HUMAN RIGHTS NOTES

Cario vs CHR (G.R. No. 96681 Dec 2,

1991)
Commission on Human Rights has no
jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the
power to try and decide, or hear and determine,
certain specific type of cases, like alleged
human rights violations involving civil or
political rights.
Facts: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a
class day, some 800 public school teachers,
among them members of the Manila Public
School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and
Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook
what they described as "mass concerted
actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight
resulting from the alleged failure of the public
authorities to act upon grievances that had time
and again been brought to the latter's attention.
The "mass actions" consisted in staying away
from their classes, converging at the Liwasang
Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies,
etc. Through their representatives, the teachers
participating in the mass actions were served
with an order of the Secretary of Education to
return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and
a memorandum directing the DECS officials
concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings
against those who did not comply and to hire
their replacements. For failure to heed the
return-to-work order, the CHR complainants
(private respondents) were administratively
charged on the basis of the principal's report
and given five (5) days to answer the charges.
They were also preventively suspended for
ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D.
807" and temporarily replaced. The case
eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary
Cario dated December 17, 1990, rendered
after evaluation of the evidence as well as the
answers, affidavits and documents submitted by
the respondents, decreeing dismissal from the
service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension
for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del
Castillo.
Issue: WoN the Commission on Human Rights
has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or
the power to try and decide, or hear and
determine, certain specific type of cases, like
alleged human rights violations involving civil or
political rights.

Held: No, CHR have no power to do so. The

most that may be conceded to the Commission
in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make
findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But
fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of

justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or

official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining
therefrom
the
facts
of
a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of
receiving
evidence
and
making
factual
conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the
law to those factual conclusions to the end that
the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject
to such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have. Hence it is that the
Commission on Human Rights, having merely
the power "to investigate," cannot and should
not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate)
the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC
Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means
to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a
claim that in the administrative disciplinary
proceedings against the teachers in question,
initiated and conducted by the DECS, their
human rights, or civil or political rights had been
transgressed. More particularly, the Commission
has no power to "resolve on the merits" the
question of (a) whether or not the mass
concerted actions engaged in by the teachers
constitute and are prohibited or otherwise
restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of
carrying on and taking part in those actions, and
the failure of the teachers to discontinue those
actions, and return to their classes despite the
order to this effect by the Secretary of
Education, constitute infractions of relevant
rules and regulations warranting administrative
disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the
grievances complained of by them; and (c) what
where the particular acts done by each
individual teacher and what sanctions, if any,
may properly be imposed for said acts or
omissions. These are matters undoubtedly and
clearly within the original jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Education, being within the scope
of the disciplinary powers granted to him under
the Civil Service Law, and also, within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission. The Commission on Human Rights
simply has no place in this scheme of things. It
has no business intruding into the jurisdiction
and functions of the Education Secretary or the
Civil Service Commission. It has no business
going over the same ground traversed by the
latter and making its own judgment on the
questions involved. This would accord success
to what may well have been the complaining
teachers' strategy to abort, frustrate or negate
the judgment of the Education Secretary in the
administrative cases against them which they
anticipated would be adverse to them. This
cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be
done. In any event, the investigation by the
Commission on Human Rights would serve no
useful purpose. If its investigation should result
in conclusions contrary to those reached by
Secretary Cario, it would have no power
anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions.
Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil

Service Commission and lastly by this Court.

The only thing the Commission can do, if it
concludes that Secretary Cario was in error, is
to refer the matter to the appropriate
Government agency or tribunal for assistance;
that would be the Civil Service Commission. 35
It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
Simon vs. CHR (G.R. No. 100150 Jan 5,
1994)
CHRs power to cite for contempt should
understood to apply only to violations of
adopted operational guidelines and rules
procedure
essential
to
carry
out
investigatorial powers.

be
its
of
its

Facts: A "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990,

signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners)
in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the
Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management
Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was
sent to, and received by, the private
respondents (being the officers and members of
the
North
EDSA
Vendors
Association,
Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents
were given a grace-period of three (3) days (up
to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the
questioned premises of North EDSA. Prior to
their receipt of the demolition notice, the
private respondents were informed by petitioner
Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to
give way to the "People's Park". On 12 July
1990, the group, led by their President Roque
Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang
Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the
petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary
Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed
to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City
to stop the demolition of the private
respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and
carinderia along North EDSA. The complaint was
docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580. On 23 July
1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the
petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls
and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution
of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the
Commission" and ordering said petitioners to
appear before the CHR. In an Order, dated 25
September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners
in contempt for carrying out the demolition of
the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite
the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of
P500.00 on each of them.
Issues: Whether or not the CHR has
jurisdiction:
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the
"business
rights"
of
the
private
respondents
whose
stalls
were
demolished by the petitioners at the
instance and authority given by the
Mayor of Quezon City;
b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the
petitioners for contempt;

Held: a) Recalling the deliberations of the

Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is
readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a
Commission on Human Rights that would focus
its attention to the more severe cases of human
rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance,
mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of
rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of
prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair
and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances,
(5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other
crimes committed against the religious." While
the enumeration has not likely been meant to
have any preclusive effect, more than just
expressing a statement of priority, it is,
nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set.
In any event, the delegates did not apparently
take comfort in peremptorily making a
conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of
investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen
it fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may
provide for other cases of violations of human
rights that should fall within the authority of the
Commission,
taking
into
account
its
recommendation." In the particular case at
hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to
be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and
carinderia, as well as temporary shanties,
erected by private respondents on a land which
is planned to be developed into a "People's
Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North
EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take
judicial notice of, is a busy national highway.
The consequent danger to life and limb is not
thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed
paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have
been violated is one that cannot, in the first
place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant.
Be that as it may, looking at the standards
hereinabove
discoursed
vis-a-vis
the
circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are
not prepared to conclude that the order for the
demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and
carinderia of the private respondents can fall
within the compartment of "human rights
violations involving civil and political rights"
intended by the Constitution.
b) No, on its contempt powers, the CHR is
constitutionally authorized to "adopt its
operational guidelines and rules of procedure,
and cite for contempt for violations thereof in
accordance
with
the
Rules
of
Court."
Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority
in providing in its revised rules, its power "to
cite or hold any person in direct or indirect
contempt, and to impose the appropriate
penalties in accordance with the procedure and
sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court."
That power to cite for contempt, however,
should be understood to apply only to violations
of its adopted operational guidelines and rules
of procedure essential to carry out its
investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power
to cite for contempt could be exercised against
persons who refuse to cooperate with the said
body, or who unduly withhold relevant
information, or who decline to honor summons,
and the like, in pursuing its investigative work.

The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a

restraining order) in the instance before us,
however, is not investigatorial in character but

prescinds from an adjudicative power that it

does not possess.