawan and other marine merchants from performing their lawful
occupation and trade.
- Some of the petitioners were charged with violations of the ordinances.
- The petitioners filed the present petition for certiorari challenging the constitutionality
of the ordinances. They contend that the Ordinances deprived them of due process of
law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade; that
Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under which the Mayors
permit could be granted or denied; and that the Ordinance took away the right of
petitioners-fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways.
- The respondents defended the validity of Ordinances as a valid exercise of the
Provincial Governments power under the general welfare clause of the LGC, and its
specific power to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts
which endanger the environment pursuant to Secs 447(a)(1)(vi), 458(a)(1)(vi), and
468(a)(1)(vi) of the LGC.
ISSUE: WON the ordinances are valid (Yes)
RATIO: Laws (including ordinances) enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. To
overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction.
- Petitioners contentions are baseless; the ordinances do not suffer from any infirmity,
both under the Constitution and applicable laws.
- They argue that they are protected under the Constitution as subsistence fishermen
as provided in Sec 2 Art XII. However, there is no showing that any of the petitioners
qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman.
- Sec 131(p) of the LGC defines a marginal farmer or fisherman as an individual
engaged in subsistence farming or fishing which shall be limited to the sale, barter or
exchange of agricultural or marine products produced by himself and his immediate
family.
- Besides, Constitutional provision aims primarily to lay stress on the duty of the State to
protect the nations marine wealth. What the provision merely recognizes is that the
State may allow, by law, cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen.
- The so-called preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen is not at all
absolute. In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the
State; their utilization shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. Their
mandated protection, development, and conservation imply certain restrictions on
whatever right of enjoyment there may be in favor of anyone.
- The state policy enshrined in the Constitution regarding the duty of the State to protect
and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature must be borne in mind.
- The LGC provisions invoked by the respondents merely seek to give flesh and blood to
the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. In fact, this is mentioned in
the general welfare clause. The general welfare provisions of the LGC shall be liberally
interpreted to give more powers to the local government units in accelerating economic
development and upgrading the quality of life for the people of the community.
- The centerpiece of LGC is the system of decentralization. One of the devolved powers is
the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters. This necessarily includes enactment
of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters.
- In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution, and the powers
granted to LGUs under the General Welfare Clause, and under Secs 149, 447(a)(1)(vi),

458(a)(1)(vi), and 468(a)(1)(vi), which unquestionably involve the exercise of police

power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.
- The ordinances have 2 principal objectives: (1) to establish a closed season for the
species of aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years; and (2) to protect
the corals of the marine waters from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities.
- The accomplishment of the first objective is well within the devolved power to enforce
fishery laws. The realization of the second objective falls within both the general welfare
clause of the LGC, and the express mandate thereunder to cities and provinces to protect
the environment.
- The dissenting opinion of Justice Bellosillo relies upon the lack of authority on the part
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to enact the Ordinance on the theory that the subject
thereof is within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR)
under PD 704; and that, in any event, the Ordinance is unenforceable for lack of approval
by the Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources (DNR).
- The majority does not agree. The jurisdiction of the BFAR is not all-encompassing. Sec 4
of PD 704 excludes municipal waters. BFAR is not under DNR anymore after the
enactment of some EOs. It is already under the Department of Agriculture.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition dismissed.
Bellosillo, J. (Dissenting):
- The general welfare clause is not the sole criterion to determine the validity or
constitutionality of the ordinances. The tests of a valid ordinance are: (a) It must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (b) It must not be unfair or oppressive; (c) It
must not be partial or discriminatory; (d) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (e)
It must be general and consistent with public policy; and, (f) It must not be
unreasonable.
- Under PD 704 fishing in municipal waters are under the jurisdiction of the municipal
government. However, the decree imposes a mandatory requirement directing municipal
governments to submit ordinances enacted pertinent to fishing to the Secretary of
Agriculture who now has control and supervision over the BFAR.
- There is no inconsistency between the LGC and PD 704. While the LGC vests power
upon the local government to enact ordinances for the general welfare of its inhabitants,
such power is subject to certain limitations imposed by the Code itself and by other
statutes. When the legislature failed to repeal Sec 4 of PD 704 it accepted and
recognized a limitation on the power of the local government to enact ordinances
relative to matters affecting fishery and aquatic resources.
- The operative principles of decentralization upon the environment and natural
resources are not absolute, as the LGC provides that local government units shall share
with the national government the responsibility in the management and maintenance of
ecological balance within their territorial jurisdiction, subject to the provisions of this
Code and national policies.
WHITE LIGHT vs MANILA
White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation, and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (Petitioners) vs
City of Manila (Respondent)

January 20, 2009

Tinga, J.

FACTS: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the
Ordinance No. 77432.
- On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a
complaint for declaratory relief with the RTC of Manila against the City of Manila. It
prayed that the Ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional, claiming that it was
authorized by PD 259 to admit customers on a short time basis as well as to charge
customers wash up rates for stays of only three hours.
- White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and
Development Corporation (STDC) intervened on the ground that the Ordinance directly
affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila.
MTDC eventually moved to withdraw as plaintiff.
- The City filed an Answer alleging that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police
power.
- The RTC ruled that the Ordinance is null and void, saying that it strikes at the personal
liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution.
- When the case was in the CA, the appellate court ruled that the Ordinance is a valid
exercise of police power pursuant to Sec 458(4)(iv) of the LGC. IT reversed the RTC
decision and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.
- TC, WLC and STDC filed the present petition for review on certiorari with the SC.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioners have standing to sue (Yes)
WON the Ordinance is valid (No)
RATIO: The petitioners allege that their business is being unlawfully interfered with by
the Ordinance. However, they also allege that the equal protection rights of their clients
are also being interfered with.
- Standing is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to
and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the
case. Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions. In this
case, the concept of third party standing as an exception and the overbreadth doctrine
are appropriate.
- Requisites for third party standing: the litigant must have suffered an injury-in-fact,
thus giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in
dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and there must exist
some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests.
- In the present case, it is clear that the business interests of the petitioners are injured
by the Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their customers for their continued
viability. The relative silence in constitutional litigation of such special interest groups in
our nation may also be construed as a hindrance for customers to bring suit.
- Assuming arguendo that third party standing cannot be invoke, the overbreadth
doctrine comes into play. In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government action are
in effect permitted to raise the rights of third parties. The overbreadth doctrine applies
when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights. In this case,
the petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to
liberty of their clients. Thus, based on the allegations, the Ordinance suffers from
overbreadth.
32 An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging
Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila

- For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the
LGU, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3)
must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5)
must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
- In this case, the Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices,
namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is
sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on LGUs by the LGC through such
implements as the general welfare clause.
- Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in
general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide
enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant.
- The goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals are
unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of police power. Yet the desirability of
these ends do not sanctify all means for their achievement. Those means must align with
the Constitution.
- The primary constitutional question here is one of due process, as guaranteed under
Sec 1, Art III of the Constitution. The due process guaranty serves as a protection against
arbitrary regulation or seizure.
- The right at stake here is fundamental right to liberty, which is the most primordial of
rights. Liberty includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint.
It is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been
endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common
welfare.
- The primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of illicit sexual behavior.
However, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior among willing married or
consenting single adults which is constitutionally protected will be curtailed as well.
- The right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe v Mutuc, the
invasion of which should be justified by a compelling state interest. The right to privacy
is recognized independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving
of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions
into the personal life of the citizen.
- There are legitimate activities which the Ordinance would impair. There are very
legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than twice a day.
- The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and
could be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures through
active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict
enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use.
Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying
the whole day rate.
- Individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be
required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. However wellintentioned the Ordinance may be, it is an arbitrary intrusion into the rights of the
establishments as well as their patrons.
- The promotion of public welfare deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary provided
that such measures do not trample rights the Court is sworn to protect.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition granted. Ordinance is declared unconstitutional.

Roble Arrastre, Inc. (Petitioner) vs Hon. Altagracia Villaflor, and the CA

(Respondents)
August 26, 2006
Chico-Nazario, J.
FACTS: Roble Arrastre, Inc. is a cargo handling service operator, authorized by the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) to provide arrastre and stevedoring services at the
Municipal Port of Hilongos, Leyte from 7 September 1992 to 15 September 1993.4 For
the years 1992 and 1993, Roble was granted Business Permits by Altagracia Villaflor as
Mayor of Hilongos.
- On 14 December 1993, pending final consideration of Robles application for renewal
with the PPA, PPA Port Manager Salvador Reyna issued a 90-day hold-over authority to
Roble.
- On 27 January 1994, while the 90-day hold-over authority was in effect, Roble filed with
Villaflor an application for the renewal of its Business Permit. However, the same was
denied.
- Roble filed with the RTC a Petition for Mandamus against Villaflor. It argues that the
mayor's power to issue licenses in Sec 444(b)(3)(iv) of the LGC is merely for the purpose
of revenue generation and not regulation, hence the mayor has no discretion to refuse
the issuance of a business license; and that it is the PPA which is vested with the
discretion to determine whether a party can render arrastre service in a particular port
area.
- Villaflor averred that mandamus does not lie as the issuance of the permit is not a
ministerial function; that the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipality passed a resolution
which prohibits any party operating a shipping line from engaging in arrastre and
stevedoring services at the port of Hilongos; and that Roble is owned and operated by
Roble Shipping Lines, a shipping company.
- Roble filed a Supplemental Petition, contending that subsequent to the filing of the
Petition for Mandamus, it was granted by the PPA a five-year contract to provide cargo
handling and other related services at the Port of Hilongos.
- The RTC granted the petition. Upon elevation of the case to the CA, the appellate court
reversed the trial court's decision, and dismissed the complaint. It ruled that mandamus
will not lie to control the discretion given by the law to the mayor. It also said that the
case has become moot since its prayer was to be given a permit in the year 1994 (CA
decision came out in 1996).
- Hence, Roble filed the present petition for review with the SC.
ISSUE: Whether mandamus can be granted (No)
RATIO: As stated by the CA, the action of Roble is already moot. However, the Court still
resolved the case to educate the bench and the bar. Also, this case comes within the rule
that courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading
review.

- The power of the mayor to issue permits is based on Sec 444(b)(3)(iv)33 of the LGC. In
turn, the said provision refers to Sec 16, otherwise known as the general welfare clause.
- The general welfare clause, encapsulates the delegated police power to local
governments. Local government units exercise police power through their respective
legislative bodies. The LGC is unequivocal that the mayor has the power to issue licenses
and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said
licenses had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance.
- Robles argues that the power to issue license should be pursuant to law other than the
LGC. However, the language of the law does not distinguish. Hence, even the LGC,
specifically Sec 16, can be utilized to determine the bounds of the exercise of the mayor
in issuing licenses.
- While there is no ordinance conferring upon the mayor the power to refuse the issuance
of the permit, it does not follow that the power of the mayor under Sec 444(b)(3)(iv) is
ministerial. What can be deduced from the said provision is that the limits in the exercise
of the power of a mayor with regard to licenses can be contained in a law or an
ordinance. The said provision takes its cue from Sec 16, which is largely an exercise of
delegated police power.
- The general welfare clause is the delegation in statutory form of the police power of the
State to LGUs. Through this, LGUs may prescribe regulations to protect the lives, health,
and property of their constituents and maintain peace and order within their respective
territorial jurisdictions.
- Sec 444(b)(3)(iv) is a manifestation of the delegated police power of a municipal
corporation. Necessarily, its exercise cannot be deemed ministerial. As to the question of
whether the power is validly exercised, the matter is within the province of a writ of
certiorari, but certainly, not of mandamus.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition denied.
PARAYNO vs Mun. of CALASIAO
Concepcion Parayno (Petitioner) vs Jose Jovellanos, and the Municipality of Calasiao, Pangasinan (Respondents)

July 14, 2006

Corona, J.
FACTS: Parayno was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In
1989, some residents of Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan for the closure or
transfer of the station to another location. Upon advise of the investigators, the
Sangguniang recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of Parayno's gasoline
33 SEC. 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the

purpose of which is the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the Municipal mayor shall:
xxxx
(3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same to the implementation of development plans,
program objectives and priorities as provided for under Section 18 of this Code, particularly those resources and revenues programmed for agroindustrial development and country-wide growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:
xxxx
(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had
been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance.

station. In its Resolution it was stated that the gas station violated the Zoning Code of
Calasiao; that the station is in a thickly populated area; that nearby residents complain
of its irritating smell; and that it violated building and safety codes
- Parayno filed a special civil action for prohibition and mandamus with the RTC against
the municipality. She claimed that her gasoline station was not covered by Sec 44 of the
Official Zoning Code since it was not a "gasoline service station" but a "gasoline filling
station" governed by Section 21 thereof; and that the decision of the HLURB in a
previous case filed by Jovellanos against her predecessor barred the grounds invoked by
the municipality.
- The trial court ruled against Parayno. It said that a gasoline filling station falls within the
ambit of Sec 44, and that it should not be allowed to continue operating its business.
- Parayno filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the CA, which the
appellate court denied. Hence, Parayno filed the present petition for review with the SC.
ISSUE: WON Paraynos Business is covered by the law. (NO)

RATIO: The zoning ordinance of respondent municipality made a clear distinction

between "gasoline service station"34 and "gasoline filling station."35

34Section 42. Service Station. A building and its premises where gasoline oil, grease, batteries, tires and car accessories may be supplied and
dispensed at retail and where, in addition, the following services may be rendered and sales and no other.
batteries, and distributor parts;

a. Sale and servicing of spark plugs,

b. Tire servicing and repair, but not recapping or regrooving;

c. Replacement of mufflers and tail pipes, water hose, fan belts, brake fluids, light bulbs, fuses, floor mats, seat covers, windshield wipers
and wiper blades, grease retainers, wheel, bearing, mirrors and the like;
d. Radiator cleaning and flushing;
e. Washing and polishing, and sale of automobile washing and polishing materials;
f. Grease and lubricating;
g. Emergency wiring repairs;
h. Minor servicing of carburators;
i. Adjusting and repairing brakes;
j. Minor motor adjustments not involving removal of the head or crankcase, or raising the motor.

35 Section 21. Filling Station. A retail station servicing automobiles and other motor vehicles with gasoline and oil only.

- The ordinance intended these two terms to be separate and distinct from each other.
Even the municipality's counsel admitted this dissimilarity.
- What applied in this case was not the principle of ejusdem generis, but the legal maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Because of the distinct and definite meanings
alluded to the two terms, the municipality could not insist that "gasoline service station"
necessarily included "gasoline filling station". Indeed, the activities undertaken in a "gas
service station" did not automatically embrace those in a "gas filling station."
- The municipality invalidly used its police powers in ordering the closure/transfer of the
gasoline station. While it had the power under the LGC to take actions and enact
measures to promote the health and general welfare of its constituents, it should have
given due deference to the law and the rights of Parayno.
- A local government properly exercised its police powers when the following requisites
are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the interference of the State and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and
not unduly oppressive. The first requirement refers to the equal protection; the second to
the due process.
- The municipality failed to comply with due process. The records do not show that it
even attempted to measure the distance, notwithstanding that such distance was crucial
in determining whether there was an actual violation.
- Parayno's business could not be considered a nuisance which respondent municipality
could summarily abate in the guise of exercising its police powers. The abatement of a
nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per se. A gas
station is not a nuisance per se.
- The HLURB findings show that Parayno complied with its requirements. It also found
that the gas station will not be a hazard. Such findings are binding upon the Court.
- In the resolution of the municipality, it raised the same grounds invoked by its corespondent in the HLURB. The HLURB had already settled these concerns and its
adjudication had long attained finality. It is to the interest of the public that there should
be an end to litigation by the parties over a subject matter already fully and fairly
adjudged.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition granted. CA decision reversed. Municipality of Calasiao ordered
to desist from enforcing its resolution.

CABRERA VS CA
BRUNO S. CABRERA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PROVINCE OF CATANDUANES, VICENTE M.
ALBERTO, ENCARNACION TORRES, SANTIAGO VALDERAMA, JEREMIAS TRINIDAD, ALFREDO DAYAWON, ZACARIAS TATAD,
FELIXBERTO CAMACHO, RUBEN GONZALES, FELIX RUBIO, RENE ALCANTARA, ARISTEO ARCILLA, PAMFILO DAYAWON,
REMEDIOS BAGADIONG, FREDESWINDO ALCALA, ELENA S. LATORRE, BALDOMERO TOLENTINO, EULOGIA ALEJANDRO,
ANGELES S. VARGAS, ISIDRO REYES, ANSELMO PEA, and CATALINA VELA, respondents.

Date: March 18, 1991

Ponente: Curz, J.
FACTS: The Provincial Board of Catanduanes adopted Resolution No. 158, closing the old
road leading to the new Capitol Building traffic, opening up a new road, and giving the
owners of the properties traversed by the new road equal area in the old road.

- Deed of Exchange were executed with the affected persons.

- Cabrera, who owned land at the northern end of the old road, filed a complaint for
"Restoration of Public Road and/or Abatement of Nuisance, Annulment of Resolutions and
Documents with Damages", alleging that old road is a public road, and thus beyond the
commerce of man. He argued that the Resolution and the closure of the road was invalid.
- The CFI upheld the validity of the Resolution. On appeal, the CA also upheld the validity
of the Resolution, ruling that RA 5185 authorizes municipal authorities to close,
thoroughfares under Section 2246 of the RAC.
- Hence, Cabrera brings his case to the SC.
ISSUE: WON the resolution is valid (Yes)

RATIO: The authority of the provincial board to close that road and use or convey it for
other purposes is derived from Sec 11(II)(a) of RA 518536 in relation to Sec 2246 of the
RAC37.
- Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene v Bercilles, and Favis v City of Baguio: the closure of a city
street is within the powers of the city council.
- There is no reason for not applying the doctrine in those cases to the provincial board in
connection with the closure of provincial roads. The provincial board has the duty of
maintaining such roads for the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants of the
province.
- Moreover, this authority is inferable from the grant by the national legislature of the
funds to the Province of Catanduanes for the construction of provincial roads.
- One whose property does not abut on the closed section of a street has no right to
compensation for the closing or vacation of the street, if he still has reasonable access to
the general system of streets.
- Richmond v City of Hinton, as cited in Favis:
The Constitution does not undertake to guarantee to a property owner the public
maintenance of the most convenient route to his door... he must content himself with
such route... as the... public authority may deem most compatible with the public
welfare. When he acquires city property, he does so in tacit recognition of these
principles. If... the city authorities abandon a portion of the street to which his property is
not immediately adjacent, he may suffer loss because of the inconvenience imposed, but
the public treasury cannot be required to recompense him. Such case is damnum absque
injuria.
- Cabrera is not entitled to damages because the injury he has incurred is the price he
and others like him must pay for the welfare of the entire community. This is not a case
where his property has been expropriated and he is entitled to just compensation. The
construction of the new road was undertaken under the general welfare clause.
- Whatever inconvenience Cabrera has suffered pales in significance compared to the
greater convenience the new road will give to the public. For the enjoyment of those
benefits, every individual in the province, including the Cabrera, must be prepared to
give his share.
DISPOSITIVE: CA decision affirmed
MODAY vs CA

36 II. The following actions by municipal officials or municipal councils, as provided for in the pertinent sections of the Revised Administrative
Code shall take effect without the need of approval or direction from any official of the national government: Provided, That such actions shall be
subject to approval or direction by the Provincial Board: (a) Authority to close thoroughfare under Section 2246;

37 Sec. 2246. Authority to close thoroughfare. With the prior authorization of the Department Head, a municipal council may close any municipal
road, street, alley, park, or square; but no such way or place aforesaid or any part thereof, shall be closed without indemnifying any person prejudiced
thereby. Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the
municipality might be lawfully used or conveyed.

PERCIVAL MODAY, ZOTICO MODAY (deceased) and LEONORA MODAY, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, JUDGE EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO OF BRANCH 6, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AGUSAN DEL
SUR AND MUNICIPALITY OF BUNAWAN
Feb. 20, 1997
Romero, J.
FACTS: The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan, Agusan del Sur passed
Resolution 43-89 ("Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for Expropriation of a
One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 along the National Highway Owned by Percival
Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government Sports Facilities.") This
resolution was approved by Mun. Mayor AnuncioBustillo and transmitted to the
SangguniangPanlalawigan (SP) for approval, but the latter disapproved it, saying that
expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in Bunawan for the
establishment of the government center Despite this, the Municipality of Bunawan filed a
Petition for Eminent Domain against Moday before the RTC, and it was later amended to include
the registered owners (Modays parents, Zotico and Leonora)
The Municipality then filed a Motion to Take or Enter Upon the Possession of Subject Matter of
This Case, stating that: it had already deposited the necessary amount with the municipal
treasurer in accordance with Sec. 2, Rule 67, ROC, and; It would be in the govts best interest for
it to be allowed to take possession of the property
[RTC] granted this petition and ordered to place the Municipality in possession of the property,
despite Modays opposition:
o The SPs failure to declare the resolution invalid leaves it effective.
o The duty of SP is merely to review ordinances and resolutions passed by the
Sangguniang Bayan under Sec. 208 (l), BP 337
o The exercise of eminent domain is not one of the 2 acts enumerated in Sec. 19 of the
LGC requiring the approval of the SP
It also set another hearing for the purpose of ascertaining the just compensation/fair market
value of the property, with notice to all parties concerned.
o Petitioners MR was denied. Petitioner went to CA on a petition for certiorari, alleging
GAD.
[CA] dismissed the petition. Petitioners filed MR, but the same was denied also.
o The public purpose for expropriation is clear from the resolution, and since SP did not
declare the same invalid, expropriation of petitioners property could proceed.
Meanwhile, Municipality of Bunawan had erected 3 bldgs on the property 38

38 The Association of Brgy Councils Hall, The Municipal Motorpool, Bunawan Municipal Gymnasium (the only concrete bldg.)

Petitioners filed a petition for review, and the Court issued a TRO to enjoin the RTC from
enforcing its order and the Municipality from using and occupying all the bldgs. constructed, and
from further constructing any building on the land. Court also cited the incumbent Mayor in
contempt, ordering him to pay the fine and to demolish the blocktiendas built in violation of
the order.
PARTIES ARGUMENTS
Petitioners say: CA erred in upholding legality of condemnation proceedings. Expropriation was
politically motivated and the resolution was correctly disapproved by the SP. The then incumbent
mayor should pay damages for insisting on enforcement of the void resolution
Respondents say: SPs reason for disapproving the resolution could be baseless since it failed to
point out which and where are the available lots. Also, since SP did not declare the resolution as
invalid, expropriation could proceed.
ISSUE: WON a municipality can expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution,
which was disapproved by the SangguniangPanlalawigan? (YES)
RATIO: Eminent domain is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is
government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private
property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of
eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public
utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for
public use and there must be just compensation.
The Municipalitys power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not disputed since it is
provided for in BP 337, (old) LGC at the time the expropriation proceedings were initiated. In Sec.
9 thereof:
o Section 9.Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its head and
acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain
and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.

The SPs disapproval of the Municipal Resolution is an infirm action which does NOT render the
resolution null and void. Sec. 153, BP 337 39 grants the SP the power to declare a municipal
resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the
Mayor to issue.
[Velasco v Blas] The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal
resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is 'beyond the
powers conferred upon the council or president making the same.' Absolutely no other ground is
recognized by the law
Thus the SP was without authority to disapprove the resolution since the Municipality has the
power to exercise the right of eminent domain and the Sangguniang Bayan has the capacity to
promulgate the resolution. Perforce, it follows that Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding and
could be used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of petitioners' property.
Minor issue: Petitioners alleged that the then incumbent mayor only disliked Moday because he
refused to support his candidacy, so he used the expropriation to retaliate, even if there are
other available lands, such as the vacant 7 ha. land beside petitioners land.
In exercising public domain, the use must be public, compensation must be made and due
process of law must be observed. Considering the adequacy of compensation, necessity of the
taking and the public use character or the purpose of the taking, SC has ruled that the necessity
of exercising eminent domain must be genuine and of a public character.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition DENIED.

CAMARINES SUR, ET AL. V. CA, Ernesto San Joaquin and Efferent San Joaquin
17 May 1993
Quiason, J.
Facts:
- The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129,
authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the
provincial capitol site in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional
agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial employees.
- Pursuant to the Resolution, the Governor filed two separate cases for expropriation against the
private respondents with the RTC. The San Joaquins moved to dismiss their respective complaints
on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property.
- The RTC denied their motions to dismiss and authorized the Camarines Sur to take possession of
the property upon the deposit of the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for
any damages that the respondents may suffer. They subsequently filed motions for relief from
the trial court judgment but these were likewise denied.
- The San Joaquins then brought a petition before the CA.The appellate court set aside the order
of the RTC. Taking the view proferred by the Solicitor General, the CA ordered the trial court to
suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have
39Sec. 153.SangguniangPanlalawigan Review.-- xxx(2) If the sangguniangpanlalawigan shall find that any
municipal ordinance, resolution or executive order is beyond the power conferred upon the
sangguniangbayan or the mayor, it shall declare such ordinance, resolution or executive order
invalid in whole or in part xxx The effect of such an action shall be to annul the ordinance, resolution or
executive order in question in whole or in part xxx

obtained the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform under Sec. 65 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) to convert the classification of the property from
agricultural to non-agricultural. Hence, the present petition before the SC.
Issue: Is it required for the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the DAR to
convert the classification of the property from agricultural to non-agricultural before it can legally
expropriate the same? (No)
Reasoning:
- Modernly there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of public purpose
or public use for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. The old concept was
that the condemned property must actually be used by the general public (as in roads, bridges,
etc.). Under the new concept, public use merely means public advantage, convenience or
benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and prosperity of the whole community
(as in a resort complex for tourists or a housing project).
- The expropriation sought to be achieved through Resolution No. 129 is for a public purpose. The
establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit of the people
because it will make available valuable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and
the cottage industry. The housing project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the
Constitution for housing is a basic human need.
- The CA, following the recommendation of the SolGen, held that Camarines Sur must first comply
with Sec. 65 of the CARL before it can validly expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins.
In Heirs of Juanita Ardana v. Reyes, the issue raised was whether the
Philippine Tourism Authority can expropriate lands covered by the Operation Land
Transfer for use of a tourist resort complex. While the Court there said that there was no
need under to rule on whether the public purpose is superior or inferior to another
purpose, it upheld the expropriation after noting that the petitioners therein failed to
overcome the need for the taking of the land.
A fair and reasonable reading of that decision is that the SC viewed the power
of expropriation as superior to the power to distribute lands under the land reform
program.
- It is true that LGUs have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when
expressly authorized by the legislature. While such delegated power may be a limited authority,
it is complete within its limits. Moreover, the limitations on its exercise must be clearly
expressed, either in the law conferring the power of in other lmgistlations.
- Resolution No. 129 was promulgated pursuant to Sec. 9 of BP 337 which provides, A local
government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian
exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or
purpose.
- Section 9 of BP 337 does not intimate that LGUs must first secure the approval of the
Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use,
before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, the CARL contains
no provision which imposes this requirement.

A reading of Section 65 of the CARL 40, the provision relied upon by the CA,
seems to show that it applies only to lands previously placed under the agrarian reform
program as it speaks of "the lapse of five (5) years from its award."
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units
can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads,
bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the
lands with the DAR.
- Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether
the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression
of legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative determination and will intervene only
when a particular undertaking has no real or substantial relation to the public use
Dispositive: Petition granted.
Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan, and Hon. Adriano Daez, Municipal Mayor
(Petitioner) vs
IAC, and Philippine Pipes & Merchandising Corporation (Respondents)

Date: January 29, 1988

Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr., J.

Short Version:
Facts: The municipality tried to expropriate the land of Philippine Pipes to be used as a public
road. The corporation filed an opposition with the provincial governor, who then created a
committee. The provincial board annulled the action of the municipality based on the
recommendation of the committee. A few years later, the municipality again tried to expropriate
the land, and this time, the provincial board approved the expropriation. The municipality then
filed a petition for expropriation with the CFI against Philippine Pipes.
Held: The land should not be expropriated. The municipality has not shown any genuine need to
expropriate the land. In fact, based on the records, there were other roads in the area which
could be used to achieve the goal of the municipality to ease the traffic in certain roads.

Facts:
- In 1975, Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation filed with the Office of the Municipal
Mayor of Meycauayan an application for a permit to fence a parcel of land. The fencing was
40 Sec. 65. Conversion of Lands. After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound
for, agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or
industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to
existing laws, may authorize the reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid
his obligation.

allegedly to enable the storage of the respondent's heavy equipment.

- The Municipal Council of Meycauayan passed a Resolution manifesting the intention to
expropriate the corporation's parcel of land. An opposition to the Resolution was filed by the
corporation with the Office of the Provincial Governor, which, in turn, created a special
committee of four members to investigate the matter.
- The Special Committee recommended that the Provincial Board of Bulacan annul the Resolution
because there was no genuine necessity for Meycauayan to expropriate the property for use as a
public road. Thus, the Provincial Board annulled the Resolution.
- On October 21, 1983, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan passed another Resolution for the
purpose of expropriating anew the corporation's land. The Provincial Board approved the
Resolution.
- The municipality filed with the RTC of Malolos a special civil action for expropriation. Upon
deposit of P24,025.00 (the market value of the land) with the PNB, the trial court issued a writ of
possession in favor of the municipality.
- On August 27, 1984, the trial court issued an order declaring the taking of the property as
lawful and appointing the Provincial Assessor as court commissioner to ascertain the just
compensation for the property.
- Philippine Pipes went to the IAC on petition for review. The appellate court affirmed the trial
court's decision. However, upon motion for reconsideration, the decision was reversed, with the
IAC holding that there is no genuine necessity to expropriate the land for use as a public road as
there were several other roads for the same purpose and another more appropriate lot for the
proposed public road.
- After its motion for reconsideration was denied, the municipality went to the SC on petition for
review on certiorari.

Issue/Reasoning:
Issue: Whether the land should be expropriated (No. There is no genuine need to do so.)
- The jurisdiction of the SC in cases brought the CA (then the IAC) is limited to the review of
errors of law. The SC can only review the findings of the CA under certain exceptions such as: (1)
when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd and impossible; (3) when there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; and (5) when
the court, in making its finding, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to
the admissions of the parties.
- None of the exceptions are present in this case. On the contrary, the IAC's decision is supported
by substantial evidence.
- The municipality's purpose in expropriating the property is to convert it into a public road which
would provide a connecting link between Malhacan Road and Bulac Road to ease the traffic in the
area of vehicles coming from MacArthur Highway. The records, however, reveal that there are
other connecting links between the aforementioned roads. The petitioner itself admits that there

are four such cross roads in existence. The IAC stated that with the proposed road, there would
be seven.
- The municipality objects to the IAC's findings contending that they were based on the
committee report previous made. However, there is no evidence which shows a change in the
factual circumstances. There is no showing that some of the other available roads have been
closed or that the private roads in the subdivision may not be used for municipal purposes.
- There is no question to the right of the State to take private property for public use upon
payment of just compensation. What is questioned is the existence of a genuine necessity
therefor.
- City of Manila v Chinese Community of Manila: Condemnation of private property is justified
only if it is for the public good and there is a genuine necessity of a public character.
Consequently, the courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of
eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity therefor.
- De Knecht v Bautista, citing J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v Land Tenure Administration: With due
recognition... of the power of Congress to designate the particular property to be taken... in the
exercise of the power of expropriation, it is still a judicial question whether in the exercise of such
competence, the party adversely affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. That the equal
protection clause will not allow.
- There is no showing in the why the more appropriate lot for the proposed road which was
offered for sale has not been the subject of the municipality's attempt to expropriate.

Dispositive:
Petition dismissed.

-Elvin
City Government of Quezon City and City Council of Quezon City v. Hon. Judge Vicente
G. Ericta
Date: June 24, 1983
Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr.
The case in a nutshell:
FACTS: The City Council of Quezon City passed Ordinance No. 6118, Sec. 9 of which provided that
at least 6% of the total area of every private cemetery should be set aside for the burial of
paupers. For 7 years, the ordinance was not enforced. Then the City Council passed a resolution
requesting the City Engineer to stop the sale of lots in private cemeteries whose owners had not
donated the 6% space for the burial of paupers. When the City Engineer notified Himlayang
Pilipino, the company filed a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition, and mandamus with
preliminary injunction in the CFI, seeking annul Sec. 9 of Ordinance No.6118 for being contrary to
the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised
Administrative Code.The CFI ruled in Himlayang Pilipinos favor and declared Sec. 9 of Ordinance
No. 6118 null and void. The Quezon City Government and City Council filed a petition for review
in the SC.
HELD: Sec. 9 of Ordinance No. 6118 is NOT a valid exercise of police power. It is not a mere

police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without
due process of law and even without compensation. There is no provision in the Charter of
Quezon City that would justify Sec. 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, except the provision granting police
power to the city. But police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or
restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does NOT
involve the taking or confiscation of property, with the exception of a few cases where there is a
necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the
peace and order and of promoting the general welfare. There is no reasonable relation between
the setting aside of 6% percent of the total area of private cemeteries for the burial of paupers,
and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people.
The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation. Instead of building or maintaining a
public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. Although the
old LGC authorizes the city council to provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in
such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance, this only authorizes the city to provide its own
city-owned land, or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries.
Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation.
Facts:
1) The City Council of Quezon City passed Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled ORDINANCE
REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL
TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF.
a. Sec. 9 provided:
Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall
be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been
residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined
by competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be
developed and should be open for operation not later than six months from the date
of approval of the application.
2) For 7 years, Sec. 9 of Ordinance No. 6118 was not enforced by city authorities. But then
the City Council passed the following resolution:
RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it does hereby request the
City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park
lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space
intended for paupers burial.
3) Pursuant to the new resolution, the Quezon City Engineer notified respondent Himlayang
Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Sec. 9 of Ordinance No. 6118 would be enforced.
4) Himlayang Pilipino filed a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition, and mandamus with
preliminary injunction in the Quezon City CFI.
a. It sought to annul Sec. 9 of Ordinance No.6118 for being contrary to the
Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised
Administrative Code.
5) The CFI ruled in favor of Himlayang Pilipino and declared Sec. 9 of Ordinance No. 6118 null
and void.
6) The Quezon City Government and City Council filed a petition for review in the SC.
Issue: Is Sec. 9 of Ordinance No. 6118 a valid exercise of police power? NO.
Held: Petition is DISMISSED. CFI decision is AFFIRMED.
Ratio:
1) Sec. 9 of Ordinance No. 6118 is NOT a valid exercise of police power. The SC agreed with
the CFIs findings that the provision is not a mere police regulation but an outright

confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law and
even without compensation.
a. There is no provision in the Charter of Quezon City that would justify Sec. 9 of
Ordinance No. 6118, except the provision granting police power to the city.
i. Sec. 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to the city, under Sec.
12(c) of the Charter, to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other
business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practiced in the
City.
1. The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit (People
vs. Esguerra; Vega vs. Municipal Board of Iloilo). A fortiori, the power to
regulate does not include the power to confiscate.
2. Ordinance No. 6118 not only confiscates, but also prohibits the
operation of a memorial park cemetery, because under Sec. 13
thereof, Violation of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine
and/or imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to
operate and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or
cancelled. The confiscatory clause and the penal provision in effect
deter one from operating a memorial park cemetery.
ii. Neither can Sec. 9 be justified under Sec. 12(t) of the Charter, which
authorizes the City Council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the
center of population of the city and provide for their burial in such proper
place and in such manner as the council may determine, subject to the
provisions of the general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries, and
governing funerals and disposal of the dead.
1. There is nothing in the above provision which authorizes confiscation.
iii. The police power of Quezon City is defined in Sec. 12(00) of the Charter.
(00) To make such further ordinance and regulations not repugnant to law as may b
to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this act and su
deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote, the
improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the
thereof, and for the protection of property therein; and enforce obedience theret
lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe under the provisions of su
of this section.
iv. The SC cited several authorities to the effect that police power is usually
exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or
property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does NOT involve the
taking or confiscation of property, with the exception of a few cases where
there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the
purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general
welfare, e.g. the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium
and firearms.
v. Sec. 9 is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives
a person of his private property without due process of law and even without
compensation.
1. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of 6%
percent of the total area of private cemeteries for charity burial
grounds of deceased paupers, and the promotion of health, morals,
good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance
is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a
private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for
this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
2. The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private
cemeteries is not covered by Sec. 12(t) of the Quezon City Charter,
which empowers the City Council to prohibit the burial of the dead

within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial
in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating
burial grounds and cemeteries.
3. When the old LGC provides, in Sec. 177(q), that a Sangguniang
Panlungsod may provide for the burial of the dead in such place and
in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance, it simply authorizes
the city to provide its own city-owned land, or to buy or expropriate
private properties to construct public cemeteries. Expropriation,
however, requires payment of just compensation.
4. Ordinance No. 6118 is different from laws and regulations requiring
owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks,
playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to
buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and
convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended
to insure the development of communities with salubrious and
wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn,
are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are
sold to home-owners.
The City of Manila v. The Arellano Law Colleges, Inc.
28 February 1950
Tuason, J.

SHORT VERSION: The City of Manila sought to expropriate land belonging to Arellano Law in order
to construct a subdivision. The Court found that this was an improper exercise of the power of
eminent domain, which is ultimately hinged on a necessity for the public benefit. The very
foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity of a public character.
The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow, the taking of the
land.Necessity within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated must be necessary
does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine
the greatest benefit to the public with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning
party and property owner consistent with such benefits. But in this case, only a handful of people
were to be benefited, as opposed to the thousands of students who would be displaced if the
land on which Arellano stands were to be expropriated.

FACTS:

RA 276 provides: Cities and municipalities are authorized to contract loans from the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Philippine National Bank, and/or other entity or
person at the rate of interest not exceeding eight per cent annum for the purpose of
purchasing or expropriating homesites within their respective territorial jurisdiction and
reselling them at cost to residents of the said cities and municipalities.
o The present action sought to condemn, for the purpose of subdivision and resale,
several parcels of land (total of 7,270 sq. m) on Legarda Street, Manila.(Im
guessing, based on the discussion in the ratio, that this is really more of a low-cost
housing project than a legit subdivision. ed.)
o The CFI of Manila dismissed the action, ruling that this provision empowers cities to
purchase but not to expropriate lands for the purpose sought.

ISSUES:
1. Was the exercise of expropriation proper?
REASONING:
1. No
The Court cited the case of Guido v. Rural Progress Administration:
o Expropriation of large estates, trusts in perpetuity, and land that embraces a
whole town or a large section of a town or city, bears direct relation to the public
welfare. The expropriation is clothed with public interest and public use, and
tends to abolish economic slavery, feudalistic practices, and other evils inimical
to community prosperity.
o In some instances, slumsites have been acquired by condemnation.
In New York, the court has ruled that slum clearance and erection of lowcost housing were public purpose for which the New York City Housing
authorities could exercise the power of condemnation.
The underlying reasons for this was that the destruction of congested areas
and unsanitary dwellings diminished the potentialities of epidemics, crime
and waste, prevents the spread of crime and diseases to unaffected areas,
enhances the physical and moral value of the surrounding communities,
and promote the safety and welfare of the public general.
However it must be noted that in all these cases, extensive areas were
affected and the general public benefited.
o The condemnation of a small property in behalf of 10, 20 or 50 persons and their
families does not inure to the benefit of the public to a degree sufficient to give
the use public character. The expropriation proceedings have been instituted for
the economic relief of a few families devoid of any consideration of public peace
and order, or other public advantage.
The word expropriating is susceptible of only meaning. But this power to expropriate
is necessarily subject to the limitations and conditions noted in the decisions cited. The
National Government may not confer in its instrumentalities authority which itself may
not exercise.
The land in this case (owned by Arellano Colleges) :
o is only 1/3 of the land sought to be taken in Guido case, and about 2/3 of that
involved in the Borja condemnation proceeding.
o is situated in a highly commercial section of the city and is occupied by persons
who are not bona fide tenants.
o was brought by the defendant for a university site to take the place of rented
buildings that are unsuitable for schools of higher learning.
To authorize the condemnation of any particular land by a grantee of the power of
eminent domain, a necessity must exist for the taking thereof for the proposed uses
and purposes.
o The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine
necessity of a public character. The ascertainment of the necessity must precede
or accompany, and not follow, the taking of the land. (City of Manila v. Chinese
Community)
o So great is the regard of the law for private property that it will not authorize the
least violation of it, even for the the public good, unless there exist a very great
necessity thereof. (Blackstones Commentaries on the English Law)
Necessity within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated must be
necessary does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical necessity,

such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least inconvenience
and expense to the condemning party and property owner consistent with such
benefits.
But in this case, measured even by this standard, and forgetting the private character
of the intended use, necessity for the condemnation has not been shown.
o The land here has cost the owner P140,000. The people for whose benefit the
condemnation is being undertaken are so poor they could ill afford to meet this
high price. Cheaper lands not dedicated to a purpose so worthy as a school and
are more suited to the occupants needs are means are available elsewhere.
o Arellano has not only invested a considerable amount for its property, but also
has the plans for construction ready and would have completed the project a long
time ago had it not been stopped by the city government.
o While a handful of people stand to benefit by the expropriation, the development
of a university that has a present enrollment of 9,000 students would be
sacrificed. Any good that would accrue to the public from providing homes to a
few families fades into insignificance in comparison with the preparation of young
men and women into useful citizenship.
The necessity of the Arellano Law College to acquire a permanent site of its own is
imperative not only because denial of the same would hamper the objectives of that
educational institution, but it would likewise be taking a property intended already for
public benefit.
The Mayor of Manila himself confessed that he believes Arellano is entitled to keep this
land.

RULING: CFI decision affirmed

The City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, et. al.

Johnson, J. 31 Oct 1919
SV: The City of Manila filed a petition in the CFI of Manila so that it may expropriate certain lands
for the extension of Rizal Avenue. Defendants opposed saying that a portion of the land to be
expropriated is being used as a cemetery. CFI ruled that there was no necessity for expropriation.
The City of Manila appealed to the SC.
The SC made a distinction between the grant of the power of eminent domain, which is purely
legislative, and the exercise of such grant of power in a particular case. In the latter case, if the
legislature provides for specific property and a specific public use, then the courts have no power
to inquire into it. However, if the grant of the power of eminent domain is general, then the court
may inquire into the propriety of the proposed expropriation. In this case, the SC found that there
was no necessity for the opening of the street in question through the cemetery. It thus affirmed
the CFI decision.
FACTS:
- 11 Dec 1916: the City of Manila filed a petition in CFI Manila praying that certain lands be
expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement: the extension of Rizal
Avenue.
- The Chinese Community of Manila, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines, alleged that it was the owner of parcels 1 and 2 of the land described in the petition.
It further alleged that:
- it was neither necessary or expedient that the said parcels be expropriated for street purposes
- the lands in question were being used as a cemetery

- other routes were available which would satisfy the City of Manilas purposes at much
less expense
- other defendants had substantially the same arguments
- Ildefonso Tambunting likewise alleged that a portion of the lands in question was used as a
cemetery in which were the graves of his ancestors. He offered to grant a right of way for the
said extension over other land without cost to the City of Manila.
- CFI ruled that there was no necessity for the expropriation and absolved each of the
defendants from al liability under the complaint of the City of Manla. The City of Manila appealed
to the SC.
ISSUE/REASONING:
In expropriation proceedings by the City of Manila, may the courts inquire into, and hear proof
upon, the necessity of the expropriation? YES.
1) The City of Manila has authority to expropriate private lands for public purposes according to
its Sec. 2429 of Act. 2711 (Charter of the City of Manila).
Act. 190 provides the procedure by which the authority to expropriate may be carried into effect:
a) A complaint in expropriation shall be presented, stating with certainty the right of
condemnation, with a description of the property to be condemned together with the
interest of each defendant separately.
b) If the court shall find upon trial that the right to expropriate the land in question exists,
it shall the appoint commissioners to fix the price
c) An appeal from the judgment of the CFI may be made to the SC, the latter shall have
authority to inquire into the right of expropriation. If it finds that no right of expropriation
existed, it shall remand the cause to the CFI to replace the defendant in the possession of
the property
2) The City of Manila argues that if the court finds that there is some law authorizing the city to
expropriate, then the courts have no other function that to authorize the expropriation and to
proceed to ascertain the value of the land involved. The SC disagreed.
If the legislature under proper authority should grant the expropriation of a certain or particular
parcel of land for some specified public purpose, the courts would be without jurisdiction to
inquire into the purpose of that legislation.
If, however (as in this case), the Legislature should grant general authority to a municipal
corporation to expropriate private land for public purposes, the courts have ample authority to
make inquiry and to hear proof upon an issue properly presented concerning whether or not the
lands were private and whether the purpose was, in fact, public.
The legislative department of the government rarely undertakes to designate the precise
property which should be taken for public use. It has generally, like in the present case, merely
conferred general authority to take land for public use when a necessity exists therefor. The SC
believed that it can be confidently asserted that, under such statute, the allegation of the
necessity for the appropriation is an issuable allegation which it is competent for the courts to
decide.
Whether it was wise, advisable, or necessary to confer upon a municipality the power to exercise
the right of eminent domain, is a question with which the courts are not concerned. But when
that right or authority is exercised for the purpose of depriving citizens of their property, the
courts are authorized, in this jurisdiction, to make inquiry and to hear proof upon the necessity in
the particular case, and not the general authority.

3) The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it
can exercise the right, some law must exist conferring the power upon it.
When the courts are called to determine whether expropriation by a municipal corporation is
proper, they must find that a) a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent
domain; and also b) that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with law.
In this case, the authority conceded to the City of Manila can only be exercised when two
conditions are present: a) the land must be private and b) the purpose must be public. Both
these conditions are questions of fact.
The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain (legislative) must not be confused
with the right to exercise it in a particular case (judicial).
- The power of the legislature to confer upon municipal corporations and other entities
with the State general authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be
questioned by the courts.
- However, the moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the
authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. This
question is one which the courts have a right to inquire into.
4) The City of Manila has not definitely decided that there exists a necessity for the appropriation
of the particular land described in the complaint. The records show that the municipal board
believed at one time that other land might be used for the proposed improvement to avoid
disturbing the resting place of the dead.
There also exists no necessity for the alleged improvements.
Further, said cemetery is ALLEGED to be public property. IF TRUE, the City of Manila cannot
appropriate it for public use as it can only expropriate private property.
- The cemetery in question was established under governmental authority of a former
Spanish Governor General.
- It is being used by the general community of Chinese, which fact, is within the general
acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery
The record also shows that adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge which will
answer every purpose of the City of Manila.
CFI JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. @ajmlegs
Municipality of Paraaque v V.M. Realty Corporation
July 20, 1998
Panganiban, J.
Short version:The Municipality filed a complaint for expropriation against V.M. Realty. The RTC
and CA dismissed the complaint, holding that it failed to state a cause of action because it was
only filed pursuant to a Resolution. The SC agreed. Based on Section 19 of the LGC, anLGU
cannot authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking
body. The LGC expressly and clearly requires an ordinance or a local law for the purpose. A
resolution that merely expresses the sentiment or opinion of the Municipal Council will not
suffice. On the other hand, the principle of res judicata does not bar subsequent proceedings for
the expropriation of the same property when all the legal requirements for its valid exercise are
complied with.
Facts:

Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the Municipality of
Paraaque filed, a Complaint for expropriation against V.M. Realty Corporation over two
parcels of land located at Wakas, San Dionisio, Paraaque, Metro Manila, and covered by
Torrens Certificate of Title.
The complaint was filed "for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the
underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project."
Paraaque had previous issued another Resolution, pursuant to which it made an offer to
enter into a negotiated sale of the property with V.M Realty, which did not accept the offer.
The RTC of Makati gave it due course. It issued an Order authorizing Paraaque to take
possession of the subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount
equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value based on its current tax declaration.V.M.
Realty filed its Answer containing affirmative defenses and a counterclaim, alleging that
o The complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a
resolution and not to an ordinance as required by the Local Government Code; and
o That the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata because
there was a previous expropriation case between the Municipality and Limpan
Investment Corp., a successor-in-interest of V.M. Realty. The RTC in that case also
dismissed the complaint.
The Answer was treated as a Motion to dismiss, which the RTC granted.
o The RTC held that the right of the Municipality to exercise the power of eminent domain
any be exercised only pursuant to an Ordinance.Therefore, the complaint stated no
cause of action.
o It also agreed that it was barred by prior judgment
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC order. Appeal to the SC.
o The Municipality contends that a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has
the same force and effect of an ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation case of a
valid cause of action, and
o That the principle of res judicata is not applicable when public interest is primarily
involved

Issues:
1) Is an Ordinance needed or the exercise of the power of eminent domain? YES
2) Is the complaint barred by res judicata? NO
Ratio:
As to the requirement of an Ordinance
1)
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may
delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities.
2)
An LGU may exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by
Congress and subject to the latter's control and restraints, imposed "through the law
conferring the power or in other legislations."
3)
Section 19 of the LGC lays down the parameters for its exercise. The requirements under it
are that:
a.
An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
b.
The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the
benefit of the poor and the landless.
c.
There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
d.
A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought
to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
4)
In this case, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain
pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first
requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance.

a.

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

10)

11)

12)

13)

The Municipality cites Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals to show that a resolution may
suffice, but that was decided under the previous Local Government Code, which provided
that a mere resolution would enable an LGU to exercise eminent domain.
The terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are not synonymous.
a.
An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion
of a lawmaking body on a specific matter.
b.
An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is
temporary in nature.
c.
They are enacted differently a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for
a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution, it
would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. But
Congress did not.
The power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental or private
right of the people. The manifest change in the legislative language demands a strict
construction.
a.
"No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and is guarded by
the Constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants.
When the legislature interferes with that right and, for greater public purposes,
appropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law
should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation."
The Municipality relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a
resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. This is clearly misplaced, because
Section 19 of the LGC prevails over the IRR. There sees to merely be an oversight in the
wording of the IRR.
The Court does not seek to diminish the policy embodied in Section 2, Article X of the
Constitution, which provides that "territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local
autonomy." It merely upholds the law as worded in RA 7160.
An LGU is created by law and all its powers and rights are sourced therefrom. It has therefore
no power to amend or act beyond the authority given and the limitations imposed on it by
law.
The power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not eminent but "inferior"
domain, since it must conform to the limits imposed by the delegation, and thus partakes only
of a share in eminent domain.
The Municipality also argued that the Sangguniang Bayan passed and Ordinance ratifying the
acts of its Mayor regarding the expropriation. But the existence of such Ordinance was merely
alleged and no certified true copy was presented.
The fact of the lack of cause of action is evident on the face of the Complaint, which was
based on a mere resolution.

As to res judicata
14)
All the requisites for the application of res judicata are present in this case. There is a
previous final judgment on the merits in a prior expropriation case involving identical
interests, subject matter and cause of action, which has been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over it.
15)
Be that as it may, the principle of res judicata, which finds application in generally all
cases and proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private
property.
16)
The very nature of eminent domain, as an inherent power of the State, dictates that the
right to exercise the power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior judgment or res
judicata. The scope of eminent domain is plenary and, like police power, can "reach every
form of property which the State might need for public use
17)
The State or its authorized agent cannot be forever barred from exercising said right by
reason alone of previous non-compliance with any legal requirement.
18)
While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise
eminent domain, it does apply to specific issues decided in a previous case.

a. For example, a final judgment dismissing an expropriation suit on the ground that there
was no prior offer precludes another suit raising the same issue; it cannot, however, bar
the State or its agent from thereafter complying with this requirement, as prescribed by
law, and subsequently exercising its power of eminent domain over the same property.
19)
This ruling that Paraaque cannot exercise its delegated power of eminent domain through
a mere resolution will not bar it from reinstituting similar proceedings, once the said legal
requirement and, for that matter, all others are properly complied with.
Petition denied.
055. City of Cebu v SpsApolonio and BlasaDedamo
Davide, Jr, C.J,
May 7, 2002
Topic: Eminent Domain
SV: Cebu filed a complaint for expropriation against SpsApolonio and BlasaDedamo on the
ground that their lands were needed for the construction of an access/relief road. Cebu already
deposited 15% of the FMV of the land to PNB, and was asking the court to grant it possession
over the land. Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint, but Court subsequently granted
possession of the land to Cebu. Cebu and the respondents eventually entered into an agreement,
whereby the parties both agreed to be bound by the just compensation to be ascertained by the
Commissioners in their report as approved by the court. RTC appointed 3 commissioners, who
gave a report valuing the land at P12,824/sqm or a total of P20,826,339.50. City of Cebu assailed
the assessment, arguing that the just compensation should be based on the prevailing market
price of the property at the commencement of the expropriation proceedings.
Court held that, contrary to petitioners arguments, just compensation should be fixed at the
time of taking, as is expressly provided in Sec. 19, LGC. It ruled that the commissioners
assessment of just compensation should be upheld because the parties agreed to be bound by it
and petitioner is estopped from assailing the same. Also, Sec. 4, Rule 67, ROC, which provides
that just compensation should be determined at the time of the filing of the complaint for
expropriation, cannot prevail over a substantive law(LGC), which provides that just compensation
should be determined at the time of taking.
FACTS:

City of Cebu (hereinafter Cebu) filed a complaint for eminent domain against Sps. Apolonio
and BlasaDedamo for Lots 1527 and 1528 with a total area of 1,624 sqm with a value of
P1,786,400
o Cebu said that the lands were needed for the construction of a public road which shall
serve as an access/relief road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum
Avenue and the back of Magellan International Hotel Roads in Cebu City, and that the
lots are the most suitable for such purpose.
o Cebu had already deposited with PNB the amount of P51,156 representing 15% of the
FMV of the property to enable it to take possession of the property pursuant to Section
19, LGC

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because the purpose for which their
property was to be expropriated was not for a public purpose, but for the benefit of Cebu
Holdings Inc, a single private entity.

After the pre-trial, Cebu filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession pursuant to
Sec. 19, LGC. This was granted by the court.

Subsequently, the parties executed and submitted to the trial court an AGREEMENT, wherein
they declared that they have partially settled the case.
o Essentially, the agreement said that the respondents conform to the intention of Cebu
to expropriate their lands and will be paid P1,786,400.00provisionally, without
prejudice to the just compensation as will be determined by the Court.
o The parties agreed to be bound by such just compensation to be ascertained by the
Commissionersin their report, which is to be approved by the court.

[RTC] appointed 3 commissioners41 to determine the just compensation. Upon submission of

the report containing their assessments, Cebu was directed to pay respondents an amount of
P24,865.930.00
o Cebu filed MR, alleging that the reports were inaccurate because it included an area
not subject to expropriation. 42

411 each nominated/designated by the petitioner, respondent, and the court.

42 More specifically, it contended that Lot No. 1528 contains 793 sqmbut the actual area to be expropriated is only 478 sqm. The
remaining 315 sqm is the subject of a separate expropriation proceeding in another Civil Case, then pending before Branch IX
RTC Cebu City.

o
o

Because of this, the Commissioner submitted an amended assessment of the only the
478 sqm that was supposed to be expropriated, fixing the amount at P12,824.10 per
sqm. (a total of P20,826,339.50). RTC approved such just compensation.
Petitioners went to CA, contending that there was an error in the valuation and that the
just compensation should be based on the prevailing market price of the
property at the commencement of the expropriation proceedings.

[CA] affirmed the decision of RTC. So Cebu filed petition for review with SC

ISSUE: Should just compensation be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint? (NO, it should be determined at the time of the taking)

Eminent domain is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is the
Government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private
property for public use or purpose. But, the govt must pay the owner just compensation.

The applicable law in this case is Sec. 19, LGC, which expressly provides that just
compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual taking:
o SECTION 19.Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain
for public use, or purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon
payment of just compensation xxx Provided finally, That, the amount to be paid for
the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on
the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.

Cebu has misread the ruling in NAPOCOR v CA. In that case, the court didnt rule that just
compensation should be determined as of the filing of the complaint.
o It was explicitly stated therein that although the general rule in determining just
compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing
of the complaint, the rule "admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value of
the property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of
the expropriation proceedings."

In that case, the trial court followed the governing procedural rule at that time (Sec. 5,
Rule 67, ROC43)

Court finds merit with respondents arguments and ruled that the commissioners report
should be upheld:
o The parties agreed to be bound by the commissioners report as approved by the trial
court. Such agreement is a contract between the parties, has the force of law as
between them, and should be complied with in good faith.

43SEC. 5.Ascertainment of compensation. Upon the entry of the order of condemnation, the court shall
appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and
report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. The order of appointment
shall designate the time and place of the first session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and
specify the time within which their report is to be filed with the court.

During the hearing, Cebu did not interpose a serious objection on the valuation. As
such he is barred by estoppel in pais 44 from questioning the same. Records show that
Cebu consented to conform with the valuation by the commissioners and so it cannot
now detract from its agreement and assail the correctness of the assessment.
Although Sec. 4, Rule 67, ROC provides that just compensation should be determined
at the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation, such law cannot prevail over
RA 7160 (LGC), which is substantive law.

Petition DENIED.
Republic of the Philippines v. CA and the Heirs of Luis Santos and Purificacion Santos Imperial
2 July 2002
Vitug, J.
SV: In 1969, the Republic of the Philippines instituted expropriation proceedings over land
situated in Bulacan. Among the property owners affected were the private respondents. The trial
court issued an order in 1979 condemning the properties stated in the petition and commanding
the Republic to pay just compensation to the affected property owners. However, the private
respondents remained unpaid for many years. The Republic later filed a manifestation and
motion to permit the deposit in court of an amount by way of just compensation. The
respondents opposed the basis used for computing just compensation. The RTC eventually held
that the 1979 order was unenforceable due to prescription. It thus ordered the return of the
property to the private respondents. However, the Supreme Court held that landowners who
remain unpaid despite the lapse of many years since the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings would only have the remedy of demanding payment of just compensation. In
insisting on the return of the property, the private respondents invoke the ruling in Provincial
Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. de Villaroya, where the unpaid landowners were allowed the
alternative remedy of recovery of the property there in question. However, it must be borne in
mind that that case involved the municipal government of Sorsogon, to which the power of
eminent domain is not inherent, but merely delegated and of limited application. Moreover, the
1979 is not unenforceable because the Republic has already partially complied with the 1979
order when it made the initial deposit. Thus, the case was remanded to the RTC for the proper
execution of the 1979 order.
Facts:
- In 1969, the Republic of the Philippines instituted expropriation proceedings covering 544,980
square meters of contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos Bulacanto be
utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the "Voice
of the Philippines" project. The Republic, through the Philippine Information Agency (PIA), took
over the premises after making a deposit of over P500,000 - the sum provisionally fixed as being
the reasonable value of the property. In 1979, the RTC issued an order condemning the
properties stated in the petition and commanding the Republic to pay just compensation to the
property owners, which included the private respondents.
- It later appeared, however, that the Republic failed to pay the private respondents the
compensation due them. A little over fiver years after the RTC issued its order, the respondents
filed a manifestation with a motion seeking payment for the expropriated property. The RTC thus
issued a writ of execution against the Republic. When the respondents still werent paid, they
filed a motion urging the trial court to direct the provincial treasurer of Bulacan to release to
them the amount of P72,683.55, a portion of the sum deposited by petitioner at the inception of
44 Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out,
intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and
acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.

the expropriation proceedings in 1969, corresponding to their share of the deposit. The trial court
granted this motion.
- Meanwhile, President Joseph Estrada issued a proclamation transferring 20 hectares of the
expropriated property to the Bulacan State University for the expansion of its facilities and
another 5 hectares to be used exclusively for the propagation of the Philippine carabao. The
remaining portion was retained by the PIA. This notwithstanding, the respondents remained
unpaid. Eventually, the Republic filed a manifestation and motion to permit the deposit in court
of the amount of P4,664,000.00 by way of just compensation.
- The private respondents opposed, stating that the basis for the computation should not be the
values used in 1969, when the expropriation proceedings were commenced but the current zonal
valuation. The RTC eventually ruled in favor of the private respondents and declared that the
1979 order condemning the properties was unenforceable on the ground of prescription. It thus
ordered the return of that portion of the expropriated property previously belonging to the
private respondents.
- The Republic brought the matter up to the Court of Appeals but the petition was outrightly
denied. Hence, the present recourse before the SC.
Issue: Is the 1979 order of the RTC unenforceable? (No)
Reasoning:
- The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign
power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. The
ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation
proceedings. Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for the
condemning authority is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property.
- Obviously, the power has limits: first, the taking must be for public use, and second, that just
compensation must be given to the private owner of the property.
- The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued utilization by the PIA, a
significant portion thereof being ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan State
University and for the propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselves in line with the
requirements of public purpose. Respondents question the public nature of the utilization by
petitioner of the condemned property, pointing out that its present use differs from the purpose
originally contemplated in the 1969 proceedings. The property has assumed a public character
upon its expropriation. The Republic, as the condemnor and as the owner of the property, is well
within its rights to alter and decide the use of that property, the only limitation being that it be
for public use.
- In insisting on the return of the property, the private respondents invoke the ruling in Provincial
Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. de Villaroya, where the unpaid landowners were allowed the
alternative remedy of recovery of the property there in question. However, it must be borne in
mind that that case involved the municipal government of Sorsogon, to which the power of
eminent domain is not inherent, but merely delegated and of limited application.
The grant of the power of eminent domain to local governments under the
LGC cannot be understood as being the pervasive and all-encompassing power vested in
the legislative branch of government. For local governments to be able to wield the
power, it must, by enabling law, be delegated to it by the national legislature, but even
then, this delegated power of eminent domain is not, strictly speaking, a power of
eminent, but only of inferior, domain or only as broad or confined as the real authority
would want it to be.

- Thus, where landowners remain unpaid despite the lapse of many years since the
commencement of the proceedings, their only relief would be to demand the fair market value of
the expropriated property
- The exercise by the Republic of the right of exercising dominion over the expropriated property
is justified by the fact of its partial compliance with the 1979 judgment when it made the initial
deposit. Such partial compliance preempted any claim of bar by prescription on grounds of nonexecution.
Dispositive: Petition granted.
MIGUEL BELUSO v MUNICIPALITY OF PANAY (CAPIZ)
7 August 2006
Austria-Martinez, ponente
petition for certiorari
SHORT VERSION:
The Municipality of Panay, through a resolution, sought to expropriate land owned by Miguel
Beluso et al, and filed the corresponding petition for expropriation. The Belusos moved to dismiss
the petition, arguing that the expropriation was not for a public purpose. The SC ruled in favor of
the Belusos, but not on the basis of the lack of public purpose. It reiterated several important
concepts about the power of eminent domain. Citing Municipality of Paraaque v VM Realty, it
said that the expropriation was invalid as it was exercised through a resolution, and not an
ordinance as required by the Local Government Code.
FACTS:
Miguel Beluso and others owned parcels of land.
o The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Panay issued a resolution authorizing
the municipal government to initiate expropriation proceedings over these
properties.
Panay filed a petition for expropriation before the Roxas City RTC.
o The court declared that the expropriation was for public use and that Panay had the
lawful right to take the property upon payment of just compensation, despite
Belusos allegations that the proceedings were politically-motivated (i.e. they had
voted against the incumbent mayor and vice-mayor.
The CA dismissed Belusos petition and held that they werent denied due process, having
been able to file an answer to the complaint.
ISSUE:
should the condemnation proceedings continue? NO
REASONING:
Eminent domain, which is the power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property to
particular uses to promote public welfare, is essentially lodged in the legislature.
o While such power may be validly delegated to local government units (LGUs), other
public entities and public utilities the exercise of such power by the delegated
entities is not absolute.
o In fact, the scope of delegated legislative power is narrower than that of the
delegating authority and such entities may exercise the power to expropriate
private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to its control and
restraints imposed through the law conferring the power or in other legislations.
o Indeed, LGUs by themselves have no inherent power of eminent domain.
Thus, strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is
in reality not eminent but inferior since it must conform to the limits

imposed by the delegation and thus partakes only of a share in eminent

domain.
The national legislature is still the principal of the LGUs and the latter cannot
go against the principals will or modify the same.
The exercise of the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a
fundamental right.
o It greatly affects a landowners right to private property which is a constitutionally
protected right necessary for the preservation and enhancement of personal dignity
and is intimately connected with the rights to life and liberty.
o Thus, whether such power is exercised directly by the State or by its authorized
agents, the exercise of such power must undergo painstaking scrutiny.
o Despite the existence of legislative grant in favor of local governments, it is still the
duty of the courts to determine whether the power of eminent domain is being
exercised in accordance with the delegating law.
Several requisites must concur before an LGU could exercise the power of eminent
domain:
o (1) An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local
chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of
eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private
property.
o (2) The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or
for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
o (3) There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of
the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
o (4) A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property
sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
A local government unit cannot authorize an expropriation of private property through a
mere resolution of its lawmaking body.
o The Local Government Code expressly requires an ordinance for the purpose and a
resolution that merely expresses the sentiment of the municipal council will not
suffice.
o The reason was that ordinances and resolutions are different from each other.
At this juncture, the SC repeated the ruling in Municipality of Paraaque v VM
Realty on the differences between the two, and also the different
requirements in the old and new local government codes.
As Panays expropriation was based on a resolution, it was clearly defective.

RULING: petition granted; CA decision reversed and set aside

Robinson Casio (Petitioner) vs CA, Gingoog Gallera, Inc., represented by its
President and Manager, Lindy De Lara (Respondents)

Date: December 2, 1991

Ponente: Regalado, J.

Short Version:
Facts: Casio operated a cockpit in Gingoog. The Sanggunian of Gingoog passed Resolution No.
49, classifying the land on which the cockpit operated as a residential area. Resolution No. 49

provided that amendments to the zoning ordinance may be made by 3/4 vote of the Sanggunian.
Casio's permit to operate the cockpit cancelled. Subsequently, the Sanggunian passed
Resolution No. 378, reclassifying the land on which the cockpit stood as a recreational zone.
Resolution No. 378 was passed by a mere majority, and not 3/4 of the Sanggunian. Casio was
thereafter granted a mayor's permit to operate the cockpit. Gingoog Gallera, Inc. protested the
grant of the permit to Casio saying that Resolution No. 378 was not validly enacted. Casio
contends that the vote by mere majority, as provided in the LGC and the city charter, is enough
to make the Resolution valid.
Held: Resolution No. 378 was not validly enacted. The voting requirement in Resolution No. 49,
being the specific enactment on the matter, must be followed. The voting requirement in the LCG
and the city charter, being of general application, applies to matters not covered by Resolution
No. 49. It is legally permissible, as exception to the general provisions on measures covered by
city charters and the LGC, that the vote requirement in certain ordinances may be specially
provided for.

Facts:
- Robinson Casio operated a cockpit known as Don Romulo Rodriguez Coliseum, located at the
corner of Lugod and Jadol Streets, Gingoog City. Casio was a licensee of a cockpit under Secs
2285 and 2286 of the Revised Administrative Code.
- The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Gingoog City enacted Resolution No. 49, classifying certain
areas of the city, including the land on which the Coliseum stood, as residential areas. The
classification led to the cancellation of Casio's permit to operate a cockpit.

- Resolution No. 49 provided in its Art 10, Sec 6.44 45 provided that amendments to the zoning
ordinance may be made by 3/4 vote of the Sanggunian.
- On August 13, 1985, Resolution No. 378 was enacted. It reclassified the land on which the
Coliseum stood as within the recreational zone, thus allegedly amending Resolution No. 49. 9
members of the Sanggunian, participated, with 4 voting for the amendment, while 4 voted
against, and with 1 abstention. The vice-mayor, as presiding officer, broke the deadlock by voting
for the amendment.
- By virtue of Resolution No. 378, the mayor issued to Casio a permit to operate a cockpit. This
permit was subsequently renewed.
- Gingoog Gallera, Inc., protested the operation of Coliseum before the Philippine Gamefowl
Commission (PGC) on the ground that no certificate of registration had as yet been issued by the
PGC. The PGC sent a telegram to the mayor to stop any cockfight in the Coliseum in view of its
failure to register with the PGC.

45 Amendments to the zoning ordinance. Changes in the zoning ordinance as a result of the review by the Local Review Committee shall be
treated as an amendment provided that any amendment to the zoning ordinance or provision thereof shall be carried out through a resolution of
three fourths vote of the Sangguniang Panglunsod. Said amendments shall take effect only after approval and authentication by the HSRC.

- Gallera then filed with the RTC an action for prohibition and mandamus against Casio on the
ground that Resolution No. 378 is invalid. It asserted that the Coliseum is still within the
residential zone, thereby rendering the mayor's permits null and void for being in violation of Sec
6 of the PGC Rules and Regulations 46.
- The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Gallera, declaring the mayor's permits null and
void, and ordering Casio to desist from further operating the cockpit.
- Casio appealed to the CA, which ruled in favor of Gallera. Casio's MR having been denied, it
filed the present petition for review with the SC.
- Casio questions the power of the PGC to stop the operations of the cockpit claiming that it
does not have the power of control. He also argues that Resolution No. 378 was validly enacted.

Issue/Reasoning:
Issue: Whether the PGC can stop the operation of the cockpit (Yes)
- The PGC has the power not of control, but only of review and supervision. This power was
validly exercised by the PGC over Coliseum when it sought to stop its operations through the
local officials. Rather, PGC only exercised its power of review over the acts performed by the
local authorities in relation to the exercise of its functions.
- The power of review is exercised to determine whether it is necessary to correct the acts of the
subordinate and to see to it that he performs his duties in accordance with law. This the PGC did
by bringing to the attention of the local authorities the non-compliance by Casio with the PGC
rules.
- In the performance its role with respect to the regulation of cockpits, PGC may indicate its
disapproval of the acts of the local officials concerned.

Issue: Whether Resolution No. 378 was validly enacted (No. It did not comply with the 3/4 vote
requirement in Resolution No. 49.)
- Casio argues that Resolution No. 378 is valid because it was passed by by a majority of 5. He
contends that the 3/4 vote requirement under Resolution No. 49, aside from its being merely a
formal requirement, is an enactment which is ultra vires. SC does not agree.
- Although the charter of Gingoog, and the LGC require only a majority for the enactment of an
ordinance, Resolution No. 49 cannot be validly amended by Resolution No. 378 without
complying with the categorical requirement of a 3/4 vote incorporated in the very same
ordinance sought to be amended.
- The pertinent provisions in the city charter, and the LGC are of general application, and
embrace a wider scope. However, the provision in Resolution No. 49 regarding amendments
46 Sec. 6. Site and Constructions of cockpits. Cockpits shall be constructed and operated within the appropriate areas as prescribed in zoning
laws or ordinances.

thereto is a specific and particular provision which explicitly provides for a different number of
votes. Where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a general one which in
its most comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former, the particular
enactment must be operative, and the general statement applies only to such cases within its
language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment.
- In the instant case, although the general law on the matter requires a mere majority, the higher
requisite vote in Resolution No. 49 shall govern since municipal authorities are in a better
position to determine the evils sought to be prevented by the inclusion of particular provisions in
enacting a particular statute.
- It is legally permissible, as exception to the general provisions on measures covered by city
charters and the LGC, that the vote requirement in certain ordinances may be specially provided
for, as in the case of Resolution No. 49, instead of the usual majority vote.

Dispositive:
Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.

Romeo J. Gamboa, Jr. v. Marcelo Aguirre, Jr. and Juan Y. Araneta

20 July 1999
Ynares-Santiago, J.

SHORT VERSION: Romeo Gamboa, Jr. was elected Vice-Governor and was later designated as
Acting Governor when the real governor when abroad. The members of the
SangguniangPanlalawigan questioned his authority to preside over the SP session as Acting
Governor. The Court agreed with the SP members and said that the Vice-Governor cannot preside
over sessions of the SP while he is Acting Governor. The designation, appointment or assumption
of the Vice-Governor as the Acting Governor creates a corresponding temporary vacancy in the
office of the Vice-Governor during such contingency.This event constitutes an inability on the
part of the regular presiding officer (Vice-Governor) to preside during the SP sessions.

FACTS:

In the 1995 elections, Rafael Coscolluela, Romeo Gamboa, Jr. and Marcelo Aguirre, Jr. and
Juan Araneta were elected Negros Occidental Governor, Vice-Governor and
SangguiangPanlalawigan (SP) members, respectively.
Aug. 1995: the governor designated Gamboa as Acting Governor, as the former was going
abroad.
When the SP held its regular session, Aguirre and Araneta questioned the authority of
Gamboa to preside, in view of his designation as Acting Governor, and asked the latter to
vacate his seat. Gamboa refused.
In another session, 7 members of the SP allowed Gamboa to stay while 4 others voted
against.

Sept. 22, 1995: Aguirre and Araneta filed a petition for declaratory relief and prohibition
with the lower court.
Oct. 2, 1995, Coscolluella re-assumed office as Governor.
Trial court declared Gamboa as temporarily legally incapacitated to preside over the
sessions of the SP during the period he is Acting Governor.
Gamboa then filed a petition for review with the SC. (Technically, the case is dismissible for
being moot and academic, but the Court decided to resolve it anyways. Meh.)

ISSUE:
2. May an incumbent Vice-Governor, while concurrently the Acting Governor, continue to
preside over the sessions of the SangguniangPanlalawigan?
REASONING:
2. No
LGC Sec. 49(a) and 466(a)(1) provide that the Vice-Governor shall be the presiding
officer of the SangguniangPanlalawigan.
In addition, he becomes the Governor and assumes the higher office for the unexpired
term of his predecessor in case of permanent vacancy.
When the vacancy is merely temporary, the Vice-Governor shall automatically
exercise the powers (subject to certain limitations) and perform the duties and
functions of the Governor.
o When the Vice-Governor exercises the powers and duties of the Office of the
Governor, he does not assume the latter office. He only acts as the Governor
but does not become the Governor.
o His assumption of the powers, duties and functions of the provincial
ChiefExecutive does not create a permanent vacuum or vacancy in his position as
the Vice-Governor.
o Necessarily, he does not relinquish nor abandon his position and title as ViceGovernor by merely becoming an Acting Governor, (not Governor) or by merely
exercising the powers and duties of the higher office.
The question now is: while in such capacity, does he temporarily relinquish the powers,
functions, duties and responsibilities of the Vice-Governor, including the power to
preside over sessions of the SP? The LGC is silent on the matter.
A Vice-Governor who is concurrently an Acting Governor is actually a quasi-Governor.
o For purposes of exercising his legislative powers, he is deemed as a non-member
of the SP for the time being.
Under the LGC of 1991 (unlike the old LGC), the Governor is deprived of the power to
preside over the SP and is no longer considered a member thereof.
o This is clear in the enumeration of the members of the SP.
o Not being included in said enumeration, the Governor is deemed excluded.
On the contrary, local executive power is vested alone in the Governor.
o The union of legislative-executive powers in the office of the Governor under the
old LGC has been disbanded, so that either department now comprises different
and non-intermingling official personalities to ensure a better delivery of public
service and provide a system of check and balance.
It has been held that if a Mayor who is out of the country is considered effectively
absent, the Vice-Mayor should discharge the duties of the mayor during the latters
absence.
o This doctrine should equally apply to the Vice-Governor since he is similarly
situated as the Vice-Mayor.

Absence should be reasonably construed to mean effective absence, that is, one
that renders the officer concerned powerless, for the time being, to discharge the
powers and prerogatives of his office.
o There is vacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and
exercise at present the duties of the office.
By virtue of the foregoing definition, it can be said that the designation, appointment
or assumption of the Vice-Governor as the Acting Governor creates a corresponding
temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor during such contingency.
o Considering the silence of the law on the matter, the mode of succession
provided for permanent vacancies, under the new Code, in the office of the ViceGovernor may likewise be observed in the event of temporary vacancy occurring
in the same office.
o This is because in the eyes of the law, the office to which he was elected was left
barren of a legally qualified person to exercise the duties of the office of the ViceGovernor.
Being the Acting Governor, the Vice-Governor cannot continue to simultaneously
exercise the duties of the latter office, since the nature of the duties of the provincial
Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge them.
o This appears to be the clear rationale of the new Code wherein the policy of
performing dual functions in both offices has already been abandoned.
o The creation of a temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor creates a
corresponding temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor whenever the
latter acts as Governor by virtue of such temporary vacancy.
o This event constitutes an inability on the part of the regular presiding officer
(Vice Governor) to preside during the SP sessions, which thus calls for the
operation of Sec. 49(b) of the LGC concerning the election of a temporary
presiding officer.

RULING: petition denied

070. Enrique Garcia et al v COMELEC and Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan

Sept. 30, 1994
Puno, J.
Topic: Local Initiative and Referendum
SV: The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, Bataan passed a PambansangKapasyahanBlg 10 where
they agreed to the inclusion of the Municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic
Zone. Petitioners filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan to annul said
PambansangKapasyahan to no avail, so petitioners resorted to their power of initiative, soliciting
signatures to cause the repeal of the resolution. COMELEC denied the petition on the ground that
its subject is merely a resolution and not an ordinance, hence, a local initiative cannot be
conducted.
Court discussed the history of the Consti provisions on local initiative. The respondents
argument that only an ordinance can be the subject of an initiative is untenable because it is
against the Constitution and the intent of the lawmakers, as can be seen from the deliberations.
The enactment of the LGC, which also dealt with local initiative did not change the scope of its
coverage; the Code did not limit the coverage of local initiatives to Ordinances alone.Also, the
distinction between an ordinance and a resolution does not lie here since even if the
PambansangKapasyahan is a resolution, it has lasting effects on the governance of its people. As
such, it is but logical to hear their voice on the matter via an initiative.

FACTS:
In the PambansangKapasyahanBlg. 10, Serye 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong,
Bataan agreed to the inclusion of the Municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special
Economic Zone in accordance with RA 7227

May 24, 1993: Petitioners Garcia et al filed a petition 47 with Sangguniang Bayan of Moronog to
annul said PambansangKapasyahan
o The Municipality did not take any action on the petition within 30 days after its
submission.
Petitioners then resorted to their power of initiative under the LGC.They solicited the required
number of signatures to cause the repeal of the resolution.
o June 11: Unknown to petitioners, however, Edilberto M. de Leon, Vice Mayor and
Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, wrote a letter to the Executive
Director of COMELEC requesting the denial of "the petition for a local initiative and/or
referendum because the exercise will just promote divisiveness, counter productive
and futility.
July 6: COMELEC en banc resolved to deny the petition for local initiative on the ground that
its subject is merely a resolution (pambayangkapasyahan) and not an ordinance."
July 13: COMELEC further resolved to direct Provincial Election Supervisor Benjamin Casiano
to hold action on the authentication of signatures being gathered by petitioners.
Petitioners went to the SC on a petition for certiorari and mandamus, alleging the ff:
o For certiorari: COMELEC did not observe due process in the conduct of its proceedings
because the subject resolutions were issued ex parte and without affording petitioners
and other proponents of the initiative the opportunity to be heard thereon. Moreover,
said resolutions were issued with grave abuse of discretion.
A Sangguniang Bayan resolution being an act of the aforementioned local
legislative assembly is undoubtedly a proper subject of initiative.(Sec. 32, Art. VI,
Constitution)

47 Contents of Petition:I. Bawiin, nulipikahin at pawalang-bisaangPambayangKapasyahanBlg. 10, Serye 1993 ng

Sangguniang Bayan para sapag-anib ng Morongsa SSEZ nawalangkondisyon.

II. Palitanito ng isangPambayangKapasiyahannaaaniblamangangMorongsa SSEZ kung
angmgasumusunodnakondisyones ay ipagkakaloob, ipatutupad at isasagawa para sakapakanan at interes ng Morong
at Bataan:
(A). Ibaliksa Bataan ang "Virgin Forests" isangbundoknahindinagagalw at punong-puno ng malalakingpunong-kahoy
at iba'-ibanghalaman.
(B) Ihiwalayang Grande Island sa SSEZ at ibalikitosa Bataan.
(K). Isamaangmgalupain ng Bataan nanakapaloobsa SBMA sapagkukuenta ng salapingipinagkakaloob ng pamahalaang
national o "Internal Revenue Allotment" (IRA) saMorong, Hermosa at saLalawigan.
(D). Payagangmagtatagrin ng sariling "special economic zones" angbawatbayan ng Morong, Hermosa at Dinalupihan.
(E). Ibasesalaki ng kanya-kanyanglupaangpamamahagi ng kikitain ng SBMA.
(G). Ibaserinangalokasyon ng pagbibigay ng trabahosalaki ng nasabingmgalupa.
(H). Pabayaangbukasang pinto ng SBMA nanasaMorong ng 24 naoras at bukodditosamagbukas pa ng pinto
sahangganannaman ng Morong at Hermosa upangmagkaroon ng pagkakataongumunladrinangmganasabingbayan,
patinarin ng iba pang bayan ng Bataan.
(I). Tapusinangpagkokonkreto ng mgadaangMorong-Tala-Orani at Morong-Tasig-Dinalupihan para sakabutihan ng
mgataga-Bataan at tuloymakatulongsapangangalaga ng mgakabundukan.
(J). Magkaroon ng sapatnarepresentasyonsapamunuan ng SBMA angMorong, Hermosa at Bataan.

For mandamus: Respondent Comelec's authority in the matter of local initiative is

merely ministerial48. It is duty-bound to supervise the gathering of signatures in support
of the petition and to set the date of the initiative once the required number of
signatures are obtained, as support by Sec. 22, par (h), LGC.

ISSUE: Is PambansangKapasyahanBlg. 10 a proper subject of initiative? (YES)

This case is of transcendental significance because it involves an issue of first impression

delineating the extent of the people to legislate. Accdg to Fr. Bernas: "in republican systems,
there are generally two kinds of legislative power, original and derivative.
o Original legislative power is possessed by the sovereign people. Derivative legislative
power is that which has been delegated by the sovereign people to legislative bodies
and is subordinate to the original power of the people."

History of Peoples exercise of legislative power

o Up until 1987, our people have not directly exercised legislative power, both the
constituent power to amend or revise the Constitution or the power to enact ordinary
laws since people gave total trust to Congress and did not reserve the power to make
or repeal laws. Such omission proved unfortunate because it allowed abuses, as can be
seen in the Martial Law days.
o In Feb 1986, however, people toppled down the Marcos regime and the result is that
the new Constitution became "less trusting of public officials than the American
Constitution."

48

The framers of our 1987 Constitution realized the value of initiative and referendum as
an ultimate weapon of the people to negate government malfeasance and misfeasance
and they put in place an overarching system. Thus, thru an initiative 49, the people were
given the power to amend the Constitution itself. Likewise, people were also endowed
with the power to enact or reject any law by Congress or local legislative body. 50

49 Sec. 2 of Art. XVII provides: "Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum of the registered voters therein."

50ART 6 Sec. 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a

Senate and a House of Representatives except to the extent reserved to the people by the provisions on initiative and
referendum.xxx xxxxxx
Sec. 32.The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions
therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof
passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per
centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum of the registered voters thereto.

The COMELEC was also empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an initiative and referendum.
It is to be noted that the scope of coverage of an initiative/referendum as
delineated by Sec. 32, Art. 6, Constitution is any act or law passed by Congress
or local legislative body.
Congress responded to mandate of the Consti, approving RA 6375 An Act Providing for
a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, which
spelled out the requirements for the exercise of the power of initiative and
referendum, the conduct of national initiative and referendum; procedure of local
initiative and referendum; and their limitations.

Respondents argue that under the LGC, only an ordinance can be the subject of an initiative,
relying on Sec. 120, Chap 2, Title 11, Book 1, LGC, which provides Local Initiative Defined.
Local initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit
may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance
o COURT does not agree with the reading of said provision because it is against the
Constitution and the intent of the lawmakers.
o Consti clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as appropriate subjects of
local initiative.
Section 32 of Article VI: "The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a
system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the
people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or
law or part thereof passed by the Congress, or local legislative body . . ." An act
includes a resolution.
Blacks definition of an act: an expression of will or purpose . . . it may denote
something done . . . as a legislature, including not merely physical acts, but also
decrees, edicts, laws, judgments, resolves, awards, and determinations . . . .
Laws should be construed in harmony rather than in violation of the Constitution
[In Re Guarina] "if there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of the
legislative, if the words or provisions are obscure, or if the enactment is fairly
susceptible of two or more constructions, that interpretation will be adopted
which will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality, even though it may be
necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or apparent
import of the language used.
o This Constitutional command to includes acts (i.e. resolutions) as appropriate subjects
of initiatve was implemented by Congress when it enacted RA 6735.
In Sec. 3(a) thereof, it gives a definition of initiative:
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the
Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called
for the purpose.
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing
amendments to the Constitution.
a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a
national legislation; and
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact
a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution, or
ordinance.
Sec. 6 states: Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies Any proposition on
ordinance or resolution approved through the system of initiative and
referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or amended, by
the local legislative body concerned within six (6) months from the date
therefrom . . . .

Likewise, COMELECs Resolution No. 230051"In Re Rules and Regulations

Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and
Referendum, on National and Local Laws"recognized resolutions as proper
subjects of initiatives.
Congress also intended resolutions to be proper subjects of local initiatives, as
confirmed by the debates.

Contrary to respondents argument, the enactment of the LGC, which also dealt with local
initiative did not change the scope of its coverage; the Code did not limit the coverage of
local initiatives to Ordinances alone.
o Sec. 12, Chap. 2, Title 9, Book 1, LGC merely defines the concept of local initiative as
the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly
propose, enact, or amend any ordinance.BUT it does not deal with matters that can be
taken up on a local initiative.
o Sec. 124, LGC states: Sec. 124.Limitations on Local Initiatives. (a) The power of local
initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year.
(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal
powers of the Sanggunians to enact.
o Such provision does NOT limit the application of local initiatives to ordinances. This
interpretation is consistent with Sec. 125 which uses the word propositions as subject
of initiative. The inclusion of the word proposition is inconsistent with respondents'
thesis that only ordinances can be the subject of local initiatives.
o Also Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, principal author of the LGC, gives a view consistent to our
interpretation in his commentaries.52

51Section 5, Article I of its Rules states: "Scope of power of initiative The power of initiative may be exercised to
amend the Constitution, or to enact a national legislation, a regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay law,
resolution or ordinance."

52 Regarding the form of the measure, the section speaks only of "ordinance," although the measure may be contained in a
resolution. If the registered voters can propose ordinances, why are they not allowed to propose resolutions too? Moreover, the
wording of Sec. 125, below, which deals not only with ordinances but with "any proposition" implies the inclusion of resolutions.
The discussion hereunder will also show support for the conclusion that resolutions may indeed be the subject of local initiative.

Although respondents do not give any reason why resolutions should not be the subject of a
local initiative, their reason lies in the well known distinction between a resolution and an
ordinance in that a resolution is used whenever the legislature wishes to express an opinion
which is to have only a temporary effect while an ordinance is intended to permanently direct
and control matters applying to persons or things in general. Thus, resolutions are not
normally subject to referendum for it may destroy the efficiency necessary to the successful
administration of the business affairs of a city.
o BUT in this case, it cannot be argued that the subject matter of the resolution merely
has temporary effects because it directs a permanent rule of conduct or government.
o Including Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone has far reaching
implications in the governance of its people, such as being subject to several policies
(i.e. tax and duty-free importations within the territory, tax exemptions, qualifications
for residency status, etc.)
o Considering the lasting changes that will be wrought in the social, political, and
economic existence of the people of Morong by the inclusion of their municipality in the
Subic Special Economic Zone, it is but logical to hear their voice on the matter via an
initiative.
o It is not material that the decision of the municipality of Morong for the inclusion came
in the form of a resolution for what matters is its enduring effect on the welfare of the
people of Morong.

As to due process:
o Petitioners were not furnished a copy of the letter-petition of Vice Mayor Edilberto M. de
Leon to the respondent COMELEC praying for denial of their petition for a local
initiative. Worse, COMELEC granted the petition without affording petitioners any fair
opportunity to oppose it.
o This procedural lapse is fatal for at stake is not an ordinary right but the sanctity of the
sovereignty of the people, their original power to legislate through the process of
initiative.

Petition GRANTED. COMEMEC resolutions annulled and set aside.

Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. COMELEC, Enrique T. Garcia and Catalino A.
Calimbas
Panganiban, J. 26 September 1996
SV: Congress enacted RA 7227 creating, among others, the Subic Economic Zone which
included, among others, the town of Morong, Bataan. Pursuant to the requirement in RA 7227
that the creation of the zone is subject to the concurrence of the concerned Sangguinans
(Bayan/Panglungsod), the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong passed PambayangKapasyanBlg. 10
Serye 1993. Garcia, Calimbas, et. al. opposed the concurrence and sought to have it replaced
with a conditional one. Eventually the COMELEC scheduled a referendum for the electorate to
vote on the petition of Garcia, Calimbas, et. al. The SBMA filed suit against the COMELEC,
seeking to prevent the holding of a referendum.
The SC ruled in favor of the SBMA and held that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion. In its assailed resolution, the COMELEC was preparing for a referendum when it was
clear that the petition of Garcia, Calimbas, et. al. was one for initiative. The SC clarified that
initiative is different from a referendum. Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and
laws, and to enact or reject them at polls independent of the legislative assembly. Referendum is
the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by
a legislative body and which, in most cases, would, without action on the part of electors,
become a law

FACTS:
- 13 Mar 1992: Congress enacted RA 7227 (Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992),
which among others, provided for the creation of the Subic Economic Zone.
a) The Subic Economic Zone was to be composed of the City of Olongapo, and the
Municipalities of Subic, Morong and Hermosa, subject to the concurrence by resolution
of their respective SangguinangPanlungsod/Sangguniang Bayan.
b) RA 7227 also provided for the creation of SBMA, with an authorized capital stock of
P20B, fully subscribed and fully paid up by the Republic of the Philippines
- Apr 1993: the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed PambayangKapasyahanBilang 10
Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence as required by Sec. 12 of RA 7227 to join
the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ). The said resolution was submitted to the Office of the
President.
- 24 May 1993: Garcia, Calimbas, and their companions filed a petition with the Sangguniang
Bayan of Morong to annul PambayangKapasyahanBlg. 10 Serye 1993. The petition prayed that
the Kapasyahan be replaced with an acceptance of Morongs inclusion to the SSEZ subject to the
following conditions: (can skip)
a) the return of the Virgin Forests to Bataan
b) the separation of Grande Island from the SSEZ and its return to Bataan
c) include the lands of SBMA within Bataan in the computation of the IRA to Morong,
Hermosa and Bataan
d) Morong, Hermosa and Dinalupihan be allowed to establish their own special economic
zones
e) base the computation of sharing in the profit of SBMA on the size of land
f) base the allocation of jobs on the size of land
g) allow the gate of SBMA in Morong to be open 24 hours and also to open an additional
gate in the border between Morong and Hermosa
h) finish the concreting of the Morong-Tala-Orani road and the Morong-Tasig-Dinalupihan
road
i) that Morong, Hermosa and Bataan have sufficient representation in the SBMA
- The Sangguniang Bayan ngMorong acted upon the petition by promulgating
PambayangKapasyahanBlg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting the Congress of the Philippines to amend
certain provisions of RA 7227, particularly those concerning the matters cited in (A), (B), (K), (E),
and (G). Garcia, Calimbas et. al. were also informed that (D) and (H) had already been referred to
and favorably acted upon by the government agencies concerned.
- Not satisfied, and within 30 days from submission of their petition, Garcia, Calimbas, et. al.
resorted to their power of initiative under the LGC of 1991, Sec. 122 par. (b) of which provides:
Sec. 122. Procedure in Local Initiative.
(b) If no favorable action thereon is taken by the sanggunian concerned, the proponents,
through their duly authorized and registered representatives, may invoke their power of
initiative, giving notice thereof to the sangguniang concerned.
- 6 Jul 1993: the COMELEC denied the petition or local initiative on the ground that the subject
thereof was merely a resolution and not an ordinance.
- 15 Aug 1993: Garcia, Calimbas, et. al. instituted a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the
SC against the COMELEC and the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong for the disallowance of the
conduct of a local initiative to annul PambayangKapasyahanBlg. 10 Serye 1993. (this case is
Garcia v. COMELEC, the case preceding this one in the syllabus, which was decided in favor of
Garcia, et. al.).

- 18 June 1996: COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2845 adopting a Calendar of Activities for local
referendum on a certain municipal ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong. The
referendum was to be held on 27 Jul 1996.
- 27 Jun 1996: COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2848 providing for the rules and guidelines
to govern the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal KapasyahanBlg. 10 Serye
1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong.
- 10 Jul 1996: COMELEC instituted the present petition for certiorari and prohibition contesting
the validity of Resolution No. 2848.
ISSUES/REASONING:
1) Is the current petition barred by the prior judgment of the Court in Garcia v. COMELEC? NO.
The only issue resolved in the earlier case was whether a municipal resolution, as contradistinguished from an ordinance, may be the proper subject of an initiative and/or referendum.
The Court disposed of the question thus:
a) The argument that under Sec. 120, Chapter 2, Title XI, Book I of the LGC of 1991, only
an ordinance may be the subject of initiative and/or referendum is wrong.
b) The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinance but resolutions as appropriate
subjects of a local initiative (Sec. 32, Art. VI Const.)
In the present case, SBMA is not contesting the propriety of a municipal resolution as the form by
which these two new constitutional prerogatives of the people may be validly exercised.
What is at issue here is whether PambayangKapasyahanBlg. 10, Serye 1993 as worded is
sufficient in form and substance for submission to the people for their approval; in fine, whether
the COMELEC acted properly in promulgating and implementing Resolution No. 2848.
2) Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating and implementing
Resolution No. 2848? YES, the COMELEC made preparations for a referendum when the process
started by Garcia et. al. was an initiative.
In enacting the Initiative and Referendum Act, Congress differentiated one from the other thus:
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to
propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments
to the Constitution;
a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national
legislation; and
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a
regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to
Congress or the local legislative body for action.
(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through
an election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely:
c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or
law, or part thereof, passed by Congress; and
c.2 Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law,
resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.
Justice Isagani A. Cruz provided the following definitions:

a) initiative the power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject
them at polls independent of the legislative assembly
b) referendum the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure
which has been passed by a legislative body and which, in most cases, would, without
action on the part of electors, become a law
These definitions are echoed in the LGC substantially:
Sec. 120. Local Initiative Defined. Local initiative is the legal process whereby the
registered voters of local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any
ordinance.
Sec. 126. Local Referendum Defined. Local referendum is the legal process whereby the
registered voters of the local government units may approve, amend or reject any
ordinance enacted by the sanggunian.
The local referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Comelec within
sixty (60) days in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities
and thirty (30) days in case of baranggays.
The Comelec shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum.
While initiative is entirely the work of the electorate, referendum is begun and consented to by
the law-making body. Initiative is a process of law-making by the people themselves without the
participation and against the wishes of their elected representatives, while referendum consists
merely of the electorate approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or enacted by a
legislative body.
It follows that there is need for the COMELEC to supervise an initiative more closely, its authority
thereon extending not only to the counting and canvassing of votes but also to seeing to it that
the matter submitted to the people is in the proper form and language so it may be easily
understood and voted upon by the electorate.
3) Is the withdrawal of the municipalitys adherence and the imposition of conditions ultra vires?
The SC declined to rule on this issue on the ground of prematurity.
SBMA argues that the creation of SSEZ is now fait accompli and Morong cannot unilaterally
withdraw its concurrence or impose new conditions anymore. Such would deprive the entire
nation of the benefits to be derived from the SSEZ and render nugatory the creation by national
law of the SSEZ.
On the other hand, Garcia counters that such argument is premature and conjectural because, at
this point, the resolution is just a proposal. If the people should reject it during referendum, then
there would be nothing to declare illegal.
The SC agreed with Garcia. It ruled that it had no authority to determine the commission of grave
abuse of discretion with regard to the the proposed iniative since it has not yet been
promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any branch or instrumentality or lower court.
PETITION GRANTED. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2848 ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. THE
INIATIVE ON PAMBAYANG KAPASYAHAN Blg. 10, Serye 1993 is REMANDED to the
COMELEC.
Ortiz v. Posadas
Date: March 3, 1931
Ponente: Malcolm

The case in a nutshell:

FACTS: There are 16 members in the municipal council of Tabaco, Albay, but only 13 were
present at the meeting when Ordinance No. 25 (concerning cockpits) was passed. Out of the 13
members present, 7 voted in favor of the ordinance, while 6 voted against. Ortiz assailed the
validity of the ordinance, claiming the required majority (of all the members of the municipal
council, not just those present at the meeting) was not met. CFI upheld the validity of the
ordinance.
HELD: Ordinance No. 25 is VOID. The approval of ALL the members of the municipal council, not
just those present, was necessary for its passage. The law, Sec. 2224 of the Administrative Code
(the law prevailing at the time), is clear. It needs only application, not interpretation. The
provision requires in mandatory language the affirmative vote of a majority of all the members of
the municipal council for the passage of any ordinance, The affirmative vote of a majority of all
the members of the municipal council shall be necessary for the passage of any ordinance, or
any proposition creating indebtedness. The phrase creating indebtedness in the provision
refers to proposition, not to ordinance. Other measures shall prevail upon the majority vote
of the members present.
Facts:
1) There are 16 members of the municipal council of Tabaco, Albay. At the meeting
concerned, 13 members were present, while 3 were absent. Out of the 13 members
present, 7 voted in favor of Ordinance No. 25, concerning cockpits, while 6 voted against
it.
2) Plaintiff-appellant Emiliano Ortiz assailed the validity of Ordinance No. 25 in the Albay CFI,
suing defendants-appellees Juan Posadas, Jr., the Collector of Internal Revenue, et al.
3) The CFI judge held that Ordinance No. 25 was valid. However, another CFI judge held an
ordinance enacted under similar circumstances invalid.
4) Ortiz appealed.
Issue: Is Ordinance No. 25 valid? NO.
Held: Judgment appealed from is REVERSED. Another judgment is issued in favor of Ortiz and
against Posadas, et al. for the sum of Php400, with the costs of both instances against the
municipality of Tabaco, Albay.
Ratio:
1) Ordinance No. 25 is VOID. The approval of ALL the members of the municipal council, not
just those present, was necessary for its passage.
a. The law, Sec. 2224 of the Administrative Code, is clear. It needs only application,
not interpretation. Sec. 2224 provides:
SEC. 2224. Journal of proceedings. Majorities necessary for transaction of
business. The council shall keep a journal of its own proceedings. The ayes and
noes shall be taken upon the passage of all ordinances, upon all propositions to
create any liability against the municipality, and upon any other proposition, upon
the request of any member, and they shall be entered upon the journal. The
affirmative vote of a majority of all the members of the municipal council shall be
necessary to the passage of any ordinance or of any proposition creating
indebtedness; but other measures, as otherwise specially provided, shall prevail
upon the majority vote of the members present at any meeting duly called and
held.
i. The ayes and noes are taken upon:
1. The passage of all ordinances
2. All propositions to create any liability against the municipality, and
3. Any other proposition, upon the request of any members.
ii. The affirmative vote of a majority of all the members of the municipal council
shall be necessary for the passage of:

1. Any ordinance, or
2. Any proposition creating indebtedness.
iii. Other measures shall prevail upon the majority vote of the members present.
iv. Creating indebtedness refers to proposition, not to ordinance. Thus, the
contention that only ordinances creating indebtedness require the approval of
a majority of all the members of the municipal council is devoid of merit.
b. The SC then cited the American case of McLean v. City of East St. Louis as
corroborative authority. In that case, the validity of Sec. 13 of the Act for the
incorporation of cities and villages in the State of Illinois (which was worded very
similarly to Sec. 2224) was contested.
i. Those assailing the validity of Sec. 13 argued that it related only to
ordinances and propositions creating a liability against a city or providing for
the expenditure or appropriation of its money, and that all other ordinances
may be passed by a majority of a quorum. They contended that this was the
intention of the legislature, and where the intention of the legislature is
ascertained with reasonable certainty and it appears that words have been
used inconsistent with such intention, a word erroneously used for another
may be eliminated and the proper word substituted.
ii. However, the Supreme Court of Illinois, through Justice Cartwright, held that
too make the changes suggested would be merely juggling with the words of
the statute to give it a different meaning from that which was intended.
1. The law requires that the yeas and nays shall be taken upon the
passage of all ordinances, and the concurrence of a majority of the
legislative body is necessary to their passage. (Hibbard & Co. v. City of
Chicago)
2. If a proposition not in the form of an ordinance creates any liability or
provides for the expenditure or appropriation of money, the
requirement is the same. As to other propositions, whether the yeas
and nays are entered upon the journal or not, the majority of a quorum
is sufficient.
3. The basic idea of the legislative body was to make impossible the
approval of ordinances or of propositions creating indebtedness by
minority votes of municipal councils, at meetings hastily called.
c. Sec. 2224 requires in mandatory language the affirmative vote of a majority of all
the members of the municipal council for the passage of any ordinance, whether or
not it creates indebtedness. An ordinance passed by less than that majority is
invalid. Ordinance No. 25 is void.
City of Manila, et al. v. Hon. Perfecto Laguio and Malate Tourist Development Corporation
12 April 2005
Tinga, J.
Short version: The City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7783 which prohibited the
operation of any business in the Ermita-Malate area providing certain forms of amusement,
entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which
tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants and adversely affect the social and moral
welfare of the community. The list of prohibited establishments included motels and inns. Thus,
the Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC), which built and opened Victoria Court in the
area, filed a petition for declaratory relief praying that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes
motels and inns as among prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court held that an Ordinance, to be valid, must conform to the following
requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or
oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate
trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.

Thus, the Court held that the Ordinance is null and void because it violates the due process and
equal protection clauses and it is also repugnant to the Local Government Code and to PD 449.
Facts:
- The City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7783 which prohibited the operation of any
business in the Ermita-Malate area providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment,
services and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb
the community, annoy the inhabitants and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the
community.
The Ordinance provided that such prohibited establishments included sauna
parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, motels, inns among others. The
owners of these establishments were given three months to wind up their business
operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to convert their
businesses to other kinds of business allowable including souvenir shops, art galleries,
restaurants, theaters, among others. The Ordinance provided that persons who violate it
would be fined or imprisoned or both and that in case of a subsequent violation, the
premises of the erring establishment would be closed and padlocked permanently.
- The Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC), a corporation engaged in the business of
hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses, built and opened Victoria Court in Malate. It filed a
petition for declaratory relief with the RTC praying that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes
motels and inns as among prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional for
the following reasons:
The LGC grants to the City Council only the power to regulate motels, inns
and similar establishments, and not the power to prohibit them;
The Ordinance is violative of PD 449 which specifically declared portions of
the Ermita-Malate area as a commercial zone allowing the establishment of motels, inns
and similar establishments therein;
The Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police power;
The Ordinance constitutes an ex post facto law by punishing the operation of
Victoria Court which was a legitimate business prior to the enactment of the ordinance;
The Ordinance violates MTDCs constitutionally protected rights to due
process and equal protection of the laws.
- In their answer, the City of Manila, et al. said that the City Council had the power to prohibit
certain forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community
under the LGC. They also asserted that the Ordinance was enacted in conjunction with its police
power as specified in the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, the provisions of which enable it
to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary for the sanitation, safety, the furtherance of
prosperity and the promotion of morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants.
- Judge League rendered a decision enjoining the City of Manila, et al. from implementing the
Ordinance. Thus, the case was elevated before the Supreme Court via Rule 42 on pure questions
of law.
Issue: Is the Ordinance valid? (No)
Reasoning:
The test of a valid ordinance

- An ordinance, to be valid, must not only be withing the corporate powers of the LGU to enact
and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2)
must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit
but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not
be unreasonable.
- The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power. LGUs are
endowed with police power delegated by the Legislature through the General Welfare clause in
Sec. 16 of the LGC. The present case concerns the issue of whether the City Council validly
exercised this delegated power.
The Ordinance contravenes the Constitution
The Ordinance violates the due process clause
- The due process guaranty exists to prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment against the
life, liberty and property of individuals. To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the
rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, not only must it appear that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with
private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose and not unduly oppressive of individuals.
- The Ordinance was enacted to address and arrest the social ills purportedly spawned by the
establishments in the Ermita-Malate area which are allegedly operated under the guise of
legitimate night clubs, bars, hotels and motels, among others. It sought to promote and protect
the social and moral values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that these
objectives are within the scope of the City Councils police powers, the means employed for their
accomplishment were unreasonable and oppressive.
- Instead of an absolute prohibition, the objectives of the Ordinance can be achieved by the
imposition of reasonable regulations such as daily inspections for any violation of the conditions
of the licenses and permits of the establishments; the suspension or revocation of licenses for
violations; and the imposition of increased license fees The closing down and transfer of the
enumerated establishments have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of the
objectives. Even if the establishments were closed down, prostitution, adultery, fornication and
the spread of sexual disease in Manila will not be eradicated.
- Conceding that the Ermita-Malate area teems with houses of ill-repute, it is baseless to bring
within that classification sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, motels, inns
among others. The enumerated establishments are legimitate business pursuts that are not per
se offensive to morals. That these establishments may be used as venues to further prostitution
is of no moment for sexual immorality, being a human frailty, may take place in the most
innocent of places.
- The means employed by the Ordinance infringes on the constitutional guarantee of a persons
fundamental right to liberty. Persons desirous to own, operate and patronize the enumerated
establishments should be able to do so without the states interference. Motel patrons who are
single and unmarried may invoke this right to autonomy to engage in intimate sexual conduct
within the motels premises owing to the fact that their consensual sexual behavior does not
contravene any fundamental state policy. The liberty protected by the due process clause allows
them to make this choice.
- In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the MTDC
of the beneficial use of its property. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property

that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be
recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation.
The Ordinance is practically confiscatory because unless the owner converts
his establishment to accommodate an allowed business, the structure that housed his
previous business can no longer be used. The option to transfer the business outside of
the Ermita-Malate area is confiscatory as well because it qualifies as a taking without just
compensation with an additional burden imposed upon the owner to build another
establishment elsewhere and solely using his own resources.
The petitioners also cannot take refuge in classifying the Ordinance as a
zoning ordinance. Private property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes
may not, by zoning, be destroyed without compensation.
- Further, the Ordinance does not set up any standard to guide the petitioners actions. It confers
upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down establishments because no
standards were provided to determine which establishments tend to disturb the community,
annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community.
The Ordinance violates the Equal Protection clause
- The Equal Protection clause limits governmental discrimination but does not necessarily
preclude laws from making valid classifications. For a classification to be valid, the following
requisites must concur: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane
to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; (4) it must apply
equally to all members of the group.
- The Court found that there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension
houses, hotels, lodging houses and similar establishments. Thus, no reason exists for prohibiting
motels and inns but not the other establishments providing lodging. There is also no logic in
prohibiting the business of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside it. If an
establishment is noxious, it does not become any less so if located outside a particular area. The
standard where women are used as tools for entertainment is also discriminatory as
prostitution is not a profession exclusive to women. Thus, the classification in this case is not
valid.
The Ordinance is repugnant to general laws
- The LGC merely empowers LGUs to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated
in the Ordinance. In Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, it was held that the word regulate means and
includes the power to control, to govern and to restrain but it should not be construed as
synonymous with suppress or prohibit.
- Congress unequivocally specified the establishments and forms of amusement or
entertainment subject to regulation, among which are beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension
houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments (in Sec. 458(a)4(iv) of the LGC), public
dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places of
entertainment and amusement (in Sec. 458(a)4(vii)). This enumeration therefore cannot be
included as among other events or activities or entertainment, particularly those which tend to
disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants or certain forms of entertainment which the
City Council may suspend, suppress or prohibit.
- The argument that the City Council is empowered to enact the Ordinance by virtue of the
general welfare clause of the LGC and of certain provisions of the Revised Charter of Manila is
likewise without merit. On the LGC,and as discussed above, the matter of regulating the
establishments enumerate is dealt with specifically elsewhere in the LGC. Thus, the general

welfare clause cannot be used as basis for the enactment of the Ordinance. As for the Revised
Charter of Manila, suffice it to say that the LGC, being a later expression of legislative will, must
necessarily prevail and override the Revised Charter which is an earlier law.
- Section 458 of the LGC conferred powers upon the City Council to prevent and prohibit certain
activities and establishments. The establishments enumerated in the Ordinance are
conspicuously absnet. If Congress intended to confer the power to prohibit the establishments
enumerated in the Ordinance, it would have so declared in no uncertain terms by including them
in Sec. 458. Moreover, the establishments themselves are recognized legitimate enterprises
under Sec. 131 on Local Government Taxation.
- The Ordinance also runs counter to the provisions of PD 499 which had already converted the
residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and
operation of all kinds of commercial establishments except warehouses or open storage depots,
dumps or yards, motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery or
funeral establishments.
- Considering all the foregoing, the Ordinance is therefore ultra vires, null and void.
Dispositive: Petition denied.
Digested by Ramon IV
Perez v. De la Cruz
Date: March 28, 1969
Ponente: Castro
The case in a nutshell:
FACTS: The municipal board of Naga City is composed of 7 city councilors, plus Vice Mayor Perez
as the presiding officer. At a meeting, 4 councilors indicated their desire to vote for a particular
person as secretary. In response, Vice Mayor Perez expressed her intention to vote twice: first in
the deliberation of the matter, to create a tie vote, and thereafter to exercise her power as
presiding officer to break the deadlock. She reiterated her intention and even radiocast it. The 4
councilors filed a petition for prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction in the CFI to prevent
Vice Mayor Perez from voting, except in the case of a tie. CFI ruled in favor of the 4 councilors.
On appeal by Vice Mayor Perez, the CA issued a restraining order enjoining the enforcement of
the writ issued by the CFI, but later dismissed Vice Mayor Perezs petition on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction. Vice Mayor Perez filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction in the SC.
HELD: The Vice Mayor of Naga City is NOT a member of the municipal board. There is nothing in
the Naga City charter which provides that the Vice Mayor is a member of the municipal board.
The Rules of Procedure of the previous municipal boards of Naga City exclude the chairman from
voting, except in case of a tie vote. The current municipal board (headed by Vice Mayor Perez)
tried to amend this, but such proposed amendment was a nullity because on the day it was
passed, there was no quorum. (The 4 councilors walked out.) The Vice Mayor of Naga City
replaced the Mayor as presiding officer of the municipal board, but did not replace him as a
member thereof. Thus, the Vice Mayor possesses no more than the prerogatives and authority of
a presiding officer as such, and those specified by law (to vote in case of tie and to sign all
ordinances or resolutions and measures directing the payment of money or creating liability
enacted or adopted by the Board.) Vice Mayor Perez cannot vote twice to elect the secretary of
the municipal board. The concurring votes of the 4 councilors were sufficient for their chosen
candidate to win. Vice Mayor Perez is NOT both the presiding officer and a constituent member of
the municipal board. Therefore, she cannot vote twice (first to create a tie as a constituent
member, and second, to break such tie as presiding officer). There are 7 councilors in the
municipal board of Naga City. 4 councilors, therefore, would constitute a majority who, voting

together for a single person could elect a secretary of the municipal board. Since the 4 councilors
manifested their desire to vote for a particular person, and there are only 3 councilors left, a tie
vote was out of the question. A 4-3 vote creates no tie and furnishes no occasion for Vice Mayor
Perez to vote
Facts:
1) On January 8, 1968, a private conference was held at the office of petitioner Virginia F.
Perez, Vice Mayor of Naga City, with Vice Mayor Perez presiding and the 7 city councilors
present. The matter of selecting the secretary of the municipal board, as well as the
chairmen of the various standing committees thereof came up for discussion.
a. 4 councilors (private respondents, who were part of the Nacionalista Party),
indicated their desire to vote for a particular person as secretary of the board, and
to hold the chairmanship of the committee on markets for 1 of them. In response,
Vice Mayor Perez (who was part of the Liberal Party) expressed her intention to vote
twice: first in the deliberation of such matters, to create a tie vote, and thereafter,
to exercise her power as presiding officer to break the deadlock.
2) On January 10, 1968, at another conference, Vice Mayor Perez reiterated the same
intention to vote twice.
3) On January 13, 1968, Vice Mayor Perezs statement (re: her intention to vote) was
radiocast.
4) On January 15, 1968, the 4 councilors filed with the Camarines Sur CFI a petition for
prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction, to prevent Vice Mayor Perez from casting
her vote in the selection of the secretary of the municipal board and in the choice of
chairmen and members of the standing committees, except in the event of a tie vote; and
from voting on any legislative proposal or measure or in any proceeding of the said board,
except when the members thereof are equally divided. They alleged that:
a. The Vice Mayor is not a member of the municipal board, only its presiding officer.
b. Pursuant to paragraph g of Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the said board, the
chairman of the board cannot vote, except in case of a tie.
c. In the choice of secretary of the board, the Vice Mayor as presiding officer of the
board cannot vote except when the members of the board are equally divided.
d. Vice Mayor Perez had threatened to participate in the election of the board
secretary, in the choice of chairmen of the standing committees, and in other
legislative matters, proposals, and proceedings, other than to break a tie vote.
5) The CFI, through respondent Judge dela Cruz, granted the 4 councilors prayer for
prohibitory injunction.
6) Vice Mayor Perez filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in
the CA.
7) The CA issued a restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the writ of prohibitory
injunction issued by the CFI.
8) On March 5, 1968, Vice Mayor Perez and the Liberal Party councilors on the municipal
board passed an amendment to the Rules of Procedure, granting the chairman thereof the
right to vote as a member, and as presiding officer, the right to vote again in case of a tie
vote.
a. The 4 Nacionalista Party councilors walked out of the session hall.
9) The CA dismissed Vice Mayor Perezs petition, on the ground that it had no jurisdiction.
10)
Vice Mayor Perez filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction in the SC, to enjoin the enforcement of the writ of prohibitory injunction issued
by Judge de la Cruz.
11)
The enforcement of the writ of prohibitory injunction by Judge de la Cruz was
stayed, and Vice Mayor Perez was allowed to sit in the municipal board, both as a
constituent member and as presiding officer thereof.
Issues:

1) Is the Vice Mayor of Naga City, besides being the presiding officer of the municipal board,
also a member thereof? Can she vote twice: to create a deadlock, and then to break it?
NO.
2) Did Judge de la Cruz have jurisdiction to issue the writ of prohibitory injunction? YES.
Held: Present petition is DENIED. Preliminary injunction is DISSOLVED.
Ratio:
1. The Vice Mayor of Naga City is NOT a member of the municipal board. Vice Mayor Perez
CANNOT vote to twice to elect the secretary of the board.
a. Vice Mayor Perez contended that since under the Naga City charter, the Mayor was
the presiding officer of the municipal board, and R.A. No. 2259 (An Act Making
Elective The Offices of Mayor, Vice-Mayor And Councilors In Chartered Cities,
Regulating The Election In Such Cities And Fixing The Salaries And Tenure Of Such
Offices) subsequently created the position of Vice Mayor, who was made the
presiding officer of the municipal board, the Vice Mayor simply replaced the Mayor
as presiding officer thereof, and acquired all the rights and prerogatives of the
presiding officer under the charter, one of which is membership in the municipal
board.
i. The Naga City charter (R.A. No. 305) provides:

Constitution and organization of the Municipal Board;

Compensation of Members thereof. The Municipal Board
shall be the legislative body of the city and shall be
composed of the Mayor who shall be its presiding officer,
the city treasurer, the city engineer and five councilors
elected at large by popular vote during every election for
provincial and municipal officials in conformity with the
provisions of the Election Code.
ii. R.A. No. 2259 provides:

The position of Vice-Mayor is hereby created in chartered cities which at

present have no position for Vice-Mayor by provision of their corporate
charters: Provided, That the Vice-Mayor shall be the presiding officer of the
City Council or Municipal Board in all chartered cities.
b. However, the SC said that her contention suffers from several grave infirmities, as
follows:
i. There is nothing in the Naga City charter which provides that the Vice Mayor
is a member of the municipal board. The position of vice-mayor was not even
provided for, as the acting mayor designated to take over in case of
sickness, absence or other temporary incapacity of the Mayor was the City
Treasurer.
ii. The cases cited by Vice Mayor Perez (Quiem v. Seria, et al. and Bagasao, et
al. v. Tumangan) are not applicable, because in both cases, the charters of
the cities involved (Cagayan de Oro and Cabanatuan, respectively) explicitly
made the Vice Mayor a member of the municipal board, and thus entitled to
vote.
c. The Rules of Procedure of the 4 th and 5th municipal boards of Naga City exclude the
chairman from voting, except in case of a tie vote. Vice Mayor Perez contended that
the 6th municipal board (which she headed) amended this.
i. Paragraph (g), Rule III of the Rules of Procedure adopted by the 4 th and 5th
municipal board provides:

(g) The chairman cannot vote, except in case of a tie. However, a member of
the Board acting as chairman may vote as a member and as chairman to

break a tie.
ii. Vice Mayor Perez insisted that the 6 th municipal board had amended the
provision to read as follows:

(g) The Chairman, as member of the Board can vote and as a Presiding
Officer may vote again in case of a tie. In the same manner, a member of the
Board acting as chairman, may vote as a member and as Chairman, to break
the tie.
d. However, the SC held that the alleged amendment was a complete nullity.
i. The amendment presupposes that the chairman is a member of the Board,
an assumption that is without legal basis.
ii. The amendment was passed almost 2 months after the filing by the 4
councilors of their petition, i.e. pendente lite.
iii. Although on the date the amendment was passed, the restraining order
issued by the CA was in force, there was no quorum in the municipal board,
as the 4 councilors had walked out of the session hall.
e. The Vice Mayor of Naga City replaced the Mayor as presiding officer of the municipal
board, but did not replace him as a member thereof. The SC cited a whole host of
sources, all to the effect that the Vice Mayor in the municipal board possesses no
more than the prerogatives and authority of a presiding officer as such, and those
specified by law (to vote in case of tie and to sign all ordinances or resolutions and
measures directing the payment of money or creating liability enacted or adopted
by the Board.)
i. American Jurisprudences explanation of the mayors role as presiding officer
is analogous to that of the Vice Mayor in the present case.

When the statutes provide that the mayor shall preside at meetings of the
municipal council, he is a constituent part of the council for certain purposes,
and he sits and acts therein, but he is not in any proper sense a member of
the council, unless the statutes expressly so provide.
ii. McQuillins The Law of Municipal Corporations was cited in Bagasao, et al. v.
Tumangan.

The presiding officer is not entitled to vote by virtue of his office, but of
course if he is a member of the body he may vote as such member and he
may also vote the second time in case of a tie if the charter confers this
privilege.
xxx
Where the presiding officer or mayor is a member of the council or governing
body, unless expressly forbidden by law, it is generally held that he may not
only vote on all questions as a constituent member, but where the charter
gives him a casting vote in event of a tie may vote the second time.
However, he may be without vote except in the case of a tie as where he is
merely the executive or presiding officer and not a member. In such case, his
vote cannot be counted in determining whether or not there is a majority
vote, nor can he vote so as to make a tie and then give the casting vote. He
gives the casting vote, where he is empowered to do so, only in the event of
a tie vote.
iii. The American case of Palmer v. Claxton also referred to the mayor as
presiding officer, but was nonetheless analogous to the present case as well.

But where he [the mayor] is merely an executive or presiding officer and not

a member of the council, his vote cannot be counted in determining whether

or not there is a majority vote, nor can he vote so as to make a tie and then
give the casting vote. Thus, for example, in the election of officers the
casting vote may be given only where there is an equal division of votes
between the candidates.
f.

2. Judge
a.
b.

c.

Vice Mayor Perez cannot vote twice to elect the secretary of the municipal board.
The 4 concurring votes of the 4 councilors were sufficient for their chosen candidate
to win.
i. The SC reiterated that the Vice Mayor is NOT both the presiding officer and a
constituent member of the municipal board. Therefore, she cannot vote twice
(first to create a tie as a constituent member, and second, to break such tie
as presiding officer).
ii. There are 7 councilors in the municipal board of Naga City. 4 councilors,
therefore, would constitute a majority who, voting together for a single
person could elect a secretary of the municipal board.
iii. Since the 4 councilors manifested their desire to vote for a particular person,
and there are only 3 councilors left, a tie vote was out of the question. A 4-3
vote creates no tie and furnishes no occasion for Vice Mayor Perez to vote
de la Cruz had jurisdiction to issue the writ of prohibitory injunction.
Under Sec. 2236 of the Revised Administrative Code, courts are given authority to
determine the validity of municipal proceedings.
The present proceeding for prohibition has for its objective to prevent Vice Mayor
Perez from participating in the election of secretary of the board, chairmanship of
different committees, and in voting in other legislative matters, proposals, and
proceedings, other than to break a tie.
Vice Mayor Perez, in insisting on exercising the right to vote twice in the municipal
board, acted without jurisdiction and power to do so, and may be validly prevented
and restrained by a writ of prohibition.

Homeowners Association of the Philippines, Inc. and Vicente A. Rufino v. The

Municipal Board of the City of Manila, et. al.
30 August 1968
Concepcion,C.J.

SHORT VERSION: The Municipal Board of Manila passed an ordinance prohibiting the increase in
rent for residential lands and buildings, pursuant to a declared state of emergency in the matter
of housing accommodations in the city. The Court said that granting that the city government
had the power to declare a state of emergency, the ordinance would still be invalid because the
ordinance did not limit the effectivity of the regulation. The regulation should be co-terminous
with the emergency it seeks to overcome, and the effects of such emergency should not exist
longer than the emergency itself.

FACTS:

The Municipal Board passed Ordinance No. 4841, regulating rentals of lots and buildings
for residential purposes.

The whereas clause states: in view of the prevailing scarcity of lands and
buildings for residential purposes in the City of Manila and the present high cost of
living, a state of emergency in the matter of providing housing accommodations
especially for poor at reasonable rates is hereby declared to exist.
o Lessors of land are prohibited from increasing the rental to an amount in excess of
the proportion, percentage-wise, in the increase of the assessed value of the land
leased.
o Lessors of buildings are prohibited from increasing the rental to an amount in excess
of 10% per annum of the assessed value of the building and of the land on which it
stands.
The Homeowners Association and its president, Vicente Rufino, filed an action for
declaratory relief with the CFI of Manila.
The CFI ruled that the ordinance was ultra vires, unconstitutional, illegal and void ab
initio.
o The power to declare a state of emergency exclusively pertains to Congress.
o There is no longer any state of emergency which may justify the regulation of house
rentals.
Hence this appeal by the Mayor of Manila.
o

ISSUE:

3. Is the ordinance valid?

REASONING:
3. No
The Court did no deal with the municipalitys power to declare a state of emergency.
But, even if it had such power and a state of emergency really existed, the ordinance
would still be illegal and unconstitutional.
The authority of municipal corporations to regulate is essentially police power. The
exercise of police power is necessarily subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction
demanded by the regard, the respect and the obedience due to the prescriptions of
the Constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights.
Individual rights may be adversely affected by the exercise of police power to the
extent only that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or
public welfare.
o If such demands are brought about by a state of emergency, the interference
upon individual rights must be co-extensive, co-equal or co-terminous with the
existence thereof.
o Since an emergency is by nature temporary, so must the regulations promulgated
therefor be.
As a consequence, a law or ordinance affecting the rights of individuals, as a means to
tide over a critical condition, to be valid and legal, must be for a definite period of
time, the length of which must be reasonable, in relation to the nature and duration
of the crisis it seeks to overcome.
The practical reason for the requirement that a statute passed to meet a given
emergency should limit the period of its effectivity is that otherwise, a new and
different law would be necessary to repeal it, and said period would be unlimited,
indefinite, negative and uncertain.
The Constitution providesauthority for Congress in times of war or other national
emergency to delegate to the President, for a limited period, and subject to
specified restrictions, the power to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a
declared national policy.

In providing that the lifetime of the authority given must be for a limited period,
the framers were influence by the fact that powers were being delegated to the
Executive, as much as by the circumstance that, since the cause for the grant of
power was temporary, so should the grant be, for the effect cannot remain in
existence upon removal of its cause.
The power of municipal corporations delegated thereto by the national government
cannot escape the inherent limitations to which the latter, as the source of said
powers, is subject.
Then again, since our law on municipal corporations is patterned after that of the US,
the rule therein, to the effect that in a proper case, emergency legislation, limited in
time, may be enacted under the police power of a municipal corporation, should be
considered part of our legal system.
o

RULING: decision affirmed

Sps. Maria Luisa P. Morata and Julius Morata v. Sps. Victor Go and Flora C. Go and
Hon. Valeriano P. Tomol, Jr., Judge, CFI of Cebu, Branch XI
Escolin, J. 27 October 1983
SV:Sps. Go filed a complaint for a sum of money plus damages against Sps. Morata in the CFI of
Cebu. Sps. Morata filed a motion to dismiss citing as ground the failure to avail of the barangay
conciliation process required by PD 1508. The judge denied the motion to dismiss, holding that
barangay conciliation as a pre-condition to filing a case is only applicable to cases cognizable by
the inferior courts.
The SC disagreed and held that the barangay conciliation process is required in all cases except
those cases enumerated in Secs. 6 and 2 of PD 1508. Thus, the judge should have dismissed the
case.
FACTS:
-5 Aug 1982: Sps. Go filed in the CFI of Cebu a complaint against Sps. Morata for recovery of a
sum of money plus damages amounting to P49,400.00.
- Sps. Morata filed a motion to dismiss citing as grounds the failure of the complaint to allege
prior availment by the Sps. Go of the barangay conciliation process required by PD 1508 as well
as the absence of a certification by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that no conciliation or
settlement had been reached by the parties.
- 2 Sep 1982: Judge Tomol denied the motion to dismiss. He likewise denied an MR by the Sps.
Morata. He ruled that the pre-condition to the filing of a complaint in Sec. 6 of PD 1508 applied
only to cases cognizable by the inferior courts mentioned in Secs. 11 and 12.
- Sps. Morata appealed the case to the SC.
ISSUE/REASONING:
Is the referral to the Lupononly a pre-condition to the filing of a case in cases cognizable by the
inferior courts? NO.
1) Sec. 6 of PD 1508 reads:
SECTION 6. Conciliation pre-condition to filing of complaint. No complaint, petition,
action for proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in
Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office for
adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon

Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified
by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary attested by the Lupon or Pangkat
Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated. However, the parties may go
directly to court in the following cases:
[1] Where the accused is under detention;
[2] Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for
habeas corpus proceedings;
[3] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction,
attachment, delivery of personal property and support pendente lite; and
[4] Where the action may otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations
Section 2 of the law defines the scope of authority of the Lupon thus:
SECTION 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement.The Lupon of each barangay shall
have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or
municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:
[1] Where one party is the government ,or any subdivision or instrumentality
thereof;
[2] Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the
performance of his official functions;
[3] Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding
P200.00;
[4] Offenses where there is no private offended party;
[5] Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the interest of
justice determine upon recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister
of Local Government.
Thus, except in cases enumerated in Secs. 2 and 6 of the law, the Lupon has authority to settle
amicably all types of disputes involving parties who actually reside in the same municipality. The
law makes no distinction whatsoever with respect to the classes of civil disputes that should be
compromised at the barangay level, in contradistinction to the limitation imposed upon the
Lupon by Sec.2 par. (3) as regards its authority over criminal cases.
By compelling the disputants to settle their differences through the intervention of the barangay
leader and other respected members of the barangay, the animosity generated by protracted
court litigations between members of the same political unit is avoided.
Likewise, the conciliation process at the barangay level is designed to discourage indiscriminate
filing of cases in court in order to decongest its clogged dockets and, in the process, enhance the
quality of justice.
To say that the authority of the Lupon is limited to cases exclusively cognizable by the inferior
courts is to lose sight of its objective. Worse, it would make the law a self-defeating one because,
then, a litigant need only bloat up his claim to place the case beyond the jurisdiction of the
inferior court and avoid the conciliation proceedings.
2) Respondent judge relied on Secs. 11, 12, and 14 of the law in holding that the conciliation
proceedings at the barangay level is only a pre-condition to filing in cases cognizable by the
inferior courts. The SC disagreed.
The mentioned sections deal with the nullification or execution of the settlement or arbitration
awards obtain at the barangay level. The jurisdiction to pass upon and resolve petitions for
nullification/enforcement of settlement/arbitration issued by the Lupon is conferred upon the city
and municipal courts. There is nothing in the said sections to justify the thesis that the mandated
conciliation process in other types of cases applies exclusively to said inferior courts.
3) Any doubt on the issue should be dispelled by Circular No. 22 issued by Chief Justice Enrique
M. Fernando. In said circular the Chief Justice issued a directive to desist from receiving

complaints, petitions, actions and proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said
Lupons to ALL judges.
The SC thus concluded that the conciliation process at the barangay level, prescribed by P.D.
1508 as a pre-condition for filing a complaint in court, is compulsory not only for cases falling
under the exclusive competence of the metropolitan and municipal trial courts, but for actions
cognizable by the regional trial courts as well.
PETITION GRANTED. RESPONDENT JUDGE RESTRAINED FROM CONDUCTING FRTHER
PROCEEDINGS EXCEPT TO DISMISS THE CASE.
077. Uy v Contreras53

53FELICIDAD UY, petitioner, vs. HON. MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro
Manila; HON. MAURO M. CASTRO, Provincial Prosecutor of Pasig, Metro Manila; SUSANNA ATAYDE and WINNIE JAVIER, respondents.

Sept. 26, 1994

Davide, Jr. J
TOPIC: Local Govt Units; The Barangay, KatarungangPambarangay
SV:Uy subleased from Atayde of a floor of a building, operating a beauty parlor therein. When
the contract expired, Uy was not able to remove all her movable properties. When Uy sought to
withdraw her remaining properties, an argument arose between Uy and Atayde, resulting into a
scuffle in which respondents Atayde and Javier (Ataydes employee) were injured. Respondents
then filed a complaint with the barangay captain. During the date assigned for the confrontation,
only petitioner Uy appeared, so the barangay reset the confrontation to another date. Meanwhile
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor filed 2 informations for slight physical injuries against Uy in
the MTC Makati. Uy filed a motion to dismiss said criminal cases for non-compliance with the
requirement on prior referral to the lupongtagapamayapa, but the MTC Judge Contreras denied
the same on the ground that the prescriptive period of the offense was already about to expire,
hence, the criminal cases could be tried in the regular courts without need of complying to the
requirement of prior referral to the lupon.
Court ruled that the Judge should have granted the motion for dismissal of the criminal cases on
the ground of prematurity. The revised katarungangpambarangay law, as contained in the LGC,
provides for new features, and one of the new features is the suspension of the prescriptive
periods of offenses during the pendency of the mediation, conciliation, or arbitration process. It is
apparent that none of the parties knew of the revisions of the law, as contained in the LGC, but it
is particularly distressing that Judge Contreras himself isnt aware of this. Since the conciliation
proceedings were reset to another date and the period of suspension applies, the offense could
not have been nearing prescription. Contrary to Judge Contreras reasoning, the respondents
would still have had enough time to file the criminal complaints even after the 60-day period of
suspension; hence, petitioners motion for dismissal should be granted.
FACTS:
Petitioner Uy subleased from Susanna Atayde the other half of the 2 ndflr of a building located
in Metro Manila, operating and maintaining therein a beauty parlor.
o The sublease contract expired, but Uy was not able to remove all her movable
properties.
An argument arose between Uy and Atayde when the former sought to withdraw from the
premises her remaining movable properties (cabinets, shelves, frames, a mirror, a shampoo
bowl, and an airconditioning casing).
o The argument degenerated into a scuffle between Uy and Atayde& her employees,
including respondent Javier.
Respondents had themselves medically examined for the alleged injuries inflicted on them by
Uy, and subsequently filed a complaint with the brgy captain of Valenzuela, Makati
o During the date assigned for the confrontation of the parties, only petitioner Uy
appeared, prompting the barangay to reset the same to another date.
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal filed 2 informations for slight physical injuries
against Uy with the MTC of Makati.
o Judge Contreras ordered Uy to submit her counter-affidavits.
o In her counter-affidavits, Uy alleged the prematurity of filing of the criminal cases for
failure to undergo conciliation proceedings. She also attached a certification by the
brgy captain of Valenzuela Makati that there was an ongoing conciliation between Uy
and Atayde.
Uy filed a motion to dismiss the Criminal Cases for non-compliance with the requirement on
prior referral to the LupongTagapamayapa.
[MTC] Judge Contreras denied the Motion to Dismiss.
o The offense was already about to prescribe; hence, the case should be allowed to be
filed in the regular courts despite non-compliance with the prior referral requirement.

Uy had already waived the right to reconciliation proceedings since the parties are
residents of different barangays.
MR was also denied, so Uy went to the SC by way of special civil action for certiorari
o

PARTIES ARGUMENTS
Petitioner insists that the Judge should have dismissed the case considering that the
respondents failed to comply with the mandatory requirement in PD 1508 (now embodied in
Sec. 412, LGC and further required in 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure)
o SolGen agrees with the petition that the criminal cases should be dismissed for failure
to comply with the requirements in PD 1508
Respondents insist that the denial was proper because prior referral of the dispute to the
lupon is not applicable in this case since Uy and Javier are not residents of barangays in the
same city or municipality or of adjoining barangays in different cities or municipalities and
that referral to the lupon is not likewise required if the case may otherwise be barred by the
statute of limitations.
o Also, assuming that prior referral to the lupon applies to Atayde, she had nevertheless
substantially complied with the requirement.

ISSUE: Should the cases be dismissed? (YES)

ON THE LAW ON KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY

The law on the katarungangpambarangay was originally governed by PD 1508, but the LGC of
1991(specifically Chap. 7, Title I, Book 3) revised this, and as a consequence, PD 1508 was
expressly repealed pursuant to Sec. 534(b) LGC. (Pertinent Portions of the law specified in the
case included in the ANNEX)
The revised katarungangpambarangay law has at least 3 new significant features, to wit:
o FIRST. It increased the authority of the lupon in criminal offenses from those
punishable by imprisonment not exceeding thirty days or a fine not exceeding P200.00
in P.D. No. 1508 to those offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding one year
or a fine not exceeding P5,000.00
o SECOND. As to venue, it provides that disputes arising at the workplace where the
contending parties are employed or at the institution where such parties are enrolled
for study, shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution is
located
o THIRD. It provides for the suspension of the prescriptive periods of offenses
during the pendency of the mediation, conciliation, or arbitration process.

According to Sec. 410 (c): Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses. While

the dispute is under mediation, conciliation, or arbitration, the prescriptive
periods for offenses and cause of action under existing laws shall be interrupted
upon filing of the complaint with the punong barangay. The prescriptive periods
shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the certificate
of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by the lupon or pangkat
secretary54: Provided, however, That such interruption shall not exceed sixty (60)
days from the filing of the complaint with the punong barangay.
The changes brought about by the features are:
o FIRST, it broadened the jurisdiction of the lupon to the end goal that fewer cases would
reach the regular courts.
o SECOND, it also broadens the authority of the lupon in the sense that appropriate civil
and criminal cases arising from incidents occurring in workplaces or institutions of
learning shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution is
located.This rule provides convenience to the parties
o THIRD, it maximizes the effectiveness of mediation, conciliation or arbitration process
because it discourages any intentional delay of the referral to a date close to the
expiration of the prescriptive period and then invoking the proximity of the expiration
as the reason for immediate recourse to the courts.
It also affords the parties sufficient time to cool off and face each other with less
emotionalism and more objectivity.

54Minor discussion: The underlined portion is ambiguous because what is referred to as receipt of the complaint is unclear. Under
Sec. 11 of the Rules and Regulations issued by the Secretary of Justice (see ANNEX), the phrase the complaint is not found, such
that the resumption of the running of the prescriptive period shall be from receipt by the complainant of the certificate of repudiation
or the certification to file action issued by the lupon or the pangkat secretary

As ruled in previous cases55, the conciliation process at the Barangay level a condition
precedent for the filing of a complaint in Court. Non-compliance with that condition precedent
could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint
vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity.
o This condition of non-compliance is analogous to non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies or lack of earnest efforts to compromise between family members. This
makes the case subject to dismissal.
o Non-compliance is not jurisdictional (Garces v CA). When the issue of non-compliance
of such procedure has been raised before the court, however, dismissal of the action is
proper.
IN THIS CASE

55Peregrina v Panis, citing Morata v Go and Vda de Borromeo v Pogoy

The parties had in mind only PD 1508, and the petitioner invoked Sec. 18 of the Revised Rules
of Summary Procedure56. None knew of the repeal of the decree by the LGC.
o The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor should have exerted enough diligence to inquire
if prior referral to the lupon was really necessary before filing the informations.
o Judge Contreras didnt do any better, and his total unawareness of the LGC (specifically
on the provisions on KatarungangPambarangay) is distressing. He should have taken
judicial notice thereof, since it is an official act of the legislative.
Judge Contreras should have applied the revised katarungangpambarangay law
under the LGC, and if he did, this case wouldnt have reached the SC.
Since respondents failed to appear at the first scheduled mediation, it was reset to another
date. No complaint for slight physical injuries could be validly filed with MTC Makati at any
time before such date.
o The filing of Criminal Cases was premature, and pursuant to Sec. 412 (a), Judge
Contreras should have granted the motion to dismiss. He cannot justify its denial under
PD 1508, Sec. 6, which states that the parties may go directly to court where the action
is about to prescribe because Sec. 410 (c) of the LGC provides for the automatic
suspension of the prescriptive period.
o Moreover, since the dispute was brought before the lupon of Brgy. Valenzuela, Makati,
private respondents are estopped from disavowing the authority of the body which
they themselves had sought. The act of trifling with the authority of the lupon by failing
to attend the mediation cannot be countenanced because it would weaken the brgy.
Conciliation system.
Granting arguendo that Uy did inflict the injuries, she would only be liable for slight physical
injuries considering that the medical certificates state that the injuries would heal in 9 days.
Such penalties are light and would prescribe in 2 months.
o This would mean that if no mediation could be had during the pendency of the period
of suspension, respondents would still have 56 days within which to file the separate
criminal complaints. Evidently, there is no basis for Judge Contreras to invoke the
exception under Sec. 412 (b) LGC
Judge Contreras reasoning that Uy had waived the right to reconciliation proceedings since
the parties are residents of different barangays is wrong.
o Uy did not waive the sameshe submitted to it and attended the scheduled
conciliation and invoked the pre-condition of referral to the lupon.
Judge Contreras acted with GAD in refusing to dismiss the criminal cases.

PETITION GRANTED.
ANNEX:
Sec. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. The luppon of
each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same
city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:
(a) Where one party is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;
(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance
of his official functions;
(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding Five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00);
(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;
56

Sec. 18. Referral to Lupon. Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation under the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1508 where there is no showing of compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived
only after such requirement shall have been complied with. This provision shall not apply to criminal cases where the accused
was arrested without a warrant.

(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities unless
the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate
lupon;
(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities,
except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit
their differences to amicable settlement by appropriate lupon;
(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or
upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice
The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the lupon under this
Code are filed may, at anytime before trial, motuproprio refer the case to the lupon concerned
for amicable settlement.
Sec. 409. Venue. (a) Disputes between persons actually residing in the same barangay shall
be brought for amicable settlement before the lupon of said barangay
(b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or municipality
shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the respondents actually
resides, at the election of the complainant.
(c) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay
where the real property or the larger portion thereof is situated.
(d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the
institution where such parties are enrolled for study shall be brought in the barangay where such
workplace or institution is located.
Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation proceedings before the punong barangay;
otherwise, the same shall be deemed waived. Any legal question which may confront the punong
barangay in resolving objections to venue herein referred to may be submitted to the Secretary
of Justice or his duly designated representative whose ruling thereon shall be binding
Sec. 410. Procedure for Amicable Settlement. . . .xxxxxxxxx
(c) Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses. While the dispute is under mediation,
conciliation, or arbitration, the prescriptive periods for offenses and cause of action under
existing laws shall be interrupted upon filing of the complaint with the punong barangay. The
prescriptive periods shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the
certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by the lupon or pangkat
secretary: Provided, however, That such interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the
filing of the complaint with the punong barangay.
Sec. 412. Conciliation. (a) Pre-condition to filing of complaint in court. No complaint,
petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed
or instituted directly in court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there has
been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no
conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat
secretary as attested to by the lupon chairman or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has
been repudiated by the parties thereto.
(b) Where parties may go directly to court. The parties may go directly to court in the following
instances:
(1) Where the accused is under detention;
(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas
corpus proceedings;
(3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction,
attachment, delivery of personal property, and support pendente lite; and
(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations. xxxxxxxxx
Sec. 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. In all katarungangpambarangay proceedings,
the parties must appear in person without the assistance of counsel or representative, except for
minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their next-of-kin who are not lawyers

Sections 8 and 11 of Rule VI (Amicable Settlement of Disputes) thereof provide in part as follows:
SECTION 8. Failure to appear. a. Sanctions The complaint may be dismissed when
complainant, after due notice, refuses or willfully fails to appear without justifiable reason on the
date set for mediation, conciliation or arbitration. Such dismissal ordered by the Punong
Barangay/Pangkat Chairman after giving the complainant an opportunity to explain his nonappearance shall be certified to by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary as the case may be, and shall
bar the complainant from seeking judicial recourse for the same cause of action as that
dismissed. xxxxxxxxx
Sec. 11. Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses and cause of action. The
prescriptive periods for offenses and causes of action under existing laws shall be interrupted
upon filing of the complaint with the Punong Barangay. The running of the prescriptive periods
shall resume upon receipts by the complainant of the certificate of repudiation or of the
certification to file action issued by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary: Provided, however, that such
interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint with the Punong
Barangay. After the expiration of the aforesaid period of sixty days, the filing of the case in court
or government office for adjudication shall be subject to the provision of paragraph (b) (4) of Rule
VIII of these Rules
John L.H. Wingarts and Ofelia A. Wingarts v Judge Servillano M. Mejia
March 20, 1995
Regalado, J.

Short version: Judge Mejia was charged with incompetence, ignorance of the law and abuse of
authority for taking cognizance of the criminal case for grave threats and issuing a warrant of
arrest without prior barangay conciliation proceedings. The OCA and SC found him guilty. He
should know that under the LGC, under Article 408 and 412, offenses punishable by
imprisonment not exceeding 1 year or a fine not exceeding P5,000 require prior barangay
conciliation. Judges are directed to desist from improvidently receiving and acting on complaints,
petitions, actions or proceedings in cases falling within the authority of the Lupon
Tagapamayapa.

Facts:

This case involves 3 administrative complaints against Judge Mejia. Only the first one involves
the Barangay.
All 3 complaints are an offshoot of 3 criminal cases decided by Judge Mejia and involving the
Wingarts and Col. Rodulfo Munar.
The first 2 criminal cases were initiated by Col. Munar against Johan Wingarts for malicious
mischief and grave threats.The 3rd criminal case was a counter-charge by Wingart against Col.
Munar for usurpation of authority.

Case 1: Incompetence, ignorance of the law and abuse of authority

The Wingarts charge Judge Mejia with incompetence, ignorance of the law and abuse of
authority, for taking cognizance of the Criminal Case for grave threats and for issuing a
warrant of arrest against Wingarts despite lack of prior barangay conciliation.
The said case was later dismissed and indorsed to the barangay official concerned.
Judge Mejia claims that he took cognizance of the case in the belief that there had been
substantial compliance with the requirements of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law since a
certification of the barangay captain regarding a confrontation of the parties, the fact that no
amicable settlement was reached by them, and that he was endorsing the filing of the case in
court, had been duly submitted to him.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found that if Judge Mejia had exercised greater
prudence, he would have known that under Article 408 (c) of the LGC, offenses punishable by
imprisonment not exceeding 1 year or a fine not exceeding P5,000 require prior barangay
conciliation. Grave threats falls under that category.

Also, under Sec. 41257, he should have remanded the case to the lupon instead of taking
cognizance of the case and prematurely issuing the warrant of arrest.
However, his acts do not seem to be tainted with malice or evil intent. Based on the records,
he dismissed the case upon motion of the defense. Still, administrative sanction is warranted
against Judge Mejia.
SC RULING
o Although there is no clear proof of malice, bad faith, bias or partiality on his part, Judge
Mejia should have exercised the requisite prudence, especially since it was a criminal
case where personal liberty was involved.
o He should have carefully examined all relevant facts and issues and avoided the
improvident issuance of the warrant of arrest without a circumspect review of the case.
o The present controversy could have been avoided had he kept faith with the injunction
that a member of the bench must continuously keep himself abreast of legal and
jurisprudential developments because the learning process in law never ceases.
o Even if he subsequently recalled the warrant of arrest, or prevented the arrest, such will
mitigate but will not free him from the charge of incompetence and ignorance of the law.
o Judges are directed to desist from improvidently receiving and acting on complaints,
petitions, actions or proceedings in cases falling within the authority of the Lupon
Tagapamayapa.
o Proceedings before the lupon are a precondition to the filing of any action or proceeding
in court or other government office. Such an initiatory pleading, if filed without
compliance with the precondition, may be dismissed on motion of any interested party
on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action.

Case 2: Malicious delay in the administration of justice

Judge Mejia is charged with malicious delay because the case allegedly dragged on for 1 year
and 4 months.
Judge Mejia claims that the proceedings were continuous and were decided1 month and 3
days after it was submitted for decision.
The OCA found that while there was indeed a delay, such delay does not appear to be
malicious nor deliberate. The postponements were all on account of the absence or
unavailability of the fiscal and/or the defense counsel. Judge Mejia had no alternative but to
grant the postponements if only to better serve the ends of justice.
There was a delay not in rendering of the decision, but in the hearing of the case, and for
excusable grounds.
SC RULING
o Agree with the OCA that there was no malice or bad faith.
o Judge Mejia should not be blamed by the delays caused by the litigants.
o However, SC reminds us that judges should adopt measures to prevent unnecessary
delays in the disposition of their cases.

Case 3: Rendering an unjust decision

57 Sec. 412. CONCILIATION (a) Precondition to filing of Complaint in Court No complaint, petition, action or
proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filled (SIC) or instituted directly in court
or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before
the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the
lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has
been repudiated by the parties thereto.

Wingarts accused Judge Mejia of rendering an unjust decision in the criminal case against Col.
Munar.
o Allegedly, Capt. Manuel and Col. Munar, both military lawyers, violated the prohibition
against their appearing in civil courts without the necessary prohibition.
Judge Mejia acquitted them, holding that Col. Rodulfo Munar did not exercise the functions of
the fiscal or public prosecutor, but acted in his capacity as the offended party and private
counsel (as the complainant in the case against the Wingarts).
Judge Mejia claims that this judgment was a result of his honest findings and conclusion
based on the evidence and the law. He reiterated that due process was observed and the
case was prosecuted to the fullest extent.
The OCA found that Judge has not knowingly rendered an unjust judgment. He does not
appear to have been motivated by an evil or corrupt motive to deliberately perpetuate an
injustice.
SC RULING
o Again agrees with OCA.
o An unjust judgment is one which is contrary to law or is not supported by evidence, or
both. The source of an unjust judgment may be error or ill will. But there is no liability for
a mere error.
o A judicial officer, when required to exercise his judgment or discretion, is not liable
criminally for any error which he commits, provided he acts in good faith.
o Complainants here fail to prove that Judge Mejia knew that his challenged judgment is
unjust, assuming that it was.

Judge Mejia ordered to pay a fine of P2,000 plus a STERN WARNING.

CARLITO CORPUZ v COURT OF APPEALS

19 June 1997
Romero, ponente
petition for review of a Court of Appeals decision
SHORT VERSION:
Corpuz filed an unlawful detainer case against Alvarado, who raised the defenses that there was
a pending ownership question over the property in the NHA, and the dispute was not referred to
the lupon. The SC ruled that the MTC had exclusive jurisdiction over ejectment cases, and that
referral to the lupon was unnecessary.
FACTS:
Carlito Corpuz filed an action for unlawful detainer against Juanito Alvarado with the
Manila MTC.
o This was to recover possession of the room Alvarado occupied, which Corpuzs
children allegedly needed for their own use.
o Both Corpuz and Alvarado were two of the tenants of Lorenzo Barredo, who decided
to sell his property to the tenants.
But because they didnt have money, Alvarado and the other lessees
executed an affidavit of waiver granting Narredo the right to sell his house to
any person who could buy it. Barredo sold the house to Corpuz to P37,500. So
now there was a tenancy relationship between Corpuz and Alvarado.
o Corpuz earlier sent a written notice demanding that Alvarado vacate the room.
o In his answer, Alvarado raised two defenses:

(1) the alleged "Affidavit of Waiver" executed between him and Barredo was a
forgery;
(2) the dispute was not referred to the Lupong Tagapayapa.
o The MTC ordered Alvarado to vacate the room.
The RTC reversed the MTC decision on the ff grounds:
o that the sale between Barredo and Corpuz was the subject of a controversy
pending before the NHA that must be resolved first by it;
o the affidavit of waiver was a forgery.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUES:
should the unlawful detainer suit be suspended due to the pending case in the NHA? NO
should the case first be referred to the lupong tagapamayapa? NO
REASONING:
The MTC had exclusive jurisdiction over ejectment cases.
o The only issue to be resolved in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases is the
physical or material possession over the real property, that is, possession de facto.
Refugia v CA: inferior courts are now conditionally vested with adjudicatory power over the
issue of title or ownership raised by the parties in an ejectment suit.
o Since the present case involved possession and ownership, Refugia applied.
Wilmor Auto Supply Construction v CA: Suits for annulment of sale, or title, or document
affecting property do not abate ejectment actions respecting the same property.
Alvarados defense re the lupon tagamayapa was stated in a single general short sentence
in his answer.
o Dui v Court of Appeals: failure of a party to specifically allege the fact that there was
no compliance with the Barangay conciliation procedure constitutes a waiver of that
defense.
o Alvarado failed to state a reason or explanation to support his allegation.
o The proceeding in PD 1508 wasnt a jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance
therewith couldnt affect the jurisdiction the lower court acquired over the subject
matter.
RULING: petition granted; CA decision reversed; RTC decision reinstated.
Bonifacio Law Office, represented by Atty. Ricardo Salomon, Jr. (Complainant) vs
Judge Reynaldo Bellosillo, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 34, Quezon City
(Respondent)

Date: December 16, 2002

Ponente: :Panganiban, J.

Short Version:
Facts: Atty. Salomon filed an ejectment case. Attached to the compliant is a copy of the
Certificate to File Action issued by the Punong Barangay attesting that barangay conciliation
proceedings were held with regard to the controversy. Judge Bellosillo insisted on referring the
case back to the barangay for conciliation proceedings. Atty. Salomon filed an administrative
case against the judge saying that the latter with ignorance of the law. Judge Bellosillo argued

the Certificate to File Action was prematurely issued.

Held: The Certificate was prematurely issued. The records show that no personal confrontation
before a duly constituted Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo took place. The barangay failed to exert
enough effort to conciliate between the parties and to settle the case before it, as required by
Sec 410(b) of the LGC and by Administrative Circular No. 14-93. Thus, the Judge's referral of the
case to the barangay cannot be equated with gross ignorance of the law.

Facts:
- In a letter-complaint dated August 28, 1997, Atty Salomon charged MTC Judge Bellosillo with
ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion, and obvious partiality.
- Factual antecedents as found by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA):
- The administrative case was filed in connection with an ejectment entitled Ricardo M.
Salomon, Jr. vs. Spouses Severino Fulgencio.

- In an Order dated April 2, 1996, Judge Bellosillo referred the case back to the barangay for
conciliation proceedings despite the fact that the complaint alleged that the matter had
already been referred to the barangay and that a copy of the Certificate to File Motion 58 was
attached to the complaint.
- Following the advice of the clerk of court, Atty. Salomon filed a compliance attaching a copy
of his complaint filed before the barangay and the minutes of the proceedings held.
- No action was taken by the Judge despite the fact that the case falls under the Rules on
Summary Procedure. Judge Bellosillo insisted that the case be referred back to the barangay.
- It was only after a year since the complaint was filed that the Judge ordered that summons
be served on the defendants in the ejectment case.
- The defendants failed to file an Answer. Atty. Salomon filed a motion to render judgment in
accordance with the Rules on Summary Procedure. Instead of rendering judgment, the Judge
required the defendants to common on the motion.
- Defense of Judge Bellosillo:
- It is a mandatory duty of the Barangay Chairman to set the meeting of the parties for the
constitution of the Pangkat upon failure of parties to amicably settle otherwise there is no
compliance with the requirements of PD 1508, now Sec 412 of the LGC.
- In the case of Atty Salomon, there was premature issuance of the Certificate to File Action
considering that there is no proof to show that the Pangkat was duly constituted before the
said certificate was issued.
- The OCA found Judge Bellosillo either ignorant or negligent in referring the case back to the
barangay despite a Certificate to File Action. It also faulted the Judge for disregarding the Rules
on Summary Procedure.

Issue/Reasoning:
Issue: Whether Certificate to File Action was prematurely issue (Yes)
- The Certificate was improperly and prematurely issued. The Certificate clearly shows that no
personal confrontation before a duly constituted Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo took place. The
Judges position that the Pangkat was not constituted, and that no face to face conciliation had
taken place is substantiated by the Minutes submitted by Atty. Salomon. Evidently, the
complainant failed to complete the barangay conciliation proceedings.
-The Complaint before the barangay was dated February 16, 1996. The hearing was scheduled
for February 29. And yet, the Certification to File Action was issued on March 1, less than 15 days
after the first scheduled hearing.

58 Maybe this should be 'Action' rather than 'Motion'. Per 'yan yung nasa Lawphil at SC website.

- The barangay failed to exert enough effort to conciliate between the parties and to settle the
case before it, as required by Sec 410(b) of the LGC 59, and by Administrative Circular No. 14-9360.
The Judge was not incorrect in remanding the case. He cannot be faulted for seeking to promote
the objectives of barangay conciliation. His referral to the barangay cannot be equated with
gross ignorance of the law, or grave abuse of discretion, or obvious partiality.

Issue: Whether the Judge disregarded the Rules on Summary Procedure (Yes)
- Sec 18 of the Rules on Summary Procedure provides that cases requiring referral for conciliation
may be revived only after the conciliation has been complied with. In this case, the Judge did not
insist on a strict compliance with the mandated barangay proceedings, and proceeded with the
case by issuing summons to the defendants. Nevertheless, the judges error is judicial in nature
and cannot be corrected in administrative proceedings.
- At any rate, because the Judge chose to continue with the proceedings, and because the
defendant failed to answer on time, he should have rendered judgment within 30 days from the
expiration of the period to file an answer. This is required by Sec 6 of the Rules on Summary
Procedure.
- The OCA correctly found:
The express language of the law states that when an Answer has not been filed within the
reglementary period, the judge, motu proprio, or on motion shall render judgment... By calling
for a preliminary conference and directing the defendants to submit their Comment... the
Judge went beyond the bounds set by the law... after the defendants had submitted their
Comment... he merely ordered that the case be deemed submitted for decision. ...[which] is
a far cry from rendition of judgment...
- The Judge rendered judgment on January 7, 1998, almost a year from the time the case had
been deemed submitted. Unacceptable is his explanation that he waited for the defendants to
avail themselves of their right to appeal the Order deeming the case submitted. He has no duty
to wait; the law mandates him to act and decide the case promptly.
- The failure of a judge to decide cases with dispatch constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants
the imposition of administrative sanctions.
59 Mediation by lupon chairman. Upon receipt of the complaint, the lupon chairman shall within the next working day summon the
respondent(s), with notice to the complainant(s) for them and their witnesses to appear before him for a mediation of their conflicting interests. If
he fails in his mediation effort within fifteen (15) days from the first meeting of the parties before him, he shall forthwith set a date for the
constitution of the pangkat in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.

60 Pertinent portions of which:

In order that the laudable purpose of the law may not be subverted... by indiscriminate, improper and/or
premature issuance of certifications to file actions... the following guidelines are hereby issued:
II. 4. If mediation or conciliation efforts before the Punong Barangay proved unsuccessful... the Punong Barangay shall not cause the
issuance... of a certification to file action, because it is now mandatory for him to constitute the Pangkat before whom mediation... be held.
III. All complaints... filed... to your sala/branch... shall be carefully read... to determine if there has been compliance with prior Barangay
conciliation procedure... as a pre-condition to judicial action, particularly whether the certification to file action... comply with the requirements...
IV. A case filed in court without compliance with prior Barangay conciliation... the court may suspend proceedings... and refer the case
motu proprio to the appropriate Barangay authority.

- Undue delay in rendering a decision constitutes a less serious charge under Sec 9, Rule 140,
and can result to a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000. The Court took note
that there was no showing of malice, corrupt motive or improper consideration on the part of the
Judge.

Dispositive:
Judge Bellosillo is found guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision and is ordered to pay a fine
of P11,000 to be taken from his retirement benefits.

Abraham L. Mendova v. Crisanto B. Afable, Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial

Court, San Julian-Sulat, Eastern Samar
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. 4 December 2002
SV: Mendova filed with the Office of the Barangay Chairman of Poblacion San Julian, Eastern
Samar a complaint for slight physical injuries against Robert Palada. Later on he filed a criminal
complaint for slight physical injuries against Palada in the MCTC of San Julian-Sulat. Judge Afable
dismissed the criminal case on the ground of prescription, the criminal action having been
instituted more than 2 months after the commission of the alleged light offense. Mendova
thereafter filed an administrative complaint against Judge Afable alleging gross ignorance of the
law. He argues that the Judge failed to apply Sec.410(c) of the LGC of 1991 which provided that
the filing of the complaint with the Barangay Chairman interrupted the prescription period.
The SC dismissed the administrative complaint. It ruled that exhaustion of judicial remedies is a
pre-requisite before an administrative action may be filed against a judge. Mendova failed to do
so, he did not even file a MR. The Court also said that the prescription period, while interrupted
by the proceedings at the barangay level, starts to run again upon receipt by the complainant of
the Certification to File Action. Here, Mendova did not present any proof as to when he received
such Certification.
FACTS:
- 1 Jul 1999: Mendova, in an affidavit-complaint, charged Judge Afable with ignorance of the law
relative to a criminal case for slight physical injuries (People v. Palada).
- Mendova alleged that on 18 Feb 1998, he filed with the Office of the Barangay Chairman of
Poblacion San Julian, Eastern Samar a complaint for slight physical injuries against Robert Palada.
a) Barangay Chairman Ronie D. Quinta confirmed such fact in his Certification dated 19
Apr 1999
b) Pangkat Chairman Eufemia L. Cabago also certified in an undated Minutes in Settling
Disputes that the case was set for hearing on March 16, 22 and 29, 1998 but the
parties failed to reach an amicable settlement
- 4 May 1998: Mendova filed with the MCTC of San Julian-Sulat, Eastern Samar a complaint for
slight physical injuries against Palada.
- 3 Nov 1998: Judge Afable dismissed the case on the ground of prescription:
a) The alleged offense took place on 15 Feb 1998. The case was filed more than 2 months
after the date of commission of the alleged offense on 4 May 1988.
b) Slight physical injuries is a light offense, the prescription period for which is 2 months
according to Art. 90 RPC.
c) The offense having prescribed, criminal liability is extinguished according to Art. 89
RPC

- 7 Jul 1999: Mendova filed with the Office of the Court Administrator and administrative
complaint against Judge Afable alleging that the judge showed his ignorance of the law in
dismissing the case and his failure to apply Sec. 410(c) of RA 7160 (LGC of 1991).
Section 410. Procedure for Amicable Settlement.
(c) Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses. While the dispute is under
mediation, conciliation or arbitration, the prescriptive periods for offenses and causes of
action under existing laws shall be interrupted upon filing of the complaint with the
Punong Barangay. The prescriptive periods shall resume upon receipt by the
complainant of the complaint or the certificate of repudiation or of the certification
to file actionissued by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary: Provided, however, That such
interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint with the
punong barangay."
ISSUE/REASONING:
Is Judge Afable administratively liable for dismissing the criminal case on the ground of
prescription? NO.
1) An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous
order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as Mr or appeal.
a) if subsequent developments prove the judges challenged act to be correct, there
would be no occasion to proceed against him at all.
b) To hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling/decision would
be nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable.
c) It is only where the error is so gross, deliberate and malicious or incurred with evident
bad faith that administrative sanctions may be imposed against the erring judge.
In the case of Flores v. Abesamis, the SC held:
a) Disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or
suppletory of, nor a substitute for judicial remedies whether ordinary (ex: MR, appeal)
or extraordinary (ex: certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, inhibition change of venue).
b) Exhaustion of judicial remedies are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures
against the persons of the judges concerned.
c) Prosecution of a judge can be had only if there be a final declaration by a competent
court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the
challenged judgment or order, and also evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance or
inexcusable negligence, on the part of the judge in rendering said judgment or order.
In the present case, Mendova did not bother at all to file a MR of Judge Afables decision
dismissing the criminal case. No reason is given why he failed to do so. His instant administrative
complaint is therefore premature.
2) Pursuant to Sec. 410(c) of the LGC of 1991, the filing of a complaint with the Office of the
Barangay Chairman interrupted the prescriptive period. It started to run again upon receipt by
the complainant of the Certification to File Action issued by the Pangkat Secretary.
In this case, the records do not show when Mendova received the Barangay Certification to File
Action. Mendova failed to present proof of his receipt of the Barangay Certification to File Action,
all he submitted was an undated certification that the case was set for hearing before the
barangay but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.
3) While Judge Afable admitted his mistake, the same may not be considered ignorance of the
law. If at all, it can only be an error of judgment.
The complaint does not allege any bad faith or malice on the part of Judge Afable when he
dismissed the criminal case either.

ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT DISMISSED.

Associated Labor Unions (ALU)-TUCP, in behalf of its members at AMS Farming
Corporation (Petitioner) vs
Voluntary Arbitrator Rosalina Letrondo-Montejo, and AMS Farming Corporation
(Respondents)

Date: October 14, 1994

Ponente: Mendoza, J.

Short Version:
Facts: ALU-TUCP and AMS entered into a CBA which contained a provision on holiday pay. It
stated that local elections are considered holidays. The President of the Philippines declared
December 4, 1992 as a special day for holding SK elections. Consequently, the members of ALUTUCP filed claims for holiday pay against AMS for the said date. The Volutary Arbitrator ruled that
the said date is not considered as a holiday within the contemplation of the CBA saying that local
elections contemplate the voting of local leaders such as governors, mayors, and members of
the sanggunian, and not the voting of SK members who not voted by everyone but only by the
youth.
Held: The LGC makes the SK part of the structure of the local government. As such, voting for its
members are considered local elections. Thus, AMS is liable to pay holiday pay on the date of the
SK elections.

Facts:
- On December 27, 1990, ALU-TUCP and AMS Farming Corporation entered into a five-year
Collective Bargaining Agreement beginning November 1, 1990 and on October 31, 1995. It
covers the regular daily-paid rank-and-file employees of AMS Farming in Davao del Norte.

- Art VII, Sec 3 of the CBA61 is the provision on holiday pay.

- The President of the Philippines declared December 4, 1992 a "special day" for the holding of
election for Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) throughout the nation. Employees covered by the CBA
filed claims for the payment of holiday pay for that day. AMS Farming, however, refused on the
ground that December 4, 1992 was not a regular holiday within the contemplation of the CBA.
- The matter was submitted to voluntary arbitration.
- The voluntary arbitrator dismissed the claim for holiday pay. She ruled that the term 'local
election' used in the CBA means the election by the people of their local leaders like the
governors, mayors, members of the provincial and municipal councils, and barangay officials,
and that SK elections are not included since not everybody, but only qualified youthful voters
vote in the said election.
- ALU-TUCP filed the present petition for certiorari with the SC.

Issue/Reasoning:
Issue: Whether the SK election is considered a local election within the contemplation of the CBA
(Yes. SK is part of the local government structure, thus the election is considered a local
election.)
- SK is part of the local government structure. The LGC creates in every barangay a Sangguniang
Kabataan composed of a chairman, 7 members, a secretary and a treasurer (Sec 423[a]). The
chairman and the 7 members are elected by the Katipunan ng Kabataan, which is composed of
citizens residing in the barangay for at least 6 months, who are between the ages of 15 and 21,
and who are registered as members (Sec 424). The chairman of the SK is an ex officio member of
the Sangguniang Baranggay (Sec 430). The President of the Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang
Kabataan, which is imposed of the SK chairmen of the SKs of the barangays in the province, city,
or municipality, is an ex officio member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang
Panlungsod, and Sangguniang Bayan (Sec 438[a]).
- Hence, SK elections are considered as 'local election' within the meaning of the CBA. Thus, the
employees are entitled to holiday pay on that day.

61 New Year, Maundy Thursday, Good Friday, Araw ng Kagitingan, 1st of May, 12th of June, Araw ng Dabaw, 4th of July, Last Sunday of August,
1st November, 30th of November, 25th of December, 30th of December and the days designated by law for holding referendum and
local/national election shall be considered paid regular holidays. Consequently, they shall receive their basic pay even if they do not work on
those days. Any employee required to work on these holidays shall be paid at last TWO HUNDRED PERCENT (200%) of his daily wage.
Covered employees performing overtime work on these days shall be entitled to another THIRTY PERCENT (30%) overtime pay. It is
understood however, that any covered employee who shall be absent for more than one day immediately preceding the paid holiday shall not be
entitled to the holiday pay.

- December 4, 1992 was announced as a nonworking holiday. It was declared a special day for
SK elections. A special day is a special holiday, as provided in the Administrative Code 62.
- The fact that only the youth takes part in the SK election does not make such it any less a
regular local election. The Constitution provides for the sectoral representatives in Congress.
Only voters belonging to the relevant sectors can take part in the election of their
representatives. Yet it cannot be denied that such election is a regular national election, and is a
holiday.

62 Bk I, Chap 7, Sec 26(2)

- The CBA provision merely reiterates the Labor Code provision on paid holidays 63.

Dispositive:
VA decision is set aside. Respondent is ordered to pay holiday pay for December 4, 1992.
Jose M. Mercado v Board of Election Supervisors of the Municipality of Ibaan, Batangas, DILG,
Crisanto P. Pangilinan and Hon. Conrado R. Antona
April 6, 1995
Davide, Jr., J.

Short version: Mercado was first proclaimed winner in the SK elections. Upon certain allegations
of his rival, the Board of Election Supervisors (BES) ordered the ballot boxes to be reopened and
there was a recount, which resulted in his rival Pangilinan being proclaimed winner. He filed a
petition for certiorari and mandamus with the SC, which dismissed the petition for lack of
jurisdiction, holding that the Board of Election Supervisors was the final arbiter of election
controversies within its level. The SC held that Resolution No. 2499, which created the BES, does
not contravene the Omnibus Election Code and the Constitution because they refer to elective
barangay officials. The SK officals are not elective barangay officials, despite the fact that the
Chairman is an ex-officio member of the sangguniang barangay. However, the BES decision
should be reviewable by the RTC.

Facts:

Mercado was proclaimed winner in the 1992 election for chairman of the
SanggunianKabataan (SK) of Barangay, Mabalor, Ibaan, Batangas. The proclamation was
made by the Board of Election Tellers (BET) acting as the Board of Canvassers. The tally
showed that Mercado won by 1 vote against his rival Pangilinan.
Pangilinan filed a formal protest with the Board of Election Supervisors (BES), questioning the
results of the election.
o He alleged that during the counting, the BET chairman was drinking gin and Coke and
had invalidated some of the votes without consulting the other board members.
The BES ordered the reopening of the ballot box and a recount of the votes.
The recount reversed the earlier tally to 51-49 in favor of Pangilinan, who was proclaimed the
duly elected SK Chairman by the BES.
Mercado filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari and mandamus, praying for the annulment
of Pangilinans proclamation, and to compel the DILG to recognize him as the duly elected SK
Chairman.

63 Art. 94. Right to holiday pay.

xxx

(c) As used in this Article, "holiday" includes... the day designated by law for holding a general election.

He assailed the jurisdiction of the BES to act on the protest of Pangilinan, on the ground
that it should have been filed with the MeTC or MuTC as an election protest, under
Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code.
o Granting that the BES has jurisdiction, the grounds raised by Pangilinan are deemed
waived because he did not invoke them at the level of the BET, and
o The BES acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the reopening of the ballot box
and the recount without giving Mercado an opportunity to be heard.
The RTC dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. It held that there was no law by which it
could act on the matters raised in Mercado's petition since Resolution No. 2499 of the
COMELEC did not vest in the RTC jurisdiction over controversies affecting
SangguniangKabataan elections. The COMELEC instead constituted the BES, which is under
COMELEC jurisdiction , as the final arbiter of all election controversies within its level.
Mercado filed an MR, arguing that the RTC had jurisdiction because
o One mode of seeking judicial review is through the writ of certiorari which may be issued
by the RTC under B.P. Blg. 129;
o Under its Resolutions Nos. 2499 and 2520, the COMELEC was to provide only technical
assistance in the conduct of the SK election and could not grant any relief from the
action of the BES;
o Under Resolution No. 2499, no appeal to a higher administrative level was allowed from
the action of the BES and
o The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies did not apply to the case at bar,
the jurisdictional and due process issues raised being legal in nature
The RTC also denied the MR, holding that the reopening of the ballot box and the recounting
were within the authority of the BES, and that Mercado should have gone to the DILG which
has direct control and supervision of the SK elections.
Mercado went to the SC through petition for review under Rule 45, raising the same
arguments regarding the competence of the BES and his right to due process.
o He also claims that Resolution No. 2499 is null and void because
It prescribes a separate set of rules for the election of the SK Chairman different
from and inconsistent with that set forth in the Omnibus Election Code, and
It constitutes a total, absolute, and complete abdication by the COMELEC of its
constitutionally and statutorily mandated duty to enforce and administer all
election laws as provided for in Section 2 (1), Article IX-C of the Constitution;
Section 52, Article VIII of the Omnibus Election Code; and Section 2, Chapter 1,
Subtitle C, Title I, Book V of the 1987 Administrative Code.
o

Issue: Is the BES competent to take cognizance of the election protest? YES 64

64 To the best of my understanding, this is how the case was decided. But its quite confusing so that might be
wrong.

Ratio:
1) It was initially organized by P.D. No. 684 in 1975 as the Kabataang Barangay (KB), a youth
organization composed of all barangay residents who were less than 18 years of age which
aims to provide its members with the opportunity to express their views and opinions on
issues of transcendental importance. It was led by a barangay youth chairman together with
six barangay youth leaders, who should at least be 15 years of age or over but less than 18.
2) The then Secretary of Local Government and Community Development was authorized to
promulgate the implementing rules and regulations.
3) Pursuant to P.D. No. 1191, the PambansangKatipunanngKabataang Barangay ngPilipinas was
constituted as "a body corporate" with "the powers and attributes of a corporation" and
placed directly under the Office of the President. Its affairs were to be administered by the
Executive Committee which was empowered to promulgate rules and regulations governing
the KB.
4) This youth organization was recognized in the LGC of 1983 which raised the maximum age
requirement of the members from 18 to 21.
5) The LGC of 1991 changed the KB to the SK. It remains as a youth organization in every
barangay, composed of a chairman and seven members to be elected by the
katipunanngkabataan, and the secretary and the treasurer to be appointed by the SK
chairman with the concurrence of the SK.
6) The katipunanngkabataan is composed of all citizens of the Philippines actually residing in the
barangay for at least six months who are 15 but not more than 21 and who are duly
registered in the list of the SK or in the official barangay list in the custody of the barangay
secretary.
7) The chairman, upon assumption of office, shall automatically become an ex-officio member of
the sangguniang barangay. Under subparagraph (5), paragraph (e) Article 203, Rule XXVII of
the IRR of the LGC, the conduct and administration of the elections for sangguniangkabataan
members shall be governed by the rules promulgated by the COMELEC.
8) Pursuant to this, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2499, providing for the BES and
BET. The BES shall have direct general supervision in the conduct of elections for
sangguniangkabataan in the barangay and shall act as final arbiter in the resolution of all
election protests.
a. Mercado contends that Resolution No. 2499 is illegal and unconstitutional because it
makes the BES the final arbiter of election contests involving the SK in contravention of
the Omnibus Election Code (which vests jurisdiction in the MeTC or MuTC) and in
contravention of Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution which lodges on such courts
exclusive original jurisdiction over contests involving elective barangay officials.
9) However, Mercado is wrong because it assumes that the SK election is an election involving
elective barangay officials. IT IS NOT, and so it is not covered by such laws.
10)
The Omnibus Election Code and the Constitution refer to the elective barangay officials
under the LGC of 1983 which was then in force. The officials there are the punong barangay
and the 6 sangguniangbayan members.
a. The MeTC and MuTC had exclusive original jurisdiction over contests relating to their
election. Their decision was appealable to the RTC.
11)
The proceedings in the Constitutional Commission show that contests involving the
election of SK officials do not fall within Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code and par. 2,
Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constituion.
12)
No law made the SK chairman an elective barangay official. His being an ex-officio
member of the sangguniang barangay does not make him one for the law specifically
provides who are its elective members.
13)
The SC recognizes the consequences of the quasi-judicial acts performed by the BES under
the operative fact doctrine.
14)
Thus, the Regional Trial Court is competent to review the decision of the BES in election
controversies within its level.

15)
The absence of a provision for the review of an administrative action does not preclude
recourse to the courts.
16)
As to administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial or legislative power, there is an
underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and
jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute.
17)
The purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction
and protect substantial rights of parties affected by its decisions.
18)
There was no need for the petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies.
a. Section 24 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2499 did not provide for recourse to a higher
administrative body; and
b. Mercado's cause falls within the exception to the rule because his petition, aside from
raising pure questions of law and jurisdiction, also alleges deprivation of due process.
Petition granted.
LYNETTE GARVIDA v FLORENCIO SALES
18 April 1997
Puno, ponente
petition for review
SHORT VERSION:
Garvida wanted to run as chair of the SK, but she was disqualified by the Comelec for being 21
years and 10 months at the time she filed her certificate of candidacy. The SC ruled that she was
qualified to be a member or the Katipunan ng Kabataan, but she was ineligible to run in the SK
elections for being over the age qualification, which was not more than 21 years old.
FACTS:
The Sangguniang Kabataan elections were set to be held on 6-May-1996.
o On 16-Mar, Lynette Garvida applied to register as a member and voter of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte.
o The Board of Election Tellers denied her application as she was 21 years and 10
months old.
She filed a petition for inclusion with the MCTC.
o The MCTC found her qualified to be registered.
Garvida filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of chairman of the KK of San
Lorenzo.
o Comelec Election Officer Dionisio Rios, per advice of the provincial election
supervisor, disapproved her petition of candidacy due to her age.
o The Comelec regional director set aside the order and allowed Garvida to run.
Rios issued a memo to Garvida informing her of her ineligibility and giving her 24 hours to
explain why her certificate should not be disapproved.
o But earlier and w/o the knowledge of Comelec, Florencio Sales (a rival candidate for
chairman) filed with the Comelec en banc a petition of denial or cancellation of
Garvidas cerificate.
o On the same day the memo was issued, the Comelec en banc issued an order
directing the Board of Election Tellers and Board of Canvassers of San Lorenzo to
suspend Garvidas proclamation in case she won in the election.
During the election, Garvida won 78 votes compared to Sales 76; she was not proclaimed
as the winner due to the Comelec order.
o Later, she ran in the Pambayang Pederasyon ng mga SK for Bangui, and won as
auditor, and proclaimed as one of the Pederasyons elected officials.
Garvida sought to have the Comelec order annulled and set aside.
ISSUES:

did the Comelec en banc have jurisdiction to act on the petition to deny or cancel her
certificate of candidacy? NO
should her certificate of candidacy be cancelled on the ground that she exceeded the age
requirement to run as an elective official of the SK?

REASONING:
LGC 532(a) provided that the conduct of SK elections was under the supervision of the
Comelec and governed by the Omnibus Election Code.
o OEC Art IX 78 governed the procedure to deny due course to or cancel a certificate
of candidacy.
o The Comelec Rules of Procedure Rule 23 provided that such a petition could be filed
with the Comelecs law department on the ground that the candidate had made a
false material representation in his certificate.
Under the same rules, jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate lay
with the Comelec sitting in division, not en banc.
Cases before a division could only be entertained by the Comelec en banc
when the required number of votes to reach a decision was not obtained in
the division.
Only MRs of rulings of the Comelec division could be resolved en banc.
o When the Comelec en banc didnt refer Sales petition to any of its divisions, it
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
The petition also didnt comply with the formal requirements of pleadings under the
Comelec Rules of Procedure.
o Pleadings must be in 10 copies, and be filed directly with the Comelec clerk of court
personally or by registered mail.
o The Sales petition only had two copies, and the petition was transmitted by
facsimile, not by registered.
THE HISTORY OF THE KATIPUNAN NG KABATAAN, BY JUSTICE PUNO:
o The Katipunan ng Kabataan was originally created by Presidential Decree No. 684 in
1975 as the Kabataang Barangay, a barangay youth organization composed of all
residents of the barangay who were at least 15 years but less than 18 years of age.
In 1983, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, then the Local Government Code, raised
the maximum age of the Kabataang Barangay members from "less than 18
years of age" to "not more than 21 years of age."
o The Local Government Code of 1991 changed the Kabataang Barangay into the
Katipunan ng Kabataan.
It, however, retained the age limit of the members laid down in B.P. 337 at 15
but not more than 21 years old.
Under Section 424 of the Local Government Code, a member of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan must be:
o (a) a Filipino citizen;
o (b) an actual resident of the barangay for at least six months;
o (c) 15 but not more than 21 years of age; and
o (d) duly registered in the list of the Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official
barangay list.
Section 428 of the Code requires that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan
must be:
o (a) a Filipino citizen;
o (b) a qualified voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan;
o (c) a resident of the barangay at least one (1) year immediately preceding the
election;
o (d) at least 15 years but not more than 21 years of age on the day of his election;
o (e) able to read and write; and
o (f) must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.

Based on Comelec Resolution No 2824:

o A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may be a qualified voter in the May 6,
1996 SK elections if he is:
(a) a Filipino citizen;
(b) 15 but not more than 21 years of age on election day, i.e., the voter must
be born between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and
(c) a resident of the Philippines for at least one (1) year and an actual
resident of the barangay at least six (6) months immediately preceding the
elections.
o A candidate for the SK must:
(a) possess the foregoing qualifications of a voter;
(b) be a resident in the barangay at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the elections; and
(c) able to read and write.
A closer look at the Local Government Code will reveal a distinction between the
maximum age of a member in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and the maximum age of an
elective SK official.
o Section 424 of the Code sets a member's maximum age at 21 years only. There is
no further provision as to when the member shall have turned 21 years of age.
The member may be more than 21 years of age on election day or on the day
he registers as member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan.
o On the other hand, Section 428 provides that the maximum age of an elective SK
official is 21 years old "on the day of his election."
The addition of the phrase "on the day of his election" is an additional
qualification.
The elective official must not be more than 21 years old on the day of
election.
The qualification that a voter in the SK elections must not be more than 21 years of age on
the day of the election is not provided in Section 424 of the Local Government Code of
1991.
o In fact the term "qualified voter" appears only in COMELEC Resolution No. 2824.
o Since a "qualified voter" is not necessarily an elective official, then it may be
assumed that a "qualified voter" is a "member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan."
o Section 424 of the Code does not provide that the maximum age of a member of
the Katipunan ng Kabataan is determined on the day of the election.
Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is therefore ultra vires insofar
as it sets the age limit of a voter for the SK elections at exactly 21 years on
the day of the election.
The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more than 21 years of age on
the day of his election is very clear.
o The Local Government Code speaks of years, not months nor days.
When the law speaks of years, it is understood that years are of 365 days
each.
One born on the first day of the year is consequently deemed to be one year
old on the 365th day after his birth -- the last day of the year.
o The phrase "not more than 21 years of age" means not over 21 years, not beyond
21 years.
It means 21 365-day cycles.
It does not mean 21 years and one or some days or a fraction of a year
because that would be more than 21 365-day cycles.
The general rule is that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must not be more
than 21 years of age on the day of his election.
o The only exception is when the official reaches the age of 21 years during his
incumbency.

IN THE PRESENT CASE:

o Garvida was born on June 11, 1974.
o On March 16, 1996, the day she registered as voter for the May 6, 1996 SK
elections, she was twenty-one (21) years and nine (9) months old.
o On the day of the elections, she was 21 years, 11 months and 5 days old.
When she assumed office on June 1, 1996, she was 21 years, 11 months and
20 days old and was merely ten (10) days away from turning 22 years old.
o She may have qualified as a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan but she was
over the age limit.
The requirement that a candidate possess the age qualification is founded on public policy
and if he lacks the age on the day of the election, he can be declared ineligible.
o The fact that the candidate was elected will not make the age requirement
directory, nor will it validate his election.
o The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility.

RULING: petition dismissed; Garvida declared ineligible for being over the age qualification for
candidacy; the vacancy is to be filled by the SK member chosen by the incumbent SK members
of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte by simple majority from among themselves. The
member chosen shall assume the office of SK Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term,
and shall discharge the powers and duties, and enjoy the rights and privileges appurtenant to
said office.
#rbm
082. Montesclaros v COMELEC65

65

ANTONIETTE V.C. MONTESCLAROS, MARICEL CARANZO, JOSEPHINE ATANGAN, RONALD ATANGAN and CLARIZA DECENA, and OTHER
YOUTH OF THE LAND SIMILARLY SITUATED, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY of the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATOR
FRANKLIN DRILON in his capacity as Senate President and SENATOR AQUILINO PIMENTEL in his capacity as Minority Leader of the Senate of the
Philippines, CONGRESSMAN JOSE DE VENECIA in his capacity as Speaker, CONGRESSMAN AGUSTO L. SYJOCO in his capacity as Chairman of the
Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, and CONGRESSMAN EMILIO C. MACIAS II in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Local
Government of the House of Representatives, THE PRESIDENT OF THE PAMBANSANG KATIPUNAN NG MGA SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN, AND ALL
THEIR AGENTS AND REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

July 9, 2002
Carpio, J.
TOPIC: Local Government Units; The Barangay; SangguniangKabataan
SV: Petitioners Montesclaros et al sent a letter to COMELEC demanding that the SK elections be
held as scheduled on May 6, 2002, but the COMELEC didnt reply. Subsequently, they received an
en banc resolution from COMELEC recommending the postponement of said elections.
Meanwhile, the Senate and the House of Reps passed bills postponing the SK elections.
Eventually, the Bicameral Committee released a consolidated bill resetting the Sk and Brgy
elections to July 15, 2002 and lowered the membership age in the SK to at least 15 but not more
than 18 years of age. Because of this, petitioners Montesclaros et al filed a petition for the
issuance of a TRO and/or preliminary injunction. The brgy and SK elections were not held as
scheduled, and Congress then enacted RA 9164, which provides that voters and candidates
must be at least 15 but less than 18 years of age on the day of the election. Said law also
provides that there shall be a synchronized SK and brgy elections on July 15, 2002.
Court said that the petition is bereft of merit. Court cannot exercise its power of judicial review
because there is no actual case or controversy; the petitioners have no personal and substantial
interest in maintaining the suit; and the petition raises no constitutional issue. The petition must
also fail since no GAD attended the postponement of the elections. Petition dismissed for utter
lack of merit.
FACTS:
PD 684 established the Kabataang Barangay (KB).
o The KB was composed of all barangay residents less than 18 y/o, without specifying the
minimum age. It was organized to provide its members with the opportunity to express
views and opinions on issues of transcendental importance.
o The LGC renamed the KB toSanguniangKabataan(SK) and limited the membership to
those at least 15 but not more than 21 years old. As a youth organization, it is tasked
to enhance the social, political, economic, cultural, intellectual, moral, spiritual, and
physical development of the youth.
o In every barangay, the SK is composed of a chairperson and 7 members, all elected by
the Katipunan ng Kabataan (which is composed of all citizens residing in the barangay
for at least 6 mos and those who meet the age requirement).
o For its elections, RA 7808 set SK elections on the first Monday of May 1996, and
accordingly, COMELEC issued resolutions to govern the SK elections of May 6, 2002.

Feb. 18, 2002: Montesclaros sent a letter to the COMELEC, demanding that the SK elections
be held as scheduled on May 6, 2002.

Feb. 20: COMELEC Chairman Benipayo wrote identical letters to the Speaker of the House and
the Senate President about the status of pending bills on the SK and Brgy elections. In his
letters, he expressed the operational difficulty of holding both elections simultaneously and
supported the bill that Sen. Drilon proposed to hold the Brgy Elections in May 2002 and
postpone the SK elections to Nov. 2002.
o Subsequently, petitioners received a COMELEC en banc resolution recommending to
Congress the postponement of the SK elections to Nov. 2002, but holding the barangay
elections in May 2002 as scheduled.

March 6: Senate and House of Reps passed the bills postponing the SK elections. This was
approved by the Bicameral Committee.
o The Bicameral Committees consolidated bill reset the SK and Barangay elections to
July 15, 2002 and lowered the membership age in the SK to at least 15 but not more
than 18 years of age.

Mar. 11: Petitioners Montesclaros et al, who are all 20 y/o filed this petition as a taxpayers
and class suit, on their own behalf and on behalf of other youths similarly situated.
o They claim that they are in danger of being disqualified to vote and be voted for in the
SK election should the same be postponed to a later date. Under the LGC, membership
in the SK is limited to youths at least 15 but not more than 21 y/o.
o They allege that respondents connived, confederated and conspired to postpone the
May 6, 2002 SK elections and to lower the membership age in the SK to at least 15 but
less than 18 years of age. They assail such conspiracy because youths 18-21 y/o will be
disqualified from the organization.
o Petitioners pray for the issuance of a TRO and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the
postponement of the SK elections and to command the respondents to continue the
same. In the alternative, if the SK elections will be postponed for whatever reason,
there must be a definite date for said elections and the present SK membership (except
those incumbent) shall be allowed to run for any SK elective position even if they are
more than 21 y/o.

On the same date, the Senate approved the Bicameral Committees consolidated bill, and the
House of Representatives approved the same 2 days later.
o Mar. 19: The President signed the approved bill into law.

ISSUE: Should the petition be granted? (NO, the petition is bereft of merit.)

The Court takes judicial notice of the ff. events that have transpired since the petitioners filed
the petition:
o The brgy and SK elections were not held as scheduled.
o Congress enacted RA 9164, which provides that voters and candidates must be at least
15 but less than 18 years of age on the day of the election. Said law also provides that
there shall be a synchronized SK and brgy elections on July 15, 2002.
o COMELEC promulgated a resolution containing the rules and regulations for the
conduct of said elections.

The Courts power of judicial review can only be exercised in constitutional cases only if the ff
requisites are complied with:
o (1) The existence of an actual and appropriate case or controversy;
o (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
o (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and
o (4) the constitutional question is the lismota of the case.

In this case, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial
review.
o Petitioners are amenable to setting the SK elections to any date not later than July 15,
2002 and RA 9164 reset the elections to said date. With respect to the date, there is no
actual controversy requiring judicial intervention.
o Also, petitioners prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill
lowering the membership age in the SK does not present an actual justiciable
controversy.
A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review because it is not a law. Having no
legal effect, it violates no constitutional right or duty. The Court can only
exercise its power of judicial review after a law is enacted and not before,
because the latter case would be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion
on a proposed act of Congress.
Under separation of powers, the Court cannot restrain the Congress from passing
any law, or from setting into motion the legislative mill according to its internal

rules. Absent a clear violation of specific constitutional limitations or of

constitutional rights of private parties, the Court cannot exercise its power of
judicial review over the internal processes or procedures of Congress.
o Court has also no power to dictate to Congress the subject/object of bills that should be
enacted into law. To do so would destroy the delicate system of checks and balances
for the three co-equal, coordinate, and independent branches of government.
Under RA 9164, Congress merely restored the age requirement in PD 684.
Petitioners do not have a vested right to the permanence of the age requirement
under Section 424 of the Local Government Code of 1991. Every law passed by
Congress is always subject to amendment or repeal by Congress.
o Court cannot also direct the COMELEC to allow over-aged voters to vote/be voted for in
an election that is limited to youths at least 15 but not less than 18y/o. Congress will
have to decide whether to enact an amendatory law. Petitioners remedy is legislation,
not judicial intervention
Petitioners have no personal and substantial interest in maintaining this suit. By real
interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or
future, contingent, subordinate, or inconsequential interest.
o Petitioners seek to enforce a right conferred by RA 9164 to those who are at least 15
but less than 18 y/o. Since they dont fall within this classification, they are no longer
members of the SK and cannot be allowed to participate in the elections. Clearly, they
no longer have any interest in the SK elections.
Petition does not raise any constitutional issue.
o At the time the petition was filed RA 9164 was not yet enacted into law. When said law
was passed, petitioners failed to assail any provision in it that could be
unconstitutional. The Court will not strike down a law unless its constitutionality is
properly raised in an appropriate action and adequately argued.
o The only semblance of a constitutional issue is their claim that SK membership is a
property right within the meaning of the constitution. Petitioner contends that they lose
the opportunity to work in the govt positions reserved for SK members/officers.
Court said that a public office is not a property right. No one has a vested right
to any public office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a
public office. While the law makes an SK officer an ex-officio member of a local
government legislative council, the law does not confer on petitioners a
proprietary right or even a proprietary expectancy to sit in local legislative
councils.
o Congress has the power to define who are the youth qualified to join the SK, which
itself is a creation of Congress. Those who do not qualify because they are past the
age group defined as the youth cannot insist on being part of the youth.
The petition must also fail since no GAD attended the postponement of the SK elections.
o COMELEC, in its resolutions, merely exercised its power and duty to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recalland to recommend to Congress effective measures to
minimize election spending. Its acts enjoy the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties.
o Petitioners failed to prove that COMELEC committed GAD.

Petition dismissed for utter lack of merit.

Muez v. Ario
Date: February 21, 1995
Ponente: Mendoza
The case in a nutshell:
FACTS: Mayor Irisari issued a warrant of arrest against Muez after the latter failed to attend a

conference regarding a land dispute. Muez filed 2 complaints against Mayor Irisari: 1) a
complaint for grave misconduct and usurpation of judicial function with the Office of the
Ombudsman, and 2) an administrative complaint for violation of the 1987 Constitution,
misconduct in office, and abuse of authority with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The
investigating officer of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a criminal case for usurpation of
judicial function against Mayor Irisari in the MTC. Judge Ario denied Mayor Irisaris motion to
quash. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, acting on the administrative complaint, found Mayor
Irisari guilty. But the DILG reversed, on the ground that what he had issued to Muez, although
denominated a Warrant of Arrest, was actually just an invitation or summons. Mayor Irisari
moved for reconsideration of Judge Arios order of denial, invoking the DILG resolution. Judge
Ario reconsidered and dismissed the criminal case. Muez sent 2 letters to the Presidential AntiCrime Commission, charging Judge Ario with knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. The
matter was indorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman, which referred it to the SC for possible
administrative action.
HELD: Judge Ario is guilty of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. The acts alleged in the
information constitute a crime. Under Art. 241 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of usurpation
of judicial functions involves the ff. elements: 1) That the officer is an officer of the executive
branch of the government; and 2) That he assumes judicial powers, or obstructs the execution of
any order or decision rendered by any judge within his jurisdiction. Mayor Irisari was an officer of
the executive branch, and what he issued against Muez was a warrant of arrest. Mayor Irisari
justified his order on the basis of Sec. 143(3) of the old Local Government Code, which expressly
provided that in cases where the mayor may conduct preliminary investigation, the mayor shall,
upon probable cause after examination of witnesses, have the authority to order the arrest of the
accused. However, this provision was repealed by Sec. 2, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, which
expressly provides that the function of determining probable cause and issuing, on the basis
thereof, warrants of arrest or search warrants, may be validly exercised only by judges.
Facts:
1) On December 26, 1989, Mayor Irisari of Loreto, Agusan del Sur, summoned to his office
complainant Apolinario Muez for a conference respecting a land dispute which the latter
had with Tirso Amado.
2) Muez failed to attend the conference, so Mayor Irisari issued a warrant of arrest against
him.
a. The warrant was served and Muez was brought before Mayor Irisari, although no
investigation was later conducted.
3) Muez filed 2 complaints against Mayor Irisari:
a. A complaint for grave misconduct and usurpation of judicial function with the Office
of the Ombudsman
b. An administrative complaint for violation of the 1987 Constitution, misconduct in
office, and abuse of authority with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur
4) After preliminary investigation, the investigating officer of the Office of the Ombudsman
filed a case for usurpation of judicial function against Mayor Irisari in the Loreto MTC.
5) The first judge inhibited, so the case was later assigned to respondent Judge Ario.
6) Mayor Irisari moved to quash the information, on the ground that the acts complained of
did not constitute a crime under the law.
a. He contended that under Sec. 143(3) of the former Local Government Code (B.P.
Blg. 337), mayors were authorized to issue warrants of arrest.
7) Judge Ario denied the motion to quash, on the ground that the power of mayors to issue
warrants of arrest had ceased to exist as of February 2, 1987, when the 1987 Constitution
took effect.
8) The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, acting on the administrative complaint, found Mayor Irisari
guilty of misconduct in office and abuse of authority, and ordered him suspended for 8
months without pay.
9) On appeal by Mayor Irisari, the DILG reversed, on the ground that what he had issued to
Muez, although denominated a Warrant of Arrest, was actually just an invitation or
summons.

10)
Mayor Irisari moved for reconsideration of Judge Arios order of denial in the
criminal case, invoking the DILG resolution.
11)
Judge Ario reconsidered and dismissed the case.
a. He held that the subject matter in the criminal case and in the administrative
complaint arose from one and the same incident and involved the same parties.
b. He also held that the DILGs resolution was not tainted with unfairness or
arbitrariness, nor did it show arbitrary action or palpable and serious error.
Therefore, it must be respected.
12)
Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, Muez sent 2 letters to the Presidential AntiCrime Commission, charging Judge Ario with knowingly rendering an unjust judgment.
13)
The matter was indorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman, which dismissed the case
for lack of probable cause for filing in court, but referred it to the SC for possible
administrative action against Judge Ario.
Issue: Is Judge Ario guilty of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment? YES.
Held: A FINE of Php5,000.00 is imposed on Judge Ario. He is enjoined to exercise greater care
and diligence in the performance of his duties as a judge and warned that a repetition of a
similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Ratio:
1) Judge Ario is guilty of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. While he may have acted
in good faith, he should nevertheless be held administratively liable.
a. The acts alleged in the information constitute a crime.
i. Under Art. 241 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of usurpation of judicial
functions involves the ff. elements:
1. That the officer is an officer of the executive branch of the
government;
2. That he assumes judicial powers, or obstructs the execution of any
order or decision rendered by any judge within his jurisdiction.
ii. Mayor Irisari was an officer of the executive branch.
iii. What Mayor Irisari issued against Muez was a warrant of arrest.
1. The warrant was denominated Warrant of Arrest and addressed to
any officer of the law in the municipality, requesting/ordering them to
effect the arrest of Muez for his refusal to acknowledge an earlier
summons, and to bring him before Mayor Irisaris office to answer an
inquiry/investigation in connection with his land dispute with Amado.
2. Mayor Irisari justified his order on the basis of Sec. 143(3) of the old
Local Government Code, which expressly provided that in cases where
the mayor may conduct preliminary investigation, the mayor shall,
upon probable cause after examination of witnesses, have the
authority to order the arrest of the accused. However, this provision
was repealed by Sec. 2, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, which
expressly provides that the function of determining probable cause and
issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of arrest or search warrants,
may be validly exercised only by judges.
a. This is evidenced by the elimination in the 1987 Constitution of
the phrase such other responsible officer as may be authorized
by law, which was in the 1973 Constitution. (Ponsica v.
Ignalaga)
3. There was no pending criminal case against Muez, only a land
dispute. Thus, in issuing the warrant of arrest, Mayor Irisari assumed a
judicial function that even a judge could not have done.
4. Mayor Irisari did not merely intend to invite or summon Muez to his
office. He had issued a summons to Muez the day before he issued

the warrant of arrest, and issued the warrant of arrest because Munez
refused to appear before him.
b. Mayor Irisaris case was not before Judge Ario on review from the decision of an
administrative agency. What was before him was a criminal case. Therefore, there
was no basis for applying the rule on substantiality of evidence. He should have
considered solely the facts alleged in the information in resolving Mayor Irisaris
motion to dismiss.
i. At the very least, he showed poor judgment and gross ignorance of basic
legal principles. While judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on
account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, they should be
conversant with basic legal principles. In every case, a judge should endeavor
diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law. He owes it to the
public and the administration of justice to know the law he is supposed to
apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. There will be
faith in the administration of justice only if there is belief on the part of
litigants that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of a
deficiency in their grasp of legal principles. (Libarios v. Dabalos)
ii. There is more than just gross ignorance of legal principles shown here. Judge
Ario appears to have relied on the DILG resolution, which found Mayor Irisari
not guilty of serious misconduct in office, on the ground that he had not really
issued a warrant of arrest, but merely an invitation or summons. By relying on
the DILG resolution, Judge Ario showed lack of capacity of independent
judgment.
Greater Balanga Development Corporation v. Municipality of Balanga
27 December 1994
Short version: The petitioner owned a parcel of land in the Municipality of Balanga and applied
for a business permit with the Office of the Mayor of Balanga to engage in business therein. The
mayor issued a permit granting the petitioner the privilege of a real estate dealer/privatelyowned public market operator. However, the Sangguniang Bayan of Balanga passed a resolution
which revoked the permit insofar as the operation of a public market is concerned. The
respondents argue that petitioner violated Sec. 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code because it
failed to disclose the true status of the area involved in the permit (in that it was subject of
adverse claims, i.e. the municipality claimed that the lot was earmarked for the expansion of a
public market) and when it did not secure separate permits for its two businesses. On the point
that the petitioner did not secure separate permits, the SC held that this was not a valid ground
for revoking the permit because the act of securing only one permit for two businesses was not
specifically enjoined by the cited provision of the Balanga Revenue Code. The only requirement
was that separate fees be paid. The powers of municipal corporations are to be construed
strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity must be construed against the municipality. On the
issue of the alleged controversy over the ownership of the land, the Court held that the question
of ownership had already been settled by the SC in a previous case. Moreover, the Resolution
merely mentioned the municipalitys plan to acquire it for expansion of the public market
adjacent thereto. Until expropriation proceedings are instituted, the landowner cannot be
deprived of its right over the land. While the Sangguniang Bayan has the duty in the exercise of
its police powers to regulate any business subject to municipal license fees and prescribe
conditions under which existing licenses may be revoked, the mere "anxiety, uncertainty,
restiveness" among the stallholders cannot be a valid ground for revoking petitioner's permit.
Facts:
- The petitioner is a domestic corporation, owned and controlled by the Camacho family. It was
the latter that donated to the respondent municipality the present site of the Balanga Public

Market. The lot in dispute in this case is registered in the name of the petitioner and is situated
behind the Balanga Public Market.
- When the petitioner conducted a relocation survey of the area, it discovered that certain
portions of the property had been "unlawfully usurped and invaded" by the respondent which
had supposedly allowed the construction of shanties and market stalls thereon while charging
market fees and market entrance fees from the occupants and users of the area. A portion of the
lot was used as an unloading site of products and the vegetable vendors were charged market
and entrance fees by the municipality.
- Later, the petitioner applied with the Office of the Mayor of Balanga for a business permit to
engage in business in the area. The mayor issued to petitioner a Mayor's permit, granting it the
privilege of a "real estate dealer/privately-owned public market operator" under the trade name
of Balanga Public Market. However, the Sangguniang Bayan of Balanga passed Resolution No. 12
which revoked the permit insofar as the operation of a public market is concerned. The Mayor of
Balanga likewise issued EO No.1, revoking the permit as far as the operation of the public market
was concerned.
- This prompted the petitioner to file the instant petition praying that the Mayor's permit be
reinstated.
The respondents argue that petitioner had violated Sec. 3A-06(b) of the
Balanga Revenue Code when it failed to disclose the true status of the area involved in the
permit (in that it was subject of adverse claims, i.e. the municipality claimed that the lot
was earmarked for the expansion of a public market) and when it did not secure separate
permits for its two businesses.
Issue: Was the petitioner's permit validly revoked? (No)
Reasoning:
- The application for Mayor's permit in this case requires the applicant to state what type of
business is being applied for. Petitioner left this field of information blank in its application form.
Indeed, the permit should not have been issued without the required information. Revoking the
permit under the aforementioned provision, however cannot be justified for good faith is always
presumed.
- Neither was petitioner's application for two businesses in one permit a ground for revocation.
This is because this act was not expressly enjoined by the aforementioned provision - the only
requirement was that separate fees be paid for each business.
The powers of municipal corporations are to be construed strictissimi juris
and any doubt or ambiguity must be construed against the municipality.
- In issuing Resolution No. 12, the Sangguinang Bayan invoked its authority under BP Blg. 337 to
provide for the establishment and maintenance of public markets in the municipality and to
regulate any business subject to municipal license tax or fees and prescribe the conditions under
which a municipal license may be revoked
.
According to the Resolution, the main reason for the revocation of the
Mayor's permit was the controversy over the land in question engendered by the filing of a
Civil Case before the RTC of Balanga involving the ownership of certain portions of Lot 261B from which the lot here involved was derived.
However, the records reveal that the question of ownership over Lot 261-B
had already been settled with finality by the SC in G.R. No. 62223. When petitioner's

Mayor's permit was revoked, five years had already elapsed since the case was decided.
By then, the petitioner was already able to have the land surveyed and such survey
approved. It also obtained in its name the TCT to the land without any memorandum or
encumbrance pertaining to any decision rendered in any civil case. Therefore, for all
intents and purposes, petitioner appeared to be the true owner of the land when the
respondents revoked its Mayor's permit.
Moreover, a close scrutiny of the records reveals that the Sangguniang
Bayan did not establish or maintain any public market on the subject lot. The Resolution
merely mentioned the plan to acquire it for expansion of the public market adjacent
thereto. Until expropriation proceedings are instituted, the landowner cannot be deprived
of its right over the land.
While the Sangguniang Bayan has the duty in the exercise of its police
powers to regulate any business subject to municipal license fees and prescribe conditions
under which existing licenses may be revoked, the mere "anxiety, uncertainty,
restiveness" among the stallholders cannot be a valid ground for revoking petitioner's
permit.
Besides, the manner by which the permit was revoked transgressed
petitioner's right to due process. This is demonstrated by the fact that the alleged violation
of the Balanga Revenue Code was not even stated in the order of revocation.
Dispositive: Petition granted.
Digested by Ramon IV
Hon. Alfredo Lim and Rafaelito Garayblas v. The Court of Appeals, Hon. Wilfredo Reyes
and Bistro Pigalle, Inc.
12 August 2002
Carpio, J.

SHORT VERSION: Mayor Lim ordered police to raid the establishments owned by Bistro Pigalle,
Inc. to inspect its license and the work permits of its staff. Bistro obtained an injunction against
Lim. The SC held that this injunction was properly ordered by the trial court. The power of the
mayor to issue business licenses and permits necessarily includes the to suspend, revoke or even
refuse to issue them. But this power is premised on violations of the conditions of the license or
non-compliance with application requirements. In this case, there was no specific charge against
Bistro. It was therefore deprived of due process. The mayor also has the power to inspect and
investigate private commercial establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses
and permits.However, he has no power to order a police raid on these establishments in the
guise of inspecting or investigating these commercial establishments. Hence, Mayor Lim acted
beyond authority.

FACTS:

Bistro Pillage Inc. (Bistro) owns the New Bangkok Club and the Exotic Garden Restaurant in
Manila.

1992: Mayor Lim instructed policemen to inspect and investigate Bistros license, and the
work permits and health certificates of its staff. This caused the stoppage of work in the
night club.
Mayor Lim also refused to accept Bistros application for a business license, as well as its
staffs work permit applications, for the year 1993.
Dec. 7, 1992: Bistro filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, against Lim in his capacity as
Mayor of the City of Manila.
o Bistro argued that the refusal to issue the business license and work permits
violated the doctrine that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of
night clubs, but can only regulate their operation, laid down in De La Cruz v. Paras.
The TC granted the injunction. Despite this, Lim still issued a closure order on Bistros
operations effective Jan. 23, 1993.
o Lim sent policemen to carry out the order.
o More policemen went to the business premises on Feb. 12, 13, 15, 26 and 27.
Feb. 17, 1993: Lim filed a motion to dissolve the injunctive order and to dismiss the case.
o He argued that the power of the mayor to inspect and investigate commercial
establishments and their staff is implicit in the statutory power of the city mayor to
issue, suspend or revoke business permits and licenses provided in the Charter of
Manila and the LGC.
TC denied Lims motions.
Lim went up to the CA. The CA denied Lims petition.

ISSUE:
4. Does the power to grant and refuse licenses and business permits, as provided in the LGC
and the Charter of Manila, implicitly include the power to inspect, investigate and close
down Bistros operations for violation of the conditions of its licenses and permits?
REASONING:
4. No
The authority of mayors to issue business licenses and permits is beyond question.
This is provided in Art. II Sec. 11(1) of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, and in
Sec. 455(3)(iv) of the LGC.
o From the language of the two laws, it is clear that the power of the mayor to issue
business licenses and permits necessarily includes the corollary power to
suspend, revoke or even refuse to issue the same.
o However, this power is expressly premised on the violation of the conditions of
these permits and licenses. Similarly, the power to refuse to issue such licenses
and permits is premised on non-compliance with the prerequisites for the
issuance of such licenses and permits.
o The mayor must observe due process in exercising these powers, which means
that the mayor must give the applicant or licensee notice and opportunity to be
heard.
True, the mayor has the power to inspect and investigate private commercial
establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses and permits.
o However, the mayor has no power to order a police raid on these establishments
in the guise of inspecting or investigating these commercial establishments.
Lim acted beyond his authority when he directed policemen to raid the New Bangkok
Club and the Exotic Garden Restaurant.

Such action was in violation of Ordinance No. 7716 which expressly prohibits
police raids and inspections.
Lim has no authority to close down Bistros business or any business establishment in
Manila without due process of law. He cannot take refuge under the Charter of Manila
and the LGC.
o There is no provision in these laws expressly or impliedly granting the mayor
authority to close down private commercial establishments without notice and
hearing.
o Even if there were, such provision would be void. The due process clause requires
that Lim give Bistro an opportunity to rebut the allegations that it violated the
conditions of its licenses and permits.
The regulatory powers granted to municipal corporations must always be exercised in
accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due
process and equal protection. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily
or despotically.
o Here, Lims exercise of this power violated Bistros property rights that are
protected under the due process clause.
o Lim did not charge Bistro with any specific violation of the conditions of its license
or permit. Still, he closed down Bistros operations even before the expiration of
its license.
o He also refused to accept Bistros license application for 1993, in effect denying
the application without examining whether it complies with legal prerequisites.
o

RULING: petition denied

Arsadi Disomancop, and Ramir Dimalotang (Petitioners) vs

Secretary of Public Works and Highways Simeon Datumanong, and Secretary of
Budget and Management Emilia Boncodin (Respondents)

Date: November 25, 2004

Ponente: Tinga, J.

Short Version:
Facts: The DPWH Secretary issued DO 119, creating a Sub-District Engineering Office in Marawi,
Lanao del Sur. RA 8999 was later passed, creating an engineering district in Lanao del Sur. The
petitioners challenged both issuances arguing that these violated the autonomy granted to
ARMM (which Lanao del Sur is part of), as implemented by RAs 6734 and 9054 (the organic acts
of the ARMM), and by EO 426 (devolving functions of the DPWH to the ARMM).
Held: The organic acts of the ARMM were ratified through a plebiscite. Any amendment must also
be ratified through a plebiscite. RA 8999, by creating an office with previously devolved
functions, in essence, sought to amend the ARMM organic acts. Since RA 8999 was never
approved by the people of ARMM through a plebiscite, it never became operative. On the other
hand, DO 119 is violative of the provisions of EO 426. Being an issuance of a cabinet secretary, it

cannot be inconsistent with the issuance of the Executive.

Facts:
- For the first time in its history after three Constitutions, the Philippines ordained the
establishment of regional autonomy in Secs 1 and 15, Art X of the 1987 Constitution.

- Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, RA 6734 66 was enacted on August 1, 1989. The law
called for the holding of provinces in certain provinces and cities 67, of which Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi voted for the creation of the autonomous region. These
provinces became the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The law contains
provisions on the powers of the Regional Government, and those which are reserved for the
National Government.

66 An Act Providing for An Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao

67 Provinces: Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu,
Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur. Cities: Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian,
Puerto Princesa and Zamboanga

- In accordance with RA 6734, President Aquino issued on 12 October 1990, EO 426 68. When
ARMM was formally organized on 6 November 1990, President Aquino had already signed 7 EOs
devolving to ARMM the powers the following departments: (1) local government; (2) labor and
employment; (3) science and technology; (4) public works and highways; (5) social welfare and
development; (6) tourism; and (7) environment and national resources.

68 Placing the Control and Supervision of the Offices of the Department of Public Works and Highways within the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao under the Autonomous Regional Government, and for other purposes

- On 20 May 1999, then DPWH Secretary Gregorio Vigilar issued DO 119. Pursuant to EO 124 69, it
created a Sub-District Engineering Office in the Marawi City, Lanao del Sur. The office shall have
jurisdiction over all national infrastructure projects and facilities under the DPWH within Marawi
and Lanao del Sur.

69 Reorganizing The Ministry Of Public Works and Highways, Redefining Its Powers And Functions, And For Other Purposes

- On 17 January 2001, RA 899970 was signed into law.

70 An Act Establishing an Engineering District in the First District in the Province of Lanao del Sur and Appropriating Funds Therefor

- RA 905471 was subsequently enacted. Like RA 6734, it contains provisions on the powers of the
Regional Government, and the retained areas of the National Government. It lapsed into law on
31 March 2001, and was ratified in a plebiscite on 14 August 2001. The province of Basilan and
the City of Marawi also voted to join ARMM72.
- On 23 July 2001, Disomangcop and Dimalotang, OIC and District Engineer, respectively, of the
First Engineering District of the DPWH-ARMM, addressed a petition to DPWH Secretary
Datumanong, seeking the revocation of DO 119 and the non-implementation of RA 8999. No
action, however, was taken on the petition.
- No action was taken by Sec Datumanong, thus the present petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus was filed.
- Alleged that DO 119 violates the constitutional autonomy of the ARMM because has tasked
the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office with functions that have already been devolved to
the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur.
- Contended that RA 8999 was not intelligently and thoroughly studied; that no public hearing
nor consultation with the DPWH-ARMM was made; that the law was skillfully timed for
signature by former President Estrada during the pendency of the impeachment proceedings.
- Reliefs sought: (1) annul DO 119; (2) prohibit DPWH Secretary from implementing DO 119 and
RA 8999; and (3) to compel the DBM Secretary to release funds for projects intended for Marawi
City and the First District of Lanao del Sur to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao
del Sur only.
- Respondents, through the OSG, contend that DO 119 was issued in accordance with EO 124;
that the powers of the autonomous regions did not diminish the legislative power of Congress to
enact RA 8999; and that petitioners have no standing.

Issue/Reasoning:
Issue: Whether the petitioners have standing (Yes. They have a material and substantial
interest.)
- Petitioners are employees of the First Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur.
They are charged with the duty and responsibility of supervising and implementing all public
works projects to be undertaken and being undertaken in Lanao del Sur which is the area of their
jurisdiction.
- The creation of the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office under DO 119 and the creation of
and appropriation of funds to the First Engineering District of Lanao del Sur under RA 8999 will
affect the powers, functions and responsibilities of the petitioners and the DPWH-ARMM.
71 An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act
No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended.

72 Pero ang Marawi ay nasa Lanao del Sur. Baka independent siya from Lanao del Sur dati kaya dun sa plebiscite sa RA 6734 hiwalay ito sa Lanao
del Sur.

- The offices created have apparently been endowed with functions almost identical to those of
DPWH-ARMM. Thus, it is likely that petitioners are in imminent danger of being eased out of their
duties and even their jobs. Their material and substantial interests will definitely be prejudiced
by the enforcement of DO 119 and RA 8999. Such injury is direct and immediate.

Issue: Whether RA 8999 is unconstitutional (No need to rule. It never became operative, and was
superseded by a subsequent enactment.)
- It is not necessary to rule on the constitutionality of RA 8999 since the case can be disposed of
on other grounds. The said law never became operative, and was superseded or repealed by a
subsequent enactment.
- The ARMM Organic Acts (RAs 6734 and 9054) are deemed a part of the regional autonomy
scheme. They are more than ordinary statutes because they enjoy affirmation by a plebiscite.
Hence, they cannot be amended by an ordinary statute, such as RA 8999. The amendatory law
has to be submitted to a plebiscite. This conclusion is supported by the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission. RA 9054 even reaffirmed the imperativeness of the plebiscite
requirement.
- By creating an office with previously devolved functions, RA 8999, in essence, sought to amend
RA 6074. Since RA 8999 was never approved by the people of ARMM through a plebiscite, it
never became operative.
- From another perspective, RA 8999 was repealed and superseded by RA 9054, a statute of later
date which clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on
the subject.
- RA 8999 is antagonistic to and cannot be reconciled with the ARMM Organic Acts. The
antagonism lies in the regional autonomy which the ARMM Organic Acts ordain pursuant to the
Constitution. On the other hand, RA 8999 contravenes true decentralization which is the essence
of regional autonomy.

Regional Autonomy Under RA 6734 and RA 9054

- The 1987 Constitution mandates regional autonomy to give a bold and unequivocal answer to
the cry for a meaningful, effective and forceful autonomy. The idea behind the Constitutional
provisions for autonomous regions is to allow the separate development of peoples with
distinctive cultures and traditions.
- The Court then quoted the sentiments of some members of the Constitutional Commission on
autonomous regions.
- The need for regional autonomy is more pressing in the case of the Filipino Muslims and the
Cordillera people who have been fighting for it. Thus, regional autonomy is also a means towards
solving existing serious peace and order problems and secessionist movements.
- However, the creation of autonomous regions does not signify the establishment of a
sovereignty distinct from that of the Republic, as it can be installed only within the framework of
this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the

Philippines.
- Regional autonomy is the degree of self-determination exercised by the local government unit
vis--vis the central government. It refers to the granting of basic internal government powers to
the people of a particular area or region with least control and supervision from the central
government.
- The objective of the autonomy system is to permit determined groups, with a common tradition
and shared social-cultural characteristics, to develop freely their ways of life and heritage,
exercise their rights, and be in charge of their own business. This is achieved through the
establishment of a special governance regime.
- In the Philippine setting, regional autonomy implies the cultivation of more positive means for
national integration. It would remove the wariness among the Muslims, increase their trust in the
government and pave the way for the unhampered implementation of the development
programs in the region.
- The Court then quoted a portion of the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission. It said
that a glimpse of which could lend a sense of the urgency and the inexorable appeal of true
decentralization.
- A necessary prerequisite of autonomy is decentralization. Decentralization is a decision by the
central government authorizing its subordinates to exercise authority in certain areas.
- Decentralization comes in two forms:
- Deconcentration which is administrative in nature. It involves the transfer of functions from
the national office to the local offices. Also referred to as administrative decentralization.
- Devolution which connotes political decentralization, or the transfer of powers,
responsibilities, and resources for the performance of certain functions from the central
government to LGUs. It aims to grant greater autonomy to LGUs in cognizance of their right to
self-government, to make them self-reliant, and to improve their administrative and technical
capabilities.
- The concept of autonomy as elucudated in Limbona v Mangelin:
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative
powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power...
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the
favor of local government units declared to be autonomous... decentralization of power
amounts to 'self-immolation,' since in that event the autonomous government becomes
accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.
- In Cordillera Broad Coalition v COA, it was ruled that the creation of autonomous regions
contemplates the grant of political autonomy an autonomy which is greater than the
administrative autonomy granted to LGUs.
- By regional autonomy, the framers intended it to mean meaningful and authentic regional
autonomy which means the kind of local self-government which allows the people of the region
the power to determine what is best for their growth and development without undue

interference from the central government.

- To this end, Sec 16, Art X limits the power of the President over autonomous regions, and as
said by Bernas, it also curtails the power of Congress over autonomous regions. The
diminution of Congress powers over autonomous regions was confirmed in Ganzon v CA.
- The diminution of Congress' power over autonomous regions is true to subjects over which such
regions have powers, as specified in Secs 18 and 20, Art X. Worthy of note is that the area of
public works is not excluded and neither is it reserved for the National Government.
- EO 426 officially devolved the powers and functions of the DPWH in ARMM to the Autonomous
Regional Government (ARG). More importantly, Congress itself through RA 9054 transferred and
devolved the administrative and fiscal management of public works and funds for public works to
the ARG.
- The aim of the Constitution is to extend to the autonomous peoples the right to selfdetermination within the framework of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippine
Republic. Self-determination refers to the need for a political structure that will respect the
autonomous peoples uniqueness and grant them sufficient room for self-expression and selfconstruction.
- In treading their chosen path of development, the Muslims in Mindanao are to be given freedom
and independence with minimum interference from the National Government. This necessarily
includes the freedom in public works and infrastructure projects within the autonomous region.
The devolution of the powers and functions of the DPWH in the ARMM are meant to be true,
meaningful and unfettered.
- With RA 8999, however, this freedom is taken away, and the National Government takes control
again. The challenged law creates an office with functions and powers which, by virtue of EO
426, have been previously devolved to the DPWH-ARMM.
- RA 8999 runs afoul of the ARMM Organic Acts and results in the recall of powers which have
previously been handed over. This should not be sanctioned, otherwise the Organic Acts desire
for greater autonomy for the ARMM in accordance with the Constitution would be quelled. It
bears stressing that one state policy of the Constitution is to ensure the autonomy of local
governments.

Issue: Whether DO 119 is valid (No. It goes against EO 426, and it was already superseded by RA
9054.)
- DO 119 is violative of the provisions of EO 426. The office created under DO 119, having
essentially the same powers, is a duplication of the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in
Lanao del Sur formed under the aegis of EO 426.
- DO 119 in effect, takes back powers which have been previously devolved under EO 426. The
DPWHs order, like spring water, cannot rise higher than its source of power the Executive.
- The fact that DO 119 was issued pursuant to EO 124 is of no moment. A special provision or law
prevails over a general one. EO 124, upon which DO 119 is based, is a general law reorganizing
the Ministry of Public Works and Highways while EO 426 is a special law transferring the control

and supervision of the DPWH offices within ARMM. The latter statute specifically applies to
DPWH-ARMM offices. EO 124 should therefore give way to EO 426 in the instant case.
- In any event, the ARMM Organic Acts and their ratification in a plebiscite in effect superseded
EO 124. The later enactment prevails because it is the later legislative will. With the repeal of EO
124, it necessarily follows that DO 119 was also rendered functus officio by the ARMM Organic
Acts.

Conclusion
- The repeal of RA 8999 and the functus officio state of DO 119 provide the necessary basis for
the grant of the writs of certiorari and prohibition.
- However, there is no basis for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the DBM Secretary
to release the funds. Sec 20, Art VI of RA 9054 clearly provides that (f)unds for infrastructure in
the autonomous region allocated by the central government or national government shall only
be appropriated through a Regional Assembly Public Works Act passed by the Regional
Assembly.

Dispositive:
The petition insofar as it seeks the writs of certiorari and prohibition is granted. However, the
petition insofar as it seeks a writ of mandamus is denied.
Abbas v. Comelec73

73 Datu Firdausi I.Y. Abbas, Datu Blo Umpar Adiong, Datu Macalimpowac Delangalen, Celso Palma, Ali Montana Babao,
Julmunir Jannaral, Rashid Saber, and Datu Jamal Ashley Abbas, representing the other taxpayers of Mindanao v.
Commission on Elections and Hon. Guillermo C. Carague, Department of Budget and ManagementAtty. Abdullah D.
Mama-o v. Hon. Guillermo Carague, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Budget, and the Commission on Elections

10 November 1989
Cortes, J.

SHORT VERSION: RA 6734 was passed, creating the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
Petitioners asked that the law be declared for unconstitutionality. The court dismissed the
petition. In this case the Court explained that the creation of ARMM was mandated not by
international treaty but by the 1987 Constitution. The creation of the autonomous region is made
to depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each
of the constituent units.The provinces and cities where such majority is not attained shall not be
included in the autonomous region.The ascertainment by Congress of areas that share common
attributes, which should be included in the autonomous region, is within the exclusive realm of
the legislatures discretion and goes into the wisdom of the law, which the Court cannot
question.The law does not give the President power to merge LGUs. What is referred here is the
merger of administrative regions, which are not LGUs.Finally, the creation of an Oversight
Committee to facilitate the transfer of power does not provide for a different date of effectivity.
The law still complies with the Consti when it says that the creation of the autonomous region is
effective upon an affirmative vote obtained in the plebiscite.

FACTS:

The Tripoli Agreement (agreement between the Philippine Government and the MNLF with
the participation of the Quadpartite Ministerial Commission Members of the Islamic
Conference and the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference) took
effect on Dec. 23, 1976.

It provided for the establishment of autonomy in the southern Philippines within

the realm of the sovereign and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines
and enumerated 13 provinces74 comprising areas of autonomy.
The 1987 Constitution provided for the creation of autonomous regions in the Cordilleras
and in Muslim Mindanao. (Art. X Sec. 15)
Pursuant to this, RA 6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
was enacted and signed into law on Aug. 1, 1989.
o In implementation, a plebiscite was scheduled for Nov. 19, 1989 in 13 provinces and
9 cities in Mindanao and Palawan.
These consolidated petitions pray that Comelec be enjoined from conducting the plebiscite
and that RA 6734 be declared unconstitutional.
o

ISSUE:Is RA 6734 constitutional? YES

REASONING:
With regard to compliance with the Tripoli Agreement

Petitioners contend that the Tripoli Agreement, being a treaty and thus part of the law of
the land, has to be complied with. They contend that certain provisions of RA 6734
contravene the provisions of Tripoli Agreement.
o The SolGen argued that the Tripoli Agreement is not a binding international
agreement.
Court says this is irrelevant. It is now the Constitution which mandates for the creation of
an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao. The standard therefore is compliance with
what is provided in the Constitution.
Even assuming that the Tripoli Agreement is a binding treaty and is part of the law of the
land, it would not be superior to RA 6734. They would be in the same class, thus RA 6734,
being a subsequent law, would be amendatory of the Tripoli Agreement.

With regard to compliance with the 1987 Constitution

Petitioners argued that RA 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region in

Mindanao, contrary to the Consti provision that the creation of the autonomous region is
dependent upon the outcome of the plebiscite.
The Court thus clarified the provision on the creation of the autonomous region and its
composition.
Art. X Sec. 18 sets forth the conditions necessary for the creation of the autonomous
region. This is echoed in RA 6734.
o Under these laws, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect only when
approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and
only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act
shall be included in the autonomous region.
The provinces and cities where such majority is not attained shall not be included in the
autonomous region.

74 Provinces: Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South

Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur.Cities: Cotabato, Dapitan,
Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa, Zamboanga.

The plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and RA 6734 will therefore be

determinative of:
o Whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Minadanao
o Which provinces and cities shall comprise it

The definition of majority

The creation of the ARMM is made effective upon approval by majority of the votes cast
by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose.
o The question has been raised to what this majority means majority of the total
votes cast in all the constituent units, or majority in each of the constituent units, or
both?
If the framers intended to require approval by a majority of all the votes cast in the
plebiscite they would have so indicated.
Comparing Art. XVIII Sec. 27 and Art. X Sec. 18, it will be seen that the creation of the
autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but
on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units.
Clearly what is required is a simple majority of votes approving the organic act in
individual constituent units, and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units
put together, as well as in the individual constituent units.

On the inclusion of certain provinces

Petitioner Mama-o insists that only Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte
and Maguindanao actually share common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage,
economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics and thus only they
should have been included in ARMM, not all the 13 provinces and 9 cities. By including
areas which do not strictly share the same characteristics, Congress has expanded the
scope of the autonomous region which the constitution has prescribed to be limited.
o This argument is untenable.
The Constitution lays down the standards by which Congress shall determine which areas
should constitute the autonomous region.
o Guided by these criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of areas that share
common attributes is within the exclusive realm of the legislatures discretion and
goes into the wisdom of the law, which the Court cannot question.
Another argument of Mama-o is that ARMM should include other non-Muslim areas in
Mindanao, citing the equal protection clause.
o This contention runs counter to the equal protection clause.
Any determination by Congress of what areas in Mindanao should comprise the ARMM,
taking into account shared historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures,
and other relevant characteristics would necessarily carry with it the exclusion of other
areas.
Moreover, equal protection permits of reasonable classification based on reasonable and
substantial distinctions.

On the exercise of free religion

RA 6734 provides that in the event of conflict between the Muslim Code/Tribal Code and
the national law, the Shariah courts should apply national law.

Petitioners argue this is against the free exercise of religion since Shariah law is
derived from the Koran, which is therefore part of divine law. Thus, it may not be
subjected to any man-made national law.
The Court did not rule on this issue because there is not actual controversy between real
litigants.
o

On the merger of regions

Petitioners contended that RA 6734 gave the President power to merge regions, a power
which is not conferred by the Constitution. This provision in RA 6734 is therefore in conflict
with Art. X Sec. 10 of the Constitution.
However, the Court said that what is referred to in RA 6734 is the merger of administrative
regions (Regions I-XII and the NCR) which are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for
administrative purposes.
o Administrative regions are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays.
While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the
Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to
facilitate the exercise of power of general supervision over local governments.
There is no conflict between the power of the President to merge administrative regions
with the constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of LGUs because the
plebiscite requirement applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not to
administrative regions.

On the creation of an Oversight Committee

Petitioners contend that the creation of an Oversight Committee to supervision the

transfer of powers from the regional government to the autonomous regions would delay
the creation of the autonomous region, when the Constitution provides that the creation of
the autonomous region shall take effect upon approval in a plebiscite.
The Court said that the provision on the Oversight Committee does not provide for a
different date of effectivity. Hence the creation of the autonomous region takes effect
immediately after obtaining the required vote in the plebiscite.

RULING: petition dismissed

Dr. Lampa Pandi and Dr. Jarmila Macacua v. CA and Dr. Amer Saber
11 April 2002
Carpio, J.
Short version: Macacua, in her capacity as Regional Director and as Secretary of the DOH of
ARMM, issued a memorandum designating Pandi as the OIC of the Integrated Provincial Health
Office-Amai Pakpak General Hospital (IPHO-APGH), Lanao del Sur. In the same memo, Sani, who
was then the OIC of IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur, was detailed to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office in
Cotabato City. Later, Lanao del Sur Provincial Governor Mahid M. Mutilan issued an order
designating Saber also as OIC of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. Subsequently, EO 133 was
issued by the President, transferring the powers and functions of the DOH in the region to the
Regional Government of the ARMM. Macacua issued another memorandum reiterating the earlier

one. Thus, a conflict arose as to whose appointments are valid. After tracing the pertinent laws
and Organic Acts of the ARMM, the Supreme Court ruled that Sabers designation was void
because at the time, provincial health officers were still national government officials to be
appointed by the Secretary of Health. As for Sani and Pandis appointments, initially, they were
void because at the time of the issuance of Macacuas first memorandum, the Secretary of
Health still exercised the power to assign provincial health officers in the ARMM. However,
Macacuas second memorandum was issued after EO 133 already took effect. EO 133 gave
Macacua, as head of the regional Department of Health, the power of supervision and control
over all functions and activities of the regional DOH. Therefore, Sani and Pandis appointments
became valid.
Facts:
- On 9 August 1993, Macacua, in her capacity as Regional Director and as Secretary of the
Department of Health of the ARMM, issued a memorandum designating Pandi as Officer-inCharge of the Integrated Provincial Health Office-Amai Pakpak General Hospital (IPHO-APGH),
Lanao del Sur. In the same memo, Macacua designated Sani, who was then the provincial health
officer of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur, to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City.
- On 15 September 1993, Lanao del Sur Provincial Governor Mahid M. Mutilan issued an order
designating Saber also as OIC of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. Sani filed a complaint with the
RTC challenging the memorandum transferring him to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato
City, alleging that he is the holder of a permanent appointment as provincial health officer of the
IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur.
- Subsequently, Saber filed with the CA a petition for quo warranto claiming that he is the
lawfully designated OIC of the IPHO-APGH. On 29 October 1993, the president issued EO No. 133
transferring the powers and functions of the DOH in the region to the Regional Government of
the ARMM. Thus, on 6 November 1993, Macacua issued another memorandum reiterating Pandis
designation as OIC as well as Sanis detail to Cotabato City.
- On 21 March 1994, Pandi and Macacua filed a motion seeking the dismissal of Sabers petition
on the ground that the issues had become moot and academic in light of the enactment of the
ARMM Local Government Code (ARMM LGC) by the ARMM Regional Assembly. However, the CA
still ruled on the case and held that Saber is the lawfuly designated OIC. It said that Lanao del
Sur Governor Mahid Mutilan has the power and authority to appoint the provincial health officer
under Sec. 478 of the LGC of 1991 notwithstanding any provision to the contrary contained in EO
133, the ARMM Local Government Code, as well as the Organic Act of 1989 for the ARMM.
- Thus, Pandi and Macacua filed a petition for review before the SC.
Issues:
- Was Sabers designation as OIC of IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur valid? (No)
- Was Sanis detail to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City valid? (At first no, but upon
Macacuas second Memorandum which was given after the issuance of EO 133, yes)
- Was Pandis designation as OIC of IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur valid? (At first no, but upon
Macacuas second Memorandum which was given after the issuance of EO 133, yes)
Reasoning:
- To answer these questions, the Court examined the laws before and after the enactment of the
Organic Act of 1989. The relevant laws cover five periods which shall be discussed below.
First Period: Prior to the enactment of the Organic Act of 1989

- At this time, the law governing the appointment of provincial health officers was found in EO
119, which was then the charter of the DOH. Under EO 119, the provincial health office was an
agency of the Ministry of Health, and the Minister of Health was the appointing power of
provincial health officers. Under Sec. 17, a provincial health officer is appointed to a region and
not to a province. The Minister of Health, upon recommendation of the Regional Director, can
assign the provincial health officer to any province within the region.
- The LGC of 1984 did not include the provincial health officer as an official of the provincial
government. Section 199 contains the enumeration of provincial officials and it clearly excludes
the provincial health officer. Thus, although the position is named that way, this official was an
official of the national government, appointed by the Minister of Health and paid entirely from
national funds.
Second Period: After the enactment of Organic Act of 1989 but before the LGC of 1991
- Under the Organic Act of 1989, the power of the Secretary of Health to appoint provincial
health officers to a region and to assign them to any province therein was not immediately
devolved to the Regional Government. Section 4 of the Organic Act immediately placed certain
line agencies and offices of the national government under the supervision and control of the
Regional Government. However, other line agencies and offices, including the regional offices of
the DOH, were not similarly treated.
- Thus, even upon the effectivity of the Organic Act of 1989, the LGC of 1984 was still the
existing law governing LGUs. It applied to the ARMM until the Regional Government could adopt
its own local government code. This meant that provincial health officers remained to be officials
of the National Government appointed by the Secretary of Health with the authority to assign a
provincial health officer to any province within the region.

- A few months after the effectivity of the Organic Act of 1989, the Revised Administrative Code
of 1987 took effect.75 This law had a provision which was practically a reenactment of Sec. 17 of
EO 119. However, even if the Revised Administrative Code is a later law than the Organic Act of
1989, it did not alter the terms of the devolution under the latter law because an ordinary statute
cannot amend an organic act that provides for an autonomous region which, under the
Constitution, can only be created and therefore, changed through a plebiscite.
Third Period: After the enactment of LGC of 1991 but before the adoption of the ARMM LGC
- Unlike the previous LGC, the LGC of 1991, in Sec. 463, made the provincial health officers one
of the officials of the provincial government to be appointed by the provincial governor. Section
465 further provides that the appointing power of the provincial governor is limited only to
officials and employees paid mainly from provincial funds.
- However, similar to the Revised Administrative Code, the LGC of 1991 also could not amend
the Organic Act of 1991. It is true that Sec. 526 of the LGC of 1991 provides that it shall apply
even to autonomous regions until such regions have adopted their own local government code
but the Court said that Sec. 526 should apply only to autonomous regions created after the
effectivity of the LGC of 1991.
- Thus, the Secretary of Health continued to be the appointing power of provincial health officers
who remained national government officials. This changed upon the issuance of EO 133 on 29
October 1993, the powers and functions of the DOH in the autonomous region under EO 119 was
then transferred to the Regional Government. EO 133 was issued upon recommendation of the
Oversight Committee created by Sec. 3 of the Organic Act of 1989 for the purpose of supervising
and transfer to the ARMM of such powers and functions vested in it by the Organic Act.
- Under EO 133, power of supervision and control over provincial health officers was transferred
from the Secretary of Health to the head of the DOH in the region. This included the authority to
assign such officers to any province within the region.
- On the other hand, the power to appoint provincial health officers was devolved to the Regional
Governor pursuant to Sec. 1 of the Organic Act which provided that executive power shall be
vested in the Regional Governor. As the holder of executive power, he was made the appointing
power in the executive branch of the Regional Government in accordance with Sec. 17 of the
Organic Act. So until the Regional Assembly enacted a law authorizing some other ARMM
executive official to appoint provincial health officers, this power remained with the Regional
Governor pursuant to the devolution of powers under the Organic Act as implemented by EO
133.
Fourth Period: After the adoption of the ARMM LGC but before the enactment of the Organic Act
of 2001
- Under the ARMM LGC, the provincial health officer was made a provincial government official.
The Regional Government would appoint the provincial health officer from a list of three
recommendees of the provincial governor. However, the ARMM LGC provides that if the salary of
the provincial health officer comes mainly from provincial funds, the provincial governor is the
appointing power because the appointing power of the regional Governor is limited to provincial
officials paid by regional funds.
- The ARMM LGC also vested in the provincial governor the power to exercise supervision and
control over all provincial government officials. This included the authority to assign provincial
health officers to other provinces.
75 The delayed effectivity was due to its effectivity clause.

Fifth Period: After the enactment of the Organic Act of 2001

- The Organic Act of 2001 took effect on 14 August 2001, the date of tis ratification by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite. It incorporates the salient features of the Peace Agreement
entered into between the National Government and the MNLF. It is a completely new autonomy
act for Muslim Mindanao since it totally replaced the previous organic act.
- The Organic Act of 2001 expressly adopted the devolution under the LGC of 1991, giving the
LGUs within ARMM the same deolved powers, functions and tax-sharing entitlements enjoyed by
LGUs outside the ARMM. This gives the provincial governor the power to appoint the provincial
health officer if the latters salary comes mainly from provincial funds. If the salary comes mainly
from regional funds, then the ARMM Local Code applies, in which case the Regional Governor is
the appointing power but only from among the three nominees coming from the provincial
governor. Moreover, the provincial governor exercises supervision and control over the provincial
health officer because the ARMM LGC has classified him as a provincial government official.
Application of the law to the facts
- On 15 September 1993, the date of Sabers designation as OIC of IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur,
the provincial health officer was still a national government official to be appointed by the
Secretary of Health. The power of supervision and control likewise still remained with the DOH
Secretary. Therefore, provincial governor Mutilan had no power to designate Saber as OIC.
Consequently, his designation is void.
- On 1 January 1988, Sani was appointed provincial health officer of Region XII and was assigned
to the Regional Health Office in Cotabato City by then DOH Secretary Bengzon. Consequently,
Sani cannot claim any security of tenure as provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur because he
was never appointed to that office. On 9 August 1993, Macacua detailed Sani to the DOH-ARMM
Regional Office in Cotabato City. As of that date, the Secretary of Health still exercised the power
to assign provincial health officers in the ARMM. Consequently, Sanis detail to the Regional
Office in Cotabato City is void. However, On 6 November 1993, Macacua issued another
Memorandum reiterating Sanis detail to the said Regional Office. This second memo was issued
after the issuance of EO 133, which gave Macacua, as head of the regional Department of
Health, the power of supervision and control over all functions and activities of the regional DOH.
Therefore, the second detail of Sani is valid.
- Pandi is similarly situated as Sani because he is covered by the same memoranda issued by
Macacua. Thus, Pandis initial designation was void but the subsequent one contained in
Macacuas second memorandum issued after EO 133 took effect is valid. The designation of
Pandi, however, while valid, is only temporary in nature - good until a new designation or a
permanent one is made.
Dispositive: Petition granted.
Digested by Ramon IV

Ordillo v. COMELEC76

76

Cordillera Regional Assembly Member ALEXANDER P. ORDILLO, (Banaue), Ifugao Provincial Board Member CORAZON MONTINIG, (Mayoyao), Former
Vice-Mayor MARTIN UDAN (Banaue), Municipal Councilors MARTIN GANO, (Lagawe), and TEODORO HEWE, (Hingyon), Barangay Councilman PEDRO
W. DULAG (Lamut); Aguinaldo residents SANDY B. CHANGIWAN, and DONATO TIMAGO; Lamut resident REY ANTONIO; Kiangan residents ORLANDO
PUGUON, and REYNAND DULDULAO; Lagawe residents TOMAS KIMAYONG, GREGORIO DANGO, GEORGE B. BAYWONG, and VICENTE LUNAG;
Hingyon residents PABLO M. DULNUAN and CONSTANCIO GANO; Mayoyao residents PEDRO M. BAOANG, LEONARDO IGADNA, and MAXIMO
IGADNA; and Banaue residents PUMA-A CULHI, LATAYON BUTTIG, MIGUEL PUMELBAN, ANDRES ORDILLO, FEDERICO MARIANO, SANDY
BINOMNGA, GABRIEL LIMMANG, ROMEO TONGALI, RUBEN BAHATAN, MHOMDY GABRIEL, and NADRES GHAMANG, Petitioners, vs. THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; The Honorable FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Secretary of Justice; Hon. CATALINO MACARAIG, Executive Secretary; The
Cabinet Officer for Regional Development; Hon. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, Secretary of Budget and Management; and Hon. ROSALINA S. CAJUCOM, OIC,
National Treasurer, Respondents.

Date: December 4, 1990

Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr.
The case in a nutshell:
FACTS: The people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra, and KalingaApayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to R.A. No. 6766,
entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The creation
of the CAR was approved by a majority of votes in the province of Ifugao, but was
overwhelmingly rejected in the rest of the provinces and the city of Baguio. The COMELEC issued
a resolution, stating that the Organic Act for the CAR had been approved and/or ratified by a
majority of votes in the province of Ifugao. The Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum
stating that the sole province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably, legally
and validly constituted the CAR. Cordillera Regional Assembly member Alexander P. Ordillo, et al.
filed a petition with the COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the Organic Act. The
COMELEC merely noted the petition. Ordillo, et al. filed a petition in the SC.
HELD: The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
There can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only 1 province, as the 1987 Constitution
and R.A. No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than 1 constituent unit. To
follow the COMELEC, et al.s position would result in result in various absurd situations, such as 2
sets of officials (provincial and regional) exercising their executive and legislative powers over
exactly the same area, which is one of the smallest provinces in the Philippines, population-wise.
The doctrine in Abbas, et al. v. COMELEC does not apply, since it deals with a completely
different issue.
Facts:
1) On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao,
Abra, and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held
pursuant to R.A. No. 6766, entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region.
2) The official COMELEC results of the plebiscite showed that the creation of the CAR was
approved by a majority of votes only in the province of Ifugao, and was overwhelmingly
rejected by votes in the rest of the provinces and the city of Baguio.
3) On February 14, 1990, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2259, stating that the Organic
Act for the CAR had been approved and/or ratified by a majority of the votes cast only in
the province of Ifugao.
4) On the same date, the Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum for the President, which
memorandum:
a. Reiterated COMELEC Resolution No. 2259.
b. Provided that considering the proviso in Sec. 13(A) of the Organic Act that only the
provinces and city voting favorably shall be included in the CAR, then the sole
province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably, legally and
validly constituted the CAR.
5) As a result, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6861, setting the elections in the Cordillera
Autonomous Region of Ifugao on the first Monday of March 1991.
6) Even before the issuance of COMELEC Resolution No. 2259, the Executive Secretary had
issued a memorandum granting authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera Executive
Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly, which had been created under E.O. No. 220.
7) Petitioners Cordillera Regional Assembly member Alexander P. Ordillo, et al. filed a petition
with the COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the Organic Act.
8) The COMELEC merely noted Ordillo, et al.s petition.
9) The President issued Administrative Order No. 160, declaring, among others, that the
Cordillera Executive Board, Cordillera Regional Assembly, and all offices created under E.O.
No. 220 were abolished, in view of the ratification of the Organic Act.
10)
Ordillo, et al. filed a petition in the SC. They maintained that there can be no valid
Cordillera Autonomous Region in only 1 province, as the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No.

6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than 1 constituent unit. They
prayed that the SC:
a. Declare null and void COMELEC Resolution No. 2259, the memorandum of the
Secretary of Justice, the memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative
Order No. 160, and R.A. No. 6861.
b. Prohibit and restrain respondents the COMELEC, et al. from implementing the
aforementioned resolution, memoranda, etc. and spending public funds for the
purpose.
c. Declare E.O. No. 220 to be still in force and effect until another organic law for the
CAR is enacted by Congress and duly ratified by the voters in the constituent units.
Issues:
1) Can the sole province of Ifugao validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region? NO.
2) Is the doctrine in Abbas, et al. v. COMELEC applicable? NO.
Held: Petition is GRANTED. COMELEC Resolution No. 2259, insofar as it upholds the creation of
an autonomous region, the memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the memorandum of the
Executive Secretary, A.O. No. 160, and R.A. No. 6861 are declared null and void, while E.O. No.
220 is declared to be still in force and effect until properly repealed or amended.

Ratio:
1) The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
There can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only 1 province, as the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than 1
constituent unit.
a. Sec. 15, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cor
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing common
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other re
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as w
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
i. The words provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas connote
that a region is to be made up of more than 1 constituent unit. The term
region, used in its ordinary sense, means 2 or more provinces.
1. The language of the Constitution, as much as possible, should be
understood in the sense it has in common use, and the words used in
constitutional provisions are to be given their ordinary meaning, except
where technical terms are employed. (Baranda v. Gustilo; J. M. Tuason
& Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration)
ii. This is supported by the fact that the 13 regions into which the Philippines is
divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces.
iii. Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it must join other
provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas with common and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures,
and other relevant characteristics.
b. Sections 1 and 2, Art. III of R.A. No. 6766 provide that the CAR is to be administered
by the Cordillera government, consisting of the Regional Government and LGUs.
Sec. 2 further provides:
SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary fo
proper governance and development of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays
the Autonomous Region.
i. Clearly, Congress never intended that a single province could constitute a
region. Otherwise, it would result in 2 sets of officials (provincial and regional)
exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same area.

c. Sections 1 and 4, Art. V of R.A. No. 6766 vest legislative power in the Cordillera
Assembly, whose members shall be elected from regional assembly districts
apportioned among provinces and cities composing the Cordillera Autonomous
Region.
i. If we follow the COMELEC, et al.s position, the members of the Cordillera
Assembly would be elected only from the province of Ifguao. This would result
in 2 legislative bodies (the Cordillera Assembly and the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan) exercising their legislative powers over the province of Ifugao,
one of the smallest provinces in the Philippines (population-wise).
d. Sec. 10, Art. XII of R.A. No. 6766 creates a Regional Planning and Development
Board, which has a counterpart at the provincial level called the Provincial Planning
and Development Coordinator.
i. The Boards functions are almost similar to the Provincial Coordinators. If it
takes only 1 person at the provincial level to perform such functions, but an
entire Board at the regional level, it could only mean that a larger area must
be covered at the regional level.
e. Sec. 13 (B) (c), Art. XXI of R.A. No. 6766 allots Php10 million to the Regional
Government for its initial organizational requirements.
i. This amount cannot be construed as funding only a lone and small province.
f. The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of the total population of the provinces
and city comprising the Region, and has the 2 nd smallest number of inhabitants
among all of them.
g. Sec. 16, Art. V of R.A. No. 6766 calls for a Regional Commission on Appointments,
with the Speaker as Chairman and 6 members coming from various provinces and
cities in the Region.
i. If we follow the COMELEC, et al.s position, the Commission would have a
Chairman and only 1 member. It would never have a quorum.
h. Other sections of R.A. No. 6766 call for cabinet members, as far as practicable, to
come from various provinces and cities in the Region; create a system of tribal
courts for the various indigenous cultural communities in the Region; and require
the development of a common regional language based on the various languages
and dialects in the region. These provisions all rule against the sole province of
Ifugao constituting the Region.
2) The doctrine in Abbas, et al. v. COMELEC is NOT applicable.
a. Abbas established the rule to follow on which provinces and cities shall comprise
the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao, which is the same rule to follow with
regard to the autonomous region in the Cordillera. However, there is nothing in
Abbas which deals with the issue on whether an autonomous region, in either
Muslim Mindanao or Cordillera, could exist despite the fact that only 1 province or 1
city is to constitute it. (In other words, its a completely different issue.)
Cordillera Broad Coalition v. Commission on Audit
Cortes, J. 29 January 1990
SV:EO 220 was issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers. Its main function
is to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the region. In
these consolidated petitions, the constitutionality of EO 220 is assailed on the primary ground
that it pre-empts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress and the creation of the
autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the act through a plebiscite.
The SC upheld the constitutionality of EO 220. It found that EO 220 did not create the
autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution, but merely provided for transitory
measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act. EO 220 merely created a region
covering a specified area for administrative purposes.

FACTS:
- In these consolidated petitions, the constitutionality of EO 220, dated July 15, 1987, which
created the Cordillera Administrative Region, is assailed on the primary ground that it pre-empts
the enactment of an organic act by the Congress and the creation of the autonomous region in
the Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the act through a plebiscite.
- EO 220 was issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers under Art. XVIII,
Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution. Its main function is to coordinate the planning and
implementation of programs and services in the region, particularly to coordinate with the LGUs
as well as with the executive departments of the National Government in the supervision of field
offices. EO 22s last Whereas clause provides:
WHEREAS, pending the convening of the first Congress and the enactment of the organic
act for a Cordillera autonomous region, there is an urgent need, in the interest of national
security and public order, for the President to reorganize immediately the existing
administrative structure in the Cordilleras to suit it to the existing political realities therein
and the Government's legitimate concerns in the areas, without attempting to pre-empt
the constitutional duty of the first Congress to undertake the creation of an autonomous
region on a permanent basis.
- During the pendency of the case, RA 6766, entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region: was enacted and signed into law. The Act recognizes the CAR and
the offices and agencies created under EO 220 and its transitory nature is reinforce in Art. XXI of
RA 6766.
ISSUE/REASONING:
Is EO 220 unconstitutional? NO, it is not.
1) EO 220 actually envisions the consolidation and coordination of the delivery of services of line
departments and agencies of the National Government in the areas covered by the
administrative region as a preparatory step to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras.
It does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely
provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act.
Petitioners are of the view that EO 220, as a capitulation to the Cordillera Peoples Liberation
Army of Balweg, is unsound, but the Court cannot inquire into the wisdom of the measures taken
by the President.
2) The Constitution provides for a basic structure of government in the autonomous region
composed of an elective executive and legislature and special courts. EO 220 did not establish
an autonomous regional government. It merely created a region covering a specified area,
for administrative purposes.
The bodies created by EO220 do not supplant the existing local government structure, nor are
they autonomous government agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an umbrella
that brings together existing local governments, the agencies of the National Government, the
tribes, and NGOs to spur development.
3) RA 6658, creating the Cordillera Regional Consultative Commission, was passed.
Subsequently, RA 6766, the organic act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region was passed into
law. A plebiscite for the approval of the organic act, to be conducted, shortly, shall complete the
process outlined in the Constitution.
EO 220, meanwhile has been in effect for more than 2 years, and the autonomous region is still
to be created, showing a the lack of basis of petitioners assertion that EO220 was a shortcut for

the creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras.

4) EO 220 did not create a new territorial and political subdivision or merge existing ones into a
larger subdivision. The CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It
does not have a separate juridical personality unlike provinces, cities and municipalities.
The CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and
services in the covered areas. It is in the same genre as the administrative regions created under
the Reorganization plan. It is, more than anything else, a regional coordinating agency of the
National Government.
5) The creation of the CAR did not contravene the constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy
for the provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao, and Mountain Province) and city
(Baguio) which compose CAR.
The constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution (Art. X, Sec. 2) refers to the
administrative autonomy of local government units, or the decentralization of government
authority.
On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras,
contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy.
The Car, however, is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for
political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of transforming a
group of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying administrative autonomy
into an autonomous region vested with political autonomy.
Petitioners have failed to show how the creation of the CAR has actually diminished the local
autonomy of the covered provinces and city. Pure speculation and a resort to probabilities are
insufficient to cause the invalidation of EO 220.
PETITION DISMISSED.
MMDA v Bel-Air Village Association
March 27, 2000
Puno, J.

Short version: MMDA ordered the BAVA to open Neptune Street to the public. BAVA assailed this,
on the ground that MMDA had no such authority. The CA and SC ruled in favor of BAVA. MMDA
does not have legislative authority nor police power. It is not a political unit. It has less powers
than its predecessor, the Metro Manila Council. All its functions are administrative. The
SangguniangPanlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the
opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal.

Facts:

BAVA received from the MMDA a notice requesting it to open Neptune Street to public
vehicular traffic. It was all apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from
the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
BAVA filed an action against MMDA for ainjunction. A TRO was issued.
The RTC denied the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
The CA issued the preliminary injunction, but subsequently ruled in favor of BAVA, finding that
MMDA had no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road.
The authority is with the City Council of Makati.

Issue: Does the MMDA have authority to open a private road inside a private residential
subdivision to public traffic? NO

Ratio:
1) Neptune Street is owned by respondent BAVA. It is a private road inside Bel-Air Village. It runs
parallel to Kalayaan Avenue, a national road open to the general public. Dividing the 2 streets
is a concrete perimeter wall approximately 15 feet high. Both ends of Neptune Street are
guarded by iron gates.
2) MMDA bases its authority on the fact that it is an agent of the state endowed with police
power in the delivery of basic services to Metro Manila. One of these services is traffic
management. It claims that there is no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance
opening Neptune St. to the public.
3) Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units. There
are12 cities and 5 municipalities, namely, the cities of Caloocan, Manila, Mandaluyong,
Makati, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon, Muntinlupa, Las Pinas, Marikina, Paranaque and Valenzuela, and
the municipalities of Malabon, ,Navotas, , Pateros, San Juan and Taguig.
4) With the passage of Republic Act (R. A.) No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared
as a "special development and administrative region" and the Administration of "metro-wide"
basic services affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the
MMDA
5) "Metro-wide services" are those "services which have metro-wide impact and transcend local
political boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it would not be viable for said
services to be provided by the individual local government units comprising Metro Manila.
6) These metro-wide services are:
a. Development planning;
b. Transport and traffic management;
c. Solid waste disposal and management;
d. Flood control and sewerage management;
e. Urban renewal, zoning and land use planning, and shelter services;
f. Health and sanitation, urban protection and pollution control; and
g. Public safety.
7) The basic service of transport and traffic management includes transport and traffic
management which include the formulation, coordination, and monitoring of policies,
standards, programs and projects to rationalize the existing transport operations,
infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares, and promotion of safe and convenient
movement of persons and goods; provision for the mass transport system and the institution
of a system to regulate road users; administration and implementation of all traffic
enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs, including
the institution of a single ticketing system in Metropolitan Manila.
8) The implementation of the MMDAs plans, programs and projects is undertaken by the local
government units, national government agencies, accredited peoples organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector as well as by the MMDA itself. For this

purpose, the MMDA has the power to enter into contracts, memoranda of agreement and
other cooperative arrangements with these bodies for the delivery of the required services
within Metro Manila.
9) The governing board of the MMDA is the Metro Manila Council. The Council is composed of the
mayors of the component 12 cities and 5 municipalities, the president of the Metro Manila
Vice-Mayors League and the president of the Metro Manila Councilors League. The Council is
headed by a Chairman who is appointed by the President and vested with the rank of cabinet
member.
10)
As the policy-making body of the MMDA, the Metro Manila Council approves metro-wide
plans, programs and projects, and issues the necessary rules and regulations for the
implementation of said plans; it approves the annual budget of the MMDA and promulgates
the rules and regulations for the delivery of basic services, collection of service and
regulatory fees, fines and penalties.
11)
The scope of the MMDAs function is limited to the delivery of those 7 services. Its powers
are limited to formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration.
There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative
power.
12)
Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the
LGUs, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the
inhabitants of Metro Manila.
13)
All its functions are administrative in nature. " It is an agency created for the purpose of
laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies,
peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the
efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area.
14)
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the
process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide
services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of the local government
units concerning purely local matters.
15)
The 2 Sangalang cases do not apply in this case. Why?
a. Sangalang involved zoning ordinances passed by the municipal council of Makati and the
Metro Manila Commission (MMC). In this case, the basis for the proposed opening of
Neptune Street is contained in the notice sent to BAVA, through its president. The notice
does not cite any ordinance or law, either by the SangguniangPanlungsod of Makati City
or by the MMDA, as the legal basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street.
b. The MMDA is not the same entity as MMC. MMC had greater powers. The MMC was the
central government of Metro Manila for the purpose of establishing and administering
programs providing services common to the area.
i. The MMC was the central government of Metro Manila. It had power to enact or
approve ordinances, resolutions, and fix penalties. Thus, it had legislative powers as
well as police powers. Whatever legislative powers the component cities and
municipalities had were all subject to review and approval by the MMC.
16)
When the MMA was created, the powers and functions of the MMC were devolved to the
MMA. However, not all powers and functions were passed on.
17)
The MMAs power was limited to the "delivery of basic urban services requiring
coordination in Metropolitan Manila." The MMAs governing body, the Metropolitan Manila
Council, although composed of the mayors of the component cities and municipalities, was
merely given the power of:
a. Formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination and
consolidation; and
b. Promulgation of resolutions and other issuances, approval of a code of basic services and
the exercise of its rule-making power
18)
Under the 1987 Constitution, the LGUs became primarily responsible for the governance of
their respective political subdivisions. The MMAs jurisdiction was limited to addressing
common problems involving basic services that transcended local boundaries. It did not have

legislative power. It merely provided local governments with technical assistance and
advice.
19)
Any semblance of legislative power the MMDA had was confined to a "review [of]
legislation proposed by the local legislative assemblies to ensure consistency among local
governments and with the comprehensive development plan of Metro Manila," and to "advise
the local governments accordingly.
20)
The MMDA is not a political unit. There is no authority to enact ordinances and regulations
for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. It not even a special metropolitan
political subdivision, which also requires a plebiscite.
21)
The power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate
administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDAs functions. There is
no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the
inhabitants of the metropolis.
22)
It is still the LGUs that possess legislative power and police power.
23)
The SangguniangPanlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution
ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is
illegal.
CA decision affirmed.

MMDA v. Dante O. Garin

Date: April 15, 2005
Ponente: Chico-Nazario
Digested by: Mandee
The case in a nutshell: Petitioner Garin (a lawyer) was issued a Traffic Violation Receipt and his
drivers license was confiscated for illegal parking. He filed a complaint with application for
prelim injunction before the RTC. He assailed the constitutionality of Sec. 5(f), R.A. No. 7924
(which defines the MMDAs powers and functions), claiming that it violated the Constitutions due
process clause and prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority. RTC ruled in
favor of Garin: directed the MMDA to return his drivers license and desist from confiscating
drivers licenses without first giving the driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate
proceeding. MMDA filed petition with SC. While the case was pending, MMDA issued new
Memorandum Circular which rendered case moot and academic, but SC discussed MMDAs
functions and powers anyway for future reference. A license to operate a motor vehicle is a
privilege that the state may withhold in the exercise of its police power. The MMDA is NOT vested
with police power; its functions are administrative in nature. To interpret Sec. 5(f), R.A. No. 7924
as granting the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses without
need of any other legislative enactment is an UNAUTHORIZED exercise of police power. But Sec.
5(f), R.A. No. 7924 grants the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and
regulations., so where theres a traffic law or regulation validly enacted, the MMDA is duty-bound
to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport
and traffic management, as well as the administration and implementation of all traffic
enforcement operations/engineering services/education programs.
Facts:
On August 5, 1995, petitioner Dante O. Garin (a lawyer) was issued a Traffic Violation
Receipt (TVR) and his drivers license was confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara
St., Binondo, Manila. The following statements were printed on the TVR:
o You are hereby directed to report to the MMDA Traffic Operations Center, Port
Area, Manila, after 48 hours from date of apprehension for disposition/appropriate

action thereon. Criminal case shall be filed for failure to redeem license after 30
days.
o Valid as temporary drivers license for 7 days from date of apprehension.
On September 12, 1995 (after his letter to then-MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreto received
no reply), Garin filed a complaint with application for preliminary injunction before the
Paraaque RTC.
o He assailed the constitutionality of Sec. 5(f), R.A. No. 7924 (AN ACT CREATING
THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEFINING ITS
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES), claiming that it:
Violates the due process clause of the Constitution - grants the MMDA
unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting
a judicial determination of the validity of the deprivation
Violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative
authority allows the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified, and therefore
unlimited, fines and other penalties on erring motorists
o Garin contended that absent any implementing rules from the Metro Manila Council
(MMC), the TVR and the confiscation of his license have no legal basis.
RTC ruled in favor of Garin. It made the temporary writ of prelim injunction (issued earlier)
permanent, and directed the MMDA to return his drivers license and desist from
confiscating drivers license without first giving the driver the opportunity to be heard in
an appropriate proceeding.
o There was no quorum during MMCs First Regular Meeting, so the MMDA
Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-01 authorizing confiscation of drivers licenses
upon issuance of a TVR is void ab initio.
o The summary confiscation of a drivers license without first giving the driver an
opportunity to be heard, depriving him of a property right (drivers license) without
due process, and not filing in court the complaint of supposed traffic infraction cant
be justified by any legislation, hence its unconstitutional.
MMDA filed a petition before the SC.
On August 12, 2004, the MMDA, through its new Chairman Bayani Fernando, implemented
Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004, which rendered the MMDAs pending case
moot and academic. The new Memorandum Circular outlined the procedures for the use of
the Metropolitan Traffic Ticket (MTT) scheme as follows:
o Motorists are issued an MTT, which can be paid at any Metrobank branch.
o Traffic enforcers cant confiscate drivers licenses as a matter of course in cases of
traffic violations.
o All motorists with unredeemed TVRs are given 7 days from the date of
implementation of the new system to pay their fines and redeem their license or
vehicle plates.
Even though the new Memorandum Circular rendered the MMDAs pending case moot and
academic, the MMDA might re-implement the old Memorandum Circular or any other
scheme which would entail confiscating drivers licenses. So the SC decided to discuss the
MMDAs functions and powers for future reference.

Issue: WON Sec. 5(f), R.A. No. 7924 is unconstitutional MOOT AND ACADEMIC
Held: Petition DISMISSED.
Ratio:
1. A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state may withhold in the
exercise of its police power, in the interest of the public safety and welfare, subject to the
procedural due process requirements.
a. Philippine jurisprudence: Pedro v. Provincial Board of Rizal on the license to operate
cockpits, Tan v. Director of Forestry and Oposa v. Factoran on timber licensing

agreements, and Surigao Electric Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Surigao, on a legislative

franchise to operate an electric plant
b. American jurisprudence (State ex. Rel. Sullivan, Commonwealth v. Funk): its the
legislature, in the exercise of police power, which has the power and responsibility
to regulate how and by whom motor vehicles may be operated on the state
highways
2. The MMDA is NOT vested with police power.
a. MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.: R.A. No. 7924 does NOT grant the MMDA
with police power, let alone legislative power; all its functions are ADMINISTRATIVE
in nature.
i. Police power is vested by the Constitution in the legislature. Having been
lodged primarily in the legislature, it cant be exercised by any group/body of
individuals not possessing legislative power.
ii. The legislature may delegate police power. In the Local Government Code of
1991, Congress delegated police power to LGUs, i.e. the provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays, which exercise police power through their
respective legislative bodies.
iii. Clearly, the MMDA isnt a political unit of government. The power delegated
to the MMDA is that given to the MMC to promulgate administrative rules and
regulations in the implementation of the MMDAs functions.
iv. The powers of the MMDA are limited to the ff. acts: formulation, coordination,
regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of
policies, installation of a system and administration. Its NOT empowered to
enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. Its an agency created for the
purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national
government agencies, peoples organizations, NGOs, and the private sector
for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast
metropolitan area.
b. To interpret Sec. 5(f), R.A. No. 7924 as granting the MMDA the power to confiscate
and suspend or revoke drivers licenses without need of any other legislative
enactment is an UNAUTHORIZED exercise of police power.
3. Sec. 5(f), R.A. No. 7924 grants the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and
regulations.
a. Sec. 5(f), R.A. No. 7924: Functions and Powers of the Metro Manila
Development Authority. The MMDA shall: xxx (f) Install and administer a
single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all
kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or nonmoving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses
in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of
R. A. 4136 and P. D. 1605 to the contrary notwithstanding. For this
purpose, the Authority shall enforce all traffic laws and regulations in
Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center, and may deputize
members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly
licensed security guards, or members of non-governmental organizations
to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to such conditions
and requirements as the Authority may impose; and xxx
b. Where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or those
agencies to whom legislative powers have been delegated (the City of Manila in this
case), the MMDA is NOT precluded, and is in fact duty-bound, to confiscate and
suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and
traffic management, as well as the administration and implementation of all traffic
enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs.
4. The MMDA was intended to coordinate services with metro-wide impact that transcend
local political boundaries or would entail huge expenditures if provided by the individual
LGUs, especially with regard to transport and traffic management. But its efforts in this

respect are limited by its enabling law they must be authorized by a valid
law/ordinance/regulation coming from a legitimate source.
096. Abella v COMELEC77

77G.R. No. 100710 September 3, 1991BENJAMIN P. ABELLA, petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ADELINA Y. LARRAZABAL,
respondents.
G.R. No. 100739 September 3, 1991
ADELINA Y. LARRAZABAL, petitioner, vs.COMMSSION ON ELECTIONS and SILVESTRE DE LA CRUZ, respondents.

Sept. 3, 1991
Gutierrez, Jr.
TOPIC: Municipal Officers and Employees; Elective Officials; Qualifications
SV:AdelinaLarrazabal is the wife of a candidate for provincial governor of Leyte who was
disqualified for lack of residence. She filed her own certificate of candidacy in substitution of her
husband. The next day, De la Cruz filed a petition to disqualify her for her alleged false
statements in her certificate of candidacy regarding her residence. Subsequently, Abella, another
candidate for governor, also filed a complaint against her. Later, COMELEC decided to disqualify
Larrazabal as governor and to disallow Abella (who got the 2 nd highest number of votes) from
being proclaimed as governor. Larrazabal insists that she is a resident and a registered voter of
Kananga, Leyte, while De la Cruz and Abella contend that she is a resident and registered voter
of Ormoc City (a component city of the province of Leyte but independent of the province).
Court ruled that Larrazabals disqualification was proper.
RESIDENCE: Larrazabal failed to show that she and her husband maintain separate
residences. Animus revertendi may be inferred from ones acts, activities and utterances.
A citizen may leave for other place for study, practice of vocation, or business, but there is
no showing that Larrazabal left Kananga for these reasons. What is clear is that she
established her residence in Ormoc City with her husband and considers herself a resident
therein. The intention of animus revertendi not to abandon her residence in Kananga,
Leyte is not present.
VOTING: Transfer of registration from Kananga to Ormoc is not supported by records. Her
story is marked by several bizarre circumstances inconsistent with ordinary course of
events.
As a voter in Ormoc City, Larrazabal is prohibited from voting and being voted in elective
offices in the province of Leyte, as mandated by the Constitution and RA 179.
Also, Abella, who obtained the 2nd highest number of votes should not be installed as the
regular governor of Leyte. People voted for Larrazabal during election day and the net
effect is that Abella lost.
FACTS:
Petitioner Benjamin P. Abella was the official candidate of the Liberal Party for provincial
governor of Leyte in the local election held on February 1, 1988.
Private respondent AdelinaLarrazabal is the wife of the original candidate of the Lakas ng
Bansa-PDP-Laban (EmeterioLarrazabal) who was disqualified for lack of residence.
o Jan. 31, 1988: Adelina filed her own certificate of candidacy in substitution of her
husband.
The next day, de la Cruz, a registered voter of Tacloban, filed a petition with the election
supervisor of Leyte to disqualify her for alleged false statements in her certificate of
candidacy regarding her residence.
o Although the petition was immediately transmitted, COMELEC could not take action
because almost all of its members hadnt yet been confirmed by the COA, so De la Cruz
came to the SC, which issued a TRO enjoining the provincial board of canvassers of
Leyte 'from proclaiming AdelinaLarrazabal as the winning candidate for the Office of
the Governor in the province of Leyte, in the event that she obtains the winning margin
of votes in the canvass of election returns of said province.
o Petitioner Abella, after raising objections during the canvass of the election returns,
seasonably elevated them to the COMELEC.
He later filed a complaint with the Law Department of the COMELEC charging respondent
Larrazabal with falsification and misrepresentation of her residence in her Certificate of
Candidacy.
o The Second Division of the COMELEC upheld all the challenged rulings of the provincial
board of canvassers, mostly on the ground that the objection raised were merely formal

and did not affect the validity of the returns or the ballots, and ordered the
proclamation of the winner after completion of the canvass.
o The disqualification case was also dismissed, and was referred to the Law Department.
Upon appeal, the SC affirmed the resolution of the Second Division and ordered the COMELEC
to directly hear and decide the disqualification case against Larrazabal.
o In view of this ruling, the COMELEC lifted its TRO against Adelinas proclamation paving
her assumption to the Office of Governor of Leyte while the hearings in the
disqualification case continued.
Later, the second division of the COMELEC in a 2-1 vote rendered a decision disqualifying
Larrazabal as governor.
o This decision was affirmed by the Commission en banc in a resolution which, at the
same time, disallowed Abellas proclamation as governor of Leyte. Hence these
petitions.
PARTIES ARGUMENTS
The position of petitioners De la Cruz and Abella was that Larrazabal is neither a resident nor
a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte as she claimed but a resident and registered voter of
Ormoc City, a component city of the province of Leyte but independent of the province
pursuant to Section 12, Article X of the Constitution.
On the other hand, respondent Larrazabal maintained that she was a resident and a
registered voter of Kananga, Leyte.
COMELEC ruled against Larrazabal.

ISSUES:
1. Was the COMELECs disqualification of Larrazabal proper on the ground of failing to
meet the residence and voting requirements? (YES)

Larrazabal says: She has complied with the residence requirement and that she is a
registered voter.
o COMELEC erred when it relied on the Family Code provisions to rule that she lacks the
required residence to qualify her to run for the position of governor of Leyte. Under
"the Election Law, the matter of determination of the RESIDENCE is more on the
principle of INTENTION, the animus revertendi rather than anything else."
Her subsequent physical transfer of residence to Ormoc did not erase or remove
her Kananga residence as long as she had the ANIMUS REVERTENDI evidenced
by her continuous and regular acts of returning there in the course of the years,
although she had physically resided at Ormoc City.
o She is a registered voter based on these antecedents:
1) She cancelled her registration in Ormoc City on November 25, 1987
2) she then transferred her registration to Kananga, Leyte on November 25,
1987 by registering thereat
3) she later voted on election day (February 1, 1988) in Kananga, Leyte.
COURT: Regarding the residence requirement, Larrazabaldid not present evidence to show
that she and her husband maintain separate residences; she considers herself a resident of
Ormoc City. The reliance of the FC provisions was proper.
o The Civil Code is clear that '[F]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil
obligations, the domicile of natural persons is the place of their habitual residence.
o As regards the principle of ANIMUS REVERTENDI, the SC has ruled in [Faypon v Quirino]:
... [M]ere absence from one's residence or origin-domicile-to pursue studies, engage in
business, or practice his avocation, is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss
of such residence.' ...The determination of a persons legal residence or domicile
largely depends upon intention which may be inferred from his acts,

activities and utterances.A citizen may leaveto improve his life, and that
includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in business
o In this case, there is no evidence to prove that the petitioner temporarily left her
residence in Kananga, Leyteto pursue any calling, profession or business. What is clear
is that she established her residence in Ormoc City with her husband and considers
herself a resident therein. The intention of animus revertendi not to abandon her
residence in Kananga, Leyte is not present.
Though she occasionally visits Kananga, this does not signify an intention to
continue her residence therein.
As for her assertion that she is a registered voter, the evidence shows that her supposed
cancellation of registration in Ormoc City and transfer of registration in Kananga, Leyte, is not
supported by the records.

As was ruled by the COMELEC, her story is marked by so many bizarre circumstances 78
not consistent with the ordinary course of events or the natural behavior of persons.
o For one, it was only two weeks after the election day that the Registrar certified for the
first time that there were two voters lists, the first without the names of the Larrazabals
and the second, submitted by the Chairman of the Board for Precinct which contained
the spouses Larrazabals' names.
o From the submitted evidence, we can see that petitioner Abellas thesis that
respondent was not registered voter in Kanangashe and her husband being
registered voters in Ormocwas supported.
2. Does the prohibition against the registered voters of independent component cities
and highly urbanized cities from electing provincial officials necessarily mean a
prohibition of the registered voters to be elected as provincial officials? (YES)
o

78 Here are some inconsistencies: application for cancellation of registration by respondent Adelina Y. Larrazabal happened to be
misplaced by a clerk in the Election Registrar's Office for Ormoc City so it was not sent to the Board of Election Inspectors in a
sealed envelope; voter's affidavit was delivered by itself without any endorsement or covering letter from the Election Registrar

Larrazabal says79: Her being a registered voter in Ormoc City was no impediment to her
candidacy for the position of governor of the province of Leyte. (Basically, she argues that
though she cant vote for provincial elective officials, she can still run for a provincial office
ed.)

79

Coz she failed in her contention that she is a resident and a registered voter of Kananga

Relating Sec. 89, RA 179 to Sec. 12, Art IX of the Consti 80, it can be concluded that
Ormoc City when organized was not yet a highly-urbanized city but is, nevertheless,
considered independent of the province of Leyte to which it is geographically attached
because its charter prohibits its voters from voting for the provincial elective officials.

80Section 12, Article X of the Constitution provides:

Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for
provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a province, whose charters
contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials.
Section 89 of Republic Act No. 179 creating the City of Ormoc provides:
Election of provincial governor and members of the Provincial Board of the members of the Provincial Board of the Province of Leyte
The qualified voters of Ormoc City shall not be qualified and entitled to vote in the election of the provincial governor and the
members of the provincial board of the Province of Leyte.

Also, citing Sec. 4, Art. X of the Consti 81, she submits that while a Component City-whose charter prohibits its voters from participating in the elections for provincial
office--is indeed independent of the province, such independence cannot be equated
with a highly urbanized city; rather it is limited to the administrative supervision
aspect, and nowhere should it lead to the conclusion that said voters are likewise
prohibited from running for the provincial offices.
COURT: Larrazabal is wrong, the Consti and RA 179 prohibit voters in Ormoc from voting and
being voted in elective offices in the province of Leyte.
o Section 12, Article X of the Constitution is explicit in that aside from highly-urbanized
cities, component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial
elective officials are independent of the province.In the same provision, it provides for
other component cities within a province whose charters do not provide a similar
prohibition.
Component cities (like Ormoc City) whose charters prohibit their voters from
voting for provincial elective officials are treated like highly urbanized cities
which are outside the supervisory power of the province to which they are
geographically attached.
This independence from the province carries with it the prohibition or mandate
directed to their registered voters not to vote and be voted for the provincial
elective offices.
o Besides, Sec. 89, RA 179 prohibits registered voters of Ormoc City from voting and
being voted for elective offices in the province of Leyte.
Court agrees with COMELEC that "the phrase 'shall not be qualified and entitled
to vote in the election of the provincial governor and the members of the
provincial board of the Province of Leyte' connotes two prohibitions one, from
running for and the second, from voting for any provincial elective official."
Larrazabal says: Such interpretation is "wrong English" since nowhere in the provision is there
any reference to a prohibition against running for provincial elective office.
o If the prohibition to run was indeed intended, the provision should have been phrased
"Shall not be qualified TO RUN in the election FOR provincial governor."
COURT: This interpretation is fallacious.In the case of [Mapa v. Arroyo] the applicable rule of
interpretation is ad proximumantedecens flat relationisiimpediatursentencia. Relative words
refer to the nearest antecedent, unless it be prevented by the context.
o Applying these principles to the instant case, the conjunction and between the phrase
shall not be qualified and entitled to vote refer to two prohibitions as ruled by the
COMELEC in relation to the demonstrative phrase "in the election of the provincial
governor and the members of the provincial board of the Province of Leyte."
o

3. Should Abella, who obtained the 2nd highest number of votes, be installed as regular governor
of Leyte? (NO)

81

Abella says: Since he obtained the 2nd highest number of votes, he should be installed as
the governor of Leyte.
o The Frivaldo and Labo cases were misapplied by the COMELEC. They were petitions
for quo warranto, contesting the eligibility of the respondents AFTER they had been
proclaimed duly elected to the Office from which they were sought to be unseated,
while the case against Larrazabal was seasonably filed during election day.
o Under RA 6646, Sec. 6: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes case for him shall not be
counted.

Art X, Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect
to component cities and municipalities and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays, shall ensure that the
acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.

Since the votes for Larrazabal (who obtained the highest number of votes) are not
considered counted, he should be installed as the regular Governor of Leyte.
COURT says: Petitioners arguments are not persuasive.
o During the election day, Larrazabal was still considered a bona-fide candidate, and
people voted for her believing that she was a qualified candidate for the position of
governor. The net effect is that Abella lost in the election.
o In Frivaldo and Labo, this is precisely the reason why candidates who obtained the
2nd highest number of votes were not allowed to assume the positions vacated.
o What matters is that in the event a candidate for an elected position who is voted
for and who obtains the highest number of votes is disqualified for not possessing
the eligibility requirements at the time of the election as provided by law, the
candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes for the same position
cannot assume the vacated position
o

Petitions DISMISSED.
Digest by Krys X_X
Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo (Petitioner) vs
Commission on Elections; and the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter,
represented by its president, Salvador Nee Estuye (Respondents)

Date: June 23, 1989

Ponente: Cruz, J.

Short Version:
Facts: Frivaldo was elected as governor of Sorsogon. A petition was filed before the Comelec
seeking the nullification of his election on the ground that he is an alien, having been naturalized
in the US. Frivaldo contends that he was forced to become a US citizen in order to protect himself
from the Marcos regime; and that he had actually reacquired his Philippine citizenship when he
participated in the elections.
Held: Frivaldo is not a Philippine citizen. His filing of his COC, and his participation on the election
does not amount to a formal declaration needed for a valid repatriation. Frivaldo should have
availed himself of the proper remedies to reacquire Philippine citizenship. Not being a Philippine
citizen, Frivaldo is not qualified to hold office. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the
Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only.

Facts:
- Juan Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988.
- On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (League), represented by
Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Comelec a petition
for the annulment of Frivaldo's election on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having

been naturalized in the US on January 20, 1983.

- Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the US but argued that he had sought American
citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos; that the case should be dismissed,
being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed within 10 days from his
proclamation, in accordance with Sec 253 of the Omnibus Election Code; and that the League
was not a proper party because it was not a voter and so could not sue under the said section.
- Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the Comelec decided
to set the case for hearing on the merits. Frivaldo's MR was deniend, hence he filed with the SC
the present petition for certiorari and prohibition.
- Frivaldo insists that he is a citizen of the Philippines because his naturalization as an American
citizen was not impressed with voluntariness. In support, he cites the Nottebohm Case, where a
German national's naturalization in Liechtenstein was not recognized because it had been
obtained for reasons of convenience only.
- Frivaldo also argues he could not have repatriated himself before the 1988 elections because
the Special Committee on Naturalization created for the purpose by LOI No. 270 had not yet been
organized then; that his oath in his COC that he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient
act of repatriation; and that his active participation in the 1987 congressional elections had
divested him of American citizenship under US law, thus restoring his Philippine citizenship.

Issue/Reasoning:
Issue: Whether Frivaldo is a Philippine citizen at the time of his election (No)

- Art XI, Sec 1882 of the Constitution requires that all public officials and employees owe the State
and the Constitution "allegiance at all times". Sec 42 of the LGC requires that a candidate for
local elective office must be a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency
where he is running. Sec 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must
be a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Art V,
Sec 1 of the Constitution.
- Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines in his COC. The evidence
shows, however, that he was naturalized as a US citizen in 1983 as per certification from the US
District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado Cortez
of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California. This is admitted by Frivaldo when
he argued that the said naturalization was forced on him as a means to protect himself from the
Marcos regime.
- Court does not agree with Frivaldo. There were many other Filipinos in the US similarly situated,
and some of them subject to greater risk, who did not find it necessary to abandon their
cherished status as Filipinos. Ninoy Aquino heads the impressive list of those Filipinos in exile
who, unlike Frivaldo, held fast to their Philippine citizenship despite the perils of their resistance
to the Marcos regime.
- The Nottebohm case, which invoked the international law principle of effective nationality, is
not applicable. The case dealt with a conflict between the nationality laws of two states as
decided by a third state. No third state is involved in the case at bar. In fact, the US is not even
claiming Frivaldo as its national. The sole question is whether Frivaldo is a Philippine citizen
under our own laws, regardless of other nationality laws. The Philippines can decide this question
alone, conformably with Sec 1 of of the Hague Convention on the Conflict of Nationality Laws
providing that "it is for each State to determine under its law who are its nationals."
- If Frivaldo really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine
citizenship, he should have done so in accordance with our laws of our country. Under CA No. 63,
as amended, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization, or by repatriation.
- Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods. He argues he has reacquired Philippine
citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation, claiming that by actively participating in our
elections, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under US law.
- US law do not concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is between Frivaldo and the US. Even if he
lost his US citizenship, such did not have the effect of automatically restoring his Philippine
citizenship. At best, he became a stateless individual.
- Frivaldo's filing his COC is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions. Philippine citizenship
previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been
convened, it meant that Frivaldo had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by
legislative or judicial proceedings.
- The argument that the petition with the Comelec should be dismissed for tardiness is not welltaken.
82 The online copy of the case stated Sec 9.

- Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only
at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire
tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.
- The Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this
country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by
the people does not excuse the violation of the rule limiting public office only to the citizens of
this country. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed that the candidate was qualified.
- If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this
country only. The status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws,
thus with all the more reason it should be treasured like a pearl of great price. Our country is like
a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms
its prodigal if repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and
unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.

Dispositive:
Petition dismissed. Frivaldo is declared not a citizen of the Philippines, and therefore disqualified
from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to vacate his office and
surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor.

Gutierrez, Jr., J. (Concurring):

- When the higher interests of the State are involved, the public good should supersede any
procedural infinities which may affect a petition filed with the Comelec. The Court should not
allow a person who admits to being an alien to continue holding the office of Governor of any
province.
- The period fixed by law for the filing of a protest whether quo warranto or election contest is
mandatory and jurisdictional. As a rule, the quo warranto petition seeking to annul the
petitioner's election should have been filed within ten days after the proclamation of election
results.
- Concurrence is limited to a clear case of an alien holding an elective public office. Where the
disqualification is based on age, residence, or any of the many grounds for ineligibility, the tenday period should be applied strictly.
- Considering the total lack of any serious grounds for the petitioner's claim of having regained
his Philippine citizenship, concurs in the procedure pro hac vice.
LABO, JR., vs. COMELEC and LARDIZABAL
Cruz, J.
Aug. 1, 1989
Cruz, J.
SV: In a quo warranto proceeding filed by Lardizabal against him, Labo, Jr. asks SC to restrain
COMELEC from looking into the question of his citizenship as qualification for his office as Mayor

of Baguio. He argues that the filing feeand in effect, the pettion for quo warranto itself--was not
filed on time.
Court disagreed with Labos contention, and said that the petition for quo warranto was filed on
time. In any case, what is important is that the filing fee was paid, and whatever delay there may
have been is not imputable to the private respondent's fault or neglect. After this, the Court also
decided to settle the more important issue involving Labos citizenship in order to settle the
dispute and because it affects public interest.

There were 2 conflicting previous rulings on Labos citizenship. COMELEC ruled that he was
a Filipino citizen, while the Commission on Deportation said that he was an Australian
Citizen. The COMELEC decision must be reversed because it is baseless. It ignored several
circumstances *see below* which pointed to his Australian citizenship.
Labo became an Australian citizen not simply because he married an Australian, but
because he underwent a process of naturalization in which he declared in an oath that he
renounces his allegiance to the Philippines. Even assuming that his naturalization was
annulled after his marriage was declared void, that circumstance does not automatically
restore his Philippine citizenship. Labo was not a Filipino citizen or voter which disqualified
him from running as mayor.
Despite the fact that he was elected as mayor, the electorate had no power to permit a
foreigner to preside over them as mayor of their city because the qualifications for such
office is prescribed by the LGC and Consti.

FACTS:

Labo Jr. asks SC to restrain the COMELEC from looking into the question of citizenship as
qualification for his office as Mayor of Baguio City.
o He says the allegation that he is a foreigner is not the issue, and that the issue is
whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction to inquire into this matter since the petition
for quo warranto against him was not filed on time.
His argument is based on the tardiness of the payment of filing fee worth P300.00, which he
contends is indispensable.
o Labo says that the fee (and in effect, the petition) was filed beyond the reglementary
period.
He was proclaimed as mayor-elect of Baguio City, on January 20, 1988. The
petition for quo warranto was filed by the private respondent on January 26,
1988, but no filing fee was paid on that date. This fee was finally paid on
February 10, 1988, or 21 days after his proclamation. As the petition by itself
alone was ineffectual without the filing fee, it should be deemed filed only when
the fee was paid.
The reglementary period as provided for in the Omnibus Election Code (Sec. 253)
is within 10 days after the proclamation of the result of the election.
The Procedural Rules of the COMELEC say that a filing fee is required to give due
course to the petition for quo warranto and the case of [Manchester v CA] holds
that the payment of the filing fee
Lardizabal denies the filing fee was paid out of time. In fact, says that it was filed ahead of
time.
o When he filed his Petition for Quo Warranto with Prayer for Immediate Annulment of
Proclamation and Restraining Order or Injunction on Jan. 26, the COMELEC treated it as
a pre-proclamation controversy. No docket fee was collected although it was offered.
It was only on Feb 8 that COMELEC decided to treat his petition as one solely for
quo warranto, serving him notice on Feb 10. He paid the filing fee on that date.
o Besides, during the period when the COMELEC regarded his petition as preproclamation controversy, the time for filing an election protest or quo warranto was
suspended under the Omnibus Election Code.

Also, the Procedural Rules of COMELEC became effective only on Nov. 15, 1988 and
could not retroact to Jan. 26, 1988 when he filed his petition.
Labo says that even if the Omnibus Election Code did not require it, the payment of filing fees
was still necessary under previous COMELEC Resolutions 1996 and 1450 promulgated on Jan
12, 1988 and 1980, respectively.
o Lardizabal says that the latter resolution was intended for local elections held on Jan
1980 and not the 1988 local election governed by the 1988 resolution.
o Res. 1996 was also not effective by the time he filed the petition since it only took
effect on March 3, 1988, 7 days after its piublication.
o

ISSUES AND REASONING:

1. Was the petition for quo warranto filed on time? (YES)

We agree with the respondents that the fee was paid during the ten-day period as extended
by the pendency of the petition when it was treated by the COMELEC as a pre-proclamation
proceeding which did not require the payment of a filing fee.
o At that, we reach this conclusion only on the assumption that the requirement for the
payment of the fees in quo warranto proceedings was already effective.
o Res 1996 took effect only on March 3, 1998 seven days after its publication, which
means, after the petition was filed.
o [Tanada v Tuvera] Under the due process clause, publication was necessary in order for
resolutions to become effective despite such effectivity clause.
In any event, what is important is that the filing fee was paid, and whatever delay there may
have been is not imputable to the private respondent's fault or neglect.
o Although in [Manchester] the timely payment of the filing fee was a precondition for
the timeliness of the filing of the case itself, under [Sun Insurance v Asuncion] the
Court said that it may allow the payment of the said fee within a reasonable time. In
the event of non-compliance, the case shall be dismissed.
o The same idea is expressed in the Rules of Procedure of COMELEC, which says that if
the fees are not paid, the Commission may refuse to take action thereon until they are
paid and may dismiss the action or the proceeding.

2. Did Labo fulfill the Citizenship requirement in running for public office? (NO)

Court decided to discuss the citizenship of Labo in order to settle the dispute and because it
affects public interest. *skippable*
o The Court noted that while arguing the technical point of dismissing the quo warranto,
the petitioner would at the same time minimize his alleged lack of citizenship as a futile
technicality, BUT the requirement of citizenship as qualification for public office cannot
be so demeaned. What is worse is that it is regarded as an even less important
consideration than the reglementary period the petitioner insists upon.
o Court explained that it has similarly acted in a number of cases (i.e. discussing other
issues in the interest of substantial justice other than those raised by the parties)
[Alger Electric v CA] it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to always
strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or
branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful purpose will be served if
this case is remanded to the trial court only to have its decision raised again to
the Intermediate Appellate Court and from there to this Court.
[Li Siu Liat v Republic] A marked characteristic of our judicial set-up is that where
the dictates of justice so demand ... the Supreme Court should act, and act with
finality.
This course of action becomes all the more justified in the present case where, to
repeat for stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is holding a public office.
Looking at the records, there are 2 administrative decisions on the question of Labos
citizenship.

First was rendered by the COMELEC on May 1982 and found the petitioner to be a
citizen of the Philippines.
This was dismissed without prejudice to the issue of the respondent's
citizenship being raised anew in a proper case."
There was no direct proof that Labo had been formally naturalized as a citizen of
Australia. Such conjecture, which was eventually rejected, was merely inferred
from the fact that he had married an Australian citizen, obtained an Australian
passport, and registered as an alien with the CID upon his return to this country
in 1980.
o The second was rendered by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) on
September 13, 1988, and held that the petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines.
It was uninanimously rendered by Chairman Miriam Defensor-Santiago and 2
other commissioners.
The decision of the CID took into account the official statement of the Australian
Government dated August 12, 1984, through its Consul in the Philippines, that
the petitioner was still an Australian citizen as of that date by reason of his
naturalization in 1976:
Labo, by virtue of his marriage with an Australian citizen, was granted
Australian citizenship.
Any person over the age of 16 years who is granted Australian citizenship
must take an oath of allegiance or make an affirmation of allegiance, and
the wording of the oath of affirmation is Irenouncing all other
allegiance.
Although the marriage was later declared void for being bigamous, Labo
still remained an Australian citizen.
That Labo was still an Australian citizen was affirmed later by the Dept of Foreign
Affairs
The ruling in the COMELEC decision should be rejected as totally baseless.
o Labo does not question the authenticity of the evidence, deny his Australian passport
or his declaration before immigration authorities that he was an alien and registered as
such. He later asked for the change of his status from immigrant to a returning former
Philippine citizen. He also categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia in a
number of sworn statements voluntarily made by him and. even sought to avoid the
jurisdiction of the barangay court on the ground that he was a foreigner
o COMELECs first decision dismisses all these acts as mistakes that did not divest Labo
of his citizenship, but this is incorrect.
There is a claim that the COMELEC decision could not be reversed because of res judicata, but
this must be dismissed also.
o This doctrine does not apply to questions of citizenship, as the Court has ruled in
several cases.
o Moreover, it does not appear that it was properly and seasonably pleaded, in a motion
to dismiss or in the answer, having been invoked only when the petitioner filed his
reply to the private respondent's comment.
o Besides, one of the requisites of res judicata, to wit, identity of parties, is not present in
this case.
Labos contention that his marriage to an Australian National didnt automatically divest him
of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant.There is no claim or finding that he automatically ceased
to be a Filipino because of that marriage.
o He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal
and positive process, simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian
citizen.
o As a condition for such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or
made the Affirmation of Allegiance, both quoted above. Renouncing all other
o

allegiance, he swore "to be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth
the Second, Queen of Australia ..." and to fulfill his duties "as an Australian citizen."
Labo contends that his naturalization in Australia made him only a dual-national and did not
divest him of Philippine citizenship, but the Court did not give merit to Labos argument.
o Such a specious argument cannot stand against the clear provisions of CA No. 63,
which enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost:
(1) naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) express renunciation of citizenship; and
(3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a
foreign country
all of which are applicable to the petitioner.
o It is also worth mentioning in this connection that under Article 4, Sec 5, of the Consti,
"Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law."
Even assuming that his naturalization was annulled after his marriage was declared void, that
circumstance does not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship.
o His divestiture of Australian citizenship does not concern us.
o What we must consider is the fact that he freely and voluntarily rejected Philippine
citizenship and embraced the citizenship of a foreign country.
o The possibility that he may have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims,
does not mean that he has been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.
Labo is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections on Jan 18, 1988, a citizen of the
Philippines.

o
o
o

He hasnt reacquired Philippine Citizenship under any of the methods under CA 63 (as
amended by PD 72583) or any decree of naturalization conferring such citizenship upon
him.
This is why the CID rejected his application for cancellation of his alien certificate of
registration. That is also the reason why his petition to be recognized as a citizen of the
Phils must be rejected.
In fact, he was not even a qualified voter under the Consti because of his alienage. He
is therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City, under Section 42 of the
LGC84

83PD725: (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire Philippine citizenship

through repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270,
and, if their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after
which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and
Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration.

84Sec. 42. Qualifications. An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-three years of
age on election day, a qualified voter registered as such in the barangay, municipality, city or province where he
proposes to be elected, a resident therein for at least one year at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy,

Labo contends that his alleged lack of citizenship is a futile technicality that should not
frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio85, but Court did not agree.
o The people of that locality could not have, even unanimously, changed the
requirements of the LGC and Consti. The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner
to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that
privilege over their countrymen.
o The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may have done so in
the belief that he was qualified only strengthens the conclusion that the results of the
election cannot nullify the qualifications for the office now held by him. These
qualifications are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency,
title to the office itself is deemed forfeited.
o In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting requirements were not subsequently lost
but were not possessed at all in the first place on the day of the election. The petitioner
was disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to
serve as such.
**skippable obiter** The citizen of the Philippines must take pride in his status as such.
Though he can reject this and transfer to another state, he cannot expect to be welcomed
back whenever he wants to.
o Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered after its
renunciation. It may be restored only after the returning renegade makes a formal act
of re-dedication to the country he has abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his
total and exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines.
o This may not be accomplished by election to public office.

3. Can Lardizabal (who obtained 2nd highest number of votes) replace Labo as mayor?
(NO)

The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the
election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio city.
o The [Santos v COMELEC] ruling, in which the second-placer won the elections by
default because the winning candidate was disqualified, should be reversed in favor of
[Geronimo v Ramos] where it was said that the elective offices are filled by those who
have received the highest number of votes.
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be
disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle
the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of
the elective office.
o The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote
the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute
which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the
votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible,
they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.

Labo, Jr. is NOT a citizen of the Phils and must be DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as
Mayor of Baguio. He is ordered to VACATE his office.

85 He said the electorate elected him by a "resonant and thunderous majority." But the Court replied: To be accurate, it was not as loud as all that,
for his lead over the second-placer was only about 2,100 votes. HAHA

Ramon L. Labo, Jr. v COMELEC and Roberto Ortega

Roberto Ortega v COMELEC and Ramon L. Labo, Jr.
July 3, 1992
Bidin, J.

Short version:Labo and Ortega both ran for Mayor of Baguio. Ortega filed a disqualification
proceeding with the Comelec, to cancel Labos certificate of candidacy on the ground that Labo
made a false representation when he stated therein that he is a "natural-born" citizen of the
Philippines, citing the 1989 decision. The Comelec issued a Resolution cancelling Labos
Certificate of Candidacy and ordering the City Election Registrar of Baguio City to delete the
name of Labo from the list of candidates. Labo filed a petition for review with the SC. Ortega also
filed a petition for mandamus with the SC, praying for the implementation of the Comelec
resolution. The SC held that Labo, since the 1989 decision, has not been able to submit a scintilla
of proof to shore his claim that he has indeed reacquired his Philippine citizenship. There are no
supervening events to preclude the application of the 1989 decision. The fact that he was voted
by the electorate is immaterial. However, Ortegas contention that since he was the candidate
garnering the 2nd highest number of votes, he should be declared the Mayor, must fail. The fact is
that the people of Baguio did not choose him as their Mayor. The rule is that the ineligibility of a
candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next
highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be
deemed elected to the office.

Facts:

Ramon Labo, Jr., believing that he was a Filipino citizen, launched his candidacy for mayor of
Baguio City in the May 11, 1992 elections by filing his certificate of candidacy.
Roberto Ortega also filed his certificate of candidacy for the same office.
Shortly after Labo filed his certificate of candidacy, Ortega filed a disqualification proceeding
against Labo before the Comelec, seeking to cancel Labo's certificate of candidacy on the
ground that Labo made a false representation when he stated therein that he is a "naturalborn" citizen of the Philippines.
Summons was issued by the Comelec to Labo, followed by a telegram, but Labo did not
respond and did not file an Answer.
Ortega filed a motion to declare Labo in default for failure to file his Answer.
The Comelec issued another order directing the Election Registrar of Baguio City to personally
deliver the summons.
The disqualification case was set for reception of evidence. At the hearing, Ortega presented
the decision of the SC in Labo v. Comelec (1989 decision) declaring Labo not a citizen of the
Philippines. Labo, though represented by counsel, did not present any evidence.
It was only on May 5, 1992 that Labo submitted his Answer claiming Filipino citizenship.
The Comelec issued a Resolution in favor of Ortega. It cancelled Labos Certificate of
Candidacy and ordered the City Election Registrar of Baguio City to delete the name of Labo
from the list of candidates.
Labo filed a motion to stay implementation of said resolution until after he shall have raised
the matter before the SC.

The Comelec issued an Order, resolving that the decision promulgated on May 9, 1992
disqualifying respondent Ramon L. Labo, Jr., shall become final and executory only after five
(5) days from promulgation pursuant to Rule 18, Section 13, Paragraph (b) of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure. Accordingly, respondent (Labo) may still continue to be voted upon as
candidate for City Mayor of Baguio City on May 11, 1992 subject to the final outcome of this
case in the event the issue is elevated to the Supreme Court either on appeal or certiorari.
The Comelec also resolved, motu proprio to suspend the proclamation of Labo in the event he
wins in the elections for the City Mayor of Baguio.
After the Resolution was issued and before it attained finality, the electorate of Baguio voted
for Labo.
Labo filed a petition for review with the SC, with a prayer for a TRO, to set aside the resolution
of Comelec; to render judgment declaring him as a Filipino citizen; and to direct Comelec to
proceed with his proclamation in the event he wins in the contested elections.
Ortega also filed before the Comelec an urgent motion for the implementation of its resolution
cancelling Labo's certificate of candidacy.
After an exchange of pleadings, the Comelec denied Ortega's motion in view of the pending
case earlier filed by Labo of the same nature before the SC.
Ortega filed a petition for mandamus praying for the implementation of the Comelec's
resolution.
o Ortega argues that respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it
refused to implement its resolution notwithstanding the fact that said resolution
disqualifying Ramon Labo has already become final and executory.

Issues:
1) Should Labo be declared a Filipino citizen? NO
2) Can Ortega, as the candidate with the 2 nd higest number of votes, be declared the Mayor? NO
Ratio:
As to Labos citizenship
1) Labo contends that he can prove his Filipino citizenship, on the ff. grounds:
a. That there was lack of trial on the merits as well as the lack of opportunity to be heard in
the 1989 Labo v. Comelec decision.
b. He cited the 1980 US case of Vance v. Terrazas, wherein it was held that in proving
expatriation, an expatriating act an intent to relinquish citizenship must be proved by a
preponderance of evidence.
c. No finding was made either by the Commission on Immigration or the Comelec as
regards his specific intent to renounce his Philippine citizenship.
d. The abbreviated proceedings before the Comelec denied him adequate opportunity to
present a full-dress presentation of his case. Because only 1 day was set for hearing, 2
days latter, the hearist was set, and instead of holding a hearing, the Comelec issued the
questioned resolution.
2) But the SC reminded Labo that summons were issued by the Comelec as early as March 27,
1992 followed by a telegram on April 1, 1992. But Labo chose to ignore them. After Ortega
filed a motion to declare petitioner Labo in default, the Comelec Over-extended him the
benefit of due process, by directing the Acting City Election Registrar of Baguio to personally
serve the summons.
3) The alleged delay in the resolution of the proceedings before the Comelec can only be
attributed to Labo and no one else.
4) When Labo filed his verified Answer, he claimed that:
a. He is a Filipino citizen and continue to maintain and preserve his Filipino citizenship;

b. He does not hold an Australian citizenship;

c. The doctrine of res judicata does not apply in citizenship; and
d. "Existing facts support his continuous maintenance and holding of Philippine citizenship"
and "supervening events now preclude the application of the ruling in the Labo v.
Comelec case and the respondent (Labo) now hold and enjoys Philippine citizenship.
5) However, no evidence has been offered by Labo to show what these existing facts and
supervening events are to preclude the application of the Labo decision.
6) The Comelec is bound by the final declaration that respondent is not a Filipino citizen.
Consequently, respondent's verified statement in his certificate of candidacy that he is a
"natural-born" Filipino citizen is a false material representation."
7) Even in the SC, Labo still failed to submit a scintilla of proof to prove his claim that he has
reacquired his Philippine citizenship.
8) Thus, the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion in cancelling Labo's certificate of
candidacy and declaring that he is NOT a Filipino citizen pursuant to the ruling in the 1989
case of Labo v. Comelec.
9) Labo claims, however, that Sec. 72of the Omnibus Election Code "operates as a legislatively
mandated special repatriation proceeding" and that it allows his proclamation as the winning
candidate since the resolution disqualifying him was not yet final at the time the election was
held.
10)
However, the SC found Labo's strained argument quixotic and untenable.
11)
Sec. 72 of the Omnibus Election Code has already been repealed by Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646
(The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987)86

86 Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or the Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

12)
The Comelec can legally suspend the proclamation of petitioner Labo, his reception of the
winning number of votes notwithstanding, especially since Labo failed to present any
evidence before the Comelec to support his claim of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
13)
Labos status has not changed. He was disqualified as a candidate for being an alien. His
election does not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship, the possession of which is
an indispensable requirement for holding public office (Sec. 39, Local Government Code).
14)
Labo also raised a new argument with the SC. He claims that he has reacquired his Filipino
citizenship by citing his application for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship filed before the
Office of the Solicitor General pursuant to PD 725 and Letter of Instruction No. 270.
15)
However, the Special Committee on Naturalization had yet acted upon said application for
repatriation. In the absence of any official action or approval by the proper authorities, a mere
application for repratriation, does not, and cannot, amount to an automatic reacquisition of
the applicant's Philippine citizenship.
As to whether Ortega should be declared the winning candidate
16)
Ortega submits that since the SC did not issue a TRO against the Comelec resolution
cancelling Labo's certificate of candidacy, said resolution has already become final and
executory.
17)
Ortega further submits that as a result of such finality, the candidate receiving the next
highest number of votes should be declared Mayor of Baguio City.
18)
The SC agrees with the first submission. When Labo filed his petition on May 15, 1992, the
May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling his certificate of candidacy had
already become final and executory a day earlier, or on May 14, 1992, since the resolution
was received by Labo on the same day it was promulgated.

19)
This is based on Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code 87 and Sec. 3, Rule 39 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure88.
20)
Since the resolution acquired finality, the SC must rule against Labos proclamation as
Mayor of Baguio City.
21)
One of the qualifications of an elective official is that he must be a citizen of the
Philippines, under Section 39 of the LGC.
22)
Undoubtedly, Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the fundamental qualification for the
contested office. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective
office.
23)
The fact that he was elected by the majority of the electorate is immaterial.
24)
As held in Frivaldo v. Comelec: The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon
does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and
employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective
office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through
the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this
case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when
the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the
Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all
fealty and fidelity to any other state.
25)
HOWEVER, the disqualification of Labo does not entitle the candidate (Ortega) receiving
the next highest number of votes to be proclaimed as the winning candidate for mayor of
Baguio City.
26)
While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the office of city
mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign will.
27)
Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office of mayor in the belief that
he was then qualified to serve the people of Baguio City and his subsequent disqualification
does not make respondent Ortega the mayor-elect.
28)
Abella v Comelec applies in this case.
29)
Thus, even if Ortega originally filed a disqualification case with the Comelec seeking to
deny due course to Labo's candidacy, the same did not deter the people of Baguio City from
voting for Labo, who, by then, was allowed by the respondent Comelec to be voted upon. At
that time, the resolution was not yet final and executory.
30)
Labo v Comelec was again heavily quoted as to why the candidate obtaining the second
highest number of votes cannot be declared the winner.
31)
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not
entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared
elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
32)
It is incorrect to argue that since a candidate has been disqualified, the votes intended for
the disqualified candidate should, in effect, be considered null and void. This would amount to
disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides.
33)
Whether or not the candidate whom the majority voted for can or cannot be installed,
under no circumstances can a minority or defeated candidate be deemed elected to the
office. Surely, the 12,602 votes cast for Ortega is not a larger number than the 27,471 votes
cast for Labo

87 Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy xxx xxx xxx
(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the

88 Sec. 3. Decisions final after five days. Decisions in

pre-proclamation cases and petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy, to declare a
candidate as nuisance candidate or to disqualify a candidate, and to postpone or suspend elections shall become
final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days from their promulgation, unless restrained by the Supreme
Court.

34)
The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in law of a
candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would
nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate
may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying
their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining
the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected.
35)
But it has not been shown that Labo was notoriously known as an ineligible candidate. On
the contrary, Labo was even allowed by the Comelec to be voted for the office of the city
mayor, since the resolution denying due course to Labo's certificate of candidacy had not yet
become final and subject to the final outcome of this case.
36)
Thus, since Labo is disqualified and Ortega cannot be declared winner, a permanent
vacancy in the contested office has occurred. This should now be filled by the vice-mayor, in
accordance with Sec. 44 of the LGC.
Petitions dismissed.
Frivaldo v. COMELEC89

89
[G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996]JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996]
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.

Date: June 28, 1996

Ponente: Panganiban
The case in a nutshell:
FACTS: Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon for the
May 8, 1995 elections. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with the COMELEC, praying that
Frivaldo be disqualified by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines, and that his COC
be canceled. The COMELEC 2 nd Division granted Lees petition. Frivaldo filed an MR, but it was not
acted upon until after the elections. So his candidacy continued. After the Provincial Board of
Canvassers canvassed the votes, Frivaldo got the highest number of votes while Lee got the 2 nd
highest. Lee filed a supplemental petition with the COMELEC, praying for his proclamation as
Governor. The COMELEC en banc granted Lees petition. Lee was proclaimed governor on June
30, 1995 at 8:30 PM. Frivaldo filed a petition with the COMELEC, praying for the annulment of
Lees proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995 at 2:00 PM, he had taken his oath of
allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines, so he was qualified. The COMELEC 1 st Division granted
Frivaldos petition. Both Lee and Frivaldo filed petitions in the SC, assailing the various
Resolutions that the COMELEC had issued re: their respective petitions.
HELD: Frivaldo is the rightful Governor of Sorsogon. His repatriation was valid and legal. It
seasonably cured his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the office
of Governor. The citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be possessed by an
elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office
to which he has been elected. P.D. No. 725 is in full force and effect up to the present, not having
been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time, and Frivaldos repatriation by
virtue thereof was properly granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the
remedial or curative nature of the law granting him a new right to resume his political status and
the legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of having been forced to give up
his citizenship and political aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his
repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of the date of his application therefor, during the
pendency of which he was stateless, he having given up his U. S. nationality. Thus, in
contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of
the term of office of governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore,
since his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of
Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of said date as well. Lack of the citizenship
requirement is not a continuing disability or disqualification to run for and hold public office. The
COMELEC has the authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for annulment of
proclamations. (Other issues were also discussed and are included in the digest.)
Facts:
1) Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in
the May 8, 1995 elections.
2) Raul R. Lee filed a petition with the COMELEC, praying that Frivaldo be disqualified from
seeking or holding any public office or position, by reason of not yet being a citizen of the
Philippines (he was a U.S. citizen) and that his COC be canceled.
3) On May 1, 1995, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a Resolution granting Lees
petition. It declared Frivaldo disqualified from running for Governor on the ground that he
was not a citizen of the Philippines, and canceled his COC.
4) Frivaldo filed an MR, but it was not acted upon until after the elections.
5) Frivaldos candidacy continued, and he was voted for during the elections.
6) The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns. The
Certificate of Votes showed the number of votes obtained by each of the 4 candidates for
Governor. Frivaldo got the highest number of votes, while Lee got the 2 nd highest.
CANDIDATE
NUMBER OF VOTES
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr.
51,060
Juan G. Frivaldo
73,440
Raul R. Lee
53,304
Isagani P. Ocampo
1,925

7) Lee filed a supplemental petition with the COMELEC, praying for his proclamation as the
duly-elected Governor.
8) On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a Resolution granting Lees petition.
It directed the Provincial Board of Canvassers to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming
Lee as the winning candidate for Governor.
9) Lee was proclaimed Governor of Sorsogon on June 30, 1995 at 8:30 PM.
10)
Frivaldo filed a petition with the COMELEC, praying for the annulment of Lees
proclamation, and for his own proclamation. In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to
the 2 Labo v. COMELEC cases, it should be the incumbent Vice Governor, Oscar G. Deri,
who should be proclaimed Governor, not Lee.

a. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 PM, he had taken his oath of allegiance
as a citizen of the Philippines, after his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 90,
which he had filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994,
had been granted. Thus, by the time he received the COMELEC order directing the
Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim Lee as Governor, there was no more
legal impediment to his (Frivaldos) proclamation.
11)
The COMELEC 1st Division granted Frivaldos petition, and promulgated a Resolution
holding that Lee was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected Governor, as he
had not garnered the highest number of votes. It was Frivaldo who was entitled. He had
garnered the highest number of votes, and was qualified to hold the office of Governor
after reacquiring his citizenship by repatriation.
12)
Lee filed a MR, but this was denied by the COMELEC en banc in another Resolution.
13)
Lee filed a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 for certiorari and preliminary
injunction in the SC, to review and annul the COMELEC Resolutions. He argued:
a. Frivaldos initiatory petition was so insufficient in form and substance that, in effect,
the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and deciding it.
b. Frivaldos judicially declared disqualification was a continuing condition and
rendered him ineligible to run for, be elected to, and hold the office of Governor.
c. Frivaldos alleged repatriation was neither valid nor retroactive as to cure his
ineligibility and qualify him to hold the office of Governor.
d. The Labo doctrine fully supports the validity of Lees proclamation as duly-elected
Governor.
14)
Frivaldo also filed a petition in the SC, likewise assailing the COMELEC Resolutions,
but on a different ground: that under Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC
had no jurisdiction to issue the Resolutions since they were not rendered within the
period allowed by law, i.e. not later than 15 days before the election.
Sec. 78. Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may b
by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained ther
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not late
twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be de
after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election."
15)
The SC consolidated Lee and Frivaldos petitions.
Issue:
1) Who is the rightful Governor of Sorsogon? FRIVALDO.
a. Was Frivaldos repatriation valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of
citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the office of Governor? If not,
may it be given retroactive effect? If so, from when? IT WAS VALID AND LEGAL. IT
SEASONABLY CURED HIS LACK OF CITIZENSHIP. IT MAY BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT.
b. Is Frivaldos judicially declared disqualification for lack of citizenship (in the 1988 and
1992 elections) a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to, or hold the
office of Governor in the 1995 elections? NO.
c. Did the COMELEC have jurisdiction over Frivaldos petition, considering that it was not a
pre-proclamation case, an election case, or a quo warranto case? YES.
d. Was Lees proclamation valid? NO.
e. Is Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code mandatory?
Held:
1) Lees petition is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of the respondent
Commission are AFFIRMED.
90
PROVIDING FOR REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAD LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF
NATURAL BORN FILIPINOS

2) Frivaldos petition is also DISMISSED for being moot and academic. In any event, it has no
merit.
Ratio:
1) Frivaldo is the rightful Governor of Sorsogon.
a. Frivaldos repatriation was valid and legal. It seasonably cured his lack of citizenship
as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the office of Governor.
i. The Local Government Code expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a
qualification for elective local officials, including that of Provincial Govenor.

Sec. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the P
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a
the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan,
where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other loc
or dialect. Xxx
ii. Under Philippine law, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress,
by naturalization, or by repatriation.
1. Frivaldo told the SC during the oral arguments that he had tried to
resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress. But the bill allowing
him to do so failed to materialize, despite the endorsement of several
members of the House of Representatives, due to the maneuvers of
his political rivals. On the other hand, his attempt at naturalization
was rejected by the SC because of jurisdictional, substantial, and
procedural defects. Now he claims that he successfully reacquired
citizenship by repatriation under P.D. No. 725.
iii. Lees argument: P.D. No. 725 was effectively repealed. Then-President
Aquino, exercising legislative powers under the Transitory Provisions of the
1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential Decree or
Executive Issuances, as the same poses an issue policy best left to the
judgment of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution. In a
memorandum to the Special Committee on Naturalization constituted for
purposes of P.D. No. 725, she directed them to cease and desist from
undertaking proceedings within their functional area of responsibility. SC
DISAGREED.
1. The memorandum cannot be construed as a law sanctioning or
authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones. No express repeal was made because the
memorandum did not categorically state that P.D. 725 was being
repealed. On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction
that repeals by implication are not favored, unless it is convincingly
and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clearly
repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist.
2. The memorandum cannot be regarded as a legislative enactment. Not
every pronouncement of the Chief Executive, even under the Transitory
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, can be regarded as an exercise of
her law-making powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive
policy addressed to the Special Committee.
iv. Lees argument: irregularities attended Frivaldos repatriation proceedings.
Frivaldos application was filed on June 29, 1995 and approved in just 1 day,
on June 30, 1995. This prevented a judicious review and evaluation of the
merits thereof. Also, he claimed that the Special Committee was
reconstituted solely for Frivaldos personal interest. SC DISAGREED.

1. Frivaldo said (and the Solicitor General confirmed) that he filed his
application with the Office of the President on August 17, 1994.
However, the Special Committee was reconstituted only on June 8,
1995. On June 29, 1995, the Special Committee required him to fill up
and submit a form, which he did. Under these circumstances, it could
not be said that there was indecent haste.
2. The Solicitor General explained during the oral argument that there
were many others who applied and were considered for repatriation.
3. Lee was not able to overcome the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty and the presumption of legality in
Frivaldos repatriation. The mere fact that the proceedings were
speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such proceedings
were necessarily tainted. After all, the requirements of repatriation
under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to comply with. Unlike in
naturalization, where an alien covets a first-time entry into Philippine
political life, in repatriation, the applicant is a former natural-born
Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship. In
the case of Frivaldo, he was a natural-born citizen who openly and
faithfully served his country and his province prior to his naturalization
in the U.S. (which he did to escape the Marcos regime).
4. Any contest on the legality of Frivaldos repatriation should have been
pursued before the Special Committee, and, failing there, in the Office
of the President, pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
v. Lees argument: even if Frivaldos repatriation was valid, it could only be
effective as of 2:00 PM on June 30, 1995. However, the citizenship
qualification prescribed by the Local Government Code must exist on the
date of his election, if not when the certificate of candidacy is filed, as the
SC said in the previous Frivaldo v. COMELEC case. Both the Local Government
Code and the 1987 Constitution require that only Philippine citizens can run
and be elected to public office. SC DISAGREED.
1. The statement in the previous case was a mere obiter, as the only
issue was whether Frivaldo's naturalization was valid or not, not the
effective date thereof.
2. Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, an elective local official
must be:
a. A citizen of the Philippines;
b. A registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province where he intends to be elected;
c. A resident therein for at least 1 year immediately preceding the
day of the election;
d. Able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or
dialect.
e. In addition, candidates for the position of governor must be at
least 23 years of age on election day.
3. The law does not specify any particular date or time when the
candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (at least 1
years residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age
(at least 23 years of age on election day).
4. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an
elective public office. The purpose of the citizenship qualification is to
ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation,
shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof.
5. An official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his
proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to
begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995, the

same day the term of office of governor began, he was already

qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office, and to discharge the
functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date.
6. It should be noted that Sec. 39 speaks of qualifications of elective
officials, not of candidates. Why should such qualification be required
at the time of election or at the time of the filing of the certificates of
candidacy?
Such
qualifications
(unless
otherwise
expressly
conditioned, as in the case of age and residence) should thus be
possessed when the elective official begins to govern, i.e., at the time
he is proclaimed and at the start of his term.
vi. An objection raised during oral arguments was that the citizenship
qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate registered as a
voter. After all, Sec. 39, apart from requiring the official to be a citizen, also
specifies that he be a registered voter. And, under the law, a voter must
be a citizen of the Philippines. Therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a
voter, much less a validly registered one, if he was not a citizen at the time of
such registration. SC DISAGREED.
1. If the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to
election, consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter,
then it would not have made citizenship a separate qualification. The
law intended citizenship to be a qualification distinct from being a
voter, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first.
2. The voter requirement was included as another qualification, not to
reiterate the need for nationality, but to require that the official be
registered as a voter in the area or territory he seeks to govern. The
Local Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered
voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registration, not
the actual voting, is the core of this qualification.
3. Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized (and Lee has not disputed) that he
is a registered voter of Sorsogon, his registration as a voter has been
sustained as valid by judicial declaration, and he even voted in the May
8, 1995 elections. Clearly, he is a registered voter in the province
where he intended to be elected.
vii. Another reason why citizenship should be reckoned from the date of
proclamation (and not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the
certificate of candidacy) is because Sec. 253 of the Omnibus Election Code
gives any voter, presumably including the defeated candidate, the
opportunity to question the eligibility of a candidate.
1. This is the only provision of the Omnibus Election Code that authorizes
a remedy (quo warranto) on how to contest before the COMELEC an
incumbents ineligibility arising from failure to meet the qualifications
enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code. Such
remedy can be availed of within 10 days after proclamation of the
winning candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the issue of
ineligibility may be taken cognizance of by the COMELEC.
2. Since, at the time of Lees proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995),
Frivaldo was already a citizen, then he should have been the candidate
proclaimed.
b. Frivaldos repatriation may be given retroactive effect as of the date of his
application therefor. During the pendency of his application, he was stateless,
having given up his U.S. citizenship.
i. General rule: laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided. (Art. 4, Civil Code) But there are exceptions, such as when the
statute is curative or remedial in nature, or when it creates new rights.
ii. P.D. No. 725 creates a new right, and also provides for a new remedy. It
creates a right in favour of Filipino women who had lost their Philippine

citizenship by marriage to aliens, and who could not (under the old law) avail
of repatriation until after the death of their husbands or the termination of
their marital status. P.D. No. 725 gave them the right to re-acquire Filipino
citizenship even during their marital coverture. The statute also provided a
right and remedy in favor of other natural-born Filipinos who had lost their
Philippine citizenship but desired to re-acquire it, because prior to the
promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to undergo
naturalization.
iii. The retroactivity of P.D. 725 (enacted on June 5, 1975) benefits Frivaldo even
if he lost his Filipino citizenship much later (January 20, 1983) and applied for
repatriation even later (August 17, 1994). It is not just P.D. No. 725 itself
which is given retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted under said
law. Thus, Frivaldos repatriation on June 30, 1995 is deemed to have
retroacted to the date of his application therefor, August 17, 1994. The
reason for this is that if it was the intent of the legislative authority that the
law should apply to past events, in order to benefit the greatest number of
former Filipinos possible, then there is all the more reason to have the law
apply retroactively to subsequent events. Being a former Filipino who has
served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of
Philippine laws.
c. Frivaldos judicially declared disqualification for lack of citizenship (in the earlier
Frivaldo v. COMELEC case) is NOT a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be
elected to, or hold the office Governor in the 1995 elections.
i. Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a
person's future status with finality. This is because a person may
subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of
the modes recognized by law for the purpose.
ii. Every time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a
judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally
not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again,
as the occasion demands. (Lee v. Commissioner of Immigration)
d. The COMELEC has jurisdiction over Frivaldos petition.
i. Sec. 2, Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution gives the COMELEC ample power to
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of all elective x x x provincial x x x
officials.
ii. The SC has invariably recognized the COMELECs authority to hear and decide
petitions for annulment of proclamations, such as the present case. However,
this power must be exercised within 10 days following the proclamation.
Since Frivaldo's petition was filed only 6 days after Lees proclamation, the
COMELEC correctly acquired jurisdiction over the same.
e. Lees proclamation was NOT valid.
i. Lee tried to cite the case Labo v. COMELEC to support the validity of his
proclamation, but the SC found that the decision actually supported Frivaldo.
Frivaldo in 1995 is in the same situation as Labo was in 1992. The COMELECs
cancellation of his COC was not yet final on election day as there was a
pending MR, so the COMELEC issued a resolution declaring that he could still
be voted for in the elections.
ii. There is no sufficient evidence presented to show that the electorate of

Sorsogon was fully aware in fact and in law of Frivaldos alleged

disqualification as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety,
i.e. that the voters intentionally wasted their ballots knowing that, in spite of
their voting for him, he was ineligible.
iii. If Labo has any relevance at all, it is that Vice Goveror Deri, and not Lee,
should be proclaimed, since in losing the election, Lee was obviously not the
choice of the people.
iv. Besides, since Frivaldo seasonably re-acquired his citizenship and obtained
the highest number of votes in the 1995 elections, he should be proclaimed.
f.

Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code is NOT mandatory.

i. Frivaldos claim is now moot and academic, inasmuch as the assailed
COMELEC Resolutions are deemed superseded by the subsequent ones
issued which both upheld his election.

ii. At any rate, Sec. 78 is merely directory, as Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646 91
authorizes the COMELEC to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even
after the elections.
ERNESTO S. MERCADO vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
MENDOZA, J.: G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999
cvflores
Short Version:
Facts: Manzano ran for vice-mayor of Makati and obtained the highest number of votes. A
petition was filed to disqualify him alleging that he was a US citizen. Manzano admitted that he
was a US citizen because he was born in the US but said that he is also a Filipino citizen being
born of Filipino parents. COMELEC disqualified Manzano on the ground that the Local Govt Code
disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for any elective position.
Held: Manzano is qualified to run. The phrase dual citizen must be understood as dual
allegiance. Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different
laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states.
Dual citizenship is a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship
of other countries. Persons with dual citizenship are not disqualified to run provided that they
renounce their other citizenship. Manzano by filing his certificate of candidacy has elected his
Philippine citizenship and renounced his US citizenship.

Facts:

Manzano ran for vice mayor of Makati.

A certain Ernesto Mamaril filed a petition for disqualification against Manzano alleging that
Manzano was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the US.
In his answer, Manzano admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of
Immigration but alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born of a Filipino father
and a Filipino mother. He was born in the US and is considered an American citizen under US
laws.
COMELEC granted the petition for disqualification and ordered the cancellation of Manzanos
certificate of candidacy due to his dual citizenship and that according to the Local
Government Code persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective
position.
Manzano filed an MR which remained pending even after the May 11, 1998 election.
In the election, Manzano obtained the highest number of votes with 103,853 votes. The other
candidates, Mercado and Daza obtained 100,894 and 54,275 votes, respectively.
Mercado sought to intervene in the case for disqualification.
The COMELEC board of canvassers tabulated the votes but suspended the proclamation.
COMELEC en banc declared Manzano qualified to run. COMELEC found that Manzano was a
natural born Filipino as both of his parents were Filipino but being born in the USA he also
acquired US citizenship by operation of US laws. At the age of 6, Manzano was brought to the
Philippines using an American passport and his parents registered him as an alien with the
Philippine Bureau of Immigration. COMELEC ruled that Manzano did not lose his Philippine

91
AN ACT INTRODUCING ADDITIONAL REFORMS IN THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

citizenship as he did not denounce it and it was a fact that upon reaching the age of majority
he registered himself as a voter.
COMELEC in ruling in favour of Manzano said that in applying election laws, it would be better
to err in favor of the popular choice than be embroiled in complex legal issues involving
private international law which may well be settled before the highest court.
Mercado filed a petition for certiorari.

Issue:
1. Whether Mercado had a right to bring suit. Yes
2. Whether dual citizenship can be a ground for disqualification. No, provided they elect
Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship.
3. Whether Manzano has elected Philippine citizenship. Yes.
Ruling:
1. Manzano argued that Mercado has no legal interest because he is a defeated candidate who
cannot be proclaimed as Vice-Mayor if Manzano be ultimately disqualified. However the SC
ruled that Mercado had a right to bring the present suit. Mercado sought to intervene in the
proceedings before the proclamation of the results of the election and therefore had an
interest in ousting Manzano from the race. Mercados right to intervene is clear from 6 of
R.A. No. 6646 which provides that when a candidate is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified and is receives the winning number of votes, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong.
2. The phrase dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160 must be understood as referring to "dual
allegiance." For candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons
with dual citizenship. Dual allegiance is more threatening than dual citizenship which is
seldom intentional and, perhaps, never insidious.
Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of
two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Such
a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to
the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Dual
citizenship may arise from several situations including:
a. Those born of a Filipino parent in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
b. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
father's' country such children are citizens of that country;
c. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are considered
citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship.
As pointed out by Bernas, dual citizenship is a reality imposed on us because we have no
control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother.
But whether she is considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond
our control.

Dual allegiance refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some
positive act, loyalty to two or more states. Our Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." In one session in

the 1987 Constitutional Commission, there was a proposition to prohibit or regulate double
citizenship because it implies a double allegiance under a double sovereignty
3. Manzano, in filing his certificate of candidacy has renounce his American citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. The certificate of
candidacy contained the statements that he is a Filipino citizen, that he is not a permanent
resident of or immigrant to a foreign country and that he will support and defend the
constitution of the Philippines and will maintain allegiance thereto. As to the fact that
Manzano is registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration, the SC said that
until the filing of his certificate of candidacy he had dual citizenship. The acts attributed to
him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality. In Aznar v.
COMELEC, the SC said that the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American
does not mean that he is not still a Filipino.
Teodulo M. Coquilla v. The Hon. Commission on Elections and Mr. Neil M. Alvarez
31 July 2002
Mendoza, J.

SHORT VERSION: Teodulo Coquilla was a natural-born Filipino who became a naturalized US
citizen, then later on applied for repatriation and reacquired Filipino citizenship. He stayed in his
birthplace, Oras, Eastern Samar, after taking his oath in Nov. 2000, then filed a certificate of
candidacy for mayor of Oras. He won. After his proclamation, the Comelec cancelled his COC on
the ground of material misrepresentation. The SC held that this was proper. He did not comply
with the 1 year residence requirement under the LGC because he can only be considered a
resident since Nov. 2000, when he reacquired Filipino citizenship. This was only 6 months before
the May 2001 elections. His visits to the Philippines when he was still an American citizen did not
count. Residence under the LGC is understood as domicile, and given the circumstances, his
visits to the Philippines were merely temporary and did not show animus manendi. Hence, the
cancellation of his COC was proper.

FACTS:

Teodulo Coquilla was born on Feb. 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He
grew up and stayed there until 1965, when he joined the US Navy. He was then naturalized
as an American citizen.
o He stayed in the US even after his retirement in 1985. He visited the Philippines
only thrice from 1970-1973 while he was on leave from the Navy.
Oct. 15, 1998: Coquilla came to the Philippines and obtained a residence certificate, but
still made several trips to the US, the last of which was July 6 to Aug. 5, 2000.
Subsequently, he applied for repatriation under RA 8171.
o His application was approved and he took his oath as a Filipino citizen on Nov. 10,
2000.
o Nov. 21, 2000: he applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar.
This was also approved.
o Feb. 27, 2001: he filed his certificate of candidacy, wherein he stated that he had
been a resident of Oras for two years.
Neil Alvarez, the incumbent mayor and re-electionist, sought the cancellation of Coquillas
COC on the ground of material misrepresentation by his statement that he had been a

resident for 2 years, when in truth he had resided therein for only about 6 months since
Nov. 10, 2000 when he took his oath as a Filipino citizen.
The Comelec was unable to render a decision before the May 14 elections. Coquilla
received the highest number of votes and was proclaimed Mayor.
July 19, 2001: the 2nd Division of Comelec granted Alvarezs petition and ordered Coquillas
COC cancelled.
o Coquilla filed an MR but this was denied by the Comelec en banc. He then filed a
petition for certiorari with the SC.

ISSUES:
5. Was the 30-day period for appealing the Comelec resolution suspended by the filing of an
MR?
6. Did the Comelec retain jurisdiction to decide the case notwithstanding Coquillas
proclamation?
7. Was Coquilla a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least 1 year before the May 14, 2001
elections?
8. Was Comelec justified in cancelling Coquillas COC?
REASONING:
5. Yes the MR tolled the 30-day period of appeal
Rule 19 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure provides that an MR must be filed within 5
days from receipt of the assailed resolution/decision. This MR, if not pro-forma
suspends the period for elevating the case with the SC.
Alvarez argued that the MR was pro-forma.
o SC said it was not. Mere reiteration of the issued raised and passed upon by the
court does not make a motion pro forma; otherwise, the movants remedy would
not be reconsideration but a new trial or some other remedy.
6. Yes the Comelec retained jurisdiction
RA 6646 explicitly provides that if a candidates is not declared disqualified and
receives the winning number of votes in the election, the Comelec shall continue with
the trial and, upon motion, may during the pendency thereof, order the suspension of
the proclamation of such candidate.
7. No Coquilla was not a resident
Sec. 39 of the LGC prescribes a residency requirement of at least 1 year immediately
preceding the day of the election for any elective official.
The term residence is to be understood not in its common acceptation as dwelling,
but rather to domicile or legal residence, that is, the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found
at any time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).
o A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place
where the childs parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by
acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice).
Here, Coquilla lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a US citizen. From then
on until Nov. 10, 2000 when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, he was an alien
without right to reside in the Philippines except as our immigration laws may allow.
o Indeed, residence in the US is a requirement for naturalization.
o Immigration to the US by virtue of a green card which entitles on to reside
permanently in that country constitutes abandonment of domicile in the
Philippines (Caasi v. CA). More so then for naturalization.
Coquilla cannot contend that he was compelled to adopt American citizenship by
reason of his service in the US Armed Forces.

He reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171, which provides for

repatriation of, among others, natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on
account of political or economic necessity, instead of under RA 2630 which
applies to those who lost their Philippine citizenship by accepting commission in
the USAF.
In any case, the fact is, by having been naturalized abroad, he lost his Philippine
citizenship as well as his residence in the Philippines. Until his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship, he did not reacquire his legal residence in this country.
It is not true that Coquilla reestablished his Philippine residence in 1998 when he
secured a Community Tax Certificate and by constantly declaring to his townmates
of his intention to seek repatriation and run for mayor.
o The status of being an alien and a non-resident can be waived either separately,
when one acquires the status of a resident alien before acquiring Philippine
citizenship, or at the same time when one acquires Philippine citizenship.
o As an alien, an individual may obtain an immigrant visa under the Philippine
Immigration Act and an Immigrant certificate of Residence and thus waive his
status as a non-resident.
o On the other hand, he may acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization under
Com. Act No. 473, or if he is a former Philippine national, by repatriation or by an
act of Congress, in which case he waives not only his status as an alien but also
his status as a non-resident alien.
In the present case, the only evidence of Coquillas status when he entered the
country on Oct. 15, 1998, Dec. 20, 1998, Oct. 16, 1999 and June 23, 2000 is the
statement Philippine Immigration Balikbayan in his passport.
o A balikbayan includes a former Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in a
foreign conduct and comes or returns to the Philippines and, if so, he is entitled,
among others, to a visa-free entry to the Philippines for 1 year.
o When Coquilla entered the country on the questioned dates, he did so as a visafree balkbayan whose stay was valid for one year only. Hence, he can only be
held to have waived his status as an alien and as a non-resident on Nov. 10, 2000
upon taking his oath as a Filipino citizen. He then lacked the requisite residency to
qualify him for the mayorship of Oras, Eastern Samar.
o

The rulings in Frivaldo v. Comelec and Bengzon III v. HRET are not applicable because
residency was not an issue in those cases.
Contrary to Coquillas assertion, registration as a voter does not bar the filing of a
subsequent case questioning the candidates lack of residency. (Nuval v. Guray)
As Coquilla clearly lacks one of the essential qualifications for running for mayor, not
even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters would substitute for a requirement
mandated by the fundamental law itself. He cannot invoke liberal interpretation of
election laws.
Coquilla cannot claim denial of due process because he was able to file a Verified
Answer, a Memorandum and a Manifestation before the Comelec.
8. Yes Comelec properly cancelled the COC
Coquilla made a false representation of a material fact in his COC, thus rendering it
liable to cancellation under the Omnibus Election Code.
What is involved here is a false statement concerning a candidates qualification for an
office for which he filed the COC. This is a misrepresentation of a material fact
justifying the cancellation of the COC.
RULING: petition dismissed

Mateo Caasi v. CA and Merito C. Miguel

AnecitoCascante v. COMELEC and Merito C. Miguel
Grino-Aquino, J. 8 November 1990/13 November 1990
SV: In these consolidated petitions, Merito C. Miguel is sought to be disqualified for the position
of municipal mayor of Bolinao, on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence a permanent
resident of the US. The SC held that Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent
residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive
proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. Absent irrevocable proof that he had waived
such status before he ran for mayor of Bolinao, he was disqualified to run and, therefore, his
election was null and void.
FACTS:
- These two consolidated petitions were brought for the disqualification under Sec. 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code of Merito Miguel (he had already won) for the position of municipal mayor
of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence a permanent resident
of the US, not of Bolinao.
a) Cascante v. COMELEC: the COMELEC dismissed three petitions for the disqualification
of Miguel.
i. The COMELEC held that the possession of a green card by Miguel does not
sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines.
ii. On the contrary, Miguel has sufficiently indicated his intention to continuously
reside in Bolinao as shown by his having voted in successive elections in the
municipality.
iii. Commissioner Badoy dissented, saying that having admitted to being a green
card holder, it was incumbent upon Miguel to prove that he has waived his status as
a permanent resident or immigrant to be qualified to run for elected office, which
Miguel had not done.
b) Caasi v. CA: the CA dismissed the petition for quo warrantofiled by Caasi, a rival
candidate, to disqualify Miguel.
i. The CA held that it was pointless for the RTC to have heard the case questioning
the qualification of Miguel as resident of the Philippines after the COMELEC has
ruled that he met the basic requirements of citizenship and residence for candidates
to elective local office, considering that RTC decisions on quo warranto under the
Election Code are appealable to the COMELEC.
- In his answer to both petitions, Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the
US Immagration Service but denied that he is a permanent resident of the US.
a) He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience that he may freely enter the US
for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there.
b) He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, that he voted in all previous
elections, including the plebiscite for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and 1987
congressional elections.
ISSUES/REASONING:
Should Miguel be disqualified on account of his being a green card holder? YES.
1) Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguels immigration to the US in 1984 constituted an
abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines.
a) In his Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration, Miguel answer to
Question No. 21 regarding his Length of intended stay was Permanently.
b) On its face, the green card issued by the US Department of Justice and Immigration and
Registration Service to Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT
ALIEN.
c) He did not go to the US merely to visit his children or doctor there, he entered the US
with the intention to stay there permanently.

2) Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all
times, and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire
the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.
This is not applicable to Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the US before he
was elected to public office, not during his tenure as mayor of Bolinao.
The law applicable to him is Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) which provides:
SEC. 68. Disqualifications ... Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to
a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code,
unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate
who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant
of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the
Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or
immigrant of the United States.
The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done
prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was
"disqualified to run for any elective office"
The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to find. Residence in the
municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of
filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public
office must possess (now found in Sec. 39, LGC -ed).
In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or
immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy of
excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess dual
loyalties and allegiance.
3) Miguel insists that even though he applied for immigration and permanent residence in the
United States, he never really intended to live there permanently. In other words, he would have
this Court believe that he applied for immigration to the U.S. under false pretenses; that all this
time he only had one foot in the US but kept his other foot in the Philippines.
Even if that were true, this Court will not allow itself to be a party to his duplicity by permitting
him to benefit from it, and giving him the best of both worlds so to speak.
4) Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his
possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent
resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant
status should be as indubitable as his application for it.
Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered
his green card to the appropriate US authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao, he was
disqualified to run for said public office, and, therefore, his election was null and void.
ELECTION OF MERITO C. MIGUEL AS MAYOR OF BOLINAO IS ANNULLED.
Eduardo T. Rodriguez v. COMELEC and Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr.

24 July 1996
Francisco, J.
Short version: Rodriguez and Marquez ran against each other for the gubernatorial post of
Quezon Province during the 1992 as well as the 1995 elections. Rodriguez won in both instances.
Marquez contended that Rodriguez should have been disqualified from running for and holding
the said position because he is a fugitive from justice, which is a ground for his
disqualification/ineligibility under Sec. 40(e) of the LGC. He alleged that Rodriguez left the United
States where a charge, filed on 12 November 1985, is pending against him before an LA Court.
The Supreme Court, in an earlier decision involving the same parties, held that fugitive from
justice includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those
who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. Here, it said that the definition indicates that
the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates ones flight from a particular
jurisdiction. There can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is
knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated
judgment of conviction. Rodriguez cannot fit this concept because his arrival in the Philippines
preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the LA Court and the issuance of the arrest warrant
against him on even date by almost five months. It was thus impossible for him to have known
about such charge and warrant at the time he left the US. Not being a fugitive from justice,
Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial post.
Facts:
- During the May 1992 elections. Rodriguez and Marquez ran against each other for the
gubernatorial post of Quezon Province. Rodriguez won and was proclaimed the duly-elected
governor.
- Marquez challenged Rodriguez victory via a petition for quo warranto before the COMELEC
(EPC No. 92-28). He alleged that Rodriguez left the United States where a charge, filed on 12
November 1985, is pending against him before a Los Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent
insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal property. He thus concluded
that Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice, which is a ground for his disqualification/ineligibility
under Sec. 40(e) of the LGC.92

92
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad

- The COMELEC dismissed the petition and subsequently denied a reconsideration thereof.
Marquez then brought the matter before the SC. In resolving the petition for certiorari, the SC, in
Marquez, Jr. v. COMELEC93 declared that, fugitive from justice includes not only those who
flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to
avoid prosecution.
Whether or not Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice under the above definition
was not passed upon in the previous case. That determination was left by the SC to
COMELEC upon remand of the case to the latter. Rodriquez MR of the previous decision
was denied.
- During the May 1995 elections, Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for the position of
governor. This time, Marquez challenged Rodriguez candidacy via a petition for disqualification
before the COMELEC, based on the same allegation that Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice. This
petition for disqualification was filed when Rodriguez petition for certiorari - from where the
Marquez Decision sprung - was still pending before the SC.
- After the Marquez Decision was promulgated, the COMELEC promulgated a Consolidated
Resolution of the two cases and found that Rodriguez was indeed a fugitive from justice based on
the definition stated in the Marquez Decision. This finding was based on an authenticated copy of
the 12 November 1995 warrant of arrest issued against him and an authenticated copy of the
felony complaint.
According to the COMELEC, the authenticated documents submitted by
Marquez show that there was indeed an outstanding warrant against Rodriguez, which
amply proves that the latter is a fugitive from justice. Thus, he was declared disqualified or
ineligible from assuming and performing the functions of Governor of Quezon Province. He
was also declared disqualified from running for the said position in the May 1995 elections.

93
Hereinafter referred to as the Marquez Decision.

- Despite the above pronouncements, Rodriguez was somehow still able to run during the
elections where he again emerged victorious. Marquez filed urgent motions to suspend
Rodriguez proclamation, which the COMELEC granted. This, as well as the aforementioned
COMELEC Consolidated Resolution gave rase to the filing of the present petition for certiorari
before the SC.94 The SC then resolved to direct the COMELEC to designate a Commissioner to
receive and evaluate such legally admissible evidence as both Rodriguez and Marquez may be
minded to present that would support their respective positions on the matter of whether
Rodriguez is indeed a fugitive from justice.
- In its report, the COMELEC made a complete turnaround from its finding in the Consolidated
Resolution and found that Rodriguez is not a fugitive from justice as defined in the Marquez
Decision. In arriving at this conclusion, the COMELEC opined that intent to evade, a material
element of the definition, was absent considering that Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines on 25
June 1985, long before the criminal charge was instituted in the US on 12 November 1985.
The COMELEC report added though that it was not sure whether it applied
the Marquez Decision correctly. It said that in the majority of cases cited in Marquez to
support the definition stated therein, the term fugitive from justice contemplates other
instances not explicitly mentioned. For instance, some cases and authorities simply state
that a person is a fugitive from justice if he commits a crime and thereafter, leaves the
jurisdiction of the court where the crime was committed. It was immaterial whether the
charge against him has already been filed against him at the time of his flight. Thus, the
COMELEC said that it was submitting the final determination of the case to the SC as the
final interpreter of the law.
Issue: Does Rodriguez come within the definition of a fugitive from justice as enunciated in the
Marquez Decision? (No)
Reasoning:
- The definition of a fugitive from justice in Marquez indicates that the intent to evade is the
compelling factor that animates ones flight from a particular jurisdiction. There can only be an
intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an
already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.
- Rodriguez cannot fit this concept. The evidence shows that his arrival in the Philippines on 25
June 1985 preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the LA Court on 12 November 1985 and
the issuance on even date of the arrant of arrest, by almost five months. It was thus impossible
for him to have known about such charge and warrant at the time he left the US. The very
essence of a fugitive from justice is nowhere to be found in his circumstances.
- There are other observations made by COMELEC consistent with the above analysis that the
Court found to be equally formidable and worthy to be adopted as part of the present decision.
The said observations are summarized as follows:
Marquez attempted to show Rodriguez intent to evade the law by offering a
voluminous copy of an investigation report on the latters alleged crimes which led to the
filing of the felony complaint. However, the fact remains that investigations of this nature
are shrouded in utmost secrecy to afford law enforcers the advantage of surprise and
effect the arrest of those who would be charged. 95

94
There were plenty of Motions filed at this point. Once such Motion was an Omnibus Motion filed by Marquez before the COMELEC seeking
the annulment of Rodriguez proclamation. Acting on this Motion, the COMELEC nullified Rodriguez proclamation.

The charges against Rodriguez were filed days after his departure from the
US. This shows that he was in good faith. In fact, Rodriguez evidence shows that his
compulsion to return to the Philippines was due to his desire to join and participate
vigorously in the political campaigns against former President Marcos. He began serving as
OIC-Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Quezon in 1986 then he was
elected Governor in 1988 and was re-elected in 1992 and 1995.
Having established his lack of knowledge of the charges to be filed against
him at the time he left the US, it becomes immaterial to determine the exact time that he
was made aware thereof. Besides, there is no law which requires him to travel back to the
US to subject himself to the burden and tedious process of defending himself before the
US courts.

95
It was not explicitly stated but it seems that the conclusion on this point is that Rodriguez couldnt possibly have known about the investigations
because of all the secrecy.

- Marquez and the COMELEC (in its report) seem to urge the SC to re-define fugitive from
justice. However, the doctrine of law of the case 96 forbade the Court from crafting an
expanded re-definition. The Marquez Decision and the instant petition involve the same parties
and issue and stem from the same Resolution promulgated by the COMELEC. Therefore, what
was established as the controlling legal rule in the Marquez decision must govern the instant
petition.
- Not being a fugitive from justice, Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon Province
gubernatorial post.
Dispositive: Petition granted.
Dissenting opinion by Justice Vitug:97

96
This doctrine means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same
case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated
continue to be the facts of the case before the court.

97
Justice Torres, Jr. had a separate concurring opinion largely echoing the reasoning employed by the main opinion.

- There is a dearth of authorities on the proper and legal connotation of the phrase "fugitive from
justice." Neither the Local Government Code nor the deliberations in Congress give much clue to
the legislative intent. It is evident that Congress, not having provided otherwise, must have
intended the ordinary connotation of the term to prevail.
- So taken, it might be understood as referring to one who, having committed or being accused
of having committed a crime in one jurisdiction, cannot be found therein or is absent for any
reason from that jurisdiction that thereby forestalls criminal justice from taking its due course.
The issue is largely a factual matter and in that determination, the motive or reason for his flight
need not be inquired into for what matters is not why he leaves but the fact that he leaves. It
should be reasonable to assume that a person was aware of his own deeds and misdeeds.
- The mere fact that there are pending charges in the United States and that petitioner
Rodriguez is in the Philippines make him a fugitive from justice. Given the factual circumstances,
the present petition therefore must be dismissed.
105. Dela Torre v COMELEC and Marcial Villanueva
Francisco, J.
July 5, 1996
Topic: Elective Officials; Disqualifications
SV: Dela Torre, a candidate for the position of mayor of Cavinti, Laguna, filed a petition for
certiorari to assail the validity of 2 resolutions issued by COMELEC disqualifying him from
running. The ground for his disqualification is Sec. 40(a) LGC which provides the
disqualication for those sentenced by a final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude. COMELEC said that since Dela Torre was convicted by final judgment of violating
the Anti-Fencing law, and since the nature of the offense involves moral turpitude, he is
disqualified. Dela Torre argues that, inasmuch as he was granted the probation, Sec. 40(a)
LGC does not apply to him.
Court said that the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude, which is defined as an act
of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen,
or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.
One of the elements of the crime of fencing is that the accused knows or should
have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived
from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
Actual knowledge of the fact that the property is stolen displays the same degree of
malicious deprivation of ones rightful property as that which animated the robbery
or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. The same
underlying reason holds even if the fence did not have actual knowledge, but
merely should have known the origin of the property received.
Although the fence and the robber have different levels of participation, both
invaded ones peaceful dominion for gain.
As to his contention that Sec. 40, LGC does not apply to him because of the probation that
was granted, the court ruled that the legal effect of probation is only to suspend the
execution of the sentence and that the disqualification subsists notwithstanding the grant
of probation.

FACTS:

Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre via the instant petition for certiorari seeks the nullification of
two resolutions issued by the COMELEC allegedly with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in a case for disqualification filed against him.
There were 2 resolutions issued against him by COMELEC.
The first assailed resolution dated May 6,1995 declared the Dela Torre disqualified from
running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the last May 8,1995 elections, citing as
the ground therefor, Sec. 40(a), LGC which disqualifies those sentenced by a final judgment
for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by 1 yr or more of
imprisonment within 2 years after serving sentence.
o COMELEC held that documentary evidence established that Dela Torre was found guilty
by the MuTC for violating the Anti-fencing law. RTC affirmed the decision, and his
conviction became final.
o As such, there exists legal grounds to disqualify him as candidate for Mayor. Although
jurisprudence involving the Anti-Fencing law is insufficient, the nature of the offense
under the law certainly involves moral turpitude.
The second assailed resolution, dated August 28, 1995, denied Dela Torres MR.
o Dela Torre argued that Sec. 40(a) LGC does not apply to his case inasmuch as the
probation granted him by MTC which suspended the execution of the judgment of
conviction and all other legal consequences flowing therefrom, rendered inapplicable
Section 40 (a) as well.

ISSUES:
1. Does the crime of fencing involve moral turpitude? (YES, COMELEC did not err in
disqualifying the Dela Torre on the ground that the offense of fencing, which he was convicted of,
involved moral turpitude.)

The Court has consistently adopted Blacks Law Dictionary definition of moral turpitude:
x xx an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his
fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right
and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals.
Not every criminal act involves moral turpitude, and it is for this reason that the SC has to
determine what crimes involves this. The Court is guided by one of the general rules that
crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not.
o [Zari v Flores] Moral turpitude implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the
fact that it is punishable by law or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the
act itself must be inherently immoral. Moral turpitude does notinclude such acts
as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively
prohibited.
o But such guideline is sometimes insufficient.
o [IRRI v NLRC] it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does
not exist by merely classifying a crime as malum in se or as malumprohibitum.
There are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude
and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. In
the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a
question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the
violation of the statute.
Since Dela Torre does not assail his conviction and has in effect, admitted all elements of
the crime of fencing, the court proceeded to analyze the elements and it was found that
the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude.
o Fencing in Sec. 2 PD 1612 is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for
himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or
dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or

anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived
from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
As can be gleaned from the definition, the elements of the crime are:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused who is not a principal or accomplice in the crime of robbery or
theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes,
or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or
anything of value, which have been derived from the proceeds of the said
crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article,
item, object or anything of value has been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for
another.
Moral turpitude is deducible form the 3rd element because actual knowledge of the
fact that the property is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of
ones rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their
very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude.
Although the participation of each felon in the unlawful taking differs in point
in time and in degree, both the fence and the actual perpetrator/s of the
robbery or theft invaded ones peaceful dominion for gain.
This deliberately reneges in the process private duties they owe their
fellowmen or society in a manner contrary to x xx accepted and
customary rule of right and duty x xx, justice, honesty x xx or good morals.
The duty not to appropriate, or to return, anything acquired either by mistake
or with malice is so basic it finds expression in the Civil Code 98

98
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
Article 2154. If something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered through
mistake, the obligation to return it arises.

The same underlying reason holds even if the fence did not have actual
knowledge, but merely should have known the origin of the property received.
the words should know denote the fact that a person of reasonable
prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in the performance of his
duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact
exists
Circumstances normally exist to forewarn, for instance, a reasonably vigilant
buyer that the object of the sale may have been derived from the proceeds of
robbery or theft.
Time and place of sale, nature and condition of goods sold, and the
fact that seller is not regularly engaged in the business of selling goods
may not be in accord with usual practices of commerce. These should
caution the buyer.
This justifies the presumption found in Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 that mere
possession of any goods, x xx, object or anything of value which has been
the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing- a
presumption that is, according to the Court, reasonable for no other natural
or logical inference can arise from the established fact of x xx possession of
the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.

2. Does the grant of probation affect Sec. 40 (a)s applicability? (NO)

The legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence.
Dela Torres conviction of fencing which we have heretofore declared as a crime of moral
turpitude and thus falling squarely under the disqualification found in Section 40 (a),
subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation.
A judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused
applies for probation, although it is not executory pending resolution of the application for
probation.

Petition for certiorari DISMISSED. Comelec resolutions AFFIRMED.

106. Magno v. COMELEC99

99
Nestor B. Magno, petitioner, v. Commission on Elections and Carlos C. Montes, respondents

Date: October 4, 2002

Ponente: Corona
The case in a nutshell:
FACTS: Nestor B. Magno was a mayoralty candidate of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija during the May 14,
2001 elections. Carlos C. Montes filed a case for Magnos disqualification, on the ground that he
had been previously convicted by the Sandiganbayan of 4 counts of direct bribery. (On July 25,
1995, he had been sentenced. Thereafter, he had applied for probation. He was discharged on
March 5, 1998.) The COMELEC granted Montes petition and declared that Magno was
disqualified for running for mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections. It Sec. 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which explicitly lifts the disqualification to run for an elective office of a person
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude after 5 years from the service of sentence (i.e. as
Magno was considered to have completed the service of his sentence on March 5, 1998, his 5year disqualification would end only on March 5, 2003). Magnos MR was denied. Magno filed a
petition for review on certiorari in the SC, arguing that 1) direct bribery is not a crime involving
moral turpitude, and 2) the applicable law was Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code, which
imposes only a 2-year disqualification period (i.e. Magnos disqualification expired on March 5,
2000).
HELD: The crime of direct bribery involves moral turpitude. Moral turpitude can be inferred from
the 3rd element of direct bribery (the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately
commits an unjust act, or refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors).
It is the Local Government Code which applies. The Omnibus Election Code was approved on
December 3, 1985, while the Local Government Code took effect on January 1, 1992. In case of
irreconcilable conflict between 2 laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the more recent
expression of legislative will. Also, Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code, insofar as it governs
the disqualifications of candidates for local positions, assumes the nature of a special law which
ought to prevail over Sec. 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, which speaks of disqualifications of
candidates for any public office. The intent of the legislature to reduce the disqualification period
of candidates for local positions from 5 years (under the Omnibus Election Code) to 2 years
(under the Local Government Code) is evident. Thus, Magno was NOT disqualified to run for
mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections. Although his crime of direct bribery involved moral
turpitude, his disqualification ceased as of March 5, 2000, and he was therefore under no such
disqualification anymore when he ran for mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections.

Facts:
1) Petitioner Nestor B. Magno was a mayoralty candidate of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija during
the May 14, 2001 elections.
2) On March 21, 2001, private respondent Carlos C. Montes filed a case for Magnos
disqualification, on the ground that he had been previously convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of 4 counts of direct bribery, penalized under Art. 210 of the Revised Penal
Code.
a. On July 25, 1995, Magno had been sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
3 months and 11 days of arresto mayor as minimum, to 1 year, 8 months, and 21
days of prision correctional as maximum, for each of the 4 counts of direct bribery.
Thereafter, Magno applied for probation. He was discharged on March 5, 1998 upon
order of the Gapan RTC.
3) On May 7, 2001, the COMELEC rendered a decision granting Montes petition. It declared
that Magno was disqualified from running for mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections.
a. It cited Sec. 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insa
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebelli
for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty to more than eighteen
months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate a
hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon, or granted amnesty.

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upo

declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been remov
after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the
period he again becomes disqualified.
i. Sec. 12 explicitly lifts the disqualification to run for an elective office of a
person convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude after 5 years from the
service of sentence. Inasmuch as Magno was considered to have completed
the service of his sentence on March 5, 1998, his 5-year disqualification
would end only on March 5, 2003.
4) Magno filed an MR, but this was denied.
5) Magno filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in the SC.
a. He argued that direct bribery is not a crime involving moral turpitude.
b. He claimed that Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code, not Sec. 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code, was the applicable law to the case at bar. Sec. 40 provides:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any el
local position:
a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or f
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years
serving sentence.

xxx
c. He insisted that he had already served his sentence as of March 5, 1998, when he
was discharged from probation. Such being the case, the 2-year disqualification
period imposed by Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code expired on March 5, 2000.
Thus, he was qualified to run in the May 14, 2001 elections.
6) Sonia Lorenzo was proclaimed by the COMELEC as the duly elected mayor of San Isidro,
Nueva Ecija.
7) Magno filed a supplemental petition in the SC.
a. He assailed the proclamation of Lorenzo, on the ground that the propriety of his
disqualification was still under review by the SC.
b. He asked the SC to declare him as the duly elected mayor instead of Lorenzo.
8) The Solicitor General filed his manifestation and agreed with Magno that the COMELEC
should have applied Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code.
Issue:
1) Does the crime of direct bribery involve moral turpitude? YES.
2) Is it the Omnibus Election Code or the Local Government Code which applies? LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE.
3) Was Magno disqualified to run for mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections? NO.
Held: The instant petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The challenged resolutions of the
Commission on Elections are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Magnos prayer in his
supplemental petition for his proclamation as the winner in the May 14, 2001 mayoralty elections
in San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, not being within the SCs jurisdiction, is hereby denied.
Ratio:.
1) The crime of direct bribery involves moral turpitude.
a. The SC has consistently adopted the definition in Blacks Law Dictionary of moral
turpitude as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which
a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.
b. By applying for probation, Magno in effect admitted all the elements of the crime of
direct bribery, namely:
i. The offender is a public officer.

ii. The offender accepts an offer or a promise or receives a gift or present by

himself or through another.
iii. Such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public
officer with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the
execution of an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must be
unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do.
iv. The act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is
connected with the performance of his official duties.
c. Moral turpitude can be inferred from the 3 rd element of direct bribery.
i. The fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately
commits an unjust act, or refrains from performing an official duty in
exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious on the part of the offender to
renege on his duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general.
ii. The fact that the offender takes advantage of his office and position is a
betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly
contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty, and good
morals.
2) It is the Local Government Code which applies.
a. The Omnibus Election Code was approved on December 3, 1985, while the Local
Government Code took effect on January 1, 1992.
i. It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict
between 2 laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the more recent
expression of legislative will. In enacting the later law, the legislature is
presumed to have knowledge of the older law and intended to change it.
b. The repealing clause of Sec. 354 of the Local Government Code states that:
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclam
administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any
this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
i. Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code is deemed to have repealed Sec. 12 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
c. Art. 7 of the Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones.
When a subsequent law entirely encompasses the subject matter of the former
enactment, the latter is deemed repealed.
i. The Local Government Code is a codified set of laws that specifically applies
to local government units. (David v. COMELEC)
d. Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code specifically and definitively provides for
disqualification of candidates for elective local positions. It is applicable to them
only. On the other hand, Sec. 12 of the Omnibus Election Code speaks of
disqualifications of candidates for any public office. It deals with the election of all
public officers.
i. Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code, insofar as it governs the
disqualifications of candidates for local positions, assumes the nature of a
special law which ought to prevail.
e. The intent of the legislature to reduce the disqualification period of candidates for
local positions from 5 years to 2 years is evident. The cardinal rule in the
interpretation of all laws is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the law.
3) Magno was NOT disqualified to run for mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections.
a. Although his crime of direct bribery involved moral turpitude, his disqualification
ceased as of March 5, 2000, and he was therefore under no such disqualification
anymore when he ran for mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections.
4) The SC pointed out that this was NOT the proper forum to rule on 1) the validity of
Lorenzos proclamation, and 2) the declaration of Magno as the rightful winner. Inasmuch
as Lorenzo had already been proclaimed as the winning candidate, Magnos legal remedy
would have been a timely election protest.

Atty. Miguel M. Lingating v. COMELEC and Cesar B. Sulong

13 November 2002
Mendoza, J.
Short version: Lingating and Sulong were both candidates for the mayoralty of Lapuyan,
Zamboanga del Sur. Lingating filed a petition for the disqualification of Sulong with the Provincial
Election Supervisor pursuant to Sec. 40(b) of the LGC which disqualifies from running for any
elective local position those removed from office as a result of an administrative case. He
alleged that in 1991, during Sulongs first term as Mayor of Lapuyan, the latter was
administratively charged and found guilty by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of violating RA 3019.
He claimed that this decision had become final and executory, thereby depriving him of his right
to run for public office. However, the SC ruled that the decision of the Sanggunian had not
become final. The records show that Sulong filed an MR of the decision and that the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan required the complainant therein to comment. This comment was never filed and
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had not resolved Sulongs MR. The filing of his MR prevented the
decision from becoming final. There being no final decision finding Sulong guilty of the offenses,
he cannot be deemed disqualified from running for public office.
Facts:

- Lingating and Sulong were both candidates for the mayoralty of Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur
in the May 2001 elections. On 3 May 2001, Lingating filed a petition for the disqualification of
Sulong with the Provincial Election Supervisor pursuant to Sec. 40(b) of the LGC 100 which
disqualifies from running for any elective local position those removed from office as a result of
an administrative case.
Lingating alleged that in 1991, during Sulongs first term as Mayor of
Lapuyan, the latter was administratively charged with having violated the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and that, on 4 February 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Zamboanga del Sur found him guilty of the charges and ordered his removal from office.
Lingating claimed that this decision had become final and executory and consequently
the, the then vice-mayor, Vicente Imbing, took his oath as mayor.
On the other hand, Sulong denied that the decision had become final and
executory. He averred that after he received a copy thereof, he filed an MR and/or notice of
appeal on 18 February 1992 and that thereafter, the complainant in the case was asked to
comment. Sulong claimed that such comment had yet to be filed and that his MR
consequently remained pending.
- The COMELEC was unable to render judgment before the elections. Sulong turned out to be the
winner so he was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Lapuyan as the duly
elected mayor.
- On 1 August 2001, the COMELECs First Division declared Sulong disqualified stating that the
decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the administrative case had indeed already become
final and executory, thereby depriving him of his right to run for public office.
- Sulong filed an MR, citing a certification from the Provincial Secretary that the administrative
case has not become final and executory as the final disposition thereof was overtaken by the
local elections of May 1992. Eventually, the COMELEC issued a resolution reversing the earlier
decision insofar as it found Sulong disqualified.
The COMELEC found that despite the 4 February 1992 resolution finding
Sulong guilty of the offenses charged, he was still re-elected in the local elections of the
same year. On May of 1995, he again won the mayoralty elections of Lapuyan. The
COMELEC said that while one of the disqualifications from running in an elective position is
removal from office as a result of an administrative case, this provision no longer applies if
the candidate got re-elected to another term. It cited Aguinaldo v. Santos, and said that
the re-election of the candidate involved is tantamount to a condonation of the decision
which found him guilty of the offenses charged.
- In this petition before the SC, Lingating contends that the COMELEC erred in applying the
Aguinaldo case. In support of his argument, he cited Reyes v. COMELEC, in which it was held that
an elective local executive officer who is removed before the expiration of the term for which he
was elected, is disqualified from being a candidate for a local elective position under Sec. 40 (b)
of the LGC.
Issue: Was Sulong disqualified from running for mayor?

100
Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:. . . . (b) Those removed from office
as a result of an administrative case;

Reasoning:
- In Reyes, the SC explained that it ruled the way it did in Aguinaldo because there, before the
petition questioning the validity of the administrative decision removing the local officer could be
decided, the latters term of office during which the alleged misconduct was committed had
already expired. Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct
was committed. In contrast, the situation in Reyes is such that the administrative case had
become final before the expiration of the officers term. Thus, he was validly removed from office
and, pursuant to Sec. 40(b), he was disqualified from running for reelection.
- However, the Reyes ruling cannot be applied in this case because it appears that the 1992
decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan finding Sulong guilty of the offenses has not become
final.
The records show that Sulong had indeed filed an MR of the decision and that
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan required the complainant therein to comment. This
comment was never filed and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had not resolved Sulongs
MR. The filing of his MR prevented the decision from becoming final.
While the LGC is silent on the filing of an MR, the same cannot be interpreted
as a prohibition against the filing of the same. The SC has held that as a matter of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, a party in a disbarment proceeding under Rule
139-B, Sec. 12(c) can move for an MR of a resolution of the IBP although Rule 139 does not
so provide.
There is thus no final decision finding Sulong guilty of the offenses charged.
In fact, the Provincial Secretary attested that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan simply
considered the matter as having become moot and academic because it was overtaken
by the local elections of May 1992.

Neither can the succession of the then vice-mayor of Lapuyan, Vicente

Imbing to the officer of Mayorbe considered proof that the decision had become
finalbecause it appears to have been made pursuant to Sec. 68 of the LGC 101 which makes
decisions in administrative cases immediately executory.
Dispositive: Petition dismissed.

Roberto A. Flores, Daniel Y. Figueroa, Rogelio T. Palo, Domingo A. Jadloc, Carlito T.

Cruz, Manuel P. Reyes
22 June 1993
Bellosillo, J.

SHORT VERSION: RA 7227 or the Bases Conversion and Development Act was passed. Sec. 13(d)
mandated that the Mayor of Olongapo City (then Richard Gordon) be appointed as Chairman of
the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA. Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of this
part of RA 7227. The Court held it unconstitutional. The constitutional prohibition is clear No
elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public
office or position during his tenure. However, since the ineligibility attaches only during the
tenure of the elective official, Gordon here may opt to resign as Mayor in order to be eligible as
SBMA Chair. The Court also ruled that Sec. 13(d) infringed on the Presidents power to appoint.
By prescribing only one person, the Mayor of Olongapo, as the sole candidate for the position of
SBMA Chair/CEO, Congress effectively took away the discretion that the President exercises in
choosing his appointees, which such discretion is the heart of the power of appointment. The
questioned proviso in Sec. 13(d) was hence declared unconstitutional and Gordons appointment
null and void.

FACTS:

101
Section 68. Execution Pending Appeal. An appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory. The respondent shall be
considered as having been placed under preventive suspension during the pendency of an appeal in the event he wins such appeal. In the event
the appeal results in an exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and such other emoluments during the pendency of the appeal.

This is an original petition with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and TRO
questioning the constitutionality of Sec. 13(d) of RA 7227 102 (Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992), under which Mayor Richard Gordon of Olongapo City was
appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
(SBMA).
Petitioners, claiming to be taxpayers, employees of the US Facility in Subic, Zambales, and
officers and member of the Filipino Civilian Employees Association in US Facilities in the
Philippines that the proviso in Sec. 13(d) (underlined in the footnote) infringes on the
following constitutional and statutory provisions:
o That no elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any
capacity to any public office during his tenure (Art. IX-B, Sec. 7, 1987 Consti),
because the Mayor of Olongapo is an elective official and the subject posts are
public offices
o That the President shall appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint (Art. VII Sec. 16, 1987 Consti), since it was Congress
and not the President who appointed the Mayor to the subject posts
o That this is an election offense under Sec. 261(g) of the Omnibus Election Code,
which provides that no new position shall be created nor any new appointment
made 45 days before a regular election, since Gordons appointment as SBMA Chair
on April 3, 1992 was within the prohibited 45-day period prior to the May 11, 1992
elections.

ISSUE:
Does the proviso in Sec. 13(d) of RA 7227 violate the constitutional proscription against
appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts? YES

REASONING:
On Art. IX-B Sec. 7

This provision states:

No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity
to any public office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
o

This section expresses the policy against the concentration of several public
positions in one person, so that a public officer/employee may serve full-time with
dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public service.

102
Sec. 13. (d) Chairman administrator The President shall appoint a professional manager as administrator of the Subic Authority with a
compensation to be determined by the Board subject to the approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex-officio chairman of the
Board and who shall serve as the chief executive officer of the Subic Authority: Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from
the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic
Authority.

The basic idea is to prevent a situation where a local elective official will work for his
appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his
constituents.
In the present case, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official,
the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government posts, i.e. Chair of the Board and CEO of
SBMA).
o Since this is precisely what the constitution seeks to prevent, it needs no stretching
of the imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Art. IX-B Sec. 7, first
paragraph.
o The fact that the expertise of an elective official may be most beneficial to the
higher interest of the body politic is of no moment.
o

On Sec. 94 of the LGC

It was argued that Sec. 94 permits the appointment of a local elective official to another
post if so allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office. This contention is
fallacious.
o Sec. 94 is not determinative of the constitutionality of the questioned proviso. No
legislative act can prevail over the law of the land.
o Moreover, since it is the constitutionality of Sec. 94 is not the issue here nor is that
section sought to be declared unconstitutional, the Court need not rule on its
validity.
o Neither can a practice otherwise unconstitutional be invoked as authority for its
validity.
In any case, this argument ignores the difference in the wording of the two paragraphs of
Art. IX-B Sec. 7.
o The second paragraph authorizes the holding of multiple offices by an appointive
official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position.
o The first paragraph is more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule
against appointment of an elective official to the government post, except as
recognized in the Consti itself.
The Court looked at the constitutional deliberations and found that this distinction was not
accidental and not without reason.
o The prohibition is more strict with elective officials because in the case of appointive
officials, there may be certain situations where the law should allow them to hold
other positions.
This distinction is clear. The exemption allowed to appointive officials cannot be extended
to elective officials.

On the SBMA positions being ex-officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo

The Court did not agree. This argument is based on a wrong premise. Congress did not
contemplate making the SBMA posts as ex-officio or automatically attached to the Office
of the Mayor of Olongapo City without need of appointment.
The phrase shall be appointed unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts
appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor.
Had that been the legislative intent, Congress would have at least avoided the word
appointed and instead ex officio would have been used.
o Sen. Rene Saguisag remarked that if the Conference Committee just said "the
Mayor shall be the Chairman" then that should foreclose the issue. It is a legislative
choice.

On the Presidents power to appoint

Petitioners assail Sec. 13(d) for being a legislative encroachment on the appointing power
of the President.
An appointment is the designation of a person, by the person or persons having
authority therefor, to discharge the duties of some office or trust, or the selection or
designation of a person, by the person to persons having authority therefor, to fill an office
or public function and discharge the duties of the same.
The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the right of
choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is
best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.
(Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. IAC)
o The power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. It is not a ministerial act of
issuing appointment papers. The choice of the appointee is a fundamental
component of the appointing power.
Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it cannot
at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate.
o Once the power of appointment is conferred on the President, such conferment
necessarily carries the discretion of whom to appoint. Even on the pretext of
prescribing the qualifications of the officer, Congress may not abuse such power as
to divest the appointing authority, directly or indirectly, or his discretion to pick his
own choice.
o When the qualifications prescribed by Congress can only be met by one individual,
such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to
choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment.
Here, the proviso limits the appointing authority to only one eligible, i.e. the Mayor of
Olongapo.
Since only one can qualify for the posts in question, the President is precluded from
exercising his discretion to choose whom to appoint.
o Such supposed power of appointment, sans the essential element of choice, is no
power at all and goes against the very nature itself of appointment.

On the eligibility of an elective official for appointment

Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his
tenure or during his incumbency, he may resign first from his elective post to cast off the
constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment.
o As long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for appointment
to another public office.
Where an incumbent elective official was, notwithstanding his ineligibility, appointed to
other government posts, he does not automatically forfeit his elective office nor remove
his ineligibility imposed by the Constitution.
o On the contrary, since an incumbent elective official is not eligible to the appointive
position, his appointment or designation thereto cannot be valid in view of his
disqualification or lack of eligibility.
This should be distinguished from Art. VI Sec. 13, prohibiting any legislator from holding
any other office in the government during his term without forfeiting his seat in Congress.
o The difference between the two provisions is significant in the sense that incumbent
national legislators lose their elective posts only after they have been appointed to
another government office, while other incumbent elective officials must first resign
their posts before they can be appointed, thus running the risk of losing the elective
post as well as not being appointed to the other post.

In this case, Gordon, as an incumbent elective official, is ineligible for appointment as

Chair and CEO of the SBMA. Hence, his appointment cannot be sustained. However, he
remains Mayor of Olongapo.
o He may be considered a de facto officer as to SBMA. Hence, any and all per diems,
allowances and other emoluments which may have been received by him pursuant
to such appointment may be retained by him.
Mayor Gordon has a choice of resigning as Mayor in order to be eligible as SBMA Chair and
CEO. However, the Court has no choice but to rule that the proviso is unconstitutional.

RULING: proviso declared unconstitutional; Gordons appointment declared invalid, null and void
Perfecto V. Galido v Comelec and Saturnino R. Galeon
Jan 18, 1991
Padilla, J.

Short version:Galeon and Galido both ran for Mayor. Galido won. Galeon filed an election
protest with the RTC, which ruled in favor of Galido. Galeon appealed the RTC decision to the
Comelec, which reversed the RTC decision. Galido appealed the Comelec decision to the SC.
Galeon contends that final decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in election contests
involving elective municipal offices are final and executory, and not appealable, based on the
Constitution. The SC, however, agreed with Galido and held that that while decisions with respect
to barangay and municipal officials are final and immediately executory and, therefore, not
appealable, that does not rule out the possibility of an original special civil action for certiorari,
prohibition, or mandamus. However, the petition is dismissed because Galeon had already
assumed office and thus, the petition for prohibition is moot and academic.

Facts:

Perfecto Galido and SaturninoGaleon both ran for Mayor in the Municipality of GarciaHernandez, Province of Bohol during the January 1988 local elections
Galido.was proclaimed duly-elected Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez, by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers.
Galeon then filed an election protest before the RTC of Bohol
The RTC upheld the proclamation of Galidoas the duly-elected Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez, by
a majority of eleven (11) votes.
Galeon appealed the RTC decision to the Comelec.
The Comelec first division reversed the RTC decision and declared Galeon the duly-elected
mayor by a plurality of five (5) votes.
Galidos MR was denied the Comelec en banc, which affirmed the First Division decision. The
COMELEC held that the fifteen (15) ballots in the same precinct containing the initial "C" after
the name "Galido" were marked ballots and, therefore, invalid.
o It relied on the rule that where a word or a letter recurs in a pattern or system to mark
and identify ballots, the ballots containing the same should be rejected as marked
ballots, and the introduction of evidence aliunde is not necessary when the repetition of
a word or letter in several ballots in the same precinct constitutes a clear and convincing
proof of a design to identify the voters.
Thus, Galido filed a petition for certiorari and injunction with the SC.

The SC first dismissed the petition for failure to comply with paragraph 4 of the Court's
Circular No. 1-88103.The MR on this was denied with finality.
Undaunted, Galidofiled this petition for certiorari and injunction with prayer for a restraining
order, containing the same allegations and legal issues as the previous petition.
The SC issued the TRO and required the Comelec and Galeon to file comment.
Galido moved to dismiss, on the ff. grounds:

103
Requires that a petition shall contain a verified statement of the date when notice of the questioned judgment,
order or resolution was received and the date of receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration, if any was
filed.

Final decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in election contests involving elective
municipal offices are final andexecutory, and not appealable, citing Article IX (C), Section
2(2), paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution 104, as implemented by the Rules of Procedure
promulgated by the COMELEC, particularly Part VII Rule 39, Section 2 105.
o 2. The petition involves pure questions of fact as they relate to appreciation of evidence
(ballots) which is beyond the power of review of Supreme Court
o 3. Exactly the same petition involving identical allegations, grounds and legal issues
was already dismissed with finality.
In his Reply to the Comment, Galidocontended that:
o

104
Decisions, final orders, or ruling of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay
offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.

105
Sec. 2. Non-reviewable decisions. Decisions in appeals from courts of general or limited jurisdiction in election
cases relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of municipal and barangay official are not appealable.

Based on Article IX (A), Section 7106 of the 1987 Constitution, and Article VIII, Section 1,
since judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court, the present petition can still be
brought to the Supreme Court by certiorari. He contends that this petition is not an
ordinary appeal contemplated by the Rules of Court or by provision of the Constitution.

106
Sec. 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it
within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted
for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

The petition involves pure questions of law, since it involvesthe correct interpretation of
Section 211. No. 10107 of the Omnibus Election Code. According to him, it has been held
before that in the appreciation of ballots where there is no evidence aliundeof a purpose
to identify the ballots, the same should not be invalidated as marked ballots. Thus, the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it disregarded the cited decisions of
this Court and declared that the suffix "C" after the name Galido was in reality a
countersign and not a mere erroneous initial.
The dismissal with finality of the first petition did not refer to the merits of the petition.

Issue: May the Comelec decision be brought to the SC through a petition for certiorari? YES

Ratio:
1) The Comelechas exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials and has
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial
courts of general jurisdiction or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction, under Article IX (C), Section 2 (2), paragraph 1 of the 1987 Constitution.
2) The Court agrees with Galido in citing Article IX (A) Section 7.
3) The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the Commission on Elections in contests
involving elective municipal and barangay offices are final, executory and not appealable,
does not preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action of certiorari.
4) The SC quoted proceedings in the Constitutional Commission on the matter. They just wanted
to say that the decision should be immediately executory, and final was just meant to
distinguish it from mere interlocutory orders.
5) It should be understood that while decisions with respect to barangay and municipal officials
are final and immediately executory and, therefore, not appealable, that does not rule out the
possibility of an original special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus, as the
case may be, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
6) However, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in rendering the questioned decision.
7) The COMELEC has the inherent power to decide an election contest on physical evidence,
equity, law and justice, and apply established jurisprudence in support of its findings and
conclusions; and that the extent to which such precedents apply rests on its discretion, the
exercise of which should not be controlled unless such discretion has been abused to the
prejudice of either party.
8) The petition for prohibition has also become moot and academic, because Galeon had already
assumed the position of Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez as the duly-elected mayor of the
municipality by virtue of the COMELEC decision.
Petition dismissed. TRO lifted.
JUAN GARCIA RIVERA v COMELEC
12 July 1991
Padilla, ponente
SHORT VERSION:
107

10. The erroneous initial of the first name which accompanies the correct surname of a candidate, the erroneous initial
of the surname accompanying the correct first name of the candidate, or the erroneous middle initial of the candidate
shall not annul the vote in favor of the latter.

Rivera filed a special civil action for certiorari questioning a Comelec decision on who should be
the mayor of Guinobatan, Albay. His opponent said the action should be allowed since under the
Constitution, Comelec decisions on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay
officials to be final, executory and not appealable. The SC said that the Constitution didnt mean
deprive the SC of the power to review Comelec decisions, so the petition should be allowed.
However, there was no grave abuse of discretion in this case, so Riveras petition was dismissed.
FACTS:
Juan Garcia Rivera and Juan Mitre Garcia II were candidates for Mayor of Guinobatan,
Albay. Rivera was proclaimed mayor by 10 votes.
o Garcia filed an election protest with the RTC.
The RTC ruled that Garcia obtained 6376 votes as against Riveras 6222
(difference of 154 votes).
o On appeal to the Comelec, Comelecs first division affirmed the RTCs decision with
the modification that Garcia won by 153 votes.
o The Comelec en banc affirmed the decision of the first decision, though it said that
Garcias winning margin was 123 votes.
Garcia discharged the duties and functions of mayor by virtue of a writ of execution, until
the SC issued a TRO upon Riveras motion.
Rivera filed a petition for certiorari with the SC questioning the Comelec en banc decision.
o Garcia opposed the decision on the ground that under the Constitution, decisions of
the Comelec on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials
were final, executory and not appealable (Art. IX-C 2 (2) second sentence).
ISSUE:
did Comelec decisions in election contests involving elective municipal and barangay
officials, being final and executory and not appealable, preclude the filing of a special civil
action of certiorari? NO
REASONING:
This was similar to Galido v Comelec.
o The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the Commission on Elections in
contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices are final, executory and
not appealable, does not preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a special civil
action of certiorari.
o In Galido, the SC reviewed the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission where
Comm. Regalado said that: while these decisions with respect to barangay and
municipal officials are final and immediately executory and, therefore, not
appealable, that does not rule out the possibility of an original special civil action for
certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus, as the case may be, under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court.
Flores v Comelec:
o Obviously, the provision of Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution that
"decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving
elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not
appealable" applies only to questions of fact and not of law.
o That provision was not intended to divest the Supreme Court of its authority to
resolve questions of law as inherent in the judicial power conferred upon it by the
Constitution.
IN THE PRESENT CASE:
o Rivera filed the petition because he alleged that the Comelec en banc committed
grave abuse of discretion in affirming the first divisions decision.
o The Comelecs decision wasnt arrived at capriciously or whimsically; it
painstakingly reevaluated the questioned 67 ballots.

The evaluation of the ballots is a factual determination.

In a petition for certiorari, findings of fact of administrative bodies are final
unless grave abuse of discretion has marred such factual determinations.

RULING: petition dismissed

SEPARATE OPINIONS
Regalado, concurring
The authorized modes of appeal (ordinary appeal, appeal by petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45, petition for review under BP Blg 129) were unavailable for
decisions, orders or rulings of constitutional commissions such as the Comelec.
However, these decisions werent invulnerable to original civil actions of certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus invoking the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
o This was because no appeal or any other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law lies from said adjudication.
Narvasa, dissenting
General rule: any order, ruling or judgment of the COMELEC may be thus appealed, or
sought to be reviewed through the extraordinary remedy of certiorari under Rule 65.
o Except: the final, executory and unappealable character of the COMELEC's rulings,
orders or decisions in election contests involving elective municipal and barangay
offices, is pronounced not by statute or presidential issuance, but by the
Constitution itself.
Benjamin Borja, Jr. (Petitioner) vs Comelec, and Jose Capco, Jr. (Respondents)
Date: September 3, 1998
Ponente: Mendoza, J.

Short Version:
Facts: Capco is vice-mayor of Pateros. He became mayor by operation of law upon death of the
incumbent mayor. Thereafter, he was consecutively elected twice as mayor. When he tried to run
for mayor for the third consecutive time, Borja opposed. Borja argued that the Constitution
prohibits local elective officials from running after having served 3 consecutive terms; and that
Capco had already served 3 terms, counting as first term his succession to mayorship.
Held: The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as
well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that a
local official has served 3 consecutive terms; he must also have been elected to the same
position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. Thus, Capco is not
disqualified.

Facts:
- Jose Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June
30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the

incumbent, Cesar Borja.

- On May 11, 1992, Capco ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which ended on
June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of three years ending
June 30, 1998.
- On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros for the May 11,
1998 elections. Benjamin Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capcos
disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three
consecutive terms, and therefore ineligible to serve for another term.
- Comelec 2nd Division declared Capco disqualified from running for reelection as mayor.
However, Comelec en banc, voting 5-2, declared Capco eligible to run. Comelec said:
The three-term limitation refers to the term of office for which the local official was elected. It
made no reference to succession to an office to which he was not elected
- Capco was voted for in the elections, receiving 16,558 votes against Borjas 7,773 votes, and
was proclaimed elected by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.
- Borja filedd the present petition for certiorari to nullify the Comelec resolution declaring Capco
eligible to run. He contends that Capcos service as mayor from September 2, 1989 to June 30,
992 should be considered one term, and since Capco thereafter served 2 more terms as mayor,
he should be considered to have served 3 consecutive terms within the contemplation of Art X,
Sec 8 of the Constitution and Sec 43(b) of the LGC.

Issue/Reasoning:
Issue: Whether Capco is barred from running for having served 3 consecutive terms (No)
- Policies embodied in Art X, Sec 8 of the Constitution: to prevent the establishment of political
dynasties; and to enhance the people's freedom of choice. To consider, therefore, only stay in
office regardless of how the official came to that office whether by election or by succession
would be to disregard the second purpose of the constitutional provision.
- The members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the
freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political
power. They rejected a proposal by Commissioner Garcia that after serving three consecutive
terms there should be no further reelection. Instead, they adopted the alternative proposal of
Commissioner Monsod that such officials be simply barred from running for the same position in
the succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive term.
- In discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that the
officials concerned were serving by reason of reelection.
- A fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people should be allowed to
choose their leaders. To bar the election of a local official because he has already served three
terms, although the first as a result of succession by operation of law, would violate this
principle.
- A textual analysis supports the ruling that constitutional provision contemplates service by local

officials for three consecutive terms as a result of election because it speaks of the term served
as one for which [the official] was elected.
- The purpose of the provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of
terms an elective official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was
elected because he succeeds to the position, such official cannot be considered to have fully
served the term.
- Reference is made to Bernas comment on Art VI, Sec 7 where states that if one is elected
Representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired term, no matter how
short, will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms
allowed.
- However, there is a difference between a vice-mayor and a member of the HOR. The vicemayor succeeds as mayor by operation of law; the Representative is elected to fill the
vacancy. Thus, the Representative serves a term for which he was elected.
- Borja cites Art VII, Sec 4 on the succession of the Vice-president to the presidency, and seeks to
apply the provision by analogy to the vice-mayor.
- However, the absence of a similar provision in Art X, Sec 8 on elective local officials shows
the difference between the two cases.
- Also, the Vice-President is elected primarily to succeed the President in the event of the
position's vacancy. Electors choose as Vice-President the candidate who they think can fill the
Presidency in the event of vacancy. Hence, service in the presidency for more than 4 years
may rightly be considered as service for a full term. This is not the case of the vice-mayor
who, under the LGC, has distinct powers and functions from the mayor.
- The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well
as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that he has
served 3 consecutive terms; he must also have been elected to the same position for the same
number of times before the disqualification can apply.
- The Court then presented 3 scenarios on the application of the provision.

Dispositive:
Petition dismissed.
ROMEO LONZANIDA v COMELEC
28 July 1999
Gonzaga-Reyes, ponente
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of a Comelec resolution
SHORT VERSION:
Lonzanida had been elected for his third term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in 1995.
However, an election protest led to his proclamation being declared null and void. So he ran
again in 1998. His opponent wanted to have him disqualified as he had already served three
terms as the mayor. The SC ruled that he had not yet been disqualified. First, he was not duly
elected as mayor in 1995 considering the Comelec ordered him to vacate his post. Second, he
did not fully serve the 1995-1998 term.

FACTS:
Romeo Lonzanida served two terms as the municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
o He was proclaimed the winner of the mayoralty race in the May 1995 elections.
o However, his proclamation was contested by Juan Alvez, his opponent.
Alvez filed an election protest before the Zambales RTC.
The RTC ruled in Alvezs favor and declared a failure of election for the office
of mayor of San Antonio.
Both parties appealed to the Comelec.
o The Comelec ruled in Alvezs favor, and so Alvez assumed office.
In the 1998 elections, Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy again.
o His opponent Eufemio Muli filed a petition to disqualify him on the ground that he
had served three consecutive terms in the same post.
o The Comelec disqualified Lonzanida.
ISSUE:
was Romeo Lonzanida disqualified from running as mayor in the 1998 elections? NO
REASONING:
The records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that the three-term limit which is
now embodied in section 8, Art. X of the Constitution was initially proposed to be an
absolute bar to any elective local government official from running for the same position
after serving three consecutive terms.
o The said disqualification was primarily intended to forestall the accumulation of
massive political power by an elective local government official in a given locality in
order to perpetuate his tenure in office.
o The delegates also considered the need to broaden the choices of the electorate of
the candidates who will run for office, and to infuse new blood in the political arena
by disqualifying officials from running for the same office after a term of nine years.
The drafters however, recognized and took note of the fact that some local government
officials run for office before they reach forty years of age; thus to perpetually bar them
from running for the same office after serving nine consecutive years may deprive the
people of qualified candidates to choose from.
o As finally voted upon, it was agreed that an elective local government official should
be barred from running for the same post after three consecutive terms.
o After a hiatus of at least one term, he may again run for the same office.
Borja v Comelec: Two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1)
that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
The two requisites were absent in the present case.
o Lonzanida was previously elected and served two consecutive terms as mayor of
San Antonio Zambales prior to the May 1995 mayoral elections.
In the May 1995 elections he again ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales
and was proclaimed winner.
He assumed office and discharged the rights and duties of mayor until March
1998 when he was ordered to vacate the post by reason of the COMELEC
decision dated November 13, 1997 on the election protest against Lonzanida
which declared his opponent Juan Alvez, the duly elected mayor of San
Antonio.
Alvez served the remaining portion of the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
o FIRST: Lonzanida couldnt have been considered as having been duly elected in the
1995 elections.
After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC
itself declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May

1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as winner was

declared null and void.
His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by
reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation.
It has been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation subsequently
declared void is no proclamation at all and while a proclaimed candidate may
assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers
he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final
outcome of the election protest.
SECOND: He didnt fully serve the 1995-1998 term.
The second sentence of the constitutional provision states, Voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was
elected.
The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to
circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at
the same time respect the peoples choice and grant their elected official full
service of a term is evident in this provision.
Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in
the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short of the full term
provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.

RULING: petition granted

#rbm
Raymundo Adormeo v. COMELEC v. Ramon Talaga, Jr.
4 February 2002
Quisumbing, J.
Short version: Ramon Talaga, Jr. was elected as mayor of Lucena City in May 1992 and he served
the full term. He was re-elected during the 1995 elections and again served the full term. During
the 1998 elections, he lost to Bernard Tagarao. In the recall election of May 12, 2000, he again
won and served Tagarao's unexpired term. Adormeo and Talaga were candidates for mayor of in
the May 14, 2001 elections. Adormeo filed a "Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate
of Candidacy and/or Disqualification" with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor against
Talaga. He contended that, in view of the circumstances, Talaga's candidacy constituted a
violation of Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution, as well as of Sec. 43 (b) of the LGC, both of which
provide that local elective officials are only allowed to serve three consecutive terms. The
Supreme Court disagreed with his contention. The term limit for elective local officials must be
taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position.
It is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office
for he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before
the disqualification can apply. Therefore, Talaga is not disqualified from running for mayor again.
Facts:
- Ramon Talaga, Jr. was elected as mayor of Lucena City in May 1992 and he served the full term.
He was re-elected during the 1995 elections and again served the full term. During the 1998
elections, he lost to Bernard Tagarao. In the recall election of May 12, 2000, he again won and
served Tagarao's unexpired term.

- Adormeo and Talaga were the only candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy for
mayor of Lucena City in the May 14, 2001 elections. Adormeo filed a "Petition to Deny Due
Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/or Disqualification" with the Office of the
Provincial Election Supervisor, Lucena City, against Talaga.

According to Adormeo, Talaga's candidacy constituted a violation of Sec. 8,

Art. X of the 1987 Constitution108 considering that the latter was elected and had served as
city mayor for three consecutive terms as follows: (1) in the election of May 1992, where
he served the full term; (2) in the election of May 1995, where he again served the full
term; and (3) in the recall election of May 12, 2000, where he served the unexpired term
of Tagarao.
On the other hand, Talaga alleged that he had only served two consecutive
terms. He pointed out that his defeat in the 1998 elections to Tagarao interrupted the
"consecutiveness" of his years as mayor and thus, his mayorship was not for three
consecutive terms of three years each. He further argued that his service from May 12,
2000 until June 30, 2001 was not a "full term" as contemplated by the Constitution and the
law.
- The COMELEC First Division found merit in Adormeo's arguments and so, it ordered that
Talaga's Certificate of Candidacy be withdrawn and/or cancelled.
- Talaga filed an MR, essentially reiterating his aforementioned arguments. Despite Adormeo's
Opposition to the MR, the COMELEC en banc ruled in favor of Talaga and reversed the ruling of
the First Division. After the votes were canvassed on May 19, 2001, Talaga was proclaimed as the
duly elected Mayor. Hence, the present petition before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Was Talaga disqualified to run for mayor? (No)
Reasoning:
- The issue in this case hinges on whether, as provided by the Constitution, Talaga has already
served three consecutive terms as Mayor of Lucena City.
Adormeo raised similar arguments as the ones he raised before the
COMELEC. He further said that Talaga's candidacy would violate, not only the Constitution,
but also Sec. 43 (b) of the LGC.109

108
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

109
Section 43. Term of Office. (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective
official concerned was elected.

- In Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, it was held that the term limit for elective local officials must be taken
to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an
elective local office for he must also have been elected to the same position for the same
number of times before the disqualification can apply.
- An example from the Borja case: Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his first term, he is
twice suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is twice reelected after that, can he
run for one more term in the next election? Yes, because he has served only two full terms
successively.
- In Lonzanida v. COMELEC, it was held that two conditions for the application of the
disqualification must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been reelected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post; and (2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.
- Accordingly, COMELEC's ruling that Talaga was not elected for 3 consecutive terms should be
upheld for the continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.
- To bolster his case, Adormeo adverts to the comment of Fr. Bernas on Sec. 8, Art. X of the
Constitution, to the effect that "if one is elected representative to serve the unexpired term of
another, that unexpired, no matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of
computing the number of successive terms allowed."
However, Fr. Bernas' comment is pertinent only to members of the House of
Representatives. Unlike LGUs, there is no recall election provided for members of
Congress.
- Adormeo also contends that Talaga's victory in the recall election should be deemed a violation
of Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution as "voluntary renunciation."
- The Court disagreed. In Lonzanida, it was said that voluntary renunciation of office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which he was elected. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced
term in the computation of the three-term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for
any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity
of service.
Dispositive: Petition dismissed.
Digested by Ramon Rocha IV
Victorino Dennis M. Socrates, Mayor of Puerto Princesa City v Comelec, the
Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) of Puerto Princesa City, PRA Interim Chairman
PunongBrgy. Mark David Hagedorn, PRA Interim Secretary PUnongBrgy. Benjamin
Jarilla, PRA Chairman and Presiding Officer PunongBrgy. Earl S. Buenviaje and PRA
Secretary PunongBrgy. Carlos Aballa Jr.
Vicente S. Sandoval Jr. v Comelec
Ma. Flores P. Adovo, Mercy E. Gilo and BienvenidoOllave, Sr., v Comelec and Edward S.
Hagedorn

November 12, 2002

Carpio, J.

Short version:Socrates was elected Mayor of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, but the barangay
officials convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) to initiate his recall, due
to their loss of confidence in Socrates. They issued a Recall Resolution and the Comelec
scheduled a recall election. Edward Hagedorn, who had previously served as Mayor for 3 terms,
filed his certificate of candidacy in the recall election. Petitions were filed seeking to disqualify
Hagedorn, due to the 3-term limit in the Constitution and the LGC. Socrates also sought to have
the Recall Resolution nullified, citing procedural infirmities in how the PRA was convened. The SC
ruled against Socrates. The findings of fact of the Comelec state that notices were properly sent
and that Socrates himself had been properly informed of all the proceedings. There is no reason
to overturn these findings. As to Hagedorn, the SC held that he was qualified to run. What the
Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive
terms. The Constitution does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the
reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election midway in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an
immediate reelection after the third term. Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection
following his three consecutive terms as mayor which ended on June 30, 2001. Hagedorn's
continuity of service as mayor was involuntarily interrupted from June 30, 2001 to September 24,
2002 during which time he was a private citizen. Involuntary severance from office for any length
of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption
from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.

Facts:

Three petitions have been consolidated here, all of them seeking the reversal of the
resolutions issued by the Comelec in relation to the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa
City, Palawan.
On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of the then incumbent barangay officials of the
Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA), to initiate the
recall of Victorino Dennis M. Socrates who assumed office as Puerto Princesa's mayor on June
30, 2001.
Mark David M. Hagedorn, president of the Association of Barangay Captains, was designated
as interim chair of the PRA.
The PRA passed Resolution No. 01-02 (Recall Resolution) which declared its loss of confidence
in Socrates and called for his recall. The PRA requested the COMELEC to schedule the recall
election for mayor within 30 days from receipt of the Recall Resolution.
Socrates filed with the COMELEC a petition to nullify and deny due course to the Recall
Resolution.
The Comelec en banc ruled against Socrates and dismissed his petition for lack of merit.
The COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election on
September 7, 2002.
The COMELEC en banc promulgated Resolution No. 5673 prescribing the calendar of activities
and periods of certain prohibited acts in connection with the recall election. The COMELEC
fixed the campaign period from August 27, 2002 to September 5, 2002 or a period of 10 days.
Edward M. Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election.

Ma. Flores F. Adovo and Merly E. Gilofiled a petition with the COMELEC, to disqualify Hagedorn
from running in the recall election and to cancel his certificate of candidacy. BienvenidoOllave,
Sr. filed a petition-in-intervention also seeking to disqualify Hagedorn. Genaro V. Manaay filed
another petition, docketed as SPA No. 02-539, against Hagedorn alleging substantially the
same facts and involving the same issues.
The petitions contend that "Hagedorn is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive
term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full
terms immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post."
The Comelec First Division dismissed the petitions. It declaredHagedorn qualified to run in the
recall election. It also reset the recall election from September 7, 2002 to September 24, 2002.
The COMELEC en banc denied the MRs of Adovo and Gilo and affirmed that Hagedorn was
qualified to run.

G.R. No. 154512

Socrates seeks to nullify the COMELEC en banc resolution which gave due course to the Recall
Resolution and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.
He alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution,
citing legal infirmities surrounding the convening of the PRA and its issuance of the Recall
Resolution:
o (1) Not all members of the PRA were notified of the meeting to adopt the resolution;
o (2) The proof of service of notice was palpably and legally deficient;
o (3) The members of the PRA were themselves seeking a new electoral mandate from
their respective constituents;
o (4) the adoption of the resolution was exercised with grave abuse of authority; and
o (5) The PRA proceedings were conducted in a manner that violated his and the public's
constitutional right to information.

G.R. No. 154683

Sandoval, Jr. seeks to annul COMELEC Resolution No. 5673 insofar as it fixed the recall
election on September 7, 2002, giving the candidates only a ten-day campaign period. He
prayed that the COMELEC be enjoined from holding the recall election on September 7, 2002
and that a new date be fixed giving the candidates at least an additional 15 days to
campaign.
The SC enjoined the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 5673 insofar as it fixed the
date of the recall election on September 7, 2002. The Court directed the COMELEC to give the
candidates an additional fifteen 15 days from September 7, 2002 within which to campaign.
Accordingly, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 5708 giving the candidates an
additional 15 days from September 7, 2002 within which to campaign. Thus, the COMELEC
reset the recall election to September 24, 2002.

G.R. Nos. 155083-84

Petitioners Adovo, Gilo and Ollave assail the COMELEC's resolutions declaring Hagedorn
qualified to run for mayor in the recall election. They also prayed for the TRO to enjoin the
proclamation of the winning candidate in the recall election.
The SC ordered the COMELEC to desist from proclaiming any winning candidate in the recall
election until further orders from the Court.

In the meantime, Hagedorn garnered the highest number of votes in the recall election with
20,238 votes. Rival candidates Socrates and Sandoval obtained 17,220 votes and 13,241
votes, respectively.
Hagedorn filed motions to lift the order restraining the COMELEC from proclaiming the
winning candidate and to allow him to assume office to give effect to the will of the
electorate.

Issues:
1) Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the Recall
Resolution and scheduling the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa? NO
2) IsHagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election? YES
3) Did the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in fixing a campaign period of only 10
days? Already moot and academic because of the SC Resolution and COMELEC Resolution No.
5708 granting an additional 15 days for the campaign period.
Ratio:
Validity of the Recall Resolution.
1) Socrates argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the
Recall Resolution despite the absence of notice to 130 PRA members and the defective
service of notice to other PRA members.
2) The COMELEC, however, found that on various dates, in the month of June 2002, the
proponents for the Recall of incumbent City Mayor Victorino Dennis M. Socrates sent notices
of the convening of the PRA to its members, pursuant to Section 70 of the LGC. Copies of the
said notice and proof of service for each of the noticeswere submitted in evidence.
3) Notices were likewise posted in conspicuous places particularly at the Barangay Hall, as
shown by pictures. Broadcast mass media was also used in the dissemination of the
convening of the PRA.
4) The City Election Officer of Puerto Princesa City in her Certification certified that upon a
'thorough and careful verification of the signatures appearing in PRA Resolution 01-02, x xx
the majority of all members of the PRA concerned approved said resolution.' She likewise
certified 'that not a single member/signatory of the PRA complained or objected as to the
veracity and authenticity of their signatures.'
5) The Provincial Election Supervisor of Palawan, Atty. UrbanoArlando, in his Indorsement, stated,
'upon proper review, all documents submitted are found in order.'
6) The Acting Director IV, Region IV, submitted the following recommendations:'This Office, after
evaluating the documents filed, finds the instant Petition sufficient in form and substance.
That the PRA was validly constituted and that the majority of all members thereof approved
Resolution No. 01-02 calling for the recall of MayorVictorino Dennis M. Socrates.'
7) This Court is bound by the findings of fact of the COMELEC on matters within the competence
and expertise of the COMELEC, unless the findings are patently erroneous.
8) There is no reason to hold that the COMELEC's findings of fact are patently erroneous.
9) Socrates also claims that the PRA members had no authority to adopt the Recall Resolution on
July 2, 2002 because a majority of PRA members were seeking a new electoral mandate in the
barangay elections scheduled on July 15, 2002.
a. This argument deserves scant consideration considering that when the PRA members
adopted the Recall Resolution their terms of office had not yet expired. They were all de
jure sangguniang barangay members with no legal disqualification to participate in the
recall assembly.
10)
Socrates contends that the manner private respondents conducted the PRA proceedings
violated his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern. However, he

admits receiving notice of the PRA meeting and of even sending his representative and
counsel who were present during the entire PRA proceedings.
11)
Proponents of the recall election submitted to the COMELEC the Recall Resolution, minutes
of the PRA proceedings, the journal of the PRA assembly, attendance sheets, notices sent to
PRA members, and authenticated master list of barangay officials in Puerto Princesa. Socrates
had the right to examine and copy all these public records in the official custody of the
COMELEC, and he does not claim that the COMELEC denied him this right.
a. Thus, there is no legal basis in Socrates' claim that respondents violated his
constitutional right to information on matters of public concern.
Hagedorns qualification for Mayor in the recall election

12)
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X 110 of the
Constitution. This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of the LGC. 111"
13)
These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts.
a. The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three
consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the
three-term limit rule.
b. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not
interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office
for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and
after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive
terms.
14)
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection
for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same
office following the end of the third consecutive term.
15)
Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for
two reasons.
a. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection
after three consecutive terms.
b. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of
service.
16)
When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term limit of elective local officials,
the question asked was whether there would be no further election after three terms, or
whether there would be "no immediate reelection" after three terms.
17)
What the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three
consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a
fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive
term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a
subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the third term.
18)
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to
run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution
prohibits is a consecutive fourth term.
19)
The debates in the Constitutional Commission evidently show that the prohibited election
referred to by the framers of the Constitution is the immediate reelection after the third term,
not any other subsequent election.
20)
If the prohibition on elective local officials is applied to any election within the three-year
full term following the three-term limit, then Senators should also be prohibited from running
in any election within the six-year full term following their two-term limit, considering that the
constitutional provision on the term limit of Senators is worded exactly like the term limit of
elective local officials.
21)
The framers of the Constitution thus clarified that a Senator can run after only three years
following his completion of two terms. The framers expressly acknowledged that the
prohibited election refers only to the immediate reelection, and not to any subsequent
110
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected."

111
Section 43. Term of Office. (a) x xx(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms
in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected."

election, during the six-year period following the two term limit. They did not intend "the
period of rest" of an elective official who has reached his term limit to be the full extent of the
succeeding term.
22)
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not
an immediate reelection after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The
immediate reelection that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the
regular elections in 2001. Hagedorn did not seek reelection in the 2001 elections.
23)
Hagedorn was elected for three consecutive terms in the 1992, 1995 and 1998 elections
and served in full his three consecutive terms as mayor of Puerto Princesa.
24)
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto
Princesa was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This
period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn's service as mayor, not because
of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition. Hagedorn's three consecutive
terms ended on June 30, 2001.
25)
Hagedorn's new recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 is not a seamless
continuation of his previous three consecutive terms as mayor.
26)
The nearly 15-month period he was out of office, although short of a full term of three
years, constituted an interruption in the continuity of his service as mayor. The Constitution
does not require the interruption or hiatus to be a full term of three years. The clear intent is
that interruption "for any length of time," as long as the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to
break an elective local official's continuity of service.
27)
Adormeo v Comelec and Talaga was heavily quoted: The period an elective local official is
out of office interrupts the continuity of his service and prevents his recall term from being
stitched together as a seamless continuation of his previous two consecutive terms.
28)
Adormeo established the rule that the winner in the recall election cannot be charged or
credited with the full term of three years for purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an
elective official's terms in office.
29)
Hagedorn's recall term does not retroact to include the tenure in office of Socrates. To
consider Hagedorn's recall term as a full term of three years, retroacting to June 30, 2001,
despite the fact that he won his recall term only last September 24, 2002, is to ignore reality.
30)
To make Hagedorn's recall term retroact to June 30, 2001 creates a legal fiction that
unduly curtails the freedom of the people to choose their leaders through popular elections.
The concept of term limits is in derogation of the sovereign will of the people to elect the
leaders of their own choosing. Term limits must be construed strictly to give the fullest
possible effect to the sovereign will of the people.
31)
Borja, Jr. v. Comelec was also cited: The members of the Constitutional Commission were
as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with
preventing the monopolization of political power.
32)
A necessary consequence of the interruption of continuity of service is the start of a new
term following the interruption. An official elected in recall election serves the unexpired term
of the recalled official. This unexpired term is in itself one term for purposes of counting the
three-term limit. This is clear from the following discussion in the Constitutional Commission:
33)
SUMMARY of why Hagedorn is qualified to run
a. Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following his three consecutive terms
as mayor which ended on June 30, 2001;
b. Hagedorn's continuity of service as mayor was involuntarily interrupted from June 30,
2001 to September 24, 2002 during which time he was a private citizen;
c. Hagedorn's recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 cannot be made to
retroact to June 30, 2001 to make a fourth consecutive term because factually the recall
term is not a fourth consecutive term; and
d. Term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the right of
the electorate to choose their leaders.
Petitions dismissed. TRO lifted.

Davide, Jr., Concurring and dissenting

The ponencia is then correct when it holds that the three-term limit bars an immediate
reelection for a fourth term. But he disagreesthatHagedorn he did not seek an immediate
reelection for a fourth term because he was not a candidate for reelection in the May 2001
election.
What would have been his fourth term by virtue of the May 2001 election was for the
period from 30 June 2001 to 30 June 2004. The flaw in the ruling results from an apparent
confusion between term and election, the root cause of which is the attempt to distinguish
"voluntary renunciation" of office from "involuntary severance" from office and the term of
office to which it relates.
The dichotomy made in the ponencia between "voluntary renunciation of the office" and
"involuntary severance from office" is unnecessary, if not misplaced. From the discussion
in the ponencia, the latter is made to apply to the banned term, i.e., the fourth term
immediately following three consecutive terms. Haggedorn cannot have suffered
"involuntary severance from office" because there was nothing to be severed; he was not
a holder of an office either in a de jure or de facto capacity.
He knew he was disqualified from seeking a third reelection to office. Disqualification is not
synonymous with involuntary severance.
Even if we concede that involuntary severance is an act which interrupts the continuity of
a term for purposes of applying the three-term principle the rule laid down in Lonzanida
vs. COMELEC, such caseis not applicable in the case of Hagedorn. The involuntary
severance in Lonzanida referred to one that took place during any of the three terms;
hence, the term during which it occurred should be excluded in the computation.
In the case of Hagedorn, no such involuntary severance took place during any of his three
terms brought about by his election in 1992 and reelections in 1995 and 1998.
The voluntary renunciation referred is one that takes place at any time during either the
first, second, or third term of the three consecutive terms.The purpose of the provision is
to prevent an elective local official from voluntarily resigning from office for the purpose of
circumventing the rule on the belief that the term during which he resigned would be
excluded in the counting of the three-term rule. In the case of Hagedorn, even if he
voluntarily resigned on his third term, he would still be barred from seeking reelection in
the May 2001 election.
Adormeo is also not applicable, because Talaga did not win his second reelection bid, or
his third term. Hagedorn here has already served three successive terms.

Puno, J., concurring

Same arguments as majority

Private respondent Hagedorn is not disqualified from running in the September 24, 2002
recall election as the disqualification under Art. X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution applies to the
regular mayoralty election succeeding the third consecutive term served. Nor is he
precluded from serving the unexpired portion of the 2001-2004 mayoralty term as this is
not service of a prohibited fourth consecutive full term.
Melanio Mendoza, and Mario Mendoza (Petitioners) vs
Comelec, and Leonardo Roman (Respondents)112

112
There is no majority in this case. Those who voted to dismiss the petition had different reasons for doing so; same with those who
voted to grant the petition. Thus, there is no main opinion. The petition was dismissed because by vote of

Date: December 17, 2002

Short Version:
Facts: Roman was elected as Governor in a recall election. Thereafter, he was elected to
the same position in two consecutive regular elections. Immediately after his last term, he
ran and was again elected as Governor. The petitioners seek Roman's disqualification
arguing that his election in the recall election should be counted as one term, thus when
he tried to run again for the same position, he had already served 3 terms, and is
therefore disqualified by the Constitution.
Held: 8 justices voted to dismiss the petition and uphold the election of Roman, while 7
voted to grant the petition. For different reasons, the 8 justices who voted to dismiss did
not consider the recall election of Roman as one term for the purpose of counting the
three-consecutive term limitation.
Facts:113

113
Taken from the opinion of Sandoval-Gutierrez.

- Leonardo Roman held the post of Governor of Bataan a number of times

- From 19861988, he was appointed OIC Governor by President Aquino and served up to
1988.
- From 19881992, he was elected Governor and served up to 1992.
- From 19941995, he was elected Governor during the recall election in 1993, assumed
office on 28 June 1994 and served up to 1995.
- From 19951998, he was elected Governor and served up to 1998.
- From 19982001, he was elected Governor and served up to 2001.
- On 22 February 2001, Roman filed a COC for the same post for the 14th May 2001
regular elections. On 16 May 2001, he was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Bataan.
- On May 25, 2001, Melanio Mendoza and Mario Ibarra, residents and registered voters of
Tenejero, Balanga, Bataan, filed with the Comelec en banc a petition for quo warranto.
They alleged that Roman has served as governor of Bataan for 3 consecutive terms
counted from his assumption of office by virtue of the 1993 recall election, and is thus
disqualified to seek a fourth term for the same position in 2001.
- Comelec dismissed the petition on the ground that the 1993 recall election cannot be
counted as a full term, thus should not be considered in applying the three-term limit.
- Hence, Mendoza and Ibarra filed with the SC the present petition for certiorari.
- On February 26, 2002, Congressman Enrique Garcia, Jr. of the 2nd district of Bataan filed
a petition-in-intervention which was admitted by this Court. As a registered voter and
Representative of his district, he joins petitioners in questioning the eligibility of Roman.
- Roman contends that he is eligible to run in the May 14, 2001 elections "for the Office of
Governor in the Province of Bataan" since he did not serve the full 19921995 term; what
he served was only "the unexpired portion of Governor Enrique Tet Garcias 1992 to 1995
term." 7 In support of his contention respondent Roman cites Lonzanida v. Comelec 8
which held that the official concerned should have fully served three consecutive terms in
the same local government post for the three-term limit to apply.
- OSG argued that the petition should be dismissed on the ground that a recall election is
not a regular election. As such, service of an official elected in a recall election should not
be counted as a full term.
- Relevant legal provisions: Sec 8, Art X of the Constitution; and Sec 43 of the LGC.
Issue:
Whether Roman's election in the recall elections is considered an election for a full-term
for the purpose of applying the three-term limit.
Dispositive:
Petition dismissed, by vote of 8 against 7.
Vitug, J., joined by Ynares-Santiago, J., voted to DISMISS:
- 2 conditions that must concur in order that the three-consecutive term limit can apply:
(1) the elective local official has been elected for 3 consecutive terms to the same local
government position; and
(2) the official has served 3 consecutive full terms, albeit a voluntary renunciation of the
office shall not be deemed to be an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full
term for which he is elected.
- The constitutional provision contemplates a continuous full 3-year term before the
proscription can apply.

- The Constitutional Commission, in its deliberations, referred to a full nine (9) years of
service for each elective local government official in the application of the prohibition,
envisioning at the same time a continuous and uninterrupted period of nine years by
providing for only one exception, i.e., when an incumbent voluntarily gives up the office.
- A winner who dislodges in a recall election an incumbent elective local official merely
serves the balance of the latters term of office; it is not a full three-year term. On the
other hand, an incumbent elective local official against whom a recall election is initiated
and who nevertheless wins must be viewed as a continuation of the term of office, and not
as a break in reckoning his three consecutive terms.
-In Lonzanida v Comelec it was held that: Voluntary renunciation of a term does not
cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three-term limit; conversely,
involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by
law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.
- Since the involuntary severance from the service which results in the incumbents being
unable to finish his term of office because of his ouster through valid recall proceedings
negates "one term" for purposes of applying the three-term limit, it stands to reason that
the balance of the term assumed by the newly elected local official in a recall election
should not also be held to be one term in reckoning the three-term limit.
- A recall election term, not being a full three-year term, is not to be counted or used as a
basis for the nine-year full three-term limit.
- The law involved is a limitation on the right of suffrage. Roman has won the election with
a comfortable margin against his closest opponent. Where a candidate appears to be the
clear choice of the people, doubts on his eligibility must be resolved to respect and carry
out the paramount will of the electorate.
Mendoza, J., joined by Quisumbing, J., voted to DISMISS:
- In Borja v Comelec it was held that the constitutional provision contemplates instances
where an individual has not only fully served three consecutive terms in the same elective
local office but has also been elected to the same position for the same number of times.
Borja was applied to a recall election in Lonzanida v Comelec. Borja was again applied in
Adormeo v Comelec.
- In all those cases, the Court did not count the term during which succession took place or
a recall election was held in determining whether an elective local official had served for
more than three consecutive terms.
- However, Socrates v Comelec in effect overruled these precedents by ruling that a city
mayor, who had served for three consecutive terms, was qualified to run in a recall
election held in the following term because of an "interruption" in the service caused by
the holding of a regular election.
- Mendoza dissented in that case because his opinion is that a local official is qualified to
run in the recall election not because of any interruption in the continuity of his service,
but because the term for which he was elected was less than three years.
- In applying the three-term limit, the term during which succession takes place or a recall
election is held should not be counted, either with the three consecutive terms preceding,
or with the three consecutive terms succeeding, such term. It should not be counted not
because of any interruption in the continuity of the service, but because such term is for
less than three years. Hence, the unexpired portion of a term, whether filled by succession
or by election in a recall, cannot be considered one full term. Thus, in the case of Roman,
his last election is valid.

- There is no reason why the result of this case should be different from Borja simply
because in this case, the official became such by virtue of election in a recall. Succession
and recall election are alike. They are both modes of succession for the purpose of
automatically filling permanent vacancies in elective local offices to prevent a hiatus in
office. The local official who succeeds to the office or is elected in a recall simply finishes
the term of his predecessor.
- The Constitution does not really prohibit service for more than three terms if continuity of
service is interrupted by means other than the voluntary renunciation of the incumbent. To
hold otherwise would result in limiting an elective local officials term to less than three
years, which is contrary to the Constitution.
Panganiban, J., joined by Puno, J., voted to DISMISS:
- The dissenters (those who voted to grant the petition) overriding concern is the
possibility that an elective local official may be elected to and hold the same position
longer than three consecutive terms. However, such concern is largely misplaced.
- The ruling in Borja v Comelec permitted Borja to hold the same office for an
uninterrupted period totaling 11 years and 10 months. How different is that case from the
present one? The apparent distinction between succession to office and a recall election
does not make a real difference.
- Does not agree that a recall term must be deemed one full term for purposes of
computing the number of successive terms allowed. Under this theory, Roman is
disqualified from running for reelection in 2001, and would in effect cut short his service to
less than nine years and thereby effectively shortchange his constituents. It would in
effect uphold legalism over the peoples will.
- The dissenters place much weight on the opinion expressed by then Commissioner
Davide during the Constitutional Commission discussions. However, there is nothing in
that exchange that would support the claim that the recall term of an elective local official
must be treated as one term, in the same manner as the term of office of a senator or a
congressman who wins in a special election is deemed as such.
- This pronouncement in Socrates cannot be regarded as controlling insofar as the instant
case is concerned. In that case, the main issue was whether a recall election that took
place after the fourth consecutive election had taken place was to be deemed an
"immediate reelection" to a fourth term, to which the Court answered "No".
- Socrates did not include the question of whether a recall term should be considered one
term for purposes of reckoning term limits. Therefore, the Courts statement that a recall
term is one term for purposes of counting the three-term limit may be regarded merely as
an obiter dictum.
- The concept of term limits is a restraint on the sovereign will of the people. Term limits
must thus be construed delicately to prevent them from unduly subverting the manifest
sovereign will of the electorate.
- Term limits should refer and strictly apply to the normal or expected duration of electoral
terms, barring unexpected or unforeseen contingencies such as acts of nature or political
upheavals as in this case.
- After having won the last election by an overwhelming margin, Roman is unarguably the
choice of the voters. The Court cannot simply turn a deaf ear to, much less stifle, the
peoples voice. Elections and the contests attendant thereto involve public interest of the
highest priority. Thus, technicalities and procedural barriers should not be allowed to
stand, if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate
in the choice of their elective officials.

- In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than
to be right in complex but little understood legalisms.
- Petitioners have not clearly demonstrated that the ineligibility of the respondent
governor is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding it
and thereby giving effect to the peoples will would ultimately be more prejudicial to the
democratic fundamentals and juristic traditions of our country.
- In Socrates, Panganiban voted with the majority, not so much because of the strict legal
rationalization, but because the ponencia therein upheld the clear choice of the people.
- By the same token, to unseat Roman would constitute an unwelcome judicial imposition
upon the people.
Azcuna, J., joined by Bellosillo, J., voted to DISMISS:
- The rule is the fundamental tenet of representative democracy that the people should be
allowed to choose those whom they please to govern them. The exception is the term limit
provided for in the Constitution. Thus, in applying the exception, it must be strictly
construed.
- The constitutional provision applies only if the official has served 3 consecutive terms in
full. Consequently, service of less than a full term, be it succession or recall election, does
not count in determining whether such official has served three consecutive terms.
- When the conditions of the constitutional provision obtain, the prohibition sets in and
what is prohibited is not simply an "immediate reelection", as contended by the majority in
Socrates v Comelec, but rather serving for more than 3 consecutive terms, i. e., service in
the immediately following term, the fourth term.
- In reference to the prohibited service, it is not required that it be for the full term. What is
proscribed is service, of any length, during the prohibited term, for such would still
constitute service for more than three consecutive terms.
- In Socrates, Azcuna joined the separate opinion of the Chief Justice, as he agreed that
once an elected local official has served 3 consecutive terms in full, that person cannot
serve for any time during the immediately following term, whether by immediate
reelection or by recall election.
- In the present case, Romans election as governor in the recall election of 1992 should
not be counted as one full term. For the disqualification to attach, 3 consecutive terms
must be served in full. This is the exception to the rule, so it must be strictly complied
with. Service for less than a full term, except only in case of voluntary renunciation, should
not be counted to determine the existence of the disqualification.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., joined by Davide, C.J., and Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Callejo, JJ., voted to GRANT petition:
- The constitutional and statutory provisions on term limits make no distinction as to the
nature of the election whether regular, special or recall elections. Where the law does not
distinguish, the courts should make no distinction. These provisions do not confine the
three-term rule to regular elections only. They include any election (such as recall election)
for the same position.
- Borja v Comelec: The term served must therefore be one for which [the official
concerned] was elected. The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the
limitation on the number of terms an elective local official may serve
- Claudio v Comelec held that "election" includes recall "by means of which voters decide
whether they should retain their local official or elect his replacement.

- The Constitutional Commission discussion involving Commissioners Davide and Suarez

reveal that being elected through a special election is already considered one term. While
the said discussion specifically refers to special elections for Senators and
Representatives, the same principle equally applies to a recall term of local officials.
- The Constitution limits the service of elective local officials to a total of nine consecutive
years. To exclude the service of such official who won the recall election would certainly
permit a circumvention of the purpose of the three-term rule, since he may hold the same
elective position longer than three consecutive terms, or more than the maximum nine
consecutive years.
- The object of the three-term limit is to forestall the accumulation of massive political
power by an elective local official. Another purpose is to broaden the choices of the
electorate. The courts, in construing the Constitution, should consider the object sought to
be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied.
- Socrates v Comelec: unexpired term is in itself one term for purposes of counting the
three-term limit... local official who serves a recall term should know that (such) term is in
itself one term although less than three years. This is the inherent limitation he takes by
running and winning in the recall election.
- There is a settled distinction between term and tenure.
- Term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as a matter of
right.
- Tenure represents the period during which the incumbent actually holds office.
- Tenure may be shorter than term for reasons within or beyond the power of the
incumbent. In the case of Roman, his tenure was only for the remaining term of the
recalled official, but his election is still for a particular term inasmuch as during the
unserved period of the recalled official, he has a claim to hold such office as a matter of
right. His service for the remaining period is considered tenure for the full term for which
he was elected.
- The Philippine Constitution is a solemn covenant made by all the Filipinos to govern
themselves. Sandoval-Gutierrez cannot understand why the majority has allowed the will
of Romans constituency to prevail over the will of the entire Filipino people, thus
completely disregarding the purpose of the constitutional three-term limit rule.
Carpio, J., joined by Carpio-Morales, J., voted to GRANT petition:
- Based on the Constitutional Commission deliberations, the framers intended a recall
term, which is the unexpired term of the recalled official, to be considered as one term for
counting term limits.
- While the exchange between Commissioners Davide and Suarez referred specifically to
special elections for Senators and Representatives, the same principle applies with equal
force to the recall term of elective local officials. To hold otherwise would allow a local
official to be elected, and to serve, for more than nine consecutive years in the same
position.
- The framers unmistakably intended that elective local officials should not be elected to
serve continuously for more than nine years in the same position. The Constitutional
Commission records reveal that the three-term limit of Representatives and local officials
was clearly understood to mean a maximum period of nine consecutive years.
- To rule that a recall term should be totally ignored in counting the three-term limit will
allow local officials to be elected to serve for more than nine consecutive years contrary to
the intent of the framers.

- The Constitution does not require a public official, whether elective or appointive, to
serve his full term in order to be disqualified from re-election or reappointment.
- If the Vice-President succeeds to the Presidency to serve an unexpired term of more than
four years, he is disqualified from running for President.
- One appointed to serve the unexpired term of a member of the CSC or the Comelec is
disqualified from reappointment even if the unexpired term is less than the full term of
seven years.
- The instant case is not a situation where the official succeeded by operation of law to the
office and served the unexpired term of his predecessor as in Borja v Comelec.
- A recall term of an official who is re-elected in the next two regular elections is not
interrupted by any term of another official. Thus, such recall term should be counted in
computing the three-term limit.
- To consider a recall term as a stray term will encourage a person disqualified because of
the three-term limit to agitate for the recall of his immediate successor. This will remove
the stability of the term of office of his immediate successor, and subject the people to too
many elections within a short period.
- The vote of the people of Bataan, while overwhelmingly for Roman, cannot overcome the
vote of the people of the entire Philippines when they ratified the Constitution that
mandates the three-term limit. Besides, the constitutional issue must be resolved without
regard to the circumstance that Roman won overwhelmingly, for the issue could also have
been raised in a case where the margin of victory was whisker-thin.

Governor Emilio M.R. Osmea,et. al. v. Commission on Elections, Hon. Oscar M. Orbos,
Executive Secretary, Hon. Guillermo Carague, Secretary of the Department of Budget
and Management and Hon. Rosalina S. Cajucom
30 July 1991
Paras, J.

SHORT VERSION: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 7056, which provides that
incumbent local elective officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and serve until their
successors shall have been duly elected, is violative of the Consti. The SC agreed with the
petitioners. The Consti clearly mandates the holding of synchronized elections on the second
Monday of May 1992, but RA 7056 provides for 2 elections: one in May and one in November
1992. The Consti also mandates that the first local officials elected under the 1987 Consti will
serve until June 30, 1992, but under RA 7056 they will hold over beyond June 30, 1992 until their
successors are elected and qualified. The Consti also states that the term of local elective
officials is 3 years. But under RA 7056, if the elections is held in Nov. 1992, the officials will only
be serving for 2 years and 7 months. For all these, the SC held RA 7056 unconstitutional.

FACTS:

This petition assails the constitutionality of RA 7056, or An Act Providing for the National
and Local Elections in 1992, Pave the Way for Synchronized and Simultaneous Elections
Beginning 1995, and Authorizing Appropriations Therefor.

Petitioners assert that the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 3 of RA 7056providing that all incumbent
provincial, city and municipal officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and serve until
their successors shall have been duly elected violates Art. XVIII Sec. 3. 114

114
There were a lot of other grounds raised, but this is the one pertinent to the topic in the syllabus.

ISSUE:
9. Is RA 7056 valid?
REASONING:
9. No
The Court quoted Art. XVIII Sec. 2 and 5 of the 1987 Constitution, which synchronize
the terms of office of Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the local
officials, the President and the Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the
same hour, date and year noon of June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the provisions that the term of
synchronization is used synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since
this is the precise intent in terminating their office tenure on the same day or occasion.
o This common termination date will synchronize future elections to once every
three years.
The Court also quoted the proceedings in the Constitutional Commission.
o Commissioner Davide proposed that the only way to effect the first synchronized
electionwould mean, necessarily, a bonus of two years to the Members of the
Lower House and a bonus of two years to the local elective officials.
o The first national and local officials to be elected in 1987 shall continue in office
for 5 years, until 1992, assuming that the term of the President will be 6 years
from 1986. From 1992, there will again be national, local and presidential
elections. This time, in 1992, the President shall have a term until 1998 and while
the next 12 senators shall serve until 1995, and then the local officials elected in
1992 will serve until 1995. From then on, there will be an election every 3 years.
Based on these, it becomes very evident that the Constitution has mandated a
synchronized national and local election prior to Juen 30, 1992, more specifically as
provided for in Art. XVIII Sec. 5 on the 2nd Monday of May, 1992.
The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, is fixed by the
Constitution at 3 years.
o The incumbents were elected in Jan. 1988. Therefore, their term would have
expired on Feb. 2, 1991. However, the Consti, their term was adjusted to expire at
noon of June 30, 1992.
Under RA 7056 provides for two separate elections in 1992: an election for President,
Vice President and 24 senators and all members of the House of Representatives on
the second Monday of May, and an election of all provincial, city and municipal officials
on the second Monday of November, 1992.
o The purpose of this is to start, as much as practicable, the synchronization of the
elections so that the process can be completed in the 1995 elections with the
result that beginning 1995 there shall be only one simultaneous regular elections
for national and local elective officials every 3 years.
With the clear mandate of the 1987 Consti to hold synchronized or simultaneous
national and local elections in the second Monday of May 1992, RA 7056 is clearly
violative of the Consti, particularly Art. XVIII Sec. 2 and 5, because it provides for the
holding of a desynchronized election.
RA 7056 is also violative of the Consti for the following reasons:
o Consti Art. XVIII Sec. 2 provides that the local official first elected under the 1987
Consti shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992. But under RA 7056 Sec. 3, the
incumbent local officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve
until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified.

It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by

providing that they shall hold over until their successors shall have been
duly elected and qualified where the consti has in effect or by clear
implication prescribed the term shall begin, there is no legislative authority
to continue the office beyond that period, even though the successors fail to
qualify with the time.
o Consti Art. X Sec. 8 provides that the term of local elective officials except
barangay officials shall be 3 years. But if the local election will be held on the
second Monday of Nov. 1992 under RA 7056, those to be elected will be serving
for only 2 years and 7 months (Nov. 30, 1992-June 30, 1995).
o Consti Art. IX Sec. 9 provides that the campaign period will be 90 days before
election until 30 days thereafter. In special cases, the Comelec can alter the
period. But under RA 7056, the campaign period for presidential and vice
presidential elections is 130 days before the election; for senatorial elections, 90
days; and for elections for members of the House, 45 days.
All these the postponement of the holding of a synchronized national and local
election from 1992 to 1995, the hold-over provision for incumbent local officials, the
reduction of the term of office of local officials to be elected on the second Monday of
November, and the change in the campaign periods are violative of the 1987
Constitution.

RULING: RA 7056 declared unconstitutional, null and void

Leyte Acting Vice-Governor Aurelio D. Menzon v. Leyte Acting Governor Leopoldo E.
Petilla in his capacity as Chief Executive of the Province of Leyte and Head of
SangguniangPanlalawigan and Leyte Provincial Treasurer Florencio Luna
Gutierrez, Jr., J. 20 May 1991
SV: Menzon, a senior SangguniangPanlalwigan member, was appointed acting Vice Governor of
the Province of Leyte by the Secretary of Local Government. The SangguniangPanlalawigan, on
the strength of an opinion issued by an USEC Rubillar of the Department of Local Government,
issued Resolution No. 505 where it held invalid the appointment of Menzon. Rubillar clarified that
the designation of Menzon did not contradict the stand they had on the matter. As such, the
Regional Director of the Department of Local Government requested Petilla, the acting Governor,
to modify Resolution No. 505. Neither Petilla nor the SangguniangPanlalawigan heeded this
request. Menzon thus filed a case with the SC to compel Petilla and the Provincial Treasurer of
Leyte to pay him his salary as acting Vice Governor. The SC initially dismissed his petition so
Menzon filed an MR.
The SC held that Menzon was properly appointed. The Local Government Code is silent on the
mode of succession in the event of a temporary vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor.
However, the silence of the law must not be understood to convey that a remedy in law is
wanting.Under the circumstances of this case and considering the silence of the Local
Government Code, the Court ruled that, in order to obviate the dilemma resulting from an
interregnum created by the vacancy, the President, acting through her alter ego, the Secretary of
Local Government, may remedy the situation. The SCthus declared valid the temporary
appointment extended to the petitioner to act as the Vice-Governor. The exigencies of public
service demanded nothing less than the immediate appointment of an acting Vice-Governor.
FACTS:
- 16 Feb 1988: by virtue of the fact that no Governor had been proclaimed in the province of
Leyte (the governor-elect, Larazzabal, was embroiled in an election protest), the Secretary of
Local Government Luis Santos designated Leopoldo E. Petilla (Vice Governor elect) as Acting
Governor.

- 25 Mar 1988: Aurelio Menzon, a senior member of the SangguniangPanlalawigan, was also
designated by Sec. Santos to act as the Vice-Governor of the province of Leyte.
- 29 May 1989: Provincial Administrator Quintero inquired from the USEC of the Department of
Local Government, Jacinto Rubillar, Jr., as to the legality of the appointment of Menzon to act as
the Vice-Governor of Leyte.
a) In his reply, USEC Rubillar stated that since BP 337 has no provision relating to succession
in the Office of the Vice-Governor in case of a temporary vacancy, the appointment
ofMenzon is not necessary
b) The Vice Governor (Petilla) who is temporarily performing functions of the Governor, could
concurrently assume the functions of both offices.
- As a result of USEC Rubillars reply, the SangguniangPanlalawigan issued Resolution No. 505
where it held invalid the appointment of Menzon as acting Vice Goveror of Leyte.
- Menzon sought clarification from USEC Rubillar regarding his opinion. Rubillar clarified that:
a) The designation of Menzondoes not contradict the stand they had on the matter.
b) The fact that Menzon was temporarily designated to perform the functions of the vice
governor could not be considered that he succeeded to the office of the vice governor.
c) It was up to the discretion of the appointing authority and the prevailing circumstances in
a given area to decide the necessity of designating an official to temporarily perform the
functions of a particular public office.
d) The peculiar situation in Leyte calls for the designation of the Sangguniang Member
(Menzon) to act as vice governor temporarily.
- In view of the clarificatory letter of USEC Rubillar, the Regional Director the Department of Local
Government, Region 8, wrote a letter to Petilla requesting that Resolution No. 505 be modified
accordingly.
This request was reiterated in a subsequent letter.
However, despite several letters of request, Petilla and the SangguniangPanlalawigan refused to
correct Resolution No. 505 and to pay Menzon the emoluments attached to the Office of ViceGovernor.
- 12 Nov 1989: Menzon filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and mandamus, seeking
the nullification of Resolution No. 505 and for the payment of his salary for his services as the
acting Vice Governor.
a) Meanwhile, the governorship of Leyte was settled and AdelinaLarrazabal was proclaimed
Governor of the province of Leyte.
b) During the pendency of the petition, the provincial treasurer of Leyte, Florencio Luna,
allowed the payment to Menzon of his salary as acting Vice Governor (P17,710).
- 28 Aug 1990: SC dismissed the petition filed by Menzon.
a) By virtue of this resolution, Petilla requested Governor Larrazabal to direct Menzon to pay
back to the province all the emoluments and compensation which he received while acting
as Vice Governor.
- 21 Sep 1990: Menzon filed an MR of the SC resolution.
ISSUES/REASONING:
Was there a vacancy in the position of Vice-Governor in the Province of Leyte? YES.
1) The law on Public Officers is clear on the matter. There is no vacancy whenever the office is
occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. A sensucontrario, there is a vacancy when there is
no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at present the duties of the
office.

Applying the definition of vacancy to this case, it can be readily seen that the office of the ViceGovernor was left vacant when the duly elected Vice-Governor LeopoldoPetilla was appointed
Acting Governor.
There is no satisfactory showing that LeopoldoPetilla, notwithstanding his succession to the
Office of the Governor, continued to simultaneously exercise the duties of the Vice-Governor.
The nature of the duties of a Provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge
them.The fact that the Secretary of Local Government was prompted to appoint the Menzon
shows the need to fill up the position of Vice Governor during the period it was vacant.
The Department Secretary had the discretion to ascertain whether or not the Provincial Governor
should devote all his time to that particular office. Moreover, it is doubtful if the Provincial Board,
unilaterally acting, may revoke an appointment made by a higher authority.
Was the appointment of Menzon as acting Vice Governor by the Secretary of Local
Government proper? YES.
1) The Local Government Code is silent on the mode of succession in the event of
a temporary vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor. However, the silence of the law must not
be understood to convey that a remedy in law is wanting.
The circumstances of the case reveal that there is indeed a necessity for the appointment of an
acting Vice-Governor. For about two years after the gubernatorial elections, there had been
no de jure permanent Governor for the province of Leyte, Governor AdelinaLarrazabal, at that
time, had not yet been proclaimed due to a pending election case before the Commission on
Elections.
The two-year interregnum which would result from the respondents' view of the law is disfavored
as it would cause disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services to the people and in the
proper management of the affairs of the local government of Leyte. Definitely, it is
incomprehensible that to leave the situation without affording any remedy was ever intended by
the Local Government Code.
Under the circumstances of this case and considering the silence of the Local Government Code,
the Court ruled that, in order to obviate the dilemma resulting from an interregnum created by
the vacancy, the President, acting through her alter ego, the Secretary of Local Government,
may remedy the situation.
The SCthus declared valid the temporary appointment extended to the petitioner to act as the
Vice-Governor. The exigencies of public service demanded nothing less than the immediate
appointment of an acting Vice-Governor.
2) The appointment of the petitioner, moreover, is in full accord with the intent behind the Local
Government Code. There is no question that Section 49 in connection with Section 52 of the
Local Government Code shows clearly the intent to provide for continuity in the performance of
the duties of the Vice-Governor.
The Local Government Code provides for the mode of succession in case of a permanent
vacancy, viz:
Section 49:In case a permanent vacancy arises when a Vice-Governor assumes the Office
of the Governor, . . . refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office,
voluntary resigns or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of
his office the sangguniangpanlalawigan . . . member who obtained the highest number of
votes in the election immediately preceding, . . . shall assume the office for the unexpired

term of the Vice-Governor. . . .

By virtue of the surroundings circumstance of this case, the mode of succession provided for
permanent vacancies may likewise be observed in case of a temporary vacancy in the same
office. In this case, there was a need to fill the vacancy. The petitioner is himself the member of
the SangguniangPanlalawigan who obtained the highest number of votes. The Department
Secretary acted correctly in extending the temporary appointment.
3) And finally, even granting that the President, acting through the Secretary of Local
Government, possesses no power to appoint the petitioner, at the very least, the petitioner is
a de facto officer entitled to compensation.
a) The appointment has the color of validity, he was appointed by no less than the alter ego
of the President, the Secretary of Local Government. Menzon also took his oath before
Senator Alberto Romulo
b) Respondents themselves acknowledged the validity of Menzons appointment and dealt
with him as such.
c) It was only when the controversial Resolution No. 505 was passed by the same persons
that the validty of the appointment was made an issued and the recognition withdrawn.
Upon the principle of public policy on which the de facto doctrine is based and basic
considerations of justice, it would be highly iniquitous to now deny him the salary due him for the
services he actually rendered as the acting Vice-Governor of the province of Leyte.
MR GRANTED. The additional compensation which the petitioner has received, in the
amount exceeding the salary authorized by law for the position of Senior Board
Member, shall be considered as payment for the actual services rendered as acting
Vice-Governor and may be retained by him.
120. Docena v. Sangguniang Panlalawigan 115

115
AGUSTIN B. DOCENA, petitioner, vs. THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF EASTERN SAMAR, GOVERNOR LUTGARDO B. BARBO,
VICE GOVERNOR CAMILO A. CAMENFORTE, BOARD MEMBERS MARCOS ALIDO, NONATO GERNA, ISMAEL KHO, MARCELINO C. LIBANAN,
NICOLAS PIMENTEL, GENEROSO YU and ATTY. SOCRATES B. ALAR, respondents.

Date: July 25, 1991

Ponente: Cruz
The case in a nutshell:
FACTS: Capito, a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar (SPES), died in
office. Local Government Secretary Santos appointed Docena to succeed him. Pursuant thereto,
Docena took his oath of office before House Speaker Mitra, and assumed office. For reasons
unknown, Secretary Santos later appointed Alar to the position already occupied by Docena. The
SPES passed a Resolution recognizing Alar, not Docena, as Capitos legitimate successor.
Howeve, the SPES was in effect reversed by Secretary Santos, who recalled Alars appointment
via letter. Secretary Santos action was affirmed in a First Indorsement signed by his Head
Executive Assistant. The SPEC reacted by passing another Resolution, reiterating its previous
recognition of Alar. The Provincial Prosecutor also rendered an opinion that Secretary Santos
recall order was void ab initio because Alars right to the office had been vested. Secretary
Santos issued another recall order, this time to Docena. Docena filed a petition for mandamus in
the SC compel the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Governor Lutgardo B. Barbo, Vice Governor
Camilo A. Camenforte, and Alar to recognize and admit him as a lawfully appointed member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar.
HELD: Docena is the lawfully appointed member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. His
appointment having been issued and accepted earlier, and he having already assumed office, he
could not thereafter be just recalled and replaced to accommodate Alar. From the tenor of the
appointment extended to Docena, there is no question that it was intended to be permanent, to
fill the permanent vacancy caused by Capitos death. As such, it was to be valid for the
unexpired portion of Capitos term. The appointment had been accepted by Docena, who had in
fact already assumed office as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, as per certification
of the Provincial Secretary. For all legal intents and purposes, his appointment had already
become complete and enforceable at the time it was supposed to have been superseded by
the appointment in favor of Alar. Docena had already acquired security of tenure in the position
and could be removed therefrom only for any of the causes, and conformably to the procedure,
prescribed by the Local Government Code. These requirements could not be circumvented by the
simple process of recalling his appointment.

Facts:
1) Luis B. Capito, who been elected to and was serving as a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar (SPES), died in office. Petitioner Agustin B. Docena was
appointed to succeed him.
2) Docenas appointment was issued on November 19, 1990, by Secretary Luis T. Santos of
the Department of Local Government.
3) Pursuant to Secretary Santos appointment, Docena took his oath of office before Speaker
Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives on November 22, 1990, and assumed
office as member of the SPES on November 26, 1990.
4) The record does not show why, but on November 27, 1990, private respondent Socrates B.
Alar was appointed, also by Secretary Santos, to the position already occupied by Docena.
5) On December 18, 1990, the SPES passed Resolution No. 75, recognizing Alar, rather than
Docena, as Capitos legitimate successor.
6) The following day, the SPES was in effect reversed by Secretary Santos, in a letter
addressed to Alar wherein he declared that:

Xxx

It appearing from perusal of records that an appointment dated November 19, 1990 was
already issued to Mr. AGUSTIN DOCENA as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Eastern Samar, vice: Luis Capito, the appointment issued to you dated November 27,
1990 as member of the same sanggunian, is hereby recalled effective the date of issue.
Xxx
7) Secretary Santos action was affirmed in a First Indorsement dated January 4, 1991, signed
by Head Executive Assistant Arturo V. Agundo of the Department of Local Government, in
which he declared by authority of the Secretary that:

1. Records show that the Secretary has appointed Mr. Agustin B. Docena as Sangguniang
Panlalawigan Member as of November 19, 1990; the Secretary has extended another
appointment to the same post in favor of Atty. Socrates Alar on November 27, 1990; the
Secretary, on December 19, 1990, has recalled the appointment of Atty. Socrates Alar on
the basis of the earlier appointment extended in favor of Mr. Docena.
In view of the foregoing, the appointment of Mr. Agustin Docena stands and should be
recognized.
8) The SPES reacted by passing Resolution No. 1 dated January 8, 1991, where it reiterated
its previous recognition of Alar and declared that the recall order issued by Secretary
Santos, dated December 19, 1990, recalling the appointment of Atty. Alar has no legal
basis in fact and in law and issued to fit his whimsical, capricious and wishy-washy desires
to the detriment of decency and due process of law.
9) On the same date, Provincial Prosecutor Dario S. Labrador had rendered an opinion that
Secretary Santos recall order was void ab initio because Alars right to the office had
been vested.
10)
On February 20, 1991, Secretary Santos issued another recall order, this time
addressed to Docena. In a letter, he declared that:

Please be informed that the appointment extended to you as Member of the

Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar, last November 19, 1990 is hereby recalled
effective immediately.
You are hereby directed to turn-over the office to Mr. Socrates Alar who was appointed by
this Department on November 27, 1990, immediately upon receipt hereof.
11)
Docena filed a petition for mandamus in the SC compel the SPES Governor Lutgardo
B. Barbo, Vice Governor Camilo A. Camenforte, and Alar to recognize and admit him as a
lawfully appointed member of the SPES. He also sought to hold them officially and
personally liable in damages for their refusal to do so in spite of his clear title to the
disputed office.
12)
Pending resolution of the case, the SC issued a TRO on January 31, 1991, enjoining
both Docena and Alar from assuming the office of member of the SPES.
Issues:
1) Who is the lawfully appointed member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern
Samar? DOCENA.

2) Is a petition for mandamus the proper remedy? YES.

3) Should damages be awarded? NO.
Held: The petition is GRANTED. The petitioner is DECLARED the lawfully appointed member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar, which is hereby DIRECTED to admit or reinstate
him as such. The temporary restraining order dated January 31, 1991, is LIFTED. No costs.
Ratio:
1) Docena is the lawfully appointed member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern
Samar.
a. The pertinent legal provision is Section 50 of the Local Government Code, which
provides:

Sec. 50. Permanent Vacancies in Local Sanggunians. In case of permanent vacan

the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang baya
sangguniang barangay, the President of the Philippines, upon recommendation o
Minister of Local Government, shall appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy i
sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod; the governor, in the
of sangguniang bayan members; or the city or municipal mayor, in the ca
sangguniang barangay members. Except for the sangguniang barangay, the appo
shall come from the political party of the sanggunian member who caused the vac
and shall serve the unexpired term of the vacant office.
b. According to Docena, he and Capito ran for the provincial board in the 1988
elections under the banner of Lakas ng Bansa. Later, they both joined the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino under the leadership of Speaker Mitra, who administered the
oath of office to him when he was appointed to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan on
November 19, 1990. He argued that that he had a preferential right to the disputed
office even on equitable grounds, because he placed 9 th in the election, next to
Capito, compared to Alar, who did not even run for the office.
c. According to the respondents, the appointment in Docenas favor on November 19,
1990, had been superseded by the appointment in favor of Alar on November 27,
1990, and the recall of the second appointment on December 19, 1990, was null
and void ab initio for lack of previous hearing.
d. The SC ruled in favour of Docena. His appointment having been issued and
accepted earlier, and he having already assumed office, he could not thereafter be
just recalled and replaced to accommodate Alar.
i. From the tenor of the appointment extended to Docena on November 19,
1990, there is no question that it was intended to be permanent, to fill the
permanent vacancy caused by Capitos death. As such, it was to be valid for
the unexpired portion of Capitos term, i.e. until noon of June 30, 1992, in
accordance with Article XVIII, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution.
ii. The appointment had been accepted by Docena, who had in fact already
assumed office as a member of the SPES, as per certification of the Provincial
Secretary. For all legal intents and purposes, his appointment had already
become complete and enforceable at the time it was supposed to have been
superseded by the appointment in favor of Alar.
iii. No reason was given for the recall of Docenas appointment (or for that

matter, the recall of Alar's appointment). It appears that after appointing

Docena and later twice sustaining his title to the office, Secretary Santos
simply had a change of heart and decided to award the position to Alar. This
is not the way things are done in a democracy.
iv. The appointment was permanent in nature, and for the unexpired portion of
Capitos term. Docena had already acquired security of tenure in the position
and could be removed therefrom only for any of the causes, and conformably
to the procedure, prescribed by the Local Government Code. These
requirements could not be circumvented by the simple process of recalling
his appointment.
v. Whatever gave the SPES the impression that Docenas appointment was
revocable at will was not based on careful legal study.
1. The Provincial Prosecutors opinion that the office had "become vested"
in Alar suffers from the same flaw and a lack of understanding of the
nature of a public office.
2. Political rather than legal considerations seem to have influenced the
action of the provincial government in rejecting Docenas claim despite
its obvious merit.
2) A petition for mandamus is the proper remedy.
a. The respondents argued that Docena have sought to enforce his claimed right in a
petition not for mandamus but for quo warranto, as his purpose is to challenge
Alars title to the disputed office. But that is only secondary in this case. The real
purpose of the present petition is to compel the SPES to recognize and admit
Docena as a member by virtue of a valid appointment extended to him by the
Secretary of Local Government.
b. Mandamus is employed to compel the performance of a ministerial duty to which
the petitioner is entitled. In arguing that the recognition and admission of Docena is
not a ministerial duty, the respondents are asserting the discretion to review, and if
they so decide, reject, the Secretarys appointment. They have no such authority.
i. What they should have done was reserve their judgment, leaving it to the
courts to decide which of the conflicting claims should be upheld. As a local
legislative body subject to the general supervision of the President of the
Philippines, the SPES had no discretion to rule on the validity of the decisions
of the Secretary of Local Government acting as her alter ego.
c. Even assuming that the proper remedy is a petition for quo warranto, the SC may in
its own discretion consider the present petition as such and deal with it accordingly.
We find that as a petition for quo warranto, it complies with the prescribed
requirements, to wit, that it be filed on time and by a proper party asserting title to
the office also claimed by the respondent. Acting thereon, we hold that Docena has
proved his right to the disputed office and could not be legally replaced by Alar.
3) Damages should NOT be awarded, as there no sufficient proof to overcome the
presumption that the respondents acted in good faith, albeit erroneously.
a. Nevertheless, Docena is entitled to the payment of the salaries and other benefits
appurtenant to the office of a member of the SPES, from the time of his assumption
of office and until he is actually admitted or reinstated.
CONRADO DE RAMA v COURT OF APPEALS
28 February 2001
Ynares-Santiago, ponente
petition for certiorari of a Court of Appeals decision

SHORT VERSION:
Mayor De Rama sought to recall the appointments of 14 municipal employees on the ground that
they were midnight appointees in violation of the Constitution. The SC said that the prohibition
only applied to Presidential employees. Appointments to positions in the civil service are a legal
right that can only be recalled for cause and with notice and hearing.
FACTS:
When Conrado de Rama assumed office as mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, he wrote a letter to
the Civil Service Commission, seeking to recall of the appointments of 14 municipal
employees.
o He said the appointments were midnight appointments of the former mayor and
thus in violation of Art VII 15 of the Constitution.
o The CSC denied the request for the recall of the appointments.
o The CA affirmed the CSC decision.
ISSUE:
should the appointments made by the outgoing mayor be recalled? NO
REASONING:
The prohibition under Art VII 15 applied only to presidential appointments.
o There was no law that prohibited local elective officials from making appointments
during the last days of his or her tenure.
De Ramas other grounds for the recall were not raised in his original appeal, but in his
supplemental pleading, consolidated appeal and motion for reconsideration.
o Thus, they were deemed waived when he failed to raise them at the earliest
opportunity and failed to present supporting documents.
Upon the issuance of an appointment and the appointees assumption of the position in
the civil service, he acquires a legal right which cannot be taken away either by
revocation of the appointment or by removal except for cause and with previous notice
and hearing.
o Moreover, it is well-settled that the person assuming a position in the civil service
under a completed appointment acquires a legal, not just an equitable, right to the
position.
o This right is protected not only by statute, but by the Constitution as well, which
right cannot be taken away by either revocation of the appointment, or by removal,
unless there is valid cause to do so, provided that there is previous notice and
hearing.
The appointment of the employees could only be recalled on the ff grounds, none of which
were raised by De Rama:
o (a) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agencys Merit
Promotion Plan;
o (b) Failure to pass through the agencys Selection/Promotion Board;
o (c) Violation of the existing collective agreement between management and
employees relative to promotion; or
o (d) Violation of other existing civil service law, rules and regulations.
RULING: petition denied
#rbm
GR No. 127116: Alex David v. COMELEC, et al.
GR No. 128039: Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter v. COMELEC and DBM
8 April 1997

Panganiban, J.
Short version: The petitioners filed these cases before the SC alleging that Sec. 43 (c) of the LGC,
insofar as it fixes the term of office of local elective officials to 3 years, is unconstitutional.
Instead, they urge that the applicable law is RA 6679, which fixed the said term of office to 5
years. The SC held that: (1) the LGC governs this case considering that it was enacted later than
RA 6679; (2) the Constitution expressly left Congress full discretion to fix the length of the term
of office in accordance with the exigencies of public service; and (3) the petitioners are estopped
from asking for any term other than that which they ran for and were elected to, under the law
governing their very claim to such offices: namely, RA 7160.
Facts:
- In his capacity as barangay chairman of Barangay 77, Zone 7, Kalookan City and as president
of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas, David filed a petition for prohibition with the SC to
prohibit the holding of the barangay election scheduled on the second Monday of May 1997.
- Later, the Liga ng mga Barangay also filed a petition before the SC for certiorari to declare as
unconstitutional:
Sec. 43 (c) of the LGC, which reads: The term of office of barangay officials
and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for three (3) years, which shall begin
after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994;
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887 fixing the date of the holding of
the barangay elections on May 12, 1997;
The budgetary appropriation of P400 million contained in the GAA of 1997
intended to defray the costs in holding the 1997 barangay elections.
- The SC consolidated the two petitions considering that they raise the same ultimate issue,
namely, how long is the term of office of barangay officials?
The petitioners contend that under Sec. 2 of RA 6653, the term of office of
barangay officials was set to 5 years. This was reiterated in RA 6679.
They further contend that although Sec. 43 of the LGC reduced the term of al
local elective officials to 3 years, such reduction does not apply to barnagay officials
because: (1) RA 6679 is a special law applicable only to barangays while the LGC is a
general law which applies to all other LGUs; (2) the LGC does not expressly nor impliedly
repeal RA 6679 insofar as the term of barangay officials is concerned; (3) while Sec. 8 of
Article X of the 1987 Constitution fixes the term of elective local officials at three years,
the same provision states that the term of barangay officials shall be determined by law;
and (4) thus, it follows that the constitutional intention is to grant barangay officials any
term, except three years.
The COMELEC defends its assailed Resolutions and maintains that the LGCs
repealing clause includes all laws, whether general or special. It also contended that the
petitioners cannot claim a term of more than 3 years since they were elected under the
aegis of the LGC of 1991.
-

The Court invited Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. as amicus curiae. In his brief, he
urged the SC to deny the petitions because (1) the Local [Government] 116 Code repealed
both RA 6679 and 6653; (2) the legislative intent is to shorten the term of barangay
officials to three years; (3) the barangay officials should not have a term longer than that
of their administrative superiors, the city and municipal mayors; and (4) barangay officials
are estopped from contesting the applicability of the three-year term provided by the LGC
as they were elected under the provisions of said Code.
Issues:
- Which between RA 7160 and RA 6679 governs the term of office of barangay officials? (RA
7160)
- Is RA 7160, insofar as it shortened the term to only three years, constitutional? (Yes)
- Are the petitioners estopped from claiming a term other than that provided under RA 7160 (Yes)
Reasoning:
Brief historical background of barangay elections
- As a unit of government, the barangay antedated the Spanish conquest of the Philippines. The
word barangay is derived from the Malay balangay, a boat which transported the Malays to
these shores. The barangay was ruled by a dato who exercised absolute powers of government.
- The Spaniards kept the barnagay as the basic structure of government but power was
centralized nationally in the governor general and locally in the encomiendero and later, in the
alcalde mayor and the gobernadorcillo. The dato or rajah was much later renamed cabeza de
barangay, who was elected by the local citizens possessing property.
- After the Americans colonized the Philippines, the barangays became known as barrios,
which were granted autonomy by the original Barrio Charter, RA 2370 and formally recognized as
quasi-municipal corporations by the Revised Barrio Charter, RA 3590.
- During the martial law regime, the barrios were renaed barangays but their basic
organization and functions remained the same. Pursuant to BP 222, a punong barangay and six
kagawads were elected who were to serve a term of six years. The LGC of 1983 also fixed the
term of local elective officials at 6 years.
- The Omnibus Election Code provided for the same term. As earlier stated, RA 6643 cut the term
of office to five years and the punong barangay was to be chosen from among themselves by
seven kagawads, who in turn were to be elected at large by the barangay electorate.
- RA 6679 was then enacted. Under this law, the term of office still remained fixed at five years
but the manner of election of the punong barangay changed. It provided that the candidate for
kagawad who obtains the highest number of votes shall be the punong barangay.
- Finally, under the LGC of 1991, the term of office of barangay officials was fixed at three years.
The composition of the Sangguniang Barangay and the manner of electing officials were also
altered, inter alia, the barangay chairman was to be elected directly by the electorate.
RA 7160 governs the term of office of local elective officials
- The intent and design of the legislature to limit the term of barangay officials to only three (3)
years as provided under the Local Government Code emerges as bright as the sunlight.
116
The case said Local Autonomy Code. Tingin ok dapat Local Government Code talaga.

 First, RA 7160 was enacted later than RA 669. It is basic that in case of an
irreconciliable conflict between two laws of different vintages, the later enactment
prevails. Considering the conflict between the two laws insofar as the term of office is
concerned, RA 7160 should prevail.
Second, the manner of election of the barangay chairman is different under RA
6679 and the LGC. Again, the latter law should prevail.
Third, during the barangay elections held on May 9, 1994, the voters actually and
directly elected one punong barangay and seven kagawads. If the thesis of the petitioners
is upheld, it follows that all the punong barangays were elected illegally and thus, David
cannot claim to be a validly elected barangay chairman, much less president of the
national league of barangays which he purports to represent in this petition. It then
necessarily follows also that he is not the real party-in-interest and on that ground, his
petition should be summarily dismissed.
Fourth, in enacting the GAA of 1997, Congress appropriated P400 million to cover
expenss for the holding the barangay elections of 1997. Likewise, under Sec. 7, RA 8189,
Congress ordained that a general registration of voters shall be held immediately after the
said barangay elections. These are clear and express contemporaneous statements of
Congress that barangay officials shall be elected in accordance with Sec. 43 (c) of the LGC.
Fifth, in Paras v. COMELEC, it was said that the next regular election involving the
barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been
scheduled in May, 1997. This judicial decision, per Article 8 of the Civil Code, is now a
part of the legal system of the Philippines.
Sixth, the petitioners incorrectly invoked the doctrine of generalia specialibus non
derogant. The petitioners may be correct in stating that RA 6679 is a special law but RA
7160 is not necessarily a general law. The latter is a special law insofar as it governs the
term of office of barangay officials. Furthermore, RA 7160 should prevail because its
repealing clause expressly states that all general and special laws which are inconsitent
with it are repealed or modified accordingly.
Three-year term not repugnant to the Constitution
Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution states:
SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years, and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter posits that by excepting barangay
officials whose term shall be determined by law from the general provision fixing the term of
elective local officials at three years, the Constitution thereby impliedly prohibits Congress
from legislating a three-year term for such officers.
However, the SC found this theory logically and legally flawed. The Constitution
did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any term of office for barangay officials. In
fact, it left Congress full discretion to fix such term in accordance with the exigencies of
public service. That this was the intention of the framers of the Constitution is reflected in
the records of the Constitutional Commission.

Petitioners are estopped from challenging their three-year terms

The COMELEC submitted, as part of its evidence, Annex A, which is the certificate of candidacy
of David. It expressly stated that he was running for the office of punong barangay. The
COMELEC also submitted Annex B, which showed the number of votes garnered by David (112)
as well as the candidates for kagawad. 117

117
Ruben Maglona garnered the highest number of votes for kagawad at 150.

 If, as claimed by the petitioners, the applicable law is RA 6679, then David could not have been
elected as barangay chairman because under this law, the punong barangay was not to be
elected directly. Furthermore, Ruben Maglona should have been the punong barangay
considering that he obtained the highest number of votes among the kagawads.
The sum total of these absurdities in the petitioners theory is that barangay officials are
estopped from asking for any term other than that which they ran for and were elected to, under
the law governing their very claim to such offices: namely, RA 7160.
Dispositive: Petitions denied.
Digested by Ramon Rocha IV
Zonsayda L. Alinsug v RTC-Negros Occidental, Rolando P. Ponsica as Municipal Mayor
of Escalante, Negros Occidental; Municipality of Escalante, Negros Occidental, and
Patricio A. Alvarez as Municipal Treasurer of Escalante, Negros Occidental
August 23, 1993
Vitug, J.

Short version:Alinsug sued the Municipal Mayor and Treasurer, for suspending her for an
alleged act of insubordination. The Mayor and Treasurer filed an answer to the petition, through a
private practitioner. Alinsug filed a motion to have the answer expunged expunged from the
record, on the ground they should have been represented by either the municipal legal officer or
the provincial legal officer or prosecutor. The RTC and SC ruled against Alinsug. It held that while
the law allows a private counsel to be hired by a municipality only when the municipality is an
adverse party in a case involving the provincial government or another municipality or city within
the province, this rule does not cover the situation when the public officials are the ones being
sued. If the petitions contain allegations that the acts being done are already beyond the
respondents official capacities, then they may be represented by private counsel, to be paid
from their own personal funds.

Facts:

Zonsayda L. Alinsug, was a regular employee of the municipal government of Escalante,

Negros Occidental, when she received a permanent appointment as Clerk III in the office of
the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator of the same municipality.
She received an order from the newly proclaimed mayor, Rolando P. Ponsica, detailing her to
the Office of the Mayor. In compliance with the order, she reported there the following day.
One day,Zonsayda absented herself from work allegedly to attend to family matters. She had
asked permission from the personnel officer but not from the mayor.
Mayor Ponsicathen issued Office Order No. 31, suspending Zonsayda for one month and one
day for "a simple misconduct . . . which can also be categorized as an act of insubordination."
The order also stated that the suspension "carries with it forfeiture of . . . benefits such as . . .
salary and PERA and leave credits during the duration of its effectivity."
Zonsayda filed with the RTC a petition for injunction with damages and prayer for temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction against Mayor Ponsica and the municipal
treasurer. SheThe petitioner alleged that since her family supported Mayor Ponsica's rival in

the previous elections, her suspension was an act of "political vendetta". Further alleging that
said respondents' acts were "malicious, illegal, unwarranted, wrongful and condemnable",
petitioner prayed for the following reliefs:
Mayor Ponsica and the municipal treasurer filed an answer to the petition, through private
practitioner Samuel SM Lezama, alleging that the Alinsug had not exhausted administrative
remedies and that her suspension was in accordance with law. They filed a counterclaim for
moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00, exemplary damages for P50,000.00, and
attorney's fees of P30,000.00, plus appearance fee of P500.00.
Alinsug then filed a motion, praying that the answer be disregarded and expunged from the
record, and that the respondents be all declared in default on the ground that since the
respondents were sued in their official capacities, "not including their private capacities," they
should have been represented by either the municipal legal officer or the provincial legal
officer or prosecutor as provided for by Sec. 481 (b) [i] and [3] of the LGC. It also cited Sec. 1
of Rep. Act No. 10 and Art. 177 of the RPC which penalizes usurpation of public authority.
The respondents opposed the motion. Manifesting that the municipality of Escalante has no
legal officer, they asserted that both the LGC and the Administrative Code of 1987 do not
have any provision "relative to the duty of any provincial legal officer or prosecutor to
represent a municipality or its officials in suits filed against them by an employee or a private
individual." They contended that it was "unnecessary to provide such a provision because
there (exist) administrative and judicial rulings sustaining the validity of the employment of a
private counsel by municipal officials. Moreover, since the petitioner prayed for the award of
moral damages," on the strength of this Court's ruling in Albuera v. Torrens, 3their hiring of a
private counsel was justified.
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Daniel M. Villaflor entered his appearance as "counsel for
Rolando P. Ponsica and Patricio A. Alvarez in their official capacities."
The RTC deniedAlinsugs motion to declare the respondents in default and motion to expunge
respondents' answer from the record. It also denied the MR, holding that Alinsugs move to
declare respondents in default "for having retained a private counsel" was not legally
sustainable because:
o The appointment of a legal officer was optional on the part of the municipal government,
based on the 3rd paragraph of Art. 481 of the LGC, and
o The municipality of Escalante had not, in fact, designated any such legal officer
Hence, this petition for certiorari with the SC.

Issues:Can a private counsel represent municipal officials sued in their official capacities? YES

Ratio:
1) Sec. 443 (b) of the LGCprovides that, in addition to the officials enumerated in the first
paragraph thereof, the mayor may appoint, among other officials enumerated therein, a
municipal legal officer. Section 481, Article 11 of Title V, states that "(t)he appointment of a
legal officer shall be mandatory for the provincial and city governments and optional for the
municipal government."
2) As part of his functions, he shall:(i) Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and
special proceedings wherein the local government unit or any official thereof, in his official
capacity, is a party: Provided, that in actions or proceedings where a component city or
municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to another component city or
municipality, a special legal officer may be employed to represent the adverse party;
3) The law allows a private counsel to be hired by a municipality only when the municipality is
an adverse party in a case involving the provincial government or another municipality or city
within the province.
4) History of the provision:

a. Ruling in De Guia v. The Auditor General:The municipality's authority to employ a private

attorney is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal would be
disqualified to serve and represent it.
b. Ramos v. Court of Appeals:A municipality may not be represented by a private law firm
which had volunteered its services gratis, in collaboration with the municipal attorney
and the fiscal, as such representation was violative Sec. 1683 of the old Administrative
Code. The municipality should not be burdened with expenses of hiring a private lawyer"
and that "the interests of the municipality would be best protected if a government
lawyer handles its litigations.
5) But these proscriptions do not necessarily include public officials. It can happen that a
government official, ostensibly acting in his official capacity and sued in that capacity, is later
held to have exceeded his authority.
6) On the one hand, his defense would have then been funded by the people's money which
ordinarily should have been his personal expense. On the other hand, personal liability can
attach to him without his having had the benefit of assistance of a counsel of his own choice.
7) In the discharge of governmental functions, "municipal corporations are responsible for the
acts of its officers, except if and when, the only to the extent that, they have acted by
authority of the law, and in conformity with the requirements thereof." (Correa v CFI of
Bulacan)
8) It has been held that if rigid adherence to the law on representation of local officials in court
actions could deprive a party of his right to redress for a valid grievance, the hiring of a
private counsel would be proper.
9) In another case, it was said that a provincial governor sued in his official capacity may engage
the services of private counsel when "the complaint contains other allegations and a prayer
for moral damages, which, if due from the defendants, must be satisfied by them in their
private capacity." (Albuera v Torres)
10)
In the same light, a public official who is sued in a criminal case is actually sued in his
personal capacity inasmuch as his principal, the State, can never be the author of a wrongful
act, much less commit a crime.
11)
The issues hinges on the nature of the action and the relief that is sought.
12)
While the petition was filed against respondents as public officials, its allegations were also
aimed at questioning certain acts that can bring the case beyond the coverage of official
functions, because of the allegation regarding the political vendetta, which would be a
constitute political harassment and persecution, acts of vindictiveness, a grave abuse of
executive discretion, etc. The petition then went on to claim moral and exemplary damages,
as well as litigation expenses.
13)
Moral damages cannot generally be awarded unless they are the proximate result of a
wrongful act or omission. Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are not awarded if the
defendant had not acted in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner nor in the absence of
gross or reckless negligence.
14)
A public official, who in the performance of his duty acts in such fashion, does so in excess
of authority, and his actions would be ultra viresthat can result in personal liability.
15)
Thus the respondents were not improperly represented by a private counsel, whose legal
fees shall be for their own account.
Petition dismissed.
Municipality of Pililla, Rizal (Petitioner) vs CA; Hon. Arturo Molave, RTC presiding
judge; and Philippine Petroleum Corporation (Respondents)
Date: June 28, 1994
Ponente: Regalado, J.

Short Version:
Facts: Judgment was rendered against PPC in favor of the Municipality. Atty. Mendiola, private
counsel of the municipality, moved to execute judgment. Later the municipality, through the
mayor, made a compromise with PPC. Atty. Mendiola still moved for execution of the judgment.
His authority to represent the municipality was questioned.
Held: Under the RAC and the Local Autonomy law, only the provincial fiscal and the municipal
attorney can represent a province or municipality in their lawsuits; private attorneys cannot
represent a province or municipality in lawsuits, unless the fiscal is disqualified to act in favor the
local government.

Facts:
- RTC rendered judgment in favor of the Municipality of Pililla against Philippine Petroleum
Corporation (PPC), ordering the latter to pay business tax, storage permit fees, mayor's permit,
and sanitary inspection fees to the municipality. Eventually, the SC affirmed with modification the
said judgment. The judgment became final and executory, and the records were remanded to the
trial court for execution.
- In connection with the execution of said judgment, Atty. Felix Mendiola filed a motion in behalf
of the municipality with the RTC for the examination of PPC's gross sales for certain years for the
purpose of computing the tax on business.
- PPC manifested that Pililla Mayor Nicomedes Patenia received from it the sum of
P11,457,907.00 as full satisfaction of the judgment. Thus, RTC issued an order denying the
motion for examination and execution of judgment on the ground that the judgment had already
been satisfied.
- MR filed by Atty. Mendiola claiming that the total liability of PPC is P24,176,599.00; and that the
mayor could not waive the balance which represents the taxes due under the judgment, and over
which judgment the law firm of Atty. Mendiola had registered two liens for consultancy services
and attorneys' fees which amount to more than P12M. Trial court denied MR. Atty. Mendiola,
again ostensibly in behalf of the municipality, filed a petition for certiorari with the SC, which
petition was referred to the CA.
- PPC questioned Atty. Mendiola's authority to represent the municipality. CA dismissed the
petition for having been filed by a private counsel in violation of law and jurisprudence, but
without prejudice to the filing of a similar petition by the municipality through the proper
provincial or municipal legal officer.
- MR denied. Hence the present petition with the SC.

Issue/Reasoning:
Issue: Whether Atty. Mendiola has the authority to file a petition in behalf of the municipality (No)
- Ramos v CA, reiterated by Cebu v IAC: private attorneys cannot represent a province or
municipality in lawsuits.

- Under Sec 1683118 of the RAC, complemented by Sec 3119 of RA 2264 (Local Autonomy Law) only
the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in their
lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is
expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it.
- In the instant case, there is no showing that the provincial fiscal is disqualified to act as counsel
for the municipality, hence the appearance of private counsel is without authority of law.
- The fiscal's refusal to represent the municipality is not a legal justification for employing the
services of private counsel. A fiscal cannot refuse to perform his functions on grounds not
provided for by law. The municipality should have requested the Secretary of Justice to appoint
an acting provincial fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who has declined to handle and
prosecute its case.
- The municipality itself opposed Atty. Mendiola's motion for execution of his lien.
- Contrary to his contention, the legality of Atty. Mendiola's representation can be questioned at
any stage of the proceedings.
- Assuming that the representation of Atty. Mendiola was duly authorized, said authority is
deemed been revoked when the municipality, through the mayor and without Atty. Mendiola's
participation, entered into a compromise agreement with PPC.

Dispositive:
Petition denied.

Antonio C. Ramos, Rosalinda M. Perez, Norma C. Castillo and Baliuag Market Vendors
Association v. Court of Appeals, Hon. Camilo O. Montesa, Jr., in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 19, and the Municipality
of Baliuag
03 March 1997
Panganiban, J.

SHORT VERSION: Petitioners filed a case against the municipality of Baliuag, Bulacan to
invalidate some ordinances. Atty. Romanillos, a private lawyer, entered his appearance as
collaborating counsel of the Provincial Fiscal and the Provincial Attorney. The petitioners
questioned Atty. Romanilloss personality to represent the municipality. Meanwhile, Atty.
118
In part: The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality... When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any
municipality or other political subdivision of a province, a special attorney may be employed by its council.

119
In part: the municipal attorney... shall act as legal counsel of the municipality...

Romanillo withdrew from the case and the Provincial Attorney, Atty. Regalado, assumed the
proceedings the private lawyer had undertaken. The SC held that a municipality cannot be
represented by private counsel in lawsuits. Only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney
can represent a province or municipality. The municipalitys authority to employ a private lawyer
is limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it, namely: (1) if
and when original jurisdiction of case involving the municipality is vested in the Supreme Court;
(2) when the municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other
municipality in the same province; or (3) when, in a case involving the municipality, he, or his
wife, or child, is pecuniarily involved, as heir legatee, creditor or otherwise. None of these
exceptions were present in this case. However, the Court also said that this did not mean that
the entire proceedings participated in by Atty. Romanillo were null and void. The assumption by
Atty. Regalado of the entire proceedings made it valid. A municipality may adopt the work
already performed in good faith by the private lawyer, which work is beneficial to it, provided
that no injustice is thereby heaped on the adverse party, andthat no compensation in any guise
is paid therefor by said municipality to the private lawyer. Unless so expressly adopted, the
private lawyers work cannot bind the municipality.

FACTS:

Petitioners filed a petition for the Declaration of Nullity of Municipal Ordinances Nos. 91
and 7 and the lease over a commercial arcade to be constructed in Baliuag, Bulacan.
o The Municipality of Baliuag opposed the petition. The Provincial Fiscal appeared in
court as counsel for the municipality during the hearing on the motion for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction.
o The Provincial Fiscal and the Provincial Attorney, Oliviano D. Regalado, filed an
Answer on behalf of the municipality.
At the pre-trial conference, Atty. Roberto Romanillos appeared, manifesting that he was
counsel for the municipality.
o Atty. Romanillos later filed a motion to dissolve injunction and a motion to admit an
Amended Answer.
Provincial Attorney Atty. Regalado appeared as collaborating counsel. But it was Atty.
Romanillos who submitted the Reply to the petitioners opposition to the municipalitys
motion to dissolve injunction. It was also Atty. Romanillos who submitted a written formal
offer of evidence for the municipality.
In one hearing, the petitioners questioned the personality of Atty. Romanillos to appear as
counsel of the municipality. They later filed a motion to disqualify Atty. Romanillos from
appearing as counsel for the municipality and to declare null and void the proceedings
participated in and undertaken by Atty. Romanillos.
o Meanwhile, Atty. Romanillos and Atty. Regalado filed a joint motion stating, among
others, that Atty. Romanillos was withdrawing as counsel for the municipality and
that Atty. Regalado was adopting the entire proceedings participated in by Atty.
Romanillos.
The RTC judge denied the petitioners motion to disqualify Atty. Romanillos.
o The judge deemed the petition moot and academic in light of Atty. Romanillos
withdrawal as counsel.
o Also, petitioners failed to file a timely objection to Atty. Romanillos appearance,
when he had been clear about appearing on behalf of the municipality from the very
beginning.
Petitioners elevated the case to the CA. The CA dismissed. Hence the present petition to
the SC.

ISSUES:
10.Can a municipality be represented by a private counsel?
11.Are the proceedings null and void?
REASONING:
10.No private counsel cannot represent a municipality
It has been settled that private attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality
in lawsuits. (Province of Cebu v. IAC)

Under Sec. 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code 120, complemented by Sec. 3
of the Local Autonomy Law, only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney
can represent a province or municipality in their lawsuits.
o The provision is mandatory. The municipalitys authority to employ a private
lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is
disqualified to represent it.
o For this exception to apply, the fact that the provincial fiscal was disqualified to
handle the case must appear on record.
o The provincial fiscals functions as legal officer and adviser for the civil case of a
province and corollarily, of the municipalities thereof, were subsequently
transferred to the provincial attorney.
These provisions show that only the provincial fiscal, provincial attorney and municipal
attorney should represent a municipality in its lawsuits. Only in exceptional cases may
a private attorney be hired by a municipality to represent it in lawsuits.
o Instances when the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent in court a
particular municipality:
o if and when original jurisdiction of case involving the municipality is vested in the
Supreme Court
o when the municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some
other municipality in the same province
o when, in a case involving the municipality, he, or his wife, or child, is pecuniarily
involved, as heir legatee, creditor or otherwise
A municipality may not be represented by a private law firm which had volunteered its
services gratis, in collaboration with the municipal attorney and the fiscal, as such
representation was violative of Sec. 1683 of the old Admin Code. (Ramos v. CA)
o This strict coherence to the letter of the law appears to have been dictated by the
fact that the municipality should not be burdened with expenses of hiring a
private lawyer and that the interests of the municipality would be best
protected if a government lawyer handles its litigations.
None of the foregoing exceptions is present in this case.
Atty. Romanillos entered his appearance as collaborating counsel of the provincial
prosecutor and the provincial attorney.
o This collaboration is contrary to law and should not have been recognized as
legal.
o The fact that the municipal attorney and the fiscal are supposed to collaborate
with a private law firm does not legalize the latters representation of the
municipality. While a private prosecutor is allowed in criminal cases, an analogous
arrangement is not allowed in civil cases wherein a municipality is the plaintiff.
Private lawyers may not represent municipalities on their own. Neither may they do so
even in collaboration with authorized government lawyers.
o This is anchored on the principle that only accountable public officers may act for
an in behalf of public entities and that public funds should not be expended to
hire private lawyers.
this does not invalidate the proceedings undertaken by the private counsel
The adoption by Atty. Regalado of the proceedings participated in by Atty. Romanillos
validated the said proceedings.
o

11.No

120

Sec. 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in litigation. The provincial fiscal
shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court, except in cases where
original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal district in
question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality or municipal district in the
same province. When the interests of a provincial government and of any political division thereof are opposed, the
provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province.When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any
municipality or other political subdivision of a province, a special attorney may be employed by its council.

It does not appear that the adoption of proceedings participated in or undertaken by

Atty. Romanillos when he was private counsel for the municipality of Baliuag would
have resulted in any substantial prejudice to petitioners interest.
Requiring new trial on the mere legal technicality that the municipality wasnot
represented by a legally authorized counsel would not serve the interest of justice.
o This Court does not see any injustice committed against petitioners by the
adoption of the work of private counsel nor any interest of justice being served by
requiring retrial of the case by the duly authorized legal representative of the
town.
In sum, although a municipality may not hire a private lawyer to represent it in
litigations, in the interest of substantial justice, the Court holds that a municipality may
adopt the work already performed in good faith by such private lawyer, which work is
beneficial to it, provided:
o that no injustice is thereby heaped on the adverse party,and
o that no compensation in any guise is paid therefor by said municipality to the
private lawyer.
Unless so expressly adopted, the private lawyers work cannot bind the municipality.

RULING: petition denied

Digest by Rix
126. Salalima v Guingona121

121
ROMEO R. SALALIMA, DANILO S. AZAA, JUAN VICTORIA, LORENZO REYEG, ARTURO OSIA, CLENIO CABREDO, VICENTE GO, SR.,
RAMON FERNANDEZ, JR., MASIKAP FONTANILLA, WILBOR RONTAS and NEMESIO BACLAO, petitioners, vs. HON. TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, VICTOR R. SUMULONG, RENATO C. CORONA and ANGEL V. SALDIVAR, in
their capacity as Members of the Ad Hoc Committee, MAYOR NAOMI C. CORRAL, KGD. FRANCISCO ALARTE, MAYOR ANTONIO
DEMETRIOU; and DOMINADOR LIM, JESUS JAMES CALISIN, EVELYN SILVERIO, SILVERIO COPE, TOBIAS BETITO, MANUEL LANUZA, JAMES
ENRICO SALAZAR, RODOLFO ANTE, JUAN RIVERA, MARCIAL TUANQUI, DR. SALVADOR SAMBITAN, ATTY. EUTIQUIO NEPOMUCENO, in
their capacity as ACTING GOVERNOR, ACTING VICE-GOVERNOR, and ACTING MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF
ALBAY, respectively,

May 22, 1996

Davide, Jr.
Topics: Appointive Local Officials Common to all municipalities, cities and Provinces; LGUs cannot
hire private counsel& Disciplinary Actions; Discipline over Local Appointive Officials
SV: The Province of Albay (Province) assessed real property taxes on National Power Corp (NPC).
NPC refused to pay so the province sold its properties at a public auction, and the province was
the winning bidder. Later on, NPC filed a case with the SC, and the SangguniangPanlalawigan
authorized the Mayor to enter into a retainer contract with a private law firm to handle the case
in SC. The Mayor entered into a retainer contract with Atty. Jesus Cornago and Cortes & Reyna
Law Firm. SC decided in favor of the Province. Subsequently, pursuant to the retainer contract,
the Province made several payments to Atty. Cornago and the law firm amounting to P7M. The Ad
Hoc committee of the Office of the President recommended the petitioners suspensions.
Afterwards, GovSalalima was re-elected on May 1992, and the Office of the President suspended
him for an alleged administrative offense committed during his first term. Likewise, some of the
other petitioners were re-elected and were suspended for an offense committed in the previous
term.
HELD for Topic: Appointive Local Officials Common to all municipalities, cities and Provinces;
LGUs cannot hire private counsel
In hiring private lawyers to represent the Province of Albay, respondents exceeded their authority
and violated the LGC. Sec. 481, LGC says that generally, it is the legal officer who represents the
province. It is only in actions or proceedings where a component city or municipality is a party
adverse to the provincial government or to another component city or municipality that a special
legal officer may be employed to represent the adverse party. Besides, the entire transaction was
attended by several irregularities.
HELD for Topic: Disciplinary Actions; Discipline over Local Appointive Officials
Salalima and the other petitioners could no longer be held administratively liable because public
officials cannot be subject to disciplinary action for administrative misconduct committed during
a prior term. The administrative liabilities they incurred in their prior terms are extinguished. The
underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the reelection to office
operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the
right to remove him therefor.
FACTS:
Petitioners seek to annul AO 153, which approves the findings of the Ad Hoc Committee
holding petitioners (who were elective officials in the province of Albay) liable in several
administrative cases filed with the Office of the President, namely O.P. Cases Nos:
o 5450 - administrative charges filed by Tabaco Mayor Antonio Demetriou against
Governor Romeo Salalima for violation of - Section 60, pars. (c) and (d) of the Local
Government Code, Section 3, par. (g) of Republic Act No. 3019, and the provisions of PD
No. 1594, as amended.

o
o
o

5470 -charge for malversation and consistent & habitual violation of pars. (c) and (d) 122
of Sec. 60, LGC, and
5471 - administrative complaint filed by the Tiwi Mayor Naomi Corral against Albay
Governor Romeo Salalima et al for abuse of authority and oppression under Sec. 60
(c) and (e), LGC
5469 - administrative complaint filed against Albay Governor Romeo Salalima
et al relative to the retainer contract for legal services entered into between
the Province of Albay, on the one hand, and Atty. Jesus R. Cornago and the
Cortes & Reyna Law Firm, on the other, and the disbursement of public fund
in payment thereof
Salalima et al were held to be liable for grave abuse of authority under
Sec. 60(e), LGC
**this digest only contains findings of the Ad Hoc Committee in OP 5469
OP 5469 Recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee

The province of Albay assessed real property taxes on National Power Corporation
(NPC)covering the period from 11 June 1984 up to 10 March 1987 amounting to
P214,845,184.76
o NPC refused to pay, so the Province sold at public auction its properties consisting of
geothermal power plants, buildings, machinery and other improvements located at Tiwi
and Daraga, Albay.
o The province was the sole and winning bidder at the auction sale.
NPC failed to redeem its properties sold at the auction, so the Province petitioned the RTC to
issue a writ of possession over the same.
Later on, NPC filed a petition with the SC, questioning the validity of the auction sale
conducted by the Province. It contends that its properties are not subject to real property tax.
o The province, through the legal officer of the Province (Atty Romulo Ricafort) filed its
comment on the NPC petition with the SC
The AlbaySangguniangPanlalawigan adopted a resolution authorizing the Governor to engage
the services of a Manila-based law firm to handle the case against NPC.
o Atty. Jesus Cornago entered his appearance as the collaborating counsel and such entry
bore the conformity of the Governor.
o Atty. Cortes of the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm sent the Governor a letterinforming him
that Atty. Jesus R. Cornago, as collaborating counsel for the Province, has filed a
memorandum with the Supreme Court, suggesting that a retainer agreement be signed
between the Province, on the one hand, and Atty. Cornago and Cortes & Reyna Law
Firm, on the other hand.
o The conditions of the retainer agreement are the ff:
Acceptance fee of P50K while the case is pending with the SC
Contingent fee equivalent to 18% of the value of the property (P214M)which is
subject of the case (amounting to P38.5M) payable to the firm in case it obtains
a favorable judgment from the SC
Expenses for photocopies of Memos, motions, documentary evidence, and for
mailing will be for the account of the province also.
The AlbaySangguniangPanlalawigan passed another resolution authorizing the Governor to
sign and confirm the retainer contract with Cortes & Reyna law firm.
o Gov. Salalima signed the retainer agreement.

122
LGC, Sec. 60 (c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty; (d) Commission
of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision mayor;

[SC] dismissed the NPC petition and upheld the auction sale conducted by the province to
answer for NPCs tax liabilities.
Several payments amounting to P7,380,410.31 were then made by the province to Atty
Cortes and AttyCornago.
o Subsequently, the Provincial Auditor informed the Governor that these payments made
by the Province as Attys fees have been disallowed by the COA with the ff. notation:
Total payments of P7,380,410.31 are disallowed for lack of the requisite
prior written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General x xx
as well as the written concurrence of the Commission on Audit as
provided for and required under COA Circular No. 86-255 dated April 2, 1986, re:
Inhibition against employment by government: agencies and instrumentalities x
xx of private lawyers to handle their legal cases
A complaint was filed against Gov. Salalima et al docketed as OP Case 5469 relative to the
retainer contract for legal services. It alleges that:
o By entering into the retainer agreement with private lawyers and paying P7M+,
Salalima et al violated several provisions of law which warrants the imposition of
administrative penalties against them. 123

123
It is to be noted that respondents Victoria, Reyeg, Cabredo, Marcellana and Osia were not yet members of the
SangguniangPanlalawigan when Resolution No. 129 was passed. However, the complaint alleges that these respondents were
named in the complaint because they approved the supplemental budget/appropriation ordinances providing for the payment of
the attorneys fees.

----------In light of these findings by the Ad-Hoc Committee, the President suspended the respondents
without pay.

ISSUES:
1. Did respondents Gov. Salalima et al abuse their authority in entering into the
retainer agreement and in making payments pursuant thereto? (YES)

In hiring private lawyers to represent the Province of Albay, respondents exceeded their
authority and violated the LGC and the doctrine in the case of [Mun. of Bocaue v Manotok]
o Sec. 481, LGC requires the appointment of a legal officer for the province, and his
functions include the [representation] of the LGU in all civil actions and special
proceedings wherein the local government unit or any official thereof, in his official
capacity is a party; Provided, That, in actions or proceeding where a component
city or municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to
another component city or municipality, a special legal officer may be
employed to represent the adverse party.
o [Municipality of Bocaue, et al. v. Manotok] LGUs cannot be represented by private
lawyers and it is solely the Provincial Fiscal who can rightfully represent them.
This ruling applies squarely to the case at hand because Sec. 481, LGC is based
on Sec. 1681 RAC, which was the subject of interpretation in this case.

Moreover, the entire transaction was attended by irregularities.

o First, the disbursements to the lawyers were disallowed on the ground that these were
made without the prior written conformity of the Solicitor General and the written
concurrence of the Commission on Audit (COA) as required by COA Circular No. 86-255
Although the respondents presented the SolGens conformity, such was obtained
after the disbursements were already made.
What is required by the circular is a prior written conformity and acquiescence of
the SolGen.
o Another irregularity is the lawyers because the retainer contract was entered into with
a party not authorized by the Sanggunian Resolution. In entering into such retainer
contract, the Governor exceeded his authority under the resolution.
The Sanggunian Resolution authorized the respondent Governor to sign and
confirm a retainer contract for legal services with the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm.
BUT the retainer contract was entered not only with that law firm, but also with
Atty. Cornago. The law firm and Atty. Cornago are 2 separate entities, and this is
evident from the retainer contract. 124

124
As collaborating counsels for the respondents in the aforementioned case, our law firm and that of Atty. Jesus R. Cornago
request that you pay us an Acceptance Fee of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS, while the aforementioned case is
pending in the Supreme Court.

Also, Cortes & Reyna law firm did not appear as counsel for the Province, but 6 of the
10 pay checks amounting to more than P3.6M were issued in favor of the law firm.
It was only Atty. Cornago who appeared as collaborating counsel of record of the
Province in the Supreme Court case
Even the Solicitor General, in his letter to respondent Governor dated 15 July
1993, noted that the Province is represented in the Supreme Court by Attys.
RicafortCornago and Glenn Manahan but not by the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm.
Also, the memorandum with the Supreme Court filed for the Province was signed
by Atty. Cornago and not by the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm
The attorneys fees of P38.5M agreed upon by Gov. Salalima were not only
unreasonable but also unconscionable, considering the labor and time involved, the
skill and experience called for in the performance of the services and the professional
character and social standing of the lawyers.
The word unconscionable, as applied to attorneys fee, means nothing more
than that the fee contracted for, standing alone and unexplained would be
sufficient to show that an unfair advantage had been taken of the client, or that
a legal fraud had been taken of the client, or that a legal fraud had been
perpetrated on him.
Besides, Atty. Ricafort had already filed a comment which covers the basic issues
raised in the petition. When Atty. Cornago filed an appearance, the petition was
already been given due course by the SC and the only pleading to be filed by the
parties before the Court would issue the decision was a memorandum. Surely,
this could not be worth P38.5M
Also, the professional character & social standing of Atty. Cornago are not such
as would merit that amount of fee for legal services.
During the hearing, Gov. Salalima admitted that he had hired Atty.
Cornago because they were schoolmates at San Beda College. In the
minutes of the hearing, it was revealed that both Gov. Salalima and Atty.
Cornago were members of the same fraternity in San Beda.
Governor hired Atty. Cornago not on the basis of his competency and
standing in the legal community but purely for personal reasons.
Likewise, the standing of the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm is not such as would merit
P38.5 million for one memorandum, which, in this case, it had not even filed
because it was not the counsel of record.
By allowing such scandalously exorbitant attorneys fees which is patently
disadvantageous to the government, respondents betrayed a personal bias to
the lawyers involved and committed abuse of authority.
Parenthetically, the retainer contract containing the exorbitant attys fees may
be violative of the ff.
COA Circular No. 85-55-A : prohibiting irregular, unnecessary, excessive or
extravagant expenditures or uses of funds;
Sec. 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)

Finally, the Committee again applies in this case, as was applied in OP Case No. 5470, the rule
of joint responsibility as enunciated under Sec. 305(1) of the Local Government Code.

2. Did the AO 153 deprive the petitioners of their office without procedural and
substantive due process? (NO)

Sec. 66(b)125 sets the limits to the penalty of suspension i.e. it should not exceed 6 months or
the unexpired portion of the term of office of the respondent for every administrative offense
o An administrative offense means every act or conduct or omission which amounts to,
or constitutes, any of the grounds for disciplinary action.

125

SEC. 66. Form and Notice of Decision. - x xx(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the
respondent or a period of six (6) months for every administrative offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to the
candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he meets the qualifications for the office.

The offenses for which suspension may be imposed are enumerated in Section
60126 of the LGC. An elective local official may be removed from office on these
grounds by order of the proper court.

Assuming that the findings and conclusions of the Office of the President in each of the
subject four administrative cases are correct, it committed no GAD in imposing the penalty of
suspension, although the aggregate thereof exceeded 6 mos and the unexpired portion of the
petitioners term of office.
o The fact remains that the suspension imposed for each administrative offense did not
exceed six months and there was an express provision that the successive service of
the suspension should not exceed the unexpired portion of the term of office of the
petitioners.

3. Can the petitioners still be held liable for the anomalous retainer contract? (NO)

GovSalalima was already re-elected on May 1992, and the Office of the President suspended
him for an alleged administrative offense committed during his first term. Likewise, some of
the other petitioners were re-elected and were suspended for an offense committed in the
previous term.

COURT: Salalima and the other petitioners could no longer be held administratively liable
because public officials cannot be subject to disciplinary action for administrative misconduct
committed during a prior term. The administrative liabilities they incurred in their prior terms
are extinguished.
o

126
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)

[Pascual v Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija] Since there is no precedent in this

jurisdiction, American authorities were resorted to, and the weight of authority seems
to incline to the rule denying the right to remove one from office because of
misconduct during a prior term.

The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that
the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officers previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present
term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to
elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be
assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that
they disregard or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It
is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule
the will of the people.

SEC. 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Action. - An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed
from office on any of the following grounds:(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;
Culpable violation of the Constitution;
Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty;
Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision mayor;
Abuse of authority;
Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case of members of the
sangguniangpanialawigan, sangguniangpanlungsod, sangguniangbayan, and sangguniang barangay;
Acquisition for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant of another
country; and
Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.

[Aguinaldo v Santos] A public official can not be removed for administrative misconduct
committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates a condonation of
the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending
against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.

SolGen argues that an officials reelection renders moot and academic an administrative
complaint against him for acts done during his previous term only if the complaint was filed
before his reelection, but Court said that the rule makes no distinction.

The rule in Pascual and Aguinaldo is still good law.

o

Such a rule is not only founded on the theory that an officials reelection expresses the
sovereign will of the electorate to forgive or condone any act or omission constituting a
ground for administrative discipline which was committed during his previous term, but
also that sound public policy dictates it.

To rule otherwise would open the floodgates to exacerbating endless partisan contests
between the reelected official and his political enemies, who may not stop to hound the
former during his new term with administrative cases for acts, alleged to have been
committed during his previous term.
His second term may thus be devoted to defending himself in the said cases to
the detriment of public service.

This doctrine of forgiveness or condonation cannot, however, apply to criminal acts

which the reelected official may have committed during his previous term.

Special Action for certiorari PARTLY GRANTED.

127. Ganzon v CA127

127
RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS AND LUIS T. SANTOS, respondents.MARY ANN
RIVERA ARTIEDA, petitioner, vs.HON. LUIS SANTOS, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Local
Government, NICANOR M. PATRICIO, in his capacity as Chief, Legal Service of the Department of Local
Government and SALVADOR CABALUNA, respondents.
RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, in his
capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Local Government, respondents.

18 Nov, 1991
Padilla, J.
Topic: Disciplinary Actions
SV: An urgent motion was filed on the 5 Aug 1991 Decision on the Ganzon v CA case (where the
Court affirmed the 3 preventive suspension orders issued against Ganzon) to question the
validity of a 4th suspension order before the SC decision was promulgated. After the SC decision
was promulgated, Santos sent him a memo, stating that the 3 rd order is in force and effect. In
reaction to the memo, Ganzon asked the CA to issue a TRO. The respondents then asked the SC
to issue a restraining order on the CAs TRO. Ganzon asked the SC to lift its TRO, arguing that he
has already completely served the preventive suspension orders; therefore, he should be allowed
to assume office on 4 Sept. 1991. Respondents contend that he hasnt fully served the
suspension orders against him and that he can only resume office on 19 Oct 1991.
The Court looked into the periods when Ganzon started to serve the preventive suspension
orders. It was found out that:
-The 1st order was admittedly fully served.
-The 2nd order was restrained by a TRO
-The 3rd order was not fully served, and there are still 46 more days remaining
-The 4th order was fully served.
Considering the bizarre circumstances in this case--where Secretary Santos has chosen to
impose preventive suspensions piecemeal, instead of consolidating the several administrative
cases of similar nature and close vintage--the Court allowed Ganzon the benefit of simultaneous
service of the 3rd and 4th suspension orders to lessen the harsh effects of the Secreatarys
punishments. This benefit of simultaneous service was also applied to the 2 nd order which wasnt
served yet due to a TRO.
In light of the fact that Ganzon has finished serving his preventive suspension orders,
respondents are directed to allow him to re-assume office immediately.
FACTS:

This is an urgent motion to the original Aug. 1991 Ganzon case where:
o In 1988, 10 administrative complaints were filed by various city officials, against
petitioner Ganzon, the elected City Mayor of Iloilo City, on various charges such as
abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct and others.
o In the course of the hearing of the administrative cases, respondent Secretary Santos
issued against petitioner Ganzon three (3) separate orders of preventive suspension 128

128
Issued on 11 August 1988, 11 October 1988, and 3 May 1990

Ganzon assailed the validity of these by filing petitions with the CA, but the CA
dismissed them for lack of merit.
o Ganzon went to the SC, and a TRO was issued by the SC barring Secretary Santos from
implementing the suspension orders.
SC eventually ruled to dismiss Ganzons petitions, lift the TRO, and affirm the
suspensions of the petitioners, provided that Ganzon may not be made to serve
future suspensions on account of any of the remaining administrative charges
pending against him for acts committed prior to 11 Aug, 1988..
Even before the promulgation of the 5 Aug, 1991 SC decision however, Santos had issued
another order of preventive suspension in connection with an Administrative Case filed by
Jopson for oppression.
o 6 July 1991: Ganzon filed an extremely urgent motion questioning the validity of the
said last mentioned suspension order. Court asked respondents to comment on the
motion.
o Respondents alleged that the issues were rendered moot and academic in view of the 5
Aug 1991 decision.
29 Aug 1991: Secretary Santos issued a memorandum to Ganzon, in connection with the SC
decision, stating that the 3rd order of suspension (3 May 1990) shall be deemed in force and
effect.
30 Aug 1991, Ganzon filed with CA a petition for mandamus against the respondents.
o On the same day, Ganzon filed his manifestation and compliance alleging that he had
already fully served the suspension orders issued against him, in compliance with the
main decision of 5 August 1991, and that he should be allowed to re-assume his office
starting 4 September 1991.
Meanwhile, Ganzon filed with the CA a motion for the issuance of a TRO in reaction to the
memo by Sec. Santos. This was granted.
o The respondents then filed with SC a motion asking for the issuance of a restraining
order against the CA and against the TRO it issued.
o 5 Sept 1991: SC issued a TRO directing CA to cease and desist from implementing the
TRO.
o 9 Sept 1991: Ganzon filed motion to dissolve SCs TRO.
The records show that petitioner Ganzon, to this date, remains suspended from office (as the
elected Mayor of Iloilo City) since the order of preventive suspension dated 3 July 1991 (the
fourth suspension order) was issued against him by respondent Secretary;
o In other words, he has been serving the said fourth suspension order which is to expire
after a period of 60 days, or on 4 September 1991.

PARTIES ARGUMENTS:

In support of his plea for the lifting of the SCs TRO, petitioner Ganzon contends that
inasmuch as he has already served fully the suspension orders issued against him, in
compliance with the mandate of the SC decision, coupled with the fact that he had also
completely served by 4 Sept 1991 the 4th order of preventive suspension, he should be
allowed to re-assume his office starting 4 Sept. 1991

Sec Santos says that Ganzon can only resume office after 19 Oct 1991 as it is only after such
date when petitioner may be said to have fully served the preventive suspension orders as
decreed in the main decision and in the 4 th suspension order.

ISSUES and REASONING:

1. Did Ganzon fully serve the 3rd preventive suspension order? (NO, he still has to

serve 46 more days)

There is a need to determine when Ganzon may resume his duties as Mayor and the answer
would depend on how petitioner has served the preventive suspension orders issued against
him.
The main decision refers to three (3) orders of preventive suspension each to last for 60 days.
o 1st order (11 Aug 1988) was admittedly fully served by petitioner
o 2nd order (11 Oct 1988) was not served because its enforcement was restrained by an
order of the RTC Iloilo City upon petition of petitioner himself.
o 3rd order (3 May 1990) the main decision states that petitioner is allowed to serve the
duration of said third suspension order.
o It would seem that after fully serving the 3 rd suspension order, he can return to his
official duties as mayor.
o But we must also take note of the supervening (3 July 1991) 4 th order, again suspending
petitioner from office for another 60 days. This order was issued even before the main
SC decision was promulgated. Records show that this has been fully served by Ganzon
also.

There is need to look into when Ganzon started to serve these orders so as to determine
when their service expires. The ff are the periods 129 within which he stayed out of his office as
he was serving the orders:
a) May 4-18, 1990 (MAY)
b) June 9-26, 1990 (JUNE)
c) July 5-Sept 3, 1990 (JULY)
Ganzon says that during the MAY and JUNE periods, he was serving the 3 rd order, and in the
JULY period he was serving the 4th order. On the other hand, Sec. Santos contends that the 3 rd
order was served only during the MAY period, but not the JUNE period. He agrees that the 4 th
order was served in the JULY period.
o In view of this divergence as to when Ganzon served the 3 rd order, Court rules that the
3rd order was served for the period of MAY only since 18 May 1990 was the date when
the CA issued the TRO, thus, interrupting Ganzons service of suspension orders and
enabled him to re-assume office.
o Ganzon couldnt have served the 3rd order in JUNE since the records show he was in
office at that time, discharging the functions of the Mayor.
o As such, he only served the 3rd order during the MAY period equivalent to 14 days,
which means that he still has to serve the remaining 46 days.

2. Can Ganzon serve the 3rd and 4th orders simultaneously? (YES, considering the
bizarre circumstances of the case)

These 46 days should be served starting 5 Aug 1991 when the main SC decision was
promulgated. Another way is to begin serving it only on 4 Sept 1991 (the day after last day
of serving the 4th order).

129
THE ABBREVIATIONS USED FOR THE PERIODS ARE NOT OFFICIAL. Just placed them there for convenience. Please
change them in your respective digests as much as possible coz Ill be using them in my digests!!

It is to be noted that Ganzon had already fully served the 4 th order in the JULY period and
Ganzon was asking if he could serve the 3 rd and 4th orders simultaneously, which would mean
that he would need to serve only 17 more days 130 to complete the service of the 3rd order.
o Respondents, however argue against this, saying that the idea of simultaneous
service is not allowed under LGC.
Court held that Ganzon can be allowed the benefit of simultaneous service of the 3 rd and 4th
suspension orders for the ff reasons:
o This would work in favor of Ganzon, an elective local official, since the balance of his 3 rd
suspension would be reduced to 17 days
In the main decision, considering that successive suspensions have been
inflicted on Ganzon, we stated that what "is intriguing is that respondent
Secretary has been cracking down, so to speak, on the Mayor piecemeal
apparently, to pin him down ten times the pain, when he, the respondent
Secretary could have pursued a consolidated effort."
Surely, allowing petitioner to serve simultaneously the overlapping third and
fourth suspensions will favor him, (and presumably the local constituency) and
certainly lessen if not offset the harsh effects of whatever motive may be behind
the intriguing action of the respondent Secretary in issuing those successive
suspension orders.
o Also, we may take judicial notice of the 1991 LGC, which, in Sec. 63 provides that
b) . . . that, any single preventive suspension of local elective official shall not
extend beyond sixty (60) days: Provided, further that in the event that several
administrative cases are filed against an elective official, he cannot be
preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days within a single year on
the same ground or grounds existing and known at the time of the first
suspension.
Since, under the bizarre circumstances of this case, the Court can allow Ganzon to serve the
3rd and 4th orders simultaneously, this means that Ganzon must serve only 17 days more
starting from 3 Sept 1991 and ending on 20 Sept 1991.
o Hence, as of 20 Sept 1991, Ganzon has complied with the main decision since he
already fully served the 3rd preventive suspension.
3. Should Ganzon still serve the 2nd preventive suspension order? (YES, but the
concept of simultaneous service was also applied)

Respondents argue that apart from serving the 3 rd order, the 2nd order should also be served
since the latter has not been served yet due to a restraining order.
Court agrees with respondents, but the concept of simultaneous service was applied also.
o If we follow the decision which states that the three (3) suspensions are affirmed, there
appears to be no reason why the second order should not be served for another 60-day
period.
o BUT, there is no cogent reason why the Court cannot allow the concept of simultaneous
service to apply to the 2nd order as well. Under the bizarre circumstances of this case
where the Secretary imposed the suspensions piecemeal, simultaneous service should
be applicable also.
o Service of the 2nd order would have started on 5 Aug 1991 (date of SC decision), which
means that the 60-day period expired on 4 Oct. 1991.
Petitioner manifested that there is still an existing preliminary injunction against the 2 nd order
in the RTC

130
from 5 August 1991 (the date the TRO issued by this Court was lifted) up to 3 September 1991 (the last day for serving the fourth
order), twenty-nine (29) days have elapsed

But since the 2nd order has already been affirmed and has been served, the special
action before the RTC was rendered moot and academic, insofar as the 2 nd order is
concerned. Same goes with the CA case filed by petitioner.

Urgent Motion of petitioner Ganzon GRANTED. TRO lifted. Respondents directed to allow Ganzon
to re-assume office immediately.

Rodolfo T. Ganzon v. CA and Luis Santos (Secretary of Local Government)

Mary Ann Rivera Artieda v. Hon. Luis Santos
Padilla, J. 8 November 1991
SV: In a previous case, the SC issued a decision upholding the three preventive suspension
orders issued by the Secretary of Local Government, Santos, against Mayor Ganzon of Iloilo City.
The Court, in that case, also ruled that no further suspensions on account of the pending
administrative charges against Ganzon may be imposed. However, during the pendency of that
case, before the SC issued the decision, a fourth preventive suspension was issued. This case
deals with the dates on which such suspension orders were served by Ganzon and when he could
re-assume his office as mayor.
The SC allowed simultaneous service of part of the third suspension and the fourth suspension
order. Ganzons service of the third and fourth suspensions thus ended on 20 Sep 1991. The SC
also allowed simultaneous service as to the second suspension and held that such suspension
ended on 4 Oct 1991. The Court also ordered the RTC and CA cases dismissed for having been
rendered moot and academic by this and the previous decision of the SC.
FACTS:
- 5 Aug 1991: the Court's decision in the present case was promulgated, upholding the validity of
the orders of preventive suspension issued by respondent Secretary Santos, the dispositive part
of which decision reads (this is the case preceding this one in the syllabus):
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary
Restraining Order issued is LIFTED. The suspensions of the petitioners are AFFIRMED,
provided that the petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made to serve future
suspensions on account of any of the remaining administrative charges pending against
him for acts committed prior to August 11, 1988. The Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to
consolidate all such administrative cases pending against Mayor Ganzon.
- However, it appears that even before the promulgation on 5 August 1991 of the main decision,
respondent Secretary Santos had issued on 3 July 1991 against petitioner Ganzon another order
of preventive suspension(fourth suspension order) in connection with Administrative Case No. 5190 filed by complainant Octavius J. Jopson.
- 6 Jul 1991: Ganzon filed his extremely urgent motion questioning the validity of the fourth
suspension order with the SC.
-29 Aug 1991: Santos issued a memorandum to Ganzon stating that the third order of suspension
issued against Ganzon shall be deemed in force and effect.

- 30 Aug 1991: Ganzon filed with the CA a petition for mandamus. On the same day, he filed with
the SC his manifestation and compliance alleging that he had already fully served the
suspension orders against him and that he should be allowed to re-assume his office starting 4
Sep 1991.
- In reaction to the 29 Aug 1991 memorandum, Ganzon filed with the CA a motion praying for the
issuance of a TRO, which was granted by the CA.
- 4 Sep 1991: Respondents filed with the SC a motion asking for the issuance of a restraining
order addressed to the CA and against the TRO it issued. SC granted the petition.
- 9 Sep 1991: Ganzon filed a motion to dissolve the SCs restraining order dated 5 Sep 1991.
ISSUES/REASONING:
Should Ganzon be allowed to re-assume his office? YES.
As to the third suspension order
As regards the third suspension order, it is noted that though both parties admit that petitioner
started serving it on 4 May 1990, they however differ as to when the service ended .
a) petitioner claims he served it even after 18 May 1990,
b) respondent claims it ended 19 May 1990.
In view of this divergence, the Court rules that the third order was served by petitioner from 4
May 1990 up to 18 May 1990 only, the latter date being the date when the Court of Appeals
issued a TRO (which interrupted Ganzons service of the suspension orders and enabled him to
assume his office as Mayor of Iloilo City).
The period from 4 May 1990 to 18 May 1990 is equivalent to 14 days. Hence, 46 days still
remained to be served by him as decreed in the main decision.
As to the fourth suspension order
However, we take note of the fact that petitioner has fully served the fourth order of preventive
suspension which started 5 July 1991 (even before the main decision was rendered) and ended
on 3 September 1991.
Petitioner raises the issue of whether he could or should be allowed to serve the third and fourth
orders simultaneously. If we allow the submission and accept simultaneous service, it would
mean the following:
a) From 5 August 1991 (date SC TRO was lifted) up to 3 September 1991 (last day for serving
fourth order), 29 days have elapsed.
b) These 29 days which form part of his service for the fourth order can be also credit to his
favor by treating them as forming part of his service of the third order.
c) If this were so, he would need to serve only 17 days more to complete the service of the
third order.
d) Said 17 days will expire on 20 September 1991, which would be the last day for serving
the third suspension order.
If simultaneous service of 2 suspension orders is allowed, this would work in favor of the
petitioner (an elective local official) as the balance of his third preventive suspension would, in
effect, be reduced from 46 days to 17 days.
It will be recalled that, in the main decision, noting that successive suspensions have been
inflicted on Mayor Ganzon we stated that what "is intriguing is that respondent Secretary has
been cracking down, so to speak, on the Mayor piecemeal apparently, to pin him down ten times

the pain, when he, the respondent Secretary could have pursued a consolidated effort.
Surely, allowing petitioner to serve simultaneously the overlapping third and fourth suspensions
will favor him, (and presumably the local constituency) and certainly lessen if not offset the
harsh effects of whatever motive may be behind the intriguing action of the respondent
Secretary in issuing those successive suspension orders.
Furthermore, We may already take judicial notice of the recently-approved Local Government
Code of 1991 (recently signed into law) which provides:
Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension.(b) that, any single preventive suspension of local elective official shall not extend beyond
sixty [60] days: Provided, further that in the event that several administrative cases are
filed against an elective official, he cannot be preventively suspended for more than ninety
[90] days within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known at the
time of the first suspension.
Since we can allow, as we here allow, under the bizarre circumstances of this case, petitioner to
serve the third and fourth orders simultaneously [insofar as they overlap], this means that, as
explained earlier, petitioner shall serve only 17 days more to complete the service of the third
order, that is, starting from 3 September 1991 and ending on 20 September 1991.
Hence, as of 20 September 1991, petitioner has complied with the mandate of the main decision
for he has already fully served the third preventive suspension which ended on 20 September
1991.
As to the second suspension order
Another issue is raised by respondents: that petitionershould also serve the second order for
another 60 days as the latter has admittedly not been served yet due to a restraining order
issued by a trial court. We agree with the respondents on this point.
There is no cogent reason why, under the bizarre circumstances of this case where the
respondent Secretary has chosen to impose preventive suspensions piecemeal, instead of
consolidating the several administrative cases of similar nature and close vintage We cannot
allow the concept of simultaneous service to apply to the second order [as we did in the third
order].
It would follow then that the second order is also fully served to this date for the service of said
second order would have started on 5 August 1991 when the main decision was rendered as this
was the time when this Court found and affirmed the validity of the three [3] suspension orders,
including the second order. The 60-day period from 5 August 1991 expired on 4 October 1991.
It appears that, as to the second preventive suspension, petitioner manifested that there is still
an existing preliminary injunction issued by the RTC of Iloilo City. However, under the main
decision of this Court dated 5 August 1991, the second preventive suspension has been affirmed.
Therefore, the case before the RTC of Iloilo City has been rendered moot and academic, insofar
as the second preventive suspension order is concerned.
The petition filed with the CA, which involves the validity of the fourth order, which has clearly
been served, has also become moot and academic, warranting dismissal thereof.
PETITION GRANTED. RTC and CA ORDERED TO DISMISS THE CASES BEFORE THEM. THIS
IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASES PROCEEDING ON THE MERITS
THEREOF. MAYOR GANZON MAY NOT BE MADE TO SERVE FUTURE SUSPENSIONS ON
ACCOUNT OF ANY OF THE REMAINING ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGES PENDING AGAINST
HIM FOR ACTS COMMITTED PRIOR TO AUGUST 11, 1988.

129. Espiritu v. Melgar

Date: February 13, 1992
Ponente: Grio-Aquino
The case in a nutshell:
FACTS: Garing filed 3 complaints (with the DILG Secretary, Oriental Mindoro Governor Espiritu,
and the Presidential Action Center of the Office of the President, respectively) against Naujan,
Oriental Mindoro Mayor Melgar. This was in connection with an incident wherein a drunk Garing
interrupted Mayor Melgar during the latters speech by prolonged but nonetheless loud and
intermittent clapping. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan passed a resolution, recommending to
Governor Espiritu that Mayor Melgar be preventively suspended for 45 days pending the
investigation of the administrative complaint. Pursuant thereto, Governor Espiritu placed Mayor
Melgar under preventive suspension, on the ground that there was reasonable ground to believe
that he had committed the acts stated in Garings complaint. Mayor Melgar filed a petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction with prayer for restraining order in the Oriental Mindoro RTC.
RTC Judge Virola issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Governor Espiritu from
implementing the order of suspension against Mayor Melgar. Governor Espiritu filed a motion to
dismiss and/or for reconsideration, but this was denied. Governor Espiritu filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition in the SC.
HELD: Judge Virola acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ
of preliminary injunction restraining Governor Espiritu from placing Mayor Melgar under
preventive suspension pending the investigation of administrative charges against the latter. A
Provincial Governor is empowered by Section 63 of the Local Government Code to place an
elective municipal official under preventive suspension pending decision of an administrative
case against the elective municipal official, at any time after the issues had been joined and any
of the following grounds were shown to exist: 1) when there is reasonable ground to believe that
the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of; 2) when the evidence of culpability
is strong; 3) when the gravity of the offense so warrants; or 4) when the continuance in office of
the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the
records and other evidence. There is nothing improper in suspending an officer before the
charges against him are heard and before he is given an opportunity to prove his innocence.
Preventive suspension is allowed so that the respondent may not hamper the normal course of
the investigation through the use of his influence and authority over possible witnesses.

Facts:
1) Ramir Garing of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, filed a sworn letter-complaint with DILG
Secretary Luis Santos, charging respondent Mayor Nelson Melgar with grave misconduct,
oppression, abuse of authority, culpable violation of the Constitution and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the public service.
a. He alleged that Mayor Melgar boxed and kicked him, inflicting upon him physical
injuries, and ordered his arrest and detention in the Naujan municipal jail without
filing any charges.
2) An identical letter-complaint was filed by Garing with the Provincial Governor of Oriental
Mindoro, petitioner Governor Benjamin I. Espiritu, accusing Mayor Melgar of the same
violations of law and requesting that he be placed under preventive suspension pending
investigation of the charges.

3) A third complaint was filed by Garing with the Presidential Action Center, Office of the
President of the Philippines. This was forwarded to Governor Espiritu with a request for
prompt action.
4) The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro required Mayor Melgar to answer the
complaint.
5) Mayor Melgar submitted his answer in which he recounted the events that led to the filing
of Garings complaint against him.
a. He claimed that while he was giving a speech during the Jose L. Basa Memorial
School graduation ceremonies, he was interrupted by a prolonged but nonetheless
loud and intermittent clapping. The culprit turned out to be Garing, who was drunk.
Garing was momentarily placed in custody for his own protection. A balisong was
taken from him.
b. He pointed out that he did not hurt Garing, based on the latters medical certificate;
that Garing was told to go home after sobering up, but refused to go until the
following morning; and that he could have filed charges against Garing under Art.
153 of the Revised Penal Code and for possession and concealment of a deadly
weapon, but to avoid any appearance of vindictiveness, he did not.
6) The Sangguniang Panlalawigan passed Resolution No. 55, recommending to Governor
Espiritu that Mayor Melgar be preventively suspended for 45 days pending the
investigation of the administrative complaint.
7) Mayor Melgar filed a motion to dismiss the administrative complaint.
8) The Sangguniang Panlalawigan denied the motion to dismiss.
9) Pursuant to the recommendation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in its Resolution No. 55,
Governor Espiritu placed Mayor Melgar under preventive suspension on May 28, 1991 on
the ground that there was reasonable ground to believe that he had committed the acts
stated in Garings complaint.
10)
Mayor Melgar received the order of suspension.
11)
Mayor Melgar filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction with prayer for
restraining order in the Oriental Mindoro RTC, alleging that the order of suspension was
an arrogant, despotic and arbitrary abuse of power by Governor Espiritu.
12)
RTC Judge Virola issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Governor Espiritu
from implementing the order of suspension against Mayor Melgar.
13)
Governor Espiritu filed a motion to dismiss and/or for reconsideration.
14)
Judge Virola denied the motion to dismiss and/or for reconsideration.
15)
Governor Espiritu filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the SC.
16)
Without giving due course to the petition, the SC required Mayor Melgar to
comment, and it issued a TRO commanding Judge Virola to cease and desist from further
proceeding.
17)
Mayor Melgar filed an Urgent Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order.
18)
The SC denied the motion.
Issue: Did Judge Virola act without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
writ of preliminary injunction restraining Governor Espiritu from placing Mayor Melgar under
preventive suspension pending the investigation of administrative charges against the latter?
YES.

Held: The petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The writ of preliminary injunction
dated June 24, 1991 in Special Civil Action No. R-5003 is hereby annulled and set aside. Said
Special Civil Action No. R-5003 is dismissed.

Ratio:
1) Judge Virola acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ
of preliminary injunction restraining Governor Espiritu from placing Mayor Melgar under
preventive suspension pending the investigation of administrative charges against the
latter.
a. A Provincial Governor is empowered by Section 63 of the Local Government Code to
place an elective municipal official under preventive suspension pending decision of
an administrative case against the elective municipal official. Section 63 provides:

Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed b

Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, b
provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by the c
municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official.
(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at anytime after the issues are joined,
there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act o
complained of, when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity o
offense so warrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondent could influ
the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and
evidence. In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days
the start of said suspension.
(3) At the expiration of sixty-days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstat
office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him un
termination. However, if the delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his
neglect or request, the time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the tim
the suspension.
b. Clearly, the governor of Oriental Mindoro is authorized by law to preventively
suspend the municipal mayor of Naujan at any time after the issues had been joined
and any of the following grounds were shown to exist:
i. When there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has
committed the act or acts complained of;
ii. When the evidence of culpability is strong;
iii. When the gravity of the offense so warrants; or
iv. When the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other
evidence.
c. There is nothing improper in suspending an officer before the charges against him
are heard and before he is given an opportunity to prove his innocence (Nera vs.
Garcia and Elicao) Preventive suspension is allowed so that the respondent may
not hamper the normal course of the investigation through the use of his influence
and authority over possible witnesses (Lacson vs. Roque)
d. Since Mayor Melgar believed that his preventive suspension was unjustified and
politically motivated, he should have sought relief first from the Secretary of Interior
and Local Government, not from the courts.
i. His direct recourse to the courts without exhausting administrative remedies
was premature (Aboitiz & Co. Inc. vs. Collector of Customs; Garcia vs.
Teehankee; Manuel vs. Jimenez; Bongcawil vs. Provincial Board of Lanao del

Norte; The Phil Veterans Affairs Office vs. Farias, et al; Bonafe vs. Zurbano).
The RTC had no jurisdiction over his petition and gravely abused its discretion
in refusing to dismiss the case.
ii. As a general rule, the office or body that is invested with the power of
removal or suspension should be the sole judge of the necessity and
sufficiency of the cause. (R.C.L., cited in Attorney General vs. Doherty) Unless
a flagrant abuse of the exercise of that power is shown, public policy and a
becoming regard for the principle of separation of powers demand that the
action of said officer or body should be left undisturbed.
e. The 60-day preventive suspension of Mayor Melgar was maintained by the TRO
issued by the SC, and therefore has already been served. Thus, he is deemed
reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the administrative
investigation of the charges against him.

Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo v. Hon. Luis Santos, as Secretary of the Department of Local

Government, and Melvin Vargas, as Acting Governor of Cagayan
21 August 1992
Nocon, J.

SHORT VERSION: Aguinaldo won the 1988 elections as Governor of Cagayan. He was charged
with disloyalty to the Republic before the Secretary of the Department of Local Government for
acts he had committed during the 1989 coup detat. The Secretary found him guilty and removed
him from office. He filed a petition (this one) with the SC. While this petition was pending, he ran
again for Governor and won. The SC said that the Secretary of Local Government had the power
to remove local officials. The effectivity of the 1987 Constitution did not repeal BP 337 (the old
LGC), and it remained in force in the meantime while the new LGC had not yet been approved.
However, since Aguinaldo had already won his re-election, he can no longer be removed from
office for the prior acts he did during his previous term. His re-election serves as a condonation
by the people of his previous acts. Thus, he remains Governor of Cagayan.

FACTS:

Aguinaldo was the duly elected Governor of Cagayan, having won the Jan. 1988 elections.
He took his oath in March 1988. His term of office was for 4 years.
Shortly after the Dec. 1989 coup detat, the Secretary of Local Government, Luis Santos,
wrote to Aguinaldo, requiring him to show cause within 48 hours why he should not be
suspended or removed from office for disloyalty to the Republic.
o In his reply (which the Secretary received on Jan. 5, 1990), Aguinaldo denied being
privy to the planning of the coup or actively participating in its execution, although
he admitted being sympathetic to their cause.
Dec. 7, 1989: a complaint for disloyalty to the Republic and culpable violation of the
Constitution was filed by mayors of Gattaran, Tuao and Lasam (all in Cagayan) against
Aguinaldo for acts the latter committed during the coup.
o Sec. Santos considered Aguinaldos reply letter as his answer to the complaint, and
so he suspended Aguinaldo from office for 60 days, pending the outcome of the
formal investigation into the charges.

During the hearing, complainants presented testimonial and documentary evidence to

prove the charges.
o Aguinaldo did not present evidence or cross-examine the witnesses. Instead he
moved that Sec. Santos inhibit himself from the case. The motion was denied.
Santos found Aguinaldo guilty as charged and ordered his removal from office. Santos
installed Melvin Vargas, who was then Vice Governor, to replace Aguinaldo.
Aguinaldo then filed the present petition for certiorari with the SC.
o While this case was pending, Aguinaldo filed his COC for Governor of Cagayan for
the May 1992 elections.
o Three separation disqualification cases were filed against him, all based on the
ground that he had been removed from office.
The Comelec granted these petitions. However, the Comelec clarified that
inasmuch as the resolutions of Comelec become final and executory only
after 5 days from promulgation, Aguinaldo may still be voted upon as a
candidate pending the final outcome of the disqualification cases with the SC.
The SC later ruled and reversed the Comelec decision on the ground that the decision of
the Secretary of Local Government had not yet attained finality and was still pending with
the SC.
This paved the way for Aguinaldos proclamation as governor.

ISSUES:
12.Can Aguinaldo occupy the position of Governor of Cagayan?
13.Has the Secretarys power to suspend/remove local elective officials under the old LGC
been repealed by the 1987 Constitution?
14.Was the appointment of Melvin Vargas as governor valid?
15.Is proof beyond reasonable doubt required before Aguinaldo can be removed from office?
REASONING:
12.Yes Aguinaldo can sit as Governor of Cagayan
Aguinaldos re-election as governor actually renders the administrative case before the
SC moot and academic.
o Offenses committed, or acts done, during a previous term are generally held not
to furnish cause for removal. This is especially true where the Constitution
provides that the penalty In proceeding for removal shall not extend beyond the
removal from office, and disqualification from holding office for a term for which
the officer was elected or appointed.
o The theory is that each terms is separate from other terms, and that the
reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officers misconduct to the
extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term
of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their
officers.
o When a people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did
this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or
forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any.
Clearly, the rule is that a public official cannot be removed for administrative
misconduct during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a
condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right
to remove him therefor.
o However, this finds no application to criminal cases pending against Aguinaldo for
acts he may have committed during the failed coup.

13.No the 1987 Constitution did not repeal BP 337

The power of Sec. Santos to remove local government officials is anchored on both the
Constitution and a statutory grant from the legislative branch.
o 1973 Consti, Art. XI Sec. 2: The National Assembly shall enact a local
government code defining a more responsive and accountable local
government structure and providing for the qualifications, election and
removal, term, salaries, power, functions and duties of local government
officials
o 1987 Consti, Art. X Sec. 3: The Congress shall enact a local government code
which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal,
term and salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials
Inasmuch as the power and authority of the legislature to enact a local government
code, which provides for the manner of removal of local government officials, is found
in the 1987 Consti as well as the 1973 Consti, it cannot be said that BP 337 was
repealed by the effectivity of the present Consti.
BP 337 remained in force despite the effectivity of the present Consti until such time
as the proposed LGC of 1991 is approved. (Bagabuyo v. Davide)
o The power of the Secretary of Department of Local Government to removal local
elective government officials is found in BP 337 Sec. 60 and 61.
14.Yes the appointment of Vargas as Governor was valid
BP 337 Sec. 48(1) provides: In case a permanent vacancy arises when a governor
refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, or is removed from office, voluntarily resigns,
or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office, the
vice-governor shall assume the office for the unexpired term of the former.
15.No removal from office does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt
Inasmuch as the charge is disloyalty to the Republic which is defined under the RPC,
Aguinaldo is not being prosecuted criminally, but administratively. The quantum of
proof required is only substantial evidence.
RULING: petition granted

Digest by Rix
131. Reyes v. COMELEC131

131
[G.R. No. 120905. March 7, 1996]RENATO U. REYES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROGELIO DE CASTRO,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 120940. March 7, 1996]
JULIUS O. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RENATO U. REYES, respondents.

Date: March 7, 1996

Ponente: Mendoza
The case in a nutshell:
Facts: Renato Reyes was the incumbent mayor of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. Manalo filed an
administrative complaint against him. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan found him guilty and
ordered his removal from office. However, Reyes had earlier filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and injunction in the RTC, which had issued a TRO. Thus, the Sangguniangs decision
could not be served on him. After the TRO expired, several attempts were made to serve the
decision on Reyes, all to no avail. Reyes filed a certificate of candidacy for the May 8, 1995
elections. De Castro sought his disqualification, citing his removal from office in the
administrative case. But because of the absence of any contrary order from the COMELEC, Reyes
was voted for in the May 8, 1995 elections. The COMELECs 2 nd Division disqualified Reyes, but
the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed him the duly-elected mayor anyway. The
COMELEC en banc declared Reyes to have been validly disqualified as candidate and,
consequently, set aside his proclamation as mayor. Reyes filed a petition for certiorari in the SC,
on the ground that the decision in the administrative case against him was not yet final and
executory and therefore could not be used as basis for his disqualification.
Held: The decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, ordering Reyes removed from office, has
become final. He has been served a copy thereof. The failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to
deliver a copy of its decision was due to his and his counsels refusal to receive the decision. If a
judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for reasons attributable to him, service is
deemed completed and the judgment or decision will be considered validly served, as long as it
can be shown that the attempt to deliver it to him would be valid were it not for his or his
counsels refusal to receive it. Reyes counsel knew that a decision in the administrative case had
been rendered, as he tried to bargain with the counsel for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan not to
have the decision served upon him and Reyes while the petition for certiorari in the RTC was
pending. His refusal to receive the decision may be construed as a waiver on his part to have a
copy of the decision. Reyes was given sufficient notice of the decision. Rather than resist the
service, he should have received the decision and taken an appeal to the Office of the President,
in accordance with Sec. 67 of the Local Government Code. But he did not do so. Accordingly, the
decision became final 30 days after the first service upon him.
Facts:
1) Petitioner Renato U. Reyes was the incumbent mayor of the municipality of Bongabong,
Oriental Mindoro, having been elected on May 11, 1992.
2) On October 26, 1994, an administrative complaint was filed against Reyes with the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan by Dr. Ernesto Manalo. It was alleged, among other things,
that:
a. He exacted and collected Php50,000.00 from each market stall holder in the
Bongabong Public Market.
b. Certain checks issued to him by the National Reconciliation and Development
Program of the DILG were never received by the Municipal Treasurer nor reflected in
his books of account.
c. He took 27 heads of cattle from beneficiaries of a cattle dispersal program, after the
latter had reared and fattened the cattle for 7 months.
3) The Sangguniang Panlalawigan found Reyes guilty of the charges and ordered his removal
from office.
4) However, earlier, after learning that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was about to render
judgment, Reyes had filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and injunction with the
Oriental Mindoro RTC, alleging that the proceedings had been terminated without giving
him a chance to be heard. The RTC issued a TRO, enjoining the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
from proceeding with the case. As a result, the Sangguniang Panlalawigans decision
could not served on Reyes.

5) Following the expiration of the TRO and without any injunction being issued by the RTC, an
attempt was made to serve the decision upon Reyes counsel in Manila. However, the
latter refused to accept the decision.
6) Subsequent attempts to serve the decision upon Reyes himself also failed, as he also
refused to accept the decision.
7) The Vice Governor, as Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, issued an order
for Reyes to vacate the position of mayor and peacefully turn over the office to the
incumbent vice mayor. But service of the order upon Reyes was also refused.
8) Reyes filed a certificate of candidacy for the May 8, 1995 elections with the Office of the
Election Officer of the COMELEC.
9) Private respondent Rogelio de Castro, as registered voter of Bongabong, sought the
disqualification of Reyes as candidate for mayor, citing Sec. 40 of the Local Government
Code, which states:

40. Disqualification. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local position:
xxxxxx
xxx
(b)
Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case.
10)
Because of the absence of any contrary order from the COMELEC, Reyes was voted
for in the May 8, 1995 elections.
11)
The COMELECs 2nd Division issued a resolution disqualifying Reyes from running for
public office and cancelling his COC, on the ground that he had been removed from office
by virtue of the administrative case.
12)
The Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bongabong, apparently unaware of Reyes
disqualification, proclaimed him the duly-elected mayor.
13)
Reyes filed an MR of the COMELEC 2nd Divisions resolution. This was denied.
14)
The COMELEC en banc declared Reyes to have been validly disqualified as
candidate and, consequently, set aside his proclamation as mayor.
15)
Reyes filed a petition for certiorari in the SC.
a. He alleged grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC, on the ground that the
decision in the administrative case against him was not yet final and executory and
therefore could not be used as basis for his disqualification.
b. He contended that the charges against him were rendered moot and academic by
the expiration of the term during which the acts complained of had allegedly been
committed. Invoking the ruling in the case of Aguinaldo v. Santos, he argued that
his election on May 8, 1995 is a bar to his disqualification.
16)
Petitioner Julius M. Garcia, who obtained the 2 nd highest number of votes in the May
8, 1995 elections, intervened in the COMELEC after its resolution disqualifying Reyes was
promulgated, contending that because Reyes was disqualified, he was entitled to be
proclaimed mayor.
17)
The COMELEC en banc denied Garcias prayer, citing the ruling in Republic v. De la
Rosa that a candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes in an election
cannot be declared winner.
18)
Garcia filed a petition for certiorari in the SC. He contended that:
a. The COMELEC en banc should have decided his petition at least 15 days before the
May 8, 1995 elections, as provided in Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Elections Code, and
that because it failed to do so, many votes were invalidated which could have been
for him had the voters been told earlier who were qualified to be candidates.
b. The decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was final and executory and resulted
in the automatic disqualification of Reyes, and the COMELEC did not need much
time to decide the case for disqualification against Reyes since the latter did not
appeal the decision in the administrative case ordering his removal.
c. The COMELEC should have considered the votes cast for Reyes as stray votes.
Issues:

1) Is the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, ordering Reyes removed from office, not
yet final because he has not been served a copy thereof?
2) Did Reyes re-election render the administrative charges against him moot and academic?
NO.
3) Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in denying Garcias petition? NO.
4) Should the votes cast for Reyes be invalidated? NO.
5) Did the COMELEC commit a grave abuse of discretion in not deciding the case before the
date of the election? NO.
6) Should the COMELEC have seen right away that Reyes had not exhausted administrative
remedies by appealing the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and, therefore,
disqualified him before the elections? NO.
Held: The petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Ratio:
1) The decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, ordering Reyes removed from office, has
become final. He has been served a copy thereof.
a. Reyes claimed that the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, ordering him
removed from office, was not yet final because he had not been served a copy
thereof. It appears, however, that the failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to
deliver a copy of its decision was due to his and his counsels refusal to receive the
decision.
i. The secretary to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan stated in his certification that
repeated attempts had been made to serve the decision on Reyes personally
(but he refused to accept) and by registered mail (but he was either out of
town, cannot be contacted, or refused to accept). They also sent someone to
Manila to serve the decision on his counsel, but the latter likewise refused to
accept.
b. Sections 3 and 7 of the Rules of Court provide for the service of final orders and
judgments either personally or by mail. Personal service is completed upon actual or
constructive delivery, which may be made by delivering a copy personally to the
party or his attorney, or by leaving it in his office with a person having charge
thereof, or at his residence, if his office is not known.
i. Hence, service was completed when the decision was served upon Reyes
counsel in his office in Manila. In addition, service by registered mail was also
made on Reyes. Although the mail containing the decision was not claimed
by him, service was deemed completed 5 days after the last notice to him
(March 27, 1995).
d. If a judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for reasons attributable to him,
service is deemed completed and the judgment or decision will be considered
validly served, as long as it can be shown that the attempt to deliver it to him would
be valid were it not for his or his counsels refusal to receive it.
i. Reyes counsel knew that a decision in the administrative case had been
rendered. This is evident in his effort to bargain with the counsel for the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan not to have the decision served upon him and
Reyes while the petition for certiorari in the RTC was pending. His refusal to
receive the decision may be construed as a waiver on his part to have a copy
of the decision.
e. The purpose of the rules on service is to make sure that the party being served with
the pleading, order, or judgment is duly informed of the same so that he can take
steps to protect his interests. In practice, service means the delivery or
communication of a pleading, notice, or other papers in a case to the opposite party
so as to charge him with receipt of it, and subject him to its legal effect.
i. Reyes was given sufficient notice of the decision. Rather than resist the
service, he should have received the decision and appealed to the Office of
the President, in accordance with Sec. 67 of the Local Government Code. But

he did not do so. Accordingly, the decision became final 30 days after the
first service upon him (April 2, 1995).
f. When the elections were held on May 8, 1995, the decision of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan had already become final and executory.
i. The filing of a petition for certiorari with the RTC did not prevent the
administrative decision from attaining finality. An original action of certiorari
is an independent action and does not interrupt the course of the principal
action nor the running of the reglementary period involved in the proceeding.
ii. To arrest the course of the principal action during the pendency of the
certiorari proceedings, there must be a restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction from the appellate court directed to the lower court.
But in the case at bar, although a TRO was issued by the RTC, no preliminary
injunction was subsequently issued. The temporary restraining order issued
expired after 20 days.
g. Reyes claimed that the decision could not be served upon him because the counsel
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan agreed not to effect service of the decision of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan pending final resolution of the petition for certiorari. But
the alleged agreement cannot bind the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. It was illegal.
i. Sec. 66(a) of the Local Government Code makes it mandatory that [c]opies
of the decision [of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan] shall immediately be
furnished to respondent and/or interested parties. It was the Sangguniang
Panlalawigans duty to serve it upon the parties without unnecessary delay. To
delay the service of the decision would result in the Sangguniang
Panlalawigans failure to perform a legal duty.
2) Reyes re-election did NOT render the administrative charges against him moot and
academic.
a. The ruling in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC, which Reyes invoked, is not applicable.
i. In that case, before the petition questioning the validity of the administrative
decision removing petitioner could be decided, the term of office during
which the alleged misconduct was committed expired. Removal cannot
extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was
committed. If a public official is not removed before his term of office
expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter re-elected for
another term.
ii. In the present case, Reyes brought an action to question the decision in the
administrative case. The TRO issued in the action he brought lapsed, so the
decision was served on him, and thereafter became final when he failed to
appeal to the Office of the President. He was thus validly removed from office
and, pursuant to Sec. 40(b) of the Local Government Code, disqualified from
running for re-election.
iii. The SC noted that at the time the Aguinaldo cases were decided, there was
no provision similar to Sec. 40(b) of the Local Government Code. The Local
Government Code could not be given retroactive effect. Also, the decision
therein has not yet attained finality, since it has been questioned by
Aguinaldo in the SC, and the petition remains unresolved.
b. Reyes failed to file his answer to the complaint filed against him within the
reglementary period of 15 days (which eventually became 61 days after a pattern
of delay, like asking for reconsideration twice).
i. Art. 126 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code provide: Failure of the respondent to file his verified answer within 15
days from receipt of the complaint shall be considered a waiver of his rights
to present evidence in his behalf.
ii. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies (Sec. 16, Art. III of the 1987
Contitution).

3) The COMELEC did NOT commit grave abuse of discretion in denying Garcias petition to be
proclaimed mayor in view of the disqualification of Reyes.
a. The candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be
proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. (Frivaldo v.
COMELEC; Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC; Abella v. COMELEC; Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC; Benito v.
COMELEC)
b. To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes
would be to substitute the courts judgment for the mind of the voter. The second
placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by
either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among
qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate,
the conditions would have substantially changed. (Aquino v. COMELEC)
4) Garcias plea that the votes cast for Reyes be invalidated is without merit.
i. The votes cast for Reyes are presumed to have been cast in the belief that
Reyes was qualified and for that reason cannot be treated as stray, void, or
meaningless. (Geronimo v. Ramos) The subsequent finding that he is
disqualified cannot retroact to the date of the elections so as to invalidate the
votes cast for him.
5) The COMELEC did NOT commit a grave abuse of discretion in not deciding the case before
the date of the election, and that the COMELEC should have seen right away that Reyes
had not exhausted administrative remedies by appealing the decision of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan and, therefore, should have disqualified him before the elections, suffice it to
say that under Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646, the COMELEC can continue proceedings for
disqualification against a candidate even after the election and order the suspension of his
proclamation whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Hon. Juan M. Hagad, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas v. Hon. Mercedes
Gozo-Dadole, et al.
12 December 1995
Vitug, J.
Short version: Criminal and administrative complaints were filed against the respondent public
officials of Mandaue City. In addition to their substantive averments, the complainants prayed
that the respondents be preventively dismissed. This motion was opposed by the respondents
who argued that under the LGC, it was the Office of the President, and not the Office of the
Ombudsman, that can lawfully take cognizance of the administrative complaints against them.
Consequently, they alleged that the power to issue a preventive suspension order against them
also lies with the President and not the Ombudsman. However, the SC disagreed with them and
held that there is nothing in the LGC to indicate that it has repealed the pertinent provisions of
The Ombudsman Act. The SC noted that the provisions of the LGC as well as The Ombudsman
Act relating to the disciplinary authority, specifically the authority to issue preventive suspension
orders, of the President and the Ombudsman respectively over local elective officials operate
differently.
Facts:

- On 22 July 1992, Mandaue City Councilors Magno B. Dionson and Gaudiosa O. Bercede filed
with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman Hagad, criminal and administrative complaints against
respondents Mayor Alfredo Alfredo Ouano, Vice-Mayor Paterno Caete and Sangguniang
Panlungsod Member Rafael Mayol, all public officials of Mandaue City, charging them with having
violated R.A. No. 3019, as amended;132 Articles 170133 and 171134 of the Revised Penal Code; and
R.A. No. 6713.135 The complainants alleged that the respondents had caused the alteration and/or
falsification of an Ordinance by increasing the allocated appropriation therein without authority
from the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue City. Dionson and Bercede also moved for the
preventive suspension of the respondent officials.
- Aside from opposing the motion for preventive suspension, the respondents prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of
jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the administrative case filed against.
The respondents argued that, under Secs. 61 and 63 of the LGC of 1991, the
Office of the President, not the Office of the Ombudsman, could lawfully take cognizance
of administrative complaints against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized
city or an independent component city and to impose disciplinary sanctions, including
preventive suspensions, and that there was nothing in the provision of the Constitution
giving to the Office of the Ombudsman superior powers than those of the President over
elective officials of local governments.
- The Deputy Ombudsman denied the motion to dismiss and recommended the preventive
suspension of the respondent officials until the administrative case is resolved by the
Ombudsman. Thus, the respondent officials were formally placed under preventive suspension.
- This prompted the respondents to file a petition for prohibitio with the RTC. Judge Gozo-Dadole
granted their prayer for a TRO enjoining Hon. Hagad from implementing the order of preventive
suspension.
- Hon. Hagad moved to dismiss the petition but this was denied by the RTC. His MR having been
denied, he filed the present petition for certiorari before the SC.

132
Entitled, "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."

133
Falsification of legislative documents.

134
Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister.

135
Entitled, "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Pubic Officials and Employees."

Issue: Has the Ombudsman, under RA 6770136, been divested of his authority to conduct
administrative investigations over local officials by virtue of the later enactment of the LGC of
1991? (No)
Reasoning:

136
Entitled, The Ombudsman Act

- The general investigatory power of the Ombudsman is decreed by Section 13(1,) Article XI, of
the 1987 Constitution137, while his statutory mandate to act on administrative complaints is
contained in Section 19 of RA 6770.138 Section 21 of the same statute names the officials who
could be subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. The enumeration includes all
elective local government officials.

137
Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient;

138
Sec. 19. Administrative complaints. The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which: (1)
Are contrary to law or regulation; (2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory; (3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an
agency's functions, though in accordance with law; (4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts; (5) Are in the
exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or (6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.

Taken in conjunction with Sec. 24 of RA 6770, 139 Hon. Hagad contends that
the Office of the Ombudsman correspondingly has the authority to decree preventive
suspension on any public officer or employee under investigation by it.

139
Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment, the evidence of guilt is strong, and a) the charge against such officer or employee
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from
the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months,
without pay ...

On the other hand, the respondents again argue that the disciplinary
authority of the Ombudsman over local officials must be deemed to have been removed
by the later enactment of the LGC and is now vested in the President as per Sec. 61
thereof.140 Thus, conformably with Sec. 63, also of the LGC, preventive suspension can only
be imposed by the President, if the respondent is an elective official of a province, a highly
urbanized or independent component city, under sub-paragraph (b) thereof. 141

140
SEC. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. A verified complaint against any erring local elective officials shall be
prepared as follows:
(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city, an independent component city or component city
shall be filed before the Office of the President.

141
(b) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when the evidence of guilt is strong, and given the gravity
of the offense, there is great probability that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the
safety and integrity of the records and other evidence; Provided, That, any single preventive suspension of local elective officials shall not
extend beyond sixty (60) days ...

The OSG also filed its comment as required by the Court. It said that the
disciplinary of the President under the LGC is not in an exclusive basis. Thus, the
Ombudsman may still exercise such authority under RA 6770.
- Indeed, there is nothing in the LGC to indicate that it has repealed the pertinent provisions of
RA 6770. Under the old LGC, the authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose
preventive suspension over elective provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the
Minister of Local Government until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the
enactment of RA 6770. The LGC did not effect a change from what already prevailed, the
modification being only in the substitution of the Minister of Local Government by the Office of
the President.
- The respondents contend that the 6-month preventive suspension without pay under RA 6770
is much too repugnant to the 60-day preventive suspension provided by the LGC to now maintain
its application. However, the SC said that the two provisions govern differently.
In order to justify the preventive suspension of a public official under Section
24 of R.A. No. 6770, the evidence of guilt should be strong, and (a) the charge against the
officer or employee should involve dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect
in the performance of duty; (b) the charges should warrant removal from the service; or (c)
the respondent's continued stay in office would prejudice the case filed against him. The
Ombudsman can impose the 6-month preventive suspension to all public officials, whether
elective or appointive, who are under investigation.
On the other hand, in imposing the shorter period of sixty (60) days of
preventive suspension prescribed in the LGC on an elective official (at any time after the
issues are joined), it would be enough that (a) there is reasonable ground to believe that
the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, (b) the evidence of
culpability is strong, (c) the gravity of the offense so warrants, or (d) the continuance in
office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records and other evidence.
- The respondents nevertheless claim that Hon. Hagad committed grave abuse of discretion
when he caused the issuance of the preventive suspension order without any hearing.
However, the records reveal that the order was issued after the filing (a) by
respondent officials of their opposition on the motion for preventive suspension and (b) by
Mayor Ouano of his memorandum in compliance with the directive of petitioner.
Besides, a preventive suspension is not penal in nature. Thus, it can be
decreed on an official under investigation after charges are brought and even before the
charges are heard for the suspension is merely a preliminary step in the administrative
investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are established and the person
investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or
dismissed. This is the penalty.
Moreover, the respondent officials were put on preventive suspension only
after the petitioner had found that the evidence of guilt against them was strong.
- As a final note, the SC said that the petition for prohibition should not have been entertained by
the RTC. This is because Sec. 14 of RA 6770 forbids any court from hearing any appeal or
application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the SC, on
pure question of law.
Dispositive: RTC Case No. MDE-14 is hereby ordered dismissed.

Digested by Ramon Rocha IV

134. Grego v COMELEC and Basco
19 June 1997
Romero, J.
Topic: Disciplinary Actions
SV: In a 1981 case filed by Tordesillas, Basco was removed due to an administrative complaint
from his position as a Deputy Sheriff upon a finding of serious misconduct. His dismissal was with
prejudice to reinstatement to any position in the national/local government. Years later, Basco
ran as a candidate for councilor in three successive elections and won all three of them. In his 3 rd
term, petitioner Grego filed a petition for his disqualification. While the case was pending before
the COMELEC, however, the Board of Canvassers declared him to be a winning candidate for
councilor. COMELEC ruled to dismiss the petitions for disqualification of Basco.
Court ruled that:
- The disqualification in Sec. 40(b), LGC does not apply to Basco because the administrative case
was rendered in 1981 and the LGC only took effect in 1992. Laws operate prospectively not
retroactively.
- Basco also did not circumvent the Tordesillas decision because the same did not bar him from
running for any elective position. The Tordesillas decision used the term reinstatement which
means reappointment, thus, pertaining to an appointive position, not an elective one.
- Maranan, the next candidate who got the highest number of votes, cannot be declared as the
councilor because Basco was qualified. Besides, even assuming Basco was disqualified, the
exception in the Labo case is inapplicable.
FACTS:
31 Oct 1981: Basco was removed from his positionas Deputy Sheriff by the SC upon a finding
of serious misconduct (for the 2nd time) in an administrative complaint lodged by a certain
NenaTordesillas.
o His dismissal was with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to
reinstatement to any position in the national or local government, including its
agencies and instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporations.
Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for Councilor in the 2 nd district of Manila during the 18
Jan 1988 local elections. He won and assumed office.
After his term, Basco sought re-election in the 11 May 1992 synchronized national elections.
He won and was elected as one of the 6 City Councilors.
o His victory was challenged by opponents, however. One of them was a petition for quo
warranto filed by Ronquillo (who was another candidate for councilor in the district)
who alleged that Basco was ineligible to be elected on the basis of the Tordesillas
ruling.
o 2 more cases were filed against him, but all these challenges were dismissed, allowing
Basco to stay in office.
Basco ran again for councilor in the 8 May 1995 elections, seeking a 3 rd and final term, and
won again.
o His right to office was again contested.
13 May 1995: Grego filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification, and asking for the
suspension of his proclamation, and for the declaration of Maranan as the 6 th duly elected
councilor of Manilas 2nd district.
o The Chairman of the Board of Canvassers (BOC) was duly furnished with a copy of this
petition, and the other members learned about this 2 days later.
COMELEC conducted a hearing of the case.

Before the parties could file their memoranda, however, the Manila City BOC
proclaimed Basco as a duly elected councilor for the Second District of Manila, placing
sixth among several candidates who vied for the seats. He immediately took his oath of
office before Bithao-Camarista.
Grego then filed an Urgent Motion to annul what he considered to be an illegal and hasty
proclamation by the BOC, reiterating Bascos disqualification and praying that Marana be
declared as winner.
o Basco filed Motion to Dismiss
[COMELEC]ruled to dismiss the petition for disqualification, holding that the administrative
penalty imposed by the Supreme Court on respondent Basco on October 31, 1981 was wiped
away and condoned by the electorate which elected him
o Also, on account of Bascos proclamation on May 17, 1965, as the sixth duly elected
councilor of the Second District of Manila, the petition would no longer be viable.
o MR was denied en banc.
o

ISSUES and REASONING:

1. Does Sec. 40(b), LGC142 apply retroactively to those removed from office before it
took effect on 1 Jan 1992? (NO)
Grego argues:
o Basco should be disqualified from running for any elective position since he had
been removed from office as a result of an administrative case pursuant to
Sec. 40(b) LGC
o Although the LGC took effect in 1992, it must be given retroactive effect. The law
does not mention/qualify the date of removal from office in order for the
disqualification to attach.
o As long as a candidate was once removed from office due to an administrative
case, regardless of whether it took place during or prior to the effectivity of the
Code, the disqualification applies.

[Aguinaldo v COMELEC] While the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive
laws.it is equally true that statutes are not to beconstrued as intended to have a
retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is expressly
declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment.
o There is no provision in the statute which would indicate that it operates
retroactively.

That the provision of the Code in question does not qualify the date of a candidates
removal from office and that it is couched in the past tense should not deter us from
the applying the law prospectively.

The basic tenet in legal hermeneutics is that laws operate prospectively and not
retroactively. Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not backward.

2. Did Bascos election in the 1988, 1992, and 1995 elections wipe away and condone
the administrative penalty against him, thus restoring his eligibility for public office?
(YES)
Grego argues:
o [Frivaldo v COMELEC] a candidates disqualification cannot be erased by the
electorate alone through the instrumentality of the ballot
o Basco circumvented the Tordesillas ruling prohibiting his reinstatement to any
position in the national or local government, including its agencies and
instrumentalities, as well as government-owned or controlled corporations

Although there seems to be semblance of merit to Gregos contentions, this argument

proceeds on the assumption that he was in the first place disqualified when he ran in
the previous elections.
o This is untenable because Basco was not disqualified under Sec. 40(b), LGC, as
was discussed.

As for Bascos alleged circumvention of the Tordesillas ruling, Gregos contention is

baseless because the Tordesillas decision did not bar Basco from running for any
elective position.

142
LGC, SEC. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position: x xxxxxxxx(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

o
o

The decision used the term reinstatement which, under the former Civil
Service Decree143, had a technical meaning that refers only to an appointive
position.
Under the Rules on Personnel Actions and Policies issued by the CSC,
reinstatement as the REAPPOINMENT of a person who was previously
separated from the service through no delinquency or misconduct on his part
from a position in the career service to which he was permanently appointed, to
a position for which he is qualified.

**can skip; I only put it here for completeness** 3. Is the proclamation of Basco as the
winning candidate, while the disqualification case was still pending in the COMELEC,
void ab initio? (NO)
Grego argues:
o Basco violated the provisions of Section 20, paragraph (i) of Republic Act No.
7166, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, as well as our ruling in the cases of
Duremdes v. COMELEC, Benito v. COMELEC and Aguam v. COMELEC.

The provisions and cases cited are all misplaced and quoted out of context. For the
sake of clarity, let us tackle each one by one.
o Section 20, paragraph (i) of RA 7166:
SEC. 20. Procedure in Disposition of Contested Election Returns.-x x
xxxxxxx
(i) The board of canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner
unless authorized by the Commission after the latter has ruled on the
objections brought to it on appeal by the losing party. Any proclamation
made in violation hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the contested
returns will not adversely affect the results of the election.
This isnt applicable because it refers to a void proclamation in relation to
contested returns and NOT to contested qualifications of a candidate.
o Sec. 6, RA 6646:
SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and
the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason, a candidate
is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election,
the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong
This does not support his contention that COMELEC or Manila City BOC
should have suspended the proclamation. The use of may indicates that
such suspension is merely directory and permissive in nature and
operates to confer discretion.What is merely made mandatory is the
continuation of the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest.
In view of the COMELECs discretion, the question of whether or not
evidence of guilt is so strong as to warrant suspension of proclamation

143
CIVIL SERVICE DECREE: ARTICLE VIII. PERSONNEL POLICIES AND STANDARDS.SEC. 24. Personnel Actions.
-x xxxxxxxx
(d) Reinstatement. - Any person who has been permanently APPOINTED to a position in the career service
and who has, through no delinquency or misconduct, been separated therefrom, may be reinstated to a
position in the same level for which he is qualified.

must be left for its own determination and the Court cannot interfere
therewith and substitute its own judgment unless such discretion has been
exercised whimsically and capriciously.
The COMELEC has not found any ground to suspend the proclamation and
the records likewise fail to show any so as to warrant a different
conclusion from this Court. Hence, there is no ample justification to hold
that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion.
Court also decided to note Section 5, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, which states:
Sec. 5. Effect of petition if unresolved before completion of canvass. - x xx
(H)is proclamation shall be suspended notwithstanding the fact that he
received the winning number of votes in such election.
But since this is an implementing rule, this must not override, but instead
remain consistent with the law it seeks to apply.
Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry out, neither to
supplant nor to modify, the law.
[Miners Association v Factoran] the power of administrative officials to
promulgate rules and regulations in the implementation of a statute is
necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what is provided in the
legislative enactment.By such regulations, of course, the law itself
cannot be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to
carrying into effect the provision of the law, they are valid.
In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation
issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or
regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.
The use of may in RA 6646 indicates that the implementing rule is
irregular.
Besides, there is no reason why the BOC should not proclaim Basco since
there is irregularity alleged.
The cases of Duremdes, Benito and Aguam, supra, cited by petitioner are all
irrelevant and inapplicable to the factual circumstances at bar and serve no
other purpose than to muddle the real issue. These three cases do not in any
manner refer to void proclamations resulting from the mere pendency of a
disqualification case.
[Duremdes v COMELEC] proclamation was ab initio because the same was
made contrary to the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code regarding
the suspension of proclamation in cases of contested election returns.
[Benito v COMELEC] In said case, the candidate receiving the highest
number of votes for the mayoralty position died but the Board of
Canvassers, instead of proclaiming the deceased candidate winner,
declared Benito, a mere second-placer, the mayor. This was rendered
ineffective by the SC.
[Aguam v COMELEC] the nullification of the proclamation proceeded from
the fact that it was based only on advanced copies of election returns
which, under the law then prevailing, could not have been a proper and
legal basis for proclamation.

4. May Maranan be legally declared the winning candidate? (NO)

In the first place, Basco was a duly qualified candidate pursuant to our disquisition
above. Furthermore, he clearly received the winning number of votes which put him in
sixth place.
The exception in Labo is inapplicable to this case because it doesnt comply with the
required concurrence of 2 conditions:
o (1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and

(2) the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidates disqualification
so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would
nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.
Dismissal of the petition for disqualification is not attended by GAD.
o

Petition DISMISSED. COMELEC resolution AFFIRMED.

Hon. Eduardo Nonato Joson, in his capacity as the Governor of the Province of Nueva
Ecija v Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres, the DILG, represented by Sec. Robert
Barbers and Undersecratry Sanchez, Mr. Oscar c. Tinio, in his capacity as Provincial
Vice-Governor of Nueva Ecija, and Mr. Loreto P. Pangilinan, Mr. Crispulo S. Esguerra,
Ms. Solita S. Santos, Mr. Vicente C. Palilio and Mr. Napoleon G. Interior, in their
capacity as Provincial Board Members of Nueva Ecija
May 20, 1998
Puno, J.

Short version: Joson was charged with grave misconduct and abuse of authority, for allegedly
harassing members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for not supporting a legislative measure
under which Nueva Ecija would obtain a loan of P150m from the PNB. A letter-complaint was filed
with the Office of the President. Then President Ramos noted the incident and instructed the
Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments to take the appropriate investigative actions.
Joson was asked to submit his answer. He asked for several extensions to file the Answer, which
were all granted, and after 7 months, he filed a Motion to Dismiss. He was declared in default
and he was placed under preventive suspension. He questioned this with the CA, which denied
his petition, and so he went up to the SC. Meanwhile, proceedings with the DILG continued, and
he was eventually found guilty and sentenced to a 6-month suspension.

There were 5 issues discussed by the SC.

1) The letter-complaint was properly filed. While it had some procedural lapses, none of them
were fatal defects.
2) Yes, the DILG had jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against
elective local officials is lodged in two authorities: the Disciplining Authority and the
Investigating Authority.The Disciplining Authority is the President of the Philippines, whether
acting by himself or through the Executive Secretary. The Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government is the Investigating Authority, who may act by himself or constitute an
Investigating Committee.
3) Joson was properly declared in default. The DILG had actually been very nice to him by
granting all his requests, but even then, he filed a Motion to Dismiss even when he was
expressly instructed to file an answer and not a motion to dismiss.
4) In view of Joson's inexcusable failure to file answer, the DILG did not err in ordering his
preventive suspension during the investigation. Preventive suspension may be imposed by
the Disciplining Authority at any time (a) after the issues are joined; (b) when the evidence of
guilt is strong; and (c) given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the
respondent, who continues to hold office, could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to
the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.The failure of Joson to file his
answer despite several opportunities given him is construed as a waiver of his right to present
evidence in his behalf (Sec. 4, Rule 4 of Administrative Order No. 23).

5) The penalty of suspension was NOT validly issued. It was made without a formal investigation.
The DILG should have granted Josons request for the investigation. It was a right explicitly
granted to him under A.O. No. 23.
Facts:

Private respondents filed with the Office of the President a letter-complaint charging petitioner
Eduardo Nonato Joson with grave misconduct and abuse of authority.
o They allege that in the morning of September 12, 1996, they were at the session hall of
the provincial capitol for a scheduled session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
whenJoson belligerently barged into the Hall;
o He angrily kicked the door and chairs in the Hall and uttered threatening words at them.
Behind him were several men with long and short firearms who encircled the area.
o Respondents claim that the incident was because they were against a pending legislative
measure, through which the province of Nueva Ecija would obtain a loan of P150m from
the PNB, which was supported by Joson.
o No session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was held that day for lack of quorum and
the proposed legislative measure was not considered.
o Private respondents opposed the loan because the province of Nueva Ecija had an
unliquidated obligation of more than P70 million incurred without prior authorization from
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Thus, the province could not afford to contract another
obligation.
o They allege that Joson's act of barging in and intimidating them was a serious insult to
the integrity and independence of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan; and that the presence
of his private army posed grave danger to private respondents' lives and safety.
o They prayed for the suspension or removal of petitioner; for an emergency audit of the
provincial treasury of Nueva Ecija; and for the review of the proposed loan in light of the
financial condition of the province.
President Ramos instructed the then Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments (SILG)
Robert Barbers to take appropriate preemptive and investigative actions, but to not break the
peace.
Secretary Barbers notified Joson of the case against him and attached to the notice a copy of
the complaint and its annexes. Barbers also directed Joson "to submit [his] verified/sworn
answer thereto, not a motion to dismiss, together with such documentary evidence that [he]
has in support thereof, within fifteen (15) days from receipt.
Secretary Barbers proceeded to Nueva Ecija and summoned Joson and private respondents to
a conference to settle the controversy. The parties entered into an agreement whereby Joson
promised to maintain peace and order in the province while private respondents promised to
refrain from filing cases that would adversely affect their peaceful co-existence.
The peace agreement was not respected by the parties and the private respondents
reiterated their letter-complaint. Joson was again ordered to file his answer to the lettercomplaint within fifteen days from receipt.
Instead of filing he answer, he repeatedly asked for extensions to file. He stated that he had
already sent letters to various law firms in Metro Manila but that he had not yet contracted
their services, and that the advent of the Christmas season kept him busy with "numerous
and inevitable official engagements."Even when he had already gotten a law firm to represent
him, he claimed that he needed time to confer with them personally; and that during this
period, he, with the help of his friends, was exploring the possibility of an amicable settlement
of the case.
Three months later, the Acting Secretary of the DILG (Undersecretary Sanchez) issued an
order declaring Joson in default and to have waived his right to present evidence. Private
respondents were ordered to present their evidence ex-parte.

Two days later, the law firm of Padilla, Jimenez, Kintanar & Asuncion, representing petitioner,
filed with the DILG an Entry of Appearance with Motion for Time to File Answer Ad Cautelam.
Joson was once again given another extension to file his answer.
Joson still failed to file his answer, thus he was deemed to have waived his right to present
evidence in his behalf. Undersecretary Sanchez reinstated the order of default and directed
private respondents to present their evidence ex-parte.
Joson then filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the letter-complaint was not verified on the
day it was filed with the Office of the President; and that the DILG had no jurisdiction over the
case and no authority to require him to answer the complaint.
Upon recommendation of Secretary Barbers, Executive Secretary Ruben Torres issued an
order, by authority of the President, placing Joson under preventive suspension for 60 days
pending investigation of the charges against him.
Secretary Barbers directed the Philippine National Police to assist in the implementation of
the order of preventive suspension. Vice-Governor Oscar Tinio was designated as as Acting
Governor for the time being.
Joson filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA, challenging the order of
preventive suspension and the order of default.
Meanwhile, the proceedings before the DILG continued. Undersecretary Sanchez denied
Josons Motion to Dismiss and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration. He also required
the parties to submit their position papers within an inextendible period of ten days from
receipt after which the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
Joson filed with the DILG a "Motion to Lift Order of Preventive Suspension," together with a
"Motion to Lift Default Order and Admit Answer Ad Cautelam."Attached to the motion was the
"Answer Ad Cautelam"and sworn statements of his witnesses.
o On the other hand, private respondents herein manifested that they were submitting the
case for decision based on the records, the complaint and affidavits of their witnesses.
Joson alleged that in the morning of September 12, 1996, he found out that Vice-Governor
Tinio was enraged at the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who were in Joson's
party because they refused to place the ratification of the proposed P150 million loan of the
province on the agenda. Joson went to the provincial capitol to advise his party-mates on their
problem and at the same time attend to his official functions. He went to the Session Hall and
asked the members present where Vice-Governor Tinio was.
o Joson claimed that there was nothing in his conduct that threatened the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan or caused alarm to the employees. He said that like ViceGovernor Tinio, he was always accompanied by his official security escorts whenever he
reported for work.
Joson filed a Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation with the DILG.He prayed that a formal
investigation of his case be conducted pursuant to the LGC and Rule 7 of Administrative Order
No. 23; and that this be held at the province of Nueva Ecija.
In the meantime, the CA denied his petition. Hence, he appealed to the SC.
The DILG also denied Josons Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation declaring that the
submission of position papers substantially complies with the requirements of procedural due
process in administrative proceedings.
The Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments found Joson guilty.
The Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, adopted the findings and
recommendation of the DILG Secretary. He imposed on petitioner the penalty of suspension
from office for six (6) months without pay.
The SC issued a TRO enjoining the implementation of the order of the Executive Secretary.
Private respondents submitted a Manifestation informing the SC that the suspension of
petitioner was implemented on January 9, 1998; that on the same day, private respondent
Oscar Tinio was installed as Acting Governor of the province; and that in view of these events,
the temporary restraining order had lost its purpose and effectivity and was fait accompli.

Issues:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

Was the letter-complaint properly filed? YES

Did the DILG have jurisdiction? YES
Was Joson properly declared in default? YES
Was the preventive suspension properly imposed YES?
Was the penalty of the 6-month suspension properly imposed? NO

Ratio:
As to the formal requirements
1) Administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective local officials are governed by the
LGC, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, and
Administrative Order No. 23 entitled "Prescribing the Rules and Procedures on the
Investigation of Administrative Disciplinary Cases Against Elective Local Officials of Provinces,
Highly Urbanized Cities, Independent Component Cities, and Cities and Municipalities in
Metropolitan Manila."In all matters not provided in A.O. No. 23, the Rules of Court and the
Administrative Code of 1987 apply in a suppletory character.

2) Section 60144 of the LGC enumerates the grounds for which an elective local official may be
disciplined, suspended or removed from office. When an elective local official commits an act
that falls under the grounds for disciplinary action, the administrative complaint against him
must be verified and filed under Section 61. 145

144
Sec. 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from
office on any of the following grounds:(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;
(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;
(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty;
(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision mayor;
(e) Abuse of authority;
(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case of members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlunsod, sangguniang bayan, and sangguniang barangay;
(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant of another country;
and
(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court.

145
Sec. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. A verified complaint against any erring local elective official
shall be prepared as follows:(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city, an
independent component city or component city shall be filed before the Office of the President.
(b) A complaint against any elective official of a municipality shall be filed before the sangguniang panlalawigan whose
decision may be appealed to the Office of the President; and
(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed before the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang
bayan concerned whose decision shall be final and executory.

3) An administrative complaint against an erring elective official must be verified and filed with
the proper government office. A complaint against an elective provincial or city official must
be filed with the Office of the President. A complaint against an elective municipal official
must be filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan while that of a barangay official must be
filed before the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan.
4) Joson is an elective official of the province of Nueva Ecija. The letter-complaint against him
was properly filed with the Office of the President.
a. According to Joson, the letter-complaint failed to conform with the formal requirements
set by the Code.
5) The SC finds no merit in this contention. The absence of the document, page or book number
of the notarial register of the subscribing officer is insufficient to prove his's claim. The lack of
these entries may constitute proof of neglect on the part of the subscribing officer in
complying with the requirements for notarization and proper verification. They may give
grounds for the revocation of his notarial commission,but they do not indubitably prove that
the verification was inserted or intercalated after the letter-complaint was filed with the Office
of the President.
6) The fact of intercalation is not sufficiently established by the affidavit of Solita C. Santos,
since the SC found that she had dubious political motives and could not be considered an
unbiased witness.
7) Assuming that the letter-complaint was unverified when submitted to the Office of the
President, the defect was not fatal. The requirement of verification was deemed waived by
the President himself when he acted on the complaint.
8) Verification is a formal, not jurisdictional requisite.Verification is mainly intended to secure an
assurance that the allegations therein made are done in good faith or are true and correct
and not mere speculation.
As to the jurisdiction of the DILG
9) Joson also questioned the jurisdiction and authority of the DILG Secretary over the case. He
contends that under the law, it is the Office of the President that has jurisdiction over the
letter-complaint and that the CA erred in applying the alter-ego principle because the power
to discipline elective local officials lies with the President, not with the DILG Secretary.
10)
Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials is lodged
in two authorities: the Disciplining Authority and the Investigating Authority. 146

146
AO23: Sec. 2. Disciplining Authority. All administrative complaints, duly verified, against elective local officials
mentioned in the preceding Section shall be acted upon by the President. The President, who may act through the
Executive Secretary, shall hereinafter be referred to as the Disciplining Authority.Sec. 3. Investigating Authority. The
Secretary of the Interior and Local Government is hereby designated as the Investigating Authority. He may constitute
an Investigating Committee in the Department of the Interior and Local Government for the purpose.
The Disciplining Authority may, however, in the interest of the service, constitute a Special Investigating Committee in
lieu of the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government.

11)
The Disciplining Authority is the President of the Philippines, whether acting by himself or
through the Executive Secretary. The Secretary of the Interior and Local Government is the
Investigating Authority, who may act by himself or constitute an Investigating Committee.
12)
The Secretary of the DILG, however, is not the exclusive Investigating Authority. In lieu of
the DILG Secretary, the Disciplinary Authority may designate a Special Investigating
Committee.
13)
The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against elective local
officials is derived from his power of general supervision over local governments, under
Section 4, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
14)
The power of supervision means "overseeing or the authority of an officer to see that the
subordinate officers perform their duties."If the subordinate officers fail or neglect to fulfill
their duties, the official may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties.
15)
Independently of any statutory provision authorizing the President to conduct an
investigation of the nature involved in this proceeding, and in view of the nature and
character of the executive authority with which the President of the Philippines is invested,
the constitutional grant to him of power to exercise general supervision over all local
governments and to take care that the laws be faithfully executed must be construed to
authorize him to order an investigation of the act or conduct of the petitioner herein.
16)
Supervision at least implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render
the power real and effective. If supervision is to be conscientious and rational, and not
automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon a knowledge of actual facts and conditions
disclosed after careful study and investigation.
17)
The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As the Disciplining
Authority, the President has the power derived from the Constitution itself to investigate
complaints against local government officials. A.O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to
investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the
Disciplining Authority.
a. This is not undue delegation. The President remains the Disciplining Authority. What is
delegated is the power to investigate, not the power to discipline.
18)
Moreover, the power of the DILG to investigate administrative complaints is based on the
alter-ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency.
19)
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the
heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive,
and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in
person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through
the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed
and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by
the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
20)
This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President, as provided in the
Constitution.147

147
Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed.

21)
Control is said to be the very heart of the power of the presidency.As head of the Executive
Department, the President, however, may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet
members except when he is required by the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of
the situation demand that he acts personally.
22)
Each head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that
department where the President is required by law to exercise authority.

23)
The procedure how the Disciplining and Investigating Authorities should exercise their
powers is distinctly set forth in the Section 62 148 of the LGC and A.O. No. 23.
24)
Joson claims that the DILG Secretary usurped the power of the President when he required
Joson to answer the complaint
25)
Strictly applying the rules, the Office of the President did not comply with the provisions of
A.O. No. 23. The Office should have first required Joson to file his answer. Thereafter, the
complaint and the answer should have been referred to the Investigating Authority for further
proceedings. Be that as it may, this procedural lapse is not fatal. The filing of the answer is
necessary merely to enable the President to make a preliminary assessment of the case.
26)
The President found the complaint sufficient in form and substance to warrant its further
investigation. The judgment of the President on the matter is entitled to respect in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion.
As to the declaration of default
27)
Joson also claims that the DILG erred in declaring him in default for filing a motion to
dismiss. He alleges that a motion to dismiss is not a pleading prohibited by the law or the
rules and therefore the DILG Secretary should have considered it and given him time to file
his answer.
28)
It is true that a motion to dismiss is not a pleading prohibited under the Local Government
Code of 1991 nor in A.O. No. 23. Joson, however, was instructed not to file a motion to dismiss
in the order to file answer. He requested and was granted an extension to time to file his
answer thrice. After all the requests and seven months later, he filed a motion to dismiss.
29)
Petitioner should know that the formal investigation of the case is required by law to be
finished within 120 days from the time of formal notice to the respondent. The extensions
requested consumed 55 days of this period.
30)
Joson, in fact, filed his answer 9 months after the first notice. Indeed, this was more than
sufficient time for petitioner to comply with the order to file answer.
31)
The speedy disposition of administrative complaints is required by public service. The
efficiency of officials under investigation is impaired when a case hangs over their heads.
Officials deserve to be cleared expeditiously if they are innocent, also expeditiously if guilty,
so that the business of government will not be prejudiced.
As to the preventive suspension

148
Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing. (a) Within seven (7) days after the administrative complaint is filed, the Office of the
President or the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the respondent to submit his verified
answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, and commence investigation of the case within ten (10) days
after receipt of such answer of the respondent.

32)
In view of Joson's inexcusable failure to file answer, the DILG did not err in recommending
to the Disciplining Authority his preventive suspension during the investigation. Preventive
suspension is authorized under Section 63 149 of the LGC.
33)
Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Disciplining Authority at any time (a) after
the issues are joined; (b) when the evidence of guilt is strong; and (c) given the gravity of the
offense, there is great probability that the respondent, who continues to hold office, could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other
evidence.
34)
Executive Secretary Torres, on behalf of the President, imposed preventive suspension on
Joson after the recommendation of DILG DILG Secretary Robert Z. Barbers.
35)
The failure of Joson to file his answer despite several opportunities given him is construed
as a waiver of his right to present evidence in his behalf (Sec. 4, Rule 4 of Administrative
Order No. 23).
36)
The act of respondent in allegedly barging violently into the session hall of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the company of armed men constitutes grave misconduct. The
allegations are bolstered by the joint-affidavit of two (2) employees of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. Josont who is the chief executive of the province is in a position to influence the
witnesses. Further, the history of violent confrontational politics in the province dictates that
extreme precautionary measures be taken.
37)
Executive Secretary Torres found that all the requisites for the imposition of preventive
suspension had been complied with.
38)
Joson's failure to file his answer despite several opportunities given him was construed as
a waiver of his right to file answer and present evidence; and as a result of this waiver, the
issues were deemed to have been joined. The Executive Secretary also found that the
evidence of petitioner Joson's guilt was strong and that his continuance in office during the
pendency of the case could influence the witnesses and pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the evidence against him.
As to the penalty of suspension
39)
Joson claims that the suspension was made without formal investigation pursuant to the
provisions of Rule 7 of A.O. No. 23. He filed a "Motion To Conduct Formal Investigation" three
months before the issuance of the order of suspension and this motion was denied by the
DILG.
40)
The denial of petitioner's Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation is erroneous. Joson's right
to a formal investigation is spelled out in A.O. No. 23.
41)
The records show that on August 27, 1997, Joson submitted his Answer Ad Cautelam
where he disputed the truth of the allegations that he barged into the session hall of the

149
Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. (a) Preventive suspension may be imposed:(1) By the President, if the respondent
is an elective official of a province, a highly urbanized or an independent component city;
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when the evidence of guilt is strong,
and given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the continuance in office of the respondent could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence; Provided, That,
any single preventive suspension of local elective officials shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days: Provided, further,
That in the event that several administrative cases are filed against an elective official, he cannot be preventively
suspended for more than ninety (90) days within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known at
the time of the first suspension.

capitol and committed physical violence to harass the private respondents who were opposed
to any move for the province to contract a P150 million loan from PNB.
42)
The rejection of petitioner's right to a formal investigation denied him procedural due
process. Section 5 of A.O. No. 23 provides that at the preliminary conference, the
Investigating Authority shall summon the parties to consider whether they desire a formal
investigation. This provision does not give the Investigating Authority the discretion to
determine whether a formal investigation would be conducted. As respondent, he is accorded
several rights under the law. 150

150
Sec. 65. Rights of Respondent. The respondent shall be accorded full opportunity to appear and defend himself
in person or by counsel, to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, and to require the attendance of
witnesses and the production of documentary evidence in his favor through compulsory process of subpoena or
subpoena duces tecum.

43)
An erring elective local official has rights akin to the constitutional rights of an
accused.These rights are essentially part of procedural due process.
44)
The local elective official has the (1) the right to appear and defend himself in person or by
counsel; (2) the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him; and (3) the
right to compulsory attendance of witness and the production of documentary evidence.
These rights are reiterated in the Rules Implementing the Local Government Code and in A.O.
No. 23.
45)
Joson's right to a formal investigation was not satisfied when the complaint against him
was decided on the basis of position papers. There is nothing in the Local Government Code
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations nor in A.O. No. 23 that provide that
administrative cases against elective local officials can be decided on the basis of position
papers.
46)
A.O. No. 23 states that the Investigating Authority may require the parties to submit their
respective memoranda but this is only after formal investigation and hearing.A.O. No. 23 does
not authorize the Investigating Authority to dispense with a hearing especially in cases
involving allegations of fact which are not only in contrast but contradictory to each other.
47)
The jurisprudence cited by the DILG in its order denying the formal investigation applies to
appointive officials and employees. Administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective
government officials are not exactly similar to those against appointive officials.
48)
The provisions that apply to elective local officials are separate and distinct from
appointive government officers and employees.
49)
It is the Administrative Code of 1987, specifically Book V on the Civil Service, that primarily
governs appointive officials and employees. Their qualifications are set forth in the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of the said Code. The grounds for administrative disciplinary
action in Book V are much more in number and are specific than those enumerated in the LGC
against elective local officials.The disciplining authority in such actions is the Civil Service
Commission,although the Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces,
cities and municipalities are also given the power to investigate and decide disciplinary
actions against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. 151

151

Procedure for appointive officials: When a complaint is filed and the respondent answers, he must "indicate whether or
not he elects a formal investigation if his answer is not considered satisfactory." If the officer or employee elects a
formal investigation, the direct evidence for the complainant and the respondent "consist[s] of the sworn statement
and documents submitted in support of the complaint and answer, as the case may be, without prejudice to the
presentation of additional evidence deemed necessary . . ., upon which the cross-examination by respondent and the
complainant, respectively, is based."The investigation is conducted without adhering to the technical rules applicable
in judicial proceedings." 85Moreover, the appointive official or employee may be removed or dismissed summarily if (1)
the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong; (2) when the respondent is a recidivist; and (3) when the
respondent is notoriously undesirable. 86

50)
The provisions for administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials are
markedly different from appointive officials.The rules on the removal and suspension of
elective local officials are more stringent. The procedure of requiring position papers in lieu of
a hearing in administrative cases is expressly allowed with respect to appointive officials but
not to those elected.
51)
An elective official, elected by popular vote, is directly responsible to the community that
elected him. The official has a definite term of office fixed by law which is relatively of short
duration. Suspension and removal from office definitely affects and shortens this term of
office. When an elective official is suspended or removed, the people are deprived of the
services of the man they had elected. Implicit in the right of suffrage is that the people are
entitled to the services of the elective official of their choice.
52)
Suspension and removal are thus imposed only after the elective official is accorded his
rights and the evidence against him strongly dictates their imposition.
Resolution of the Executive Secretary imposing the suspension is declared null and
void.
JESUS CONDUCTO v JUDGE ILUMINADO MONZON
2 July 1998
Davide, ponente
letter-complaint
SHORT VERSION:
Judge Monzon refused to preventatively suspend a barangay chairman who was charged with
unlawful appointment (a criminal case). The SC said he was incorrect in saying that there should
also be a pending administrative case. Criminal liabilities incurred by an elective public official
during his previous term of office were not extinguished by his re-election.
FACTS:
Jesus Conducto filed a complaint with the Sangguniang Panlungsod of San Pablo City
against Benjamin Maghirang, the barangay chair of Barangay III-E for abuse of authority,
serious irregularity and violation of law.
o Maghirang had appointed his sister-in-law as the barangay secretary in violation of
LGC 394.
He also filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman, which at first dismissed it, but
later granted Conductos MR and recommended the filing of an information for unlawful
appointment (RPC Art 244) against Maghirang.
The City Prosecutor filed a motion for suspension pursuant to RA 3019.
o SEC. 13. Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under
a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code
or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property
whether as a single or as complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and
mode of participation, is pending in Court, shall be suspended from office.
o However, Judge Monzon denied the motion for suspension on the ground that the
act complained of had been committed in the term prior to Maghirangs present
term as barangay chair.
He said that preventative suspension only applied for administrative cases
filed against a local official who was at the same time criminally charged.
Since Maghirang had not been administratively charged, then he shouldnt be
suspended.
ISSUE:
should Maghirang have been suspended during the pendency of the criminal case against
him? YES

REASONING:
Ingco v Sanchez: the re-election of a public official extinguishes only the administrative,
but not the criminal, liability incurred by him during his previous term of office.
o While the criminal cases involves the character of the mayor as a private citizen and
the People of the Philippines as a community is a party to the case, an
administrative case involves only his actuations as a public officer as [they] affect
the populace of the municipality where he serves.
Luciano v The Provincial Governor: criminal liabilities incurred by an elective public official
during his previous term of office were not extinguished by his re-election.
o Pascual v. Provincial Governor and Lizares v. Hechanova referred only to
administrative liabilities committed during the previous term of an elective official.
Oliveros v Villaluz:
o Punishment for a crime is a vindication for an offense against the State and the
body politic.
The small segment of the national electorate that constitutes the electorate
of the municipality of Antipolo has no power to condone a crime against the
public justice of the State and the entire body politic.
o Reelection to public office is not provided for in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code
as a mode of extinguishing criminal liability incurred by a public officer prior to his
reelection.
On the contrary, Article 9 of the Anti-Graft Act imposes as one of the
penalties in case of conviction perpetual disqualification from public office
and Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code declares that such penalty of
perpetual disqualification entails "the deprivation of the public offices and
employments which the offender may have held, even if conferred by popular
election."
o Such condonation of an officer's fault or misconduct during a previous expired term
by virtue of his reelection to office for a new term can be deemed to apply only to
his administrative and not to his criminal guilt.
Aguinaldo v Santos: The rule is that a public official cannot be removed from
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office
operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off
the right to remove him therefor.
o The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending against
petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.
RULING: for incompetence as a result of ignorance of a settled doctrine interpreting a law, or
deliberate disregard of such doctrine in violation of Canon 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics,
respondent Judge Iluminado C. Monzon is hereby FINED in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) and warned that the commission of similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
#rbm
Ramir Pablico (Petitioner) vs Alejandro Villapando (Respondent)
Date: July 31, 2002
Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.

Short Version:

Facts: An administrative complaint was filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan against Mayor
Villapando. The SP found him guilty and ordered his dismissal from service. This was affirmed by
the Office of the President. Villapando questioned his dismissal.
Held: Under Sec 60 of the LGC, the penalty of dismissal may only be decreed by a court of law.
Thus, Villapando's dismissal by the SP is void.

Facts:
- Two members of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Vicente, Palawan, filed with the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Palawan an administrative complaint against Alejandro Villapando, then Mayor of
San Vicente for abuse of authority and culpable violation of the Constitution.
- Alleged that Villapando entered into a consultancy agreement with Orlando Tiape, a defeated
mayoralty candidate; and that the said agreement amounted to an appointment to a
government position within the prohibited one-year period under Art IX-B, Sec 6 of the
Constitution.
- Villapando countered that he did not appoint Tiape, rather, he merely hired him. He invoked a
DOJ Opinion stating that the appointment of a defeated candidate as a consultant does not
constitute an appointment to a government office or position as prohibited by the Constitution.
- SP of Palawan found Villapando guilty of the administrative charge, and dismissed him from
service. Appeal to the Office of the President which affirmed the decision.
- Pending Villapandos MR of the decision of the OP, Ramir Pablico, then Vice-mayor of San
Vicente, took his oath of office as Mayor. Consequently, Villapando filed with the RTC a petition
for certiorari and prohibition, seeking to annul the oath administered to Pablico.
- The Executive Judge granted a TRO. RTC denied Villapandos motion for extension of the TRO.
Hence, Pablico resumed his assumption of the functions of Mayor.
- Villapando instituted a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA seeking to annul the
decisions of the OP and the SP, and the RTC's denial of the extension of the TRO.
- CA declared void the assailed decisions, and ordered Pablico to vacate the Office of Mayor. MR
denied, hence Pablico filed the present petition for review.

Issue/Reasoning:
Issue: Whether Villapando's dismissal by the SP, as affirmed by the OP, is valid (No)
- Under Sec 60 of the LGC, An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds
enumerated above by order of the proper court.
- The penalty of dismissal may be decreed only by a court of law. Thus, in Salalima v Guingona:
[t]he Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials, since such
power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph
of the aforequoted Section 60.

- Art 124 (b), Rule XIX of the IRR, however, adds that An elective local official may be removed
from office... by order of the proper court or the disciplining authority... The disciplining
authority referred to pertains to the SP and the OP.
- But, as held in Salalima, this grant to the disciplining authority of the power to remove
elective local officials is clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight Committee that
prepared the IRR. No rule or regulation may alter, amend, or contravene a provision of law,
such as the LGC.
- Based on the Senate deliberations, the clear legislative intent is to make the subject power of
removal a judicial prerogative.
- Thus, the power to remove erring elective local officials from service is lodged exclusively with
the courts. The IRR, insofar as it vests power on the disciplining authority to remove the erring
elective local officials, is void for being repugnant to the LGC.
- The law on suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed, and the
authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost
good faith, for what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the
people. Their will must not be put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining
authority.

Dispositive:
Petition denied.
Enrique Garcia, et al. v. COMELEC and Lucila Payumo, et al.
5 October 1993
Puno, J.
Short version: The petitioners in this case are questioning the constitutionality of Sec. 70 of the
LGC, insofar as it provides for an alternative method for exercising the power of recall. The SC
held that Sec. 70 is constitutional. There is nothing in the Constitution that suggests that the
people have the "sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding."
The petitioners theory that the recall resolution is itself the recall is erroneous for the PRA
resolution merely initiates the process. Moreover, Sec. 70 does not violate the equal protection
clause A careful reading of the law will show that it does not give an asymmetrical treatment to
locally elected officials belonging to the political minority.
Facts:

- Garcia was elected governor of the province of Bataan in the May 11, 1992 elections. Around a
year later, some mayors, vice mayors and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the 12
municipalities of Bataan met and constituted themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly
(PRA), pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 70 of the LGC, to initiate the recall election of Garcia.
Thereafter, motion was made for a resolution to be passed for the recall of Garcia on the ground
of loss of confidence. Thus, Resolution No. 1 was passed. It carried 80 signatures but only 74
were found to be genuine.152
- The petitioners filed with the COMELEC a petition to deny due course to the resolution. They
alleged that the PRA failed to comply with the substantive and procedural requirements laid
down in Sec. 70 of the LGC. However, the COMELEC dismissed the petition and scheduled the
recall elections for the position of Governor of Bataan. This prompted the petitioners to file a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with the SC.
The petitioners argued that Sec. 70 of the LGC is unconstitutional because:
(1) the people have the sole and exclusive right to decide whether or not to initiate recall
proceedings, and (2) it violated the right of elected local public officials belonging to the
political minority to equal protection of law. They also argued that the proceedings
followed by the PRA in passing the resolution suffers from the fatal flaw of deliberate
failure to send notices of the meeting to 65 members of the assembly.
- After the hearing, the SC granted the petition on the narrow ground that the sending of
selective notices to members of the PRA violated the due process clause, thereby making the
enactment of the Resolution fatally flawed. The Court found it unnecessary to decide on the
alleged constitutional infirmity of Sec. 70 of the LGC.
- In accord with the above decision, the Mayor of Dinalupihan again sent Notice of Session to the
members of the PRA for another convention. The PRA convened in session and 87 of its members
oce more passed a resolution calling for the recall of Garcia. This prompted the petitioners to file
a Supplemental Petition and Reiteration of Extremely Urgent motion pressing for a resolution of
their contention that Sec. 70 of the LGC is unconstitutional.
Issue: Is Sec. 70 of the LGC, insofar as it allows a preparatory recall assembly to initiate the recall
of local elective officials, unconstitutional? (No)
Reasoning:
- Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term of office.
The people's prerogative to remove a public officer is an incident of their sovereign power and in
the absence of constitutional restraint, the power is implied in all governmental operations.
- Recall made its maiden appearance in the 1973 Constitution. The Batasang Pambansa then
enacted the BP 337 entitled The Local Government Code of 1983. It provided only one mode of
initiating the recall elections of local elective officials , i.e., by petition of at least twenty-five
percent (25%) of the total number of registered voters in the local government unit concerned.
- In February 1986, the people more than exercised their right of recall when they resorted to
revolution and booted out of office the highest elective officials of the land. Thus, upon the
adoption of the 1987 Constitution, the role and rights of Peoples Organizations were expressly
recognized.153

152
The PRA had a membership of 144 and with a majority of 73.

- In response to the mandate of the Constitution, Congress enacted the LGC of 1991. This Code
provided for a second mode of initiating the recall process through a preparatory recall assembly
which in the provincial level is composed of all mayors, vice-mayors and sanggunian members of
the municipalities and component cities. 154

153
This can be found in Secs. 15 and 16, Art. XIII of the Constitution.

154
The pertinent provisions are Secs. 69-74 of the LGC.

- The Court looked at the legislative history of the recall provisions of the LGC and found that
there were 2 principal reasons why this alternative mode of initiating the recall process thru an
assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action
of the people; and (b) to cut down on its expenses.
- The petitioners argue that "the right to recall does not extend merely to the prerogative of the
electorate to reconfirm or withdraw their confidence on the official sought to be recalled at a
special election. Such prerogative necessarily includes the sole and exclusive right to decide on
whether to initiate a recall proceedings or not.
The SC does not agree. There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely
suggest that the people have the "sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate
a recall proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for any mode, let alone a single
mode, of initiating recall elections.
The mandate given by Sec. 3, Art. X is for Congress to enact an LGC which
contains, among others, effective mechanisms of recall. Thus, Congress was given the
power to choose such effective mechanisms as its discernment dictates. Congress has
made its choice when it enacted the alternative method assailed in this case and the Court
cannot supplant this judgment.
- The petitioners next argue that in passing Resolution No. 1, the PRA did not only initiate the
process of recall but had de facto recalled Garcia from office, a power reserved to the people
alone. In other words, the petitioners believe that a PRA resolution of recall is the recall itself.
The SC does not agree. The petitioners have embraced the view that
initiation by the PRAC is not initiation by the people. This is a misimpression for initiation
by the PRAC is also initiation by the people, albeit done indirectly through their
representatives. This is Constitutionally permissible. There is no reason why the initiation
of the recall process cannot be entrusted to elected representatives of the people if the
paramount task of drafting our Constitution is delegated by the people to their
representatives.
Moreover, a PRA resolution is clearly not the recall itself for the PRA
resolution of recall merely starts the process. This is self-evident considering that a PRA
resolution that is either not submitted to the COMELEC will not recall its subject official.
Even if the resolution is submitted to the COMELEC, if it is rejected by the people in the
election called for the purpose, it bears no effect whatsoever. Thus, Sec. 72 of the LGC
explicitly states that "the recall of an elective local official shall be effective only upon the
election and proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate receiving the
highest number of votes cast during the election on recall."
- The petitioners also argue that the disputed law is contrary to the equal protection clause
considering that the majority party can constitute itself into a PRA and initiate the recall of a duly
elected provincial official belonging to the minority party thus rendering ineffectual his election
by popular mandate for purely partisan political ends regardless of the original mandate of the
electorate.
The SC does not agree. What this argument really assails is not the law itself
but its possible abuse by the members of the PRA while exercising their right to initiate
recall proceedings. A careful reading of the law, however, will ineluctably show that it does
not give an asymmetrical treatment to locally elected officials belonging to the political
minority. The fear that such an abuse may take place is not a sufficient ground to strike
down the law as unconstitutional.

First, the LGC mandates a politically neutral composition of the preparatory

recall assembly. Under the law, all mayors, vice-mayors and sangguniang members of the
municipalities and component cities are made members of the preparatory recall
assembly at the provincial level. Second, the preparatory recall assembly at the provincial
level includes all the elected officials in the province concerned. Considering their number,
the greater probability is that no one political party can control its majority. Third, sec. 69
of the Code provides that the only ground to recall a locally elected public official is loss of
confidence of the people.By necessary implication, loss of confidence cannot be premised
on mere differences in political party affiliation.
Moreover, the the law instituted safeguards to assure that the initiation of
the recall process by a preparatory recall assembly will not be corrupted by extraneous
influences. As stated above, the diverse composition of the membership of the assembly
guarantees that all sectors of the electorate province shall be heard. The law also requires
a qualified majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members to convene in session
and in a public place. It also requires that the recall resolution by the said majority must
be adopted during its session called for the purpose. Compliance with these requirements
is necessary, otherwise, there will be no valid resolution of recall.
- The petitioners also argue that the Resolution subverted the will of the electorate of the
province of Bataan, who elected Garcia with a majority of 12,500 votes.
The SC does not agree. This contention again proceeds from the erroneous
premise that the resolution of recall is the recall itself. The electorate of Bataan may or
may not recall Garcia in the election called for that purpose.
Dispositive: Petition dismissed.
Dissenting opinion by Justice Davide:155

155
Joined by Justice Melo

- Recall is of American origin. Wallace vs. Tripp considers it a fundamental right reserved to the
people of the state by the Constitution, and Bernzen vs. City of Boulder declares it, like the power
of initiative and referendum, to be a fundamental right of citizens within a representative
democracy.
- Recall is specifically mandated by the Constitution. To implement the Constitutional provision
on recall, the LGC expressly provides, in Sec. 69, that it shall be exercised by the registered
voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall
belongs. Indubitably then, the power is exclusively vested in the electorate or, more specifically,
in the registered voters of the local government unit concerned. It follows from the foregoing that
the said power cannot be shared any other group of persons or officials.
- The essential components of the power of recall are the initiation and the election. Thus, both
of these components must be exercised by the electorate alone. If the power to initiate recall
proceedings can also be done by another body, such as the PRA in this case, the exclusiveness or
indivisibility of the power is necessarily impaired or negated. Worse, since the second component
of the power of recall does not come into play without the recall petition, it follows that where the
petition is not done through the initiative of the electorate, that election becomes, as to the
electorate, more of a duty and not a power.
- Furthermore, since Congress decided to retain the 25% requirement for the traditional method
of initiating recall, the LGC provision for an alternative method, is subtly designed to negate, if
not altogether defeat, the power of the electorate and to substitute the will of a very small group
for the will of the electorate. The conclusion then is inevitable that the provision on the
preparatory recall assembly in Sec. 70 of the LGC is unconstitutional because it amounts to an
undue delegation of the power of recall.
Concurring opinion by Justice Quiason:
- The intent is clear that the 1987 Constitution leaves it to Congress to provide the recall
mechanism without any pre-ordained restrictions. The membrer of the PRA can be considered as
constituting a segment of the electorate because they are all registered voters of the province. If
they constitute less than one percent of the voters in the province, that miniscule number goes
to the policy, not the validity of the law and the remedy to correct such a flaw is left with the
legislature, not with the judiciary.
Concurring opinion by Justice Vitug:
- It may not be amiss to caution against any idea of omnipotence in wielding the "power of
recall" conferred to the "Preparatory Recall Assembly." Clearly implicit in any grant of power, like
any other right, is an assumption of a correlative duty to exercise it responsibly.
070. Enrique Garcia et al v COMELEC and Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan
Sept. 30, 1994
Puno, J.
Topic: Local Initiative and Referendum
SV: The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, Bataan passed a PambansangKapasyahanBlg 10 where
they agreed to the inclusion of the Municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic
Zone. Petitioners filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan to annul said
PambansangKapasyahan to no avail, so petitioners resorted to their power of initiative, soliciting
signatures to cause the repeal of the resolution. COMELEC denied the petition on the ground that
its subject is merely a resolution and not an ordinance, hence, a local initiative cannot be
conducted.

Court discussed the history of the Consti provisions on local initiative. The respondents
argument that only an ordinance can be the subject of an initiative is untenable because it is
against the Constitution and the intent of the lawmakers, as can be seen from the deliberations.
The enactment of the LGC, which also dealt with local initiative did not change the scope of its
coverage; the Code did not limit the coverage of local initiatives to Ordinances alone.Also, the
distinction between an ordinance and a resolution does not lie here since even if the
PambansangKapasyahan is a resolution, it has lasting effects on the governance of its people. As
such, it is but logical to hear their voice on the matter via an initiative.
FACTS:
In the PambansangKapasyahanBlg. 10, Serye 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong,
Bataan agreed to the inclusion of the Municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special
Economic Zone in accordance with RA 7227

May 24, 1993: Petitioners Garcia et al filed a petition 156 with Sangguniang Bayan of Moronog
to annul said PambansangKapasyahan
o The Municipality did not take any action on the petition within 30 days after its
submission.
Petitioners then resorted to their power of initiative under the LGC.They solicited the required
number of signatures to cause the repeal of the resolution.
o June 11: Unknown to petitioners, however, Edilberto M. de Leon, Vice Mayor and
Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, wrote a letter to the Executive
Director of COMELEC requesting the denial of "the petition for a local initiative and/or
referendum because the exercise will just promote divisiveness, counter productive
and futility.
July 6: COMELEC en banc resolved to deny the petition for local initiative on the ground that
its subject is merely a resolution (pambayangkapasyahan) and not an ordinance."
July 13: COMELEC further resolved to direct Provincial Election Supervisor Benjamin Casiano
to hold action on the authentication of signatures being gathered by petitioners.
Petitioners went to the SC on a petition for certiorari and mandamus, alleging the ff:
o For certiorari: COMELEC did not observe due process in the conduct of its proceedings
because the subject resolutions were issued ex parte and without affording petitioners
and other proponents of the initiative the opportunity to be heard thereon. Moreover,
said resolutions were issued with grave abuse of discretion.
A Sangguniang Bayan resolution being an act of the aforementioned local
legislative assembly is undoubtedly a proper subject of initiative.(Sec. 32, Art. VI,
Constitution)

156

Contents of Petition:I. Bawiin, nulipikahin at pawalang-bisaangPambayangKapasyahanBlg. 10, Serye 1993 ng

Sangguniang Bayan para sapag-anib ng Morongsa SSEZ nawalangkondisyon.
II. Palitanito ng isangPambayangKapasiyahannaaaniblamangangMorongsa SSEZ kung
angmgasumusunodnakondisyones ay ipagkakaloob, ipatutupad at isasagawa para sakapakanan at interes ng Morong
at Bataan:
(A). Ibaliksa Bataan ang "Virgin Forests" isangbundoknahindinagagalw at punong-puno ng malalakingpunong-kahoy
at iba'-ibanghalaman.
(B) Ihiwalayang Grande Island sa SSEZ at ibalikitosa Bataan.
(K). Isamaangmgalupain ng Bataan nanakapaloobsa SBMA sapagkukuenta ng salapingipinagkakaloob ng pamahalaang
national o "Internal Revenue Allotment" (IRA) saMorong, Hermosa at saLalawigan.
(D). Payagangmagtatagrin ng sariling "special economic zones" angbawatbayan ng Morong, Hermosa at Dinalupihan.
(E). Ibasesalaki ng kanya-kanyanglupaangpamamahagi ng kikitain ng SBMA.
(G). Ibaserinangalokasyon ng pagbibigay ng trabahosalaki ng nasabingmgalupa.
(H). Pabayaangbukasang pinto ng SBMA nanasaMorong ng 24 naoras at bukodditosamagbukas pa ng pinto
sahangganannaman ng Morong at Hermosa upangmagkaroon ng pagkakataongumunladrinangmganasabingbayan,
patinarin ng iba pang bayan ng Bataan.
(I). Tapusinangpagkokonkreto ng mgadaangMorong-Tala-Orani at Morong-Tasig-Dinalupihan para sakabutihan ng
mgataga-Bataan at tuloymakatulongsapangangalaga ng mgakabundukan.
(J). Magkaroon ng sapatnarepresentasyonsapamunuan ng SBMA angMorong, Hermosa at Bataan.

For mandamus: Respondent Comelec's authority in the matter of local initiative is

merely ministerial157. It is duty-bound to supervise the gathering of signatures in
support of the petition and to set the date of the initiative once the required number of
signatures are obtained, as support by Sec. 22, par (h), LGC.

ISSUE: Is PambansangKapasyahanBlg. 10 a proper subject of initiative? (YES)

This case is of transcendental significance because it involves an issue of first impression

delineating the extent of the people to legislate. Accdg to Fr. Bernas: "in republican systems,
there are generally two kinds of legislative power, original and derivative.
o Original legislative power is possessed by the sovereign people. Derivative legislative
power is that which has been delegated by the sovereign people to legislative bodies
and is subordinate to the original power of the people."

History of Peoples exercise of legislative power

o Up until 1987, our people have not directly exercised legislative power, both the
constituent power to amend or revise the Constitution or the power to enact ordinary
laws since people gave total trust to Congress and did not reserve the power to make
or repeal laws. Such omission proved unfortunate because it allowed abuses, as can be
seen in the Martial Law days.
o In Feb 1986, however, people toppled down the Marcos regime and the result is that
the new Constitution became "less trusting of public officials than the American
Constitution."

157

The framers of our 1987 Constitution realized the value of initiative and referendum as
an ultimate weapon of the people to negate government malfeasance and misfeasance
and they put in place an overarching system. Thus, thru an initiative 158, the people
were given the power to amend the Constitution itself. Likewise, people were also
endowed with the power to enact or reject any law by Congress or local legislative
body.159

158
Sec. 2 of Art. XVII provides: "Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum of the registered voters therein."

159
ART 6 Sec. 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate

and a House of Representatives except to the extent reserved to the people by the provisions on initiative and
referendum.xxx xxxxxx
Sec. 32.The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions
therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof
passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per
centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum of the registered voters thereto.

The COMELEC was also empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an initiative and referendum.
It is to be noted that the scope of coverage of an initiative/referendum as
delineated by Sec. 32, Art. 6, Constitution is any act or law passed by Congress
or local legislative body.
Congress responded to mandate of the Consti, approving RA 6375 An Act Providing for
a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, which
spelled out the requirements for the exercise of the power of initiative and
referendum, the conduct of national initiative and referendum; procedure of local
initiative and referendum; and their limitations.

Respondents argue that under the LGC, only an ordinance can be the subject of an initiative,
relying on Sec. 120, Chap 2, Title 11, Book 1, LGC, which provides Local Initiative Defined.
Local initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit
may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance
o COURT does not agree with the reading of said provision because it is against the
Constitution and the intent of the lawmakers.
o Consti clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as appropriate subjects of
local initiative.
Section 32 of Article VI: "The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a
system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the
people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or
law or part thereof passed by the Congress, or local legislative body . . ." An act
includes a resolution.
Blacks definition of an act: an expression of will or purpose . . . it may denote
something done . . . as a legislature, including not merely physical acts, but also
decrees, edicts, laws, judgments, resolves, awards, and determinations . . . .
Laws should be construed in harmony rather than in violation of the Constitution
[In Re Guarina] "if there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of the
legislative, if the words or provisions are obscure, or if the enactment is fairly
susceptible of two or more constructions, that interpretation will be adopted
which will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality, even though it may be
necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or apparent
import of the language used.
o This Constitutional command to includes acts (i.e. resolutions) as appropriate subjects
of initiatve was implemented by Congress when it enacted RA 6735.
In Sec. 3(a) thereof, it gives a definition of initiative:
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the
Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called
for the purpose.
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing
amendments to the Constitution.
a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a
national legislation; and
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact
a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution, or
ordinance.
Sec. 6 states: Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies Any proposition on
ordinance or resolution approved through the system of initiative and
referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or amended, by
the local legislative body concerned within six (6) months from the date
therefrom . . . .

Likewise, COMELECs Resolution No. 2300160"In Re Rules and Regulations

Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and
Referendum, on National and Local Laws"recognized resolutions as proper
subjects of initiatives.
Congress also intended resolutions to be proper subjects of local initiatives, as
confirmed by the debates.

Contrary to respondents argument, the enactment of the LGC, which also dealt with local
initiative did not change the scope of its coverage; the Code did not limit the coverage of
local initiatives to Ordinances alone.
o Sec. 12, Chap. 2, Title 9, Book 1, LGC merely defines the concept of local initiative as
the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly
propose, enact, or amend any ordinance.BUT it does not deal with matters that can be
taken up on a local initiative.
o Sec. 124, LGC states: Sec. 124.Limitations on Local Initiatives. (a) The power of local
initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year.
(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal
powers of the Sanggunians to enact.
o Such provision does NOT limit the application of local initiatives to ordinances. This
interpretation is consistent with Sec. 125 which uses the word propositions as subject
of initiative. The inclusion of the word proposition is inconsistent with respondents'
thesis that only ordinances can be the subject of local initiatives.
o Also Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, principal author of the LGC, gives a view consistent to our
interpretation in his commentaries.161

160
Section 5, Article I of its Rules states: "Scope of power of initiative The power of initiative may be exercised to
amend the Constitution, or to enact a national legislation, a regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay law,
resolution or ordinance."

161
Regarding the form of the measure, the section speaks only of "ordinance," although the measure may be contained in a
resolution. If the registered voters can propose ordinances, why are they not allowed to propose resolutions too? Moreover, the
wording of Sec. 125, below, which deals not only with ordinances but with "any proposition" implies the inclusion of resolutions.
The discussion hereunder will also show support for the conclusion that resolutions may indeed be the subject of local initiative.

Although respondents do not give any reason why resolutions should not be the subject of a
local initiative, their reason lies in the well known distinction between a resolution and an
ordinance in that a resolution is used whenever the legislature wishes to express an opinion
which is to have only a temporary effect while an ordinance is intended to permanently direct
and control matters applying to persons or things in general. Thus, resolutions are not
normally subject to referendum for it may destroy the efficiency necessary to the successful
administration of the business affairs of a city.
o BUT in this case, it cannot be argued that the subject matter of the resolution merely
has temporary effects because it directs a permanent rule of conduct or government.
o Including Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone has far reaching
implications in the governance of its people, such as being subject to several policies
(i.e. tax and duty-free importations within the territory, tax exemptions, qualifications
for residency status, etc.)
o Considering the lasting changes that will be wrought in the social, political, and
economic existence of the people of Morong by the inclusion of their municipality in the
Subic Special Economic Zone, it is but logical to hear their voice on the matter via an
initiative.
o It is not material that the decision of the municipality of Morong for the inclusion came
in the form of a resolution for what matters is its enduring effect on the welfare of the
people of Morong.

As to due process:
o Petitioners were not furnished a copy of the letter-petition of Vice Mayor Edilberto M. de
Leon to the respondent COMELEC praying for denial of their petition for a local
initiative. Worse, COMELEC granted the petition without affording petitioners any fair
opportunity to oppose it.
o This procedural lapse is fatal for at stake is not an ordinary right but the sanctity of the
sovereignty of the people, their original power to legislate through the process of
initiative.

Petition GRANTED. COMEMEC resolutions annulled and set aside.

DANILO PARAS v COMELEC
4 November 1996
Francisco, ponente
petition for certiorari
SHORT VERSION:
Danilo Paras was the subject of a recall election, and he sought to have it stopped because the
recall election was too close to the SK elections. The SC said that LGC 74 on the limitations of
recall should be construed as having designated the period when such elective local official may
be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office.
FACTS:
Danilo Paras was the incumbent punong barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City.
o He won during the 1994 regular barangay election.
The registered voters of the barangay filed a petition for his recall.
o The Comelec resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the signing and set the
recall election 13-November-1995.
o At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25%
requirement provided by law.
o The Comelec later deferred the election due to Paras opposition and rescheduled it
to 16-December-1995.

To prevent the recall election, Paras filed a petition for injunction with the RTC.
o The RTC dismissed the petition, so the Comelec rescheduled the election on 13
January-1996

ISSUE:
should the recall election be held? NO, BUT ONLY BECAUSE IT WOULD BE MOOT AND
ACADEMIC
REASONING:
Paras: The January 1996 recall election was barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan election
was set on the first Monday of May 1996.
o Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (the Local Government Code) states that no
recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption
to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.
The full provision was:
o SEC. 74. Limitations on Recall. (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of
a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.
The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election
once during his term of office.
o Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period
when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during
the second year of his term of office.
o A different interpretation would unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local
Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the
people before the end of his term.
And if the SK election which is set by R.A. No. 7808 to be held every three
years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase
regular local election, as erroneously insisted by Paras, then no recall
election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local
Government Code.
The interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b)
thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X
of the Constitution to enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum x x x.
Recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit
necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall
election one year immediately preceding the regular local election.
o The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of
the local elective official concerned.
o The electorate could choose the officials replacement in the said election who
certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall
election.
o It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the
Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the
office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and
be filled by the electorate.
Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated
under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular election involving the
barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been
scheduled on May 1997.

RULING: petition dismissed; moot and academic

#rbm
Claudio vs Mendoza162

162
[G.R. No. 140560] JOVITO O. CLAUDIO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT and RICHARD ADVINCULA, respondents [G.R. No. 140714] PREPARATORY RECALL
ASSEMBLY OF PASAY CITY, herein represented by its Chairman, RICHARD ADVINCULA, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT and HON. JOVITO O. CLAUDIO,
respondents.

Date: May 4, 2000

Ponente: Mendoza, J.

Short Version:
Facts: Claudio was elected Mayor of Pasay City. He assumed office on July 1, 1998. On May 1999,
a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) was convened. On May 29, 1999, the PRA resolved to
initiate a recall proceeding against Claudio. A petition for recall was filed with the Comelec on
July 2, 1999. Comelec set the recall election on April 15, 2000. Claudio contends that recall is a
process which started when the PRA resolved to initiate the recall, and since the resolution was
made on May 29, 1999, it was made within the one year from his assumption of office, and thus
a violation of Sec 74(b) of the LGC. He also contends that election does not only mean the day of
the elections itself, but also election period prior to the said date, thus the election date set by
the Comelec violates the other limitation set by Sec 74(b) that no recall elections be held one
year immediately prior the next election.
Held: Recall refers to the election recall itself. Sec 74 deals with restrictions on the power of
recall. The power of recall is different from the power to initiate a recall, thus there is no limit on
the number of times recall may be initiated, as long as the recall election itself is not held during
the prohibited period. Also, to construe recall as including the convening of the PRA for the
purpose of discussing the performance of elective local officials would be to unduly restrict the
constitutional right of speech and of assembly of its members. In this case, since the election is
more than one year after Claudio assumed office, it is not barred.
With regard to Claudio's other contention, the law is clear that election only refers to the day of
elections; it does not include the election period prior to election day.

Facts:
- Jovito Claudio was the duly elected mayor of Pasay City in the May 11, 1998 elections. He
assumed office on July 1, 1998.
- The chairs of several barangays in Pasay gathered to discuss the possibility of filing a petition
for recall against Mayor Claudio for loss of confidence. On May 19, 1999, several barangay chairs
formed an ad hoc committee for the purpose of convening the Preparatory Recall Assembly
(PRA). Richard Advincula was designated chair.
- On May 29, 1999, 1,073 members of the PRA composed of barangay chairs, kagawads, and
sangguniang kabataan chairs of Pasay City, adopted a Resolution entitled RESOLUTION TO
INITIATE THE RECALL OF JOVITO O. CLAUDIO AS MAYOR OF PASAY CITY FOR LOSS OF
CONFIDENCE.
- The petition for recall was filed on July 2, 1999, accompanied by an affidavit of service of the
petition on the Office of the City Mayor. Copies of the petition were posted publicly. A verification
of the authenticity of the signatures was conducted by the election officer.
- Oppositions to the petition were filed by Claudio alleging procedural and substantive defects in
the petition, to wit: (1) the signatures affixed to the resolution were actually meant to show

attendance at the PRA meeting; (2) most of the signatories were only representatives of the
parties concerned; (3) the convening of the PRA took place within the one-year prohibited period;
(4) the election case, filed by Wenceslao Trinidad, seeking the annulment of the proclamation of
Claudio should first be decided before recall proceedings could be filed; and (5) the recall
resolution failed to obtain the majority of all the members of the PRA
- Comelec granted the petition for recall.
- The PRA's records showed its total membership is 1,790, while the DILG statistics showed
that the total membership is 1,876. In either case, since only a majority is required to
constitute the PRA, the 1,073 members who attended the May 29, 1999 meeting constitute a
majority. Based on the verification made by election officer Ligaya Salayon, the COMELEC
found the signatures of 958 members of the PRA sufficient.
- The pendency of the case questioning the proclamation of Claudio was not a prejudicial
question which must first be decided before any recall election could be held.
- The petition for recall did not violate the bar on recall within 1 year from the elective official's
assumption of office.
- Claudio filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking the nullification of the
Comelec Resolution. On the other hand, the PRA filed a petition for mandamus to compel the
Comelec to set the date for the holding of the recall elections. Both petitions were consolidated.

Issue/Reasoning:
Issue: Whether the petition for prohibition should be granted (No. Moot and academic.)
- In a Resolution dated March 9, 2000, Comelec set the date of the recall elections on April 15,
2000. Thus, the petition for mandamus is no longer tenable.

Issue: Whether the recall against Claudio is barred (No. Recall refers to the election recall itself.
Since the election is more than one year after Claudio assumed office, it is not barred.)
- The bone of contention is Sec 74163 of the LGC.
Claudio: "recall" in Sec 74(b) refers to a process, while "recall election" found in Sec 74(a)
refers to an election. When several barangay chairmen met and convened on May 19, 1999
and resolved to initiate the recall, followed by the taking of votes by the PRA on May 29, 1999
for the purpose of adopting a resolution to initiate the recall, the process of recall began. Since
May 29, 1999 was less than a year after he had assumed office, the PRA was illegally
convened and all proceedings held thereafter are void.
Comelec: The process of recall starts with the filing of the petition for recall. Since the petition
was filed on July 2, 1999, exactly one year and a day after Claudio's assumption of office, the
163
Limitations on Recall. - (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of
confidence. (b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately
preceding a regular local election.

recall was validly initiated outside the one-year prohibited period.

- Recall is a process which begins with the convening of the PRA or the gathering of the
signatures at least 25% of the registered voters of the LGU, and then proceeds to the filing of a
recall petition with the Comelec, the verification of such petition, and the fixing of the date and
holding of the recall election. However, as used in Sec 74(b), "recall" refers to the election itself
by means of which voters decide whether they should retain their local official or elect his
replacement.
- Sec 74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall. Sec 69 gives the power of recall to the
electorate. On the other hand, under Secs 70(c) and (d), the power to initiate a recall proceeding
is vested in the PRA or at least 25% of the registered voters. Hence, the limitations in Sec 74
cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall proceedings. The term "recall" in Sec 74(b) refers
only to the recall election, excluding the convening of the PRA and the filing of a petition for
recall with the Comelec, or the gathering of the signatures of at least 25 % of the voters for a
petition for recall.
- There is no legal limit on the number of times PRAs may be held or petitions for recall may be
filed with the Comelec. These are merely preliminary steps for the purpose of initiating a
recall. The limitations in 74 apply only to the exercise of the power of recall which is vested in
the registered voters.
- In Garcia v Comelec (1993), it was held that it is the power to recall and not the power to
initiate recall that the Constitution gave to the people.
- These preliminary proceedings do not produce a decision by the electorate on whether the
local official concerned continues to enjoy the confidence of the people. Thus, the prohibition
in Sec 74(b) cannot apply to such proceedings.
- There are two limitations in Sec 74(b) on the holding of recalls: (1) no recall within 1 year from
the date of the official's assumption of office; (2) no recall within 1 year immediately preceding a
regular local election.
- The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for judging the
performance of an elective local official. As said in the Bower case cited in Angobung v
Comelec: The... reason... for requiring the electors to wait one year... is to prevent premature
action... to remove a newly elected official before having had sufficient time to evaluate... his
policies and decisions.
- It is not the holding of PRA nor the adoption of recall resolutions that produces a judgment on
the performance of the official concerned; it is the vote of the electorate in the Election that
does. Therefore, as long as the recall election is not held before the official concerned has
completed one year in office, he will not be judged on his performance prematurely.
- To construe the term "recall" in Sec 74(b) as including the convening of the PRA for the purpose
of discussing the performance in office of elective local officials would be to unduly restrict the
constitutional right of speech and of assembly of its members. The people cannot just be asked
on the day of the election to decide on the performance of their officials. It is wrong to assume
that such assemblies will always eventuate in a recall election. To the contrary, they may result
in the expression of confidence in the incumbent.

- Refutation of Puno's dissent:164

- Puno argues that the purpose of the one-year period is to provide the local official concerned
a "period of repose". However, the law cannot really provide for a period of moratorium in
politics. When elective official assumes office, his acts become subject to scrutiny and
criticism; it is not easy to determine when criticism of his performance is politically motivated
and when it is not. The only safeguard against the baneful politics is the good sense and self
restraint of the people and its leaders.
- Puno argues that the judgments of PRAs are not "as politically unassailable as recalls initiated
directly by the people." However, voters who directly initiate recalls are just as vulnerable to
political manipulations as are those composing PRAs. Also, the question here is not whether
recalls initiated by 25% of the voters are better.
- As the recall election is set on April 15, 2000, more than one year after Claudio assumed office
as mayor, there is no bar to its holding on that date.

Issue: Whether the phrase "regular local election" in Sec 74(b) includes the Election Period for
that Regular Election or Simply the Date of Such Election (No. Law is clear. Also, Claudio's
interpretation would severely limit the period during which a recall election may be held.)
- Claudio contends that the date set by the Comelec for the recall election (April 15, 2000) is
within the second period of prohibition in Sec 74(b). He argues that the phrase "regular local
elections" does not only mean "the day of the regular local election" which, for the year 2001 is
May 14, but the election period as well, which is normally at least 45 days before the day of the
election, hence beginning March 30, 2000, no recall election may be held.
- The law is unambiguous in providing that "[n]o recall shall take place within... one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election." Had Congress intended this limitation to refer to
the campaign period, which period is defined in the Omnibus Election Code, it could have
expressly said so.
- Because no recall election may be held until one year after the assumption of office,
presumably on June 30 following his election, the free period is only the period from July 1 of the
following year to about the middle of May of the succeeding year. This is a period of only around
nine months, 15 days. Claudio's interpretation of the provision would reduce this period to eight
months. Such an interpretation must be rejected, because it would devitalize the right of recall.

Issue: Whether the recall resolution was signed by a majority of the PRA and duly verified (Yes)
- Claudio contends that a majority of the signatures of the members of the PRA was not obtained
because 74 members did not really sign the recall resolution. This is shown by the word
"Attendance" written by hand at the top of the page which contain the 74 signatures.
- Although the word "Attendance" appears at the top of the page, it was apparently mistaken for
164
The following points are not in Puno's dissent. Puno stated that he made a Preliminary Dissent which I think contains the points discussed
here.

the attendance sheet which is a separate document. It is absurd to believe that the 74 members
of the PRA who signed the recall resolution signified their attendance at the meeting twice.
- The claim that the recall petition filed in the Comelec was not duly verified was also not raised
before the Comelec itself. It cannot be raised now.

Dispositive:
Claudio's petition dismissed for lack of merit. PRA's petition dismissed for being moot and
academic.

Puno (Dissenting):165
- The purpose of Sec 74(b) is to give the voters a sound basis for their decision. Sound basis
requires affording the official concerned a fair and reasonable opportunity to accomplish his
program for the people. There is no reasonable opportunity if from Day One after assumption of
office, the process of recall can already be initiated against the official.
- The more disquieting and destabilizing part of recall is its initiation more than the recall election
itself. It is in the too early initiatory process where the baseless criticisms and falsehoods of a few
are foisted on the many. To allow early recall initiative is to encourage divisive, expensive, and
wasteful politics.
- The reasoning of the majority is based on the misleading perception that the only participation
of the people in recall is on election day when they cast their vote.
- There are 2 type of recall. In both cases the people participate in the initiation of the recall
process.
- Recall initiated directly in the people: self-evident that the people are involved from the
beginning of the process.
- Recall through the PRA: members of the PRA are not in representation of their political parties
but as representatives of the people.
- The rationale for fixing the election day one year after assumption of office is for the benefit of
the people, to give them sufficient time to assess the performance of an incumbent. The
rationale for prohibiting premature recall initiative is for the benefit of the incumbent, to give him
a fair chance to govern well, to serve the people minus the unnecessary distractions of politics.
The ruling of the majority will deprive an incumbent a fair opportunity to prove himself through
the politics of performance.
- It is one thing to postulate that during the one-year waiting period the people cannot legally
start a recall process. It is entirely non sequitur to add that during the said period, the people's
freedom of speech and freedom of assembly are suspended. These rights are in no way
restricted for critical speeches during the one-year waiting period cam serve as valuable inputs
165
Joined by Panganiban, Pardo, and De Leon, JJ.

in deciding after the said period whether to initiate the recall process.
- The one-year waiting period is not a new, startling legal mechanism. This legal mechanism has
long been installed to regulate our labor-management relations. One of the areas of concern in
labor-management relations relates to the choice of bargaining agent. The repeated petitions for
certification elections in early labor laws weakened employee representatives and resulted in
instability in labor-management relations. As a remedial measure, the Industrial Peace Act
insulated the term of the employee representative from change for one year. This progressive
mechanism is still contained in the Labor Code. This 12-month ban on certification election has
never been challenged as violative of freedom of speech and of assembly.
- Recall is a powerful weapon given to our people but, like any power, it can be abused. For this
reason, the legislature carefully defined its limitations for its misuse can bring about the disuse of
a valuable means to terminate the misrule of misfits in government. Sec 74 spelled out these
restraints. Sec 74 (a) limits the number of times an official can be subjected to recall during his
term of office to only one time. Sec 74 (b) limits the periods when the power can be exercised. It
sets two periods: the first, sets the beginning, i.e., one year after the assumption of office; the
second, sets the end, i.e., one year immediately preceding a regular election. These limitations
should be strictly followed considering the short 3-year term of office of local officials.
- The best way to strengthen the right of recall is to interpret it to prevent its misuse.
- By way of summation, the majority failed to recognize the need for stability of a public office,
exposed our people to an overdose of politics, forgot that recall initiatives are meaningful only if
they are used to adjudge an official's performance in office, induced incumbents to play the
politics of compromise instead of the politics of performance, and has cast a blind eye on the
expenses that accompany the exercise of recall initiative.

Kapunan (Separate and Dissenting):166

- "Recall" under Sec 74(b) is not limited to the election itself, but rather it is a process which
begins once the PRA makes its first affirmative acts towards the recall of the elective local
official, i.e. the convening of the PRA and the passing by the PRA of a recall resolution.
- In the Garcia case, recall is always described and referred to as a process. The case explained
that recall is a process which begins with the convening of the PRA coupled with the passing of a
recall resolution and culminating with the recall election itself.
- The recall process may be considered as composed of two distinct but continuous phases: the
initiatory phase and the election phase. As such, for purposes of determining whether the recall
was instituted within the allowable period under Sec 74(b), the reckoning point should be the
initiatory phase which is the time of convening and passing of the recall resolution. It is at this
precise moment when the PRA, as representatives of the electorate, concretizes its stand and
makes an affirmative act of its intent to recall the elected local official.
- The underlying reason behind the time bar provisions is to guard against the abuse of the
power of recall. The phrase "premature action" used in the Angobung case logically refers to any
166
Joined by Panganiban, J.

activity geared towards removing the incumbent official. The convening of the PRA and the
passing of the recall resolution were actions proscribed by law, rendering the entire recall
process invalid.
- In our political culture where a losing candidate does not easily concede defeat, all that a
disgruntled candidate has to do to undermine the mandate of the victor is to the stage for the
convening of a PRA and the passage of a recall resolution. After this, all that needs to be done is
to wait for the lapse of the first time bar and, thereafter, file the petition for recall. In the
meantime, the incumbent official sought to be removed and his political opponents engage in a
full-scale election campaign which is divisive, destabilizing and disruptive.
- Senator Pimentel in his commentary used the phrase "move to recall". It connotes a progressive
course of action or a step-by-step process.
- The people can assemble and discuss their opinions and grievances against the incumbent
official, at any time during his term and as often as they would like, because it is their right to do
so. An exercise of their right to peaceably assemble and exchange views about the governance
of the local official would not be violative of the limitations set forth in Sec 74(b).
- However, once notice is sent to convene the PRA and to pass a recall resolution, then Sec 74(b)
is transgressed. In this instance, the limitation on the freedom of speech and assembly is not
violated since the time bar is imposed by the legislature in the exercise of its police power. The
limitation is analogous to the prohibition under the Omnibus Election Code, which prohibits a
person from engaging in any election campaign or partisan political activity except during the
campaign period.
- Although the filing of the petition for recall with the Comelec is an important component in the
recall process, it cannot be considered as the starting point of the same. The filing of the petition,
being merely a consequential mechanical act, is just a next step in the process of recall after
PRA's acts of convening the recall assembly and passing the recall resolution.

-Elvin
Raymundo Adormeo v. COMELEC v. Ramon Talaga, Jr.
4 February 2002
Quisumbing, J.
Short version: Ramon Talaga, Jr. was elected as mayor of Lucena City in May 1992 and he served
the full term. He was re-elected during the 1995 elections and again served the full term. During
the 1998 elections, he lost to Bernard Tagarao. In the recall election of May 12, 2000, he again
won and served Tagarao's unexpired term. Adormeo and Talaga were candidates for mayor of in
the May 14, 2001 elections. Adormeo filed a "Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate
of Candidacy and/or Disqualification" with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor against
Talaga. He contended that, in view of the circumstances, Talaga's candidacy constituted a
violation of Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution, as well as of Sec. 43 (b) of the LGC, both of which
provide that local elective officials are only allowed to serve three consecutive terms. The
Supreme Court disagreed with his contention. The term limit for elective local officials must be
taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position.
It is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office
for he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before
the disqualification can apply. Therefore, Talaga is not disqualified from running for mayor again.

Facts:
- Ramon Talaga, Jr. was elected as mayor of Lucena City in May 1992 and he served the full term.
He was re-elected during the 1995 elections and again served the full term. During the 1998
elections, he lost to Bernard Tagarao. In the recall election of May 12, 2000, he again won and
served Tagarao's unexpired term.
- Adormeo and Talaga were the only candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy for
mayor of Lucena City in the May 14, 2001 elections. Adormeo filed a "Petition to Deny Due
Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/or Disqualification" with the Office of the
Provincial Election Supervisor, Lucena City, against Talaga.
According to Adormeo, Talaga's candidacy constituted a violation of Sec. 8,
Art. X of the 1987 Constitution167 considering that the latter was elected and had served as
city mayor for three consecutive terms as follows: (1) in the election of May 1992, where
he served the full term; (2) in the election of May 1995, where he again served the full
term; and (3) in the recall election of May 12, 2000, where he served the unexpired term
of Tagarao.
On the other hand, Talaga alleged that he had only served two consecutive
terms. He pointed out that his defeat in the 1998 elections to Tagarao interrupted the
"consecutiveness" of his years as mayor and thus, his mayorship was not for three
consecutive terms of three years each. He further argued that his service from May 12,
2000 until June 30, 2001 was not a "full term" as contemplated by the Constitution and the
law.
- The COMELEC First Division found merit in Adormeo's arguments and so, it ordered that
Talaga's Certificate of Candidacy be withdrawn and/or cancelled.
- Talaga filed an MR, essentially reiterating his aforementioned arguments. Despite Adormeo's
Opposition to the MR, the COMELEC en banc ruled in favor of Talaga and reversed the ruling of
the First Division. After the votes were canvassed on May 19, 2001, Talaga was proclaimed as the
duly elected Mayor. Hence, the present petition before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Was Talaga disqualified to run for mayor? (No)
Reasoning:
- The issue in this case hinges on whether, as provided by the Constitution, Talaga has already
served three consecutive terms as Mayor of Lucena City.
Adormeo raised similar arguments as the ones he raised before the
COMELEC. He further said that Talaga's candidacy would violate, not only the Constitution,
but also Sec. 43 (b) of the LGC.168

167
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

168
Section 43. Term of Office. -

- In Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, it was held that the term limit for elective local officials must be taken
to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an
elective local office for he must also have been elected to the same position for the same
number of times before the disqualification can apply.
- An example from the Borja case: Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his first term, he is
twice suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is twice reelected after that, can he
run for one more term in the next election? Yes, because he has served only two full terms
successively.
- In Lonzanida v. COMELEC, it was held that two conditions for the application of the
disqualification must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been reelected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post; and (2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.
- Accordingly, COMELEC's ruling that Talaga was not elected for 3 consecutive terms should be
upheld for the continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.
- To bolster his case, Adormeo adverts to the comment of Fr. Bernas on Sec. 8, Art. X of the
Constitution, to the effect that "if one is elected representative to serve the unexpired term of
another, that unexpired, no matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of
computing the number of successive terms allowed."
However, Fr. Bernas' comment is pertinent only to members of the House of
Representatives. Unlike LGUs, there is no recall election provided for members of
Congress.
- Adormeo also contends that Talaga's victory in the recall election should be deemed a violation
of Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution as "voluntary renunciation."
- The Court disagreed. In Lonzanida, it was said that voluntary renunciation of office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which he was elected. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced
term in the computation of the three-term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for
any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity
of service.
Dispositive: Petition dismissed.
Digested by Ramon Rocha IV
Mayor Ricardo Angobung (Petitioner) vs Comelec, and Atty. Aurora de Alban
(Respondents)
Date: March 5, 1997
Ponente: Hermosisima, Jr., J.

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective
official concerned was elected.

Short Version:
Facts: Angobung was elected as Mayor. De Alban filed petition for recall against Angobung. The
Comelec issued a Resolution which approved the petition, and set the signing of the petition by
the rest of the voters. Angobung contends that the Resolution is void since the petition was only
by one person.
Held: The Resolution is void. The LGC clearly provides that the petition for recall must be initiated
by 25% of the total number of registered voted in the LGU concerned. While the initiatory recall
petition may not yet contain the signatures of at least 25% of the total number of registered
voters, it must contain the names of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters in
whose behalf only one person may sign the petition in the meantime.

Facts:
- Ricardo Angobung won as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Tumauini, Isabela in the
local elections of 1995, garnering 55% of all the votes cast. Aurora de Alban was also a candidate
in said elections.
- In September 1996, de Alban filed with the Local Election Registrar a Petition for Recall against
Angobung. Angobung received a copy of the petition. The petition was then forwarded to the
Regional Office in Tuguegarao, and then to the main office in Manila, for approval.
- Deputy Executive Director for Operations Pio Jose Joson submitted to the Comelec En Banc, a
Memorandum recommending approval of the petition for recall and its signing by other qualified
voters in order to garner at least 25% of the total number of registered voters as required by Sec
69(d)169 of the LGC.
- Comelec en banc issued a Resolution, approving the petition for recall, setting the signing of the
petition by the rest of the voters, and in case the petition is signed by at least 25% of the total
number of registered voter, scheduled the recall election on December 2, 1996.
- Angobung filed the present petition for certiorari with the SC. He contends that the Resolution is
invalid on two grounds: (1) the Petition for Recall was signed by just one person, in violation of
the 25% minimum number of signatures supporting any petition for recall; and (2) the resolution
scheduled the recall election within 1 year from the May 12, 1997 Barangay Elections. SC issued
a TRO.
- De Alban sought the lifting of the TRO on 2 grounds: (1) the issue of the one-year bar on recall
elections has been resolved in Paras v Comelec; and (2) the procedure prescribed the Comelec
Resolution involving petition signing upon initiation of even just one person, is no different from
that provided for in Resolution upheld in the cases of Sanchez v Comelec, and Evardone v
Comelec.

Issue/Reasoning:
169
Probably should be Sec 70(d). That's the relevant provision prior to the amendment by RA 9244.

Issue: Whether the Comelec Resolution is void (Yes. The law clearly states that the petition must
be by at least 25% of the voters.)
- De Alban is correct in saying that in the light of the ruling in Paras v Comelec, the recall election
scheduled on December 2, 1996 in the present case is not barred by the May 12, 1997 Barangay
Elections. For the time bar to apply, the approaching regular local election must be one where
the position of the official to be recalled, is to be actually contested and filled by the electorate.
- However, Angobung's petition is impressed with merit with respect to the other ground invoked.
- Before the enactment of the LGC of 1991, the recall of public officials voted for in popular
elections was governed by BP 337 (LGC of 1983). Sec 59 thereof which gives the Comelec the
power to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, the Comelec promulgated Resolution
No. 2272 which provided for the procedure in a petition for recall.
- In Sanchez and Evardone, the procedure in Resolution No. 2272 (1) allowing the recall petition
to be filed by at least one person or by less than 25% of the total number of registered voters,
and then (2) inviting voters to sign said petition on a date set for that purpose, was never put to
issue. The issue in those cases is the legal basis for the exercise by Comelec of its rule-making
power.
- Court quoted a portion of Garcia v Comelec (1993) on the history of the mechanism of recall.
- Sec 69(d)170 of the LGC of 1991 is plain and unequivocal as to what initiates recall proceedings:
a petition of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters. The law does not state that
the petition must be signed by at least 25% of the registered voters; rather, the petition must be
"of" or by, at least 25% of the registered voters. Thus, the petition must be filed, not by one
person only, but by at least 25% of the total number of registered voters.
- This is understandable, since the signing of the petition is statutorily required to be
undertaken "before the election registrar... ". Hence, while the initiatory recall petition may not
yet contain the signatures of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters, it must
contain the names of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters in whose behalf
only one person may sign the petition in the meantime.
- In this case, the filing of the petition for recall by just one person is indubitably violative of clear
and categorical provisions of law.
- Our legislators did not peg the voter requirement at 25% out of caprice. They knew that this is
the requirement under a majority of the constitutions and recall statutes in various American
states. While recall was intended to be an effective and speedy remedy to remove an official who
is not giving satisfaction to the electorate, it must be pursued by the people, not just by one
disgruntled loser in the elections or a small percentage of disenchanted electors.
- A scrutiny of the rationale underlying the time bar provisions and the percentage of minimum
voter in American recall statutes, reveals the vigilance of lawmakers against the abuse of the
power of recall.
- SC of Illinois in the case of In Re Bower:
170
In part: recall of any elective... municipal... official may also be validly initiated upon petition of at least... (25%) of the total number of
registered voters in the local government unit concerned during the election in which the local official sought to be recalled was elected

[t]he... reason... we can ascribe for requiring the electors to wait one year before petitioning
for a recall... is to prevent premature action on their part in voting to remove a newly elected
official before having had sufficient time to evaluate the soundness of his political policies and
decisions... to insure that an official will not have to defend his policies against frivolous
attacks launched by a small percentage of disenchanted electors.
- SC of Colorado in the case of Bernzen v City of Boulder:
[t]he framers... assured that a recall election will not be held in response to the wishes of a
small and unrepresentative minority...
- De Alban who is a lawyer knows that Sec 69(d) of the LGC plainly provides that recall is validly
initiated by a petition of 25% of the total number of registered voters. Notwithstanding such
awareness, she filed the petition for recall with only herself as the filer and initiator. She claims
that she has, together with many others in Tumauini, Isabela lost confidence in the leadership of
Angobung, but the petition does not bear the names of all these other citizens.
- The procedure of allowing just one person to file the initiatory recall petition and then setting a
date for the signing of the petition, which amounts to inviting and courting the public which may
have not, in the first place, even entertained any displeasure in the performance of the official
sought to be recalled, is not only violative of statutory law but also tainted with an attempt to go
around the law. The Court cannot allow a circumvention of the explicit 25% minimum voter
requirement in the initiation of the recall process.

Dispositive:
Petition granted. Comelec Resolution is declared null and void.
Froilan A. Mendez v. Civil Service Commission and Register of Deeds of QC
Paras, J. 23 December 1991
SV: An administrative case was filed against Mendez, a legal research assistant in the QC Office
of the City Attorney. The Mayor dismissed the complaint against Mendez for insufficiency of
evidence. On appeal by Coloyan, the person who lodged the complaint, the MSPB reversed the
mayor an found Mendez guilty. The CSC affirmed the MSPB decision. Mendez argues that Coloyan
is not an aggrieved party allowed by law to file an appeal, and that his exoneration by the mayor
is unappealable.
The SC ruled that, indeed, Coloyan was not an aggrieved party allowed by law to file an appeal.
The aggrieved party referred to in the law is the officer himself charged with the offense.
Furthermore, the Court ruled that an appeal is only available when the person charged is found
guilty by the city mayor.
FACTS:
- 7 June 1984: then Acting Register of Deeds of QC, Vicente N. Coloyan, filed an administrative
complaint against Froilan A. Mendez, a legal research assistant in the QC Office of the City
Attorney for gross misconduct and dishonesty, allegedly for having torn off a portion of a TCT
from the registry book of QC and for having pocketed it.
- 14 Oct 1985: after 3 months of investigation, then QC Mayor Adelina Rodriguez dismissed the
said complaint against Mendez for insufficiency of evidence.

- Coloyan appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) which reversed the Mayor and
declared Mendez guilty as charged and dismissed from service.
- The Civil Service Commission (CSC) affirmed the MSPB on appeal.
- Mendez filed an MR assailing the reversal on the ground that Coloyan is not an aggrieved party
or party adversely affected by the decision allowed by law to file an appeal. Moreover,
petitioner claimed that his exoneration by the city mayor is unappealable pursuant to Sec. 37 (b)
of PD 807 (Philippine Service Law).
- CSC denied the MR ruling that there is nothing in PD 807 which precludes an appeal from the
decision of the disciplining authorities to determine, among others, whether the decision
rendered is supported by the facts on record and the law.
ISSUE/REASONING:
Is the exoneration by the city mayor of Mendez unappealable? YES.
1) The right to appeal, being merely a statutory privilege, may only be exercised in the manner
and in accordance with the provision of law. Sec. 37(a) of PD 807 provides:
The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving
the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount
exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal
from office.
This must be read together with Sec. 39(a) of PD 805:
Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision.
The phrase "party adversely affected by the decision" refers to the government employee
against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may
take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from
office.
In the instant case, Coloyan who filed the appeal cannot be considered an aggrieved party
because he is not the respondent in the administrative case below.
2) Finally, pursuant to Section 37 paragraph [b] of P. D. 807, the city mayor, as head of the city
government, is empowered to enforce judgment with finality on lesser penalties like suspension
from work for one month and forfeiture of salary equivalent to one month against erring
employees.
By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a case where the
respondent is found guilty of the charges filed against him. But when the respondent is
exonerated of said charges, as in this case, there is no occasion for appeal.
CSC DECISION ANNULLED. QC MAYOR DECISION REINSTATED.
Victor M. Macalincag and Lorinda M. Carlos v Roberto E. Chang
May 6, 1992
Paras, J.

Short version:Administrative charges were filed by Carlos, and signed by Macalincag as acting

Secretary of Finance, against Roberto Chang, for dishonesty, neglect of duty and acts prejudicial
to the best interest of the service. Macalincag issued an Order of Preventive Suspension against
Chang, and also requested for the designation of an Officer-in-Charge to replace Chang. Chang
questioned the Order and the authority of Macalincag with the RTC, which first ruled against him
but ruled in his favor upon MR, holding that the suspension only takes effect upon designation of
the replacement. The SC reversed, holding that the designation of the officer-in-charge to replace
Chang is immaterial to the effectivity of his suspension. A contrary view would render nugatory
the very purpose of preventive suspension. Also, the Office of the Municipal Treasurer is
unquestionably under the Department of Finance as provided for by law. Hence, the Secretary of
Finance is the proper disciplining authority to issue the preventive suspension order.

Facts:

On October 6, 1989, Lorinda M. Carlos signed a formal administrative charge against Roberto
Chang, approved by Victor C.Macalincag, who was then acting Secretary for Finance, for
dishonesty, neglect of duty and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service. 171
o The basis of the formal charge was the preliminary evaluation of the Commission on
Audit (COA) Report and the affidavit-complaints of Councilor Roberto Brillante.
On the same date that the charge was signed, Macalincag issued an Order of Preventive
Suspension against Chang.
Macalincag sent a letter to the "Governor, Metro Manila Commission Attn: the Officer-inCharge MMC Finance Office," seeking the implementation of the Order of Preventive
Suspension. He recommended that an Officer-in-Charge be immediately designated from the
ranks of qualified Municipal Treasurers and Assistant Municipal Treasurers in Metro Manila.
Chang was furnished a copy of the Order of Preventive Suspension by the Officer-in-Charge,
MMC Finance Office.
Chang filed a petition for prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC against
petitioners Macalincag and Carlos.
The RTC set the case for hearing and also temporarily restrained Macalincag and Carlos, or
their duly authorized representatives from implementing the questioned "Order of Preventive
Suspension", for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending the final determination
of the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.
The RTC denied Changs Chang application for a writ of preliminary injunction, and sustained
the power of the Secretary of Finance to issue the Order of Preventive Suspension.

171
1. During the 45-day election ban period, before the January 18, 1988 local elections, disbursement of a total amount
of P30,000.00 to Ms Marissa Chan, Head of Department, in violation of Section 261 (v), (2), Article XXII of the Omnibus
Election Code;2. That for the months of November and December 1987, disbursement of a total amount of P218,500,
allegedly as financial assistance extended by the municipality to 437 bereaved families:
3. Disbursement of the amount of P180,643.55 to cover expenses for merienda of municipal employees;
4. In violation of Sections 41 and 44 of PD 477 and Section 4(3) of PD 1445, incurring cash overdrafts, amounting to
P107,493,158.76 in the General Infrastructure and Trust Funds at the end of the year 1987;
5. On December 29, 1987, transferring the amount of P1,977,492.00 from the Treasurer/Cashier's safe to the Realty
Tax Division's safe, thus subjecting said municipal funds to possible loss; and
6. Continually failing to remit to the Bureau of Treasury the national collection which as of September 30, 1988 already
amounted to P370,422,093.74.

Upon MR, Chang raised a new argument by invoking Section 8 of the recently issued
Executive Order No. 392 entitled "Constituting the Metropolitan Manila Authority, providing for
its powers and functions and for other purposes," which had only been issued on January 9,
1990.
The RTC granted the MR and thus granted Chang's application for a writ of preliminary
injunction, ordering Macalincag and Carlos to permanently desist from enforcing the Order of
Preventive Suspension.
o The RTC pointed out that in order that a preventive suspension will be implemented,
there are two steps involved: Service of a copy of said order on the respondent and
designation of his replacement. The trial court ruled that until an acting municipal
treasurer is appointed to replace the respondent, the order of preventive suspension
dated October 6, 1989 is incomplete and cannot be said to have taken effect.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
o Petitioners contend that the Order of Preventive Suspension became effective upon
receipt by Chang and not upon the designation of an officer-in-charge to replace him;
that the Order of Preventive Suspension dated October 6, 1989 became effective before
the issuance of Executive Order No. 392 and, therefore, can no longer be enjoined by
reason of the alleged transfer of the power to suspend from the Secretary of Finance to
the President of the Republic of the Philippines and that the power to suspend and
remove municipal officials is not an incident of the power to appoint.
o Chang contends that a government officer is not suspended until someone has assumed
the post and the officer subject of the suspension order has ceased performing his
official function; that the implementation of the questioned suspension order was
overtaken by the issuance of Executive Order No. 392 creating the Metropolitan Manila
Authority and that the power to discipline is vested solely on the person who has the
power to appoint.

Issue: Does the Secretary of Finance have jurisdiction to issue an Order of Preventive
Suspension against the acting municipal treasurer of Makati, Metro Manila? YES

Ratio:
1) Chang was administratively charged on October 6, 1989 for dishonesty, neglect of duty and
acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service. It was signed by Carlos, Executive Director,
Bureau of Local Government and approved by Macalincag, Undersecretary of Finance, then
acting Secretary. Simultaneous with the charge, Chang was preventively suspended which
caused him to file a complaint for Prohibition with preliminary injunction in the lower court.
2) The RTC ruling is wrong. The two requirements it set out are incorrect, based on Sec. 41 of the
Civil Service Law172, which does not require designation of the replacement as a requirement
to give effect to the preventive suspension.
3) On the contrary, Section 156 of the LGC 173 provides for the automatic assumption of the
assistant municipal treasurer or next in rank officer in case of suspension of the municipal
treasurer.
4) But it also states, in Section 233(2), that Until otherwiseprovided by law, nothing in this code
shall be understood to amend or repeal the pertinent provisions of P.D. No. 824 and BP 20,

172
Sec. 41. Preventive Suspension. The proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend any subordinate
officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer or employee
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons
to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from service

and all presidential decrees and issuances relevant to Metropolitan Manila and the
SangguniangPampook of Regions IX and XII.
5) There appears to be no question that: the Order of Preventive Suspension of respondent
Chang became effective upon his receipt thereof, which is presumed when he filed a
complaint in the trial court preventing the implementation of such Order of Suspension.
6) The designation of the officer-in-charge to replace Chang is immaterial to the effectivity of his
suspension. A contrary view would render nugatory the very purpose of preventive
suspension.
7) Among others, Chang argued that Executive Order No. 392, which took effect on January 9,
1990, gave rise to the creation of the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA) and vested in the
President of the Republic of the Philippines the power to appoint municipal treasurers in Metro
Manila. As the power to suspend and remove a municipal official is an incident of the power to
appoint, he maintained that it is the President who may suspend or remove him.
8) Earlier, prior to Executive Order No. 392, the power to appoint all city and municipal
treasurers, municipal assessors and their assistants was vested in the Provincial Treasurers
and Assessors of the Municipalities concerned, and later transferred to the Commissioner of
Finance under, but under both decrees, the power of appointment was made subject to Civil
Service Laws and the approval of the Secretary of Finance.
9) The intention of the legislations to follow the Civil Service Laws, Rules and Regulations is
unmistakable.
10)
Correspondingly, the power to discipline, under the Civil Service Law is specifically vested
in heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces and chartered cities who
have original jurisdiction to investigate and decide on matters involving disciplinary action.
11)
The Office of the Municipal Treasurer is unquestionably under the Department of Finance
as provided for in P.D. No. 477.174 Hence, the Secretary of Finance is the proper disciplining
authority to issue the preventive suspension order.
12)
Thus, as acting Secretary of Finance, Macalincag acted within his jurisdiction in issuing the
Order of Preventive Suspension.
13)
Even assuming that the power to appoint, includes the power to discipline as argued by
Chang, acting Secretary Macalincag as Secretary of Finance is an alter ego of the President
and therefore, it is within his authority, as an alter ego, to preventively suspend respondent
Chang.
Petition granted.
149. Garcia v Pajaro
July 5, 2002
Panganiban, J.
Topic: Discipline Over Local Appointive Officials
SV: Garcia, an employee at the City Treasurers Office of Dagupan City was ordered preventively
suspended because of charges filed against him on the ground of gross neglect of duty, refusal
to perform official duties and functions, and insubordination. Despite this suspension, Garcia
claims he has been reporting for work, and he is claiming for his alleged unpaid salaries and
173
Sec. 156. TEMPORARY DISABILITY. In the event of inability of the treasurer to discharge the duties of his office
on account of a trip on official business, absence on leave, sickness, suspension, or other temporary disability, the
assistant municipal treasurer or, in his absence, the treasury official next in rank in the municipality shall discharge
the duties of the office subject to existing laws.

174
TO BE KNOWN AS THE DECREE ON LOCAL FISCAL ADMINISTRATION

damages. Garcia argues that only the City Mayor may discipline him, and not the City Treasurer,
and that his right to due process was violated.
Court ruled that the City Treasurer has the right to discipline Garcia. The power to discipline is
granted by Sec. 47, 1987 Admin Code to the heads of departments, agencies, instrumentalities,
provinces and cities. Also, under the Local Administrative Regulations (LAR) No 2-85, the city
treasurer may institute, motuproprio, disciplinary proceedings against a subordinate
officer/employee.In this case, the city treasurer is the proper disciplining authority referred to in
the law.Pajaro, as the city treasurer, was the head of the Office of the Treasurer; while Garcia, a
senior revenue collector, was an officer under him. Thus, the city treasurer is the proper
disciplining authority who could investigate petitioner and issue a preventive suspension order
against him. There is nothing in the law which prohibits the city treasurer from filing a complaint
against Garcia.
Garcias right to due process was not violated. In an administrative proceeding, the essence of
due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones side. Such process requires notice and an
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. The proceedings were conducted in
accordance with the procedure in the 1987 Admin Code, however, it can be seen that it was the
petitioner who refused to avail of the opportunity to answer charges against him. As such, he
cannot now complain of a denial of due process.
FACTS:

Garcia (61 y/o) was an employee at the City Treasurers Office, Dagupan City. He has been
employee thereat since June 15, 1974 as Revenue Collector appointed to that position by
then City Mayor CiprianoManaois.
o He was ordered suspended by City Treasurer JuanitoPajaro from June 1, 1990 to
March 15, 1992 and directed the withholding of his salary because of the Formal
Charge filed against him.
o He resumed work on March 16, 1992 as Local Treasury Officer III. When he was
suspended, his position was Local Treasury Officer and Revenue Officer with a salary
of P6,800.00 a month. When he resumed work, his salary was already P7,615.00
monthly.
From June 1, 1990 up to March 15, 1992, however, he had been reporting for work
because he did not honor the suspension order as the City Treasurer acted as the
complainant, investigator and judge and there was no complaint against him from the
Office of the City Mayor. He did not believe in the Order and he did not submit himself for
investigation.
Garcia was not paid his salary because of the suspension order which he says caused his
sleepless nights and caused his 2 out 4 children to stop schooling.
o During the 1990 earthquake, there was calamity loan granted to employees but he
could not avail of it because the City Treasurer would not approve the loan.
o As such, Garcia is asking for damages for his mental sufferings and for his salary for
the work he did during the period he was allegedly suspended.
Garcias rating had been Unsatisfactory in his performance for several semesters, which is
the reason why a Formal Charge was filed against him.
o A subpoena had been issued pursuant to an investigation, but Garcia did not
Answer and refused to honor the subpoena and submit himself to investigation.
Eventually, the City Treasurer instituted disciplinary proceedings against him.

ISSUES:

1. Can the City Treasurer of Dagupan discipline Garcia? (YES)

Court pointed out that under the old and the present LGC, appointive officers and employees
of local government units are covered by the Civil Service Law; and such rules, regulations
and other issuances duly promulgated pursuant thereto, unless otherwise specified.
o Moreover, the investigation and the adjudication of administrative complaints against
appointive local officials and employees, as well as their suspension and removal, shall
be in accordance with the Civil Service Law and rules and other pertinent laws.
The 1987 Administrative Code (specifically Book 5 on civil service) is the primary law
governing appointive officials and employees in the government. This Code enumerates the
grounds for disciplining them.
o They may be removed or dismissed summarily when:
The charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong
The respondent is a recidivist;
The respondent is notoriously undesirable.
o Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; due process in the
administrative context cannot be fully equated with that in the strict judicial sense.
The power to discipline is granted by Sec. 47, 1987 Admin Code to the heads of
departments, agencies, instrumentalities, provinces and cities.
o On the other hand, the power to commence administrative proceedings against a
subordinate officer/employee is granted to the secretary of a department, the head of
office of equivalent rank, the head of a local government unit, the chief of an agency,
the regional director or a person with a sworn written complaint. (Sec. 34 on the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Admin Code)
o Further, the city treasurer may institute, motuproprio, disciplinary proceedings against
a subordinate officer/employee.
Local Administrative Regulations (LAR) No 2-85175, issued by the Ministry of
Finance, authorized the Secretary of Finance, the regional director, and head of a
local treasury or an assessment office to start administrative disciplinary action
against officers or employees subordinate to them.
In this case, the city treasurer is the proper disciplining authority referred to in Section 47 of
the 1987 Admin Code.
o The term agency refers to any of the various units of the government including a
department, a bureau, an office, an instrumentality, a government-owned or controlled
corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein.

175
RULE I - INSTITUTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY ACTIONSSec. 1. How commenced. Administrative
disciplinary action may be commenced against a subordinate officer or employee by the Minister of Finance, Regional
Directors or heads of the local treasury or assessment offices at their own instance (motuproprio) or upon sworn
written complaint by any other person.
In the case of a complaint filed by any other person, the complainant shall submit sworn statements covering his
testimony and those of his witnesses together with his documentary evidence.
x xxxxxxxx
RULE IV - HEARING
Sec. 1. Officer authorized to conduct hearings. -- The investigation shall be conducted by the Minister of Finance or
the Director for Local Government Finance or his/her assistants or regional director or head of office concerned or the
duly designated representatives of said officials. The duly designated representatives shall make the necessary report
and recommendation to the chief of office, regional director or this Ministry, as the case may be. The investigation
shall be held not earlier than five (5) days not later than ten (10) days from date of receipt of respondents answer by
the disciplining authority and shall be finished within thirty (30) days from commencement of the hearing, unless the
period is extended or continuance allowed in meritorious cases.

Pajaro, as the city treasurer, was the head of the Office of the Treasurer; while Garcia, a
senior revenue collector, was an officer under him. Thus, the city treasurer is the
proper disciplining authority who could investigate petitioner and issue a preventive
suspension order against him.
As to Garcias contention that only the City Mayor may discipline him:
o Section 455 (b-1-x) of the 1991 Local Government Code states that the city mayor
may cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings against any official
or employee of the city.This rule isnt incongruent with the provisions of 1987 Admin
Code, which authorizes heads of agencies to discipline subordinate employees.
o Likewise, the old LGC doesnt vest in city mayors the sole power to discipline and to
institute criminal/administrative actions against any officers or employees under their
jurisdiction.
In fact, there is no provision under the present LGC expressly rescinding the
authority of the Department of Finance to exercise disciplinary authority over its
employees.
o By the same token, there is NOTHING that prohibits the city treasurer from filing a
complaint against Garcia.
As a corollary, the power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate.
o [Hagad v Gozo-Dadole] not being in the nature of a penalty, a preventive
suspension can be decreed on an official under investigation after charges are
brought and even before the charges are heard. Naturally,such a preventive
suspension would occur prior to any finding of guilt or innocenceSuspension
is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the
charges are established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting
his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore,
nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before the
charges against him are heard and be given opportunity to prove his innocence.
o Pajaro was authorized to issue the assailed Preventive Suspension Order against
petitioner, because the latter was charged with gross neglect of duty, refusal to
perform official duties and functions, and insubordination-- grounds that allowed the
issuance of such Order, as provided by Section 51 of the 1987 Administrative Code.
The city treasurer acted within the scope of his power when he commenced the investigation
and issued the assailed Order.
o

2. Was Garcias right to due process violated? (NO)

In an administrative proceeding, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to

explain ones side.Such process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before
judgment is rendered.
o One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation in an oral argument, but also -and perhaps even many times more creditably and practicably -- through pleadings.
o So long as the parties are given the opportunity to explain their side, the
requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with. Moreover, this
constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to
seek reconsideration of an action or a ruling.
In this case, the administrative proceedings were conducted in accordance with the
procedure set out in the 1987 Administrative Code and other pertinent laws.
o First, petitioner was furnished a copy of the May 30, 1990 formal charge against
him.
o Second, Respondent Pajaro requested the approval of the Order of Preventive
Suspension in his June 1, 1990 letter addressed to the Bureau of Local Government
Finance regional director, who approved the Order in the First Indorsementdated
June 4, 1990.

Third, a subpoena dated July 31, 1990 was issued to petitioner ordering him to
testify during an investigation on August 15, 1990. However, he admittedly refused
to attend the investigation; thus, it was conducted ex parte.
o Fourth, the Department of Finance affirmed Respondent Pajaros findings in its
August 1, 1991 Decision.
Parties who choose not to avail themselves of the opportunity to answer charges against
them cannot complain of a denial of due process.
o Garcias refusal to attend the scheduled hearings, despite due notice, was at his
own peril. He therefore cannot validly claim that his right to due process was
violated.
As to petitioners claim for damages, the extant rule is that a public officer shall not be
liable by way of moral and exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of official
duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence.
o There is no such showing in this case.
o

Petition DENIED.
Erwin Javellana (Petitioner) vs DILG, and Secretary Luis Santos (Respondents)
Date: August 10, 1992
Ponente: Grino-Aquino, J.

Short Version:
Facts: Atty. Javellana was elected City Councilor. An administrative complaint was filed against
him for violation of a DILG Memorandum Circulars prohibiting certain local government officials
from the practice of their professions, unless permission is given by the Secretary. Javellana
allegedly acted as counsel in certain cases without authority from the Secretary. During the
pendency of the administrative case, the LGC was enacted, Sec 90 of which provides for
limitations of the practice of profession by local government officials. Javellana contends that the
Circulars and Sec 90 of the LGC are unconstitutional since only the SC has the power to
promulgate rules on the practice of law.
Held: They are not unconstitutional. They do not encroach upon the powers of the SC to
promulgate rules on the practice of law; rather, they simply prescribe rules of conduct for public
officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private
practice of their profession, in those instances where the law allows it.

Facts:
- Atty. Erwin Javellana was an elected City Councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental.
- On October 5, 1989, City Engineer Ernesto Divinagracia filed an Administrative Case against
Javellana for: (1) violation of Department of Local Government (DLG) Memorandum Circular No.
80-38 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58, and of Sec 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 (Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees)f; and (2) for oppression,
misconduct and abuse of authority.
- Divinagracia alleged that Javellana, as an incumbent member of the Sanggunian Panglungsod,

has continuously engaged in the practice of law without securing authority for that purpose from
the Regional Director, Department of Local Government, as required by DLG Memorandum
Circulars.
- Javellana, as counsel for Antonio Javiero and Rolando Catapang, filed a case against
Divinagracia for "Illegal Dismissal and Reinstatement with Damages".
- Javellana appeared as counsel in several criminal and civil cases in the city.
- Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 provides in part:
The Secretary (now Minister) of Justice in an Opinion... stated... that 'members of local
legislative bodies, other than the provincial governors or the mayors, do not keep regular
office hours.'... they are not therefore to required to report daily... they may, therefore, be
allowed to practice their professions provided that in so doing an authority... first be secured
from the Regional Directors pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 74-58... While being
authorized to practice their professions, they should as much as possible attend regularly any
and all sessions... except in very extreme cases, e.g., doctors who are called upon to save a
life. For this purpose it is desired that they always keep a calendar of the dates of the
sessions... As to members of the bar the authority given for them to practice their profession
shall always be subject to the restrictions provided for in Section 6 of Republic Act 5185. In all
cases, the practice of any profession should be favorably recommended by the Sanggunian...
and by the provincial governors, city or municipal mayors, as the case may be.
- A formal hearing of the complaint was held.
- Meanwhile, on September 10, 1990, Javellana requested the DLG for a permit to continue his
practice of law. Sec Santos did not object to Javellana's practice of profession provided that it will
not conflict with his official functions.
- On September 21, 1991, Sec Santos issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 setting forth the
following guidelines for the practice of professions by local elective officials:
- The permission to practice one's professions shall be granted by the Secretary.
- Governors and Mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession during their
incumbency.
- Other local elective officials may be allowed to practice their profession on a limited basis at
the discretion of the Secretary, subject to existing laws and to the following conditions: a) the
time devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the local chief executive to the end
that it will not impair the efficiency of the officials concerned; b) no government time,
personnel, funds or supplies shall be utilized in the pursuit of one's profession; c) no conflict of
interests between the practice of profession and the official duties shall arise; d) such other
conditions that the Secretary deems necessary on each particular case.
- On March 25, 1991, Javellana filed a Motion to Dismiss the administrative case on the ground
that the Memorandum Circulars are unconstitutional because the SC has the sole and exclusive
authority to regulate the practice of law. The motion to dismiss, and the subsequent MR were
denied.
- On October 10, 1991, the LGC of 1991 was signed into law. Sec 90 is the provision on the

practice of profession by local government officials.

- Javellana filed the present petition for certiorari with the SC praying that the Memorandum
Circulars and Sec 90 of the LGC be declared unconstitutional. Javella argued that these violate
Art VIII, Sec 5 of the Constitution on the power of the SC to promulgate rules on the practice of
law, and that they are class legislations for only sanggunian members who are doctors and
lawyers are restricted in the exercise of their profession.

Issue/Reasoning:
Issue: Whether the Memo Circulars and the LGC provision are constitutional (Yes)
- As a matter of policy, great respect is accorded to the actions of administrative authorities. In
the present case, there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents in issuing
the Memorandum Circulars, and in denying Javellana's motion to dismiss.
- The complaint for illegal dismissal against Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against of
Bago City, the complainants' real employer. By serving as counsel for the complaining
employees, Javellana violated Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 (in relation to RA 6713)
prohibiting a government official from engaging in the practice of his profession, if such
practice would represent interests adverse to the government.
- Neither the LGC nor the Circulars trench upon the Supreme Court's power to prescribe rules on
the practice of law. They simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of
interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession,
in those instances where the law allows it.
- Sec does not discriminate against lawyers and doctors. It applies to all provincial and municipal
officials in the professions or engaged in any occupation. If there are some prohibitions that
apply particularly to lawyers, it is because of all the professions, the practice of law is more likely
than others to relate to, or affect, the area of public service.

Dispositive:
Petition denied.
Dr. Eleanor A. Osea v. Dr. Corazon E. Malaya
Ynares-Santigao, J. 30 January 2002
SV:Osea filed a protest with the CSC praying for the setting aside of the appointment of Malaya
as Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur. She argues that such appointment was null
and void for failure to comply with the requirement under Sec. 99 LGC that prior consultation
with the Provincial School Board must be made before appointment. The CSC dismissed her
complaint. The CA likewise dismissed her appeal.
The SC agreed with the CSC and CA. It held that Sec. 99 LGC applied only to appointments made
by the Secretary of the DECS. In this case, Malayas appointment was made by the President
himself. Further, Malayas appointment was really only a reassignment. The SC also rejected
Oseas argument that she had a vested right to the position as she lacks one essential ingredient
to her qualification to the office: her appointment thereto.

FACTS:
- 20 Nov 1997: Osea filed a protest with the Civil Service Commission (CSC). She prayed that
Malayas appointment as Schools Division Superintendent be set aside for being null and void.
She averred that:
a) she was appointed as Officer-in-Charge, Assistant Schools Division Superintendent of
Camarines Sur by the then Sec. Glorio of the DECS (Department of Education, Culture and
Sports) upon endorsement of the Provincial School Board of Camarines Sur
b) despite the recommendation of Sec. Gloria, Pres. Ramos appointed Malaya to the position
of Schools Division Superintendent of Camariens Sur
c) Malayas appointment was made without prior consultation with the Provincial School
Board in violation of Sec. 99 of the LGC
Sec. 99. Functions of Local School Boards. --- The provincial, city or municipal
school board shall:
xxx
The Department of Education, Culture and Sports shall consult the local school
boards on the appointment of division superintendents, district supervisors, school
principals, and other school officials.
- 31 Mar 1998: CSC dismissed petitioners protest-complaint. It found that
a) On 13 Sep 1996, Pres. Ramos appointed Malaya, who was then OIC Schools Division
Superintendent of Iriga City, without any specific division
b) Subsequently, on 3 Nov 1997, Sec. Gloria designated Malaya as Schools Division
Superintendent of Camarines Sur and Osea as Schools Division Superintendent of Iriga
City.
c) Sec. 99 of the LGC contemplates a situation where the DECS issues the appointments,
whereas Malayas appointmen was made by the President in his appointing power
d) The designation of Malaya as Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur and of
Osea as Schools Division Superintendent of Iriga City were in the nature of reassignments,
in which case consultation with the local school board was unnecessary.
- CSC denied Oseas MR. CA dismissed her appeal.
ISSUES/REASONING:
Is Pres. Ramos appointment of Malaya void? NO.
1) Clearly, the afore-quoted portion of Section 99 of the Local Government Code of 1991 applies
to appointments made by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports.
a) At the time of the enactment of the LGC, schools division superintendents were appointed
by the DECS to specific divisions or locations.
b) Subsequently, in 1994, the Career Executive Service Board issued Memorandum Circular
No. 21, series of 1994, placing the positions of schools division superintendent and
assistant schools division superintendent with the carrer executive service.
c) Consequently, the power to appoint persons to career executive positions was transferred
from the DECS to the President.
d) The appointment may not be specific as to location. It is the DECS which is vested with the
prerogative to designate the appointees to their particular stations.
2) Also, the CSC and CA were correct when they ruled that the designation of Malaya as Schools
Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur was not a case of appointment but partook of the
nature of a reassignment.
Therefore, the requirement in Sec. 99 LGC of prior consultation with the local school board does
not apply.
Appointment should be distinguished from reassignment.

a) An appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power,
of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually
with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen
unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office.
b) On the other hand, a reassignment is merely a movement of an employee from one
organizational unit to another in the same department or agency which does not involve a
reduction in rank, status or salary and does not require the issuance of an appointment.
3) Osea asserts a vested right to the position of Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines
Sur, citing her endorsement by the Provincial School Board. Her qualification to the office,
however, lacks one essential ingredient, i.e., her appointment thereto.
Her designation was merely temporary. Osea can be transferred or reassigned to other positions
without violating her right to security of tenure. She has no vested right to the position of Schools
Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur.
PETITION DENIED.
Attorneys HumbertoBasco, EdilbertoBalce, Socrates Maranan and Lorenz Sanchez v.
Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)
Paras, J. 14 May 1991
FACTS:
- Petitioners filed the instant petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR Charter (PD1869) because it
is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy, and order, and because:
a) It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
It waived the Manila City government's right to impose taxes and license fees, which is
recognized by law;
b) For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has intruded
into the local government's right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in
contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy;
c) It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR
conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with
prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices;
d) It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic and crony
economy, and toward free enterprise and privatization.
- Petitioners also claim that PD1869:
a) is contrary to the declared national policy of the new restored democracy and the
peoples will as expressed in the 1987 Constitution
b) has a gambling objective and therefore is contrary to Sec. 11 (Personal Dignity),
12 (Family), and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Sec. 13 (Social Justice) of Art. XIII and
Sec. 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV.
ISSUES/REASONING:
1) Can petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyer (Basco is the Chairman of the Committee
on Laws of the City of Manila) question and seek the annulment of PD1869? YES.
The SC brushed aside technicalities of procedure and took cognizance of the petition citing its
duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or not the other branches of government
have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and have not abused the
discretion given to them.
2) Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But the prohibition of
gambling does not mean that the Government cannot regulate it in the exercise of its police

power.
Police power is the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare. It is inborn in the very fact of statehood and
sovereignty. Marshall refers to it as the plenary power of the state to govern its citizens.
PD 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to regulate and centralize thru an
appropriate institution all games of chance authorized by existing franchise of permitted by law.
PAGCOR is also a reliable source of much needed revenue and provides funds for social impact
projects and subjected gabling to close scrutiny, regulation, supervision and control of the
government.
3) Does PD 1869 constitute a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal
fees and thereby violates the principle of local autonomy? NO.
The SC interpreted this argument of petitioners to refer to Sec. 13 par. 2 of PD 1869 which
exempts PAGCOR from paying any tax, fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether
National or Local. The SC disagreed with petitioners argument for the following reasons:
a) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent power to impose taxes.
The Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality
cannot assume it. Therefore, its power to tax must yield to a legislative act which is superior,
having been passed upon by the state itself which has the inherent power to tax.
b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. Municipal corporations
are mere creatures of Congress (Unson v. Lacson) which has the power to create and abolish
municipal corporations due to its general legislative powers (Asuncion v. Yriantes).
Congress has the power of control over Local Governments (Hebron v. Reyes).If Congress
can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide exemptions or
even take back the power.
c) The City of Manilas power to impose license fees on gambling has long been revoked. PD 771
withdrew the power of LGUs to regulate gambling thru the grant of franchise licenses or permits.
d) Local Governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. PAGCOR, a GOCC with an original charter, has a dual role- to operate and to
regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which makes it an
agency/instrumentality of the Government.
e) The SC also said that PD 1869 did not violate the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution.
1987 Constitution. Art. X. Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to
create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to
such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the
basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to
the local government.
The power of the LGU to impose taxes and fees is always subject to limitations which Congress
may provide by law. Thus, PD 1869 is not violative, but rather consistent, with the principle of
local autonomy.
Besides, the principle of local autonomy simply means decentralization. It does not make local
governments sovereign within the state or an imperium in imperio. What state powers should be
decentralized remains a matter of policy- it is a political question.

It is, however, settled, that the matter of regulating, taxing, or otherwise dealing with gambling
is a State concern, and, hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to
LGUs.
4) Does the PAGCOR charter violate the equal protection clause? NO.
The equal protection clause does not preclude classification, so long as the classification is not
unreasonable or arbitrary.
The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting, horse racing, sweepstakes,
lotteries and races are legalized under certain conditions while others are prohibited does not
render applicable laws like PD 1869 unconstitutional.
5) Is PD1869 unconstitutional for being contrary to the avowed trend of the Cory Government to
go away from monopolies and crony economy and toward free enterprise and privatization? NO.
The judiciary does not settle policy issues. If it indeed runs counter to the governments policies,
then it is for the Executive Department to recommend to Congress its repeal or amendment.
On the issue of monopoly, it should be noted that, the provision in the Constitution does not
necessarily prohibit monopolies. The State must still decide whether public interest demands
that monopolies be regulated or prohibited. This is, again, a matter of policy.
6) IS PD 1869 unconstitutional for being violative of Secs. 11, 12 and 13 Art II; Sec 13 Art. XII;
and Sec. 2 Art. XIV? NO.
The cited provisions of the Constitution are merely statements of principles and policies. They
are not self-executing. A law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such
principles.
PETITION DISMISSED.
The City of Cebu v. The National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority
30 April 1960
Barrera, J.

SHORT VERSION: The City of Cebu operated the Osmea Waterworks System, which provided
water for the inhabitants of the City. NAWASA was later created by virtue of RA 1383. Under its
charter, all existing waterworks systems under the control of government would be transferred to
NAWASA in exchange for an equivalent value of NAWASAs assets. The Court declared RA 1383
unconstitutional insofar as the automatic expropriation of the waterworks. The System was held
by the City not in its governmental capacity but in its proprietary capacity. It was part of the
patrimonial property of the LGU and as such was not under legislative control.

FACTS:

Act No. 2009 (Dec. 17, 1910) authorized the Municipality of Cebu to insurance
indebtedness of $125,000 and to issue bonds covering the said amount to provide funds
for the construction of sewer and drainage facilities.
The Osmea Waterworks System was created pursuant to this law.
o The System supplied the inhabitants of the municipality of Cebu with water
originally taken from the Buhisan basin (basically a dam), within an area of
approximately 500 hectares, and which is admittedly within a government
reservation.
The City of Cebu was created and absorbed the former municipality of Cebu.
o Under its charter, the City is bound to provide for the maintenance of waterworks
for the purpose of supplying water to the inhabitants of the city.
Pursuant to this, the City has been running and operating the Osmea Waterworks
System. The City was eventually granted a CPC to operate the System. It also later applied
and was granted a permit for the use of water emanating from a natural spring in a private
land (owned by the late Dr. Pio Valencia).
The National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) was created by virtue of RA
1383.
o Under its charter, it shall own and/or have jurisdiction, supervision and control over
all territory now embraced by the Metropolitan Water District as well as all areas
now served by existing government-owned waterworks and sewerage and drainage
systems.
o The charter also provided that all existing government-owned waterworks systems
are transferred to the NAWASA.
The City of Cebu filed an action for declaratory relief with the CFI to prevent NAWASA from
taking over. It prayed for:
o A clear interpretation of RA 1383
o A declaration of the rights and obligations of the parties
o A declaration that the statute or any part thereof, insofar as it deprives the City of
its property rights in the Osmea Waterworks System without due process of law
and just compensation, is unconstitutional.
The CFI ruled in favor of the City and declared RA 1383 unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
16.Is RA 1383 unconstitutional?
REASONING:
16.Yes
The Court cited the case of City of Baguio v. NAWASA, where, in passing upon the
question of whether RA 1383 provides for automatic expropriation of the waterworks,
the Court said:
o The State may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer to public ownership
any private enterprise upon payment of just compensation. At the same time, no
person can be deprived of his property except for public use and upon payment
of just compensation.
o There is an attempt in RA 1383 to comply with this requirement when in providing
for the transfer of the waterworks to NAWASA, it was directed that the transfer be
made upon payment of an equivalent value of the property.
o However, there was no showing that any of this was done, that there was any
actual transfer of NAWASAs assets that may be considered just compensation for
the property expropriated.

The law speaks of NAWASAs assets but they are not specified. There is also
nothing to indicate when the payment of just compensation should be made. And
unless this aspect of the law is clarified and the entity is given its due
compensation, it cannot be deprived of its property even if NAWASA desires to
take over its administration in line with the spirit of the law.
o The law, insofar as it expropriates the waterworks in question without providing
for an effective payment of just compensation, violates our Constitution.
This is the exact same situation in the present case.
Under Sec. 8 of RA 1383, all the properties and assets of the Osmea Waterworks
System are transferred to NAWASA in exchange for an equal value of the latters
assets. But what these assets consist of, nothing concrete presently appears.
All that appears is that NAWASA acquires all the assets and liabilities of all
government-owned waterworks and sewerage systems in the country. It is an equal
value of these unliquidated assets and liabilities that is supposed to be given to the
City as payment of the System.
o Such, certainly, is not a compensation that satisfied the Constitutional provision.
NAWASAs argument: the System is not patrimonial property of the City, but rather one
for public use and therefore falls within the control of the legislature. The Court found
not merit in this argument.
o The System was established out of the $125,000 loan extended to the
municipality of Cebu. This was fully paid for by the municipality.
o The City applied for and obtained a CPC for the operation of the System and was
made subject to the rates imposed by the Public Service Commission.
o The System owned properties worth about P10,000,000 and operates on a budget
approved by its Board of Directors, not by Congress.
o The mere fact that the Buhisan basis where the water is collected stands on a
government reservation and that the System was created to serve the needs of
the residents of the City (upon payment of certain rates from which the System
derives material gain) do not transform the proprietary nature of the ownership of
the System to governmental or public.
Because the System serves the public in a manner of speaking does not, by itself,
necessarily mean it is for public service.
o Only those of the general public who pay the required charges make use of the
water.
o In other words, the System serves all who pay the charges.
o It is open to the public, and in that sense it is public service, but upon the
payment only of a certain rental, which makes it proprietary.
Court cited Art. 424176 of the Civil Code. The term public works for public service
must be interpreted in the concept of the preceding words provincial roads, city
streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters and promenades
which are used freely by all without distinction.
o Hence, if the public works is not such free public service, it is not within the
purview of the first paragraph of Art. 424, but of the second paragraph, which
pertains to patrimonial property.
o A municipal water system designed to supply water to the inhabitants for profit is
a corporate function of the municipality (Mendoza v. Leon).
o The water system of a city not being a property held for governmental purposes
is not subject to legislative control. (Kenton Water Co. v. City of Covington)
o

176

Art. 424. Property for public use, in the province, cities and municipalities, consist of the provincial roads, city streets,
municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, public works for public service paid for by said
provinces, cities and municipalities.All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed
by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.

NAWASAs argument: the transfer of ownership of the System to another government

agency is a valid exercise of police power. Court disagreed.
o No exercise of the police power can disregard the constitutional guarantees in
respect to the taking of private property, due process and equal protection of the
laws and it should not override the demands of natural justice. (People v.
Chicago)
o Action in the nature of police regulation is void if against the express provisions of
the Constitution although otherwise within its general power to make police
regulations. (State v. Froechlich)

RULING: decision affirmed

Digest by Rix
PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE v CITY OF ZAMBOANGA
28 March 1968
Bengzon, ponente
SHORT VERSION:
Zamboanga was converted into a city, and the Province of Zamboanga moved its capital
elsewhere. In the law that converted the city, there was a provision that stated that certain
properties left by the province would be paid for by the city. Later, Zamboanga the province was
divided into Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. Del Norte became entitled to be paid
by the City for the properties. However, RA 3039 was passed, and it stated that the transfer of
properties from the province to the city would be free of charge. Del Norte protested this, saying
that it (as successor-in-interest to the former Province of Zamboanga) held the properties in a
proprietary character, and thus Congress couldnt just dispose of them however it wants.
First, the SC looked at the two applicable laws: the Civil Code and the law of municipal
corporations. It said that the latter should apply as it could be considered a special law that
could prevail over the Civil Code. Second, it looked at the properties in question. Under the law of
municipal corporations, properties devoted to public service were deemed public; the rest were
patrimonial. Thus, the properties referring to schools, the capitol site, and hospitals were public.
These could be freely disposed of by Congress. The properties consisting of vacant lots were
patrimonial, and so the City should pay Del Norte for them.
[sorry long short version. its more or less good for recit though :)]
FACTS:
When the Municipality of Zamboanga was converted into Zamboanga City, the converting
law (Commonwealth Act No 39) contained a provision that stated:
o Buildings and properties which the province shall abandon upon the transfer of the
capital to another place will be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a
price to be fixed by the Auditor General.
o These referred to 50 lots and some buildings located in the City, covered by
certificates of title in the name of Zamboanga Province.

No. of Lots
Use
1 ................................................ Capitol Site
3 ................................................ School Site
3 ................................................ Hospital Site

3
1
1
2
2
9
1
1
23

................................................
................................................
................................................
................................................
................................................
................................................
................................................
................................................
................................................

Leprosarium
Curuan School
Trade School
Burleigh School
High School Playground
Burleighs
Hydro-Electric Site (Magay)
San Roque
vacant

Later, RA 286 created the municipality of Molave, the new capital of the Province.
o Much later: RA 711 divided the Province into Zamboanga del Norte and Del Sur.
It provided that the assets and obligations of the old Province would be
divided as follows:
Upon the approval of this Act, the funds, assets and other properties
and the obligations of the province of Zamboanga shall be divided
equitably between the Province of Zamboanga del Norte and the
Province of Zamboanga del Sur by the President of the Philippines,
upon the recommendation of the Auditor General.
Based on this, the Auditor General divided the old Provinces properties such
that Del Norte became entitled to 54% of P1.2M, the total value of the
aforementioned lots and buildings, payable by Zamboanga City.
The Executive Secretary issued a ruling stating that Del Norte had a vested right as owner
(or co-owner pro-indiviso) to the properties and was entitled to be paid by the City.
o This revoked a previous Cabinet resolution conveying the 50 lots etc to the City for
P1.
o The Secretary of Finance authorized the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to
deduct 25% of the Citys IRA to be credited to Del Norte.
However: RA 3039 then amended CA 39, providing that: All buildings, properties and
assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of
Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of charge, in favor of the said City of
Zamboanga.
o The Secretary of Finance then ordered the CIR to stop paying Del Norte and return
the IRA money to the City.
Del Norte filed a complaint for declaratory relief with the Zamboanga del Norte CFI,
arguing that RA 3039 was unconstitutional.
o The CFI ruled in favor of the province.

ISSUE:
was RA 3039 void? ONLY FOR CERTAIN PROPERTIES
REASONING:
RA 3039s validity depended on the nature of the properties involved.
o This case was about the extent of legislative control over the properties of a
municipal corporation, which included provinces.
The principles were simple:
o If the property is owned by the municipal corporation in its public and governmental
capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it.
o But if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is
patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control.
The municipal corporation cannot be deprived of it without due process and
payment of just compensation.
The Civil Code classified public properties thus:

ART. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into
property for public use and patrimonial property.
o ART. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities,
consists of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares,
fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for
by said provinces, cities, or municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be
governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.
o Based on this:
All the properties in question, except the two (2) lots used as High School
playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties of the former
Zamboanga province.
Even the capital site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school sites
will be considered patrimonial for they are not for public use.
They would fall under the phrase "public works for public service" for it
has been held that under the ejusdem generis rule, such public works
must be for free and indiscriminate use by anyone, just like the
preceding enumerated properties in the first paragraph of Art 424.
The playgrounds, however, would fit into this category.
o This was the law used by the CFI, based on Municipality of Catbalogan v Director of
Lands and Municipality of Tacloban v Director of Lands.
Then there is the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of municipal
corporations.
o All those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public service are
deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered
public, it is enough that the property be held and, devoted for governmental
purposes like local administration, public education, public health, etc.
o Supporting jurisprudence:
(1) Hinunangan v. Director Of Lands:
"... where the municipality has occupied lands distinctly for public
purposes, such as for the municipal court house, the public school, the
public market, or other necessary municipal building, we will, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, presume a grant from the States in
favor of the municipality; but, as indicated by the wording, that rule
may be invoked only as to property which is used distinctly for public
purposes...."
(2) Viuda De Tantoco v. Municipal Council Of Iloilo:
Municipal properties necessary for governmental purposes are public in
nature. Thus, the auto trucks used by the municipality for street
sprinkling, the police patrol automobile, police stations and concrete
structures with the corresponding lots used as markets were declared
exempt from execution and attachment since they were not
patrimonial properties.
(3) Municipality Of Batangas vs. Cantos
A municipal lot which had always been devoted to school purposes is
one dedicated to public use and is not patrimonial property of a
municipality.
o Following this classification, Republic Act 3039 is valid insofar as it affects the lots
used as capitol site, school sites and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites and
the high school playground sites a total of 24 lots since these were held by the
former Zamboanga province in its governmental capacity and therefore are subject
to the absolute control of Congress.
o

Regarding the several buildings existing on the lots above-mentioned, the records
do not disclose whether they were constructed at the expense of the former
Province of Zamboanga.
Considering however the fact that said buildings must have been erected
even before 1936 when CA 39 was enacted and the further fact that
provinces then had no power to authorize construction of buildings such as
those in the case at bar at their own expense, it can be assumed that said
buildings were erected by the National Government, using national funds.
Hence, Congress could very well dispose of said buildings in the same
manner that it did with the lots in question.
But even assuming that provincial funds were used, still the buildings
constitute mere accessories to the lands, which are public in nature, and so,
they follow the nature of said lands, i.e., public.
Moreover, said buildings, though located in the city, will not be for the
exclusive use and benefit of city residents for they could be availed of also by
the provincial residents.
The province then and its successors-in-interest are not really
deprived of the benefits thereof.
o But Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied to deprive Zamboanga del Norte of its
share in the value of the rest of the 26 remaining lots which are patrimonial
properties since they are not being utilized for distinctly, governmental purposes.
The SC here is referring to the vacant lots.
Moreover, the fact that these 26 lots are registered strengthens the
proposition that they are truly private in nature. On the other hand, that the
24 lots used for governmental purposes are also registered is of no
significance since registration cannot convert public property to private.
The SC preferred to apply the law of municipal corporations.
o This Court is not inclined to hold that municipal property held and devoted to public
service is in the same category as ordinary private property. The consequences are
dire.
As ordinary private properties, they can be levied upon and attached.
They can even be acquired thru adverse possession all these to the
detriment of the local community.
o Lastly, the classification of properties other than those for public use in the
municipalities as patrimonial under Art. 424 of the Civil Code is "... without
prejudice to the provisions of special laws."
For purpose of this article, the principles, obtaining under the Law of
Municipal Corporations can be considered as "special laws".
Hence, the classification of municipal property devoted for distinctly
governmental purposes as public should prevail over the Civil Code
classification in this particular case.
o

RULING: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and another judgment is
hereby entered as follows:.
(1) Defendant Zamboanga City is hereby ordered to return to plaintiff Zamboanga del
Norte in lump sum the amount of P43,030.11 which the former took back from the latter out of
the sum of P57,373.46 previously paid to the latter; and
(2) Defendants are hereby ordered to effect payments in favor of plaintiff of whatever
balance remains of plaintiff's 54.39% share in the 26 patrimonial properties, after deducting
therefrom the sum of P57,373.46, on the basis of Resolution No. 7 dated March 26, 1949 of the
Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General, by way of quarterly payments from the
allotments of defendant City, in the manner originally adopted by the Secretary of Finance and
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

#rbm
Mayor Pablo Magtajas and The City of Cagayan de Oro v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., and
PAGCOR
July 20, 1994
Cruz, J.
Short version: PAGCOR leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation,
Inc., renovated and equipped it, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there. In respose, the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of CDO enacted two ordinances: the first one, prohibiting the issuance
of business permits and canelling existing permits to any establishment for the using and
allowing to be used its premises for the operation of a casino; and the second one, banning the
operation of casinos in CDO altogether. The constitutionality of the ordinances were assailed by
Pryce and PAGCOR. On the other hand, the petitioners Mayor of CDO and the City of CDO
contend that the ordinances are valid in light of the general welfare clause of the LGC as well as
the power given to the Sangguniang Panglungsod to enact ordinances intended to prevent,
suppress, and impose appropriate penalties for (among other things) gambling and other
prohibited games of chance. The SC held that the ordinances are invalid. The authority given to
LGUs to prohibit and suppress gambling only pertains to those forms of gambling which are
prohibited by law. Moreover, to uphold the petitioners arguments would mean that the PAGCOR
would be shorn of all power to centralize and regulate all forms of gambling, in light of the fact
that the LGC mandates (i.e. uses the word shall) the suppression of gambling by LGUs. Thus,
the SC found that the ordinances violate PD1869, which has the character and force of a statute,
as well as the public policy expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain games of
chance.
Facts:
- In 1992, PAGCOR leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc.,
renovated and equipped it, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there. There was instant
opposition from civic and religious groups, as well as womens groups and the youth.
- The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro enacted Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the
issuance of business permit and cancelling existing business permit to any establishment for the
using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of casino. Under
the ordinance, no business permit could be issued authorizing the operation of a casino within
the City of Cagayan de Oro, and it would be a violation of any existing business permit for an
individual or a corporation to use its business establishment for casino operations.
- It also adopted Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casino and providing
penalty for violation therefor. This ordinance was stricter, and simply banned the operation of
casinos in Cagayan de Oro. It cited the Local Government Code, and the power that Code gave
the City Council to enact measures to suppress any activity inimical to public morals and general
welfare of the people and protect the social and moral welfare of the community. 177
- Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and
supplemental petitioner. CA declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to
prohibit their enforcement.
- Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor filed the present petition for review. The petitioners
arguments are summarized as follows:
177
In particular, Sec. 16 and Sec. 458 (4), subparagraph VI of the LGC was cited.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos because they involve
games of chance, which are detrimental to the people, and that gambling is not allowed
by general law and even by the Constitution itself. Cagayan de Oro City, like all other
political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purpose indicated in the
Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under the General
Welfare Clause (Sec. 16, LGC), which allows LGUs to exercise the powers essential to the
promotion of the general welfare. Also, under Sec. 458 of the LGC, it declares that the
Sangguniang Panglungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances
intended to prevent, suppress, and impose appropriate penalties for (among other things)
gambling and other prohibited games of chance.

The legislative power given to the local government may be exercised over all kinds of
gambling and not only over illegal gambling as petitioners argue. Even if the operation
of casinos may have been permitted under PD1869, Cagayan de Oro City has the authority
to prohibit them within its territory pursuant to the authority given by the LGC.

When the Code authorized LGUs to prevent and suppress gambling and all other
prohibited games of chance, it meant all forms of gambling without distinction, because it
did not expressly exclude from the scope of power casinos and other forms of gambling
authorized by special law. Ubi Lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos.

The adoption of the LGC, in effect, modified the charter of PAGCOR. The LGC is also a later
enactment than PD1869 and is deemed to prevail in case of inconsistencies. Also that the
powers of PAGCOR under the decree are expressly discontinued by the LGC insofar as they
do not conform to its philosophy and provisions, pursuant to par. (f) of its repealing clause.

If there is doubt regarding the effect of the LGC on PF1869, it should be resolved in favor
of petitioners, in accordance with the directions in the LGC calling for its liberal
interpretation in favour of the local government, in Sec. 5 thereof.

Petitioners attack gambling as intrinsically harmful, citing Constitutional provisions against

it and invoking the State policies on the family and the proper upbringing of the youth.
They decry the immorality of gambling and impugn the wisdom of PD1869 in creating
PAGCOR and authorizing them to operate casinos.

Issue: Are the assailed ordinances are valid? (No)

Reasoning:
- Firstly, the SC noted that the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. There is nothing in
the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling. It is left to Congress to deal
with the activity as it sees fit.
- The only question that the Court decides in the petition is the validity of Ordinance No. 3355
and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of CDO City.
- The tests of a valid ordinance are that: (1) It must not contravene the constitution or any
statute; (2) It must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) It must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) It
must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) It must be general and consistent with public
policy; and (6) It must not be unreasonable.
- Under Sec. 458 of the LGC, LGUs are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others,
gambling and other prohibited games of chance. This provision excludes games of chance
which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a
word or phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with
which it is associated. The Court concludes that since gambling is associated with and other
prohibited games of chance, the word should be read as referring to only illegal gambling, which
like the other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed.

- The apparent flaw cited by the petitioners in the ordinances is that they contravene PD1869
and the public policy embodied therein as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power
conferred on it to operate casino in CDO City. It is petitioners view that the decree has not been
really repealed by the ordinances for they admit that an ordinance cannot prevail against a
statute. The petitioners theory is that the change has been made by the LGC itself. It is their
view that the decree has been modified pro tanto such that PAGCOR cannot now operate a
casino over the objection of the LGU concerned.
The SC refused to give merit to the petitioners argument. If their logic is
followed, it would appear that they are actually arguing that the PD is already dead,
repealed, and useless for all intents and purposes. Under their view, the LGC has shorn
PAGCOR of all power to centralize and regulate casinos, especially since the prohibition is
not only discretionary but mandatory under Sec. 458.
- Also, petitioners disregarded the rest of the repealing clause which painstakingly mentions the
specific laws repealed or modified by LGC. PD1869 is not included therein. Implied repeals are
not to be presumed in the absence of a clear and unmistakeable showing of such intention.
There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of PD1869. On the contrary, PAGCOR is
mentioned as the source of funding in 2 later enactments of Congress, showing that it has not
been repealed by the LGC but has been improved to make the entity more responsive to the
fiscal problems of the government.
- The Courts must also exert effort to reconcile seemingly conflicting statutes instead of simply
pitting them against one another, to make both laws effective and mutually complementary. The
Court holds that under the LGC, local governments must prevent and suppress all kinds of
gambling within their territories except only those allowed by statutes like PD1869. Thus, there
are 2 kinds of gamblingthe illegal and those authorized by law.
- In light of the above considerations, the Court finds that the Ordinances violate PD1869, which
has the character and force of a statute, as well as the public policy expressed in the decree
allowing the playing of certain games of chance.
- The requirement is that ordinances should not contravene a statute. The rationale behind this
is that municipal governments are only agents of the national government, and local councils
exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national
lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal. Local governments cannot
undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power, and negate by mere
ordinance the mandate of a statute.
Dispositive: Petition denied.
Concurring opinion by Justice Padilla:
- Padilla concurs with the holding of the majority but wishes to state that despite the legality of
the opening and operation of a casino in CDO, gambling in any form runs counter to the
governments own efforts to re-establish and resurrect the Filipino moral character which is
generally perceived to be in a state of continuing erosion. What is legal is not always moral and
the ends fdo not always justify the means.
- The national government should thus re-examine its decision of imposing the gambling casino
on the residents of CDO for it is obvious that the public opinion of the city is very much against it.
Concurring opinion by Justice Davide, Jr.:
- Pryce directly field with the CA its so-called petition for prohibition. However, the principal
cause oaf ction of the petition is actually one for declaratory relief: to declare null and
unconstitutional - for, inter alia, having been enacted without or in excess of jurisdiction, for
impairing the obligation of contracts, and for being against public policy - the challenged

ordinances enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of CDO. Accordingly, the CA does not have
jurisdiction over the action. Even assuming that the case was indeed one for prohibition, the
hierarchy of courts should have been observed.
- Davide joins the majority in holding that the ordinances cannot repeal PD 1869. The CA nullified
the ordinances as unconstitutional primarily because they contravene PD 1869. However, such
declaration of unconstitutionality is unwarranted. A contravention of a law is not necessarily a
contravention of the constitution. The ordinances can be reconciled with PD 1869 such that they
should be construed as not applying to PAGCOR.
- The sentiment of the public is clearly against theopeining of the gambling casino in CDO. Thus,
the PAGCOR must consider the valid concerns of the people and should not impose its will upon
them in an arbitrary, if not despotic, manner.
Adapted from a Consti II digest by Ramon IV
157. Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority 178
Date: December 11, 1991
Ponente: Cruz
The case in a nutshell:
FACTS: In the case of Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M.
Gonong, the SC held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic
violations was not among the sanction that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission
under PD 1605. The judgment became final and executor. Subsequently, the SC received several
complaints and letters from people complaining about the confiscation of their drivers licenses
and/or removal of their motor vehicles license plates by traffic enforcers. One of the incidents
took place in Mandaluyong. In his comment, the traffic enforcer involved invoked Ordinance No. 7
of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, authorizing the confiscation of drivers licenses and removal
of license plates. Later, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, authorizing
itself to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor
vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila. Since Ordinance No.
11 appeared to be in conflict with the Gonong decision, the SC resolved to require the
Metropolitan Manila Authority and the Solicitor General to submit separate comments. The
Metropolitan Manila Authority defended Ordinance No. 11, on the ground that it was adopted
pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by EO 392. For his part, the Solicitor General expressed
the view that Ordinance No. 11 was null and void because it represented an invalid exercise of a
delegated legislative power.
HELD: Ordinance No. 11 of the Metropolitan Manila Authority and Ordinance No. 7 of the
Municipality of Mandaluyong are NULL and VOID. The ordinances are enactments of local
governments acting only as agents of the national legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these
agents must reflect and conform to the will of their principal. To test the validity the ordinances,
the SC applied the particular requisites of a valid ordinance, as laid down by the accepted
principles governing municipal corporations. The ordinances do not pass the first criterion (must
not contravene the Constitution or any statute) because they do not conform to existing law. PD
1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of drivers licenses
for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the provisions of PD
1605 authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Authority to impose such sanctions. In fact, the
provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was
allowed to impose fines and otherwise discipline traffic violators only in such amounts and
178
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RODOLFO A. MALAPIRA, STEPHEN A. MONSANTO, DAN R. CALDERON, and GRANDY N. TRIESTE, petitioners, vs.
THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MANDALUYONG, respondents.

under such penalties as are herein prescribed, that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the
removal of license plates directly imposed by PD 1605 or at least allowed by it to be imposed by
the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that in case of traffic violations,
the drivers license shall not be confiscated. These restrictions are applicable to the
Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan
Manila, including the Municipality of Mandaluyong.

Facts:
1) In an earlier case, Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M.
Gonong, promulgated on July 13, 1990, the SC held that the confiscation of the license
plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be
imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605, and was permitted only under
the conditions laid down by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public
streets.
a. The SC also observed that even the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic
violations was not directly prescribed by the decree, nor was it allowed by the
decree to be imposed by the Commission.
2) No motion for reconsideration of that decision was submitted. The judgment became final
and executory on August 6, 1990, and it was duly entered in the Book of Entries of
Judgments on July 13, 1990.
3) Subsequently, the following developments transpired:
a. In a letter dated October 17, 1990, Rodolfo A. Malapira complained to the SC that
when he was stopped for an alleged traffic violation, his drivers license was
confiscated by a traffic enforcer in Quezon City.
b. On December 18,1990, the Caloocan-Manila Drivers and Operators Association sent
a letter to the SC asking who should enforce the decision in the Gonong case,
whether they could seek damages for confiscation of their drivers licenses, and
where they should file their complaints.
c. Another letter was received by the SC on February 14, 1991, from Stephen L.
Monsanto, complaining against the confiscation of his drivers license by a traffic
enforcer for an alleged traffic violation in Mandaluyong.
i. Required to submit a Comment on the complaint against him, the traffic
enforcer invoked Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of
Mandaluyong, authorizing the confiscation of drivers licenses and the
removal of license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations.
d. A letter-complaint was filed on March 7, 1991, from Dan R. Calderon (a lawyer) for
confiscation of his driver's license by a member of the Makati Police Force.
i. The police officer argued that the Gonong decision prohibited only the
removal of license plates, and not the confiscation of drivers licenses.
e. Another complaint dated April 29, 1991 was received by the SC, this time from
Grandy N. Trieste (another lawyer), who also protested the removal of his front
license plate by a member of the Metropolitan Manila Authority-Traffic Operations
Center and the confiscation of his driver's license by a member of the Metropolitan
Police Command-Western Police District.
i. For his part, the police officer said he confiscated Triestes drivers license
pursuant to a memorandum dated February 27, 1991, from the District
Commander of the Western Traffic District of the Philippine National Police,
authorizing such sanction under certain conditions.
4) In his own Comment, Director General Cesar P. Nazareno of the Philippine National Police

assured the SC that his office had never authorized the removal of the license plates of
illegally parked vehicles, and that he had in fact directed full compliance with the Gonong
decision in a memorandum dated February 28, 1991, entitled Removal of Motor Vehicle
License Plates.
5) On May 24, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of
1991, authorizing itself to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/
unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in
Metro Manila.
6) On July 2, 1991, the SC issued a Resolution. Since Ordinance No. 11 appeared to be in
conflict with the Gonong decision, to clarify these matters for the proper guidance of law
enforcement officers and motorists, it resolved to require the Metropolitan Manila
Authority and the Solicitor General to submit separate comments.
7) In its Comment, the Metropolitan Manila Authority defended Ordinance No. 11, on the
ground that it was adopted pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by EO 392.
a. It cited Section 2 thereof, vesting in the Council (its governing body) the
responsibility of:
i. Formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination
or consolidation for the Authority.
ii. Promulgation of resolutions and other issuances of metropolitan wide
application, approval of a code of basic services requiring coordination, and
exercise of its rule-making powers.
b. It argued that there was no conflict between the Gonong decision and Ordinance
No. 11 because the latter was meant to supplement and not supplant the latter. It
stressed that Gonong said that the confiscation of license plates was invalid in the
absence of a valid law or ordinance, which was why Ordinance No. 11 was enacted.
c. It also pointed out that Ordinance No. 11 could not be attacked collaterally, but only
in a direct action challenging its validity.
8) For his part, the Solicitor General expressed the view that Ordinance No. 11 was null and
void because it represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power.
a. The flaw in the measure was that it violated existing law, specifically PD 1605,
which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and
the confiscation of drivers licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.
b. He made no mention, however, of the alleged impropriety of examining Ordinance
No. 11 in the absence of a formal challenge to its validity.
9) On October 24, 1991, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted a motion for the early
resolution of the questioned sanctions, to remove once and for all the uncertainty of their
validity.
10)
A similar motion was filed by the Metropolitan Manila Authority, which reiterated its
contention that the incidents in question should be dismissed because there was no actual
case or controversy before the SC.

Issues:

1) Should the complaints be dismissed on the basis of the doctrine that the validity of a law
or act can be challenged only in a direct action and not collaterally? NO.
2) Are Ordinance No. 11 of the Metropolitan Manila Authority and Ordinance No. 7 of the
Municipality of Mandaluyong valid? NO.
Held: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Declaring Ordinance No. 11, Series of l991, of the Metropolitan Manila Authority and
Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988 of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, NULL and VOID; and
2) Enjoining all law enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license
plates of motor vehicles (except when authorized under LOI 43) and confiscating driver
licenses for traffic violations within the said area.
SO ORDERED.

Ratio:
1) The complaints should NOT be dismissed. This is an exception to the doctrine that the
validity of a law or act can be challenged only in a direct action and not collaterally.
a. The Metropolitan Manila Authority correctly invoked the doctrine that the validity of
a law or act can be challenged only in a direct action and not collaterally. That is the
settled principle. However, that rule is not inflexible and may be relaxed by the SC
under exceptional circumstances.
b. The Solicitor General noted that the practices complained of created a great deal of
confusion among motorists about the state of the law on the questioned sanctions.
More importantly, he maintained that these sanctions are illegal, being violative of
law and the Gonong decision, and should therefore be stopped.
c. Regrettably, not one of the complainants has filed a formal challenge to the
ordinances, including Monsanto and Trieste, who are lawyers and could have been
more assertive of their rights.
d. The SC felt it must address the problem squarely presented to it and decide it as
categorically rather than dismiss the complaints on the basis of the technical
objection raised and thus, through its inaction, allow them to fester.
e. The SC has the power to suspend procedural rules in the exercise of its inherent
power, as expressly recognized in the Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. (Sec. 5(5), Art. VI, 1987
Constitution) In proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the
interest of substantial justice, which otherwise may be miscarried because of a rigid
and formalistic adherence to such rules. In Araneta vs. Dinglasan, Justice Tuason
justified the deviation on the ground that the transcendental importance to the
public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.
2) Ordinance No. 11 of the Metropolitan Manila Authority and Ordinance No. 7 of the
Municipality of Mandaluyong are NULL and VOID.
a. The Metro Manila Authority sustained Ordinance No. 11 under the specific authority
conferred upon it by EO 392, while Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, is justified on

the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in the Local Government Code. It
is not disputed that both measures were enacted to promote the comfort and
convenience of the public and to alleviate the worsening traffic problems in
Metropolitan Manila due in large part to violations of traffic rules.
b. The SC held that there was a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate
such measures, it appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present. But
the problem is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power. The question is
the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.
c. Ordinance No. 11 and Ordinance No. 7 are enactments of local governments acting
only as agents of the national legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must
reflect and conform to the will of their principal. To test the validity of Ordinance No.
11 and Ordinance No. 7, the SC applied the particular requisites of a valid
ordinance, as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal
corporations.
d. According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid:
i. Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
ii. Must not be unfair or oppressive;
iii. Must not be partial or discriminatory;
iv. Must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
v. Must not be unreasonable; and
vi. Must be general and consistent with public policy. (U.S. v. Abendan)
e. A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that Ordinance No. 11 and
Ordinance No. 7 do not pass the first criterion (must not contravene the Constitution
or any statute) because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD
1605.
i. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal
confiscation of drivers licenses for traffic
Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the
authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission
Manila Authority) to impose such sanctions.

of license plates or the

violations committed in
provisions of the decree
(and now the Metropolitan

ii. In fact, the provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in

Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed to impose fines and
otherwise discipline traffic violators only in such amounts and under such
penalties as are herein prescribed, that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is
the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least
allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof
expressly provides that in case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall

not be confiscated.
iii. These restrictions are applicable to the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all
other local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the
Municipality of Mandaluyong.
f.

The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law
explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a
valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that
the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by
the Constitution itself). (Section 5, Article X, 1987 Constitution)
i. They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate
legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot
contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal.
ii. In the present case, the ordinances, which are merely local in origin, cannot
prevail against PD 1605, which has the force and effect of a statute.

g. The self-serving language of Section 2 of Ordinance No. 11 is worth noting.

Curiously, it is the measure itself, which was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila
Authority, which authorizes the Metropolitan Manila Authority to impose the
questioned sanction.
h. Ordinance No. 11 and Ordinance No. 7 do not merely add to the requirement of PD
1605 but, worse, impose sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact actually
prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially
repeal the law.
i.

The SC emphasized the ruling in the Gonong decision that PD 1605 applies only to
the Metropolitan Manila area.
i. It is an exception to the general authority conferred by R.A. No. 413 on the
Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish violations of traffic rules
elsewhere in the country with the sanction therein prescribed.

j.

The SC agreed that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of
motives and shared the concern of the rest of the public for the effective reduction
of traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila through the imposition and enforcement
of more deterrent penalties upon traffic violators. At the same time, it also
reiterated the public misgivings over the abuses that may attend the enforcement
of such sanction in eluding the illicit practices described in detail in the Gonong
decision. At any rate, the fact is that there is no statutory authority forand indeed
there is a statutory prohibition againstthe imposition of such penalties in the
Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be imposed
by the challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers.

k. It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not
to impose such sanctions, either directly through a statute or by simply delegating

authority to this effect to the local governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without

such action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues prohibit the confiscation of
license plates of motor vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43)
and of driver licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY v CITY OF MANILA
28 April 1956
Bengzon, ponente
SHORT VERSION:
Meralco questioned the inspection fees imposed by the city of Manila, saying that the national
government already imposed the same kind of inspection fees. The SC ruled against Meralco,
saying that the city was using its power to tax, while the national government was using its
regulatory power when imposing their respective fees.
FACTS:
Manila Electric Company owned seven steam boilers of more than 100 horespower in
Manila.
o It paid the National Government fees to inspect its boilers through the Department
of Labor.
o It also paid under protest the City of Manila inspection fees with the City Engineer,
under Manilas Revised Ordinances.
It filed a suit to recover the money it paid the city.
o The CFI dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE:
should Meralco be refunded? NO
REASONING:
The Manila Charter (1917) authorized the Municipal Board "to tax . . steam boilers" and to
regulate . . . steam engines and boilers" and provide for the inspection thereof and for a
reasonable fee for such inspection".
o Commonwealth Act No. 104 (1936) as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 696
(1945), which directed "for inspection of boilers and pressures vessels, the
Secretary of Labor . . . shall fix and collect reasonable inspection fees, did not
repeal the Charter by implication.
WHY:
o ONE: the City's power to tax steam boilers could not have been affected by the
Department of Labor's power to regulate or inspect them: one is taxation, the other
regulation.
o TWO: he power of inspection of the Secretary of Labor does not necessarily conflict
with that of the Secretary of Labor does not necessarily conflict with that of the City
authorities, because the former has particular relation to the "safety of laborers and
employees" of industrial enterprises, whereas that of the City of Manila is not
limited to such purpose, but is related to the safety and welfare of the inhabitants of
the City, particularly of the neighborhood wherein the boilers are located.
US v Chan Teinco:
o The mere fact that a municipality, for the purpose of protecting the health of its
people, requires a permit from the president of the municipal board of health for the
slaughtering of large cattle, does not contravene nor it is repugnant to the
provisions of the general law, a permit from the municipal treasurer for the
slaughtering of large cattle. The purposes of the two laws are distinct. Many
instances might be given showing that an inhabitant of a municipality, before he

can do a particular thing or engage in a particular class of business, should secure

two permits, one from the municipality and another from the State.
US v Joson: A municipal regulation or prohibition of a certain line of activity may co-exist
with national regulation or prohibition of the same.

RULING: appealed judgment affirmed

#rbm
Laguna Lake Development Authority (Petitioner) vs CA, et. al. (Respondents)
Date: December 7, 1995
Ponente: Hermosisima, Jr., J.

Short Version:
Facts: RA 4850 was enacted creating the LLDA. RA 4850 was amended by PD 813 and gave the
LLDA the exclusive authority to issue permits for the use of the Laguna Lake. The LGC was
subsequently enacted. In view of the LGC provisions giving municipalities authority to grant
fishing privileges in their municipal waters, the municipalities around the Laguna Lake granted
permits to construct fishpens and other aqua-culture structures. The LLDA argues that it still
retains the authority to issue permits for the use of the Lake.
Held: It is the LLDA which has the authority to issue permits for the use of the Lake. The LLDA
Charter is a special law; it must prevail of the LGC which is a general law, there being no express
repeal by the LGC of the provisions of the LLDA Charter. Also, removal from the LLDA of its
licensing authority will render nugatory its purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake
Region.

Facts:
- Towards environmental protection and ecology, navigational safety, and sustainable
development, RA 4850 created the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA). It is supposed to
carry out the aforesaid policy, so as to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the
Laguna Lake area and the surrounding LGUs.
- RA 4850 was later amended by PD 813 because of the concern for the rapid expansion of
Metropolitan Manila, and the lakeshore towns of Laguna Laguna Lake, and their impact on the
Lake.
- Among the changes made by PD 813 was the addition of Sec 4(k) to RA 4850. It gave the LLDA
the power to issue permits for the use of the Laguna Lake. It reads in part:
...the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue new permit for the use of the lake
waters for any projects or activities in or affecting the said lake including navigation,
construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like... Provided,
That the fees collected for fisheries may be shared between the Authority and other
government agencies and political sub-divisions in such proportion as may be determined by

the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Authority's Board...

- The Chief Executive subsequently enacted EO 927, and further defined and enlarged the
functions and powers of the LLDA. The pertinent portions of EO 927 are as follows:
Sec 2. Water Rights Over Laguna de Bay and Other Bodies of Water within the Lake
Region: ...the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permit for the use of all
surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region...
...the term 'Laguna de Bay Region' shall refer to the Provinces of Rizal and Laguna; the Cities
of San Pablo, Pasay, Caloocan, Quezon, Manila and Tagaytay; the towns of Tanauan, Sto. Tomas
and Malvar in Batangas Province; the towns of Silang and Carmona in Cavite Province; the
town of Lucban in Quezon Province; and the towns of Marikina, Pasig, Taguig, Muntinlupa, and
Pateros in Metro Manila.
Sec 3. Collection of Fees. The Authority is hereby empowered to collect fees for the use of the
lake water... Provided, that the rates of the fees to be collected, and the sharing with other
government agencies and political subdivisions, if necessary, shall be subject to the approval
of the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Authority's Board, except
fishpen fee, which will be shared in the following manner; 20 percent... to the lakeshore local
governments, 5 percent... to the Project Development Fund... the remaining 75 percent shall
constitute the share of LLDA. However, after the implementation within the three-year period
of the Laguna Lake Fishery Zoning and Management Plan, the sharing will be modified as
follows: 35 percent... to the lakeshore local governments, 5 percent... to the Project
Development Fund... remaining 60 percent... retained by LLDA; Provided, however, that the
share of LLDA shall form part of its corporate funds...
- RA 7160 (LGC of 1991) was subsequently enacted. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake
Region interpreted the said law to give municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue
fishing privileges within their municipal waters because of Sec 149 and Sec 447 of the said law.
- The municipal governments then issued fishing privileges and fishpen permits. Fishpen
operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens and fishcages to the
consternation of theLLDA. The implementation by the municipalities of separate policies in the
operation of fishpens and fishcages within their claimed territorial municipal waters in the lake
and their indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits have already saturated the lake with fishpens,
thereby aggravating the environmental problems of the Lake.
- In view of the foregoing circumstances, the LLDA served notice to the general public that all
fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna Lake which are not registered
with LLDA are illegal, and that the said illegal structures shall be subject to demolition.
- The affected fishpen owners then filed separate injunction cases agaist LLDA in different RTCs.
TROs were issued by the trial courts.
- LLDA filed with the SC petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and injunction against the said cases
in the RTCs. LLDA prayed for the following:
- Nullification of the TROs
- Permanent prohibition against the RTCs from exercising jurisdiction over the cases

- Judicial pronouncement that the LGC did not repeal or alter the provisions of RA 4850
- SC referred the petitions to the CA. CA ruled against LLDA. CA ruled that LLDA is not a quasijudicial agency; and that the provisions of its charter insofar as fishing privileges in Laguna Lake
are concerned had been repealed by the LGC, thus the power to grant permits are now vested
with the LGUs concerned.
- LLDA went to up to the SC.

Issue/Reasoning:
Issue: Which between the LLDA and the LGUs should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake
insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned? (The LLDA. Its charter
being the special law, and with no express repeal by the LGC of its provisions, LLDA still has
authority over the Laguna Lake.)
- The LGC did not repeal the laws creating the LLDA and granting the latter water rights authority
over Laguna Lake and the surrounding region. The LGC does not contain any provision expressly
repealing the charter of the LLDA.
- The LLDA charter is a special law, while the LGC is a general law. The enactment of a later
legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. Where
there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should prevail
since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. Thus, the LLDA
charter should prevail over the LGC.
- Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the LLDA, which are environmental
protection, navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is every indication that the
legislative intent is for the LLDA to proceed with its mission.
- Court agrees with the manifestation of the LLDA that:
Laguna de Bay... has its own unique natural ecosystem... one integrated delicate natural
ecosystem that needs to be protected with uniform set of policies... This is an exhaustible
natural resource... which requires judicious management and optimal utilization to ensure
renewability and preserve its ecological integrity and balance... Managing the lake... would
mean the implementation of a national policy geared towards the protection, conservation,
balanced growth and sustainable development of the region with due regard to the intergenerational use of its resources by the inhabitants in this part of the earth.... The garbage
thrown...into the lake, abstraction of water therefrom or construction of fishpens... affect not
only that specific portion but the entire...lake... The implementation of a cohesive and
integrated lake water resource management policy, therefore, is necessary to conserve,
protect and sustainably develop Laguna de Bay.
- The power of the LGUs to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes. This
is evident from the fact that Sec 149 of the LGC is under the heading, "Specific Provisions On The
Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power Of Local Government Units."
- On the other hand, the power of the LLDA to grant permits for fishpens, fishcages and other
aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in

the Laguna de Bay region. This partake of the nature of police power which is the most
pervasive, least limitable, and most demanding of all State powers. Accordingly, the LLDA
charter which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the LGC on
matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
- Removal from the LLDA of its licensing authority will render nugatory its purpose of protecting
and developing the Laguna Lake Region. The abrogation of this power would render useless its
reason for being. This, the LGC never intended to do.
- There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures in the Laguna de Bay area. Sec 3 of EO 927 provides for the proper sharing of fees
collected.

Issue: Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency (Yes)

- Considering the provisions of RA 4850 and EO 927, and the ruling in LLDA v CA (1994) 179, there
is no question that the LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in
respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a "cease and desist order" and on matters
affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in
Laguna de Bay.
- However, the LLDA's pretense that it is co-equal to the RTC such that all actions against it may
only be instituted before the CA cannot be sustained. On actions necessitating the resolution of
legal questions affecting the powers of the LLDA, the RTC has jurisdiction.

Dispositive:
Petitions granted, insofar as they relate to the authority of the LLDA to grant fishing privileges
within the Laguna Lake Region. The TROs issued by the RTCs are set aside. The Municipal Mayors
of the Laguna Lake Region are prohibited from issuing permits to construct and operate fishpens,
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures within the Laguna Lake Region; their previous
issuances are declared null and void. The structures put up by virtue of the void permits are
declared illegal and subject to demolition.

Padilla (Concurring):
- The LGUs in the Laguna Lake area are not precluded from imposing permits on fishery
operations for revenue raising purposes.
- While the exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether activities in the lake area should be
allowed, as well as their regulation, is with the LLDA, once it grants a permit, the permittee may
still be subjected to an additional local permit for revenue purposes. This approach would
harmonize the relevant laws, and will enable the municipalities in the lake area to rise to some
level of economic viability.
179
Admin throwback!

Jose Mondano v. Fernando Silvosa, Provincial Governor of Surigao, Jose Arreza and
OlimpioEpis, Members of the Provincial Board
Padilla, J. 30 May 1955
SV: A sworn complaint for rape and concubinage was filed with the Presidential Complaints and
Action Committee against Mayor Mondano. The Assistant Executive Secretary endorse the
complaint to Governor Silvosa for immediate investigation, appropriate action and report.
Governor Silvosa subsequently suspended Mondano from office and the Provincial Board
proceeded to hear the charges against Mondano. Mondano filed a petition with the SC praying for
a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction.
The SC ruled in favor of Mondano. It said that the President, the Department Heads and the
Provincial Governor only has the power of supervision over the LGUs under their jurisdiction. The
investigation of Mondano must be done only for those causes under Sec. 2188 RAC. The charges
here being none of those listed in Sec. 2188 RAC, the investigation of Mondano is unlawful and
without authority of law.
FACTS:
- Mondano is the duly elected and qualified mayor of the municipality of Mainit, Surigao.
- 27 Feb 1954: ConsolacionVda. De Mosende filed a sworn complaint with the Presidential
Complaints and Action Committee accusing him of rape committed on her daughter,
CaridadMosende; and concubinage for cohabiting with her daughter in a place other than the
conjugal dwelling.
- 6 Mar 1954: The Assistant Executive Secretary endorsed the complaint to Governor Silvosa for
immediate investigation, appropriate action and report.
- 10 April 1954: Governor Silvosa issued Administrative Order No. 8 suspending Mondano from
office. Thereafter, the Provincial Board proceeded to hear the charges proffered against
Mondano.
- 4 May 1954: Mondano went to the SC praying for a writ of prohibition with preliminary
injunction to enjoin respondents from further proceeding with the administrative case against
him and for a declaration that the order of suspension issued by the governor is illegal and
without effect.
ISSUES/REASONING:
Was the suspension of Mondano by Gov. Silvosa valid? NO.
1) Sec. 10 par. 1, Art. VII of the 1935 Constitution provides:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices,
exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and
take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
The President has power of control over all the executive departments, bureaus or offices, but
not of all local governments over which he has been granted only the power of general
supervision as may be provided by law.
The power of the President to remove officials from office as provided for in Sec. 64(b) RAC must
be done conformably to law and only for disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines he may
at any time remove a person from any position of trust or authority under the Government of the
Philippines.
2) The Department head, as agent of the President, has direct control and supervision over all
bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in Sec. 79(c) RAC, but does not have

the same control of local governments.

a) Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the
service of any bureau or office under his department is confined to the bureaus or offices
under his jurisdiction.
b) The authority to order investigation does not extend to local governments.
In administrative law, there is a distinction between the power of control and that of supervision.
a) Supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the
former may take such ation or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties.
b) Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or
set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
3) Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal
officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to receive and investigate complaints
made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption
or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any
crime involving moral turpitude.(Sec. 2188 RAC)
If the charges are serious, he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial
board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail,
and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action
by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official intergrity of the officer in
question. (Sec. 2188 RAC)
Sec. 86 RAC adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the department Head
over the administration of municipalities. (Read: The power of supervision of the President over
LGUs is the same power of supervision of the Provincial Governor over municipal officials. -ed)
4) The charges proffered against Mondano are not malfeasances or any of those enumerated or
specified in Sec. 2188 RAC, because rape and concubinage have nothing to do with the
performance of his duties as mayor nor do they constitute or involve neglect of duty, oppression,
corruption or any other form of maladministration of office.
True, they may involve moral turpitude, but before the provincial governor and board may act
and proceed in accordance with the provisions of the RAC, a conviction by final judgment must
precede the filing by the provincial governor of charges and trial by the provincial board.
Even the provincial fiscal cannot file an information for rape without a sworn complaint by the
offended party who is 28 years of age and the crime of concubinage cannot be prosecuted but
upon sworn complaint of the offended spouse.
The charges against Mondano, not being any of those specified in Sec. 2188 RAC, the
investigation of such charges by the provincial board is unauthorized and illegal. The suspension
is consequently unlawful and without authority of law.
WRIT OF PROHIBITION GRANTED. @ajmlegs
Bernardo Hebron v. Eulalio D. Reyes
28 July 1958
Concepcion, J.

SHORT VERSION: Hebron was the mayor of Carmona, Cavite. Reyes was vice mayor. The
President suspended Hebron pending admin charges and designated Reyes as Acting Mayor. The
proceedings were still ongoing by the time Hebrons term expired. Hebron filed the present quo
warranto proceedings assailing the legality of the suspension order and Reyess assumption of
office. The SC held that the President has no power to order the suspension of a municipal mayor.
The President only has the power of general supervision over all local government units, as
opposed to the power of control. In the suspension of municipal officials, the procedure in Sec.
2188-2191 of the Revised Admin Code must be followed.

NOTE: There was a lot of discussion on history and jurisprudence which I decided to omit for
being repetitive. However I tried to pick out the important points and included them in this
digest. Apologies if I missed anything.

FACTS:

Bernardo Hebron (from the Liberal Party) and Eulalio Reyes (from the Nacionalista Party)
won as mayor and vice mayor, respectively, of Carmona, Cavite in the 1951 elections.
They assumed office on Jan. 1, 1952.
May 1954: Hebron received a letter from Malacaang, informing him of charges against
him for oppression, grave abuse of authority and serious misconduct, and of his
suspension from office until the termination of the admin proceedings against him. Reyes
was directed to assume the office of Acting Mayor during the period of suspension.
The provincial fiscal submitted his report on his investigation to the Office of the President
on July 15, 1954.
o Since then, the matter has been pending with the OP.
No decision seemed to be forthcoming as the expiration of Hebrons term drew nearer, so
on May 13, 1955 he filed the present action for quo warranto.
o He alleged that Reyes was illegally holding the Office of Mayor of Carmona and was
unlawfully refusing to surrender the said office to him, who was entitled thereto.
The case was submitted for decision on Sept. 2, 1955, but it could not be disposed of
because the Court could not reach an agreement.
Hebrons term expired on Dec. 31, 1955.

ISSUES:
17.Has the case become moot and academic?
18.May a municipal mayor, not charged with disloyalty to the Republic, be removed or
suspended directly by the President, regardless of the procedure set forth in the Revised
Administrative Code?
REASONING:
17.No the case is not moot (feel free to skip)
Although Hebrons term expired on Dec. 31, 1955, his claim to the Office of Mayor of
Carmona has not thereby become entirely moot, as regards such rights as may have
accrued to him prior thereto.

18.No

Also, the question of law posed in the pleadings concerns a vital feature of the
relations between the national government and the local governments, and the Court
has been led to believe that the parties are earnestly interested in a clear-cut
settlement of the question, otherwise this will continue to be a constant source of
friction, to the detriment of the smooth operation of the government.
For these reasons, the Court deemed it necessary to rule on the case.
the President has no authority to suspend a municipal mayor in this case
There is neither statutory nor constitutional provision granting the President sweeping
authority to remove municipal officials. Supervision does not contemplate control.
The Revised Admin Code prescribed the causes and the fashion and the procedure
for the suspension of elective municipal officials.
o Causes: neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of
maladministration of office, conviction by final judgment of any crime involving
moral turpitude (Sec. 2188)
o Procedure for trial: Governor submits written charges to the provincial board
(governor may suspend the officer pending action by the board). During the next
board, meeting, trial date (day, hour, place) is set. Board shall hear and
investigate the truth of falsity of the charges. In case of suspension, hearing shall
occur not later than 10 days from accuseds receipt of the charges, unless the
accused requests an extension of time to prepare his defense. (Sec. 2189 1 st
paragraph)
o Decision: If board finds no merit, proceedings will be dismissed. If adjudged
guilty, direct the governor to reprimand. In either case, the suspended official will
be reinstated. If more severe discipline is required, board will forward its decision
within 8 days to the DILG Secretary with its recommendation of the officials
suspension, further suspension, or final dismissal from office. (Sec. 2190)
Secretary reviews the boards decision and decides within 30 days. (Sec. 2191)
o Preventive suspension shall not be more than 30 days. He must be reinstated at
the end of the 30 days, without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings
until their completion, unless the delay is due to the fault of the accused. (Sec.
2189 2nd paragraph)
These sections control in the field of investigations of charges against, and the
suspension of, municipal officials. The wording of the provisions clearly manifests a
purpose to exclude other modes of proceeding by other authorities under general
statutes. (Villena v. Roque)
o When the procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified by law, the same
must be deemed mandatory and adhered to strictly, in the absence of express or
clear provision to the contrary which does not exist with respect to municipal
officers.
Moreover, the law frowns upon prolonged or indefinite suspension of local elective
officials. (Lacson v. Roque)
o In this case, Hebron was suspended in May 1954. The records of the investigation
by the provincial fiscal were forwarded to the Exec Sec on July 15, 1954, yet the
decision on the case was not rendered, either before the filing of the complaint
herein on May 13, 1955, or before the expiration of Hebrons term on Dec. 31,
1955. Manifestly, Hebrons continued, indefinite suspension cannot be reconciled
with the letter and spirit of the provisions of the RAC.
Under the Consti, the President has been invested with the power of control of all the
executive departments, bureaus or offices, but not of all local governments over which
he has been granted only the power of general supervision as may be provided by law.
o The Department head, as agent of the President, has direct control and
supervision over all bureaus and offices under him, but he does not have the
same control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and
offices.

Supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that

subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to perform,
the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties.
o On the other hand, control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Congress has specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in
the provincial governor, who is authorized to receive and investigate complaints
against the municipal officer for the grounds enumerated above. The RAC adds nothing
to the power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the
administration of municipalities.
It is true that Sec. 64(c) of the RAC provides that the President shall have authority to
order, when the public service so requires, an investigation of any action or conduct of
any person in the government services.
o However, this section cannot be construed literally without violating the
Constitution.
The same principle applies to Sec. 64(b), which gives the Executive the power to
remove officials from office and to declare vacant the offices held by such removed
officials for disloyalty to the Republic.
o Besides, there is no allegation of Hebrons disloyalty. This is not a question
here.
If there is any conflict between Sec. 64(b) and (c), Sec. 79(c) and 86 of the RAC, and
Sec. 2188-2191 of the RAC, the latter, being specific provisions dealing with the
procedure for disciplinary action against municipal officials, must prevail over the
former, as general provisions dealing with the powers of the President and the
department heads over the officers of the government. (Laxamana v. Baltazar)
To sustain the alleged authority of the President to suspend a municipal mayor without
any action of the governor or the provincial board pursuant to Sec. 2188-2191 of the
RAC, there should be an explicit repeal of the said provisions. There is none to such
effect here.
o Such legislation would place local governments under the control of the Executive
and consequently conflict with the Constitution.
Under the Jones law, the Governor General had both control and supervision over all
local governments, in contrast with the present Constitution, where the President only
has the power of supervision over local governments.
o As early as 1900, Pres. McKinley laid down the policy that municipal governments
should be subject to the least degree of supervision and control on the part of the
national government and that organization of local governments should follow the
example of the distribution of powers between the states and the national
government of the United States. Accordingly, the national government shall
have no direct administration except of matters of purely general concern.
o The evident aim of the members of the Constitutional Convention must have
been to free local governments from the control exercised by the central
government.
Local governments have only such autonomy as the central government may deem fit
to grant it, and the said autonomy shall be under the control of the national
government. But who shall exercise this power on behalf of the State? Not the
Executive, but the Legislative, as an incident of its authority to create or abolish
municipal corporations and to define its jurisdiction and functions.
o Hence, it is Congress which has the authority to prescribe the procedure by which
the President may perform his constitutional power of general supervision. (Dean
Since, Philippine Political Law)
o

In the present case, when the Office of the President acted in lieu of the Provincial
Board, the former sought to control the latter.
o Instead of compelling the board to comply with its duties under Sec. 2188-2191 of
the RAC, the Executive, in effect, restrained, prevented or prohibited it from
performing said duties.
In summary:
o Under the present law, the procedure in RAC Sec. 2188-2191 for the suspension
and removal of municipal officials is mandatory. In the absence of a clear and
explicit provision to the contrary, relative particularly to municipal corporations,
said procedure is exclusive.
o The Executive, in the exercise of its power of general supervision over local
governments, may conduct investigations to determine the officials guilt as a
means only to ascertain whether the governor and the provincial board should
take disciplinary action. The Executive may take measures to compel the
governor and the board to take such action if warranted.
o The provincial governor and provincial board may not be deprived by the
Executive of the power to exercise the authority conferred upon them by the RAC.
o The preventive suspension of a municipal officer shall not be for more than 30
days, after which he must be reinstated, unless the delay in the decision is his
fault.

RULING: (case did not explicitly say, but Im guessing) petition granted

DISSENTING OPINION by Paras, C.J.:

By virtue of Sec. 64(b) and (c) of the RAC, in consonance with the totality of his executive
power and specifically the power of supervision of all offices in the executive branch, the
President has concurrent supervisory authority with the provincial governor to order an
investigation of charges against an elective municipal official.
While the governor has to submit the charges to the Provincial Board for investigation, the
President may designate the official, committee or person who will conduct such
investigation.
The President can remove even elective municipal officials subject to the limitation that
such removal must be conformable to law.
o This means it must be for a cause provided by law (under Sec. 2188 RAC) and
conducted in a manner in conformity with due process.
The distinction between control and supervision is not important insofar as the Presidents
power to order the investigation of a local official is concerned. It does not affect the
supervisory authority of the President to cause the investigation of the malfeasance of a
municipal official relating to and affecting the administration of his office and directly
affecting the rights and interests of the public. (Planas v. Gil)

Digest by Rix
162. Rodolfo Ganzon v Union C. Kayanan
Bautista-Angelo, J.
30 Aug 1958
TOPIC: Legislative and Executive Relations with Local Governments; Presidents Power of General
Supervision

SV: Rosales lodged an administrative complaint against Mayor Ganzon with the President,
charging the latter with taking advantage of his position as mayor of Iloilo in committing the acts
of violence and intimidation in order to stop Rosales radio program thus suppressing and
curtailing his right to free speech, among other things. In his complaint, Rosales prays that an
investigation be conducted and proper action be taken against Ganzon. The Executive Secretary
designated respondent to conduct the investigation.Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition
with preliminary injunction, questioning the Presidents authority to order an investigation. CFI
dismissed the petition.
Court affirmed the CFI decision. As embodied in the Consti and RAC, the President has the power
and authority to investigate the mayor of a city and, if found guilty, to take disciplinary action
against him. The causes under which the President may order an investigation are: disloyalty,
dishonesty, oppression, and misconduct in office. In this case, the alleged acts of Mayor Ganzon
constitute misconduct in office for which he may be ordered investigated by the President.
FACTS:

25 Aug 1956: Ernesto Rosales lodged a verified complaint against Ganzon (Mayor of Iloilo)
with the President, charging the latter with the ff. 180:
o [Count 1] Oppression or unjust exercise of authority or power and/or grave
misconduct in office: Mayor Ganzon stormed the broadcasting station of DYRI of
Iloilo and stopped the radio-press interview program of Peoples Forum of said
station for about a quarter hour
o [Count 2] Oppression and shameful misconduct in office: During the occurrence of
Count 1, Ganzon personally pushed away the microphones and hit the back of the
neck of Rosales, who is a radio commentator and program director of Station DYRI
of Iloilo.
o [Count 3] Oppression and oral defamation: During the occurrence of Counts 1 and 2,
the Mayor hurled invectives at the complainant.
Complainant prays that
o An investigation be conducted and the proper action be taken against Ganzon
o Ganzon be immediately suspended
13 Sept 1956: The Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, designated
respondent to conduct the investigation of said complaint pursuant to Sec. 64(c), RAC
granting said respondent all the powers given to an investigating officer.

180
Count 1. That on August 22, 1956 the respondent taking advantage of his public position as Mayor of Iloilo City and accompanied by his armed body-guards and
henchmen, stormed into the broadcasting station of DYRI of Iloilo City, and with violence and intimidation, unjustifiably and unlawfully stopped the radio-press
interview program People's Forum' of said station, thus, suppressing and curtailing for about a quarter hour the complainant's right to free speech, the radio station's
right to broadcast, and the people's right to listen to a radio-press interviews, which acts constitute oppression or unjust exercise of authority or power and/or grave
misconduct in office.Count 2. That during the occurrence of the acts mentioned in Count 1, the respondent Mayor of Iloilo City arrogantly took the law in his own
hands by personally pushing away the microphones and hitting on the back of the neck the complainant, who is a radio commentator and program director of Station
DYRI of Iloilo City, and a member of the panel of interrogators of the 'People's Forum', a public service press interview program of said nature, constitutive of
oppression and shameful misconduct in office.
Count 3. That during the occurrence of the acts above-stated in Counts 1 and 2, the respondent Mayor of Iloilo City, in a fit of devouring fury, unrestrainedly hurled
invectives at the complainant, calling the latter indecent bad-mannered, dammed-no-good-Cebuano who should evacuate to Cebu and other similar names, which verbal
acts constituted oppression and oral defamation, highly unbecoming of Iloilo City's supposedly No. 1 public official and model citizen.

18 Sept: Respondent served a copy of the complaint and set investigation of the
charges on 20 Sept. Since petitioner filed a motion for postponement, the
investigation was moved to Sept. 25-26.
24 Sept: Mayor Ganzon instituted in the CFI Iloilo an action for prohibition with preliminary
injunction, questioning the authority of the President to order his investigation and praying
that respondent be enjoined to suspend and desist from proceeding with the investigation
and that, pending decision of the case on the merits, a preliminary injunction be issued
against respondent.
[CFI] decline to issue the writ. Eventually, it dismissed the petition. MR was denied.
o

ISSUES AND REASONING

1. Does the President have the power and authority under our Constitution and laws to
investigate the mayor of a city and, if found guilty, to take disciplinary action against him as the
evidence and law may warrant? (YES)

Mayor Ganzon is the duly elect mayor in the City of Iloilo whose charter provides that he
shall hold office for six years unless removed". Said charter does not contain any
provision as regards the procedure by which he may be removed.
o Nevertheless, "the rights, duties, and privileges of municipal officers (including city
officials) do not have to be embodied in the charter, but may be regulated by
provisions of general application specially if these are incorporated in the same
code of which the city organic law forms a part". The code referred to is the
Revised Administrative Code.
The Charter does not say that the Mayor shall hold office at the pleasure of the President,
unlike similar provisions appearing in other city charters.
o The idea is to give the mayor a definite tenure of office not dependent upon the
pleasure of the President.
o If this were the case, he could be separated from the service regardless of the cause
or motive.But when he was given a definite tenure, the implication is that he can
only be removed for cause.
o An inferential authority to remove at pleasure cannot be deduced since the
existence of a defined term negatives such inference and implies a contrary
presumption i.e. that the incumbent shall hold office to the end of his term subject
to removal for cause.
From the provisions governing the power of the President over local officials, be they
provincial, city, or municipal (as embodied in Sec. 64(b) and (c), RAC 181, in connection with
Art. VII, Sec. 10, par.1182Consti) it can be inferred that the President may remove any
official in the government service conformably to the law and to declare vacant the
office held by the removed official.

181
Revised Administrative Code, Sec. 64. (b) To remove officials from office conformably to law and to declare vacant the offices held by
such removed officials. For disloyalty to the (United States), the Republic of the Philippines, the (Governor-General) President of the
Philippines may at any time remove a person from any position of trust or authority under the Government of the (Philippine Islands)
Philippines.
(c) To order, when in his opinion the good of the public services requires, an investigation of any action or the conduct of any person
in the Government service, and in connection therewith to designate the official, committee, or person by whom such investigation
shall be conducted.

182
Consti, SEC. 10. (1) The President shall have control of an the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments
as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

o
o

To this end, the President may order an investigation of any action or the conduct
of any person in the Government service, and in connection therewith to designate
the official committee, or person by whom such investigation shall be conducted.
This provision refers to the any official in the government service, which must
necessarily include the mayor of a chartered city.
It cannot therefore be disputed that in this case, the President is vested with the
authority to order the investigation of Ganzonwhen in his opinion the good of the
public service so requires.
Such being the case, petitioner cannot now contend that the designation of
respondent as the official to investigate him in connection with the charges lodged
against him by Rosales has been done without the authority of law.
This of course is upon the premise that the charges involved in the
investigation refer to those for which petitioner may be suspended or
removed under the law, a question which we will take up later in this
decision.
[Mondano v Silvosa] Control and supervision are two different things which differ
one from the other in meaning and extent."In administration law supervision means
overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take
such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
From this pronouncement it cannot be inferred that the power of supervision
of President over local govt officials does not include the power of
investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires,
as postulated in Sec. 64(c), RAC.
[Hebron v Reyes]the executive department of the national government, in the
exercise of its general supervision over local government, may conduct
investigations with a view to determining whether municipal officials are guilty of
acts or omissions warranting the administrative action referred to in said sections,
as a means only to ascertain whether the provincial governor and the provincial
board should take such action;

2. For what cause/s may the President order the investigation of petitioner comformably to law?

Since the position of a mayor of a chartered city may be fairly compared in category and
stature with that of a provincial governor, we are of the opinion that the mayor, by
analogy, may also be amenable to removal and suspension for the same causes as the
latter, which causes, under Sec. 2078, RAC are:
o Disloyalty
o Dishonesty
o Oppression
o Misconduct in office
Considering the allegations in the complaint that Mayor Ganzon took advantage of his
position as mayor of Iloilo in committing the acts of violence and intimidation in order to
stop the respondents radio program thus suppressing and curtailing his right to free
speech, Court is of the opinion that the acts constitute misconduct in office for which he
may be ordered investigated by the President within the meaning of the law.

Decision AFFIRMED.

RupertoTaule v Secretary Luis T. Santos and Governor Leandro Verceles

August 12, 1991
Gancayco, J.

Short version:The Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) conducted an

election of its officers. A protest was filed regarding violations of DLG Circular 89-09,
promulgated by Secretary Santos, the Secretary of Local Government. Secretary Santos nullified
the election and directed that a new one should be held. The SC held that Secretary Santos did
not have jurisdiction to entertain an election protest involving the election of the officers of the
Federation of Association of Barangay Councils. Unless expressly empowered, administrative
agencies are bereft of quasi- judicial powers.The jurisdiction of administrative authorities is
dependent entirely upon the provisions of the statutes reposing power in them; they cannot
confer it upon themselves. Such jurisdiction is essential to give validity to their
determinations.Presidential power over local governments is limited by the Constitution to the
exercise of general supervision "to ensure that local affairs are administered according to
law."The general supervision is exercised by the President through the Secretary of Local
Government. The Constitution permits the President to wield no more authority than that of
checking whether said local government or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided
by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments so long
as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. Based on this, the Secretary has
no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election of the officers of the katipunan.
To allow him to do so will give him more power than the law or the Constitution grants. It will in
effect give him control over local government officials for it will permit him to interfere in a purely
democratic and non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the basic
component of local governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved.
His order that new elections should be held is a clear interference in the affairs of the barangays.

(Only the first issue seems important)

Facts:

The Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes, composed of 11

members, in their capacities as Presidents of the Association of Barangay Councils in their
respective municipalities, convened in Virac, Catanduanes, for the purpose of holding the
election of its officers. 6 out of the 11 members attended.
o Present were petitioner RupertoTaule of San Miguel, Allan Aquino of Viga, Vicente Avila of
Virac, Fidel Jacob of Panganiban, Leo Sales of Caramoran and Manuel Torres of Baras. The
Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants was composed of Provincial Government
Operation Officer (PGOO) Alberto P. Molina, Jr. as Chairman with Provincial Treasurer Luis
A. Manlapaz, Jr. and Provincial Election Supervisor Arnold Soquerata as members.
When the group decided to hold the election despite the absence of 5 of its members, the
Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial Election Supervisor walked out.
The election nevertheless proceeded with PGOO Alberto P. Molina, Jr. as presiding officer.
Chosen as members of the Board of Directors were Taule, Aquino, Avila, Jacob and Sales.
o Thereafter, the following were elected officers of the FABC:

President RupertoTaule
Vice-President Allan Aquino
Secretary Vicente Avila
Treasurer Fidel Jacob
Auditor Leo Sales
Leandro I. Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes, sent a letter to respondent Luis T. Santos, the
Secretary of Local Government,protesting the election of the officers of the FABC and seeking
its nullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted.
RupertoTaule as President of the FABC, filed his comment on the letter-protest. He denied the
alleged irregularities and denounced the respondent Governor for meddling or intervening in
the election of FABC officers which is a purely non-partisan affair. At the same time, he
requested for his appointment as a member of the SangguniangPanlalawigan of the province,
as the duly elected President of the FABC in Catanduanes.
Secretary Santos issued a resolution nullifying the election of the officers of the FABC in
Catanduanes, and ordering a new one to be conducted as early as possible to be presided by
the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local Government.
Taule filed an MR but this was denied. Thus, he went to the SC.

Issues:
1) Does Secretary Santos have jurisdiction to entertain an election protest involving the election
of the officers of the Federation of Association of Barangay Councils? NO
2) Does the Governor have the legal personality to file an election protest? YES
3) Was the election valid? NO

Ratio:
As to the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Local Government
1) Secretary Santos, acting in accordance with the provision of the Local Government Code
empowering him to "promulgate in detail the implementing circulars and the rules and
regulations to carry out the various administrative actions required for the initial
implementation of this Code in such a manner as will ensure the least disruption of on-going
programs and projects issued Department of Local Government Circular No. 89-09, to provide
the guidelines for the conduct of the elections of officers of the Katipunanngmga Barangay at
the municipal, city, provincial, regional and national levels.
2) Taule contends that neither the constitution nor the law grants jurisdiction to Secretary Santos
over election contests involving the election of officers of the FABC, the katipunanngmga
barangay at the provincial level. He contends that under Article IX, C, Section 2 183 of the 1987
Constitution, it is the Commission on Elections which has jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective barangay officials.
183

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions: xxxxxx
2. Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by
trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay
offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.

3) Secretary Santos contends that any violation of the guidelines as set forth in said circular
would be a ground for filing a protest and would vest upon the Department jurisdiction to
resolve any protest that may be filed in relation thereto.
4) The 1987 Constitution expanded the jurisdiction of the COMELEC by granting it appellate
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of
general jurisdiction or elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
5) The jurisdiction of the COMELEC over contests involving elective barangay officials is limited
to appellate jurisdiction from decisions of the trial courts.
6) The jurisdiction of the COMELEC is over popular elections, the elected officials of which are
determined through the will of the electorate. An election is the embodiment of the popular
will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people. It involves the choice or selection of
candidates to public office by popular vote.
7) Specifically, the term "election," in the context of the Constitution, may refer to the conduct
of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the
casting and counting of the voteswhich do not characterize the election of officers in the
Katipunanngmga barangay.
8) "Election contests" would refer to adversary proceedings by which matters involving the title
or claim of title to an elective office, made before or after proclamation of the winner, is
settled whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute and in the case of
elections of barangay officials, it is restricted to proceedings after the proclamation of the
winners as no pre-proclamation controversies are allowed.
9) The jurisdiction of the COMELEC does not cover protests over the organizational set-up of the
katipunanngmga barangay composed of popularly elected punong barangays as prescribed
by law whose officers are voted upon by their respective members. The authority of the
COMELEC over the katipunanngmga barangay is limited by law to supervision of the election
of the representative of the katipunan concerned to the sanggunian in a particular level
conducted by their own respective organization.
10)
However, the Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to entertain
any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC.
11)
He has the power to promulgate rules and regulations, under Section 222 of the LGC.
Under Book IV, Title XII, Chapter 1, See. 3(2) of the Administrative Code of 1987, he has the
power to "establish and prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances and implementing
laws on the general supervision of local government units and on the promotion of local
autonomy and monitor compliance thereof by said units." His rule-making power is provided
in Sec. 7, Chapter II, Book IV of the Administrative Code.
12)
Thus, DLG Circular No. 89-09 was issued by respondent Secretary in pursuance of his rulemaking power conferred by law and which now has the force and effect of law.
13)
But this does not meant that a violation of said circular vests jurisdiction upon the
Secretary, as claimed by him, to hear a protest filed in relation thereto and consequently
declare an election null and void.
14)
Unless expressly empowered, administrative agencies are bereft of quasi- judicial
powers.The jurisdiction of administrative authorities is dependent entirely upon the provisions
of the statutes reposing power in them; they cannot confer it upon themselves. Such
jurisdiction is essential to give validity to their determinations.
15)
There is no provision expressly or impliedly conferring upon the Secretary of Local
Government the power to assume jurisdiction over an election protect involving officers of the
katipunanngmga barangay. Thus, it is important to first understand the extent of authority of
the Secretary over local governments.
16)
Presidential power over local governments is limited by the Constitution to the exercise of
general supervision "to ensure that local affairs are administered according to law."The
general supervision is exercised by the President through the Secretary of Local Government.
17)
In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer
to see that the subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fails or neglects to fulfill
them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform
their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and

to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The fundamental law permits
the Chief Executive to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local
government or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments.
Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments so long as the same or its
officers act within the scope of their authority. Supervisory power, when contrasted with
control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any
restraining authority over such body.
18)
Based on this, the Secretary has no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the
election of the officers of the katipunan. To allow him to do so will give him more power than
the law or the Constitution grants. It will in effect give him control over local government
officials for it will permit him to interfere in a purely democratic and non-partisan activity
aimed at strengthening the barangay as the basic component of local governments so that
the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved.
19)
His order that the new elections to be conducted be presided by the Regional Director is a
clear and direct interference by the Department with the political affairs of the barangays
which is not permitted by the limitation of presidential power to general supervision over local
governments.
20)
This is more in line with the policy of the state to ensure the autonomy of local
governments.
21)
Moreover, although the Department is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and
other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely "monitoring
compliance" by local government units of such issuances.
22)
To monitor means "to watch, observe or check. This is compatible with the power of
supervision of the Secretary over local governments which as earlier discussed is limited to
checking whether the local government unit concerned or the officers thereof perform their
duties as provided by statutory enactments.
23)
Since the respondent Secretary exercises only supervision and not control over local
governments, it is doubtful if he could enforce compliance with the DLG Circular. Any doubt
therefore as to the power of the Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be resolved in
favor of the greater autonomy of the local government.
24)
Thus, in assuming jurisdiction over the election protest filed by respondent Governor and
declaring the election of the officers of the FABC as null and void, the respondent Secretary
acted in excess of his jurisdiction. The respondent Secretary not having the jurisdiction to
hear an election protest involving officers of the FABC, the recourse of the parties is to the
ordinary courts. The Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear the
protest.
25)
There was also an amendment to DLG Circular 89-09, which states that "whenever the
guidelines are not substantially complied with, the election shall be declared null and void by
the Department of Local Government and an election shall conduct and being invoked by the
Solicitor General. This cannot be applied retroactively becasuse it was issued after the
electionsMoreover, such provision is null and void for having been issued in excess of the
respondent Secretary's jurisdiction, inasmuch as an administrative authority cannot confer
jurisdiction upon itself.
As to the personality of the Governor to file the protests
26)
Respondent Governor has the personality to file the protest. Under Section 205 of the LGC,
the membership of the sangguniangpanlalawigan consists of the governor, the vice-governor,
elective members of the said sanggunian and the presidents of the katipunangpanlalawigan
and the kabataang barangay provincial federation. The governor acts as the presiding officer
of the sangguniangpanlalawigan.
27)
As presiding officer of the sagguniangpanlalawigan, the respondent governor has an
interest in the election of the officers of the FABC since its elected president becomes a
member of the assembly. If the president of the FABC assumes his presidency under
questionable circumstances and is allowed to sit in the sangguniangpanlalawigan the official

actions of the sanggunian may be vulnerable to attacks as to their validity or legality. Hence,
respondent governor is a proper party to question the regularity of the elections of the
officers of the FABC.
As to the validity of the elections
28)
The SC decided to resolve the issue of the validity of the elections in order to prevent any
unnecessary delay that may result from the commencement of an appropriate action by the
parties.
29)
The elections were declared null and void primarily for failure to comply with Section 2.4 of
DLG Circular No. 89-09 which provides that "the incumbent FABC President or the VicePresident shall preside over the reorganizational meeting, there being a quorum." The rule
specifically provides that it is the incumbent FABC President or Vice-President who shall
preside over the meeting. The word "shall" should be taken in its ordinary signification, i.e., it
must be imperative or mandatory and not merely
permissive, as the rule is explicit and requires no other interpretation. If it had been intended
that any other official should preside, the rules would have provided so, as it did in the
elections at the town and city levelsas well as the regional level.. 39
30)
Neither the incumbent FABC President nor the Vice-President presided over the meeting
and elections but Alberto P. Molina, Jr., the Chairman of the Board of Election
Supervisors/Consultants. Thus, there was a clear violation of the aforesaid mandatory
provision. On this ground, the elections should be nullified.
31)
Under Sec. 2.3.2.7 of the same circular it is provided that a Board of Election
Supervisors/Consultants shall be constituted to oversee and/or witness the canvassing of
votes and proclamation of winners. The rules confine the role of the Board of Election
Supervisors/Consultants to merely overseeing and witnessing the conduct of elections. This is
consistent with the provision in the Local Government Code limiting the authority of the
COMELEC to the supervision of the election.
32)
PGOO Molina, the Chairman of the Board, presided over the elections. There was direct
participation by the Chairman of the Board in the elections contrary to what is dictated by the
rules. Worse, there was no Board of Election Supervisors to oversee the elections in view of
the walk out staged by its two other members, the Provincial COMELEC Supervisor and the
Provincial Treasurer. The objective of keeping the election free and honest was therefore
compromised.
33)
Thus, the election of officers of the FABC held on June 18, 1989 is null and void for failure
to comply with the provisions of DLG Circular No. 89-09.
34)
Meanwhile, pending resolution of this petition, petitioner filed a supplemental petition
alleging that Augusto Antonio had been designated by Secretary Santos as temporary
representative of the Federation to the sangguniangpanlalawigan of Catanduanes.
35)
Section 205(2) of the LGC states that the (2) The sangguniangpanlalawigan shall be
composed of the governor, the vice-governor, elective members of the said sanggunian and
the presidents of the katipunangpanlalawiganand the kabataang barangay provincial
federation who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines.
36)
Augusto Antonio is not the president of the federation. He is a member of the federation
but he was not even present during the elections despite notice. The argument that Antonio
was appointed as a remedial measure in the exigency of the service cannot be sustained.
Since Antonio does not meet the basic qualification of being president of the federation, his
appointment to the sangguniangpanlalawigan is not justified notwithstanding that such
appointment is merely in a temporary capacity.
37)
If the intention of the respondent Secretary was to protect the interest of the federation in
the sanggunian, he should have appointed the incumbent FABC President in a hold-over
capacity.
38)
Since the election is still under protest such that no successor of the incumbent has as yet
qualified, the respondent Secretary has no choice but to have the incumbent FABC President

sit as member of the sanggunian. He could even have appointed Taule since he was elected
the president of the federation but not Antonio.
39)
The appointment of Antonio, allegedly the protege of respondent Governor, gives
credence to petitioner's charge of political interference by respondent Governor in the
organization. This should not be allowed. The barangays should be insulated from any
partisan activity or political intervention if only to give true meaning to local autonomy.
Petition granted.Orders of Secretary Santos annulled. Elections annulled.
Appointment of Antonio also annulled.

Citizen J. Antonio M. Carpio v. The Executive Secretary, The Secretary of Local

Governments, The Secretary of National Defense and the National Treasurer
Paras, J. 14 February 1992
SV: RA 6975, establishing the Philippine National Police under a Reorganized Department of the
Interior and Local Government, passed into law. Justice Carpio, as a citizen, filed the current suit
assailing its validity.
The SC ruled that Ra 6975 was constitutional. The NAPOLCOM was not emasculated by the
placing of the PNP under the DILG Secretary. At any rate, the doctrine of Qualified Political
Agency provides that it is the single Executive (the President) that has the power of control over
all executive departments, bureaus and agencies. Such power of control is exercised by the
President over the Department Heads, who, in turn, and, under his authority, control the bureaus
and other offices under their jurisdiction.
FACTS:
- The constitutional provision at the core of the controversy is:
Art. XVI, Sec. 6. The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which stall be
national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national
police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their
jurisdiction shall be provided by law.
- Congress passed RA 6975 (An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police Under a
Reorganized Department of the Interior and Local Government, and for other purposes).
- Citizen J. Antonio M. Carpio filed the present case assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of RA 6975.
ISSUES/REASONING:
Is RA 6975 unconstitutional? NO.
BRIEF HISTORY OF THE POLICE FORCE
1) During the Commonwealth period, the Philippine Constabulary was the nucleus of the
Philippine Ground Force (now the Armed Forces of the Philippines). The PC was made part of the
PGF but its administrative, supervisory and directional control was handled by the Department of
Interior.
After the war, it remained as the National Police under the Department of National Defense as
a major service component of the AFP.
2) Later, the Integration Act of 1975 created the Integrated National Police (INP) under the Office
of the President, with the PC as the nucleus, and the local police forces as the civilian

components. The PC-INP was headed by the PC Chief who, as concurrent Director-General of the
INP, exercised command functions over the INP.
a) The National Police Commission (NAPOLCOLM) exercised administrative control and
supervision while the local executives exercised operational supervision and direction over
the INP units within their respective localities.
b) The set-up whereby the INP was placed under the command of the military component,
which is the PC, severely eroded the INPs civilian character and the multiplicity in the
governance of the PC-INP resulted in inefficient police service.
c) Moreover, the integration of the national police forces with the PC also resulted in
inequities since the military component had superior benefits and privileges.
The Constitutional Commission of 1986 was fully aware of the structural errors that beset the
system. Thus, Com. Teodulo C. Natividad explained that:
The basic tenet of a modern police organization is to remove it from the military
Therefore, in keeping with this, and because of the universal acceptance that a police
force is a civilian function, a public service, and should not be performed by military force,
one of the basic reforms we are presenting here is that it should be separated from the
military force which is the PC.
RA 6975 DID NOT EMASCULATE THE NAPOLCOM
In the main, petitioner advances the view that RA 6975 emasculated the NAPOLCOM by limiting
its power to administrative control over the PNP, thus control remained with the Department
Secretary under whom both the NAPOLCOM and the PNP were placed.
The SC disagreed. The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices.
This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all
executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk.
a) Control means the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former with that of the latter. (Mondano v. Silvosa
b) It is said to be at the very heart of the meaning of Chief Executive.
Corollary to the control powers of the President, is the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency. As
the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in
person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.
In short, the Presidents power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the
Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their
respective jurisdictions in the executive department.
Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the reorganized
DILG is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and
cooperation among the citizenry, local executives, and the integrated law enforcement agencies
and public safety agencies created under the assailed Act, the funding of the PNP being in large
part subsidized by the national government.
Such organizational set-up does not detract from the mandate of the Constitution that the
national police force shall be administered and controlled by a national police commission as, at
any rate, and, in fact, the Act in question adequately provides for administration and control at
the commission level.
THE POWER OF CONTROL OF THE NAPOLCOM OVER THE PNP IS NOT DEROGATED BY
THE VESTING OF THE POWER TO CHOOSE THE PNP PROVINCIAL DIRECTOR AND THE
CHIEFS OF POLICE IN THE GOVERNORS AND MAYORS

Petitioner further asserts that in manifest derogation of the power of control of the NAPOLCOM
over the PNP, RA 6975 vested:
a) the power to choose the PNP Provincial Director and the Chiefs of Police in the Governors
and Mayors, respectively;
b) the power of "operational supervision and control" over police units in city and municipal
mayors; in the Civil Service Commission,
c) participation in appointments to the positions of Senior Superintendent to Deputy DirectorGeneral as well as the administration of qualifying entrance examinations; disciplinary
powers over PNP members in the "People's Law Enforcement Boards" and in city and
municipal mayors.
The SC found no real controversy on this point as well.
When the Constitutional Commissioners of 1986 provided that the authority of local executives
over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law, they intended that the day-today functions of police work like crime, investigation, crime prevention activities, traffic control,
etc., would be under the operational control of the local executives as it would not be advisable
to give full control of the police to the local executives.
They reasoned that in the past, this gave rise to warlordism, bossism, and sanctuaries for vices
and abuses.
It would appear then that by vesting in the local executives the power to choose the officers in
question, the Act went beyond the bounds of the Constitution's intent.
Not so. We find light in the principle of constitutional construction that every presumption should
be indulged in favor of constitutionality and the court in considering the validity of the statute in
question should give it such reasonable construction as can be reached to bring it within the
fundamental law.
Under the law, full control remains with the NAPOLCOM. There is no usurpation of the power of
control of the NAPOLCOM under Sec. 51 because under the very same provision, it is clear that
the local executives are only acting as representatives of the NAPOLCOM.
D. PARTICIPATION OF LOCAL EXECUTIVES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE PNP.
Sec. 51. Powers of Local Government Officials over the PNP Units or Forces.
Governors and mayors shall be deputized as representatives of the Commission in their
respective territorial jurisdictions. As such, the local executives shall discharge the
following functions:
a.) Provincial Governor (1) . . .
The provincial governor shall choose the provincial director from a list of three (3) eligibles
recommended by the PNP Regional Director.
4) . . . City and municipal mayors shall have the following authority over the PNP units in
their respective jurisdictions:
i.) Authority to choose the chief of police from a list of five (5) eligibles recommended by
the Provincial Police Director. . . .
THE OPERATIONAL SUPERVISION AND CONTROL EXERCISED BY THE LOCAL OFFICIALS
DOES NOT USURP THE POWER OF CONTROL OF THE NAPOLCOM OVER THE PNP
Under the questioned provisions, here, the officials would also simply be acting as

representatives of the NAPOLCOM.

Sec. 31. Appointment of PNP Officers and Members. The Appointment of the officers and
members of the PNP shall be effected in the following manner:
a.) Police Officer I to Senior Police Officer IV. Appointed by the PNP regional director for
regional personnel or by the Chief of the PNP for national headquarters personnel and
attested by the Civil Service Commission;
b.) Inspector to Superintendent. Appointed by the Chief of the PNP, as recommended by
their immediate superiors, and attested by the Civil Service Commission;
c.) Senior Superintendent to Deputy Director-General. Appointed by the President upon
recommendation of the Chief of the PNP, with proper endorsement by the Chairman of the
Civil Service
Commission . . .
Sec. 32. Examinations for Policemen. The Civil Service Commission shall administer the
qualifying entrance examinations for policemen on the basis of the standards set by the
NAPOLCOM.
THE GRANT OF DISCIPLINARY POWERS OVER PNP MEMBERS TO THE PEOPLES LAW
ENFORCEMENT BOARDS (PLEB) AND CITY/MUNICIPAL MAYORS IS ALSO NOT IN
DEROGATION OF NAPOLCOMS POWER OF CONTROL OVER THE PNP.
Pursuant to the Act, the Commission exercises appellate jurisdiction, thru the regional appellate
boards, over decisions of both the PLEB and the said mayors. This is so under Section 20(c).
Furthermore, it is the Commission which shall issue the implementing guidelines and procedures
to be adopted by the PLEB for in the conduct of its hearings, and it may assign NAPOLCOM
hearing officers to act as legal consultants of the PLEBs (Section 43-d4, d5).
THERE IS NO ABDICATION BY THE PRESIDENT OF, EXECUTIVE CONTROL AND
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF POWERS UNDER Sec. 12
Petitioner argues that Sec. 12 constitutes an encroachment upon, interference with, and an
abdication by the President of, executive control and commander-in-chief powers.
Sec. 12. Relationship of the Department with the Department of National Defense.
During a period of twenty- four (24) months from the effectivity of this Act, the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) shall continue its present role of preserving the internal and
external security of the State: Provided, that said period may be extended by the
President, if he finds it justifiable, for another period not exceeding twenty-four (24)
months, after which, the Department shall automatically take over from the AFP the
primary role of preserving internal security, leaving to the AFP its primary role of
preserving external security.
The national police force does not fall under the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President.
This is necessarily so since the police force, not being integrated with the military, is not a part of
the AFP. As a civilian agency, it properly comes within, and is subject to, the exercise by the
President of the power of executive control.
The provision herein assailed precisely gives muscle to and enforces this proposition.
Consequently, Sec. 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief powers. It simply
provides for the transition period or process during which the national police would gradually
assume the civilian function of safeguarding the internal security of the State.

The CREATION OF A SPECIAL OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE IS NOT AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL

DIMUNITION OF THE PRESIDENTS POWER OF CONTROL OVER ALL EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENTS, BUREAUS AND OFFICES.
There is not the least interference with the Presidents power of control under Sec. 84. The
Special Oversight Committee is simply an ad hoc or transitory body, established and tasked
solely with planning and overseeing the immediate transfer, merger, and/or absorption in the
DILG of the involved agencies.
Once this is carried out, its functions, as well as the committee itself would cease altogether. As
an ad hoc body, its creation and function, decidedly do not constitute an encroachment and in
diminution of the power of control which properly belongs to the President.
INDEPENDENT CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS vs. NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION
The Constitution provides for the so-called independent Constitutional Commissions, namely: The
Civil Service Commission, commission on Audit and the Commission on Elections. The
Constitution also created an independent office called the Commission on Human Rights (which,
although independent like the other Commissions, still had to be constituted through EO 163).
The 3 Constitutional Commissions + CHR are all independent of the Executive, but the
NAPOLCOM is not. In fact, it was stressed during the CONCOM deliberations that this commission
would be under the President and hence may be controlled by the President thru his or her alter
ego, the Sec. of Interior.
PETITION DISMISSED.
Bito-onon v FERNANDEZ
31 January 2001
SHORT VERSION
Bito-onon and Quijano ran for the same position in the Liga ng Barangay. When Quijano lost, he
filed a protest with the BSE; when the protest failed, he elevated the case to the RTC pursuant to
a memorandum circular issued by the DILG. Bito-onon moved to dismiss the case, saying that
the circular was ultra vires since the internal rules of the liga provided that the mode of appeal
should be to the National Liga Board. The SC ruled that the memorandum circular was invalid, as
it was an exercise of the power of control and not the power of supervision. It effectively
amended the rules of the liga, which the Local Government Code stated was suppletory to its
own provisions when it came to matters concerning the liga.
FACTS:
Joel Bito-onon was the barangay chairman of Tacras, Narra, Palawan and the Municipal Liga
Chapter president for Narra. He ran against Elegio Quijano for executive vice-president of the
Liga ng Barangay Palawan chapter. Onon was proclaimed the winner so Quijano filed an election
protest with the board of election supervisors.
The BSE ruled againt Quijano, so he filed a petition for review with the RTC. Onon questioned the
jurisdiction of the RTC over decisions rendered by the BSE in Liga elections, and claimed that the
DILG circular (Memorandum Circular 97-193) which provided for this mode of review was an ultra
vires act on the part of the DILG Secretary. The RTC denied Onon's motion to dismiss, saying that
the circular was properly promulgated in accordance with the Secretary's rule-making power.
ISSUE: was the issuance of the memorandum circular a valid exercise of the President's
supervisory power? NO
REASONING:

There was an apparent conflict between Memorandum Circular 97-193 and the Implementing
Rules and Guidelines for the 1997 General Elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay Officers and
Directors. The circular provided for an appeal of BSE decisions to the regular courts, while the
guidelines stated that their decisions were reviewable by the National Liga Board, the decision of
which would be final and executory.
The circular was issued pursuant to the DILG's rule-making power in the exercise of the
President's power of general supervision. This supervisory power extended to the liga ng mga
barangay, despite it not being a local government unit.
In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the Department of Justice ruled that the liga ng mga barangay
is a government organization, being an association, federation, league or union created by law or
by authority of law, whose members are either appointed or elected government officials.
The Local Government Code defines the liga ng mga barangay as an organization of all
barangays for the primary purpose of determining the representation of the liga in the
sanggunians, and for ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting barangay
government administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto. The
liga shall have chapters at the municipal, city, provincial and metropolitan political subdivision
levels. The municipal and city chapters of the liga shall be composed of the barangay
representatives of the municipal and city barangays respectively. The duly elected presidents of
the component municipal and city chapters shall constitute the provincial chapter or the
metropolitan political subdivision chapter. The duly elected presidents of highly urbanized cities,
provincial chapters, the Metropolitan Manila chapter and metropolitan political subdivision
chapters shall constitute the National Liga ng mga Barangay.
The ligas are primarily governed by the LGC. However, their respective constitution and by-laws
shall govern all other matters affecting the internal organization of the liga not otherwise
provided for in the LGC provided that the constitution and by-laws shall be suppletory to the
provisions of Book III, Title VI of the Local Government Code and shall always conform to the
provisions of the Constitution and existing laws.
The circular effectively modified the rules that the liga had promulgated to govern itself. The
amendment of the guidelines was more than an exercise of the power of supervision but was an
exercise of the power of control, which the President didn't have over the liga.
Although the DILG was given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances, the
Administrative Code limited its authority to merely monitoring compliance by local government
units of such issuances.To monitor means to watch, observe or check and is compatible with
the power of supervision of the DILG Secretary over local governments, which is limited to
checking whether the local government unit concerned or the officers thereof perform their
duties as per statutory enactments.
RULING: petition granted; petition for review in the RTC dismissed
The Province of Batangas, represented by its Governor, Hermilando Manandas
(Petitioner) vs Hon. Alberto Romulo, Executive Secretary and Chairman of the
Oversight Committee on Devolution; Hon. Emilia Boncodin, Department of Budget and
Management Secretary; Hon Jose Lina, Jr., Department of Interior and Local
Government Secretary (Respondents)

Date: May 27, 2004

Ponente: Callejo, Jr., J.

Short Version:
Facts: The General Appropriations Act of 1999 contained a provision earmarking P5B of the IRA to
be part of the Local Government Service Equalization Fund, and subjecting the release thereof to
the rules prescribed by the Oversight Committee. The Oversight Committee then issued
resolutions detailing how the fund should be released. The resolutions of the Oversight
Committee provided for a sharing of the fund between LGUs different from that prescribed in the
LGC. The resolutions also provided for the release of parts of the fund subject to the compliance
by LGUs of the rules prescribed by the Oversight Committee. The GAAs of 2000, and 2001 also
contained provisions similar to the GAA of 1999, and pursuant thereto, the Oversight Committee
issued resolutions for detailing the release of the funds. The province of Batangas challenged the
provisions of the GAAs and the resolutions issued by the Oversight Committee.
Held: The said provisions and resolutions are unconstitutional. To subject the distribution and
release of the IRA to the rules prescribed by the Oversight Committee makes the release not
automatic, a flagrant violation of the constitutional and statutory mandate that the just share of
the LGUs be automatically released. The Oversight Committee exercising discretion, even
control, over the distribution and release of a portion of the IRA is an anathema to and
subversive of the principle of local autonomy embodied in the Constitution.

Facts:
- On December 7, 1998, President Estrada issued EO 48 184. The program was established to
facilitate the process of enhancing the capacities of LGUs in the discharge of the functions and
services devolved to them by the National Government Agencies concerned pursuant to the LGC.
- The Devolution Adjustment and Equalization Fund was created. DBM was directed to set
aside an amount to be determined by the Oversight Committee, constituted under Sec 533(b)
of the LGC, based on the devolution status appraisal surveys undertaken by the DILG. The
initial fund was to be sourced from the savings of the national government for CY 185 1998. For
the succeeding years, the amount required to sustain the program was to be incorporated in
the annual GAA. The Oversight Committee was authorized to issue the implementing rules
governing the equitable allocation and distribution of said fund to the LGUs.
- In RA 8745 (GAA of 1999), the program was renamed as the Local Government Service
Equalization Fund (LGSEF). Under said appropriations law, the amount of P96.78B was allotted as
the share of the LGUs in the internal revenue taxes. Of the said amount, P5B was earmarked for
the LGSEF, and was subject to the rules promulgated by the Oversight Committee.
- Pursuant to the GAA of 1991, the Oversight Committee passed resolutions detailing how the
184
ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM FOR DEVOLUTION ADJUSTMENT AND EQUALIZATION

185
Calendar Year?

LGSEF is to be spent.
- P2B is to be allocated based on the sharing scheme provided in the LGC.
- P2B is to be allocated following this formula: 40% to provinces, 20% to cities, and 40% to
municipalities.
- P1B is to be given to LGUs based on certain criteria for eligibility. LGUs were required to
identify the projects eligible for funding, and submit the project proposals thereof and other
documentary requirements to the DILG for appraisal.
- Under RA 8760 (GAA of 2000), P5B of the IRA was also earmarked for the LGSEF.
- Pursuant to GAA of 2000, the Oversight Committee passed a resolution detailing how the LGSEF
for the year is to be allocated.
- P3.5B will be divided as follows: 26% to provinces, 23% to cities, 35% to municipalities, and
16% to barangays.
- P1.5B shall be earmarked to support the initiatives and local affirmative action projects, to be
approved by the Oversight Committee in accordance with its guidelines.
- For the year 2001, in view of Congress' failure to enact a general appropriations law, the GAA of
2000 was deemed re-enacted, together with the IRA proviso earmarking P5B for the LGSEF. The
Oversight Committee then issued a resolution detailing how the LGSEF for the year is to be
allocated.
- P3B shall be divided as follows: 25% to provinces, 25% to cities, 35% to municipalities, and
15% to barangays.
- P1.9B for priority projects based on certain criteria.
- P.1B will be part of the Capability-Building Fund.
- The Province of Batangas then filed with the SC the present petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus to declare as unconstitutional and void the provisions in the GAAs earmarking
part of the IRA for the LGSEF, and the Oversight Committee resolutions issued pursuant to those
GAA provisions.
- Arguments of Batangas:
- Sec 6, Art X of the Constitution mandates that the just share of the LGUs be automatically
released. Secs 18 and 286 of the LGC also mandate that the just share of the LGUs shall be
automatically and directly released without need of further action. To subject the distribution
and release of a portion of the IRA to compliance by the LGUs with the rules prescribed by the
Oversight Committee contravenes the explicit directive of the law.
- To vest the Oversight Committee with the authority to determine the distribution and release
of part of the IRA is an anathema to the principle of local autonomy. The possible disapproval
by the Oversight Committee of the project proposals of the LGUs would result in the
diminution of the latters share in the IRA.
- The resolutions also constitute an illegal amendment by the executive branch of a
substantive law since they prescribe a sharing of a part of the IRA different from that

prescribed in Sec 285 LGC186.

- There are still portions of the LGSEF that have not been received by the Batangas, resulting
to its damage and injury.
- Arguments of Respondents:
- Sec 6, Art X of the Constitution does not specify that the just share of the LGUs shall be
determined solely by the LGC. The phrase as determined by law means that there is no
limitation on the power of Congress to determine what is the just share of the LGUs in the
national taxes.
- Sec 285 of the LGC was not intended to be a fixed determination of the LGUs' just share in
the national taxes. Congress may enact other laws, such as the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001,
providing for a different sharing formula. Sec 285 is merely the default share to do away with
the need to determine annually by law the just share.
- The petition is defective for it raises factual issues which should be properly threshed out in
the lower courts.
- The petition is moot and academic. The IRAs for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001, have
already been released and the government is now operating under the 2003 budget.
- The petitioner has no legal standing because it has not suffered any injury. In fact, its just
share was even increased because of the Oversight Committee resolutions.

Issue/Reasoning:
Issue: Whether the petition should be dismissed on procedural grounds (No)
-Petitioner is a local government seeking relief in order to protect its interest, and of the other
LGUs. This interest pertains to the LGUs share in the national taxes or the IRA. Further, it claims
to have suffered injury occasioned by the implementation of the assailed measures. These
allegations are sufficient to grant the petitioner standing as it clearly has a plain, direct and
adequate interest in the manner and distribution of the IRA among the LGUs.
- The earmarking of P5M of the IRA as LGSEF, the promulgation of the assailed Oversight
Committee resolutions, and release of the LGSEF to the LGUs only upon their compliance with
the rules of the Oversight Committee, are admitted. They are no longer in issue, and need not be
determined by the trial court.
- The case is of transcendental importance. It warrants the relaxation of procedural rules.
- A question otherwise moot and academic can be decided if it is capable of repetition, yet
evading review. For the GAAs in the coming years may contain provisos similar to those now
being sought to be invalidated, and yet, the question may not be decided before another GAA is
enacted. Thus, the Court should make a categorical ruling on the substantive issue now.

186
Provinces 23%; Cities 23%; Municipalities 34%; and Barangays 20%.

Issue: Whether the assailed GAA provisions and the Oversight Committee resolutions issued
pursuant thereto are unconstitutional (Yes. The said provisions violate the constitutional mandate
of the automatic release of the LGUs share in the national taxes.)
- The Constitution has adopted a policy of local autonomy. Consistent with the principle of local
autonomy, the Constitution confines the Presidents power over the LGUs to one of general
supervision. This has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. The distinction between
the two powers was enunciated in Drilon v Lim:
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he
may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate... Supervision does
not cover such authority. The supervisor... merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he
himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace
them... he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules...
He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.
- The Constitution and the LGC mandate that the LGUs have a just share in the national taxes
which are to be automatically released. As held in Pimintel v Aguirre:
A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the
National internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution. The [LGC]
specifies that the release shall be made directly to the LGU... and 'shall not be subject to any
lien or holdback...' the term shall is a word of command that must be given a compulsory
meaning. The provision is... imperative... the 'temporary' nature of the retention by the
national government does not matter. Any retention is prohibited... [Sec 4 of AO 372]
effectively encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local governments...
- The entire process involving the distribution and release of the LGSEF is constitutionally
impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or just share of the LGUs in the national taxes. To
subject its distribution and release to the rules prescribed by the Oversight Committee, as
sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD
resolutions, makes the release not automatic, a flagrant violation of the constitutional and
statutory mandate that the just share of the LGUs shall be automatically released to them.
The LGUs are, thus, placed at the mercy of the Oversight Committee.
- The Oversight Committee exercising discretion, even control, over the distribution and release
of a portion of the IRA is an anathema to and subversive of the principle of local autonomy
embodied in the Constitution.
- The Oversight Committee was created merely to formulate the rules and regulations for the
efficient and effective implementation of the LGC. Tts creation was placed under the title of
Transitory Provisions, signifying its ad hoc character. According to Senator Pimentel, the
Committees work was supposed to be done a year from the approval of the Code. The
Committees authority is limited to the implementation of the LGC, not to supplant or subvert the
same. Neither can it exercise control over the IRA.
- The automatic release of the IRA was precisely intended to guarantee and promote local
autonomy as can be gleaned from the discussions in the Constitutional Commission.
- The concept of local autonomy was explained in Ganzon v CA:
local autonomy means a more responsive and accountable local government structure

instituted through a system of decentralization... Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the
relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local
government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of federalism... Local governments... are
subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit
paradoxically, to enhance self-government... decentralization means devolution of national
administration but not power to the local levels...
- Local autonomy includes both administrative and fiscal autonomy. As stated in Pimentel v
Aguirre:
local government units, in addition to having administrative autonomy... enjoy fiscal
autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy means that local governments have the power to create
their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes... as well
as the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities... a basic
feature of local fiscal autonomy is the constitutionally mandated automatic release of the
shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue.
- Similar to the assailed provision in Pimentel v Aguirre, the assailed provisos in the GAAs of
1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions constitute a withholding of a portion of the IRA.
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions effectively
encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the LGUs and must be struck down.

Issue: Whether the provisos in the GAAs can amend Sec 285 of the LGC (No. Amendment of a
law cannot be done through an appropriations law.)
- The LGC is a substantive law. While it is conceded that Congress may amend any of its
provisions, it may not do so through appropriations laws or GAAs. Any amendment to the LGC
should be done in a separate law because Congress cannot include in a general appropriation bill
matters that should be more properly enacted in a separate legislation.
- A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to specified
sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit. Any provision therein
which is intended to amend another law is considered an inappropriate provision.
- Increasing or decreasing the IRA or modifying their percentage sharing therein are matters of
general and substantive law. To permit Congress to undertake these amendments through the
GAAs, as the respondents contend, would be to give Congress the unbridled authority to unduly
infringe the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs, and thus put the same in jeopardy every year.

Conclusion
- The principle of local autonomy dates back to the turn of the century when President McKinley,
in his Instructions ordered the new Government to devote their attention in the first instance to
the establishment of municipal governments in which the natives of the Islands... shall be
afforded the opportunity to manage their own affairs to the fullest extent of which they are
capable, and subject to the least degree of supervision and control...
- While the 1935 Constitution had no specific article on local autonomy, it limited the executive

power over local governments to general supervision... as may be provided by law.

- The 1973 Constitution explicitly stated that [t]he State shall guarantee and promote the
autonomy of local government units, especially the barangay to ensure their fullest development
as self-reliant communities. An entire article on Local Government was incorporated therein.
- The present Constitution has broadened the principle of local autonomy. Article X thereof
markedly increased the powers of the local governments in order to accomplish the goal of a
more meaningful local autonomy.
- The value of local governments as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of
autonomy that they enjoy. As eloquently put by M. De Tocqueville, [l]ocal assemblies of citizens
constitute the strength of free nations. Township meetings are to liberty what primary schools are
to science; they bring it within the peoples reach; they teach men how to use and enjoy it. A
nation may establish a system of free governments but without the spirit of municipal
institutions, it cannot have the spirit of liberty.
- Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local
autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions are
based.

Dispositive:
Petition granted. The assailed provisions and resolutions are unconstitutional.
Engr. Ranulfo Feliciano, in his capacity as General Manager of the Leyte Metropolitan Water
District v. Commission on Audit, et al.
14 January 2004
Carpio, J.
Short version: A Special Audit Team from COA Regional Office No. VIII audited the accounts of the
Leyte Metropolitan Water District (LWMD). Subsequently, LMWD received a letter from COA
requesting payment of auditing fees. Feliciano, as General Manager of LMWD, refused to pay the
auditing fees. He argues that LMWD is outside the audit jurisdiction of the COA and thus, it
cannot be made to pay for the said auditing fees. However, the SC ruled that Local Water
Districts, such as LMWD, is a GOCC with an original charter and is thus subject to COAs audit
jurisdiction. Feliciano contends that it is the Sangguniang Bayan resolution 187 which creates the
LWDs. This therefore assumes that the Sangguniang Bayan has the power to create corporations.
The SC disagreed and said that the LGC does not vest in the Sangguniang Bayan the power to
create corporations. What the LGC empowers the Sangguniang Bayan to do, through Sec. 447 (5)
(vii) is to to provide for the establishment of a waterworks system subject to existing laws.
Thus, the Sangguniang Bayan may establish a waterworks system only in accordance with the
provisions of PD 198. The Sangguniang Bayan, by itself, has no power to create a corporate
entity that will operate its waterworks system. However, it may avail of existing enabling laws,
like PD 198, to form and incorporate a water district.
Facts:

187
This resolution concerning water districts is made pursuant to PD 198.

- A Special Audit Team from COA Regional Office No. VIII audited the accounts of the Leyte
Metropolitan Water District (LWMD). Subsequently, LMWD received a letter from COA requesting
payment of auditing fees.
- As General Manager of LMWD, Feliciano sent a reply informing COAs Regional Director that the
water district could not pay the auditing fees. He cited as basis for his action Secs. 6 and 20 of
PD 198, as well as Sec. 18 of RA 6758. The Regional Director referred the reply to the COA
Chairman. Later, Feliciano also wrote COA asking for the refund of all auditing fees LMWD
previously paid to COA.
- Afterwards, Feliciano received COA Chairman Gangans Resolution denying his requests.
Feliciano filed an MR but this was denied. Hence, he filed the present petition for certiorari before
the SC.
Issue: Did the COA commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
by auditing LMWD and requiring it to pay auditing fees? (No)
Reasoning:
- The Constitution, in Sec. 2(1), Art. IX-D 188, as well as the Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines, mandate COA to audit all government agencies, including GOCCs with original
charters as well as those without original charters. Local Water Districts (LWDs) such as LWMD is
an example of a GOCC with an original charter and is thus subject to COAs audit jurisdiction.
Whether LWDs are private or government-owned and controlled corporations with original
charters
- Feliciano maintains that LWDs are not GOCCs with original charters and are, in fact, private
corporations. He theorizes that what PD 198 created was the Local Waters Utilities Administration
(LWUA) and not the LWDs. Thus, he concludes that PD 198 cannot be deemed as an original
charter that would place LWDs within the COAs audit jurisdiction.
The SC disagreed. The Constitution recognizes two classes of corporations,
namely, private corporations created under a general law, and GOCCs created by special
charters. The Constitution, in Sec. 16, Art. XII, emphatically prohibits the creation of
private corporations except by a general law applicable to all citizens. 189 The purpose of
this constitutional provision is to ban private corporations created by special charters,
which historically gave certain individuals, families or groups special privileges denied to
other citizens. In other words, any legislation creating a private corporation by a special
charter would be unconstitutional. On the other hand, the Constitution authorizes
Congress to create GOCCs through special charters.
188
SECTION 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the
revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit
basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state
colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities
receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the government, which are required by law or the granting institution to
submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the
Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It
shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting
papers pertaining thereto.

189
This general law is our present day Corporation Code.

Obviously, LWDs are not private corporations because they are not created
under the Corporation Code. LWDs exist by virtue of PD 198, which constitutes their
special charter. To claim that LWDs are private corporations with a special charter is to
admit that their existence is constitutionally infirm.
LWDs derive their legal existence and power from Secs. 6 190 and 25191 of PD
198. Without PD 198, LWDs would have no corporate powers. Thus, PD 198 constitutes
the special enabling charter of LWDs. The ineluctable conclusion is that LWDs are GOCCs
with a special charter.
The phrase GOCCs with original charters means GOCCs created under
special laws and not under the general incorporation law. The SC clarified, however, that
there is no difference between the term original charters and special charters. This
was made clear in National Service Corporation v. NLRC, by citing the deliberations in the
Constitutional Commission, as reiterated in Davao City Water District v. CSC.
- Feliciano contends that it is the Sangguniang Bayan resolution 192 which creates the LWDs. This
therefore assumes that the Sangguniang Bayan has the power to create corporations.
The SC found that this is a patently baseless assumption. The LGC does not
vest in the Sangguniang Bayan the power to create corporations. What the LGC empowers
the Sangguniang Bayan to do, through Sec. 447 (5)(vii) is to to provide for the
establishment of a waterworks system subject to existing laws. 193
Thus, the Sangguniang Bayan may establish a waterworks system only in
accordance with the provisions of PD 198. The Sangguniang Bayan, by itself, has no
power to create a corporate entity that will operate its waterworks system. However, it
may avail of existing enabling laws, like PD 198, to form and incorporate a water district.

190
Sec. 6 pertinently provides that [t]his Act is the source of authorization and power to form and maintain a district. For purposes of this
Act, a district shall be considered as a quasi-public corporation performing public service and supplying public wants. As such, a district
shall exercise the powers, rights and privileges given to private corporations under existing laws, in addition to the powers granted in,
and subject to such restrictions imposed, under this Act.
xxx xxx xxx

191
Sec. 25. Authorization. The district may exercise all the powers which are expressly granted by this Title or which are necessarily implied
from or incidental to the powers and purposes herein stated. For the purpose of carrying out the objectives of this Act, a district is hereby
granted the power of eminent domain, the exercise thereof shall, however, be subject to review by the Administration.

192
This resolution concerning water districts is made pursuant to PD 198.

193
SECTION 447. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang bayan shallx x x
- Subject to existing laws, provide for the establishment, operation, maintenance, and repair of an efficient waterworks system to supply
water for the inhabitants;
xxx

Even assuming that the Sangguniang Bayan has the power to create
corporations, the LWDs would remain government-owned or controlled corporations
subject to COAs audit jurisdiction. The resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan would
constitute an LWDs special charter, making the LWD a GOCC with an original charter. In
any event, it has already been ruled in Baguio Water District v. Trajano that the
Sangguniang Bayan resolution is not the special charter of LWDs.
- Feliciano further contends that a law must create directly and explicitly a GOCC in order that it
may have an original charter. Thus, one special law cannot serve as enabling law for several
GOCCs but only for one GOCC.
The SC disagreed. Again, Sec. 16 of the Constitution permits Congress to
create a GOCC with a special charter. There is, however, no prohibition on Congress to
create several GOCCs of the same class under one special enabling charter. The rationale
behind the prohibition on private corporations having special charters does not apply to
GOCCs. There is no danger of creating special privileges to certain individuals, families or
groups if there is one special law creating each GOCC. Certainly, such danger will not
exist whether one special law creates one GOCC, or one special enabling law creates
several GOCCs.
Thus, Congress may create GOCCs either by special charters specific to each
GOCC, or by one special enabling charter applicable to a class of GOCCs, like PD 198
which applies only to LWDs.
- Feliciano also contends that LWDs are private corporations because Sec. 6 of PD 198 declares
that LWDs shall be considered quasi-public in nature. His rationale is that only private
corporations may be deemed quasi-public and not public corporations.
The SC found this argument inconsequential. He forgets that the
constitutional criterion on the exercise of COAs audit jurisdiction depends on the
governments ownership or control of a corporation. The nature of the corporation,
whether it is private, quasi-public, or public is immaterial. Neither is the manner of
creation of the GOCC material, whether it be under a general or special law. In Philippine
Veterans Bank Employees Union-NUBE v. Philippine Veterans Bank, it was held that the
criterion of ownership and control is more important than the issue of original charter.
- Certainly, the government owns and controls LWDs. This principle is affirmed by several
factors, such as the fact that the government organizes LWDs in accordance with a specifica law,
PD 198. Furthermore, there is no private party involved as co-owner in the creation of an LWD. 194
If LWDs are neither GOCCs with original charters nor GOCCs without original
charters, then they would fall under the term agencies or instrumentalities of the
government and thus, still subject to COAs audit jurisdiction. However, it is undeniable
that the government owns LWDs. This is evident when Sec. 45 of PD 198 states that the
board of directors may dissolve an LWD only on the condition that another public entity
has acquired the assets of the district and has assumed all obligations and liabilities
attached thereto. The implication is clear that an LWD is a public and not a private entity.
Feliciano also advances the theory that the water districts owner is the
district itself. Assuming this to be true, the fact remains that the government controls all
194
Other factors include the following: prior to the creation of LWDs, the national or local government owns and controls all their assets; under PD
198, the municipal or city mayor, or the provincial governor, appoints all the board directors of an LWD for a fixed term of six years; LWDs
have no private stockholders or members; the board of directors and other personnel of LWDs are government employees subject to civil service
and anti-graft laws.

LWDs. First, government officials appoint all LWD directors to a fixed term of office.
Second, any per diem of LWD directors in excess of P50 is subject to the approval of the
LWUA, and directors can receive no other compensation for their services to the LWD.
Third, the LWA can require LWDs to merge or consolidate their facilities or operations. This
element of government control subjects LWDs to COAs audit jurisdiction.
- Feliciano argues that upon the enactment of PD 198, LWDs became private entities through the
transfer of ownership of water facilities from local government units to their respective water
districts.
The SC disagreed. he transfer of assets mandated by PD 198 is a transfer of
the water systems facilities managed, operated by or under the control of such city,
municipality or province to such (water) district. In short, the transfer is from one
government entity to another government entity. PD 198 is bereft of any indication that
the transfer is to privatize the operation and control of water systems.
- Finally, Feliciano claims that, even on the assumption that the government owns and controls
LWDs, SEc. 20 of PD 198 nevertheless prevents COA from auditing LWDs when it said that the
auditing of LWDs shall be performed by a certified public accountant not in the government
service.
The SC disagreed. PD 198 cannot prevail over the Constitutional mandate of
the COA to audit GOCCs, including LWDs. In fact, Sec. 3, Art. IX-C of the Constitution 195
outlaws any scheme or devise to escape COAs audit jurisdiction. There being an
irreconcilable conflict between the second sentence of Sec. 20, PD 198 and the cited
provision of the Constitution, the SC ruled that such second sentence is unconstitutional.
On the legality of COAs practice of charging auditing fees
- Feliciano claims that the auditing fees COA charges LWDs for audit services violate the
prohibition in Sec. 18 of RA 6758.196
The SC disagreed and found that this claim has no basis. Section 18 of RA
6758 prohibits COA personnel from receiving any kind of compensation from any
government entity except compensation paid directly by COA out of its appropriations
and contributions.
Thus, COA may charge GOCCs actual audit cost but GOCCs must pay the
same directly to COA and not to COA auditors. Feliciano has not alleged that COA charges
LWDs auditing fees in excess of COAs actual audit cost. Neither has he alleged that the
195
Sec. 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any investment of public
funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.

196
Sec. 18. Additional Compensation of Commission on Audit Personnel and of other Agencies. In order to preserve the independence
and integrity of the Commission on Audit (COA), its officials and employees are prohibited from receiving salaries, honoraria, bonuses,
allowances or other emoluments from any government entity, local government unit, government-owned or controlled corporations, and
government financial institutions, except those compensation paid directly by COA out of its appropriations and contributions.
Government entities, including government-owned or controlled corporations including financial institutions and local government units
are hereby prohibited from assessing or billing other government entities, including government-owned or controlled corporations
including financial institutions or local government units for services rendered by its officials and employees as part of their regular
functions for purposes of paying additional compensation to said officials and employees.

auditing fees are paid by LWDs directly to individual COA auditors. Thus, this contention
must fail.
Dispositive: Resolution of the Commission on Audit affirmed. Second sentence of Sec. 20 of PD
198 declared void for being inconsistent with Secs. 2(1) and 3, Art. IX-D of the Constitution.
Digested by Ramon Rocha IV
Quisumbing v. Garcia197
08 December 2008
Tinga, J.

SHORT VERSION: COA found that several contracts entered into by Gov. Garcia, on behalf of the
Province of Cebu, were not authorized by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as required by the LGC
Sec. 22(c). Garcia argued that the appropriations ordinance was sufficient authorization for her to
enter into said contracts. The SC disagreed. The Court found that Cebu was operating on a
reenacted budget. Thus, under Sec. 323, there are only specific items which funds may be
disbursed. These items are in an exclusive list in Sec. 323. Clearly, contractual obligations which
were not included in the previous years annual and supplemental budgets cannot be disbursed.
New contracts entered into by the local chief executive require the prior approval of the
sanggunian.

FACTS:

COA conducted a financial audit on the Province of Cebu for 2004 and found that several
contracts amounting to P102,092,841.47 were not supported with a Sangguniang
Panlalawigan resolution authorizing the governor to enter into them, as required under
Sec. 22(c)198 of the LGC.
o The audit team recommended that the local chief executive secure a sanggunian
resolution authorizing her to enter into a contract, pursuant to Sec. 22.
Garcia, in her capacity as governor of Cebu, sought the reconsideration of the COAs report
and recommendation. However, without waiting for COAs resolution, she instituted an
action for declaratory relief with the RTC of Cebu.
o She alleged that the infrastructure contracts subject of the audit report complied
with bidding procedures under RA 9184 (Government Procurement Reform Act) and
were entered into pursuant to the general and/or supplemental appropriation

197
Hon. Gabriel Luis Quisumbing, Hon. Estrella P. Yapha, Hon. Victoria G. Corominas, Hon. Raul D. Bacaltos (Members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Cebu) v. Hon. Gwendolyn F. Garcia (in her capacity as Governor of the Province of Cebu), Hon. Delfin P. Aguilar (in his
capacity as Director IV (Cluster Director) of COA), Cluster IV Visayas Local Government Sector, Hon. Helen S. Hilayo (in her capacity as
Regional Cluster Director of COA), and Hon. Roy L. Ursal (in his capacity as Regional Legal and Adjudication Director of COA)

198

Sec. 22. Corporate Powers. (a) Every local government unit, as a corporation, shall have the following powers:x x x
(c) Unless otherwise provided in this Code, no contract may be entered into by the local chief executive in
behalf of the local government unit without prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned. A legible copy of such
contract shall be posted at a conspicuous place in the provincial capitol of the city, municipality or barangay hall.

ordinances passed by the SP, hence there was no need for a resolution for a
separate authority to enter into such contracts.
RTC ruled in favor of Garcia.
Petitioners, who are members of the SP, brought this present case to the SC.
o Petitioners claimed that there was no appropriation ordinance passed for 2004. The
appropriations ordinance for 2003 was merely reenacted for 2004. Neither did the
contracts in question proceed from a public bidding.
The OSG argues that LGC Sec. 323 allows disbursements for, among others, statutory and
contractual obligations authorized in the annual and supplemental budgets of the
preceding year which are deemed reenacted in case the sanggunian fails to pass the
ordinance authorizing the budget for the present year. Contractual obligations not included
in the preceding years annual and supplemental budgets require the prior approval or
authorization of the local sanggunian.
COA, in its comment, argued that LGC Sec. 306 and 346 cannot be considered exceptions
to Sec. 22(c). Sec. 346 refers to disbursements which must be made in accordance with an
appropriations ordinance without need of approval from the sanggunian, while Sec. 206
refers to the authorization for the effectivity of the budget, which should not be mistaken
for the specific authorization by the SP for the local chief executive to enter into contracts
under Sec. 22.

ISSUE:
19.Are the contracts valid?
REASONING:
19.No
There appears to be two basic premises from which the Court can proceed to decide
on the issue: (1) The province of Cebu was operating under a re-enacted budget in
2004, and (2) Gov. Garcia entered into contracts on behalf of the province while this
re-enacted budget was in force.
It is clear from Sec. 22(c) that prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned is
required before the local chief executive may enter into contracts on behalf of the local
government unit.
Gov. Garcia argues that Sec. 306 and 346 are the exceptions to Sec. 22(c). The Court
disagreed.
o Sec. 306 is merely a definition of terms. Read in conjunction with Sec. 346, Sec.
306 authorizes the local chief executive to make disbursements of funds in
accordance with the ordinance authorizing the annual or supplemental
appropriations.
o The ordinance in Sec. 346 refers to that which enacts the local government
units budget, for which reason no further authorization from the local council is
required, the ordinance functioning as the legislative authorization of the budget.
o To construe Sec. 306 and 346 as exceptions to Sec. 22(c) would render the
requirement of prior sanggunian authorization useless and irrelevant. There would
be no instance when such prior authorization would be required.
The fact that the province of Cebu operated under a re-enacted budget made things
more complicated.
o Sec. 323 provides that in case of a reenacted budget, only the annual
appropriations for salaries and wages of existing positions, statutory and
contractual obligations, and essential operating expenses authorized in the
annual and supplemental budgets for the preceding year shall be deemed
reenacted and disbursement of funds shall be in accordance therewith.

The items for which disbursements may be made under a reenacted budget
are exclusive.
Clearly, contractual obligations which were not included in the previous
years annual and supplemental budgets cannot be disbursed. New
contracts entered into by the local chief executive require the prior approval
of the sanggunian.
o Disbursement means payment for statutory and contractual obligations which the
sanggunian has already authorized thru ordinances enacting the annual budget
and are therefore already subsisting obligations.
o Contracts are those which bind the LGU to new obligations, with their
corresponding terms and conditions, for which the local chief executive needs
prior authority from the sanggunian.
Under the LGC, the governor shall represent the province in all business transactions
and sign in its behalf upon authority of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (Sec. 465).
The Sanggunian also has the power to authorize the governor to negotiate and
contract loans and lease public buildings held in a proprietary capacity, among others
(Sec. 468).
o These confirm the indispensability of the sanggunians authorization in the
execution of contracts which bind the LGU to new obligations.
o Note that the LGC does not explicitly state the form that the authorization by the
sanggunian has to take.
The TC ruled that RA 9184 does not require the head of the procuring entity to secure
a resolution from the sanggunian concerned before entering into a contract. The SC
disagreed.
o RA 9184 Sec. 37 in fact provides: The Procuring Entity shall issue the Notice to
Proceed to the winning bidder not later than 7 calendar days from the date of
approval of the contract by the appropriate authority.
o This blends seamlessly with LGC Sec. 22(c) and acknowledges that in the exercise
of the LGUs corporate powers, the chief executive acts merely as an
instrumentality of the local council.
o These provisions mandate the local chief executive to secure the sanggunians
approval before entering into procurement contracts and to transmit the notice to
proceed to the winning bidder.
This decision should not be construed so as to proscribe any and all contracts entered
into by the local chief executive without formal sanggunian authorization.
o For instance, in cases where the LGU operates under an annual, as opposed to a
reenacted, budget, it should be acknowledged that the appropriation passed by
the sanggunian may validly serve as the authorization required under Sec. 22(c).
Resort to the appropriation ordinance is necessary in order to determine if there is a
provision therein which specifically covers the expense to be incurred or the contract
to be entered into.
o Should the ordinance already contain in sufficient detail the project and cost of
capital outlay such that all the local chief executive needs to do after the public
bidding is to execute the contract, no further authorization is required. The
appropriations ordinance is sufficient.
o However, should the ordinance describe the project in generic terms, there is an
obvious need for a covering contract for every specific project, that in turn
requires approval by the sanggunian.
o Specific sanggunian approval may also be required for the purchase of goods and
services which are neither specified in the appropriation ordinance nor
encompassed within the regular personal services and maintenance operating
expenses.

RULING: petition granted in part, case remanded

Digest by Rix
Municipality of Tiwi and the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi v. Antonio Betito
9 July 2010
Del Castillo, J.
Short version: In the case of National Power Corporation v. Province of Albay, the SC found NPC
liable for unpaid real restate taxes on its properties located in the Province of Albay. Some of
these properties were geothermal plants in the Municipality of Tiwi. The Sangguniang Bayan of
Tiwi passed Resolution No. 15-92, authorizing Mayor Corral to hire a lawyer to represent Tiwi and
its barangays in the recovery of their rightful share in the aforesaid realty taxes. A Contract of
Legal Services was thus entered into between the municipality and Atty. Betito and Lawenko for
this purpose. The Contract provided that the counsels would receive a 10% contingent fee on
whatever amount of realty taxes that would be recovered by Tiwi through their efforts. When
Atty. Betito tried to enforce the Contract, the Sangguniang Bayan refused to pass an ordinance
for the purpose of paying his fees. It alleged that the Resolution did not authorize Mayor Corral to
enter into the Contract of Legal Services and that the contract needed to be ratified by the
Sanggunian first for it to be enforceable. However, the SC disagreed. It cited Section 444(b)(1)
(vi) of the LGC which pertinently provides that upon authorization by the sangguniang bayan, the
municipal mayor has the power to represent the municipality in all its business transactions and
sign on its behalf all bonds, contracts, and obligations, and such other documents made pursuant
to law or ordinance. The Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi unanimously passed Resolution No. 15-92,
authorizing Mayor Corral to hire a lawyer of her choice to represent the interest of Tiwi in the
execution of the SC Decision in NPC v. Albay. This authority necessarily carried with it the power
to negotiate, execute and sign on behalf of Tiwi the Contract of Legal Services.
Facts:
- In the case of National Power Corporation v. Province of Albay, the SC found NPC liable for
unpaid real restate taxes on its properties located in the Province of Albay. These properties
consisted of geothermal plants in the Municipality of Tiwi and substations in the Municipality of
Daraga.
- Later, the NPC, through its President Pablo Malixi, and Albay, represented by Gov. Romeo
Salalima, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement where the former agreed to settle its tax
liabilities. The terms of the MOA provided, among others, that the actual amount collectible from
NPC will still have to be recomputed and that NPC shall make an initial payment of
P17,763,000.00 upon signing of the agreement. It also provided for a payment scheme for the
remaining balance.
- Mayor Naomi Corral of Tiwi requested Gov. Salalima to remit the rightful tax shares of Tiwi and
its barangays where NPCs properties were located in the payments already made by NPC to
Albay. However, Gov. Salalima refused, saying that the initial payment was only an earnest
money and the total amount to be collected was still being validated.
- Thus, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi passed Resolution No. 15-92, authorizing Mayor Corral to
hire a lawyer to represent Tiwi and its barangays in the recovery of their rightful share in the
aforesaid realty taxes. Thereafter, Mayor Corral sought the services of respondent Atty. Betito
and Atty. Lawenko. They entered into a Contract of Legal Services which provided, among others,
that Betito and Lawenko would receive a 10% contingent fee on whatever amount of realty taxes
that would be recovered by Tiwi through their efforts.

- Meanwhile, NPC sought clarification with the Office of the President as to the scope and extent
of the shares of the LGUs involved in the real estate tax collections. The Office of the President,
through then Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Antonio Carpio, opined that the MOA merely
recognized and established NPC's realty taxes and the sharing secheme should be that provided
under the law. Since Tiwi is entitled to a share in the said realty taxes, the opinion stated that
NPC may remit such share directly to Tiwi.
- Because of this opinion, Malixi informed Mayor Corral and Gov. Salalima that NPC would directly
pay Tiwi its share in the payments under the MOA. As of that time, NPC had already paid Albay
over P40M. Tiwi requested that Albay remit to the former its share in that amount as well but the
latter refused. This resulted in the filing of several administrative complaints including the case
of Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., where the SC held that the elective officials of Albay are
administratively liable for abuse of authority due to their unjustified refusal to remit the rightful
share of Tiwi in the subject realty taxes.
- Afterwards, Atty. Betito filed an action with the RTC seeking to enforce the Contract of Legal
Services after rendering his services which allegedly benefityed Tiwi. He claimed that he handled
numerous cases which resulted in Tiwis recovery of P110,985,181.83 and another
P35,594,480.00 from the NPC as well as other amounts which will be proven during the trial. He
prayed that the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi be ordered to pass an ordinance authorizing the
payment to him of his fees amounting to 10% of the collected amounts considering that it
refused to pass the said ordinance despite repeated demands.
- In their answer, the herein petitioners denied that Resolution No. 15-29 authorized Mayor Corral
to enter into the subject contract. In particular, they averred that Mayor Corral exceeded her
authority when she bound Tiwi to pay the lawyers an amount equivalent to 10% of the realty
taxes to be recovered from NPC. For these reasons, the subject contract is void, unenforceable,
unconscionable and unreasonable. In addition, the Contract of Legal Services was not ratified by
the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi in order to become effective. Petitioners also raise the defense
that the realty taxes were recovered by virtue of the opinion rendered by Office of the President
and not through the efforts of Atty. Betito.
- The RTC rendered a partial judgment on the pleadings in favor of Atty. Betito, ordering the
petitioners herein to pay over P14M, with the remaining amounts due him pursuant to the
contract to be determined upon reception of evidence. The CA affirmed the RTC decision, hence
the present recourse before the SC.
Issues:
- Was the application of the rule of judgment on the pleadings and/or summary judgment
improper? (Yes)
- Was Mayor Corral authorized to enter into the Contract of Legal Services? (Yes)
- Is the scope of the legal services contemplatin in Resolution No. 15-92 limited to the execution
of the decision in NPC v. Albay? (Yes)
- Is the award of attorneys fees to Atty. Betito unreasonable and without any proof as to whether
it resulted from his legal servies pursuant to Sec. 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court?
Reasoning:
Judgment on the pleadings was improper
- A motion for judgment on the pleadings admits the truth of all the material and relevant
allegations of the opposing party and the judgment must rest on those allegations taken
together with such other allegations as are admitted in the pleadings. It is proper when an
answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse
party's pleading. Here, the records reveal that the parties set up multiple levels of claims and

defenses, with some failing to tender an issue while others requiring the presentation of
evidence for resolution. The generalized conclusion of both the trial and appellate courts that
petitioners' answer admits all the material averments of the complaint is, thus, without basis.
Mayor Corral was authorized to enter into the Contract of Legal Services
- Petitioners argue that Resolution No. 15-92 did not authorize Mayor Corral to enter into the
subject contract, hence, the contract must first be ratified to become binding on Tiwi. However,
the SC disagreed. It cited Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC which pertinently provides that upon
authorization by the sangguniang bayan, the municipal mayor has the power to represent the
municipality in all its business transactions and sign on its behalf all bonds, contracts, and
obligations, and such other documents made pursuant to law or ordinance.
- The Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi unanimously passed Resolution No. 15-92, authorizing Mayor
Corral to hire a lawyer of her choice to represent the interest of Tiwi in the execution of the SC
Decision in NPC v. Albay. This authority necessarily carried with it the power to negotiate,
execute and sign on behalf of Tiwi the Contract of Legal Services.
- Therefore, the contention that the subject contract should first be ratified in order to become
enforceable as against Tiwi must necessarily fail. The law clearly speaks of prior authorization
and not ratification with respect to the power of the local chief executive to enter into a contract
on behalf of the LGU. As stated above, this authority was granted in the form of Resolution No.
15-92.
The scope of the legal services contemplated in the Resolution was limited to the execution of
NPC v. Albay
- Atty. Betito claims that the Contract should be construed to include his services even outside
the scope of the execution of the ruling in NPC v. Albay. In support of this position, he argues that
the wording of the Resolution that he is to represent the interest of the Municipality of Tiwi and
its Barangays, means that the Resolution encompasses such other matters not related to the
NPC v. Albay ruling.
However, the SC disagreed because the wording of the Resolution is clear. Its
title and whereas clauses indicate that the hiring of a lawyer was for the sole purpose of
executing the judgement in the earlier case. Moreover, it could not have been the
intention of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi to authorize the hiring of a lawyer to perform
general legal services because this duty devolves upon the municipal legal officer. The
council sought the services of a lawyer because the dispute was between the municipality
(Tiwi) and province (Albay), thereby falling under the exception provided in Sec. 481(b)(3)
(i)199 of the LGC.

199
SECTION 481. Qualifications, Terms, Powers and Duties. -- x x x
(b) The legal officer, the chief legal counsel of the local government unit, shall take charge of the office of legal services and shall: x x x
(3) x x x x
(i) Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and special proceedings wherein the local government unit or any official
thereof, in his official capacity, is a party: Provided, That, in actions or proceedings where a component city or municipality is a party
adverse to the provincial government or to another component city or municipality, a special legal officer may be employed to
represent the adverse party;

The issue of the reasonable fees due to Atty. Betito still needs to be resolved in a trial on the
merits
- The main source of Atty. Betitos claim for attorneys fees lies with respect to several
administrative and court cases that he allegedly prosecuted and defended on behalf of Tiwi
against the elective officials of Albay in order to compel the latter to remit the rightful share of
Tiwi in the unpaid realty taxes. One of this cases is the aforementioned Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,
where Atty. Betito appears as the counsel of record.
- Nevertheless, the other cases allegedly handled by respondent cannot be deemed admitted for
purposes of fixing respondent's compensation because petitioners controverted the same on
several grounds, to wit: (1) these cases where not handled by respondent, (2) the OSG was the
lead counsel in these cases, and (3) these cases were the personal cases of Mayor Corral and
other officials of Tiwi. With the above ruling that the Contract of Legal Services only overs legal
services which reasonably contributed to the recovery of Tiwi's share, these defenses properly
tender issues which should be determined in a trial on the merits.
- Another vital issue tendered by the pleadings is with regard to the extent of the benefits which
Tiwi actually derived from the legal services rendred by Atty. Betito. The RTC partially ruled that
these amounts should be P110,985,181.83 and P35,594,480.00, respectively because the herein
petitioners Answer constitutes a negative pregnant considering that its denial of the allegations
were not specific.
However, the SC again disagreed and said that the tenor of the petitioners
Answer evinces the defense that the amount of P110+ million was received by Albay and
not by Tiwi. As for the P35+ million, the petitioners argued that this amount was received
as Tiwis share under Secs. 286-293200 of the LGC. Therefore, it was erroneous or the RTC
and the CA to have ruled that these amounts were sufficiently established as reasonably
flowing from the legal services rendered by Atty. Betito.
Dispositive: Petition granted. Case remanded to determine the reasonable amount of attorney's
fees.
Digested by Ramon Rocha IV
Bartolome E. San Diego, plaintiff-appellee v The Municipality of Naujan, Province of
Oriental Mindoro
February 29, 1960
Gutierrez David, J.:

Short version:San Diego was the winning bidder for the 5-year lease of the municipal waters of
Naujan, Oriental Mindoro. Due to a storm which he claimed destroyed his fish corals, an
extension of 5 years was granted to him. The Municipal Council of Naujan, now composed of new
members, issued a Resolution annulling the extension of San Diegos lease contract, on the
ground that it was done without public bidding and was thus contrary to law. The lower court
ruled in favor of San Diego and upheld the lease. The SC reversed, holding that the public
bidding was mandatory. Statutes requiring public bidding apply to amendments of any contract
200
Pertaining to the share of the LGU in the utilization of the national wealth.

already executed in compliance with the law where such amendments alter the original contract
in some vital and essential particular.Public biddings are held for the protection of the public, and
to give the public the best possible advantages by means of open competition between the
bidders. He who bids or offers the best terms is awarded the contract subject of the bid, and it is
obvious that such protection and best possible advantages to the public will disappear if the
parties to a contract executed after public bidding may alter or amend it without another
previous public bidding. Also, the doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied against the municipality.
doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied as against a municipal corporation to validate a contract
which it has no power to make or which it is authorized to make only under prescribed
conditions. Where a contract is violative of public policy, the municipality executing it cannot be
estopped to assert the invalidity of a contract which has ceded away, controlled, or embarrassed
its legislative or government powers.

Facts:

A public bidding was conducted by the municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro for the lease
of its municipal waters.
Resolution 46, series of 1947 was passed by the municipal council of Naujan, awarding the
concession of the Butas River and the Naujan Lake to the highest bidder, Bartolome San
Diego.
A contract was entered into between the San Diego and the municipality, stipulating that for a
period of 5 years, from January 1, 1948 to December 31, 1952, San Diego was to be the
lessee of "the exclusive privilege of erecting fish corrals along the Butas River beginning from
its junction with the San Agustin River up to the Naujan Lake itself," for annual rental of
P26,300.00, or a total of P131,500.00 for five years. Upon petition by the San Diego, the
Naujan council reduced the annual rental by 20% by virtue of Resolution 59, series of 1949.
On September 1950, the lessee requested for a five-year extension of the original lease
period. San Diego explained that the typhoon "Wanda" destroyed most of his fish corrals.
Thus, the the council adopted Resolution 222, series of 1951, extending the lease for another
5 years beginning January 1, 1952, with the express condition that San Diego would waive the
privilege to seek for reduction of the amount of rent which was to be based on the original
contract.
The Resolution was approved and the contract was approved and confirmed by the municipal
council. Pursuant to the said contract, the lessee filed a surety bond of P52,000.00 and then
reconstructed his fish corrals and stocked the Naujan Lake with bagus fingerlings.
On January 2, 1952, the municipal council of Naujan, composed of a new set of members,
adopted Resolution 3, series of 1952, revoking Resolution 222, series of 1951. It claimed that
Resolution 222, which extended the lease contract, was contrary to law because the
extension was done without a public bidding.
The new council also passed Resolution 11, revoking Resolution 229, which confirmed the
extension of the lease period.
San Diego requested for reconsideration and recall of Resolution 3, on the ground that it
violated the contract executed between him and the municipality on December 23, 1951, and
was therefore, contrary to Article III, section 1, clause 10 of the Constitution. The request was
not granted.
San Diego filed an action against the municipal council of Naujan, seeking to have Resolution
3 declared null and void for being unconstitutional, and praying for an order enjoining the
defendant municipality from conducting a public bidding for the leasing of the Naujan
fisheries to any person other than the San Diego during his lease period.

The municipal councils defense was that the original lease contract and its extension was
null and void for not having been passed in accordance with law. It also filed a counterclaim
for the illegal reduction of 20% of the original rentals.
The lower court ruled in favor of San Diego, upholding the validity of the lease contract, as
well at is extension, and declaring Resolution 3, series of 1952, null and void.
The Municipality of Naujan appealed.

Issue: Is Resolution No. 3, series of 1952, revoking Resolution 222, series of 1951, of the
municipal council of Naujan valid? YES

Ratio:
1) Sec. 2323 of the Revised Administrative Code requires that when the exclusive privilege of
fishery or the right to conduct a fish-breeding ground is granted to a private party, the same
shall be let to the highest bidder in the same manner as is being done in exploiting a ferry, a
market or a slaughterhouse belonging to the municipality.
2) The requirement of competitive bidding is for the purpose of inviting competition and to guard
against favoritism, fraud and corruption in the letting of fishery privileges.
3) The original lease contract in this case was awarded to the highest bidder, but the reduction
of the rental and the extension of the term of the lease appear to have been granted without
previous public bidding.
4) Public biddings are held for the protection of the public, and to give the public the best
possible advantages by means of open competition between the bidders. He who bids or
offers the best terms is awarded the contract subject of the bid, and it is obvious that such
protection and best possible advantages to the public will disappear if the parties to a
contract executed after public bidding may alter or amend it without another previous public
bidding.
5) Statutes requiring public bidding apply to amendments of any contract already executed in
compliance with the law where such amendments alter the original contract in some vital and
essential particular.
6) The period in a lease is a vital and essential particular to the contract.Thus, the extension of
the lease period in this case, which was granted without the essential requisite of public
bidding, is not in accordance with law. And it follows the Resolution 222, series of 1951, and
the contract authorized thereby, extending the original five-year lease to another five years
are null and void as contrary to law and public policy.
7) Resolution 3 is not an impairment of the obligation of contract, because the constitutional
provision on impairment refers only to contract legally executed. While, apparently,
Resolution 3 tended to abrogate the contract extending the lease, leglly speaking, there was
no contract abrogated because the extension contract is void and inexistent.
8) The lower court, in holding that the defendant-appellant municipality has been estopped from
assailing the validity of the contract, seems to have overlooked that the doctrine of estoppel
cannot be applied as against a municipal corporation to validate a contract which it has no
power to make or which it is authorized to make only under prescribed conditions, within
prescribed limitations, or in a prescribed mode or manner, although the corporation has
accepted the benefits thereof and the other party has fully performed his part of the
agreement, or has expended large sums in preparation for performance.
9) Where a contract is violative of public policy, the municipality executing it cannot be estopped
to assert the invalidity of a contract which has ceded away, controlled, or embarrassed its
legislative or government powers.
10)
Contracts requiring public bidding affect public interest, and to change them without
complying with that requirement would indeed be against public policy. There is, therefore,
nothing to plaintiff-appellee's contention that the parties in this case being in pari delicto
should be left in the situation where they are found, for "although the parties are inpari

delicto, yet the court may interfere and grant relief at the suit of one of them, where public
policy requires its intervention, even though the result may be that a benefit will be derived
by a plaintiff who is in equal guilt with defendant.
11)
San Diego is thus also ordered to pay the ineffective reduction of the 20% of the lease
rental.
Judgment reversed.

Resoltuion
April 18, 1960
Gutierrez David, J.:

San Diego filed an MR on the amounts he was ordered to pay, because the claimed there
were clerical errors in the decision.
The Court simply recomputed and ordered the payment of new amounts.
172. Pedro P. Rivera v. Municipality of Malolos
Date: October 31, 1957
Ponente: Padilla
The case in a nutshell:
FACTS: The municipality of Malolos, Bulacan called for bids for the supply of road construction
materials to repair a road. At the public bidding, Pedro P. Rivera made the lowest bid. The
contract was signed by the municipal mayor, in behalf of the municipality, and Rivera. It was
stipulated that in consideration of Php19,235, Rivera was to furnish and deliver to the
municipality crushed adobe stone and gravel, which he did. In 1950, he informed the municipal
treasurer that he had not yet been paid and requested that the sum be included in the
appropriations form the next fiscal year as an outstanding obligation. The municipal council
passed a resolution ratifying the public bidding and the contract entered into by the municipality
with Rivera. Rivera filed a complaint against the municipality in the Bulacan CFI to collect the
sum under the contract. The CFI dismissed the case without prejudice. Rivera sought the
intervention of the Presidential Complaints and Action Committee, which forwarded Riveras
claim on the ground that as there was no sum of money appropriated to meet the obligation
incurred before the execution of the contract, as required by Section 607 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the said contract is void, as provided in Section 608 of the same Code; and
that even if there was such sum appropriated to meet such obligation, the alleged deliveries
could no longer be verified by the Provincial Auditor or his representative. Rivera requested the
Deputy Auditor General to reconsider his decision. Before the Deputy Auditor General could take
action on the request for reconsideration, Rivera filed his notice of appeal with the Office of the
Auditor General, and a petition for review in the SC.
HELD: The contract with Rivera was NOT validly entered into by the municipality. The power or
authority conferred upon municipal corporations must be exercised in conformity with law.
Section 1920 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that such contracts must be entered
into by the district engineer, not the municipal mayor. Section 607 requires that before a contract
involving the expenditure of Php2,000 or more may be entered into or authorized, the municipal

treasurer must certify to the officer entering into such contracts that funds have been duly
appropriated for such purpose and that the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract is
available for expenditure on account thereof. Section 58-A provides that the provincial auditor or
his representative must check up the deliveries made by a contractor pursuant to a contract
lawfully and validly entered into. As the contract entered into by the municipal mayor was not in
accordance with law, the Auditor General was correct in denying Riveras claim. The Motor
Vehicle Law, invoked by Rivera, merely allocates 10% of the money collected under its provisions
to the road and bridge funds of the different municipalities for the repair, maintenance, and
construction of municipal roads. This alone is not sufficient appropriation and authority to
disburse part of the 10% collected to pay Riveras claim. But Section 608 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides Rivera a remedy by making the municipal mayor liable.

Facts:
1) Sometime in August 1949, the municipality of Malolos, Bulacan called for bids for the
supply of road construction materials to repair the road of the municipality.
2) At the public bidding held on 28 August 1949 for the purpose, petitioner Pedro P. Riveras
bid was the lowest. On the same day, the acting municipal treasurer informed Rivera that
the contract had been awarded to him and requested him to call at his office for the
execution of the contract.
3) On 31 August 1949, the contract was signed by the municipal mayor in behalf of the
municipality and Rivera. It was stipulated that for and in consideration of the sum of
Php19,235, Rivera was to furnish and deliver to the municipality 2,700 cubic meters of
crushed adobe stone (cascajo) and 1,400 cubic meters of gravel.
4) In compliance with the contract, Rivera delivered crushed adobe stone and gravel to the
municipality at the places designated by the municipal mayor.
5) On 29 July 1950, Rivera wrote to the municipal treasurer, through the provincial auditor,
calling his attention to the fact that the sum of Php19,339.56 due him as payment had not
yet been paid, and that as the fiscal year 1949-1950 had already expired, he requested
that the sum be included in the appropriations for the incoming fiscal year 1950-1951 as
an outstanding obligation.
6) On 2 August, 1950, the principal clerk, acting in behalf of the municipal treasurer,
informed Rivera that the Municipal Council (had) agreed to put said amount as standing
obligation of the municipality authorizing payment and authorizing the Municipal Treasurer
to pay as soon as funds are available.
7) On 16 October 1951, the municipal council passed Resolution No. 68, ratifying the public
bidding called by the municipal treasurer for the supply of road construction materials, and
the contract entered into by the municipality with Rivera.
8) On 30 October 1951, Rivera filed a complaint against the municipality in the Bulacan CFI
to collect the sum of PhpP19,235 under the contract.

9) On 8 January 1954, the CFI dismissed the case without prejudice.

10)
On 11 January 1954, Rivera sought the intervention of the Presidential Complaints
and Action Committee, which forwarded Riveras claim on the ground that:
a. As there was no sum of money appropriated to meet the obligation incurred before
the execution of the contract, as required by Section 607 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the said contract is void, as provided in Section 608 of the
same Code; and
b. Even if there was such sum appropriated to meet such obligation, the alleged
deliveries could no longer be verified by the Provincial Auditor or his representative.
11)
On 1 March 1955, Rivera requested the Deputy Auditor General to reconsider his
decision.
12)
On 5 March 1955, before the Deputy Auditor General could take action on the
request for reconsideration, Rivera filed his notice of appeal with the Office of the Auditor
General, and a petition for review in the SC.
13)
On 9 March 1955, upon motion of Rivera, the SC resolved to suspend the service of
notice upon the Auditor General pursuant to Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and
granted Rivera 5 days from receipt of notice of the action taken by the Auditor General on
his request for reconsideration within which to file a supplement to his petition for review.
14)
On 2 June 1955 the Deputy Auditor General denied Riveras request for
reconsideration, reiterating the grounds previously relied upon in his decision on 14
January 1954.
15)

On 21 June 1955 Rivera filed a supplement to his petition for review in the SC.

Issue: Was the contract entered into by the municipal mayor with Rivera in accordance with
law? NO.

Held: The decision under review is AFFIRMED without pronouncement as to costs.

Ratio:
1) The contract entered into by the municipal mayor with Rivera was NOT in accordance with
law.
a. Riveras contentions:

i. The municipality should not be allowed to invoke legal technicalities to delay

or refuse payment after its municipal council has acknowledged the
indebtedness, because the municipality had received an annual allotment or
a certain percentage of the amount collected under the provisions of Act No.
3992, known as the Motor Vehicle Law, out of which it could pay said
indebtedness.
ii. There is no issue as to the validity of the contract entered into and by and
between Rivera and the municipality, nor is there any question as to delivery
by Rivera and receipt by the municipality of the road construction materials.
b. Before a contract may be entered into validly by a municipality, the law requires
that there should be an appropriation of municipal funds to meet the obligation
validly passed by the municipal council and approved by the municipal mayor.
c. In answer to the Solicitor Generals statement that there is no provision of law which
authorizes a municipal mayor to enter into a contract with a private contractor for
furnishing the municipality with public works materials, Rivera cited Sections 2165
of the Revised Administrative Code, which provides that:

Municipalitiesare endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised b

through their respective municipal governments in conformity with law. It shall be compete
them, in their proper corporate name,to contract and be contracted with,

d. The power or authority conferred upon municipal corporations must be exercised in

conformity with law. Section 1920 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that
such contracts must be entered into by the district engineer, not the municipal
mayor.
e. Rivera contends, however, that Section 1920 of the Revised Administrative Code
must be read in connection with Sections 1912 and 1913 of the same Code, and
concludes that Section 1920 does not abrogate the general rule that a municipal
council may designate an officer of the municipal corporation to execute such a
contraction behalf of the municipality. But these sections do not refer to contracts
entered into by the municipality for the supply of road construction materials.
i. Section 1912 refers to investigation and survey by the district engineer for a
proposed construction or repair of public works and submission by him to the
mayor to reports and estimates of the cost of such construction or repair with
his recommendations, and to the preparation of plans and specifications for
such public works and supervision of the construction or repair of the same.
f.

Section 607 of the Revised Administrative Code requires that before a contract
involving the expenditure of Php2,000 or more may be entered into or authorized,
the municipal treasurer must certify to the officer entering into such contracts that
funds have been duly appropriated for such purpose and that the amount necessary
to cover the proposed contract is available for expenditure on account thereof.

i. A purported contract entered into contrary to the requirements is wholly void.

Riveras claim that there is no longer any question as to the validity of the
contract entered into by and between him and the municipal mayor is not
correct.
g. Likewise, Section 58-A of the Revised Administrative Code provides that the
provincial auditor or his representative must check up the deliveries made by a
contractor pursuant to a contract lawfully and validly entered into.
i. There was no such check up. Riveras claim that there is no longer an issue
as to whether the road construction materials have been actually delivered
by Rivera and received by the municipality is groundless.
ii. The Auditor General is not in duty bound to pass and allow in audit the sum
claimed by Rivera if he or his authorized representative did not check up the
delivery of the crushed adobe stone and gravel.
iii. Rivera enlisted the aid of the Presidential Complaints and Action Committee
to request the Auditor General to pass in audit and authorize the payment of
Riveras claim. The Auditor General had no alternative but to comply with the
provisions of the law and as the contract entered into by the municipal mayor
was not in accordance with law, the Auditor General was correct in denying
Riveras claim.
h. Section 73 of Act No. 3992 (otherwise known as the Motor Vehicle Law), as
amended by Section 2, R.A. No. 314, invoked by Rivera, merely allocates 10% of the
money collected under its provisions to the road and bridge funds of the different
municipalities, in proportion to population as shown in the latest available census,
for the repair, maintenance, and construction of municipal roads. This alone is not
sufficient appropriation and authority to disburse part of the 10% collected under
the Motor Vehicle Law for the purpose of paying Riveras claim.
i. The section cited, as amended by Section 5 of R.A. No. 917, approved on 20
June 1953, provides:

Moneys collected under the provisions of this Act shall be deposited in a special trus
the National Treasury to constitute the Highway Special Fund, which shall be appo
expended in accordance with the provisions of the Philippine Highway Act of ninete
and fifty-three.

i.

Section 608 of the Revised Administrative Code affords Rivera a remedy. It pvodies:

SEC. 608. Void contract Liability of officer. A purported contract entered into contr
the requirements of the next preceding section hereof shall be wholly void, and the
assuming to make such contract shall be liable to the Government or other contracting pa
any consequent damage to the same extent as if the transaction had been wholly be
private parties.

Pedro P. Rivera v. Carlos P. Maclang

31 January 1963
Makalintal, J.

SHORT VERSION: Rivera entered into a contract with Maclang, as Mayor of Malolos, Bulacan, for
the repair of barrio roads. The Court later declared the contract void for failure to comply with
the requirements under the Revised Admin Code, but in the same decision, pointed out that
Rivera had a remedy against Maclang. Rivera then filed his claim in the trial court, but the trial
court dismissed. The SC ruled that the dismissal was wrong. Rivera had a case against Maclang
under Sec. 608 of the Revised Admin Code. Since Maclang was the officer who signed the void
contract, he would be liable as if the contract had been been entered into by him in his personal
capacity.

FACTS:

Aug. 19, 1949: the municipality of Malolos, Bulacan, called for bids for furnishing and
delivering materials to be used in the maintenance and repair of barrio roads.
o Pedro Rivera won in the bidding.
Aug. 31, 1949: the contract was signed by Rivera and Carlos Maclang, in his capacity as
Municipal Mayor of Malolos.
o Oct. 16, 1951: the municipal council of Malolos approved the contract.
Pursuant thereto, Rivera delivered gravel and adobe stones worth P19,235 to the
municipality. However, despite repeated demands, the municipality failed to pay.
Rivera went to the Presidential Complaint and Action Commission, which referred the
matter to the General Auditing Office. The said office refused to pay.
Rivera then went to the SC via a petition for review. The SC sustained the decision of the
General Auditing Office and declared the contract void for no money had been
appropriated to meet the obligation prior to the execution of the contract, as required by
Sec. 607 of the Revised Admin Code201.
o However, in the same decision, the Court indicated that Sec. 608 of the Admin
Code202 afforded a remedy.
Hence, Rivera filed an action with the trial court against Maclang in his personal capacity,
pursuant to the said provision.The TC dismissed the complaint, ruling that since the
contract had been declared null and void, it cannot produce any legal effect for which
thereafter no recovery can be made.

201
Sec. 607. Except in the case of a contract for supplies to be carried in stock, no contract involving the expenditure by any province,
municipality, chartered city or municipal district of two thousand pesos or more shall be entered into or authorized until the treasurer of the
political division concerned shall have certified to the officer entering into such contract that funds have been duly appropriated for such purpose
and that the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract is available for expenditure on account thereof.

202
Sec. 608. A purported contract entered into contrary to the requirements of the next preceding section hereof shall be wholly void, and the
officer assuming to make such contract shall be liable to the Government or other contracting party for any consequent damage to the same
extent as if the transaction had been wholly between private parties.

ISSUE:
20.Was the dismissal of the complaint proper?
REASONING:
20.No
The ruling in the previous case was that the contract was null and void vis--vis the
Municipality of Malolos by reason of non-compliance with the requirement of Sec. 607
of the Admin Code.
The present action is against Maclang in his personal capacity on the strength of Sec.
608.
o The position of Maclang, as the officer who signed the contract with Rivera in
violation of Sec. 607, comes squarely under Sec. 608. His liability is personal, as if
the transaction had been entered into by him as a private party.
The intention of the law is to ensure that public officers entering into transactions with
private individuals calling for the expenditure of public funds observe a high degree of
caution so that the government may not be the victim of ill ad-vised or improvident
action by those assuming to represent it.
RULING: judgment reversed, Maclang ordered to pay P19,235 + legal interest

Digest by Rix
174. Leonardo Palafoxet. al v Province of Ilocos Norte, the District Engineer, and the Provincial
Treasurer
Bengzon, J.
Jan. 31, 1958
Torralba was working for the government, and while he was doing his duties, he ran over Palafox.
He pleaded guilty to the charge of homicide through reckless imprudence, and the heirs of
Palafox sought to claim indemnity from the Province.
Court held that Province is not liable. To hold the state liable, he must be considered a special
agent, but Torralba was not. The government is not also liable under the doctrine of respondeat
superior because the negligent employees was engaged in the performance of governmental
duties, as distinguished from corporate or proprietary or business functions.
FACTS:

SabasTorralba was employed as a chauffeur of the Provincial Government for Ilocos Norte
detailed to the Office of the Engineer.
While driving his freight truck along the National Highway in compliance with his duties, he
ran over ProcetoPalafox, the father of appellants, and the victim died as a result.
Torralba was charged with homicide through reckless impurdence, and he pleaded guilty and
was sentenced.
The heirs reserved their right to file a civil action, and they began these proceedings against:
o The province

o
o
o
[CFI]

The district engineer

The pronvicial treasurer
SabasTorralba
dismissed the claim against the appellees for damages

ISSUE: May the province be held liable for Torralbas act? (NO)

To hold the state liable under Art. 1903 (now Art. 2180) for Torralbas negligence, a
declaration must be made that he was a special agent and not one upon whom properly
devolved the duty of driving the truck on that occasion.
o Torralba, however, was not a special agent of the Govt within the scope of the article.
o Also, the principle of vicarious liability applies only to the insular government, as
distinguished from the pronvicial/municipal governments, because the SC has
interpreted the State to mean Govt of the Phils and these words include both
central and local governments.
Appellants invoke the doctrine of respondeat superior illustrated in [Mendoza v De Leon] for
negligent acts of their employees.
o In that case, it was held that the municipality is not liable for the acts of its officers or
agents in the performance of its governmental functions.
o On the other hand, a municipality is not exempt from liability for the negligent
performance of its corporate or proprietary or business functions.Its contracts, validly
entered into, may be enforced and damages may be collected from it for the torts of its
officers or agents within the scope of their employment in precisely the same manner
and to the same extent as those of private corporations or individuals. As to such
matters the principles of respondeat superior applies. It is for these purposes that the
municipality is made liable to suits in the courts
o As we can see, if the negligent employee was engaged in the performance of
governmental duties, as distinguished from corporate or proprietary or business
functions the government is not liable.
The construction and maintenance of roads in which the truck and the driver worked at the
time of the accident are admittedly governmental activities.
o Hence, the death of Palafox tragic and deplorable though as it may be
imposed on the province no duty to pay monetary compensation.
o The reason for the exemption according to Mr. Justice Story is that the Government
does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents
whom it employs, since that would involve in all its operations in endless
embarrassments, difficulties and losses which would be subversive of the public
interest.

CFI Judgment AFFIRMED.

Marcos Mendoza, plaintiff-appellee v Francisco de Leon, et al., defendants-appellants
February 11, 1916
Trent, J.

Short version:Mendoza filed a case an action for damages against the individual members of
the municipal council of Villasis, Pangasinan, for the revocation of his lease over an exclusive
ferry privilege and his forcible ejection. The SC held that in its governmental capacity, the LGU is
not liable for the acts of its agents, like the State. However, in its corporate capacity, it can be
held liable for contracts it has entered into which is within its powers, and for torts. In general,

the individual officers cannot be held liable for acts which they do using honest judgment (like
the Board Members of a corporation). However, the defendant councilors here were not honestly
acting for the interests of the municipality. Thus, they are solidarily liable for the damages
sustained by Mendoza.

Facts:

This is an action for damages against the individual members of the municipal council of
the municipality of Villasis, Pangasinan, for the revocation of the lease of an exclusive ferry
privilege duly awarded to the plaintiff under the provisions of Act No. 1643 of the
Philippine Commission. After use of a little more than one year, the plaintiff was forcibly
ejected under and pursuance of a resolution adopted by the herein defendants, awarding a
franchise for the same ferry to another person.

Issue: Can the defendant councilors be held liable? YES

Ratio:
1) Municipalities of the Philippine Islands organized under the Municipal Code have both
governmental and corporate or business functions. Of the first class are the adoption of
regulation against fire and disease, preservation of the public peace, maintenance of
municipal prisons, establishment of primary schools and post-offices, etc. Of the latter
class are the establishment of municipal waterworks for the use of the inhabitants, the
construction and maintenance of municipal slaughterhouses, markets, stables, bathing
establishments, wharves, ferries, and fisheries.
2) Act No. 1643 provides that the use of each fishery, fish-breeding ground, ferry, stable,
market, and slaughterhouse belonging to any municipality or township shall be let to the
highest bidder annually or for such longer period not exceeding five years as may have
been previously approved by the provincial board of the province in which the municipality
or township is located.
3) In the performance of its governmental functions, it is not liable for the acts of its officers
and agents. In the performance of its corporate powers, it is liable.
4) When the acts of its officers come within the powers which it has as agent of the state, it is
exempt from liability for its own acts and the acts of its officers; if the acts of the officer or
agent of the city are for the special benefits of the corporation in its private or corporate
interest, such officer is deemed the agent or servant of the city, but where the act is not in
relation to a private or corporate interest of the municipality, but for the benefit of the
public at large, such acts by the agents and servants are deemed to be acts by public or
state officers, and for the public benefit.
5) Governmental affairs do not lose their governmental character by being delegated to the
municipal governments. Nor of the municipality which, for convenience the state allows
the municipality to select, change their character.
6) The state being immune for injuries suffered by private individuals in the administration of
strictly governmental functions, like immunity is enjoyed by the municipality in the
performance of the same duties, unless it is expressly made liable by statute.
7) The state cannot, without its consent expressed through legislation, be sued for injuries
resulting from an act done in the exercise of its lawful governmental powers and
pertaining to the administration of government. ... Municipal corporations are agents of
the state in the exercise of certain governmental powers. The preservation of the health
and peace of its inhabitants and fire protection afforded the property owner, are
governmental functions.

8) Neither the state nor any of the subdivisions, like a municipality, through which it
operates, is liable for torts committed by public officers, save in definitely excepted
classes of cases. The exemption is based upon the sovereign character of the state and its
agencies, and upon the absence of obligation, and not on the ground that no means for
remedy have been provided.
9) The government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers
or agents whom it employs, since that would involve in all its operations in endless
embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest.
10)
Nor are officers or agents of the Government charged with the performance of
governmental duties which are in their nature legislative, or quasi judicial, liable for the
consequences of their official acts, unless it be shown that they act willfully and
maliciously, and with the express purpose of inflicting injury upon the plaintiff. If they
exercise their honest judgment in the performance of their duties, their errors cannot be
charged against them.
11)
In so far as its governmental functions are concerned, a municipality is not liable at
all, unless expressly made so by statute; nor are its officers, so long as they perform their
duties honestly and in good faith.
12)
On the other hand, a municipality is not exempt from liability for the negligent
performance of its corporate or proprietary or business functions. In the administration of
its patrimonial property, it is to be regarded as a private corporation or individual so far as
its liability to third persons on contract or in tort is concerned. Its contracts, validly entered
into, may be enforced and damages may be collected from it for the torts of its officers or
agents within the scope of their employment in precisely the same manner and to the
same extent as those of private corporations or individuals. The principles of respondeat
superior applies.
13)
Municipal corporations are subject to be sued upon contracts and in tort. Upon an
authorized contract (one that is within the scope of the charter or legislative powers of the
corporation and duly made by the proper officers or agents) they are liable in the same
manner and to the same extent as private corporations or natural persons.
14)
The principle is that the superior or employer must answer civilly for the negligence
or want of skill of his agent or servant in the course or line of his employment, by which
another, who is free from contributory fault, is injured. Municipal corporations fall within
the operation of this rule of law, and are liable, accordingly, to civil actions for damages
when the requisite elements of liability coexist.
15)
To create such liability, it is necessary that the act done which is injurious to others
must be within the scope of the corporate powers as prescribed by charter or positive
enactment. The acts must not be ultra vires in the sense that it is not within the power or
authority of the corporation to act in reference to it under any circumstances.
16)
If the act complained of necessarily lies wholly outside of the general or special
powers of the corporation as conferred in its charter or by statute, the corporation can in
no event be liable to an action for damages, whether it directly commanded the
performance of the act whether it be done by its officers without its express command; for
a corporation cannot of course be impliedly liable to a greater extent than it could make
itself by express corporate vote or action.
17)
The leasing of a municipal ferry to the highest bidder for a specified period of time
is not a governmental but a corporate function. Such a lease, when validly entered into,
constitutes a contract with the lessee which the municipality is bound to respect.
18)
Under the provisions of Municipal Code and Act No. 1634, Mendoza had a vested
right to the exclusive operation of the ferry in question for the period of his lease. Were the
municipality a party to this action, it would be patent that a judgment for damages against
it for the rescission of the contract would be proper. This, be it said, is the usual method of
exacting damages, either ex contractu or ex delicto arising from the exercise of corporate
powers of municipalities.
19)
But the present action is against the members of the municipal council personally.
In administering the patrimonial property of municipalities, the municipal council acts like

a board of directors of a private corporation. In disposing of the local public utilities, they
must exercise considerable judgment.
20)
Councilors cannot be held personally liable for their error in resorting to forcible
eviction of the lessee. Theirs was an error of judgment, and honest mistake on their part
as to the rights of the municipality in the premises. The rule of personal liability should be
with municipal councilors in such matters as it is with the directors or managers of an
ordinary private corporation.
21)
HOWEVER, in this case, there is not a scintilla of evidence that there was any
justifiable reason for forcibly evicting the plaintiff from the ferry which he had leased. The
defendant councilors attempted to justify their action on the ground that the ferry which
he was operating was not the one leased to him; this, in spite of the fact that the vicepresident had personally placed him in possession of it more than a year before, and the
fact that he had operated this ferry for over year, evidently with the knowledge of the
defendants.
22)
The defendant councilors were not honestly acting for the interests of the
municipality. They made the municipality liable to an action for damages for no valid
reason at all.
23)
Thus, the defendants are liable jointly and severally for the damages sustained by
the plaintiff from the rescission of his contract of lease of the ferry privilege in question.
Judgment affirmed.
176. Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme 203
Date: April 8, 1991
Ponente: Medialdea
The case in a nutshell:
FACTS: A collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney, a gravel and sand truck, and a dump
truck owned by the municipality of San Fernando and driven by its employee, Alfredo Bislig. Due
to the impact, jeepney passenger Laureano Bania, Sr. died. The heirs of Bania instituted a
complaint for damages in the CFI against the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney, who in
turn filed a third-party complaint against the municipality and Bislig. The heirs of Bania
amended the complaint and impleaded the municipality and Bislig as defendants. In its answer,
the municipality raised the affirmative defense of non-suability of the State. CFI Judge Firme
deferred the resolution of the defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of
jurisdiction until trial. However, he failed to resolve such defense, proceeded with the trial, and
thereafter rendered a decision against the municipality and Bislig, holding them jointly and
severally liable to the heirs of Bania. He also dismissed the complaint against the owner and
driver of the passenger jeepney. He denied the municipality and Bisligs MRs, so the municipality
filed a petition for certiorari in the SC.
HELD: The CFI did not commit grave abuse of discretion when, in the exercise of its judgment, it
arbitrarily failed to resolve the vital issue of non-suability of the State in the guise of the
municipality. However, Judge Firme acted in excess of his jurisdiction when he held the
municipality liable for the quasi-delict committed by its regular employee. The test of liability of
the municipality for the torts committed by its employee depends on whether or not the
employee, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary
203
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME, JUANA RIMANDO-BANIA, IAUREANO
BANIA, JR., SOR MARIETA BANIA, MONTANO BANIA, ORJA BANIA, AND LYDIA R. BANIA, respondents.

functions. Municipalities are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of
governmental functions, and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were
acting in a proprietary capacity. Bislig was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office. The
construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the driver worked at the time of the
accident are admittedly governmental activities. The municipality cannot be held liable for the
torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of
governmental functions. Hence, the death of Bania imposed on the municipality no duty to pay
monetary compensation.

Facts:
1) At about 7:00am on December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger
jeepney, driven by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras; a
gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez; and a
dump truck of the municipality of San Fernando, La Union, driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to
the impact, several passengers of the jeepney, including Laureano Bania Sr., died as a
result of the injuries they sustained, and 4 others suffered varying degrees of physical
injuries.
2) On December 11, 1966, the heirs of Bania instituted a complaint for damages in the La
Union CFI against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Balagot, owner and driver,
respectively, of the passenger jeepney.
3) The Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot filed a third-party complaint against
the municipality and Bislig, owner and driver, respectively, of the dump truck.
4) The case was transferred to the CFI branch presided over by Judge Romeo N. Firme.
5) By virtue of a court order dated May 7, 1975, the heirs of Bania amended the complaint.
The municipality and Bislig were impleaded for the first time as defendants.
6) The municipality filed its answer and raised affirmative defences, such as lack of cause of
action, non-suability of the State, prescription of cause of action, and the negligence of the
Estate of Macario Nieveras and Balagot as the proximate cause of the collision.
7) In the course of the proceedings, Judge Firme issued the ff. questioned orders:
a. Order dated November 4, 1975 dismissing the cross-claim against Balagot;
b. Order dated July 13, 1976 admitting the Amended Answer of the municipality and
Bislig and setting the hearing on the affirmative defenses only with respect to the
supposed lack of jurisdiction;
c. Order dated August 23, 1976 deferring the resolution of the grounds for the Motion
to Dismiss until the trial;
d. Order dated February 23, 1977 denying the motion for reconsideration of the order
of July 13, 1976 filed by the municipality and Bislig for having been filed out of time;
e. Order dated March 16, 1977 reiterating the denial of the motion for reconsideration
of the order of July 13, 1976;
f. Order dated July 26, 1979 declaring the case deemed submitted for decision it
appearing that parties have not yet submitted their respective memoranda despite
the courts direction; and
g. Order dated September 7, 1979 denying the municipalitys motion for
reconsideration and/or order to recall prosecution witnesses for cross examination.
8) The CFI ruled in favour of the heirs of Bania, and ordered the municipality and Bislig to
pay them, jointly and severally, the funeral expenses and lost expected earnings of
Bania, moral damages, and attorneys fees. It also dismissed the complaint against the
Estate of Macario Nieveras and Balagot.
9) The municipality filed a motion for reconsideration and for a new trial, without prejudice to

another motion which was then pending. However, Judge Firme issued another order dated
November 7, 1979 denying the motion for reconsideration of the order of September 7,
1979 for having been filed out of time.
10)
Judge Firme issued an order dated December 3, 1979 providing that if the
municipality and Bislig further wish to pursue the matter disposed of in the order of July
26, 1979, such should be elevated to a higher court in accordance with the Rules of Court.
11)
The municipality filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction in the SC, seeking the nullification or modification of
the proceedings and the orders issued by Judge Firme.

Issue: Did the CFI commit grave abuse of discretion when it deferred and failed to resolve the
defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss? NO.
Held: The petition is GRANTED and the decision of the respondent court is hereby modified,
absolving the petitioner municipality of any liability in favor of private respondents.
Ratio:
1) The CFIs dereliction in failing to resolve the issue of non-suability did not amount to grave
abuse of discretion. But the CFI exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled on the issue of
liability.
a. The municipality maintained that Judge Firme committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction in issuing the aforesaid orders and in rendering a
decision. Furthermore, it asserted that while appeal of the decision may be
available, the same is not the speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.
b. On the other hand, the heirs of Bania alleged that the petition is devoid of merit,
utterly lacking the good faith which is indispensable in a petition for certiorari and
prohibition. In addition, they stressed that the municipality had not considered that
every court, including the CFI, has the inherent power to amend and control its
process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice.
c. Judge Firme deferred the resolution of the defense of non-suability of the State
amounting to lack of jurisdiction until trial. However, he failed to resolve such
defense, proceeded with the trial, and thereafter rendered a decision against the
municipality and Bislig.
d. The CFI did not commit grave abuse of discretion when, in the exercise of its
judgment, it arbitrarily failed to resolve the vital issue of non-suability of the State in
the guise of the municipality. However, Judge Firme acted in excess of his
jurisdiction when in his decision dated October 10, 1979 he held the municipality
liable for the quasi-delict committed by its regular employee.
e. The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in Article XVI,
Section 3 of the Constitution, to wit: The State may not be sued without its
consent.
i. General rule: the State may not be sued except when it gives consent to be
sued. Consent takes the form of express or implied consent.
1. Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law.
a. The standing consent of the State to be sued in case of money
claims involving liability arising from contracts is found in Act
No. 3083.
b. A special law may be passed to enable a person to sue the

government for an alleged quasi-delict, as in Merritt v.

Government of the Philippine Islands. (United States of America
v. Guinto)
2. Consent is implied when the government enters into business
contracts, thereby descending to the level of the other contracting
party, and also when the State files a complaint, thus opening itself to
a counterclaim. (United States of America v. Guinto)
f. Municipal corporations like provinces and cities are agencies of the State when they
are engaged in governmental functions, and therefore should enjoy the sovereign
immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance
of such functions because their charters provide that they can sue and be sued.
(Cruz, Philippine Political Law)
g. A distinction should first be made between suability and liability.
i. Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the
applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is
suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can
never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not
conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When
the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the
chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable. (United States of
America vs. Guinto)
h. The test of liability of the municipality for the torts committed by its employee
depends on whether or not the employee, acting in behalf of the municipality, is
performing governmental or proprietary functions.
i. The distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of determining the
liability of the municipality for the acts of its agents which result in an injury
to third persons. (Torio v. Fontanilla)
ii. Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are
twofold. In one they exercise the right springing from sovereignty, and while
in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are political
and governmental. Their officers and agents in such capacity are public
functionaries performing a public service, and as such they are officers,
agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity the municipalities
exercise a private, proprietary or corporate right, arising from their existence
as legal persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and agents in the
performance of such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their
corporate or individual capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power.
(City of Kokomo vs. Loy)
i. Municipalities are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge
of governmental functions, and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that
they were acting in a proprietary capacity.
i. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant
the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental
capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the
exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover. (Cruz,
Philippine Political Law)
j. Bislig insisted that he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand
and gravel for the repair of San Fernandos municipal streets. In the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is
presumed. (Section 3(m), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court)

i. Bislig was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office. The construction
or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the driver worked at the time
of the accident are admittedly governmental activities. (Palafox, et al. v.
Province of Ilocos Norte, the District Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer)
k. The municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular
employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions.
Hence, the death of Baniatragic and deplorable though it may beimposed on
the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation.
CASE: Fernando v CA204
DATE: May 8, 1992
PONENTE: Medialdea, J.

SHORT VERSION:
Facts: The City of Davao wanted to have the septic tank in its public market cleaned. It invited
some persons to bid on who will clean the septic tank. Bertulano, a losing bidder, together with
some companions, went to the septic tank and tried to clean it themselves. They were found
dead inside the septic tank. The heirs of those who died filed a case for damages against the
City. They contend that the city is negligent in keeping a dirty septic tank which was the cause of
death of Bertulano, et. al.
Held: The City is not liable. The proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of the Bertulano,
et. al. They had no authority to enter the septic tank. On the other hand, the city has not duty to
put up signs of the danger of the septic tank since septic tanks are not nuisances per se.

FACTS:

November 7, 1975: Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market, filed a
requisition request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurers Office for the reemptying of the septic tank in Agdao.

Invitation to bid was issued. Feliciano Bascon won.

November 22, 1975: One of the other bidders, Aurelio Bertulano, with four other
companions (Joselito Garcia205, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando, and Jose Fajardo), were

204
SOFIA FERNANDO, in her behalf and as the legal guardian of her minor children, namely: ALBERTO & ROBERTO, all surnamed
FERNANDO, ANITA GARCIA, NICOLAS LIAGOSO, ROSALIA BERTULANO, in her behalf and as the legal guardian of her minor
children, namely: EDUARDO, ROLANDO, DANIEL, AND JOCELYN, all surnamed BERTULANO, PRIMITIVA FAJARDO in her behalf and
as legal guardian of her minor children, namely: GILBERT, GLEN, JOCELYN AND JOSELITO, all surnamed FAJARDO, and EMETERIA
LIAGOSO, in her behalf and as guardian ad litem, of her minor grandchildren, namely: NOEL, WILLIAM, GENEVIEVE and GERRY, all
surnamed LIAGOSO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND CITY OF DAVAO, respondents.

205
Found alive, but died in the hospital.

found dead inside the septic tank.

The City Engineers office investigated, and learned that the five victims had entered the
tank without clearance from it, nor with the knowledge and consent of the market master.
The tank was found to be almost empty and the victims were presumed to be the ones
who did the re-emptying.

Autopsy of the bodies by the city health officer showed that their cause of death was
asphyxia caused by dimunition of oxygen supply in the body working below normal
conditions. Their lungs burst, swelled in hemorrhagic areas. This was due to their intake of
sulfide gas produced from the waste matter inside the septic tank.

Heirs of those who died filed a case against the City of Davao.

Trial court: dismissed the case. Heirs appealed to the IAC (now CA).

The appellate court, in view of the facts and the liberal interpretation intended by the
Constitution and the law to protect the plight of the poor, the needy, the ignorant and the
indigent, set aside the TC decision and rendered another one, obliging the City of Davao to
pay compensatory and moral damages to the family of the victims.

Both parties filed MRs. CA granted the MR of Davao and dismissed the case against it.
Hence, the heirs filed the present petition for review on certiorari with the SC.

ISSUE:

Is the City of Davao liable to the petitioners?

HELD:

NO, it is not. The proximate cause of the injury was the negligence of Bertulano,
et. al.
It has not been shown to have been negligent.
o Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the
interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance
which the circumstances justly demanded, whereby such other person suffers
injury. Under the law, a person who by his omission causes damage to another,
there being negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
o
Picart v Smith: The test to determine the existence of negligence may be
stated as Did the defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have
used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law, in
effect, adopts the standard of pater familias of the Roman law. What would be
considered by the law, then, would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent acts
or omissions of the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence.
o Petitioners fault the government of Davao for failing to clean the septic tank
for the period of 19 years, causing an accumulation of hydrogen sulfide gas
which killed the laborers. They also contend that such failure was compounded
by the fact that there was no warning sign of the existing danger and no efforts
exerted by the public respondent to neutralize or render harmless the effects
of the toxic gas.

However, while it was remiss in its duty to re-empty the septic tank, such
negligence was not a continuing one. Upon learning that the tank needed
cleaning, the public respondent immediately issued invitations to bid. Davao City
did not lose any time in taking up remedial measures to meet the situation. Also,
despite the respondents failure to re-empty the septic tank since 1956, it is an
undisputed fact that people in the market have been using the public toilet for
their personal necessities but have remained unscathed.
o
Engineer Demetrio Alindada of the city government testified and
demonstrated by drawings how the safety requirements like emission of gases
in the construction of both toilet and septic tank have been complied with.
Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisances per se as defined in Art 694 of the CC
which would necessitate warning signs for the protection of the public. While the
construction of these public facilities demands utmost compliance with safety and
sanitary requirements, the putting up of warning signs is not one of those
requirements.
The accident occurred because the victims on their own and without authority from
the public respondent opened the septic tank.
o Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank, especially one
that has not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should have
been aware of the attendant risks.
o Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in the service, is presumed to know the hazards of
the job. His failure to take precautionary measures for their safety was the
proximate cause of the accident.
The market master cannot be faulted for not being around to supervise the area
because in the first place, the bidding had just been conducted. Although a bidder
already won, the Committee on Awards had yet to award such bid to him. There
was supposedly no work to be commenced on the septic tank as of yet.
The surreptitious way in which the victims did their job without clearance from the
market master or any of the security guards goes against their good faith.
Petitioners insistence on the applicability of Art 24 206 of the CC cannot be
sustained as well. There is a total absence of contractual relations between the
victims and the City of Davao that could give rise to any contractual obligation,
much less, any liability on the part of the City.
The circumstances lead to the conclusion that the proximate and immediate
cause of the death of the victims was due to their own negligence. Consequently,
the petitioners cannot demand damages from the public respondent.

HELD:
ACCORDINGLY, the amended decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 11, 1990 is
AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
Domingo A. Tuzon and Lope C. Mapagu v CA and Saturnino Jurado.
August 21, 1991
206
In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance,
indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.

Cruz, J.

Short version: The Sangguniang Bayan passed a Resolution stating that it would solicit a 1%
donation from all applicants to be palay threshers within the municipality, to fund its Sports
and Nutrition Center. An agreement was drawn up, which was to be signed by all applicants.
Jurado, an applicant, sent his payment to the municipal treasurer, which refused to accept it and
stated that he should first get a mayors permit. The mayor also refused to issue him a permit,
saying he should first sign the agreement. Jurado filed a petition for mandamus and declaratory
relief with the CFI. The CFI and CA both upheld the validity of the Resolution. The SC, while
stating that it need not concern itself with the validity of the Resolution (because the actual
issue was on damages), observed that the CA did not properly explain why the Resolution was
valid. If it is to be considered a tax ordinance, then it must be shown to have been enacted in
accordance with the requirements of the Local Tax Code. These would include the holding of a
public hearing on the measure and its subsequent approval by the Secretary of Finance, in
addition to the usual requisites for publication of ordinances in general. It cannot be considered a
mandatory donation.

Facts:

The Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan, Cagayan, adopted Resolution No. 9, which states
that
o The Municipality was going to build a Sports and Nutrition Center for the physical
development of its people
o To held fund its construction, it would solicit a 1% donation, of all palay threshed, from all
thresher operators who will apply for a permit to thresh within the municipality
o It authorized the municipal treasurer to enter into an agreement to all thresher operators
who will apply for a permit, to donate such 1%
To implement the Resolution, then municipal treasurer Lope Mapagu, prepared an agreement
for all applicants (for the mayors permit to thresh) to sign.
Saturnino Jurado, an applicant, sent his agent to the municipal treasurers office to pay the
license fee of P285.
Mapagu refused to accept the payment and required him first to secure a mayors permit.
Mayor Domingo, on the other hand, said that Jurado should first comply with Resolution No. 9
and sign the agreement before the permit could be issued.
Jurado filed a special civil action for mandamus with actual and moral damages with the CFI,
to compel the issuance of the mayors permit and license. He also filed an petition for
declaratory judgment against the Resolution and the implementing agreement, for being
illegal either as a donation or a tax measure.
The CFI upheld Resolution No. 9, but it dismissed the claims for damages of both parties for
lack of evidence.
On appeal, the CA upheld Resolution No. 9 and the agreement. However, it found that
Mapagu and Tuzon to have acted maliciously and in bad faith in refusing the application of
Jurado, so they were made liable.
Tuzon and Mapagu appeal to the SC.
o They claim that they were acting in their official capacity when they enforced the
Resolution, thus they cannot be held personally liable because their act was not done
with bad faith or malice.
o Jurado claims that the signing of the implementing agreement was not a condition sine
qua non to the issuance of a permit and license. He also assails the Resolution for

compelling him to donate something which he does not yet own, and for violating the
limitations on the taxing powers of LGUs.
Issues:
1) Is the Resolution valid? YES, but SC is not sure why.
2) Should Tuzon and Mapagu be held liable for damages? NO
Ratio:
As to the validity of Resolution No. 9 and its implementing agreement
1) The SC did not concern itself with its validity because the issue has not been raised in the
current petition as an assignment of error. The previous decision is considered final and
binding as to Jurado. However, the SC did make the observation that the CA did not properly
explain its decision in upholding the validity of the Resolution.
2) The CA merely said that
a. It was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan in the lawful exercise of its
legislative powers in pursuance to Article XI, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution which
provided that: "Each local government unit shall have the power to create (sic) its own
source of revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such limitation as may be provided by
law."
b. And under Article 4, Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 231 (Enacting a Local Tax Code
for Provinces, Cities, Municipalities and Barrios), it is provided that: "Section 29.
Contributions. In addition to the above specified taxing and other revenue-raising
powers, the barrio council may solicit monies, materials, and other contributions from
the following sources: (c) Monies from private agencies and individuals."
3) This is an oversimplification. From the wording of the ordinance, it seems that the
municipality merely intends to solicit the 1% contribution. However, the implementing
agreement seems to make the donation obligatory and a condition precedent to the issuance
of the mayors permit.
a. This goes against the nature of a donation, which is an act of liberality and is never
obligatory.
4) If it is to be considered a tax ordinance, then it must be shown to have been enacted in
accordance with the requirements of the Local Tax Code. These would include the holding of a
public hearing on the measure and its subsequent approval by the Secretary of Finance, in
addition to the usual requisites for publication of ordinances in general.
As to the liability of Tuzon and Mapagu for damages
5) The claim for damages is based on Article 27 207 of the New Civil Code.
6) The provision presupposes that the refusal or omission of a public official to perform his
official duty is attributable to malice or inexcusable negligence. In any event, the erring public
functionary is justly punishable under this article for whatever loss or damage the
complainant has sustained.
7) It has not been alleged that the Mayor Tuzons refusal to act on the private respondents
application was an attempt to compel him to resort to bribery to obtain approval of his
application.
207
Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects,
without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter,
without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken

8) It cannot be said that the mayor and the municipal treasurer were motivated by personal
spite or were grossly negligent in refusing to issue the permit and license.
9) No evidence has been offered to show that the petitioners singled out the private respondent
for persecution. Neither does it appear that the petitioners stood to gain personally from
refusing to issue to Jurado the mayors permit and license he needed.
10)
The petitioners were not Jurados business competitors nor has it been established that
they intended to favor his competitors.
11)
The resolution was uniformly applied to all the threshers in the municipality without
discrimination or preference.
12)
Petitioners acted within the scope of their authority and in consonance with their honest
interpretation of the Resolution.
13)
As a rule, a pubic officer, whether, judicial, quasi-judicial or executive, is not personally
liable to one injured in consequence of an act performed within the scope of his official
authority, and in line of his official duty.
14)
An erroneous interpretation of an ordinance does not constitute nor does it amount to bad
faith, that would entitle an aggrieved party to an award for damages.
15)
Laudencio Torio, et. al. vs Rosalina Fontanilla, et. al. 208
16)
Date: October 23, 1978
17)
Ponente: Muoz-Palma, J.
18)
19)
Short Version:
20)
Facts: The municipality organized a town fiesta. For the occasion, it had ordered the
building of a stage for a zarzuela. During the zarzuela, the stage collapsed. As a result
thereof, Fontanilla, a performer in the zarzuela was pinned, and he eventually died. The
heirs of Fontanilla sued the municipality and its councilors for damages. The defendants
allege that the holding of a town fiesta is an exercise of the municipality's governmental
function for which they could not be held liable.
21)
Held: The holding of a town fiesta is not an exercise of the municipality's
governmental function. Rather, it is an exercise of its proprietary function. It is an act for
the special benefit of the community, and not for the general welfare of the public
performed in pursuance of a policy of the State. Since the act is an exercise of the
proprietary function of the municipality, it can be made liable if the injury is attributable to
the negligence of the municipality's agents. Here it was shown that the municipality,
through its agents, is negligent.
22)
With regard to the councilors, they should not be held liable. Since the act is a
proprietary function of the municipality, it is similar to a private corporation, where the
councilors are the members of the board of directors. A corporation is separate and
distinct from its directors; the latter are not liable unless there is a showing of bad faith or
gross or wanton negligence on their part.
23)
24)
Facts:
25)
- On October 21, 1958, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, passed
Resolution No. 159 where it resolved to manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta
208
[G.R. No. L-29993] LAUDENCIO TORIO, GUILLERMO EVANGELISTA, MANUEL DE GUZMAN, ALFONSO R. MAGSANOC, JESUS
MACARANAS, MAXIMO MANANGAN, FIDEL MONTEMAYOR, MELCHOR VIRAY, RAMON TULAGAN, all Members of the Municipal
Council of Malasiqui in 1959, Malasiqui, Pangasinan, petitioners, vs. ROSALINA, ANGELINA, LEONARDO, EDUARDO, ARTEMIO,
ANGELITA, ANITA, ERNESTO, NORMA, VIRGINIA, REMEDIOS and ROBERTO, all surnamed FONTANILLA, and THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. [G.R. No. L-30183] MUNICIPALITY OF MALASIQUI, petitioner, vs. ROSALINA, ANGELINA,
LEONARDO, EDUARDO, ARTEMIO, ANGELITA, ANITA, ERNESTO, NORMA, VIRGINIA, REMEDIOS and ROBERTO, all surnamed
FONTANILLA, and the Honorable COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

celebration. Resolution No. 182 was also passed creating the Town Fiesta Executive
Committee which in turn organized a sub-committee on entertainment and stage, with
Jose Macaraeg as Chairman. the council appropriated the amount of P100 for the
construction of 2 stages, one of which was for the zarzuela. Macaraeg supervised the
construction of the for the stages. The zarzuela was donated by an association of
Malasiqui employees of the Manila Railroad Company.
26)
- One of the members of the zarzuela troupe was Vicente Fontanilla.
27)
- The program for the Zarzuela began on 10:15pm on January 22. Before the
dramatic part of the play was reached, the stage collapsed, and Fontanilla who was at the
rear of the stage was pinned underneath. He was taken to the hospital where he died in
the afternoon of the following day.
28)
- The heirs of Fontanilia filed with the CFI of Manila a complaint for damages against
the Municipality of Malasiqui, its Municipal Council, and all the individual members of the
council.
29)
- The municipality argued that the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its
governmental functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of
any of its agents.
30)
- The councilors maintained that they merely acted as agents of the municipality,
and as such they are not liable for damages as the undertaking was not one for profit; and
that they had exercised due care and diligence in implementing the municipal ordinance.
31)
- The trial court narrowed the issue to whether or not the defendants exercised due
diligence in the construction of the stage. The court dismissed the complaint. It found that
the Executive Committee had exercised due diligence in selecting a competent man to
construct a stage strong enough for the occasion; that the stage collapsed due to forces
beyond the control of the committee; and consequently, the defendants were not liable for
damages.
32)
- On appeal by the Fontanillas, the CA reversed the trial court and ordered
defendants jointly and severally liable for the sum of P12,000 for moral and actual
damages, P1,200 for attorney's fees, and costs.
33)
- The municipality, and the councilors filed separate petitions for review of the CA
decision.
34)
35)
Issue/Reasoning:
36)
Issue: Whether the holding of the fiesta is a governmental or proprietary function of
the municipality (It is a proprietary function. It is an act for the special benefit of the
community, and not for the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a
policy of the State.)
37)
- The powers of a municipality are twofold in character: public, governmental or
political on the one hand; corporate, private, or proprietary on the other.
38)
- Governmental powers are those exercised in administering the powers of the State
and promoting the public welfare. Municipal powers on the other hand are exercised for
the special benefit and advantage of the community and include those which are
ministerial, private, and corporate.
39)
- It is generally difficult to determine when a certain activity is governmental, and
when proprietary or private. Each case will have to be determined on the basis of
attending circumstances.
40)
- The rule stated by McQuillin on Municipal Corporations is this: "A municipal
corporation proper has... a public character as regards the state at large insofar as it is its
agent in government, and private (so-called) insofar as it is to promote local necessities
and conveniences for its own community.

41)
- In Mendoza v De Leon, the Court classified the following activities as
governmental: regulations against fire, disease, preservation of public peace, maintenance
of municipal prisons, establishment of schools, post-offices. On the other hand, the
following are classified as proprietary in character: municipal waterwork, slaughter houses,
markets, stables, bathing establishments, wharves, ferries, and fisheries.
42)
- This distinction of powers is important for purposes of determining the liability of
the municipality for the acts of its agents which result in an injury to third persons.
43)
- If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental function
or duty no recovery, as a rule, can be had from the municipality unless there is an existing
statute on the matter (ex: Art 2189 CC), nor from its officers, so long as they performed
their duties honestly and in good faith or that they did not act wantonly and maliciously.
44)
- With respect to proprietary functions, a municipal corporation can be held liable to
third persons ex contractu or ex delicto.
45)
- Sec 2282 of RAC209 authorizes a municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta. However,
it does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta is in essence an act for
the special benefit of the community, and not for the general welfare of the public
performed in pursuance of a policy of the State.
46)
- The mere fact that the celebration was not to secure profit, but merely to provide
entertainment is not a conclusive test. For instance, the maintenance of parks is not a
source of income, but it is a private undertaking as distinguished from the maintenance of
public schools, jails, and the like which are for public service.
47)
- Thus, the holding of the town fiesta by the municipality of Malsiqui was an exercise
of its private or proprietary function.
48)
49)
Issue: Whether the municipality is liable (Yes. It is negligent.)
50)
- From the finding that the holding of a fiesta is a proprietary function, the
municipality will be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior if the injury
caused is attributable to the negligence of the municipality's officers, employees, or
agents.210
51)
- CA found that the municipality is negligent.
52)
- A member of the zarzuela troupe was alleged to have removed some supports at
the front of the stage. However, it is incredible that any person in his right mind would
remove those principal braces and leave the front portion of the stage practically
unsupported. Moreover, if that did happen, there was negligence as there was lack of
suspension over the use of the stage to prevent such an occurrence. Also, the person
alleged to have removed the supports denied having done so.
53)
- The stage was not strong enough considering that only P100 was appropriated for
the construction of two stages. The defendants described the stage as being supported by
24 posts. However, there was actually only 13.
54)
- The collapse was due to the number of onlookers who mounted the stage. The
municipality and its agents had the necessary means to prevent such an occurrence, but
did not do so.
209
Celebration of fiesta. A fiesta may be held in each municipality not oftener than once a year upon a date fixed by the municipal council. A
fiesta shall not be held upon any other date than that lawfully fixed therefor, except when, for weighty reasons, such as typhoons, inundations,
earthquakes, epidemics, or other public calamities, the fiesta cannot be held in the date fixed, in which case it may be held at a later date in the
same year, by resolution of the council.

210
The Court then quoted Arts 2176 (quasi-delict) and 2180 (vicarious liability for quasi-delict) CC.

55)
- The findings of the appellate court will not disturbed in the absence of a clear
showing of an abuse of discretion or a gross misapprehension of facts.
56)
- When the municipality agreed to hold the zarzuela and constructed the stage for
the purpose, the participants of the show had the right to expect that the municipality
would build a stage strong enough to sustain the weight of the performance and take the
necessary measures to insure the personal safety of the participants.
57)
- Present case is similar to the American case Sanders v City of Long Beach.
58)
- The city was showing of a motion picture in the city auditorium to which the
general public was invited and the plaintiff was one of those who attended. The plaintiff
fell while descending the steps of the auditorium. The court held that event is a
proprietary activity; that the city has the duty of exercising ordinary care for the plaintiff's
safety; and that the plaintiff was entitled to assume that she would not be exposed to
danger that would come to her through a violation of defendant's duty.
59)
- Fontanilla, as one of the participants of the zarzuela, had the right to expect that
he would not be exposed to danger on that occasion.
60)
- The municipality cannot evade liability under the claim that it was Macaraeg who
constructed the stage. The municipality acting through its municipal council appointed
Macaraeg in charge of the construction of the stage; he is merely as an agent of the
municipality. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the municipality is liable for the
negligence of its agent acting within his assigned tasks.
61)
62)
Issue: Whether the councilors are liable (No. They did not directly participate in the
negligent acts.)
63)
- CA held the councilors solidarily liable with the municipality under Art 27 CC 211.
64)
- CA erred in applying the said provision since it covers a case of nonfeasance or
non-performance by a public officer of his official duty; it does not apply to a case of
negligence or misfeasance in carrying out an official duty.
65)
- The consequence of the ruling that the celebration of a town fiesta is not a
governmental function is that the Municipality stands on the same footing as an ordinary
private corporation with the council acting as its board of directors. A corporation has a
personality, separate and distinct from its directors, and the latter are not as a rule coresponsible in an action for damages for negligence committed by the corporation's
agents unless there is a showing of bad faith or gross or wanton negligence on their part.
66)
- The councilors did not directly participate in the defective construction of the
stage. They did not personally permit spectators to go up the platform. They should be
absolved from liability.
67)
68)
Issue: Whether the award of attorney's fees is proper (Yes)
69)
- Attempts were made by the heirs of Fontanilla to secure an extrajudicial
compensation from the municipality. The latter gave promises of assistance but failed to
comply. It was only eight months after the incident that the heirs was compelled to seek
relief from the courts to ventilate their cause. Thus, there is no error in granting attorney's
fees.
70)
71)
Dispositive:

211
Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his
official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against he latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action
that may be taken.

72)
CA decision is affirmed insofar as the Municipality of Malasiqui is concerned. The
municipal councilors are absolved from liability, and the judgment against them is set
aside.
City of Manila v. Genaro N. Teotico and CA
Concepcion, C.J. 29 January 1968
SV: Teotico fell in an uncovered and unlighted manhole on P. Burgos Avenue, within the City of
Manila. He sustained injuries and thus sued the City of Manila for damages. The CFI dismissed
the complaint but the CA held the City of Manila liable to pay damages. The SC held that the City
of Manila was liable for damages. It ruled that it was of no moment whether or not P. Burgos
Avenue was a national highway. Art. 2189 CC, which provides for the liability of the city, does not
require that the street belong to the city. All it requires is that the street be under the control and
supervision of the city.
FACTS:27 Jan 1958: At about 8pm, Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos
Avenue, Manila, waiting for a jeepney to take him down town. He managed to hail a jeepney. As
he stepped fown from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an
uncovered and unlighted manhole on P. Burgos Avenue.
Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken
pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. He also suffered various contusions, abrasions, and an
allergic eruption caused by the anti-tetanus injection administered to him in the hospital.
Teotico filed with the CFI of Manila a complaint for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor,
city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police.
CFI dismissed the complaint. CA ordered the City of Manila to pay damages in the sum of P6,750.
ISSUES/REASONING: Is the City of Manila liable to Teotico for damages? YES.
1) The City of Manila argues that it cannot be held liable for damages because the accident
involving Teotico took place in a national highway. The SC disagreed.
This argument is based upon an allegation of fact not made in the answer of the city.
Furthermore, in its answer to Teoticos complaint, the City alleged that the streets involved have
been consistently kept in good condition and regularly inspected by the Citys officers. In effect,
The City had admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and supervision.
At any rate, under Art. 2189 CC, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach
that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted. All the article requires is control or supervision over said street or
road.
2) In fact, under Sec. 18(x) of RA 409, the Municipal Board has the legislative power to regulate
the use of streets, provide for the inspection of drains, and to regulate curbs and gutters.
This authority has neither been withdrawn nor restricted by RA 917 and EO 113, as argued by the
City.
a) RA 917 merely governs the disposition of highway funds and the giving of aid to provinces,
cities, and municipalities in the construction of roads and streets.
b) EO 113 merely implements the provisions of RA 917.
3) The determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is under the control or supervision of
the City of Manila, and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, is one of fact. The findings of
the CA thereon are not subject to review by the SC.

DECISION APPEALED FROM AFFIRMED.

CONCEPCION ABELLA, plaintiff-appellee, vs.MUNICIPALITY OF NAGA, ET AL., defendants,
MUNICIPALITY OF NAGA, defendant-appellant.
Tuason, J.
Nov. 20, 1951
SV: The municipality ordered the closing of a street which ran between the market and plaintiff
Abellas property in order to expand the market. This deprived Abellas property of access to the
street and consequently retarded her actions. The Municipality contends that it acted and
exercised its police power pursuant to the promotion of general welfare.
The municipality should be held liable. The contentions of the municipality must fail because it is
not charged with any unlawful act. The basis for the decision is Sec. 2246, RAC, whichprovides
that no municipal road, street, etc. or any part thereof "shall be closed without indemnifying any
person prejudiced thereby." The fact of damage to the plaintiff is not disputed.
FACTS:Through a resolution, the municipality of Naga ordered the closing of that part of a
municipal street which ran between the public market and the plaintiff's property, and used the
closed thoroughfare to expand the market.

As a consequence of the resolution, permanent, semi-permanent, as well as temporary

constructions were allowed by the municipality along the sidewalk of Abella's property and
abutting to said property, facing P. Prieto Street, and extending out in the middle of the same
street
This deprived Abella's property of access to said street, and consequently retarding her
reconstructions.
It was further stipulated "that if all the damages is to be awarded the plaintiff, the same
should not exceed the sum of Three hundred pesos (P300)

[CFI] sentenced the Municipality to pay the plaintiff P300 damages resulting from the closing of a
municipal street.
The Municipality contends that it acted and exercised its police power, prompted to preserve the
peace and good order of the community and promote the general welfare, and this being the
case, it believes that it is not liable for damages.
ISSUE: Should the Municipality be held liable? (YES)

The municipality or city of Naga was not charged with any unlawful act, or with acting without
authority, or with invasion of plaintiff's property rights
o The basis of the lower court's decision in Section 2246 of the Revised Administrative
Code copied in appellant's brief, which provides that no municipal road, street, etc. or
any part thereof "shall be closed without indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby."
The question is whether the plaintiff prejudiced by the municipalitys action.
o As the stipulation of facts admits, she was economically damaged, and the indemnity
assessed is within the bounds of damages suffered.
o As a matter of fact, the damages awarded seem to be nominal judged by the
description of the plaintiff's interests adversely affected by the conversion of P. Prieto
Street into a market.

CFI Decision AFFIRMED.

VDA DE TAN TOCO v THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ILOILO

25 March 1926
Villamor, ponente
bill of exceptions
SHORT VERSION: Vda de Tan Toco had certain properties of the municipality attached in order
to pay a debt that the municipality owed her. The provincial fiscal moved to have the attachment
dissolved; this motion was granted by the CFI. The SC agreed, saying that properties held by the
municipality for public use cannot be attached and sold to pay for municipal liabilities.
FACTS:
Tan Tocos widow sued the municipal council of Iloilo for P42,966.40. This was the purchase
price of two parcels of land that the municipality had appropriated for street widening.
o The CFI sentenced Iloilo to pay the amount; the judgment was affirmed by the SC.
When Iloilo failed to pay due to lack of funds, Vda de Tan Toco obtained a writ of execution
against the municipalitys property.
o The sheriff attached two trucks used for street sprinkling, one police patrol car, three
police stations, and three concrete structures used as markets along with their
corresponding lots.
o A few days before the sale, the provincial fiscal of Iloilo filed a motion with the CFI
praying to have the attachment dissolved.
The CFI granted the motion.
ISSUE:
were the properties levied upon exempt from execution? YES
REASONING:Administrative Code 2165 stated:
Municipalities are political bodies corporate, and as such are endowed with the
faculties of municipal corporations, to be exercised by and through their
respective municipal government in conformity with law.
It shall be competent for them, in their proper corporate name, to sue and be
sued, to contract and be contracted with, to acquire and hold real and personal
property for municipal purposes, and generally to exercise the powers
hereinafter specified or otherwise conferred upon them by law.
While the Admin Code didnt specify the kind of property a municipality could acquire, the
Civil Code divided the property of provinces and towns as (1) property for public use, and (2)
patrimonial property.
o Provincial roads and foot-path, squares, streets, fountains and public waters, drives and
public improvements of general benefit built at the expense of the said towns or
provinces, are property for public use.
o All other property was patrimonial.
o Manresa: In accordance with administrative legislation (Spanish) we must distinguish,
as to the patrimonial property of the towns, between that a common benefit and that
which is private property of the town.
The first differs from property for public use in that generally its enjoyment is
less, as it is limited to neighbors or to a group or class thereof; and, furthermore,
such use, more or less general, is not intrinsic with this kind of property, for by
its very nature it may be enjoyed as though it were private property.
The third group, that is, private property, is used in the name of the town or
province by the entities representing it and, like and private property, giving a
source of revenue. [note: idk where the second group went]
The principle governing property of the public domain of the State is applicable to property
for public use of the municipalities as said municipal is similar in character.

The property for public use of the State is not within the commerce of man and,
consequently, is inalienable and not subject to prescription.
o Likewise, property for public of the municipality is not within the commerce of man so
long as it is used by the public and, consequently, said property is also inalienable.
[At this point the SC cited a bunch of American jurisprudence supporting the above bullet
points.]
o Tufexis v Olaguera: Even though a creditor is unquestionably entitled to recover out of
his debtor's property, yet when among such property there is included the special right
granted by the Government of usufruct in a building intended for a public service, and
when this privilege is closely related to a service of a public character, such right of the
creditor to the collection of a debt owed him by the debtor who enjoys the said special
privilege of usufruct in a public market is not absolute and may be exercised only
through the action of court of justice with respect to the profits or revenue obtained
under the special right of usufruct enjoyed by debtor.
The movable and immovable property of a municipality, necessary for governmental purpose,
may not be attached and sold for the payment of a judgment against the municipality.
o The supreme reason for this rule is the character of the public use to which such kind of
property is devoted.
o The necessity for government service justifies that the property of public of the
municipality be exempt from execution just as it is necessary to exempt certain
property of private individuals.
Even municipal income was exempt from levy and execution.
o Municipal Corporations, Dillon: To enable them beneficially to exercise these powers
and discharge these duties, they are clothed with the authority to raise revenues,
chiefly by taxation, and subordinately by other modes as by licenses, fines, and
penalties. The revenue of the public corporation is the essential means by which it is
enabled to perform its appointed work.
Deprived of its regular and adequate supply of revenue, such a corporation is
practically destroyed and the ends of its erection thwarted. Based upon
considerations of this character, it is the settled doctrine of the law that only the
public property but also the taxes and public revenues of such corporations
cannot be seized under execution against them.
o

RULING: judgment appealed from affirmed

Municipality of Makati v. CA, et al.
1 October 1990
Cortes, J.
Short version: The Municipality of Makati initiated expropriation proceedings against the private
respondents. It was ordered by the RTC to pay the value of the property in accordance with its
value as fixed by the court. After this order became final and executory, a writ of execution was
issued and eventually, a notice of garnishment was served upon the manager of PNB Buendia,
where the municipality maintained two bank accounts: one account which was opened
specifically pursuant to the expropriation proceedings; and a second account which was
supposedly for its statutory obligations and other purposes of the municipal government. The
municipality argues the funds in the second account cannot be garnished because such funds are
in the nature of public funds which are exempted from execution without the proper
appropriation required under the law. The Supreme Court agreed with this contention. The funds
deposited in the second PNB account are public funds of the municipal government which, as a
rule, are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. Absent a
showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating from its
public funds an amount corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision in the
expropriation case no levy under execution may be validly effected on the funds in the second
account. Nevertheless, the municipality still has to pay the balance due on the expropriation

considering that it has been enjoying the possession and use of the subject property for three
years now notwithstanding its inexcusable failure to comply with its legal obligation to pay just
compensation.
Facts: The Municipality of Makati initiated expropriation proceedings against Admiral Finance
Creditors Consortium, Inc. Home Building System & Realty Corporation and one Arceli P. Jo,
involving a parcel of land and improvements thereon located at Mayapis St., San Antonio Village,
Makati.
- Attached to the complaint was a certification that a bank acount (Account No. S/A 265-5371543) had been opened with PNB Buendia Branch under the name of the municipality pursuant to PD
42. The RTC judge rendered a decision fixing the value of the property at P5,291,666.00, and
ordering the municipality to pay this amount the advanced payment of P338,160.00 which was
earlier released.
- This decision became final and executory so Admiral Finance moved for the issuance of a writ
of execution, which was granted. A Notice of Garnishment was served upon the manager of PNB
Buendia. The Municipality field a motion to lift the garnishment on theg round that the manner of
payment of the expropriation amount should be done in installments which the RTC judge failed
to state in his decision.212
- The trial court issued an order denying the motion to lift the garnshiment. It ordered PNB
Buendia to immediately release the balance of the appraised value of the subject property from
the garnshied account of the municipality.
- The municipality filed an MR but this was denied by the trial court. The case was brought
before the CA on petition for certiorari but the same was denied for lack of merit. Its MR having
been denied, the municipality filed the present petition for review before the SC.
In this petition, the municipality alleged for the first time that it actually has
two accounts with PNB Buendia, namely: (1) Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 - exclusively
for the expropriation of the subject property, with an outstanding balance of P99,743.94;
and (2) Account No. S/A 263-530850-7 - for statutory obligations and other purposes of the
municipal government, with a balance of P170,098,421.72, as of July 12, 1989.
Admitting that the first account was specifically opened for expropriation
proceedings, the municipality poses no objection to the garnishment or levy under
exection of the P99,743.94 deposited therein. However, its main contention is that the
funds in its second account cannot be garnished because such funds are in the nature of
public funds earmarked for the municipal government's other statutory obligations which
are exempted from execution without the proper appropriation required under the law.
Issue: May the municipalities funds in the second account be garnished? (No, but the
municipality should still pay the balance)
Reasoning: The funds deposited in the second PNB account are public funds of the municipal
government. The rule is that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise
provided for by statute. More particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether real or
personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to
satisfy a money judgment against the municipality.
212
Pending resolution of the motion, manifestations were filed before the court indicating that the true and lawful owner of the property became
Philippine Savings Bank (PSB). PSB and the original respondents entered into a compromise agreement whereby they agreed to split the
proceeds from the expropriation proceedings.

- Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating
from its public funds an amount corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision in the
expropriation case, less the sum of P99,743.94 deposited in the first account, no levy under
execution may be validly effected on the public funds of the municipality deposited in the second
account.
- Nevertheless, the municipality must now pay the said balance. The validity of the RTC decision
in the expropriation case is not disputed and no appeal was taken therefrom. For three years
now, the municipality ahs enjoyed possession and use of the subject property as the site of
Makati West High School since the [school] year 1986-1987 notwithstanding its inexcusable
failure to comply with its legal obligation to pay just compensation.
Just compensation not only means the correct determination of the amount
to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable
time from its taking. Under the circumstances, the municipality has had more than
reasonable time to pay the compensation in full.
Dispositive: Municipality of Makati ordered to immediately pay the amount of P4,953,506.45 and
is required to submit to the Court a report of its compliance with this order within a nonextendible period of 60 days from its receipt of the resolution.
The Pasay City Government, the City Mayor of Defendant Pasay City Government, the
Members of the Municipal Board of Pasay City and the City Treasurer of Pasay City
Government v. The Honorable Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X and Vicente
David Isip (doing business under the firm name V.D. Isip, Sons & Associates)
28 September 1984
Makasiar, J.
SHORT VERSION: VD Isip (the contractor) and the Pasay City government entered into a contract
whereby VD Isip would construct a new Pasay City Hall and the City government would pay on a
stage-by-stage basis of completion. The work completed amounted to about P1.7m, but the City
paid only P1.1. The contractor sued for specific performance, without completing the entire
project (which was worth about P4.9m). The parties entered into a compromise agreement,
where the City acknowledged its debt and promised to pay. The CFI later issued a writ of
execution, garnishing the funds of the City with PNB in the amount needed to satisfy the
obligation. The City moved for the quashal of the writ. The CFI denied.
The SC said the denial was proper. The general rule was that all government funds
deposited with the [PNB] by any agency or instrumentality of the government, whether by way of
general or special deposit, remain government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or
levy. However, the exception was that Judgments against a State in cases where it has
consented to be sued, generally operate merely to liquidate and establish plaintiffs claim in the
absence of express provision; otherwise they cannot be enforced by processes of the law; and it
is for the legislature to provide for the payment in such manner as it sees fit. In this case, the
compromise agreement was approved by the City through an ordinance. In effect, the ordinance
was enacted expressly appropriating the amount needed as payment to the contractor. Hence,
this case fell under the exception.
FACTS:VD Isip, Sons & Associates, represented by Vicente David Isip, and the Pasay City
government, represented by then Mayor Pablo Cuneta, entered into an agreement for the
construction of a new City Hall at Harrison Street.

Under the contract, the contractor (VD Isip) shall advance the necessary amount for
each stage of the construction, to be reimbursed by the Pasay City government before
proceeding to the next stage, provided that the contractor shall inform the City in
writing as to the amount necessary before starting each stage of work.
VD Isip proceeded with construction as per duly approved plans and specifications by the City
Engineer. The work completed amounted to P1,713,096. The total contract price was
P4,914,500.80.
The Pasay City government paid only P1.1m. It failed to pay the balance despite demands.
VD Isip filed an action for specific performance with damages against the Pasay City
government.
o Later, the parties arrived at a Compromise Agreement which was submitted to the
Municipal Board of Pasay City for its consideration.
o The Municipal Board approved the Compromise Agreement via Ordinance No. 1012,
and empowered the incumbent Mayor Jovito Claudio to represent the Pasay City
government, subject to the final approval of the CFI.
o March 12, 1969: The CFI also approved the Compromise Agreement, but included
several addenda, including:
Immediately upon final approval of the CFI, the contractor will submit and file in
favor of the City government a new performance bond in the amount required by
law, in proportion to the remaining value or cost of the unfinished work.
Within at least 90 days, the Pasay City government must remit the amount of its
balance, plus 3% of this amount, as attorneys fees, to the contractor, who in
turn shall be bound and obliged to commence the next stage of construction.
At the instance of VD Isip, the CFI issued a writ of execution.
o Later, a notice of garnishment was made upon the funds of the City with PNB.
The City government filed an urgent motion to quash the writ of execution on the ground of
lack of authority, since the sheriff has no power to levy or garnish on execution the funds of
the City.
o The CFI denied the motion. The City filed an MR, which was also denied. The CFI
ordered the enforcement of the writ of garnishment.
(feel free to skip facts starting here) The CFI also found that the contracted had already paid a
performance bond worth P100,000, equal to 20% of the cost of the next stage of construction,
and held this to be sufficient compliance. Since the work was to be undertaken in stages, it
would be unreasonable to compel the contractor to submit a performance bond equivalent to
the cost of the entire project.
The City filed its notice of appeal and record on appeal. Meanwhile, Vicente Isip, in the
original complaint, filed an urgent motion for permit to serve a supplemental complaint
seeking rescission of the original contract and of the compromise agreement.
The SC required the City to file a petition for review on certiorari, which it did. It was later
denied for lack of merit. However, the SC granted the MR.
o VD Isip prayed for the dismissal of the petition for review since the issues involved in
the supplemental complaint are prejudicial to the present petition.
ISSUES: (Only the 1st is relevant to the topic in the syllabus; the rest were included for
completeness. ed.)
o

21.Should the writ of execution/garnishment have been quashed?

22.Should the supplemental complaint have been entertained?
23.Was the performance bond already filed sufficient?
REASONING:
21.No the motion to quash the writ of execution was properly denied
The City government moved for the quashal of the writ alleging, among other things, the
exemption of the government from execution.

At first glance, this is laudable for all government funds deposited with the [PNB] by any
agency or instrumentality of the government, whether by way of general or special
deposit, remain government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy
(Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego).
o However, there is an exception: Judgments against a State in cases where it has
consented to be sued, generally operate merely to liquidate and establish plaintiffs
claim in the absence of express provision; otherwise they cannot be enforced by
processes of the law; and it is for the legislature to provide for the payment in such
manner as it sees fit. (Republic v. Palacio)
o Inasmuch as an ordinance has already been enacted expressly appropriating the
amount needed as payment to the contractor, the present case is covered by the
exception to the general rule.
22.No the supplemental complaint for rescission should not have been entertained
Having established that the compromise agreement was final and immediately executory,
and was in fact already enforced, the CFI erred when it still entertained the supplemental
complaint, for by then, the CFI had no more jurisdiction over the matter.
When a decision has become final and executory, the court no longer has the power and
jurisdiction to alter, amend or revoke, and its only power is to order its execution. After
the perfection of an appeal, the trial court loses jurisdiction over its judgment and cannot
vacate the same.
Moreover, supplemental pleadings are meant to supply deficiencies in aid of the original
pleading, not to entirely substitute them.
o In this case, the contractor originally asked for specific performance which was later
settled through a compromise agreement. After this, the contractor asked for
rescission of both the original contract and the compromise agreement using a
supplemental complaint.
o Clearly, the supplemental complaint is not only to supply deficiencies but is also
meant as an entirely new substitute to the latter.
23.Yes the performance bond was sufficient
It is obvious that the contracting parties envisioned a stage-by-stage construction and
payment. This is manifest in the contract and the compromise agreement.
o The parties contemplated a divisible obligation necessitating a performance bond in
proportion to the uncompleted work.
If the parties really intended the legal rate of 20% performance bond to refer to the whole
unfinished work, then the provision in the compromise agreement should have required
the contractor to submit and file a new performance bond to cover the remaining value
cost of the unfinished work.
Also, the filing of the performance bond was not a condition precedent for the Citys
payment of the balance for the work already completed. This was nowhere in the contract
nor in the compromise agreement.
o A reciprocal obligation was not created, since the original contract was entered into
several years ahead of the obligation to file a performance bond.
RULING: CFI decision affirmed
The Municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte v TeodoroManaois and Eulogio F. De Guzman,
CFI Judge of Pangasinan
June 30, 1950
Montemayor, J.
Short version:Duque won a case against the Municipality of Paoay and the Provincial Sheriff
levied against two properties of the municipality: income from the lease of fishery lots and the
some parcels of the fishery lots themselves. The Municipalitys filed a petition for the dissolution
of the attachment of levy, claiming that they are properties of public use and are thus not
subject to execution and levy. The SC ruled that as to the fishery lots, the Municipality does not
own them but only has the right of usufruct over them because it is still the State which owns

them. But even this right of usufruct cannot be levied upon because the usufruct is not an
inherent right but is merely granted by the legislature. However, as to the income from the lease,
these can be subject to levy because unlike taxes, municipal licenses, and market fees, they are
not depended upon by the municipality, nor are they fixed or definite.
Facts:

The municipality of Paoay entered into a contract with Francisco V. Duque for the lease of 6
fishery lots, from January 1, 1937 to December 31, 1940. In 1938, the municipal council of
Paoay approved a resolution confiscating said fishery lots on the ground that Duque had failed
to comply with the terms of the lease contract.
The municipality advertised the lease of its fishery lots for public bidding. TeodoroManaois,
being the highest bidder, was awarded the lease through a resolution of the municipality on
December 1, 1938.
On January 1, 1939, Manaois paid P2,025 as rental for the said lots for the year 1939.
However, when Manaois and his men tried to enter the property, he found therein Duque and
his men who claimed that Duque was still the lessee.
Despite the appeal of Manaois to the Municipality of Paoay to put him in possession and the
efforts of the municipality to oust Duque, the latter succeeded in continuing in his possession
and keeping Manaois and his men out.
Manaois brought an action against the Municipality of Paoay to recover not only the sum paid
by him for the lease of the fishery lots but also damages.
The CFI ruled in favor of Manaois. Judge De Guzman issued a writ of execution against the
defendant municipality.
The Provincial Sheriff of Ilocos Norte levied upon and attached the following properties:
o The amount of P1,712.01 in the Municipal Treasury of Paoay, Ilocos Norte, representing
the rental paid by Mr. Demetrio Tabije of a fishery lot belonging to the defendant
municipality;
o About forty fishery lots leased to thirty-five different persons by the Municipality.
In 1949, the Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Norte, in representation of the municipality of Paoay,
filed a petition in the CFI asking for the dissolution of that attachment of levy of such
properties. Judge De Guzman denied the petition for the dissolution of the attachment. An MR
was also denied.
Instead of appealing, the municipality of Paoay has filed the present petition for certiorari with
the writ of preliminary injunction, asking that the order of Judge de Guzman be reversed and
that the attachment of the properties of the municipality already mentioned be dissolved.
o The Municipality claims that that the properties attached by the sheriff for purposes of
execution are not subject to levy because they are properties for public use.
Issues:
1) Are the fishery lots subject to execution? NO. What the municipality owns is not the fishery
lots themselves, but only the usufruct. But even the usufruct is not subject to execution.
2) Is the income on the fishery lots subject to execution? YES
Ratio:
1) The municipality of Paoayhas for many years been operating/leasing fishery lots on municipal
waters. These waters have been parceled out in lots, either singly or in groups and let out or
rented after public bidding to the highest bidders, ordinarily, for a year, but sometimes, for a
longer period of time.
2) Properties for public use held by municipal corporation are not subject to levy and execution.
3) Properties for public use like trucks used for sprinkling the streets, police patrol wagons,
police stations, public markets, together with the land on which they stand are exempt from
execution. Even public revenues of municipal corporations destined for the expenses of the
municipality are also exempt from the execution.

4) The reason behind this exemption extended to properties for public use, and public municipal
revenues is that they are held in trust for the people, intended and used for the
accomplishment of the purposes for which municipal corporations are created, and that to
subject said properties and public funds to execution would materially impede, even defeat
and in some instances destroy said purpose.
5) Property however, which is patrimonial and which is held by municipality in its proprietary
capacity is treated by great weight of authority as the private asset of the town and may be
levied upon and sold under an ordinary execution. The same rule applies to municipal funds
derived from patrimonial properties, for instance, it has been held that shares of stocks held
by municipal corporations are subject to execution.
6) The fishery or municipal waters of the town of Paoay, Ilocos Norte, which had been parceled
out or divided into lots and later let out to private persons for fishing purposes at an annual
rental are clearly not subject to execution.
7) In the first place, they do not belong to the municipality because they are properties of the
State. Paoay only has the usufruct or the right to use said municipal waters, granted to it by
section 2321 of the Revised Administrative Code 213.
8) This usufruct of the municipality of Paoay over its municipal waters is NOT subject to
execution to enforce a judgment against the town.
9) It is not a usufruct based on or derived from an inherent right of the town. It is based merely
on a grant, more or less temporary, made by the Legislature. The municipality has no vested
rights over it.
10)
The Legislature, for reasons it may deem valid or as a matter of public policy, may at any
time, repeal or modify said section 2321 and revoke this grant to coastal towns and open
these marine waters to the public. Or the Legislature may grant the usufruct or right of
fishery to the provinces concerned so that said provinces may operate or administer them by
leasing them to private parties.
11)
The municipality of Paoay is not holding this usufruct or right of fishery in a permanent or
absolute manner so as to enable it to dispose of it or to allow it to be taken away from it as its
property through execution.
12)
If the usufruct were to be sold on execution, the buyer would immediately step into the
shoes of the judgment-debtor municipality. Such buyer presumably buys only the right of the
municipality. He does not buy the fishery itself nor the municipal waters because that belongs
to the State. All that the buyer might do would be to let out or rent to private individuals the
fishery rights over the lots into which the municipal waters had been parceled out or divided,
and that is, after public bidding. This, he must do because that is the only right granted to the
municipality by the Legislature, a right to be exercised in the manner provided by law,
namely, to rent said fishery lots after public bidding. (See sec. 2323 of the Administrative
Code in connection with sec. 2319 of the same Code.)
a. Then there would be an anomalous situation of a private individual conducting public
bidding, renting to the highest bidders fishery lots over municipal waters which are
property of the State, and appropriating the results to his own private use. The
impropriety, if not illegality, of such a contingency is readily apparent.

213
SEC. 2321. Grant of fishery. A municipal council shall have authority, for purposes of profit, to grant the exclusive
privileges of fishery or right to conduct a fish-breeding ground within any definite portion, or area, of the municipal
waters."Municipal waters", as herein used, include not only streams, lakes, and tidal waters, include within the
municipality, not being the subject of private ownership, but also marine waters include between two lines drawn
perpendicular to the general coast line from points where the boundary lines of the municipality touch the sea at high
tide, and third line parallel with the general coast line and distant from it three marine leagues.
Where two municipalities are so situated on opposite shores that there is less than six marine leagues of marine
waters between them the third line shall be a line equally distant from the opposite shores of the respective
municipalities.

13)
This would deprive the municipal corporation of a source of a substantial income,
expressly provide by law.
14)
BUT the revenue or income coming from the renting of these fishery lots is certainly
subject to execution.
15)
This kind of revenue is different from that derived from taxes, municipal licenses and
market fees.
16)
The real estate taxes collected by a municipality do not all go to it. A portion thereof goes
to the province, in the proportion provided for by law. For the same reason, municipal markets
are established not only to provide a place where the people may sell and buy commodities
but also to provide public revenues for the municipality. To many towns, market fees
constitute the bulk of their assets and incomes. These revenues are fixed and definite, so
much so that the annual appropriations for the expenses of the municipalities are based on
these revenues.
17)
The income derived from fisheries, on the other hand, all go to it. The usufruct over
municipal waters was granted by the Legislature merely to help or bolster up the economy of
municipal government. There are many towns in the Philippines which do not have municipal
waters for fishery purpose and yet they can function.
18)
The amount of this income is far from definite or fixed. It depends upon the amounts which
prospective bidders or lessees are willing to pay.
19)
To many municipalities engaged in this business of letting out municipal waters for fishing
purposes, it is a sort of sideline, so that even without it the municipality may still continue
functioning and perform its essential duties as such municipal corporations.
20)
This activity of municipalities in renting municipal waters for fishing purposes is a business
for the reasons that the law itself allowed said municipalities to engage in it for profit.
21)
It is but just that a town so engaged should pay and liquidate obligations contracted in
connection with said fishing business, with the income derived therefrom.
22)
Thus, the levy on the fishery lots is void. Levy on the income from the lease of the fishery
lots is valid. Other amounts coming or due from lessees of the forty odd fishery lots leased by
the municipality to different persons may also be attached or garnished to satisfy the
judgment against the municipality of Paoay.
23)
Other properties of such municipalities not held for public use, including funds which are
not essential to the performance of their public functions, may be levied upon and sold to
satisfy valid claims against said municipalities.