Cases No. 45 and 46
Cases No. 45 and 46
Cases No. 45 and 46
ISSUE: WON the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the public
prosecutors motion to withdraw the Information and in lifting the warrant of arrest
against the petitioners on the DOJs finding that there was no probable cause for the
filing of said Information.
HELD: Yes.
The ruling in Crespo v. Mogul that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in
court, any disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused
rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence and discretion of the trial court. This
rule applies in motion to withdraw the Information or dismiss the case even before or
after the arraignment of the accused. The only qualification is that the action of the court
must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People or the
private complainant to due process of law.
The trial court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor
or the Secretary of Justice that no crime was committed or that the evidence in the
possession of the public prosecutor is insufficient to support a judgment of conviction of
the accused. As the Court emphasized in Martinez v. Court of Appeals, the trial court
must make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case and the
evidence on record of the prosecution.
The trial court may make an independent assessment of the merits of the case based
on the affidavits and counter-affidavits, documents, or evidence appended to the
Information; the records of the public prosecutor which the court may order the latter to
produce before the court; or any evidence already adduced before the court by the
accused at the time the motion is filed by the public prosecutor.
In this case, the trial court failed to make an independent assessment of the merits of
the cases and the evidence on record or in the possession of the public prosecutor. In
granting the motion of the public prosecutor to withdraw the Informations, the trial court
relied solely on the joint resolution of the Secretary of Justice, as gleaned from its
assailed order. In granting the public prosecutors motion, the trial court abdicated its
judicial power and acted as a mere surrogate of the Secretary of Justice.
Worse, the trial court knew that the Joint Resolution of the Secretary of Justice had not
yet become final and executory because the respondent, the private complainant, had
filed a timely motion for the reconsideration thereof which had not yet been resolved by
the Secretary of Justice. It behooved the trial court to wait for the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice on the motion for reconsideration of the respondent before
resolving the motion of the public prosecutor to withdraw the Informations. In fine, the
trial court acted with inordinate haste.
Had the trial court bothered to review its records before issuing its assailed order, it
would have recalled that aside from the affidavits of Azarcon, Ernesto and Dennis, there
was also the affidavit of Frias implicating the petitioner and the other accused to the
killing of Francis and that it even gave credence to the testimony and affidavit of
Azarcon when it denied Tonion and Sorianos petition for bail. Moreover, the trial court
found probable cause against the petitioner and issued a warrant for her arrest despite
the pendency of her petition for review in the Department of Justice, only to make a
complete volte face because of the Joint Resolution of the Secretary of Justice.
PRINCIPLES:
1. Withdrawal of Information already filed in court. Once a criminal complaint is filed
in court, any disposition of the caseor dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the
accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence and discretion of the
trial court
2. The trial court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public
prosecutor or the DOJ that no crime was committed on that the evidence of the
public prosecutor is insufficient to support a judgment of conviction of the
accused
Held:
Yes. This case is governed by our decision in Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462, where
we ruled that once the information is filed in court, the court acquires complete
jurisdiction over it. A motion for reinvestigation should, after the court had acquired
jurisdiction over the case, be addressed to the trial judge and to him alone. Neither the
Secretary of Justice, the State Prosecutor, nor the Fiscal may interfere with the judge's
disposition of the case, much less impose upon the court their opinion regarding the
guilt or innocence of the accused, for the court is the sole judge of that.
The avowed purpose of the reinvestigation "to give an opportunity to the private
respondent to present an authentic copy of the board resolution of the offended party
(Techtrade Management International Corporation) which [allegedly] had authorized him
to deal and otherwise dispose of the funds of the corporation" can also be achieved at
the trial in the lower court where that piece of evidence may be presented by the
accused as part of his defense.