Skandinaviska Case

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[2007] 2SLR(R)
SINGAPORE LAW REPORTS (REISSUE)
367
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ),

Singapore Branch
v
Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd
and other appeals
[2007] SGCA 9
Court of Appeal Civil Appeals Nos 17, 18, 19 and 20 of 2006
Chan Sek Keong CJ and Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA
24 August 2006; 22 February 2007
Evidence Documentary evidence Private documents Draft reports by lawyers
and accountants commissioned by directors of company after discovery of fraud on
company perpetuated by companys employee Defrauded banks bringing action
against company and seeking order for disclosure of draft reports Whether draft
reports protected by legal advice privilege and/or litigation privilege Whether
privileged information forming integral part of draft reports Whether court should
inspect draft reports to assess whether privileged information contained therein
Sections 128, 131 Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed)
Facts
Between 1999 and September 2003, one Chia Teck Leng (Chia), who was
employed by Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd (APBS) as its finance
manager, had used APBSs name to obtain credit and loan facilities from four
foreign banks (the appellant banks). On 2 September 2003, officers from the
Commercial Affairs Department of the Singapore Police Force (CAD) visited
the premises of Asia Pacific Breweries Limited (APBL), the parent company of
APBS, to meet with senior officers of APBL. CAD informed them that Chia had
used bank accounts fraudulently opened in the name of APBS by using forged
documents and resolutions to borrow money for his own use.
After writing to the appellant banks to ascertain if there had been accounts
opened in its name (by Chia of which it had no prior knowledge), APBS
requested for all account-opening documents and bank statements in its name,
and instructed the appellant banks to immediately suspend operation of the
unauthorised accounts until further notice.
On 4 September 2003, a special committee was constituted by APBLs board of
directors (the Special Committee). The Special Committee immediately
appointed PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) and Drew and Napier LLC
(D&N) and made an announcement on MASNET (the first MASNET
announcement) in which the APBL announced that PWC and D&N had
undertaken to identify the nature of the unauthorised transactions, quantify
their financial impact, assist the company in taking the necessary action to
prevent such unauthorised transactions and to conduct a review of the system of
internal control and procedures to prevent the occurrence of such unauthorised
transactions in the future. On 24 September 2003, APBL released a second
MASNET announcement (the second MASNET announcement) in which it
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was noted, inter alia, that APBS had sought legal advice on the claims and had
been advised that it had legal defences, and accordingly had instructed D&N to
contest the claims by the appellant banks vigorously.
Preparation of the PWC draft reports pursuant to the first MASNET
announcement ceased sometime in late 2003 and a final report was never issued.
In early March 2004, the appellant banks made an unsuccessful application for
pre-action discovery against APBS, seeking disclosure of documents including
the PWC draft reports. In September 2004, the appellant banks commenced this
action against APBS and subsequently made applications for specific discovery.
The assistant registrar ordered that the PWC draft reports be produced by APBS
as they were not privileged information. On appeal, the High Court reversed the
assistant registrars decision on the ground that the PWC draft reports were
protected by both legal advice privilege and litigation privilege. The appellant
banks appealed against the High Courts decision.
Held, dismissing the appeal:
(1) Section 128 of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) (the Act) read
with s 131 of the Act made it clear that the full effect of the legal advice privilege
was that the client was protected from having to disclose to any other party any
legal advice which he had obtained from his legal adviser, whether he was an
advocate or a solicitor. In that connection, it was implicit that the nature of the
business or enterprise involved in a client obtaining legal advice from a lawyer
had to have the element or quality of confidentiality in the communication to
the lawyer or the advice given to the lawyer: at [32], [33] and [35].
(2) There was no inconsistency between s 128 of the Act and the English
Court of Appeal decision of Three Rivers District Council v Governor and
Company of the Bank of England (No 5) [2003] QB 1556 (Three Rivers No 5).
While Three Rivers No 5 adopted an exceedingly narrow meaning of a client
for the purposes of legal advice privilege, it did not lay down a general principle
that all communications between a company and its legal advisers had to be
made by a specially-appointed committee or that no communication made by an
employee to the companys legal adviser was privileged. Three Rivers No 5 had to
be, instead, read in the context of the courts finding that only the unit set up to
deal with all matters relating to the inquiry in that case had been authorised to
communicate with the banks solicitors. Accordingly, as Three Rivers No 5
represented good law in the light of the relevant provisions of the Act, legal
advice privilege at common law was not inconsistent with the parameters of
s 128 of the Act: at [36], [37], [39], [41] and [42].
(3) As legal advice privilege was concerned with protecting confidential
communications between lawyers and clients, and litigation privilege was
concerned with protecting information and materials created and collected for
the dominant purpose of litigation, there were a number of operational
differences between the two. First, legal advice privilege existed regardless of
whether litigation was contemplated, though it did not apply to communications
by third parties to the solicitor unless they were made to the solicitor as agent, as
a conduit, for the client. Second, litigation privilege applied to every
communication, whether confidential or otherwise, as long as it was for the
purpose of litigation, including communications from third parties, whether or
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Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v

369
not they were made as an agent of the client. However, as the two forms of
privilege overlapped, in that if legal advice was sought or given in connection
with current or contemplated litigation, the advice would fall into both of the
two categories, if it was proved that the communications made by APBS to PWC
and D&N (and vice versa) in connection with the joint undertaking under the
terms of the first MASNET announcement, were related to contemplated or
imminent litigation, then it would follow that such communications would be
covered by both legal advice privilege and litigation privilege. Indeed, in that
context, the only communications that would not be covered by legal advice
privilege would be those which emanated from third parties, and even then only
if the decision in Wheeler v Le Marchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675 was preferred over
the decision of Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2004)
136 FCR 357 (Pratt Holdings): at [43] to [46].
(4) There were two requirements to litigation privilege. First, the threshold
question was whether litigation must have been contemplated. For this purpose,
it was clear that there was no requirement that the chance of litigation had to be
higher than 50% and that satisfaction of the general criterion of a reasonable
prospect of litigation was sufficient to raise the privilege. The second
requirement, related to the purpose for which legal advice had been sought,
namely that the dominant purpose for which legal advice had been sought and
obtained was for anticipation or contemplation of litigation: at [69] to [71], [73]
and [74].
(5) On the evidence, the first draft report could only have been created within
a reasonable period after 4 September 2003. In the courts view, the facts of the
case supported the factual finding that the dominant purpose of the reports at
the time they had been created had been in aid of litigation as there would have
been little point in appointing D&N to undertake jointly with PWC the work
that was referred to in the first MASNET announcement. Indeed, given that
from 4 September 2003, demands and disavowals flew fast and furious between
the parties and/or their respective solicitors, it would be reasonable to conclude
that by the time PWC and D&N set to work, litigation had gone beyond a
reasonable prospect and had become a reality. In this respect, by the time the
joint investigation by PWC and D&N really got going, the prospect of litigation
and the need to get the best legal advice to mount the best defence in court
would have been foremost in the mind of the respondent: at [84], [87], [88] and
[97].
(6) While parties should be slow to claim privilege for entire documents
where there was only partial or even trifling reference to legal advice or
communications leading to the giving or obtaining of legal advice, and/or where
the ostensibly non-privileged parts did not play an integral role in the context of
the relevant legal analysis, in this case, the legal advice was so embedded or had
become such an integral part of the reports that it could not be redacted from
them. This was because even if the PWC draft reports did, literally, contain
ostensibly non-privileged material, such material would only form the backdrop
for the legal advice as to how the respondent should mount the best legal defence
against the appellants claims: at [98] to [100].
[Observation: In Singapore, legal professional privilege was a statutory right
enacted in ss 128 and 131 of the Act. As the Act was modelled on the Indian
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Evidence Act of 1872 (Act I of 1872), which itself had its roots in English law, the
court would need to refer to English decisions in order to determine the scope of
the said provisions as well as the current state of the law, while bearing in mind
that not all English law principles could be used for this purpose as a result of
s 2(2) of the Act: at [27] to [29], [31].
The High Courts holding that PWC was, for the purposes of legal advice
privilege, an agent for receiving and communicating confidential information
from the respondent to D&N, and that the fact that PWC was a co-author of the
draft reports did not make them any less an agent, was at odds with established
English authority that a party was only an agent if he performed no function
other than to act as a conduit for communication between the client and the
legal adviser. That said, as the relationship between clients and legal advisers had
changed considerably since the legal privilege rules were formulated more than a
century ago, the reasoning in Pratt Holdings that a broader and more flexible
approach in giving protection to communications from third parties in the
context of legal advice privilege should apply, appeared sound and provided a
sensible and workable basis for balancing the need for complete confidentiality
in a solicitor and client relationship with the need for disclosure of information
which was not communicated for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.
Nonetheless, as it was not necessary for the court to decide this particular issue,
it would suffice to observe that the approach in Pratt Holdings was principled,
logically coherent and yet practical, and was also consistent with the reality of
legal practice whilst, through the dominant purpose test, providing an
appropriate safeguard against an overly broad application of legal advice
privilege: at [47], [52], [62], [63] and [65].
While an inspection by the judge, pursuant to s 164 of the Act, of evidence
that was claimed to be subject to legal advice privilege and/or litigation privilege
would quickly solve the dispute between the parties and therefore be an effective
and practical middle ground which ensured that the claim to legal professional
privilege was not abused, there was also a case for using this approach only in
cases where the judge had a real doubt about the claim of the party seeking to
resist discovery on the ground of legal professional privilege. Nonetheless, as the
court agreed with the finding in the High Court that the evidence before it
showed that the said reports had been prepared for the purposes of litigation, it
followed that this argument had to fail: at [101] to [104].]
Case(s) referred to
Alfred Crompton Amusement Machines Ltd v Customs and Excise Commissioners
(No 2) [1972] 2 QB 102 (refd)
Anderson v Bank of British Columbia (1876) 2 Ch D 644 (refd)
Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52 (refd)
Balabel v Air India [1988] 1 Ch 317 (folld)
Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG v Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte
Ltd [2004] 4 SLR(R) 39; [2004] 4 SLR 39 (refd)
Blair v Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Co [1998] ABQB 1025 (refd)
Brinks Inc v Singapore Airlines Ltd [1998] 2 SLR(R) 372; [1998] 2 SLR 657 (refd)
C-C Bottlers Ltd v Lion Nathan Ltd [1993] 2 NZLR 445 (refd)
Collins v London General Omnibus Company (1893) 68 LT 831 (refd)
[2007] 2SLR(R)

371
Cook v North Metropolitan Tramway Company (188990) 6 TLR 22 (refd)

DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Intertan Inc (2003) 203 ALR 348 (refd)
Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission (2002) 192 ALR 561 (refd)
David Lyell v John Lawson Kennedy (No 2) (1883) 9 App Cas 81 (refd)
Esso Australia Resources Limited v Commissioner of Taxation of the
Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 201 CLR 49 (refd)
Fletcher Timber Ltd v Attorney-General [1984] 1 NZLR 290 (folld)
Frmji Bhicji v Mohnsing Dhnsing (1893) 18 ILR Bom 263 (refd)
General Accident Assurance Company v Chrusz (1999) 180 DLR (4th) 241 (refd)
Government of the State of Selangor v Central Lorry Service & Construction Ltd
[1972] 1 MLJ 102 (refd)
Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674 (refd)
Greenough v Gaskell (1833) 1 My & K 98 (refd)
Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance of New Zealand v Stuart [1985] 1 NZLR
596 (refd)
Guild (Claims) Ltd v Eversheds [2001] Lloyds Rep PN 910 (refd)
Guinness Peat Properties Ltd v Fitzroy Robinson Partnership [1987] 1 WLR 1027
(refd)
Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd and General Contractors
Importing and Services Enterprises v Harrison (The Sagheera) [1997]
1 Lloyds Rep 160 (refd)
Highgrade Traders Ltd, Re [1984] [1984] BCLC 151 (refd)
International Minerals & Chemical Corp (Canada) Ltd v Commonwealth
Insurance Co (1990) 47 CCLI 196 (refd)
Jones v Great Central Railway Company [1910] AC 4 (refd)
Lee v South West Thames Regional Health Authority [1985] 1 WLR 845 (refd)
Mariwu Industrial Co (S) Pte Ltd v Dextra Asia Co Ltd [2006] 4 SLR(R) 807;
[2006] 4 SLR 807 (folld)
Minet v Morgan (1873) LR 8 Ch App 361 (refd)
Minister of Justice v Sheldon Blank (Attorney General of Ontario, The Advocates
Society and Information Commissioner of Canada (Interveners)) [2006]
SCC 39 (folld)
Minter v Priest [1930] AC 558 (refd)
Muchershaw Bezonji v The New Dhurumsey Spinning and Weaving Company
(1880) 4 ILR Bom 576 (refd)
Nederlandse Reassurantie Groep Holding NV v Bacon & Woodrow [1995] 1 All
ER 976 (refd)
ORourke v Darbishire [1920] AC 581 (refd)
OShea v Wood [1891] P 286 (refd)
Patraikos 2, The [2000] 2 SLR(R) 21; [2001] 4 SLR 308 (refd)
Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 136 FCR 357 (refd)
Price Waterhouse v BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) SA [1992] BCLC 583 (refd)
Public Prosecutor v Haji Kassim [1971] 2 MLJ 115 (refd)
Regina v Derby Magistrates Court, Ex parte B [1996] 1 AC 487 (refd)
372
[2007] 2SLR(R)
Regina (Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax [2003]
1 AC 563 (refd)
Sarah C Getty Trust, In re [1985] QB 956 (refd)
Southwark and Vauxhall Water Company, The v Quick (1878) 3 QBD 315 (refd)
Taranaki Co-operative Diary Company Limited v Rowe [1970] NZLR 895 (refd)
Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England (No 6) [2005] 1 AC 610 (refd)
Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England
(No 5) [2003] QB 1556 (refd)
Time Super International Ltd v Commissioner of the Independent Commission
Against Corruption [2002] HKEC 821 (refd)
Waugh v British Railways Board [1980] AC 521 (folld)
Wee Keng Hong Mark v ABN Amro Bank NV [1997] 1 SLR(R) 141; [1997] 2 SLR
629 (refd)
Westminster Airways Ltd v Kuwait Oil Co Ltd [1951] 1 KB 134 (refd)
Wheeler v Le Marchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675 (not folld)
United States of America v Philip Morris Inc [2004] EWCA Civ 330 (refd)
Ventouris v Mountain [1991] 1 WLR 607 (refd)
Yau Chiu Wah v Gold Chief Investment Limited [2003] 3 HKLRD 553 (refd)
Legislation referred to
Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed) s 58
Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) ss 128, 131 (consd);
ss 2(2), 23, 164
Evidence Act (Act I of 1872) (India) s 126
Steven Chong SC, Chew Ming Hsien Rebecca, Koh Mei Ping Lynette, Tay Yew Jin
Lionel, Ng Wei-Chern Paul and Christopher Eng (Rajah & Tann) for the appellants
in Civil Appeals Nos 17 and 18 of 2006;
Alvin Yeo SC, Monica Chong, Sannie Sng and Tan Hsiang Yue (Wong Partnership)
for the appellant in Civil Appeal No 19 of 2006;
Tan Kok Quan SC and Siraj Omar (Tan Kok Quan Partnership) for the appellant in
Civil Appeal No 20 of 2006;
Davinder Singh SC, Hri Kumar, Yarni Loi, Kabir Singh and Shivani Retnam (Drew
& Napier LLC) for the respondent.
[Editorial note: The decision from which this appeal arose is reported at [2006] 3
SLR(R) 441.]
22 February 2007
Judgment reserved.
Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA (delivering the judgment of the court):

Introduction
1
The present appeal raises several important legal issues with regard to
both legal advice privilege (under s 128 of the Evidence Act (Cap 97,
1997 Rev Ed) (the Act)) as well as litigation privilege (under s 131 of the
[2007] 2SLR(R)

373
Act and the common law). Indeed, as we shall see, the answers to these
issues centre on a consideration and analysis of both the relevant statutory
language and common law principles as well as the interaction between
them. It would, however, be appropriate to first set out the relevant factual
matrix of the present proceedings.
The facts
2
In January 1999, one Chia Teck Leng (Chia) was employed by the
respondent, Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd (APBS), as its
finance manager. Between 1999 and September 2003, Chia used the name
of APBS to obtain credit and loan facilities from four foreign banks. He
pleaded guilty to six charges under s 467 of the Penal Code (Cap 224,
1985 Rev Ed) and eight charges under s 420 of the same. Chia is currently
serving a custodial sentence of 42 years.
3
The present actions arose out of suits filed by the foreign banks
against APBS for the money that Chia had cheated them of. The plaintiff in
Suit No 774 of 2004 (appellant in Civil Appeal No 17 of 2006) is
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (PUBL), Singapore Branch (SEB).
SEBs claim is approximately US$26.6m, or alternatively S$45.3m.
4
The plaintiff in Suit No 775 of 2004 (appellant in Civil Appeal No 18
of 2006) is Mizuho Corporate Bank (Mizuho), which is claiming
approximately US$8m.
5
of 2006) is Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank Aktiengesellschaft
(Hypo), and its claim is approximately US$32m.
6
of 2006) is Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation, Singapore Branch
(Sumitomo) and its claim is approximately S$10.3m. The banks shall
hereafter be collectively referred to as the appellant banks.
7
On 2 September 2003, officers from the Commercial Affairs
Department of the Singapore Police Force (CAD) visited the premises of
Asia Pacific Breweries Limited (APBL), the parent company of APBS, to
meet with senior officers of APBL. CAD informed them that Chia had used
bank accounts fraudulently opened in the name of APBS by using forged
documents and resolutions to borrow money for his own use. On the same
day, Chia was taken into custody. He was charged two days later. APBS also
received a letter from Mr Bernard Kong, a CAD officer, ordering it to
produce documents pursuant to an order under s 58 of the Criminal
Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed).
8
On 3 September 2003, APBS wrote to the appellant banks to ascertain
if there had been accounts opened in APBSs name of which it had no prior
knowledge. At the same time, APBS requested all account opening
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documents and bank statements in its name. The appellant banks were also
instructed to immediately suspend operation of the unauthorised accounts
until further notice.
9
Hypo wrote to APBS on 3 September 2003, informing APBS of the
term loan of US$30m borrowed in its name and that the first repayment of
the principal instalment plus interest was due on 25 September 2003.
10 APBS also heard from Sumitomo on 4 September 2003 terminating,
with immediate effect, a short term credit facility it had granted on 11 July
2001 to APBS. Sumitomo also demanded immediate repayment of the sum
of approximately S$10m by 5 September 2003.
11 On 4 September 2003, a special committee was constituted by APBLs
board of directors (the Special Committee). The Special Committee
immediately appointed PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) and Drew and
Napier LLC (D&N). APBL made an announcement on MASNET (the
first MASNET announcement) addressing these events. The full text of the
first MASNET announcement, which was submitted by Mr Anthony
Cheong Fook Seng (Anthony Cheong), the company secretary of APBL,
is as follows:
Asia Pacific Breweries Limited (APBL) wishes to announce that
Mr Chia Teck Leng, an employee of the Company, has been charged in
the Subordinate Courts today. Mr Chia is suspected of unauthorized
opening and operating of bank accounts in the name of Asia Pacific
Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd (APBS), a subsidiary company, during
his tenure as Finance Manager of APBS. Mr Chia has been suspended
pending investigations.
Steps have been taken to freeze the unauthorized accounts.
A special committee of directors, comprising Mr Lee Yong Siang,
Chairman of Audit Committee of the Board of APBL, Mr Goh Yong
Hong, another member of the Audit Committee (both being
independent directors) and Mr David Hazelwood, has been appointed
to oversee investigations and take any necessary actions.
The Company has also appointed Pricewaterhouse Coopers and Drew
& Napier to undertake the following:
Identify the nature, circumstances and extent of any

unauthorized transactions;
Quantify the financial impact of such unauthorized

transactions;
Assist the company in taking the necessary action to

prevent such unauthorized transactions;
Subsequently, to conduct a review of the system of

internal control and procedures to prevent the occurrence
of such unauthorized transactions in the future.
[2007] 2SLR(R)

375
12 On 24 September 2003, APBL released a second MASNET

announcement (the second MASNET announcement) entitled Update
on Investigations. The full text of the second MASNET announcement is
as follows:
On 4 September 2003, Asia Pacific Breweries Limited (the Company)
announced that an employee of the Company had been charged in
Court for opening and operating bank accounts in the name of Asia
Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd (APBS) without authority. The
Company
also
announced
that
it
had
appointed
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) and Drew & Napier to assist the
Company in its investigation.
PwC have completed their review of significant cash transactions for a
4-year period commencing in 1999.
The scope of PwCs work included reviewing APBS accounting
records, checking all material cash receipts and payments for the
relevant period. Their work has revealed that unauthorised payments
have been made from APBS bank accounts. The aggregate of all such
unauthorised payments match the aggregate of payments into APBS
bank accounts from the unauthorised accounts. All material cash
balances of APBS have been accounted for.
Claims against APBS have been asserted by the banks with respect to
the unauthorised transactions. The Company has sought legal advice
on these claims and has been advised that legal defences are available to
APBS. APBS intends, and has instructed its lawyers, Drew & Napier, to
contest these claims vigorously.
13 Preparation of the PWC draft reports pursuant to the first MASNET

announcement ceased sometime in late 2003 and a final report was never
issued. In early March 2004, the appellant banks made an application for
pre-action discovery against APBS, seeking disclosure of documents
including the PWC draft reports. APBS asserted privilege. The court
dismissed the application on the ground that the appellant banks had not
demonstrated that the documents sought were necessary for them to plead
and commence an action against APBS (see Bayerische Hypo- und
Vereinsbank AG v Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2004]
4 SLR(R) 39).
14 In September 2004, the appellant banks commenced the present
action against APBS, claiming, inter alia, that Chia had actual and/or
apparent authority to enter into unauthorised agreements with the
appellant banks and that even if there had been no contractual relationship
between APBS and the appellant banks, APBS should be vicariously liable
for the fraudulent acts of Chia.
15 The appellant banks subsequently made applications against APBS
for specific discovery, including the production of the PWC draft reports.
APBS also made applications against each of the appellant banks for specific
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[2007] 2SLR(R)
discovery. The applications were heard by an assistant registrar, who

ordered, inter alia, that the PWC draft reports be produced by APBS as they
were not privileged information. APBS appealed against this decision.
The decision below
16 The trial judge (the Judge) reversed the assistant registrars decision
on the ground that the PWC draft reports were protected by both legal
advice privilege and litigation privilege (see Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken
AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v Asia Pacific Breweries (Singapore) Pte Ltd
[2006] 3 SLR(R) 441 (hereafter referred to as GD)).
17 The Judge found that legal advice privilege did not only apply to
protect communications between the Special Committee and D&N but
extended to communications between D&N and APBS as s 128 of the Act
made no distinction between communications made by an individual or a
corporate client and those made by an employee/agent of the individual or
corporate client. Hence, the PWC draft reports prima facie fell within the
ambit of legal advice privilege.
18 The next issue was whether the element of confidentiality in the
communications between APBS and D&N had been lost because the
communications occurred in the presence of PWC, who was a third party
to the solicitorclient relationship. The Judge found that confidentiality had
not been lost for two reasons. Firstly, both PWC and D&N owed an
obligation of confidence to APBS. This could be inferred from the joint
appointment of PWC and D&N and the degree of collaboration between
PWC and D&N. Accordingly, the confidential nature of the
communications was not lost just because the communications were
disclosed in PWCs presence. Further, each PWC draft report was a record
of the privileged communication and had the same sort of quality as the
actual communication itself. The PWC draft reports were likely to be so
intertwined with the legal advice and assistance given by D&N to PWC that
these reports became part of the privileged solicitorclient
communications.
19 Secondly, PWC was APBSs agent for communication. D&N and
PWC had collaborated as a team in order to fulfil the terms of their joint
appointment. Implicit from the lawyers and the accountants joint
appointment would be consent and authorisation from the client to each
adviser to request, give and receive information and views to and from the
other. Indeed, it would be unrealistic if this were not the case.
20 Turning to the applicability of litigation privilege, the Judge found
that the relevant time period to consider was the time when the PWC draft
reports were prepared. In this regard, the Judge had little doubt that APBS
was aware that litigation would ensue. Indeed, some of the appellant banks
had sent demand letters to APBS before the second MASNET
[2007] 2SLR(R)

377
announcement was made (see [12] above). As regards the purpose of the
PWC draft reports, the Judge held that the confidential legal advice
contained in the PWC draft reports was prepared predominantly for the
purpose of prospective litigation against APBS (see GD at [48]). The PWC
draft reports were required to determine whether APBS could maintain its
denial of liability for Chias unauthorised loans. The making of
recommendations on improving internal financial controls within APBS
was merely a subsidiary purpose of the PWC draft reports.
The issues
21 The issues in the present appeals mirrored the two bases for the
Judges decision in the court below. Put simply, were the PWC draft reports
protected by legal advice privilege (pursuant to s 128 of the Act) and/or
litigation privilege under the Act and/or under the common law?
22 Before we consider these issues, an examination of the nature of, as
well as relationship between, legal advice privilege on the one hand and
litigation privilege on the other would be both appropriate and helpful. This
is especially so not only in the light of the developments in law relating to
legal professional privilege in recent years, but also because business and
legal practices have changed and become more complex and wide-ranging.
For example, in the area of finance, lawyers do not necessarily limit their
advice only to the law. We turn first to examining the rationale of these two
privileges.
The rationale underlying legal professional privilege
23 Legal professional privilege is to be found in two principal forms viz,
legal advice privilege and litigation privilege, respectively, and has been
firmly entrenched as part of the common law system of justice for centuries.
The two privileges are conceptually distinct although they overlap.
However, they both serve a common cause: The secure and effective
administration of justice according to law, and they are complementary
and not competing in their operation (per Fish J (delivering the judgment
of McLachlin CJ and Binnie, Deschamps, Fish and Abella JJ) in the
Canadian Supreme Court decision of Minister of Justice v Sheldon Blank
(Attorney General of Ontario, The Advocates Society and Information
Commissioner of Canada (Interveners)) [2006] SCC 39 (Minister of
Justice) at [31]). A neat exposition of the different rationales of these two
related privileges is also provided by the same judge in that case, as follows
(at [26][27]):
[Legal advice privilege] recognizes that the justice system depends for
its vitality on full, free and frank communication between those who
need legal advice and those who are best able to provide it. Society has
entrusted to lawyers the task of advancing their clients cases with the
skill and expertise available only to those who are trained in the law.
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[2007] 2SLR(R)
They alone can discharge these duties effectively, but only if those who
depend on them for counsel may consult with them in confidence. The
resulting confidential relationship between solicitor and client is a
necessary and essential condition of the effective administration of
justice.
Litigation privilege, on the other hand, is not directed at, still less,
restricted to communications between solicitor and client. It
contemplates, as well, communications between a solicitor and third
parties or, in the case of an unrepresented litigant, between the litigant
and third parties. Its object is to ensure the efficacy of the adversarial
process and not to promote the solicitorclient relationship. And to
achieve this purpose, parties to litigation, represented or not, must be
left to prepare their contending positions in private, without
adversarial interference and fear of premature disclosure.
24 Other judgments explaining the underlying rationale of the two

privileges are found in decisions spanning many courts and (more
importantly) many jurisdictions as well. These include the English
decisions of Greenough v Gaskell (1833) 1 My & K 98 at 103105; Anderson
v Bank of British Columbia (1876) 2 Ch D 644 at 649; The Southwark and
Vauxhall Water Company v Quick (1878) 3 QBD 315 at 317320 and
322323; David Lyell v John Lawson Kennedy (No 2) (1883) 9 App Cas 81 at
86 and 90; ORourke v Darbishire [1920] AC 581 at 628; Minter v Priest
[1930] AC 558 at 566 and 579; Lee v South West Thames Regional Health
Authority [1985] 1 WLR 845 at 850; Ventouris v Mountain [1991] 1 WLR
607 at 611; Regina (Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd) v Special Commissioner of
Income Tax [2003] 1 AC 563 at [7]; and Three Rivers District Council v Bank
of England (No 6) [2005] 1 AC 610 (Three Rivers No 6) at [24], [34], [52],
[54] and [61]; the Bombay High Court decision of Muchershaw Bezonji v
The New Dhurumsey Spinning and Weaving Company (1880) 4 ILR Bom
576 at 582583; the Australian High Court decisions of Baker v Campbell
(1983) 153 CLR 52 at 66, 115116 and 129 as well as Esso Australia
Resources Limited v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of
Australia (1999) 201 CLR 49 at [35] and [85][87]; the Canadian Supreme
Court decision of Minister of Justice ([23] supra); and the Ontario Court of
Appeal decision of General Accident Assurance Company v Chrusz (1999)
180 DLR (4th) 241 (Chrusz) at [92] and [94].
25 Another restatement of the public interest involved in relation to legal
professional privilege is found in the House of Lords decision of Regina v
Derby Magistrates Court, Ex parte B [1996] 1 AC 487, where Lord Nicholls
of Birkenhead observed thus (at 510):
Legal professional privilege is concerned with the interaction between
two aspects of the public interest in the administration of justice. The
public interest in the efficient working of the legal system requires that
people should be able to obtain professional legal advice on their rights
and liabilities and obligations. This is desirable for the orderly conduct
[2007] 2SLR(R)

379
of everyday affairs. Similarly, people should be able to seek legal advice

and assistance in connection with the proper conduct of court
proceedings. To this end communications between clients and lawyers
must be uninhibited. But, in practice, candour cannot be expected if
disclosure of the contents of communications between client and lawyer
may be compelled, to a client's prejudice and contrary to his wishes. That
is one aspect of the public interest. It takes the form of according to the
client a right, or privilege as it is unhelpfully called, to withhold
disclosure of the contents of client-lawyer communications. In the
ordinary course the client has an interest in asserting this right, in so far
as disclosure would or might prejudice him.
The other aspect of the public interest is that all relevant material
should be available to courts when deciding cases. Courts should not
have to reach decisions in ignorance of the contents of documents or
other material which, if disclosed, might well affect the outcome.
All this is familiar ground, well traversed in many authorities over
several centuries. The law has been established for at least 150 years,
since the time of Lord Brougham L.C. in 1833 in Greenough v. Gaskell,
1 M. & K. 98: subject to recognised exceptions, communications
seeking professional legal advice, whether or not in connection with
pending court proceedings, are absolutely and permanently privileged
from disclosure even though, in consequence, the communications will
not be available in court proceedings in which they might be important
evidence.
[emphasis added]
26 And, nearer home, Ong CJ (Malaya) observed, in the Malaysian

Federal Court decision of Public Prosecutor v Haji Kassim [1971] 2 MLJ 115
and in relation to the equivalent of s 128 of the Act, thus (at 116):
The only relevant provision in our Evidence Ordinance excluding
professional confidences is s 126 [s 128 of the Act], which states that no
advocate and solicitor shall at any time be permitted, unless with his
clients express consent, to disclose any communication made to him
and in the course of his employment as such. This rule is founded on
the principle that the conduct of legal business without professional
assistance is impossible and on the necessity, in order to render such
assistance effectual, of securing full and unreserved intercourse between
the two. This privilege does not protect professional disclosures made
to clergymen or doctors: see Phipson on Evidence, 10th Edition, para.
587 and commentaries in Sarkar on s 126 of the Indian Evidence Act
1872. [emphasis added]
380
[2007] 2SLR(R)
The statutory provisions

Legal professional privilege in Singapore sections 128 and 131 of the
Evidence Act
27 In Singapore, legal professional privilege is a statutory right enacted in
ss 128 and 131 of the Act. These two sections cover legal advice privilege
and also an element of litigation privilege. They provide as follows:
Professional communications
128. (1) No advocate or solicitor shall at any time be permitted,
unless with his clients express consent, to disclose any communication
made to him in the course and for the purpose of his employment as
such advocate or solicitor by or on behalf of his client, or to state the
contents or condition of any document with which he has become
acquainted in the course and for the purpose of his professional
employment, or to disclose any advice given by him to his client in the
course and for the purpose of such employment.
(2)
Nothing in this section shall protect from disclosure

(a) any such communication made in furtherance of any
illegal purpose;
(b) any fact observed by any advocate or solicitor in the course
of his employment as such showing that any crime or fraud has
been committed since the commencement of his employment.
(3) It is immaterial whether the attention of such advocate or

solicitor was or was not directed to such fact by or on behalf of his
client.
Explanation. [italics in original] The obligation stated in this section
continues after the employment has ceased.
[emphasis added in italics and in bold italics]
Confidential communications with legal advisers

131. No one shall be compelled to disclose to the court any
confidential communication which has taken place between him and his
legal professional adviser unless he offers himself as a witness, in which
case he may be compelled to disclose any such communications as may
appear to the court necessary to be known in order to explain any
evidence which he has given, but no others. [emphasis added]
28 The Act is modelled on the Indian Evidence Act of 1872 (Act I of

1872). When moving the First Reading of the Evidence Bill, the then
Attorney-General observed (see Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the
Straits Settlements, 1893, Shorthand Report (23 February 1893) at B23):
[T]he Law of Evidence now in force in this Colony is to be found in
various volumes of text-books on the Law of Evidence, containing
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381
many hundreds of pages, and in various Acts of the Indian Legislature

which are in force here and no longer in force in India. Under these
circumstances it has been thought desirable to introduce here the
Indian Evidence Code which is now in force in India. That Code has
stood the test of more than twenty years experience, and has been found
an inestimable benefit to Magistrates and all persons concerned in the
administration of justice, who have no longer to turn to reports of
cases, and wade through TAYLOR on Evidence, but can find in the
compass of a few pages the proposition of law which meets the case before
them. That such a state of things is an improvement on the present
state of things no one can deny. There is nothing or very little that is
original in this Bill. It is the Indian Code adapted to the circumstances of
this Colony. [emphasis added]
29 The Indian Evidence Act itself had its roots in English law. In drafting
the Indian Evidence Act, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen drew almost entirely
from the then existing English common law; in his own words (see James
Fitzjames Stephen, The Indian Evidence Act, with an Introduction on the
Principles of Judicial Evidence (Thacker, Spink & Co, 1872) at p 2):
The Indian Evidence Act is little more than an attempt to reduce the
English law of evidence to the form of express propositions arranged in
their natural order, with some modifications rendered necessary by the
peculiar circumstances of India.
In the Bombay decision of Frmji Bhicji v Mohnsing Dhnsing (1893)

18 ILR Bom 263, Candy J observed thus (at 271272):
The law in India is contained in section 126 of the Evidence Act [s 128
of the Act], and with one exception appears to be the same as the law in
England, which has been established by many decisions through a long
course of years. The one exception relates to the substitution of illegal
purpose for criminal purpose in the first portion of the proviso to
section 126; and, as Mr. Field says in his Law of Evidence in British
India, this carries the principle enunciated in the proviso somewhat
further than what can be said to be the established law in England, but
is in conformity with the expressed opinion of several able Judges.
That the law in India on this point is practically the same as in England,
and that in interpreting section 126 of the Evidence Act this Court may
rightly refer to English cases, is shown by the judgments of
Westropp, C. J., and Sargent, J., in the case of Memon Hji Harun v.
Mulvi Abdul Karim, in which Chief Justice Sir M. Westropp said:
Communications to be protected by that section (126 of the Evidence
Act) must, we think, be confidential. The words contained in it are
indeed any communication, &c., but the word disclose shows, and
common sense seems to demand, that the privileged communication
must be confidential or private.
[emphasis added]
382
[2007] 2SLR(R)
30 In this connection, Prof Pinsler has observed that, historically,

Greenough v Gaskell ([24] supra) is the authority upon which s 126 of the
Indian EA [Evidence Act; which is s 128 of our Act] was constructed (see
Jeffrey Pinsler, The Three Rivers District Council Saga: New Issues of
Professional Privilege for a Singapore Court to Decide (2005) 17 SAcLJ
596 at 605). Prof Pinsler writes (id at note 45):
This is obvious from the connection between the terminology of s 128
[of our Evidence Act and, as we have seen, the equivalent of s 126 of
the Indian Evidence Act] and Lord Brougham LCs judgment in
Greenough v Gaskell, id at 101103. [Sir James Fitzjames] Stephen ...
referred to this case as the principal authority underlying s 126 of the
Indian EA [Evidence Act] (see [Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, Digest of
the Law of Evidence (Macmillan and Co, Limited, 5th Ed, 1899)],
Note XLIII, at p 193).
31 For the above reasons, we will need to refer to the English decisions in
order to determine the scope of ss 128 and 131 of the Act as well as the
current state of the law. However, we need to bear in mind that not all
English law principles can be used for this purpose. The reason is that s 2(2)
of the Act provides as follows:
All rules of evidence not contained in any written law, so far as such
rules are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Act, are
repealed.
The scope of sections 128 and 131 of the Evidence Act

32 As is evident from its language, s 128 applies only to an advocate or
solicitor, but not to the client. He may not (a) disclose any communication
made to him by or on behalf of his client, or (b) state the contents or
condition of any document of which he has become acquainted, or
(c) disclose any advice given by him to his client, if all these events occurred
in the course and for the purpose of his employment as such advocate or
solicitor.
33 However, when s 128 is read with s 131, it becomes clear that they
complement each other and give full effect to the legal advice privilege, as
the latter provision protects the client from not having to disclose to any
other party any legal advice which he has obtained from his legal adviser,
whether he is an advocate or a solicitor. In Singapore, the distinction
between an advocate and solicitor would make no difference to the
operation of legal advice privilege because we have a fused profession.
34 It should also be noted that since s 131 is expressed to operate in the
broader context of court proceedings where the client might offer himself as
a witness, in which case he may be compelled to disclose any
communication the court deems necessary, it also extends the area of legal
advice privilege to the domain of litigation privilege. That this is the
intention of s 131 is made clear by the reference to the use of the expression
[2007] 2SLR(R)

383
legal professional adviser who need not necessarily be an advocate or

solicitor. When s 131 was enacted, the legal profession in Singapore did not
have any advocates or solicitors, but English barristers and solicitors and
also what were then known as law agents and also pleaders, who might not
even be legally qualified. But litigation privilege was applied to all legal
advisers involved in assisting their respective clients in litigation.
35 Although s 128 does not refer to the confidentiality of the
communication from the client to the lawyer, whilst s 131 refers to such a
quality with respect to any communication passing between him and his
lawyer, it is implicit that the nature of the business or enterprise involved in
a client obtaining legal advice from a lawyer must have the element or
quality of confidentiality in the communication to the lawyer or the advice
given to the lawyer: see OShea v Wood [1891] P 286 and Government of the
State of Selangor v Central Lorry Service & Construction Ltd [1972] 1 MLJ
102.
Legal advice privilege
Who is the client? the status of Three Rivers No 5 in Singapore
36 As will be seen, legal advice privilege at common law, which is fairly
well-settled, is not inconsistent with the parameters of s 128 of the Act. The
only legal hiccup at common law in recent times relates to the issue as to
the identity of the client. In particular, the English Court of Appeal decision
in Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of
England (No 5) [2003] QB 1556 (Three Rivers No 5) adopted an
exceedingly narrow meaning of a client for the purposes of legal advice
privilege.
37 In Three Rivers No 5, the liquidators of the collapsed bank, BCCI, had
commenced an action against the Bank of England (BOE) on behalf of its
creditors after the Bingham inquiry, ordered by the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, into the supervisory role of the BOE in the spectacular collapse
of BCCI. The inquiry was conducted by Bingham LJ (as he then was). For
the purpose of the inquiry, the BOE had set up its own unit, the Bingham
Inquiry Unit (BIU) to deal with all matters relating to the inquiry. The
court held that only the BIU could be considered as a client for the purpose
of legal advice privilege and all other employees, including the Governor
himself, stood in the position of third parties providing information to the
solicitors. Hence, all other documents prepared by employees of the BOE
and sent to BOEs solicitors for advice in relation to its conduct did not fall
under the scope of such privilege.
38 The decision in Three Rivers No 5 has been almost universally
criticised and often trenchantly at that (see, but for a mere sampling,
Phipson on Evidence (Sweet & Maxwell, 16th Ed, 2005), especially at
para 23-60 and The Law of Privilege (Bankim Thanki, ed) (Oxford
384
[2007] 2SLR(R)
University Press, 2006) (Thanki), especially at paras 2.182.34 and

2.1362.138); though cf Adrian Zuckerman, Zuckerman on Civil Procedure
Principles of Practice (Sweet & Maxwell, 2006) at paras 15-3815-51). One
of the central threads of the critique is that as a company can only act
through its officers and employees, the decision in Three Rivers No 5 is far
too restrictive, impractical and unworkable. The House of Lords was in fact
invited, in Three Rivers No 6, to consider and overrule Three Rivers No 5 but
declined to express a view on the Court of Appeals ruling as that issue was
not relevant to the appeal.
39 The issue arises, in the local context, as to whether or not Three Rivers
No 5 is, in any event, good law in the light of the relevant provisions of the
Act (in particular, s 128 thereof).
40 In the court below, the Judge held that the words by or on behalf of
his client in s 128 of the Act made a crucial difference. In particular, in her
view, s 128 makes no distinction between communications made by an
individual and those made by his employee or agent, and that [n]either is
there a distinction made between communications made by a corporate
client and those made by the corporate clients employees or agents (see
GD at [30]). The Judge concluded thus (see id):
From this perspective, the decision in Three Rivers (No 5) is
inconsistent with the provisions of s 128 on professional
communications and is inapplicable by virtue of s 2(2) of the Act.
41 In our view, the Judge, with respect, has given too broad an
interpretation of the ruling in Three Rivers (No 5). That ruling does not lay
down a general principle that all communications between a company and
its legal advisers must be made by a specially appointed committee or that
no communication made by an employee to the companys legal adviser is
privileged. In that case, the English Court of Appeal held ([36] supra at
[31]) that the BIU, which was established to deal with inquiries and to seek
and receive Freshfields advice, is for the purpose of this application, the
client rather than any single officer however eminent he or she may be
[including, presumably, the Governor of the Bank of England]. Implicit in
this finding would be that only the BIU was authorised to communicate
with the Bank of Englands lawyers. No other employee was authorised,
including the Governor. The principle is that if an employee is not
authorised to communicate with the companys solicitors for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice, then that communication is not protected by legal
advice privilege. We do not find this principle exceptional. When a
company retains solicitors for legal advice, the client must be the company.
But since a company can only act through its employees, communications
made by employees who are authorised to do so would be communications
made on behalf of his client. The only relevant issue is whether the
communication is made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, and if so,
the communication falls within the privilege, provided the other
[2007] 2SLR(R)

385
requirements of the privilege are present, viz, that the communications are
confidential in nature, and the purpose of the communication is for the
purpose of seeking legal advice. Authorisation need not be express: it may
be implied, if that function is related to or arises out of relevant employees
work.
42 In our view, Three Rivers No 5 should be read in the context of the
courts finding that the BIU (and no one else) was authorised to
communicate with the banks solicitors. In so far as s 128 of the Act is
concerned, the company cannot itself make the communication to its
solicitors: only individuals can do so, and those individuals would be those
authorised to do so, expressly or impliedly. The words by or on behalf of
his client in this particular provision embody, statutorily, the proposition
just mentioned. Accordingly, we see no inconsistency between Three Rivers
No 5 and s 128 of the Act.
The relationship between legal advice privilege and litigation privilege
43 Because of the functional difference between legal advice privilege
and litigation privilege (see [23] above), they operate in different ways.
There are, in fact, a number of operational differences. First, legal advice
privilege exists at any time a client seeks legal advice from his solicitor
whether or not litigation is contemplated, whereas litigation advice applies
only where litigation exists or is contemplated. The former applies only to
confidential communications made for the purpose of seeking legal advice,
and not just any communication made to the lawyer. Hence it does not
apply to communications by third parties to the solicitor unless they were
made to the solicitor as agent for the client. In this respect, we should note
that although s 128 refers to communication made by or on behalf of his
client, the words on behalf of do not signify that any communication by an
agent is protected. The established principle is that only a communication
made through the agent as a conduit that is protected. In the English Court
of Appeal decision of Wheeler v Le Marchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675,
Cotton LJ observed thus (at 684685):
It is said that as communications between a client and his legal advisers
for the purpose of obtaining legal advice are privileged, therefore any
communication between the representatives of the client and the
solicitor must be also privileged. That is a fallacious use of the word
representatives. If the representative is a person employed as an
agent on the part of the client to obtain the legal advice of the solicitor,
of course he stands in exactly the same position as the client as regards
protection, and his communications with the solicitor stand in the
same position as the communications of his principal with the
solicitor. But these persons were not representatives in that sense. They
were representatives in this sense, that they were employed on behalf of
the clients, the Defendants, to do certain work, but that work was not
the communicating with the solicitor to obtain legal advice. So their
386
[2007] 2SLR(R)
communications cannot be protected on the ground that they are

communications between the client by his representatives and the
solicitor. In fact, the contention of the Respondents comes to this, that
all communications between a solicitor and a third person in the
course of his advising his client are to be protected. It was conceded
there was no case that went that length, and the question is whether, in
order fully to develop the principle with all its reasonable
consequences, we ought to protect such documents. Hitherto such
communications [from third parties] have only been protected when
they have been in contemplation of some litigation, or for the purpose
of giving advice or obtaining evidence with reference to it. And that is
reasonable, because then the solicitor is preparing for the defence or
for bringing the action, and all communications he makes for that
purpose, and the communications made to him for the purpose of
giving him the information, are, in fact, the brief in the action, and
ought to be protected. But here we are asked to extend the principle to a
very different class of cases, and it is not necessary, in order to enable
persons freely to communicate with their solicitors and obtain their legal
advice, that any privilege should be extended to communications such as
these. [emphasis added]
44 Secondly, in contrast to legal advice, litigation privilege applies to

every communication, whether confidential or otherwise so long as it is for
the purpose of litigation. It also applies to communications from third
parties whether or not they were made as agent of the client. This is the
critical difference between legal advice privilege and litigation privilege: see
Wheeler v Le Marchant ([43] supra) and the Singapore Court of Appeal
decision of Brinks Inc v Singapore Airlines Ltd [1998] 2 SLR(R) 372 at [20]
(Brinks). This difference is explained by the different functions of the two
privileges. One is concerned with protecting confidential communications
between lawyers and clients, and the other is concerned with protecting
information and materials created and collected for the dominant purpose
of litigation.
45 However, the two forms of privilege overlap. As Lord Scott of Foscote
put it in the recent House of Lords decision in Three Rivers No 6 ([24] supra
at [27]):
[L]egal advice privilege has an undoubted relationship with litigation
privilege. Legal advice is frequently sought or given in connection with
current or contemplated litigation. But it may equally well be sought or
given in circumstances and for purposes that have nothing to do with
litigation. If it is sought or given in connection with litigation, then the
advice would fall into both of the two categories. But it is long settled
that a connection with litigation is not a necessary condition for
privilege to be attracted: see, e g, Greenough v Gaskell (1833) 1 My & K
98, 102103, per Lord Brougham and Minet v Morgan (1873) LR 8 Ch
App 361). On the other hand it has been held that litigation privilege
can extend to communications between a lawyer or the lawyer's client
and a third party or to any document brought into existence for the
[2007] 2SLR(R)

387
dominant purpose of being used in litigation. The connection between

legal advice sought or given and the affording of privilege to the
communication has thereby been cut.
46 What is of particular significance in the context of the present appeal

is the fact that if it is proved that the communications concerned, ie, the
communications made by APBS to PWC and D&N (and vice versa) in
connection with the joint undertaking under the terms of the first
MASNET Announcement, are related to contemplated or imminent
litigation, then it would follow that such communications would be covered
by both legal advice privilege and litigation privilege. Indeed, the only
communications which would not be covered by legal advice privilege
would, as we have already noted, be those which emanate from third parties.
However, even such communications would be covered by legal advice
privilege if the decision in Pratt Holdings ([53] infra) is accepted as good
law in Singapore in preference to the present English position as embodied
in, most notably, in Wheeler v Le Marchant ([43] supra).
Impact of modern developments on legal advice privilege
47 The relationship between clients and legal advisers, especially in
economic activities, has changed considerably since the legal privilege rules
were formulated more than a century ago. Business has become much more
complex, and so have the legal knowledge and skills that are required of
lawyers to guide their clients safely in their commercial and investment
ventures. Today, such clients not only need legal advice in the conduct of
their business but also require multi-disciplinary advice from different
professions in many of the problems they face or encounter. Furthermore,
the nature of the advice that lawyers may be asked to give may also extend
to other fields of learning which go beyond what was traditionally legal
advice. In the English Court of Appeal decision of Balabel v Air India
[1988] 1 Ch 317 (Balabel), one of the most influential decisions on the
nature of legal advice privilege in modern conditions, Taylor LJ (as he then
was, and with whom Lord Donaldson of Lymington MR and Parker LJ
agreed) said (at 330):
Although originally confined to advice regarding litigation, the
privilege was extended to non-litigious business. Nevertheless, despite
that extension, the purpose and scope of the privilege is still to enable
legal advice to be sought and given in confidence. In my judgment,
therefore, the test is whether the communication or other document was
made confidentially for the purposes of legal advice. Those purposes have
to be construed broadly. Privilege obviously attaches to a document
conveying legal advice from solicitor to client and to a specific request
from the client for such advice. But it does not follow that all other
communications between them lack privilege. In most solicitor and
client relationships, especially where a transaction involves protracted
dealings, advice may be required or appropriate on matters great or
388
[2007] 2SLR(R)
small at various stages. There will be a continuum of communication

and meetings between the solicitor and client. Where information is
passed by the solicitor or client to the other as part of the continuum
aimed at keeping both informed so that advice may be sought and
given as required, privilege will attach. A letter from the client
containing information may end with such words as please advise me
what I should do. But, even if it does not, there will usually be implied
in the relationship an overall expectation that the solicitor will at each
stage, whether asked specifically or not, tender appropriate advice.
Moreover, legal advice is not confined to telling the client the law; it must
include advice as to what should prudently and sensibly be done in the
relevant legal context. [emphasis added]
48 Taylor LJs observations have been approved subsequently in

numerous English and other Commonwealth judgments. In Three Rivers
No 6 ([24] supra at [111]), Lord Carswell said:
I agree with the view expressed by Colman J in Nederlandse
Reassurantie Groep Holding NV v Bacon & Woodrow Holding [1995]
1 All ER 976, 982 that the statement of the law in Balabel v Air India
does not disturb or modify the principle affirmed in Minter v Priest,
that all communications between a solicitor and his client relating to a
transaction in which the solicitor has been instructed for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice will be privileged, notwithstanding that they do
not contain advice on matters of law or construction, provided that they
are directly related to the performance by the solicitor of his professional
duty as legal adviser of his client. [emphasis added]
49 And, in the English High Court decision of Guild (Claims) Ltd v

Eversheds [2001] Lloyds Rep PN 910, Jacob J (as he then was) had this to
say (at [22]):
I think that it is not possible to deal with the question of duty in
relation to quasi-commercial matters in the abstract. Solicitors
concerned with assisting parties in relation to commercial transactions
are often faced with commercial considerations. Ultimately,
commercial matters are for the client but things are not so simple that
one can say the solicitors duty simply stops at questions of law.
[emphasis added]
50 Other decisions where similar statements of approval of Taylor LJs

observations in Balabel include the English decision of Nederlandse
Reassurantie Groep Holding NV v Bacon & Woodrow [1995] 1 All ER 976
and Three Rivers No 6 ([24] supra); the Federal Court of Australia decision
of DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Intertan Inc (2003) 203 ALR 348 as well as the
Hong Kong decisions of Time Super International Ltd v Commissioner of
the Independent Commission Against Corruption [2002] HKEC 821 and
Yau Chiu Wah v Gold Chief Investment Limited [2003] 3 HKLRD 553 at
[43].
[2007] 2SLR(R)

389
Legal advice privilege and third parties

51 We have referred to many judicial statements according recognition
to the changing nature and scope of legal advice in a more complex world.
The case under appeal is a good example: APB and APBS needed not only
the advice of accountants but also the advice of lawyers to determine the
nature of the legal claims that would inevitably be made by the banks as well
as the complexity of the financial and legal issues arising from Chias
unauthorised loans. In this appeal we have a complex situation where the
respondent has claimed legal advice privilege not merely in the context of
communications between it and its solicitors but, rather, in the context of
communications rendered to it as a result of the joint efforts of its solicitors
and its accountants in investigating the massive fraud by its financial
controller and the consequent financial impact on its operations.
52 This raises the important issue as to whether the draft reports
submitted by PWC to the respondent are protected by legal advice privilege
as PWC are alleged by the appellant banks to be third parties. The English
position is clear: communications to and from a third party are not
protected by legal advice privilege (see the leading decision of Wheeler v Le
Marchant ([43] supra), as well as Re Highgrade Traders Ltd [1984]
BCLC 151; Ventouris v Mountain ([24] supra); Price Waterhouse v BCCI
Holdings (Luxembourg) SA [1992] BCLC 583 (Price Waterhouse); The
Patraikos 2 [2000] 2 SLR(R) 21; as well as Thanki ([38] supra at para 2.04)
and Charles Hollander, Documentary Evidence (Sweet & Maxwell, 9th Ed,
2006) at paras 13-05 and 13-06), unless the third party is an agent for
communication, and in this respect an agent is a mere conduit and nothing
more (see [43] above, as well as, for example, not only Wheeler v Le
Marchant, but also the House of Lords decision of Jones v Great Central
Railway Company [1910] AC 4 at 6; the English Court of Appeal decision of
Anderson v Bank of British Columbia ([24] supra); and the New Zealand
High Court decision of C-C Bottlers Ltd v Lion Nathan Ltd [1993] 2 NZLR
445). We have already mentioned that the Judge found that PWC was for
this purpose an agent for receiving and communicating confidential
information from the respondent to D&N and that the fact that PWC was a
co-author of the draft reports did not make them any less an agent for the
purpose of s 128 of the Act. In our view, the Judges holding is at odds with
established English authority that a third party is only an agent if he
performs no function other than to act as a conduit for communication
between the client and the legal adviser. In so far as PWC was a co-author of
the PWC draft reports and had done considerable work in preparing the
reports, as borne out by the contents of second MASNET announcement, it
would not be an agent of communication for the purpose of legal advice
privilege if we apply the English decisions. However, a recent Australian
decision suggests that the distinction between an agent who is a mere
conduit of communication and one who may at the same time be a creator
390
[2007] 2SLR(R)
of information for communication should no longer hold in modern

conditions.
Pratt Holdings
53 The Australian Federal Court in Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v
Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 136 FCR 357 (Pratt Holdings) has
recently suggested a broader and more flexible approach in giving
protection to communications from third parties in the context of legal
advice privilege. The facts in Pratt Holdings were straightforward. A
corporation had asked an accountant to prepare a report valuing its losses
in the context of a balance sheet reconstruction and financing exercise. The
corporation then forwarded the report from the accountant to the lawyer
who had in fact advised that such a report be obtained in the first instance.
No litigation was contemplated at the material time. Hence, this particular
case related only to legal advice privilege.
54 The Commissioner of Taxation subsequently sought statutory access
to the report and the corporation claimed legal advice privilege on the basis
that the report had been prepared for the dominant purpose of obtaining
legal advice. Two of the three the judges were of the view that the
accountant was not an agent of the corporation. In the circumstances, this
raised squarely for the decision of the court the status of third party
communications in the context of legal advice privilege.
55 The court held that legal advice privilege was indeed capable of being
extended to such third party communications. But as the trial judge had not
made an actual finding as to the clients purpose(s) in having the report
concerned created, the case was remitted back to the trial judge. The
reasoning of the court is of the first importance and we will examine it now.
Finn J was of the view that the distinction hitherto drawn between
communications via agents and communications via third parties was an
apparently arbitrary distinction ([53] supra at [3]). He observed thus
(see id):
The principal question in these appeals is whether we are, nonetheless,
obliged to accept the distinction so drawn with its inevitable and
obvious triumph of form over substance. I consider we are not.
[emphasis added]
Finn J did not find any existing Australian authority that was binding on
him, and was of the view that the present question falls to be decided by
reference to principle, legal policy and to such authority of other
jurisdictions as is persuasive (see at [34]). In the circumstances, the
obvious starting point is with what was the intended use (or uses) of [the]
document which accounted for it being brought into existence, and that
[i]n answering that question which is a question of fact attention
necessarily must focus on the purpose (or purposes) of the person who
[2007] 2SLR(R)

391
created the document, or who, if not its author, had the authority to, and
did, procure its creation (see at [35]).
56
Finn J then proceeded to observe as follows (at [39]):

I have already commented upon what I consider to be the patent
artificiality flowing from the denial of privilege in such circumstances.
If Pratt Holdings [the party claiming legal advice privilege] had its own
and appropriately qualified accounting staff which prepared a like
report, that report would have been privileged. Equally, if it had
directed PricewaterhouseCoopers [the third party] to send the report
directly to ABL [the firm of lawyers], it would likewise be privileged as
Pratt Holdings would have thus constituted PricewaterhouseCoopers
its agent to make the, or else a part of the communication by Pratt
Holdings to ABL for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. [emphasis
added]
57 And, in so far as general principle was concerned, the learned judge

opined thus (at [41][43]):
The important consideration in my view is not the nature of the third
partys legal relationship with the party that engaged it but, rather, the
nature of the function it performed for that party. If that function was to
enable the principal to make the communication necessary to obtain
legal advice it required, I can see no reason for withholding the privilege
from the documentary communication authored by the third party.
That party has been so implicated in the communication made by the
client to its legal adviser as to bring its work product within the rationale
of legal advice privilege.
There are, in my view, clear reasons of policy that support extending
the privilege to such third party authored documentary
communications. Whether a natural person or a corporation, a party
seeking to obtain legal advice may not have the aptitude, knowledge,
skill and expertise, or resources to make adequately, appropriately or at
all such communication to its legal adviser as is necessary to obtain the
advice required. Such is commonplace today where advice is sought on
complex and technical matters. To deny that person the ability to
utilise the services of a third party to remedy his or her own inability or
inadequacy unless he or she is prepared to forego privilege in the
documents prepared by the third party, is to disadvantage that person
relative to another who is able adequately to make the desired
communication to a legal adviser by relying upon his or her own
knowledge, resources, etc.
For the law to provide such an incentive not to utilise the services of
third parties in such circumstances is to undercut the privilege itself. It
would not facilitate access to effective legal advice nor would it
facilitate effective communication with legal advisers for the purpose
of obtaining legal advice.
[emphasis added]
392
[2007] 2SLR(R)
58 However, the counterweight to too liberal an extension of the

doctrine vis--vis third parties is the requirement that the communication
concerned be for the dominant purpose of giving legal advice (see also per
Stone J, id at [86]). In this regard, Finn J was of the following view (at [47]):
[N]otwithstanding the principals stated purpose in having a
documentary communication brought into existence, the principal
may have so conducted himself or herself in the matter as to indicate
that the intended use of the document authored by the third party was
not its communication to the legal adviser as the principals
communication, but rather it was to advise and inform the principal
concerning its subject matter, with the principal then determining
(a) in what manner, if at all, the whole or part of the document would
be used by the principal in making its own communication or (b) the
purpose(s) for which the document could or should be used. The less
the principal performs the function of a conduit of the documentary
information to the legal adviser, the more he or she filters, adapts or
exercises independent judgment in relation to what of the third partys
document is to be communicated to the legal adviser, the less likely it is
that that document will be found to be privileged in the third partys
hands. This will be because the intended use of the document is more
likely to be found to be to advise and inform the principal in making
the principals communication to the lawyer (whether or not that
communication embodied wholly or substantially the content of the
document) and not to record the communication to be made.
[emphasis added in bold italics]
59 Stone J sought to distinguish the decision in Wheeler v Le Marchant

([43] supra). In particular, she was of the view that [t]he letters from the
surveyors [in that case] were not created for the purpose of obtaining legal
advice for the client and that [i]n the absence of such purpose the
rationale for legal professional privilege does not require that a
communication be protected ([53] supra at [95]). The surveyors in
Wheeler v Le Marchant were, in fact, retained by the solicitors on behalf of
the client to do certain work, but the purpose of the communications with
the solicitor did not relate to the obtaining of legal advice as such (see ibid).
60
Like Finn J, Stone J was of the view (id at [102][106]) that:

102 [T]he present issue must be decided by the application of
principle, eschewing formalistic approaches and concentrating on
substance.
103 The history of legal professional privilege shows that the courts
have been willing and able to adapt the doctrine to ensure that the
policy supporting the doctrine is not sabotaged by rigid adherence to
form that does not reflect the practical realities surrounding the
application of privilege. The complexity of present day commerce
means that it is increasingly necessary for a client to have the
assistance of experts, including financial experts such as accountants,
in formulating a request for legal advice and in providing legal advisers
[2007] 2SLR(R)

393
with sufficient understanding of the facts to enable that advice to be

given. This much was recognised by Taylor LJ in Balabel.
105 The coherent rationale for legal professional privilege developed

by the High Court does not lend itself to artificial distinction between
situations where that expert assistance is provided by an agent or alter
ego of the client and where it is provided by a third party. Nor, in my
view, should the availability of privilege depend on whether the expert
opinion is delivered to the lawyer directly by the expert or by the client.
Provided that the dominant purpose requirement is met I see no
reason why privilege should not extend to the communication by the
expert to the client.
106 I do not accept that this approach would lead to uncontrollable

extension of the privilege. The difficulties in proving the relevant
purpose should not be underestimated. Advice as to commercially
advantageous ways to structure a transaction are extremely unlikely to
attract privilege because the purpose in putting the advice together
will, in most cases, be quite independent of the need for legal advice.
Even if the parties have in mind that the advice will be submitted to a
lawyer for comment, the purpose is unlikely to be the dominant
purpose. Determining the dominant purpose underlying a
communication may be difficult but no more so than many questions
that come before courts. Courts would need to take into account
exactly what function was served by the expert advice and whether it
was really required in order to instruct the legal advisers fully.
Obviously if the third party is an agent of the client and the client has
the requisite purpose the determination is comparatively simple.
Similarly if the material sought by the lawyer is required for litigation it
is not difficult to determine the chain of authority and to find the
requisite purpose Ultimately the question is one of fact and the onus
is on the person seeking privilege protection to establish the case.
[emphasis added in bold italics]
61 Merkel J agreed (at [52]) with the judgments of both Finn and
Stone JJ.
62 The reasoning of the judges in Pratt Holdings, apart from preferring
substance to form, is particularly apposite in cases of large commercial
frauds where the victims need expert advice not only to protect themselves
from future frauds but also to determine the rights or liabilities in
connection with the fraud. In the present case, the respondent was faced
with precisely these two problems. Instead of obtaining a report from the
accountants on the failings of its system of financial controls, the
respondent employed two teams of experts to work together to ensure how
such kinds of fraud would not be perpetrated again as well as how its
financial exposure resulting from Chias fraud could be defended. There is
394
[2007] 2SLR(R)
no doubt in our minds that, on the evidence, the respondent was seeking
both accounting and legal advice when it appointed PWC and D&N to
report on the problem. The only question we have to determine is which
was the dominant purpose, and if on the evidence, the dominant purpose
was for legal advice, we cannot see why, in principle, following the
reasoning in Pratt Holdings, we should not hold that the draft PWC reports
are subject to legal advice privilege.
63 However, since no argument was made to us by counsel for the parties
who did not refer to Pratt Holdings (although Mr Alvin Yeo SC, counsel for
Hypo, did make oral submissions before us, advocating the (contrary)
English position), we are constrained from going further except to reiterate
that the reasoning in Pratt Holdings appears sound and provides a sensible
and a workable basis for balancing the need for complete confidentiality in
a solicitor and client relationship with the need for disclosure of
information which is not communicated for the purpose of obtaining legal
advice. The approach in Pratt Holdings is principled, logically coherent and
yet practical, and is also consistent with the reality of legal practice
expressed in Taylor LJs views in Balabel (see generally above at [47][50]).
64 We should add that in relation to legal advice privilege under s 128 of
the Act, Mr Yeo did contend in his oral arguments that the obtaining of
legal advice had to be the sole purpose of the communications in question
before privilege would accrue. In response, counsel for the respondent,
Mr Davinder Singh SC, contended that as long as communications were for
the purpose of D&Ns employment, whether this was a dominant or
subsidiary purpose was irrelevant for the purpose of legal advice privilege.
65 For the reason we have given, it is also not necessary for us to decide
this particular issue, but if as a matter of legal policy it is necessary to ensure
that parties do not cloak every piece of evidence with immunity from
disclosure, it would be necessary for the courts to find a modus vivendi
between the two extremes. It will suffice for the present to observe (in a
narrower area of third party communications) that if the approach in Pratt
Holdings is adopted, the dominant purpose test might, as observed in that
case itself, constitute an appropriate safeguard against an overly broad
application of legal advice privilege.
66 We now turn to litigation privilege, which was the primary basis on
which this appeal was argued by the parties below. The issue here is a short
one: Was the appointment of PWC and D&N to advise on the matters set
out in the first MASNET announcement for the purpose of legal advice in
contemplation of litigation and was it the dominant purpose?
[2007] 2SLR(R)

395
Litigation privilege
Introduction common law or statute?
67 As already mentioned at the outset of this judgment, litigation
privilege exists by virtue of the common law. Since, as we have stated earlier
(at [34]), s 131 of the Act (reproduced at [27] above) clearly envisages the
concept of litigation privilege, there is no inconsistency between the
common law and the statutory provisions. Accordingly, s 2(2) of the Act
would apply to confirm the applicability of litigation privilege at common
law in the local context (reproduced above at [31]) as there is no
inconsistency between litigation privilege at common law and ss 128 and
131 read together: see Mariwu Industrial Co (S) Pte Ltd v Dextra Asia Co
Ltd [2006] 4 SLR(R) 807, a decision of this court on the applicability of the
English decisions on without prejudice communications in relation to
s 23 of the Act.
68
We now proceed to consider the requirements of litigation privilege.
The applicable rules and principles

69
There are, in essence, two basic (and closely related) principles.
Is there a reasonable prospect of litigation?

70 Turning to the basic principles or requirements of litigation privilege,
the threshold question is whether litigation must have been contemplated.
This is only logical and commonsensical, for if litigation was not even
contemplated to begin with, how could any party invoke litigation privilege
in the first instance? This is a question of fact. The question is: At the time
the client sought legal advice or consulted his lawyer, did he have the
prospect of litigation in mind? To determine his state of mind, we would
need to know the circumstances in which legal advice was sought. In this
respect, we are of the view that Taylor LJs concept of a legal context in
Balabel (although originally expounded in the context of legal advice
privilege) is appropriate for this purpose. Was, in other words, the legal
context in the present case one in which litigation was contemplated?
71 For this purpose, the generally accepted criterion is that of a
reasonable prospect of litigation (see also, for example, per Lord Carswell
in Three Rivers No 6 ([24] supra at [83]) and per Rix J (as he then was) in the
English High Court decision of Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association
(Bermuda) Ltd and General Contractors Importing and Services Enterprises
v Harrison (The Sagheera) [1997] 1 Lloyds Rep 160 at 166, as well as
Phipson on Evidence ([38] supra at para 23-85) and Singapore Civil
Procedure 2003 (Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2003) at para 24/3/15).
396
[2007] 2SLR(R)
72 In the recent English Court of Appeal decision of United States of

America v Philip Morris Inc [2004] EWCA Civ 330, for example, Brooke LJ
(with whom Chadwick and Scott Baker LJJ agreed) observed thus (at [68]):
In the present case it is quite clear that the judge correctly considered
that a mere possibility of litigation did not suffice. He was also
correct to conclude that the fact that there was a distinct possibility
that sooner or later someone might make a claim was insufficient. So
was a general apprehension of future litigation. He repeated three
times that the appropriate test was that litigation must have been
reasonably in prospect. The expression real likelihood seems to have
been used as a counterpoise to a mere possibility, and I do not
consider that any more can properly be read into this phrase. The
judge was certainly not saying that there must have been a greater than
50% chance of litigation.
73 Adopting the general sense of the above passage, it is clear that there is
no requirement that the chance of litigation must be higher than 50%
(although as it was once thought that there must be a virtual certainty: see
Collins v London General Omnibus Company (1893) 68 LT 831, a
standard/threshold which was too high and unrealistic). We are content to
accept that the test of a reasonable prospect of litigation is sufficient to
raise the privilege.
The dominant purpose test
74 There is, however, the second requirement that has to be satisfied
before litigation privilege can be successfully established, assuming that
litigation was contemplated as having been reasonably in prospect. This
second requirement relates to the purpose for which legal advice had been
sought. If, of course, the sole purpose, on the facts of the case concerned,
was for seeking legal advice in anticipation or contemplation of legal
proceedings, there would be no problem and vice versa. However,
difficulties arise when there is more than one purpose for seeking such legal
advice in a given case.
75 In the leading House of Lords decision of Waugh v British Railways
Board [1980] AC 521 (Waugh), the House held that if the dominant
purpose for which legal advice had been sought and obtained was for
anticipation or contemplation of litigation, then the advice concerned
would be protected by litigation privilege. In arriving at this legal
proposition, the House endorsed and adopted the minority view expressed
by Barwick CJ in the Australian High Court decision of Grant v Downs
(1976) 135 CLR 674.
76 The dominant purpose test in Waugh (now firmly established in
England (see, for example, the English Court of Appeal decision of
Guinness Peat Properties Ltd v Fitzroy Robinson Partnership [1987] 1 WLR
1027, amongst many others)) has, in fact, been endorsed in the Singapore
[2007] 2SLR(R)

397
context (see, for example, the Singapore High Court decision of Wee Keng
Hong Mark v ABN Amro Bank NV [1997] 1 SLR(R) 141 at [5] and the
Singapore Court of Appeal decision of Brinks ([44] supra)). It has also
found favour in other jurisdictions as well (see, for example, the New
Zealand Court of Appeal decision of Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance of
New Zealand v Stuart [1985] 1 NZLR 596). Most significantly, perhaps, the
Australian High Court (by a majority), in Esso Australia Resources ([24]
supra) chose to overrule its (majority) decision in Grant v Downs, and
approved Waugh instead. Waugh, of course, adopted the minority view of
Barwick CJ in Grant v Downs (see at [75] above). However, there was, this
time around, still a minority view expressed. Both McHugh and Kirby JJ
were of the view that the majority decision in Grant v Downs ought not to
be overruled, although the majority (comprising Gleeson CJ and Gaudron,
Gummow Callinan J) thought otherwise. In a subsequent decision, the
Australian High Court, in Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) 192 ALR 561,
confirmed its decision in Esso Australia Resources (with Kirby J expressly
acknowledging (at [82]) that, although he was in a minority in the earlier
decision, the principle laid down by the majority there must be accepted,
although McHugh J did not, apparently, make any express comment in this
particular regard as such). Significantly, though, with the latest position
adopted by the Australian High Court, the dominant purpose test in
Waugh apparently represents the established law at the present time
throughout the Commonwealth (including Singapore).
77 There might have been some doubt as to the Canadian position but,
as far as we could tell, there were clear authorities that endorse the
dominant purpose test in Waugh (see, for example, the Ontario Court of
Appeal decision of Chrusz ([24] supra) and the Saskatchewan Court of
Queens Bench decision of International Minerals & Chemical Corp
(Canada) Ltd v Commonwealth Insurance Co (1990) 47 CCLI 196
(International Minerals)). Significantly, since an initial draft of this
judgment was prepared, it has come to our attention that the Canadian
Supreme Court has in fact endorsed the dominant purpose test in its
recent judgment in Minister of Justice ([23] supra at [59][60]).
Our decision
Litigation privilege
78 We turn now to consider the rival arguments of the appellant banks
and the respondent on whether, on the facts of this case, the respondent is
entitled to claim litigation privilege with respect to the PWC draft reports.
398
[2007] 2SLR(R)
The parties arguments

79 The appellant banks arguments that the respondent is not entitled to
claim litigation privilege with respect to the PWC Report may be
summarised as follows:
(a) The purpose for which the respondent commissioned PWC and
D&N to undertake the work described in the first MASNET
announcement was to reassure shareholders and investors in the
immediate aftermath of Chias arrest and this purpose is confirmed by
the second MASNET announcement which disclosed that PWCs
work has revealed that the unauthorized payments had been made
from APBS bank accounts. The aggregate of all such authorized
payments match the aggregate of payments into APBS bank accounts
from unauthorized accounts. All material cash bank balances of APBS
have been accounted for.
(b) The respondents basis of its claim for privilege is contradictory
and inconsistent. In pre-action discovery in March 2004, the claim
was based on the alleged presence of handwritten advice in the
draft. For this reason, the AR found that the PWC draft reports were
not privileged as the handwritten advice in the report could be
cleaned up. In these proceedings, 18 months later, the respondent
now asserts, through Anthony Cheongs affidavit, that the PWC draft
reports contain and/or comprise confidential communications
between D&N and the Special Committee.
(c) Tay Kok Chyes affidavit (Tay being Assistant General Manager,
Finance of the respondent) filed in March 2004 merely asserted that
the reports are being prepared for the dominant purpose of
obtaining legal advice in relation to the anticipated litigation brought
by the various banks. This is merely a bare assertion which is
inadequate to support a claim of litigation privilege.
(d) There was nothing in the first MASNET announcement which
referred to litigation. Given the nature and scale of the fraud,
accountants had to be appointed to uncover the extent of the fraud, to
ascertain the loss, and to put in control procedures to prevent a
recurrence of fraud. This work is unrelated to litigation. The second
MASNET announcement confirms this. D&N is mentioned in the
separate context of litigation. Accordingly, if litigation was
contemplated in relation to the reports, it was merely for a subsidiary
purpose.
(e) If the dominant purpose of the report were for litigation
purposes, it would not have been left in draft.
(f) On an objective analysis of the evidence, the Judges conclusion
on dominant purpose is not supported by the evidence.
[2007] 2SLR(R)

399
(g) The respondent is not entitled to argue that there was a change
of purpose between the time when the report was commissioned
(4 September 2003) and when the drafts were prepared (around
18 September 2003: see [97] below) since its evidence as to its state of
mind has always focused on the time when the Special Committee
and PWC were appointed. The respondents position has always been
that litigation was on its mind and featured as the dominant purpose
from the outset. There is no evidential basis for any argument of a
subsequent change of purpose.
(h) Under the APBL Group Policy Reporting Procedure on Fraud
(Reporting Procedure on Fraud), it is stated that all fraud shall be
investigated and corrective action implemented, and that an
investigative report must be issued as soon as possible after a fraud is
reported. This is a requirement set by APBL to deal with the
investigation of all frauds perpetrated in their operating subsidiary
companies regardless of whether litigation was contemplated or
whether legal advice was required. The PWC draft reports were
prepared to comply with the Reporting Procedure on Fraud, and not
for the purpose of anticipated litigation. If this was not the case, the
investigations would have been done in private and not made public.
(i) In the light of the conflicting evidence, the Judge should have
inspected the PWC draft reports before making her decision (we deal
specifically with this argument at [101][104] below).
80
In response, the respondent argues as follows:

(a) The relevant time to consider in determining the respondents
motive for commissioning the report is the time the document is
brought into being. The appellant banks themselves, in their
submissions, admitted that there could be no question that litigation
was in contemplation at the very latest by 5 September 2003. The first
PWC draft report was prepared about two weeks after the Special
Committee was appointed, which was well after litigation was
contemplated.
(b) The objective facts and circumstances demonstrate that
litigation was the dominant purpose of commissioning the reports.
First, there was the size of the claim. Secondly, litigation was
imminent. Letters of demand were received around the same time
PWC and D&N were engaged. Thirdly, the paramount interest in
commissioning the PWC draft reports was to protect or advance the
interests of APBS and its shareholders. It was clear at the material
time that whatever the findings of PWC, APBS would in all likelihood
be involved in significant litigation. The paramount concern was to
protect and advance the interests of APBS and APBL.
400
[2007] 2SLR(R)
(c) The MASNET announcements were not meant to address the

purpose of the PWC draft reports. A MASNET announcement is an
announcement which listed companies must release to the public
under the relevant provisions of the Singapore Exchanges Listing
Manual. Its aim is to ensure a fair and efficient market for trading of
securities. APBL therefore had to reassure the investing public of what
steps it was taking to protect APBLs financial interests. The
MASNET announcement is used to announce facts, not speculate on
possible claims against the company. They simply informed the
shareholders of what they needed to know. They did not purport to
define the scope or purpose of the PWC draft reports.
(d) The Reporting Procedure on Fraud merely sets out what should
be done if fraud is discovered. It is then for the management to
determine how to deal with the fraud, and if the management
anticipates that litigation may follow, it must be permitted to take
steps to ensure that any report produced is protected by privilege. In
the present case, the senior management was already aware of the
situation and took immediate steps to constitute the Special
Committee. The Special Committee then took immediate steps to
appoint D&N as its lawyers and PWC as special accountants to
investigate the fraud. These steps were not taken in accordance with
the Reporting Procedure on Fraud. The Reporting Procedure on
Fraud therefore has no application. Further, even if the PWC draft
reports were also for the purpose of complying with the Reporting
Procedure on Fraud, this was a subsidiary purpose as, at that time,
obtaining advice to fend of the appellant banks claims was far more
important that reviewing internal procedures. If the appellant banks
arguments are accepted, any responsible company which has a
written policy which requires fraud to be investigated would be worse
off claiming privilege than a company with no policy at all.
(e) The contents of the first MASNET announcement and the
Reporting Procedure on Fraud merely constitute fundamental
elements of any investigation of this nature, namely, to take steps such
as identifying the fraudulent transactions, quantifying the loss and
taking remedial action to prevent re-occurrence. But that does not
preclude the PWC draft reports being privileged if they are or contain
communications which are protected by legal advice privilege or are
prepared for the dominant purpose of litigation.
Evaluation of parties arguments
81 We agree with counsel for the appellant banks that a mere assertion of
privilege is not sufficient to found privilege. We need to examine all the
evidence before us. As Lord Denning MR observed in the English Court of
[2007] 2SLR(R)

401
Appeal decision of Alfred Crompton Amusement Machines Ltd v Customs

and Excise Commissioners (No 2) [1972] 2 QB 102 (at 129):
The affidavit should not be treated as conclusive, nor anything like it. A
party cannot use the affidavit as a taboo or spell to prevent anyone
looking at the documents.
82 Before evaluating the arguments of the parties, we should like to

observe that they are substantially the same arguments that were put before
the Judge. Accordingly, it would be useful to see how the Judge dealt with
them.
83 The Judge found that the dominant purpose in the preparation of the
PWC draft reports was for the purpose of litigation as, given the
circumstances in which the reports were commissioned and prepared,
litigation was contemplated by the respondent. Indeed, litigation was
inevitable given the magnitude of the potential financial exposure of the
respondent attendant upon the fraud of it chief financial officer over a
period of more than four years. The objective facts and circumstances
which the Judge took into account in arriving at her decision were as
follows:
(a) On 5 September 2003, APBS, through D&N, had written to
Hypos lawyers on disavowing the unauthorised loans and accounts
created by Chia, thus confirming its denial of liability, and making
litigation inevitable.
(b) The prospect of litigation became a certainty by the time of the
second MASNET announcement that the appellant banks claims
against APBS would be strenuously defended.
(c) The PWC draft reports were required for and also constituted
the legal advice as to whether or not APBSs denial of liability could be
maintained. The fact that these draft reports would aid in ascertaining
the financial impact of the fraud on APBS was, in context, relevant for
litigation as well.
(d) In the circumstances, recommendations, if any, on improving
internal financial controls in APBS constituted a merely subsidiary
purpose.
84 In our view we find that, on balance, the decision by the Judge that the
dominant purpose of the reports was in aid of litigation is sustainable on
the evidence. The facts of this case support the factual finding that the need
for both legal and accounting advice was foremost in the minds of the
directors of the respondent. Otherwise, there would have been little point in
appointing D&N to undertake jointly with PWC the work that is referred to
in the first MASNET announcement. As the Judge emphasised, PWC and
D&N were required, inter alia, to quantify the financial impact of all the
unauthorised transactions that were identified, their nature and the
402
[2007] 2SLR(R)
circumstances in which they had occurred. In this regard, we find the

appellant banks arguments with respect to the alleged inconsistencies in
the various affidavits to be unpersuasive and agree with the reasoning of the
Judge (see GD at [26]).
85 The scope of this particular joint undertaking can be appreciated by
examining the events that had occurred before the appointment was made.
It will be recalled that on 2 September 2003, CAD informed the respondent
that Chia had used bank accounts fraudulently opened in the name of APBS
by using forged documents and resolutions to borrow money for his own
use. This was a fraud of a very serious magnitude or order. On 3 September
2003, the respondent had informed SEB that Chia had no authority to
operate accounts in its name, which was at least an implicit denial of any
liability for the loans taken by Chia under than account. On the same day,
the respondent wrote to Hypo, Mizuho and Sumitomo, to ascertain if there
were accounts opened in its name, requested all account opening
documents and statement in its name and instructing them to immediately
suspend operation of the said accounts until further notice.
86 These events called for an immediate and urgent response from the
respondent to take all necessary actions to uncover the extent of Chias
fraud in order to determine its financial impact on the respondents
business. This objective required the services of PWC and D&N to discover
and quantify the financial impact of the fraud and to determine the
potential liability of the respondent to the appellant banks for the fraud of
Chia. Given the huge unauthorised loans that the respondent would be
called upon to repay, it is simply unarguable that the respondent would not
have concluded that litigation was bound to occur by the time it appointed
PWC and D&N to investigate the unauthorised loans and assess their
financial impact. In this regard, we agree with the respondents argument to
the effect that the MASNET announcements ought to be construed in their
proper context. In particular, we do not think that the contents of the first
MASNET announcement are inconsistent with the dominant purpose of
the PWC-D&N joint investigation being for the purpose of litigation as
litigation was well within the contemplation of the respondent.
87 True enough, as submitted by counsel for the respondent, from
4 September 2003 onwards, letters, demands and disavowals flew fast and
furious between the parties and/their respective solicitors. On 3 September
2003, Hypo informed the respondent what was due on its account and on
4 September 2003, Sumitomo made a demand for payment. By this time,
both the banks would have sought legal advice on the recoverability of their
loans since it would be contrary to commercial sense to believe that they
had expected the respondent to admit liability for the loans. This would be
the relevant legal context in which the appointment of D&N was made, as
litigation was already a reasonable prospect by then.
[2007] 2SLR(R)

403
88 It is therefore reasonable to conclude that by the time PWC and D&N

set to work a few days later, litigation had gone beyond being a reasonable
prospect: it had become a reality. Thus by the time the joint investigation by
PWC and D&N really got going, the prospect of litigation would have been
foremost in the mind of the respondent. In our view, certainly by this time
too, what would have been more important to the respondent would have
been to get the best legal advice to mount the best defence in court. The
dominant purpose then would have been to see whether the internal
controls existing as at 2 September 2003 were in such a bad state that the
respondent could be held to have been culpably negligent in failing to
prevent Chias fraud which had taken place over a period of four years. It is
reasonable to assume that PWC would have identified the review or
supervisory lapses, if any, of the directors, and the weaknesses, if any, in the
respondents internal control procedures and system, such as the reporting
of specific loans of a certain size to the directors. D&N on its part would
have given its legal advice on whether any findings by PWC would render
the respondent liable for the unauthorised loans and how, strategically and
tactically, a legal defence might be mounted when the appellant banks
sought to enforce their loans by court action, as they were bound to do.
89 Further, by the time the second MASNET announcement was made,
three out of the four substantive claims mounted in the context of the
present proceedings had been filed. Hypo filed its claim on 21 September
2003, while SEB and Mizuho filed its claim on 23 September 2003. In this
context, it is perhaps understandable that this particular announcement
refers to the contesting of the claims vigorously. Some three days after the
announcement, on 27 September 2003, Sumitomo commenced court action
against APBS to recover its loan.
90 Counsel for SEB and Mizuho, Mr Steven Chong SC, argued
vigorously that the dominant purpose of the PWC draft reports was
primarily fact-finding, and that this factual inquiry was conducted pursuant
to APBSs own internal standard operating procedure, viz, the Reporting
Procedure on Fraud, not merely to ascertain what had happened in fact but
also to utilise such findings in order to devise a better system in order to
prevent future transgressions. In our view, this argument does not take the
appellants case very far. Of course, the joint investigation would certainly
lead to factual findings, but they could and would also lead to legal findings
by D&N. What is legally material or significant is the purpose for which the
factual findings would be used. In our view, the only issue is whether the
PWC draft reports were commissioned and prepared for the dominant
purpose of litigation. On this issue, we are of the view that the dominant
purpose was litigation for the reasons we have given earlier. That the
reports had other purposes, that of ascertaining the potential financial
exposure of the respondent and of putting in place a more reliable system to
prevent future frauds cannot be denied. However, in the context of this
404
[2007] 2SLR(R)
case, they were but subsidiary purposes. Indeed, the former purpose
constituted an integral part of the above factual backdrop against which the
legal findings by D&N would be made.
91 Where, of course, a particular report is made as a matter of routine in
the course of ones daily duty and not with reference to any litigation at all,
then it would obviously not be privileged (see the English decision of Cook v
North Metropolitan Tramway Company (188990) 6 TLR 22). This is
clearly not the case in so far as the present proceedings are concerned.
92 One might, in fact, usefully contrast the situation in the present
proceedings with that in Waugh ([75] supra). In that case, the relevant
affidavit of the party claiming litigation privilege actually conceded or
admitted that the two purposes contained therein for the purpose of
routine returns and for contemplated litigation were of equal importance.
Hence, the dominant purpose requirement was not, ex hypothesi,
satisfied. The material part of the affidavit in Waugh itself read as follows:
3.
The general manager of the Eastern Region is required (as are
the general managers of the other railways regions) to submit returns
to the Department of [the] Environment in respect of accidents
occurring on or about any railway 6. It has long been the practice of
the board [the British Railways Board] and its predecessors to require
that returns and reports on all accidents occurring on the railway and
joint internal departmental inquiries into the causes of the said
accident be made by the local officers of the board who would forward
them to their superiors in order to assist in establishing the cause of
such accidents. 7. Such reports and the statements of witnesses to such
accidents are made for the purposes mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 6 of
this affidavit and equally for the purpose of being submitted to the
boards solicitor as material upon which he can advise the board upon
its legal liability and for the purpose of conducting on behalf of the
board any proceedings arising out of such accidents 11. The internal
inquiry report in fact states on the face of it that it has finally to be sent
to the solicitor for the purpose of enabling him to advise the board.
[emphasis added]
93
Lord Wilberforce, in the case itself, observed thus ([75] supra at 531):
[T]he affidavit makes it clear that the report was prepared for a dual
purpose: for what may be called railway operation and safety purposes
and for the purpose of obtaining legal advice in anticipation of
litigation, the first being more immediate than the second, but both
being described as of equal rank or weight. [emphasis added]
94 It should, of course, be borne in mind that prior to the holding of the

House itself in Waugh, it was unclear what the law with respect to this
particular aspect of litigation privilege was. It is therefore highly improbable
or unlikely that we will find such admissions or concessions in future cases
[2007] 2SLR(R)

405
now that Waugh has laid down in no uncertain terms the dominant
purpose requirement (as to which, see generally [74][77] above).
95 However, one thing is clear: Much will depend on the actual factual
matrix concerned. In the context of the present proceedings, for example,
the appellant banks sought to rely on Price Waterhouse ([52] supra).
However, Millett J (as he then was) made an express finding that the
dominant purpose of the investigation in that case was to establish the facts
necessary to enable the defendant banks financial position to be
determined. As we have already pointed out above, the dominant purpose
in these proceedings is quite different and was clearly related to
contemplated litigation.
96 In our view, the second MASNET announcement made on
24 September 2003 that legal advice had been sought and that APBL had
been advised that the respondent was not liable to the banks was merely the
culmination of the joint undertaking. Between 3 September 2003 and
24 September 2003, D&N would have been working jointly with PWC to
prepare the report, and it is in our view not unreasonable to conclude that
the draft reports were substantially the basis of the respondents statement
in the second MASNET announcement that it was not liable for the
unauthorised loans and would contest [the claims of the appellant banks]
vigorously.
97 With respect to the appellants argument that the purpose of the
PWC-D&N undertaking was always fact finding, we find that it does not
accord with the law. It is common ground that the question of dominant
purpose is to be determined by the purpose at the time when the documents
were created. Counsel for the respondent has submitted that case law has
recognised that the motive for procuring a report may well change over
time (see the Alberta Court of Queens Bench decision in Blair v Wawanesa
Mutual Insurance Co [1998] ABQB 1025 (CanLII)). So, when was the first
draft report created? On the evidence it could only have been created within
a reasonable period after 4 September 2003. Counsel for the respondent in
the court below informed the Judge, in response to her question, that the
first draft report was prepared two weeks after the appointment of the
Special Committee. Counsel has asserted that he was in a position to
provide the information as D&N was involved in the preparation of the
report. We have no reason to doubt this, and neither have the appellants
made an issue of this.
Legal advice privilege
98 In view of our conclusion that litigation privilege applies to the PWC
draft reports, it must also follow that legal advice privilege also applies to
any legal advice embedded in or which forms an integral part of the reports,
even though the reports themselves might have been drafted by PWC and
forwarded to the respondent by PWC directly. In our view, we do not place
406
[2007] 2SLR(R)
much significance on these two factors so long as it is clear that D&N had
joint authorship of the reports. In this connection, we have no reason to
disbelieve the sworn statement of Anthony Cheong that D&N was indeed a
co-author of the report. The question here is whether the legal advice is so
embedded or has become such an integral part of the reports that it cannot
be redacted from them. In this regard, the Judge has found, as follows (see
GD at [41]):
[T]he PWC Draft Reports in their entirety attracted legal advice
privilege for another added reason namely, the privileged material
communicated to PWC was, so to speak, inseparably embedded in the
reports. I agreed with Mr Kumar that the findings of the accountants in
the PWC Draft Reports could not be presented from purely an
accounting point of view without a legal dimension and perspective.
Redaction or separation of parts of the drafts so as to exclude passages
containing privileged information would not be practical here since
PWC and D&N acted as a single unit. The PWC Draft Reports were in
all likelihood so intertwined with the legal advice and assistance given
by D&N to PWC that these reports became part of the privileged
solicitor-client communications.
99 We have no reason to disagree with the Judge on this particular

finding. Even if the PWC draft reports did, literally, contain ostensibly nonprivileged material, such material would form the backdrop against which
the legal advice as to how the respondent should mount the best legal
defence against the appellants claims: (see also Re Highgrade Traders Ltd
([52] supra at 173174) as well as In re Sarah C Getty Trust [1985] QB 956).
As has been aptly observed by a leading author (Hollander ([52] supra at
para 12-07)):
Where part of a document contains privileged matter, and the
remaining unprivileged, it is not necessary to disclose the privileged
matter. If the document deals with a single subject-matter and can be
said to have been brought into existence either for the purpose of giving
or getting legal advice or for the dominant purpose of gathering evidence,
it is permissible to claim privilege for the entire document. If the
document does not satisfy this test, then the document is not privileged
as a whole but if part of the document refers to privileged matters, the
privileged part may be blanked out. This analysis can be stated as a
result of the [English] Court of Appeal decision in GE Capital
Corporate Finance v Bankers Trust Company [[1995] 1 WLR 172] as
explained by Rix J. in The Sagheera. [emphasis added]
100 However, in situations where part of the document contains

privileged material, and the remaining part is unprivileged, and where the
unprivileged part is separable from, and is not integral to, the privileged part
of the document, then redaction of the privileged parts may be carried out
and the rest of the document revealed to the opposing party through the
usual discovery process. Similarly, mere references to legal advice in
[2007] 2SLR(R)

407
otherwise unprivileged documents can be redacted (see Hollander ([52]

supra at para 12-09)). In short, parties should be slow to claim privilege for
entire documents where there is only partial or even trifling reference to
legal advice or communications leading to the giving or obtaining of legal
advice, and/or (and this is of particular importance) where the ostensibly
non-privileged parts do not play an integral role in the context of the relevant
legal analysis
Should the Judge have inspected the PWC draft reports?
101 We will now address the appellants argument (at [79] above) that the
Judge was wrong in not exercising her discretion to inspect the PWC draft
reports to determine whether or not they contain legal advice, and if so
whether such advice could be redacted from the reports. It is clear to us that
the Judge decided against inspection because she was satisfied that the
evidence before her showed that the said reports were prepared for the
dominant purpose of litigation. Since we have agreed with her finding on
this issue, it follows that this argument must be rejected.
102 Nevertheless, we wish to make some observations for the guidance of
judges and judicial officers who may be faced with the same problem in
future cases. One of the major difficulties facing the court in situations
involving a claim of either legal advice privilege and/or litigation privilege is
the fact that the claim is invariably based on affidavit evidence. Much time
and argument are then devoted by the parties to persuading the court as to
what the true factual position is, and what the law is in relation to that
factual position, as has happened in this case. An inspection by the judge,
pursuant to s 164 of the Act, would quickly solve the dispute between the
parties, thus saving time and money for the parties: see also Jeffrey Pinsler,
Singapore Court Practice 2006 (LexisNexis, 2006) at para 24/13/3. Such an
approach might be an effective and practical middle ground which
ensures that the claim to legal professional privilege is not abused, hence
ensuring that the competing public policy that all available evidence ought
to be disclosed is fulfilled to the fullest extent possible.
103 We agree with this approach. As Woodhouse P put it in the New
Zealand Court of Appeal decision of Fletcher Timber Ltd v AttorneyGeneral [1984] 1 NZLR 290 at 295, for the court to proceed otherwise
without the benefit of inspection of the documents concerned would
often result in the court depending on processes of sheer speculation,
leaving the Judge himself grasping at air. In the learned judges view (and
we agree), [t]hat cannot be sensible nor is it necessary when by the simple
act of judicial reconnaissance a reasonably confident decision could be
given one way or the other (see id).
104 However, there is also a case for using this approach only in cases
where the judge has a real doubt about the claim of the party seeking to
resist discovery on the ground of legal professional privilege. In the English
408
[2007] 2SLR(R)
Court of Appeal decision of Westminster Airways Ltd v Kuwait Oil Co Ltd

[1951] 1 KB 134, Jenkins LJ observed thus (at 146):
[T]here is nothing in the rule, or in the authorities, to constrain the
court to hold that, in every case where a claim to privilege is made and
disputed, the party seeking production is entitled to come to the court
and (as it were) demand as of right that the court should go behind the
oath of the opposite party and itself inspect the documents. The
question whether the court should inspect the documents is one which
is a matter for the discretion of the court, and primarily for the judge of
first instance. Each case must depend on its own circumstances; but if,
looking at the affidavit, the court finds that the claim to privilege is
formally correct, and that the documents in respect of which it is made
are sufficiently identified and are such that, prima facie, the claim to
privilege would appear to be properly made in respect of them, then, in
my judgment, the court should, generally speaking, accept the affidavit
as sufficiently justifying the claim without going further and inspecting
the documents.
This approach was accepted by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in

Taranaki Co-operative Diary Company Limited v Rowe [1970] NZLR 895,
where Turner J, delivering the judgment of court said (at 904), [t]he
jurisdiction to inspect the documents of one party without disclosing what
is in them to the other is perhaps one to be conservatively exercised
[emphasis added]. Subsequently, Cooke J (as he then was), in the New
Zealand Court of Appeal decision of Guardian Royal Assurance v Stuart
([76] supra) observed thus (at 599):
As in previous cases in this Court (see Konia v Morley, Environmental
Defence Society Inc v South Pacific Aluminium Ltd (No 2) [1981]
1 NZLR 153 and Fletcher Timber Ltd v Attorney-General [1984]
1 NZLR 290) inspection of the documents by the Judges has proved
illuminating. High Court Judges now appear to be adopting this practice
quite commonly in disputed privilege claims. Experience suggests that its
advantage in being likely to lead to a more just decision outweighs the
disadvantage that only the Judge and not the other side sees the
documents if the claim to privilege is upheld. Accordingly, in the field
of legal professional privilege at least, I think that in general a Judge
who is in any real doubt and is asked by one of the parties to inspect
should not hesitate to do so. [emphasis added]
Conclusion
105 For the reasons we have given, we agree with the Judge and find that
on the facts of this case and given the relevant legal context, both litigation
as well as legal advice privilege would apply with regard to the PWC draft
reports. Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed with costs.
[2007] 2SLR(R)

409
Addendum to judgment
8 March 2007
Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA:
106 After this judgment was delivered, it was brought to our attention that
there was a factual error in [89] in that the claims referred to therein were
not filed on the stated dates. However, the claims were made before the date
of the second MASNET Announcement and [89] was intended to convey
that fact.
Reported by Mohamed Faizal.

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paginator.

book Page 367 Tuesday, December 8, 2009 3:29 PM

SINGAPORE LAW REPORTS (REISSUE)

Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ),

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SINGAPORE LAW REPORTS (REISSUE)

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Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v

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SINGAPORE LAW REPORTS (REISSUE)

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Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v

Cook v North Metropolitan Tramway Company (188990) 6 TLR 22 (refd)

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SINGAPORE LAW REPORTS (REISSUE)

Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA (delivering the judgment of the court):

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Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v

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SINGAPORE LAW REPORTS (REISSUE)

Identify the nature, circumstances and extent of any

Quantify the financial impact of such unauthorized

Assist the company in taking the necessary action to

Subsequently, to conduct a review of the system of

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Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v

12 On 24 September 2003, APBL released a second MASNET

13 Preparation of the PWC draft reports pursuant to the first MASNET

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SINGAPORE LAW REPORTS (REISSUE)

discovery. The applications were heard by an assistant registrar, who

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Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v

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SINGAPORE LAW REPORTS (REISSUE)

24 Other judgments explaining the underlying rationale of the two

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Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (Publ), Singapore Branch v

of everyday affairs. Similarly, people should be able to seek legal advice

26 And, nearer home, Ong CJ (Malaya) observed, in the Malaysian

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SINGAPORE LAW REPORTS (REISSUE)

The statutory provisions

Nothing in this section shall protect from disclosure

(3) It is immaterial whether the attention of such advocate or

Confidential communications with legal advisers

28 The Act is modelled on the Indian Evidence Act of 1872 (Act I of

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many hundreds of pages, and in various Acts of the Indian Legislature

In the Bombay decision of Frmji Bhicji v Mohnsing Dhnsing (1893)

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SINGAPORE LAW REPORTS (REISSUE)

30 In this connection, Prof Pinsler has observed that, historically,

The scope of sections 128 and 131 of the Evidence Act

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legal professional adviser who need not necessarily be an advocate or

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