Case of Voicu v. Romania
Case of Voicu v. Romania
Case of Voicu v. Romania
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THIRD SECTION
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JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
10 June 2014
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 2 of the
Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
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PROCEDURE
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THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
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5. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Bucharest. At the time of
the facts of the case, the applicant was in private legal practice and was a
senator.
6. On 10 December 2009 the Anti-Corruption Department of the
Prosecutors Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice
(referred to herein as the prosecutor and the DNA) started criminal
proceedings against the applicant (urmrirea penal) on suspicion of
trading in influence (traffic de influen). In particular, the prosecutor
alleged that: (i) the applicant had accepted 200,000 euros (EUR) from a
businessman, C.C., in return for using his connection to Judge F.C. of the
High Court of Cassation and Justice in order to influence the outcome of a
case pending before that court which concerned a dispute between C.C.s
company and a state agency; and (ii) that he had accepted money from
M.L., under the pretext of providing legal services through his law firm, in
order to facilitate M.L.s access to the head of the police with the aim of
discussing criminal investigations that were being conducted against M.L.
7. On 11 December 2009 the applicant was returning home during the
day in a car belonging to the Senate. Close to his home, his route was
blocked by another car. Several armed individuals jumped out, dragged the
applicant from his car and, in front of his neighbours and a crowd of
passers-by, handcuffed him and put him in their car. He was then taken to
the DNAs headquarters, where he was informed of the criminal
proceedings against him. The applicant gave a statement to the prosecutor.
8. At the DNAs headquarters, the applicant found out that he had been
under investigation for a crime against national security. However, the
prosecutor had decided on 27 November 2009 not to prosecute that offence.
The evidence gathered in that investigation, in particular through
intercepting the applicants telephone, had led the investigators to suspect
the commission by the applicant of the crimes of corruption for which he
was currently under investigation by the DNA.
9. On the same date, the prosecutor issued an order prohibiting the
applicant from leaving town for thirty days.
10. Upon the applicants request, on 12 January 2010 the prosecutor sent
him a copy of the decision of 27 November 2009.
11. On 9 March 2010 the prosecutor sought, through the Minister of
Justice, Parliaments approval to arrest the applicant. On the same date, the
DNA issued a press release informing the public that it had sought
authorisation for the arrest.
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12. From the moment the DNA informed the public about the
proceedings against the applicant, the media took great interest in the case.
Numerous panel discussions were broadcast and journalists and politicians
commented publicly on the events.
13. Excerpts from conversations between the defendants which had been
obtained through telephone tapping during a criminal surveillance operation
conducted prior to the criminal prosecution made it into the newspapers
before the applicant and his co-accused had been committed for trial. Those
excerpts gave the impression that the applicant and Judge F.C. had tried to
manipulate some of the judges from the panel ruling in a commercial case
involving C.C., and had reported back to the latter on the progress of those
alleged manoeuvres. In the conversations among them, the applicant and the
co-defendants expressed in strong terms their disappointment that the
outcome had not been favourable to C.C., and made assumptions as to
whether the remaining judges on the panel had been influenced by someone
else.
14. The transcripts of telephone conversations intercepted during the
surveillance operation first appeared in the press between 18 and 22 March
2010.
15. Other pieces of evidence from the prosecution file were likewise
published and commented on in the press.
B. The applicants arrest and pre-trial detention
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19. Upon the applicants appeal, by a final decision of 2 April 2010 the
High Court, sitting as a nine-judge bench, upheld the previous decision. At
the applicants request, this hearing was held in secret and journalists and
the public were removed from the courtroom. The High Court found that the
evidence lawfully included in the file justified a reasonable suspicion that
the applicant had committed the crimes under investigation. It also
dismissed the applicants argument as to procedural flaws, in so far as it
found that the prosecutor had heard the applicant on 11 December 2009 and
considered that his right to mount a defence had not been disregarded
because of the mere fact that a certain lapse of time had passed between the
date of his statement and that of the arrest order.
20. The applicant sought his conditional release. On 12 April 2010 the
High Court dismissed his application, on the grounds that the evidence in
the file indicated that he had tried to influence one of the witnesses and to
create false evidence in his defence. It also considered that the reasons
underlying the court decision to place him in pre-trial detention were still
valid, given that, in particular, such a short time had passed since that
decision.
This decision became final on 16 April 2010, when the High Court
dismissed the applicants appeal.
21. The High Court examined the applicants pre-trial detention on
ten more occasions and the applicant repeatedly applied for release pending
trial conditioned on the obligation not to leave town (decisions of 23 April,
25 May, 16 June, 14 July, 10 September, 6 October, 16 November 2010,
12 January, 9 February and 4 March 2011).
The High Court considered that the evidence in the file offered a
reasonable indication that the applicant had committed the crimes he was
accused of and that his continued detention was needed given the difficulty
involved in investigating such crimes. It also referred to his attempt to
influence witnesses, to his personal situation (first time on trial, family
situation), his personality, his office during the alleged commission of the
offences, and the nature and severity of the crimes under investigation. The
High Court also took into account the fact that the proceedings on the merits
had only recently started, on 20 May 2010.
It referred to the European Courts case-law and the relevant Council of
Europe texts, and considered that the grounds for the applicants detention
were still valid and the time spent in pre-trial detention was not excessive
within the meaning of Article 5 of the Convention.
For these reasons, it did not consider it opportune to substitute the
preventive measure that had been applied with a less strict measure.
22. The appeals lodged by the applicant against each of these court
orders were dismissed by a different panel of the High Court on 26 April,
31 May, 21 June, 22 July, 30 September, 13 October and 29 November
2010, 20 January, 28 February and 14 March 2011 respectively.
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23. On 4 April 2011 the High Court examined a new application for
release on probation lodged by the applicant and decided that he could be
released. It held that the vast majority of the evidence for the prosecution
had already been heard in court, thus the risk of the applicant trying to
influence witnesses was no longer acute. The court ordered him not to leave
town and not to contact his co-accused.
24. However, on 11 April 2011 the decision was quashed and a
five-judge panel of the High Court dismissed the applicants application for
release. The High Court examined the suitability of releasing the applicant
in the particular circumstances of the case, considered the evidence before it
and referred to the Courts case-law on the subject. It considered that the
severity of the crimes allegedly committed and the particular circumstances
in which they had occurred, coupled with the applicants attempts to
influence a witness, were sufficient factors to justify extending the
applicants detention pending trial, which remained the only adequate
preventive measure. It also considered that the overall length of the measure
remained reasonable in the applicants particular situation.
25. On four more occasions (27 April, 11 May, 8 June and 12 July 2011)
the High Court was called to examine the necessity of keeping the applicant
in detention and each time it decided to release him pending trial for the
same reasons as those advanced on 4 April 2011. The High Court replaced
the measure with the obligation not to leave town.
However, each order, save for the last one, was quashed by a five-judge
panel of the High Court and the applicants detention was extended (on
29 April, 24 May and 17 June 2011 respectively).
26. On 18 July 2011 the High Court dismissed an appeal lodged by the
prosecutor against the court order of 12 July 2011.
As a consequence, the applicant was released from detention on the same
day.
C. The conditions of the applicants pre-trial detention
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of 14.57 sq. m with six beds. The cells were at full occupancy at that time.
Each cell was equipped with beds, a table, chairs, a squat toilet, a sink with
cold and hot water and a shower separated from the living space by a
curtain. The inmates cleaned the cell themselves with products provided by
the administration or purchased by them.
29. The applicant described these cells as badly lit and ventilated, humid
and foul smelling. He further explained that because the toilet was not
partitioned off from the beds, the inmates lacked privacy when using it. The
tap for washing dishes and clothes and for showering was placed above the
toilet and the water ran straight into the toilet. There was frequently no
running water at all, which rendered it impossible to flush the toilet. The hot
water was never sufficient for all of the inmates to take showers.
30. The records show that from 30 March to 16 April 2010 the applicant
was held in Jilava Prison Hospital in a hospital room measuring 30 sq. m
which was equipped with five beds and had access to hot water twice a
week.
31. The applicant spent the remainder of his pre-trial detention in
Bucharest-Rahova Prison, where he was held, at his request and because of
his position as a senator, in a cell for vulnerable individuals. The cell
measured 24.59 sq. m, had eight bunk beds and was at full occupancy at that
time. The cell had a window which allowed in natural light and ventilation.
The detainees had at their disposal a table, benches, shelves and a TV set.
Adjacent to the cell there was a bathroom equipped with a toilet, sinks and a
shower. Cold water was continually available and hot water was available
twice a week. The cell was heated to 18oC during the winter. The applicant
explained that it was very hot in the summer and very cold in the winter; the
heating system was old and broke down frequently, leaving the cells
brutally cold. Hot water was scarce and there was never enough for all of
the inmates to take showers.
D. The conditions of the applicants transport during detention
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sit on or lean against, thus having to stand up during the entire journey with
nothing to hold on to.
When the van arrived in Piteti and returned to Bucharest, he was
allowed to stretch, warm up and do some physical exercise.
33. The Prison Administration informed the Government that the
applicant had been transported in a van designed for transporting sixteen
people, as follows: two people in the forward cabin, ten detainees on chairs
in a separate compartment, and four guards in another separate compartment
in the back of the van. The van had natural and artificial ventilation, a
heating system, and artificial light, which was kept on throughout each
journey in order to allow the guards to keep watch over the detainees. The
applicant had been transported alone, thus having ten chairs at his disposal.
The journey had started at 8.45 am and ended at 1.35 pm.
34. In his observations in reply to the official information supplied by
the Prison Administration, the applicant explained that the back of the van
where he had been held had been completely opaque without any natural
light and that the artificial lighting and the heating system had not been
working. He reiterated that the two hatches on the roof had remained open
during the journey, resulting in freezing temperatures inside the van. The
guards had had blankets to cover themselves during the journey, but he had
not been given one. In addition, the seats in the detainees compartment had
not been fitted with safety belts, which had made it difficult to keep his
balance.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
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THE LAW
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43. The Court reiterates that the purpose of the exhaustion rule is to
afford the Contracting States the opportunity of preventing or putting right
the violations alleged against them before those allegations are submitted to
it. However, the only remedies which Article 35 of the Convention requires
to be exhausted are those that relate to the breaches alleged and at the same
time are available and sufficient. The existence of such remedies must be
sufficiently certain, not only in theory but also in practice, failing which
they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness. It falls to the
respondent State to establish that these various conditions are satisfied (see,
among many other authorities, Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94,
74-75, ECHR 1999-IV, and Vukovi and Others v. Serbia [GC],
no. 17153/11, 69-77, 25 March 2014).
44. The Court reiterates that it has recently examined identical
complaints, raised by F.C. and C.C., the applicants co-defendants in the
domestic proceedings (see Costiniu v. Romania (dec.), no. 22016/10,
19 February 2013, and Cuneanu, cited above, 44-48). In those cases, it
found that the interested parties had had effective remedies at their disposal
with which to complain that they had been exposed wearing handcuffs in
public.
45. The Court has no reasons to depart, in the present case, from those
findings and reaffirms that the applicant should have complained to the
authorities about the fact that he had been kept handcuffed in public places
(see Costiniu (dec.), cited above, 35, and Cuneanu, cited above, 48).
It follows that this complaint must be rejected under Article 35 1 and
4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
ON ACCOUNT OF THE CONDITIONS OF THE APPLICANTS
PRE-TRIAL DETENTION
46. Again citing Article 3 of the Convention, the applicant complained
of the conditions of his detention.
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A. Admissibility
47. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes
that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be
declared admissible.
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B. Merits
1. The parties position
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48. The applicant reiterated that he had been detained in poor conditions,
lacking in basic hygiene and personal space.
49. Relying on the information from the prison records, the Government
contested the applicants allegations on this point.
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put forward any argument that would allow the Court to reach a different
conclusion.
53. Moreover, the applicants submissions in respect of the overcrowded
and unhygienic conditions correspond to the general findings by the CPT in
respect of Romanian prisons (see paragraph 35 above).
54. The Court concludes that the conditions of detention caused the
applicant harm that exceeded the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in
detention and have thus reached the minimum level of severity necessary to
constitute degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the
Convention.
There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in
respect of the material conditions of the applicants pre-trial detention.
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A. Admissibility
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55. The applicant complained that the conditions in which he had been
transported from the prison in Bucharest to the prosecutors office in Piteti
during his detention had constituted inhuman and degrading treatment
prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention.
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56. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes
that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be
declared admissible.
B. Merits
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57. The applicant reiterated that he had felt grossly humiliated by the
conditions of transport between the prison and the prosecutors office. He
refuted the description of the prisoner transport van offered by the
Government (paragraph 33 above), but submitted that he was unable to
bring further evidence to support his allegations, as such evidence was
exclusively in the hands of the authorities.
58. The Government contested the applicants assertions about the
conditions of transport and pointed out that he had failed to present any
proof of his statements. They contended that the applicant had been
transported alone, in good conditions, with heating and artificial light
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throughout the journey. They sent a copy of the vans registration card and
car inspection record.
2. The Courts assessment
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require that seat belts be fitted to all available seats in a car (see paragraph
38 above).
63. In these circumstances, the absence of seatbelts alone cannot lead to
a violation of Article 3. Nevertheless, the Court can envisage how, in
complete darkness, the absence of seat belts might cause detainees to lose
their balance, thus putting them in a humiliating situation. In addition, a lack
of heating on a winter day could add to the distress suffered by a detainee
during his or her transport. It remains to be ascertained if that was the case
in the present application.
64. The parties versions differ on this point. While the applicant
claimed that he had been transported in complete darkness and cold, the
Government argued, based on official documents, that the heating and
artificial light systems in the vehicle had been functioning properly. It is
regrettable that the applicant did not raise the matter with the authorities at
the time: he did not complain, either to the prosecutor when he arrived in
Piteti, or to the post-sentencing judge, after his return to Rahova Prison.
The Court does not have enough evidence to consider whether such
remedies could be effective either as preventive or as compensatory
measures in cases of improper conditions of transport not caused by
systemic flaws (see Guliyev v. Russia, no. 24650/02, 54, 19 June 2008);
the response by the authorities would nevertheless have provided valuable
information allowing for a better assessment of the situation.
65. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the applicants prison medical
records that he needed special care after the journey. While the existence or
not of such consequences for the applicants health is not a prerequisite for
finding a violation, such records would have allowed the Court to draw
inferences as to the conditions of the applicants transport.
66. Lastly, assuming that there was no heating in the van, the agents
should have given the applicant a blanket or, failing that, the applicant could
have asked them for one. However, nothing in the applicants submissions
indicates that he did so and was refused.
67. In the light of the particular circumstances of the case, the Court
considers that there is not enough evidence to conclude that the applicant
was transported in conditions that breached the requirements of Article 3 of
the Convention (see also, mutatis mutandis, Ali v. Romania (no. 2),
no. 30595/09, 46, 15 October 2013).
Consequently there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention
on this account.
IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION
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68. The applicant complained that the courts had refused to take into
consideration other preventive measures that would have been less
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71. The Court makes reference to the principles it has established in its
case-law concerning the acceptable justifications for pre-trial detention and
the length of such a measure. In particular, it reiterates that a person charged
with an offence must always be released pending trial unless the State can
show that there are relevant and sufficient reasons to justify continued
detention. Justification for any period of detention, no matter how short,
must be convincingly demonstrated by the authorities. Quasi-automatic
prolongation of detention contravenes the guarantees set forth in
Article 5 3 (see Blteanu v. Romania, no. 142/04, 62, 16 July 2013 with
further reference).
72. The Court has developed in its case-law four fundamental
justifications for detention pending trial: the danger of absconding, of
tampering with evidence, of repetition of the offence(s), or of disturbance to
the public order (see Calmanovici v. Romania, no. 42250/02, 93, 1 July
2008; Georgiou v. Greece (dec.), no. 8710/08, 22 March 2011; and the
cases cited therein). Furthermore, whether a period of time spent in pre-trial
detention is reasonable cannot be assessed in the abstract. Whether it is
reasonable for an accused to remain in detention must be assessed on the
facts of each case and according to its specific features. Continued detention
can be justified in a given case only if there are actual indications of a
genuine requirement of public interest which, notwithstanding the
presumption of innocence, outweighs the rule of respect for individual
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liberty laid down in Article 5 of the Convention (see Idalov v. Russia [GC],
no. 5826/03, 139, 22 May 2012; McKay v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.
543/03, 42 and 45, ECHR 2006-X; and Bujac v. Romania, no. 37217/03,
68, 2 November 2010).
73. In the present case, the Court notes that the applicant was first
ordered not to leave town (see paragraph 9 above) and was only placed in
pre-trial detention two months later, on 30 March 2010 (see paragraph 17
above). His detention was subsequently reassessed roughly every month
until he was finally released pending trial on 18 July 2011 (see paragraph 26
above). Therefore, the applicant spent a total amount of one year, three
months and nineteen days in pre-trial detention.
74. The Court will look into the manner in which the domestic courts
assessed the necessity of maintaining the measure and the grounds they
gave for not changing it into a more lenient one.
75. The Court notes that the domestic courts based their decision to keep
the applicant in detention mainly: (i) on the fear that he would try to tamper
with evidence; and (ii) on the impact of the alleged crimes on the public
order. In doing so, they undertook an examination of the particular
circumstances of the case and gave specific reasons based on the applicants
personal situation (see paragraph 10 above). They also examined on each
occasion the opportunity to apply a more lenient preventive measure (see, in
contrast, Gona v. Romania, no. 38494/04, 57, 1 October 2013, and
paragraphs 21 and 24 above).
76. It is to be noted that the reasons given by the domestic courts
remained the same throughout the proceedings (attempts to tamper with
evidence and impact on the public order). However, the Court considers that
such an occurrence was legitimate, notably given the relatively short period
of time between the two examinations by those courts of the reasons for
extending the applicants detention (see Medinu v. Romania (dec.),
no. 5623/04, 47, 13 November 2012; Georgiou, cited above; and
Blteanu, 69, cited above). Moreover, their reasoning was neither succinct
nor formulaic, and took into account developments in the trial proceedings
(see, in contrast, Begu v. Romania, no. 20448/02, 86, 15 March 2011, and
paragraph 21 above).
77. In the light of the particular circumstances of the case, the Court
considers that the domestic authorities offered relevant and sufficient
reasons for not changing the preventive measure into a less strict one and
thus for extending the applicants pre-trial detention, which, overall, was not
excessively long.
It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be
rejected in accordance with Article 35 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
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78. The applicant complained that the authorities had leaked excerpts
from the prosecution file to the press in particular, transcripts of telephone
conversations that had been intercepted by the authorities during a
surveillance operation. He relied on Article 8 of the Convention, which
reads as follows:
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1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.
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2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
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A. Admissibility
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B. Merits
1. The parties arguments
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84. The Government averred that any communication to the press during
the criminal proceedings had been in accordance with the applicable
domestic regulations and the Council of Europe recommendations in the
matter, and developed the same line of reasoning as in Cuneanu (cited
above, 77-79). In addition they pointed out that the DNA had drawn the
attention of the media institutions to the risks that they exposed themselves
to when publishing information which was not officially confirmed.
85. The applicant contested those arguments.
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86. The Court reiterates that in the case Cuneanu, cited above, which
raised an identical problem, it concluded that there had been a violation of
Article 8 of the Convention in so far as the respondent State had failed in
their obligation to safeguard the information in their possession in order to
secure the applicants right to respect for his private life, and likewise failed
to offer any means of redress once the breach of his rights occurred (see
Cuneanu, cited above, 97).
87. The Court has no reasons to depart, in the present case, from those
findings.
There has consequently been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.
VI. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
88. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
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If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols
thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to
the injured party.
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A. Damage
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90. The Government argued that there was no causal link between the
complaints raised with the Court and the pecuniary losses alleged. They also
considered that the applicant had failed to substantiate the existence of any
non-pecuniary damage and that the amount he had claimed in respect
thereof was excessive. In their view, the acknowledgement of a violation of
the Convention would represent in itself sufficient just satisfaction.
91. The Court reiterates that in the present case it has found a violation
of Articles 3 (conditions of detention) and 8 of the Convention. In this
context, the Court does not discern any causal link between the violation
found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On
the other hand, it awards the applicant EUR 4,500 in respect of
non-pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
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93. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate
should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank,
to which should be added three percentage points.
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Josep Casadevall
President
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Santiago Quesada
Registrar